I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject
Strawson, G. (2012) I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject. In: Prosser, S. and Recanati, F. (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom. ISBN 9780521198301 (In Press)
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Abstract I argue for the following claims:  all uses of I (the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I.  no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless  I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though  I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although  if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although  a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although  if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself.