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I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject

Strawson, G. (2012) I and I: immunity to error through misidentification of the subject. In: Prosser, S. and Recanati, F. (eds.) Immunity to Error Through Misidentification: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, pp. 202-223. ISBN 9780521198301

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Abstract/Summary

Abstract I argue for the following claims: [1] all uses of I (the word ‘I’ or thought-element I) are absolutely immune to error through misidentification relative to I. [2] no genuine use of I can fail to refer. Nevertheless [3] I isn’t univocal: it doesn’t always refer to the same thing, or kind of thing, even in the thought or speech of a single person. This is so even though [4] I always refers to its user, the subject of experience who speaks or thinks, and although [5] if I’m thinking about something specifically as myself, I can’t fail to be thinking of myself, and although [6] a genuine understanding use of I always involves the subject thinking of itself as itself, whatever else it does or doesn’t involve, and although [7] if I take myself to be thinking about myself, then I am thinking about myself.

Item Type:Book or Report Section
Refereed:No
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:22118
Publisher:Cambridge University Press

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