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Abstract

Dominant paradigms of causal explanation for why and how Western liberal-democracies go to war in the post-Cold War era remain versions of the 'liberal peace' or 'democratic peace' thesis. Yet such explanations have been shown to rest upon deeply problematic epistemological and methodological assumptions. Of equal importance, however, is the failure of these dominant paradigms to account for the 'neoliberal revolution' that has gripped Western liberal-democracies since the 1970s.

The transition from liberalism to neoliberalism remains neglected in analyses of the contemporary Western security constellation. Arguing that neoliberalism can be understood simultaneously through the Marxian concept of ideology and the Foucauldian concept of governmentality – that is, as a complementary set of 'ways of seeing' and 'ways of being' – the thesis goes on to analyse British security in policy and practice, considering it as an instantiation of a wider neoliberal way of war. In so doing, the thesis draws upon, but also challenges and develops, established critical discourse analytic methods, incorporating within its purview not only the textual data that is usually considered by discourse analysts, but also material practices of security.

This analysis finds that contemporary British security policy is predicated on a neoliberal social ontology, morphology and morality – an ideology or 'way of seeing' – focused on the notion of a globalised 'network-market', and is aimed at rendering circulations through this network-market amenable to neoliberal techniques of government. It is further argued that security practices shaped by this ideology imperfectly and unevenly achieve the realisation of neoliberal 'ways of being' – especially modes of governing self and other or the 'conduct of conduct' – and the re-articulation of subjectivities in line with neoliberal principles of individualism, risk, responsibility and flexibility. The policy and practice of contemporary British 'security' is thus recontextualised as a component of a broader 'neoliberal way of war'.
DECLARATION OF ORIGINAL AUTHORSHIP

I, Ben Whitham, confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

[Signature]

15th August 2014
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1. **Introduction: A neoliberal way of war?**

1.1 The research problem: An 'Age of Liberal Wars' or a neoliberal way of war?

In 2005, Sir Lawrence Freedman – long-serving Professor of War Studies at King’s College London, foreign policy adviser to Tony Blair and, from 2009, key committee member of the public inquiry into the Iraq War – published an influential article in the *Review of International Studies* under the title ‘The Age of Liberal Wars’.\(^1\) Freedman argues that Western liberal-democracies are increasingly engaged in wars that are justified under the ‘normative stream of human security’, with a specific remit to ‘protect the weak and the vulnerable’, and that these conflicts can be properly characterised as ‘liberal wars’.\(^2\) Specifically, Freedman seeks to situate the ‘War on Terror’, including its component conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, within this explanatory paradigm.

What Freedman’s liberal wars thesis (and the multiple ‘liberal peace’ theses of which it is a variant) misses as a form of causal explanation for why and how Western states wage war today is any account of the ‘neoliberal revolution’ that has gripped these states for several decades now.\(^3\) It is widely accepted that by contrast to the welfarist and ‘social’ liberalism that prevailed in Western states after the Second World War, the neoliberalism that has been rising to prominence since the late 1970s involves a wholesale reorganisation of state and society, in the West and beyond.\(^4\) If it is not liberalism, but rather *neoliberalism* that constitutes the political horizons of Western societies today, then seeking to explain the ‘liberal way of war’ is to begin with the wrong question. In this sense, the rationale for this research project is the lacuna in the extant literature on post-Cold War Western states’ involvement in conflict, with regard to neoliberalism.

The purpose of this thesis is to develop an initial contribution towards to a ‘critical explanation’\(^5\) of the ways in which neoliberalism, as a form of ideology and governmentality, shapes the approach to warfare of Western states, focusing on the policy and practices of the UK. In other words; the aim of the thesis is to begin mapping the ‘neoliberal way of war’. It is hoped that this effort to ‘tell a better story’ about this aspect of world politics\(^6\) – that is, to offer a story with greater ontological depth, capable of accounting for the causal efficacy of a prevailing social structure – will go some way toward explaining seemingly ‘illiberal’ practices of the War on Terror.

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2 Ibid., p. 95.


The fundamental research question guiding this investigation can therefore be constructed in the following way:

- In what ways might contemporary British security, in policy and practice, be considered a component of a neoliberal way of war?

In this sense, the key original contribution to knowledge that this thesis offers is a critical intervention into the debates on ‘liberal peace’ and ‘liberal wars’ that accounts for the role of neoliberalism. The remainder of this introductory chapter is divided into three further sections: an elaboration of the context of the research problem described above, which develops further the rationale for the thesis; an introduction to the approach or orientation to the research problem taken in later chapters; and finally a schematic outline of the content and argument of the remaining chapters of the thesis, which highlights especially the key ways in which this thesis constitutes an original contribution to knowledge in the field of international politics.

1.2 Context: Liberal Wars, the Contemporary British Security Imaginary, and the Neoliberal Revolution

The context in which the above research problem arises is that of a tense and seemingly contradictory contemporary ‘security imaginary’ in Britain and the wider West. This imaginary is of a dual character. On the one hand there exists a popular perception of unlimited and ‘global’ threat, especially from terrorism, and of the ‘War on Terror’ that is justified and necessitated as a response to this threat. On the other hand, older doctrines of ‘just war’, and ‘liberal peace’ continue to find traction – especially in the influential views of figures like Freedman but also among politicians, media and publics. A key tension thus arises between, on the one hand, what this thesis will refer to as the ‘liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm’, which employs both justificatory and explanatory logics in constructing a narrative around why Western states go to war, centring on their ‘liberal’ and ‘democratic’ nature, and, on the other hand, the ostensibly ‘illiberal’ practices of the War on Terror.

1.2.1 Imagining Terror After 9/11

More than a decade has now passed since passenger jets were flown into the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia on 11th September 2001, killing thousands, yet political discourse, military strategy, media coverage and academic
scholarship across a tremendous range of disciplines – but especially international relations (IR) – remains transfixed by the spectre of this event and the ‘War on Terror’ that has followed it. Not a year has passed since ‘9/11’ in which scores of new books and articles on such topics ‘Islamism’, the ‘new terrorism’, ‘al Qaeda’, ‘radicalisation’ and the War on Terror have not been published across the Anglosphere and beyond. Long-running and award-winning fictional TV series, from 24 (2001-present) to Homeland (2011-present) have been spawned, as have countless films dealing with both the events of 9/11 itself (for example, Paul Greengrass’s United 93 and Oliver Stone’s World Trade Centre) and the wars waged under the War on Terror banner, from The Hurt Locker (2008) and Zero Dark Thirty (2012) to Lone Survivor (2014).

Beyond the cultural enthralment to the concept of (counter-)terrorism, the UK’s Security Service (MI5) also remains preoccupied with the ‘terrorist threat’. Though it is enumerated as one of four key threats to national security (along with espionage, weapons of mass destruction and, rather cryptically, ‘cyber’), it is, notably, only in relation to terrorism that MI5 continue to issue a colour-coded ‘UK threat level’. The UK threat level indicator, in use since 2006 and closely modelled on the US Department of Homeland Security’s ‘Advisory System’, which was phased out by the Obama administration in 2011 in favour of issuing specific alerts, currently stands at the yellow level of ‘substantial’ (see Figure 1, below):

Figure 1. The Security Service’s UK threat level indicator

Source: http://www.mi5.gov.uk
Between 2006 when it was introduced in this form, replacing an older and more complex system, and 2009, when it was finally reduced to ‘substantial’, the UK’s threat level was variously listed as ‘severe’ and ‘critical’ (pink and red, respectively). From 2009 to 2014, though the threat level from ‘Northern Ireland-related’ terrorism (introduced as a separate level in 2010) has been ‘moderate’ for Great Britain, the threat to the UK mainland from ‘international’ terrorism has never dropped below ‘substantial’ (yellow). The seeming permanence of this substantial/yellow threat level as a ‘zero level’ lends itself to what Brad Evans has recently characterised as ‘liberal terror’:

What we may term ‘liberal terror’ refers to this global imaginary of threat which, casting aside once familiar referents that previously defined the organisation of societies, now forces us to confront each and every potential disaster threatening to engulf advanced liberal life.

The contemporary British ‘security imaginary’ can clearly be situated within this wider ‘global imaginary of threat’ described by Evans. This is a historically-specific security imaginary, characterised by fears over amorphous ‘global threats’, especially the threat of terrorism. In the UK, barely a day goes by without political leaders and media issuing dire warnings about some new terrorist ‘threat’ or atrocity, from the ‘radicalisation’ of British Muslims in schools and prisons, or on Syrian battlefields, to the activities of groups like Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and ISIS.

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12 Himadeep Muppidi, ‘Postcoloniality and the construction of international insecurity: The persistent puzzle of US-Indian relations’, in Jutta Weldes et al. (Eds.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 120.
Despite the preponderance of political, media and academic focus on terrorism post-9/11 as the issue of the day (not only as a ‘defence’ or ‘security’ issue but also a broader social/(multi-)cultural/integration issue), there can be no doubt that there is, at large in Western societies, a distorted picture of the threat posed. The notion that Islamist terrorists like those following Al Qaeda constitute an ‘existential’ threat to the whole ‘way of life’ in Western liberal-democracies is a delusion. As Colin Wight points out: ‘despite its prominence in the public imagination, terrorism is not, and has never been, a major cause of human deaths’. A range of phenomena from influenza to suicide could be said to pose a greater physical ‘threat’ to the citizens of the liberal West. Similarly, Richard Jackson highlights the fact that whereas terrorist violence is understood to claim around 7,000 lives per year worldwide, there are about 10,000 firearms murders per year in the US alone. The aim of this thesis is thus partly to address the exaggerated vision of a ‘terrorist threat’ inherent in the political culture of Western states, by attempting to critically explain the ways in which the ‘public imagination’ is shaped by discourses on terrorism, and specifically the ways in which such discourses are related to neoliberal ways of seeing.

One aspect of this security imaginary is the widespread demonization of Muslims in the West. Himadeep Muppidi stresses how central notions of identity are to security imaginaries, and chiefly, in relation to the War on Terror, two broad category identities predominate: an orientalist and ‘othered’ figure of the ‘Muslim’, as a threatening yet backward, perverse and prejudiced ‘bad guy’ or ‘monster’ – as ‘premodern zealots’ yet simultaneously dangerous ‘sophisticates ready to confound the West’ – and the Western states as reluctant ‘heroes’ drawn into conflicts they didn’t want, out of a desire to protect the lives of populations, or to protect ‘life itself’. This aspect of the post-9/11 Western security imaginary, the demonization of Muslims and Islam from what Tzvetan Todorov

17 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2005) p. 5.
22 Ibid., p. 11.
identifies as a misplaced ‘fear of barbarians’, inasmuch as it involves a correlate valorisation of Western state actors as fearful but ultimately brave and righteous, is intimately bound-up with the so-called ‘liberal peace thesis’ and the doctrine of liberal wars articulated by Freedman.

1.2.2 From Liberal Peace to Liberal Wars: The Persistence of an Explanatory Paradigm

The War on Terror has been the subject of criticism and controversy over the legality, legitimacy and ethics of methods employed by state apparatuses in pursuing the conflicts they have carried out under its auspices (Chapter 7 looks at two of these methods in detail). The invasion and occupation of sovereign states, the use of torture and ‘extraordinary rendition’, biometrics, widespread covert surveillance, and ethnic and religious discrimination against, or ‘profiling’ of, Muslims could all be understood as contrary to basic liberal norms and principles of national self-determination, state neutrality, individual autonomy and universal human rights. It is precisely in the face of this controversy that Freedman finds it necessary to defend the War on Terror as a set of ‘liberal wars’, seeking to counter claims that the War on Terror is illiberal in practice.

The problematique with which this thesis is concerned is in some ways similar to that dealt with by Jackson in Writing the War on Terrorism (2005):

I wanted to understand how societies such as America and Britain, which pride themselves on their liberal democratic cultures, could [...] actively support [...] a massive campaign of counter-terrorist violence involving destructive military assaults on two of the world’s poorest countries, political assassinations, aid and support to dictators, the torture of prisoners and the systematic violation and erosion of deeply cherished civic rights.25

The aim of this thesis is to reflect on the use of apparently illiberal aims and practices of the contemporary conflicts that others seek to label ‘liberal wars’. It is these deeply controversial aspects of the War on Terror conflicts that pose the clearest challenge to the narratives of ‘liberal peace’ and ‘liberal wars’. If liberal wars are fought for liberal ends, and

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25 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 180.
by liberal means, why has the War on Terror included so many suspensions of the normal rights and freedoms of the individual that are the basis of liberal political thought?

In claiming that the post-Cold War era is an ‘age of liberal wars’, in which Western states only wage war to ‘protect’, Freedman seeks specifically to recontextualise the War on Terror within the tradition of the ‘liberal peace’. This idea – that wars should only be waged for the protection of populations from despotic leaders and the replacement of unjust regimes – of course has its roots much further back in European history, in the cosmopolitanism of Immanuel Kant.26 This liberal peace or the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, one of the key themes of the academic discipline of International Relations as it has developed since 1918. While it is better to think of a plurality of ‘theses’ around relationship between liberalism, war and peace, rather than a singular ‘thesis’, the shared assumption of all articulations of this argument since Kant are that republican, democratic, and/or liberal states will be, or should be, less inclined to wage war with other states of similar constitutional character. The prevalent form of the liberal peace thesis since 1999 has been that which Michael Doyle describes as ‘dyadic’; the view that liberal-democratic states will not go to war with one another, but will be more likely wage war against states with illiberal, undemocratic and ‘unjust’ forms of government.27 This idea finds even earlier roots in the Christian traditions of ‘just war’ theory.28 The story according to which Western powers only fight wars for the good of the human race, while the rest fight for selfish or barbaric reasons, is an old one indeed. In the post-Cold War, post-9/11 era, confronted with supposedly ‘liberal’ states waging increasing numbers of brutal wars, Freedman merely translates liberal ‘peace’ into liberal ‘wars’. What is characterised by Doyle as ‘liberal peace’ and by Freedman as ‘liberal wars’ is thus a shared understanding that Western ‘liberal democracies’ do wage wars of aggression, but that they only do so against enemies that lack moral and political legitimacy, and therefore in the interests of populations and humankind itself. We can think of this as a ‘liberal peace/liberal wars’ paradigm for explaining and justifying Western ways of war today.

It is in this context that this thesis seeks to challenge such narratives, that would have us believe that the War on Terror can be understood, explained and even justified as a ‘liberal

26 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983).
war’. As Andreas Behnke puts it, ‘in the aftermath of a failed liberal war in Iraq, and in the throes of a failing one in Afghanistan, a critical reflection on the philosophical foundations of such a form of war has become increasingly necessary’. 29 This thesis aims to provide just such a critical reflection, challenging the philosophical foundations of the liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm and constructing an alternative explanation for the form and functions of such wars; one that places neoliberalism centre-stage in the causal story.

1.2.3 The neoliberal revolution: putting ‘liberal wars’ in their place

The 1990s and 2000s, the supposed ‘age of liberal wars’, have been characterised by a key social shift which does not seem to figure in the dominant security imaginary described above – the transition from liberalism to neoliberalism. The emergence and entrenchment of the ‘neoliberal state’ 30 or ‘managerial state’, 31 the decline or transformation of welfare states and the end of the ‘compromise between capital and labour’ 32 that such states had represented since the end of the Second World War, and the swathes of privatisations across the Western world – of everything from water, gas and electricity supply to public transport systems and the management of public spaces – are all evidence of what the late Stuart Hall characterises as a ‘neoliberal revolution’. 33 These changes began in earnest in the late 1970s, as the increasingly influential political-economic thought of the ‘new right’ swept the US and UK under the Reagan and Thatcher administrations. Friedrich Hayek, whose work apparently had a profound effect upon Thatcher’s political philosophy, 34 and Milton Friedman, a senior economic adviser to Reagan, are often seen as the two key neoliberal thinkers whose ideas have gained so much traction since this time. 35

But neoliberalism is not just a rebalancing between public and private sectors, or a merely ‘economic’ programme of marketization and privatisation. Hayek and Friedman’s arguments, and those of other neoliberal theorists and politicians, are political philosophies in their own right, including conceptions of the good – of good mechanisms for social

30 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 64.
32 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 10.
33 Hall, ‘The neo-liberal revolution’.
organisation, of freedom as a good in itself, and of good ‘conduct’. This is why Michel Foucault, one of the first social scientists to offer serious critical reflections on neoliberalism, in his lectures at the College de France in 1978-9, describes it as a form of ‘governmentality’. Governmentality, or the ‘conduct of conduct’, means a form of government ‘at a distance’, whereby governmental power is diffused to the extent that individuals come to govern themselves and others in accordance with the principles of a particular governmental rationality. In this case, the rationality of neoliberalism – a rationality according to which markets, rather than politics, offer the only route to freedom and the best solutions to most social problems, economic planning restricts such freedom, and risk-transference from society to the individual produces more valorous or heroic, and ultimately more free people, while that ‘social insurance’ (e.g. welfare) is a malignant force. Neoliberalism, then, amounts not simply to a slightly altered way of organising ‘the economy’ or politics, but rather to a wholesale ‘recoding of social mechanisms’. Neoliberalism, beginning from Hayek’s rejection of the ‘laissez-faire’ attitude of classical liberalism, recognises that ‘Homo economicus or “economic man” is not a natural being with predictable forms of conduct and ways of behaving, but is instead a form of subjectivity that must be brought into being and maintained through social mechanisms of subjectification’.41

It is against this backdrop that the so-called ‘liberal wars’ and ‘humanitarian interventions’, everywhere from Kosovo to Iraq, have taken place. The Western belligerents of the War on Terror are not ‘liberal’ states, but rather neoliberal ones. Neoliberal ideology and governmentality has supplanted more traditional modes of liberal thought in guiding political decision making in major Western ‘liberal-democracies’, such that we can effectively speak of ‘neoliberal-democracies’.

And this brings us full circle, back to the research problem outlined at the beginning of this chapter. If the West is no longer a ‘liberal’, but rather a ‘neoliberal’ political space, why should we imagine it seeks to wage ‘liberal wars’? If the politics and societies of Western ‘liberal democracies’ like Britain have been so transformed by neoliberalism, so must

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their ‘ways of war’. In this context, the aim of this thesis is to begin by supposing, *conjecturing*, a ‘neoliberal way of war’, and to look at how this paradigm, rather than liberal peace/liberal wars, might be used in explaining the forms and functions of contemporary British security as it plays out in policy and practice.

The British security imaginary of complex global threats and terrorism, of the Muslim other and the rogue state that threatens global order, is mutually reinforced by, or co-constituted with, the liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm. And imaginaries, of course, have material repercussions. As Muppidi puts it, security ‘practices are only possible and only make sense within the security imaginary, the security imaginary itself is reproduced through the continued performance of those practices’.  

1.3 Approaching the research problem

1.3.1 A ‘critical’ orientation to causal explanation

As the title of the thesis suggests, the aim is to develop a ‘critical’ analysis of contemporary British security in policy and practice, placing neoliberalism centre-stage in the process. The term ‘critical’ is bandied about in the contemporary social sciences, often standing in for something like ‘alternative’ or ‘non-mainstream’, but the word is used in several distinct yet overlapping ways to describe the research approach of this thesis, which are worth clarifying here. Firstly, we can think of a ‘critical tradition’ in philosophy and literature, which can be traced all the way back to Plato but finds perhaps its archetypal formulation in Immanuel Kant’s investigations into the ‘conditions of possibility’ for phenomena. The approach of this thesis corresponds to this broad and internally diverse tradition, of what we might call *critical epistemology*, since it seeks to better understand the conditioning causes that render the particular social practices of contemporary British security possible. This form of reasoning can be described as ‘retroductive’ (rather than inductive or deductive) since it effectively works ‘backward’ from observed phenomena to conjecture the further phenomena that make them possible, or as ‘transcendental’, if we

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construe it as a form of reflection consisting in ‘raising’ oneself above the milieu of particular phenomena to consider their conditioning causes.

In some, but not all, approaches that could be said to fall within this wide critical tradition, the term critical is meant to have specific political implications too. This is especially the case for Marxian, historical materialist approaches.\textsuperscript{45} For Marx, the process of critical reflection through which the materialist social scientist ‘ascends from earth to heaven’,\textsuperscript{46} (whereas ‘idealistic’ philosophers make the opposite move) necessarily has political implications. For example, analysing the conditions of possibility for the social form we call ‘commodities’ leads to the discovery of mechanisms of exploitation, alienation and inequality.\textsuperscript{47} It is this association with Marxian thought that often links the term critical to a broadly ‘left wing’, anti-capitalist ethical and political project; and the approach of this thesis can certainly be understood within the context of that project too.

This leads to a third important concept of critique at work in the research agenda of this thesis – a synthesis of the previous two – which is the approach to critical explanation. Critical explanation\textsuperscript{48} or explanatory critique\textsuperscript{49} is an inherently controversial concept, since the dominant paradigms for conceptualising approaches to the study of politics and IR suggest that ‘understanding’ and ‘explanation’ are two discrete forms of reasoning about the social world,\textsuperscript{50} whereas proponents of critical explanation suggest they may be combined. The point is that whether one considers oneself an ‘interpretivist’ (usually characterised as concerned with ‘understanding’ social practices and events) or a ‘positivist’ (supposedly an approach to dispassionately ‘explaining’ the social world), one’s attempts at explanation, at least as regards the social world – the world of people, relationships and meanings – necessarily have political and ethical implications and dimensions. The most obvious manifestation of these dimensions is in the placing of responsibility with particular social actors. Marx’s critical explanations, for example, can be seen to make ‘capitalists’ or the ‘ruling class’ responsible parties for social

\textsuperscript{48} Glynos and Howarth, Logics of Critical Explanation.
\textsuperscript{49} Roy Bhaskar, From Science to Emancipation (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
\textsuperscript{50} Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991).
phenomena including poverty. Equally, though, a positivist research project lacking Marx’s critical intent and instead aiming at ‘objective’ analysis – using, perhaps, only quantitative survey data – equally assigns causal responsibility and with it invokes political and ethical judgments.

Another sense in which the approach of this thesis is ‘critical’, stemming from this is, then, its refutation of any possibility for ‘objectivity’ in social science. The scientific study of the social world is the study by subjects (social scientists) of subjects (individuals and groups in society). To pretend that it can be ‘objective’ – that political and ethical content can be evacuated at some stage of the research process – is not only a unfortunate and unnecessary error, but has important political and ethical implications in itself. That is to say, to pretend to study subjects as objects can lead to their treatment as such. To think of people, for example, as sets of discrete objects which, like atoms, interact and bond with one another in various ways, and to think of oneself (the social scientist) as akin to a chemist, physicist or biologist watching these interactions through the specialist equipment of one’s research methodology, is to create a very specific imaginary of what individuals and societies are. If the outputs of such research are influential – through policy networks or think tanks for example, or simply through mass media diffusion – they may help to shape a social world in that image, in what Anthony Giddens calls the ‘double hermeneutic’.\(^51\) This amounts to a political project – individualism – being sustained in practice by the very atomistic approach to the analysis of political projects; political science shaping political practice.

While objectivist social scientists have tried to distinguish between ‘methodological individualism’, as the study of society that begins from an imagined individual rather than an imagined whole, and ‘political individualism’ as a specific ethical and political belief,\(^52\) it is notable that, with some exceptions,\(^53\) most of those who begin from methodologically individualist premises are of liberal, libertarian or conservative sympathies, while ‘holists’ tend toward communisms. What this tells us is that our ontologies – our theories about the fundamental character of what exists – are political and partial (or ‘subjective’), not neutral,

and as such they shape our research in political terms, resulting in particular political and ethical implications.

This brings us to a final, crucial sense of ‘critical’ upon which the research approach taken here is predicated, and that is its critical ontology. Chapter 4 describes the ‘critical realist’ social ontology underpinning this thesis in much greater detail, but for now it shall suffice to note the origins of the ‘critical’ in critical realism. Roy Bhaskar’s philosophy of social science, the basis of critical realism, combines what Bhaskar calls a ‘transcendental realism’ with a ‘critical naturalism’. The former means an acceptance that there must be a world existing independently of our knowledge of, or ideas about, it, and that this world must be of a certain character, for any ‘science’ (that is, rigorous study) of it to be possible; this is a reductive summary of scientific realism which is expanded upon in Chapter 4. ‘Critical naturalism’, on the other hand, means accepting that, to a certain degree, we can safely make the same sort of realist claim for the social sciences as transcendental realism does for the natural sciences. In other words, for social science to be possible or meaningful, some aspects of the social world must exist independently of our knowledge of them and must be of a certain character.

However, whereas naturalism proper (upon which positivist approaches to social science are premised) assumes an identity between natural and social science, the critical naturalism that, combined with transcendental realism, produces critical realism, recognises the very different character of the social world and the social scientist. In particular, Bhaskar notes, naturalist approaches such as positivism fail to account for the absolutely crucial fact that whereas natural science is based upon experimental ‘closures’ for the purposes of hypothesis-testing, in the inherently ‘open’ system of the social world, no such closure is possible. This is why, unlike many doctoral theses in IR, this one does not begin by attempting to define ‘variables’ in the research problem, in order to go about ‘measuring’ their co-variance.

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56 Ibid., p. 19.
Unlike, say carbon dioxide, magnesium or DNA, such things as ‘democracy’ and ‘liberalism’ are not amenable to the this sort of analytic closure, since they are, as W.B. Gallie famously put it, ‘essentially contested concepts’\(^{57}\). They have no stable or agreed definition; on the contrary, vast conflicts have been fought over competing conceptions of social forms – the superpowers of the Cold War essentially fought for two radically different versions of ‘democracy’. More importantly, even when they are defined for the purposes of a research project, they are not bounded in the same way. Social things have no fixed ‘edges’ but rather blur into one another. This is what makes the claim of liberal peace/liberal wars scholars to be able to prove their thesis through measurement of co-variance between two variables (liberalism, or ‘democracy’, and war) so problematic; who gets to define which states are democracies and which are not? For the socialist, radical feminist or anarchist, of course, ‘liberal-democracy’ is not the ‘rule of the people’ and so not democracy at all – it is, rather, the rule of a particular set of people, an elite; it is an oligarchy or patriarchy or hierarchy.

What this critical realist social ontology lends the thesis is a basis for considering neoliberalism, as ideology and governmentality, as a real causal tendency constraining, enabling and shaping British security policy and practice. In this sense critical realism can be thought of as a reflexive Marxian philosophical response to that other great contemporary strand of the ‘critical tradition’ at work in IR today; poststructuralism. Unlike most poststructuralists, however, for critical realists the point is not only to accept that things like ideologies and discourses are as ‘real’ as any other social forms, but to analyse their causal efficacy and power in producing specific social configurations and practices, and to distinguish between them on an ethical and scientific basis by developing arguments about their quality and relative merits in terms of their effects on power and politics (in other words, to reject discursive relativism or equivalence in favour of a ‘judgemental rationalism’\(^{58}\)). This thesis can therefore be considered a new contribution to the growing body of critical realist work in IR.

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\(^{58}\) Bhaskar, *The Possibility of Naturalism*. 
that has been pioneered in recent years by figures like Colin Wight, Heikki Patomaki, Milja Kurki and Jonathan Joseph.

Rather than follow the pattern in some critical literature on the liberal peace/liberal wars thesis, where discussion of causation is eschewed entirely on the grounds that it is an essentially positivist pursuit, critical realism allows us – in Kurki’s terms – to ‘reclaim’ causal analysis for the critical traditions. Escaping the simple, positivist efficient causal story that ‘liberal-democracy causes peace’, the aim is instead to develop a causal narrative about how neoliberalism constrains, enables and shapes practices of war and security. This is no less a causal approach than the positivism of the liberal peace thesis, but is rather one that includes greater ontological depth and provides a more nuanced account of causation, in which less visible but no less real social phenomena (ideologies, governmentalities) are understood to shape social practices and events, and where a retroductive (rather than inductive or deductive) mode of reasoning may therefore be employed in analysing practices and events as effects of such phenomena.

1.3.2 Critical war studies (CWS): Re-writing ‘security’ as war

Beyond its broader critical orientation and its critical realist ontology, this thesis can also be considered a contribution to the burgeoning field of critical war studies (CWS). In announcing the arrival of CWS, Tarak Barkawi and Shane Brighton note that the turn from war to ‘security’ studies in IR has been problematic to the extent that thinking about war has been left to those who presume war already to be ‘known’. In practice this has meant the ideologically charged field of ‘strategic studies’ has been left to describe a ‘common sense’ understanding of war, while the critical study of war, which, Barkawi contends, ‘should be at the heart of the discipline of International Relations’ has been almost entirely neglected. One of the original contributions of this thesis is thus the repositioning of British policies and practices that are enunciated as elements of security within a frame of war. The point is to

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understand these policies and practices as elements of a way of war, rather than as components of a passive or defensive ‘security arrangement’.

Whereas all manner of policies and practices are placed under the banners of national and international ‘security’ by Western states, and are thus discursively associated with notions of defensiveness, stability, political neutrality, and, above all, with a notion of necessity, reconsidering these policies and practices as elements of a way of ‘war’ effectively repoliticises them, re-associating them with notions of morality and politics, aggression, hubris and choice. Such an approach aims at undoing the ‘securitisation’ of the very practices of war, placing them squarely back in the context of politics, and thus undermines the discourse of ‘emergency’ that has underwritten most ‘security’ policies in Western states for the last century.

As Mark Neocleous suggests, whereas ‘our whole political language and culture has become saturated by ‘security’’, such that ‘every day is Security Awareness Day’, we should in fact consider ‘security’ itself not as a universal category but rather a ‘mode of governing’ and a ‘political technology’. While some in the field of critical security studies (CSS) have engaged in yet further securitisations (human security, food security, and so on) in the hope of re-appropriating this category, this led us to a situation in which, Evans notes, ‘the idea of security not only remained ontologically entrenched, but was actually afforded more reverence’. In considering policies and practices of ‘security’ not on their own terms but instead within the frame of a ‘way of war’ – that is, to paraphrase David Campbell, in re-writing security as war – the aim is to destabilise and denaturalise the category of security. This thesis thus seeks to steer CWS toward an acceptance of Neocleous’ claim – radically opposed to the underlying assumptions of CSS – that in fact ‘insecurity is part of the human condition’ whereas ‘security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion’.

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66 Ibid., p. 41.
67 Ibid., p. 2.
68 Ibid., p. 3.
69 Ibid., p. 4.
70 Brad Evans, *Liberal Terror*, p. 54.
1.4 Outline of the Thesis

This introductory chapter having elucidated the research problem and the context in which it arises, in addition to introducing the research approach, it now remains to provide a schematic outline of the structure of the remainder of the thesis.

Chapter 2 expands upon many of the themes presented by the research problem and its context, as outlined in Sections 1.1 and 1.2, above. Organised along the lines of a thematic and periodised matrix of change in thinking on ‘liberal wars’, this chapter begins by looking at the literatures around the ‘classical’ liberal peace thesis and the relationship of the liberal state to violence, before moving on to look at the debates around ‘humanitarian interventions’ and R2P, and finally looking at the emergence of the War on Terror and the various debates it has sparked. The aim of the chapter is to more thoroughly ground the research problem in extant thinking on (neo)liberalism and war. The chapter finds that the liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm espoused by figures like Doyle and Freedman, but also Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Tony Blair and other political leaders, is severely limited in its explanatory power, for a range of epistemological, methodological and substantive reasons. Notable among these is the failure of such approaches – and those of their numerous and trenchant critics – to account for changes to the values and social morphologies of liberalism with the emergence of neoliberalism.

Chapter 3 consists in a substantial theoretical discussion, analysis and development around the concept of neoliberalism. Ultimately, the chapter embarks upon an original re-theorisation of the concept of neoliberalism that attempts to avoid some of the key pitfalls, including essentialist political economy approaches, limited and linguistically-focused discourse and ideology approaches, and Foucauldian governmentality approaches. Refuting putative incompatibilities between ideology and governmentality approaches, the chapter argues for novel and inventive re-conceptualisations of these two ‘critical explanatory concepts’ in order to provide a useful theoretical lens through which to look at problems of neoliberalism. This chapter draws upon unorthodox approaches to theorising ideology, especially those developed by John Berger, Terry Eagleton and Slavoj Žižek, and wrests the
Foucauldian concept of governmentality back from those, like Laura Zanotti,73 and Hans-Martin Jaeger,74 who seem intent on prescribing its applicability as a narrowly defined ‘heuristic tool’. The consequent description of neoliberalism as a set of a set of inter-related ‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of being’ that revolve around imaginaries of globalisation, markets, networks and flows, and practices of adaptation, resilience, flexibility, self-entrepreneurship and commodification, makes an original contribution to the field political theory.

Chapter 4 reflects upon how, given the theoretical discussion in the prior chapters, one might go about studying the causal influence of neoliberalism, as ideology and governmentality, upon the discourse and practice of Western ways of war and security. Beginning from the critical realist philosophy of social science that underpins the thesis, it is argued that framing the research in terms of ontology is important. A specific and original ontology of discourse and social practice is outlined, predicated upon this critical realist approach and it is argued that a form of critical discourse analysis (CDA) and a broader form of pragmatic analysis would be an appropriate set of methods for the retroductive research methodology advanced. Following this, an analytic framework for the following three empirical chapters is outlined.

Chapter 5 mobilises and develops a CDA approach in studying six key security policy papers in depth and it is argued that neoliberal ways of seeing and being are instantiated in these papers, specifically in their calls to ‘moderate’ and ‘non-ideological’ ways of thinking and in the framework of ‘resilience-building’, which effectively individualises and marketises responsibility for ‘security’. Crucially, an antipathy to politics as such and a desire to situate security within the ‘scientific’ frame of the market is evidence in these papers of the influence of neoliberal ontologies and subjectivities.

Chapter 6 analyses three speeches by British political leaders on the themes of war, security and liberty. Through the application and development of a CDA approach, the chapter highlights the modalities of neoliberal understandings of temporal, spatial, and ethico-political aspects of the world at work in the texts. It is argued neoliberal ways of seeing

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and being can be discerned in these texts to the extent that they privilege an imaginary of the world wherein globalisation has brought about a new and potentially prosperous order, but an order that is facing persistent challenges from certain actors, who are depicted as ‘of the old world’ and as incapable of accepting the new. Audiences are asked, in the face of these threats, to become more malleable and flexible, especially with regard to their liberty, and to refrain from partaking of bad ways of thinking, the negative circulations, of the ‘network/market’ of ideas.

Chapter 7 aims to address a key limitation of the previous two chapters, namely their textual orientation. Given the complex and overlapping account of aspects of social practice articulated in Chapter 4, a purely textually-oriented approach is insufficient to this study. This chapter is therefore oriented toward a broader form of pragmatic analysis of two specific practices of security: UAVs/drone warfare, and Control Orders/TPIMs. It is argued that the materiality of these practices is directed toward the control of and immunisation against particular sorts of internal/external, domestic/international circulation. ‘Bad’ circulations of persons and ideas that threaten the imagined equilibrium of the network/market are subject to special forms of sovereign violence, and it is in the conceptualisation of social processes and actors upon which these practices are based that we can again locate the influence of neoliberal ways of seeing and being.

The original contribution of the three analysis chapters – Chapters 5, 6 and 7 – lies not only in what amounts to a new interpretation by the author of a set of discourses and practices, but in the refocusing of critical attention on the UK. Critical analyses, and especially critical discourse analyses, of Western involvement in post-Cold War and War on Terror conflict has been predominantly focused on the ‘easy target’ of the US. The Bush administration’s jingoistic discourse, hypocritical exceptionalism, and open flouting of international human rights law, along with Obama’s secretive programmes of ‘targeted killing’ and drone warfare, have been the subject of vast swathes of academic research. The UK, on the other hand – the US’s ‘sidekick’ in more or less every significant conflict since the

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75 For example, Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (Eds.), *Discourse, War and Terrorism* (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007); Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism* (Manchester: MUP, 2005).
end of the Cold War – has got off lightly. Scant attention has thus far been paid, in any holistic sense, to the UK’s role in the contemporary Western way of war, and so a final area of contribution of this thesis is to subject British policy and practice to scrutiny in this regard.

Finally, Chapter 8 draws together the analyses and arguments made in chapters 5, 6, and 7 and, summarising these insights in conjunction with the theoretical work undertaken in the first half of the thesis, draws some conclusions about the postulated ‘neoliberal way of war’ – summarising the key findings of this research project – and points to areas for further research into the political economy of state and non-state violence.
2. Liberal wars do not exist: literatures on liberalism, neoliberalism and war

2.1 Introduction

Given the critical framing of this research project outlined in the Introduction, the form and purpose of this literature review is rather different from that of some, more ‘mainstream’ political science and IR approaches. The assumption here is not that social science consists of a gradual revealing of the real causal covering laws underpinning the social world, from which predictions of future events might be made. This natural scientific model does not hold – as is argued in detail in Chapter 4 – for the social world. Therefore, the purpose of the literature review is not to locate the ‘edge’ of an expanding body of knowledge, based on what Thomas Kuhn identifies as the ‘development-by-accumulation’ model that pervades positivist research, since all the knowledge that already exists of the social world is necessarily partial, contingent and shifting anyway (this is the position of ‘epistemic relativism’ elaborated in Chapter 4). However, for this thesis to avoid covering theoretical or empirical ground already well-trodden, and thus for it to constitute an original contribution to a debate, it is nevertheless essential to show how it might be differentiated from other works and theses on closely related topics. The overarching aim of this chapter is, therefore, to cast a critical eye over the key debates that have taken place in relation to the research problem as it is outlined in Chapter 1, and to situate the thesis at hand in contradistinction to some of the ontological, epistemological, methodological and political commitments at work in these debates.

This chapter really reviews and ties together three distinct but overlapping ‘literatures’: the first is the broad background literature on liberalism(s) and violence, from individual autonomy to the ‘democratic peace’; the second literature incorporated is that which grew up in the early post-Cold War era, and which is still being written today, in relation to so-called ‘humanitarian intervention’ and the international military role of Western liberal states in a post-Cold War context; finally, there is a review of the literature and debates on

77 Some sections of this chapter are published as: Ben Whitham, ‘From security to resilience? (Neo)liberalism, war and terror after 9/11’, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1 (3), pp. 219-229.
the War on Terror, which takes place within this post-Cold War context, but introduces new political problems distinct from those posed by the humanitarian intervention and ‘R2P’ fields.

The relationship between liberalism and violence has been a fraught and controversial one, in both theory and practice. State violence has been a key referent object of liberal theory since its inception. John Locke opposed the arbitrary violence of the absolutist state in favour of a property-based social contract which would govern the appropriateness of violence and confine its (legitimate) use to the defence of ‘lives, liberties and estates’. As Beate Jahn’s recent work on the origins of liberal ‘internationalism’ puts it:

The period prior to the development of Locke’s ideas was characterised by extremely violent and widespread civil and religious wars. It was thus the absence, rather than the presence, of a secular, tolerant, and relatively nonviolent political culture that provided the motivation for Locke’s work.79

For Immanuel Kant, founding father of modern liberal internationalism, a key virtue of liberal states would be their potential to co-exist peacefully as an international community. Republican national constitutions including a separation of powers, representative government, principles of international non-interference and respect for sovereignty (‘no nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another’80), combined with the establishment of a ‘federation of nations’, would, in Kant’s view, eventually ‘end all wars forever’.81 John Stuart Mill, meanwhile, sought, through his ‘harm principle’, to argue for a liberalism wherein violence between individual citizens would be checked by the power of the state.82 Liberal thinking has thus often been ostensibly concerned with limiting, managing and transcending violence, both between individuals and states.

Although this thesis is specifically concerned with neoliberalism, which can be clearly distinguished from the classical liberalism of Locke, Kant and Mill, there nevertheless remain, in the neoliberal international order, or at least in the rhetoric of that order, residual elements of the classical liberal tradition. The Kantian liberal peace thesis and the principle of individual autonomy (though often reduced to the freedom to make money, ‘free enterprise’, or

81 Ibid., p. 117.
freedom from social obligations like taxation) continue to loom large in the speeches and writings of Western political leaders. The three aims of this chapter are, therefore:

i) to situate the contemporary debates on liberal and neoliberal state violence in a broader genealogy of the relationship between liberalism and violence

ii) to understand epistemological and political differences between key approaches to the problem of liberalism/neoliberalism and state violence

iii) to evaluate the existing literature on this research problem and identify avenues for further research, specifically with regard to the utility of applying a critical realist ontology

Although this literature review will be as broad and inclusive as possible, there will be a special focus on ‘critical’ (in the sense outlined in Chapter 1) approaches to the research problem, since this is the type of approach proposed in this thesis.

Sections 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 deal with different but overlapping areas of the literature on liberalism and violence. The sections are organised around a loose chronology of theory and practice. Section 2.2 therefore deals with the classical liberal approach to state violence, especially the Kantian ‘liberal peace thesis’ and its critics. Section 2.3 reviews the literature on liberal state violence in the changing political context of the post-Cold War era, specifically the emerging norm of ‘humanitarian intervention’ and its relation to concepts of state sovereignty and liberal warfare, while Section 2.4 discusses the extant literature on post-9/11 liberal state violence and the ‘War on Terror’. Each section identifies philosophical, methodological and empirical issues with the existing literature, whilst also pointing to the problems and limitations of key approaches. This historical-chronological organisation is inspired by Michel Foucault’s challenge, issued during some reflections on his ‘method’ during a lecture at the College de France in 1979, to ‘suppose that universals do not exist’. Such was the supposition, Foucault goes on to note, underpinning his early, seminal research into the history of madness. To produce a compelling historical analysis of a set of social practices, Foucault suggests, we should begin from this perspective, where we suppose the non-existence of those very grand categories and concepts that are usually supposed to describe the essence of those practices. He therefore began his study of madness on the following
basis: ‘If we suppose that it does not exist, then what history can we make of these different events and practices which are apparently organised around something which is supposed to be madness?’

In this sense, the question this chapter seeks to answer is: what if liberal wars do not exist? What history can we make of these different events and practices which are apparently organised around something which is supposed to be a liberal way of war?

Section 2.5 concludes the chapter by bringing together some of the critical reflections on these extent literatures in order to differentiate the basis and aims of the project at hand, arguing for the need to develop a serious, non-positivist alternative to dominant explanatory paradigms, which is at once sensitive to the significance of neoliberalism and capable of accounting for the role of social structures in shaping social practices and events.

2.2 Liberalism and war I: From individual freedom to the ‘Democratic Peace’

Though neoliberalism, the predominant articulation of liberalism today, draws upon intellectual sources other than the ‘classics’ of liberal political philosophy – especially, of course, the Austrian and Chicago Schools of economics – it is nonetheless rooted in the same conception of individual liberty expounded by the earliest liberal theorists. And if, in seeking a ‘genesis’ of theories and practices that can be called ‘liberal’, we turn to the writings of John Locke, we cannot escape the connection between liberalism and war. In his Second Treatise, Locke, having established the impossibility of a divine right of kings or any tracing of the lineage of a particular family back to Adam, seeks to describe an alternative basis for ‘civil government’. But his very starting point for this is a series of reflections on the relative merits and justice of different forms of violence. The fundamental basis for a form of limited civil government is, for Locke, the necessity of a body to adjudicate in cases where individuals seek to ‘make war’ against one another in various ways. Where one person, whomsoever he or she may be (including those people who call themselves ‘kings’) has ‘designs’ on the life of another – be it to kill them or with the more limited aim of depriving them their God-given freedom; exerting absolute power over them – then those two individuals are in a ‘state of

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83 Michel Foucault, *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France 1978-1979*, p.3
84 Schwartzmantel, *Ideology and Politics*, p.2
85 Chapter 3 includes a detailed delineation of the development of neoliberalism and the features distinguishing it from its classical antecedents.
war’ according to Locke. What’s more, the individual who has another planning to take or unjustly control his life has an unconditional right to strike the fatal blow first:

And therefore it is Lawful for me to treat him, as one who has put himself into a State of War with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a State of War, and is aggressor in it [emphasis in original].

Locke goes on to reflect upon the scenarios in which one person might justly kill another, and where such violence would not be justified. On the one hand, Locke’s lingering fascination with bloody violence may be symptomatic of the period in which he wrote, and was certainly common to other early modern political theorists, but on the other hand it also speaks to the intimacy with which liberal political philosophy, violence and notions of war are connected. The liberty at the heart of ‘classical’ liberalism is one founded on individualist principles that are at best morbid, at worst bloodthirsty. Liberalism is often portrayed as the ‘nice’ alternative to vicious Hobbesian conservatism, as the political philosophy of the potential for human good in the world, and as a theory predicated on a more positive image of ‘human nature’, yet even the shallowest engagement with liberal political philosophy finds its atomistic social ontology of individualism riddled with references to violence and war.

But the extrapolation of the linkages between liberalism and war are not yet taken to the level of the international in Locke. The work of Immanuel Kant has influenced almost all contemporary liberal thought in this regard, especially in the fields of international political theory and IR. In the 1784 essay Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent – a brief but central contribution to the Enlightenment project – Kant argues that humans are characterised by an ‘unsocial sociability’, whereby ‘a propensity for living in society’, is complemented by ‘the unsociable characteristic of wanting everything to go according to his own desires’. This fundamental antagonism between individual and society is the source of (often violent) conflict, but also of innovation, and should be managed through the establishment of a ‘civil society’ that:

87 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983) pp. 31-32.
combines the greatest freedom, and thus a thoroughgoing antagonism among its members, with a precise determination and protection of the boundaries of this freedom, so that it can co-exist with the freedom of others.  

Here we have the basic premise of the liberal state, in a form not radically different to that expressed in the work of Locke or, later, Mill. Individuals will be willing to forgo their freedom to the extent that they will not interfere in the affairs – violently or otherwise – of others, so long as there is a mutual respect for this principle, enforced by a state apparatus. However, Kant goes further at this point, noting that the same unsocial sociability operates at the level of ‘external relations among nations’. The wars endemic to the anarchic international system – the most egregious and devastating examples of state violence – will eventually force the various states to ‘leave the lawless state of savagery and enter into a federation of peoples’.  

This theory is further developed, a decade later, in To Perpetual Peace: a Philosophical Sketch, where Kant argues for a ‘federation of free states’ as the necessary solution to the problem of interstate violence. Such a league is only attainable amongst states with republican constitutions (as opposed to absolutist monarchies, for example) and, in Kant’s view:

[T]his idea of federalism should eventually include all nations and thus lead to perpetual peace. For if [...] a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic (which by its nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace), it will provide a focal point for a federal association among other nations that will join it in order to guarantee a state of peace [...] and through several associations of this sort such a federation can extend further and further.

In the practice of international politics, the League of Nations and its successor, the United Nations, are examples of an attempt to implement such a federation. This teleology of human development, of the pacification of international relations, has become known as the ‘liberal peace thesis’ or, more commonly today, the ‘democratic peace thesis’ (DPT). The Kantian liberal peace thesis has been perhaps the most influential theorisation of the

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88 Ibid., p. 33.
89 Ibid., p. 34.
90 Ibid., p. 117.
relationship between liberalism, the state and violence. It remains, as Meera Sabaratnam puts it, ‘the dominant critical intellectual framework applied to post-Cold War policies and practices of post-conflict intervention’. 92 The philosophical significance and practical implications of this thesis are so central to the development of liberal theory and practice that ‘an engagement with the question of liberalism and violence must include consideration of the democratic peace thesis’. 93

Though it would be at best naïve to claim that liberal-democracies are less belligerent in general than other types of state (most of the biggest wars of the last century, from the Second World War to Korea and Vietnam, have involved liberal-democratic states), contemporary articulations of the DPT do claim that liberal-democracies do not tend to go to war with one another. This ‘dyadic’ version of the DPT has found its most consistent academic advocate in Michael Doyle, who has argued that ‘a separate peace exists among liberal states’. 94

The dyadic DPT initially appears a fairly robust theory, ostensibly supported by empirical data (Doyle’s own work relies heavily upon the data of the Correlates of War programme, which aims at quantifying the history of inter-state war95). The vast majority of armed conflict in which Western liberal-democracies have directly engaged in the last century has been against states which have ‘other’ constitutions and forms of government (fascist and communist states, military regimes, and so on). The DPT therefore remains a popular explanatory and predictive theory of international politics.

The discourse of the War on Terror, especially the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, is permeated by the referent concept of democratisation ‘for’ peace. At least in the rhetoric of Western leaders justifying these conflicts, the DPT is a major factor. If we ‘know’ that liberal states (simply ‘democracies’ in much of the literature) are statistically less likely to go to war with one another, and – after the bloody twentieth century – we know the incalculable

95 The Correlates of War Project: http://www.correlatesofwar.org
horrors of war, then we must feel duty-bound to ‘spread’ liberalism (or ‘democracy’). As Tony Blair put it in a 2004 speech defending the invasion of Iraq: ‘The best defence of our security lies in the spread of our values’, and, therefore, ‘it is our duty is to rebuild Iraq and Afghanistan as stable and democratic nations’.96

The ‘realists’ of IR theory have, as a key plank of their traditional opposition to liberal idealism, criticised the DPT. ‘Structural’ or ‘neo’ realism attacks liberalism for its attempt to universalise – both in theory and practice – a ‘second image’ view of international politics, which assumes that the internal/domestic political character of states can be extrapolated to the level of international relations, despite the structural anarchy inherent to the international system.97 Neoliberal notions of globalisation advanced by theorists like Fukuyama, Keohane and Nye, and Keniche Ohmae, all of whom posit a teleology of liberal globalisation where world peace emerges, to a greater or lesser extent, from the spread of market-led social transformation, are, Kenneth Waltz contends, simply a rhetorical cover for the wielding of American power.98 Much realist criticism has centred around the ‘causal logics’ of the DPT, whereby it assumed that a lack of conflict amongst liberal-democracies is the effect of domestic constitutions, rather than other factors, such as the Cold War or a ‘balance of power’.99

In recent years, however, and especially since the 1990s when, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western liberal-democracies embarked on more military ‘humanitarian interventions’ and others forms of belligerence, often unilaterally or in small coalitions, a number of more interesting critiques of the DPT have emerged.

A central problem associated with the DPT by ‘critical’ scholars like Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey is the tendency to ‘divide the world, both conceptually and empirically, in two’.100 In this way the dyadic DPT encourages a form of ideological ‘binarism’101, which neatly and

apparently unproblematically distinguishes between ‘democracies’ and ‘non-democracies’ as two categories of state. This binarism is not only overly simplistic but also encourages conflict, as the world outside the liberal West is represented as a homogenous – and dangerous – ‘other’, which harbours terrorists and threatens the ‘Free World’. This ‘us’ and ‘them’ attitude underpinned George W. Bush’s rhetoric on the War on Terror, especially his famous claim that ‘you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists’.103

Indeed, it has been argued that there seems to be a generalised propensity for belligerence among certain liberal-democracies, particularly the US, which, as Sven Chojnacki notes, leads to a situation wherein ‘(some) democratic states are no more peaceful than other regimes’.104 The type of wars such states are likely to wage is also a concern. Christopher Daase points out that the ‘reideologization’ of war in liberal-democracies means that wars tend to be fought in the name of democracy itself, rather than over a more straightforwardly geopolitical issue, and are thus closer to the Clausewitzian volkskrieg, ‘absolute’ wars.105 This sentiment is also reflected in the claims of Western political leaders. Tony Blair speaks of the War on Terror as an ‘existential’ threat to ‘our way of life’.106 A war against such a perceived threat can presumably be limitless in scope.

There are even grounds on which to question the empirical work underpinning the dyadic account of the DPT. It has been noted that the Correlates of War study fails to account for proxy wars, where one liberal-democratic state may indirectly wage war against another, as in the case of the CIA-organised coup in Guatemala in 1954.107

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102 Anna Geis, ‘Spotting the 'Enemy'? Democracies and the Challenge of the 'Other'', in Democratic Wars: Looking at the Dark Side of Democratic Peace, ed. by L. Brock, A. Geis and H. Müller (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006).
106 Tony Blair, Speech to Sedgefield Constituents ([n.p.]: [n.pub.], 2004).
Furthermore, what constitutes a ‘democratic’ state or society remains one of the most contested issues in politics. Barkawi and Laffey point out that there is a significant, and what should be highly controversial, conflation of political concepts at work in the DPT:

The DP debates adopt an essentially liberal definition of their independent variable, democracy [...] Defining democracy in liberal terms, collapsing the distinctions between democracy and liberalism, is unsurprising given that liberalism is the dominant ideology of the modern state in the contemporary West. But democracy and liberalism are distinct and by no means necessarily compatible [...] Democracy is about popular rule. Liberalism, in contrast, is about the construction of a particular kind of social order, organized around the individual and his or her rights.109

This undermines the claim of the DPT theorists to be able to make a straightforward empirical classification of states as either ‘democratic’ or ‘non-democratic’, since such judgements are always bound to particular understandings of democracy – usually to the ‘liberal democratic’ state model, which ranks rights to private property and ‘free enterprise’ at least as highly as popular rule.

Some critics of the DPT go further, however, in their analyses of the contradictory logic of the liberal peace. Influenced by the work of Michel Foucault, poststructuralist scholars have posited more complex accounts of liberal and neoliberal universalism. Foucault’s key contention about the liberal state, especially as it emerged in his lectures at the Collège de France, is that, from at least the nineteenth century, it attained ‘control of the biological’.110 Since the eighteenth century, when the idea of human beings as a ‘species’ began to take hold in Western societies, ‘the basic biological features of the human species became the object of a political strategy’.111

Whereas the ‘disciplinary power’ Foucault had mapped so masterfully in his earlier work on the asylum and the prison was focused on governing ‘individual bodies’ through surveillance, punishment and suchlike, from the end of the eighteenth century, the referent object of politics in liberal states shifted from ‘man-as-body’ to ‘man-as-species’. Thus this period marked a transition from an anatamo-politics of the human body to a “biopolitics” of the human race. Liberal states, according to this view, have been increasingly concerned with monitoring, protecting and otherwise governing ‘life’ itself.

Michael Dillon and Julian Reid’s *The Liberal Way of War* (which we will return to in greater detail in Section 2.4) is an excellent example of how such a Foucauldian ‘biopolitical’ framework can be applied to understandings of liberal-democratic state violence. Liberal states inevitably wage war, they argue, as part of a universalist biopolitical logic of ‘killing to make life live’. This casts the possibility of any ‘liberal’ or ‘democratic peace’ into doubt.

Though critical responses to the DPT have been richly illuminating in many instances, little attention has been paid to the changing character of the Western liberal-democratic state, and how this might relate to contemporary logics of liberal violence. It is widely accepted that neoliberal ideology has, since the late 1970s, been central to structural transformations of Western states, yet the DPT debates fail to account for this change as a potential factor in the increasing bellicosity of liberal states.

Rather than continue to hold out for a federation of free states which all nations would eventually join of their own accord, as envisioned by Kant, Western liberal-democracies have increasingly imposed their own state model upon other societies. The DPT has underpinned dominant currents in international relations, at least at the levels of rhetoric and formal organisation, throughout the twentieth century. From the League of Nations to the United Nations, from the bombing of Kosovo to the invasion of Iraq and the NATO bombing of Libya, the notion of pacifying the world by spreading the liberal-democratic state model (through violent conflict where necessary) has been central to the justification of Western foreign policy. The next section, considers how the notion of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has proved

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113 Ibid.
crucial in this regard. An increasingly aggressive liberal order has sought to impose itself upon the rest of the world, whilst at the same time speaking the language of ‘peace’, ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’.

2.3 Liberalism and War II: Post-Cold War ‘humanitarian interventions’

It has been argued that since the 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, an emerging norm of ‘humanitarian intervention’ has gained increasing legitimacy.\(^\text{116}\) Whereas during the Cold War it was widely accepted that ‘the use of force to save victims of gross human rights abuses was a violation of the [United Nations] Charter’\(^\text{117}\), an increasing number of military interventions by leading Western liberal-democracies have taken place under precisely such a ‘humanitarian’ banner. To varying degrees the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (1993-1996), the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo (1999), the US-UK led invasion of Iraq (2003) and the NATO bombing campaign in Libya (2011) have all been justified by reference to principles of humanitarian intervention.

Tony Blair’s famous ‘Chicago Speech’, delivered during the Kosovo conflict (and analysed in detail in Chapter 6 of this thesis), is widely recognised as an attempt to legitimise or formalise this doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Blair describes the bombing campaign as ‘a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions, but on values’, an essential action required to halt ‘the evil of ethnic cleansing’.\(^\text{118}\)

This argument was made decades earlier by, among others, Michael Walzer, whose *Just and Unjust Wars* (1978) argued that ‘humanitarian interventions’ are necessary in states where domestic strife might put into question the existence of a ‘political community’ and therefore negate any claim to a right of national self-determination and freedom from external interference.\(^\text{119}\)

The legitimacy of one or more states intervening violently in the affairs of another sovereign state to prevent human rights abuses and other humanitarian crises has been further entrenched among UN member countries following the 2001 publication by the


\(^{117}\) Ibid, p. 1.

\(^{118}\) Tony Blair, ‘Speech to the Economic Club of Chicago’, 1999.

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) of a report entitled *The Responsibility to Protect*\(^{120}\) and the adoption of the principles outlined in that report by the UN General Assembly in 2009 in Resolution 63/308.\(^{121}\) The responsibility to protect (R2P) is described in the ICISS report as:

The idea that sovereign states have a responsibility to protect their own citizens from avoidable catastrophe – from mass murder and rape, from starvation – but that when they are unwilling or unable to do so, that responsibility must be borne by the broader community of states\(^{122}\)

An initial critical response from Noam Chomsky to the doctrine of interventionism, in one of his most significant and influential works of recent years, documents the strategic selectivity with which this ‘new military humanism’ is applied. Chomsky notes that while NATO chose to violently intervene to prevent the ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars, no such action was taken to protect the Kurds in Turkey. On the contrary, Western liberal democracies expressed sympathy for the Turkish state in its struggle with the Kurdish separatist movement and placed the blame for the thousands of civilian deaths with the separatists.\(^{123}\) The question of selectivity applies to other, more recent examples, too. Why Libya but not Syria or Iran? Perhaps the simple answer is that a violent intervention in the latter two might trigger more widespread regional conflict, but this nonetheless signals that interventions are not based – as Western politicians would like us to believe – purely on the basis of moral concerns, but at least partly (perhaps wholly) according to other, traditionally ‘realist’, strategic and geopolitical considerations.

David Chandler, meanwhile, points out that the arguments for R2P made in the ICISS report fail to acknowledge ‘the essential concerns of non-Western states’, specifically that interventions might not be based on ‘moral’ or ‘humanitarian’ concerns, but rather *realpolitik*, and that determining motivations might be difficult or impossible.\(^{124}\) In the post-Cold War era, Chandler argues, when the provisions for non-interference of the UN Charter are thrown into

\(^{120}\) ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001).
\(^{122}\) ICISS, *The Responsibility to Protect*, p. viii.
doubt, discourses like the ‘responsibility to protect’ are an expression of ‘the dynamic driving the convergence of morality and Realpolitik’.\(^\text{125}\)

This convergence is also of concern to Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, in the ‘sequel’ to their seminal study of contemporary Empire, *Multitude* (2006). Hardt and Negri argue that:

> The rhetoric of many leaders and supporters of the United States often relies heavily on the republican virtue that makes America an exception, as if this ethical foundation made it the historical destiny of the United States to lead the world. In fact, the real basis of the state of exception today is the second meaning of US exceptionalism, its exceptional power and its ability to dominate the global order [...] There is nothing ethical or moral about this connection; it is purely a question of might, not right.\(^\text{126}\)

In an allegedly ‘unipolar’ world order, a neoliberal US expressed its military dominance in wars against ‘non-democracies’ as a means to maintain its position as hegemon and to shore up that position ideologically, geostrategically and financially. While American neorealists like Kenneth Waltz and Robert Jervis have also identified this confluence between liberal rhetoric and the maintenance of American power, and have been sharply critical of recent US military interventions, their objections are of course of a more conservative nature. Jervis worries that the revitalised American ‘transformational impulse’ in the post-Cold War era will actually lead to ‘high costs, […] instability and anti-American regimes’, which will threaten rather than preserve or further entrench US hegemony.\(^\text{127}\) The critical position on this state of international affairs is perhaps summarised best by Slavoj Žižek:

> So, while the USA presents its domination of other sovereign states as grounded in a benevolent paternalism which takes into account the interests of other nations [...] it reserves for itself the ultimate right to define its allies’ ‘true’ interests [...] the pretence of neutral international law is abandoned, since, when the USA perceives a potential threat, it formally asks its allies for support, but the allies’ agreement is actually optional. The underlying message is always ‘We will do it with or without you’ (in short, you are free to agree with us, but not free to disagree). The old paradox of the forced choice is reproduced here: the freedom to make a choice on condition one makes the right choice (Žižek, 2004, 14).

\(^\text{125}\) Ibid., p. 75.


Under conditions of globalised neoliberalism, we see the ‘forced choice’ offered not only to individual citizen-consumers within liberal-democratic states, but also expanded the level of international relations, as whole states outside of the Western bloc (e.g. Iraq and Afghanistan) are offered an ultimatum: ‘democratise’ or die! Rights to ‘sovereignty’ or ‘self-determination’ are only appropriate to the enlightened Western states, which have stable enough political systems to ensure that liberal-democracy, as opposed to religious fundamentalist governance, is maintained.

If, as Francis Fukuyama famously claimed, the collapse of the Soviet Union signalled ‘the unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’, then the way the newly victorious liberal states responded was to engage in a series of bloody military interventions in ‘non-liberal’ or ‘non-democratic’ states. This seems very much at odds with the classical liberal policy of non-intervention expressed clearly in Kant’s preference that ‘no nation shall forcibly interfere with the constitution and government of another’. On the other hand it makes a lot more sense from a neoliberal perspective, which prioritises the ‘opening up’ of new markets. Such a perspective is apparent in US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton’s recent comment that ‘as with [...] Tunisia and Egypt’, the US will:

partner with Libya to create new economic opportunities and broader prosperity by boosting trade and investment, increasing tourism, building ties between Libyan and American businesses, and helping to integrate Libya more closely into regional and global markets.

Though the critical literature on the DPT and the doctrine of humanitarian interventionism is generally lacking in discussion of this neoliberal aspect of the problem, Mark Rupert neatly captures the essence of the issue:

If democracy is understood broadly to entail processes of social self-determination, then this neoliberalism appears actually antidemocratic; it occludes real material possibilities

129 Kant, Perpetual Peace and Other Essays, p. 109.
for the transformation of social dominance relations through the realisation of unfulfilled promises of self-determination.\textsuperscript{131}

Though they remain controversial in academic and policy circles, as well as the wider public sphere, the doctrines of humanitarian intervention and R2P continue to underpin the arguments made by Western governments to justify (both pre- and post-conflict) military interventions in other sovereign states. Perhaps most controversially, the US-UK led invasion and occupation of Iraq was often couched in the language of humanitarianism and a responsibility to protect the Iraqi people by Western political leaders, despite frequent and seemingly contradictory attempts by those same leaders to frame the conflict as part of a ‘War on Terror’, which was supposed to be about strategic concerns regarding states that ‘harbour’ groups threatening to the West. As Žižek puts it, with regard to the changing nature of US justifications for the invasion of Iraq (from terrorism and ‘weapons of mass destruction’ to humanitarian intervention and preserving or enforcing stability in the wider Middle East), ‘the problem, again, was that there were too many reasons for the war. What conferred a semblance of consistency on this multitude of reasons was, of course, ideology’.\textsuperscript{132}

Žižek’s comment highlights a lack within the critical literature on humanitarian interventions and liberal wars fought in the name of the liberal peace of a proper analysis of how neoliberalism – as the ‘globally dominant ideology’\textsuperscript{133} – shapes such liberal-democratic state violence. Neoliberal ideology seems able to subsume a number of antagonistic processes, from the expansion of ‘free’ markets, to the facilitation of monopolisation by Western firms, and from the spreading of a liberal peace to the legitimation of frequent, bloody warfare. As Section 2.5 will argue, one of the best ways to understand the effects that something so ostensibly nebulous as ‘ideology’ has on the day-to-day realities and materialities of international politics is through the analysis of discourse, the use of language in its social context.

\textsuperscript{133} Schwarzmantel, Ideology and Politics.
Just as we saw an overlap between the ‘democratic peace thesis’ and a policy of violent ‘humanitarian interventionism’, another overlap emerges between the policy of humanitarian intervention and the waging of a ‘War on Terror’.

2.4 (Neo-)Liberalism and war III: The ‘War on Terror’

The ‘war against international terrorism’ or ‘War on Terror’ inaugurated by George W. Bush following the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks in September 2001 has inspired a huge swathe of radical critiques in the academic literature on liberalism and violence. This is a war waged both outside and inside the liberal-democratic state. Terrorists live among us, from the ‘9/11’ attackers to the ‘7/7’ London bombers. This has forced a refocusing of critical academic attention on the blurring of the boundaries between the domestic and the international, between war and policing, the legal and the political. Governments in the West and elsewhere are, by their own admission, waging a war against sections of their own populations. An absolute and divisive distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ has allowed the outcasting of individuals and of entire ‘suspect communities’. The War on Terror, fought in the era of neoliberal ideological dominance, provides a unique opportunity for understanding the relationship between neoliberalism as ideology and liberal-democratic state violence, because it is at least partly situated outside the traditional terms of debate on liberal state violence. Rather than invoking only questions of international armed conflict, this ‘war’ reflects back upon the contemporary liberal-democratic state and again calls into question the ‘democratic’ internal nature of such states. Can states which employ extensive detention without charge or trial, the torture and humiliation of prisoners, heavy restrictions on political protest and the surveillance of civilian populations by state security services really be ‘democratic’? In what ways are the practices and discourses of the War on Terror shaped by the dominant neoliberal ideology?

One cannot assess the critical literature on (neo-)liberalism and the War on Terror without considering the contribution of Critical Terrorism Studies (CTS), a small and close-knit subfield coalescing around the founding figure of Richard Jackson, whose aims the first chapter of this thesis expressed sympathy with. However, this project takes a radically different trajectory from Jackson’s, diverging from his approach in several crucial ways.
Firstly, the primary concern here is with how neoliberalism as a capitalist ideology – that is, an ideology which sustains structured social exploitation and inequality of various kinds – and a mode of governmentality shapes the discourse and practice of war and security. This can be understood as both the broadest and perhaps the most important distinction between the approach taken in this thesis and Jackson’s general project. CTS attempts to critique the policies, discourses and practices of Western counter-terrorism since 9/11 by drawing upon the ‘Critical Theory’ (CT) of the Frankfurt School. Jackson and other CTS scholars seek to situate their work in contrast to both the mainstream of terrorism studies and poststructuralist approaches. Specifically, they speak of an ‘emancipatory’ approach, which aims at revealing the ways in which the War on Terror can be considered an oppressive form of rule, whereby Western states employ various kinds of violent ‘othering’ both at home and abroad in order to maintain and develop stronger forms of social control. The thesis at hand is in general agreement with this characterisation of the forms of contemporary liberal state violence. However, such an approach does not seem to particularly invoke the Frankfurt tradition. In Jonathan Joseph’s terms, ‘there is not that much actual CT in CTS’. The real purpose of CT, as it was developed by figures like Adorno and Horkheimer, was very clearly a reconfiguration of historical materialism – an attempt to rebuild Marxism in a way that could account for the rise of the Third Reich and the popularity of the Nazis among proletarians.

While it treads a reformist rather than revolutionary path, CT is nonetheless a Marxian critique of capitalist society, first and foremost. Yet, as Joseph notes, CTS scholars fail to develop a critique of capitalist society, to situate terrorism within the context of capitalist society, or even to mention – when they do draw directly upon texts like Horkheimer’s famous ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ – that this is the core of CT, and in so doing they ‘seriously misrepresent what critical theory is about’.

A further key problem with Jackson’s Writing the War on Terrorism as an attempt to critically explain contemporary liberal wars lies in its restrictive methodological approach and the sort of social ontology this presupposes. One of the most significant methodological

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136 Ibid., p. 27.
oversights is the limited view of ‘material practices’ Jackson employs. In designing his analytical framework, Jackson rightly notes that the War on Terror may be considered a ‘discourse’, but, as such, is more than just ‘language’:

Discourses are actually broader than just language, being constituted not just in texts or words, but also in definite institutional and organisational practices – what we call discursive practices.  

So far, so good – Jackson recognises that while language is ‘crucial’ to discourse, and thus to (re)producing structured patterns of social activity, such activity is not constituted by words alone. However, in elaborating on these extra-textual practices, Jackson argues that a political discourse includes:

[...] not just speeches by politicians, or their pamphlets or writings, but also the symbols they appropriate (flags, colours, dress codes, insignia), the myths and histories they refer to, the laws they pass, the organisational structures they create, the decision-making procedures they follow and the actions they undertake (marches, demonstrations, boycotts). Discourses can be considered an amalgam of material practices and forms of language and knowledge where each reinforces the other in a continuous cycle.

Whereas the view of discourse elaborated in the final sentence is close to that adopted in this thesis, the list of examples of ‘material practices’ that precedes it is strangely myopic. The types of practice Jackson prioritises – the use of particular symbols, myths and histories, for example, or the phenomena of marches and demonstrations – seem still to gravitate around semiotic interaction. These are indeed material practices, but they are ones closely associated with the context or performance of texts, with ‘politics’ used in a limited sense (the activity of politicians and activists).

It seems counter-intuitive to suggest that the most prominent ‘material practices’ of the War on Terror amount to insignia, dress codes, organisational structures and political demonstrations. What Jackson’s approach obscures are the actual practices of violent conflict. Surely the primary material practices of the War on Terror consist in, for example, the bombing of targets in Afghanistan and Iraq, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles to survey

137 Jackson, Writing the War on Terrorism, p. 19.
138 Ibid.
and attack people and buildings, the establishment of military bases and compounds in north Africa, the confinement of British ‘terror suspects’ under control orders, the patrolling of airports and other ‘infrastructural’ and government buildings by armed police, the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of captured militants to third party countries and their violent interrogation and torture. Language, symbolism and institutional-organisational structure are certainly crucial to a particular security configuration or ‘way of war’ like the War on Terror, but to limit our understanding of this complex phenomenon to this is to forget the most obvious materiality associated with it: the waging of war itself, the ‘material practices’ of security, state and non-state violence.

CTS is problematic in a number of ways. Most obviously, it lacks the critical edge of the Critical Theory from which it claims to take its cue – which is to say, it lacks any clear or consistent critique of capitalist society.\(^{139}\) Ruth Blakeley, one of the few scholars to have directly addressed the connections between neoliberalism and the War on Terror, exemplifies the problems with the CTS approach. Firstly, in common with much CTS scholarship, she seeks simply to reverse the ‘terrorist’ label, accusing neoliberal states of ‘terrorist’ interventions in the Global South.\(^{140}\) This misses the complex functioning of neoliberal modes of thought and action, which do not necessarily require forceful imposition ‘from above’, so to speak, but can in fact be gently encouraged ‘from below’, in the everyday practices of ordinary people the world over (the next chapter takes up this question in greater detail).

Secondly, in her eagerness to be on the winning side, Blakeley (ab)uses critical theory in an instrumental and confused way, to the point that it verges on a form of liberalism. This is most evident in a 2012 article on ‘human rights, state wrongs’ and emancipation, which constitutes Blakeley’s most direct engagement with Marxian Critical Theory. She argues that the concept of human rights should form a central plank of CTS and the wider Critical Security Studies (CSS) movement from whence it came, on the grounds that ‘those who would reject human rights simply on the grounds that they facilitate ‘bourgeois individualism’, fail to acknowledge their emancipatory potential’.\(^{141}\) Claiming that it was campaigning around

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human rights that ‘culminated’ in the ‘closure of all CIA secret prisons’ (a rather astonishingly naïve claim, apparently based solely on a single press release from Leon Panetta, then-Director of the CIA), Blakeley – who claims to take a ‘historical materialist’ approach – insists that this concept should therefore be embraced. Rendering Marx’s historical materialism compatible with the concept of human rights is impossible without first rendering it acritical. Historical materialism is a social ontology Marx develops as a response to the inequities of capitalist society and the bourgeois ideologies (including liberal rights orders) he sees emerging from, and sustaining, it. The very ‘individuation’ intrinsic to human rights – the ‘natural’ and ‘eternal’ notion of the human individual, and of the interaction of individuals in ‘civil society’, upon which they rest – is what Marx sees as the primary dogma, the ‘twaddle’ underpinning capitalist economics. Some of Marx’s earliest work was dedicated to the ruthless critique of ‘so-called human rights’ as the basis of the individualist ideology that drives capitalist exploitation and alienation:

Thus freedom is the right to do and perform what does not harm others. The limits within which each person can move without harming others is defined by the law, just as the boundary between two fields is defined by the fence. The freedom in question is that of a man treated as an isolated monad and withdrawn into himself.

The rejection of human rights in historical materialist theory is not, then, so ‘simple’ a matter as Blakeley suggests – it is in fact one of the central insights of critical theory; that the very ‘freedoms’ people imagine liberal societies to be characterised by are the essence of their unfreedom. So keen is Blakeley to identify as part of her emancipatory project ‘possibilities for change within the prevailing order’ that she fails to notice the very fundamental and inescapable incommensurability of the historical materialist and Gramscian positions she champions on the one hand, and the liberal rights order on the other.

The limitations of CTS, therefore, lie not only in the ontological, epistemological and methodological constraints employed by scholars like Jackson, but also in the political

142 Ibid, p. 6.
143 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology.
146 Ibid., p. 60.
147 Blakeley, ‘Human rights, state wrongs and social change: the theory and practice of emancipation’, p.2
constraints expressed so clearly in Blakeley’s work. Poststructuralist accounts, on the other hand, avoid some of these pitfalls (and are often sharply critical of both CSS and CTS\textsuperscript{148}) by seeking to critique, rather than develop, emancipatory political strategies.

Michael Dillon and Julian Reid’s \textit{The Liberal Way of War} situates a critique of the War on Terror within a broader Foucauldian genealogy and critique of operation of liberal-democratic state violence. Dillon and Reid begin with Foucault’s claim that the politics of the modern (or post-modern) liberal state is really ‘biopolitics’ in the sense that the referent object of the political apparatus is ‘life itself’. They go on to point out that there has ‘particularly in the last 50 years’ been a shift in the way life is perceived. A process of ‘informationalisation’, bolstered by the discovery of DNA and developments in computing and communications technologies, has resulted in the reduction of life, both biological and social, to code.\textsuperscript{149} When politicians in liberal-democracies draw upon discourses of humanitarianism in their rhetoric, they appeal often also appeal to the notion of informationalised species life.

The ‘liberal way of war’ at work in the War on Terror, Dillon and Reid argue, corresponds to the biopolitical ‘liberal way of rule’.\textsuperscript{150} The ‘biohuman’ subjects of the contemporary neoliberal order are to be governed on the basis of their ‘pluripotency’, the ‘always-emergent’ nature of life itself. The 9/11 and 7/7 attacks are taken by liberal-democratic states to be examples of how life becomes threatening to itself, in a manner analogous to the growth of a bacterium or disease:

\begin{quote}
Life is thus reduced to a living which is a continuously becoming-dangerous to itself. Securing such a life, making war to emancipate such a life from the becoming-dangerous to which it is continuously exposed via the operation of its very own life processes, becomes a war waged against life; one which calls routinely, in addition, when it is not also applying lethal force to the forms of life said to endanger life, for unlimited emergency measures to be continuously implemented to guard against the dangers of what life might become.\textsuperscript{151}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{148} For example, Brad Evans, \textit{Liberal Terror},
\textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 7-8.
\textsuperscript{151} Ibid, p. 147-148.
This biopolitical account of liberal state violence is not only supported by contemporary political practice (informationalisation, surveillance, pre-emptive arrest and pre-emptive war), but is also at large in the very earliest works of liberal philosophy. Locke, for example, writes that the criminal transgressor, ‘in transgressing the law of nature, [...] declares himself to live by another rule than reason and common equity [...] and so he becomes dangerous to mankind’.\textsuperscript{152} Such transgressions, Locke goes on to claim, constitute ‘a trespass against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it’ and other members of society may ‘restrain, or, where it is necessary, destroy things noxious to them’. This notion of society as a biological entity to which transgressive individuals are a ‘noxious’ existential threat certainly fits with the Foucauldian analysis of the War on Terror presented in The Liberal Way of War.

The discursive framing of the War on Terror and of ‘the terrorists’ as actors, can lead to the justification of unorthodox applications of violence by the neoliberal state. It has led, Brad Evans contends, to a state of ‘liberal terror’, which he describes as a:

> global imaginary of threat which, casting aside once familiar referents that previously defined the organisation of societies, now forces us to confront each and every potential disaster threatening to engulf advanced liberal life.\textsuperscript{153}

Evans contends, in a passage reminiscent of Slavoj Žižek’s writing on the ‘zero level’ of violence,\textsuperscript{154} that since 9/11 liberal societies have been haunted by the ‘spectre’ of another terrorist attack to the extent that terror itself has effectively been normalised in everyday political life. The crucial feature of 9/11 as an event lies, according to Evans, in the transformation of space-time it enabled. He describes how this is reflected in a number of discursive features of the post-9/11 era. The shift from ‘terrorism’ to ‘terror’ despatialized threat,\textsuperscript{155} while the translation of ‘September 11\textsuperscript{th} 2001’, a standard date that ‘repeats itself every year in familiar diachronic rotation’, into ‘9/11’ produced ‘a quantum shift in significance’ in temporal terms, so that other events (such as ‘7/7’) are constructed to evoke the imagery of that one. Even ‘Ground Zero’, Evans notes, signifies more than a place in

\textsuperscript{152} Locke, The Second Treatise of Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, p.10
\textsuperscript{153} Evans, Liberal Terror, p. 2
\textsuperscript{155} Evans, Liberal Terror, p.26
Manhattan, representing in the new imaginary of global threat ‘a point of Zero so as to reinforce the claims that 9/11 was the original sin of globalization’.156

Evans’ wide-ranging and persuasive assessment of the conditions that enable liberal terror further notes the significance of fear in ‘conditioning what is possible’ in the post-9/11 world, where ‘visual representations of threat so integral to our contemporary imaginaries have become globally networked’,157 and where emergence thinking portrays ‘terror’ as something which ‘emerges from within our afflicted communities’.158 Secondly, Evans points to the preponderance of representations of ‘global risks’, and of the supposedly scientific methods by which they might be evaluated and managed. Resilience, he argues, is crucial in this regard, having become ‘the lingua franca of contemporary security discourse’, since it suggests something more than bare survival, rather a positive programme that ‘promotes adaptability so that life may go on living despite the fact that elements of our living systems may be destroyed’.159 The birth of the ‘resilient subject’, in this view, amounts to the birth of:

a post-political subjectivity which, accepting the fatefulness of existence, proposes an emergent ontology that is exclusively bound to mastering the control of life-shaping events by pre-emptively governing those catastrophes (actual or potential) which shape the normality of the times. Resilient life as such offers no political concern with a future that may be politically different. What concerns the resiliently minded is whether or not the future is at all liveable.160

Against this backdrop, the poststructuralist critique goes, the ‘terrorist’ or ‘terror suspect’ can be effectively dehumanised and thus not necessarily subject to the supposedly universal rights at the normative root of the liberal project. In Frames of War (2009) Judith Butler writes that the perceptual ‘frames’ which act to ‘structure modes of recognition, especially during times of war’ and are ‘operative in imprisonment and torture’ ensure that ‘certain lives are perceived as lives while others, though apparently living, fail to assume perceptual form as such’.161 War, Butler argues, divides lives into those which are ‘grievable’

156 Ibid, p. 27
157 Ibid, p. 29
158 Ibid, p. 33
159 Ibid, p. 39
and those which are not. The ‘ungrievable’ life is ‘one that cannot be mourned because it has never lived’. Butler notes that after 9/11 there was a media frenzy over publishing the names, photographs and personal histories of those who were killed. There was, however, ‘considerably less public grieving for non-US nationals, and none at all for illegal workers’. Such ‘others’ are, like the figure of the ‘terrorist’ or the ‘insurgent’ not framed as fully human. Thus, in the War on Terror, the inmates held without charge or trial at Guantanamo ‘do not count as the kind of “human lives” protected by human rights discourse’ and so torture by simulated drowning, beatings and the use of ‘stress positions’ is legitimised.

Furthermore, Butler claims, a ‘civilizational war’ is underway in war zones linked to the War on Terror. Like Žižek, Butler views the highly sexualised nature of the prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib – together with the distribution of pornography and images of women without veils by US soldiers in Iraq – as underpinned by the army’s belief that it is ‘the more sexually progressive culture’. The Iraqi or Afghan or ‘Arab’ prisoner is, in the eyes of Western combatants representing liberal states, a sort of homo sacer, to use the term Giorgio Agamben has popularised, he or she is ‘bare life’ existing outside of the political order of the West (which is inherently, because of liberal universalism, the entirety of political order). These individuals are understood to be uncivilised, and thus open to violent, civilising, disciplinary procedures.

The significance of language-use in constructing and representing the War on Terror has been widely recognised in the critical literature. Many critiques speak of the War on Terror as a ‘discourse’ or ‘narrative’, a set of sociolinguistic practices, with Adam Hodges recently noting that:

The events of 9/11 have produced an abundance of reactions, among scholars in particular and the nation in general. Regardless of the specific details of those reactions, they all have one thing in common: they are interpretive acts achieved through discourse. Although the events of 9/11 are actual happenings in the world, those events do not

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162 Ibid, p.38.  
163 Ibid.  
164 Ibid, p.58.  
166 Butler, Frames of War, p. 128-129.  
intrinsically contain their own interpretation. [...] Through language we name protagonists, ascribe motivations, and provide explanations. Through language, we construct a narrative.\textsuperscript{168}

Hodges goes on, in a ‘critical discourse analytical’ fashion, to map the ‘struggles over meaning’ at the heart of the War on Terror: the sociolinguistic representation of terrorism and terrorists, of enemies and war.

Critical responses to the War on Terror thus go beyond the concerns of empire, warfare and sovereignty which have occupied critics of humanitarian intervention and state-building, to encompass such phenomena as biopolitics and global governance, ‘othering’ and racial discourse. However, as David Chandler has rightly pointed out, while Foucauldian biopolitics has proven a rich and fruitful analytical framework for critiquing and undermining ‘liberal political ontologies’, it is nonetheless limited. In fact, Chandler contends, there are strong similarities in the approach to ‘post-territorial political community’ between ‘the 1990s liberal cosmopolitans and the 2000s radical poststructuralists’.\textsuperscript{169} In their approach to practical political alternatives to the international regime of neoliberal state violence, poststructuralists tend either to avoid ‘answers’ altogether (as in the case of Dillon and Reid) or to swerve dangerously close to the same notion of a deterritorialised, ‘pluralist’ political community which features in neoliberal rhetoric.

In studying the relationship between neoliberalism and contemporary liberal-democratic state violence, then, a fresh approach might be helpful. Such an approach should be sensitive to the extent to which ‘the social’ and ‘social events’, including liberal state violence, are shaped and represented by language, yet able also to conceive of the structures sustained by linguistic representations. It is the failure to do the latter which leaves postmodern and poststructuralist accounts lacking in terms of emancipatory critiques, or, as the preacher of Baudelaire’s The Generous Gambler puts it: ‘My dear brethren, never forget [...] that the devil’s cleverest trick is to convince you that he does not exist’.\textsuperscript{170}


2.5 Conclusions and directions

As the preceding sections have emphasised, there have already been rich and illuminating ‘critical’ engagements with the problem of liberalism/neoliberalism and state violence, from the critiques of the DPT to the Foucauldian biopolitical analyses of the War on Terror. Nonetheless, a number of interrelated shortcomings have been identified with these approaches. This final section of the literature review seeks to establish some of the ways in which a critical realist approach, employing CDA methods, might overcome some of these issues and therefore constitute both a valuable and original contribution to knowledge in this field.

Most of the approaches to liberalism and state violence discussed in this chapter differentiate themselves from one another on the basis of epistemology. Michael Doyle and the positivist theorists of the liberal peace, and Robert Jervis and his neorealist ‘game theory’ colleagues, all opt for methodologically individualist and positivist epistemologies. The poststructuralists, on the other hand, tend to reject positivism as part of the ‘Enlightenment project’ through which the Western social ‘scientists’ claim to gain privileged access to universal ‘truths’. In fact, epistemology has become the common point of departure for most social research, with the author stating at the beginning whether they fall on the positivist or post-positivist side of the big epistemological debate, and therefore what sort of methods are appropriate to their particular study.

Critical realism, however, reminds us that ‘all research begins with ontology’, and to fail to deal with ontological questions or state one’s basic ontological premises is to import an implicit ontology instead. The stratified social ontology of Roy Bhaskar’s critical realism presented in Chapter 4 of this thesis is particularly useful to the study of contemporary neoliberal state violence because it allows us to understand dialectical connections between social structures as causal tendencies and discourses as sociolinguistic practices; ways of seeing/interpreting, representing and acting the social world.

As Milja Kurki points out, dispensing with the Humean notion of causation allows critical realists to understand ‘discourses as causes’ acting not in a linear ‘where a, then b’

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fashion, but rather in a complex and dialectical relation with other social events, practices and structures.\textsuperscript{173} It is this sort of critical realist ontology that informs the work of ‘critical discourse analysts’, especially Norman Fairclough and those he has influenced.\textsuperscript{174} The critical discourse analysis (CDA) method employed in parts of this thesis (see Chapter 4 for a detailed methodological framework) is rooted in the work of Fairclough’s approach to semiosis – the ways in which struggles over meaning take place in social fields like politics and international relations.\textsuperscript{175}

CDA is not a social scientific method pretending to be ethically ‘neutral’, but rather ‘a resource in struggles against exploitation and domination’. In revealing the means by which social structures and ideologies shape representations and social practices, and are thus reproduced, CDA provides an opportunity to approach the problem of neoliberal state violence – and especially the War on Terror – in a radically critical, emancipatory way. If discourses of terrorism are involved in the legitimisation of torture, arbitrary arrest and detention without charge, restrictions on protest and so on, such practices should be challenged by the analysis of those discourses of terrorism and the ideologies and social structures that sustain them. This is not to posit a mechanistic, deterministic or ‘structuralist’ thesis of the old-fashioned Marxist variety, but rather to assume that while there may be no position ‘outside of discourse’, there are nonetheless clearly dominant discourses and ideologies at play in the social world. Through processes of what Bob Jessop describes as ‘strategic selectivity’,\textsuperscript{176} certain discourses, particular representations are favoured over others and become dominant because they are the ways of understanding and representing and acting which are most beneficial to the reproduction of the dominant social order. This thesis thus seeks to apply such a critical realist approach to the analysis of discourse to the case of contemporary liberal-democratic state violence as a set of ways of acting/doing

international politics and neoliberal ideology as a framework for interpreting, explaining and justifying such activity.

The edited volume *Discourse, War and Terrorism* (2007) aims to achieve something similar to this thesis in that it contains a series of contributions, each of which takes a critical discourse analytic (CDA) approach to the ‘War on Terror discourse’. These contributions are ‘critical’ in two senses: they are reflexive and conscious that ‘analysts are also participants in the world under study’; and they aim to ‘expose existing wrongs in society in an effort to shape a better world’ – they ‘take a keen interest in understanding the workings of power in an effort to counter abuses of power’.  

*Discourse, War and Terrorism* is, then, an attempt at critical emancipatory social science, an analysis of the political problems associated with contemporary liberal state violence, and a discourse analytic approach to explaining phenomena of international politics.

To highlight but a few of the excellent contributions to that volume: Dunmire examines the ways War on Terror discourses represented in the text of the US National Security strategy, and in speeches by George W. Bush, ‘claim the future’ for the doctrine of preventative war, constructing future imaginaries which require pre-emptive strikes; Lazar and Lazar analyse the speeches of Bushes Senior and Junior to reveal how Bush Junior’s ‘War on Terror’ is represented as the enforcement and policing of Bush Senior’s ‘New World Order’, and how the discursive practice ‘outcasting’ allows the responsibility for all the worlds ills to be placed on a few individuals (Saddam Hussein or Osama bin Laden, for example); meanwhile Becker looks at television interviews with former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder in the run-up to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, analysing the discursive strategies by which he avoids ‘taking sides’.

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178 Patricia L. Dunmire, "Emerging threats" and "coming dangers", in *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, ed. by Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007).
180 Annette Becker, 'Between "us" and "them"', in *Discourse, War and Terrorism*, ed. by Adam Hodges and Chad Nilep (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2007).
However, the volume suffers from some important deficiencies. As an edited volume, each author is only able to contribute a relatively short piece, analysing small and divergent areas of the discourse of war and terrorism. This limited scope also restricts the number of texts the analyst can engage with. While a much larger corpus study may not be desirable in a CDA context (because it would negate the necessary attention to linguistic detail), a larger and more diverse set of texts would both evidentially strengthen the analyst’s arguments and provide a broader range of examples or ‘instances’ of a discourse.

There is also a lack, in most of the chapters, of any discussion of the neoliberal character of the states involved in waging the War on Terror and how this might bear upon the discourses and practices at stake. As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, this seems to be an oversight common to many analyses of liberal-democratic state violence.

Furthermore, the limitations on the scope of the contributions means that, while there is some discussion of methodology in each chapter, there is – as usual – a lack of explanation of the ontology which informs the analysis. An explicitly critical realist CDA approach would seek to include such a discussion, which would better justify, in philosophy of social science terms, the analytical approach being taken.

While Discourse, War and Terrorism is lacking in certain respects, largely due to the nature of the ‘edited volume’ format, much of the analysis it contains nonetheless sets the benchmark for applying CDA to problems relating to liberal and neoliberal state violence, especially in the War on Terror, a benchmark against which the analytical chapters of this thesis should be judged.

In the spirit of other critical realist ‘interventions’ in social science, this thesis will map discursive and phenomenological aspects of the relationship between neoliberal ideology and liberal-democratic state violence in the context of a stratified social ontology. Critical realism has been applied as a ‘metatheory’ in the field of IR (Kurki, Wight), and one which accepts ‘discourses as causes’, but thus far there have been no applications of a critical-

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realism-informed CDA to the problem of neoliberal state violence which are explicitly based on a critical realist ontology.

Critical realists working in the field of IR (Jonathan Joseph and Colin Wight, for example) have only recently engaged with the War on Terror, but have been more concerned with understanding and critically explaining ‘terrorism’ as a phenomenon, rather than analysing in depth the ways in which the neoliberal state deals with the ‘terrorists’.182

This thesis will, then, fulfil several unique but interconnected functions with regard to the extant literature on liberalism and state violence:

i) It will focus on how neoliberalism – as both an ideology and a mode of governmentality – relates to contemporary forms of liberal-democratic state violence.

ii) It will employ an approach to CDA which is explicitly tied to a critical realist social ontology and thus more rigorously established as a social scientific investigation.

iii) It will constitute a contribution to both the CDA approaches to liberal warfare and the War on Terror and recent critical realist engagements in this field.

iv) It will attempt to study both war and liberal-democratic state violence more generally, including ‘domestic’ instances within the borders of such states, and thus go some way toward transcending the dichotomous domestic/international thinking that has plagued the study of IR.

However, before a full methodological framework can be outlined for approaching this research problem, it is necessary to first elaborate on some of the key, contested, political concepts which have emerged. Terms like ‘neoliberalism’, ‘ideology’ and ‘governmentality’ have no neutral or ‘accepted’ definition. These are highly contested concepts, and while multifarious interpretations of their meanings are at play across the social sciences, it is vital that we engage in an attempt to delineate what these terms ‘mean’ for the project at hand. As Colin Wight points out with regard to ‘terrorism’ and the poverty of ‘terrorism studies’ (‘critical’ or otherwise), that to avoid definition altogether, to ‘decide it really is a problem

with no solution, but to carry on regardless’ does not really escape the problem of ontology, but instead ‘makes the definition implicit rather than explicit’.\textsuperscript{183} The next chapter will, therefore, explain what neoliberalism – as the central explanatory concept at stake here – means for the thesis at hand, that it might be considered causally efficacious in shaping a ‘way of war’.

3. WAYS OF SEEING, WAYS OF BEING: (RE-)THEORISING NEOLIBERALISM

3.1 INTRODUCTION: NEOLIBERALISM AS AN OBJECT OF RESEARCH

The methodological directions taken in later chapters of this thesis are informed by a series of prior theoretical reflections and decisions. With regard to the specific choice of a ‘critical discourse analytic’ (CDA) approach, Norman Fairclough, here influenced by Pierre Bourdieu, puts it this way:

Whether CDA itself is a suitable part of the combination of methods used in a research project can only be decided in the light of the progressive construction of the ‘object of research’ during the course of the research process. The construction of the object is inevitably a theoretically-informed process – it involves decisions about how to theorise one’s area of concern. 184

The decision to employ and develop CDA, and to attempt a more general approach to ‘practice analysis’, in the chapters that follow, is thus informed by precisely this kind of theorisation of the object of research, which is the task of this chapter. The aim here is to research and (re-)theorise neoliberalism, as the core object of the thesis. If the aims of the thesis as they have thus far been elaborated centre on explaining the influence of neoliberalism on the policies and practices of war and security in the post-Cold War West, then a full interrogation and construction of this concept will be necessary to make any such retroductive argument possible.

This chapter therefore begins by looking at what the term neoliberalism has thus far been understood to signify, how it has been deployed, and the ideas and practices it may refer to. Since the central concern of this thesis is to contribute to a critical explanation for the influence of something called ‘neoliberalism’ upon the discourse and practice of war and security, it is important to construct this object of research in advance of any empirical analysis. While definitions of social concepts cannot be ‘hard and fast’, but must rather remain malleable and open-ended, 185 it is nevertheless important to set some boundaries around what will be taken to constitute neoliberal thought and action, in order to limit the

184 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research, p. 211.
185 The reasons for this are elaborated further below, and in Chapter 4.
potential for a sort of ‘confirmation bias’, where every aspect of the discourse and practice of security and war can be ‘explained away’ by reference to neoliberalism. This is not to say that the analysis in later chapters cannot remain reflexive with regard to what neoliberalism is and how it functions. As Fairclough says in the quote above, constructing the objects of research is part of the process of doing research. If there were to be no ‘new’ material added in the analysis chapters of the thesis in terms of attributing particular discursive and practical phenomena to neoliberalism, it would make for very dull reading.

Neoliberalism, like all political ideas, has already been heavily ‘theorised’ or conceptualised in a variety of quite different directions, by a divergent range of scholars. The aim of this chapter is therefore a ‘re-theorisation’ of neoliberalism, since these other antecedent theories inevitably influence and frame the model developed here. However, the conceptualisation of neoliberalism that is developed in this chapter stands as an original contribution in its own right, going against the grain of some of the more rigid conceptual orthodoxies, instead favouring of a softer conceptual lens.

The argument that is developed in this chapter is for thinking neoliberalism not merely as a particular type of capitalist political-economic theory and practice. Rather, it is theorised as a whole set of interdependent ‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of being’, entailing and ideologically reproducing particular social ontologies and morphologies; a grouping of political mystifications and governmental rationalities that are wider-reaching than the economic doctrine of any particular neoliberal theorist, since they enable particular frames for understanding, explaining and representing the world and simultaneously constrain, through those same frames, the potential range of ways of acting in the world. In making this argument, the chapter draws upon critical explanatory concepts including Marxian notions of ideology and Foucauldian approaches to governmentality. To help to make this theoretical framework more capacious and also more intelligible, the terms ‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of being’ are deployed, the former inspired by the Marxist art criticism of John Berger and the latter by the ways in which Michel Foucault describes governmentality. While some attempts have already been made at marrying these two conceptual approaches, the model development here seeks to avoid the ‘vertical analogy’ to which they all succumb – whereby ideology is treated as a ‘top-down’ concept and governmentality as a ‘bottom-up’ one.
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first of these outlines a ‘brief genealogy’ of neoliberalism, avoiding a search for its ‘essence’ and instead looking at the emergence of the concept, its uses and limitations. The second section attempts to situate neoliberalism as a ‘critical explanatory concept’ for use in this thesis. This is achieved by first examining the current ‘state of the art’ with regard to critical theorisations of neoliberalism, focusing on the schism between ideology and governmentality approaches, and looking in detail at how each of these concepts might be used in thinking neoliberalism. Finally, in Section 3.4, a conceptualisation of neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality, or as neoliberal ways of seeing and being, is articulated.

3.2 SOME CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND

Rather than attempt here to provide an in-depth conceptual or practical history of neoliberalism, which scholars such as Jamie Peck have recently achieved to a high degree of sophistication, this section seeks instead to briefly establish some conceptual background to the discussion in this chapter.

Works like David Harvey’s *A Brief History of Neoliberalism* and Duménil and Lévy’s *The Crisis of Neoliberalism* seek to establish in some sense an historical essence of neoliberalism. By describing a set of historical changes and the development of a new political economic constellation as a period and phenomenon of neoliberalism, often by contrast to a period and phenomenon of social democracy, Keynesianism or welfarism, such works do usefully delineate many crucial social changes. However, in searching for the essence, origins and identity of neoliberalism in this historical way, such approaches imagine it to be a ‘thing’ to be ‘discovered’, and to the extent that they do so, they fail to adequately address their own role in constructing neoliberalism as a concept; in making the object of their research.

The aim in this chapter is not to pretend that neoliberalism is a simple thing existing out there in the world, and as such is easily discernible and describable, but rather to produce a particular theorisation of neoliberalism, an initial element of which involves considering problems with current theorisations. The approach in this initial section might therefore be considered closer to a ‘brief genealogy’ than a brief history in the sense Harvey intends it. Reflecting on Friedrich Nietzsche’s genealogical approach to morality, Michel Foucault notes

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186 Jamie Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason* ( ).
that the crucial difference with those approaches that instead sought to discover the true ‘origins’ of morality lies in Nietzsche’s rejection of the ‘attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their carefully protected identities; because this search assumes the existence of immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession’.¹⁸⁷ The point is not to solve the riddle ‘what is neoliberalism?’ Foucault is interested in undertaking a ‘genealogy of problems, of problématiques’ rather than finding ‘solutions’, and so it is for this chapter – the point is to look at how neoliberalism has been conceived of, problematized, by others, in order to further problematize it here.¹⁸⁸ It is fair to say that ‘neoliberalism’ is, first of all, a word – a linguistic sign. It is a relative neologism made by prefixing ‘liberal’ with ‘neo’, and it is given meaning through the pre-existing semiotic frameworks that allow this conjunction to ‘make sense’ to us. Beyond this semiotic phenomenon itself, what social phenomena we take the word to refer to, describe or explain is up to us. This is, nevertheless a (very) brief genealogy. Whereas Foucault insists that genealogy ‘requires patience […] and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material’,¹⁸⁹ the rather more limited aim here is to connect and critique some of the key reference points in the extant thinking on neoliberalism, in order to allow for the author’s own theorisation to emerge from the critical cleavages that are thus opened up.

The term ‘neoliberalism’ has, since the 1990s, been widely employed by scholars of sociology, politics, international relations, political economy, geography, development, education and gender studies, along with countless political activists inside and outside academia. Its use has, more often than not, been critical, pejorative even; a label for policies, discourses, practices and ideas that scholars suspect of being more aligned to the interests and expansion of markets and capital than the wellbeing of people.

But neoliberalism appears to be many things to many people. Its use in diverse and apparently contradictory contexts by social scientists has been recognised in several studies of its conceptual and phenomenal development. The aim here is not to define what neoliberalism ‘really is’ – such an exercise would in any event be futile, since, like all signifiers, it has no fixed, permanent or eternal ‘content’ as a term, and cannot escape the ‘struggles

¹⁸⁸ Michel Foucault, ‘On the Genealogy of Ethics’, The Foucault Reader, p. 343
¹⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 76.
over meaning’ to which it is subjected. Instead, the aim is to recover an analytically productive and coherent model for understanding neoliberalism as a critical explanatory concept to be deployed in the research project at hand.

In a 2009 article, Taylor Boas and Jordan Gans-Morse present the results of a content analysis investigation of scholarly articles on neoliberalism across a range of journals in the fields of development studies, Latin American studies and comparative politics. The authors are, furthermore, frustrated that they ‘did not find a single article focused on the definition and usage of neoliberalism’ in their sample, and ‘nor are we aware of one published elsewhere’. Since the 1990s, when its use in Anglophone academia became widespread, neoliberalism has become a heavily used term in academic (and activist) writing in fields such as sociology, international political economy, geography, education, law, philosophy, planning and architecture, organisational studies, history and gender studies. Like all such terms, what it is supposed to signify has become more, rather than less, contested over time, with Clive Barnett going so far as to suggest we accept that ‘there is no such thing as neoliberalism!’.

One commonplace, and deeply problematic, conceptualisation of neoliberalism, variants of which are articulated by, among others, Harvey, Steger and Roy and Stedman Jones, considers it as simply ‘a theory of political-economic practices’. Specifically, it is understood by these scholars as, in Steger’s terms, the popularisation of the ‘laissez-faire economic theories of Anglo-American economists such as Friedrich Hayek’, and of their policy

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192 Ibid., p.138.
193 Boas and Gans-Morse find that, whereas uses of the term ‘neoliberalism’ in academic journal articles numbered well below 100 per year between 1980 and 1990, an ‘explosion’ of usage from 1991 onward led to around 1,000 uses per year by the early 2000s.
198 Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*, p. 2.
implemmentation in the political leadership of figures like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.\footnote{Manfred Steger, Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism, (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2005), p. 10}

The reason for describing such a conceptualisation of neoliberalism – as a policy renaissance for laissez-faire – as problematic becomes apparent if we let Hayek ‘speak for himself’:

Probably nothing has done so much harm to the liberal cause as the wooden insistence of some liberals on certain rough rules of thumb, above all the principle of laissez-faire.\footnote{Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 13}

Hayek is deeply dissatisfied with the laissez-faire ‘classical’ liberalism of the sort Adam Smith advocated. He views it as an awkward but necessary phase in the development of ‘free’ liberal societies, as one of the ‘crude rules in which the principles of economic policy of the nineteenth century were expressed’, rather than a timeless principle to be exalted and propagated in the twentieth century. The slim and often polemical volume for which he became best known, The Road to Serfdom (1944), was addressed to ‘the socialists of all parties’ because Hayek saw a certain homology in the collectivisms at the root of Stalinism, the emergent Western socialism or ‘social-democracy’, and Hitler’s fascism. A philosophical, political and methodological individualist, Hayek was deeply disturbed by the tendency toward social-democracy as a sort of ‘middle ground’ between socialism and unrestrained capitalism in post-war Europe. Just six months after the German surrender, he voiced these fears:

[I]t has come about that under the sign of “neither individualism nor socialism” we are in fact rapidly moving from a society of free individuals toward one of a completely collectivist character.\footnote{Friedrich Hayek, Individualism and the Economic Order, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1948), p.1}

But classical liberalism, with its laissez-faire and ‘invisible hand’ would not suffice, in Hayek’s view, as a means of avoiding this disastrous ‘collectivist’ future. He noted that there is ‘a difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible, and passively accepting institutions as they are’.\footnote{Hayek, Road to Serfdom, p. 13} Opting squarely
for the former strategy, Hayek argues that ‘where competition can be created, it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other’ [emphasis added].

Hayek’s concern is certainly to eliminate any elements of economic ‘planning’ (with a few small exceptions, such as – potentially at least – monetary policy) in favour of a competitive market system. He opposes policies aiming at ‘full employment’, the notion of job ‘security’, insured by society via the state, and the emergent forms of unemployment benefit. Such ‘state intervention’ in the supposedly autonomous realm of the economic runs counter to his notion of a labour market in which each individual homo economicus must take on not only the ‘choice’ of employment, but also the associated ‘risk’ (of choosing low-paid employment or employment which might become superfluous). Indeed it is in this very risk that Hayek locates ‘economic freedom’ and ultimately ‘political freedom’ itself. In this sense, Hayek’s neoliberalism is a ‘theory of political economic practices’ of the sort Harvey is referring to. But to speak of what has been called ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ today is not to speak of this theory, but the rather of the transformation of political economic horizons, subjects and action that it has helped to induce.

Neoliberalism – both in theory and practice – is absolutely not about laissez-faire or the simple ‘rolling back’ of the state to allow the market to replace it. It is not predicated on a belief in an ‘invisible hand’. Hayek wants to actively make and promote an individualist ideal type, a form of homo economicus, susceptible to ‘inducement’ and ‘incentives’ within a competitive system. While Hayek happily admitted to his most influential early text being fundamentally ‘a political book’ that is ‘derived from certain ultimate values’, many of its principles are now commonly taken to be ‘value-free’ truisms. Neoliberal discourse today, as Pierre Bourdieu has argued, conceives of itself as ‘the scientific description of reality’. Useful conceptualisations of neoliberalism today must therefore account for how this state of affairs has come to pass; which is to say, they must account for the ways in which

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203 Ibid., p. 27.
204 Ibid., p. 91.
205 Ibid., pp. 92-93.
206 Ibid., p. 75.
207 Ibid., p. 90.
208 Ibid., p. v.
neoliberalism has re-shaped widespread patterns of ways of seeing and being-in the social world. Far from the ‘negative’ hands-off approach of classical liberalism, neoliberalism is a ‘positive’ programme for change.\footnote{Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 14} As the other doyen of neoliberal theory, Chicago School economist Milton Friedman puts it:

“Chicago” stands for belief in the efficacy of the free market as a means of organising resources, for scepticism about government intervention into economic affairs, [...] for an approach that takes seriously the use of economic theory as a tool for analysing a startlingly wide range of concrete problems.\footnote{Milton Friedman cited in: Warren J. Samuels, The Chicago School of Political Economy, (Transaction Publishers, 1992)}

‘Chicagans’, as Warren J. Samuels calls them, are a set of political-economists agreed upon a general ‘presumption in favour of the market, that is, for market solutions’.\footnote{Samuels, The Chicago School of Political Economy, p. 9} Crucially, while they understand the ‘market’ as resting firmly within the conceptually discrete domain of the ‘economic’ and not in the far messier, less rule-governed domain of the ‘political’, there is nonetheless a drive to marketise – to bring other social activity than traditional forms of ‘trade’ under the logic of the market – in their work, inasmuch as they ‘believe in the market system and voluntary exchange as the most efficient and widely equitable modes of organising human activity’.\footnote{Ibid.} The role of government becomes that of a sort regulatory body for the market, a ‘forum for determining the “rules of the game” and [...] an umpire to interpret and enforce the rules decided on’,\footnote{Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2002), p. 15} and an instrument for injecting competitive market dynamics ever more areas of social life.

Perhaps the key aspect of neoliberalism that is missed, then, in conceiving of it merely as a renewal of laissez-faire theory and ‘free market’ economics following the period of post-war ‘social’ liberalism, is its moral dimension. The fundamental recommendation of the market as a basic premise for social interaction rests on presuppositions about the moral ‘goodness’ of individualism and intra-social competition. A key player in the rise of actually existing neoliberalism in the UK was the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in London, which had been established as one of the world’s first ‘think tanks’ in 1955. The IEA’s founder and
first Director (and Britain’s first ‘factory farmer’), Antony Fisher had been so impressed by *The Road to Serfdom* that he visited Hayek at the LSE to seek advice on pursuing a political career. Fisher was advised personally by Hayek that, if he wanted to realise the neoliberal political-economic transformations hinted at in *The Road to Serfdom*, he should avoid becoming a politician and instead reach out to ‘the intellectuals, the teachers and writers’ with ‘reasoned argument’, and that with this achieved, politicians and society ‘will follow’. Fisher therefore founded the IEA as an organisation that could sit outside of formal political structures, but promote neoliberal political-economic ideas among policy-makers, politicians, academics and journalists. A central goal of the IEA to ‘promote personal liberty’, specifically by:

 [...] persuading our fellow men not only that free market allocation of goods and services is economically efficient and wealth-enhancing but also, and much more importantly, that *market allocation is morally superior to other methods of exchange* [emphasis added].

In the 1970s the IEA was elevated from obscure think tank to a sort of oracle of the new economic and social science. As John Blundell, Director General of the IEA from 1993 to 2009, puts it:

[T]he 1970s must be viewed as the IEA’s finest hour. [...] Inflation, recession and the clear failure of big government were the background as Seldon’s [another of the IEA’s founding economists] shells began to reach their targets, littering the landscape with shattered collectivist concepts and exploded myths, blowing apart the postwar consensus. In 1975, the *Sunday Telegraph* called the IEA a centre of useful economic activity. In 1976, the *Times* said it had become the source of ‘a good deal of the most influential economic thinking’. And in 1977, the *Financial Times* wrote that it was the organisation to have most influenced ‘public economic understanding’.

The neoliberalism that has come to pass has therefore entailed a transformation of more than just ‘the economy’, narrowly conceived, but also of the very worldviews and moral ‘imaginaries’ of individuals and societies and the practices these views engender. This is why it is disappointing that even some of the most sophisticated theorisations of neoliberalism,

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216 Ibid, p. 17
217 Ibid, p. 11
218 Ibid, p. 26
such as the critical geographical one proffered by scholars like Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, which are capable of conceiving of the ‘positive’ nature of really existing neoliberalism as a ‘rolling-out’ as well as a ‘rolling-back’, nevertheless remain wedded to a narrow essentialist conception of neoliberalism as ‘free-market economic theory, manufactured in Chicago’.  

Competition is held by Hayek to be the ideal, ‘superior’, organising principle for social affairs, ‘because it is the only method by which our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority,’ but effective competition must sometimes be ‘created’ through intervention, and where it is, ‘it is a better way of guiding individual efforts than any other’.  

Hayek was even willing to reconcile himself to economic ‘planning’, so long as this was exclusively ‘planning for competition’; in other words, a sort of moral government or intervention. Our conduct as individuals is to be guided by the market, which offers both the greatest individual freedom (or the least ‘coercion’) and the best guidance to acceptable behaviour (through the supply-and-demand model).

The moralising tone of Hayek and Friedman, but also, for example, of Margaret Thatcher’s government, which was concerned with ‘responsibilising’ individuals for their own socio-economic conditions (because ‘there is no such thing as society’), is something like an attempt at ‘re-programming’ individual subjects themselves. Dissatisfied with the failure of actual people to fit into the ideal world described by classical liberals, neoliberals seek to actively remake ‘human nature’ itself, to mould it around the figure of homo economicus – the exchange-making, flexible, risk-bearing, individually responsible heroic and atomistic abstract individual of liberal economic theory. Such a re-programming requires activity on a much deeper level, and any critical explanatory concept of neoliberalism must therefore be ready to consider how such effects can be brought off on subjects.

3.3 RETHINKING NEOLIBERALISM: CRITICAL EXPLANATION, IDEOLOGY AND GOVERNMENTALITY

In critically discussing what liberalism and neoliberalism means to others, the point has been to open up a space from which to begin the articulation of a particular theorisation. This theorisation, outlined below, relies upon two of the most popular critical
conceptualisations of neoliberalism today: neoliberalism as ideology and neoliberalism as
governmentality.

Chapter Four of this thesis (‘From metatheory to methods’) will elaborate in detail a
‘retroductive’ conception of social scientific causal explanation, rooted in a critical realist
social ontology. However, in broad terms, this critical realist approach belongs to a wider
school of thought in the philosophy of social science, which has been well summarised by
Jason Glynos and David Howarth in their concept of ‘critical explanation’.222 The point of this
conjunction of ‘critique’ and ‘explanation’ is precisely to challenge the ‘naturalist’ view,
propagated by Kant, Weber, and countless positivist and neo-positivist social scientists today,
that a ‘value-free’ study of the social is possible; that judgement and explanation can and
must be separated in studying the social world.223 All social scientific explanations, Glynos and
Howarth contend, involve a degree of justification (of the objects of research, for example;
just as the first chapter of this thesis justified problematizing the ‘neoliberal way of war’).
They are premised on ontological and epistemological presuppositions about the form and
intelligibility of social ‘things’.

Furthermore, as critical realists note, given the impossibility of ‘closed system’
experimentation (of the sort carried out in natural science) in the social world, social scientific
concepts and events cannot even approximate the sort of stability or regularity found in the
natural sciences. Indeed, many such concepts are ‘essentially contested’.224 What ‘democracy’
signifies can be shown to be radically contingent upon time, location, culture and subjects.
Democracy meant something very different to Pericles than what it meant to George W. Bush.
It means something else to present day Marxists or anarchists than to present day liberals. In
some societies, it has no meaning, it does not exist as a concept at all. Given this radical
contingency based upon historically specific circumstances, inter-subjective meaning-making,
ideological framings and so on, how can ‘democracy’ possibly be isolated, operationalised and
ultimately quantified or ‘measured’? To do so would involve being utterly, perhaps wilfully,
blind to the actuality of social practices in all their diversity and specificity; it would be to
ignore the social world as such and to instead attempt to foist a dead abstract concept upon

222 Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*.
the living, changing mass of actual people and the complex relations between them. How is such an approach ‘social science’ at all, when it hides from the social world, effectively ‘looking the other way’ in order to achieve its results? Yet this is precisely what much of the original ‘democratic peace’ scholarship in IR does. It makes democracy its ‘independent variable’, measuring change in the ‘dependent variable’, war, against this; which is to say, it develops a measurement of democracy based on value-laden, normative beliefs and then pretends to construct a ‘value-free’ causal explanation. And in creating this explanatory narrative about how democracies do not go to war with one another – in trying to make this narrative compelling – such scholarship covertly engages in a logic of justification, rather than the simple logic of discovery it claims to deal in. The point of a critical explanatory approach is to recognise and embrace the dialectical, reflexive and inextricable roles of such allegedly discrete logics as justification and discovery, fact and value, knowledge and interpretation, or theory and practice, in social scientific explanation.

Having rejected the artificial and unsustainable hard barrier between explanation and critique, the question remains; what does a ‘critical explanation’ look like? Chapter Four answers this question in greater detail, but one element of that answer is relevant to the discussion of neoliberalism here. A critical explanation should be a retroductive explanation. That is to say that, whereas a deductively reasoned explanation ‘purports to prove what is the case’ and an inductively reasoned one ‘purports to approximate what is the case’, a retroductively reasoned explanation ‘conjectures what is the case’. It does this, in critical realist terms, by working ‘backward’ or ‘upward’ from some set of empirically observable social phenomena in order to postulate a real causal tendency or mechanism that shapes it. In one sense, this type of explanation can be considered ‘critical’ in the context of the widest notion of a ‘critical tradition’, including, for example, Kant’s model of critique, with its transcendental injunction to reflect upon ‘conditions of possibility’. What is it that makes certain social practices and events possible; what other social things shape, limit, constrain and enable particular practices and events? In postulating an answer to any given specific question of this nature, we tend to use what this thesis refers to as a ‘critical explanatory concept’.

225 Glynos and Howarth, Logic of Critical Explanation.
3.3.1 Marx versus Foucault? Critical conceptualisations of neoliberalism

Critical conceptualisations and explanations of neoliberalism today – that is, conceptualisations aimed at critically explaining the sorts of social and political-economic changes that are discussed above by reference to this concept – tend to fall into two camps. On the one hand there are those whose Marxian (often Gramscian) approach to social science frames their conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a dominant or hegemonic ‘ideology’. On the other hand, there are those whose Foucauldian inclinations in social theory and research steer them toward a conceptualisation of neoliberalism as a form of ‘governmentality’.

Governmentality approaches to thinking about neoliberalism, which have proliferated since the mid-2000s, have often sought to reject the Marxian understandings of neoliberalism as ideology as simplistic and even reifying; Foucauldian criticism has focused on the idea that ‘neoliberal ideology’ is conceived of as a monolithic and unidirectional, and above all theoretically and practically coherent ‘programmatic’ phenomenon. They emphasise instead the partial and unstable successes of neoliberal governmentality, its location in ‘everyday’ social practices, and therefore also the active participation of ‘governed’ subjects in the activity of neoliberal government.

It is the contention of this thesis that this division and rivalry is not only crude and often based on weak theorisations of the ‘other’ approach by Marxian and Foucauldian scholars alike, but that it is unnecessary since, far from being mutually exclusive, the two concepts can be very productively entwined. One of the claims of the thesis is to push past the unproductive state of the art when it comes to critically conceptualising neoliberalism; getting beyond the ‘ideology versus governmentality’ or ‘Marx versus Foucault’ deadlock, but without opting for a cheap ‘third way’ between the two.

Clive Barnett is right to criticise, in several articles, a tendency toward blinkered eclecticism by some ‘leftist’ (Marxist and poststructuralist) academics in the early 2000s who jumble together Marxian and Foucauldian concepts in describing neoliberalism. However, whereas he rejects attempts to foster a productive dialogue between the two approaches on the grounds that it would require the development of a synthetic coherent ‘social theory’, the aim here is different. The point is to see how instead of a social theory, the two approaches might be employed together in providing useful but different critical explanatory concepts (as
defined above) for exploring the *problematique* of neoliberalism and its causal influence on the discourse and practice of war and security today.

### 3.3.2 Neoliberalism as Ideology

The notion of a ‘death of ideology’ has loomed over Western politics and political theory from as early as the 1960s, when the sociologist Daniel Bell first declared it. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s, in what Francis Fukuyama famously called the ‘unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism’, supposedly signalled a Hegelian ‘end of history’ in the West, and shift guaranteed by a new-found certainty that these ‘victorious’ political-economic beliefs were the best to be had. Tony Blair, the strident political reformer responsible for eliminating the principle of public ownership from the British Labour party’s manifesto, was to become well-known as a believer in the death of ideology, while the term ‘ideology’ in academic discourse was to lose much of its political edge, becoming a textbook byword for ‘doctrine’. Politicians accuse one another of making ‘ideological’ decisions and policies, since the term is inherently pejorative, seen as a marker of the old-fashioned and ultimately dangerous, even genocidal political projects of the early twentieth century, communism and fascism.

So why seek to resuscitate a ‘dead’ concept, and especially one that died for such apparently good reasons? The term can only be useful if it describes something that other conceptual categories do not adequately include. Given that it was Marx and Marxists who reinvigorated and recontextualised the concept of ideology, from the mid-19th century until its supposed death at the end of the 20th century, it is worth first thinking about which, if any, elements of Marx’s concept of ideology might be useful in the theorisation of neoliberalism today.

In *The German Ideology*, Marx and Engels provide one of the most concise outlines of their historical materialist philosophy and methodology that can be found anywhere in their oeuvre. This work includes some of their most widely known ideas and snappiest sound bites. It is also a crucial repository for their theory of ideology. The book begins with an outline of

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228 Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’.
230 For example Andrew Heywood and Michael Freedan.
the ‘first premises of the materialist method’, in opposition to the philosophical idealism and the ‘philosophic charlatanry, [...] the pettiness, the parochial narrowness’ of the ‘Young Hegelian’ movement current in German at the time Marx and Engels were writing.\footnote{Marx and Engels, \textit{The German Ideology}, 40.} 

The problem with the idealism inherent to popular, Hegelian currents in German philosophy of the mid-19th century is, for Marx and Engels, that it ‘descends from heaven to earth’, whereas their materialism aims to ‘ascend from earth to heaven’.\footnote{Ibid., 47.} Where the Young Hegelian idealists begin from great general abstractions (the idea, the spirit, the absolute and so on) in order to explain particular aspects of the social world, Marx and Engels seek to begin from the ‘concrete’ premises of smaller-scale actual social phenomena, and to retroductively derive or posit general abstractions from that sociological analysis. This is the structure of Marx’s \textit{Capital}, too, and the reason that \textit{Volume I} begins by looking at commodities like iron and corn, and at their exchange, in minute detail.\footnote{Marx, \textit{Capital: Volume I}.} Proceeding from this analysis of concrete social forms, Marx is better able to elaborate his critical account of capitalism as a structuring social force that transforms use-value into exchange-value and thereby creates the commodity form and ‘commodity fetishism’ – the transposition of imagined social relations onto these objects.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 164-165.} In \textit{The German Ideology}, the materialist premise underpinning this approach is summarised in the well-known statement that ‘life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life’.\footnote{Marx and Engels, \textit{The German Ideology}, p. 47.} The ideal, in this view, appears as an effect of the material; ideas are reflections of material, socio-economic conditions.

Ideology, then, for Marx and Engels, consists in those ways of seeing that make ‘men \[sic\] and their circumstances appear upside down, as in a \textit{camera obscura’}.\footnote{Ibid.} Ideology thus disguises the relationship between a given mode of production (which includes the very ways in which human life itself is reproduced) as the ‘basis of the State’ and the ‘idealistic superstructure’ of civil society that is ‘determined’ by that basis.\footnote{Ibid., p. 57.} The task of ideology critique, in this view, is to refuse the temptation to ‘explain practice from the idea’ and to
instead attempt to explain ‘the formation of ideas from material practice’. Bourgeois ideology consists in those ways of thinking that render civil society (as the ‘idealistic superstructure’) the engine of social activity and change, and disguise how far social change is actually limited and determined by material conditions. At any given time in a class-based society, we will find that particular sets of ideas constitute a ruling ideology that corresponds to the interests of the ruling class.

So this initial Marxian theory of ideology is the one stemming from the much-derided ‘base-superstructure’ model of social activity and change. Key criticisms of this way of thinking have centred on its overly ‘economic’ focus on production as the driving force behind social phenomena, and its seemingly rigid and unidirectional ‘determinism’ as a model of social morphology. Especially from the 1980s onward and with the advent of second and third-wave feminisms, these criticisms coalesced on the failure of such an account of society – and such a concept of ideology – to explain the myriad ways in which ‘civil society’ includes oppressive practices like sexism that have no clear roots in a ‘mode of production’. We will return to and address this failure later in this reconstruction of the concept of ideology.

While *The German Ideology* is often thought of as Marx and Engels’ key conceptual text on ideology, the concept of ideology permeates almost their entire collected works. In looking at how ideology figures in their critique of political economy, we can glimpse some of the utility that remains in Marx and Engels’ conceptualisation.

In *The Grundrisse*, Marx’s critique of Smith and Ricardo – the founding fathers of modern capitalist economic ‘science’, whose ideas of ‘free markets’ and ‘comparative advantage’ continue to inform the thinking of contemporary economists and businesspeople around the world – rests upon their abstract, idealised and ahistorical notion of the human individual. Beginning from the assumption that ‘society’ is no more than a set of such pre-existing, rational individual actors – a notion which, Marx notes, only came about as a complete imaginary in the eighteenth century, but had been in development since the sixteenth – these thinkers retrospectively project their model of the ‘Natural Individual’ into the past, positing it as the ‘eternal’ and basic building block of ‘civil society’. Re-asserting

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238 Ibid., p. 58.
239 Marx, Grundrisse, p. 83.
240 Ibid., p. 84.
the Aristotelian notion of the human being as a political animal, as ‘an animal which can individuate itself only in the midst of society’, Marx refutes this eighteenth century conceptualisation of the relationship between individual and society as ‘twaddle’, yet accepts that it has been ‘common to each new epoch to this day’ and had, by the nineteenth century, come to form the ‘centre of the most modern economics’.

And it is clear that this atomistic ideology persists in the work of today’s economists. One need only turn to a contemporary economics textbook to find abundant evidence of it. One popular textbook begins by explaining that there is ‘no mystery to what an ‘economy’ is’, since it is ‘just a group of people interacting with each other’ and therefore ‘the behaviour of an economy reflects the behaviour of the individuals who make up the economy’. The starting point of the study of economics should then be, according to the textbook’s authors, the ‘principles of individual decision-making’, of which they are interested in four. Here, immediately, we find the problem of abstraction. Individuals only ever make decisions in the context and milieu, the historically and culturally specific circumstances, of society. To begin a study of ‘the economy’, which the authors clearly conceive of as a social phenomenon, not by looking at the social circumstances and relations at the time, but instead by speculating on the mental processes that might be (or, in the view of the economist, must be) inherent to all people at all times, is to posit an abstract, ahistorical and individualist theory of ‘human nature’. This route, which is not really ‘social science’ at all, since it does not begin by even attempting to look at social conditions on the ground, inevitably leads to a series of problems. The four principles the authors proclaim are: ‘people face trade-offs’, ‘the cost of something is what you give up to get it’, ‘rational people think at the margin’ and ‘people respond to incentives’.

We need not deny that ‘the behaviour of an economy reflects the behaviour of the individuals who make up the economy’; the social activity we traditionally deem ‘economic’ – production, consumption and exchange – exists only in everyday actual social practices, the things individual human beings do. But the relationship surely cannot be one-way. We should

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241 Marx uses the French ‘fadaise’.
242 Ibid., p. 83.
243 Ibid., p. 84.
245 Ibid., pp. 4-7.
equally stress that ‘the behaviour of individuals reflects the economy’, in the sense that if there exists an ‘economy’ at all – that is, a relatively stable or structured *mode* of producing, consuming and exchanging things – then its very (abstract) existence demands of individuals born into its influence a certain compliance. If I don’t take part in the structured ‘economic’ system of capitalist wage labour, selling my time and bodily function to assist an enterprise, I will struggle to survive. In any case, the wider social world into which I am born, including what Louis Althusser called the ‘ideological state apparatus’\(^{246}\) (educational and religious institutions, and so on), ensures that I am aware of the ‘benefits’ and ‘naturalness’ of wage labour, the ‘freedom’ inherent to it, and also of the risks, forfeits and punishments I will be liable for if I fail to engage. For Ricardo, Marx notes, wage labour is seen as ‘a natural, not as a historically specific social form [*Gesellschaftsform*]’.\(^{247}\) Ricardian economics is therefore a way of thinking that can be conceived of as ideological, since it relies upon and simultaneously reproduces or promotes a naturalised understanding of individuals and society that lends itself to the reproduction of social inequality, domination and exploitation.

If neoliberalism can be construed as what Marx called a ‘new epoch’, then the twaddle of the abstract, ‘eternalised’ individual is certainly as common to this epoch as it was to the previous one. But we must, like Marx, be prepared to delineate some of the specificities of this understanding of the individual, for if nothing had changed about it, we would not be in a ‘new epoch’ at all. The question is, then, what is specific about the neoliberal way of seeing the individual and its relation to society? This is the core of our mission to understand neoliberalism as ideology, and it is this understanding that can inform an assessment of neoliberal ways of being-individual – in other words, neoliberal subjectivities.

In many instances, the term ‘ideology’ is used in both academic literature and the wider public sphere of the mass media and political debate to denote something roughly equivalent to ‘fixed political doctrine’. The structure of the popular undergraduate textbook *Political Ideologies* by Andrew Heywood is an excellent example. The book enumerates and analyses a host of ‘political ideologies’ from liberalism and conservatism to socialism, anarchism and fascism.\(^{248}\) It is not necessarily wrong to say that such ‘isms’ can be called

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\(^{247}\) Marx, *Grundrisse*, p. 331.

\(^{248}\) Andrew Heywood, *Political Ideologies* (3\(^{rd}\) Edn), (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2003).
ideologies, but this analytic framework leaves little room for an understanding of ideology that goes beyond simply ‘a set of shared political beliefs’. Inscribed into the structure of this framework is something which might be described, to use Laclau and Mouffe’s term, as a ‘logic of equivalence’. Ideologies are, in this view, marked by difference, with distinct and divergent imaginary bases, goals, interpretive and representative frameworks, yet they are fundamentally equivalent, to the extent that they are ‘listed’ as a plurality within a category. This is what John Thompson calls the ‘neutral conception of ideology’, which describes various mental phenomena as ‘ideology’ or ‘ideological’ but without the necessary adjunct that such phenomena may be ‘misleading, illusory or aligned with the interests of any particular group’. It is what Thompson calls the ‘critical’ conception of ideology that is to be salvaged for this thesis; that which connects it to the functioning of power in language and symbolisation, and to the naturalising of unequal power relations. This is the point at which it becomes potentially useful for thinking about the neoliberal project for ‘re-programming’ human nature discussed above.

Perhaps the most fundamental basis of objections to the use of the critical concept of ideology – and to Marxian projects more broadly – by other ‘critical’ scholars working today is the perception that it constitutes part of a wider preoccupation with establishing ultimate ‘truth’. The rise of scientism and what Foucault calls the ‘will to truth’ is deeply problematic for poststructuralist scholars, and Marxism and the Marxian concept of ideology are seen to fall within this movement – precisely the same movement that produced liberal biopolitics and neoliberal governmentality.

What is missed here is that Marxian social science is a science like no other. As we shall see in greater detail in Chapter Four, the retroductive and inherently speculative nature of Marxian social inquiry, and the stratified social ontology according to which we can never

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251 Ibid.
fully or perfectly ‘know’ the world (though its real existence and independence from our permanently shifting and partial knowledge of it existence can nonetheless be asserted) negates this criticism. Underpinned by a radically different – and, this thesis contends, ‘critical realist’ – ontology and concept of causation than the positivist science that informs liberal and other mainstream accounts of the social world, a Marxian approach which employs the concept of ideology is premised on a form of speculative reasoning and on a principle of fallibility. In this sense its ‘will to truth’ is stillborn.

To imagine a critical concept of ideology to be equivalent to ‘falsehood’, ‘untruth’, ‘unreality’ or ‘illusion’ is patently an error. As Gramsci notes in his rebuttal of ‘vulgar’ materialisms, from a Marxist perspective ideological ‘superstructures’ are an ‘objective and operative reality’, to the extent that ‘men [sic] become conscious of their social position, and therefore of their tasks, on the terrain of ideologies, which is no small affirmation of reality’.255 To put it another way, borrowing from perhaps the pre-eminent theorist of ideology in the present day, Slavoj Žižek: ‘the concept of ideology must be disengaged from the ‘representationalist’ problematic: ideology has nothing to do with ‘illusion’, with a mistaken, distorted representation of its social content’ [emphasis in original].256

The concept of ideology is useful for distinguishing between those ways of seeing (like neoliberal economic ‘science’) which serve only to reproduce a particular hierarchical and exploitative social order, and those which instead seek – through retroductive ‘critical explanation’, or simply ‘critique’ – to reveal the operation of those social structures and practices of dominance. It is not, however, a concept aimed simply at mobilising ‘truth’ against ‘falsehood’, as many of its critics, including Foucault, imply. Indeed, it is correct to say – as Eagleton and others do – that ‘ideological’ dictums can be very much ‘true’ in the historical context in which they are spoken. For example, to say ‘it’s a dog-eat-dog world out there!’ in the context of a neoliberal society where individuals are incentivised to compete with one another in more and more aspects of social life, may well be ‘true’. The critical concept of ideology is not, therefore, intended in this thesis to be set-up in stark contradistinction to an acritical concept of ‘truth’, as poststructuralist critics of the theory of ideology have sometimes suggested. As Eagleton points out, ideology is not simply ‘baseless

illusion’ but rather ‘a solid reality, an active material force’ and though ideology ‘often or typically involves falsity, distortion and mystification [...] it does not follow from this, however, that all ideological language necessarily involves falsehood. This contextualisation and historicisation is key to the Marxian project. Ideologically charged statements ‘may be true to society as at present constituted, but false in so far as they thereby serve to block off the possibility of a transformed state of affairs’.

The second key criticism of the concept of ideology to be addressed, the second reason we are supposed not to mourn its ‘death’, lies in the economic determinism that allegedly inheres to it. As the foregoing discussion noted at length, neoliberalism must be about more than a mode of production or a market mechanism if it is to be a helpful critical explanatory concept. So if ideology is to be rendered a useful conceptual category within which to frame neoliberalism, it too must be able to escape the confines of economism. We need a concept of ideology that could describe any way of seeing that is causally efficacious in bringing about social relations of domination and exploitation – a racist ideology, a sexist ideology, and so on, if we are to be able to account in detail for the moralising aspects of neoliberalism. In this view, ideology need not be reductionist – a concept employed to reduce all social domination to a question of capital or a ‘base/superstructure’ social ontology. Instead, intersectionality can be accounted for within a critical conceptualisation of ideology. One ideological way of seeing may privilege a particular class or gender, while another might privilege a particular sexual orientation or species; more likely any given ideology will cut across many of these areas.

Michèle Barrett describes just such an intersectional concept of ideology, which she insists must be called ‘post-Marxist’, since ‘any Marxist theory of ideology coalesces around the point of class interest as the dynamic force behind mystification and this is simply inadequate’. Barrett, whose life’s work has been devoted to addressing the tension between Marxism and feminism in various ways, is of course right to highlight the problems of a narrow, class-based view of the sources of political power and social domination. Sexism and patriarchy, like racism and xenophobia, predate capitalism – perhaps even class societies.

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258 Ibid., p. 27.
To suggest otherwise is at best naïve and at worst a disingenuous attempt to make a critique of political economy a total explanation of the sort usually offered up by religious doctrines. Marx did not explain sexism, or racism, and though capitalism may be powerfully gendered and racist, and may thrive on the social divisions that sexism and racism maintain, it did not ‘create’ them. This is why an account of ideology – what might be called the ‘orthodox’ or ‘vulgar’ Marxist concept of ideology – that consists merely in that which is generated by, and in its turn serves to obscure, class relations, is not acceptable.

But ideology remains, for Barrett, a useful concept precisely because of its reference to a social function of ‘mystification’, to the ‘discursive and significatory mechanisms that may occlude, legitimate, naturalise or universalise in a variety of different ways’. This, she argues, is the ‘retrievable core of the meaning of the term ideology’. To the extent that ideology functions along class lines, some of Marx’s original analysis still holds; people living in capitalist societies tend to identify as ‘freedom’ that which is their very unfreedom – the freedom to choose ones path in life by selling one’s labour (i.e. ‘choosing’ a career). But since the ‘choice’ is really one between wage labour, on the one hand, or poverty, insecurity, destitution, and ostracism on the other hand, it is hard to locate any ‘freedom’ in it. This is a version of what Lacan calls a ‘forced choice’, the imagined choice between taking part in the symbolic order or not, a choice that can never involve any real choosing since we are always-already constituted by the very symbolic order of which we imagine our membership to be optional, and where actually failing to take part in the order is considered psychosis. Working for an employer, selling one’s (alienated) labour and so on, are considered natural and an expression of freedom, and doing otherwise is seen as an aberration, which is why societies are more willing to tolerate worklessness among the mentally and physically disabled. A function of ideology is the naturalisation of this sort of social order, an order of bosses and workers. Again though, this is not to say that ideology is an ‘illusion’ or ‘falsehood’ as such, since in capitalist societies the choice between different lines of work – however limited and determined by birthright and socio-economic background – actually is the main freedom experienced by citizens, it is the key area in which choices are made, for the very reason that the alternative is madness, poverty and outcasting.

260 Ibid.
Equally, though, we can see ideological mystification at work on very different matrices than those of class. For example, the sort of ideological thinking required to maintain patriarchy, as opposed to capitalism, might include the contemporary idea that to be a ‘strong’ and ‘independent’, even *liberated*, woman, one must undertake recreational pole-dancing, take part in ‘Girls Gone Wild’-style amateur pornography and generally render one’s body no more than the object of the male gaze. A hyper-sexualised culture and feminine subjectivity are constructed as ultimately ‘natural’; expressions of human sexual nature that have no necessary implications for power relations between men and women, or, better still, that provide a creative outlet for women to express their freely chosen identities. Again, there’s no real ‘choosing’ taking place here, since the girls and women who choose not to reduce themselves to a configuration of available body parts amenable to the male gaze are deemed (often from early childhood) to be frumps, misfits, outcasts who deny and repress their true nature, or, worse still, homosexuals, perverts and so on. But again, this is not an ideological ‘illusion’ as such; in patriarchal societies, women’s liberation and women’s subjugation really are reduced to bodily and sartorial aesthetics, since the symbolic order of such societies has always-already constituted women as no more than *visible* and desirable bodies. The ideological is an integral part of the real.

In societies where neoliberal ideological thinking holds sway, then, freedom is seen to be located not so much in simply choosing which employer to sell your labour to, but rather in selecting and developing a complete individual identity, not only through a career choice, but also (perhaps largely) through *consumer* choice. The fundamental flexibility or reflexivity of a society underpinned by competition and individualised self-responsibility enables individuals to express their identity through their purchases. The ‘common sense’ of neoliberal societies is that we are freer than we have ever been, and that this freedom is enabled and facilitated by further marketisations, privatisations, deregulations and globalisations.

‘Common sense’ or what linguists have traditionally called shared ‘background knowledge’ is rendered problematic precisely by its perceived status as something

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262 Ariel Levy provides a detailed analysis of this ‘raunch culture’ in *Female Chauvinist Pigs* (New York: Free Press, 2005).
unproblematic. Explicit injunctions to ‘common sense’ are made not only when somebody does something perceived to be foolish, but also when somebody ‘over-thinks’ a problem. Using our common sense is a shortcut. It is a framework of knowledge providing ready-made answers to our possible questions about various aspects of the world, and of how to engage with it, which saves us from dwelling – or critically reflecting – on certain issues. Yet, as Maja Zehfuss puts it, it is for this very reason that ‘what is accepted as commonsensical constitutes a significant site of critique, for we easily lost sight of how common sense constitutes the problem it claims merely to negotiate’.264 And here we see why common sense provides such fertile territory for ideology, since it is our common sense that very often sets the limits to what is perceived as possible. This point is well-made in Slavoj Žižek’s argument about ‘the unrelenting pertinence of the notion of ideology’.265 Drawing upon Frederic Jameson’s well known aphorism that it is easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism, Žižek points out how, just a few years after the end of the Cold War, ‘popular imagination’ in the West was drastically changed. He notes that up until at least the 1980s ‘everybody was busy imagining different forms of the social organisation of production and commerce (Facism or Communism as alternatives to liberal capitalism)’, whereas, by the time of his writing (1994) ‘it seems easier to imagine the ‘end of the world’ than a far more modest change in the mode of production’. This leads him to assert the ‘existence of ideology qua generative matrix that regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and non-imaginable’. This view of ideology is useful in that it not only shows how integral common sense understandings of the possible, the ‘visible’ and the ‘imaginable’ are to achieving ideological dominance, but also attributes this ideological common sense some causal power (inasmuch as it is a ‘generative matrix’).

Thus far, then, we have found that ideology can be a useful conceptual category for describing neoliberalism if it is taken to be something not equivalent to falsehood or pure illusion, is divorced from any ‘base-superstructure’ economic determinism, and is understood to be closely connected to ‘common sense’ or ‘background knowledge’ that enables forms of social domination and exploitation. A useful way of imagining this critical concept of ideology,

using an everyday turn of phrase that has already been used throughout the chapter, is as a ‘way of seeing’.

In his book *Ways of Seeing* (1972), and the ground-breaking BBC television series that accompanies it, the art critic and historian John Berger argues that every representation we make to one another, every communication, statement and discourse, ‘embodies a way of seeing’, while, at the same time, our perception and interpretation of these communications equally ‘depends also upon our own way of seeing’. But whereas Berger is mainly concerned with highlighting the operation of the ‘painter’s way of seeing’ and the ‘photographer’s way of seeing’, we can move away from images and consider other forms of representation, interpretation and communication in this lens. Specifically, if we are interested in the influence of neoliberalism on the policy and practice of security, we might seek to analyse the politician’s or the policy-maker’s way of seeing.

Of course, we all see paintings in different ways; they work on each of us differently and we interpret them differently. But there is, sometimes, an effort made to guide and limit our interpretation, to mediate the immediacy of our way of seeing and to overlay it or frame it with another way of seeing. A way of seeing is, in Berger’s sense, ideological when it mystifies some aspect of social relations. In the first chapter of his book, which is indebted to Walter Benjamin’s *Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction*, Berger looks at how fellow art critic and historian Seymour Slive describes the work of Frans Hals. Berger notes that Slive is able to elide all of the political content of the social relations between Hals and his subjects, which might be read from his paintings, and instead presents readers with an analysis of Hals’ key works that focuses almost entirely on composition. Silve is keen, almost desperate, to impress upon the reader that what we might take to be an understanding of, or insight into, the lives and subjects represented in the painting is in fact a ‘seduction’; a by-product of Hals’ masterful painterly *technique*. He encourages us instead to understand the paintings in terms of colours, light, shading, brushstrokes, almost anything but the subjects and their relationships. This, Berger contends, is the very essence of mystification. Whereas once we might have looked upon a painting and felt something immediate to ourselves, by the time

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267 Ibid., p. 13.
268 Ibid., p 14.
we are out of childhood, we have learned to interpret and experience, to refract what we see, through the prisms of other ways of seeing. Sometimes, when I stand in front of a painting in a gallery, rather than simply absorbing what I see and applying my own creative interpretation, I instead find myself wondering about what the message of the painting is; trying to read it like information. Helpfully, a small sign next to the painting will explain to me the proper context and meaning of the image; will provide me with a sanctioned way of seeing it. The supposedly ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ message of the painting is thus conveyed to me. This sanctioned way of seeing is represented as being of the nature of the painting; it is a naturalising and universalising way of seeing that tells me that, whatever other elements I might appreciate of this work of art, it is inherently and always about x.

Thinking neoliberal ideology as a complex and contradictory, mystifying, way of seeing, rather than as some sort of ‘doctrine’ of falsehood, imposed ‘from above’, is productive to the extent that it better explains its success. Another angle on ideology conceived as a way of seeing involves Žižek’s ‘Lacanian concept of ideology’, which draws upon psychoanalytic categories. Fantasies, in particular, Žižek argues, can usefully be used to illustrate the functioning of ideology. Fantasies are the narratives we construct to make sense of otherwise apparently senseless events, to cover up any ‘gaps’ in our experience of the world, and to ultimately to mask the contradictory nature of aspects of our lives. To this extent, we can certainly think of fantasmatic logics as ‘ways of seeing’. Inasmuch as such logics relate to power and politics, and serve to bring apparent order and coherence to disorderly and incoherent sets of phenomena, they are ideological fantasies. Žižek uses the example of the ‘conceptual Jew’ of Nazi Germany, an imagined figure constructed to narrativise – to ‘explain away’ – the failure to produce once and for all a true social unity for the German people. This was a central plank of Nazi ideology. Such ideological ways of seeing of course rely on powerful individuals, states and so on, for their promotion and success. But the everyday functioning of ideology as what Žižek calls a ‘generative matrix’ is diffuse; it rests upon each us seeing the world through it.

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271 Žižek, ‘Between Symbolic Fiction and Fantasmatic Spectre’. 
Neoliberalism involves a set of ideological fantasies;\(^{272}\) it is a way of seeing that mystifies. It does this by naturalising, universalising and dehistoricising the principles of individualism and risk transfer, flexibility, competition and marketization. Whereas Berger was concerned mainly with ways of seeing European oil paintings of the renaissance period, this thesis is concerned with how neoliberal ways of seeing frame our view of war. The key claims of the great neoliberal thinkers are that human beings are ontologically discrete, that they are first and foremost individuals, that their ‘nature’ is one of competition with other human beings (for resources, status, wealth and so on) and that the ‘market’ is thus the most natural and appropriate way to describe and organise their shared life, and should therefore be brought into being (or re-instated) in places where it does not yet exist (or from which it has been banished). Competition will drive invention, and will ultimately support political freedoms and human flourishing and happiness. Such are the contradictory logics of neoliberalism as ideology.

But it is clear that political and social life is not limited to ways of seeing – to representation and interpretation, or ideology and discourse – it also consists in and intersects with material and practical concerns. Neoliberalism is not only thought and spoken, it is *practiced*. And the myriad modes of social practice do not begin and end at ideological or discursive representations and interpretations; they include, for example, ways of conducting oneself. And thus the potential for a synergistic relationship between the conceptualisation of neoliberalism as an ideology, and its conceptualisation as a form of *governmentality* presents itself.

### 3.3.3 Neoliberalism as Governmentality

From 1971 to 1984, when his life was cut short by the AIDS epidemic that was spreading across Western Europe, Michel Foucault delivered public lectures at the *College de France* in Paris as its Chair in the History of Systems of Thought. Of the ideas emerging in Foucault’s later lectures that were not discussed in his earlier written works, the concept of ‘governmentality’ – a key focus of the lectures from 1977 onward – has been particularly influential. The relatively recent systematic publication of English translations of these

lectures, beginning in 2003 and continuing to the present day, has had a major impact on the social sciences, and on the disciplines of politics and International Relations in particular.273

In recent years – and unsurprisingly, given the preponderance of poststructuralism(s) among critical scholars in the Western academe – a popular critical understanding of neoliberalism has rested upon Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Thomas Lemke (2001) argues that this concept has ‘advantages in theoretical terms for an analysis of neoliberalism’,274 while Wendy Larner (2000) has suggested that ‘understanding neo-liberalism as governmentality’ is more useful than understanding it as a ‘policy framework’ or as an ‘ideology’.275 In his lectures on ‘the birth of biopolitics’, delivered at the College de France in early 1979, Foucault himself says of the form of neoliberalism that emerged in post-war Germany (which, he claims, speaking in the year Margaret Thatcher was to come to power in the UK, is really ‘the contemporary neo-liberalism which actually involves us’276):

It is something other than a political calculation, even if it is completely permeated by political calculation. No more is it an ideology, although, of course, there is a whole set of perfectly coherent ideas, analytical principles and so forth. What is involved is a new programming of liberal governmentality.277

When he speaks of neoliberal governmentality in the Birth of Biopolitics lectures, Foucault is referring to a concept he first articulated in the previous year’s lectures, which have been published in English as Security, Territory, Population. It is in these lectures that Foucault traces the historical-conceptual emergence of an ‘art of government’, from the sixteenth century onward. The art of government is a new dominant political problematique borne out of, on the one hand, the end of feudalism and the beginnings of the modern ‘territorial’ and ‘administrative’ state form, and, on the other hand, the reformation and the genesis of the protestant ethic of spiritual self-direction.278 These two historical shifts,

273 Andrew Neal, ‘Cutting off the King’s head’, Alternatives, 29 (2004), pp. 373-398.
277 Ibid., p. 94
Foucault contends, create a ‘general problematic of government’ wherein the big questions are of ‘how to be governed, by whom, to what extent and by what methods’. 279

‘Government’ is perhaps now most often understood as an object rather than a process or activity – as a noun rather than a verb. We more often speak of ‘the government’ or ‘a government’ than of government itself. In describing the emergence of the ‘art of government’ literature, and eventually of ‘governmentality’, Foucault is relocating this term in its genealogical context. When Jeremy Bentham describes government as ‘but a particular kind of action performed by a particular person or persons’, 280 he does so in a context where, already in the early nineteenth century, the prevailing understanding of ‘government’ is of formal political leadership. Bentham’s definition is closer to the notion of ‘conduct’ that underpins Foucault’s concept of governmentality. In the nineteenth century, in Foucault’s view, government takes places everywhere in Western societies; at every level, from the whole society to the workplace, the family and even the individual, not just in palaces and parliaments.

As Mitchell Dean notes, a useful and radical contribution of the concept of governmentality in Foucault’s work is this breaking-down of the artificial connection between the concept of government and the state. 281 Understanding governmental power as equivalent and limited to the power of the state blinds us to the more everyday operation of governmental power in contemporary societies. To think about government instead as the ‘conduct of conduct’ (and in doing so drawing upon the various meanings of ‘conduct’; one’s personal conduct, to conduct others and so on) is to reconnect with a more ‘classical’ notion of government as it is characterised in the Ancient Greek oikonomia (government of the oikos; the family or household, and the root of today’s ‘economy’). 282 Government in this sense is not about some linear hierarchical programme imposed top-down by the state upon the governed, but rather represents ‘a practice that fixes the definition and respective positions of the governed and governors facing each other and in relation to each other’. 283

279 Ibid.
283 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 12.
practice of government, for Foucault happens through ‘transaction, in the very broad sense […] that is to say “action between”, that is to say, by a series of conflicts, agreements, discussions and reciprocal concessions’. 284

The literature that developed the ‘arts of government’ (Foucault mainly draws examples from the ‘implicit’ critiques of Macchiavelli’s The Prince published in the late sixteenth century) was concerned with highlighting ‘both a plurality of forms of government and the immanence of practices of government to the state’. 285 This literature was established in contradistinction to the ‘transcendent singularity of Machiavelli’s Prince’, who is supposed to be effectively external to the state or society, by virtue of his sovereignty. Whereas the Machiavellian approach to power is thus characterised by a ‘discontinuity’, Foucault sees in the anti-Machiavelli literature ‘both an upward and a downward continuity’, where, on the one hand a good Prince should really be educated to properly ‘govern himself’, and on the other hand, in a well governed state, ‘fathers will know how to govern their families […] and individuals will also know how to conduct themselves properly’. 286 While the actual emergence of such an art of government in practice was prevented, according to Foucault, by a series of crises in the seventeenth century, it was eventually released from this ‘blockage’ by the emergence of the ‘problem of population’ in the eighteenth century. 287 As population becomes the object of power at this time, the concept of ‘economy’ – which had previously referred only to the good government of the family – could be directed at this object, as could the emerging technique of ‘statistics’ (the ‘science of the state), which measures the contours of population in terms of births, deaths, marriages and other ‘regularities’. The ‘final end of government’, Foucault says, is thus no longer simply to govern (i.e. it is not power exercised for its own sake) but rather ‘to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity and its health.’ 288

So, by the eighteenth century, Foucault contends, a ‘governmentality’ had emerged, which still characterises life in Western societies today. 289 By ‘governmentality’ he means the

284 Ibid.
285 Foucault, Security, Territory, Population, p. 93
286 Ibid., p. 94
287 Ibid., p. 104
288 Ibid., p. 105
289 Ibid., p. 109
matrix of institutions and processes that facilitates this form of power ‘that has population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument’, in conjunction with the general rise of ‘the type of power that we can call “government”’, over and above the forms of sovereign and disciplinary power he had studied in his earlier work, and, finally, the transformation of the liberal state, beginning in the sixteenth century, by which it became effectively ‘governmentalised’. 290

As early as 1993, when, it will be remembered, the term ‘neoliberalism’ was still new currency in Anglophone social science, Nikolas Rose argued, in a special issue of Economy and Society dedicated to ‘liberalism, neoliberalism and governmentality’, that the concept of governmentality encapsulated neoliberalism. Rose argues that neoliberal governmentality should be understood in Foucauldian terms as a ‘political rationality’ and ‘not simply an ideology’.

So how does neoliberalism constitute a ‘new programming’ of liberal governmentality? Here it is useful to think of a final key aspect of governmental power, a concept with which governmentality has become almost synonymous in much of the literature; the ‘conduct of conduct’. 291 Foucault himself only used the term once, in a short essay on ‘the exercise of power’, the only major English translation of which – in the afterword of Dreyfus and Rabinow’s Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics (1983) – did not include a direct translation of Foucault’s claim that ‘l’exercice du pouvoir consiste à «conduire des conduites»’ 292 (literally, ‘the exercise of power consists in “the conduct of conducts”’). Yet this brief aphorism has become absolutely central to the field of ‘governmentality studies’ since Foucault’s death, because it encapsulates something of the very core of Foucault’s general project, inasmuch as it related to power/knowledge, which we might call the general ‘diffusion’ and ‘internalisation’ of power in modern societies. Power today is thus understood to act to shape the actions of individuals. While Foucault accepts that forms of sovereign and disciplinary power continue to function, the novelty of governmentality lies in the diffusion of power whereby each individual takes responsibility for ‘conducting’ herself ‘properly’, thus

290 Ibid., p. 108
internalising the rules and norms of the wider social order – her behaviour, or conduct, is, therefore, itself conducted.

One effect of neoliberal governmentality is, in Foucault’s view, a re-emergence, but also a radical transformation of, *homo economicus* as the model subject. Unlike the *homo economicus* upon which classical liberal political economy was predicated (the eternal and essentially individual exchanger that forms the premise for Smith and Ricardo and is the starting point for Marx’s critique of them in the *Grundrisse* – see above), the neoliberal ideal subject is not a participant in a series of exchanges. The neoliberal *homo economicus* is, rather, ‘an entrepreneur of himself’.293 This entrepreneurship is enacted in the very ‘enterprise activity’ of consumption, whereby the subject in fact *produces* something; ‘his own satisfaction’.294

Neoliberalism is then, according to the theorists of governmentality, a reprogramming of the microsocial relations of everyday day life, remoulding the government or ‘conduct’ of the self and relationships between the self and the family, colleagues, and of course the state. Individuals must take individual responsibility for their welfare and that of their family, take on the ‘risks’ that, according to Hayek, make them truly free; they must underpin their social relations with the notion of market competition – promote themselves, treat others as competitors and ensure their own flexibility.

The neoliberal governmentality is one in which, as Larner notes, there may be ‘less government’, in the predominant sense in which that term is understood today (i.e. as largely equivalent to the directive activities of the organs of state) but ‘it does not follow that there is less governance’.295 It is not only businesses and regulatory bodies that are supposed to make themselves more ‘flexible’ and ‘entrepreneurial’, for ‘so too are political subjects’.296 Neoliberalism is thus understood as governmentality to the extent that it is a general ‘mode of thinking’ or ‘mentality’, which includes both the ‘governing of the self’ and the ‘governing of others’.297 The neoliberal emphasis on individuals taking responsibility for their own well-

294 Ibid.
296 Ibid., p. 13.
being includes certain ‘technologies of the self’, based on a ‘neo-liberal model of rationality’, from the responsibility for one’s own wealth to the responsibility for one’s own happiness.298

We might even understand, through this theoretical framework, the concept of ‘austerity’ as a neoliberal technology of the self. ‘Austerity’ is not simply a political-economic context where public spending, welfare and jobs are massively reduced. It is also a way of conducting oneself. Invoking the Second World War ‘spirit’ of ‘keep calm and carry on’, austerity demands of us that we accept the ‘tough times’ ahead, the reduced incomes, the pay freezes, the elimination of pensions and so on. And more than this, just like the austere times of the war, we must all be ready to ‘muck in’, to take responsibility for providing our own social services, volunteering with ‘Big Society’ organisations to provide the services that the state used to be responsible for. The contemporary British neoliberal subject should be a voluntaristic member of the Big Society in public, and an austere family manager in private, tidying-up the towpath or doing some unpaid youth work at the weekend perhaps, while carefully budgeting at home, cooking cheaper, more basic meals (a la war time rationing). It is through these technologies, these systems of daily social practice, that the neoliberal goal of passing social responsibility from the collective – the government, the state, ‘society’ at large – to the individual is (partially) achieved. The neoliberal subject is increasingly responsible for her own employment (those refusing minimum wage work many miles from their home may now have their Job Seekers’ Allowance and/or Housing Benefit cut), healthcare (‘NHS Direct’ encourages self-diagnosis and prescription) and pension (by somehow accruing private ‘savings’ from one’s low-paid or unpaid work). The very word ‘austerity’, though deriving from the Latin austerus, meaning dry or harsh, has among its common meanings, since at least the early seventeenth century: ‘severe self-discipline or self-restraint; moral strictness, rigorous abstinence, asceticism’.299 Austerity is thus not only a harsh condition in which to live, but a mode of harsh conduct one imposes upon oneself and one’s family.

As William Walters’ recent study Governmentality: Critical Encounters has it, ‘what we usually regard as the ideology of neoliberalism’ is a focus on the rolling-back of the state and the increasing responsibilisation of the individual for their own wellbeing. He argues, on the

298 Ibid., p. 202
299 OED online.
other hand, that the actual habits and practices of a neoliberal society (he cites, for example, the use of the now ubiquitous hand sanitising gel dispensers in public spaces, the reading of nutritional data on shop-bought foods and the search for cheap train tickets online) might not imply that ‘I have been ideologically persuaded by the rhetoric of neoliberalism’ but rather that ‘I have become implicated in neoliberal strategies at the level of habits, routines and little technologies’. Walters’ point here is an important one. Neoliberalism is manifest in actual habits and practices – in what we might call ‘ways of being’ – that are interpenetrated by, but not identical to, ideology in the sense of ways of seeing. Neoliberalism is not just something we think, it’s something we do; often in the form of banal everyday activities. However, whereas Walters seems to want to sever the connection between neoliberalism as ideology and neoliberalism as governmentality even before he has made it, the conceptualisation of neoliberalism in this thesis rests precisely on the view that ideology, including ideological ‘rhetoric’ (language) and its persuasive power, is a necessary condition to sustain governmental practice.

One of the most important contributions of governmentality scholars with respect to neoliberalism has been to emphasise the break it signifies with the *laissez-faire* approach of ‘classical’ liberalism. Despite the fact that Hayek himself based his argument in *The Road to Serfdom* in part on an explicit recognition of the inadequacy of *laissez-faire*, in light of what he saw as the creeping spread of socialist and totalitarian thinking in Western Europe, much of the literature that conceives of neoliberalism as ideology or political-economic transformation mistakenly identifies it with a revival of *laissez-faire* economics. Neoliberalism is precisely concerned with jettisoning this ‘weak’ negative approach and replacing it with a positive programme for injecting market dynamics – and specifically the dynamic of competition – into more spheres of social life.

When Hayek says that ‘one of the main arguments in favour of competition is that it dispenses with the need for “conscious social control”’, he is arguing precisely for neoliberalism as a governmentality, a diffusion of governmental power through individualised competition, a cutting off of the King’s head, to paraphrase Foucault. In a society underpinned

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302 Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*. 

by the principle of competition, government in the sense of an intervening sovereign power is less necessary since people are effectively compelled to govern themselves and those around them through competition.

The superiority of a competition-based economy over planned models is, for Hayek, evidenced in the former’s capacity to give ‘the individuals a chance to decide whether the prospects of a particular occupation are sufficient to compensate for the disadvantages and risks associated with it’.  

Each person must compete with every other average person for work, and the stakes in this competition are high – losing means no income, no material means to sustain one’s life. Each person must sell herself properly on her CV, must ‘market’ herself to potential employers. In the workplace, too, competition rules. Each of us must compete with our colleagues in terms of not only productivity, but adaptability, flexibility and resilience. I should be willing to do whatever my firm needs of me, whatever my boss needs of me. Better still, I should pre-empt and prepare for what might be needed of me. I should assess risks and prepare for shocks. Whether it’s a change to my job description or contract status, a cut to my salary or pension, or a reduction to my paid working hours, I must be flexible enough to adapt if I am to out-compete my notional competitors – my colleagues and the imagined others in the labour market who might be recruited in my place. By individualising, rather than socially insuring against, risk, the neoliberal competitive principle engenders a particular form of the government of self and others. When, in neoliberal societies, competition is ‘created’ as Hayek willed it should be, through specific marketisations, privatisations and deregulations, it becomes one of the ‘techniques and procedures by which one sets about conducting the conduct of others [...] the procedures of, let’s say, governmentality’. Hayek is right that ‘conscious social control’ becomes unnecessary for the maintenance of a particular social order, as soon as people begin to conduct themselves and others in accordance with the principles of a dominant ideology – there is no need for a ruling class to actively and consciously exploit workers in the name of capital, since workers can exploit themselves and their colleagues perfectly well without it.

303 Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, p. 27.
Foucault himself describes the American model of neoliberalism as ‘a whole way of being’ and we can think of neoliberal governmentality in this sense as a correlative way of being to the neoliberal ideological way of seeing.

Just as a schism exists between Marxian conceptualisations of neoliberalism as ideology and Foucauldian conceptualisations of it as governmentality, so a series of internal fractures has divided the field of ‘governmentality studies’, since its inception. A central fault line in these disputes is usefully captured in a recent article by Laura Zanotti, who seeks to distinguish ‘heuristic’ from ‘descriptive’ uses of the concept. In the former category, she places the work of Didier Bigo, Michael Merlingen, William Walters, Wendy Larner, while the latter is occupied by Giorgio Agamben, Sergei Prosorov, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri. While those who approach governmentality as a ‘heuristic’ tool ‘tend to conduct inquiries based upon analyses of practices of government and resistance’, using ethnography to emphasise ‘the multifarious ways government works in practice’, the ‘descriptive’ approaches, on the other hand, ‘focus instead on one particular trajectory of global liberalism’ and in doing so ‘privilege abstract theorisations’.

In response to those who, like Zanotti, concern themselves with assessing which are the more and less ‘Foucauldian’ applications of Foucault’s concept, this thesis takes its cue from Jonathan Joseph:

We could spend an endless amount of time trying to work out the most authentic interpretation of Foucault’s ideas. Or we could just admit that Foucault’s work is an evolving and unfinished product and that his approach is deliberately evasive, elusive and provocative.

Or, as Michèle Barrett puts it in reference to her reworking of the concept of ideology: ‘The definition of concepts, like the definition of everyday words, is partly a matter of usage: one cannot legislate against other people’s uses of terms’. Conceptualising governmentality as ‘ways of being’ is predicated on just such a carefree approach to

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305 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 218.
306 Laura Zanotti, ‘Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Rethinking Political Agency in the Global World’
borrowing concepts. Foucault, of all people, would surely not be so keen to discipline others into using a term he coined in the ‘proper’ way; after all, he famously directed his critical gaze at the discursive power of the ‘author function’,\textsuperscript{309} and an awareness of the problems associated with striving for ‘authenticity’ to the author remains important (but not because Foucault said it was!).

The American historian of political thought Michael Behrent has argued, in a claim recently echoed by Wanda Vrasti,\textsuperscript{310} that contrary to popular interpretations and uses of Foucault’s later work, the latter was in fact distinctly sympathetic to economic liberalism, and neoliberalism itself.\textsuperscript{311}

Whereas Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and governmentality have largely been deployed in critiques of neoliberal society, it is the contention of Behrent and Vrasti that these were not intended to be ‘negative’ concepts; given the standard Foucauldian creed that power is always ‘productive’, and discourse not only constraining, but enabling, it is perhaps reasonable to assume that Foucault did view both biopolitics and governmentality as, at least potentially, sites for the realisation of freedom, resistance and so on – so that we might conceive, for example, of a ‘revolutionary’ or a ‘socialist’ governmentality. However, it is notable that both authors emphasise Foucault’s aim as that of persuading the radical political Left to make a conceptual ‘leap’ or ‘jump’, ‘from ideology to governmentality’.\textsuperscript{312}

While Behrent and Vrasti may be right about Foucault’s intentions, this is a troubling suggestion, since it seems to entail something of a conceptual teleology. Foucault makes it clear that his critical conceptual vocabulary on power, which develops across the span of his intellectual life to encompass things like ‘discourse’, ‘discipline’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘biopower’ and ‘governmentality’, is not intended to map a ‘development’ of political power: biopower does not ‘replace’ disciplinary or sovereign power, just as governmentality does not replace biopower. Neither these critical concepts of power, nor the phenomena they represent, work

\textsuperscript{309} Foucault, ‘What is an author’, \textit{The Foucault Reader}, p. 108.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid., p. 568; Vrasti, ‘Universal but not truly ‘global’’, p. 13.
in such a teleological way. So why should the concept of ideology be superceded by
governmentality in this conceptual ‘jump’ of the political Left (i.e. critics of capitalist society)?

Studies of neoliberal governmentality thus provide a useful paradigm upon which to
draw in describing how neoliberalism shapes social action and social relations. In looking at
the ways in which neoliberal ideology shapes contemporary warfare, this thesis is precisely
concerned with the ways in which, in Lemke’s terms, a ‘previously extra-economic domain’ is
in some sense ‘colonised by criteria of economic efficiency’. This is not to say that the thesis
at hand is concerned simply with highlighting how economic imperatives are often a causal
factor in decisions to wage war and otherwise deploy state violence, but rather that the whole
rationality and common sense of neoliberalism – the mental image it constructs of an
increasingly rational and scientific political order based on a perfectly scientific economic
order, populated by ‘cost-benefit’ analysing rational universal individuals – must also
penetrate the daily language, thought and practices of the politicians, armed forces and police
tasked with deploying state violence. Of course, wars have often been ‘economic’ in the sense
that they may have been fought for territory, natural resources, and other material ends, but
they have been ‘extra-economic’ in terms of their constitutive discursive and material
practices. The concept of governmentality provides a rich theoretical framework with which
to understand the functioning of neoliberal societies, but, this thesis contends, it also has
important limitations.

Mitchell Dean, one of the most prominent analysts of contemporary governmentality,
aims to ‘take up the challenge left by Foucault to treat relationships of power as plural and
heterogeneous’. Certainly this is an admirable endeavour in the sense that it has the
potential to throw into relief some of the intricacies and nuances of social relations of power.
However, unless it is complemented by an approach which also accepts that such intricacies
are often constituted within the context of larger-scale, more monolithic, less ‘plural and
heterogeneous’, structural relations of social dominance and exploitation, it runs the risk of
becoming a sort of crypto-liberalism – its ‘critical’ edge blunted by a preoccupation with the
complexity, diversity and plurality of contemporary society. Of course, other than

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313 Lemke, Thomas, ‘The birth of bio-politics’: Michel Foucault’s lecture at the College de France on neo-liberal
poststructuralists, the group of academics most enchanted by the idea of the ‘diffusion’ of power relations and the play of difference within social configurations are liberal ‘pluralist’ political scientists like Robert Dahl and Nelson Polsby.\textsuperscript{315} The ‘critical’ potential of such approaches is limited inasmuch as they are unable to account for social structures, including the sustained, patterned ways of seeing that we are effectively ‘born into’ (Chapter Four takes the question of structure up in much greater detail). Governmentality might act as a useful conceptual category for neoliberalism to the extent that it describes powerful and interactional ways of being, but it cannot alone account for the persistence of such ways of being.

3.4\textbf{ Ways of seeing, ways of being: Neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality}

Simon Springer is right to call the line often drawn between Marxian models of neoliberalism as ideology and Foucauldian models of neoliberalism as governmentality a ‘false dichotomy’;\textsuperscript{316} the potential compatibility of these two conceptualisations of neoliberalism – as ways of seeing and being – should now be apparent, in light of the above theorisation. But Springer is right for the wrong reasons. He still thinks ideology in a crude sense, much more limited than the theorisation above. This is reflected in his use of the classic vertical analogy, which has in the past also been favoured by methodological individualists seeking to discredit their ‘holist’ Marxist foes through crude misrepresentation. Springer describes governmentality as a ‘bottom-up’ concept and ideology as a ‘top-down’ one.\textsuperscript{317} In this view, the two concepts describe correlative social phenomena; neoliberalism as ideology takes the form of hegemonic ruling ideas, imposed ‘top-down’ by a ruling class, and it exists as governmentality in the form of ‘governing at a distance’ and the ‘conduct of conduct’, or ‘a processual character where neoliberalism’s articulation with existing circumstances comes through endlessly unfolding failures and successes in the relations between peoples and their socially constructed realities’.\textsuperscript{318} If we take ideology, as we have above, to describe not simply hegemonic or ruling ideas that work in the favour of a ruling class and are propagated by that class, but rather as consisting in the sorts of commonsensical ways of seeing that are bound up with and serve to naturalise unequal power relations, then the vertical analogy does not


\textsuperscript{317}Ibid, p.145

\textsuperscript{318}Ibid, p.137
seem to hold. Ideology in this sense is not ‘top-down’; it is diffuse, existing in our daily social practices – the ways we receive and interpret and explain the relations, processes and entities we encounter. The social reproduction of ideology does not require any ‘top-down’ imposition.

While a number of scholars have attempted to fuse Foucauldian and Marxian approaches when conceptualising neoliberalism, they have all tended to engage in some version of the vertical analogy. Jonathan Joseph describes Marxian and Foucauldian concepts in his analysis of neoliberalism in *The Social in the Global* (2012) as relating respectively to the ‘macro’ and ‘micro’ social levels. This is based in Joseph’s reading of Marx and Foucault, where he finds the former better at dealing with top-level ‘why’ questions about ‘motives’ and the latter with more finely-grained ‘how’ questions relating to ‘micro practices’. Much of Joseph’s analysis here should be accepted, but this thesis is not considering the concepts of ideology and governmentality as they are presented by Marx and Foucault themselves, but with the more developed conceptions discussed above, which have emerged from other scholars working in the Marxian and Foucauldian traditions. In particular, the concept of ideology, it will be argued below, should not be conceived of as a ‘macro level’ social function, since it is generated at, and instantiated at, the everyday ‘micro’ level of individual and social interpretation and understanding of the world. In this sense the concept of ideology used here is closer to Žižek’s than Marx’s.

Jessop and Sum, similarly, have developed an argument for understanding the transformations of capitalist societies that are usually characterised as neoliberalism as taking place at both the micro and macro levels, and have employed Marxian and Foucauldian concepts to do so. In their ‘cultural political economy’ approach, however, the distinction remains entrenched between macro level ‘political economic’ analysis and the micro level ‘cultural’ analysis it is to be fused with. While micro-macro models such as these do not imply a negative moral evaluation of Marxian theory – on the contrary, Joseph and Jessop and Sum are embedded in Marxist traditions – but they do imply an analytic distinction that

320 Žižek, *The Sublime Object of Ideology*.
doesn’t hold when one considers the conceptualisation of ideology (and governmentality) developed here.

Describing what is meant by ‘neoliberalism as governmentality’, Springer actually says that ‘the internal dynamics of neoliberalism in this understanding are underpinned by an unquestioned ‘commonsense’, meaning quite literally, a sense held in common’. Here, apparently unwittingly, he shows the real potential for conceiving of neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality simultaneously, which does not attempt an implicitly normative characterisation of the two concepts through the vertical analogy, and does not require their sublation and simplification into a re-articulated concept of ‘discourse’. For the ‘common sense’ that Springer sees as underpinning neoliberal governmentality as it plays out, unevenly, in the everyday practices of people, can be understood as ideology. Ideology thus provides the conditions of possibility for governmentality. Neoliberal ways of seeing clear the ground for neoliberal ways of being. This is very different from the pseudo-dialectical approach adopted by Springer, where ‘discourse’ is selected as a sort of ‘third way’ option between ideology and governmentality. That approach is any case inadequate, for it requires stretching the signifier ‘discourse’ to breaking point. As is argued in more detail in Chapter Four, the term discourse is usefully understood as having some relation to communication and representation. If we also include within it all of the things that have been described above as belonging to ideology and governmentality, as Springer seems to suggest, we are left with a concept of discourse so capacious as to be distinctly unhelpful in the activity of critical explanation.

If we instead conceive of ideology as a condition of possibility for governmentality, but with both concepts retaining distinctive reference points in the processes of social reproduction (ideology as ways of seeing, governmentality as ways of being) then we can deploy the critical concept of ideology in a broad sense to designate those relatively structured or systematic ways of thinking about the world that are tied to particular social projects that necessitate unequal power relations. In this sense, we might speak of ‘racist’ ideology, of ‘sexist’ or ‘patriarchal’ ideology, and of course of ‘capitalist’ ideology.

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Iver Neumann defines discourse as ‘the preconditions for action’ and practice, as ‘socialised patterns of action’, and we can see that governmentality as the conduct of conduct fits into this framework as particular practices of government (of self and others) that rely on discourses of government. It is the contention of this thesis that neoliberal ideology should be understood as the precondition for neoliberal discourse and thus also for neoliberal governmentality. It is the neoliberal ideology, or way of seeing, that ‘fills in the gaps’, so to speak, allowing us to make sense of market-led conduct.

It can, therefore, be said that ideologies, as (powerful) ways of seeing the world, are ‘typically, though not exclusively, reproduced in discourse and communication’. Ideology as a structured way of seeing and interpreting the world, which lends itself to the reproduction of a particular social order predicated on unequal power relations, is, then, a form of ‘social structure’. Ideology is a precondition for various forms of social practice and discourse. By providing the basic interpretive context upon which many of the things we say and do are based ideology limits what is ‘said’ or communicated in social interactions. As a result, a useful approach to critically explaining the causal influence of neoliberal ideology lies in textual analysis – how do particular texts represent aspects of the world, and how do those representations mesh with the neoliberal ideological worldview or common sense?

We can apply this ‘structural’ model to governmentality too. Governmentality consists of structured and shared ways of being/acting. Similarly to ideology, governmentality relies on textual instantiations, and is to some extent open to being ‘read’ in texts, since the dissemination of ideas on how to conduct ourselves is often achieved textually. However, the ‘conduct of conduct’ is something which takes place at the level of social practice, and though texts and the production of texts can be considered elements of social practice, they are only one, small, element. At the risk of reductionism, social practices can be simply defined as the things that people do inasmuch as those things relate to other people. When one conducts oneself or others in a way that correlates to a particular ‘governmental rationality’ – in the way that they dress, speak, the things that they say and do, their material interactions with other people – we might call this practicing governmentality. Neoliberal governmentality, as it was outlined above, can therefore be discerned in those texts and practices that rely on the

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neoliberal rationality (and ideology). For example, where practices are inspired, constrained or enabled by concerns with flexibilisation, individualised responsibility and risk, they may be viewed as instantiations of neoliberal governmentality.

We must now establish how neoliberalism can be seen as an ideology in the critical sense of the concept described above. Understanding neoliberalism as ideology need not entail understanding the diffusion of neoliberal political-economic practice in what Peck disparagingly terms a ‘unidirectional’ way. But neither does the understanding at work in this thesis accept that it is useful to characterise the international spread (or ‘globalisation’) of neoliberal ideology and policy as ‘dialogic’. To do so ignores the imperative status of economic statements made by hegemonic powers such as the US.

Neoliberalism can, however, be described as an ideology in the sense that it comes to constitute the ‘common sense’ basis of much daily decision-making, it is the set of principles that inform all sorts of social policy, and its central tenets (about markets and political freedom) are increasingly taken to be universally valid scientific ‘truths’.

To take one pertinent example, neoliberalism can be seen as ideology in the Althusserian sense that it assists in the ‘reproduction of the (diversified) skills of labour power’ that is integral to the general reproduction of the material conditions of production as presently constituted. This reproduction is, as Althusser notes, ‘achieved more and more outside production: by the capitalist education system, and by other instances and institutions’. For example, through what Norman Fairclough has called the ‘marketisation of higher education’, the principles of neoliberal thinking have come to permeate universities, with degrees being increasingly thought of as commodities, and universities as ‘businesses competing to sell their products to consumers’. This neoliberal marketisation is manifested not only in academics being encouraged to see themselves as ‘entrepreneurial’ and self-promoting businesspeople, and students as ‘customers’, but also in the introduction of ‘employability’ training into a wide range of degree courses, from business studies to

326 Ibid., p. 6.
327 Althusser, Lenin and Philosophy, p. 88.
philosophy. The removal of the teaching budget by the present government and consequent massive increase in student-paid ‘tuition fees’, in combination with an increasing reliance upon private sector funding of research (especially in the natural sciences) can be understood as a ‘creeping privatisation’ of universities. Higher education is thus in the process of being transformed by neoliberal ways of thinking and acting in two key ways: on the one hand it is being pulled into the ‘private sector’ of the economy, becoming a competitive system, and on the other hand it is increasingly moulding students to be good, flexible, competitive and individualist neoliberal workers through a special focus on ‘employability’.

This is not to say that the emergence of neoliberalism as ideology, governmentality and political-economic practice marks a fundamental rupture in the social fabric of Western societies. The dominance of neoliberal ideology has entailed not only a renewal of pre-1930s economic liberalism (where ‘laissez-faire’ is replaced by state intervention on behalf of capital), but also the spreading of novel conceptions of the human individual and of the relationship between society and market, the state and individuals. These new trends have led the way for an unprecedented wave of privatisations and marketisations in formerly ‘non-economic’ spheres. However, in addition to these changes, we can also see in neoliberalism powerful continuities in terms of the development of capitalist ideology. As Chris Harman notes, some critical analyses of neoliberalism – including those of David Harvey and many of the ‘anti-neoliberal’ and ‘anti-globalisation’ protest groups that emerged in the late 1990s – tend, to varying degrees, to romanticise the post-War, Keynesian socioeconomic order. Such a rewriting of the dominant ideologies of the past will ultimately undermine the critique these scholars and activists attempt to construct of the dominant ideology of the present. It is important to note the continuities between post-war Keynesianism and the neoliberalism that emerged in the 1970s, precisely because both political-economic orders are in a sense ‘symptoms’ of the dominance of a broader logic of capital:

Ruling class ideologies are rarely just lies cynically spread in order to win the acquiescence of the ruled. They are sets of beliefs that give the ruling class a sense of its own importance, sanctify its rule in its own eyes as well as in the eyes of others and provide it with confidence that it can deal with any apparent flaws in its own system. Keynesianism fulfilled this role during the post-war decades in the advanced Western countries, as did Stalinism in the “Communist” states and “developmentalism” in Latin
America, as well as the post-colonial states of Africa and Asia. But it became increasingly clear from the mid-1970s onwards that state intervention could not prevent economic crises in any of the world’s regions. Neoliberalism succeeded in filling the ideological gap.330

While Harman perhaps attributes more ideological ‘consciousness’ to the ‘ruling class’ than it is due, the point stands that a dominant ideology which benefits a minority at the ‘top end’ of society the most must also convince those rulers – the politicians, financiers and Chief Executives – of their own intrinsic value and rightful position in the social hierarchy. In the era of neoliberalism we see this ideological function time and again in debates on taxation. Arguments in favour of ‘taxing the rich’, or of increasing corporation tax, or taxing international financial transactions (the ‘Tobin tax’), in order to create a more ‘fair’ distribution of wealth, within societies and globally, are routinely met with rebuttals from those in political office over fears of ‘capital flight’. Most recently, the UK’s Liberal Democrat Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, suggested that a temporary increase in income tax on the very wealthiest in the country would be a ‘fair’ solution to some of the financial problems faced by Britons today. In response, the (Conservative) Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, stated that it was vital not to take government action that might upset or deter the ‘wealth creators’. Thus even so modest a redistributive measure as an emergency tax to be levied on the millionaire class of bankers and bosses is rejected precisely because it is that class that allegedly ‘creates wealth’ – they are not social leeches after all but, to the contrary, the lifeblood of society, without whose toil we would surely all starve. Such a depiction is, of course, reminiscent of Frank Knight’s view of the heroic ‘entrepreneur’.

According to this ideology, a society’s ‘wealth’ is not created by the daily labours of the proletarian classes, not by the factory, farm, shop and office workers, nor by the clerical and intellectual labour of the ‘service’ and education ‘sectors’, but by the investment bankers, the hedge fund managers, those at the ‘coal face’ (could there be a more perfectly ironic metaphor?) of the international financial markets, the traders in ‘derivative securities’ and other abstractions. The notions of ‘capital flight’ and of protecting the ‘wealth creators’ are precisely ‘meanings in the service of power’ – they are ways of reading and representing social

order which maintain a hierarchy in which a small minority dominates and exploits the majority; not because they are malevolent spirits (with, perhaps, a few exceptions), but because the logic of neoliberalism tells them they are doing this for everyone. “We’re all in it together”.

Those who seek to understand neoliberalism as a form of governmentality instead of ideology tend to – often implicitly – define ideology in the limited ‘political doctrine’ sense criticised above. Lemke argues that:

[T]he theoretical strength of the concept of governmentality consists of the fact that it construes neo-liberalism not just as ideological rhetoric or as a political-economic reality, but above all as a political project that endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists.

But a critical account of ideology of the sort developed here is not of a system of political ideas that simply colour political rhetoric, but precisely as a more material force that ‘endeavours to create a social reality that it suggests already exists’. The dominance of neoliberal ideology is really the continuous (re)production of a particular political-economic order by means of naturalising, universalising and ultimately dehistoricising discourses. As Bourdieu puts it, the ‘desocialised and dehistoricised’ neoliberal way of seeing ‘has, today more than ever, the means of making itself true and empirically verifiable’. 331

The medium of this shift is, more often than not, language. Given that ideology is, in one sense, ‘a convenient way of categorising under one heading a whole lot of different things we do with signs’ 332 – a sort of ‘semiotic order’ that is co-constitutive of a material order – it is very often manifested in what we can call ‘discourses’ (see Chapter Four). These sets of representations of the world and ways of acting in the world shape all social action. Ideology is thus most often and most obviously realised in texts (spoken or written). 333 Or, to put it another way, ideology is frequently ‘linguistically realised’. 334 Neoliberalism as ideology is not, therefore, some disembodied force acting only upon individuals, but rather exists in the acts

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331 Bourdieu, ‘The Essence of Neoliberalism’.
333 Van Dijk, ‘Discourse Analysis as Ideology Analysis’.
334 Ibid.
and speech acts of individuals and in their relations between each other. Ideology can, and often does, in this sense ‘come from ‘below’ as well as ‘above’’.\footnote{Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress, 
Language as Ideology (Abingdon: Routledge, 1979).}

Certainly neoliberalism reconstitutes modes of conduct, self-regulation and the microsocial relations of the workplace, the family, and so on. Certainly it entails, in Lemke’s words, ‘a re-coding of social mechanisms of exploitation and domination on the basis of a new topography of the social domain’.\footnote{Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-Politics’, p. 203.} But inasmuch as this re-coding consists of the extension of market principles into formerly ‘public’ spheres, it takes place in the interests of capital, its accumulation and circulation, what Wallerstein calls ‘the commodification of everything’.\footnote{Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism (London: Verso, 1983).} In short, while Foucauldian approaches do an excellent analytical job of explaining \textit{how} neoliberalism functions at the level of practices, it is by ‘bringing ideology back in’ that we are better able in such analyses to maintain a critical and functional explanation of \textit{why} it shapes practices the way it does, by reference to the social structures that form the context within which social action takes place. Even if Tony Blair was right to say that ideology is ‘dead’ in the sense of ‘rigid forms of social and economic theory’, it is alive and kicking in the sense of ‘meaning in the service of power’ and as a critical analytic concept at the heart of this thesis.

A productive conceptualisation of neoliberalism as ideology \textit{and} governmentality, as \textit{ways of seeing and ways of being} has now been developed. If we want to critically explain the influence of neoliberalism on discourses and practices of war and security, this is a solid theoretical framework from which to do so.

\textbf{3.5 Conclusion}

This chapter has achieved a number of important goals for the thesis at hand. It has studied, in the form of a ‘brief genealogy’, the emergences of neoliberalism in political-economic thought and discourse, but has also noted the important \textit{moral} dimensions to neoliberal discourses, policies and practices. It was argued that a powerful focus on the moral goodness of markets, individualised risk and responsibility, flexibility and self-
entrepreneurship is at the heart of projects led by both neoliberal theorists and the politicians and practitioners who have been called neoliberal since the late twentieth century.

It was further argued that the moral focus of neoliberalism, the emphasis on remaking our very selves in the image of *homo economicus* is both what can meaningfully differentiate it from the ‘classical’ *laissez-faire* liberalisms of Smith or Mill, and what renders inadequate descriptions of neoliberalism as a political economic theory and practice that prioritises markets, a ‘market fundamentalism’. Neoliberalism can be better understood as a ‘positive’ project that is concerned with intervening in very direct ways into the micro-social practices of individuals, and in their very subjectivities, in order to sow the seeds of competition in those places.

Having found the conceptualisation of neoliberalism as market fundamentalism or a straightforward reincarnation of *laissez-faire* to be lacking, the remainder of the chapter explored the potential for constructing a useful and analytically productive ‘critical explanatory concept’ of neoliberalism to be deployed in this thesis. Two extant critical conceptualisations – of neoliberalism as ideology and neoliberalism as governmentality – were explored in detail.

Ultimately, and in opposition to those who would draw a false dichotomy between the two, it was argued that, with some subtle rethinking of the categories of ideology and governmentality, the two could be productively used together in sketching the contours of neoliberalism. To achieve this, the chapter above breaks with the orthodoxies of both traditions, and develops wider, more capacious conceptualisations of ideology as ‘ways of seeing’ and governmentality as ‘ways of being’. Neoliberal ways of seeing form the structural context or ‘conditions of possibility’ for neoliberal ways of being. In order to flexibilise ourselves, take risks upon ourselves, to become entrepreneurs of ourselves (neoliberalism as governmentality) we must always-already see this as the natural way of the world and the nature of human individuals – competition, individualism, flexibility and resilience must be naturalised, universalised and dehistoricised (neoliberalism as ideology).

Having established this nuanced rearticulation of neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality, we are now better placed to take up the project of Chapter Four – that is, to begin to developing a methodological and analytic framework that will allow for an
empirical analysis of the influence of neoliberalism on discourses and practices of war and security.
4. FROM METATHEORY TO METHOD: CRITICAL REALISM, CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND SOCIAL PRACTICES

The answer to the transcendental question ‘what must the world be like for science to be possible?’ deserves the name of ontology.

Roy Bhaskar.338

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In a forthcoming article for the European Journal of International Relations, two veteran IR theorists, John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, argue that their field is in the process of ‘moving away’ from theory.339 The discipline has traditionally been theory-led; its most well-known figures and texts espouse at length the complex and conflictual theoretical positions of the so-called ‘great debates’: ‘realisms’, ‘liberalisms’, ‘Marxisms’, ‘constructivisms’ and so on. However, the emerging trend Mearsheimer and Walt observe in their analysis of the TRIP Survey of International Relations Scholars is toward ‘simplistic hypothesis testing’.340 A ‘growing emphasis on methods at the expense of theory’, they argue, is reflected in everything from the training of junior scholars and the academic job market in IR, to the increasingly commonplace accusation that the traditional IR theories amount to ‘sects’.341

This shift away from theory might be viewed as a backlash against the impasse of the ‘fourth debate’, but the idea of moving IR – or, indeed, any social science – ‘away’ from theory is deeply problematic, since the theory and the practice (including methods) of studying the social are inextricably linked.

Mearsheimer and Walt note the increasing prevalence of ‘quantitative methods’ and ‘hypothesis testing’ in the field, but such methods and tests are invariably and necessarily premised upon philosophical and methodological theoretical presuppositions, including

340 Ibid.
341 Ibid.
metatheoretical presuppositions about the way the world is and how we can reliably come to ‘know’ and explain aspects of it (and to what extent). Any object must, after all, be a certain way, in order to be susceptible to a particular method of studying it. These presuppositions are really ontological and epistemological assumptions that, in the case of quantitative methods and hypothesis testing, would seem to chime strongly with the long-dominant neopositivist approaches to social science,342 which, in turn, are premised on a fundamental equivalence between natural and social science. In this sense, the danger is that scholars who opt for a ‘less theory, more method’ approach inadvertently allow positivism – which had, from at least the 1980s, faced increasingly influential challenges in IR from constructivisms and other ‘reflectivist’ approaches – to re-colonise the discipline ‘through the back door’.

In attempting to abandon theory, those IR scholars who insist that we should move beyond paradigms and ‘-isms’ risk undoing vital work undertaken since the 1980s by Marxists, constructivists, feminists, Foucauldians and other critical and reflectivist scholars, to introduce an intelligent, critical and reflective orientation to a famously conservative discipline previously dominated by the ‘pragmatist’ anti-intellectualism of realism.

What is missing from the new trends in IR scholarship, Mearsheimer and Walt argue, is ‘explicit attention to how theory and method are related’.343 It is precisely this connection – between theory and method in the thesis at hand – that this chapter attends to. This chapter, beginning with an explicit discussion of the ontological underpinnings of the thesis, attempts to show how both ‘metatheoretical’ (ontological and epistemological) assumptions and the theorisation of the research problem (see Chapter 3) shape the choice of ‘method’ for the analysis in chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Even before we begin social research we have some idea of what the social world, the object of our investigations, is like. If we didn’t begin from some assumptions about the character of that world, about what exists in the first place to be investigated, how could we generate a research problem? Or select, develop or apply a methodological approach? How could we distinguish what is worth studying from what is not? One does not sit down to write

343 Mearsheimer and Walt, ‘Leaving Theory Behind’.
a thesis in international politics with a *tabula rasa*, but rather with a more-or-less specific idea of the *objects of research*.

Emphasising the primacy of *ontology* – the study and theory of what ‘is’ – in this way, and recognising the importance of explicitly discussing underlying ontological premises before outlining epistemological and methodological orientations, is characteristic of critical realist approaches to social science. This chapter is thus not simply a ‘methodology’ chapter of the type found in many theses and dissertations, but rather constitutes a logical movement from a ‘metatheory’, a transcendental philosophical argument about the character of the social world, to a method, a means for practically engaging with the research problem.

This chapter is structured in two parts. The first part details the ‘critical realist’ philosophical and metatheoretical assumptions and reasoning that underpin the approach to social (and specifically international political) research taken in this thesis. This includes a specific focus on how critical realism provides a distinctive basis for a form of retroductive and critical, but also *causal*, international political analysis.

In the second half of the chapter, a methodological framework is elaborated, which flows from and is justified by the critical realist social ontology outlined in the first half. Specifically, it is argued that the analysis of discourse, and especially of language, but also of more ‘material’ elements of ‘social practices’, is effectively necessitated by the critical realist perspective. A ‘critical discourse analytic’ (CDA) approach, rooted in a critical realist social ontology, is developed to address this need. Since the concern of the thesis is to highlight the causal power of neoliberal ideology in shaping, constraining and enabling particular security policies and practices, it is through an empirical study of these objects, but one which links their form and functions to more abstract social structures, that a ‘broader’ and ‘deeper’ causal analysis than that of the ‘liberal peace’ and ‘liberal wars’ paradigms (discussed in Chapter 2) can be achieved. It is further argued that as a form of ‘critical discourse analysis’, the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 will constitute not only a ‘critical explanation’ of dominant discourses and practices but also a new ‘critical discourse’ on these phenomena. The final sections of the second part of the chapter outline a specific analytical framework to be applied to the texts and practices under study in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, before highlighting the ways in which this analysis fits with the causal model outlined in the first part of the chapter.
4.2 Metatheory

4.2.1 Ontology, Critical Realism and Causation

The debates which have most sharply divided the social sciences since the mid-20th century have largely been epistemological and methodological in nature. On one side, there are the empiricists and positivists of various stripes, intellectually indebted to the empiricism of David Hume and more recently inspired by figures like Karl Popper, whose approach has dominated the mainstream of social science research methodology. On the other side there are the post-positivists, post-modernists, post-structuralists, the various hermeneutic or interpretive analysts and constitutive theorists, often inspired by critical continental philosophy, who have so enriched social inquiry in Western academia in recent decades.

The dispute between these two very broad and internally diverse schools of thought has been largely over the ‘knowability’ of the world. Epistemology and methodology have featured heavily in this schism, where one side views social inquiry as a gradual revealing of the nature of things by means of falsifiable hypothesis-testing through empirical observation, while the other asserts an epistemological relativism according to which categories such as ‘truth’ and even ‘reality’ are always-already undermined by the essential contingency of knowledge upon historical circumstance, subject-positions and inter-subjective meaning making.

The critical realist intervention in this debate has been to point to what Patomäki and Wight call the ‘discourse of philosophical anti-realism’ which actually unites both positivist and post-positivist approaches.\textsuperscript{344} For all their epistemological divergence, the two sides in this ‘great debate’ converge in their failure to begin with ontology and their consequent, anthropocentric reduction of the world to our knowledge of it; the reduction of ontology to epistemology – what Roy Bhaskar calls the ‘epistemic fallacy’.\textsuperscript{345} Since all social theories and analyses presuppose an ontology in the sense that they are premised on particular pre-existing objects of research, the result of this epistemic fallacy is the introduction of ‘hidden ontologies’ into theories of IR.\textsuperscript{346}


\textsuperscript{345} Bhaskar, \textit{A Realist Theory of Science}, p. 16.

The ‘two category mistakes’ made by empiricists (including positivists) are, Bhaskar notes, the identification of ‘events’ with ‘experiences’ and of ‘constant conjunctions’ of events with causal laws.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 34-35.} An illustrative, natural science, example of this problem could be a physical force such as gravity. In describing gravity we explain observable phenomena by reference to an unobservable causal mechanism. Despite this mechanism being outside the realm of the empirical, beyond the reach of immediate human sense-experience, we still ‘know’ it to exist, to be \textit{real}. In this sense, physical forces like gravity are among what Bhaskar calls the ‘intransitive objects of knowledge’. Though our knowledge of such causal mechanisms is itself always transitive, partial and shifting, we must understand them as having a ‘real’, persistent existence regardless of our observation or, for that matter knowledge of them, in order for any rigorous ‘scientific’ investigation to be possible.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 30-32.} To claim otherwise would be to engage in what Bhaskar, along with other critical realists and complexity theorists, calls ‘anthropocentrism’\footnote{Ibid., p. 34.}. Furthermore, the very basis of the scientific ‘discovery’ of forces like gravity rests not on the inductive or deductive approaches held up today (in positivisms) as the only properly ‘scientific’ approach to causal analysis, but rather on the abductive or retroductive approach whereby we begin from observable phenomena and work backward, positing possible causes.

All of this leads Bhaskar to sketch a particular kind of ontology, characterised by \textit{stratification}, for, in addition to the domain of the ‘Empirical’ (that which is experienced by human individuals), there must logically also exist the domains of the ‘Actual’ (that which actually happens – events, observable or otherwise – \textit{and} that which is experienced) and ultimately what Bhaskar simply calls the ‘Real’ (the generative causal laws, mechanisms and tendencies which are by their nature \textit{unobservable}, \textit{and} events \textit{and} experiences).\footnote{Bhaskar, \textit{A Realist Theory of Science}, p. 56.} This stratified critical realist ontology has been depicted by Bhaskar in the diagram reproduced below (Figure 1).
This is all very well for a philosophy of science in general, but what of the relevance to studying the social world, and the specific research problem at hand?

In critical realist thought, social structures, like the causal mechanisms of natural science, are granted ‘ontological’ status. Such structures are understood to be real and enduring – insofar as they are generative causal mechanisms which exist in a relationship of dialectical causation with social practices and events. Furthermore, especially in the inherently ‘open systems’ of the social world (as opposed to the ‘closed systems’ of the experimental laboratory) ‘structures, generative mechanisms and the like’ are often ‘out of phase with the patterns of events which actually occur’, because in open, non-experimental, systems

[...] no constant conjunctions of events obtain. If this activity is to be rendered intelligible causal laws must be analysed as the tendencies of things, which may be possessed unexercised and exercised unrealised, just as they may of course be realised unperceived (or undetected) by people.351

So critical realism in social science is based on a ‘depth ontology’,352 it claims that reality is stratified, consists of different levels: the Real, the Actual and the Empirical; within which

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352 Ibid., 12-13.
we find things like, respectively, social structures (generative causal mechanisms), social practices and events (things done but not necessarily ‘seen’) and observable/observed social events (the things we observe happening in the social world).

Milja Kurki has sought to establish how such a critical realist social ontology can allow those conducting what she calls ‘reflectivist’ work in IR to effectively ‘reclaim’ causal analysis. As Bhaskar makes clear, the Humean empiricist approach to establishing causation is wholly inadequate since it attributes all valid knowledge production to observations in the domain of the empirical and is thus unable to posit more complex causal interaction between social structures, practices and events. Kurki seeks to ‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ the conception of cause at work in dominant strands of social science today – which has its roots in the work of Hume and Descartes – and invokes Aristotle’s ‘Four Causes’ as a more useful model to look to. The ‘reflectivists’ of IR theory, she warns, ‘have also bought into the Humean assumptions concerning causation’ and therefore tended to avoid (explicit) causal analysis altogether, often abandoning claims to a ‘scientific’ approach in the process. Thus what begins as a rejection of positivism as a dominant discourse (or metatheory) in social research ends in the abandonment of emancipatory ‘explanatory critique’ as a social scientific enterprise. By drawing upon the Aristotelian concepts of ‘formal’ causes (ideational factors in the name of which social action takes place – discourses and ideologies for example) and ‘material’ causes (the limits to what is socially possible set by the pre-existing material conditions in which social action takes place – resource availability for example), Kurki demonstrates how critical realism can paint more complex and plausible causal pictures.

4.2.2 Marxism, emancipatory social science and critical explanation

This social ontology and its concomitant approach to establishing causation through a process of ‘critical’ retroductive reasoning has its antecedents in the Marxian method. In one of his earliest known published texts, a short letter to the *Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher*, later published under the title ‘For a Ruthless Critique of Everything Existing’, Marx wrote:

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354 Ibid., p. 10.
355 Ibid., p. 8.
356 Ibid., p. 27.
Reason has always existed, only not always in reasonable form. The critic can therefore start out by taking any form of theoretical and practical consciousness and develop from the unique forms of existing reality the true reality as its norm and final goal.\(^{357}\)

This notion, that true ‘reason’ has an emancipatory, ‘revealing’ (not of objects but relations) content, has fuelled the ‘critical’ impulse of Bhaskar’s critical realism (and of many other ‘critical’ approaches to politics and IR in general).\(^{358}\) Critical realism is thus at its most interesting, honest, and useful when, rather than simply providing an injunction to ‘do’ ontology, it describes a specific content to its stratified social ontology.

As an elaboration of the historical materialist ontology implied in the work of Marx and Engels, critical realism can describe a ‘mode of production’\(^{359}\) as a real causal mechanism or tendency, a social structure which shapes and constrains possible outcomes and events in the domains of the Actual and Empirical.

Unlike the most deterministic base-superstructure models, however, critical realism allows us to understand aspects of the social world as ‘ultimately socially constructed’,\(^{360}\) so that social structures are, in fact, ‘largely the unintended consequence of action’.\(^{361}\) However, as Fairclough notes, ‘once constructed they are realities which affect and limit the textual (or ‘discursive’) construction of the social’\(^{362}\) – so the transitive objects of the social world exist in an interactive or ‘dialectical’ relation to the intransitive. In contrast to more ‘economistic’ Marxisms, the critical realist causal model allows us to claim that ‘formal causes’, things like discourses and texts, ideas themselves, can wield a causal efficacy that has the potential to alter more abstract social structures (causal mechanisms) themselves. From a critical realist perspective, we can understand ideologies like neoliberalism as the systematic ways of ‘thinking’ and ‘seeing’ the world, the ‘common senses’ and the ‘scientific truths’, which ensure the reproduction of such structures by limiting the possible and the actual, while


\(^{358}\) Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*


discourses are those interconnected complexes of textual/linguistic representation and daily material practices that shape the ‘events’ we may empirically observe.

The philosophy of critical realism is perhaps best understood as the articulation of a Marxian response to the various structuralisms, poststructuralisms and postmodernisms precipitated by the ‘linguistic turn’ and the rise of ‘hermeneutic’ and ‘interpretive’ social research. It is therefore important to understand some of dynamics of the relationship between critical realism and these various structuralist and poststructuralist metatheoretical approaches.

Bhaskar argues that the ‘main problem’ with various ‘poststructuralist’ and ‘postmodern’ scholars, in which category he includes not only Derrida and Foucault but also Habermas, is their failure to ‘thematise ontology’. As a result, he claims, these authors ‘tacitly inherit an implicit ontology’, which is in fact the predominant positivist ontology. This is, Bhaskar notes, of course at odds with their explicit rejection of positivist epistemology. While Derrida lacks ‘ontological depth’ and Foucault fails to ‘coherently thematise ontology’, Althusser is also criticised by Bhaskar, for his ‘disconnected’ understanding of social structure, which, due to its lack of a depth ontology, is unable to account for or employ ‘notions like generative structures, transformative change [...] and [...] transformative praxis within a totality that we constitute’.

The diversity and vitality of the whole poststructuralist movement in social theory and research since the 1970s lies not only in its principled opposition to, and eclectic critiques of, dominant social orders and modes of (inter-)action, from psychiatry and sexuality to workplace ethics and institutional politics, but also in its rejection of the condescending (and potentially dangerous/dominating) ‘emancipatory’ approach taken by the structural Marxists whose work they have sought to move beyond. Perhaps the clearest example of how critical realism can be understood as a Marxian conversation with, or at least reply to, poststructuralism lies in Foucault’s own very specific critique of the Marxists in France at the time he was writing. As we have seen (Chapter 3), Foucault takes issue with the concept of ‘ideology’ due to its implicit relation to a concept of ‘truth’. More broadly, though, he feels

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363 Bhaskar, From Science to Emancipation, p. 63.
364 Ibid., p. 64.
that mid-twentieth century Marxist critiques of social (power) relations in Western capitalist societies are always-already undermined by the fact that the Marxist intellectuals tend to ask ‘the same theoretical questions as the academic establishment, to deal with the same problems and topics’. The questions with which Foucault concerns himself are much more interesting than those dealt with by certain of his Marxist contemporaries. Rather than attempting to scientifically describe macroeconomic mechanisms, in his histories of madness, sexuality and the prison, Foucault instead reveals the operation of power and structure at the ‘micro-social’ level. In this sense he was more radical than many Marxists, offering something closer to a ‘ruthless critique of everything existing’ than many a card-carrying Communist in Western academia.

The apparent inability or unwillingness of Marxist intellectuals to evolve their critique, and their tendency to instead cling in a reactionary way to the old orthodoxies of ‘science’, disappointed Foucault. He sought to investigate the linkages between science and politics, to ascertain how ‘medicine’ and ‘psychiatry’ were, on the one hand, supposed to be ‘sciences’, and, on the other hand constituted sites of social control and power struggles, and embodied particular political-economic programmes. Such ‘uncharted domains’, Foucault argues, were disregarded by Marxist academics, to the detriment of their critical capabilities: ‘The price Marxists paid for their fidelity to the old positivism was a radical deafness to a whole series of questions posed by science’.

Of course Foucault is right to question Marxism as a form of critical social inquiry, where that inquiry is underpinned by ‘the old positivism’. He is also right to suggest that, in a sense, this approach plays into the hands of the ‘establishment’ – the liberal capitalist social order. And this is where critical realism comes in. As Bhaskar puts it: ‘my account of scientific method is diametrically opposed to that of positivism’. The argument for positivist social science rests upon ‘the illicit generalisation, and the incorrect analysis, of a special case: that of an epistemically significant closure [...] but it is a case without application to the social sciences’. The point, then, is to ‘reclaim’ rather than abandon a ‘science’ for the social world. Devoid as it is of both the narrow and shallow empiricism, and the hamfisted attempts

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366 Ibid., p. 53.
367 Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 18.
368 Ibid., p. 19.
at prediction that typify much positivist social science, critical realism instead offers a radically
different, retroductive, scientific approach to the social.

Critical realists are just as concerned as Foucault to leave the ‘old positivism’ in the past,
but unlike many Foucauldian scholars, do not abandon science altogether. A critical realist
social science can be just as concerned with the micro-social relations of power entailed in
particular historical epistemes, discourses and governmentalities as the poststructuralists,
but weave into its critical explanation accounts of social *structure* and of *causation*. These
accounts, we argue, should be called *scientific*.

Approaches like this, which seek on the one hand to provide causal explanations, but
on the other hand tie these explanations to a normative commitment to emancipation, have
been called ‘explanatory critique’\(^{369}\) or ‘critical explanation’,\(^{370}\) and such approaches
undermine the presumed mutual exclusivity of both ‘explanation’ and ‘understanding’ as
research orientations, and ‘positivist’ and ‘hermeneutic’ methodologies. It is the aim of this
thesis to provide such a ‘critical explanation’, in this case of the ways in which neoliberal
ideology (as defined in Chapter 3) shapes the discourse and practice of contemporary British
‘security’.

Given the metatheoretical base established in the first half of this chapter, it is now
necessary to consider how one might approach the research problem outlined earlier in the
thesis – a critical causal analysis of the linkages between neoliberalism, as an ideology and
governmentality, and contemporary liberal state violence.

4.3 Methodology

4.3.1 Language, Politics and Power

It is often said that, following Aristotle, humans are ‘political animals’. What is usually
inferred from this is Aristotle’s initial claim justifying this statement, that ‘the state is a
creation of nature’.\(^{371}\) In other words, that the emergence of some form of political

\(^{369}\) Ibid.

\(^{370}\) Glynos and Howarth, *Logics of Critical Explanation*.

\(^{371}\) Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. I
community or *polis*, based on some conception of ‘a good life’, and invariably ‘composed of rulers and subjects’, is inevitable and natural among human beings.

What is sometimes overlooked, however, is Aristotle’s further claim that the clearest indicator that ‘man’ is indeed a ‘political’ animal lies in the feature which most sharply distinguishes human beings from other animals (even in the eyes of many anthropologists, linguists and evolutionary biologists today):

Nature, as we often say, makes nothing in vain, and man is the only animal whom she has endowed with the gift of speech. And whereas mere voice is but an indication of pleasure or pain, and is therefore found in other animals [...], the power of speech is intended to set forth the expedient and the inexpedient, and therefore likewise the just and the unjust. And it is a characteristic of man that he alone has any sense of good and evil, or just and unjust, and the like, and the association of living beings who have this sense makes a family and a state.

In the time that has passed since Aristotle wrote the *Politics* – more than two millennia – many of his arguments and ideas may of course have been weakened or disproven. To suggest, for example, that non-human animals are capable only of expressing ‘pleasure or pain’, might today seem preposterous, given the complexity of communication that has been extensively documented in everything from dogs to bees. Substantial evidence points to the ability of the Bonobo ape to not only communicate in its own terms, but to learn human languages and engage in the sort of ‘symbolic processing’ previously thought to be the exclusive domain of *homo sapiens*.

Nevertheless, the claim that ‘speech’ (or, more accurately, ‘language’) remains a most fundamental distinction setting humans apart from other animals holds sway even among the very scientists observing Bonobo communication today. And it is precisely the abstract

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372 Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. I
373 Aristotle, *Politics*, Bk. VII, Ch. 14,
375 Bk. I Ch. 2, 1253a
symbolism language entails, including the conceptions of ‘good and evil’, ‘just and unjust’, and the ‘good life’ that it allows us to articulate, that provides the very basis for, ‘politics’.

Since this thesis has been situated in the field of international politics (Chapter 1), it is necessary to provide here some indication of what the political consists of. In doing this here, the goal is not merely to define ‘the political’, but to show how a particular conception of the political connects the theoretical work undertaken in Chapter 3, the philosophy and metatheory outlined above, and the particular methods employed and objects studied in the empirical analysis of Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Aristotle’s approach continues to provide a useful basic concept, especially in its focus on language as the key medium of the political, and its identification of competing conceptions of the ‘good life’ as the source and goal of political activity. But it is too limited, teleological and institutional in its location of politics in ‘the state’, and in fact serves to naturalise and reify a particular form of statist hierarchical political power (e.g. ‘rulers and subjects’). A more useful concept of the political with which to augment these Aristotelian reflections is that provided by Colin Hay. Hay argues for a broad conception of the political, which encompasses, with qualification, ‘the entire sphere of the social’. The point here is to emphasise that no aspect of the social (nor, we might add, the material) world should be a priori excluded from the political. The inclusion of some particular phenomenon within ‘the political’ is dependent upon context and analytic perspective. Any object and any social relationship has the potential for inclusion (‘politicalisation’) or exclusion (‘depoliticisation’) in the realm of the political, the key condition being, according to Hay, whether that object or relation is seen to be bound up with ‘the distribution, exercise and consequences of power’.

Given that ‘the political’ is, therefore, really an analytic category – a ‘lens’ through which a particular situation, object, relation or process is viewed – the politicisation and depoliticisation of such phenomena is largely achieved through linguistic representation and discourses (structured sets of representations and modes of social interaction premised on those representations). A pertinent example, worth elaborating here, is the depoliticisation of ‘economic’ activity in neoliberal discourse and practice. Capitalism has, since its origins as a

380 Ibid.
doctrine and practice, always entailed a drive toward separating ‘the political’ from ‘the economic’. Marx identified this already in the transition from ‘feudal’ societies to modern capitalist states. Whereas feudal societies had ‘a directly political character’ since power was, in the form of ‘seigniorial right’ (the rights of lordship), directly and explicitly recognised as the basis of social relations and relative social positions of individuals to one another and to the state, the ‘political state’ that emerged after the bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries separated and then privileged ‘unpolitical man’ or ‘man as a member of civil society’. Marx saw in the emergence of ‘so-called human rights’, not the abolition of the divine right of kings as a form of arbitrary class-based power, but rather its evolution and re-articulation in the form of a new ‘public/private’ and ‘political/economic’ divide. Marx insisted on politicising ‘the economic’ by always relating its components (production, exchange, circulation and so forth) to the distribution and exercise of (class) power. As Ellen Meiskins Wood notes, Marx’s project was, in part, about revealing ‘the political face of the economy’ which was, at the time of his writing, being increasingly obfuscated by the discourse of ‘bourgeois political economists’.

Neoliberal thinkers have, as we saw in Chapter 3, attempted an even stronger discursive and pragmatic depoliticisation of the economic, dissolving altogether in some cases the analytic category of ‘political economy’, into which the work of not only Marx but also their ‘classical’ liberal forebears (Adam Smith, for example) falls, in favour of recognising two discrete entities (and related disciplines), ‘the economy’ and ‘politics’. For Friedman in particular, the political – precisely as it concerns power relations – should be effectively ‘kept out’ of the economic and recognised as a separate ontological category from it. The neoliberal ideological ‘common sense’, which is achieved through the popularisation of neoliberal discourse among both policy makers and the general public, asserts that ‘the economy’ and ‘politics’ exist as fundamentally and naturally discrete things. This naturalisation also entails a specific focus on ‘the economy’ not as a sort of analytic category or realm of social action (like ‘politics’ or ‘the political’) but as an entity, akin to an actor, an agent, or even an organism.

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383 Ibid., p. 63.
384 Ibid., p. 59.
The prolific references in British news media to the ‘health of the economy’ (and the need for ‘austerity’ to improve this ‘health’) since the onset of the international financial crisis in 2007/8 is a linguistic formulation that relies upon this neoliberal discourse – it both conceptually reflects and pragmatically (if partially and contingently) achieves the depoliticisation of the economic.

4.3.2 DISCOURSE, MATERIALITY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE: A CRITICAL REALIST VIEW

The utility, for a ‘critical’ emancipatory approach to social scientific research, of adopting a critical realist social ontology rather than a more ‘determinist’ or ‘economistic’ Marxist philosophical basis is, as was argued above, that it allows us to thoroughly engage with the linguistic and poststructuralist ‘turns’.

The refocusing of much social research, following the structuralist semiotics of Saussure and his followers, and the poststructural discourse theory of Foucault, on how signification and representation in general – and language-use in particular – constitutes particular expressions of structure and agency in day-to-day life, is not a shift this thesis seeks to contest or reject. In fact, such a shift of focus is warranted, not only by the expansive definition of the political advanced above, but by a desire to conduct more ‘concrete’ forms of social research, based on what people actually do and say, rather than the abstract theorising of structures.

There is no necessary mutual exclusion between a Marxian ‘ideology critique’ and a ‘discourse’ or ‘practice’ based approach to studying the social world. To the contrary, the two can be seen as deeply compatible, particularly when the former is underpinned by a critical realist social ontology. Let us take, for example, Marx’s famous claim, in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, that ‘men make their own history, [...] but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past’.386 This statement is perhaps most often read as an assertion of the power and historicity of social structures. Certainly it can be read as supporting Marx’s essential drive to ‘historicise’ thinking about the social world (and thus to destabilise formerly dehistoricised/naturalised structures like the capitalist mode of production). However, the first thesis in this sentence is really of equal import: ‘men [sic] make their own history’. This is a statement about human agency, which is followed by a

clause about the conditioning power of structure. In Marx’s view, the ‘social’ is (re-)produced by the everyday activities of individuals. This is not, then, a ‘determinist’ or ‘structuralist’ statement. However, it is true that Marx’s oeuvre focuses more on the operation of structural social forces and relations than the exercise of individual agency.

This is where critical realist philosophy provides a useful rethinking of the relationship between structure and agency in the reproduction of the social world. Bhaskar and other critical realists simply provide a more developed account of this relationship. We might contrast the aforementioned quote from Marx with Bhaskar’s claim that ‘society stands to individuals, then, as something that they never make, but that exists only in virtue of their activity’. 387 ‘Society’, for Bhaskar, is not ‘created’ or ‘made’ by the agency of individuals, since it is always-already present for each individual, it is a ‘given’. It is, however, both ‘reproduced’ and ‘transformed’ only by virtue of the ‘conscious human activity’ of individuals, which we might call ‘agency’.

But in what precise ways do we humans, as agents of history and constituents of society, actually reproduce society and its structures? What constitutes the socially reproductive ‘activity’ to which Bhaskar refers? In a very broad, and rather crude, sense, we can see that ‘society’ exists in the things that people think, say, and do together.388 These three sets of things fall into the categories of the mental (or ‘psychological’), the semiotic and the material. Clearly, each of these categories overlaps the other in many cases, and the boundaries between each and all are blurred. What one is thinking ‘internally’ (the mental) can simultaneously be shaping one’s significations to others in terms of tone of voice and content of speech, or the ‘body language’ intrinsic to the disposition of one’s limbs and facial features (the semiotic), and the physical way one’s body is interacting with other bodies or the environment (the material). In most human activity, it can be argued, these categories are more-or-less inextricably linked, as illustrated in Figure 2, below.

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387 Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism, p. 34
388 An alternative and similar, but rather more limited and overly-specified, taxonomy of social practice can be found in Norman Fairclough’s New Labour, New Language? (London: Routledge, 2000).
Figure 3. A Venn diagram of social practice

The Venn diagram in Figure 3 represents ‘social practices’ (‘S.P.’) as occupying the central, intersectional space where all three broad categories of social activity overlap with or internalise one another. This is not, however, to say that any particular social practice might not lie more strongly in one of the three categories. Political speeches, for example (see Chapter 6), can be said to be a predominantly semiotic activity, since their goal is the communication of meaning. Nevertheless, any speech also entails materiality (the environment in which it is given, the attire and bodily dispositions of the speaker, the relative position of the audience), and mental activity (the speech is the product of and reflects a way of thinking, and may also influence ways of thinking and be interpreted and understood in particular ways.

An example of how the mental, semiotic and material elements of social activity combine to constitute social practices can answer our question about the substance of socially reproductive activity. We can begin from the uncontroversial and commonplace premise that the capitalist mode of production is a broad and prevailing social structure in

Source: Author’s own illustration
British society. Yet this structure, which is, in Marx’s terms ‘transmitted from the past’ or, in Bhaskar’s terms, is a ‘given’, exists at any moment only in the (material-mental-semiotic) social practices in which most people are engaged. So for British capitalism to exist as a social structure, the supermarket Sales Assistant must enter the shop at the correct time in the morning, and conduct herself in the manner of her training (i.e. in such a way that customers will buy things and will not be scared/confused/offended by her behaviour). Furthermore, her employer must monitor her working hours and ensure that her remuneration for her time is low enough that a profit can be drawn from the sale of the commodities in the shop. Overall, the owner(s)/shareholder(s) of the business must be concerned with capital accumulation as a process of continuous growth, whereby a portion of any profit generated from the Sales Assistant’s labour constitutes new capital for reinvestment (perhaps into another shop, or into expanding the original one), with a view to increasing profit, and, therefore, capital, and so on.

The abstract-sounding ‘self-regarding process’ of capital to which Immanuel Wallerstein refers is realised, day-to-day, in the mental, semiotic and material social activity of people like the Sales Assistant. The mental process by which she comes to view herself each day as a ‘Sales Assistant’ exists in a relation of dialectical interdependence with the (‘semiotic’) ways she interacts/communicates with other staff and customers in the shop, and the material things she does – driving to work in the morning, shelf-stacking, operating a checkout. There might be a million or more other facets to the mental, semiotic and material activity of the Sales Assistant, a huge proportion of which contribute to the reproduction of capitalism, but since this is a social, and not an individual, structure, and only exists by mass participation, we can say that the most important thought processes, materialities (and of course semiotic effects) are those which concern her relation to other people. She views someone as her ‘boss’, she views others as ‘customers’, and so on. Her understanding of herself as ‘Sales Assistant’ is purely relational – it only works in the context of a relationship with ‘Manager’, ‘customer’, ‘supermarket’, ‘firm’, and ‘stock’. Equally importantly, her Manager must conceive of herself as a boss, the Sales Assistant as an employee and so on.

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390 Wallerstein, *Historical Capitalism*
What is foregrounded in the above discussion is the fact that although language is crucial in the (re)production of social structure and political power, and therefore important to all critical political analysis, it does not exist in a vacuum. M.A.K. Halliday, the founder of ‘systemic functional’ linguistics, suggests that ‘human history is the interplay of material and linguistic forces’. The role played by language, then, in reproducing both society and other social structures, should not be underestimated. In Hodge and Kress’s terms: ‘It is an absolute precondition for nearly all of our social life’. But if, as Saussure notes, language is a system of signs, language-use is a ‘practice’, bound up with the other mental, semiotic and material elements of social practice.

To assess the influence of neoliberal ideology on the discourse and practice of British ‘security’ thus requires an analysis of both the largely semiotic, linguistic, representations of security (see the textual analysis in Chapters 5 and 6) and an analysis of wider ‘security practices’, including more obviously material activity (see practice analysis in Chapter 7).

There have already been moves toward understanding security as a form of social practice, rather than a reified ‘thing’. Though it is significantly more methodologically thoroughgoing than Richard Jackson’s attempt to analyse the language and practice of the ‘War on Terror’ (see Chapter 2), Lene Hansen’s *Security as Practice* shares the limitation that it claims to analyse security ‘as practice’, yet remains entirely at the level of textual discourse analysis. The ‘practice’ to which Hansen is referring is exclusively the *representational* or ‘discursive’ practice of security; specifically, the textual representation of identities in the Western discourse on the Bosnian War. But the social practices that (re)produce Western ‘security’ are not only textual, they include more material practices. Today, such practices include, for example: the use of surveillance technologies including CCTV and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs); ‘war games’; bombing campaigns; the securing of borders by armed soldiers and other officers of the state; the killing of ‘enemy combatants’ and civilians; the arrest and detention of ‘terror suspects’; the ‘extraordinary rendition’ of captured ‘enemies’ and so on. The ways in which ‘enemy combatants’, ‘civilians’ and ‘terror suspects’ are constructed as identities – in the *discursive* practice and constitution of ‘security’ – is clearly of great significance to how these more material practices play out, and former may even

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constitute the enabling cause for the latter. But an analysis of security as social practice should surely also seek to trace the ways in which these ‘non-discursive’ or ‘non-semiotic’, more material elements of practice (that is, the elements which are not directed toward communicating or representing, even if they may be interpreted as doing so) are also shaped, constrained and enabled by (and feed back into) discourses and ideologies.

4.3.3 CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS (CDA) AND IDEOLOGY CRITIQUE

In Chapter 3, a ‘critical’ concept of ideology was proffered, whereby the term is understood to designate ‘meaning in the service of power’, in the sense that it constitutes the parameters of a ‘common sense’, and thus the parameters of popular conceptions of what the world is like, its dynamics and the limits to possibility that define it. But a more precise explanation of ‘common sense’ is required in order to think about how we might analyse, and ‘critically explain’ the operation of ideology. Common sense as it was described in Chapter 3 consists of a vast set of assumptions, a key feature of which is that they are widely held to be ‘true’ within a society. Common sense, in Norman Fairclough’s terms, consists of ‘assumptions in the service of power’ – that is, those implicit assumptions upon which our production and interpretation of language in written and spoken texts is based, when such assumptions serve to (re)produce unequal power relations between individuals or groups in a society. This common sense is ‘common’ in that the assumptions are shared by ‘most if not virtually all of the members of a society or institution’ 393.

But how do such assumptions come to be so widely held? Here it is useful to recall Terry Eagleton’s dehistoricising ‘ideological strategies’ of universalisation and naturalisation (see Chapter 3). The transition of a belief or idea about the some aspect of the world from contentious and ‘political’ or ‘ideological’ article of faith to depoliticised ‘neutral’ common sense assumption takes place precisely via these ideological strategies, and the struggle over meaning in which they exist. The neoliberal depoliticisation of the economic, for example (see Section 4.3.1, above) relies upon persuading people – through the representative strategies of particular discourses – that ‘politics’ and ‘the economy’ are essentially, universally and naturally, separate entities. In this sense, naturalisation, the triumph of a particular meaning for a word, phrase, image or concept – over what traditional linguistics refers to as a social

393 Norman Fairclough, Language and Power (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013) p. 73
‘sign’ – is ‘the royal road to common sense’. Winning these linguistic or ‘semiotic’ struggles, struggles over meaning, is essential to winning broader social struggles, which incorporate other, more ‘material’ concerns. If a ‘boss’ and a ‘worker’ are thoroughly convinced of the ‘naturalness’ of their relative subject positions, within a particular discourse of employment, the worker will accept less salary, and consequently less food, property and leisure time, than the boss. Even more crucially, in ideological terms, attempts by someone not engaged in, or at least sceptical of, that particular discourse of employment, to convince the worker that she is being exploited, will likely receive the resounding reply “but this is how it is!” Such a statement would not be ‘false’ as such (see Chapter 3 on why ‘false consciousness’ concepts of ideology are unhelpful), but would be ‘ideological’ in the sense that it would serve to ‘block off the possibility of a transformed state of affairs’.

We have established, then, the significance of language and social practice, from a critical realist perspective, in the (re)production of social structure, and the permeation of language by power. It has been argued (Chapter 3) that the matrices of assumptions that constitute ‘common sense’ are often ‘ideological’, in the sense that they exist in the service of the reproduction of unequal power relations between individuals or social groups. It has further been suggested that particular discourses and social practices – relatively stable ways of representing, interpreting and acting in the world – can be strongly shaped by ideology to the extent that they rely on shared, naturalised, common sense. This entire conceptual apparatus of discourse and ideology has, furthermore, been developed from and situated in the critical realist social ontology and metatheoretical orientation described in the first half of this chapter. The crucial question remains, however, of how to study the ideological conditioning of discourse.

Here, the methodology of critical discourse analysis (CDA), as it has been developed by Norman Fairclough, provides a useful starting point. Whereas conventional linguistics may be understood as the study of language in or for itself, Fairclough’s CDA seeks to understand language-use as socially-embedded, as an element of ‘social practice’. Discourses as established sets of socio-linguistic practices are both constituted by the social reality in which they arise, and simultaneously constitutive of that reality. As a method of critical textual

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394 Ibid., p. 76
395 Eagleton, Ideology, p. 27.
analysis, CDA thus entails ‘analysing the means and patterns by which [...] ideology is linguistically realised’. This conceptualisation of the dialectical relationship between social structures, practices, language, discourses and texts is the key difference between CDA and ‘other critical (e.g. Foucaultian, “post-modern”, “post-structural”, “social constructivist” etc.) approaches to discourse’. CDA, Fairclough and Graham argue, unlike the longer-established Foucauldian models, ‘views texts as a moment in the material production and reproduction of social life’.

Given the argument developed above for the importance of language as an instantiation of ideology, it would seem that, in order to assess the influence of neoliberal ideology on the discourse and practice of contemporary liberal war, it is worth studying language-use. But, in looking at what people say and write around this topic, how are we to ‘see’ the influence of ideology? While written and spoken texts (with some exceptions, such as books of political theory) rarely ‘spout ideology’ directly, many texts, Fairclough notes, ‘routinely cue’ ideological assumptions. By using particular terms and structuring a text in a particular way, its producer can rely on the interpreters (audience) to do the actually ‘importing’ of ideological assumptions. The ‘critical’ in CDA can thus be understood as signifying the attempt, by means of retroductive, causal, textual analysis, to denaturalise the language-use in political texts, in order to systematically ‘reveal the kinds of ideas, absences and taken-for-granted assumptions’ that form the conditions of possibility for particular texts, with a special focus on how such ideas, absences and assumptions (re)produce unequal power relations. The aim of CDA is thus ‘to draw out ideologies, showing where they might be buried in texts’ through the analysis of discourse. In this sense, it is an attempt to bring together the Marxian tradition of ‘ideology critique’ and the Foucauldian tradition of ‘discourse analysis’, not by means of some form of conceptual ‘middle-grounding’, but rather by firmly situating discourse within a deeper social ontology, where ideology constitutes the

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397 Norman Fairclough and Phil Graham, 'Marx as a Critical Discourse Analyst: The genesis of a critical method and its relevance to the critique of global capital', Estudios de Sociolingüística, 3 (2002), 185-229 p. 188.
398 Ibid.
399 Fairclough, Language and Power, p. 71.
401 Ibid., p. 25.
condition of possibility for – and thus a (but not the) material cause of – particular forms of discourse and instantiations of those forms in particular texts.

Fairclough provides a version of discourse analysis which is reconcilable with a Marxian approach to social science and – especially as he develops it in *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research* (2003) – is explicitly rooted in a critical realist social ontology:

Both concrete social events and abstract social structures [...] are part of reality. Reality (the potential, the actual) cannot be reduced to our knowledge of reality, which is contingent, shifting and partial.  

The aim of a CDA approach, rooted in a critical realist social ontology, is absolutely not to somehow ‘cut through’ discourse in order to access ‘truth’. While beginning from the realist premise that there is a real world ‘out there’, critical realists nonetheless accept that our knowledge of it is always contingent, shifting and partial. It is therefore impossible to somehow ‘directly’ access this reality, to peel back the layers of representation and ‘see’ social structures. The aim is, rather, to reveal the underlying representation of reality upon which a particular discourse, text or other element of social practice is based.

Here it is useful to draw upon the ‘critical linguistics’ of Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress. An ideology, Hodge and Kress maintain, entails ‘a systematically organised presentation of reality’.  

Such a characterisation of ideology certainly fits well with the broad definition offered earlier (Chapter 3). Neoliberalism is, as we saw in Chapter 3, an ideology in this sense – it is a complex representative structure, involving attempts to portray (and, in fact, produce) a particular social reality, focused on the primacy of actors and processes like the individual, the market, globalisation (and causal relations between them) and on the realisation of ‘freedom’ through the individualisation of ‘risk’. But the aim of this thesis is not to ‘discover’ the ‘truth’ that neoliberal ideology obscures, but to show the ‘form in which the speaker or writer chose to present reality’.  

The point is to show how neoliberalism as a ‘systematically organised presentation of reality’ underpins, conditions and structures the discourses (and more material practices – see Section 4.3.4 below) of contemporary liberal state violence.

404 Ibid., p. 17.
And even this attempt to move from what Hodge and Kress call the ‘surface structure’ of particular discursive utterances to the ‘underlying structure’ can only ever be a ‘speculative act’ – a fallible and partial ‘reading’ of texts and events, premised on the necessarily speculative retroductive logic outlined above (Section 4.2.2). In positing, through a historically and theoretically grounded account of political-economic changes, the existence of neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality in Chapter 3, this thesis makes a speculative claim. The aim of the analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 is to demonstrate the ways in which this posited ideology and governmentality can be said to shape the discourse and practice of contemporary liberal state violence.

Beyond the broad analytic framework and critical realist ontology underpinning the form of CDA in which this thesis is engaged, there is one further aspect of the CDA approach that must be made clear. Discourse analysts of all stripes seem to be open to one easy and fundamental criticism: if discourses – ways of representing the world and of (inter)acting in it – pervade social life in the way suggested above, how can one possibly provide a meaningful ‘analysis’ of discourse and discursive practices, since it is surely impossible to step ‘outside’ of discourse in the first place, in order to somehow ‘look back in’ upon discourse as an object of research. When we (social researchers) interpret texts, when we read, write and speak, we continuously engage in discourses – this very thesis engages in what we might call ‘Marxian discourses’ of exploitation and emancipation (representing capitalist societies as inherently unequal and exploitative and so on) and in certain academic discourses inherent to the ‘doctoral thesis’ genre. Discourse is seemingly inescapable. This apparent problem for discourse analysis is, of course, reminiscent of the criticism commonly levelled at the Marxian ‘ideology critique’ approach discussed above and in Chapter 3: that to critique ideology (whether or not one does so through ‘discourse analysis’) implies, firstly, that the researcher is able to adopt a position ‘outside’ ideology in order to take an ‘objective’ view, and, secondly (as a consequence of this first fallacy) that the critique of ideology presupposes a paternalistic and condescending perspective according to which most people (with the exception of certain enlightened revolutionaries) are suffering from a ‘false consciousness’ that blinds them to their own conditions and renders them an object of care for the emancipatory social scientist.

405 Ibid.
The response to the claim that we cannot step outside of discourse must be to concur. Even the ‘scientific’ model of critical explanation, rooted in a critical realist social ontology, outlined in the first part of this chapter, is a manifestation of discourse: ‘the critical analyst, in producing different interpretations and explanations of [...] social life, is also producing a discourse’.406 But this is not as problematic as it might at first seem. Any social ‘explanation’, be it ‘positivist’, ‘structural’, ‘post-positivist’, ‘scientific’ or otherwise, is a form of discourse, in the sense that it is a (predominantly textual and linguistic) way of representing aspects of the world. The important point for the thesis at hand is that a CDA approach should produce a critical discourse on the objects of its research – a discourse that highlights the ways in which other pervasive discourses serve to (re)produce unequal power relations (ideology) and social structures, and that seeks to undermine and destabilise those discourses and ideologies as a consequence. The aim of the CDA approach taken here is, therefore, twofold. On the one hand, this thesis seeks to critically analyse discourse in relation to liberal-democratic state violence, drawing upon the concept of neoliberal ideology outlined previously, while on the other hand, this analysis should itself constitute a new critical discourse on this same political problem.

A final objection that might be raised, and must be confronted, is that, following from the argument above, we could say that discourses are equivalent. If we cannot ‘escape’ discourse, even when we critically analyse a particular discourse, what is the point of the endeavour? Won’t we simply be producing another, equivalent discourse, which might be equally problematic?

In considering why such a critical discourse on liberal war might be any more valuable than the ideologically conditioned neoliberal discourse it seeks to critique, we reconnect the concept of discourse elaborated above to the critical realist metatheory outlined earlier in this chapter.

In common with many constructivists and post-structuralists, and in opposition to the positivist tradition, critical realists accept that an ‘epistemic relativism’ is inescapable. In fact, the depth ontology of critical realism, according to which causal mechanisms can exist unseen, necessitates epistemic relativism in the sense that our knowledge of the social world is

inevitably partial, shifting and constituted by our individual predispositions and the conditioning to which we are subject in our various ‘epistemic communities’ – in other words by (inter-)subjectivities.

However, critical realists do insist upon a judgemental rationalism. This is also a necessary corollary to the depth ontology, since the only measure for rationally ‘judging’ a discourse available is the ‘depth’ of its explanation. In other words, ‘the only basis for claiming superiority [for our critical discourse, over the ideological discourse under analysis,] is providing explanations that have greater explanatory power’.  

For example, the ‘shallowest’, and also the weakest, most ‘common sense’ (and thus potentially ‘ideological’) explanation of why a senior politician’s speech on the ‘War on Terror’ includes references to ‘risk management’ might be to simply say, ‘because contemporary armed conflict is largely about managing risks!’ . This explanation does not move beyond the level of the empirical. The cause of the politician’s use of words is, in this account, simply the ‘fact’ that ‘risk management’ is the predominant activity of the Armed Forces today. A deeper, critical, causal explanation might instead attempt to link-up this language use with similar uses in different discursive contexts (‘intertextuality’), noting that this particular framing is popular not only in speeches, but in the doctrinal training documents used by the armed forces, in the defence policy papers of major political parties, and so on. It might further point beyond the broad genre of ‘political texts on security’, to the prevalence (and genesis) of the language of ‘risk management’ in insurance, investment and finance discourses of the ‘private’ sector. It might further connect this seemingly intertextual or trans-discursive ‘common sense’ constraint to the prevalent understanding of social interactions as something generally underpinned by market principles, by the individualisation of social risk and by the ‘financialisation of security’; an understanding that has often been tied to the dominance of neoliberalism as an ideology. This critical explanation might thus develop a much richer causal narrative, showing how the speeches of politicians are shaped and constrained by wider linguistic and discursive practices, which are in turn causally conditioned, constrained and

407 Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism.
408 Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis, p. 8.
enabled, by particular discourses and ideologies. Of course, it is to precisely this type of explanation that this thesis seeks to make a (much more detailed) contribution.

Critical discourse analysis, then, can be distinguished from other forms of discourse analysis, and from other methods in social science more generally, precisely by its concern with causal analysis. It is a form of a critical causal narrative that itself internally engages in ‘sorting through, debating and appraising [the] causal narratives’ of the discourses and practices under analysis.\textsuperscript{409} It is in this sense that CDA is about the exercise of what Bhaskar calls ‘judgemental rationalism’.

4.3.4 Beyond the text: bringing the materiality of practice back in

In recent years, first the discipline of politics, and then IR, have been subject to what has been called a ‘practice turn’.\textsuperscript{410} In the words of Theodore Schatzki:

Thinkers once spoke of ‘structures’, ‘systems’, ‘meaning’, ‘life world’, ‘events’ and ‘actions’ when naming the primary generic social thing. Today many theorists would accord ‘practices’ a comparable honour.\textsuperscript{411}

Of course ‘once spoke of’ is an over-statement; the language of ‘structures’, ‘meanings’ and ‘actions’ continues to pervade social scientific accounts of the world, while it has been argued that the ‘life-world’ remains, in the very context of a practice turn, the most useful analytical concept for telling us ‘how practice is constituted’.\textsuperscript{412} However, Schatzki is right to contextualise the practice turn within a continuous, and arguably reductionist, quest to establish, once and for all, the ‘primary generic social thing’.

We can think of the emergence of debates around practice as intervention in the long-running structure-agency debates. On the one hand, we have Marxism, structural linguistics and anthropology, providing excellent and plausible accounts of the operation and dominance of structures as the core generic ‘substance’ of the social. On the other hand, we can find equally powerful and convincing arguments among methodological individualists, including many liberals, and among post-structuralists, that the primary substance of the

\textsuperscript{410} Theodore Schatzki et al., \textit{The Practice Turn}, (London: Routledge, 2001).
\textsuperscript{411} Ibid.
social actually consists in the action (including speech-action) of individuals – the exercise of ‘agency’. The specificity, and the value, of the ‘practice turn’ thus resides in the attempt to say ‘let’s look at what people actually do together!’.

Whereas the extremes of the structure-agency debate tend to reside too much in metatheoretical claims and abstract argumentation, thinking ‘the social’ in terms of ‘practices’ as they were outlined above (Section 4.3.2) allows us to access precisely the intersection of structure and agency, and our analysis of these practices should be central to the claims we make about the relative significance of either. The practice turn is a positive and laudable development in politics and IR only to the extent that it encourages social scientists to refocus their gaze away from their navels and toward the things that are happening all around them.

One of the most important potential contributions of a practice turn inspired by the work of Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu and Bruno Latour should be to refocus the lens of critical methodologies – including CDA – beyond the ‘text’ and toward other, non-textual, aspects of social activity as sites of meaning. As Derek Hook has noted, while Foucault’s own studies were of much broader social practices, taken in their discursive/semiotic but also their more material aspects, many ‘Foucauldian’ discourse analysts in fact remain trapped ‘within the text’.

But the approach to practices taken in this thesis remains grounded in a realist ontology. The ‘doings’ and ‘sayings’ that make up ‘social practices’ do actually happen ‘out there’ in the real world, even if they are only intelligible as practices ‘in here’, and as such are subject to infinite (re-)interpretation. Unlike Patrick Jackson, whose attempt at metaphysical ‘monism’ (as opposed to what he rather crudely characterises as the ‘mind-world dualism’ at work in critical realism) is premised on the claim that ‘world’ is endogenous to social practices’, the approach taken here takes ‘world’ to be precisely a signifier for what is external to (but constitutive and inclusive of) the ‘self’, the ‘mind’, or, better still, the ‘I’ (as in the Freudian das Ich, a term that lost its proper impact in the Latinisation into the more ‘objective’ sounding ‘ego’ by Freud’s English translator, James Strachey). Mind is, of course, always and

414 Jackson, The Conduct of Inquiry, p. 36.
only of world, but the latter cannot simply be reduced to the former without committing a gross act of anthropocentrism: the epistemic fallacy.

Nevertheless, the conceptualisation of social practice advanced above, which informs the analysis in the next three chapters of the thesis, constitutes an advance on current conceptualisations in CDA. As early as 1989, Fairclough was emphasising the need for critical textual analysis to situate texts as elements of social practices. He has re-emphasised this in his more recent work too. However, the objects of Fairclough’s (and many other discourse analysts’) analysis remain largely textual, linking particular texts and their internal structure and relations to wider social practices (generic conventions and so on) and social structures (political-economic arrangements, ideologies etc). This thesis seeks to broaden CDA to incorporate an analysis of less textual, more material elements of practice. British ‘security’ is not only achieved through the policy papers and speeches analysed in Chapters 5 and 6 (which would traditionally be the concern of CDA), but also in the material activities studied in Chapter 7.


The framework for systematically analysing discourse and practice of contemporary British security in the following chapters will, in light of the above discussion, be divided into two. The first part of this framework pertains to the textual analysis that takes place in Chapters 5 and 6, which concentrate on textual analysis, while the second part of the framework pertains to Chapter 7, in which an analysis of more material aspects of security practices is provided.

4.4.1 T E X T U A L A N A L Y S I S

The following analytical framework for the textual analysis in Chapters 5 and 6, which focuses the analysis on three broad categories of textual features, is based on a development of the analytical frameworks set out by Fairclough and Machin and Mayr. Some elements of each of those frameworks are left out. Textual features that are specific to conversation and therefore useful only in conversational analysis, for example, are not analysed. Multimodal analyses, including body language and image analysis, are also excluded.

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415 Fairclough, Language and Power.
416 Fairclough, Analysing Discourse.
417 Ibid.
418 Machin and Mayr, How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis.
Instead, this framework draws upon and develops the analytic categories from each of these texts that are most susceptible to an application of CDA to speech transcripts and policy papers with a view to discerning ideological conditioning. In a broader sense, this framework is also informed by both elements of Halliday’s SFL – especially his work on transitivity – and by Fairclough’s earlier work on language and power, which has already been discussed (above).

Chapters 5 and 6 analyse texts in terms of three broad categories, which can be (reductively) summarised as: vocabulary, semantics and transitivity. In the following sections, these three broad categories of textual features are broken down in a more detailed way, including explanations and examples of how their analysis is useful in identifying ideological cues. It should, however, be borne in mind that these three categories of textual features have significant overlaps with one another – to borrow that dialectical phrase again, they are ‘distinct but not discrete’.

The aim of textual analysis in CDA is really to describe the networks of underlying assumptions that are necessary for a text to make sense to an audience. What interpretive framework does a particular metaphor presuppose or construct for the audience of a text? What naturalised assumptions are necessary to the intelligibility or coherence of a text? How is a text grammatically structured or ‘textured’\(^{419}\) by a particular ‘way of seeing’ or ‘common sense’? In Fairclough’s terms, the point is to look for ideological cues. It is therefore also important to remember that textual analysis is not simply linguistic analysis, but rather incorporates both linguistic analysis and ‘intertextual’ analysis. That is to say, it is about demonstrating how textual features are shaped by the discursive features of the discourses that are ‘selectively drawn upon’ in a given text.\(^{420}\) This analysis is about drawing out and making explicit the connections between text and context.

**Vocabulary, rhetorical tropes and lexical relations**

An analysis of vocabulary or ‘lexical’ features is important to any textual discourse analysis, since ‘discourses ‘word’ or ‘lexicalize’ the world in particular ways’.\(^{421}\) Pierre

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\(^{419}\) Halliday, *On Grammar*, p. 207  
Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant identify a neoliberal ‘planetary vulgate’. In this newly pervasive terminology ‘economic disinvestment by the state and [...] deregulation of financial flows’ along with a ‘reduction of social protection and of moralizing sense of “individual responsibility”’ are rendered ‘benign, necessary, ineluctable or desirable’ by a series of lexical ‘oppositions and equivalences’.\footnote{Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant, ‘NewLiberalSpeak: Notes on the new planetary vulgate’, Radical Philosophy, No. 105 (2001), pp. 2-5.} Specifically, they note the following series of oppositions and equivalences that are constructed through the neoliberal discourse of globalisation to represent a particular comparative image of ‘state’ versus ‘market’:

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
\textbf{state} & \textbf{[globalization]} & \textbf{market} \\
\hline
constraint & freedom & \\
closed & open & \\
rigid & flexible & \\
immobile, fossilized & dynamic, moving, self-transforming & \\
past, outdated & future, novelty & \\
stasis & growth & \\
group, lobby, holism, collectivism & individual, individualism & \\
uniformity, artificiality & diversity, authenticity & \\
iautocratic (‘totalitarian’) & democratic & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{The ‘new planetary vulgate’ of neoliberal globalisation}
\end{figure}

This type of sketch of the neoliberal lexicon is useful in analysing texts for ideological cues. It is not enough, however, to simply ‘count’ the uses of particular words and then associate a high use of the words in the right-hand column above with the presence of neoliberal ideological conditioning. Whereas ‘content analysts’ are satisfied with the ‘classification and counting of data’ from texts,\footnote{David Marsh and Gerry Stoker, Theory and Methods in Political Science, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2010) p. 218.} CDA has a much stronger focus on the inter-
subjective making of meaning; an inherently unquantifiable analytic concern. The meaning of particular words is contingent and shifting; every word is potentially polysemic (open to an unlimited number of interpretations). To encourage or elicit a particular interpretation of a word, we must place it in a relational context with other words. The number of times a politician uses the terms ‘flexibility’ or ‘adaptability’ tells us very little on its own, what is significant is how the other words they use relate to these ones – are these terms thematised (i.e. prioritised by being placed at the beginning of a sentence)? What sort of moral evaluation is implied (i.e. is ‘flexibility’ to be understood as ‘good’)? Are flexibility and adaptability represented as desirable, necessary or inevitable; and if so, for whom, or what? What other words are these ones collocated with – is ‘flexibility’ collocated with ‘government’, ‘workers’, ‘employers’, ‘citizens’, ‘companies’, ‘armed forces’ or other specific participants? CDA should analyse not only a lexicon, but lexical relations too.

So, apart from the most basic lexical features (i.e. the actual vocabulary being drawn upon), we need to also consider the ways in which particular words are used (or not used) in specific instances within a text. One important way in which lexical features figure in ideological texturing, and especially in ‘narratives about the ‘global economy’’, is ‘nominalisation’. A nominalisation substitutes a constructed noun for a verb process, and can therefore ‘obscure agency and responsibility for an action’, or be used for reasons of ‘mystification and obfuscation’. As we will see (below) nominalisation is, in this sense, related to transitivity (the linguistic representation of processes, participants and circumstances). However, rather than simply leaving out or obscuring agency by using a passive verb process, nominalisation entails representing a process as a noun. One of the most common uses of nominalisation in contemporary Western political discourse is ‘globalisation’, which represents a process or set of processes, involving participants, as a ‘thing’ or entity. Nominalisation is, in this sense, actually a form of grammatical metaphor.

What Machin and Mayr refer to as ‘rhetorical tropes’ – metaphor, personification, metonymy, synecdoche and so on – are particularly relevant lexical features in analysing

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425 Machin and Mayr, *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis*.
427 Ibid., p. 144
428 Machin and Mayr, *How to Do Critical Discourse Analysis*. 

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discourse and attempting to connect texts to ideologies. When a speaker or writer uses a metaphor, such as ‘Britain is an international hub’, they select from an indeterminate array of options, and the selection they make is significant. One might say that Britain is a ‘country’, or a ‘state’, which would not be a metaphor, but to call it a ‘hub’ is to construct a particular relational picture of the country, just as it would to call it a ‘node’, a ‘leader’ or a ‘chain link’. In rhetorical tropes such as these, we can often see *intertextuality*. ‘Hub’ traditionally signifies the central part of a wheel, from which spokes radiate, but as a metaphor is used widely in the lexicon of computer networking (an ‘ethernet hub’, for example) and in business, especially in the provision of information and services to businesses by other institutions. The University of Reading, for example, describes itself as a ‘hub for enterprise’ providing business information and facilities to ‘start-ups and high-tech companies’, while the University of Essex similarly boasts a ‘Business Hub’ and Imperial College London an ‘Entrepreneurship Hub’. The intertextual use of network metaphors and business/managerial vocabulary in other contexts (in this example, national security policy) is typical of what Fairclough calls ‘language in new capitalism’, including neoliberal ideological discourses.

While lexical options and relations are clearly important in analysing discourse, it is now clear that the use of particular words cannot be studied in isolation from the wider context of their relations to other textual features. As Fairclough notes of Bourdieu and Wacquant’s article on neoliberalism:

> It is not enough to characterise the ‘new planetary vulgate’ as a list of words, a vocabulary; rather, texts and interactions need to be analysed to show how some of the effects that they [Bourdieu and Wacquant] identify are brought off, e.g., making the socio-economic transformations of new capitalism and the policies of governments to facilitate them seem inevitable [...] and representing the imaginaries of interested policies – the interested possible realities they project – as the way the world actually is.

Crucial to engaging in such an analysis is the study of meaning relations in texts. In order to pinpoint how a text represents particular, contingent social changes as inevitable, and particular, historically-specific imaginaries as universal and/or ahistorical realities, we need to

430 OED Online.
432 Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, p. 282
analyse how these processes and things are textually ‘worked-up’, how social agents ‘set up relations between elements of texts’.

**Semantic and grammatical relations between sentences and clauses**

The ways in which meaning relations are set-up between clauses and sentences can be politically significant. That is to say, the way we relate together the elements of a text – the ordering of our words – can have implications for the meaning potential of our written or spoken texts. One of the most obvious mechanisms through which these implications can be discerned is *thematisation*. Simply, this is the emphasis on a particular element in a clause, so that it becomes the *theme* of that sentence. In English, this is usually done by placing the thematic term at the beginning of the sentence. For example, ‘globalisation has changed the world’ thematises ‘globalisation’. ‘The world has been changed by globalisation’, on the other hand, thematises ‘the world’. If we conceive of any clause in any sentence as fulfilling the function of a ‘message’, then the theme is ‘as it were the peg on which the message is hung’. Again, thematisation does not tell us anything in isolation, it is necessary to look at how a particular theme in a clause prioritises a particular element of a sentence, and especially a particular element of a representation, and which other elements are deprioritised.

Many sentences include multiple clauses that can exist in complex relations with one another, and with the whole sentence or with other sentences in the text. Relations of meaning between clauses and sentences can be called *semantic relations*. As with the other textual features discussed above, the primary concern here is with how semantic relations between sentences and clauses are shaped by, and in turn help to reproduce in audiences, ideological ways of seeing, in particular representations of aspects of the world. For this reason, of particular interest is the operation of logics of explanation and appearance, and of equivalence and difference. Semantic relations are, as Fairclough notes, realised in grammatical relations. How are two clauses in a sentence related? What does this relationship signify for the relationship between elements of the representation constructed in the text?

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433 Ibid., p. 285
434 Fairclough *Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p. 22
437 Ibid., p. 94 and p. 100.
A speaker or author might favour a logic of appearances, where instead of using grammatical features that introduce causal or other types of explanation, they use only, say, additive or elaborative clauses, so that the text takes on the characteristics of the ‘report’ genre, rather than an ‘expository’ (that is, explanatory rather than simply descriptive) style.\textsuperscript{438}

Representations of relations of equivalence and difference can be grammatically realised in semantic relations between clauses, for example where \textit{hyponymy} (relations of meaning inclusion) is used to make equivalences.\textsuperscript{439} For instance, when Tony Blair says that the NATO intervention in Kosovo is ‘the result of a wide range of changes – the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread of democracy’, he makes these three elements co-hyponyms and so draws them into a relation of equivalence with one another. Three \textit{nominalised} processes – the end of the Cold War, changing technology and the spread of democracy – are ‘listed’ through additive clauses, which are, in grammatical terms, \textit{paratactically} related. Parataxis exists where clauses are given equal footing, so to speak, in a sentence. \textit{Hypotaxis}, on the other hand, entails the subordination of one clause to another.\textsuperscript{440}

Relations of difference can similarly be grammatically realised in relations between clauses. When Blair says that ‘many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world’, for example, he uses a hypotactically related pair of clauses to set up a clear distinction between two spaces – ‘our domestic’ space, and ‘the other side of the world’. Constructing relations of equivalence and difference in these ways is integral to discursive \textit{recontextualisation}. The speaker or author is thus able to make new equivalences and differences. A neoliberal ideological position, for example, might represent as co-hyponyms ‘flexibility’, ‘risk’ and ‘dynamism’ and equate these terms with positive characteristics of the contemporary working environment. It may, meanwhile, be ideologically useful to represent other ways of working as different from, and inferior to, ‘our’ neoliberal model.

A further key aspect of the discursive power of semantic relations between sentences and clauses lies in the representation of \textit{causation}. Clauses that are related through a ‘because’ (or, as in Tony Blair’s sentence above, ‘are caused on’), represent a \textit{reason} for

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{438} Ibid., p. 95
\textsuperscript{439} Ibid., p. 101
\textsuperscript{440} Ibid., p. 92}
something happening. These clause relations become interesting when we consider that particular discourses rely on particular causal narratives; narratives about how the social world has been changed, is changing and can be changed in the future. And these narratives, to the extent that they are accepted, can constrain or enable social action and practices. Causal representations can be very important in understanding how texts are shaped by ideological perspectives, since ways of seeing the world that reproduce and naturalise unequal power relations must rely on particular narratives about the way the world is and the way it works, about what its ‘nature’ is. But to really appreciate the ways in which causation may be ideologically textured, we need to analyse the textual representation of processes, and of the participants and circumstances involved in them.

Transitivity: The representation of processes, participants and circumstances in social change

Halliday defines transitivity as the ‘linguistic representation of processes, and of the participants (and, by extension, the circumstances) associated with them’.

When a sentence, clause or paragraph is constructed in a spoken or written text, a vast number of choices are made over how to organise the words used, and these choices affect the meaning produced in the text. Any speech act, in Halliday’s view, involves a ‘simultaneous selection from among a large number of interrelated options’ which in turn conditions the ‘meaning potential’ of a text, though this does not necessarily entail ‘deliberate acts of choice’ with regard to wording, but rather a more diffuse form of ‘symbolic behaviour’, so that it ‘would be better, in fact, to say that we “opt”, rather than ‘choose’.

Here are five sentences, which each make claims about a particular process, but where transitivity textures each representation in different, and politically significant, ways:

i) Globalisation has transformed the world.

ii) The world has been transformed by globalisation.

iii) The world has transformed as a result of globalisation.

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441 Halliday On Grammar, p. 179.
442 Ibid., p. 174
iv) In the era of globalisation, major political economic changes have taken place around the world.

v) The decisions and actions of political economic institutions and leaders have transformed international political economy.

In sentence i) ‘globalisation’ is represented as a participant, rather than a circumstance; it is an entity, an actor that acts upon, ‘transforms’, a passive ‘world’. Sentence ii) also represents globalisation as an active participant and the world as a passive object, but demonstrates how two quite different wordings can achieve similar meaning potential.

Sentence iii) differs from the first two in that ‘the world’ is attributed a less passive, more active role, as that which ‘has transformed’ rather than ‘has been transformed’. However, this sentence also textures a quite explicit causal relation in its representation of a process, identifying the world’s transformation as a ‘result’ (effect) of ‘globalisation’. Globalisation is again represented through nominalisation (i.e. a process represented by a noun, making possible interpretations of that process as an entity)\(^{443}\), but there remains the meaning potential for globalisation to be interpreted as a circumstance, or as another process (additional to the world’s transformation) rather than a participant here, in contrast to the first two sentences.

In Sentence iv) we find globalisation clearly articulated as a historical circumstance, an ‘era’, within which the process of ‘major political economic changes’ takes place. Furthermore, this process is more concrete, less abstract, than the vaguer ‘transformation’ referred to in the previous sentences. However, Sentence iv) retains a passive verb structure (‘have taken place’) and conceals or omits the role of actors and participants altogether. Sentence v), meanwhile, specifies and foregrounds types of actors as participants – ‘political economic institutions and leaders’ – making their ‘decisions and actions’ the subject of the sentence, and representing them as the causal driver in the process of transforming international political economy.

From a CDA perspective, it can be argued that the representations of processes in sentences i) – iv) might be considered a product of neoliberal ideological conditioning, since

\[^{443}\text{Fairclough, Analysing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research.}\]
the operation of transitivity in each of these sentences acts to conceal the operation of agency in international political economy and instead promote a naturalising view of ‘globalisation’ as an impersonal entity and actor affecting the world. This view of globalisation as an abstract entity producing inevitable changes is at the heart of neoliberalism since it reflects a perspective on markets and competition as the most ‘natural’ forms of social organisation, the existence or proliferation of which is beyond the influence of human agency. We would be much less likely to find sentences approximating sentence v) in texts that have a neoliberal tinge, since this text attributes some agency within a process, and therefore represents it as a more contingent and historically specific set of events.

Taking his cue from Halliday, Roger Fowler argues that ‘transitivity is the foundation of representation’. This is because it is in the representation of processes, the participants engaged in them, and the circumstances in which they take place, that we paint particular images of aspects of the world. This is why transitivity analysis is so important in CDA, and in assessing the role of ideological ways of seeing in the production of discourses and texts.

**Vocabulary, semantics, transitivity: textual instantiations of discourse**

It is apparent that each of the three categories of textual feature described above overlaps the others. A nominalisation like ‘globalisation’, for example, is a matter of vocabulary in that it forms part of particular lexicons and is specific to particular discourses, but it is also an issue of transitivity, since it is a substitution for a verb process. Furthermore, its discursive significance may rest entirely upon the semantic context in which it is deployed, since it is its relational context with other elements of a representation that signal the assumptions and evaluations informing the term’s use in a given speech act.

In the two chapters that follow, this framework will provide a guideline for analysing two genres of political texts –policy papers (Chapter 5) and speeches by political leaders (Chapter 6). It is worth re-iterating here, however, the position of epistemic relativism from which this analysis begins. The point is not to exhaust the meaning in the texts under analysis, nor to pin down their one ‘true’ meaning, but rather to point to the ways in which textual features are used to limit the meaning potential of what is written or spoken, and the sorts

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of ideological presuppositions and interpretive frameworks this limited potential implies on the part of text authors and/or demands on the part of audiences. The purpose of Chapters 5 and 6 is, in this sense, to identify the ways in which neoliberal ideological thinking, as it was described in Chapter 3, is imbued and cued in texts that purport to focus on issues of ‘security’ and war.

Chapters 5 and 6 involve an analysis of policy papers and speeches by British political leaders, respectively. The use of these two genres of political text is intended to be complementary, rather than comparative, and to contribute to a more holistic approach to analysing political discourse. Similarly, the sample of texts under analysis is limited and intuitive rather than being rooted in a positivist attempt at exhaustively analysing all relevant documents (such an exercise would in any case be rendered futile by the impossibility of making hard analytic closures in social research – see above). The analysis here is, furthermore, relational; it is an analysis of the ‘internal’ relations of, and the ‘external’ relations between, neoliberal ideology, governmentality, discourses, texts and practices. As such, the aim is not ‘measurement’ of any kind, but rather critical, causal and relational explanation.

4.4.2 Practice Analysis

Chapter 7 involves an analysis of two ‘material practices’ of security engaged in by the British state. Similarly to the textual analysis, the aim here is not somehow to provide an ‘exhaustive’ or ‘representative’ sample as such, but rather to take some prominent examples and attempt to understand and explain their connection to neoliberalism. Unlike the textual analysis, where the focus is primarily on ideological conditioning, this chapter will also seek to critically explain the influencing role of neoliberalism as a mode of governmentality since, as was argued in Chapter 3, governmentality as an analytical concept is most useful for thinking about (and takes as its main object) the play of actual social practices and ‘conduct’ rather than being limited to discourses and texts. While the sources analysed for this chapter will also often be ‘texts’, and there will be some textual analysis, and the analysis will also involve an ideological analysis, the analytic net will be cast wider than in Chapters 5 and 6, to incorporate an analysis of the internal logics of particular security practices and their external relations to other practices, discourses and texts.
The framework for the practice analysis employed in Chapter 7 is outlined at the beginning of that chapter, but it is worth emphasising here that the aim is to produce — through the use of ‘thick description’ and interpretation — a more holistic picture of security practices, focusing on their more ‘material’ aspects, but of course accepting and drawing upon their semiotic potential too.

4.4.3 Linking metatheory and method: CDA as causal analysis and critical explanation
At the beginning of this chapter, following the outline of the critical realist social ontology, and the positioning of this ontology within the broader tradition of critical explanation, it was argued that research within this tradition can and should make causal claims. It was suggested that the ‘broader’ and ‘deeper’ (than the Humean model) conception of causation that emerges from Bhaskar’s stratified ontology, and is thoroughly elaborated in an IR context by Kurki, is key to the reclaiming of social ‘science’ by critical scholars from positivists, and to contesting the poststructuralist tendency to reject causal analysis altogether.

But how does a CDA approach of the sort outlined above constitute a form of causal analysis? In order to answer this question, the empirical analytic chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5, 6 and 7) must be considered as but one component of the broader narrative encompassed in the entirety of this text. Kurki and Suganami argue that a causal analysis of some aspect of world politics consists in ‘a relevantly and adequately detailed causal narrative’. To appreciate the causal connection being investigated and described in this thesis, between neoliberalism as ideology, and governmentality, and the language and practice of contemporary liberal ‘security’, the empirical component cannot be read in isolation, but must rather be apprehended simultaneously with the theoretical construction of neoliberalism in Chapter 3 and the ontological and metatheoretical framework offered earlier in this chapter.

CDA, as it has been outlined above, is necessarily a form of causal analysis, inasmuch as it contributes to the critical explanation of language and other (‘micro-’)social practices and events by reference to such ontologically ‘deeper’ macro-social structures as ‘causal

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mechanisms’ or ‘causal tendencies’.\textsuperscript{446} In focusing especially on things like ideology, discourse and social practices as relatively systematic ways of thinking, representing and acting that affect a constraining and enabling power over events, CDA can assist in the production of a critical, explanatory, causal account of social action that avoids the sort of reductionist statements common to positivist approaches. CDA can, therefore, be a method with which to ‘engage in causal enquiries [...] of a critically reflective sort, which keeps open the possibility of different interpretations’, as critical realists demand.\textsuperscript{447}

In thinking about how the analysis of discourse might be situated within a critical realist causal analysis, and critical explanation, of the sort advocated in the first half of this chapter, it is useful to draw upon Kurki and Suganami’s critique of Jenny Edkins. Edkins, in common with other post-structuralist scholars in politics and IR, explicitly eschews causal explanation of the social world. There are a number of reasons for this eschewal that Kurki and Suganami pick up on, but the pertinent one here is her Foucauldian critique of the sort of ‘problem-solving’, ‘diachronic’ approach to social phenomena, whereby one looks for the ‘origins’ of a problem (in the case of Edkins’ analysis, the example is famine), rather than considering it, as Foucault might, as a ‘positive present’.\textsuperscript{448} Foucault famously advocated, especially in his later works, a ‘genealogical’ approach, or ‘history of the present’, concerned with the operation of particular narratives and practices in the ‘here and now’, the discursive exclusions and the configurations of power that sustain them, and the alternative positions that are marginalised on precluded by them.\textsuperscript{449}

While many critical realists would tend to agree that such a Foucauldian approach to explaining political problems might be more productive than the ‘problem-solving’ search for ‘origins’, they would not accept that this entailed a rejection of causal analysis, since ‘such a narrative, synchronic/structural rather than diachronic/processual, would still be ‘causal’ in our way of thinking’.\textsuperscript{450} Moving beyond Edkins’ critique of the latter approach to sketch what the former might look like, Kurki and Suganami suggest that it would consist in ‘a narrative [that] would explore how particular discourses of famine disable, condition and influence the

\textsuperscript{446} Kurki, ‘Critical Realism and Causal Analysis in International Relations’.
\textsuperscript{447} Kurki and Suganami, ‘Towards the politics of causation’, p. 408.
\textsuperscript{448} Ibid., p. 413
\textsuperscript{449} Foucault, The Foucault Reader, p. 343.
\textsuperscript{450} Kurki and Suganami, ‘Towards the politics of causal explanation’, p. 413.
social and political and thereby the relevant social actors, [and] their power relations’. Such a discourse analysis, entailing the identification of the ‘conditions of possibility’ and ‘enabling contexts’ that give rise to particular forms of social practice is, Kurki and Suganami maintain, a form of rich, narrative causal analysis, of the variety prioritised by critical realists (Section 4.2.3, above), rather than the simple ‘pushing and pulling’ form of efficient causation prioritised by positivists.

A key element of CDA is the study of representations of causation in the discourses, texts and practices that constitute the objects of study. How does an author or actor represent causation in a social process or event? Which actors or processes do they prioritise in their causal account? How explicit or implicit is their causal account? Upon what sort of ‘common sense’ assumptions does their causal account rest? As Hodge and Kress note, different language-uses, including grammatical models, entail ‘distinct versions of causality’, so that when one is seeking to better understand how a particular text or practice is itself causally conditioned, constrained or enabled by a particular discourse and/or ideology, the analysis of representations of causation and process in that text or practice is ‘of crucial importance’. CDA thus constitutes a form of causal analysis in two senses: on the one hand, it seeks to establish a critical causal account of the ways in which ideologies and discourses shape, constrain and enable social action; and, on the other hand, it analyses such action (usually in the form of texts as ‘elements of social events’) in terms of the causal claims it (re-)produces. The concern is not to establish ‘what actually happened’ in a given case. No discourse or causal explanation, however ‘critical’, can actually ‘correspond’ exactly to the ‘reality’ of events, since all discourses are always-already interpretations as well as representations, subject to subjectivity and infinite re-interpretation. The point is rather to engage critically in a causal debate, where ‘a plurality of causal accounts is the starting point’, and to construct a causal narrative that does not include a commitment to ‘singular truth claims’, but is aimed instead at delivering what might be judged to be greater explanatory power than the representations of causation under analysis.

451 Ibid., p. 413.
452 Hodge and Kress, Language as Ideology, p. 19.
4.5 Conclusion

This chapter has fulfilled several important functions. Firstly, it has outlined in detail the critical realist approach to social scientific research, alluded to in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, that underpins this thesis. It has been argued that it is important to be explicit about ontologies, since all approaches entail one, and a specific, stratified, critical realist social ontology has been suggested. This ontology has been situated in contrast to other positivist and post-positivist approaches, with a special emphasis on the status of critical realist philosophy as a Marxian ‘reply’ to the linguistic and poststructural turns. The expansive and radically non-positivist conception of causation at the heart of critical realism has been emphasised in this regard.

Following this metatheoretical discussion, this chapter has constructed a particular concept of the political and of international political analysis that, in conjunction with the critical realist social ontology, points to particularly useful methodological avenues. It has been argued that language is especially important as a key medium of the political in general and of ideology in particular.

Approaches to discourse analysis and ideology critique that are overlapping, rather than mutually exclusive, have been developed, and an argument has been made for the necessity of critically analysing discourse to any form of critical explanation. Norman Fairclough’s CDA paradigm has been drawn upon, but also reformulated in order to integrate the more expansive approach to social practices elaborated here.

An approach to applying CDA in the context of the research problem at hand has been suggested. Analytic frameworks for the textual analysis in chapter 5 and 6, and for the analysis of extra-textual practices in Chapter 7, have been outlined. These broad and flexible guides are intended to provide some structure to the analysis of each text and practice, without rigidly determining an approach.

Finally, links between the CDA methodology – as it has been reconstructed here – and the metatheoretical conception of (and commitments to) causal analysis, outlined earlier in the chapter, have been established. It has been argued that in order to proceed with a critical realist, retroductive and ‘critical explanatory’ account of the causal influence of neoliberal
ideology on the discourse and practice of British ‘security’, CDA can provide a particularly productive framework.

The analysis in the following three chapters will engage the approach to CDA developed here in order to contribute to a critical explanation of how neoliberalism as a set of ways of seeing and being shapes the discourse and practice of British ‘security’ today.
5. WRITING SECURITY: POLICY PAPERS

‘The frontiers of a book are never clear-cut: beyond the title, the first lines, and the last full stop, beyond its internal configuration and its autonomous form, it is caught up in a system of references to other books, other texts, other sentences’.

Michel Foucault.453

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Foucault’s words in the above epigraph hold true not only for books, but also, we might say, for all texts, written or spoken. Whereas the texts (speeches) dealt with in Chapter 6 were produced, or at least spoken, by individual political leaders, Chapter 5 analyses the ‘policy papers’ produced by political parties, in government or opposition. These texts are supposed to represent what practical politics the parties intend to pursue or are presently pursuing – they outline the actual and material forms of government they seek to employ. Such texts are inevitably firmly situated in a network of intertextual relations of the sort Foucault refers to, with other policy papers, with legislative acts and bills, with speeches and statements, press conferences and philosophical and religious tracts.

We can, however, identify the policy paper as a particular genre or sub-genre of political text by reference to its structure, intended audience and ultimate ‘communicative purposes’.454 For example, the (2010) Conservative Party ‘Policy Green Paper’ on ‘national security’, A Resilient Nation, substantively differs in terms of content from, say, the Labour government’s (2006) Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy (‘CONTEST I’). However, both texts serve the purpose of communicating a message to the ‘public’ in general, and the electorate in particular, along with journalists, other politicians

and various public institutions. That message is characterised by an attempt to decisively state what the authoring party/government has done, is doing and/or will do about a particular (set of) political problem(s). As a result, most policy papers begin by explaining, to a greater or a lesser degree of detail, the nature of the political problem at hand. This ‘problem construction’ is, despite (or perhaps precisely because of) its epistemic modality, of course no less a politically and ideologically charged exercise than the parts of the paper that deal with what the party/government intend to ‘do about’, or are doing about, the ‘problem’.

The inclusion of this particular genre of political texts is intended to complement the leaders’ speeches of Chapter 6, which are generally at a higher level of abstraction, and the analysis of Chapter 7, which is focus on the more concrete practices of the neoliberal way of war. In this sense, the policy paper can be understood as standing at something of an ‘intermediate’ level of abstraction in terms of the discourses in which it operates – the policy paper stands between the often lofty, idealistic or nebulous goals and imaginaries embodied in the speeches of political leaders and the pragmatic embodiment of security policy ‘on the ground’, so-to-speak.

The following analysis is based on a selection of six significant policy papers from the Labour and Conservative parties, and from the Labour and coalition governments, published between 2006 and 2012. These include two papers from the previous Labour government, two papers from the current Conservative-dominated coalition government, and one paper each from the Conservative Party and the Labour Party published in their respective roles as opposition parties. The papers are listed below, along with the abbreviation, acronym or common name by which they are referred to in the chapter:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Paper</th>
<th>Abbreviation/acronym/common name</th>
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The selection of texts is neither intended to develop a comparative analysis between parties, nor to scientifically ‘sample’ data in order to produce a generalisable predictive model (see Chapter 4 on why this is neither possible nor desirable). Rather, the aim is simply to provide a reasonably broad and fair appraisal of dominant, mainstream British political discourses on ‘security’ policy – ‘domestic’ and ‘foreign’ – in recent years.

The bulk of the chapter is divided into three sections, headed ‘globalisation’, ‘marketisation’ and ‘depoliticisation’. These sections correspond to what are identified in the analysis as key neoliberal discourses. That is to say, they refer to complex and inter-related but relatively coherent sets of ways of representing the world. Many of the crucial elements of each discourse might also be contained within the other. For example, a certain anti- or post-statism is intrinsic to the neoliberal globalisation discourse, which asserts the increasing irrelevance of the state as a geo-political entity in the face of transnational flows of information, goods, service, labour and capital, but is also central to the marketisation discourse – the practice of representing and shaping various public spheres according to market principles – which deprioritises the state domestically in favour of the expansion of the private sector. In this sense each of these discourses is distinct, but definitely not discrete. There are, moreover, many other discourses or ‘sub-discourses’, such as ‘privatisation’ and ‘deregulation’ which are, for the purposes of this chapter, subsumed under one or other of the three main headings. The analysis in this chapter therefore begins to move away from the
more detailed study of the grammatical structure of texts and toward the identification of specific, though broad, discourses that form the basis of neoliberal ideological strategies.

It should be borne in mind, again, that neoliberal ideology does not totally determine any of the texts under analysis, nor even necessarily significantly conditions large portions of them. Other ‘voices’ are at work in each text, since, as Wodak and Meyer remind us, texts are rarely single-authored and are ‘often sites of struggle in that they show traces of differing discourses and ideologies contending and struggling for dominance’, even if one ‘dominant ideology’ structures or constrains the overall semiotic effect of the particular text with which we are dealing. Policy papers are thus to a significant extent ‘polyphonic’ in the sense that the social contradictions and conflicts of their historical specificity are ‘inscribed into’ them. While the focus here is, of course, on identifying the ways in which neoliberal ideology shapes the linguistic construction of liberal war, there are, nonetheless, other contesting, conflicting and contradictory ways of seeing and representing at play in these texts. It may be, for example, that more traditionally liberal and conservative moral and political ideas are represented in policy documents too. The point is to see how neoliberalism as a dominant set of ways of seeing and being frames and is instantiated in the texts, rather than to infer that it is the sole political economic programme underpinning them.

Finally, it should be noted that some texts are referred to more frequently than others in the course of the analysis that follows. This is because of the very substantial differences in length of the papers discussed. Prevent I, for example, runs to just nine pages, while the SDSR comes in at over seventy pages and CONTEST I stands at well over one hundred.

5.2 Globalisation

As previous chapters have suggested, the linkages between discourses of ‘globalisation’ and neoliberal ideology are extremely strong. Since neoliberalism is partly about the territorial expansion or ‘widening’, as well as the intensification or ‘deepening’, of market structures, it is dependent upon a set of institutional, infrastructural and political-economic changes and restructurings which have the potential to bring such an expansion about.

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456 Ibid., p. 17.
Clearly, globalisation is a highly contested or ‘polysemic’ term and does not ‘belong’ to neoliberalism as such. The most general definitions are of an ‘increasing interconnectedness’ between or rather ‘across’ states or societies, facilitated largely by developments in communications technologies.457 There are even cosmopolitan and Marxian approaches (sometimes called ‘alter-globalisations’) which are firmly anti-neoliberal, and instead conceptualise globalisation as an increasing cultural interchange between societies.458

However, neoliberal ideology engenders a very specific discourse of globalisation, one which is very successful and often overlaps with other – even ‘critical’ – discourses. The neoliberal discourse represents globalisation as a process outside of the control of human individuals, groups of individuals and even states or groups of states, as the inevitable and largely ‘agentless’ spread of a neoliberal political-economic model based on the prioritisation and freedom of markets and transnational capital flows. This discourse employs the ideological strategies of naturalisation and universalisation and the grammatical strategy of nominalisation, to great intellectual and material effect. So central is this globalisation discourse to legitimising neoliberal theory and (re)producing neoliberal practice that many scholars speak not of ‘globalisation’ but instead of ‘neoliberal globalisation’.459 Neoliberal ideology tends to limit representations and interpretations of political and economic changes to being either a product of, or a reaction to, this agentless, ‘universal’ and ‘natural’ process of globalisation.

Bourdieu and Wacquant note that the language of neoliberalism,

[...] rests on a series of oppositions and equivalences which support and reinforce one another to depict the contemporary transformations advanced societies are undergoing

[...] as in turn benign, necessary, ineluctable or desirable.460

458 See, for example, Alex Callinicos, An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), pp. 13-14.
These conceptual ‘oppositions’ upon which the neoliberal vernacular is premised can, they contend, be represented by the ‘ideological schema’ in Figure 4 (see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1), in which ‘globalization’ figures as a transformative force from state to market, and fundamentally a force for ‘modernisation’ or ‘progress’. This schema of oppositions is useful in understanding not only how globalization discourse figures as a function of neoliberal ideology in the texts analysed here, but also how the discursive strategies of marketisation and depoliticisation discussed later in the chapter function and relate to this globalization discourse.

In CONTEST, the government’s counter-terrorism strategy, published in the wake of the 2005 London bombings, globalization is first referred to – in a very direct way – under the ‘Prevent’ strand, which is concerned with ‘preventing terrorism by tackling the radicalisation of individuals’:

The process of globalization, in particular over the past two decades, has had ramifications right across the world and in many countries the effect has been not just economic, but also political, social and cultural change on a significant scale. Given the impact on local ways of life, those already predisposed to be suspicious of the West can seek to portray these changes as a deliberate attempt to replace traditional structures with Western models, rather than as the consequence, for good or ill, of modernisation.

The problem of ‘terrorism’ and of ‘radicalisation’ is, in this text, constructed in terms of globalization as a disembodied ‘process’ which has the ‘effect’ of ‘economic […] political, social and cultural change’ but which ‘those already predisposed’ use as a justificatory resource for their deployment of political violence. To the contrary, the text asserts that globalization – and, implicitly, the replacement ‘of traditional structures with Western models’ – is simply a ‘consequence’ of ‘modernisation’. So while CONTEST understands a ‘reason’ for the political violence of Islamic terrorists (economic, political, social and cultural change), it seeks to undermine any claim to legitimacy behind such a reason by reference to the neoliberal teleology – so well encapsulated in the writings of figures like Francis Fukuyama – according to which the spread of market economies and of liberal political institutions is part of the inevitable and inexorable march of history, or ‘modernisation’. Terrorists are thus enemies of the ‘modern’. They misperceive globalization as a form of Western cultural
imperialism precisely because they still view the world through a ‘pre-modern’ lens. The terrorist is, in this representation, the flotsam of history, the misinformed, ‘radicalised’ enemy of progress.

An alternative imaginary of the terrorist, and justification of the repressive state apparatuses deployed in the War on Terror, also hinges on the neoliberal telos of globalisation, but in a different way to the ‘modern/pre-modern’ distinction. Many political texts represent the ‘new threats’ of ‘global terror’ as a sophisticated but perverse alter-globalisation, the exploitation of the apparently innocuous technologies and communicative networks that the benign and agentless process of globalisation has bestowed upon the human race. The following excerpts from A Resilient Nation, the Conservative Party ‘Green Paper’ on national security, illustrate this other vision of the ‘terrorist’:

**Side-effects of globalisation.** The most significant secular political change of the last twenty years, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, has been [globalisation – started by Western financial institutions](#) operating on a 24/7 basis worldwide through modern technology. Open global markets and free trade have brought into being [new, highly dynamic](#) and increasingly indigenous centres of wealth creation, especially but not exclusively, in Asia. [...]This [spreading prosperity, hugely positive in itself](#), will have major long term effects. [...] Globalisation has already brought consequences.

**Proliferation of potentially hostile technologies.** Technology has driven globalisation. But it can also be put to malign uses: the greatest danger is the illegal nuclear arms trade in which state and non state actors engage. [...]There is also growing awareness of the danger of terrorists making or acquiring ‘dirty’ bombs; the likelihood of biological and chemical weapons proliferation is also increasing. Indeed, the US National Intelligence Council has judged that [terrorist attacks using these weapons are more likely than the use of a nuclear device](#). Individuals are able to create and wield biological and chemical weapons without the support or technological infrastructure of a state. And knowledge of how to make such weapons is quite widespread and the [materials relatively cheap](#). The other side of the technology coin is the [reliance of developed societies and economies on networks](#) and computer systems for the effective functioning of all aspects of daily life which [creates new vulnerabilities](#) for exploitation by [malicious actors](#).
Network terrorists operate on a transnational basis, greatly aided by Western technology. They exploit ‘unregulated spaces’ – or even capture failed states – to train and command while operating underground in societies they wish to destroy. The current epicentre of global terrorism along the Pakistan/Afghanistan border represents a direct and serious threat to the UK in particular. But there is no reason to suppose that the highly mobile terrorist of no fixed address will not set up elsewhere – as for instance is already happening in the coastal states of the Middle East and Africa along the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean.

The first paragraph, on ‘side-effects of globalisation’ sets the scene. We live in a world where ‘modern technology’ and ‘global markets and free trade’ – but under ‘Western’ leadership – have spread ‘prosperity’. While this is ‘hugely positive in itself’, there may be other, more ambiguous ‘effects’ or ‘side-effects’ of the globalisation process. In the second paragraph some of these effects are outlined under the heading ‘proliferation of potentially hostile technologies’. While ‘technology’ has apparently ‘driven globalisation’ it ‘can also be put to malign use’ – the implication of this ‘also’ clause is of course that globalisation is itself benign. This paragraph goes on to create a nightmare imaginary of the many and varied ‘dangers’ posed by ‘terrorists’ in the globalised world, where ‘knowledge’ and ‘materials’ become ‘widespread’ and thus terrorists may be able to construct and ‘wield’ not only ‘biological and chemical weapons’ but even a ‘dirty bomb’ (a hypothetical explosive device designed to spread radioactive material over a large area, often imagined in counter-terror ‘risk assessments’ and policies). A contrast is set up across the first two paragraphs between the clean, benign, ‘technology driven’ and ‘prosperous’, ‘hugely positive’ globalised order engendered by ‘Western financial institutions’, and the ‘dirty’, malign, ‘biological and chemical’, sinister misuse of globalised ‘knowledge’ by dark forces – ‘exploitative’ and ‘malicious’ actors. As Mary Douglas puts it in her famous treatise on ‘pollution’, Purity and Danger (1966): ‘Dirt offends against order. Eliminating it is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment’. The globalised/globalising neoliberal market system is a clean, positive, technological and financial order; the terrorists are dirty, polluting

particles, infecting or attempting to infect that order and the solution to such a pollution or infection is, of course, evisceration by any means necessary.

The third paragraph develops this imaginary further, describing the dirty, shadowy ‘network terrorist’, ‘operating underground’, and in ‘unregulated spaces’ – the ‘highly mobile terrorist of no fixed address’. This last description is a reference to the official status of homeless people in British society – also considered ‘dirty’, ‘dangerous’ and ‘unregulated’ individuals who have failed to properly engage with the self-help neoliberal political-economic order – who are recorded by the police and other state authorities as being of ‘no fixed address’ or ‘no fixed abode’. Liberal state violence is thus justified and represented as a ‘cleaning’ operation necessary to complete the work of neoliberal globalisation. Not only the War on Terror, but also the ‘interventions’ to replace dictatorial regimes in Libya and other less ‘modern’ countries are part of a global ‘mopping-up’ exercise.

Apart from the specific framing of terrorism and the ‘War on Terror’ in modern/pre-modern and clean/dirty terms, there is a more general construction, across many of the texts, of a ‘new’, ‘complex’ and ‘ever-changing’ world order in the post-Cold War era. ‘Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty’, the coalition government’s strategic defence and security review (SDSR), accuses the previous government of failing to adapt to this:

‘And there was a failure to face up to the new security realities of the post Cold War world; ’This is the result of the failure to take the bold decisions needed to adjust our defence plans to face the realities of our ever-changing world’.

This is clearly a reference to the same ‘New World’ of globalisation constructed in Tony Blair’s ‘Chicago Speech’ (see Chapter 6). The notion of ‘adjustment’ and an ‘ever-changing’ world are also central to the ‘flexibility’ principle at the heart of the marketisation discourse we will return to later in this chapter. The emergence of ‘new security realities’ is predicated on a set of ‘global changes’, which are mentioned in A Resilient Nation:

Global changes are affecting not only Britain’s commercial interests but also our domestic security.

The use of the ‘not only, but also’ clause sets up a hypotactic relation between ‘commercial interests’ and ‘domestic security’ within ‘global changes’, whereby it is
recognised that globalisation is a *primarily* ‘commercial’ set of changes, but is also, *secondarily*, impacting upon ‘security’. The text goes on to elaborate on this new arrangement:

In short, **we no longer inhabit a ‘simple’ world in which foreign and defence issues can be separated from domestically generated threats**. Instead, we live in a world in which dangers, events and actions abroad are inter-dependent with threats to our security at home.

This passage of *A Resilient Nation* represents the post-Cold War world order as complex (by contrast to the ‘simple’ world of the Cold War!), and the complexity at stake is apparently rooted in an increased ‘interdependence’ between what happens ‘abroad’ and what happens ‘at home’. The characterisation of ‘abroad’ as a potential threat to ‘security at home’ is developed in the *SDSR*:

*Globalisation* increases the likelihood of **conflict involving non-state and failed-state actors**.

Recent experience has shown that **instability and conflict overseas can pose risks to the UK**, including by **creating environments** in which **terrorists and organised crime groups can recruit for, plan and direct their global operations**. Groups operating in countries like **Somalia and Yemen** represent a **direct and growing terrorist threat to the UK**; criminal gangs use **West Africa** for smuggling goods into the UK; and **conflicts overseas disrupt our trade and energy supplies**. […]

‘Abroad’ – places like ‘Somalia and Yemen’ and ‘West Africa’ – is the source of ‘direct and growing threats’ to the UK. These threats may be ‘terrorist’ in nature, but may also, crucially, ‘disrupt our trade’. There is a particular focus in many national security policy papers on the ‘threat’ posed by what the *SDSR* calls ‘failed’ or ‘fragile’ states. These states are represented as a breeding-ground for both the terrorist bacterium and for a general force of ‘instability’ within the globalised neoliberal order:

4.B.2 A key principle of **our adaptable approach** (set out in Part One) is to **tackle threats at source**. We must focus on those **fragile and conflict-affected countries where the risks are high, our interests are most at stake and where we know we can have an impact**. To **help bring enduring stability to such countries** […]
Specifically, we will:

• provide clearer direction with a greater focus on results through the new **Building Stability Overseas Strategy** to be published in spring 2011;

• enhance the UK’s system of **early warning for countries at risk of instability** to ensure that our response is timely, appropriate and informed by the UK national interest.

The ‘fragile states’ where ‘risks are high’ are constructed as ‘threatening’ or at least potentially threatening because of their instability. The response to this ‘problem’ thus becomes a key aim of British security policy: ‘building stability overseas’. This seemingly ambiguous concept is of course tied to the justifications for the invasions and occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq, but also, presumably, the NATO bombing of Libya. Much contemporary Western state warfare is waged in the name of establishing stability in the form of a global order. By ousting the Taliban, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi, the UK and its allies reduce the ‘risks’ posed by ‘fragile countries’ which might become hotbeds of threatening activity. The preoccupation of neoliberal theory with risk is realised in this way of imagining the function of security policy and war to be a form of what is called, in the parlance of financial economics but increasingly in all manner of public management, ‘risk management’. In the new global world, individuals are responsible for managing their own risks, while state security policies are about intervening where necessary to manage risks to the stability of the market-based order. Some of the more specific aspects of how the coalition government intends to implement ‘stability building’ are elaborated later in the **SDSR**:

**Supporting fragile states**

The **needs of fragile and conflict-affected states** are among the greatest. None has met a single Millennium Development Goal. They also present significant challenges to delivering aid effectively. Instability, weak government and poor security all impede a country’s development.

We have learned important lessons about **what works best in these environments**: we must address the root causes of conflict and fragility; support an inclusive political system which builds a closer society; and strengthen the Government’s ability to deliver security, justice and economic opportunity. That requires marshalling our development programmes, alongside our diplomatic effort and defence engagement. And we know that we must be prepared to innovate.
The **SDSR** suggests that security policy should be directed at ‘strengthening’ government in fragile states in various ways and at somehow overcoming internal divisions in populations – building a ‘closer society’ – in order to reduce the risk posed to the rest of the global order. This policy is tied to ‘a country’s development’ and ‘our development programmes’ and the delivery of ‘aid’. These passages thus describe what Mark Duffield and others call the ‘development-security nexus’:

The claim *you cannot have development without security or security without development* has become a truism of the post-Cold War period. However, if the liberal way of development equates with adaptive self-reliance, this begs the question, how secure is self-reliance in a world of neoliberal globalization?[^62]

As Duffield notes, in a ‘world of neoliberal globalisation’, Western states increasingly see their role as that of ‘developing’ the more peripheral states of the international order so as to reduce the risks they might pose given the ‘transnational flows’ – the porosity of state borders – that ‘globalisation’ is supposed to have engendered. Duffield continues:

Given the circulatory powers of actually existing development, the struggle over acceptable and unacceptable ways of life in the global south interconnects with the security of the global north. Once war becomes a struggle over ways of life, and life itself is characterized by powers of emergence and radical interconnectivity […] then the old dichotomy between the national and the international […] collapses within political imagination.^[63]

This imagined collapse also leads to a more general notion of ‘diffusion’ in security policy. The Labour Party’s response to the **SDSR**, a consultation paper entitled *21st Century Defence* highlights the implications of globalisation for power in the new international order:

**Globalisation.** This is *diffusing power more widely among many different actors* in the international system. It is fuelling a major *re-distribution of economic and political influence* from the Atlantic seaboard to Asia, the Pacific and parts of Latin America. A


[^63]: Ibid., p. 68.
global multipolar system is emerging with the rise of China, India and Latin American nations. Everyone has a stake in making sure this transition is peaceful but conflict between states in future cannot be ruled out.

This passage of 21st Century Defence highlights as another destabilising effect of globalisation the emergence of a ‘global multipolar system’ in which ‘China, India and Latin American nations’ come to wield more ‘economic and political influence’. The text attempts to imbricate these states in the Western-led global order, representing them as ‘stake-holders’ for whom peace and stability should be seen as a priority. This view, however, swiftly gives way to a more paranoid imaginary:

The relative power of non-state actors — businesses, religious groups, criminal or terrorist networks — also will increase, afforded new opportunities by growing interdependence [...] Globalisation can increase our vulnerabilities — interdependence increases the risk of catastrophic cyber attack, or the risk of global pandemics [...] The rise of new global powers will necessitate new defence relationships.

21st Century Defence then goes even further, suggesting that globalisation demands ‘interventionism’ in order to mitigate the dangers of border porosity and to maintain ‘prosperity’ for ‘those at home’:

Defence and interventionism. In today’s world the prosperity, security, liberty and civil liberties of those at home cannot be separated from events beyond our borders.

A belief that you have responsibility beyond your borders is not only, as some would have it, ideological, but a rational response to the world in which we live.

Defence and our economic interest. National security and economic stability are mutually reinforcing. Britain’s ability to defend our values and interests as well as promote our ideas depends on strong force projection as well as economic strength.

How defence policy can be used to protect economic interests and objectives, whether territorial or industrial, therefore, will be explored. [...] In today’s interdependent world risks are increasingly shared and interconnected, and therefore the solutions must be too.
Here the text makes quite a direct link between ‘defence policy’, ‘national security’ and ‘economic stability’. In ‘today’s interdependent world’ the challenge of national security policy, and thus of the use of state violence, is to secure the newly globalised political-economic structures and flows of neoliberalism.

If what is fundamentally being ‘globalised’ by means of liberal state violence is a set of neoliberal political-economic practices, there is a need for complementary and interlinked discourses which will promote and reinforce the shift to these practices. Thus there is also a ‘marketising’ discourse at work within, or in conjunction with, neoliberal globalisation discourse.

5.3 Marketisation

As we saw in Chapter 3, neoliberal theory and practice favours the extension of the (nominally ‘free’) market model to spheres of social life beyond those traditionally held to be ‘markets’ – education, healthcare, arts, sciences and local and national governmental institutions, for example. If globalisation provides the dynamic through which neoliberal political-economic practice territorially expands, it is marketisation which ‘deepens’ the neoliberal ideological logic within societies. Since there are no limits to the process of marketisation, given that markets are supposed to be the most efficient and socially valuable mode of organisation, the discourse of marketisation must also touch on the military and policing functions of states, on the structuring and deployments of state violence.

The marketisation of liberal state violence is evident across the policy papers analysed here. It takes a variety of forms, but this section focuses on two forms of marketising language – the first of which is the more abstract form, whereby states, international politics and warfare are couched in broadly ‘market’ terms; the second form is the attempt to posit specifically market-based solutions to, and engagements with, the problems of international political violence.

A Resilient Nation describes proposed government policy on national security in terms of making ‘major changes to the way we do business’. The ‘way we do business’ metaphor is common to many government departments, perhaps an indicator of the corporate background of many civil servants and politicians today. However, it is also indicative of a certain understanding of the role of state, government and international relations as
essentially equivalent to market relations. This understanding becomes clearer elsewhere in *A Resilient Nation*:

‘[Britain is] a global trading nation’ (RN)

**Britain is an international ‘hub’. We depend on trade. We have close links with many parts of the globe.** (RN)

*Britain as an ‘international hub’. Britain is an international financial, media, education, tourism and communications centre. London, along with New York and Tokyo, has had a place as one of three ‘command centres’ for the global economy which it will be important to continue to sustain.* (RN)

Here are some very specific representations of what ‘Britain’ is. It is represented as a ‘hub’, a ‘centre’ and a ‘command centre’ within the ‘global economy’. These representations rely on an understanding of the newly globalised world as a sort of network – specifically a ‘global market’ – within which certain states are nodes or ‘hubs’. There is an emphasis on the idea that Britain is one of the most important of such nodes, effectively a ‘market-leader’.

There is an interesting and seemingly paradoxical similarity between the Conservative Party’s interpretation of global order here and that elaborated in Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s *Empire* (2000), which points to the reduction of nation-states to ‘instruments to record the flows of the commodities, monies and populations’ set in motion by businesses.464

This general marketised representation of international politics is also applied in *A Resilient Nation* to ‘daily life’, which is to say the most basic social practices in which humans materially engage:

The nine essential sectors of daily life – energy, food, water, transport, telecommunications, government and public services, emergency services, health and finance – must be able to withstand and respond to extreme events such as terrorist attacks and natural hazards. These sectors have international supply chains, underpinning the delivery of their services to customers which must also be flexible enough to adapt to changes in supply and demand. (RN)

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The division of ‘daily life’ into ‘essential sectors’ draws upon the corporate language of neoliberalism – Bourdieu and Wacquant’s ‘NewLiberalSpeak’ – and the lexicon of ‘new public management’. The transition from politics to market-based social order that neoliberalism seeks to achieve involves recontextualising the activities of state, government and political leaders as a form of ‘management’, and just as a national economy is divided into ‘sectors’ amenable to managerial techniques, so the very basic requirements of the material reproduction of life are here ‘sectorised’. Meanwhile the broader notion of ‘resilience’ at work here (a concept Jonathan Joseph has rightly associated with ‘embedded neoliberalism’\textsuperscript{465}) contrives to induce neoliberal conduct and ways of being. As Joseph puts it, while resilience as a concept is not driven exclusively by neoliberalism, ‘it does fit neatly with what it trying to say and do’,\textsuperscript{466} in the sense that it invokes a type of subjectivity where the individual is expected to increase their adaptability and flexibility and to accept and manage certain risks. Securing circulation in these essential ‘sectors’ becomes a primary aim of defence policy, which equates the ‘national interest’ to the security of markets and capital flows, as well as a ‘rules-based international system’:

1.2 **Global threats**

What therefore are the **UK’s national interests?** [...]  
- the **security of international trade, investment and resource flows**;  
- a **stable, just and rules-based international system**

The securing of commodity and capital circulation in the global market is a priority which is often expressed in the policy papers discussed here. The SDSR speaks of a ‘burden of securing international stability’ which must be shared with ‘regional partners’ (presumably some of the more peripheral – and perhaps less liberal – states of the globalised political-economic order) in order to secure ‘trade’ and ‘energy supply routes’:

But we will also work more with our allies and partners to **share the burden of securing international stability** [...] building the capacity of **regional partners** to address common security interests such as securing trade and energy supply routes.

\textsuperscript{466} Ibid., p. 38.
Similarly, Labour’s 21st Century Defence also focuses on securing ‘trading relationships’ and ‘energy supply’, and again by reference to the idea of supporting the particular states and regions upon which the UK relies for imports. The unspoken sentiment here is that we must maintain and ‘secure’ good relations with states like Saudi Arabia (oil exporters); a sentiment that was much in evidence when Tony Blair intervened in 2006 to halt a Serious Fraud Office investigation into bribery and corruption in British arms firm BAE Systems’ dealings with the Saudi state in the interests of ‘national security’:

Our trading relationships are evolving, more Britons are living overseas, we have defence commitments to allies and others that have to be fulfilled, and in recent years the country has moved from energy exporter to energy importer, potentially exposing us to greater risks to our sources of energy supply. By examining our ‘international footprint’ and combining it with the analysis of the drivers of change we will have a thorough understanding of the regions that must shape the focus of our security strategy.

It is emphasised in 21st Century Defence that the use of force in the UK’s relations with other states, along with diplomatic efforts, should be focused on those states and regions where ‘economic interests’ are at stake:

Shifting regional priorities. Defence strategy is necessarily based on identifying the regions where our interests are greatest and threats gravest. Our economic interests, and our historical and evolving links to other countries all shape our geographic focus.

The principle of ‘flexibility’ central to neoliberal marketisation discourse, itself premised on the principle that all social interactions should be based on a ‘supply-and-demand’ model, promotes the circulation of capital. It also stigmatises forms of thinking and acting which are in some sense ‘static’ or enduring, favouring instead a constant willingness to adopt different positions and discourses based as a ‘dynamic’ reaction to social events. In discourses of state violence this often leads to a de-prioritisation of fixed ‘principles’ for military alliances, spending, development and engagement in favour of a more fluid approach, ‘which will enable us to counter the threats we face with the diverse and flexible range of capabilities any modern defence posture demands’ (21st Century Defence). This ‘pragmatic approach’ is about finding ‘new innovative solutions to enhance capabilities’ and is apparently a response
to ‘threats [...] becoming more widespread and complex and their focus more diffuse’ (Ibid.). Both military alliances and military interventions are thus subject to the complexity and contingency of market forces, rather than fixed political principles.

The SDSR is permeated by the marketised language of flexibility and change, of ‘uncertainty’, ‘adaptation’, contingency and shifting requirements for the deployment of the UK armed forces:

In terms of the Army, in this age of uncertainty, our ground forces will continue to have a vital operational role.

[Introduction of new vehicles and communications technologies] will make the Army more mobile and more flexible. It will be better adapted to face current and future threats, with the type of equipment it needs to prevail in today’s conflicts.

[Aircraft carriers] will give the UK long term political flexibility to act without depending, at times of regional tension, on agreement from other countries to use of their bases for any mission we want to undertake. It will also give us in-built military flexibility to adapt our approach.

[Military science and technology programmes must] maintain flexibility to adapt to the unexpected.

‘Flexibility’ as the key organising principle of market-based neoliberal societies is introduced into security policy papers by reference to the amorphous nature of vague ‘complex threats’, of ‘uncertainty’ and ‘constant change’. Nightmarish yet deeply ambiguous imaginaries of almost unknowable ‘enemies’, existing potentially anywhere, are constructed in these texts. And it is these nightmarish scenarios, from the continuous reference to the dire-sounding ‘substantial’ and ‘severe’ terrorist attack threat levels that the Home Office has been issuing since 2006, that legitimate the draconian implementation of ‘anti-terror’ legislation, the clamping down on protest, the practices of border security humiliation (the requirement that travellers remove their belts and shoes, the body searches and so on). State violence is thus to be aimed at pre-emptively eliminating or avoiding ‘risks’ or ‘threats’, especially potential risks or threats, to the ‘stable’ market-based order. The equilibrium of the perfectly free market is the basic premise upon which this approach rests.
Apart from the broad framing of security and defence policy in market language, there is also an approach to dealing with ‘security’ issues in several of the policy papers which seems to promote the idea that agents – individuals within a society or states within the international order – can be incentivised or disincentivised into particular courses of action by money, and that defence policy must be cast in terms of ‘value for money’, cost-benefit analyses and ‘business plans’, as evidenced in CONTEST II...

11.36 **Government Departments** set out their CONTEST commitments in their *business plans*. Reflecting the Government’s commitment to greater *transparency*, these business plans are updated and published annually: business plans for 2012/13 will include commitments made in this strategy.

...and in *21st Century Defence*:

**Assessing value for money (VfM)**

11.42 **VfM** is the method used across Government to assess activities based on the outcomes they achieve in relation to their cost. VfM is about achieving as much as we can with the resources available to us. In CONTEST, the strategic risk model ensures we are able to match resources to the areas of greatest priority.

11.43 **CONTEST programme boards** agree on *priority deliverables*, ensure the adequate allocation of resources and hold departments to account for delivering on key priority areas. These boards regularly receive reports on implementation, including an assessment of the *financial health of our key improvement activities*. Our economic and security interdependence is growing. World trade looks set to return to growth rates above 10 per cent this year, yet the patterns of trade are set to change. Equally, at a time of *fiscal contraction* resultant *capability shortfalls* will need to be minimised through greater international co-operation.

The language of ‘priority deliverables’, ‘financial health’, ‘shortfalls’ and ‘value for money’ are all derived from the new corporate lexicon. This lexicon is drawn upon heavily in both CONTEST strategies, and in *21st Century Defence* to paint a picture of national security as not simply something which is restricted by markets, but something which is mutually co-constituted with the global market:
Economic and defence interests. Economic and military strength and stability are mutually reliant and it will be important to map our main trading partners, trading routes and how these are set to evolve in coming years. With the growth of piracy and cyber attack maintenance of economic relationships is a vital defence challenge requiring a strategic focus on localities and capabilities.

A commitment to effective conflict prevention as well as being responsible postconflict stakeholders once a conflict has ended. Effective preventative measures, which sometimes require deployment of defence assets and defence diplomacy as well as development policy, not only saves lives but saves money.

In a marketised/marketising global order, the use of state violence becomes about regulating, managing and/or eliminating threats to the global market which underpins the ‘New World’. This approach necessitates the negation of the ‘political’ aspects of conflict in favour of a ‘managerial’ understanding, and thus rests upon the final neoliberal discourse and practice discussed here – depoliticisation.

5.4 Depoliticisation

The discourse and practice of ‘depoliticisation’ – the displacement, obfuscation or replacement (by markets and/or ‘management’) of ‘the political’ – is a central feature of neoliberal ideology. In this sense neoliberalism is a self-denying ideology, an ideology which contests the very existence of ideology in a market-driven world.

Tony Blair famously proclaimed the ‘death’ of ideology, in the sense of coherent and stable (‘rigid’, in his own terms) sets of political beliefs, emphasising instead the need for politics and politicians to be more flexible, more reactive to the sorts of supposedly extra-political ‘changes’ posited by the neoliberal discourse of globalisation. As Michael Freeden (whose approach to ideology, it should be noted, diverges significantly from the ‘critical’ conception used in this thesis) has pointed out, this ‘declared disavowal of ideology’ amounts to ‘a colossal act of self-deception’.

It is, however, a notion that fits very clearly within the framework of neoliberal rationality. If we accept that capitalist market-based liberal-democracy is the only viable political system, then ‘politics’ becomes an epiphenomenon – a superstructure even – of the market, and the role of the political leader, party or government

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is restricted to the management or facilitation of the interaction between individuals and markets. This leads to the sort of ‘managerial state’ model posited by Clarke and Newman.\textsuperscript{468} Furthermore, since ‘ideology’ in the sense of a set of specific and relatively static political beliefs, is supposed to be ‘dead’, those who continue to espouse such fixed principles – rather than accept dynamism, flexibility and change as paradigmatic – are effectively zombies, the living dead who continue to stalk our nightmares in the globalised ‘New World’ discursively constructed by figures like Blair (see Chapter 6).

The ‘end of ideology’ thesis, which had first been clearly articulated by Daniel Bell in the 1960s,\textsuperscript{469} is premised, as Schwartzmantel notes, on the belief that ‘because there was no significant movement calling for radical change in the structure of Western society, these societies were therefore non-ideological’.\textsuperscript{470} In fact, of course, Western liberal-democracies are characterised by the dominance of a very particular form of ideology, the ‘ideology of Western liberal-democracy’ which, Schwartzmantel recognises, became ‘globalised neoliberalism’ in the latter half of the twentieth century:

While liberal-democratic systems might in theory allow for a wide range of political ideas to be debated and considered [...] in practice the span of effective political opinion was constrained by a dominant ideology which limited political debate to a set of questions concerned with managing the established system.\textsuperscript{471}

Thus those whose political or religious rhetoric and action falls outside of the ‘mainstream’ and challenges the very legitimacy of the Western liberal-democratic system are automatically deemed ‘extremist’. Before 9/11, mainstream British political discourse – especially, for example, during the strikes and social conflicts of the 1970s and 1980s – characterised Marxist or socialist thought in this way, and also Irish Republicanism. After 9/11, the focus of the ‘post-ideological’ discourse became ‘Islamist’ or simply ‘Islamic’ extremism.

Much of the discursive representation of terrorism, but also of ‘extremist’ beliefs in general, revolves around this notion that ‘they’ – the terrorists, the anarchists, the Marxists, even the traditionalist conservatives and the welfarist social democrats – continue to adhere

\textsuperscript{468} Clarke and Newman, \textit{The Managerial State}.  
\textsuperscript{469} Daniel Bell, \textit{The End of Ideology}.  
\textsuperscript{470} John Schwartzmantel, Ideology and Politics (London: Sage, 2008), p.10  
\textsuperscript{471} Ibid., p. 11.
to dead ‘political ideologies’. The stigmatisation of ‘political ideologies’ is – as we will see in Chapter 6 – at work in speeches on the War on Terror. In the policy papers analysed in this chapter, the War on Terror is also often characterised as a ‘battle of ideas’, wherein the challenge of preventing or combating terrorist violence is framed as a process of disabusing ‘extremists’ of their ‘radical’ politico-religious ideologies and replacing them with something more benign.

A controversial security policy paper was published by the Labour government in 2006 as ‘Countering International Terrorism: The United Kingdom’s Strategy’, and is generally referred to as ‘CONTEST’ or ‘the CONTEST strategy’ (CONTEST I hereafter).

CONTEST I is sub-divided into four ‘strands’: ‘PREVENT, PURSUE, PROTECT and PREPARE’. The fifth element, not explicitly mentioned in the CONTEST strategy, but which nonetheless operates throughout the ‘PREVENT’, ‘PURSUE’, ‘PROTECT’, and ‘PREPARE’ strands is, of course ‘PORTRAY’. How texts like this portray ‘terrorists’, ‘the threat from Islamist terrorism’, ‘our citizens’, ‘interests abroad’ and ‘violent and extremist beliefs’ influences other representations, in the media and in the public imagination, as well as shaping the social practices of ‘security’.

Like David Cameron’s Munich Security Conference speech, discussed in the previous chapter, CONTEST I describes the justification of political violence by ‘Islamist’ terrorists as a form of ‘extremism’ reliant upon a ‘distorted [...] version of the Islamic faith’. CONTEST I, Prevent I and CONTEST II, meanwhile, accuse ‘violent extremists’ of adhering to ‘ideologies’ in a pejorative sense. There is an attempt in these texts to delegitimise the widely-known critiques of Western capitalism, liberal-democracy and especially US-led Western foreign policy. CONTEST I speaks of:

‘engaging in the battle of ideas – challenging the ideologies that extremists believe can justify the use of violence’.

Much emphasis was placed on the significance of the ‘Prevent’ strand of CONTEST I, largely because the ‘7/7’ bombings were perpetrated by people born (with the exception of Germaine Lindsey) and raised in the UK. This strand is largely concerned with the issue of ‘radicalisation’, the alleged process by which individuals become convinced of the legitimacy
of the use of violence in the pursuit of their political and religious goals, and has had several iterations in separate publications apart from CONTEST I. In ‘Preventing Violent Extremism: a Strategy for Delivery’ (Prevent I), we find a number of crucial passages with regard to the role of religion and ‘ideology’ in ‘violent extremism’:

The most severe terrorist threat currently comes from individuals and groups who distort Islam to attempt to justify murder and their attacks on our shared values. [...] those who hijack the peaceful religion of Islam as a basis for their attacks. [...] We have a diverse society within which people have the freedom to form and embrace their own identity. Violent extremists promote a simplistic and intentionally divisive view of the world. [...] Violent extremists distort Islam in an attempt to justify their actions. We will facilitate debate and amplify mainstream voices against them. Government can help credible individuals to speak out. It can promote discussion and recognise and support people and organisations who speak authoritatively about Islam.

where theology is being distorted to justify violent extremist rhetoric or activity and threaten both Muslims and non-Muslims, Government should reinforce faith understanding and thereby build resilience. Violent extremists exploit vulnerabilities in individuals to drive a wedge between them and their families and communities. We can support individuals whose lack of effective support networks, poor understanding of their faith and uncertainty about their own identity is exploited by recruiters.

These passages of Prevent I reinforce the notion of the ‘violent extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ as being someone who ‘distorts Islam’. The text takes on an extreme epistemic modality in which it is implied that there is one correct and ‘peaceful’ ‘version’ of Islam, and that the terrorists who threaten our order are guilty of ‘hijacking’ and ‘distorting’ this religion to justify political violence they are apparently determined to carry-out regardless. The role of ‘Government’ should thus be to ‘amplify mainstream [Muslim] voices’ against ‘extremists’ while at the same time preventing ‘radicalisation’ of ‘vulnerable’ individuals who are confused and ‘have a poor understanding of their faith’. Prevent I hints at the closing down of differing and divergent interpretations of both Islam and of the political issues ‘extremists’ use to justify violence. The aim of Prevent I, along with the other formulations of this sub-strategy of CONTEST, is as Charlotte Heath-Kelly notes, to manage ‘risk’ by attempting to ‘govern
‘terrorism’ pre-emptively’. In other words, the strategy is to intervene to stop ‘radicalisation’ and thus to stop ‘radical’ ideas from gaining support and traction in the first place.

The Conservatives proposed a renewal of Prevent I while in opposition, and outlined this proposal in A Resilient Nation:

The Prevent Strategy should therefore:
• combat extremism which promotes violence or hatred, not just violent extremism.

Government must take the lead in promoting shared values and set an example for individuals by:
– preventing propagators of hate from entering the country and actively preventing the import and dissemination of extremist written material and speech which promotes hatred and violence. The police must exercise their powers to take down websites which violate the law.

Here we see a more explicit desire to shut down political debate in favour of a hard line, even on those ‘non-violent’ individuals and groups whose views are deemed ‘extremist’ and thus potentially ‘radicalising’, since they might provide a source of ethical legitimacy for uses of non-state political violence. Once in power as part of a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, the Conservatives re-wrote the CONTEST strategy (CONTEST II). Here, they begin the implementation of their policy of eliminating non-violent extremism:

We believe that Prevent work to date has not clearly recognised the way in which some terrorist ideologies draw on and make use of extremist ideas which are espoused and circulated by apparently non-violent organisations, very often operating within the law [...] 

Work to challenge ideology should not try to change majority opinion because it does not need changing

[Islamic ‘extremism’ draws on and then reinterprets different theological traditions.]

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The grievances upon which propagandists can draw may be real or perceived, although clearly none of them justify terrorism. They include a perception of foreign policy, in particular towards the Muslim majority world; a sense and experience of Islamophobia; and counterterrorism powers, which have sometimes been regarded as discriminatory or disproportionate.

5.55 In the UK, evidence suggests that radicalisation tends to occur in places where terrorist ideologies, and those that promote them, go uncontested and are not exposed to free, open and balanced debate and challenge. Some of these places are the responsibility of Government, some are Government funded but have considerable autonomy and others are both privately owned and run.

We are also working to counter extremists’ false characterisation of the UK as being a place where Muslims are oppressed.

According to CONTEST II the ‘extremist’ vision of a world in which Muslim-majority countries around the world, and Muslim populations within Western states, are downtrodden in the Western-led globalised order is simply false. The text denies any traction to these ideas and frames them as an intrinsic ‘divisiveness’ stirred-up by trouble-making ideologues. Work must therefore be done to ‘challenge ideology’ and to counter ‘false characterisations’. Paradoxically, since the rhetoric of neoliberalism demands that ‘free’ societies be based upon a ‘marketplace of ideas’, the text calls – in between closing down freedom of speech for non-violent ‘extremists’ and denying oxygen to debates over Western foreign policy in Muslim countries or the oppression of Islamic minorities in the UK – for ‘free, open and balanced debate’.

Another depoliticising discursive strategy, which is at work both in the speeches analysed in the preceding chapter and the policy papers discussed here, involves the reduction of the role of ‘state’ or ‘government’ to being primarily about providing ‘security’, ‘safety’ and ‘stability’. This is a radically anti-democratic proposition, but of course a common theme in liberalism (in this sense again we can see the contradiction in collapsing liberalism and democracy into ‘liberal-democracy’ [see Chapter 2]). However, crucially for understanding depoliticisation as a particular dynamic of neoliberalism, we can point to the
more general deprioritisation of the ‘political’ in favour of ‘security’ – but security for whom or what, and from whom or what?

While the diagnoses of sociologists like Beck and Giddens in the 1990s of an emergent ‘risk society’ model did not limit this social form to the terms of neoliberalism, it is interesting to think this problem with neoliberalism. As a sociological analysis, the notion of the risk society – societies in which a preoccupation with the future and potentiality leads to a preoccupation with ‘risks’ and ‘riskiness’ – is premised on what is perceived to be sociological, rather than ideological, change. This change takes the form of the emergence of what sociologists call ‘post-Fordism’ or ‘post-industrialism’ in Western states, facilitated by the outsourcing of manufacturing from the global West to the global East. Now, we might contend that these sociological ‘changes’ don’t spring from thin air – ex nihilo nihil fit – and that it is precisely the processes of globalisation and marketisation which neoliberal ideology sustains that have assisted in the changes in production and consumption that are the necessary conditions for the risk society. However, it is true to say that the outsourcing of manufacture and other changes leading to the emergence of the preoccupation with risk were well under way long before the rise of neoliberalism, that they were in fact at work already in the era of colonialism and that they have merely intensified in the neoliberal era. On the other hand, the concept of ‘risk management’, which has become central to the various risk discourses in the contemporary West, is very much an expression of what Bourdieu and Wacquant call the ‘new planetary vulgate’ of neoliberalism. The term ‘risk management’ also predates the rise of neoliberalism (though it certainly emerged from the world of business and finance), but its increasing ubiquity and its application to a variety of political, rather than business, issues are a function of its place in the neoliberal nomenclature and of the ‘imperialism of neoliberal reason’. There is, moreover, a connection between the general emphasis placed on flexibility by neoliberal ideology and the concern with ‘managing’ and pre-empting ‘risks’ in a market-based society. It is the potentiality of ‘risk’ that necessitates ‘flexibility’; an approach characterised by Claudia Aradau and Rens van Munster as ‘precautionary risk’.

473 Bourdieu and Wacquant, ‘NewLiberalSpeak’, p. 5.
This connection can be seen in the way the present government’s ‘Strategic Defence and Security Review’ (SDSR) describes planned changes to the organisation and functions of the UK Armed Forces:

[T]o respond to growing uncertainty about longer-term risks and threats, we will pursue an over-arching approach which:

- identifies and manages risks before they materialise in the UK, with a focus on preventing conflicts and building local capacity to deal with problems
- maintains a broad spectrum of defence and other capabilities, able to deter and contain, as well as engage on the ground, developing threats
- ensures those capabilities have in-built flexibility to adjust to changing future requirements (SDSR)

The SDSR also re-iterates the aims of the ‘National Security Strategy’ instituted by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the second ‘clear objective’ of, which is, the SDSR says:

[T]o shape a stable world, by acting to reduce the likelihood of risks affecting the UK or our interests overseas, and applying our instruments of power and influence to shape the global environment and tackle potential risks at source

And this strategy, in turn, apparently leads to a National Security Council policy which:

‘Identifies and manages risks before they materialise in the UK’

Similarly, 21st Century Defence argues that:

Our national security will depend on [...] tackling oppression through democratic reform, opening countries up to trade and technology [...] Targeted funding. We support the focus on building stability overseas in the SDSR and it is right the Government direct 30% of Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to support fragile and conflict-afflicted states to tackle the drivers of instability.

This amounts to an approach to deploying state violence in liberal societies which is based more on a notion of pre-emptive immunity from ‘risks’ – a strategy previously specific to the financial sector in the form of such things as insurance policies – than on a notion of
resolving, perpetuating or otherwise enacting political conflicts. This point is sharply apparent in the use of financial metaphor in the SDSR and many of the other policy papers. For example, the SDSR says that:

We will retain and renew our independent **nuclear deterrent** – the United Kingdom’s **ultimate insurance policy** in this **age of uncertainty**.

To reduce the continuous manufacture of nuclear weapons, ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD), to an ‘insurance policy’ — to couch this activity in the terms of the market — is to attempt to depoliticise it, so that, in the very next sentence, the text can speak, without irony, of ‘our commitment vigorously to pursue multilateral global disarmament’. ‘Multilateral global disarmament’ is a political goal, whereas retaining and renewing a ‘nuclear deterrent’ is simple market rationality, a strategy of risk management, an ‘insurance policy’. We can also see here how it is specifically liberal state violence which is subject to neoliberal ideology, whereas the manufacture of WMD in non-liberal ‘rogue’ states like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran under the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, or in nominally ‘communist’ North Korea, is very much politicalised. In the discourse of Western policy papers — in the hands of such regimes WMD become a ‘risk’ precisely because of the ‘ideological’ (as opposed to post-ideological/depoliticised/managerial) nature of their governments.

Depoliticisation is a discursive strategy at work in policy papers on security which is shaped by neoliberalism as a dominant ideology. On the one hand, the violence of liberal states is shown to be nothing more than ‘management’, the pragmatic — indeed the only possible — response to perpetual, shifting and complex ‘risk’ in a ‘globalised’ and market-driven world. On the other hand, this very depoliticisation is constructed in contrast to the excessively ‘political’ or, more specifically, ‘ideological’ basis upon which the non-liberal violent Other (terrorist, rogue state) acts. Here we can also apprehend the linkages between depoliticisation and the above-mentioned neoliberal discourses of globalisation and marketisation. ‘Politics’ is dead or dying inasmuch as it is being replaced by a ‘globalised’ or ‘globalising’ market model of social interaction. Therefore, the contemporary conflicts in which liberal states engage — the War on Terror being a primary example — are framed as a war between the market-enlightened West and a few outdated ‘ideologically-driven’ homicidal maniacs looking to disrupt or block the globalisation of (neo)liberal order.
The point here is not, of course, to suggest that the mass killings of 9/11 or 7/7 should be conceived of as ‘legitimate’, but rather to highlight the ways in which the response of British governments to this violence, and the ways in which they direct and represent their own ‘counter-terrorist’ violence is shaped by neoliberal ideology. Rather than admit the possibility that terrorist attacks might be carried-out for at least potentially legitimate or rationally intelligible ‘political’ reasons, mainstream British political discourse prefers simply to reduce motivations to mental disturbance and social marginalisation of a ‘tiny minority’. They have a misguided and outdated adherence to ‘ideologies’ and a ‘distortion’ of the central principles of a religious doctrine. If nothing else, such an approach – as with the above-mentioned strategy of marketisation – seems counter-productive and doomed to failure as a ‘counter-terrorist’ strategy, since it fundamentally fails to take seriously the grievances which constitute the ‘reasons’ of terrorists. Given that, from the critical realist view, reasons can be causes (see Chapter 4), this is a grave error of judgement.

5.5 Conclusion: Globalising, Marketising and Depoliticising ‘National Security’

In this chapter we have seen how three broad and overlapping neoliberal discourses – globalisation, marketisation and depoliticisation – are at work in policy papers on ‘national security’ and ‘terrorism’ produced by the major British political parties, when in government and opposition.

Liberal state violence is deployed as a ‘mopping-up’ exercise, cleaning away the last messy remnants of the pre-globalisation world, laying the foundation for the neoliberal way of rule, the neoliberal governmentality. The old ‘political ideologies’, the (‘distorted’) religious doctrines, the dictatorships and the statist regimes that remain in the globalised neoliberal order must be swept away. The supreme efficiency and rationality of the market model must replace the archaic structures of government with the flexibility of governance. The shift must be completed from the political to the managerial, and this may require violent interventions which, returning to Mary Douglas’ words on ‘cleaning’ (above), are ‘not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the environment’. The bringing-about of ‘stability’ and ‘order’, the elimination/replacement of ‘fragile’ and ‘failed’ states are the necessary preconditions for ensuring the proper circulation of capital and the entrenchment of market structures and market-based social organisation.
Policy papers from the main political parties frame state violence in financial terms, in terms of ‘risk management’ and ‘insurance’ for example. They attempt to translate warfare and policing into the language of the market, and in doing so also depoliticise these activities. Neoliberalism is a ‘self-denying’ ideology, central to which is the claim that ideology is dead. Policy papers on national security emphasise this in their pejorative use of the term to describe the beliefs and motives of ‘terrorists’.

While this analysis is by no means exhaustive, and there are other discourses at work in each of the texts studied, this chapter has demonstrated some of the ways in which the policies of the mainstream political parties in the UK – and of successive British governments – are shaped by the ‘common sense’ of neoliberal ideology. In order to garner a better understanding of how this conditioning process shapes the actual practices of British security, however, it is necessary to consider how the security imaginary of political leaders – and its transmission to the wider public – has been neoliberalised; this task will be taken up in the next chapter.
6. SPEAKING SECURITY: PRIME MINISTERIAL SPEECHES

It was for too long the assumption of philosophers that the business of a ‘statement’ can only be to ‘describe’ some state of affairs, or to ‘state some fact’, which is must do either truly or falsely. [...] Many utterances which look like statements are either not intended at all, or only intended in part, to record or impart straightforward information [...] [but] are perhaps intended, solely or partly, to evince emotion or to prescribe conduct or to influence it in special ways.

J.L. Austin.475

6.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter applies the theoretical and analytic frameworks developed through Chapters 3 and 4 in order to analyse the ways in which neoliberalism shapes political language around security and war, and how such language in turn encourages particular understandings of the world that enable and constrain social practice.

This chapter analyses three important and well-known speeches, each delivered by a British Prime Minister, spanning the twelve-year period from 1999 to 2011. These are: Tony Blair’s 1999 ‘Chicago Speech’, Gordon Brown’s 2008 address to the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) on ‘liberty and security’, and David Cameron’s 2011 Munich Security Conference (MSC) speech on ‘Islamic extremism’ and multiculturalism. In keeping with the non-positivist approach explicated in the preceding chapters, the selection of these three speeches is not driven by a desire to provide an ‘exhaustive’

sample as such. Rather, they have been chosen because they straddle what was identified in Chapter 2 as a shift in Western security discourse and practice from ‘humanitarian intervention’ to ‘War on Terror’. Other selection criteria include: the fact that the speeches all explicitly address issues of war and security, the fact that this selection allows an analysis of the language of the three most recent Prime Ministers, representing the two main UK political parties, and the consequent potential to draw more general conclusions about mainstream British security discourse.

The aim is categorically not, however, to decisively ‘prove’ the influence of neoliberal ideology on British security discourse to be ‘true’, to establish with absolute certainty an efficient causal story about this influence, or to produce from such a story a predictive and generalizable universal model for the influence of neoliberal ideology and governmentality on the thought and action of people. The aim is, rather, to develop a complex and contestable causal story, to make a retroductive conjecture – in short, to continue the project of constructing a critical explanation for the form and functions of British security discourse by reference to the critical concept of neoliberalism as it was defined in Chapter 3.

Of course, powerful and ideological, socially reproductive discourses work at all levels of social interaction. Political discourse is not the preserve of politicians. One might equally study newspapers, social media websites, advertisements or telephone conversations as texts, and be able to discern the operation of neoliberal ideological assumptions in structuring the discourse and practice of war and security from these. However, like many CDA approaches, the analytic lens here is focused on the texts of ‘those in power’, in order to better understand ‘the way discourse (re)produces social domination’. This is because ‘powerful speakers’ often have the ability to control or set the agenda in terms of selecting discourse topics and ‘semantic macrostructures’. The discourse of political elites – that is to say, of the groups who benefit the most from the social relations of inequality and domination propagated by ideological ways of seeing –

is therefore of particular interest since, as Jäger and Maier put it in their analysis of the Foucauldian conception of discourse: ‘in the long run, powerful politicians and other groups can accomplish changes in discourse [...] discourses exert power because they transport knowledge [...] This knowledge is the basis for individual and collective, discursive and non-discursive action, which in turn shapes reality’. Political leaders constitute a key juncture in these circuits of discourse and practice; they represent a site of potential intervention and interruption where new discourses or elements of discourses can be introduced with a higher likelihood of success.

The unifying feature of these particular three speeches is the definitive role they have perceived as playing in each of the three leaders’ approaches to government and politics. Blair’s Chicago Speech, inaugurating the ‘doctrine of international community’, and largely penned by none other than Lawrence Freedman, signalled a proactive and outward looking foreign policy agenda, aimed at ‘helping’ and ‘protecting’ people around the world. It is also deeply rooted in an understanding of globalisation that is very peculiar to the post-Cold War, but pre-9/11, era of the late 1990s. Brown’s speech to the IPPR, on the other hand, set against the backdrop of a debate over deep proposed changes to the perceived ‘liberty-security’ balance in the UK, typified the more paranoid and inward-looking post-9/11, post-7/7 era and met with much controversy. Brown sought to justify in the speech a set of ‘security measures’ and technologies widely perceived as illiberal and sinister. David Cameron’s equally controversial Munich Security Conference address, meanwhile, sought to proclaim, with the birth of the first Conservative led government in thirteen years, the ‘death’ of ‘the doctrine of state multiculturalism’ that Labour had supposedly embraced, in favour of a ‘muscular liberalism’ and a stronger assertion of specific British cultural values in the face of demographic diversity.

The speeches are analysed in their entirety, which is not to say sentence-by-sentence, but rather that they are taken as complete texts, with a certain ‘global coherence’ and carefully planned overarching ‘messages’. They are also analysed as a sort of ‘metatext’; rather than analysing each speech in isolation, discursive themes have

been drawn out that overlap and inter-penetrate the three texts and the analysis is therefore presented below in thematic format. The three thematically organised sections that follow cover: temporality in the representation of social change (Section 6.2), representations of ‘management’ and business logics as the essence of security (Section 6.3) and ‘post-ideological’ stability as a moral prerogative in a globalised world (Section 6.4). These are, of course, but three powerful themes that struck the analyst as relevant to the project of critically explaining war and security policy by reference to neoliberalism upon repeated readings of the texts. This is not to say that these are the only themes or topics that might be shaped by neoliberal ways of seeing and being, nor that the existence of these themes is solely and entirely determined by the neoliberal inclinations of the authors/speakers.

6.2 OLD AND NEW WORLDS: REPRESENTING TEMPORALITY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

6.2.1 FROM THE ‘OLD WORLD’ TO THE ‘NEW WORLD’

In ‘The Spectre of Ideology’, his introduction to Mapping Ideology (1994), Slavoj Žižek looks at some of the contemporary manifestations and functions of ideology, as a means of illustrating his argument that, upon reflection, we ‘find ourselves […] compelled to accept the unrelenting pertinence of the notion of ideology’. Specifically, he argues that ideology, in the sense of a ‘generative matrix that regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible’, is easily discernable in ‘the dialectics of ‘old’ and ‘new’’. The two cases he employs to support this claim are ‘cyber’ sex and the breaking-up of the former communist Eastern bloc into new states in the early 1990s; the former is widely perceived to be ‘new’ in that it simulates or distorts ‘real’ sex with a present partner, while the latter is portrayed by ‘Western liberal intellectuals’ as a return of the ‘old’, a ‘return to the nineteenth-century tradition of the nation state’. To the contrary, Žižek claims, ‘real’ sex has always been imaginary, in that it consists of partners overlaying or projecting their own ‘phantasmic’ imaginaries onto one another’s bodies. The emergence of new states in eastern Europe, meanwhile, is not a ‘return’ at all, but rather ‘the ‘withering-away’ of the traditional nation-state’ and its replacement by set of new social

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480 Slavoj Žižek, Mapping Ideology. 1.
481 Ibid., p. 2
relations including newly defined ethnic communities, transnational capital and supranational political communities like the EU.

Whether one agrees with Žižek’s examples or not, he is clearly right to highlight the powerful and at least potentially ideological, character of ‘old’ and ‘new’ in political discourse. Much can be achieved by seeing and representing a set of people, ideas, states or technologies as ‘old’ or ‘new’. This is especially the case at a point in time when Darwinian evolutionary theory and developmental and teleological political theories like liberalism predominate in Western societies to the point of ubiquitous metaphor; a time when the world is divided into ‘developing’ and ‘developed’ states (the latter having entered the ‘end of history’); a world where the foundation and growth of a vast international political-economic bureaucracy like the United Nations is described as ‘evolution’.482

The ideological potential of temporal language lies in its capacities to naturalise and denaturalise, to render as obsolete, outdated, eternal or necessary, particular social relations and socio-political changes. Liberal discourse on the UN portrays it as a natural phenomenon since it ‘evolves’, like a plant genus, rather than being ‘made’ like a machine. The choice of metaphor is crucial to achieving particular political goals. The ‘distorting lens’483 of Marxist political theory and practice, on the other hand, is ‘dead’ or ‘collapsed’, found guilty of being ‘unscientific’.484 It is an ‘outdated’ doctrine of the 19th and 20th centuries, irrelevant today. Revolutionary communist ideologues, as much as liberals, deploy temporal language in their political discourse. In marginalising the Mensheviks during the Russian Revolution, Trotsky popularised the phrase now widely formulated as ‘consigned to the dustbin of history’, while Mao’s propaganda machine in communist China characterised a programme of forced collectivisations that led to widespread famine as a ‘Great Leap Forward’. The politics of past and future are thus integral to political discourse across the spectrum. Temporal statements can lend a discursive representation greater political efficacy, helping to naturalise or dehistoricise favoured

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483 Fukuyama, ‘The End of History?’.

social changes and policies, while denaturalising or denouncing as extinct/archaic those streams of political thought and action the speaker disagrees with.

As Bourdieu and Wacquant’s framework shows (See Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1), temporality figures heavily in neoliberalism as an ideology; especially in its representation of the pre- and post-globalisation worlds, the former being characterised by stasis, even inertia, while the latter is a world of flux, change, development and flexibility.

Temporal markers and metaphors abound in the three speeches under analysis here, and nowhere more so than in the earliest of them, Tony Blair’s Chicago Speech. A major topic in Blair’s speech is the emergence of a ‘new world’ as a result of ‘globalisation’. At one point, he goes so far as to proclaim that ‘we live in a completely new world’. The Chicago Speech was delivered in the context of the conflict in Kosovo and the NATO intervention there. It was hailed for introducing what Blair referred to in the speech as a ‘new doctrine of international community’, which is often, in turn described as the doctrine of ‘humanitarian intervention’. Blair begins his discussion of the conflict in Kosovo and its ‘wider context’ by thematising the temporal; ‘twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo’. He elaborates a causal explanation for the postulated change in stance on security:

The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide range of changes - the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread of democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalisation has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalisation is not just economic. It is also a political and security phenomenon. We live in a world where isolationism has ceased to have a reason to exist. By necessity we have to co-operate with each other across nations. Many of our domestic problems are caused on the other side of the world.

In this passage Blair develops, in a very strong ‘epistemic modality’, an explicit causal explanation for why, in 1999, ‘we’ don’t turn our backs on the conflict in Kosovo as we apparently would have in 1979. We are ‘engaged’ (effect) as a ‘result’ of ‘a wide range of changes’ (cause). Blair uses a three-part list to detail some of these causes, ‘the

end of the cold war; changing technology; the spread of democracy’. The three-part list is a very well-established and well-documented rhetorical trope in Anglophone political discourse. In fact, in political speeches, ‘the most commonly used type of list contains three items’, since such lists ‘have an air of unity or completeness about them’ that shorter or longer lists lack. Why this is the case is debatable, but the historico-cultural significance of ‘threes’ in the West has also been well-documented, from the Holy Trinity of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Ghost’ and Hegel’s dialectical triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to the US constitutional rights to ‘life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness’ and the favouring of three-character acronyms (FBI, CIA, DEA, FCO and so on). But short lists like this tend to employ logics of appearances over logics of explanation, since they contain only three, usually small, lexical items or phrases.

In this instance, the three-part list can be construed as a means of concealing participants and agency in processes, especially, for example, in ‘the spread of democracy’. The listed impersonal abstract noun ‘spread’ is used here as a metaphor. It occludes specific agents and events from this process and implies that ‘democracy’ works in a manner analogous to a biological phenomenon. We would more usually talk about ‘the spread’ in the context of epidemiology – ‘the spread of Avian flu’, for example – the point being that the proliferation of such phenomena takes place outside of human control. The list also makes these three causes hyponyms of ‘a wide range of changes’ and creates a grammatical relation of parataxis – and thus a semantic relation of equivalence – between them. We are to understand that there is something essentially the same about, for example, ‘changing technology’ and ‘the spread of democracy’.

Blair has a tendency to foreground processes-without-agents in his causal analysis. Each of the three processes is presented as abstract and agent-less – an ‘end’, a ‘change’ and a ‘spread’. This way of seeing the dynamics of processes of international political change resonates strongly with what Manfred Steger calls ‘neoliberal globalism’, and this position becomes clearer when Blair introduces a ‘bigger’ and ‘more fundamental’

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488 Steger, Globalism: Market Ideology meets Terrorism.
cause of the intervention in Kosovo: ‘globalisation’. The term globalisation is, as was noted in Chapter 4, a nominalisation; it transforms a process into a thing, and renders human agency in that process invisible.

Obscuring agency in processes helps precisely to naturalise them, to take social or political contestation away from them and represent them as equivalent to, say, biological processes. To talk about ‘the end’ of the dinosaurs or ‘change’ in geological features or the ‘spread’ of a virus is less problematic, since such physical and biological processes do not have (at least clearly defined) ‘agents’. The processes Blair lists do involve specific agents, so why does he represent them as abstracted from the specific people, states and choices involved in bringing them about?

In the second sentence of the excerpt above, Blair adds a contrastive ‘but’ clause to his initial causal claim. ‘It’, by which he means the subject of the previous sentence – the reason for being ‘engaged’ in Kosovo – ‘is bigger than that’. He then elaborates on this clause: ‘I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way’. This is the first time Blair introduces an actor – himself – and is his only use of a weaker epistemic modality in this excerpt, ‘I believe’. Blair immediately reverts to a modality of absolute certainty (‘globalisation has’) and introduces, as means of explaining this fundamental change, ‘globalisation’. Globalisation is the subject of the sentence, while ‘our economies’ and ‘our working practices’ are the objects. Globalisation is thus represented as an actor, since it ‘does’ something active (‘transforms’), while our economies are passive. The ‘completely new world’ is thus one where ‘we’ – governments, societies – face changes that are made ‘necessary’ by the actions of ‘globalisation’. These include, on the one hand, our acceptance of and adaptation to global economic interdependence and, a twin concept, the emergence of a global security situation. By positing globalisation and the new world as natural, inevitable and agentic, Blair can justify his political decisions as nothing more than a necessary response to the demands of the new world.

Gordon Brown has some initially similar insights to offer with regard to the emergence of the new world, when, almost a decade later, he delivers a speech to the IPPR. In his introductory remarks, Brown states the aim of his speech, to ‘discuss the new challenges we all face’, placing it in a specific political context (‘in the face of global
terrorism and organised crime’) and, through an embedded clause in the middle of his sentence, describes and evaluates the IPPR Security Commission (‘a non-partisan and highly experienced body whose work I commend’), the hosts of his speech.

From the very beginning, ‘newness’ is foregrounded throughout the speech. In his second sentence, Brown says that ‘the modern security challenge is defined by new and unprecedented threats’, some of which he lists as ‘terrorism, global organised crime, organised drug trafficking and people trafficking’. This is a contentious rhetorical claim, since each of these categories of ‘threat’ can be said to have existed in some form for centuries (the French Revolutionary ‘Reign of Terror’ that first popularised the term ‘terrorism’, the sacking of ancient cities, eighteenth century piracy, the Opium Wars and the Atlantic slave trade, and so on). So what does the temporal marker ‘new’ achieve in the context of Brown’s speech?

Like Blair, Brown refers to a ‘new world’ in his third sentence, but whereas Blair’s new world was constituted by the forces of ‘globalisation’, Brown’s is constituted by the ‘threats’ outlined in the previous sentence. After listing the threats that define the new security challenge, Brown asserts that ‘this is the new world’. The agentic capacity of ‘government’ in this context is limited to ‘work[ing] out how it best discharges its duty to protect people’. The weak agentic position is realised in part through the rather clunky lexical choice ‘discharges its duty’. The use of the negatively prefixed ‘discharges’ (rather than, say, ‘takes action’) textures the role of government in this process as a fairly passive one, and in any case one driven or determined primarily by the circumstance of the ‘new world’. Here we find the commonality with Blair’s usage of ‘new world’. In both speeches the new world is a circumstance (in terms of representational transitivity) that limits and prescribes the actions of states, governments and other actors.

In his fourth sentence, Brown elaborates that ‘new technology’, represented as an actor in a material process, ‘is giving us modern means by which we can discharge these duties’. The political and generic context of Brown’s speech must be related at this point. The address was billed by the IPPR at the time as ‘a speech on liberty and emerging threats to security’ that covered topics including ‘the use of CCTV, DNA technology and the extension of pre-charge detention to 42 days’, as well as ‘ID cards’. The speech was
delivered one year into Brown’s prime-ministerial term, during a period of intense political and media debate over security measures taken and legislative changes introduced as part of the ‘War on Terror’. These included: the government’s proposed scheme for the introduction of identification cards for all British citizens, partly as a means countering terrorism, which Brown personally supported in the face of fierce opposition from various media, pressure groups, the Conservative party, and many Labour MPs; the extensive and increasing use of CCTV cameras in public spaces; the retention and recording of DNA samples, in a national Home Office database, of people whose DNA was sampled following arrest, even where they were later released without charge or proven innocent of charges in court; and the proposed increase in the pre-charge detention period available to the police when questioning suspects under terrorism legislation (a period that was already increased from seven to 28 days during the immediate post-9/11 ‘War on Terror’ period), to a total of 42 days. Brown’s speech was clearly aimed at addressing and responding to the criticisms his government was facing with regard to these changes.

It is in this context that Brown seeks to represent the ‘new technology’ of the ‘new world’ as that which simply gives the ‘modern’ means (another temporal cue) by which government protects people. DNA databases, ID cards and CCTV are depicted as a form of providence, in keeping with the pseudo-religious discourse on globalisation and the ‘new world’. They are a simple fact of the new, modern world, rather than a set of chosen government policies or programmes, and to reject them would be to reject progress; ‘we need these modern means to protect people from new threats’ Brown goes on to say, emphasising this necessity. The theme of newness is deployed to legitimate particular policies by reference to ‘necessity’; it stands in implicit opposition to ‘oldness’.

Brown uses the term ‘new’ a total of 47 times in this address. The frequency of comparable temporal adjectives is much lower. ‘Old’ is used just four times, while ‘present’ is never used, and ‘future’ only once, as a noun. However, while Brown prefixes many terms with ‘new’ in individual instances – for example, he speaks of ‘new rights’ once, and of ‘new freedoms’ once – there are strong patterns of collocation, so that he really emphasises (through repetition) the newness of just a few aspects of the world. Figure 4, below, details every instance of the adjective ‘new’, in the order spoken,
together with details of the noun, or noun phrase, it is collocated with. Where the collocated noun is immediately preceded or followed by an elaborative clause specifying some further description, this is included in brackets.

**Figure 5. Collocations of ‘new’ in Gordon Brown’s speech to the IPPR**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of ‘new...’</th>
<th>Collocated noun</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>...challenges (we all face)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>...(and) unprecedented threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>...world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>...technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>...threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>...chapter (in our country’s story)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>...(and fast changing) threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>...challenge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>...threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>...security issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>...threats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>...challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>...opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>...challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>...world (of crime and threats to our security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>...risks (to our security)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>...laws</td>
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<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>...technologies</td>
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<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>...technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>...problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>...21st century means (of detecting and preventing crime)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>...technologies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>...action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the table in Figure 4 illustrates, Brown’s specific focus is on new threats, new technologies, and new challenges. Of the 47 uses of ‘new’, nine are collocated with ‘threat’ or ‘threats’, eight with ‘technology’ or ‘technologies’, and seven with ‘challenge’ or ‘challenges’. These collocations account for just over 50% of the uses of ‘new’ in the
text. Apart from these three terms, three more terms – *laws, opportunities*, and *world* – are each collocated with ‘new’ on two occasions. Every other instance of ‘new’ involves unique collocation. In addition to his two references to a ‘new world’, three out of four instances of ‘old’ in the speech refer to an ‘*old world*’.

Temporal politics also play out in Brown’s speech through a concern with possible and imagined futures, highlighted by the overarching focus on the ‘threats’ that constitute the new world. As Dunmire notes, in her analysis of American policy and of George W. Bush’s political speeches, the wider ‘War on Terror’ relies heavily upon justificatory statements that make reference to ‘emerging threats’ and ‘coming dangers’ in legitimating the policy of ‘preemptive war’.\(^{489}\) Dunmire points out that we have, at least since Aristotle, understood political speech as often being about the future, to the extent that it is frequently characterised by a ‘deontic modality’, emphasising what *should* be done, but also by an epistemic modality, emphasising how things *will* be.\(^{490}\) Crucially, this ‘future orientation’ in political speech has ‘ideological implications’\(^{491}\) since it may help to shape the limits of what is conceived of as possible or achievable or inevitable in the future, and thus serve to constrain or enable particular courses of action.

Brown attempts to ‘claim the future’ in a number of ways early in the speech. He uses a strong epistemic modality to assert that ‘when people look back at the history of the first decade the twenty-first century, they will see it as a period of *new and fast changing threats*’. Brown thus seeks to justify his policies at the time of the speech by reference to an imaginary of the future, which he asserts as categorical fact. Brown effectively seeks to terrorise his audience into acquiescence, to win their consent to his proposed legal and political security changes by convincing them that they live in a ‘new world of crime and threats to our security’, the novelty and contingency of which justifies his plans, since to respond to the new and various threats generated by the globalised new world, we will have to develop a mimetic security apparatus that plays upon these new security dynamics.

\(^{489}\) Dunmire, “Emerging threats” and “coming dangers”, p. 20.
\(^{490}\) Ibid., p. 21.
\(^{491}\) Ibid., p. 22.
While David Cameron’s speech focuses more strongly on ideas and representing mental processes on the part of various actors, and is marked by a lack of temporal language, he too acknowledges early on that a key aim of his government is to ‘make sure that Britain is protected from the new and various threats we face’, the ‘biggest’ of which he characterises as ‘terrorist attacks, some of which are, sadly, carried out by our own citizens’. Cameron’s focus is, however, much more on responding appropriately to these new threats, rather than the emergence of the new world of threats itself, and as a result, his speech is dealt with in more detail in the following sections.

The ‘new world’ of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 era, as it is characterised in these three speeches, is a world created by globalisation the fall of the Soviet Union and new technologies. It is interdependent in financial and security terms, and it is a dangerous world filled with threats. The texturing of the dynamics of this new world is very detailed in the speeches, and it is to this texturing we now turn.

6.2.2 Dynamics of the new world: Interchange, networks, flows and fear

Each of the three speeches elaborates, to some degree, on the dynamics of the new world, describing the ways in which social interaction take place and telling the audience what the implications of these social morphologies are for their present and future security. These morphologies – or representations of dynamics – are telling in that they are a key constitutive element of how people understand the ‘nature’ of the world and what takes place in it.

Apart from ‘globalisation’, Blair uses another key political-economic nominalisation in contextualising his speech, ‘interchange’. This is again represented as something which ‘goes on’, in Blair’s words, rather than something that is caused by particular agencies or practices:

Despite the absence of Prime Ministerial visits, there is a long British history with Chicago; We set up our Consulate here in 1855. Marshall Field opened their first overseas buying office in Manchester in 1870. One of Field’s shop assistants subsequently opened his own store in London in 1909. His name was Harry Selfridge. He employed the same architect who designed your City Hall to build Selfridge’s, the landmark store on London’s Oxford Street. That sort of interchange goes on today too. Chicagoland is the headquarters of some of Britain’s most
important inward investors: Motorola, Sara Lee, RR Donnelly and many, many others. Nearly half the $124 billion US firms spent on foreign acquisitions last year went on British companies. We would like it to be even more. Nor is the traffic all one way. British investment in Illinois generates some 46,000 jobs, making us the biggest foreign investor in the State, so there are a lot of ties between this city and my country and it really is an especial pleasure to be with you here this evening.

In order to draw an equivalence between the historic capitalistic links between the US and UK that he describes in the first part of this introduction and the contemporary ‘traffic’ of capital, investment and jobs he describes in the second part. The description of historical events is the only place in this excerpt where Blair names specific individuals (apart from himself) – Marshall Field, Harry Selfridge, and a nameless ‘architect’ [renowned American architect and Director of Works for the 1893 Chicago World’s Fair, Daniel Burnham] – as participants within the processes he describes.

When he discusses ‘interchange’ at the time of his speech, however, the participants Blair refers to are limited to multinational corporations – ‘Motorola, Sara Lee, RR Donnelly and many, many others’. Furthermore, whereas the individuals named in the first part of the excerpt are attributed causal responsibility through verb processes (e.g. opened his own store), the MNCs are only referred to as ‘inward investors’, in the abstract, and are not attributed specific agency. In texturing relations of equivalence between the processes and participants of the late 19th/early 20th century ‘interchange’ and the MNCs and ‘investment’ he speaks of ‘today’, Blair ‘recontextualises’.

Recontextualisation is a concept that is widely drawn upon in CDA, but finds its most thoroughgoing and widely cited articulation in the work of Theo van Leeuwen. Whereas the Faircloughian concept of discourse employed in this thesis is of discourses as ways of representing, van Leeuwen sees them instead as ‘ways of knowing’, which, he argues, are ‘ultimately based on’ what people do – actual social practices as they play out. However, van Leeuwen, inspired here by Basil Bernstein’s pioneering work on linguistic
codes in the (re)production of social relations, notes that discourses also ‘transform these doings’ in what he calls recontextualisation.492

Blair draws, on the one hand, on very well established discourses about the valorous and progressive nature of nineteenth century capitalist entrepreneurship; where the efforts of individual ‘self-made men’ are lionised as adventurers and heroes for bearing the risks of investment and driving economic growth and wider social development. This discourse is evident in the reverential ‘His name was Harry Selfridge’ (a cue for the audience to connect this individual with a famous British retail outlet), and in the ‘rags-to-riches’ trope of the shop-assistant-turned-millionaire-capitalist.

On the other hand Blair recontextualises this classical liberal political economic discourse into his representation of interchange today, making an equivalence between the entrepreneurial endeavours of Field, Selfridge and Burnham and the ‘acquisition’ of British companies by American ones, or the ‘British investment in Illinois’ that ‘generates some 46,000 jobs’.

In this excerpt then, Blair has textually constructed an image of late 20th century capitalistic social relations of globalisation as not only a positive and desirable state of affairs (‘we would like it to be even more’), but as equivalent to the ‘golden age’ of nineteenth century industrialism. He places today’s MNCs in the same sort of category as that ‘special social class, the business men’ and ‘entrepreneurs’ that Chicago School economist Frank Knight referred to in 1921 as society’s real ‘producers, while the great mass of the population merely furnish them with productive services’.493 The economic dynamic of transnational ‘interchange’ is represented in an ahistorical manner, such that the audience should appreciate the continuous and natural status of international capitalist trade.

Blair’s speech maintains something of a positive and proactive outlook in terms of future security. He is keen that the US should maintain and develop its role as a global economic, military and ‘humanitarian’ power, and seems to lay the blame for current

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problems largely at the feet of a couple of named individuals (Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein). Brown’s address – delivered in the context of the War on Terror, seven years after 9/11 and three years after the ‘7/7’ bombings in London – has a rather darker tone, as does Cameron’s; focusing on the threatening nature of the new world and the new terrors that come with it.

Clearly, there a number of things may be achieved when a figure of authority like a Prime Minister – who is widely understood to be privy to ‘secret’ information or ‘intelligence’ with regard to security and military affairs, regularly supplied to him or her by the security services – suggests that specific (but unspecified) threats of violence to the population are immanent. Following a passage in which Brown chains together a series of terrorist attacks (‘September 11th, then Bali, then Madrid and then the London bombings’) and represents his own mental process of remembering how ‘the British people [...] stood as one’, Brown makes the deontic statement that ‘it should not be forgotten that even today, the security service [MI5] estimate that there are at least 2000 known terrorist suspects, 200 organised networks and 30 current plots’. In this sentence, Brown uses the contrastive ‘even’ to relate ‘today’ to the series of attacks he has just outlined, emphasising the duty of not forgetting a set of immanent threats. Yet the content of these threats is abstract and vague, and their actuality seemingly tenuous. Not only are MI5’s figures an ‘estimate’, but the first statistic recited, ‘at least 2000 known terrorist suspects’ is highly problematic. What is the status of a ‘known suspect’? Clearly, these are not the same as ‘known terrorists’. Rather they are people suspected of involvement in terrorism (some of whom must presumably, by the law of averages, be innocent and incorrectly suspected). The use of the strong epistemic adjective ‘known’ indicates certainty, yet the noun phrase that forms its object, ‘terrorist suspects’ represents an inherently uncertain category. Brown’s statement here is reminiscent of Donald Rumsfeld’s (in)famous ‘known knowns’ speech, where he attempted to explain the lack of evidence for the presence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in Iraq bin the following way:

There are known knowns; there are things we know that we know. There are known unknowns; that is to say, there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also unknown unknowns – there are things we do not know we don’t know.
‘Known suspects’ perhaps fall into the second category, known unknowns, since what is supposedly ‘known’ is actually only ‘suspected’; indeed, suspiciousness itself is no more than an attitude or mental process on the part of the suspicious observer, not an inherent quality of the observed subject. What is claimed to be ‘known’ about the subject in this case is only the ‘unknown’ that they may be involved in terrorism in some unspecified way. But using this epistemically modalised noun phrase helps to constitute an identity. The point here is to focus not on what a phrase like ‘known terrorist suspects’ means, as such, but at what it does, what it creates, constrains and enables. It is also interesting to note, as Žižek once observed, the missing category of ‘unknown knows’ which may actually correspond to the sort of ‘common sense’ background assumptions of an ideological way of seeing:

What he forgot to add was the crucial fourth term: the “unknown knowns,” the things we don’t know that we know—which is precisely, the Freudian unconscious, the “knowledge which doesn’t know itself,” as Lacan used to say [...]; the disavowed beliefs, suppositions and obscene practices we pretend not to know about, even though they form the background of our public values.494

Furthermore, the quantitative qualifier ‘at least’ here acts to make even the most explicit content of the claim, the number ‘2000’, uncertain. The remaining two items in Brown’s three-item list of threats similarly combine apparently numerical precision with highly abstract and uncertain categories. The use of quantitative data to strengthen a truth-claim, to represent it as incontrovertible, is a well-known rhetorical approach, especially in political speech. The specificity, universality and intransitivi...
Brown’s words here – his deontic imperative to ‘not forget’ about an array of threats he portrays as numerable (and thus to some extent ‘knowable’) and temporally immanent but contextually attenuated or under-specified – achieve, or at least have the meaning potential to achieve, the instillation of a sense of fear in his audience. It has been noted that many critiques of the language and practices of the War on Terror focus on the exploitation of a ‘politics of fear’ by politicians, but, as Simon Critchley rightly argues, ‘this idea of politics as the management of fear is nothing new’. In fact, Critchley points out, an explicit recognition of the utility – even necessity – of fear in facilitating political and social orders goes at least as far back as the plays of Aeschylus. However, the merging of a fear-inducing discourse and a statistically-led claim is interesting for an analysis of neoliberal conditioning. Living with uncertainty and managing risk in a competitive world are at the core of the neoliberal ways of being. In claiming to ‘know’, even quantify ‘unknowns’, suspicions and fears, we induce a state of what Brad Evans has called ‘liberal terror’, characterised by a ‘global imaginary of threat’ that ‘forces us to confront each and every potential disaster threatening to engulf advanced liberalis life’. To emphasise the immanence and epistemic certainty of these threats, Brown goes on to say that ‘these are not remote or hypothetical threats. They are, sadly, part of today’s reality’.

Brown now moves on to detail some of the other, non-‘terrorist’ threats that shape the new world: ‘And whilst terrorism is the most dramatic threat, there are other new security issues that help also help define the modern world’. The hypotactic relation of clauses here represent terrorism as the primary thing that defines the modern world, while this sentence also reiterates the newness of all the security issues about which he is speaking. In the following sentence, Brown introduces ‘organised crime’ as the first of his second-order security issues. Brown employs the globalisation idiom in his representation of local and global space-times, prioritising the latter as the domain of today’s organised crime, which is ‘no longer confined to a neighbourhood, or even a city, but involving networks spanning the world’. Drug trafficking, Brown’s next security issue,

497 Ibid.
498 Evans, Liberal Terror, p. 2.
is described as an ‘ever more sophisticated international business, stretching from the Helmand Valley – where British forces are serving with great courage and distinction to bring order and a chance of progress to this once lawless region – through international networks, to the streets of our own cities’, while ‘so too is organised illegal immigration’, the last in Brown’s list of threats, and one which is ‘faced by the entire developed world’. Terrorism, organised crime, drug trafficking and illegal immigration thus constitute what we might call a global topography of threat in the new world, and the nomos of this world is the ‘network’. But, while networks are represented as global or international, it is important to note that distinctions are drawn between zones or localities, specifically between the ‘lawless’ Helmand Valley and ‘our own streets’ and between the ‘developed world’ and an implied undeveloped world. The British are textured as bringers of ‘order’ and ‘progress’ to the lawless others of Helmand. Lara Coleman has noted the intimate relation of ‘development’ to violence and neoliberalism.499 ‘Neoliberalism’s absorption of social space into the logics of the market’500 has, Coleman contends, partly been enabled by the social production of specific spaces as sites for potential intervention, often by reference to ‘savage’ (as opposed to ‘civilised’) spaces in what she calls the ‘imaginative geographies’ of neoliberalism. 501 Brown’s ‘developed world’ is a civilised space, threatened by the ‘savage’ and ‘lawless’ space of Helmand, and its response to this threat is to beneficently send-in soldiers to bring development, ‘a chance of progress’, to the region.

The lexical choice of the network metaphor is significant in that it represents what has been called a ‘new social morphology’502 of global circulation. The network lacks clear hierarchy and organisational centrality. Like the market, it signifies a social domain of complex connections, interactions and exchanges. A recent major US textbook, Networks, Crowds and Markets (2010) illustrates the extent to which the two entities ‘network’ and ‘market’ are represented as interdependent, with the latter as a special, analytically privileged instantiation of the former. The textbook’s authors – an economist and a

500 Ibid., p. 206.
501 Ibid., p. 207.
502 Evans, Liberal Terror, p. 11.
computer scientist from Cornell University – contend that ‘[o]ver the past decade there has been a growing public fascination with the complex “connectedness” of modern society. At the heart of this fascination is the idea of a network – a pattern of interconnections among a set of things’. 503 Deeply embedded in the neoliberal discourse of globalisation, Easley and Kleinberg’s analysis further suggests that ‘[o]ur technological and economic systems have also become dependent on networks of enormous complexity. This has made their behavior increasingly difficult to reason about, and increasingly risky to tinker with’. 504 Already this analysis betrays a (neo)liberal-tinged view of the social world, where an ‘economic system’ is less the set of relations and events resultant from the activities of a society or group of societies of actual human beings and more an agent, with its own ‘behaviour’, standing outside of human agency; the very ‘networked’ form of which renders it risky even to ‘tinker with’. Easley and Kleinberg also recognise that the language of networks has permeated political speech around international conflict, specifically in the War on Terror. 505 Advocating the use of ‘game theory’ in the analysis of complex networks, they go on to suggest that the market in particular is a ‘natural setting’ for looking at network behaviour, since ‘interactions among buyers and sellers, or pairs of counterparties to a trade or loan, naturally forms a network’. 506 The alleged ‘naturalness’ of this sort of network-thinking about political economy is an ideological cue. We are told to understand behaviour within networks, now taken as the underlying structures of most, if not all, social life, through game theory, a theory predicated not only on an ahistorical and de-contextualised abstract model of the universal human subject, but also on the assumption that the most fundamental social dynamic, prevailing in interactions between individuals (nodes in the network) is competition. Neoliberal policy positions are thus, as Foucault puts it, ‘a matter of making the market, competition, and so the enterprise, into what could be called the formative power of society’. 507

504 Ibid.
505 Ibid., p. 2.
506 Ibid., p. 12.
507 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, p. 148.
Additionally, though, Brown’s (networked) imaginary is ravaged by fear: ‘people are understandably fearful that they may become victims of terrorist attack’, ‘people are fearful of guns and knives on our streets’, ‘people are fearfully about people traffickers or illegal workers’, ‘people feel less safe and less secure’. And all this fear, what Brown calls ‘all these new challenges’ (that is, terrorism, ‘illegal workers’ and so on), Brown asserts, ‘reflect the modern world’:

a world more interconnected, and interdependent, with travel faster and cheaper than ever before, and the flow of goods and ideas around the world almost instantaneous. These are, of course, great positive changes, empowering individuals and creating new opportunities.

In the first sentence above, Brown textures an equivalence between ‘goods’ and ‘ideas’ in the ‘more interconnected’ globalised world, whereby both are characterised by the dynamics of ‘flow’. This involves a recontextualisation of ‘ideas’ as equivalent to commodities, and draws upon the discourse of commodity flows, trade flows and capital flows, where ‘flow’ acts as a naturalising metaphor, representing exchanges of goods and services as a natural system like the flow of water in rivers or of tides in and out. These ‘positive’ changes specifically ‘empower individuals’ and ‘create new opportunities’, though Brown favours a logic of appearances here, and whereas his delineation of ‘threats’ and ‘challenges’ consists in often lengthy and comparatively detailed exposition (see above), he does not explain how individuals are empowered or what new opportunities are created. Nevertheless, we can discern in these two positive aspects of the ‘changes’ Brown describes in the modern world the neoliberal view that, on the one hand, the globalisation of markets and the penetration of market dynamics (‘flows’) into more strata of social life is a positive thing since it ‘empowers’ consumer-citizens/consumer-sovereigns, and, on the other hand, that these changes produce ‘opportunities’ for these individuals to make decisions and choices to seize or not. Focusing on opportunities and individuals in this way is integral to the neoliberal discourses on individual moral responsibility discussed in Chapter 3.

Following his brief passage on the ‘great positive changes’ of the modern world, Brown uses the contrastive clause ‘but they also create new challenges for our security’. This outlining of first ‘positive’ aspects and then ‘negative’ aspects of the new world is
typical of Brown’s speech. He goes on to say that ‘the internet, a revolutionary force for change and opportunity, is also used to hateful ends by terrorists and criminals’. Brown speaks of what has to be done ‘in this new world of crime and threats to our security’.

In the networked and globalised new world economy, the activities of terrorists, people-traffickers and Mafiosi represent ‘bad’ transnational circulations, or ‘flow toxicity’, to borrow a phrase from contemporary economics.508 This particular representation of terrorism and crime enables particular responses to them under the justificatory aegis of ‘security’. In reading political and criminal violence as a sort of natural phenomenon, a flow, rather than the agentic activity of real human individuals, terrorists and other ‘threatening’ people are dehumanised, rendered as something akin to algorithmic patterns.

6.3 SECURITY AS MANAGEMENT: FACING THE TOPOGRAPHY OF GLOBAL THREAT

While the above analysis has described some of the ways in which the three speeches develop and communicate temporalised and spatialised imaginaries of the ‘new world’, the speeches also include policy-type statements on how this situation should be or will be responded to. This section looks at the ways in which the speeches propose that Britain and other Western societies face the new topography of global threat that is inherent to their outline of the new world.

Blair utilises a trinity of claims, as he does with his problematisation of the ‘other side of the world’ to elaborate on the reasons for his initial claim about our universal and non-optional internationalism. He uses an identical clause structure across the three sentences, producing a strong repetitive emphasis:

We cannot refuse [verb] to / participate in global markets [subject] / if we want to [conditional clause] / prosper

We cannot ignore [verb] / new political ideas in other countries [subject] / if we want to [conditional clause] / innovate

We cannot turn our backs on [verb phrase] / conflicts and the violation of human rights in other countries [subject] / if we want still to be [conditional clause] / secure

In these sentences, Blair thematises what ‘we cannot’ do, really emphasising a lack of choice. The assumed desirability and priority of prosperity, innovation and security is textured into these sentences. While each of the sentences ends in an identical conditional clause (‘if we want’), the placing of these clauses at the end of the sentences, rather than thematising conditionality by placing them at the beginning, signals to the audience that it is a ‘given’ that we do, in fact, want to prosper/innovate/be secure. It is therefore also a given that we must participate in global markets, pay attention to political ideas, and engage with conflicts in other countries. Furthermore, these are abstract nominalisations; ‘prosper’ how? ‘Innovate’ at what? Here Blair is drawing upon the sort of ‘vulgate’ Bourdieu and Wacquant refer to – intransitive verbs representing ‘new’ ways of being as necessary or inevitable and desirable or positive. He is also blurring ‘security’ concerns into ‘economic’ ones.

This blurring of security and economy is at work in David Cameron’s plan of action for the dangerous new world too, where it is tied to an injunction to bring security ‘inside’ the state:

Last week at Davos I rang the alarm bell for the urgent need for Europe to recover its economic dynamism, and today, though the subject is complex, my message on security is equally stark.

Here Cameron renders Davos (the World Economic Forum) and Munich (the Security Conference) as two poles of crisis-response. Terrorism is represented as something akin to financial crisis, a technical problem to be solved.

The representational blurring of ‘terrorism’ and ‘crime’ in Brown’s speech begins early on, until, by one of the last passages, Brown has textured the two together into what he calls ‘terrorist crime’. The significance of this discursive recontextualisation, from the perspective of an analysis of neoliberal ideology, is twofold. First, Brown is engaging in a depoliticisation. Terrorism is traditionally and widely understood as a consisting in a range of violent tactics, often directed at civilians, aimed at highlighting some political cause or achieving some political goal. In Clausewitzian terms, terrorism, like war, can be understood as the continuation of politics by ‘other means’. ‘Crime’, on the other hand, and especially organised crime, is generally taken to signify the apolitical pursuit of
economic ends. Engagement with politics by mafias, cartels and other criminal syndicates is purely instrumental, since their bottom line, like ‘legitimate’ businesses, is profit. Whereas neoliberal ways of seeing and being are predicated on ideas of rational choosing within a world of free economic competition, organised crime undermines or skews competition through rule-breaking, market-fixing, monopolisation, racketeering, encouraging instability and so on. Making terrorism equivalent to and implicated in organised crime thus helps to render it intelligible as an economically-motivated and underwritten activity, rather than a political tactic. But terrorism is to be seen specifically as a negatively evaluated, ‘bad’, rule-breaking type of economic enterprise that interferes with the conditions for competition. Terrorism spoils things for everyone.

In addition to his two references to a ‘new world’, three out of four instances of ‘old’ in Brown’s speech refer to an ‘old world’. He compares the ‘old world’ to ‘now’ or ‘today’, outlining ‘the use of modern technology’ by contrast to older technologies. Brown is concerned with justifying the security measures he is criticised for – developing and extending the use of biometric and surveillance technologies by state agencies – in terms of their inherence to the ‘new’ or ‘modern’ world. The ‘old world’, according to Brown, was one where ‘we could only use fingerprints’, a world that ‘relied on the eyes of a policeman’ and that ‘used photographs’. In the new world, by contrast, ‘now we have the technology of DNA’, ‘today we also have the back-up of CCTV’, and ‘now we have biometrics’. The adoption and use of these technologies is, to use Bourdieu and Wacquant’s framing of the logic of neoliberal ideology, rendered ‘benign, necessary, ineluctable or desirable’ through this series of linguistic ‘oppositions and equivalences’.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>‘Old world’</th>
<th>[globalisation]</th>
<th>‘New world’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fingerprints</td>
<td>DNA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The eyes of a policeman</td>
<td>CCTV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographs</td>
<td>Biometrics</td>
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</table>

Brown pre-empts criticism by conceding that ‘of course all these new technologies raise new problems’ but tells his audience that ‘the answer’ to these problems is ‘not to reject the new 21st century means of detecting and preventing crime’, temporally situating the use of such technologies as the ‘means’ that inhere to the 21st century, another component of the providence of the new world, rather than designed and constructed ‘(hu)man-made’ technologies applied selectively and deliberately to particular social ‘problems’. Their use is represented as an inevitability of ‘modern’ life, and an implicit meta-opposition is thus constructed between those that would ‘reject’ such elements of the modern, new world, and those, like Brown, who recognise the inevitable and natural status of these technologies.

In this sense, Brown’s response is typical of what Steger calls ‘neoliberal globalism’, in that it is rooted in assumptions about the inevitability of globalisation and the ‘changes’ it ushers in, treating it as ‘a natural force’ generating ‘external imperatives’ that are out of human control. Indeed, this neoliberal way of seeing globalisation and socio-technological change has pseudo-religious ideological tones, invoking ‘religious narratives found in Genesis, St. Paul’s Epistle to the Romans, and St. Augustine’s City of God […] as well as doctrines of sin and redemption’. Like Blair, Brown describes global market forces as a near-divine actor whose commands we must react appropriately to.

In outlining a ‘British way’ of dealing with the ‘new technologies’ and the ‘new problems’ they present, Brown insists that ‘the British way cannot be a head-in-the-sand approach that ignores the fact the world has changed with the advent of terrorism which aims for civilian casualties on a massive scale’ and has ‘no recognisable moral framework’. The strong epistemic modality (‘cannot’) again foregrounds the inevitability of using DNA, CCTV and biometric security technologies, while the ‘head-in-the-sand’ metaphor portrays critics of these technologies as lacking vision, unable to apprehend the nature of

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510 Steger, Globalism: Market Ideology Meets Terrorism, p. 60.
the present moment; as Brown goes on to say, ‘we don’t suggest these changes to be tough or populist, but because we believe they are necessary’.

Brown uses contrastive clauses to maintain a sense of fear and uncertainty about the new world he describes. ‘The new, more open, global society creates both new freedoms for all of us but also new opportunities for terrorists and criminals to use against us the very freedom and mobility and openness we rightly take pride in’. So the very social changes that constitute neoliberal order – globalised ‘openness’ and ‘freedom’ – are exploited by the terrorists and criminals, who use the dynamics of the new world against us, representing toxic flows or bad circulations in the new networked system of social relations.

People’s ‘identity’ in Brown’s speech is not represented as who people think they are, how they relate to or describe or think of themselves, but rather to sets of objectively discernable and quantifiable pieces of information – names, addresses, bank accounts, credit cards, passports – that, as part of the field of new information technologies, are vulnerable to being ‘stolen’ by criminals. ‘Biometrics’ is the proposed solution to this problem of vulnerability. By adding to people’s identities new pieces of biological information – their fingerprint and iris patterns, for example – their other pieces of identity information (e.g. their passports or identity cards) can be tied to their physical bodies in ways that make it harder for terrorists and criminals to adopt or use the identities of others. This concept of (securitised) identity widens the older model based on ‘papers’, on documentation and unique numbers or codes, to include a ‘new world’ model of identity as a group of embodied biological characteristics, recorded as information, without leaving any space for a ‘self’ identity at all. Identity ceases to be a matter of how one understands and relates to oneself, and instead becomes a matter of how the state, banks, border agencies and other organisations go about quantifying and monitoring the existence, movements and activities of individual human beings. Identity becomes a matter of statistics. As Foucault notes, the etymological root of statistics lies in ‘knowledge of the state, of the forces and resources that characterise a state at a given moment’, 511 while they are also ‘one of the main technical factors’ behind the

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development of the ‘art of government’,\textsuperscript{512} in that they allowed for a level and problem of government that was neither too abstract and centralised (like sovereignty) nor too small-scale and weak (like the family). Statistics, for Foucault, are crucial because they re-focus government on the level of ‘population’, and thus allow for the emergence of governmentality; the form of power ‘that has population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge’.\textsuperscript{513}

In reducing identities to digital signatures, to small sets of computer-stored information representing a facial image, a fingerprint pattern, \textit{an individual human being}, as numbers, Brown presses on with one of the key projects of neoliberal governmentality – the marketization of \textit{social life as such}. In the passages of his speech that seek to justify the ID card scheme, Brown emphasises that ‘identity is precious and needs to be secured’, and that ‘people understand the value of secure identity’. In using the indefinite pronoun ‘people’, Brown seeks to marginalise ‘opponents of the identity card’ who ‘like to suggest that its sole motivation is to enhance the power of the state’. In a contrastive clause, opposing what opponents ‘like to say’ with \textit{reality}, he says that ‘\textbf{in fact} it [the ID card] starts from a recognition of something which is fundamental to the rights of the individual: the right to have your identity protected and secure’. By appealing to the discourse of ‘individual rights’, Brown recontextualises the proposed universal legal \textit{obligation} to possess an ID card as the free and individualised exercise of a ‘right’. Through a further discursive recontextualisation, he goes on to employ a rhetorical trope – a narrative metaphor – to assert and naturalise ‘people’s’ support for the scheme: ‘In banking, to protect their money, people were happy to move from signatures to PIN numbers. Increasingly they are moving to biometrics – for example, many people now have laptops activated by finger-scans’. Brown thus textures together, and renders equivalent, the use of code-based information technologies to secure electronic access to money, the use of ‘biometrics’ and ‘finger-scans’ to secure (through biologically-determined exclusivity) computer equipment, and – his wider concern in the speech – the national and ‘individual’ security of people in the face of threats from international terrorism and crime.

\textsuperscript{512} Ibid., p. 104.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., p.108.
In the global market/network of the new world, the security of individuals and their identities is to be ensured through their measurement, quantification and monitoring. Brown advocates the ‘national identity scheme’ as a tactic in ‘the fight against crime, illegal working, benefit fraud and terrorism’. The singularity of the ‘fight’ metaphor not only implies an aggressive approach to these issues, but that there is an equivalence between them, so that tackling them consists of a single fight. ‘Criminals’, ‘illegal [presumably ‘immigrant’] workers’, people claiming benefits fraudulently and ‘terrorists’ are identified together, recognised as exploiters of, or toxic flows in, the network of the new world. Monetary, political and violent misconduct are represented as facets of the same object.

‘We have made DNA one of the most effective tools in fighting crime’. This discursive recontextualisation portrays the agency of the Government as having transformed the material object DNA – deoxyribonucleic acid; molecules of which constitute the genetic basis for the growth and development of living things – into a ‘tool’ for ‘fighting crime’. As Dillon and Reid have argued, the identification of DNA by biologists has enabled a number of political shifts, not least the representational reduction and treatment of life as ‘code’. 514

6.4 THE POST-IDEOLOGICAL PRESENT: STABILITY, RATIONALITY, MORALITY AND MODERATION IN THE NEW WORLD

The last discourse topic to discuss in the three speeches analysed is their representation of identities and ideas. Like most political and media texts, substantial portions of each of the speeches are devoted to representing individual and group identities, and to discussing and casting judgement upon their ideas. The process of discursive identification is one of the most obviously ‘political’ aspects of a text, since it involves differentiating ‘others’ (identity and difference, like self and other, being two sides of the mutually constitutive coin). Sections 6.2 and 6.3 dealt with the representation of temporality, spatiality and social ontology in the three speeches under analysis. This final section of analysis takes the representation of identities and ideas into account, specifically through an analysis of statements about stability, rationality, morality and

514 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War.
moderation. These seem to be the core themes across the three speeches when it comes to representing actors, their thoughts and motivations.

In elaborating on the ‘terrible things’ happening in Europe at the time of his speech, Blair thematises ‘awful crimes’, which he delineates in the form of a three-part list: ‘ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass murder’. These crimes ‘that we never thought we would see again have reappeared’. There is a strong representation of an identity – this time ‘we’ is used in a much broader sense, signalling Blair and ‘the West’, or the US and UK (the focus of the earlier excerpt), and is attributed a mental process, ‘we never thought’. There is also a strong representation of temporality (‘again’, ‘reappeared’). The theme of the sentence is not just ‘awful crimes’, but rather the qualified version, complete with clause, awful crimes that we never thought we would see again. The temporality and (mental) perception of the crimes is prioritised thematically over the material events themselves, which appear in the final clause of the sentence as a list.

This framing presupposes a sort of teleologic ontology, whereby certain types of events (ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, mass murder) that have occurred in the past might not be expected to occur again. The political significance of this temporal representation lies in this ‘progressive’ developmental view of the social world. If a particular activity is consigned to the past, its existence in the present implies ‘backwardness’ on the part of participants. It has long been noted that a binarism between ‘backward’ and ‘advanced’ societies and behaviours is central to orientalist representations of foreign ‘others’, while the strategic choices and military conduct of non-Western ‘others’ has also commonly been associated with ‘backwardness’ by Western political leaders. Blair is beginning to texture a relation of advanced/backward between ‘we’/’Kosovo’.

Having built this differential sense of place and temporality, Blair says that he wants ‘to put these events in a wider context – economic, political and security’, because ‘Kosovo’ cannot ‘be seen in isolation’. The list of terms included under the superordinate

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516 For example, Patrick Porter’s analysis of US strategic perceptions of Al Qaeda and the Taliban, Military Orientalism, p. 146.
‘wider context’ suggest a more explanatory or expository style of presentation. Rather than simply describe the surface appearance of the ‘awful crimes’ he lists, Blair wants to situate or explain them by reference to ‘economic, political and security’ phenomena. His claim that these events cannot be understood ‘in isolation’ is, as we shall see below, already beginning to specify some of the content of this wider context – ‘globalisation’.

As Blair further elaborates on how ‘our’ problems are caused on the other side of the world, he uses a three-item list structure to draw a logic of equivalence between financial markets, poverty and armed conflict, while also presenting Asia, the Caribbean and the Balkans as hyponyms of ‘the other side of the world’ and the UK, Germany and the US as hyponyms of the ‘us’ implied in ‘our domestic problems’:

Financial instability in Asia destroys jobs in Chicago and in my own constituency in County Durham. Poverty in the Caribbean means more drugs on the streets in Washington and London. Conflict in the Balkans causes more refugees in Germany and here in the US. These problems can only be addressed by international co-operation.

‘They’ are unstable, criminal and violent; by implication, ‘we’ are not. Ideas and beliefs are attributed to ‘other’ actors in the three speeches, largely through the mode of transitivity by which mental processes are represented. The attribution of mental processes is crucial to the identification of actors; to ‘working-up’ an identity. Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein in Blair’s speech, terrorists and criminals in Brown’s, and Islamic extremists, the soft left, hard right and moderate Muslims in Cameron’s are all characters to whom particular ideas are attributed. But there exists also, in parts of the three speeches, an overall theme of ideas themselves – of old, new, modern, adaptive, extreme, moderate, complementary and conflicting ideas. The ‘reform of our laws’, in terms of detention without charge, Gordon Brown insists, is a component of a wider package of changes in response to the ‘new terrorist threat’, and part of a broader approach of ‘isolating and confronting extremism – the long term struggle to win the battle of ideas’.

As a rhetorical trope, the battle of ideas metaphor here provides a moral high ground, and is one among many examples of battle and war metaphors used in political
speech; politicians and media outlets frequently refer to such things as the ‘war on drugs’ or the ‘war on AIDS’ and so on. As George Lakoff has noted, metaphors in themselves are ‘neither good nor bad’, they are ‘simply commonplace and inescapable’, yet nevertheless ‘metaphors can kill’.\(^{517}\) This is because, as Lakoff elaborated in a recent commentary on the Obama administration’s discourse on the necessity for military intervention in Syria:

> Metaphors in language are reflections of metaphorical thought that structures reasoning, and thus our actions, both in everyday life and in politics. In politics, they are rarely isolated. They usually come as part of a coherent system of concepts – usually a moral system.\(^{518}\)

In other words, the systematic use of metaphor in political speech can provide a window on the metaphorical and moral ways of seeing that structure and limit political action. It is worth following Lakoff’s argument here to reflect on how the ‘battle of ideas’ metaphor fits within wider commonplace metaphorical frameworks, in order to adduce the ways of seeing that inform Brown’s representation of the goals of contemporary British security policy.

The ‘war on terror’, within which Brown situates the battle of ideas, is itself of course a metaphor, a metaphorical ‘war’ against an emotion or feeling, though it has of course included major armed conflicts Afghanistan and Iraq. Writing in the build-up to the 1991 Gulf War, Lakoff identifies a metaphorical framework – a metaphorical way of seeing and representing – through which armed conflict and various ‘security measures’ are often morally justified in the West. This framework begins with a commonplace metaphor about war, Clausewitz’s famous statement that ‘war is the continuation of politics by other means’.

This metaphor has informed a broad consensus that decisions to wage war must be based on a form of ‘cost-benefit analysis’, whereby the potential gains of waging a particular war must be balanced against possible ‘costs’; the thinking underlying liberal


approaches to waging ‘limited’ wars. However, this implies a second metaphor, of ‘politics as business’, wherein ‘efficient political management is seen as akin to efficient business management’, including the keeping of a ‘careful tally of costs and gains’. A series of further metaphors are deployed in justifying war: states are represented as people, with homes (borders), neighbourhoods, friends, enemies and ‘inherent dispositions’ (aggression, leadership, laziness, indifference and so on). Their ‘health’ is constituted by their wealth, and their ‘strength’ by their military capabilities. Mature, adult states are ‘developed’, industrialised liberal-democracies, while ‘developing’ unindustrialised states are immature, children. The rationality of the state, as of the individual, is of maximising self-interest.

This metaphorical ‘state-as-person’ system underpins, among other things, what Lakoff calls the ‘fairy tale’ narrative of ‘just wars’, wherein a cast of characters (a villain, a victim and a hero) are situated in a story scenario, where the victim is suffering (usually violence) at the hands of the villain, creating a ‘moral imbalance’, and the hero – either with a band of allies or alone – goes on a great adventure to a foreign and treacherous terrain, rescues the victim and restores moral balance. The hero thus proves his moral worth, strength and virility and receives the ‘gratitude of the victim’ to boot.

These metaphors and the justificatory narrative they sustain fit nicely in explaining aspects of the Gulf War, imminent at the time of Lakoff’s writing (the villainous and petulant Iraq is hurting his victim, the prosperous and peaceable Kuwait, and the American moral hero – with his coalition of fellow-adventurers – rides to the rescue). But the fairy tale becomes more confused in the case of both the ‘humanitarian interventions’ of the 1990s, and the subsequent War on Terror. In both of these sets of conflicts, the villain is depicted not as a state-as-person, but as an individual person or government – Slobadan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, the Taliban – who, through a moral imbalance, is threatening or hurting two categories of victim. On the one hand, the War on Terror villain persecutes the people of the state, while on the other hand, the people of the Western heroic states are also (potential) victims of his tyranny. The result is that, when the ‘victims’ in the immature states turn out not to be grateful and begin concerted insurgencies against occupying forces, the narrative is compromised and the hero is forced to act unheroically.
As Cameron says in the very first sentence of his speech, the focus of the speech is on ‘terrorism’, but he seeks to first ‘address one point’ to set the context for this discussion of terrorism. That point, as he elaborates it, relates to criticism of the government’s Strategic Defence and Security Review that was underway in the UK at the time of the Munich address. In rebutting these critics, Cameron argues that ‘we are dealing with our budget deficit, but we are also making sure our defences are strong’, using the contrastive (‘but’) and then elaborative (‘are also’) clauses to represent the two activities as not mutually exclusive (where ‘some’ people think they are); reductions in public expenditure do not equate to ‘weakness’.

There is a pedagogical tone to the speech, as with many political speeches, but Cameron structures his ‘teaching’ of the audience around exercises in simulated dialogue, where ‘some people say x’, followed by a corrective of a strong epistemic modality that explains how those people are wrong. Tying together the political-economic programme of cuts and so-called ‘austerity’ his government was just beginning to implement and military activity, Cameron boasts that: ‘Britain will continue to meet the NATO 2% target for defence spending’ and ‘will still have the fourth largest military defence budget in the world’. ‘At the same time’, he goes on, ‘we are putting that money to better use, focusing on conflict prevention and building a much more flexible army’. Here, Cameron is justifying the position and policies of his government with regard to the armed forces and security by reference to being financially frugal and pragmatic (‘dealing with our deficit’) and building a (positively evaluated) ‘flexibility’ at the same time.

This initial statement deliberately sets the context for the body of the speech, which deals with ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamist extremism’ specifically as it arises among ‘our own citizens’ and in ‘our own countries’, as a context in which reduced public spending and increased ‘flexibility’ form the core of the government’s security policies. Cameron then goes on to say that ‘every decision we [his government] take’ with regard to defence and security has three aims: supporting the NATO mission in Afghanistan, reinforcing ‘our actual military capability’ and making sure that ‘Britain is protected from the new and various threats that we face’. Elaborating, Cameron says that ‘But the biggest threat that we face comes from terrorist attacks’. Again, the topography of known unknowns, of
‘new’ and multiplicitous ‘threats’ is invoked, as an aspect of the new world, but when Cameron elaborates, he cites only one: ‘terrorist attacks’.

Cameron’s speech discusses security, but foregrounds identity. He elaborates a causal explanation for the existence of ‘terrorism’ and ‘Islamist extremism’ in Britain and the rest of Europe, and he does so using transitive linguistic structures that predominantly represent mental processes, especially around identification, as the cause of terrorism. Some ‘young men’, he says, ‘find it hard to identify with the traditional Islam practiced at home by their parents’, but these young men ‘also find it hard to identify with Britain too, which is because we have allowed the weakening of our collective identity’. According to Cameron, the ‘hands-off tolerance’ of what he calls ‘the doctrine of state multiculturalism’ has ‘served to ‘reinforce the sense that not enough is shared’, which in turn ‘leaves some young Muslims feeling rootless’. And, Cameron continues his causal story, ‘the search for something to belong to and something to believe in can lead them to this extremist ideology’:

> We will not defeat terrorism simply by the action we take outside our borders.

> Europe needs to wake up to what is happening in our own countries.

This ‘enemy within’ discourse, calling on people to ‘wake up’ to some sinister activity they are not paying due care and attention to, especially as it is uttered in conjunction with claims about the financial crisis, has historical form, notably in the European persecution of Jews.

Not only in Munich, but throughout the policy literature produced by the Government since 2010,519 there has been a strong and distinctive focus on the importance of conceptually separating ‘Islamist’ and ‘extremist’ ideology from the ‘normal’, ‘moderate’ and ‘majority’ religious practices of Muslims. A binary distinction is drawn between the two, so that religion is understood as something other than, standing in opposition to, ‘ideology’. Mainstream British political discourse since the 1990s has drawn heavily on a narrative according to which ‘ideologies’ – with ‘fascism’ and ‘communism’ usually given as the key examples – were damaging and dangerous

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519 For example, HM Government, Tackling Extremism in the UK, 2013.
attempts at projects of social control, belonging especially to the era of the Second World War and the Cold War. Liberalism on the other hand, or, rather, ‘liberal-democracy’, is supposed in this narrative to have been a ‘middle ground’; a ‘neutral’ and ‘pluralist’ mode of organisation of nation-states, wherein no one ideology is favoured, while ostensibly any might be believed in.

In this sense, Cameron’s Munich speech employs the neoliberal ideological strategy of depoliticisation, which features more heavily in the analysis of the previous Chapter. In declaring ‘Islamism’ an ideology, he seeks to deny all legitimacy and rationality to the central claims of terrorists about the reasons for their attacks and to render them, in his own terms, ‘completely perverse’ and ‘warped’, fundamentally irrational. This depoliticisation finds its strongest expression in Cameron’s careful undermining of causal narratives around terrorism that recognise the significance of political-economic and geopolitical factors in the motives of those who commit terrorist attacks. Cameron characterises such explanations as just ‘so much muddled thinking’.

On the right, he says, this is manifested in the ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis and an idea that Muslim ways of thinking are fundamentally different from (and irreconcilable with) Western ways. This he ‘completely rejects’ and insists leads to Islamophobia. The left, meanwhile, ‘lump all Muslims together, compiling a list of grievances, and argue that if only governments addressed these grievances, the terrorism would stop’. Dismissively, Cameron suggests that while ‘yes, we must resolve the sources of tension, not least in Palestine’, we must not ‘fool ourselves’ since ‘even if we sorted out all of the [political-economic and geopolitical] problems I have mentioned, there would still be this terrorism. I believe the root lies in the existence of this extremist ideology’.

The depoliticised identities Cameron describes here are, on the one hand, the ‘we’, ‘ourselves’ who are at least in principle capable of ‘sorting out’ a range of problems from global poverty to the oppression of the Palestinian people by the Israeli state, and on the other hand, the terrorists. But any political or diplomatic solution is futile, in Cameron’s view, since this would assume that the terrorists had reasons, a rationale for their actions. Instead, it is simply the very existence of ‘extremist ideology’ that produces terrorism.
Cameron here challenges not only the ‘soft left’ he disdainfully refers to, but also the reasons for terrorism articulated by its perpetrators. 7/7 bomber Mohammad Siddique Khan stated in his ‘martyrdom video’ that ‘your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world, and your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters’.\(^{520}\) Khan goes on to threaten that ‘until we feel security you will be our targets and until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight’.\(^{521}\) This sentiment is echoed by another of the bombers, Shehzad Tanweer, who says, addressing British non-Muslims who wonder what they have done to ‘deserve’ the 7/7 attacks, that it is because ‘you have voted-in your government who in turn have, and still continue to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters from the East to the West, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya’.\(^{522}\) The view Cameron seeks to persuade us of is that these ‘reasons’ are not causes. The real cause of the actions of these men, in Cameron’s discourse, is ‘the existence of this extremist ideology’. Thus, rather than accept the challenges terrorists pose around global social injustice, we should disregard them and concentrate on annihilating the ‘completely perverse and warped’, ‘ideological’ ways of thinking that render terrorism possible.

Neoliberal ways of seeing, as was elaborated in Chapter 3, are especially formed around a (supposedly) ‘post-ideological’ or even ‘post-political’ worldview, since they centre on the claim that politics and ideology is about the tyrannical imposition of minority views on others (e.g. in the form of a welfare state funded by a progressive taxation system), whereas the market offers a genuinely free, fair and democratic mechanism for social organisation. What we find in Cameron’s speech, and in the texturing of identity across the three speeches, is evidence of this way of seeing; of an imagined post-ideological, rational order of global capitalist society, wherein those who exercise political violence in response to perceived grievance are ‘perverts’, while ‘our’

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521 Ibid.
role as the West is to educate them or discipline them. Crucially, and especially for Cameron, this must work through attacking their very beliefs. This view, which emerges again in recent counter-terrorism policies discussed in the previous chapter, involves an ideological circuit whereby people become terrorists because terrorist ways of thinking exist – *terrorism causes terrorism* – and this constitutes a depoliticisation typical of the neoliberal imaginary that prevails in British politics today.

6.5 Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has examined three speeches by British political leaders on the subjects of war and security, and has explained some of the ways in which these texts are shaped, constrained and enabled by neoliberal ways of seeing and being. In summary, the three themes that structure the analysis above have been shown to broadly correlate to three core areas of neoliberal ideology and governmentality:

| Section 6.1, ‘Old and new worlds: representing temporality and social change’ | • The newness and naturalness of globalisation
• The necessity and inevitability of economic interdependence and international capitalist markets |
| Section 6.2, ‘Security as risk management: facing the topography of global threat’ | • Security and war as sectors of the economy
• Management as the new politics
• Risk, flexibility, adaptation, dynamism and continuous change as the *nomos* of the new world |
| Section 6.3, ‘The post-ideological present: rationality, morality, moderation and stability in the new world’ | • The death of ideology and the ‘old’ politics and their replacement by economic management
• The moral goodness and balance/equilibrium of markets and the badness of ‘extremism’ and political ‘ideologies’ |
The analysis of the three speeches has shown how neoliberal ways of seeing and being have shaped political discourse on security – insisting upon the radical novelty, inevitability and goodness of globalisation and the ‘new world’; describing the real or ‘natural’ character of social relations in terms of networks, flows and markets, and prescribing flexibility, adaptation and entrepreneurship as the solution to meeting the many new ‘challenges’ and ‘threats’; and, lastly, condemning ‘political’ and ‘ideological’ thinking that would see us all ruled by minority interest groups rather than the pure, impartial and scientific government of the market.

Globalisation, in Blair’s and Brown’s speeches in particular, is depicted as a pseudo-divine force that is busy remaking the world. Our role, as individuals and societies, is to accept this fact of nature and adapt appropriately. Cameron laments the failure of ‘extremists’ to accept the new global market order, while Brown seeks to secure our networks and flows against the threats posed by ‘global terrorism’. The neoliberal security imaginary these speeches entail – with its focus on the inevitability and naturalness of globalisation and markets, the need for individuals to adapt and absorb risk, and the role of government and state in policing the new order – is intertextually realised in the linguistic and discursive features this chapter has examined. These three Prime Ministers have sought, in various ways, to persuade the public of a view of the world – a whole way of seeing – premised on this security imaginary. And to the extent that this way of seeing obfuscates the actual operation of power and decision-making, and the interests served by the globalisation of markets and the responsibilisation of individuals, it belongs to neoliberal ideology.
7. PRACTICING SECURITY: CONTROL ORDERS AND DRONES

“Thought”, understood in this way, is not, then, to be sought only in theoretical formulations such as those of philosophy or science; it can and must be analysed in every manner of speaking, doing, or behaving in which the individual appears and acts as subject of learning, as ethical or juridical subject, as subject conscious of himself and others. In this sense, thought is understood as the very form of action – as action insofar as it implies the play of true and false, the acceptance or refusal of rules, the relation to oneself and others. The study of forms of experience can thus proceed from an analysis of “practices” – discursive or not – as long as one qualifies that word to mean the different systems of action insofar as they are inhabited by thought as I have characterised it here.

Michel Foucault.523

7.1 INTRODUCTION

Whereas the two prior analysis chapters took an explicitly textual approach, focusing on policy papers and speeches respectively, this chapter instead adopts a broader practice-focused approach to its subject matter, looking specifically at two key practices of contemporary British security policy – namely, the use of control orders (now Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures or ‘TPIMs’) and the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs or, hereafter, ‘drones’).

The rationale for analysing these two particular security practices is twofold. Firstly, they have been two of the most widely publicised and criticised elements of the British ‘War on Terror’. They have garnered much controversy and have sparked powerful debates, not only among media, publics and politicians, but also within legal circles, among the judiciary,

legal scholars and practitioners too. Control orders and TPIMs have been widely criticised as representing a serious breach of longstanding and generally accepted principles of ‘human rights’; from the right to a fair trial and ‘due process’ to the freedom of movement and the right to a private and family life.524 Drone warfare, meanwhile, has been subjected to intensive criticism over the ethical implications of ‘robotising’ or automating killing, removing ‘fighters’ (drone pilots) from the theatre of conflict, and thus from the sorts of dangers to life and limb — and the bloody, messy immediacy of killing other human beings — that might otherwise constrain them.525 Drone warfare has also faced considerable criticism for the fact that, in spite of claims by governments and militaries to the contrary, drones are relatively indiscriminate weapons, that might have been responsible for the deaths of large numbers of ‘innocent civilians’;526 this latter criticism being compounded by the fact that, once razed from the earth by a Hellfire missile, it is difficult to identify exactly who a drone strike has killed.

These reasons for the perceived controversy of the two practices point to the second component of the rationale for choosing to focus on them. Their ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ character as security measures, and a perceived intermingling of what can be characterised as ‘war power’ and ‘police power’ are key here527. Concerns around the legality, ethics, and compatibility with notions of human rights of the practices of control orders and TPIMs, and drone warfare, are often articulated in these terms. Is it right to treat suspected ‘terrorists’ as ‘combatants’ or as ‘criminals’? Is the ‘War on Terror’ only a metaphor for investigative and punitive policing strategies, or does it represent a particular phase or type of armed combat? Can a British citizen be denied constitutional rights if they are deemed a suspect in ‘international’ or ‘global’ terrorism? What does drone warfare mean for the principle of state sovereignty? These are some of the important IR questions that arise in the context of the ethical dilemmas around these two security practices as they relate to domestic and international imaginaries.

As has been noted in previous chapters, the domestic and the international are increasingly blurred and interpenetrating, according to neoliberal globalisation discourse and we should therefore be able to find this view reflected in contemporary security policy and practice too. Hardt and Negri have argued that in the era of supposed globalisation, we have witnessed in Western liberal democracies a transfer of functions between the police and the military. Domestic policing is being carried out by increasingly heavily armed and militarised forces making use of exceptional extra-legal powers, while the military is being deployed in global ‘policing’ roles.\footnote{Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, \textit{Multitude} (London: Penguin, 2005).} As Mark Neocleous suggests in \textit{War Power, Police Power}, it is more likely that these two expressions of violent state power have been intermingled for much longer.\footnote{Neocleous, \textit{War Power, Police Power}.} What has changed is that the state agencies charged with dispensing violence have themselves become much more conscious, and encouraging, of this view of their role. This awareness has entailed explicit recognition by, for example, counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine in the British military, that COIN is actually a form of police power.

Recent examples of the interpenetration of war power and police power include the pursuit of the ‘Boston bombers’ in 2013, where suburbs of the city were ‘locked-down’ and under curfew, swarming with Kevlar-helmeted paramilitary police armed with fully automatic weapons, assault rifles, heavy calibre sniper rifles and so on. It can also be seen in the rise of the Metropolitan Police’s Territorial Support Group in policing most large protests in the UK through body armour, balaclavas, batons and ‘kettling’ techniques. These techniques are designed not simply to ‘contain’ crowds but to terrorise, demoralise and disperse them – to strike fear into the heart of the ‘enemy’.

International state violence, on the other hand, has increasingly been framed in terms of policing global order, taking out ‘criminal’ regimes, often personified in political discourse as a single individual. Tony Blair’s Chicago Speech portrayal of Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein as two ‘evil’ men, causing ‘problems’ for the West, and his discussion of how crime ‘on the other side of the world’ increasingly impacts on us Westerners because of globalisation, is a case in point. But the discourse of the War on Terror goes further, implying that the reasons for conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq relate to ‘criminal’ and ‘terrorist’ regimes,
or regimes that harbour criminality, and fail to adhere to the laws of the (imagined\textsuperscript{530}) ‘international community’ of states. It would be only too easy to forget that the conflict in Afghanistan, now well over a decade old, was started under the pretence of pursuing a single ‘criminal mastermind’, Osama bin Laden, for the purposes of retributive justice.

A final note on the selection of these two practices relates to their treatment thus far in politics and IR. To date, very little has been published on control orders and TPIMs in these fields, with most of the extant literature taking a legal and/or criminological perspective. Critical IR scholarship on conflict, security and the War on Terror (where it analyses the materiality of practices at all) has instead tended to focus on areas like migration, biometrics and border security,\textsuperscript{531} US drone warfare, and detention conditions at Guantanamo Bay. Yet to the extent that control orders constitute an element of the War on Terror – and they are very clearly articulated as such – they form a legitimate and interesting object of analysis for IR. Drone warfare, on the other hand, has been something of a fascination for IR scholars across the board, sparking scores of books, journal articles, conference papers and panels, and heated debates. However, as in so much of the critical attention paid to the War on Terror the UK has been neglected. Analyses of drone warfare have been focused almost exclusively on the US and its role as ‘early adopter’ and pioneer of drone warfare, along with the singular sovereign power of deciding over life and death that drone strikes have invested in the office of President, with Barack Obama allegedly signing off personally on ‘kill lists’ of targets.\textsuperscript{532} The approach of the UK to drone warfare, which is the object of the second half of this chapter, has been comparatively overlooked by scholars. Most of the attention paid to British adoption of drone warfare technologies and techniques has in fact been in the military literature and doctrine that this chapter analyses. Studying the practices of control orders/TPIMs and drone warfare can therefore complete the articulation of an initial analysis of the ‘neoliberal way of war’, and the British role in it, in this thesis. Having explained the selection of the two practices to be studied in this chapter, it remains to justify the approach being taken to their study.


\textsuperscript{532} Jo Becker and Scott Shane, \textit{New York Times}: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted=all\_r=0 29\textsuperscript{th} May 2012 [accessed 15\textsuperscript{th} August 2014].
7.2 A RATIONALE FOR, AND APPROACH TO, PRACTICE ANALYSIS

As mentioned above, and by contrast to the two preceding chapters, which drew upon a CDA methodology, this chapter opts for a view of two security practices that focuses more on their materiality rather than their textual instantiations. The point here is not to suggest that texts or indeed discourses are somehow immaterial. On the contrary, CDA views texts precisely as material ‘moments’ in long and complex articulations of material and mental processes. Neither is the point to claim that discourses are not material, since, as Banta has argued, from a critical realist perspective discourses clearly have an ‘emergent materiality’ in the sense that they have effects and become realised on a continuous basis.533 The aim is rather to refocus the analytic lens away from textual-semiotic-representational fields of social practice and onto specifying some of the ways these fields shape particular materialities of practice. This chapter therefore attempts to throw some light upon the points of connection between saying, writing and representing things in particular ‘neoliberal ways’ on the one hand, and doing, acting out and embodying neoliberal things on the other. Referring back to the Venn diagram of social practice in Chapter Four, this chapter seeks to re-focus more strongly on explaining the ‘material’ or ‘physical’ elements of practice, but this does not imply any possibility of actually discerning these elements as conceptually or ontologically discrete from the mental/psychological and semiotic/linguistic elements. Rather than envisaging this analysis as an attempt at disentangling the strands of social practice (which are really intertwined in too Gordian a fashion to render such an endeavour possible), the use of filters on a camera lens provides a more apt metaphor. The empirical image captured still incorporates all of the elements in the field of view; the messy overlapping elements of a social practice. Just as the photographer’s filters pick out particular hues or tones of colour, so the ‘materiality of practice’ filter used in this chapter amplifies or picks out more material elements in an analogous way to how the ‘semiotic’ or ‘discourse’ filter applied in the previous chapters picked out the discursive and linguistic elements of contemporary war/security practice.

In differentiating this chapter from the ‘close’ textual analysis of Chapters 5 and 6, the intention is not to deny the materiality of the text itself. Texts do, as is widely noted in the literature on semiotics, have an obvious material existence. They often take the form of inked

shapes on paper, or sound waves travelling from a person’s mouth, or images displayed by
the electronic illumination of pixels in a television screen. This materiality of the text is
certainly a part of the broader materiality of discourse. The distribution of political pamphlets
and policy documents among officials and publics, or the striking audio-visual experience of
witnessing a political speech, can constitute material elements of the reproduction of
particular discursive representations and the ideologies those representations sustain.
However, we might describe the materiality of the text in this sense as the ‘minor materiality
of discourse’. The more conspicuous and, it can be argued, socially and politically significant
material embodiment of discourse is, of course, the material and often ‘non-linguistic’
practices in which people engage on a daily basis. In the context of this thesis, there should
thus be a focus on the practices of liberal state violence and warfare.

Inspired in part by Foucault’s injunction to study any particular area of social life (from
his own oeuvre he cites sexuality, criminality and madness534) by analysing ‘the relations
between truth, power, and subject without ever reducing each of them to the others,’535 this
chapter maps on to this Foucauldian trinity the categories of social structure, practice and
agency, respectively, as they were outlined in Chapter 4. In other words, the aim is to see how
a structured neoliberal regime of truth and knowledge around contemporary security and
war, which was posited by the discourse analysis of the previous two chapters, produces, and
is in turn (re)produced by powerful social practices and pliable subjectivities.

One strand of the rationale for using a broader form of practice analysis here, then, is
that it is can be more adequate in assessing the causal power of neoliberalism as

governmentality. Whereas the textual analysis of the preceding chapters has a well-
established lineage as a method of ideology-critique – for highlighting the functioning of
powerful ways of seeing – its capacity for shedding light on the dissemination of powerful
ways of being is more limited. Ideological discourses on war and security - as they are realised
in texts or policies - are seen in a rather unidirectional way (which is not to say that they
operate in such a way); as something like ‘statements’. In order to understand their deeper

534 Foucault, Government of Self and Others p. 42.
causal connections, we need to sink further into the security practices they seek to bring about, reproduce, naturalise or justify. As Ricky Wichum puts it:

Governmentality Studies encompass security as strategical effect of specific relations of power, knowledge, and subjectivity. Consequently, both the discourses and the materialities of security become the focus of analysis.536

This is not, then, about jettisoning meaning from the picture, but rather about studying how meanings come into play in practice, beyond their communication (it will be remembered that Chapters 3 and 4 accepted that ideology and discourse are especially discernable at the level of communication), in what Wichum calls ‘the materialities of security’.

Whereas the traditional concern of ‘pragmatics’ as the study of social practice has been the interface between words and events, speech and acts – a fundamentally linguistic orientation – the aim here is really to focus beyond the word, on the socio-material configurations that go into a social practice. Nevertheless, since these are socio-material configurations, they are also meaningful or semiotic ones – given the importance of the semiotic to the social as described in Chapter 4. In this sense, the method adopted here shares more with those employed by the ‘practice theorists’ of cultural anthropology and religious studies than with the pragmatics of linguists.537 It involves a degree of what anthropologists like Gilbert Ryle and Clifford Geertz popularised in the 1970s as ‘thick description’. That is to say, the approach here is concerned not with ‘photographing’ the material practices of control orders538 and drones, in order to record some imagined empirical purity, but rather with interpreting – deriving meaning from and framing in meaningful ways – these material practices.539 Specifically, the meaningful materiality of these practices will be related through an analysis of their connection to the systems of meaning analysed in the two preceding chapters. The aim is to look in more detail at how, and to what degree of success, the

538 An attempt at precisely this – exploring the materiality of control orders ‘through photographs and architectural representations of the house’ of a controlled person – was actually carried out by artist Edmund Clark who, with Home Office approval, was allowed to spend six days in the house of an anonymous ‘controlled person’ as research for his illustrated book, Control Order House, (London: Here Press, 2012).
neoliberal ways of seeing and being highlighted in the policy papers of Chapter 5 and speeches of Chapter 6 are ‘brought off’ or have social effects in the form of the practices analysed here.

To what extent do the temporal, spatial and ethical dimensions of neoliberal ways of war and security find material manifestation in the practices of Control Orders and drones? How far do these practices realise the social ontologies, morphologies and subjectivities that underpin neoliberalism as ideology and governmentality, and that were found to be operative in various ways in the official discourse analysed in the two preceding chapters? These are the questions this chapter seeks to address by means of a practice analysis, and are therefore the questions guiding the method that is devised for that analysis.

To this end, the remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Each practice – Control Orders and TPIMs first, drone warfare second – is described, interpreted and analysed through identically structured frameworks, in sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. Each section consists of three sub-sections, the first of which provides an introduction to the practice as it has emerged in public and political discourse, through for example, legislation, policy development, political debate and media scrutiny. Following this, each practice is studied in terms of its material specifications and the ideological framings lent to it by the semiotic order in which it is constituted. Finally, each practice will be analysed for its effectiveness and material articulation ‘in practice’. This is to say, in terms of how social practices and subjects are shaped by the material conditions of these particular security practices, and with what degree of ‘success’ such security practices realise the ways of seeing discussed in the preceding chapters in ways of being.

7.3 Practices of Security I: Control Orders and TPIMs

7.3.1 Control Orders and TPIMs: An Introduction

The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA 2005 hereafter), which introduced for the first time in Britain the legal instrument of the ‘control order’, has as its core legislative aim:

To provide for the making against individuals involved in terrorism-related activity of orders imposing obligations on them for purposes connected with preventing or restricting their further involvement in such activity. \(^{540}\)

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Control orders, and the instrument that replaced them, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs hereafter) have been a source of controversy in British security politics since their inception, particularly due to a perceived conflict with the basic tenets of what is often called the ‘global human rights regime’. The passage of PTA 2005 through the Houses of Parliament was fraught with backbench revolt and internecine conflict and brought Westminster to the brink of one constitutional crisis as the initial bill was heavily amended by the Lords during its longest ever session (over thirty hours) before being returned to the Commons, where almost all amendments were rejected.

But the PTA 2005 was one piece of legislation in a series, which began with the ‘emergency’ law hurried through in the wake of 9/11, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA 2001 hereafter) and finds its current iteration in the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIM) Act 2011. The pre-9/11 Terrorism Act 2000 remains in force and represents a more ‘traditional’ approach to UK terrorism policy with a strong focus on terrorism emanating from the conflict over Northern Ireland. Indeed, the three Acts have taken a different trajectory, and each of the three has repealed some or all elements of the previous one in order to re-articulate the UK approach to dealing with what policy papers routinely refer to as ‘terror suspects’. The very title of the ATCSA 2001, with its nebulous referents, reflects a ‘bringing together’ of approaches to dealing with armed conflict and international political and religious violence with more mundane ‘domestic’ criminality, all captured under the banner of ‘security’. It was an extremely controversial piece of legislation in its own right, as in bill form it initially sought to extend the legal power to detain anyone suspected of terrorist activities criminal without charging them. Blair suffered a significant back bench rebellion at the time the legislation was voted on grounds that this move represented a breach of civil rights.\[541\]

The Act was rushed through parliament, with Blair’s New Labour government using its powers of legislative initiative and control of Parliamentary time to secure its passage in just one month.\[542\] While the majority of the ATCSA 2001 refers explicitly to terrorism and ‘suspected international terrorists’, making provision for the seizing and freezing of terror


suspects’ assets and property, parts of the Act are open to wider interpretation. For example, Gordon Brown used Section 4 of the Act when in 2008 he issued a ‘Freezing Order’ on the UK assets of the collapsing Icelandic bank Landsbanki. This was on the grounds that, in the words of the Act, Landsbanki constituted a person or persons who threatened ‘action to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it)’. Iceland’s Prime Minister at the time, Geir Haardie, later suggested that the use of anti-terror legislation in this case amounted to was ‘shameful and totally unnecessary’ and amounted to placing ‘a friendly country like Iceland on a list of terrorist organisations – we were there alongside al Qaeda, the Taliban, North Korea. Now that’s not friendly at all’.

In 2004 the ATCSA 2001 was ruled incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (the provisions of which were generally incorporated into UK law-making by the Human Rights Act 1998), and Sections 21-32, which related to the treatment of terror suspects, were repealed by the PTA 2005 (though other sections, including of course the Freezing Orders, remain in force).

Sections 21-32 the ATCSA 2001 were found to contradict the European Convention since these were the sections (under Part 4 of the Act, ‘Immigration and Asylum’) that allowed for the Home Secretary to identify and certify foreign nationals as ‘suspected international terrorists’ who, if attempts to the deport them were unsuccessful, could instead be detained indefinitely in prison. As the pressure group Liberty notes, it was under these provisions that a number of people were detained at high security prisons and mental institutions, without charge, and without even being made aware of any specific accusations they faced, for three years. PTA 2005, though it repealed these Sections of ATCSA 2001, proved no less controversial.

Much like ATCSA, PTA 2005 was prompted – and hurried through parliament – in the wake of a terrorist incident, this time in the UK; the bombings on public transport in central London on the 7th July 2005. As a House of Lords investigation into ‘fast-track’ legislation later

found, this reactive legislative approach has been the pattern UK counter-terrorism policy has followed. Following the now familiar pattern, this event was reduced to the signifier ‘7/7’ in political and media discourse, and therefore also in everyday conversation. The hasty construction of PTA 2005 was aimed at swiftly overcoming the legal problems faced by Sections 21-32 of ATCSA 2001, by instead instituting ‘control orders’, a legal instrument to be deployed by the Home Secretary where they are unable to bring charges against a ‘terror suspect’ but feel that it is essential that they are detained. However, control orders both widened the powers of the home secretary to detain terror suspects, including British citizens where the problematic Sections of ATCSA had referred only to foreign nationals who could not be deported, and deepened them, giving much more detailed, and open, provisions for ‘controlling’ detainees (these will be elaborated in the following section), running to many pages.

Control orders were on the way out before the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition came to power in the May 2010 General Election. In the House of Lords and House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR) concluded in its Sixteenth Report on Counter-Terrorism Policy and Human Rights, published in February 2010 in response to the Government’s fifth annual request to renew control orders, that ‘the current control order regime is no longer sustainable’. The committee noted that parliament’s ‘opportunities to thoroughly scrutinise these powers’ were ‘limited’ by excessive secrecy, while evidence showed the ‘devastating impact of control orders on the subjects of the orders, their families and their communities’, as well as high costs for the state associated with the extensive litigation around the orders and a lack of evidence of their necessity.

7.3.2 Material dimensions and ideological frames of control orders and TPIMs

PTA 2005 defines ‘terrorism-related activity’, involvement in which is supposed to justify the issuing of a control order on an individual, by specific reference to types of

547 As Brad Evans has noted, the reduction of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, and the crashing of a third plane into a field, that took place on 11th September 2001 to ‘9/11’ serves to represent this event by reference to a date, yet simultaneously de-temporalises it, rendering it seemingly eternal by removing the year. 9/11 is, in this sense, the tragedy that never ends, and the justification for the War on Terror, the definitive war without end (either spatial or temporal). This is what enables such events to remain so much at the forefront of the popular imaginary, well over a decade after they happened. The use of identical transformations with regard to other terrorist attacks has become common place and, perhaps to a lesser extent, seems to serve the same purpose. See Brad Evans, Liberal Terror.

prohibited ‘conduct’. In addition to ‘the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism’, a set of related conducts are grounds for imposing a control order: ‘conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts’, ‘conduct which gives encouragement’ to such acts and ‘conduct which gives support or assistance’ to other people ‘known or believed’ to be involved in terrorism-related activity as defined in the earlier clauses.\textsuperscript{549} The notion of conduct at work here is found to be even broader than it might at first seem, when, turning to the Act’s interpretation notes, it is stated that for the purposes of PTA 2005, “act” and “conduct” include omissions and statements.\textsuperscript{550} So merely saying, or even omitting, \textit{not saying}, certain things could be construed as ‘terrorist-related activity’ justifying a control order. It is worth noting here that the ‘terrorism’ part of ‘terrorism-related’, meanwhile, is defined by reference to the definition used in the Terrorism Act 2000:

\begin{quote}
In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where [...] the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.\textsuperscript{551}
\end{quote}

For the purposes of the Terrorism Act 2000, the action (whether actually ‘used’ or merely threatened) must additionally meet one or more of the following criteria in order to be considered terrorism:

\begin{itemize}
\item[(a)] involves serious violence against a person,
\item[(b)] involves serious damage to property,
\item[(c)] endangers a person’s life, other than that of the person committing the action,
\item[(d)] creates a serious risk to the health or safety of the public or a section of the public, or
\item[(e)] is designed seriously to interfere with or seriously to disrupt an electronic system.\textsuperscript{552}
\end{itemize}

While PTA 2005 allows for control orders to broadly be orders made by a Secretary of State (in practice, the Home Secretary), placing ‘obligations’ on individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism-related activity, it also includes details (under Part 1, Paragraphs 4-\textsuperscript{549} Subsection 9 (a-d)
\textsuperscript{550} Paragraph, 15 subsection 1.
\textsuperscript{552} HM Government, \textit{Terrorism Act 2000}, I(2).
10 of the Act) of what particular obligations this might include. These ‘particular’ obligations are nevertheless vague and far-reaching. Through a control order, a Home Secretary may impose upon an individual (a ‘controlled person’, in the Act), prohibitions or restrictions on such things as the ‘possession or use of specified articles or substances’, the ‘use of specified services’ or simply ‘his carrying on specified activities’. The content of such obligations is therefore left to be ‘specified’ in the orders themselves, in accordance with those substances, services and activities the Home Secretary deems that this individual should not be involved in.

A strong focus of the particular obligations outlined in PTA 2005 is on closely restricting or outright prohibiting the movements, contacts and communications of controlled persons. Controlled persons may be subject to restrictions on their ‘association or communication with specified persons or with other persons generally’, as well as on where they live and whom they allow into their home. They may, furthermore, be outright banned from ‘being at specified places or within a specified area’, or from ‘movements to, from or within the United Kingdom’. Additionally, controlled persons may be required to surrender their passports, along with any other items specified in the order, allow access to their home to ‘specified persons’, including for the purposes of a search, and must ‘allow himself to be photographed’ for surveillance purposes. Finally, and crucially, the controlled person must ‘co-operate with specified arrangements for enabling his movements, communications or other activities to be monitored by electronic or other means’, including providing information when asked for it by a ‘specified person’ and reporting to a specified person at specified times and places.

553 Paragraph 2, subsection (4)(a).
554 Paragraph 2, subsection (4)(b).
555 Para 1, subsection (4)(d).
556 Para 1, subsection (4)(e).
557 Para 1, subsection (4)(f).
558 Para 1, subsection (4)(g).
559 Para 1, subsection (4)(i).
560 Para 1, subsection (4)(j).
561 Para 1, subsection (4)(k).
562 Para 1, subsection (4)(m).
563 Para 1, subsection (4)(n).
564 Para 1, subsection (4)(o).
565 Para 1, subsection (4)(p).
The order thus demands the active participation of the controlled person in their own control, especially with regard to their movements and associations. In elaborating on this requirement for co-operation, the Act states that controlled persons must ‘submit to procedures’ required for monitoring their movements and communications,\(^{566}\) including by ‘wearing or otherwise using apparatus’,\(^{567}\) maintaining that apparatus themselves,\(^{568}\) and ‘complying with directions’ with regard to these monitoring arrangements.\(^{569}\) The person whose ‘terrorism-related’ conduct – their doing or saying, or even not saying, for example, of things that could be construed as supporting or encouraging an ‘Act of Terrorism’ as defined by the Terrorism Act 2000 – was the cause of the imposition of the control order, thus has their conduct adjusted, corrected; they are transformed from a misconducting individual into a carefully conducted and conducting one. This transformation of conduct from ‘terrorism-related’ to ‘controlled’ involves a series of material changes.

Key material aspects of control orders can now be seen to fall within three categories of legally-enforced control measures:

1. **Spatio-temporal measures**: a controlled person is not allowed to physically cross certain boundaries – whether this is by entering a particular town or region, or simply stepping across the threshold of their home – or travel in particular directions. They may, on the other hand, be required to move to specific locations at designated times in order to ‘check in’ with security services.

2. **Communicative measures**: a controlled person may be banned from being in physical proximity to, speaking, writing or otherwise materially signally to, particular people (or even ‘other persons generally’). They must also submit to, and co-operate with, the monitoring of all their communications, including the use of ‘apparatus’.

3. **Embodied measures**: Controlled persons must submit to and co-operate with – and, as required, to ‘wear’ – the use of bodily technologies and ‘apparatus’, such as electronic tags and surveillance devices such as cameras and audio-visual recording equipment. The interpretation notes in the PTA 2005 state that ‘apparatus’ includes ‘any equipment,\

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\(^{566}\) Para 1, subsection (6)(a).
\(^{567}\) Para 1, subsection (6)(b).
\(^{568}\) Para 1, subsection (4)(c).
\(^{569}\) Para 1, subsection (6)(d).
machinery or device and any wire or cable, together with any software used with it’. The Act thus effectively places a legal obligation upon the controlled person to wear and maintain electronic tags so that their physical movements can be monitored automatically and at a distance, potentially on a ‘24/7’ basis. Controlled persons must also submit to being photographed – they cannot refuse, or cover their face, or turn their head away, but must rather submit, fully and bodily to the process.

The TPIM Act 2011 (‘TPIM Act’ hereafter) proclaims in its opening paragraph the ‘abolition of control orders’ and formally repeals PTA 2005. It then goes on to give legal power to the Secretary of State (again, this is the Home Secretary in practice) to ‘by notice (a “TPIM notice”) impose specified terrorism prevention and investigation measures on an individual’. A parallel can be found between the measures instituted in a control order and measures employed in the policing of protest in recent years. Protestors subject to the Metropolitan Police’s infamous ‘kettling’ techniques (pioneered at the May Day 2001 demonstrations in London, but now routinely deployed at large demonstrations of all kinds) are often forced to remove any mask, scarf, hat or face covering and look directly into a video camera. The making of a ‘controlled person’ therefore seems to entail more than just another form of subjectification, producing a compliant subject, but actually aims at objectification. This means rendering ‘dangerous’ or ‘threatening’ individuals simple objects of government, devoid of rights and voice, unable to contest their treatment, and physically adapted by means of material ‘apparatus’ (electronic tagging, communications monitoring and so on) into passive measurable objects to be manipulated at the will of the Home Secretary.

Persons who cannot sufficiently control themselves must become controlled persons, through control orders. Neoliberal subjects are, in an important sense, really construed and constituted as objects. The process by which this takes place appears as a mirror to what Marx called ‘fetishism of the commodity’. Whereas, in capitalist societies, the attribution of exchange-value and use of currency gives the impression that social relations exist between things – that is, objects appear as subjects – the obverse of this fetishism is that in advanced capitalist societies, subjects – people – are increasingly treated as objects. It is imagined that

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570 15(1)
572 Ibid., 2(1).
we can control, quantify and measure change in people and their movements as we can objects; and control orders may be seen as an aspect of this objectification of the subject.

Neoliberalism demands a scientifically governed social world and scientific in the positivist sense of being equivalent to natural science because, as Bourdieu notes, the vision of ‘neoliberal utopia’ is one that ‘succeeds in conceiving of itself as the scientific description of reality’.573 That is to say, ‘this “theory” that is desocialised and dehistoricised at its roots has, today more than ever, the means of making itself true and empirically verifiable’.574 The more aspects of our lives are marketised, the more that individual competition and reflexivity are injected into the basis of our social world, the more we will regulate ourselves freely and peacefully through the market’s mechanisms; so goes the neoliberal creed. Bad ideas and behaviours will have no demand, so they will wither and die. Those who still cling to bad ideas, then – who fail to accept the new scientific social world – are irrational and barbaric or ‘perverted’, to recall David Cameron’s Munich speech, and must be dealt with. What more perfect way of dealing with these pre-modern perverts than to actually make them into scientific objects. Experiment on them. Isolate them, observe them and analyse them under laboratory conditions. This is what control orders and TPIMs attempt to enable: the transformation of resistant subjects into controllable, quantifiable commodity-objects, amenable to scientific study.

7.3.3 From policy to practice: the practical efficacy of Control Orders and TPIMs

To complete the practice analysis of control orders and TPIMs, it is now necessary to consider how they have played out ‘in practice’. A key source drawn upon here is the author’s interview with Cerie Bullivant. Bullivant was subject to a control order from June 2006 until it was finally quashed at the High Court in February 2008,575 following the Security Service’s (MI5) presentation of their secret evidence, which the High Court judge, Mr. Justice Collins, found to be entirely unconvincing. Bullivant’s troubles began when he was detained and questioned under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000 at Heathrow airport upon attempting to board a flight to Syria in 2006. Dissatisfied with his stated reasons for travel and apparently

574 Ibid.
convinced that Bullivant was engaged in or planned to engage in terrorist activity, the Security Service warned him not to travel to politically sensitive areas outside the UK. When, later that year, he attempted to travel to Bangladesh to work in an orphanage, he was again detained before leaving the UK. This time, he was issued with a control order. While neither Bullivant nor his legal counsel was ever privy to all of the ‘secret evidence’ that the Security Service held against him, the two factors that were mentioned in court were that he was travelling with another young man whose brother had been convicted for planning a terrorist attack, and that his name had been mentioned in a call to the Metropolitan Police’s ‘Anti-Terrorist Hotline’. As it transpired, the hotline call had been made by a former family friend, while drunk, working on the assumption that for a young white man to convert to Islam, he must have been ‘radicalised’ and that this radicalisation effectively rendered Bullivant a would-be ‘terrorist’.

Following the above schema of control order measures as concerning spatio-temporal controls, communicative controls and embodied controls, the interview with Bullivant focused on three broad questions: how the order affected his movements and travel, how it affected his communications with others, and how it affected him bodily. Asked how the control order impacted upon his movements, Bullivant initially responded:

CB: Um, so strictly movement-based, I couldn’t attend any, I couldn’t go, even if, to any international ports, even to collect someone. Um... If I was even taking a train on the Underground for example I couldn’t go through King’s Cross St. Pancras cos that counts as an international port, so it’s ridiculous [...] um so it’s a bit ridiculous in the sense of what you can and can’t, can and can’t do. Er... I wasn’t allowed any, any travel documents, I was obviously definitely banned from leaving, leaving the country and going on holiday.

BW: So did you have, did you have to surrender your passport?

CB: I had to surrender my passport, yep. Um. I actually didn’t know where my passport was – I hadn’t been away for quite a while. And they were like look you’ve got 24 hours to find your passport or we’re gonna arrest you.

Bullivant was thus restricted, under threat of arrest, from entering the global space-time that is prioritised in neoliberal discourse (see Chapter 6 on Prime Ministerial speeches). This space is defined in the globalist imaginary as including such limited and ‘domestic’ geographical spaces as King’s Cross St. Pancras London Underground station, which, in its role as a sort of ‘port’, acts as something like a piece of the ‘global’ within the local. This special status is observed in a particularly prescient piece by Paul Virilio from 1991, where he notes that the shifting design and physical environment of the airport from the 1970s onward ‘had become a function of the risks of “terrorist contamination”’ such that the overriding concern is with demarcating ‘sterile zones’ from the ‘non-sterile’ and the very architecture of such spaces is driven by ‘perceived public security requirements’, rather than the aesthetic imaginary of the architect.\(^{577}\) The control order thus appears to achieve, at least partly, the aim of limiting the bad circulations of those designated ‘terrorist’. Bullivant became excluded from the positive global order and limited to an inferior, national space-time. The limits to this space for circulation were tighter than merely avoiding ports, however:

CB: And obviously because I had a, um, a twelve hour curfew, I had to be, I could only go obviously six hours at … d’you what I mean?

BW: Yeah

CB: I had to be back in time for, for the, and the signing-in in the middle of the day, so...

BW So you were, you were allowed to leave your home for twelve-hour periods at a time [CB: Yeah] of time?

CB: Well I was allowed out from sort of nine til nine, roughly, um, but I had to sign on at the middle of the day at a police station in my local area [BW: Right] so... if you’re allowed out from nine but at one o’clock you’ve gotta sign and then you’ve gotta be back home by nine. So you can’t...

BW: You’re effectively, yeah...

CB: You’re, you’re boxed in all the time

BW: And was the police station er..

CB: And this was the, this was the, the lightest of the control orders, d’you what I mean? What happened to me I mean in terms of the control orders and in terms of other cases, mine was the… most relaxed and most free of any of them. Um… From that issue I’m gonna sort of pre-empt you on the question of the police station, um […] They had um basically, there was a police station, I was only allowed to sign in for one hour in the middle of the day around one o’clock and there was a police station that was open during that time period. Um. And there was a police station that was open during that time period, like a nine to five police station, umm… about a 20 minute walk away from my house, or five minute bus ride. Um, but they for some reason they’ve got a, um a, a rule that you have to sign in at 24, uh the closest 24-hour police station. So for me that meant taking a 40 minute bus ride out to an industrial estate in Dagenham East and signing on out there at the 24-hour police station, even though I’m only allowed to sign on for, for err… one hour a day in the middle of the day. So why the hell’s it need to be a 24-hour police station? And I coulda gone to the local one that’s round the corner… er…

Bullivant did not have specific towns or regions which he was prohibited from entering as a condition of his control order, with the exception of ‘international ports’. However, he found that in practice the condition requiring him to sign in daily at an appointed police station effectively restructured his circulation through space-time such that he was limited in terms how far he could travel in order to be back for a middle-of-the-day sign-in in Dagenham.

Later in the interview, Bullivant reveals that he was also required to have a large ‘black box’ telephone system installed in his house. The conditions of his control order were such that, before leaving the house for any period of time, on arriving back from any trip out of the house, and at the seemingly random times that the phone rang during his curfew hours, Bullivant had to ‘check in’ with an operative of a private security company via this telephone:

CB: Um, I had this weird black box phone, um, that plugged into the wall and er… as you picked it up it phoned straight through to, um… a security company. And so, at the beginning and end of my curfew I had to phone in to let them know I was inside, and every time I wanted to leave the house I had to phone and tell them I was leaving the house and every time I returned to the house I had to phone and tell them that I’d come back. So, I…

BW: Was that a private company?
CB: Yeah it was, er, I think it was G4S. Um... but don’t hold me to that [BW No] but I’m pretty sure it was G4S [BW: A private security company but... INDISTINCT] But um, so yeah I would have to pick up and “hey I’m going out to buy a pint of milk”, “ok, I’m back now from buying my pint of milk”. And, and it was, go through, and it would ring at random times during the night or when I was meant to be at home, “hi we’re just checking that you’re still there”.

Bullivant was left relatively free from communicative restrictions. He was allowed to use a telephone and computer, though of course he suspected these were monitored. His regular telephone calls were not routed through the black box (‘it was like the, like the Batman phone [...] and er Commissioner Gordon picks it up and it just goes straight to Batman and that’s it’). But the use of a private security company to monitor his movements on a continuous basis was at least an inconvenience. The delegation of the ‘dirty work’ of actual surveillance to private security companies can of course be framed as part of the wider shift to privatising costly and time-consuming tasks previously undertaken by state agencies that has been such a core plank of the neoliberal policy revolution since the 1970s. This checking-in via the black box amounted to another measure controlling Bullivant’s circulation more than his communication. On the other hand, reflecting on the extent to which these limitations on his freedom of movement, and the conditions of the control order more generally, are effective, Bullivant is sceptical:

CB: If you’ve got people who you think are alleged terrorists and are involved in terrorist activity, control orders and TPIMs are an awful way to stop them doing that. So for example, I could go to any number of massively crowded busy places within my time, I could go pretty much anywhere on the Underground network. I could’ve gone to Oxford Street. [...] I used to laugh with my friends that like thank god that we’re not terrorists, cos if we were, these measures would have almost no effect on actually stopping us being as effective as we’d wanna be, d’you know what I mean? [BW: Yeah] Like, um, I still went and saw the same people that I saw, I did all the same things that I pretty much coulda wanted to do, yeah?

So the controlling of dangerous circulations succeeds to the extent that undesirables are kept out of the global space-time, but might be less successful in preventing an actual terrorist attack. Bullivant notes that there have, additionally, been many absconders from control orders and TPIMs, with the controlled persons never being found again.

Asked about the degree of communicative restriction he faced under the control order, Bullivant noted that his restrictions were relatively light. Initially, he was told that he was not allowed to speak to other people also under a control order and on a list provided by the Home Office. Taking this to mean people who were both under a control order and on the list (which he never received), he continued to communicate with several friends who were also placed under control orders. At the trial for the 47 ‘breaches’ of his order, the Prosecution alleged that Bullivant’s communications with other controlled persons constituted breaches. It was his interpretation that prevailed:

CB: So, and we argued this out in court and um I actually, the, the judge said that like my, my understandin’ of it was completely correct grammatically and the Oxford, er, um prosecutor was forced to, er, shut up about it, cos he kept [BW: Accept that he’d read it wrong?] yeah, accept that it was poorly written. And um, that really pissed him off, sort of getting into a, he’s Oxford graduate getting into a grammatical debate with [LAUGHING] a guy from Dagenham [BW: boy from east London?]. Yeah and, and, and losing. So, you know how these Oxford boys love, sort of public school boys love, they’re sticklers for this stuff anyway.

There is, however, an important sense in which Bullivant did find the control order to be effective:

CB: Um, the actual only effective thing about it, was the fact that, because I was on it and because of it being, because of its, the nature of it, it left, er, me feeling depressed and so I, I ceased to be active in and of myself because of the pressure of the order itself and the pressure of being accused of such a serious crime without evidence. So... that was the only, only disabling factor.

In Bullivant’s view, then, the order worked at a more micro-social and psychological level than at the macro-level of normal legal prohibition. What effectiveness the order does have resides in the ways it alters his feelings and re-shapes him as a subject. His depression
reduced his activism, ‘disabling’ him. He describes his treatment as ‘malicious’ and feels that he was and continues to be punished by the security services.

CB: A lot of people around me, once they found out I was on a control order, didn’t want to talk to me. And I ended up losing contact and losing connection with a lot of people both from my, from the Muslim community, and, but it wasn’t actually from a condition of the order but from the fear of having of associating with someone on the order in and of itself. So, so it was a, a general feel within the community and within, within things, and also my mum didn’t know that I was on the order for a year and a half. So, obviously in those regards it affected communication with, with my mother and with my family, because I’m keeping a huge secret that I don’t wanna keep but obviously because of the circumstance I have to, and... that affects with the way you live with people and the way that you interact with them and communicate with them, because you’re living with a secret hanging over you all the time, and the stress of that.

In spite of all this, Bullivant sees the use of control orders as ultimately a failure, since they do not in fact prevent controlled persons from either absconding or from carrying out terrorist attacks. But how can we measure the ‘success’ of an instrument like this? In this case, the order worked to induce or produce a particular sort of subjectivity, via some very direct interventions in the life of the controlled person. You may legally have the right to travel fairly widely, to visit crowded places or to maintain contact with your friends, but if you are depressed and paranoid, if your friends and family are afraid to speak to you (and are in any case themselves being covertly approached by the security services, as Bullivant’s friends have frequently attested to since), perhaps your ability and desire to do such things is diminished anyway.

From the controlled person’s perspective, the control order thus works at the level of the subject’s emotions and identity, undermining confidence, inducing fear, paranoia and uncertainty, and alienating them from friends and relatives. While Bullivant felt that the orders were ineffective as compared with arresting and imprisoning suspected terrorists (following proper police investigation and due legal process), he nevertheless concedes to being profoundly affected by the order and its repercussions, even now, several years after the order was quashed at the High Court. Control orders and TPIMs can therefore be understood as a means of privatising and individualising security. They are bound up in
processes of privatisation in a number of ways. Controlled persons are linked by means of the sort of ‘black box’ telephone Bullivant describes, not to the Police or MI5, but to a private, profit-making security company. Companies like G4S have made vast profits by taking on these sorts of para-state roles, carrying out executive functions like enforcement or monitoring. This has been one element of a wider shift of responsibility for enforcing security measures away from the ‘public’ sphere and in to the hands of private enterprises working for financial incentives. Privatisation of this sort is a crucial neoliberal policy strategy, since the displacement of the political and of other forms of social interaction with the market and supply-and-demand forms of interaction is the key moral good from the perspective of the neoliberal way of seeing.

Control orders are also about individualising responsibility for maintaining security. In this case, the controlled persons themselves are ‘responsibilised’ since many of the conditions of the control order were either open to interpretation or wholly ineffectual. It is the controlled person that must conduct themselves in the appropriate way, making calls, attending appointments, meeting curfews, staying away from ‘bad’ people, and so on. Unlike a prison, where guards actively monitor and enforce required codes of conduct, control orders and TPIMs rely on the internalisation by the controlled persons of the correct forms of conduct. It is the knowledge that one might be being observed (a ‘known unknown’), together with the threat of unspecified further conditions or actions for breaching conditions, and the feelings of anxiety, depression and paranoia induced by the order and its effect on one’s social circle that give it its power. Indeed, the high rate of people absconding from both control orders and TPIMs is evidence that it is really up to the controlled persons to ‘control themselves’. Even when, after a few weeks ‘on the run’, Bullivant decided to hand himself in, the police did not feel the need to locate and arrest him on a weekend but instead asked him to drop in to a police station on Monday:

I absconded for 5 ½ weeks. Without warning the Home Office dropped the anonymity ban and suddenly my face was everywhere, headlines screamed that I was one of the most dangerous people in the country. My name was mentioned in parliament with the Home Secretary at the time talking of derogating from the ECHR – all because of me! I couldn’t believe it – I’m just an ordinary guy from east London. I realised that running away wasn’t solving anything; I saw that the press
were camping outside my mum’s house - it was affecting my friends and family and was causing such trouble. It was time to face up to my situation. I called my lawyer and said I was ready to turn myself in. It was the Saturday that my lawyer called the police and said that I had returned and was ready to face the consequences. I sat with them as they called the police. My lawyer put down the phone, looking baffled ‘the police said you can turn yourself in on Monday’. Monday! I’d been hearing how I was the most dangerous man in Britain and the police weren’t coming to arrest me and sling me in a cell – instead they were giving me the weekend and asking me to turn up unescorted at the beginning of the next working week!579

As of 2013, of the nine people who have absconded from their control order or TPIM since they were first introduced in 2005, Bullivant is the only one to have been ‘recovered’, having given himself up to police voluntarily. Not only are the public responsibilised as individuals for ‘remaining vigilant’ and expected to call the anti-terrorist hotline (a call to which, MI5 revealed, was integral to their pursuing a control order on Bullivant with the Home Secretary), but even the ‘suspects’ of the War on Terror are made to police themselves, since it often isn’t possible to bring any charges against those the security services identify as such. This is governing at a distance580 – the essence of neoliberal governmentality – but it nevertheless relies upon other forms of power. This includes disciplinary power through the ‘panopticon’-like effect of surveillance measures and sovereign power since each order is issued by, and entirely at the discretion of, the Home Secretary.

The ultimate limit to the success of control orders and TPIMs as ways of producing neoliberal subjectivities/objectivities and of governing subject-objects ‘at a distance’ is, therefore, this: there is no such thing as a ‘controlled person’, nor can there be. The truly controlled person has ceased to be a person, since part of all definitions of ‘persons’ entail some form of intentionality. The point here is that, for all their apparently totalitarian framing, control orders simply do not appear to be hugely effective in achieving the goal of producing properly responsibilised, individualised security and in fully ‘controlling’ their subjects.

As long as the people subjected to these orders are alive, they are capable of resistance – of thinking, behaving and even communicating in ‘uncontrolled’ ways. The legislation that brought these orders into being, in spite of its controversial breadth, remains limited in terms of what sorts of controls may be applied. Control orders and TPIMs, as so many measures of the War on Terror, have been called ‘Orwellian’, and 1984 has been invoked in discussions of such measures in the media and in parliament.\footnote{Samira Shackle, ‘Will a weak compromise on control orders trigger rebellion?’, The New Statesman, 25\textsuperscript{th} January 2011, http://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/the-staggers/2011/01/control-orders-measures, [accessed 8\textsuperscript{th} August].} Indeed, the fact that under PTA 2005 ‘acts’ and ‘conduct’ that can be considered ‘terrorist-related’ may include ‘omissions’ – that is to say \textit{unarticulated thoughts}, knowledge that is not uttered – recalls Orwell’s ‘thought police’. What is missed, however, in the appropriately bleak picture the invocation of this book lends, is the fullness of Orwell’s allegory. It is not only that governmental power, under the guise of ‘securing freedoms’, in fact denies individual liberties \textit{in extremis}, but also that it is ultimately limited in terms of its reach. Just as Winston Smith, through keeping his secret diary, his secret loathing of the regime, and his secret affair with Julia, is able to retain some sense of freedom – to act out some measure, however small, of resistance – so the limits to governmental power intrinsic to control orders and TPIMs lie at the core of the subject. Ironically, in a 2006 address to the Royal United Services Institute, Gordon Brown (then Chancellor) quoted a little-known poem by Orwell, which he included at the end of a short 1943 essay ‘Looking Back on the Spanish War’. Brown quotes the following lines, suggesting that they described perfectly how and why ‘on 7\textsuperscript{th} July and after the British people stood as one’, referring of course to the ‘7/7’ London bombings of the previous year:

\begin{quote}
But the thing that I saw in your face
No power can disinherit:
No bomb that ever burst
Shatters the crystal spirit\footnote{George Orwell, \textit{The Italian Soldier Shook My Hand}, http://theorwellprize.co.uk/george-orwell/by-orwell/poetry/the-italian-soldier-shook-my-hand/, [accessed 8\textsuperscript{th} August].}
\end{quote}

Orwell’s poem is actually an elegy to an Italian communist soldier he had encountered at the Lenin barracks on his arrival in Barcelona in December 1936. The pure empathy, the willingness to kill or die in order to stop fascism in Spain, the ‘crystal spirit’ Orwell saw in that
man’s face, described vividly also in the opening lines of *Homage to Catalonia*,\(^5\) represented a transcendent resistance to all the ‘lies’, violence and summary executions referred to in the preceding passages of the poem. Orwell’s point is precisely that for all the brutal political machinations and conniving and state violence and subjugation that allowed fascism ultimately to triumph in Spain, this man and his comrades represented a resistant spirit. That Brown should use this quote at a time when the actual government response to 7/7 had been the fast-tracking of the PTA 2005 and the introduction of control orders is ironic indeed. This is especially pertinent given that what he issues forth a few sentences later might have come from the pages of *1984* as a description of the history of Oceania:

> The Treasury itself had to become a department for security [...] and I have found that it is not just the Treasury that is a department of security. So too is almost every other department [...] We used to think national security was about Home Office policy, international security about defence policy and foreign affairs. Now we find that national and international action for security is inextricably linked and security issues dominate decisions in transport, energy, immigration and extend to social security and health.\(^6\)

This ‘securitisation of everything’ and the regime of governmental power intrinsic to control orders and TPIMs, these things do not represent the ‘crystal spirit’ Orwell so admired, but rather all that it stands in opposition to. If anything, the crystal spirit belongs to those, like Bullivant, wrongly detained by agents of Brown’s government, subjected to curfews, sign-ins and electronic tagging, never informed of the allegations or evidence against them, who nevertheless remain defiant:

> CB: It, it, you know what it was, I think it maybe was just our group of people, the, the, the other people that I knew that were on control orders, and our mindset at the time. Like we had a bit more of a ‘sod you!’ attitude about it, because we thought it was so unjust and so unfair what was happening to us and that it was so... oppressive, d’you know what I mean? That’s the exact word for it. Yes we’re gonna abide by your conditions, we’re gonna do what we have to do, but we’re, we’re not gonna bend over backwards to appease you and make you happy with this, we’re gonna, we’re gonna basically try and get on with our lives as much as possible, without letting you win, as it were. So, we were

very adversarial with them in regards to, to that. [...] Just recently I was sorting out paperwork and clearing out our old house and I was going I, I was reading through my old interview, my first police interview after I was arrested for the first time. I was so antagonistic with the police! Because, I just felt that what they were doing was un-British, unconstitutional and, and just completely against standards and norms.

7.4 Practices of security II: drone warfare

7.4.1 Drone warfare: an introduction

The emergence of what has been dubbed ‘drone warfare’ has been a distinctive and controversial element of the War on Terror spawning hundreds of news stories, books, journal articles, research projects and academic conference panels discussing their ethics and legality. Justifications for the increasing use of unmanned aircraft, piloted remotely for both reconnaissance and combat missions include removing the risk of own-side casualties, the potential for cutting costs, and developing a ‘persistent’ aerial reconnaissance presence beyond that achievable by human pilots. Research and development around the use of such unmanned aircraft has spilled out from military applications to the point where drones are being developed to do everything from monitoring street crime in urban Britain to delivering Amazon packages to people’s homes and protecting endangered animals from poachers in South Africa and Uganda.

Nevertheless, the term ‘drone’ has become synonymous with controversy and drone warfare has faced increasing suspicion and hostility, with activists and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engaging in monitoring and protest activity around their use. This stems, in large part, from a visceral fear of the idea of ‘killer robots’ or killing by ‘remote control’. The concerns associated with this are multiple, but the core anxieties seem to relate to two problems. The first is a general fear of machines having the ‘choice’ over the life and death of people – that is, over the automation of killing – a scenario which has long been a theme in dystopian science fiction novels and films. From Isaac Asimov’s I, Robot and Philip K. Dick’s Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep? to the Terminator films, we have been

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culturally pre-occupied with the notion that our wondrous technological abilities as a species will eventually result in machines so sophisticated that they supersede humanity, ‘rising up’ to destroy us. This fear seemingly revolves around the question of ‘conscience’ and the lack of moral feeling in machines. Just as the systematic killing of Jews in Nazi Germany has been understood as ‘industrial’ – as fundamentally machine-like – so the concern is that robots will not hold back or equivocate, will not show mercy or restraint or leniency, and will not hear or properly accommodate pleas and explanations from potential victims. The robot feels none of the guilt, shame, disgust, self-loathing, or post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that a person might when they kill another; they experience no empathy. This, it is imagined, might make a machine more capable of killing more people, in a more nonchalant and arbitrary way.

The second main problem underpinning our anxieties around drones is a concern about the removal of human beings from the battlefield and thus from the immediacy of armed conflict and its repercussions. Given the current level of drone technologies, it is this concern that is the most pertinent, since there are no fully autonomous armed drones in use. At stake are questions of proportionality and precision, ‘battle stress’, civilian casualties and possible moral ambiguity stemming from the game-like ‘remote control’ experience.

These concerns have been supported by statistics; large numbers of civilians have been killed. The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism has devoted significant resources over several years to building detailed data on civilian casualties resultant from armed drone strikes, as has the small NGO ‘Drone Wars’. A complaint against the US, lodged with the United Nations Human Rights Council in February 2012 by the human rights lawyer Clive Stafford Smith on behalf of Pakistani victims of US drone strikes, and a further complaint lodged with the International Criminal Court in February 2014, provide meticulously researched detail of many specific instances of individuals, groups and whole families of civilians being suddenly and violently killed by sudden drone strikes for no apparent reason. One example, is that of complainant number one in the UN HRC complaint, Mohamed Yusuf:

Mohammad Yusuf is a resident of Dawar Tapi, Miranshah, North Waziristan, Pakistan. On Wednesday, October 9, 2008, he was in Ghundi Kala, at the house of his Uncle Sultan Jan.

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for a family gathering. In addition to Sultan Jan, others present at the house included: his cousin and son of Sultan Jan, Bukhtoor Gul, his uncle Aman Ullah Jan, and his cousin, and son of Aman Ullah Jan, Imran Khan. Imran was aged 14 and half years of age. No members of his family were involved with any terrorist organizations or activities, and there were no foreign nationals living at the house.

At approximately 10 PM that evening Mohammad Yusuf left the compound surrounding the house to defecate in a nearby field. From the field he saw a missile strike his uncle’s house, destroying part of the house and killing his two uncles and his two cousins. The missile was launched from a drone, which had been flying around the area.

The indiscriminate killing of Mohammad Yusuf’s innocent family members was unjustified, and constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of their lives, in violation of Article 6.1 of the ICCPR [The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, of which the US is a signatory], and constitutes cruel and inhuman treatment, in violation of Article 7 of the ICCPR. The missile strike was also a violation of their Article 9.1 right to liberty and security of person; their Article 17 right to freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference with their privacy, family, and home; their Article 21 right to peaceful assembly; and their Article 22 right to freedom of association with others.

Though in use in various forms since the First World War, the use of drones by the US began in earnest after 9/11.589 Both the CIA and the three branches of the armed forces developed drone programmes. This has included the use of drones armed with missiles and laser-guided bombs, which are charged with both ‘ISTAR’ (intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance) duties and actually killing individuals and groups acquired as targets. In particular, US-operated General Atomics MQ-1 Predator drones have been used for many years now to both acquire and eliminate targets in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere.590 The use by the US of armed drones to strike at targets has only increased under the Obama administration, with its ‘embrace of a drones-first counterterrorism policy’,591 and, while autonomous armed drones are yet to be put into service, there is evidence that the US has engaged in ‘signature strikes’, whereby analysts studying the video feed from a drone

identify suspicious patterns or ‘signatures’ of movement and behaviour that might be associated with ‘insurgent’ activity, in order to determine targets.

These US drone programmes have also been integral to the normalisation of the practice of what is euphemistically called ‘targeted killing’ that is, extra-judicial killing, or assassination by Western militaries and strategists. From al Qaeda leader Mohammed Atef Al-Masri being killed by a Predator drone just two months after 9/11,\textsuperscript{592} to Baitullah Mehsud, a former leader of the Pakistani Taliban, apparently being killed, along with members of his family and bodyguards, by Hellfire missiles launched from a CIA-controlled Predator while he was sunbathing on a roof terrace in August 2009.\textsuperscript{593}

But the globalist, post-9/11 thinking behind the expansion of drones has meant other uses of Predator drones by the US, including by agencies of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for patrolling borders (especially the US-Mexico border)\textsuperscript{594} and even assisting SWAT teams in arresting regular domestic criminals. In early 2014, Rodney Brossart, a North Dakota farmer wanted for cattle theft, became the first US citizen to be convicted following an arrest where an MQ-1 Predator, on loan from the DHS, was used to locate and track him and his family after they offered armed resistance to their arrest. These ‘domestic’ applications of such an ominously named technology underscore the ways in which drones can be said to represent a bleeding through of war power into police power, and vice versa.

Pushing this interpenetration of military and policing applications of drones even further, the South African firm Desert Wolf announced in a widely publicised press release in June 2014 that a South African mining company had placed their first order for the ‘Skunk Riot Control Copter’, a remotely controlled drone helicopter equipped with pepper spray, dazzling lasers and an array of paintball guns capable of firing 80 rounds per second into

\textsuperscript{592} BBC, ‘Taleban vow to defend Kandahar’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/1661261.stm, 17\textsuperscript{th} November 2001 [accessed 29\textsuperscript{th} June 2010].
\textsuperscript{593} New Yorker, ‘The Predator War’, http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer, 26\textsuperscript{th} October 2009 [accessed 10\textsuperscript{th} May 2014].
crowds at demonstrations. This announcement of the intention to use armed drones against domestic populations for ‘riot control’, especially by a South African mining company, was particularly alarming. The recent ‘Marikana massacre’, wherein South African police used live ammunition to indiscriminately fire into crowds of platinum miners striking over pay and conditions, killing 34 and wounding or maiming 78 more, apparently as a deliberate means of ending a long-running labour dispute with the mine’s operators Lonmin. Lonmin is a British, London-based platinum mining firm, who had refused to meet with the miners to discuss pay.

Whereas US Predator drones have been in operation since the mid-1990s, their Department of Defence designation switched from ‘RQ-1’ to ‘MQ-1’ in 2002, in the context of their use in Afghanistan. The change from ‘R’ for ‘reconnaissance’ to ‘M’ for ‘multi-role’ was made specifically to highlight the increasing use of armed Predators to kill, rather than merely survey, targets. In 2001, the Predator’s manufacturer, General Atomics – itself a former division of General Dynamics, makers of the popular F-16 fighter jet – first flew the Predator B, or MQ-9 Reaper as the USAF and RAF call it, a new drone based on the Predator model, but specifically designed with killing in mind. As General Atomics puts it: ‘twice as fast as Predator, it carries 500% more payload and has nine times the horsepower. Predator B provides a long-endurance, persistent surveillance/strike capability for the war fighter’. The USAF happily reported having ‘scored’ its first ‘insurgent kill’ with an MQ-9 Reaper, in Afghanistan, in October 2007. It is this ‘Reaper’, a ‘hunter-killer’ class drone that the UK has placed at the heart of its own, more modest but growing, armed drone programme.

The UK has been following slowly but surely in the footsteps of the US with regard to armed drones. The MoD’s (2011) Joint Doctrine Note 2-11: The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (JDN 2-11 hereafter), which is heavily influenced by recent US policy, experience and technologies, in fact concedes that ‘the US is ahead of the UK on the

specification, development and procurement of unmanned aircraft systems’. The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), meanwhile, committed the UK to developing its own investment in drones further. British use of drones has been largely symbiotic with the American drone programmes. Until 2013, the RAF (the only branch of the British armed forces to use armed drones, to date) operated five Reapers in Afghanistan, piloted by RAF personnel working alongside US Air Force (USAF) ‘pilots’ in the Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, USA.

However, in 2012, the RAF’s XIII Squadron became the first UK-based Reaper squadron based at RAF Waddington, in Lincolnshire. The XIII Squadron ‘undertook its first sortie’, remotely piloting armed Reaper drones in Afghanistan, on 24th April 2013. In 2014, the RAF acquired a further five Reapers, initially for use in Afghanistan, to be controlled from Waddington. All of the RAF’s Reapers – in fact its entire fleet of drones currently in service – have been purchased under ‘urgent operational requirement’ guidelines, rather than as part of a planned acquisition. While drone missions remain classified and little information is provided to the media and the public, it seems that the UK is now heavily invested in using armed drones to select and kill individuals in Afghanistan, and possibly elsewhere. In 2006, the Ministry of Defence awarded a major contract to a group of British companies led by BAE Systems and including Rolls-Royce and QinetiQ, to work on ‘Project TARANIS’, developing a state-of-the-art drone. In 2010, BAE unveiled the Taranis, an unmanned craft bearing a strong resemblance to the ‘stealth’ fighters and bombers of the sort that came into service in the 1980s and ‘90s (such as the Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk), with flat geometric panels and jagged lines designed to avoid radar detection. The Taranis prototype or ‘demonstrator’, specifications of which remain almost entirely secret, though it is known to employ ‘stealth’ technology and to be capable of supersonic flight, was first flown in August 2013, with

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600 Ministry of Defence, Joint Doctrine Note 2-11: The UK Approach to Unmanned Aircraft Systems
602 Ibid.
604 JDN 2/11.
606 BAE Systems, ‘Taranis’, http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned;baeSessionId=d9vrTLDpQxDFGG7g62zVtYtq8XWXyRLzCfqqbzzZld3yp10Pt9Dq4!-
footage of the flight being made public as part of a press release in February 2014.607 The *Guardian* newspaper reported in 2011 that it had been informed by an RAF source that the UK aims to match the US stated target of making around one-third of military aircraft unmanned,608 in the British case by 2030.609 What do these developments signify for the practice of security and war in Britain?

7.4.2 Material dimensions and ideological frames of drone warfare

While much of the approach to British drone warfare has, by the military’s own admission, been rather *ad hoc*, a 100-page ‘joint doctrine note’ for the three armed forces, published in 2011 by the Ministry of Defence’s ‘Defence Concepts and Doctrine Centre’ (DCDC) at Shrivenham, outlines the current trajectory of drone warfare and makes recommendations for its development from 2011 to 2030. The ‘principle issue’ in deciding whether drones are more appropriate in particular types of operations than manned aircraft, according to JDN-2-11, ‘will remain through-life cost. Can unmanned systems provide the same effect as manned ones, for less money?’610 While the document notes that there are ‘ethical’ and ‘legal’ problems around the use of drones, and in particular armed drones, these are *not* the ‘principle’ considerations for their use. Instead, the decision to use drones is presented as primarily an actuarial or financial one. This concern, seemingly, overrides or stands in for any concern about the loss of pilot’s lives – this latter concern only figures inasmuch as the loss of a life (or, for that matter, the maintenance of a life) is expensive, and in at least some cases, the risks of injury or loss of life might make using a drone the rational financial choice.

The fundamental analysis involved in the decision to use drones over regular aircraft with equivalent capabilities and equipment is, JDN 2-11 states, a ‘cost-benefit’ one: ‘The decision between such an unmanned system and an equivalent manned solution would simply be based on a cost/benefit analysis to establish which solution would have the lowest

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607 *Telegraph*, ‘Successful test flight for Taranis stealth drone’


through-life cost’. It will be remembered that a previous chapter drew upon the famous 1991 paper by George Lakoff on ‘metaphor and war’, in which Lakoff noted that the cost-benefit analysis constitutes one of the ‘widespread, relatively fixed set of metaphors that structure how we think’ and is commonly applied to decisions to go to war. ‘Military and international relations strategists’, Lakoff notes, use the cost-benefit metaphor because they view it as the natural elaboration of the Clausewitzian maxim that war is ‘politics pursued by other means’. Since the Clausewitzian model proceeds on a cost-benefit basis, it entails a secondary metaphor, that politics is a form of business. Lakoff uses the fact that Clausewitz’s metaphor is taken as natural and is interpreted as literal rather than metaphorical, as the starting point for an investigation of the family of metaphors associated with Western discourse on war. What we find in the British approach to drone warfare, articulated here quite explicitly by the Ministry of Defence, is the reification then, of the literal interpretation.

The decision to engage in drone warfare is literally based, in part, on a cost-benefit analysis, in the monetary or ‘business’ sense. The centrality of cost-benefit accounting of this sort to the neoliberal way of being is well-documented, with James Aune suggesting that neoliberal economics is predicated on a discourse of economic ‘realism’ characterised by modes of ‘constant calculation’. In this sense, the MoD itself embodies neoliberal ways of being, inasmuch as the rational, literal, monetary cost-benefit analysis is prioritised in war-making over and above and legal, ethical or moral considerations. Drones are used, according to the MoD, for the simple reason that they make good financial sense. This is not to say that this enunciated reason for employing drone warfare is the only or ‘true’ reason, but rather that the ‘financialisation of security’ forms the backdrop against which these tactical and technological decisions are made.

JDN 2-11 includes some very specific benefits that can be reaped through the use of drones, as compared with manned aircraft, in particular situations, and details what might be

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611 Ibid., p. 3-1.
613 Ibid., p. 2.
achievable with them in the future. The document includes a story about an imaginary future military engagement, where British forces are deployed to ‘stabilise’ regions of a ‘failed state’ that are currently ‘under hostile control’, and predicts the following role for UAVs:

Unmanned aircraft are tasked to conduct a ‘pattern of life’ Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) soak, to build understanding of activity in the area of operations; this focuses attention on a single village where insurgents are observed moving and transporting prohibited weapons. Ground troops, supported by combat-ISTAR3 unmanned aircraft respond quickly and with surgical precision. [...] As insurgents attempt to withdraw, they are destroyed from the air by the same unmanned aircraft that provided the intelligence feeds.

The fantasmatic logic underpinning this imaginary is one of automation and robot-led conflict – something like a science fiction imaginary – but it is also a logic of good and bad circulations, wherein movements of prohibited goods leads to righteous evisceration of the responsibilised individuals (the ‘insurgents’). Further implied in the concepts of a ‘pattern of life’ ISR ‘soak’ is a social ontology of emergent complexity – of the complexity of life itself. More importantly for this analysis, this represents the hallmarks of what David Chandler and others616 call ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ which represents a transformation from the initial neoliberal theoretical critique of the ‘liberal assumptions of knowledge’ (for example, the assumptions of human nature as homo economicus and of the ‘invisible hand’ of the market) to ‘a search for ever more knowledge: a constant process of filling the ‘knowledge gaps’ required to intervene in social processes’617. Similarly, another passage of JDN 2-11 suggests that ‘swarms of unmanned aircraft may be used to quickly provide unprecedented amounts of surveillance data on a particular problem’. Drones are thus framed as assisting in the violent government of complexity and emergence, through knowledge acquisition.

‘Persistence’ is a benefit factored into the cost-benefit analysis in a major way; a point that is often emphasised is that the length of time a drone can spend monitoring an area or target far exceeds that of manned aircraft: ‘without a human crew to become tired,

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unmanned aircraft can [...] have extremely long endurance’, with ‘more novel designs’ offering a persistence of ‘weeks’. On the other hand, ‘persistence comes at a cost’ since longer sorties necessitate multiple shifts of drone operators and thus a potentially higher cost in terms of person-hours and associated salaries.\textsuperscript{618} Limitations on persistence and the costs associated with it are described as a problem soluble with the development of ever more ‘resilient’ technologies.\textsuperscript{619} Persistence can be understood as an aspect of, or near-synonym for, resilience. A drone is more resilient than a human flight crew: it needs no food, no water and no sleep to survive and continue to carry out its ‘duties’. As Jonathan Joseph notes, while resilience is not ‘reducible to neoliberal policy and governance’ it does nevertheless ‘fit neatly with what it is trying to say and do’.\textsuperscript{620} Just as resilience discourse is integral to neoliberal governmentality in that it facilitates the drive toward ‘heightened self-awareness, reflexivity and responsibility’ on the part of subjects, so for technologies it involves a drive toward automation. A society of resilient subjects needs no state and an army of resilient objects needs no humans.

Automation is a key theme of JDN 2-11, and, like many aspects of the future of drones described in the text, it is depicted as inevitable, with the MoD claiming that: ‘As systems become increasingly automated, they will require decreasing human intervention between the issuing of mission level orders and their execution’.\textsuperscript{621} Eventually, in between five and 15 years’ time, this will mean the use of autonomous, ‘artificially intelligent’ drones. It would be the document states, ‘only a small technical step to enable an unmanned aircraft to fire a weapon based solely on its own sensors’. Indeed, JDN 2-11 closes its notably brief passage on ‘moral and ethical issues’ with the open-ended, seemingly rhetorical question, ‘is debate and development of policy even still possible, or is the technological genie already out of the bottle, embarking us all on an incremental and involuntary journey towards a Terminator-like reality?’ Automated killing is what might be called, to borrow Jodi Dean’s term, a ‘neoliberal fantasy’.\textsuperscript{622} Just as politics as a form of human frailty and bias must be disentangled from the pure science of the economic, so such frailties ought to be removed from the sphere of

\textsuperscript{618} p. 3-8.
\textsuperscript{619} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{621} p. 5-4.
\textsuperscript{622}Dean, Democracy and Other Neoliberal Fantasies.
managing security. The neoliberal way of war is characterised by resilience, individuation and automation – it seeks to produce independent security apparatuses, what Foucault called *dispositifs*, as a component of the project of governing at a distance. Automating killing, much like privatising it (through the use of PMSCs), is a neoliberal strategy to the extent that it takes the responsibility for this activity away from the state and leaves it instead to the organic mechanisms of the market.

Mark Neocleous argues that drones must be understood within the wider context of air power, which, in turn ‘has always been police power’. That is to say instruments of ‘war’ are also instruments of regulation and ultimately of governmental power. War is not a state of exception, but is interwoven into the very fabric of everyday security and government, and drones are particularly apt to illustrate these interconnections. Neocleous points out that despite media and academic attention being largely focused on the ‘killing machines’ aspect, the vast majority of drones are used for surveillance purposes. Air power has, historically, proven blind to any distinction between ‘civilians’ or ‘non-combatants’ and combatants, and drones are no exception, with Neocleous going so far as to claim that the concept of the ‘civilian’ was in fact ‘destroyed with the very invention of air power’. One is only a non-combatant retrospectively, ‘when one is dead’. Utilitarian and risk-transferring capacities of drones render them not only a ‘perfect technology of liberal war’ but also a ‘perfect technology of liberal police’ or a ‘permanent police presence in the skies’.

7.4.3 FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE: THE PRACTICAL EFFICACY OF DRONE WARFARE

While the British military have, like their American counterparts, shrouded the specific missions in which drones have participated in secrecy, the Government did announce in July 2014 that RAF Reapers in Afghanistan have flown for over 54,000 hours and have fired 459 weapons. Also in 2014, a new, unarmed drone, the ‘Watchkeeper’ was granted permission to fly in UK airspace (a privilege RAF Reapers are not allowed), operated by the British Army. Together with the significant investment in procuring five new Reapers and commissioning Taranis, the evidence is clear that the UK continues to embrace the practice of drone warfare. But, while the above analysis has connected this practice in terms of its aims and framing to

624 Ibid., p. 160.
626 HM Government, ‘New RAF Reapers take to the skies’. 
neoliberal ways of seeing, how far has it entailed or encouraged neoliberal ways of being, ‘in practice’?

Unlike control orders and TPIMs, it is not easy to speak to those directly targeted by armed British drones, since most are dead or maimed, and the living are resident in Afghanistan. However, a picture of the practice of British drone warfare can be at least partially reconstructed from documentary evidence. From the accounts of those who have lost friends, relatives or limbs to drone strikes, documented in reports like Stanford University’s ‘Living Under Drones’, to the House of Commons Defence Committee report ‘Remote Control: Remotely Piloted Air Systems, Current and Future Use’, which was published in 2014 as the outcome of an inquiry into the UK’s use of drones ordered in 2013, a range of documents allow some insight into how this technology of ‘security’ has played out in practice.

One aspect of the implementation of the UK’s drone programme that it remains difficult to assess is the use of drones for ‘targeted killing’ or assassination. This has been one of the main uses the US has put its drone fleet to, especially those operated by the CIA. This assassination programme has been justified by the US government by recourse to the Authorisation for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), a fast-tracked Congressional resolution passed in a single day, three days after 9/11. The legal and ethical acceptability of this use of AUMF has been challenged in some quarters, but if the UK is engaging in assassination, it has no such recourse to an emergency law. While, like all major Western powers, there is of course a long and well-documented historical precedent of British intelligence agencies employing or attempting assassination, the practice is more controversial today, since the British political establishment is openly committed to the doctrine of universal human rights, including rights to trial and due process. Notably, the RAF and MoD have been much less inclined to name specific victims or targets of drone attacks than have their US counterparts. Remote Control, the Defence Committee’s report into British

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drone warfare, is extraordinarily abstruse on the matter, though the implication seems to be that the UK does not engage in targeted killing, but might be supplying information to the US for this purpose:

Targeted killings 19. We acknowledge that over the last few years there has been a growing concern in relation to the sharing of intelligence with allies and the uses to which such data may contribute. While the issues raised by Reprieve stray beyond the terms of reference for our inquiry and indeed the remit of the Defence Committee, we do believe that there should be greater transparency in relation to safeguards and limitations the UK Government has in place for the sharing of intelligence.

Rendering assassination plots nothing more than the ‘sharing’ of ‘data’ highlights the degree to which drone warfare as a method of ‘targeted killing’ is situated within a wider ‘netwar’ or ‘information age’ paradigm.630 As previous chapters have demonstrated, this netwar model is central to the neoliberal way of war, since the discourse and practice of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ in the 21st century is permeated by references to the globalised and networked social morphology that is at one and the same time the evidence for, and the ideal of, a market-based social order. In this security imaginary, the elimination of a bad circulation or dark network might well require ‘decapitation’ of individual nodes/leaders. While a recent article in RUSI Defence Systems, on ‘the weaponisation of future unmanned aerial vehicles’ claims that miniature ‘micro’ or nano-type drones will be limited to ISTAR duties due to their ‘payload restrictions’,631 a USAF animated film on the development of ‘biologically-inspired’, flapping-wing ‘micro air vehicles’ (MAVs), suggests that tiny, insect like drones will be able to silently approach individual people in difficult-to-reach rooms, land on them and detonate explosive charges.632 Targeted killing with drones is thus conceived of partly as the management of problematic nodes in the network, or ‘toxic flows’ in the global market.

But what of the principles of flexibility and adaptability, so crucial to the ‘vulgate’ of neoliberalism; do drones fulfil these principles? A House of Commons Library briefing note

630 Dillon and Reid, The Liberal Way of War.
632 https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=_5YkQ9w3PJ4#! [accessed 19th December 2013].
that acts as introduction to drones for MPs who might be called upon to debate their use notes as a specific weakness of drones the fact that they ‘currently lack the flexibility and adaptability of manned aircraft’. Designed for specific mission types (e.g. ISTAR) and with limited manoeuvrability, current drones are apparently not flexible enough, though those in development (e.g. TARANIS) are supposed precisely to overcome these limitations to adaptability and flexibility.

Furthermore, as Remote Control’s very sympathetic account of current UK drone warfare emphasises, RAF drone pilots are required to follow the same ‘rules of engagement’ as pilots in manned aircraft. Again, the document implies this is a point of distinction from the US approach; sticking to the rules of engagement presumably means not assassinating a man, and half his family, with a Hellfire missile while he sunbathes unarmed on a rooftop. Of course the secrecy around drone missions makes it impossible to judge this clearly.

Living Under Drones, a report resulting from a research project conducted jointly by Stanford University and New York University, presents a detailed analysis of ‘death, injury and trauma to civilians from US drone practices in Pakistan’. The report, based on interviews carried out with more than 130 people living in the ‘tribal areas’ of northern Pakistan, notes that – beyond normalising assassination through ‘targeted killing’ – the US drone programme also has deep effects on the very personalities of those people living in the region:

Interviewees described the experience of living under constant surveillance as harrowing. In the words of one interviewee: “God knows whether they’ll strike us again or not. But they’re always surveying us, they’re always over us, and you never know when they’re going to strike and attack.”

Impacts on mental health noted by psychiatrists in the area, interviewed for the project, include a ‘pervasive worry about future trauma’ or ‘anticipatory anxiety’, which is bound up with a deep-seated sense of uncertainty or ‘uncontrollability’. In addition to meticulously detailing the many symptoms that had been linked to experiencing drone strikes, from panic attacks and insomnia to fits and hysterical episodes – even violent headaches at

633 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (drones): an introduction, p. 3.
634 Living Under Drones
635 Ibid., p. 80.
636 Ibid., p. 81.
the sound of propellers – the report notes that interviewees ‘indicated that their own powerlessness to minimize their exposure to strikes compounded their emotional and psychological stress’. In particular, ‘many interviewees’ reported that ‘drone strike practices cause individuals to fear assembling in groups [...] out of concern that they might be assumed to be engaged in suspicious activity that might result in a signature strike’. This transformation of conduct, and the designation of certain conducts (e.g. assembling in groups) as ‘bad’ or at least ‘risky’ or ‘dangerous’ can be understood as a partial success for neoliberal ways of being resultant from drone programmes. While it is as yet unknown whether the UK carries out signature strikes (from the MoD’s take on their legality in JDN 2-11, it seems likely), British drones being flown in Afghan airspace where US Predators and Reapers have carried out such strikes will doubtless have a similar impact. Particularly interesting is the undermining of social solidarity and the assertion of an individualist ethos and social ontology. The logic of Western drone operating forces seems to be ‘if people in these areas gather in groups, it is likely they are insurgents/terrorists’, and fear of this logic drives people on the ground to cease gathering in groups. To the extent that people’s conduct is conducted by the possibility of drones, the operation of governmentality can be discerned, and to the extent that this conduct revolves around a reformulation of the subject as a resilient, rational individual actor, operating only along network-market lines, that governmentality can be understood as neoliberal in character. This is not to say that drone technology, or drone warfare in general is intrinsically neoliberal, but rather that the application of drone warfare as a technique of government in ‘risky’ and ‘unstable’ places – especially where drone strikes are based on ‘pattern of life’ type data analysis – is aimed at achieving stability and security by responsibilising individuals for behaving in safe patterns.

Like control orders and TPIMs, then, drone warfare does entail the internalisation of governmental forms of power that are essential to neoliberalism. But in addition to being conceivable as an element of neoliberal governmentality, it also implies a whole set of other manifestations of power. In fact, drones present themselves as an excellent opportunity to reflect on Foucault’s full range of categories of power.

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637 Ibid., p. 82.
638 Ibid., p. 118.
The drone represents sovereign, decision-making power, with US strikes being personally sanctioned by the President, for example. The sovereign power – that which Hobbes so aptly characterised as a ‘mortal God’ here on earth – sends the drone to smite wrongdoers and enemies of the state just as Zeus dealt swift and brutal justice with his thunderbolt from the heavens. This godly analogy is not lost on the military-industrial complex, with BAE Systems’ supersonic stealth drone ‘Taranis’ – the first all-British designed and built hunter-killer drone – being ‘named after the Celtic god of thunder’. Through drones, the sovereign can globally select individuals whose right to life is suspended by their suspected involvement in terrorist-related activity or insurgency, and exercising this sovereign right is, as the post-9/11 Schmittian revival has pointed out, a central constitutive aspect of sovereignty itself. The transnational scope of the drone, its lack of territorial boundaries and its geographic functions as an element of air power – it’s very ‘verticality’ of operation – illustrate the analogy between sovereign and divine power; the sovereign can find you and kill you from above, wherever you may hide, for the sovereign, like God, is omnipotent.

The drone also represents disciplinary power, making an ‘example’ of its targets to others who might have considered engaging in ‘terrorist-related’ activity or insurgency. The razing of a compound or convoy, and all within it, with ‘Hellfire’ missiles invokes that spirit of punishment as a spectacle’ that Foucault identified as ‘disappearing’ with the rise of modern penal systems. One function of the drone strike is as a ‘preventative’ or ‘pre-emptive’ strike against those seen as a potential threat, and crucially, one component of this preventative approach is that is has an audience. But the drone includes the ‘panopticism’ of the disciplinary power that inheres to modern disciplinary systems too. Its deployment is justified through ‘mechanisms of exclusion’ and the ‘normal/abnormal’ binary that allows for the designation of ‘terrorists’ and ‘insurgents’ as targets, and the rendering of the surveilled subject such that ‘he is seen, but he does not see. He is the object of information, never a

640 [http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned;baeSessionId=7z2CT1xDfbr3RygzzyjML5Qnhhw1tB3GTHvVXQ25nJGvFLUjfnl1-17447453897_afrLoop=82597638240000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null%26_f_rWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D82597638240000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D4y7594vlf_4](http://www.baesystems.com/enhancedarticle/BAES_157659/taranis-unmanned;baeSessionId=7z2CT1xDfbr3RygzzyjML5Qnhhw1tB3GTHvVXQ25nJGvFLUjfnl1-17447453897_afrLoop=82597638240000&_afrWindowMode=0&_afrWindowId=null%26_f_rWindowId%3Dnull%26_afrLoop%3D82597638240000%26_afrWindowMode%3D0%26_adf.ctrl-state%3D4y7594vlf_4)
641 Agamben, *Homo Sacer*.
643 Ibid., p. 199.
subject in communication’. Could Foucault’s words here more thoroughly epitomise this aspect of drones – of the ‘signature strike’, of the informationalisation of life in the project of death from above? The drone is the all-seeing eye in the sky, encoding and decoding your behaviour, assigning you an algorhythmic signature. The drone is thus a material embodiment of a symbolic omnipotent observer; you don’t see it, but it sees you, like the Eye of Horus, or Tolkein’s Eye of Sauron, the ‘eye in the Dark Tower that did not sleep’. Indeed, in 2008, when the BBC became the first British media outlet to be granted access to Creech Air Force base in Nevada, to speak with US and British drone operators as part of the USAF and RAF’s PR offensive on drones, USAF Colonel Chris Chambliss, commander of the US fleet of Predator and Reaper drones, told them: ‘It’s not the weapons. It’s the persistence. It’s the unblinking eye - how long you can spend over the target’. The panoptical potential of the drone’s gaze thus disciplines the rural populations of countries like Pakistan, Afghanistan and Yemen into right conduct.

The informationalisation of life by the drone implicates it, furthermore, in regimes of ‘biopower’. The drone is a technology that seeks to make ‘precision strikes’, to clinically eviscerate those contagious and infected elements of the global human organism that fester in far-flung corners of foreign lands. As JDN 2/11 puts it, future drones will support operations counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations with a ‘surgical precision’. This pre-emption and preventative cutting out of tumours, this violent government of possibility by the drone, is surely an example *par excellence* of the biopolitical process that Dillon and Reid call ‘killing to make life live’; the process of eliminating the threats to life that emerge from the very emergent nature of (biologically conceptualised) life itself.

Sovereign power, disciplinary power and biopower are, therefore, all operative in drone warfare, but it also sits within the field of governmentality as the conduct of conduct. Drone warfare is not simply a product of – that is to say, it is not ‘determined’ by – neoliberalism, but it does entail ways of seeing and being that are essentially neoliberal in

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644 Ibid., p. 200.
645 The Eye of Horus, the Ancient Egyptian falcon deity, a pervasive feature of Egyptian iconography, is a classical symbol of the omnipotence of the gods.
647 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7439825.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7439825.stm)
648 Dillon and Reid, *The Liberal Way of War*. 
character. The neoliberal security imaginary, with its notions of global network-markets and individualised risk and responsibility, is one of the conditions of possibility for the discourse and practice of drone warfare. Every Pakistani, Afghani, Palestinian or Yemeni family that ‘lives under drones’, that is conscious in their everyday activity of the risks of death from above associated with incorrect conduct, is to some extent drawn into the relations of neoliberal governmentality. If, as a result of this consciousness, one is careful not to drive erratically, or to avoid digging near roads, or carrying tools, cameras or other items that might be mistaken for weapons, then one is having ones conduct conducted; being governed at a distance. This is one key way in which the neoliberal way of war is achieved through the individualisation of responsibility for security. Security is not for the state to serve up on a plate, it is for each of us to contribute. Behaving in insecure ways, in threatening ways, means taking risks upon ourselves; the state cannot insure us against the repercussions of such behaviour.

7.5 Conclusion

This chapter has used an approach to practice analysis, rooted in the traditions of ‘thick description’ or ‘cultural interpretation’ and qualitative document analysis, in an attempt to shed light upon the influence of neoliberal ways of being and seeing upon two key security practices of the War on Terror – the use of control orders/TPIMs, and drone warfare.

It has been argued that control orders and TPIMs can be conceived of as an important element of the neoliberal way of war inasmuch as they reflect in materiality the social ontology of neoliberalism. These measures that seek to isolate and ‘control’ dangerous individuals, to limit and survey their flows around social networks, to monitor their communications and to place them under the control of private security companies. Control orders and TPIMs thus involve neoliberal ways of seeing (an individualist social ontology and network-market centred morphology, along with an emphasis on privatisation and self-regulation) and ways of being (the transformation of individual subjects into self-governing and disciplined nodes, the responsibilisation of individuals for security, and so on).

It was also found that drone warfare fits within the framework of a neoliberal way of war. It, too, is concerned with the isolation and management of risky individuals; it too is predicated on a globalist, networked, but fundamentally individualist social ontology. And
drone strikes also work ‘on the subject’, serving to conduct the conduct of those living in affected areas. However, it has also been established that these security practices exist and function beyond or apart from neoliberalism in at least two key ways. Firstly, they both entail other forms of power than governmentality and are predicated on other (for example, disciplinary and retributive) paradigms than that of the scientifically-governed market. Secondly, it has been noted that these practices both fail, in a number of ways, to bring off the effects that their ideological framings imply as their goals. Control orders do not produce ‘controlled persons’ and do not prevent terrorist attacks. Drone warfare has failed to prevent insurgencies and has arguably been more successful at causing severe psychological disturbance in civilians than at halting dangerous circulations.

These practices are nevertheless elements of the broader ‘neoliberal way of war’ in which the UK is engaged in the 21st century. However partially or successfully, they are based on neoliberal ways of seeing and interpreting the world and aim at producing forms of social order and ways of being consistent with these ways of seeing. They materialise, in a variety of incomplete ways, the discourses of globalisation, marketization, privatisation, flexibilisation and individual responsibilisation that are central to neoliberal political economic thought and action. They are thus informed by the sort of ‘security’ thinking represented in the policy papers and speeches studied in Chapters Five and Six. The question that remains, to be discussed in the concluding chapter to this thesis, is of how useful the conceptual framework of a neoliberal way of war might be, given the analysis in these three chapters, to further research on war and security in the post-Cold War West.
8. CONCLUSIONS: THE NEOLIBERAL WAY OF WAR, OR BEYOND NEOLIBERALISM?

8.1 FINDINGS (OR ‘MAKINGS’)

To speak of ‘findings’ at the end of a thesis of this sort is slightly disingenuous since, as has been emphasised throughout, the aim of this project was the construction of a critical explanation; an alternative to the liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm. While that construction may have entailed a retroductive or transcendental ‘logic of discovery’, as well as a logic of explanation, it is nevertheless more appropriate to think of the results of the study in terms of something like ‘makings’. What has been made here, is a critical explanatory causal narrative that describes the ways in which neoliberalism can be understood to have constitutive effects upon the discourses and practices of war and so-called ‘security’.

Like all causal explanations in politics and IR, what has been made here is also a political argument, an attempt at persuading the reader of a particular story. This does not render the project any the less ‘scientific’. Political science, as it was first described by Aristotle, necessarily involves judgments, values, conceptions of the good and the not-so-good, evaluations of relations of power. To claim otherwise, to imagine political science as identical to natural science is, as the early chapters of this thesis argued at length, a grave error. The study of subjects, by subjects (social science) cannot escape ‘subjectivity’ of analysis, while the attempt to treat subjects as objects has, as this thesis has shown, dangerous political implications.

This final chapter seeks to draw the central arguments together, demonstrating not only the original contributions this thesis represents – and, as should now be clear, it can be considered a ‘thesis’, strictu sensu; it is a conjectured explanation – but also its limitations. Finally, by way of concluding the chapter, some reflections will be offered on possible interesting directions for further research that the conclusions drawn here suggest.

8.1.1 THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FINDINGS

This thesis has demonstrated some of the fundamental weaknesses of what it identifies as the ‘liberal peace/liberal wars’ paradigm for explaining Western involvement in post-Cold War conflict. It has been shown that such explanations tend to rest upon

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650 In The Nichomachean Ethics.
ontologically ‘shallow’ empiricist conceptions of the social world, which are unable to sufficiently account for the role of neoliberalism as a prevailing social structure in shaping social practices, and which fail – in their ‘operationalisation’ of social concepts and forms like war and democracy into ‘variables’ – to properly grasp the differences between the social sciences and the natural sciences. The result is that this acritical explanatory paradigm ideologically obfuscates the very things with which it claims to be concerned. These are the reasons for the forms and functions of so-called ‘liberal wars’ today.

It has further been demonstrated how instead beginning from a critical realist social ontology, and from an explicitly articulated ethico-political approach, a more nuanced and compelling causal story can be constructed. In particular, the original re-theorisation of neoliberalism in Chapter 3, through the ‘critical explanatory concepts’ of ideology and governmentality – expressed here as ‘ways of seeing’ and ‘ways of being’ respectively – has allowed for the development of a much richer narrative than the liberal peace/liberal wars paradigm can offer. This conceptualisation of neoliberalism has also avoided the pitfalls of following a more simplistic model according to which neoliberalism is simply an ‘illusion’ or ‘lie’ imposed ‘top-down’ by the ruling classes in order to achieve particular economic ends. Instead, the thesis has demonstrated that neoliberalism can productively be thought of as both a way of seeing, in the sense of a ‘generative matrix’ that renders the world intelligible via a very particular, marketising ‘common sense’, and as a way of being in the sense of a set of produced subjectivities articulated through processes of government of self and others. This thesis has also argued that, given the widely documented prevalence of neoliberal ways of seeing and being in the world today, Western ways of war and ‘security’ must also be seen through this lens. Achieving this has entailed the construction of an original take on critical discourse analysis (CDA), appended with an interpretivist form of ‘practice analysis’, and the use of this research methodology to consider a range of texts and practices.

8.1.2 Analytic findings

It should be remembered that one of the initial original analytic contributions of this thesis was simply to frame its overall analysis in terms of a ‘way of war’. The policies and practices under analysis here are framed by the British governments that have developed and promoted them within a context of ‘security’. Following the logic of critical war studies (CWS)
and insisting upon ‘re-writing security as war’ in this thesis has meant that the analysis here constitutes a contribution to attempts at re-politicising ‘security’.

Specific conclusions about the causal influence of neoliberalism on the policies and practices of British security are outlined in the final sections of Chapters 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 5 analysed six key security policy papers of recent years to consider the ways in which neoliberal thought can be understood to shape such policies. In particular, three key overlapping ideological-discursive ‘strategies’ were identified as structuring elements of these texts: globalisation, marketisation and depoliticisation. In common with the speeches analysed in Chapter 6, it was found that the prioritisation of global space-times, and the use of temporal distinctions between a ‘new’ and ‘old’ world prevailed. These distinctions were found to be textured in line with Bourdieu and Wacquant’s schema of the neoliberal ‘vulgate’, representing the old world as static and limited and the new as flexible, dynamic and open. In counter-terrorism policies, terrorists are represented as unable to accept that globalisation is simply ‘modernisation’, and instead insist on construing it as a set of intentional changes and strategies led by powerful Western states working in their own interests. Globalisation is thus further naturalised in these policy papers, while critics are demonised. Marketisation functions across the security policies through the translation of issues of war and security into the vernacular of business and risk management. Particular security measures are framed in terms of their cost-effectiveness or cost-benefit analyses, while the restructuring of military force and critical infrastructure is directed to flexibilisation and resilience-building. Neoliberal modes of subjectification are thus found to be at work in the marketising language of these texts, while rationales for war and security are recontextualised through economic models of justification. Ultimately, and again in common with the analysis in Chapter 6, a complementary ideological-discursive strategy of depoliticisation was found to structure the logics of these policy texts. This strategy – realised especially in the portrayal of terrorists as disturbed and distorted interpreters of the world, and in the attempts in many of the papers to naturalise socio-economic and political changes as simple development and modernisation – is absolutely crucial to clearing the ground for neoliberal ways of being, since, as Hayek and Friedman emphasise (see Chapter 3), the evacuation of dirty, messy politics from social decision making is the ultimate goal.
Chapter 6 develops the analysis begun in Chapter 5, examining speeches on national and international security by the three most recent Prime Ministers, Tony Blair, Gordon Brown and David Cameron. It discerned a number of common discursive themes and representations that can be explained by reference to neoliberal ways of seeing. The texturing of spatio-temporality in the speeches, of an ‘old world’ and a ‘new world’ were found, through detailed analysis, to reflect and naturalise neoliberal understandings of globalisation as a disembodied ‘process-without-agents’. The inevitability of globalisation, and the positive evaluation of its perceived effects, evidenced neoliberal ways of seeing changing social time and space. All of the speeches, meanwhile, were found to construct ‘others’ of those seen as obstructing or resisting globalisation. For Blair, pre-9/11, these others consisted of illegitimate political leaders left over from the ‘old world’ – Milosevic and Hussein – and their clinging to old ideologies. For the post-9/11, post-7/7 speeches of Brown and Cameron, on the other hand, ‘Islamic extremists’ and ‘terrorists’ are portrayed as the ‘warped’ and ‘perverse’ resisters of globalisation, clinging to outdated and static doctrines in an age of flexibility, complexity and dynamism. Overall, Chapter 6 identified elements of a shared neoliberal social ontology and morphology underpinning the three speeches, in the model of the ‘network/market’. ‘Security’ is constructed, across these texts, as the management of dangerous and threatening circulations of various kinds through the natural pathways of the global network/market.

Chapter 7, which engaged in a more interpretivist, open and holistic approach to describing and analysing two security practices (control orders and drone warfare), was able to shed more light on the instantiation of neoliberal ways of being. Whereas the textual analysis of Chapters 5 and 6 was useful in connecting texts to contexts, discourses to the social structures that enable and constrain them, Chapter 7 considers how ideological and discursive effects are materially ‘brought off’ in particular social configurations. It was argued that the use of control orders and TPIMs has as its goal the bringing into being of neoliberal subjectivities. These measures effectively seek to individualise security, to responsibilise individuals and to monitor and measure flows through the network/market. The interview conducted with Cerie Bullivant evidenced some of the ways in which control orders work on the subject; transforming their emotions and behaviour in various ways and inducing neoliberal ways of being to the extent that they achieve this. Drone warfare was similarly
found to be premised on neoliberal biopolitical and governmental rationales relating to the control of circulations, and to be situated within wider neoliberal concerns with achieving full and ‘scientific’ knowledge of human behaviour. What was also, crucially, argued in Chapter 7, though was that while these security practices can be explained in part as effects of neoliberal ways of seeing, they are at best only partially successful in achieving neoliberal ways of being. Those subjected to security practices resist in various ways, or fail to be fully absorbed by their logics. Neoliberal interpellation is not only incomplete, but faces challenges and contradictions in the form of other prevalent modalities of power. As Foucault noted, the emergence of neoliberal governmentality did not mean the actual transcendence or displacement of older forms of political power (sovereign and disciplinary power continues to be exerted). Instead, neoliberal governmental rationalities continue to jostle for space with these other forms of political power, particularly where they are unable to achieve the more diffuse forms of self-government and self-entrepreneurship at which they aim.

Overall, through its focus on British security policy and practice, this thesis has both argued and demonstrated that it is possible to construct richer, ontologically deeper and ultimately more compelling narratives about the forms and functions of wars waged by Western states in the post-Cold War era. Considering the causal efficacy of such things as neoliberal ways of seeing and being allows us to better explain otherwise jarring and contradictory – seemingly illiberal – practices. The central argument emerging from the analysis chapters is that both the policies and the actual practices of British security are simultaneously conditioned by and reproductive of neoliberal ideology and governmentality, and that to this extent they should be reframed within the context of a wider neoliberal way of war.

8.2 Limitations

As with any research project, there have been a number of limitations to this thesis, each of which has been addressed in earlier chapters as they were encountered. In particular though, there are two interlinked issues that should be addressed in any further research on this topic. Firstly, the research methodology of critical discourse analysis was found lacking as regards its exclusive analytic focus on texts and linguistic features. In this thesis, an attempt was made to overcome this limitation through the inclusion of some more holistic ‘practice analysis’, considering the material, as well as textual dimensions of neoliberalism. This
approach allowed for a much richer appraisal of the functioning of neoliberalism as governmentality, the conduct of conduct, since it sought to establish how material elements in practices have the capacity shape particular subjectivities. However, in future research, it would be useful to attempt a greater integration of these methodological approaches, synthesising them rather than holding them apart. Such a project would fit better with the model of social practices elaborated in Chapter 4, since it would resist the ‘picking apart’ of the various components of practice and the binaries that so often re-emerge between ‘discursive’ and ‘non-discursive’ practices.

The second point, stemming from this, is that future research in this area would do well to incorporate the approach developed by Lee Jarvis and others under the banner of ‘vernacular securities’. Making social science practice-driven, relevant and accessible (aims necessitated by the critical orientation described in Chapter 1) means drawing more upon ‘lived experience’. Ethnographic interviews of the sort drawn upon in Chapter 7, or focus groups, with ‘ordinary people’, has the potential to provide even sharper images of the causal chains around ideology and governmentality, offering deeper insights into the operation, successes and failure of particular ways of seeing and ways of being. Specifically, such an approach might balance out what could be construed as a rather heavy focus on the transmission, rather than the reception, of discourses in prevailing approaches to discourse analysis.

A further, though rather less clear-cut, limitation lies in the scope of empirical analysis. As something of a ‘theory-heavy’ thesis, there might have been more space given over to empirical study. In this instance, the balance was right since the approach to understanding neoliberalism and the metatheoretical grounding of the project were novel and worth elaborating at length. Future research building upon this, however, might make a stronger empirical case through the use of a wider range of case studies or sources.

8.3 Directions for further research

In light of the above, a number of specific opportunities present themselves for further research in the fields covered by this thesis. In particular a vernacular security approach to

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the neoliberal way of war, researching the lived experience of members of those populations subjected to violent neoliberal government, could prove very valuable. The theoretical and methodological premises of this thesis could be further refined and integrated in order to form the basis for just such a study, which would constitute another significant contribution to the field of critical wars studies.

One important point for future research in the burgeoning field of CWS is that it should avoid the pitfalls of CSS and CTS. As this thesis has noted, these two fields have been characterised not only by a tendency to reification, through their reproduction of dominant discourses and signifiers, but they also lack one of the crucial elements of the critical theoretical traditions from which they derive their basis; namely, they too often fail to situate or sufficiently imbricate the social practices of security, war and (counter-)terrorism within the wider context of political economic structures. In particular, little attention has been paid to the role of ideology, as that which gives coherence to the incoherent, which ‘fills in the gaps’ of a given social practice or mystifies its complex and contradictory, historically-specific and contingent form. This applies just as much to practices of war and security as it does to political economic practices more narrowly conceived. One aim of further contributions to this field should be the displacement of approaches, especially prevalent in certain strands of Strategic Studies, fetishize, dehistoricise and naturalise war. To the extent that CWS seeks to interrogate the conditions for the possibility of wars and warfares, it must consider ideology a pertinent explicans for consideration. In the present this would mean studying neoliberal ideology, as the prevailing way of seeing of the post-Cold War West.

David Chandler has suggested that the world is moving ‘beyond neoliberalism’, in the sense that contemporary government by Western states takes ‘complex, emergent life’ as its object, something neoliberalism, which he believes remains tied to an older liberal notion of life, cannot do. Resilience, he suggests, is the name for this new mode of governance. While Chandler is right to point to contemporary government as focused on the very complex and emergent nature of life itself (a fact attested to by much of the discourse analysis in this

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thesis), and to suggest that resilience is becoming the key governmental technology of security in this context, he is too quick to abandon the concept of neoliberalism. As was emphasised in Chapter 3, neoliberalism if first and foremost a signifier. If we use it, as this thesis does, through the critical explanatory concepts of ideology and governmentality, to signify a set of ways of seeing and being associated with the specific changes that capitalist societies have undergone in the last three or four decades, there is no need to abandon it just yet. The question is whether neoliberalism remains a useful theoretical device for critically explaining the forms and functions – the how and why – of specific social practice. What this thesis has demonstrated is that, with regard to a critical explanation of the policy and practice of contemporary British ‘security’, including policies and practices of ‘resilience’, neoliberalism can be a decidedly useful theoretical device. If we avoid reifying neoliberalism as a determinate ‘epoch’ of capitalism or limiting it to a specific set of economic policies, and instead understand and use it in the critical and more capacious sense in which it has been employed here, we may find there is life in it yet.
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A – INTERVIEW CONSENT FORM

The following is the interview consent form used for the interview data gathered in this thesis.

Name(s) of researcher(s): Ben Whitham

Title of project: A Neoliberal Way of War?

Research Statement: This doctoral (PhD) research project, being undertaken at the University of Reading, is concerned with explaining how developments in liberalism, as an ideology and governing rationality, are shaping contemporary British policies and practices around ‘security’. One element of this research involves an analysis of the ‘material’ implications of security measures including control orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs). The study aims to ascertain, in particular:

- The material or ‘physical’ impacts of control order/TPIM conditions on the everyday lives of those subject to them.
- How these material conditions relate to the wider aims and functions of control orders and TPIMs as counter-terrorism policy tools and legislative measures.

1. I confirm that I have read and understood the research statement for the above study.
2. I confirm I have had an opportunity to discuss my decision to participate in this research study with others.
3. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time, without giving any reason.
4. I understand that this interview may be recorded for transcription purposes.
5. I understand that data collected for this research, including any recording, will only be accessed by the researcher and any other parties with permission from the researcher.
6. I understand that following completion of the doctoral research project, any audio recording will be destroyed.
7. I agree that comments I make in this interview may be quoted, and attributed to me by name, in any published or unpublished research outputs from this study (including, but not limited to, the final PhD thesis, and any journal article(s) and/or books that are derived from it).

I agree / do not agree (delete as appropriate) to take part in the above study.

Name of participant: _______________________
Signature of participant: _____________________ Date: __________
APPENDIX B – INTERVIEW PLAN
The following is the interview plan for the semi-structured interview carried-out with Cerie Bullivant on 31st May 2014.

Interview plan

Subject: Cerie Bullivant

Interview time: Between 30 minutes and one hour

Interview focus: the material implications of living under a control order

Core questions:

1. (Spatio-temporal implications)
   Did living under a control order affect your movements and travel; if so, how?

2. (Communicative implications)
   Did living under a control order affect your communications with others; if so, how?

3. (Embodied implications)
   Did living under a control order affect you ‘bodily’ – for example, in what you wore and how you moved (e.g. wearing an electronic tag or other apparatus); if so, how?

4. (Overall aims)
   What do you feel the ‘aim’ of your control order was; what did it seem intended to achieve?
The following is the full transcript of the interview with subject Cerie Bullivant.

Transcript: Interview with Cerie Bullivant, 31st May 2014, Whitechapel, east London.

Key

BW  Ben Whitham (Interviewer)
CB  Cerie Bullivant (Subject)

BW: So the first sort of question I wanted to ask, um, is how, is basically did the, did the, living under a control order affect your movements and travel and, if so, how? So these are quite broad questions and they’ll probably overlap.

CB: Ok, in terms of movement and travel, um, a lot of people were forced to relocate to another area, um in my case I wasn’t er so I was still living in in in the basic area that I lived in. Er… and I didn’t have a curf… like er a boundary area?

BW: Ok

CB: Um, so because basically my control order was the, the first one, I was one of the first people to be put, er British people, British citizens, to be put under a control order, so in the, in the outset my control order was a lot looser than, for example, the Libyans that have been put under them and the other foreign nationals. Er, we, by the time it came round to sort of like latter days of control orders and TPIMs it was only British people being put on them

BW: Yeah

CB: Um, but first it was foreign nationals that they put it on and it was very very strict and then they they moved they changed focus to the British as they used other measures like SIAC and deportation orders for the foreign nationals. Um so, so the sort of strictest controls on my movement I had was that I had to be home by the curfew.

BW: Ok

CB: Um, so strictly movement-based, I couldn’t attend any, I couldn’t go, even if, to any international ports, even to collect someone. Um… If I was even taking a train on the Underground for example I couldn’t go through King’s Cross St. Pancras cos that counts as an
international port, so it’s ridiculous [speaks to waiter] um so it’s a bit ridiculous in the sense of what you can and can’t, can and can’t do. Er... I wasn’t allowed any, any travel documents, I was obviously definitely banned from leaving, leaving the country and going on holiday.

BW: So did you have, did you have to surrender your passport?

CB: I had to surrender my passport, yep. Um. I actually didn’t know where my passport was – I hadn’t been away for quite a while. And they were like look you’ve got 24 hours to find your passport or we’re gonna arrest you.

So... Ummm... Yeah basically... Ummm...

BW: No holidays? No overseas travel at all?

CB: No travel, I couldn’t even go to an airport to pick someone up. Um. No going into a port at all, under any circumstances. And obviously because I had a, um, a twelve hour curfew, I had to be, I could only go obviously six hours at ... d’you what I mean?

BW: Yeah

CB: I had to be back in time for, for the, and the signing-in the middle of the day, so...

BW: So you were, you were allowed to leave your home for twelve-hour periods at a time [CB: Yeah] of time?

CB: Well I was allowed out from sort of nine til nine, roughly, um, but I had to sign on at the middle of the day at a police station in my local area [BW: Right] so... if you’re allowed out from nine but at one o’clock you’ve gotta sign and then you’ve gotta be back home by nine. So you can’t...

BW: You’re effectively, yeah...

CB: You’re, you’re boxed in all the time

BW: And was the police station er...

CB: And this was the, this was the, the lightest of the control orders, d’you what I mean? What happened to me I mean In terms of the control orders and in terms of other cases, mine was the... most relaxed and most free of any of them. Um... From that issue I’m gonna sort of pre-
empt you on the question of the police station, um [talks to waiter] They had um basically, there was a police station, I was only allowed to sign in for one hour in the middle of the day around one o’clock and there was a police station that was open during that time period. Um. And there was a police station that was open during that time period, like a nine to five police station, umm... about a 20 minute walk away from my house, or 5 minute bus ride. Um, but they for some reason they’ve got a, um a a rule that you have to sign in at 24, uh the closest 24-hour policw station. So for me that meant taking a 40 minute bus ride out to an industrial estate in Dagenham East and signing on out there at the 24-hour police station, even though I’m only allowed to sign on for err... one hour a day in the middle of the day. So why the hell’s it need to be a 24-hour police station... and I coulda gone to the local one that’s round the corner... er...

**BW:** Ah, it’s something to do with [Indistinct]

**CB:** It’s a lot of things like this, where there were very very malicious and calculated in being malicious. Um. And I use that word very specifically, that it’s malicious, because for example, I mean this is the most clear example of d... like outright pig-headedness and maliciousness. When the, when the judge ruled that he was gonna quash my control order, erm he said “right, I’m gonna quash this order, I’m not gonna allow any grounds for appeal and this order will be completely revoked and erm unfortunately it’s coming up to a bank holiday weekend so I’ve gotta I need to prepare my written judgement, so when I do my written, hand down of my judgement this will become binding. Until that time you’re still under a control order and you have to maintain that, but it will be quahed and there’s gonna be no grounds of appeal from the government” So we were like ‘Yes! This is, this is brilliant’. So... sort of like the, um, the sort of, oh what’s the word... um paperwork that needed to catch up, d’you know mean, and some, my solicitor went to the Home Office and said “look, you’ve lost the case, the judge has said that thewree was no case to answer, that my client was completely innocent from the beginning. Um, so although there has to be a control order for the next month, drop the conditions right down to, to signing on once a week and just get rid of every every other condition, cos you’ve lost it’s over. D’you know what I mean, and the judge has said you’ve lost, so just keep it on in name only” basically, which seems quite reasonable after they’ve lost and they’ve been toold that there’s no grounds for appeal. Um. They wouldn’t even do that. They kept the control order exactly as it was , as strict as possible, for er basically it
ended up being two months cos every time the judge went to release his written judgement, they blocked it on the grounds that he was breaching national security...

**BW:** That the judgement itself contained, like stuff that was in breach of national...

**CB:** from the secret evidence, yeah? So they made him re-write his judgement 4, 5 times just to prolong the inevitable

**BW:** Yeah

**CB:** Yeah? And during that time they didn’t even reduce my conditions so...

**BW:** [Indistinct]

**CB:** It’s it’s maliciousness, just pigheaded, d’you know what I mean?

**BW:** It certainly sounds like it, yeah

**CB:** Yeah

**BW:** Um ok, well I think that’s kind of that covers the sort of stuff about travel and movement really. I think that’s er, that’s covered everything there. So the kinda the second part of the question or the second question then is: to what extent did, were your communications with other people shaped or restrained in any way by the control order?

**CB:** I had a condition in my control order that I was not allowed to communicate with anybody on a control order and on a list, er provided to me by the Home Office. And the Home Office didn’t give me a list of names. And so, I actually continued communicating with everybody as per normal, cos my reading of that, from a grammatical standpoint was: they have to be on a control order and on a list from the Home Office, i.e. the Home Office cannot put anyone on that list that wasn’t on a control order.

**BW:** Yeah

**CB:** They read as differently, that it was anyone on a control order, and anyone that the Home Office would choose to put on a list, yeah?

**BW:** Ok
CB: So and we argued this out in court and um I actually, the the judge said that like my my understandin of it was completely correct grammatically and the Oxford er um prosecutor was forced to er shut up about it, cos he kept [BW: Accept that he’d read it wrong?] yeah, accept that it was poorly written. And um, that really pissed him off, sort of getting into a, he’s Oxford graduate getting into a grammatical debate with [LAUGHING] a guy from Dagenham [BW: boy from east London?]. Yeah and and and losing. So, you know how these Oxford boys love, sort of public school boys love, they’re sticklers for this stuff anyway.

BW: Absolutely, yeah.

CB: So... it amused me anyway. Um, so yeah in that, er in that sense I was never restricted in terms of from the conditions of the control order and who I could communicate with. What changed in terms of my communications was actually in a more subversive way. A lot of people around me, once they found out I was on a control order, didn’t want to talk to me. And I ended up losing contact and losing connection with a lot of people both from my, from the Muslim community, and, but it wasn’t actually from a condition of the order but from the fear of having of associating with someone on the order in and of itself [BW: Yeah]. So, so it was a a general feel within the community and within, within things, and also my mum didn’t know that I was on the order for a year and a half. So, obviously in those regards it affected communication with , with my mother and with my family, because I’m keeping a huge secret that I don’t wanna keep but obviously because of the circumatance I have to, and... that affects with the way you live with people and the way that you interact with them and communicate with them, because you’re living with a secret hanging over you all the time, and the stress of that. And... and that put massive strain on those relationships in that regard. I don’t know if that’s necessarily what you mean in terms of communication or [BW: Yeah, yeah] or [BW: nah, absolutely...] or [BW: anything] or, sort of like not allowed a mobile phone. Cos I didn’t have those sorts of restrictions but it was it was in a more um nefarious sort of subversive way that, it it still... has effects...

BW: Well, in a more informal way basically [CB: Yeah] just that there’s something intrinsic to being under the order which means that, yeah, people are people are afraid...

CB: and being accused, accused of the things that you’re accused of without being able to defend yourself. D’you know what I mean?
**BW:** Yeah, absolutely. Um, but, so there weren’t the formal restrictions, there weren’t, part of your order... your order didn’t require that you didn’t have a mobile phone or a computer, or?

**CB:** Well I didn’t have those restrictions, the only restrictions was that I wasn’t allowed to speak to people on control orders. But, because of my understanding of the condition, I ignored that anyway.

**BW:** Yeah

**CB:** So, the only, the only conditions that, the only firm conditions I had on that, I completely disregarded.

**BW:** Ok...

**CB:** When I was on control order, especially considering, compared to the people on TPIMs and the people, the later people on control orders, we were a lot more free and loose with our control orders, like...

**BW:** It was, d’you think it was more straightforward to breach, in a sense [CB Well...], without really getting pulled up on it, or...

**CB:** It it, you know what it was, I think it maybe just our group of people, the the the other people that I knew that were on control orders, and our mindset at the time. Like we had a bit more of a sod-you attitude about it, because we thought it was so unjust and so unfair what was happening to us and that it was so... oppressive, d’you know what I mean, that’s the exact word for it, that yes we’re gonna abide by your conditions, we’re gonna do what we have to do but we’re, we’re not gonna bend over backwards to appease you and make you happy with this, we’re gonna, we’re gonna basically try and get on with our lives as much as possible, without letting you win, as it were [BW: Yeah] So, we were very adversarial with them in regards to, to that. And, we had [indisitinct]. Just recently I was sorting out paperwork and clearing out our old house and I was going I, I was reading through my old interview, my first police interview after I was arrested for the first time. I was so antagonistic with the police! Because, I just felt that what they were doing was un-British, unconstitutional [BW: Yeah] and, and just completely against standards and norms...
BW: Well it certainly flies in the face of human rights, the European Convention on Human Rights and all this stuff [CB: Yeah] and I think that probably at the time you were, er were placed under an order, there were judges, all sorts of people who were um, very explicitly criticising, very openly criticising [indistinct]

CB: So we, I, I ... we were a lot more sort of... um... for example, when it came to my, when it came to my trial for breaches, I had 47 breaches, which is quite a lot...

BW: Yeah, yeah absolutely. Ok, that’s that’s very useful so if we can then move on to just er I guess the third of the three kind of main questions that I had then it would be... so if we've looked at kind of how it affected your movements and travel and how it affected your communications with other people... was there any sort of, er, I mean, did you have to wear a tag [CB: Yes], were there kind of ‘embodied’, sort of like um, so you were tagged?

CB: Yeah, in terms of like physical constraints I had, er, I had a tag on. Um, I had this weird black box phone, um, that plugged into the wall and er... as you picked it up it phoned straight through to, um... a security company. And so, at the beginning and end of my curfew I had to phone in to let them know I was inside, and every time I wanted to leave the house I had to phone and tell them I was leaving the house and every time I returned to the house I had to phone and tell them that I’d come back. So, I...

BW: Was that a private company?

CB: Yeah it was, er, I think it was G4S. Um... but don’t hold me to that [BW: No] but I’m pretty sure it was G4S [BW: A private security company but INDISTINCT] But um, so yeah I would have to pick up and “hey I’m going out to buy a pint of milk”, “ok, I’m back now from buying my pint of milk”. And, and it was, go through, and it would ring at random times during the night or when I was meant to be at home, “hi we’re just checking that you’re still there” [BW: Ok] So, um there was that and there was er a tag around, around my ankle, that um [BW: And...] Yeah?

BW: And the tag, did you have to do anything to kind of maintain that or...

CB: No, er...

BW: It looked after itself basically?
CB: Basically, yeah

BW: Cos it would alert them, in theory, to you being outside your house...

CB: See, I’m not sure about that, cos I don’t know what technology was in it, but I’ve seen GPS tags now, and they’re a helluva lot bigger than the tag I had [BW: Ok yeah] so [BW: They need a substantial battery in them, the GPS] yeah, mine was probably about the size of your watch [BW Oh ok] Um so like the actual tag part of it [BW: Yeah] was about the size of that watch, and there was a rubber band and obviously you couldn’t disconnect it or like take it off [BW Yeah] so, that’s as big as it was. So I don’t know... what level of thing it... at the time, at the time I was sure it did have GPS in it, but now I’ve seen actual GPS ones and they’re like [BW: Much bulkier] like bricks on your, on your leg, so

BW: And they didn’t, there wasn’t, they didn’t explain to you what the tag did, as such, just said you have to wear this as a condition of your order?

CB: Yeah. Um, the only clue I had as to what it did was they did um, they went to four corners of like the boundary that I was allowed in within my curfew so my, basically my, front living room, and the back garden, and they did something and so I, I think it was just a proximity thing to the box phone [BW: Mm hm, ok] um but I’m not entirely sure...

BW: But that’s quite possible I suppose that they would have something in there, and so, and the black box phone, that wasn’t, and you didn’t also make regular phone calls through that [CB: No] or was that only for communicating with the security service or the security company

CB: Yeah it it was like the, like the Batman phone in um, and er Commissioner Gordon picks it up and it just goes straight to Batman and that’s it [BW: Yeah] so um yeah [BW: Ok] it just had, it was a massive box it was, and it just had two buttons, a red button and a green button. So you just pick it up, press the green button, it called straight through to them and that’s it.

BW: Ok. And were you required to wear the tag for the entirety of the order, like for the whole time you were under the order or was that...

CB: Not at first. Basically what it was with us, from when we were put under the control order, every couple of months the conditions would get stricter and stricter and stricter and stricter. So, like every month or so they’d come and say “ok we gotta couple a new conditions for you,
this, this and this, we gotta couple a new conditions, this this and this we gotta couple a new conditions, this this and this…” [BW: Mm...] Especially cos control orders were a non-exhaustive list, they could just add whatever they wanted [BW: incredibly vague isn’t it, yeah they can] so...

BW: Ok, yeah and so they added the tag

CB: Yeah the tag came in later

BW: Oh ok then... Ok then and I guess just to the fourth and the kinda last question that I wanted to ask, is I guess: what was your feeling, um, in terms of what you think the overall aim or aims of placing you under a control order were or what you think the conditions of the control order were geared towards? Um, did you, did you have a feeling that that there was, you know [CB: I mean, I mean] how would you describe it, I s’pose?

CB: The irony is... con... control orders are probab... I mean even, even Gordon Brown and um... er John Reid er said at er various times that control orders aren’t the best option, they’re just the best option that we’ve got. I would say, like in terms of not the best option, they’re actually an awful option. If you’ve got people who you think are alleged terrorists and are involved in terrorist activity, control orders and TPIMs are an awful way to stop them doing that. So for example, I could go to any number of massively crowded busy places within my time, I could go pretty much anywhere on the Underground network. I could’ve gone to Oxford Street. The... of of the people on control orders, there’ve been um, there was about, up until relocation came in there was a 22% absconision rate, which is massive. None of them were ever caught. So er these measure are, and obviously with TPIMs again, there’ve been two abconsions and no one’s been caught from them [BW: Hm]. These measures as a, as a way of preventing terrorism [BW: Yeah] are frankly a debacle. I used to laugh with my friends that like thank god that we’re not terrorists, cos if we were, these measure would have almost no effect on actually stopping us being as effective as we’d wanna be, d’you know what I mean? [BW: Yeah] Like, um, I still went and saw the same people that I saw, I did all the same things that I pretty much coulda wanted to do, yeah? Um, the actual only effective thing about it, was the fact that, because I was on it and because of it being, because of its, the nature of it, it left, er, me feeling depressed and so I, I ceased to be active in and of myself because of
the pressure of the order itself and the pressure of being accused of such a serious crime [BW: Mm] without evidence. So... that was the only, only disabling factor.

BW: It was a kind of demoralising [INDISTINCT]

CB: Yeah and and that’s just because it’s a form of, er and er I spoke with er um a psychiatrist, a Dr. Michael, oh gosh what’s his name, anyway he works at the Helen Bamber Foundation [charity providing support and counselling to victims of human rights abuses], they deal with victims of torture, and he, he was doing some work on control orders and stuff and I er, I said “look, why are you doing work on control orders, like, you do torture, that’s your thing?” and he said “no control orders are a form of psychological torture, you’re accusing someone of a crime, you’re not giving them any information about it, and then you’re restricting them and penalising them for that, and that is a form of mental torture” and that was a, a revelation to me, I was already off my order by then but I never thought of it, in, in that paradigm, that it was actually torture what they did to me. So the only effectiveness that you gain from control orders and TPIMs is from that torturous nature of them, not from the conditions in and of themselves.

BW: Ok, yeah, yeah, so it’s like er

CB: If that makes any...

BW: Yeah absolutely, well if they’re sort of a side-effect in a sense, but maybe an intended side-effect, um as well I guess. Um yeah having just read through, spent a lot of time kind of poring through the er, the Prevention of Terrorism Act and the TPIM Act, um, I mean, when it talks about, you know, what a ‘controlled person’ in the Prevention of Terrorism Act and and you know, what that consists in, the number of possible conditions, there’s an implication that, if they so wished, they could produce an order which meant that you had no kind of, that you were utterly isolated from the world, basically [CB: Yeah] and every aspect of your life and movement could be controlled legally, if they’d wanted to under that piece of legislation...

CB: and and this, this this is the aim and objective of it. The irony is that if someone’s a dangerous terrorist, the last place you want them is living in the community [BW: yeah] yeah? And, thank God, you can only put someone in prison when they’ve committed a crime. So the
fact is that you need proper police work, to build a case and arrest people who are dangerous terrorists and put them in prison [BW: yeah] because that’s where dangerous terrorists need to be. Fact of the matter is that if someone hasn’t committed a crime... then this is the worst of both worlds [BW: Yeah] because, even David Anderson [QC, a government-appointed independent reviewer of terrorism legislation] has said that um the more these go on you’re not gonna be able to build a case, because they’re so aware of what’s going on that they’re not gonna allow that to, d’you know what I mean they’re not gonna make any slip-ups [BW: No] and at best you’re just pissing off someone and delaying their inevitable release and freedom for a moment at some undesignated time in the future where they’re gonna be exactly, in exactly the same position to do what they were doing [BW: Yeah, absolutely] So, it’s the worst of both worlds. And possibly even worse than all of that , is the fact of the damage it does to cohesion within British society, cos now you’ve got a whole generation of young Muslims that look at control orders and TPIMs and see that the government hates us. This hasn’t happened to, the Irish terrorists, this didn’t happen to, to um um it like people who go off and join the IDF, it doesn’t happen to sort of extreme BNP people or extreme Zionists. It only happens to extreme Muslims. Yeah? And so, that has caused a level of disaffection which feeds into the very problem that they are trying to allegedly solve [BW Sure] and that’s more disruptive than anything else, I think [BW: Yeah], and...

BW: No that makes a lot of sense and I think I agree with most of that, but would you, as a kind of final point actually then, um... in terms of um living beyond now, it’s been a few years after you’ve been [CB: yeah yeah] you’ve been out of your control order, but do you ever feel, or are you concerned that you can, that, that there is a continuation of monitoring of you [CB: Yes] or do you feel like [CB: A lot]...

CB: Um, my wife is Dutch, um so I go to and from Amsterdam quite a bit, to see her family – we’ve just had a baby – um, every single time I fly, I get stopped, yeah? Um... er... my close friends, on a number of occasions, have been approached by MI5 to spy for them, um, and my name’s been mentioned. They’re like “look, we know you’ve spent time with Cerie Bullivant and he’s a bad man”. And... this is as recent as last month. Um, this happened to a friend of mine when he came back from Kenya, Schedule 7’d, got asked to spy, and my name brought up, specifically. Um...
BW: At the airport?

CB: At the airport, yeah. Another friend of mine, um... this was about two weeks ago, actually, got invited for a coffee with um MI5. Again, my name was mentioned specifically. So... yes I know that there’s continuation of their, of of of that, and it’s it’s not even made, um er, sort of subtle [BW covert?] yes, um last er Christmas Day, I was with a few friends and um, er like, basically, er, for us Christmas Day’s just a great day, everyone’s got a day off, so you just go around and visit everyone, d’you know what I mean? Even though we’re not celebrating Christmas you just go and see everyone anyway [BW: Yeah], and um have a nice, have a nice day. Good thing about Christmas day – roads are empty. We’re driving around, and as we’re going from place to place to place, there’s this one Mondeo [laughing] literally just following us around the whole day. And there’s just empty roads, and just us, and this Mondeo behind us and it’s just ridiculous! [BW: Have to feel sorry for that spy whose Christmas day is spent, er, having to tail you!] yeah and and the, the fact is that it’s... completely just nonsensical and ridiculous that they’re wasting their time and resources after the judge said that there was no reason to, to, to have a problem with me. Since I’ve come off my control order, I’ve worked with Liberty, with Amnesty International, I’ve spoken in the Houses of Parliament three or four times. I won an award from Liberty for my human rights work. I’m doing media and film and like I’ve been, sort of, out there and very open about what I’m doing and what I’m spending my time doing, d’you know what I mean? And... it’s just... I’ve had to come to a place in my life where I know that they’re never gonna accept that they screwed up and that they’re wrong and, it it it comes, it’s come to a position now, where... I have to accept that either my life is lived with Big Brother right there on my shoulder, or, I , I... I basically try and find somewhere else to live in the world where... this isn’t an issue, do you know what I mean? So...

BW: It’s not an easy choice... or not a, not a fair choice, really

CB: Well, it means leaving my, my, my family, my d’you know what I mean, the country that I grew up in, the country that, I... I, I can say without even a shadow of a doubt, yeah, that I love, like it’s not because “oh, you must be ha...” I, I love it, I’m British, yeah, I love being British, I love England, d’you know what I mean, d’you know what I mean I grew up in, in, spending my summers in Yorkshire, I, I, York is probably, in my opinion the best city, in, in
definitely in the UK, probably one of the best cities in the world that I’ve ever visited, I love, love the place, yeah? [BW: Yeah] But, the fact of the matter is, I don’t feel that I can live my life comfortably, any more, in the UK, because too many times I’m seeing that the legislation is going in a way and that the, the government is going in a way that I don’t feel safe and secure any more [BW: No]. And it’s not because of people on the street, it’s because I don’t feel safe and secure from, from my own, from from the government, even though I know I’ve never done anything criminal or anything that would even put anyone at harm. And more than most, even with their secret evidence, even though I had no way to defend myself, a judge agreed with that. And they won’t even listen to their own, their own legal system [BW: Yeah] I mean to place a control order – sorry, I, I know I’m waffling, I’ll be really quick [BW: No!] – to place a control order on someone you need er, reasonable doubt. Reasonable doubt is the same burden of proof that you need to do a stop-and-search. So if you can imagine the difficulty of proving, to the, that they don’t even have grounds for reasonable doubt, that you’re involved in terrorism, when you’re not given any evidence, when you’re not being allowed to make a case, when you don’t even know what the accusation is against you. Remember, I was never even told what I was accused of, other than, it was terrorism...

BW: ‘Terrorist-related activity’

CB: Exactly, so I still don’t know if they, d’you know what I mean, if they thought I was gonna... I dunno, fund something, blow something up, this, I’ve got no idea, even what I was accused of, yeah? But even with all of these things, still, the judge... with secret courts and secret hearings and secret this and secret that... the judge said “no it’s all bollocks”. Sorry, pardon, I don’t mean to [BW: No it’s alright], but he said it’s all, it’s all a load of crap, yeah? Their own justice system and they won’t even accept that they’re wrong, d’you know what I mean?

[Informal conversation about current government and its policies, and CB’s desire to move to Latin America, follows].


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