PLATO, TRAGEDY, THE IDEAL READER AND PLUTARCH’S 

DEMETRIOS AND ANTONY

The prologue to Plutarch’s Lives of Demetrios and Antony is much cited by modern commentators for its claim to introduce negative examples, Lives of men who might function as deterrents for the reader – an apparent revision of Plutarch’s moral programme in the Parallel Lives. Earlier prologues, notably those to the Perikles and Fabius and Aemilius and Timoleon, had encouraged the reader to expect examples of virtuous men to imitate. But the Demetrios and Antony prologue proclaims that this pair will include men ‘renowned for their vice’, men whose Lives the reader is not expected to imitate but which will instead have a deterrent effect. The subject of this paper is Plutarch’s justification for this change of approach. It will be argued that the Demetrios and Antony prologue contains allusions to and dialogue with several passages of Plato, and a redefinition of some of Plato’s statements about literature; 2) highlights the need for the reader’s own active discrimination in evaluating and responding to the actions and fates of the great men of history; and 3) invites the reader to approach Demetrios and Antony as tragic heroes.

The Demetrios and Antony begins with a contrast between our physical senses or sense-perception (αἰσθητική) and our rational capacity:

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2 E.g. Russell (1973) 135; Lamberton (2001) 73. Other citations are too numerous to list, but none have discussed the prologue in depth. See Duff (1999) 45–49 for preliminary discussion.


5 Many have seen Demetrios and Antony as a tragic heroes, e.g. De Lacy (1952) 168–171; Russell (1973) 135; Pelling (1988b) 21–22; Mossman (1992) 100 and 103; Andrei (1989) 78–82; Guillén Selfast (1997) 247–253; cf. Candau Moron (1999) 142–143; Pelling (1999a) – though none have linked this suggestion with the prologue.
The first people to assume that the arts are like the senses seem to me to have perceived not least their power to make judgements, by which we are naturally able to grasp opposites equally in both cases. For this is what they have in common. But they differ as regards the goals of their discrimination. For sense-perception exists no more for the discrimination of white than of black, or of sweet than of bitter, or of soft and yielding than of hard and resisting, but it is its task when it encounters each of these things to be moved by all and being moved to report the experience to the understanding. The arts, on the other hand – or rather their practitioners – are active; while they notice everything, they employ reason to determine how they should react to different objects; this discrimination can allow the practitioners of the arts to react appropriately to both good examples and bad examples and gain benefit from both.
Much of this is similar to the *Perikles and Fabius* prologue, which had also begun with a contrast between the senses and reason: our physical senses, Plutarch had argued, must receive every stimulus that strikes them, whereas with our mind we can choose to concentrate only on objects which are beneficial to us – such as the virtuous deeds of others;7 indeed when we look at the work of craftsmen, we admire it but do not want to imitate it; but when we turn our mind to the contemplation of virtuous deeds – especially the virtuous deeds of the great men of history – we both admire them and desire to imitate them, thus becoming better people (*Per*. 1–2). The two prologues share the notion that the use of reason allows one to be selective and to concentrate on beneficial stimuli, and the assumption that virtue is an art.8 But in the *Perikles and Fabius* the arts had been subdivided into two contrasting types: the art of virtue, the products of which encourage both admiration and imitation, and the other arts (e.g. sculpture and music), the products of which encourage mere admiration, but do not benefit the observer. In the *Demetrios and Antony*, however, Plutarch chooses to align the arts with reason (speaking of ‘the arts which are constituted through the use of reason’), and mentions medicine and music as parallels with the art of virtue – a significant choice, as we shall see. The practitioners of both, he argues, can learn from looking at bad examples to produce their opposites.9

The notion, however, that one might usefully study what is harmful as well as what is beneficial is not present in the *Perikles and Fabius* or in earlier prologues. But the other similarities with the *Perikles and Fabius* prologue emphasise the continuity of vision in both prologues concerning the moral benefit of reading the *Lives*: this may be a new approach, but the same moral aims and assumptions which have gone into the whole programme of the *Lives* until this point are present.10 But in fact the concept of the educative value of looking at bad examples would have been familiar to Plutarch’s readers and was one widely recognised in antiquity.11 Indeed, Plutarch’s text *On lack of anger*, which proba-

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7 τῇ μὲν γὰρ αισθήσει, κατὰ πάθος τὴν πληγήν ἀντιλαμβανόμενην τῶν προστηργοὺντος, ἵνα ἀνέγραψη πάν τὸ φαινόμενον, ὅ τε χρήσιμόν τε καὶ έχρηστόν, ή ἰθωδές, τὸ νόθο δὲ ἅβαστος, εἰ βούλετο, χρῆσθαι καὶ τρέπειν ἔπειτα ἀκεί καὶ μεταβάλλειν ῥήσαντ' πρὸς τὸ δοκοῦντ' ἐφικέον... τούτα δὲ ἐστὶν ἐν τοῖς ἀπ’ ἀρετής ἔργοις, ὡς καὶ ζηλών τινα καὶ προθυμίαν ἐγγονόν εἰς μίμησιν ἐμποιεῖ τοῖς ἑστηροφράσειν (*Per*. 1.3–4).

8 On virtue as an art in Plato, see e.g. Gould (1955) 3–46.

9 πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἐκατηρισθεὶν ἀγερασίαν, ἀγερασία (‘production’) is a word often used of the arts: e.g. Plato, *Prot*. 312d, πρὸς τὴν ἀγερασίαν τὴν τῶν ἐκατήρων (of painters).

10 The recurrence of Ismenias the Theban in both prologues (*Demetr*. 1.6; *Per*. 1.5) has a similar effect. For a comparable revising of the programme offered in earlier pairs in the prologue to a late pair, see *Thes*. 1, with the helpful comments of Pelling (1999b) 431–432 [a longer version can be found in repr. (2002a) 171–173] and (2002a) 277.

11 Cf. in particular Livy, e.g. Preface 10 (with Chaplin 2000) and Valerius Maximus, who includes a book on vices to be avoided (Book Nine) in his *Memorable Deeds and Sayings*; cf. also Diog. Laert. 1.103 and Clem. Alex. *Paid.* III 41–45 (278–281 Potterius) ["Ὅτι οἱ ἐκάκόντες καὶ τὰ
bly predates all of the *Parallel Lives*, shows just this process at work;¹² the speaker Fundanus describes how looking at the ill-effects of anger in others encouraged him to control his own (e.g. 455e–456b).¹³ Significantly, Fundanus invokes the same example that Plutarch invokes in the *Demetrios and Antony* prologue (1.5), that of the Spartans displaying drunk helots to their youths in order to teach them the dangers of drunkenness (455e).

But it is important to note that in the *Demetrios and Antony* prologue Plutarch stresses the ‘incidental’ nature of this contemplation of bad examples: the arts – or people who wish to practise the arts – study good examples on purpose, but bad examples ‘incidentally’ (κατά συμβέβηκε). The idea of incidentality is important enough to repeat in the next sentence: ‘it has happened’ (συμβέβηκε) that doctors and musicians study sickness and discord. The point is perhaps that negative examples should not be considered interesting in themselves; rather, those examples of bad behaviour, poor health or unharmonious sounds which – just like the stimuli which impinge on our senses – ‘come our way’ (ἐνυπαρχονύσαν) can, with correct observation, logical thinking and discrimination, be used for our benefit. Bad examples can be valuable, but are not to be sought out as of themselves absorbing or titillating. This is a point to which Plutarch will return in 1.5.

Having made the point that negative examples can be helpful, Plutarch now turns to the study of what he terms the ‘the most perfect arts of all’, that is, the virtues. He has already made the point that the arts, like the senses, can distinguish good from bad, but they differ from the senses ‘as regards the goals (téλη) of such discernment’ (1.1). Here the arts of virtue are called τελειώτατα, that is, not only ‘most perfect’ but also most efficacious in achieving the worthwhile goal (téλος) of moral improvement:

(1.4) αἱ τε πιασάν τελειώτατα τεχνάν, σωφροσύνη καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ φρόνησις, οὐ κολαὶ μόνον καὶ δικαιαν καὶ αφελίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βιαβερῶν καὶ αμερῶν καὶ αἴδεικν κρίσεις οὐσία, τὴν ἀπερία τῶν κακῶν καλωστιμομένην ἁκειαν ὡς ἐπεισόδιον, ἀλλὰ ἀμελετῶν ἠροῦντα καὶ ἀγνοοῦν ἄν μᾶλλον τὴν ἀποβάσεις τοὺς ὀρθῶς βιωκομένους.

(1.4) And the most perfect arts of all – temperance, justice, and wisdom – do not consist of judgements about fine, just and useful things alone, but also about harmful, shameful and unjust things. So these arts do not praise the innocence that plumes itself in its inexperience of evil, but they consider it silliness and ignorance of what those who intend to live correctly ought to know.

(Deimetr. 1.4)

υποδείγματα μέγερον μέρος τῆς ὀρθῆς εἰσὶ διδασκαλίας’, which both have reference to the Spartan practice (41–2). STADTER (1997) 66–70 and (2000) 498–9 points to Cicero, *De Offic.*, 3.73–88 and Seneca, *Ep.* 94.62–66 (where Seneca uses Alexander, Gn. Pompey, Caesar and Marius as examples of men not to imitate or envy, men driven by greed into constant activity). The illustration of the teacher taking his pupils to see a bad flute-player (*Deimetr. 1.6*) is also used at Phil. *Apoll.* 5.32.

¹²Περὶ ἀφράτητος (De cohibenda ira). For the date, see JONES (1966) 61–62. On this text, cf. e.g. INGENKAMP (1971) 14–26; BIECHI (1990).

An understanding of vice, then, is essential if one is to reach moral maturity. The relevance of the argument to a reading of the Lives, with their especially moral, character-forming purpose, is now becoming clearer.

There is almost certainly an allusion here to a passage of Plato. In Book 3 of the Republic Plato had argued for the damaging effects of having bad behaviour portrayed in poetry – damaging both for the listener, especially if he is young (401b–c), and for the reciter or actor, especially if he ‘imitates’ bad men in a dramatic presentation (396c–e). Plutarch, in his treatise How a young man should listen to poems, argues at length, implicitly against Plato in the Republic, that reading about bad behaviour need not be damaging. His lengthy justification in the Demetrios and Antony of the utility of reading about bad behaviour engages much more directly with Plato’s arguments, though once again the latter is not named. Although the best doctor, Plato had argued, would be one who had treated and indeed suffered the most diseases, this does not apply to the good judge:

αλλ’ ἀπειρον αὐτήν καὶ ἄκεφαλον δὲι κοκόν ἡδὼν νέον οὕτων γεγονέναι, εἰ μὴλει κάγωθ’ οὕσα κρίνεις ὑπὸ τῆς δίκης. 16 διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθείᾳ νέοι ὑπέρ ὁποῖοι ἐπιλέγεσθαι ταῖς ἔκβοσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀδίκων, ὅτε οὐκ ἔχοντες ἐν ἐστιοὶ παραδείγματο ομοιστάθη τοῖς ποιητοῖς.

But his soul should, when young, be inexperienced and uncontaminated by bad characters, if it is going to be fair and good and make healthy judgements about what is correct. So it is that noble people, when young, seem simple-minded and are easily deceived by the wicked, because they do not have within themselves examples compatible with anything which is bad. (Republic 409a–b)

It is clear that Plutarch is responding to this passage: reading about bad behaviour, can – despite Plato – be beneficial. In fact, verbal correspondences are so striking that the reader is probably expected to recognise the Platonic original. In particular, Plutarch’s argument in 1.4 that ‘experience’ of evil is necessary for correct action seems designed to counter Plato’s argument that, as a young man, the good judge should have no ‘experience’ of evil. Plutarch’s ‘examples [consisting] of the Lives’ (τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν βιῶν) probably picks up παραδείγματα in Plato: noble people do not have examples of bad behaviour ‘within themselves’ – that is, they do not have direct knowledge of evil – but they need to observe examples of such behaviour, which Plutarch will provide through his literary programme.

14 Rather than just narrates their actions. The one apparent exception to Plato’s ban on the imitation of bad men in poetry is when it is done in fun (ταῦτα ἄχρηστοι: Rep. 396c). Plato may have had comedy in mind: see Laws 816d–e (p. 277 below).

15 It is difficult to date the How a young man should listen to poems (Πῶς δὲι τὸν νέον ποιητῶν ἁκούειν); it may predate the Demetrios and Antony, but this is not at all certain: see Jones (1966) 71 [= repr. (1995) 117]. On this text, see Hillyard (1981); Schenkeveld (1982); La Matina (1991); Valiglio (1991); Diaz Laveda (1996); Whitmarsh (2001) 48–54 and 91–96.

16 Cf. Plut.: οὐ καλῶν μόνον καὶ δικίων καὶ ὀφελίμων, ἀλλὰ καὶ βλαβέρων καὶ σιδηρῶν καὶ ἀδίκων κρίσεις οὕσα.
Furthermore, Plutarch’s choice of the arts of medicine and music in 1.3 as exemplars of the way in which bad examples can be used is also particularly significant: both music and medicine had been discussed at length in the preceding chapters in Republic Book 3.

Plato goes on to argue that the good judge should gain understanding of evil only later in life, and this understanding should be ‘through knowledge, not through his own experience’ (ἐπιστήμη, οὐκ ἐμπειρίᾳ οἴκεια κεχρημένον). For Plato, experience of evil is here a bad thing and potentially corrupting; for Plutarch experience is redefined positively as experience gained through study, a helpful and necessary aid to moral maturity, and is not so far removed from what Plato meant by knowledge (cf. 409d). For Plutarch, then, although ‘imitating’ bad men – in the sense of modelling one’s life on them – is undesirable, having experience of them through study may be beneficial (cf. 1.6: ἀνίον καὶ τῶν φημίθων ζεύγαν λογίζοντοι). The disagreement with Plato might, of course, be partly explained by the age of the audience envisaged. Plato was discussing the education of the young, the future guardians. Likewise in the How a young man should listen to poems Plutarch too is talking about the young – children or teenagers – a fact which may explain the rather utilitarian approach to literature taken there, which sidelines the aesthetic value of poetry and is concerned only with its potential for improving or corrupting its young readers. But in the Lives, Plutarch imagines a mature reader, able to grapple with the realities of history and with the moral problems that these realities raise. Hence the stress here on the reader’s judgement or discrimination (κρίσις) and the ability to act on it.

At this point Plutarch himself cites a negative example: we should not be like the Spartans who used to make their helots drunk in order to teach the young the dangers of drunkenness, an act which Plutarch characterises as ‘hardly humane or the act of a statesman’ (οὐ πανόιοις θύλλαθροι του νομοῦ πολιτικήν). The reference to the Spartans and their helots is particularly effective. Plainly this is a stock example, often invoked to illustrate that one can learn from negative examples. But Plutarch here takes the Spartan practice as itself a negative example from which to learn – one should not be like the Spartans, seeking out and creating negative examples by humiliating others. On the one hand, then, this is clever and self-reflexive argumentation: a negative example to illustrate how not to use negative examples. On the other hand, it also introduces an example drawn from

17 Cf. Plut.: τῆν ἐμπειρία τῶν οικίων καλλιαρημένην ἀκακίαν οὐκ ἑπανοίδοσιν καὶ τῶν δὲ κεχρημένων ἀσκετώτερον αὐτοῖς.
18 For other tacit corrections of Plato, see Duff (1999) 43–45 (on Per. 1–2), 213 and 266 (on De Cohib. Ira 457b–c).
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History, and makes smoother the transition from general reflection on the value of negative examples to an argument about Plutarch’s own literary programme in the *Lives* and the potential of bad examples drawn from history. Furthermore, by rejecting the Spartan practice, Plutarch also succeeds in constructing both himself and his readers as humane and sympathetic to the plights and weakness of others, a key virtue in Plutarch’s *oeuvre* and a key plank in his own self-presentation. Such *philanthropia*, given its most clear and famous statement in *Kimon* 2.2–3, is what will condition Plutarch’s attitude to the failings of his subjects, especially of Demetrios and Antony, who fail in grand fashion, and is assumed of his readers.

But the reference to the helots has a further function: it alludes to another passage of Plato from Book 7 of the *Laws*. The subject is the education of the young. After dealing at length with the subject of dance, Plato’s protagonist turns briefly to drama. Comedy, he argues, should be allowed in the ideal state: ‘For it is impossible to learn the serious without the ridiculous or any one of a set of opposites without the other’ (816d–e). ‘It is for this reason’, he goes on, ‘that one should learn these things too (ie. how people can engage in ridiculous behaviour) in order never through ignorance to do anything ridiculous, when one should not’. Such ‘mimicry’ (ie. comic acting) should not be undertaken by citizens but should be imposed on slaves and foreigners working for pay (816e). The *Laws*, then, provided a justification for the use of negative examples; Plutarch’s mention of helots is probably intended to recall this passage. But whereas Plato had approved the imposition of degrading behaviour on slaves in order to teach young citizens how not to act, Plutarch explicitly disapproves. He thus implicitly corrects Plato in one of his harsher pronouncements: the latter was right in seeing the value of looking at bad behaviour but not right in his inhumane treatment of the weak.

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20 On the importance of the virtue of *philanthropia* for Plutarch, see Martin (1961). On Plutarch’s *persona* of *philanthropia* in the *Lives*, and the relevance of *Kimon* 2.2–3, see Duff (1999) 55–62.

21 What he calls ‘the behaviour of base bodies and ideas and of those engaged in laughable comic-acting, in speech and song and dance and all the representations of all these things by the comedians’ (816d).

22 άνευ γάρ γελοίων τά σπουδαία καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ ἐννοιαὶ μαθεῖν μὲν οὐ δυνατόν, εἰ μέλλει τις φρόνιμος ἔσπεσθαι, ποιήσῃ δὲ οὐκ οὕτω δυνατόν ἀμφότερα, εἰ τις οὗ μέλλει καὶ σμιρνὸν ἀρετῆς μετέχειν, ἀλλὰ αὐτῶν ἑνέκα τούτων καὶ μανθάνειν αὐτὰ δὲ, τοῦ μή ποτε δι’ ἄγνωσιν δρᾶν ἢ λέγειν ὡσα γελοία, μηδὲν δέον, δούλοις δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ ξένους ἐμμύποις προστάτειν μιμεῖσθαι… Cf. *Rep.* 396c.

23 Plato may in fact have had the Spartan custom in mind, as Plutarch may have seen; he had already referred to helots at 776c and 777b–c.

24 Plato goes on to discuss tragedy, which will be allowed if it will teach what the rulers want to be taught. He imagines the rulers addressing the tragedians and saying ‘… we are the poets of the fairest and best possible tragedy; for our whole state is an imitation of the fairest and best life (μίμησις τοῦ καλλίστου καὶ ἀρίστου βίου), which is in reality – so we at least assert – the truest tragedy’ (817b).
If Plato’s suggestion for the way one might learn from negative examples was too harsh, then how should one use them? Plutarch continues:

(1.5) Perhaps, however, it is not such a bad idea for me to insert into the paradigms of my Lives one or two pairs of men who conducted themselves in a rather [or more] unreflecting way and who became in their positions of power and amid great affairs renowned for their vice – not by Zeus in order to please and distract readers by varying my writing, (1.6) but just as Ismenias the Theban used to point out to his pupils both those who played the pipes well and those who played badly, saying ‘That is how you should play’ and ‘That is how you should not play’, and just as Antigeneidas thought that the young listened with more pleasure to the good pipers if they had experienced a bad player too, in the same way I think we will be more enthusiastic both as spectators and imitators of the better Lives, if we do not leave unexamined the base and the castigated. (Demetr. 1.5–6)

While humiliating the weak is not humane nor good statesmanship, reading about the lives of the flawed characters of history can be helpful. This, like the observation of poor flute players, is acceptable because it does not involve humiliating the objects of investigation. Such negative examples can be introduced to the mature reader because – to return to the language of the earlier sentences – through the use of reason such a reader can not only perceive good and bad, virtue and vice, but can also discriminate as regards the appropriate reaction to each. The mature reader should, as Plutarch said earlier, not be in a state of innocence or ignorance about vice, but, through studying examples drawn from history of men ‘renowned for vice’, should learn the better to avoid it.

But if Plutarch is disagreeing with Plato here, he is equally at pains to emphasise that the purpose of narrating the Lives of such less-than-perfect-men is not at all the pleasure of the casual reader, who might take pleasure in spicy, exciting tales (1.5). Of course, such a claim does not rule out the possibility that the Lives which follow indeed might be exciting and emotive; indeed, it might be thought to encourage the expectation. But the point is that the pleasure that arises from such narrative is not to be seen as the goal for the serious reader.

There is thus an implied contrast here between pleasure and utility – a standard one in historiographical theory. The Demetrios and Antony is often considered one of the most exciting and moving of all Plutarch’s texts: e.g. RUSSELL (1973) 135–142; LAMBERTON (2001) 130–142. There is also an implied contrast between casual

25 The Demetrios and Antony is often considered one of the most exciting and moving of all Plutarch’s texts: e.g. RUSSELL (1973) 135–142; LAMBERTON (2001) 130–142.

readers and the ideal, serious reader. The verb ἑντυγχάνω is standard Greek for ‘read’. So τῶν ἑντυγχάνοντων in 1.5 means in the first place simply ‘readers’. But the participle of ἑντυγχάνω had been used earlier in the prologue to refer to the senses which must respond passively to any data which they ‘happen to come across’ (ἐντυγχάνωσον). So there is probably a sense here of ‘those who happen to come across’ his work, that is, casual, chance readers. Such casual readers, are aligned with the physical senses, and simply respond passively to stimuli. Serious readers, on the other hand, are aligned with the practitioners of the arts, and actively use reason to think about and consider what they are reading; they can benefit, just as much as serious students of music or medicine can, from a self-conscious study of bad examples. They will not actively seek them out for any pleasure or titillation which such bad examples might provide, but will attempt to gain benefit from the examples that they happen to come across (the point of κατ’ συμβεβηκός in 1.3). In making a distinction between the casual reader and the serious, discriminating reader, and in aligning the former with the physical senses and the latter with reason, Plutarch is of course both complimenting his readers and creating a bond of shared expectations and values between writer and recipient – ‘You are not the sort of readers to take pleasure from reading about the bad behaviour of the great – nor am I the sort of frivolous writer who would aim solely at your pleasure’. 

Plutarch is thus positioning not only his ideal reader in relation to other less serious readers, but also himself in relation to other writers. Claims that rival historians indulged in sensationalist narrative either lacking in moral content or transgressing the basic rules of historical accuracy are common-place in the

27 PELLING (2002b) 275–6, who points also to a similar implied contrast in Nik. 1.1, where less than ideal readers are called τοὺς ἑντυγχάνοντος τοὺς γράμματα τούτοις, and in Alex. 1–3, where some readers might ‘quibble’ (σοφοφοντεῖν) that the narrator will not give an exhaustive military account.

28 In fact ἑντυγχάνω can also mean ‘meet’, and there is probably a sense of that here too: ‘those who meet (through reading the Lives)’ such notorious men of the past. This might be taken is a subtle claim for the vividness of the Lives, comparable to the description in the prologue to the Aemilius and Timoleon of the act of reading the Lives as being like ‘spending time and living’ with the heroes of the past, ‘receiving and inviting each of these men in turn when they visit us through history’ (Aem. 1.2).

29 See PELLING (2002b) passim for ways in which Plutarch constructs both his own persona and his audience, especially in the prologues and synkrieseis, suggesting complicity of attitudes and purpose (cf. also STÄDTER 1988). The use of first-person plural verbs here (ἡμεῖς ... ἐγὼμεθά ... οὕτως ... δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς ...), as in other formal prologues (e.g. Per. 2.3: ἀγαπώμεν ... βουλόμεθα ...; Aem. 1, Alex. 1 and Nik.1 passim) and in many formal synkrieseis (e.g. Lys.-Sulla 5.6; Phil.-Flam. 3–5; Ages.-Pomp. 1.1), also has the effect of suggesting a bond of common attitudes and endeavour between author and reader (see below, p. 286). As PHILIP STÄDTER has pointed out to me, οὕτως ... δοκοῦμεν ἡμεῖς in 1.5 combines both first person singulars and plurals: this cannot be considered as a false plural. On such inclusive plurals, see DUFF (1999) 268–269, 286, 299; PELLING (2002b) 273–4.
ancient world, as are claims of a distinction between serious readers and frivolous
readers. Polybios famously attacked Phylarchos for what he presented as just such
sensationalist, emotive narrative (2.56), comparing him to his discredit to a tragic
poet, and appealing to a distinction between frivolous readers (τοὺς ἐντυγχάνον-
tας … τοὺς ἀκόουντας) and serious readers (τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας).30 Plutarch
himself sometimes elsewhere categorises rival historians with terms such as
‘tragic’ or ‘dramatic’,31 though such claims generally serve to differentiate Plutar-
ch’s own narrative from theirs on the grounds of a supposed greater objectivity or
restraint or a higher moral purpose. Similarly Plutarch’s explicit rejection of
pleasure as a goal here serves to highlight the presence of an educational element
in his narration of flawed individuals, rather than as a total denial that such
narratives will be enjoyable – nor indeed as a total rejection of the tragic.

Indeed, when Plutarch mentions Demetrios and Antony by name it is with
reference to another Platonic passage and, implicitly, to the notion of the tragic:

(1.7) Περιεξέι δὲ τὸ τούτο τὸ βιβλίον τὸν Δημητρίου τοῦ Πολιορκητοῦ βιον καὶ τὸν Ἀντωνίου
toῦ αὐτοκράτορος, ἀνδρῶν μάλιστα δὲ τῷ Πλάτωνι μαρτυρησάντων, ὁτι καὶ κακίας
μεγάλας ὀσπέρ ἀρετάς οἱ μεγάλαι φόσες εὐχέρευσαν. (1.8) γενόμενοι δὲ οὕτως ἐρωτικῶν
πολιτικῶν καὶ μεγαλόδουρων πολυτελείς ὄρισται, καὶ τὰς κατὰ τήν ὁμοιότητας
ἀκολουθοῦσας ἕσοχον, οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ βιων μεγάλα μὲν κατορθοῦντες, μεγάλα δὲ
σφαλλόντες, πλείστων δὲ ἐπικρατοῦντες, πλείστων δὲ ᾠδαμέλλοντες, ἀπορεοδοκήτως δὲ παιών-
tες, ἀνελίπτως δὲ πάλιν ἀναφέροντες διετέλεσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατέστρεφεν ὁ μὲν ἀλοίπος ὑπὸ
tῶν πολέμων, ὁ δὲ ἑγέρσαστο τοῦ ποιθεὶν τοῦτο γενόμενος.

(1.7) This book will contain the life of Demetrios the Besieger and that of Antony the
Imperator, men who most bore witness to Plato’s assertion that great natures produce great
great virtues as well as great virtues. (1.8) Both were similarly given to love and drink, were soldierly,
munificent, extravagant and hubristic; and they had resultant similarities in fortune. For it was not
just that in the rest of their lives they continually had great successes and great failures, huge
conquests and huge losses, unexpected failures and unexpected recoveries, but also that one
overturned his life after being captured by the enemy, the other after coming very near to
suffering this fate. (Demetr. 1.7–8)

τὸν Ἀντωνίου Ζιέγερ: Ἀντωνίου.
pολιτικοὶ: I: πολιτικοὶ.

The technique is subtle: Plutarch follows his disagreement with Plato over the
value of bad examples with an explicit quotation of him. The reference is to a
passage in Book 6 of the Republic (491b–495b), to which Plutarch alludes

30 Cf. 7.7.8 (καὶ γὰρ τοὺς ὕποκόουσας ἢδιον οὕτως καὶ τοὺς ἀκόουντας τῷ παντὶ χρη-
σιμοποιεῖν); 11.19.2 (τοὺς ἀκόουντας … τοὺς φιλομαθοῦντας).
31 E.g. Theopompos: Dem. 21.2; Douris of Samos: Per. 28.2; Phylarchos: Them 32.4. There
was almost certainly no school of ‘tragic history’, as was once believed: accusations of writing in
a tragic way were stock ammunition to use in attacking rivals. On the whole issue of the so-called
‘tragic history’, seeWalbank (1938; 1960); Kebric (1977) 14–18; Sacks (1981) 144–170;
Plato, tragedy, the ideal reader and Plutarch’s Demetrios and Antony

Plato had argued that men with great potential would turn out either very good, if they receive the appropriate education and grow up in a suitable environment, or very bad, if they do not. Plutarch, both here and in his other references to this passage, is rather more ambiguous: men of great potential produce ‘great vices as well as great virtues’. The idea is presumably that men with such great potential may produce great virtues under some circumstances and great vices under others; the possibility is left open that great vices and great virtues may coexist in the same man at the same time. Plutarch may then be revising Plato’s position, which was rather two-dimensional, and hinting at a more subtle and realistic moral vision, and one with more room for sympathetic involvement and understanding. He is, then, once again engaged in a dialogue with Plato: citing him – and expecting the reader to notice the citation – while at the same time reinterpreting him.

Plutarch goes on to list some of the shared characteristics of the two men whose Lives will follow – a common feature of the ‘formal prologues’: ‘Both were similarly given to love and drink, were soldierly, munificent, extravagant and hubristic; and they had resultant similarities in fortune’. The division of a man’s Life into two categories: i) character or moral qualities and ii) fortune, success or circumstances of life is a common one in Plutarch and in ancient thought generally. In terms of success and circumstance, the stress here is both on the greatness of the two men – as is fitting for men introduced as ‘great natures’ – and on the vagaries of their fortune: they stumble (πταίνοντες), recover (ισχοφόροντες) and finally ‘overturn’ (κατέστρεφον) their life. The verb καταστρέφω (sc. βιον) is acceptable Greek in Plutarch’s time for ‘die’. But κατέστρεφον is

33 Notably, Plutarch does not raise the issue here of education: while education is important in determining a man’s moral, as well as practical, success (e.g PELLING 1989; SWAIN 1989, 62–66; 1990; 1996, 140–144) it is not a major issue in the Demetrios and Antony.
34 The term was coined by STAIDER (1988) to designate prologues which introduce both Lives of the pair, rather than just the first, and thus mirror the ‘formal synkrisis’ at the end.
35 The two can be seen as working together as here, or opposed: i.e. that success or failure either did or did not reflect the character or virtue either of an individual (e.g. Alexander) or of a people (e.g. the Romans). See OAKLEY (1997–) note on Livy 7.34.6 and 9.17.1–19.17. This is a common theme in rhetoric and is seen at its most spectacular in Plutarch’s On the fortune or virtue of Romans and On the fortune of virtue or Alexander, and in the formal synkriseis (cf. DUFF 1999, 263).
36 The vicissitudes of fortune is a theme common to both Lives and explicitly stated in the first line of the synkrisis (Demeter.-Ant. 1.1).
37 ἐν τῷ λοιπῷ βίῳ at the start of the phrase ensures that the sense ‘end one’s life’ is prominent (as also in Them. 31.6 and Herodian 5.8.10: ἀντονόμασε μὲν οὐν ἐς ἐκτὸν ἐτος ἐλάσσος τῆς βοσκείας καὶ χρησάμενος τῷ προειρημένῳ βίῳ, οὕτως ἐμά τῇ μητρὶ κατέστρεψεν). There is thus in Demetr. 1.8 a play on the meaning of life, as both physical and literary, life and Life. Such puns on βιον are not uncommon: e.g. Aen. 1.1; Tim. 15.11; probably Mul. Virt. 243b. For καταστέφω without βιον, cf. Arrian, Anab. 7.3.1.
plainly chosen here for its continuing of the notion of the ups-and-downs (ἄνω- ... κάτω-) of their fortune. These ups and downs, the great successes and great failures of Demetrios and Antony, are seen as resulting from their character: this is the force of ἀκολούθους (‘following on, resultant’).

But what of their character? It is important to note that what is envisaged as negative has shifted as this passage proceeds. At the start of the passage, it is aesthetic – the sights or tastes which the senses are forced to accept even if they are unpleasing. Then it is practical – bad flute players, bad doctors: there is no suggestion that such men are morally bad, merely bad players or bad doctors. The allusion to the last passage of Plato introduces the notion of moral badness or goodness: these men are introduced as ‘notorious for their vice (κωτία)’, and ‘base and castigated’, and as confirming Plato’s doctrine about ‘great vices and great virtues’. There is probably an element of both senses, practical and moral, here: Demetrios and Antony are to be seen as men who failed, who were bad at the business of living – examples, like the drunken helots, of incompetence and foolishness but for whom a civilised man still feels pity and understanding. Indeed in the body of the two Lives themselves Plutarch does not present Demetrios and Antony as simple paradigms of vice; they are shown certainly to be flawed individuals, but as CHRISTOPHER PELLING has emphasised the tone, especially in the Antony, is one of understanding, even admiration for their good qualities and for that quality of greatness which marks both their lives, while at the same time of regret and sympathy for their weaknesses and ultimate failures.

The list of adjectives with which Demetrios and Antony are described in the prologue seems to support this reading. Although taken together the picture is certainly rather negative, most of the qualities mentioned (e.g. στρατηγικός, μεγαλόδοχος) are not morally wrong in themselves, though it is easy to see how they can become so when taken to an extreme. Take the term στρατηγικός, which perhaps implies a soldier’s bluffness, even roughness, and an ability to mingle with the common-soldiers, to win their trust, to bear their hardships; combined with ἐρωτικοὶ ποικιλοὶ there might be a sense of the commander’s ability to


39 στρατηγικός is very rarely used of individuals in Plutarch. Caesar applies it self-deprecatingly to himself: his diction is that of a στρατηγικός not an orator (Caes. 3.4); Plutarch puts down Parmenion’s inability to follow his doctor’s diet as resulting from his being νέος και στρατηγικός (Alex. 72.2); Philopoimen, who, Plutarch emphasises, was much better suited for life as a soldier than a commander, is told that the body and life of an athlete are very different from those of a στρατηγικός (Phil. 3.4). The term is plainly not critical in itself: but seems to carry implications of excessive commitment to the military or a certain boorishness or boisterousness. When Cato the Elder praises his father ὁς ἀγαθὸν ἀνδρα καὶ στρατηγικῶν (Cato Maj. 1.1) the term reflects Cato’s own pose of rejection of cultural sophistication in favour of a more rugged militarism. The word is perhaps applied to Antony in Ant. 27.2 (see below and n. 43).
carouse and drink with his men. Similarly, their extravagance and generosity are qualities which cut both ways. With Demetrios, drinking and uncontrolled sexual desires are treated as minor and endearing peccadillos at the start (e.g. Demetr. 9.5–7; 19.4–10); Plutarch states explicitly that they did not detract from his military abilities (2.3; 19.10; Demetr.-Ant. 3.1–3). As the Life progresses, however, his sexual behaviour alienates allies (e.g. 23.4–24.5, his exploits on the Athenian Akropolis) and in the end his drinking causes his own death (Demetr. 52.2–5). But in the Antony the positive, practical benefits of such behaviour – playing the rugged soldier, drinking with his men, assisting in their erotic escapades and joking about his own, liberality – are brought out in an important passage near the start of the Antony (4.1–7). This kind of thing is what will contribute in large part to Antony’s military success (e.g. Ant. 17.5), although such behaviour will also contribute to his failures; this is clearest at Ant. 27.2, where Kleopatra correctly ‘saw in him a lot of the common soldier’ (πολλὸς τὸ στρατιωτικὸν καὶ βάρτυσον), and was able to adjust her tactics of seduction accordingly. Only the final adjective, υπηρεσίας, is unequivocally negative, suggesting excessive self-regard, a disdain for others, perhaps violence.

Moral failings combined with greatness, sudden and unexpected changes of fortune, hybris, tyche, suffering (ποθεῖν): the language of 1.8, finally, lends support to the theories of those who wish to see in the Demetrios and Antony a tragic structure and its subjects as tragic heroes. It has long been recognised that...

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40 μεγαλόδωροι (lit. ‘great givers’) is of course an adjective entirely suitable for ‘great natures’ like Demetrios and Antony. For their generosity, cf. also e.g. Demetr. 6.5; Ant. 6.5.


42 As Plutarch puts it, commenting on Antony’s liberality and open-handed behaviour to his friends, ‘it provided a brilliant start to his growing strength, and when he had become great lifted his power to yet greater heights, though this was being overturned (ἀντιτρέπομενον) by countless faults besides’ (Ant. 4.6). See PELLING (1988b) notes ad loc.

43 στρατιωτικῶν in Ant. 27.2 is Ziegler’s emendation for στρατιωτικὸν. See PELLING (1988b) notes ad loc.

44 In fact, ποτικῶς is found in only one 14th cent. ms (I = Parisinus 1679, not collated by Ziegler; see MANNREDDI 1995) and thence in the Iuntine edition, the editio princeps of the Lives; the other mss have πολιτικῶς. As PHILIP STADTER has pointed out to me, ποτικῶς is certainly a Plutarchan word (e.g. Demetr. 36.6: οὐκ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα ποτικῶς; Alex. 4.7; De Is. et Osir. 352f; Quest. conv. 663c; 709b). A reference to drinking is suitable for both men, and coheres with all the other terms mentioned. But πολιτικῶς is not impossible and would form a neat pair with στρατιωτικῶς. If πολιτικῶς were correct, then this list could even less be considered a list of vices.

45 See above note 5. A detailed treatment of the links between Plutarch’s Lives and tragedy as a genre (rather than of particular Lives or particular tragedies) has not been attempted since DE LACY (1952) and TAGLIOSSACCHI (1960), though a good starting point is now provided by PELLING (2002a) 111, n. 27. Scattered discussions of individual Lives or themes can be found in RUSSELL (1973) 123, 135; DE GREGORIO (1976) 166–173; PELLING (1980) 132 [= repr. (1995) 135–136; repr.
there is a high concentration of metaphors from the tragic stage in these two Lives: Demetrios is repeatedly called or compared to an actor, and terms such ‘tragic’ (τραγικός), ‘actor’ (υποκριτής), and ‘drama’ (δράμα) occur repeatedly. For example, when Demetrios’ troops begin to desert to Pyrrhos, he is described as going to his tent (σχηνή: the word can also have connotations of the stage) ‘not like a king but like an actor’ and putting on a dark cloak ‘instead of that tragic costume’ (Demetr. 44.9). Such metaphors in Plutarch and more generally in this period often express, as in this passage, the puncturing of over-blown and grandiose self-regard. But stage terms are too common in the two Lives for this to be their only implication. In the transition from the first Life to the second, Plutarch makes explicit the dramatic mood of the two Lives: ‘Now that the Macedonian play has been performed to the end, it is time to bring on the Roman too’ (Demetr. 53.10). And in the final words of the book as a whole, that is at the end of the synkrisis (Demetr.-Ant. 6.4), Plutarch has Antony ‘making his exit’ (ἐξήχυσεν). Such metaphors, combined with the great prominence given to the role of fortune in the two Lives, especially in the Demetrios, where it builds him up and ultimately casts him down, suggest that the Lives of the two men might well be read as tragedies and their subjects as tragic heroes. The reader watches helplessly as both men unwittingly work their own downfall.

A recognition of the tragic elements of the Demetrios and Antony is, of course, not new. Indeed Shakespeare chose the Life of Antony as inspiration for one of his


46 E.g. Demetr. 18.5; 25.9; 28.1; 34.4; 41.5–6; 44.9; 53.1; 53.10; Ant. 29.4; 45.4; 54.5; Demetr.-Ant. 6.4. The tragic metaphors in the Demetrios almost certainly owe something to Douris of Samos, an important source for this Life: Sweet (1951) 179–181; Tagliasacchi (1960); Kebric (1977) 59–60; Mastrocinque (1979) 269–276; Andrei (1989) 43–44, 47–48; Amantani (1995) xxiii–xxiv. But their presence in the Antony too show that Plutarch did not merely reproduce them unthinkingly from his source.

47 It might be worth noticing in passing that this presentation of Demetrios as a tragic figure, or as an actor in his own drama, plainly influenced Cavafy. In his poem entitled ‘Ο Βοσνιακός Δυστύρες (published 1906), Cavafy chooses exactly that image, Demetrios’ changing of his clothes like an actor leaving the stage, to sum up the man. In highlighting the tragic and the theatrical aspects of Demetrios, Cavafy showed himself an insightful reader of Plutarch.


49 Δημοτικός φαντάσματος, ἄρα τοῖς Ἠθικοῖς ἐπεισαγαγεῖν.

50 On this final sentence of the synkrisis as providing a vision of Antony’s death as strikingly at odds with that in the Life itself, see Duff (1999) 279–281.

own tragedies. But it is notable that such a reading is encouraged by the language of the prologue. Perhaps we are meant to think specifically of Aristotle’s *Poetics*: the ideal tragedy, according to *Poetics* 13, does not concern either a good man or a bad man, but someone in between (ὁ μεταξὺ τῶν): men of great renown (ἐπιφανείς ἄνδρες) who fall ‘not through vice and depravity’ but through some mistake. Demetrios and Antony, then, although introduced initially as men ‘renowned for their vice’ (ἐπιφανῶν ἐς κακίαν) are presented more like the great characters of tragedy, men who – as Aristotle saw them – are neither very good nor very bad but are shown passing from success to disaster. Plato had notoriously criticised tragedy in *Republic* 10 on the grounds not only that it is a poor imitation of reality but also that it corrupts the audience by appealing to their emotions and encouraging the imitation of the bad behaviour presented on stage (esp. Rep. 605a–608b). In the *Laws*, although he allowed it a place, tragedy is still treated as dangerous and is only allowed if subject to censorship. Plutarch in the *How the young should listen to poems* seems to accept the Platonic notion that the bad behaviour presented in tragedy might corrupt the young: he argues at length that children must be taught that not everything presented on the stage is worthy of imitation. But it is significant that he does not go as far as rejecting tragedy as a whole. In the *Demetrios and Antony*, on the other hand, Plutarch implicitly rejects Plato’s crudely moralising criticisms of tragedy and assumes a mature, discerning reader able to grapple with the moral challenges provided by two such tragic figures.

In fact, this emphasis on the mature reader’s use of his or her own critical faculties is central to Plutarch’s moral programme in the *Lives* more generally. Recent studies of the moralism of the Lives have stressed the high demands these texts make on the reader: there are very few examples of direct authorial comment; the reader is expected to see for him or herself what is commendable or not. Indeed, some pairs of Lives present figures who are morally very complex, neither wholly virtuous nor without redeeming features – Lysander and Sulla, for example, or Coriolanus and Alkibiades or indeed *Demetrios and Antony*. Christopher Pelling has argued that the moralism of such Lives is not one that encourages direct action – imitation or its opposite – but rather a ‘descriptive’ one which

52 See PELLING (1988b) 37–45. Contrast the simplistic readings of Plutarch’s *Antony* by some Shakespearian scholars; e.g. COOK (1997) 91–92.

53 There is no convincing evidence, however, that Plutarch knew the *Poetics*: see SANDRACH (1982) 208, 229; ZADOROJNYI (1997) 172–173.

54 For discussion of the precise meaning of Aristotle’s words in *Poetics* 13, see e.g. LUCAS (1968) ad loc., esp. 143–144.

55 See e.g. MURRAY (1996) 6. The apparent contradiction between Plato’s treatment of poetry in Books 2–3, where he allows some forms of poetry for pedagogical purposes, and Book 10, where his condemnation seems more far-reaching, is discussed by LEVIN (2001) 150–167.

56 See above, n. 24.
encourages the reader’s reflection on the human condition, in rather the same way which a tragedy does.\textsuperscript{57} \textsc{Philip Stadter}, on the other hand, has put the emphasis on the way in which Plutarch’s dramatising of the real-life combination of virtues and vices, the moral dilemmas faced by great men, might indeed provide useful lessons for the contemporary reader, himself likewise flawed and imperfect. In \textsc{Stadter}’s view the imperfections of many of Plutarch’s subjects is important for his programme of encouraging thought and discrimination \textit{aimed at a practical goal}: men like Demetrios and Antony might well be read as warnings to contemporary statesmen, particularly those who held high office in the Roman administration, men who might meet with some of the same temptations and who might see the failures of Demetrios and Antony as salutary examples for themselves.\textsuperscript{58} I have myself attempted to argue that such Lives may sometimes complicate and challenge moral assumptions themselves.\textsuperscript{59} But what all three approaches have in common is the insistence that Plutarch’s \textit{Lives} encourage the reader’s active involvement and moral self-examination; this is, as \textsc{Stadter} puts it, a specifically ‘adult education’. Tragic figures like Demetrios and Antony, when met with and examined with proper ‘discernment’, provide much food for thought.\textsuperscript{60}

Such active involvement and discernment on the part of the reader is assumed, as we have seen, in the \textit{Demetrios and Antony} prologue. It is also assumed in the \textit{Perikles and Fabius} prologue, where the reader’s character is said to be improved οὐ τῇ μιμήσει … ἀλλὰ τῇ ἱστορίᾳ τοῦ ἑργoffee, ‘not so much by imitating but by investigating the work’, that is, by investigating and studying both the virtuous deeds (‘the work of virtue’) performed by the subjects of the \textit{Lives}, and Plutarch’s own literary ‘work’ by which they are mediated (\textit{Per}. 2.4). What is being imagined is the reader’s own active involvement rather than a mere mechanical imitation.\textsuperscript{61} The formal comparison (\textit{synkrisis}) often dramatises this act of judgment or discrimination (\textit{krisis}), sometimes even addressing the reader and soliciting his or her own involvement (e.g. \textit{Lys.-Sulla} 5.7: ὁρᾷ δὲις σκοπεῖν).\textsuperscript{62} The young man encountering poetry in the \textit{How a young man should listen to poems} is to be taught this kind of discrimination; the reader of the \textit{Lives} must learn to see for him or herself what is to be imitated and what not. In the \textit{Demetrios and Antony} prologue, then, Plutarch argues that \textit{if one uses judgement and discrimination} then reading about immoral men not need damage the reader – on the contrary, such

\textsuperscript{58} \textsc{Stadter} (1997; 2000; 2003/4). Cf. \textit{Kim}. 2.2–3 on the impossibility of complete virtue.
\textsuperscript{59} \textsc{Duff} (1999).
\textsuperscript{60} \textsc{Stadter} (2000) 493.
\textsuperscript{61} On the complexities of \textit{Per}. 2.4, see \textsc{Duff} (1999) 37–42.
\textsuperscript{62} Cf. \textit{Phil.-Flam}. 3.5 (σκόπεῖ): \textit{Ag.}/\textit{Kleon.-Gracch}. 5.7 (συνοπθεῖ μὲν οὖν καὶ αὐτοῦ). See \textsc{Goldhill} (2002) 258–259; \textsc{Pelling} (2002b) 274–275. Dissonance between \textit{synkrisis} and \textit{Life} might also be thought to contribute to the sense that the reader’s own judgement is required: see \textsc{Duff} (1999) 200–205; 263–286.
figures will cause the thoughtful and discriminating reader to reflect, with that same humanity and understanding which Plutarch expects him or her to display in the case of the helots, on the moral lessons which such complex real-life figures can bring. If that is the case, then Plutarch has managed to combine explicit citation of Plato with implicit criticism and redefinition, to justify in short a very un-Platonic presentation of the past by appealing to and adapting passages of Plato himself.

Bibliography


Reading

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