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To link to this article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199314621.013.45

Publisher: Oxford University Press

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The Metaphysics of Self in Praśastapāda’s Differential Naturalism

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Abstract and Keywords
In *A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories (Pādārthadharmasamgraha)* the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (6th c. CE) presents an innovative metaphysics of the self. This article examines the defining metaphysical and axiological features of this conception of self and the dualist categorial schema in which it is located. It shows how this idea of the self, as a reflexive and ethical being, grounds a multinaturalist view of natural order and offers a conception of agency that claims to account for all the reflexive features of human mental and bodily life. Finally, it discusses the ends of self’s reflexivity and of human life as a return to the true self. It argues that at the heart of Praśastapāda’s metaphysics of self is the idea that ethics *is* metaphysics, and that epistemic practice *is* ethical practice.

Keywords: self, agency, dualism, realism, dharma, values, nature, Vaiśeṣika, Praśastapāda, Śrīdhara, Udayana

Introduction
The *Pādārthadharmasamgraha (A Compendium of the Characteristics of Categories)* is a seminal sixth century work of the classical Vaiśeṣika philosopher Praśastapāda (*circa* 530 CE). A contemporary of the Buddhist epistemologist Dignāga (early 6th c. CE), Praśastapāda is the key figure in the development of Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. The *Compendium*, his sole work, is one of the most distinguished contributions to Indian metaphysics and a major classical Indian text on the self. The significance of the *Compendium* in the development of Indian metaphysics is difficult to exaggerate. It is foundational for all subsequent developments in Vaiśeṣika metaphysics and the later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika tradition, and remains the key text against which even the most revisionary and reformist metaphysicians of this tradition define themselves well into the early modern period (*circa* 17th c. CE). The philosophy of self and mind, conceptions of mereological holism, and material atomism presented in the *Compendium* anchor subsequent Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika critiques of Buddhist metaphysics and philosophy of mind, as well as those of competing Brahmanical schools such as Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya.

The *Compendium* is also known as *The Commentary of Praśastapāda (Praśastapādabhāṣya)*, on the *Vaiśeṣika -sūtra* of Kaṇḍa (first c. CE), the earliest extant Vaiśeṣika text. Although based
on the Śūtra, the Compendium’s integration of its somewhat loosely organized contents in a revisionist and systematic categorial analysis considerably supersedes the characteristics of a commentary to make it one of the most important contributions to Indian metaphysics. I dub the metaphysical paradigm presented in the Compendium differential (vaiśeṣika) naturalism. This owes in part to its fine-grained analysis and classification of the constituents of the world, by way of their similarities and differences, but also to its unique concept of a differentiator (viśeṣa), a primitive category that distinguishes elementary objects of the same class, such as earth or water atoms for instance. For the purposes of this essay, interpretations of the Compendium rely on two major commentaries on it from the classical period, Śrīdhara’s Shoots of Reason (Nyāyakandali, 10th cent. C.E.) and Udayana’s Row of Lightbeams (Kiranāvali), as well as his Investigation of the Reality of the Self (Āmatattvaviveka), from the late 10th/early 11th c. C.E.; and an early modern commentary, Jagadīśa’s Sūkti (fl. 1600–1620) which is possibly the most succinct interpretation of the metaphysics of self presented in the Compendium.

Although the analytical rigour and robustness of the Compendium is exemplary, what sets it apart is its philosophical integrity. This refers to its integration of ontological, ethical, and epistemic concepts in a unified conception of embodied existence in a world that includes both nonphysical selves and matter, reason and values. The following discussion attempts to unpack the key features of this integrative and axiologic metaphysics and epistemology of the self (ātman) with a view to their philosophical scope and implications. The first section discusses the key features of Praśastapāda’s metaphysical paradigm, the mitigated dualism of its ontological and causal architecture, and how this locates self and moral values in the material world. The following section examines the idea of self presented in the Compendium and the conceptions of life and natural order this offers by way of a conception of ethics as metaphysics. The intrinsic reflexivity and axiology of the embodied self is discussed next and how this accounts for the phenomena of human life from its first-personal features all the way down to biological processes. The penultimate section considers the possibilities of self-transformation that self’s value-laden reflexivity advocates as its own end through a conception of epistemic practice as ethical practice; it is followed by a concluding discussion.

Classical Vaiśeṣika Metaphysics

The Compendium claims that a six-fold categorial schema of metaphysical kinds accounts for all that exists, namely, substance (dravya), property (guṇa), motion (karman), inherence (samavāya), differentiator (viśeṣa), and universal (sāmānya). Substances are the foundation of this system. They serve as the existential basis in which properties and motion instantiate, and the loci in which
causal relationships between substances, properties, and motion, the relata of causation, take place – the latter notion dates back to Kaṇāda. The ontological relation of inherence or being-in enables the existence of properties and motion in a substance, whereas the unique Vaiśeṣika category of ontological differentiator or individuator distinguishes otherwise identical elementary substances such as earth or water atoms. The last category, universal, groups tokens of the same property or substance type, such as redness or cowness, in distinct classes.\(^6\)

**An Axiological Realism**

Classical Vaiśeṣika holds that a world of mind-independent objects exists. This is, however, an epistemically, semantically, and axiologically constrained realism and it reflects the centrality of rational and moral agency in Vaiśeṣika metaphysics. “All six categories (padārtha),” Praṣṭapāda asserts, “possess reality, (astitva), cognizability (jhneyatva) and nameability (abhidheyatva).”\(^7\) This says that a mind-independent world of particulars exists which is cognitively accessible in terms of distinct sorts of categories or kinds, and is linguistically expressible in the semantic structures of natural language. This is a comprehensive epistemic and semantic realism which claims that the categories that are constitutive of the world encompass all that exists, a version of realism that is quite unlike contemporary realist paradigms.\(^8\)

The first three categories of objects, substances, properties, and motion, also possess certain axiological features. They are called artha, which means, alternately, object, purpose, or meaning, most plausibly, because they are considered the relata of causation. Material objects are considered here in terms of the rational and moral concerns of agents, as sources of value, meaning, and purpose (artha), illustrated by Praṣṭapāda’s claim that objects are the “cause of virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma) states [of the self],”\(^9\) a notion that again goes back to the Vaiśeṣika-sūtra.\(^10\) Śrīdhara elucidates this by saying that all objects (artha) “have an inherent capacity in themselves of producing virtue and non-virtue”.\(^11\) Objects are here sources of value and meaning (artha) for selves qua agents and come to be incorporated in intentional actions in ways that are “virtuous (dharma) and non-virtuous (adharma)”\(^12\).

The intent of these epistemic, semantic, and axiological constraints on Vaiśeṣika realism is perhaps best understood in terms of a succinct claim made by Śrīdhara: “[It is self] for whose purpose are all the things [in the world]”.\(^13\) Śrīdhara’s reference here is to the world of objects that is for embodied selves as experiencing subjects (jñātr) and agents (kartr), a world to which conscious agents stand in various evaluative, affective, volitional, and ethical modes. It is thus from the standpoint of the agentive self that objects are cognitively accessible and semantically expressible here, and bearers of ethical and affective values, rather than the “dead” material things of scientific naturalism.\(^14\)
following two sections examine the ontological and constructivist sources of this version of realism. The ontological architecture of Vaiśeṣika realism is set out first, followed by a discussion of how this shapes a world of embodied existence that is constitutively ethical and value-laden.

**Self, Mind, and Matter in a Mitigated Dualism**

The axiological thrust of Vaiśeṣika realism is embedded in a substance dualism that differs significantly from more radical dualisms such as Jainism, among Indian traditions, as well as Cartesianism, and is perhaps more akin to contemporary non-Cartesian dualisms such as E. J. Lowe’s emergent substance dualism.\(^\text{15}\) Three features limit classical Vaiśeṣika dualism: (i) the metaphysical commonalities that underwrite mental and physical substances *qua* substance and assure a degree of commensurability between them; (ii) an ontological architecture that includes intermediate substances that are the enabling conditions of mental and physical causation and, ostensibly, mitigate the mental-physical divide; (iii) relations of necessary causal dependence of the characteristic mental and ethical properties of the self on its body\(^\text{16}\) and, conversely, the dependence of a distinct sphere of physical causation, and the possibility of organic life, on the nonphysical self. Let us discuss these features in turn.

The categorial schema of the *Compendium* distinguishes a set of nine substances (*dravya*): atomic matter (*bhūta*), consisting of the elements earth, water, fire, and air; the non-atomic material element ether; the dimensional substances temporality (*kāla*) and spatiality (*dik*); the nonphysical self (*ātman*), and self’s inner instrument (*antahkaraṇa*), the non-conscious mind (*manas*). In contrast to radical dualisms, such as Cartesianism, a sharp substance and property dualism is excluded here by the generic (*sāmānya*) properties and overlapping features of mental and physical substances. All substances, including nonphysical selves and matter, share certain generic properties (*guna*) *qua* substance, namely, spatial extension (*parimāna*), temporality (*kāla*), causal conjunction (*samyoga*) and disjunction (*vibhāga*), countability (*saṃkhyā*), and separateness (*prthaktva*).\(^\text{17}\) This means that, *pace* Descartes, nonphysical and physical substances share certain essential metaphysical features such as spatial extension and the possibility of causal connection. They are, in other words, metaphysically commensurate, or equivalent,\(^\text{18}\) in ways that make them similar kinds of things, and possibly mitigate the problem of causal commensurability and causal interaction between mental and physical substances faced by Cartesian and other radical dualisms.\(^\text{19}\)

As Matilal observes, in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other Indian philosophies “the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ may not constitute … two strange categories so very different from each other that causal explanation would be relevant to the latter and not the former.” Further, “[t]he idea that mental and physical events are basically and irreducibly different is somewhat foreign to the Indian … [S]uch
talk of ‘interaction’ [between mental and physical phenomena] must be regarded as a reference to simple causation among similar sorts of items.”

The dualism of classical Vaiśeṣika is further mitigated by the fact that mental and physical substances exhibit overlapping physical and mental features in ways that confound a clear mental-physical divide. Thus, ordinary matter (bhūta), such as the substances earth, fire, water, and air, is typically atomic. Yet the atomic particle that mediates self-body causation, the non-conscious mind (manas), is considered non-material (abhūta). At the same time, in virtue of being spatially bounded (mūrta), it is excluded from being a potentially conscious, mental substance, a self. It does, however, serve as an unconscious processor of information from both the senses and from self’s conscious and unconscious mental states, a function which is characteristically considered mental. Among material substances, ether (ākāśa) has the feature of spatial ubiquity (vibhu), a feature that is characteristic of the nonphysical substance, the self. Similarly, the dimensional substances, spatiality and temporality, like the self, are ubiquitous, yet they are identified as neither mental nor material but as merely the condition of possibility of physical causation.

The demarcation of material and mental substances here leaves the atomic mind and the dimensional substances outside the mental-material divide. What is striking about these substances is their significance as enabling conditions of mental and physical causation. These substances lack an independent ontology, i.e. they lack characteristic (viśeṣa) properties of their own, and are bearers of only those generic properties of a substance and certain general material properties that facilitate their role in causation. In contrast, matter and selves, the relata of causation, are distinguished by characteristic properties that constitute the similar and dissimilar features of the objective world.

The inclusion of mind and the dimensional substances as ontological connectors in mental and physical causation further attenuates Vaiśeṣika dualism and distinguishes it from its Cartesian counterpart. As a non-material yet non-mental substance, the atomic mind is a necessary ontological link that bridges the gap between the nonphysical self and its material body. In virtue of being atomic, and yet lacking characteristic properties, mind serves merely as an instrument of causal connection between the spatially ubiquitous self and its sensory-bodily complex. It functions as a kind of subpersonal processor that transmits information and signals between self and its body and self and its mental states, in a sequential and co-ordinated manner that facilitates mental-physical and mental-mental causation.
A third factor that alleviates Vaiśeṣika dualism, and sharply distinguishes it from Cartesianism, is the metaphysical dependence of mental states on the living body (śārīra). The body, Praśastapāda asserts, is a necessary causal basis (ādhāra) of consciousness and mental life. Only the embodied self can therefore be a bearer of consciousness and other mental properties. The liberated self, the end to be achieved in human life for Vaiśeṣika, is disembodied and, therefore, unminded. Consciousness and other mental properties are, therefore, not essential properties of the self, and self is not essentially a mental substance. It is one of the most distinctive features of the Vaiśeṣika self that it is only potentially a mental substance, and its characteristic mental and ethical properties are non-essential. In contrast, material properties are essential properties. The significance and implications of this core distinction between self and matter, and mental and material properties, has its source, it is argued next, in the idea of self as a reflexive being, a being that is a value in and for itself.

**Reflexivity, Value, and the Self in a Compositionist Metaphysics**

Praśastapāda characterizes the self in the following way: “Its [i.e., self’s] qualities are, cognition (jñāna), pleasure (sukha), pain (dukhha), desire (icchā), aversion (dveṣa), will (prayatna), [the states of] virtue (dharma), non-virtue (adharma), cognitive imprints (samskāra), …” These characteristic properties of the self distinguish it from all other substances. Now the common metaphysical feature these properties share, I argue, is their reflexivity. Reflexivity here simply means that which is directed back onto itself and can act or operate on itself. We might say that reflexivity is the ‘mark’ of the mental, and the living, in classical Vaiśeṣika: it marks those phenomena of embodied mental and bodily life that are self-attributing or self-regarding, in some way, because they are necessarily of or for someone.

The defining feature of selfhood, what makes something a self, in this view, is the reflexivity of that substance or being. The reflexivity of self, however, is a relational and contextual feature of its embodiment, i.e. self is directed back onto itself, and acts or operates on itself, only through its relationships with the world of objects it is embodied in - a claim which is consistent with the metaphysical dependence of self’s mental properties on its embodied existence. The range of reflexive powers attributed to the self is distinguishable into two distinct types of agency, the first, personal and individual, the second, impersonal and ‘natural’. This section discusses the impersonal agency of the self. A discussion of personal agency is left to the following sections.

Self’s intrinsic reflexivity in the Compendium is intimately bound to its axiological status as a primitive value that is in and for itself. The self, Praśastapāda asserts, is itself the highest value; it
is the good (*nīḥśreyasa*) to be achieved as the aim of human life,\textsuperscript{33} a sentiment first expressed in the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*.\textsuperscript{34} The relational reflexivity of the self, however, means that it is a value for itself through its relationships with the objective world. Moreover, the embodied self is constitutively a ethical being because embodied existence in Vaiśeṣika is a psychophysical composition shaped by self’s impersonal ethical-compositional power (*adrṣṭa*).

Self’s compositional powers (*adrṣṭa*) are natural causal powers that are synonymous with the powers of the states of virtue (*dharma*) and non-virtue (*adharma*) of the self that explicate ethical law (*dharma*). The states of virtue and non-virtue are *measures of value*, for which reason, they are often translated as merit and demerit. They register the moral value of a self’s intentional actions in its former embodiments and, in accordance with these, act directly on matter to constitute a world of psychophysical objects: an ethical distribution (*vyavasthā*) of embodied selves that is appropriate to the goodness, or moral genealogy, of each self’s past lives and actions. Praśastapāda explains this in the following way: “[T]he virtuous (*dharma*) and non-virtuous (*adharma*) actions of beings act on [material] atoms to form bodies as a means of experiencing pain and pleasure that is consistent with the quality of their past actions …”. Śrīdhara adds: “The [living] body is the receptacle of the experiences of the conscious agent…”,\textsuperscript{35} while Udayana suggests that it is fabricated as a mechanism (*yantra*) that enables a self to experience the pleasures and pains consistent with the moral quality of its past actions.\textsuperscript{36}

The underlying thought here seems to be that only a reflexive being, a self, *can* be a measure of value and ethical law, as the good itself, and hold the possibility of organizing natural difference and order. The measures of moral value, *qua* the ethical-compositional powers of the self, exemplify a kind of ethical reason that is ‘natural’ reason, present in the very constitution of the world. The intuition here, found in much of Indian philosophy, is that there is ‘reason’ and ‘values’ in nature, of an impersonal sort, that is bound to reason and values in the human realm in some way. It is in virtue of this ethical reason and agency that living organisms come to inhabit subjective and affective worlds that are defined by particular sensory and cognitive capacities and a bodily apparatus that are moral constructs infused with appropriate values and possibilities. A world of different physicalities is thus created in which the cognitive, affective, and volitional life of beings, human and animal,\textsuperscript{37} is embedded. This is a multiplicity of psychophysical worlds and existences, appropriate to each self as its very own, that is unified in the impersonal axiomatic framework of ethical-compositional law (*adrṣṭa*), the values and norms of which are never fully spelt out, even though they have an ontological reality.
In this view, the very possibility of being, and of coming to be, is the accrued power of goodness, the measures of value of which are self's states of virtue and non-virtue. A living being is here an entity that brings about a world and comes into this world as its own good, the assumption being that living being is goodness itself, or a measure of it, because it is the embodiment of a self-substance that is intrinsically the good (niḥṣreyasa) itself. Nature or natural being, if we mean by this the material and mental world we inhabit, comes to be an ethical composition, an articulation of moral reason and values, via the compositional agency of adṛṣṭa that constitutes and integrates the ordinary world of composite middle-sized objects. The natural world is here founded on particularities and valences of the good that reflect the values and concerns that shape the thought and action of individual self-substances. It is the power of being of the good itself that is the foundation of the natural world and integrates different sorts of regularities, both the rational sphere of human mental and bodily life, and the sphere of physical causal order, by way of its compositional agential powers (adṛṣṭa). The former corresponds to the reflexive, rational sphere of agency, the latter to the instrumental and mechanical sphere of instrumentality. Each sphere is here defined, distinguished, and regulated according to its distinct mental and physical ontological components, and their characteristic properties, by the values and norms of the impersonal agency and compositional power of adṛṣṭa which spans and integrates these spheres.

In this conception of self and world, ethics is metaphysics, or certainly underwrites it. At its heart is the assumption that the foundations of law, order, and the good are inseparable in a way that is constitutive of each. This assumption is voiced more clearly in the idea that being and truth, and the good itself, are inalienably bound together, a confluence of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics that rests on a fundamental equivocation between the notions of reality, or being (sat), and truth (satya) that permeates Indian philosophical thought - Brahmanical, Buddhist, and Jaina. This claims that reality, or the true nature of things, is truth and this has moral value qua the highest good to be achieved in human life. In Vaiśeṣika, this takes the form that the substance itself of human life qua self-substance is a foundational value that informs, through its range of properties and powers, a value-infused ontology of embodied existence in which natural order is an ethical order.

The natural world, in this account, is an ethically integrated universe bound by values, a world whose standpoint is one of agential engagement rather than scientific detachment. Human, animal, and physical nature, and the objects of the natural world, do not come here already made as complex continua of deterministic processes; rather, the multiplicity of differentiated natures,
mental and physical, human and non-human, that constitute the world are composed and recomposed as a differentiated order of things that explicate, and are bound together by, moral values and ethical concerns. The material world is not, then, an impersonal world of things but a world of objects (artha) that explicates particular values in each individual context of embodiment, where these values constrain and make demands on human, and other, agents as a particular ensemble of possibilities that each self can refer back to as its very own.

The notion of nature adumbrated above coheres with a broader notion of nature as own-nature or own-being (svabhāva) in Indian philosophy whose materialist correlate, svabhāvavāda, is often translated as naturalism. In an interesting analysis, Bhattacharya, via Joseph Needham, suggests that “own-being” may stand for natural order, or causality, in some accounts, and may be linked to the Vedic conception of a dynamic order that is the active realization of truth (ṛta) which, together with its later guise of dharma or ethical-compositional law, is the antecedent of Praśastapāda’s conception of natural order as an ethical order.

We see above that the Vaiśeṣika conception of the natural world, or the natural order of things, evokes the idea of the integrity and integration of multiple natures. We might dub this conception of natural order multinaturalism to borrow Viveiros de Castro’s term if not its entire meaning. As opposed to scientific or strict naturalistic conceptions of nature as an order of dead things, this is a world of differentiated natures that are held together by an integrative schema of values and norms across the human, animal, and material spheres. Whether or not we concede such a view, it does point to a primitive idea of what may be considered nature or naturalism in Indian traditions that does not simply rest on the claims of matter and its local laws and regularities, nor entirely correspond to liberal naturalisms such as those of McDowell or Strawson. Rather than a conception of nature and naturalism in Indian traditions as simply matter-based (bhūta) or materialistic (bhūtavāda), this points to notions of nature and natural order that are more closely aligned to the idea of a dynamic order that is constitutively value-based, admitting a wider impersonal ontological reality of values, norms, and ethical-compositional agency.

Agency, Instrumentality, and Causal Order
The compositional powers of the self underwrite and integrate two distinct spheres of local activity, the sphere of the embodied self and agency, and the sphere of material objects and instrumentality. It is the very nature of a self, Praśastapāda claims, that it is an agent, i.e. a conscious reflexive being that exhibits reasons, values, and self-interest that refer to its own good. Material objects, on the other hand, are non-conscious, irreflexive substances that are incapable of self-regard and, as such,
wholly subject to instrumental use by another.\textsuperscript{49} Śrīdhara explains the distinction between agency and instrumentality in the following way: “There can also be no compatibility between the characters of an agent and an instrument because the character of an agent consists in not being urged by some thing else, while that of an instrument consists in being employed by others [in actions] – and thus one is positive while the other [is] negative; and as such the two are wholly incompatible with each other..."\textsuperscript{50} The possibility of agency rests foremost “… [in] the action of cognition … [in which] self is independent [of all other things]”, and so “has the character of being an agent …”\textsuperscript{51} Jagadīśa elucidates these features of conscious agency further by saying that it is characteristic of selves that they exhibit movements that are self-regarding, such as, striving to acquire objects that are considered beneficial and avoiding those considered harmful. Material phenomena such as the movement of wind, on the other hand, do not exhibit this capacity for acquiring that which is favourable and averting that which is unfavourable for oneself.\textsuperscript{52}

An agent then is a rational kind that exhibits the capacity to act for itself and on itself in ways that are not wholly subject to external causal powers. Material substances such as the body, however, are instrumental kinds that are wholly subject to external causal powers. They cannot, therefore, be agents.\textsuperscript{53} Śrīdhara remarks that material phenomena, as instrumental kinds, exhibit regularities whose impersonal structures follow an impact-model of causation and demonstrate natural systemic regularities and random contingencies that are externally imposed.\textsuperscript{54} In contrast, personal agency exhibits self-regarding, rational regularities. Agency cannot, therefore, be attributed to material objects such as the body or its parts.\textsuperscript{55}

An agent, our philosophers agree, is a being who stands in an evaluative relationship to itself, something that is possible only for a reflexive being that is a value in and for itself. The irreflexivity of matter, however, means that it lacks the possibility of being a value for itself, and of acting or operating to change or to regulate itself in any way. Material properties in being subject to change and regulation by external causes cannot, therefore, be eliminated except by the destruction of the substance they are instantiated in. For this reason, only a nonphysical substance can holds reflexive possibilities of self-determination and self-transformation that can culminate in liberation, i.e. in the divesting by self of its mental and ethical properties and its bodily accoutrement.

\textbf{The Scope of Agency}

Agency, Praśastapāda asserts, is the mark of a self, and an agent (kartr), as shown below, is a being who stands in a reflexive attitude to itself at all levels of its mental and bodily life.\textsuperscript{56} Self qua agent is the locus of the rational structures of personal agency, namely, cognition, desire, aversion,
pleasure, pain, volitional impulse, and memory, and the impersonal agency of the states of virtue and non-virtue, discussed earlier. These powers of the self are held to account for a range of phenomena that demonstrate some degree of self-attribution or self-application and include: (i) the first-personal phenomena of selfhood, in particular, the experience, or sense, of self-identity as an I-ness (ahaṃ, ahamatā) or a mine-ness (mama, mamatā); (ii) the ownership of mental states but also of the body as uniquely my own (sva); (iii) the rational structures of intentional action and the primitive rationality exhibited by the subintentional activities, and the subpersonal and biological processes, of the human body; and (iv) synchronic and diachronic mental and bodily unity and identity. These features are briefly discussed in turn.

Our ordinary conception of the self is largely phenomenal and psychological and centers on the first-personal presentations of reflexivity a self exhibits. A self is ordinarily thought to be that which distinguishes me, myself, reflexively and uniquely from others in a variety of ways. In particular, by way of the first-personal presentations of selfhood, the sense of I-ness or mine-ness that identifies me subjectively and informs my psychological life as my own. Udayana explore the first personal phenomena of selfhood associated with intentional consciousness (caitanya), or cognition (jñāna), further. Self, they claim, explicates modes of self-identity, a sense of being my own (sva) or myself, from the inside so to speak, which distinguishes me from others. It denotes that which presents the nature of being one’s own (sva), says Śrīdhara. Udayana explains selfhood as the experience of being non-different from oneself (sva).

The first-personal phenomena of selfhood in classical Vaiśeṣika are features of the agentive activity of cognition. Cognition is the core characteristic of the self, Praśastapāda claims, and like all activities of the self, cognition is agentive as receptive attention to an object or striving to perceive an object. It is the necessary causal connection of mind with the self in the activity of cognizing that yields introspective (antarā grassroots) experience of the self as the I-object (ahaṃkāra), an experience of self as an agent of its cognitive acts and an owner (svāmi) of its mental states. The source of this, Śrīdhara and Udayana point out, is that we experience our volitional impulses in the act of cognizing as the cause of cognizings and of the conscious effects of these cognizings, because both volitional impulses and their cognitive effects arise successively in the same substratum. That is, we experience ourselves as agents and owners of our cognitions. Mental states, i.e. conscious experience of affections and volitions as objects of cognition, can thus be reflexively attributed to oneself, and owned as I or mine, in virtue of their instantiation in a self that is identified as I. In a similar way, it is by causal connection with the body and bodily activity, that self can identify with, and appropriate, the body as uniquely its own so that this body is identified as
my body and not that of another, Śrīdhara claims.\textsuperscript{66}

It is the structures of rational agency, however, that exemplify most clearly the presence of a self according to the Compendium. The capacity (yogyaṭā) for engaging in rational, desire-motivated activity of the type ‘striving’ (ceṣṭā)\textsuperscript{67} is evident, it suggests, not only in conscious and deliberative actions but all the way down in the primitive, unconscious, and subpersonal activities and processes of human mental and bodily life. The rational structure of intentional action is explicated in the following way: judgements (jñāna) about whether an object is a source of pleasure (sukha) or pain (duḥkha), and so favourable (hita) or unfavourable (ahita) for oneself, induces desire (icchā) or aversion (dveṣa) towards it. Desire and aversion, in turn, motivate volitional impulses (prayatna) that are executed by the mind, self’s inner instrument of execution and attention (manas), as mental and bodily activity (pravṛtti) and restraint (nivṛtti). Actions of the type activity seek to acquire objects that are considered favourable as a means of gaining pleasure (sukha); actions of the type restraint shun objects that are considered harmful to avoid pain (duḥkha).\textsuperscript{68} Praśastapāda explains: “Just as a charioteer is inferred by the motion of the chariot, so a willful controller (prayatnavan adhīṣṭhātṛ) [of the living body] is inferred by such activity (pravṛtti) as is fit for obtaining what is advantageous (hita) and such restraint (nivṛtti) as is fit for avoiding what is disadvantageous (ahita), both being located in the body (vigraha).\textsuperscript{69}

Examples of more archaic modes of agency that mark the presence of a self include subintentional and instinctual activities such as breathing and blinking: “[The self is also inferred] from such processes as breathing in and breathing out. How so? From observing the changing (vikṛta) movement of the air contained in the body, [we infer a willful controller who is] like one who pumps the bellows. On account of the regular activity of opening and shutting the eyes, [we infer a controller who is] like a puppeteer [directing] a wooden puppet”.\textsuperscript{70} Similarly, sneezing in a dusty environment to avoid harm,\textsuperscript{71} the subpersonal processes that maintain bodily equilibrium and prevent the body from falling down,\textsuperscript{72} and the biological processes of growth, healing, and repair of the human body mark the existence of a self: “From the growth of the body, the healing of its wounds and fractures, etc., [we infer a controller] like a house-owner [who extends and repairs his house].”\textsuperscript{73} The idea here is that living systems exhibit unconscious or subconscious self-interest by way of the reflexes and responses they demonstrate in responses to stimuli and circumstances because these responses are self-regarding, even if in a primitive way. The thought here is that the preservation of life, its maintenance and continuance is itself a value, because it is the good of self itself, which is exemplified in the subpersonal and biological processes of the human organism that acts to maintain the well-being and integrity of the body.\textsuperscript{74}
Self, as a reflexive unifier, also accounts for the cross-modal unity of sensory deliverances,⁷⁵ and the unity of agency. Praśastapāda exemplifies the latter in the following way: “...after perceiving a visual object, we observe modifications in the faculty of taste following the recollection of the taste [of that object]; [from this], a single [unifier] is recognized, who is the perceiver of both [faculties, vision and taste], like a spectator situated behind two round windows [of a house]”.⁷⁶ Self accounts then for a continuum of relational and reflexive phenomena that exhibit self-reference, self-interest, or self-attribution in primitive and simple or complex ways, from the subjective and psychological forms that are associated with the first-person perspective, to deliberative forms of personal agency, and the self-maintenance and self-continuity of the human organism – and other living systems.

**Reflexivity and Epistemic Practice**

Human selves in classical Vaiśeṣika are conscious, reflexive beings who stand in an evaluative relationship to themselves and so hold the possibility of self-knowledge (ātma-jñāna).⁷⁷ Self-knowledge is here synonymous with self-experience and refers to direct experience of self’s true nature (svarūpa) as substance and the highest good (niḥśreyasa). It is accomplished by transformative practices that involve reflexive cultivation of self’s cognitive powers by philosophical and meditative analysis.⁷⁸ Since, self’s reflexivity is mediated by its inner instrument, the mind (manas), practices of self-transformation involve cultivation of the attentional capacities of the mind. Mind is the faculty, or more precisely the instrument, of attention (dhyāna) and introspection. In this capacity, it is the means of cognitive development as the necessary causal link that allows the self to access its mental states and sensory deliverances and to know itself as a substance.

Cultivation of attention is cultivation of attentional receptivity to objects.⁷⁹ Attention (dhyāna) is synonymous with meditation, as concentrated receptive awareness of an object, which engenders a deeper awareness of the substantive character of the object and its distinct qualities and distinguishes it from the substantive and qualitative features of other objects.⁸⁰ Cognitive development, via meditative attention promotes the analytic separation of materiality, mental objects, and the self. Most significantly, concentration of ‘mind’, or attention, centres on self-substance as a means of gaining direct experience of the self unmixed with material or mental objectivity of any sort.⁸² The essential requirement of such experience is the elimination of I-making (ahaṁkāra), i.e. elimination of the identification of self with mental and physical objects and of mental and physical objects with the self. The idea here is that by cultivation of its reflexive powers of self-knowledge by meditative attention, a self develops the ability to distinguish its own-
nature (*svarūpa*) as self-substance and the own-nature of the constituents of the world, and the ontological relations which bind these, as a categorial order of things.\textsuperscript{83}

Cognition has moral and affective value here, so cognitive development as experiential knowledge of the self, and of the order of things more broadly, is associated with ethical and affective values. In fact, epistemic practice is ethical practice. Thus, meditative concentration, which is an immersion in self-substance, is true cognition because it is an experience of the true being of the self distinct from other objects. As such, it engenders virtue (*dharma*) and is a joyful experience because it is an experience of the good itself. Erroneous, ordinary cognition, the epistemic mixing of self and matter, on the other hand, accrues non-virtue (*adharma*) and unhappiness.\textsuperscript{84} Self-experience is thus not merely a cognitive end, a cognitive good, but equally an ethical and affective good as knowledge of that good which is itself, intrinsically, the highest virtue and happiness.\textsuperscript{85}

By generating virtuous powers (*dharma*), self-knowledge transforms the conative, desire-based structure of personal agency to one that is virtue-based and virtue-laden. Ordinarily, mind, as the connecting link between self and body, is impelled by desire-motivated volitional impulses of the self in all forms of intentional and subintentional behaviour. With the cognitive, ethical, and affective transformation of the self, however, virtuous powers (*dharma*) which ordinarily act indirectly as ethical-compositional powers (*adrṣṭa*) come to have direct agentive force: they directly grasp and direct the mind in intentional and subintentional activities. Action is now motivated by virtuous powers that derive from right knowledge, knowledge of the true nature (*svarūpa*, *svabhāva*) of things and the affections of joy, compassion, and so on, that accompany this, rather than conscious or unconscious desire-belief complexes. The essence of virtue-motivated action is that it is non-appropriative epistemically. Such action is informed by an understanding of the own-nature, or own-being, of self and matter and so does not seek to conceptually own or appropriate mental and physical objects and events as *me* or *mine*. This is a dualistic understanding that considers self-substance to be the pre-subjective and pre-objective ground of embodied subjectivity and the objectivity of the natural world, respectively – as we saw earlier. It admits the metaphysical dependence of the objective differentiation of the outer world on the mental and ethical qualities of the self, what we might term its inner qualitative differentiation; and conversely, the dependence of the inner differentiation of self’s mental and ethical life on material objectivity. It rests on a clear insight that what binds the realms of subjective and objective life is moral values and ethical structures *qua* *adrṣṭa* and aims, therefore, at the ethical integrity of a life of non-appropriation and non-ownership of that which is not truly itself.
Conclusion

Praśastapāda, we have seen, presents an innovative conception of the self as a reflexive being that is a value in and for itself. This grounds a metaphysics of embodied existence in which self and world are infused with an ethics of the self, the possibility of which lies in a conception of ethics as metaphysics and epistemic practice as ethical and affective practice. Regardless of the plausibility of some of its core assumptions, this metaphysics of self rests on the intuition that reason, values, and law have an ontological reality, and are primitively linked in ways that are constitutive of each, which guarantees their continuity between the rational domain of human agency and the impersonal causal order of the physical world. The dualist thrust of this metaphysics, however, supports epistemic and ethical recognition of the true-being or own-nature of material and non-material things – rather than the appropriation of the natural world by human selves. Two core assumptions are at work here: an ethics of non-appropriation; and a primitive interlocking of being, truth, and values or, we might say, of metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, which invokes the metaphysical co-dependence of embodied selfhood and its world. These twin themes permeate not just Vaiśeṣika but classical Indian philosophy more generally. More significantly, they define and shape Indian philosophical practice historically, in its various conceptual guises, Brahmancial, Buddhist, and Jaina, from Vedic speculations to the Buddha and Gandhi.

Bibliography

Suggested Reading


KUMAR, SHASHI PRABHA. *Classical Vaiśeśika in Indian Philosophy: On Knowing and What is to be Known* (London: Routledge, 2013).


PHILLIPS, STEPHEN. *Classical Indian Metaphysics* (Chicago: Open Court, 1995).


Notes:


See the discussion of elementary substances below.

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §§1-2.

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §11.


Praśastapāda, Word Index, §15.

See Kanāda, Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, §1.3.


Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason p. 42.

Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason, pp.70, 19-20.

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §15; Śrīdhara. Shoots of Reason, p. 42.


The mental properties of the self that structure personal agency, cognition, affections, and volitions are necessarily causally dependent on the material body. Its ethical properties, however, the states of virtue and non-virtue subsist in causal dependence on either the material body or the ‘subtle’ body (ātivāhika sarīra), a body of ‘fine’ materiality the self is associated with between lives. See Praśastapāda, Compendium, ed. G. Jha, pp. 647-48.

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §80.

The notion of a metaphysical “equivalence” across substances and of causal influences that span the mental, physical, and moral domains looks back possibly to the Vedic intuition of correspondences or equivalences across elements in different domains, physical, ethical, moral, and so on, as phenomena that are equally regulated by rta, later dharma. See Brian K. Smith, Reflections on Resemblance, Ritual, and Religion (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989), pp. 78-9.


“Space and time have the common character of … being the instrumental cause of all that has an origin [i.e., all that is a product],” and are “the instrumental cause of all produced things because the production of all material things is invariably restricted within particular points of space and time …” (Praśastapāda, Word Index, §24); see also Śrīdhara. Shoots of Reason, p. 61.

Apart from the common properties of substance such as spatiality, mind has the additional material property of speed or velocity (vega) that allows it to move rapidly as the instrument of mental-physical causation. See Praśastapāda, Word Index, §81.


It is arguable that the mind (manas) plays a similar role to, and poses similar sorts of problems as, the pineal gland in Descartes. For a discussion of this, see Shalini Sinha, Self and Agency: A Defence of Praśastapāda’s Differential Naturalism, PhD diss., University of Sussex, 2013, pp. 170-3, 197-98.

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §81

Praśastapāda, Word Index, §§31, 79; Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason, p. 76.


See Praśastapāda, Word Index, §§77; Śrīdhara. Shoots of Reason, ed. Dwivedin, p. 72, 11-3; Udayana, Row of Lightbeams, p. 84, 13-6.

Dharma and adharma are the inherited moral dispositions and capacities of the individual self, derived from the moral quality of its intentional actions in past embodiments. These terms are usually translated as merit and demerit.
respectively. They are the source of a self’s pleasurable and painful experiences in its current embodiment (Prāśastapāda, Word Index: §31, §80).

30 These are the imprints of perceptual experience, affections, volitions and actions, and include learnt theoretical and practical skills, acquired in a self’s current embodiment. These imprints are retained and accessed as memories, dispositions, character traits, and theoretical and practical skills. 

31 Prāśastapāda, Word Index, §80.

32 This notion of reflexivity is reminiscent of the Vedic idea of reflexive movements of thought and breath as the vital essence of the universe. See The Rig Veda, ed. and trans. Stephanie W. Jamison and Joel Brereton, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), v. 10.129.


34 See Vaiśeṣika-sūtra, §§ 1.1.1-1.1.4.

35 Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason, p. 76.


37 Udayana goes so far as to include trees and vegetation as subjects of experience (bhoktṛādhiṣṭhātāḥ) in this gradation of life. See Udayana, Row of Lightbeams (Kīraṇāvālī), Jitendra S. Jetly, ed., Prāśastapādabhāsāyam With the Commentary Kīraṇāvālī of Udayanācārya (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971), p. 39, 21; p. 40, 1-2.


40 This is the obverse of Carpenter’s argument that in early Buddhism, metaphysics is ethics, Amber Carpenter, Indian Buddhist Philosophy (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2014), chap. 2.

41 A striking example of this is the Four Noble Truths (satya) of the Buddha.


46 Bhattacharya, Studies on the Cārvāka; Chatterjee, Naturalism; Ganeri, The Self, pp. 25-27.

47 Śrīdhara’s claim that the world of objects is for selves is consistent with other strands of Indian thought such as Sāṃkhya which advocates a conception of nature (prakṛti) that is for the conscious self (puruṣa).

48 Prāśastapāda, Word Index, §§77-8

49 Prāśastapāda, Word Index, §77


52 Jagadīśa, Verses, p. 234.


54 Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason, ed. Dvivedin, p. 83, 12-13, p. 84, 2-3.

55 Prāśastapāda, Word Index, §77; Udayana, Row of Lightbeams, p. 85, 17-20, p. 90, 14-16.

56 Prāśastapāda, Word Index, §§76, 78.

57 Note reflexivity does not refer here to the idea that consciousness is immediately aware of itself in each cognitive act. Mental states are, however, grasped as mine and I can be aware of myself introspectively as me, and articulate this as I.

58 Śrīdhara, Shoots of Reason, ed. Dvivedin, p. 84, 21-22.
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