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Strategy before Clausewitz: linking warfare and statecraft, 1400-1830

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1. Was Strategy Practiced before the Word was Used?

> Above all, the supreme military commander and the supreme decision-maker in the war should consult, so that they may ascertain on what [aim] they want to stake most of their assets and hopes, and by which ways and means they hope to achieve victory in war, or to bring or force the enemy to agree to an acceptably good treaty and peace. Once such a resolution and decision is made, one should abide by it in all cases.
> (Lazarus von Schwendi, 1522-1583)[1]

This book presents a challenge, as it purports to deal with strategic thinkers in Europe, most of whom lived and wrote before the word 'strategy' was introduced to European languages.[2] Even then, European definitions of 'strategy' at the time of the French Revolution and Napoleon would still be far from what we understand by 'strategy' today. For example, Clausewitz's definition is very narrow: he defined 'strategy' merely as 'the use of engagements for the object of the war'.[3] Admittedly today, more than ever, the word is a catch-all for a vast array of meanings, ranging from a simple synonym for 'planning' to 'foreign policy making in a hostile environment' and to more complex definitions. These are many and varied, and might be summed up as 'Strategy is a comprehensive way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of force, in a dialectic of wills'.[4]

So how can we find a definition that is a useful starting point for the question whether people thought (and argued) 'strategically' before the word was generally used? A different approach suggests itself. Rather than seeking one recent definition which could be projected into the past, we might begin with certain commonly recognised features of strategy. Strategy is about linking the use of force with political ends, or, when a more sophisticated polity has been created with its division of labour and its political and military leadership, about the relationship between warfare and statecraft. In this relationship, warfare is the tool of statecraft, next to others (such as the many tools of diplomacy including forming coalitions, or alliances through marriage, or enticing an enemy's allies away from him; or economic tools such as trading concessions or tariffs; or 'chequebook diplomacy', the buying off of an adversary). As we shall see, warfare and statecraft went hand in hand throughout the centuries covered in this volume, and were not thought of as separate as they would be in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Strategy is also about identifying aims, as Lazarus Schwendi put it above. Moreover, it is about planning, and about making choices: the choice of ends, means, and ways to apply the means. Strategy is about prioritising some tasks over others (this becomes especially salient when wars are prosecuted against more than one adversary, on more than one front, with potential naval and land dimensions). One may have to prioritise fighting one adversary over another, one front over another, one service over another, because one simply cannot afford to employ all possible means. Hence, strategy is about prioritising defence spending in some areas rather than others. And finally, to the extent possible, it is about choosing between different ways to prosecute a war. This may be entirely or in part because some forms of warfare would produce effects that would preclude the overall political ends pursued in the war (e.g. one would not want to destroy the prosperous town that one wishes to conquer). As the classicist Kimberly Kagan has put it, strategy is 'the setting of a state's objectives and of priorities among those objectives' in order to allocate resources and choose the best means to prosecute a war.[5] In

other words, we can discern strategy – or reflections on strategy or strategic prescriptions – in the sources we are looking at once we can see that such choices or prioritisations were made.

This could apply even at the simplest level. If a group of humans is attacked, they may have three choices: fight back, surrender, or try to buy off the attackers. Such a choice depends in part on the adversary: Genghis Khan's hordes might have wiped out a village before its elders could pause for reflection, or surrender in Classical Antiquity might not have been a serious option: it might have brought no hope of survival as the adversary might still have massacred all adult males and abducted all women and children into slavery. With other adversaries, other considerations might influence choices. Fighting meant death, destruction and suffering, but a significant part of the population might survive to live in freedom. Surrender would inevitably mean a curtailment of freedom and sacrifice of prosperity, but lives might be saved. Buying off an attacker would avoid deaths and loss of freedom, but it could transform the relationship into one commonly associated with Mafia practices, where the criminals, well pleased with this bargain, would come back regularly to collect more 'protection money'. (A historic example of this was the Viking raids on the British Isles which were later turned into the 'Danegeld' taxation of the local populations.)

Besides being about planning, choosing, prioritising, strategy is also about consulting and explaining. Unless the prince is also the supreme military commander, to use Schwendi's terms again, the prince will have to explain to his general what he or she intends to do, and consult him on how to do it. Such explanations would also be contained in communications with ambassadors or leading ministers, when they were not in the same place as the prince, where communication could take place orally, and without a record kept. Unless one was dealing with an absolute monarchy, princes also would have to explain themselves to those who would help them finance their war – those providing money or men through taxation or feudal levies, or both. These, then, are the contexts in which we shall look for examples of the articulation of strategic reasoning in surviving sources.

This chapter endeavours to identify instances where strategy was indeed applied – or strategic decisions were made – in the context of war in the centuries and the writings covered in this book. And to repeat, most of these date from before the introduction of the word into Western languages around the time of the French Revolution. Thus before claiming, in the following chapters, that theoreticians of warfare conceived of strategy, we shall apply here the test of whether strategy was *practised*, using three case studies dating before the time when the term 'strategy' made its first appearance. I have chosen three monarchs, because their biographers have claimed that they thought and acted strategically: King Edward III of England; Philip II of Spain, and Louis XIV of France. In other words, I shall lazily dig where others have already prospected and found precious metal. Nevertheless, this exercise is worth doing, as I shall be applying the same criteria to define 'strategy' – the definition of objectives, the prioritisation of conflicting needs, i.e. the allocation of resources when these were not sufficient to address all needs at once – to all three: only then can we tell if the precious metal found is gold in all three cases. In each case, one or two documents examined in greater detail will serve to conduct this test.

Polities, Dynasties, and Wars of Succession.

To set the stage, we should briefly summarise the main patterns of relations between European polities in the Late Middle Ages. Throughout Central and Western Europe, systems of governance had emerged by which populations were ruled at several different levels and in a variety of ways. Many people were subjects of a local lord, who in turn came under a prince, or to a more highly-ranking aristocrat who in turn owed loyalty to a prince. Others lived in towns

or cities which might have been directly under a prince's authority and below that, to some extent, governed by their own elites. Some cities – especially in Italy, from which Christine de Pizan hailed – were themselves sovereign polities.

The King of France or the Holy Roman Emperor did not have direct ownership of all the lands of their respective kingdom or empire, even if they expected an oath of fealty from the other land owners within their realm. England was something of an exception to this rule, as nominally, William the Conqueror claimed to have inherited all of England in 1066, and had merely loaned parts of it to his loyal vassals. But the fundamental principle of property that pertained throughout Europe, namely, that parents would pass on the lands they occupied to their children, conflicted with the notion that the king of England was the ultimate proprietor of all lands. When the king asserted this right and denied his vassals an automatic succession right, or re-appropriated their territory, he asked for trouble. Three such waves of re-appropriations of land by Edward II, by his wife, and his son Edward III occurred in the fourteenth century, the earlier two each followed by a minor civil war.[6] When in 1399, King Richard II tried to prevent his exiled first cousin, Henry Bolingbroke, from taking full possession of his late father's Lancastrian lands, many peers of the realm rose up in support of Bolingbroke. For Richard's transformation of the ritual of automatic confirmation of succession – still marked as taking place by the king's grace by being coupled with the payment of a fee or inheritance tax – into something the king could veto jeopardized their own children's guaranteed succession rights.[7]

The problems of dynastic succession also lay at the roots also of other wars, civil or domestic and foreign: the dividing line was quite blurred throughout this period. In principle, by the High Middle Ages, many polities accepted primogeniture. But in practice, this pattern of succession continued to compete with elective rulership, which applied to the supreme power in the Holy Roman Empire, or the Doge of Venice, or the King of Poland in the early modern period. Elected rulers quite liked to turn the principle of election into heredity for their children, and the process into something on a sliding scale between, on one and, a mere going through the motions, and acrimoniously negotiated consensus on the other. This would always be a potential cause of war.

Prior to the general acceptance of primogeniture, there had been two patterns that were at odds with it, but which actually survived the *general* convergence towards a pattern of primogeniture. One was that of the succession, within a dynasty, by the worthiest or most able male in the family (in France it was later asserted that Salic law excluded all females, but whether this also excluded inheritance by males through their mothers or grandmothers was at the centre of the Hundred Years' War). Given mortality patterns at the time, primogeniture brought a number of young children (or occasionally, somebody with a mental illness) to the throne, and inevitably the question arose whether the succession of an uncle or elder cousin would not be better for the security and good governance of the realm. Often such an uncle was appointed regent, like the York prince famous for his deformed back, the future Richard III, who would get a taste for the power this brought that he would not want to forego. Or else several uncles or cousins would dispute the regency among them, the pattern underlying the Armagnacs vs. Bourguignon Civil War which Christine de Pizan lived through in France, and subsequently the Wars of the Roses in England.

The other was the division of lands, at the father's death, among his sons. This pattern, which had moved even Charlemagne to divide his possessions among his sons would be recognisable almost until the end of the period covered here. Thus William the Conqueror's lands were disputed among his sons, so that initially, his two eldest sons Robert Curthose and William II Rufus laid claim to England and Normandy respectively; his third son, Henry I, ultimately re-united the territories after going to war with his surviving elder brother Robert. After all the empire-building of his ancestors, Habsburg Charles V divided his global possessions

between his brother Ferdinand (I as Holy Roman Empire) and his son Philip (II of Spain). Even Louis XIV of France, coming from a tradition which had upheld primogeniture and exclusively male succession rigorously for centuries, merrily departed from this principle when it suited his dynasty. He thus claimed a part of his father-in-law's heritage for his wife in the form of the 'devolution' of the Spanish Netherlands. Later he was prepared to settle for an outcome of the War of the Spanish Succession that would secure the Spanish crown for one of his wife's and his younger descendants (*not* the Dauphin), in return for the latter's renunciation of all claims to the French crown. This pattern, and further quarrels over whether heredity through the female line was acceptable, and whether lands inherited through the female line by definition had to stay separate from the father's lands and thus go to a younger offspring, were a recurrent cause of wars throughout our period, from Edward III's claims to the crown of France to Louis XIV's to the crown of Spain for his grandson.

Dynastic marriages, a tool of diplomacy widely practised by the late West Roman Emperors and by the Byzantines, and warfare were two sides of the coin of Medieval and Early Modern statecraft: alliances through marriage were at least as valuable as whole armies. But both came at a price: allies expected reciprocity in commitment, and armies were hugely expensive. Add to this multiple alliances with interested relatives and their respective families, or partisan (arch)bishops or abbots with their lands and riches (and sometimes, private armies), and a pattern emerged which could only be managed by deft statecraft: allied interests would always have to be taken into consideration in decisions over what to prioritise, and where to concentrate one's forces.

If land was acquired through dynastic marriages, it was not necessarily the coveted strip of land adjacent to one's own hereditary territories (although the kings of France managed to absorb several such areas through marriage, and the Habsburgs did pretty well within the Iberian Peninsula). Ruling families and nobles throughout Europe thus ended up as owners of widely scattered territories, and the same was true for abbeys or other churches that were bequeathed lands by rich, childless benefactors. Inevitably, this meant quarrels over border regions, as many boundaries were vague if they ran through particularly inhospitable and sparsely settled regions such as mountain ranges that were less coveted by rulers on either side. As rulers delegated the control of such areas – usually remote from their centres of power – to 'lords of the marches' or marquesses, the latter enjoyed relative freedom from control. Clashes with the central authority easily ensued. Thus the English king's northern vassals would be reluctant to send him forces for campaigns in France when they feared (or desired, for their own aggrandisement) border clashes with the Scots.

The need to rely on vassals for the levying of troops for any campaign created the need to persuade them that this was necessary – even for the English kings who claimed sovereignty over all of England. The paradox was thus that the English king theoretically owned all of England, but was dependent on his vassals for most of his income. The vassals potentially got more out of such a bargain than mere security: the booty, plunder, and ransom money for hostages taken in war were all important incentives to support war, but such investments were risky, even though the risks were limited as long as the wars were confined to the Continent. Since Anglo-Saxon times, the English monarch was expected to consult his nobles in what was called the *magnum concilium* or large council. Monarchs who acted without such consultation – especially Henry II and his youngest son, King John – incurred the ire of their peers, leading in the latter's humiliation by his barons and his forced signing of *Magna Carta* in 1215.[8] From Edward I' reign onwards, English monarchs met with their subjects through 'parliaments' in order to persuade them to pay more taxes. These were assemblies of nobles and bishops, but also knights and burgesses from the towns which provided a substantial part of the royal revenue to extend the basis of consent. Monarchs were thus forced to articulate their motivations and plans for war, and in return had to satisfy at least some of their subjects' demands, as such

parliamentary assemblies gave their subjects the chance to voice grievances. The exchanges between monarch and parliament are thus an occasion where we might look for articulations of strategic reasoning.

Edward III and Strategies in the Hundred Years' War

As our first theorist writing on the link between statecraft and the art of war is Christine de Pizan, it is appropriate to start here with an example of strategy-making that she witnessed in her own lifetime: the warfare between the Plantagenet King Edward III (1312-1377) and his heirs, and Christine's patron Charles V (1338-1380) and his heirs. Like his father and grandfather before him, Edward tried to acquire overlordship over Scotland, and also made a bid for the crown of France after the successive deaths of his mother's three elder brothers, all of whom had been kings of France. Instead, claiming that Salic law applied which purportedly excluded women from the succession, the descendants of their uncle, Charles of Valois, claimed the throne. This pitted Edward III, first against Philip VI (Charles of Valois' son), then John II the Good (Philip's son). This phase ended with the nine-year peace of Brétigny (1360-1369).

War resumed still under Edward III, but on the French side under Charles V the Wise (John's son). Another peace treaty was concluded at Bruges in 1375, which initially held when Charles VI the Mad succeeded his father, Charles V. The new king even gave his daughter (aged seven) in marriage to Edwards' heir, Richard II. Unsurprisingly, this marriage remained without issue. for as we recall, only three years later, Richard was deposed his Lancastrian cousin Henry Bolingbroke (crowned as Henry IV) and subsequently murdered in what would turn into a civil war which kept the Valois-Plantagenet conflict from boiling up again. Yet Henry IV's son Henry V and Charles VI's youngest son Charles (the future Charles VII) would be at each other's throats again for the last phase of the Hundred Year's War, referred to as the Lancastrian war. Another spell of peace followed after the battle of Agincourt in 1415, when in the Treaty of Troyes 1420, Charles VI was forced to resort again to the statecraft-tool of peace-by-marriage, offering another daughter in marriage, this time to Henry V. This union did produce a son – Henry VI. Like Edward III he would claim his mother's heritage and would even be crowned king of France, but at the same time he was cursed with his maternal grandfather's hereditary mental illness, thus replicating the conditions for civil war in England that had engendered the Armagnac-Bourguignon War in France. This gave Charles VI's surviving son Charles all the more reason to contest the Treaty of Troyes agreed by his father and to reclaim the French crown, with the help of Joan of Arc. The Hundred Years' War would thus continue and end well after the deaths of Henry V and Christine de Pizan, when Charles VII – this time truly decisively –defeated the Lancastrian forces at the Battle of Castillion in 1453.

MAP I: English possessions on the Continent.

Let us focus here on the conflict in the fourteenth century. To repeat, Edward III's ambitions lay both in France and in Scotland. His grandfather had already brought Wales firmly under Plantagenet control, and like France, Scotland had a series of succession crises of which Edward III sought to take advantage. Eventually Edward and his heirs had to make a strategic choice: they would concentrate their efforts on France and leave Scotland alone, as they could not in the long run sustain a war on two fronts. (Even their marriage politics concentrated on France throughout. The English royal house did not make a Scottish match from the early twelfth until the early sixteenth centuries.)

With Edward seeking to extend his rule both to the North and to the South-East, the respective kings of Scotland and France realised that they had a common adversary, and an interest in making common front against him. Already their forebears of the late thirteenth century had concluded an alliance against the expansionist Plantagenets, and the treaty would be renewed several times in the subsequent centuries. In the Peace of Brétigny, Edward III managed to prise the 'auld alliance' of France and Scotland apart, at least temporarily, but in turn had to give up his own alliance with the Flemings and his stop pursuing his claim to the French throne.[9] Thus balance-of-power politics – albeit not always fully translated into grand strategies of co-ordinated alliance warfare – can be identified at this point not only in the relations between the rivalling Italian city-states, but also among the kingdoms of Western Europe.[10]

It has been argued by some historians that medieval strategies differed substantially from later strategies, as different mind-sets and culture prevailed. Philippe Contamine has characterised medieval strategy making as dominated by two principles: the avoidance of pitched battles and the 'obsidional reflex', the tendency to seek refuge in fortifications.[11] Battles were indeed rare in the high and late Middle Ages, for which Jan Willem Honig has put forward a cultural explanation, namely that they were seen as divine ordeals, and thus shunned by any prince aware of his own sins and shortcomings in the eyes of God.[12] By contrast, John Gillingham favours practical, non-cultural explanations: the high risk involved in battles that they would not lead to the desired end, the scarcity of resources, the weak economic bases the small overall populations and thus the small size of armies that were raised *ad hoc* for every campaign and poorly trained, containing few experienced soldiers, and in which losses would be difficult to replace.[13] Yet princes whose claim to the throne was contested in some way needed victories to show that the Divine Judge was on their side; only, argues Clifford Rogers, both sides' wish to give battle coincided less frequently than in later times.[14] Nevertheless, the few pitched battles that did take place in the Hundred Years' War tended to be important turning points.

What were alternative strategic options to giving battle? One was the construction of castles or fortifications around key towns to defend inherited or conquered territories, and the other side of that same medal was, of course, siege warfare to take such 'places', as both were called during our entire period. Both fortifying 'places' – a strategic measure adopted in the mid-fourteenth century and sometimes referred to as the 'Barbicans strategy' – and sieges took a long time and were costly although on different scales. It took years and huge amounts of money and manpower to build fortifications; it would generally take months to get a 'place' to surrender, and in the meantime, one's own forces might well demand to be released as they generally only owed their lords 40 days' of military service per year, and would also run out of supplies. So even sieges tended not to take place as frequently before, as after, 1500.

Much more common were border raids and the *chevauchée*, a form of warfare that is difficult to comprehend let alone justify even with the medieval mentality in mind. For it consisted of inflicting great suffering on the civilian population by ransacking and burning villages and harvests – and this despite the concern of the princes on both sides of this conflict to be seen as the legitimate ruler who – according to all standards of European kingship – had a duty to protect just that civilian population. Moreover, to our minds, the *chevauchée* clashed with the self-denying ordinances which both sides adopted for war more generally, and which tended to include the proscription of pillaging and stealing food.[15] It must be kept in mind, however, that Edward III was not much more compassionate in his dealings with his own subjects in England: similarly cruel measures of extortion were used to seize provisions for his armies, and the officials he sent out to collect this revenue in money and kind, the *escheators*, were the most detested among the royal officials, even more so than his sheriffs.[16] Edward also seems to have been inspired to adopt the *chevauchée* by his experience of the Scottish border raids into English territory, and applied it to France. Much of the Hundred Years' War consisted of such raids, usually conducted by the Plantagenet and later Lancastrian forces, within France. According to

Rogers, Edward III's main strategy in the Hundred Years' War was to take repeated recourse to the *chevauchée*, in order to force the French monarch to give battle.[17]

Another strategic option was to take the war to sea. Yet outside the Mediterranean, notwithstanding the Vikings' extraordinary naval exploits, naval warfare beyond the mere transport of soldiers, horses, and supplies was in its infancy. On the south coast of England, at the end of the Anglo-Saxon era which was at once the end of the era of Viking invasions, King Edward the Confessor had granted the 'Cinque Ports' special privileges in return for their provision of ships with its purely defensive aim; in 1066 these ships were cooped up in port by the same winds that allowed William the Conqueror to set sail for England. This arrangement with the Cinque Ports was continued by the Norman kings, and by around 1300 had been increased to include three more towns.[18] Even the kings involved in the Hundred Years' War did not have their own navies but merely the right to requisition ships. Proper naval battles away from ports and estuaries had not taken place outside the Mediterranean. Even naval battles over the access to estuaries like the Battle of Damme on the Zwyn river (today a silted-up arm of the Scheldt estuary) in 1213 which pitted ships requisitioned by Plantagenet King John against ships requisitioned by King Philip II of France and involved ramming and burning rather than any form of manoeuvre were most rare. In 1340, English merchantmen were blocked from access to their crucial trading partners in Antwerp by a fleet anchoring, again in the estuary of the Scheldt, near the river Zwyn and the town of Sluis. The fleet was under French command, assembled from various Genoese and Flemish ships. Edward III in turn pulled together a fleet to break through this inbound blockade, carrying off one of the few celebrated naval victories of the Middle Ages. The outcome of this battle secured England politically unchallenged domination of the Channel for the next two centuries (admittedly, piracy continued to be rife), but did not put an end to French raids on southern English coastal towns, nor did it decide the outcome of the Hundred Years' War.

Let us thus look at how this naval battle fitted into Edward's strategy, by turning to one exemplar of a document that might serve us here as evidence that Edward reasoned strategically. On 9 July 1340, Edward wrote to his parliament – his 'dukes, archbishops, bishops, earls, barons and others' – from Bruges. He recounted how he was on the point of crossing the Channel to Flanders on 24 June, 'with a certain number of men-at-arms',

> news came to us that our enemy of Valois had arrayed a great armada of ships, which was before us in the river Zwyn. Having heard this news, and considered the perils which might come if they left there in order to damage our realm of England or our people elsewhere, and what a comfort which it would have been to our enemies, and especially the Scots, if such a force came to them, we immediately decided to seek them out wherever we could find them...

As noted, Edward's navy proceeded to win this naval battle (see also chapter 6). But immediately thereafter,

> the country of Flanders, and also other lords, our allies, came to us, and informed us how our enemy was on the border, ready to enter Flanders or elsewhere against our allies, wherever he could most harm them and most effectively drive them to withdraw from our alliance.
>
> Considering the pursuit of our right, and most importantly the keeping of our faith and the resisting of his malice, and by the assent of our said allies and of the lords of our realm and of the land of Flanders who were then around us, we decided to land and to split our host; one part going with us towards Tournai, where there would be 100,000 armed Flemings, and [the other with] lord Robert d'Artois towards St. Omer with 50,000. That is aside from all our allies and their forces.

Both armies moved South in a pincer movement to engage the French, if the latter were prepared to give battle. 'To govern and lead such a host requires a very great sum of money,' Edward continued, 'on top of the debts that we must necessarily pay before our departure.' Therefore

> We pray you dearly, each one of you, that you first of all weigh the right that we have; next the great peril which will come, unless we are quickly succoured with money and goods, in order to satisfy the said land [of Flanders] and our allies and the soldiers who have already been retained by us and who will withdraw if they are not paid. And also if our allies are not paid, they may even perhaps go over to our enemy; and considering his malice and their power rejoined to his, bear in mind that our land, ourself, our children and all the lords and others would be on the point of perdition. … [By contrast] if we are quickly aided, we hope to take him at a disadvantage, and to triumph over him forever after – if only you will arrange that we should be hastily succoured by money or by goods in such a way as to give satisfaction for our debts and to retain our forces.[19]

This, it would seem, is a clear example of strategic reasoning. Having secured the Channel, Edward III took the war to the Continent, continuing to prioritise the campaigns against and in France to those against Scotland. Given these different options, Clifford Rogers rightly argues that Edward III did indeed make strategic choices, and used warfare strategically, along with other tools of statecraft, within the social, economic, and fiscal limitations of this age.

*

Eighty years later, Edward's great-grandson Henry V made an attempt to create a standing fleet under Royal ownership, but it did not survive him.[20] Even though Charles V of France had already developed a system of coastal patrols in 1369/1370, when war with the Plantagenets had resumed, France only moved to create a permanent navy after the end of the long wars with England, in 1455. In short, while we see nascent attempts to develop the naval component of warfare, the infrastructure in the form of ships and the economic base that could have supported a standing fleet were simply too feeble to allow the growth of these limited moves into full-fledged naval strategy. It is illustrative that despite the problems of movements on land, no English invasion of Scotland was attempted by sea. At best, some ships were sent to resupply land forces that had marched north through the borders.[21]

To sum up, given the constraints posed by economic and social factors, it is plausible to argue with Francisco García Fitz that medieval monarchs, just like their modern successors, did seek to impose their will on their adversaries (to use Clausewitz's definition of the aims of any war). Like the great leaders of Classical Antiquity or modern rulers, they did draw on a selection of tools, military as well as diplomatic and economic, and they were quite capable of articulating choices and weighing different options.[22] Different preferences in their selection of tools notwithstanding, medieval princes thought and acted no less 'strategically' than Thukydides' protagonists in the Peloponnesian War, Rome's emperors, or later, Philip II of Spain or Louis XIV of France.

Religious Wars

Recommended by Christine de Pizan, an implemented by Charles VII of France as he emerged triumphant from the Hundred Years' War with England, the re-invention of a standing army (as the Romans had of course had standing armies) on the basis of important changes in fiscal-military relations ushered in a new age of warfare in Europe. While many of their ambitions were far-reaching, princes in the intervening millennium may not have lacked the strategic imagination, but certainly the means to realise them. Such limitations would equally apply to the

Tudor and early Stuart monarchs of England for a long time yet. It would in due course strengthen their dependence on their aristocracy and nobility which in turn would result in the progressive reduction of the powers of the monarch, until Britain was turned into a constitutional monarchy. By contrast, French monarchs would be set on the path towards absolutism. The path would be long as the process would be slowed down by the Religious Wars that tore the polity apart and led to the assassination of two successive monarchs and several attempts on the lives of others.[23]

Although they diverged in this critical area of state structure, both countries were affected similarly by other, more general trends, revolving around the centralisation of government and the gradual growth of a bureaucracy to administer states. Royal courts were still peripatetic throughout the sixteenth century; Spain did not even have a *permanent* capital city until around 1600. Philip II (1527-1598) ruled his empire from the Escorial Palace 50 kilometres outside Madrid, which would only gradually evolve into this capital city around the turn from the sixteenth to the seventeenth centuries.[24] France was ahead of other states in forming central institutions, but by the reign of Henry VIII and Elizabeth, English monarchs also relied greatly on a very small number of trusted ministers. This pattern can also be seen in other European polities. Philip II still prided himself on holding all the threads of the government of his vast realm in his own hands. Sitting in his small study in the Escorial, a special window overlooking the high altar of the huge adjacent chapel, he insisted on being his own first minister. Only in the following century would his heirs entrust the government of their huge possessions to ministers such as the Count-Duke Olivares or Don Baltasar de Zúñiga.

Like Edward III of England (and the English monarchs throughout), Philip needed the support of the representatives of his estates, especially the *Cortes* of Castile, the largest and richest entity among his European possessions, to finance his military enterprises; his other revenues, though considerable, did not suffice. The transformation of state finances, along with an equally steady growth of European populations, and an increase in trade and revenues brought in from the taxation of such trade would gradually allow several countries, including Burgundy, Hungary, and Spain to follow the French example of establishing a standing army.[25] Meanwhile warfare changed slowly but comprehensively under the effects of the introduction of fire-power, first in the form of cannon, and gradually in the form of hand-held weapons (see chapter 3). The same growth of fiscal-military states allowed for the creation of navies owned directly by the crown. Key innovations in the maritime sphere had led to the discovery of the New World. By the late sixteenth century the globe had been circumnavigated. Philip II of Spain, scion of the Habsburg dynasty, in uniting in personal union the crowns of Spain and Portugal, could look on an empire extending not only to the Americas in the West but also to the islands named after him in the Far East.

In the immediate context of the discovery by Columbus in 1492 of the Western passage to what was originally thought to be Asia, the respective monarchs of Spain and Portugal had asked the Spanish-born Borgia Pope Alexander VI for adjudication, and his bull *Inter caetera* of 1493, modified slightly by the Treaties of Tordesillas (1494) and Saragossa (1496), divided the extra-European world with two longitudinal lines. America West of the Western line was to go to Spain, territories between both lines (from modern Brazil to Macao, but generally taken to exclude the Mediterranean and its littoral) to Portugal, and anything East of the Eastern line (above all, the Philippines) again to Spain (see Map I). And no other state was to meddle and claim land in the new world. Any boat 'crossing the line' by sailing from Europe to the new world (or indeed to any other part of the globe), as Queen Elizabeth's voyagers so often would, for purposes other than mere exploration, thus could be interpreted by Philip to have committed an act of war. This needled the English in particular, and they came to see Philip as aspiring to world domination.

Yet the Habsburgs – both the Austrian branch that was hogging the Holy Roman Emperorship, and the Iberian branch – encountered a huge challenge to their pre-eminence arising from a new feature in European politics: war based on confessional differences. From 1520 until 1648, almost all wars in Europe had a religious dimension.[26] This made warfare more difficult to contain and to steer by the rulers who engaged in it, as it inflamed public passions which were not easy to calm down again. Once the opponent had been stigmatised as the Anti-Christ, it was difficult to explain why one would want to sit down and negotiate peace with him. Religious wars then and now have a tendency to develop a momentum of their own and to drag on.

In the 1570s, 1580s and 1590s, several at least partly religiously-motivated civil wars or insurgencies took place across Western Europe. From 1562, France was rent apart by a series of such wars. In 1568 the Protestant Dutch began an eighty years' insurgency (or war of independence) against their overlord, who as Philip II was king of Spain. Despite the shocking implications of such a rebellion against the God-given authority of a prince, Protestant opinion throughout Europe rapidly took the side of the Dutch in view of the brutal and infamous repression of the rebels and local populations. External protestant powers – especially England and, later, Sweden – would intervene on the side of the Protestants in their fight in what Nicholas Rodger has aptly called the world-wide 'Catholic International', with the Roman Papacy formulating its doctrines and, through its churches everywhere, taking care of propaganda.

In reality, this 'Catholic International' was no more a 'monolith' than the Communist world after the Second World War. Already from the early sixteenth century, the Catholic Valois monarchs would break ranks and ally with anybody from the Ottoman Sultan to the Protestants to spite the Habsburgs in their own dynastic balance-of-power game in which they sought pre-eminence in Europe for themselves, a pre-eminence which they traced back to seeing France as the 'oldest daughter of the Church' and to their own descent from Charlemagne. Yet like world Communism in the Cold War, the 'Catholic International' (or at least the House of Habsburg with all its branches) was *perceived* as a monolith by its adversaries.[27] Moreover, whether they intended to or not (see below), the Habsburgs were *seen* as wanting to re-establish a universal monarchy, and thus rule the planet, something the Medieval Holy Roman Emperors had never quite managed to do.[28] Therefore, European strategy began to acquire a global dimension even in the sixteenth century.

In the French Religious Wars, Queen Elizabeth's England and King Philip's Spain took opposite sides, each favouring the French monarchs or pretenders closest to their own religious inclinations. Thus Elizabeth sided with the Prince of Condé, and Henri Bourbon, King of Navarre; Philip II sided with the Catholic Guises (to whom Mary Queen of Scots had belonged on her mother's side). When the Protestant Henri of Navarre, as the legal heir, claimed the French crown after the death of the last Valois King in 1589, Philip made a rival bid for the French crown on behalf of his daughter, the Infanta Isabella Clara Eugenia. His several invasions of French territory did not, however, allow him to gain a permanent foothold in France, as the forces of Henri of Navarre expelled him each time, usually with English support, either financial or in the form of actual soldiers.

Moreover, the Protestant princes supported Prince William of Orange, leader of the Dutch rebels, who would be assassinated, a fate wished also upon Elizabeth by Catholics. As we shall see, the Dutch even had the sympathy of loyal servants of the Habsburgs such as Lazarus von Schwendi (see Chapter 7). The religious strife of this period was thus a crucial cause of war, and a crucial factor in strategy making.

Philip II's Ambitions and Strategies

As we have noted, the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were marked by the House of Habsburg's flirtation with world rule, a *monarchia universalis* surpassing that of any former empire in its geographic span. True, Charles V in the mid-1550s divided his heritage between his brother Ferdinand I (to whom he left the Eastern Habsburg lands and who got himself elected emperor in Charles' place) and his son Philip II (to whom he left Spain, the Netherlands, the Mediterranean possessions, and the colonies), but he had hoped that upon Ferdinand's death (which came in 1564), Philip might succeed to the empire and not to his Ferdinand's son Maximilian. But in fact within a decade after the religious peace between Catholics and Protestants within the Empire had been agreed with the edict of Augsburg (1555), Philip with his support for the Inquisition, the burnings of Protestants on Spanish soil from 1559 (as acts of faith, Port. *autos da fé*) and his fierce suppression of the Dutch insurgency had made himself so unpopular among more liberal-minded Catholics not to mention the Protestants that there was no chance of his being elected emperor.[29]

Even without the Holy Roman Empire, however, the heritage received by Philip was colossal. Moreover, through his marriage with Mary Tudor, Philip hoped to gain England for his heirs, a hope frustrated when she died childless in 1558. But as king of Naples & Sicily, Duke of Milan from 1554, ruler of Netherlands from 1555, king of Spain from 1556, and, through another quirk of fate in the game of royal (in)fertility, heir and successor to a childless king of Portugal from 1581, Philip was the most powerful monarch in Europe. His dangerous ambitions for global, indeed universal, hegemony seemed confirmed with the medal he had coined in 1580, depicting a horse poised to leap off the globe and into space, with the modest little caption, '*non sufficit orbis*': the world is not enough.

ILLUSTRATION 1.1: Philip II of Spain 'non sufficit orbis'[30]

(It is known that Sir Francis Drake got his hands on a copy of the medal; what he made of it, we can imagine.[31]) It was only Philip II's eponymous grandson, Philip IV, who in the following century would be called the *Rey Planeta*, king of the entire planet (captured in an equestrian portrait by Rubens in which Philip carries the world upon his shoulders, a personification of Faith marking Spain with a cross, while the personification of Divine Justice destroys heresy with Jupiter-like arrows of lightning).[32] But the symbolism linking dominion over the entire planet with the Spanish monarch was already well established in the iconography of Philip II's reign, and was promoted by writers such as Jaime Vadés who called him *Emperador del Nuevo Mundo y de Europa* – emperor of the new world and of Europe.[33]

ILLUSTRATION 1.2:Philip IV of Spain as 'Rey Planeta', after Rubens, Florence, Uffizi.

https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Peter_Paul_Rubens/Portraits_of_men#/media/File:Retrato_aleg%C3%B3rico_de_Felipe_IV,_after_Rubens.jpg

According to historian Geoffrey Parker, Philip II's overall strategy was, first, to preserve his inheritance, threatened especially by the insurgence of the protestant Dutch in quest of independence. Secondly, he tried to keep what he had acquired in his own lifetime: the English crown through his marriage with Mary Tudor, lost again once she predeceased him without issue, and that of Portugal. Thirdly, he was encouraged to follow in the Spanish tradition of

defending Christianity against the infidel, the long-standing leitmotif of the Reconquista, but now also to be the *defensor fidei,* champion of – by now world-wide – Catholicism against the Protestant heresies, with the ultimate aspiration of re-establishing a universal monarchy.[34] This is beautifully illustrated by the Titian painting dating from the early 1570s (the Dutch revolt was well underway), that is now in the Prado in Madrid, where *ecclesia* is threatened by the Turks from the sea, and by the snakes of heresy in her back (see below).

ILLUSTRATON 2: Titian: 'Religion saved by Spain' (Spain succouring Faith), 1572-1575 (Madrid: Prado).[35]

There was even an initiative dating from 1596 to create a religious order (in the tradition of the crusading orders) to operate at sea, with a navy of 21 galleons, against the Infidel and against heretics.[36] The choice of galleons – ships relying entirely on wind power – is of course an indicator that this fleet was to be used mainly in the open waters of the Atlantic rather than in the Mediterranean, where in 1571 the Christian forces under Spanish leadership had triumphed against the Ottoman navy using galleys and galleasses, i.e. ships propelled mainly by power of oar.

Parker doubts that Philip himself espoused the goal of a 'universal monarchy', but to repeat, contemporaries were convinced that he embraced it fully, and felt threatened by it much as the liberal democracies of the 20th century would feel existentially threatened by the expansionist, universalist ambitions 'world Communism'. Either way, as it was Philip's unquestionable aim to assert his authority over the Netherlands, against the Dutch uprising, he needed to continue with his counterinsurgency campaign there. The Dutch fielded an increasingly regular force, with the open support of Elizabeth's England and, periodically, Henri IV's France. Spain's lines of communication lay either overland on the '*camino español*' (the preferred route from 1568-1638), through Habsburg possessions from Milan through the Franche Comté to the low country, or by sea, along the coast of France through the channel to the Dutch ports. Two of these – Brill (Brielle) and Flushing (Vlissingen) – were controlled by England, on the basis of the 1585 Treaty of Nonsuch concluded with the Dutch rebels.[37] Following this treaty, Anglo-Spanish hostilities, never formally taking the form of a declared war, turned into direct military clashes.

With hindsight we can see, however, that the Anglo-Spanish War of 1585-1604 (see Chapter 4) was a sideshow to the main rivalry that was to dominate European politics until 1756, and even after that, the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars were mainly directed against the (Austrian) Habsburgs. (The rivalry really only ended when Napoleon claimed the imperial heritage from Rome via Charlemagne for himself and for France in 1804, and two years later caused the dissolution the Holy Roman Empire, to be replaced by a Franco-Prussian and then Franco-German rivalry.) The Habsburgs in general and the Spanish Habsburgs in particular with their ever growing empires were rising to become the French kings' rivals for pre-eminence in Europe, and later, in large parts of the world. France's religious wars were closely linked with the Dutch insurgency in what was to some extent a Europe-wide civil war that would later grow into the Thirty Years' War. The Franco-Habsburg conflict was muted when Bourbon King Henri IV became a Catholic and above all tried to assert his authority within France, which hinged on inter-denominational reconciliation; despite the troubles which followed his assassination, this put an end to foreign meddling in French domestic affairs.[38] Even so, until the Spanish War of Succession, Spain's wars were dominated mainly by the confrontation with France, a bloody sparring that was only concluded when Henri IV's descendant, King Louis XIV, managed to put one of his grandsons on the Spanish throne. At least between 1570 and 1625, France had no navy that could threaten any other country, so the conflict took place almost entirely on land, and mainly within France's possessions.

Another major and mortally dangerous adversary of Philip, the House of Habsburg, and indeed all of Christendom was the Ottoman Empire. The immediate threat to Spain and its North African possessions was naval, and this was largely but by no means entirely rebutted in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571, which only retrospectively can be seen as a turning point in favour of Christendom. During Philip's lifetime it was by no means certain that the many campaigns of the Ottoman fleet that took place even in the Western Mediterranean, and that would secure most of North Africa for the Sultan's rule, would not again pose a threat to South-Western Europe. For the naval operations which led to the battle of Lepanto, Philip joined a coalition of Christian powers and navies whose interest in fending off the Turks converged: this was the short-lived Holy League that had been brought together by Pope Pius V, and it also counted among its members Venice, Genoa, Savoy and some other Italian states and the Knights of Malta. Its navies were commanded by Philip's handsome half-brother, Don John of Austria; thus Philip ensured that he could dominate this successful venture and could claim leadership among the Christian powers in the defence against the Turks, an enduring concern. Meanwhile South-Eastern Europe was of course firmly under the Sultan's control. Local piracy along the Barbary Coast added to Philip's concerns about the security of his southern flank and naval lines of communication in and around the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, in the following decades of Philip's reign, the Ottoman threat receded behind the Dutch rebellion which began in 1568, and Spain's wars with France and England.

Spain's strategic options and choices

If further evidence of strategic thinking is needed for Philip II, but also of the statecraft in presenting it and garnering support for it, we might look for it in the arguments presented on behalf of Philip to the Castillian *Cortes,* the representatives of the estates of Castile from which Philip drew his main revenue. One such example of a letter from Philip read out to the *Cortes* by his secretary, Francisco de Eraso, can be found in 1570, when the Ottoman threat was at its greatest, and the Dutch Revolt had only just started. Here Philip asked the *Cortes* for more funds. He explained that it behoved him not only to ensure the security of his kingdom's frontiers, its fortified places and the good provisioning of his armies and navy, but that he also needed the means to 'castigate … the rebels' in Flanders, i.e. the rebellion in the Netherlands, 'with a great example and authority'. To do so he needed to help the last Valois French King Charles IX against the 'heretics' in his own country, but also to support a campaign to quell an uprising of the Moriscos in Granada, which assumed a further dimension as possible preparation to help a landing in Spain by a Turkish fleet. Philip added that he needed ships to fend off the Turks, but also pirates operating in the Mediterranean. In this letter, Philip stressed that the priority for him and all the faithful – '*prima y principalmente*' – must be the defence of the Catholic faith, but at the same time this provided a justification for *all* these campaigns and expenses. In his negotiations with the *Cortes*, he thus made it quite impossible for the Castilian emissaries to take issue with this long list of obligations and to unpick it, by arguing that some might be less pressing than others. Admittedly, strategy making in this case was a denial of choice, and an insistence that all these points must be met. (Things would look different once the Dutch War of Independence had been underway for some years; it was only in its third year at this point.) The *Cortes* on this occasion promised to support the king's plans.[39]

While at this stage, Philip could aspire to have it all, as the Dutch wars dragged on, he had to choose between different priorities and focus on other enemies as well. Spain proved unable to defeat France in a head-on campaign (which would have required a massive confrontation of land armies either in France's north or along the Pyrenees or both); nor did Philip II have hopes of doing so. Instead, as we have seen, he meddled in the French Wars of Religion by supporting the Catholic side. He repeatedly seized (but subsequently lost again) French ports along the

English Channel in order to secure his naval lines of communication to the Netherlands, but henceforth, France was not his priority. From 1876 until his death in 1598, the dithering king as one might also call him weighed the options of concentrating his strategic options on the defeat of the Dutch rebellion, or on a direct or indirect assault on their principal supporter, Queen Elizabeth of England.[40]

After Philip's courtship of Elizabeth was rejected, he began to see Elizabeth as a danger to Spain's great Catholic programme. Already in 1563, Spain's ambassador to England, Alvaro de Quadra, wrote to King Philip about Queen Elizabeth: 'This woman desires to make use of religion in order to excite rebellion in the whole world … If she had the power today she would sow heresy broadcast in all your Majesty's dominions, and set them ablaze without compunction …'.[41] Swayed by evidence of Elizabeth's support for the Protestant rebels against his rule in the Netherlands, Philip proceeded to back Catholic Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, as pretender to the English crown, through conspiracies and plots, a strategy of 'all mischief short of war' (one definition of the Cold War of the twentieth century). Don John was keen to replace Elizabeth on the English throne himself, and from 1576 until his own death in 1578 tried hard to manipulate his half-brother, the King, into prioritising an invasion of England.[42]

The Turkish threat was always lurking in the background and we only know with the benefit of hindsight that the Sultan would cause Philip no further grief. Philip managed to bribe him to accept an armistice, which in turn did not please Pope Gregory XIII who would have preferred Philip to win back the Christian lands that had been conquered by the Ottoman Empire. If Philip was not willing to go on an all-out *Reconquista,* the pope could threaten him with the revocation of the 'Three Graces', special taxes paid by the Spanish churches to their monarch that had originally been granted to fend off the Turks. From 1582, Pope Gregory XIII expressly urged Philip to invade England. At the very least, thus the pope's demand, Philip should invade Ireland to force out the English and restore Ireland fully to the Catholic fold. This option was attractive not least as Philip oud do unto the English as they were doing unto him: as they were supporting the Dutch against him, he might support a rebellion against Tudor rule in Ireland. Until 1574, Spanish ships could freely approach the coasts of Ireland as King in 1553, the first year of his spouse's Mary I's reign, Philip had bought the right for Spanish fishermen to fish in that region for a period of 21 years.[43] Thereafter, Spanish relations with the Irish were maintained, and indeed, elites of both nations were united in their antipathy towards English Protestantism. The archbishop of Dublin, for example, was a Spaniard, and Spaniards were among the soldiers who were to invade England in Philip's campaigns. Indeed, in September 1581, Philip footed the bill for a small fleet to take 800 Spanish and Italian volunteers to the coast of Ireland. But news of this had travelled, and they were met by an English contingent and soundly beaten [44]

Further challenges deflected Philip from the 'Enterprise of England'. While his realm and colonial empire doubled in size with his succession to the Portuguese throne in 1581, his rule was challenged by Dom Antonio, an illegitimate grandson of the late King Manuel I of Portugal. Dom Antonio managed to establish himself in the Azores. Philip sent a fleet to evict him from there, upon which he fled to France and then to England. In 1585 Queen Elizabeth imposed an embargo on English trade with the Spanish in the Netherlands, to which Philip retaliated by arresting the crews of foreign ships in Spanish harbours; it transpired that his reason was one of deterrence: 'hearing that the Hollanders seake ayde in England and fearing they shalbe ayded' Philip 'meaneth by this arreste to fear [=deter] the Englishe from ayding them.' It was only after Sir Francis Drake's surprise attack on Cádiz in the same year that Philip moved from deterrence to aggression and opted for an invasion of England, even though the preparations – including building the necessary navy – and final decision would be another three years to come.[45]

As England could threaten Philip II's maritime line of communication with his Dutch possessions, especially in the Channel, one strategic option for Philip was to try in turn to dominate the Channel by gaining a foothold in Brittany and seizing Calais in Normandy. This is indeed an option he pursued, but as we have noted, the forces of Henri IV, with English help, ousted his forces each time.

England was objectively much weaker and poorer than Habsburg Spain. While Philip's resources – local taxation in his united kingdoms covering the Iberian Peninsula but also revenue from his overseas' empire – were much larger than those of Elizabethan England. Even so, there were still limits, not merely financial but also physical, to what he could do to harm England.[46] Yet this only became clear during the Anglo-Spanish War. Both Philip and Elizabeth tried throughout to avoid direct confrontations. Indeed, both Philip II and Elizabeth I are both counted among the hesitators or 'Fabians' among strategic decision-makers.[47] Even after 1585, Philip postponed the invasion of England several times. For reasons of economy alone, both the Tudor and the Habsburg monarchs needed a lasting peace.

Philip's and Elizabeth's hesitations and last-minute cancellations of campaigns are not in themselves evidence of an absence of strategy, but of the dilemma monarchs faced repeatedly: the cost for their economies of raising armies was considerable, not only in terms of losses of manpower to the economy as a whole, but also the money lost for their provisions. Unless one had a standing army like France, an army that had been assembled and that waited for a long time to be deployed usually cost nearly as much as an army actually sent into action, and the same applied to armies that were disbanded again without seeing action.[48] Navies, whose operations were frequently cancelled or delayed due to unfavourable winds, often consumed large parts of their dearly acquired victuals while waiting in port or trying to brave the storms. To decide to call off action meant an even greater wastage of money.

Eventually, Philip and Elizabeth were so committed to the Europe-wide war confessional and dynastic strife that their credibility was at stake; they could not easily pull back, and their own subjects would not have allowed this to happen. While Philip II along with his dynasty, ancestors, was imbued by Catholic missionary zeal, Elizabeth's claim to the English throne was strongly supported by the English Protestants. Their conflict was thus ideologically inescapable. Even now, Philip hesitated, trying to bring Elizabeth's rival Mary Stuart to the throne of England through conspiracy rather than invasion. After her execution in 1587, he aspired to a match between Mary's son James and daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia, and wanted James to claim the English crown (he wanted Isabella on the throne of either England or France; unsuccessful, he later gave her the Netherlands to administer).[49] Only an invasion would put her on the throne however. In 1588, a year after Mary Stuart's execution, Philip finally ordered his *gran armada,* configured around this set of crown-owned vessels built for this specific operation, to sail. The strategic flaw in his 'masterplan' was that he tried to do three things simultaneously – launch a surprise attack on England's southern shores, but also pick up a Spanish army in the Netherlands and ferry them across the Channel (preparations for which could not go undetected by English spies), and also meet an English fleet, now assembled and prepared, in open battle.[50] Famously, Philip's Armada was repulsed by an English fleet that was assembled defensively *ad hoc*, and then scattered by the winds.

When the news of this calamity reached Spain, Philip on 1 October 1588 had a letter read out to the *Cortes*, in which he explained that he had launched this campaign 'in the service of God and the Holy Catholic Faith, and for the benefit of [his] kingdoms'. Anything could happen now, he argued and the security of the seas and of the Indies was at risk, if the [merchant] navy, and even of 'our own homes'. He implored them as his good vassals to support him in what he needed to do, given his 'great and inexcusable obligations'. The war with England now topped the Spanish list of strategic concerns, and Philip asked for support above all for a defence of

Spain and its shipping against England.[51] (After six days' deliberations, the *Cortes* grudgingly agreed to give the crown 16 000 ducats.[52]) Nevertheless, Philip's prioritisation of the 'Enterprise of England' forced him to make economies elsewhere, and he chose to make cuts in his fortification scheme for his African and Asian possessions.[53]

Delayed by more pressing demands on his attention – revolts in Castile, Sicily and Aragon – Philip only attempted to carry out another naval invasion of England in 1595 with a little success (the Spanish fleet succeeded in burning Penzance, Moushole and Newlyn in Cornwall), and two more, one unsuccessfully in 1596 and on again unsuccessfully in 1597, when adverse winds persuaded the each *armada* to turn back. In 1595, Don Bernardino de Mendoza, who had been Quadra's successor as Spanish ambassador to the Court of St James (London) and expelled for plotting with Mary Stuart, argued implicitly against the creation of a standing Spanish royal navy, and explicitly for configuring a navy each time it was needed, according to the purpose it was to serve in any particular campaign.[54] His view either reflected the king or persuaded him: the armadas of 1596 and 1597 were thus again assembled and in part built specifically for the operation against England. This joint venture character of the armadas was perhaps an additional reason for their failure besides the adverse winds that met them on their operations: the decision to turn back was taken more easily by captains of privately-owned vessels, as the prospect of booty slipped from their grasp.

Philip also returned to the Irish option. After Spain's unsuccessful attempt in 1581 to help the Irish in an uprising against English rule, Philip decided to support Tyrone's Rebellion (or the Nine Year's War 1594-1603) which was being prepared through contacts with Spain. From 1591, Tyrone received first, Spain's indirect, and later direct support, initially only with Spanish advisers helping the Irish to develop increasingly successful guerrilla tactics, then with the actual deployment of Spanish troops. Eventually, England had to deploy larger forces to Ireland than it had been able to finance in support of the Dutch Rebellion. The Spanish strategy of supporting the Irish against England of course relied heavily on naval communications with Ireland, and thus on vessels as vehicles for transport, rather than equipped for naval battle. The Nine Years' War was only brought to an end well after Philip's death and indeed years after the battle of Kinsale (1601), where Irish rebel and Spanish regular forces clashed with and were defeated by an English army.[55] (Irish resistance against English rule would break into flames again in the War of the Three Kingdoms, when the Irish even offered Spanish King Philip IV the Irish crown. He declined.)[56]

Both monarchs under whom the Anglo-Spanish War had started were dead and buried before peace would be concluded under their respective successors, Philip III and James I and VI. (The Dutch Rebellion, however, was not over, and would drag on for eighty years, eventually ending with the independence of the United Provinces at the end of the Thirty Years' War into which the rebellion merged.)

Geoffrey Parker, who first argued that Philip had a grand strategy, shows that he had to make decisions about the prioritisation of investments in his military (creating a royal navy, raising and deploying troops in his various theatres of war, ensuring the openness of his own lines of communication etc.), as well as using (or attempting to use) diplomatic tools such as dynastic marriages and the kinship with the Austrian Habsburgs. Despite the great revenues which the Spanish crown drew upon, not least from its American possessions, Philip's budget was overstretched by his multiple ambitions. While Philip was convinced that in all of this, he was doing God's bidding, this did not translate itself into good fortune in all his campaigns. He managed to keep most of his realm, but could not reconquer England or contain the Dutch independence movement. Nor could he put the genie of Protestantism back in the box.[57]

Parker has seen a link with a deficiency in statecraft on the part of Philip: his very style of personal government drove him into a rut in which he ended up so preoccupied with all details

of administration that bagatelles in all shapes and forms prevented him from a more coherent application of strategy on higher levels. Philip was too reactive to have been a very successful grand strategist, excessively preoccupied by daily events to be able to keep on top of greater developments.[58] But even if weaknesses in Philip II's statecraft and strategy making can be identified, he managed to leave to his successors a global empire that lasted until the death of the last Habsburg monarch triggered the war of succession that would be won by Louis XIV of France.[59]

War in the Grand Siècle of Louis XIV

Louis, who acceded to kingship at the tender age of four, as a youth was very keen to shake off the joint tutelage of his mother and of Cardinal Mazarin. In later life, however, he would make excellent use of his ministers, generals and other advisers, including Jean-Baptiste Colbert; his son, the Marquis of Seignelay; father and son Telliers, who would both be Marquis de Louvois; Sebastien Le Prestre de Vauban; Jules-Louis Bolé de Chamlay; and Godefroi, Count d'Estrades,[60] and delegate to them tasks in ways that his maternal great-grandfather Philip II would not have dreamt of.

Between the two monarchs lay a period of wars which engulfed all of Europe from Ireland and Britain (in the Wars of the Three Kingdoms) to Poland, and from Sweden to Spain and the Balkans (the Thirty Years' War). On the periphery even the Russian and Ottoman Empires got involved. A number of factors lay at the origins of this: attempts by the Austrian Habsburgs, at the helm of the Holy Roman Empire, to roll back Protestantism and support the Counterreformation, and on the other side attempts by many sides to counter the 'Catholic International'; centrifugal forces of regional self-assertion; and blank opportunism on the part of several princes. These wars were civil wars and inter-state wars at once, and the strategic aims of all parties were exceedingly complex and shifted often.[61] It is perhaps because of this complexity that only two serious strategic theorists wrote at the time of this war or soon thereafter: Raimondo Montecuccoli (see chapter 7) and the considerably less brilliant Paul Hay du Chastelet Jr.[62] (A few other works appeared at the time that are of tactical interest, but not much more.)

Louis XIV was himself only ten when the Thirty Years' War was ended with the 1648 Peace Treaties of Münster and Osnabrück. The former turned Alsace into a part of France but oddly gave the French king a seat of the Imperial Diet of the Holy Roman Empire (although Cardinal Mazarin managed to avoid making the French king a subordinate prince of the empire that would have been reminiscent of the status which the Plantagenet kinds had been as vassals of the French king, for their possessions in France).

Henceforth, religion was theoretically and generally speaking no longer a major factor in European Warfare. While religious strife was off the agenda, the Bourbon-all-Habsburg rivalry that had succeeded the rivalry between the French and Imperial heirs of Charlemagne was fully unleashed. And this despite or because of the intermarriage between the House of Bourbon and the House of Habsburg: not only was Louis' mother the granddaughter and daughter of Spanish Habsburg kings Philip II and Philip III respectively. Louis himself married his first cousin, daughter of his mother's brother, Philip IV King of Spain. Indeed, as war drew to a close in 1648 elsewhere in Europe, war between France and Spain dragged on until 1659. In that year's Peace of the Pyrenees, France obtained a swathe of territory to its north that had previously been parts of the Spanish Netherlands, including Artois and Hainault, and to the South, the Roussillon and a chunk of Catalonia called Cerdanya (Cerdagne). This territorial enlargement of France was the achievement of the two faithful servants of the Bourbon dynasty, Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin. The most striking illustration of this is the splendid building facing the Louvre on the Left Bank of the Seine, which today houses the Institut de France. Cardinal Mazarin left his

fortune to its construction, to house a *Collège des Quatre Nations*, meaning the new 'nations' or populations that had been integrated into the Bourbon realm with the Treaties of Münster and the Pyrenees. The College was designed to educate future loyal civil servants of France who hailed from these areas. Louis XIV's own strategic aims of enlarging his kingdom even further were thus in principle a mere continuation of the aims of his father's reign, and of the two cardinals. Their respective strategies, however, differed considerably. Louis XIV's relentless pursuit of his expansionist aims using the far greater means left to him by the two cardinals, the power with which he pursued his objectives distinguished him in particular.

Louis XIV had considerable advantages over all his predecessors. Religious strife was on the whole reduced in prominence in interstate relations if not in the domestic politics of France (Louis still had to face the Camisard uprising in the Cevennes and was ultimately obliged to negotiate with a baker's son and had to concede religious freedom to the rebels). But on the whole, the monarchs' absolutist powers increased significantly, and with it, a fiscal-military state on a scale that Europe had not seen since the end of the Roman Empire in the West. The French state apparatus that was fostered by the two cardinals, and later by Louis' finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert, allowed Louis XIV to embrace expansionist strategic aims. Richelieu had begun to build up a navy which provided Louis with a strategic tool that his predecessors had lacked, even though in 1695, due to financial constraints, the King had to choose between navy and army, strategically choosing to concentrate his remaining funds on the latter. Louis had a whole series of extremely talented servants and ministers dealing with the many dimensions of warfare, of whom Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban, famous for his system of fortifications along France's land frontiers was but one.[63] Despite the demographic dip in the French population due to the famine of 1695, France's population was significantly larger than it had been in previous reigns. That, together with the previous and ongoing fiscal reforms allowed Louis to double and then more than triple the size of his standing army: where his father's army had had a paper strength of 125 000 when France entered the Thirty-Years' War in 1635, the Sun-King had 279 000 soldiers during his Dutch War of 1672-1678, and up to 420 000 during his Nine Years' War against the League of Augsburg (the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, Great Britain and Savoy) 1688-1697.[64]

Louis XIV of France as strategist.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that Louis himself formulated the strategic priorities of his reign, albeit with the help of these and other able men.[65] In ascertaining these, the 358 notes produced for Louis by Chamlay, between 1690 and 1709 are revealing: 145 concerned the Netherlands, 140 the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire, 122 Italy, and only 49 concerned Spain (and that mainly from 1700, as the Spanish succession crisis came to the fore). Only 6 concerned Britain, and a further 8 the defence of the French coast.[66]

Louis' own hand could be seen when, upon Philip IV of Spain's death in 1665, much like an Edward III of England before him, the French monarch would invoke an obscure principle of inheritance to increase his territories. Thus began the first of Louis' wars, the 'War of Devolution' of 1667-1668, aimed to enlarge France to the North. For from the beginning, Louis' grand strategic objectives were to increase his dynasty's possessions wherever he could. A letter he sent to the Count d'Estrades on 19 December 1664 may serve as an example for strategic thinking that integrated warfare, the forging and undoing of alliances, reflections on short-and long-term consequences of actions, the application of the laws of war (*ius ad bellum*) and other aspects of statecraft. Louis had concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Johan de Witt, the Grand Pensionary (or republican head of government) of Holland, internally opposed by the faction of William III of Orange, son and husband to Stuart princesses (family bonds he would eventually use to seize the crowns of England and Scotland in 1688). In late 1664, de Witt

called upon Louis to support him in a war against England. In the letter to Estrades – our next piece of evidence for the presence of strategic reasoning before the word was coined – Louis explained his hesitations to fulfil his treaty obligations.

Louis wrote that he wanted to secure the Spanish Netherlands, interposed between de Witt's state and his own, for his wife and their heirs. But at this point Louis hoped for a peaceful succession, as the heir of Spain and half-brother of Louis' wife, the future Carlos II, might be prevailed upon to cede the Spanish Netherlands peacefully. Louis noted that London was on the point of concluding a similar treaty of mutual assistance with Madrid, and going to war against England was likely to obviate his wife's peaceful succession to the Spanish Netherlands. Nor was Louis confident that de Witt would pass up the occasion of such a war – which might escalate to bring Spain into it – to seize the Spanish Netherlands for his country. King Charles II of England and Scotland was obviously aware of de Witt's attempts to bring in France as an ally, and had cleverly suggested to Louis XIV a way of reneging on his treaty commitments to de Witt, by suggesting that an *unjust* war was not covered by such a treaty of mutual assistance. Charles defined de Witt as the aggressor, thus claiming the moral high ground. The Dutch-British quarrel concerned possession of the Dutch West India Company, so another excuse for Louis not to honour his treaty commitments was to claim that the Treaty did not pertain to extra-European conflicts. In short, on this occasion, Louis XIV did not want to go to war.[67] In his Memoirs, Louis explained the choice that he was facing: to try to keep his own pursuit of the succession of the Spanish Netherlands separate from de Witt's war, or to join forces with him at the risk of seeing him play false at the end, or otherwise losing the Spanish Netherlands while deeply alienating Spain and what was by now the United Kingdom of Great Britain.

Then there was the choice of means, were he to go to war: would he use his navy or his army? He opted for the latter. As 'the wellbeing of my kingdom did not permit that I expose myself to the caprices of the sea', and as naval warfare would force him to delegate all his authority 'to his lieutenants, without the ability to intervene personally', he was reluctant to espouse a mainly naval strategy. Moreover, he had a large standing army which he was maintaining at the expense of his subjects, so he would prefer to make use of that and to 'throw it into the Spanish king's estates' to fight. Given that he was faced with a war on two fronts, he preferred to concentrate on his fight with France, and to leave the naval dimension of this war to the Dutch.[68]

Louis' calculations changed, however, when in the following year, the likelihood increased that a Dutch defeat in this (Second) Anglo-Dutch War was likely to lead to the overthrow of de Witt, and to the rule of William III of Orange with his family links with the crown of England and Scotland. Louis eventually joined the fray in 1666 on the side of de Witt. In the following year, however, Louis would clash with de Witt over his attempts to secure the Spanish Netherlands under wife's claim to succession, a war that would become known as the War of Devolution (1667-1668).

The following phase of Louis' reign, lasting from roughly 1675 up to 1697, he intended to be one of consolidation. But in fact the Nine-Years' War of 1688-1697 that pitted Louis against a Grand Alliance of all Habsburgs and some other princes of the Holy Roman Empire, the Dutch, and Victor Amadeus II of Savoy brought huge reversals for France, including the temporary loss of Lorraine.[69] Louis had no inhibitions about employing scorched earth tactics to break resistance to French occupation in contested areas, or to make them unattractive to his adversaries;[70] his tactics closely resembled those of the *chevauchées* of Edward III and other English monarchs in France in the Hundred Years' War. Louis's earlier wars with Spain had paradoxically been conducted mainly along France's northern frontier with the Habsburg lands in Flanders. Briefly, in 1694, at Chamlay's advice, Louis attempted an offensive move against Catalonia and the Basque country. In 1697, this led to the French seizure of Barcelona, which

proved decisive in persuading Madrid to sue for peace, leading to the Peace of Rijswick of the same year.[71]

Even during the last phase of Louis' wars (1701-1714), centring on the War of the Spanish Succession waged over his wife's claims to the crown of Spain itself, the main theatres of the wars between Louis' forces and those of the Spanish Habsburgs were the Low Countries and Northern France, and in Italy, with Spain being a theatre of tertiary importance. It curiously became a war in which the Bourbons mainly fielded land forces but were faced with a coalition of the Austrian Habsburgs, the Dutch and the British with a strong naval element which Louis could not match, either in terms of numbers of ships or of reach: France's ports were shallow and always on the verge of silting up, and only Toulon on France's Mediterranean coast and Brest in Brittany could support larger vessels. Moreover, Britain's conquest of Gibraltar in 1704 would be a serious blow not only for Spain but also for France, as Britain henceforth controlled both the waters along France's Western and Southern coasts, along with the passage between the Mediterranean and the Atlantic through which France might want to move her ships if ever she wanted to concentrate her navies in one area.[72]

Louis' secondary strategic aim in the War of the Spanish Succession was to seize also the Spanish Habsburg possessions in Italy (especially Milan and its dependencies). The Austrian Habsburgs under Prince Eugene of Savoy were also trying to secure these lands, and Austrian and French armies would thus clash in northern Italy. Access to Italy presupposed the passage through the Alps in the areas controlled by Victor Amadeus II of Savoy, who would thus continue to hold the key to Louis' successes and failures.[73]

Despite the impressive fiscal-military state and the exceptionally talented ministers Louis could draw upon, even he did not have enough revenue to develop fully all strategic options. He was able to extend France's frontiers to the north, east and south, and to fortify the frontier regions with Vauban's constructions permitting a defence-in-depth. But he could not also to finance a big enough standing navy to deal Britain or the Netherlands a decisive blow; historian Jean-Philippe Cénat has argued that the *Royale* (French Navy) was in part sacrificed to the other parts of the military budget. Neither did France have the means to assure the long-term defence of France's colonies in North America. But Louis' personal lack of interest in territories outside of Europe was another strong factor in this lack of a colonial strategy: French emigration to North America was not particularly encouraged, so that during his reign, the number of British settlers in North America grew to be almost twenty times as large as that of French settles. The peace of Utrecht of 1813 formalised this imbalance by transferring the Hudson Bay, Terre-Neuve (Newfoundland) and Acadia (renamed Nova Scotia) to Britain. [74] Even if France clung onto the Antilles and stole other Caribbean islands away from the Dutch, on the whole conquests beyond Europe were not part of Louis' grand strategy.

Even during the defensive middle phase of Louis' war, his expansionism antagonised all neighbouring states; intimidation was key to his overall strategy.[75] Louis was always on the look-out for new allies, courting the Ottomans and even the King of Siam, but he was less keen to follow through on alliance commitments. Louis followed a few strong principles: the 'sancturisation' (i.e. the protection and defence) of French territory; the preference of sieges over battles with their uncertain outcome and their tendency rapidly to bring a campaign to a potentially adverse conclusion; and overall risk-minimisation, unless a preventive war promised success. And finally, he had a tendency to concentrate the bulk of his forces on one of the several fronts on which his wars took place, while employing diversions and peripheral moves, forming temporary alliances or promising aid where none would eventually be forthcoming.[76]

At the end of Louis' reign, France had almost its present shape, except for parts of its northern frontier, the parts of the Duchy of Savoy in the South-East which France acquired later, and the repeated changes in status of Lorraine until the twentieth century. Louis' France

had Europe's largest population, defended in depth guaranteed by Europe's largest army and an awe-inspiring system of fortified 'places', mainly towns and cities, that at the time set the gold standard for the entire Western world. But it had come at a considerable price in blood and treasure, and also of resentment which all of France's neighbours bore this country.[77] As the motto that Louis XIV chose for himself,[78] France was superior to many, and many were those who begrudged her this. On his deathbed, Louis told his heir, Louis XV,

> Darling, you will be a great king, but your entire happiness will depend on your obedience to God and the care you will ease the burdens of your people. For this purpose you must avoid war as much as possible: it is the ruin of the peoples. Do not follow the bad example that I have given you in this matter; I have often undertaken war too easily and I have carried on out of vanity. Do not imitate me, but be a pacific prince, and let it be your principal undertaking to ease the burdens of your subjects.[79]

Even though he had presented them all as a *defence* of his dynastic interests and obligations, Louis had united all of Europe against France in a fashion that only Napoleon would manage to do again.[80]

Conclusions

The three examples we have sketched admittedly show that the war machines, the administrative and military apparatus upon which the three monarchs could draw, expanded and changed spectacularly over 300-odd years. Armies grew in size, especially under Louis XIV; but even then it would be said not of his country, but of Frederick William I's Prussia that it was an army with a state, not a state with an army. At the beginning of the period considered here, the existence of the Western hemisphere was as yet out of reach, while naval exploits of the subsequent two centuries would come to transform warfare. By then, and thenceforth, European wars, particularly those prosecuted by the littoral powers of the Atlantic, could assume a global dimension.

Despite all this change, we do see some patterns in common across all three case studies, and these confirm that strategies can be found in all of them. To use the criteria for this that we have defined at the outset, in all three cases, we find careful planning of campaigns. This involved choosing between several fronts on which to concentrate the forces and choosing between various forms of war. Thus all three monarchs considered here used navies to force battle, to attempt invasions, to capture or hold and supply territory, but less so than they might have done (or in the case of Philip II, were ill favoured by wind and weather to a degree well beyond his control). All three effectively prioritised their armies. Edward III and Louis XIV used the *chevauchée* or its more modern form of scorched earth tactics to badger the local populations into submission and sow terror; Philip's generals, especially the dreaded Duke of Alba, used massacres and mass executions for a similar effect. Only Louis invested heavily in defensive fortifications, very much a strategic choice.

It is also striking how all three monarchs used diplomatic and economic tools of statecraft to complement and offset military measures, most visibly perhaps their dynastic politics, their marriages and their claims to land as their inheritance. While Louis was not good at forging alliances or making friends, Edward had some Continental allies and Philip could count on the allegiance of most Catholic princes in Europe, and, of course, the Pope. And within their realms, while all three had to contend with insurgencies by their own peers and populations on whom they otherwise had to rely to finance their wars, famously, after the Fronde Louis managed to re-establish law and order by rendering his central government structures more effective, and taking absolutism to unprecedented heights in France.

With greater or lesser success, with more or less enduring outcomes, all three monarchs can thus safely be said to have been strategists, and to have made strategy. To draw on the description of strategy-making that we find in Lazarus Schwendi's work, they identified outcomes, they discussed them with their leading generals (or admirals) and ministers, and, in the cases of Edward III and Philip II, articulated their aims and priorities to their parliaments (representatives of the estates). They prepared means and defined ways to use them, and they can be said to have pursued their aims by carefully choosing and applying their strategies and other tools of statecraft.

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1 Lazarus von Schwendi, Freyherr zu Hohen Landsperg etc: *Kriegsdiscurs, von Bestellung deß ganzen Kriegswesens unnd von den Kriegsämptern* (Frankfurt/Main: Andree Weichels Erben Claudi de Marne & Johan Aubri, 1593), p. 45.

2 Beatrice Heuser: *The Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chapter 1.

3 Carl von Clausewitz: *Vom Kriege,* Book II (Berlin: Dümmler, 1832) transl. by Peter Paret & Michael Howard: *On War* (Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 128, 177.

4 Heuser: *Evolution of Strategy*, p.27f.

5 Kimberly Kagan: 'Redefining Roman Grand Strategy', *The Journal of Military History* Vol. 70 No. 2 (2006), p. 348

6 Natalie Fryde: *The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II, 1321-1326* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), *passim*

7 Caroline Barron: 'The Tyranny of Richard II', *Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research* Vol. 41 No. 103 (1968), pp. 1-18.

8 Natalie Fryde: *Why Magna Carta? Angevin England revisited* (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2001).

9 Clifford Rogers: 'The Anglo-French Peace Negotiations of 1354-1360 Reconsidered,' in J.S.Bothwell: *The Age of Edward III* (York: York Medieval Press, 2001), pp. 193-212.

10 This is not to claim that it had not existed previously – for example, it had been practised deftly by Pope Innocent III in the early 13th century, see Natalie Fryde: 'Innocent III, England and the modernization of European international politics.' *Innocenzo III, Urbs et Orbis* Vol. 2 (1998), pp. 971-984.

11 Philippe Contamine: *La Guerre au Moyen Age* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1986²), p. 365.

12 Jan-Willem Honig: 'Reappraising Late Medieval Strategy: The Example of the 1415 Agincourt', *War in History* Vol. 19 No. (2012), pp.123-151.

13 John Gillingham: 'War and Chivalry in the History of William the Marshal', reprinted in Matthew Strickland, (ed.): *Anglo-Saxon Warfare: Studies in Late Anglo-Saxon and Anglo-Norman Military Organisation and Warfare* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1992), pp. 251–263

14 Clifford J.Rogers: *War Cruel and Sharp: English Strategy under Edward III, 1327-1360* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2000); id.: 'The Vegetian 'Science of Warfare' in the Middle Ages', *Journal of Medieval Military History* No 1 (2002), pp.1-19.

15 For examples, see Sir Travers Twiss (ed.): *The Black Book of the Admiralty, vol. 55 of the Rerum britannicarum medii aevi scriptores or Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland during the Middle Ages* (London: Longman & Co et al. 1871) Vol. I.

16 Nigel Saul: *A Companion to Medieval England, 1066-1485* (Stroud: Tempus, 2000), pp. 281-283.

17 Rogers: *War Cruel and Sharp*.

18 Which were by now: Sandwich, Dover, Hythe, New Romney, Hastings, Rye, Seaford, and Winchelsea.

19 Clifford J.Rogers (ed & trs): *Edward III's Wars* (Woodbridge, Suffolk and Rochester, NY: Boydell Press, 1999) Document No. 55.

20 Susan Rose: *Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500* (London : Routledge, 2002), pp. 123-131

[21] Frédérique Laget: 'Guerre sur Mer et Usage stratégique de la Mer, Manche, XIVe-XVe siècle », in *Revue du Nord,* Vol. 95 No. 402 (Oct.-Dec. 2013), pp.947-966.

[22] Francisco Garcia Fitz: '¿Hube estrategia en la edad media? A propósito de las relaciones castellano-musulmanas durante la segunda mitad del siglo XIII', in *Revista da Faculdade de Lettras*, Series II Vol. 15 No. 2 (1998), pp. 837-854.

[23] David Grummit & Jean-François Lassalmonie: 'Royal Public Finance, 1290-1523', in Christopher Fletcher, Jean-Philippe Genet & John Watts (eds): *Government and Political Life in England and France, c.1300-c.1500* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 116-149.

[24] For example, the last time the representatives of Castile, the *Cortes de Castilla*, met in Valladolid before settling permanently in Madrid was in 1604.

[25] Frank Tallett and David Trim (eds): *European Warfare, 1350-1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), p. 22f.

[26] David El Kenz & Claire Gantet: *Guerres et paix de religion en Europe, XVIe- XVIIe siècles* (2nd edn, Paris: Armand Colin, 2008), p.1.

[27] N.A.M. Rodger: *The Safeguard of the Sea: A Naval History of Britain, 660-1649* (London: Penguin, 2004), p. 356; id.: 'Queen Elizabeth and the Myth of Sea-power in English History', in *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society* 6th series, Vol. XIV (2004), pp. 153-174.

[28] This fear would remain alive until after the Thirty Years' War, see for example Anon.: *Dessein perpétuel des Espagnols à la monarchie universelle avec les preuves d'iceluy* (s.l.: 1624), trs. into English by Robert Gordone (?): *The Spaniards perpetvall Designes to an Vniversall Monarchie* (s.l.: 1624).

[29] Friedrich Edelmayer: *Philip II: Biographie eines Weltherrschers* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2009), pp. 67-73, 97-107.

[30] Copyright: British Museum.

[31] Carlos José Hernando Sánchez: 'Non sufficit orbis? Las estrategias de la Monarquía de España', in Luis Robot (volume ed.): *Historia Militar de España* III *Edad Moderna* Part II *Escenario europeo* (Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2013), p.30.

[32] Equestrian Portrait of Philip IV after Rubens (the original has been destroyed), Florence, Galleria degli Uffizi, inv. 1890 no. 792. See also Sir Anthony Sherley's MS treatise, 'Peso político de todo el mundo', which the Bibliotéca nacional de España dates to 1601, see http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000174347&page=1, but it should probably read 1622. The frontispiece of J. van de Solorzano: *Political Indiana* (Madrid: Diego Diaz de Carrera, 1647) shows Philip IV enthroned with the globe as his foot stool. See Peer Schmidt: *Spanische Universalmonarchie oder 'teutsche Libertet'* (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2001), p.435.

[33] Schmidt: *Spanische Universalmonarchie*, p. 127.

[34] Geoffrey Parker: *The Grand Strategy of Philip II.* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); see also Hernando Sánchez: 'Non sufficit orbis?', pp. 29-77.

[35] On the interpretation of the painting, see Hernando Sánchez: 'Non sufficit orbis?', pp. 32-34.

[36] Augustín Jiménez Moreno: 'Las Órdenes Militares y la defensa de la Monarquía hispánica. Un proyecto de organización naval atlántica: el memorial de Ramón Ezquerra (1596)', in Enrique García Hernán & Davide Maffi (eds): *Guerra y Sociedad en la Monarquía Hispánica: Política, Estrategia y Cultura en la Europa Moderna (1500-1700)* vol. II *Ejército, economía, sociedad y cultura* (Madrid: Laberinto, 2006), pp. 700-705.

[37] Geoffrey Parker: *The Army of Flanders and the Spanish road, 1567-1659: the logistics of Spanish victory and defeat in the Low Countries' wars* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

[38] N. M. Sutherland: 'The Origins of the Thirty Years' War and the Structure of European Politics', in *The English Historical Review* Vol. 107, No. 424 (Jul.. 1992), pp. 587-625

[39] *Actas de las Cortes de Castilla,* Vol. III (Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1863), pp. 16-24.

[40] Geoffrey Parker: *Imprudent King: A New Life of Philip II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), pp. 237-350.

[41] Quoted in David Loades: *England's Maritime Empire : Seapower, Commerce and Policy, 1490-1690* (Harlow: Longman 2000), p. 86.

[42] Parker: *Imprudent King,* p. 237-246.

[43] Sir John Boroughs: *The Soveraignty of the British Seas, proved by Records, History, and the Municipall Lawes of this Kingdome, written in the yeare 1633* (London: Humphrey Moseley, 1651), p.80.

[44] Parker: *Imprudent King,* pp.271-273.

[45] Ibid., pp. 273, 280

[46] Parker: *Grand Strategy of Philip II*, pp.179-268

[47] In the tradition of the Roman general Fabius Maximus, nicknamed *Cunctator*

[48] Robert Lacey: *Robert Earl of Essex: an Elizabethan Icarus* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1971), p. 148.

[49] Parker: *Grand Strategy of Philip II*, pp. 86, 161, 172.

[50] Parker: *Imprudent King,* p. 307.

[51] *Actas de las Cortes de Castilla,* Vol. X (Madrid: Los Hijos de J.A. García, 1886), p.244f.

[52] Ibid., p. 253.

[53] Parker: *Imprudent King,* p.311.

[54] D. Bernardino de Mendoza: *Teórica y práctica de la guerra* (Madrid. Pedro Madrigal, 1595; repr.. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 1998), p. 128; trans. Sir Edwarde Hoby. *Theorique and practise of warre* (Middelburg: Richard Schilders, 1597), p. 148.

[55] Enrique García Hernan: *Ireland and Spain in the reign of Philip II* (Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2009). These relations did not prevent the notorious massacres by the Irish of survivors of the 1588 Armada when those were shipwrecked on Irish beaches on their way back to Spain.

[56] Hernando Sánchez: 'Non sufficit orbis?', p. 64.

[57] Parker: *Grand Strategy of Philip II*, pp. 111-114.

[58] Ibid., pp. 281-296

[59] Davide Maffi: 'El reducto desdeñado. el ejército de Flandes y la monarquía de Carlos II (1665-1700)', in Enrique García Hernán & Davide Maffi (eds.): *War and Society in the Spanish Monarchy: Politics, Strategy and Culture in Early Modern Europe, 1500-1700* (Valencia: Albaros, 2016), Vol. 2, pp. 277-300.

[60] Significantly, all three of them would be given military as well as diplomatic missions.

[61] For a discussion of these war aims, albeit not of strategy, see Peter Wilson: 'Habsburg Imperial Strategy during the Thirty years War' in García Hernán & Maffi (eds.): *War and Society in the Spanish Monarchy*, Vol. 1, pp. 245-267.

[62] Excerpts from his works in English translation can be found in Beatrice Heuser (trs. & ed): *The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz* (Santa Monica, CA: ABC Clio for Praeger, 2010), chapter 6.

[63] Hervé Drévillon: 'Vauban stratège', in Jean Baechler and Jean-Vincent Holeindre (eds): Penseurs de la Stratégie (Paris: Hermann, 2014), pp. 99-110.

[64] John Lynn: *The Wars of Louis XIV, 1667-1714* (Harlow: Pearson Education, 1999), p. 50. See also David Parrott: *The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[65] Lynn: *Wars of Louis XIV,* p.19f.

[66] Jean-Philippe Cénat: *Le roi stratège : Louis XIV et la direction de la guerre, 1661-1715* (Rennes: Presses Universitaires, 2010), pp. 274, 293.

[67] M. Mignet (ed.): *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne sous Louis XIV,* Vol. I (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1835), pp. 414-416.

[68] *Mémoires de Louis XIV,* quoted in Mignet (ed.): *Négociations relatives à la succession d'Espagne*, Vol. I, pp. 425-427.

[69] Guy Rowlands: 'Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II and French Military Failure in Italy, 1689-96', *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 115, No. 462 (Jun., 2000), pp. 534-569.

[70] Bertrand Fonck & George Satterfield: 'The Essence of War: French Armies and Small War in the Low Countries (1672-97)', in *Small Wars and Insurgencies* Vol. 25 No. 4 (August 2014), pp. 767-783.

[71] Cénat: *Le roi stratège,* pp. 285-287.

[72] Ibid., pp. 287-293.

[73] Rowlands: 'Louis XIV, Vittorio Amedeo II'.

[74] Cénat: *Le roi stratège*, pp. 257-264, 297.

[75] Lynn: *The Wars of Louis XIV*, pp. 17-46.

[76] Cénat: *Le roi stratège,* pp.299-377.

[77] Hervé Drévillon : *L'impot du Sang* (Paris: Eds Tallandier, 2006).

[78] « Nec pluribus impar »

[79] François Bluche: *Louis XIV* (Paris: Fayard, 1986), p. 890 (my translation).

[80] Lynn: *The Wars of Louis XIV*, p. 350.