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Explaining the Level of Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency Campaigns Abroad: A Typological Model.

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Declaration of original authorship: I, Fausto Scarinzi, confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

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Abstract: What shapes the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad? While practitioners do not explicitly address this important question, political scientists produced competing explanations pointing to independent variables like regime type, military organizational interests, military culture, force structure affecting intelligence collection, the image of the enemy, and the military threat posed by insurgents. After assessing the explanatory power of current scholarly explanations, in this work I build a typological model that can account for spatial and temporal variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency abroad. My model includes two causal factors: the external threat environment as perceived by the incumbent state and the local alliance strategy of the incumbent itself. Since each of my causal factors can assume two values, my model includes four possible combinations of independent variable values. Each combination – or type – is a scenario in which the incumbent is likely to use a specific level of indiscriminate violence by way of a specific causal logic. As a result, my work does not produce an overarching explanation indistinctly applicable to the whole population of cases; indeed, my model includes as many explanations and causal pathways as the number of types; each type can only explain a group of cases in the population. In this way, my typological model acknowledges the complexity of a phenomenon like civilian targeting, while still allowing for contingent generalizations. On the empirical level, I show and test my model against competing arguments by studying four cases: British counterinsurgency in Kenya and Cyprus, French counterinsurgency in Algeria, and German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (SWA). I conclude by highlighting the policy prescriptions stemming from my model.

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INTRODUCTION

Small Wars, Guerrilla, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, and Civilian Targeting

A quick glance at the history of the modern system of states is enough to note that the invasion, occupation, and conquest of foreign territories have been frequent occurrences in international politics (Edelstein 2008; Lieberman 1998; Mearsheimer 2001). The occupation of territories abroad can serve different political purposes. Firstly, a state may seek to colonize and exploit an occupied territory. By the end of the nineteenth century, for example, most states in Western Europe, including small powers like Belgium and Portugal, had colonial empires in Africa and Asia and they would retain those territories until the second half of the twentieth century. Occupation can also be a temporary retributive measure aimed to enforce the putative rights of the occupying power. The Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr in 1923 is an example. Occupations, however, have often had a long-term security goal. A state or a group of states may decide to occupy another country in an attempt to build a friendly regime and possibly include it into its sphere of influence in an attempt to reduce the risk of future military conflicts with the occupied state. The Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe as well as the U.S. occupation of Japan in the aftermath of the Second World War stands out as examples; the occupation of Afghanistan and Iraq by the United States and its allies would fall under the same category.

Regardless of its goal, the control of territories abroad remains a highly risky enterprise. Indeed, the presence of foreign troops in another territory may spark organized resistance by the local population (see Edelstein 2008). When resistance takes the form of an insurgency, the incumbent may respond by waging a counterinsurgency campaign in order to protect its political goals.

The struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents is a type of ‘small war’. The term ‘small wars’ began to appear frequently in the eighteenth century’ treatises on war and originally connoted special operations – sabotage, harassment of the enemy’s troops, reconnaissance, intelligence-gathering missions etc. – carried out by small light units – either regular or irregular – in support of regular troops in the context of conventional warfare; between the late eighteenth and the early nineteenth century, in the wake of the American and French revolutions as well as the Napoleonic wars, the

term ‘small wars’ would also come to be referred to the violent resistance of a population against the regular forces of an occupying power or a government perceived as oppressive (Heuser 2014). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, the semantic scope of the term had further expanded. In one of the broadest studies on small wars of that time, British Army officer Charles Callwell would refer the concept of ‘small war’ to “all campaigns other than those where the opposing sides consist of regular troops” (Callwell 1906: 21). The term would have “no particular connection with the scale on which any campaign may be carried out” and could indicate “all operations of regular armies against irregular or, comparatively speaking irregular, forces” (Callwell 1906: 21). Such a broad understanding of ‘small wars’ arguably mirrored Callwell’s effort to analyze the wide range of conflicts that Britain had faced – and was expected to face again – to expand and preserve its worldwide empire.[1] The concern to preserve a sphere of influence beyond national borders is also evident in the Small Wars Manual of the United States Marines Corp (USMC) which explicitly linked ‘small wars’ to “the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine” (1940: 2) after defining this kind of wars as “operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our Nation” (1940: 1).

The officers that endeavoured to understand the phenomenon of small wars in the twentieth century acknowledged the potential ambiguity of a term that could apply to any type of force employment “from simple demonstrative operations to military intervention in the fullest sense, short of war” and admitted that it would be extremely difficult to segregate small wars into “fixed classifications” (USMC Small Wars Manual 1940: 1). Yet, practitioners agreed that the concept of ‘small wars’ would include some specific classes of conflicts like punitive expeditions to avenge a perceived offence, military interventions aiming to protect citizens living abroad or topple a hostile government, and – importantly – the suppression of lawlessness and insurgencies abroad (Callwell 1906: 22, 25-28; USMC Small Wars Manual 1940: 1-4).

In fact, the association between ‘insurgency’ and the concept of ‘small war’ had been acknowledged to such an extent that the Spanish term for ‘small war’ – *la guerrilla*, used for the Spanish resistance against Napoleon’s occupying forces during the Peninsular War – had become fully accepted as synonym for ‘insurgency’, even if that

[1]The concern with the protection of the empire is also present in the work of other British officers that would focus on the Amy’s police duties (See Gwynn 1939, II Edition).

was inaccurate on the semantic level (Heuser 2014). Since most scholars and practitioners routinely use the term 'guerrilla' as synonym for 'insurgency', I will do the same in this work.

Studies about insurgency and counterinsurgency further proliferated in the twentieth century. Some of the most prominent works were authored by Marxist revolutionaries (see especially 'Che' Guevara 1998; Mao Tse-Tung 1965a, 1965b, 2000) and military officers that had been involved in the repression of communist and nationalist insurgencies[2] especially during decolonization conflicts (see Galula 1964; Kitson 1971; Thompson 1966; Trinquier 1964).

Some authors, like David Galula (1964: 3-4), maintain that the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents would always be an internal conflict or civil war because the insurgent would invariably try to seize power from a local government. The understanding of insurgency and counterinsurgency as a civil war is perplexing as it rests on the implicit assumption that the local government will always play the role of counterinsurgent. Such an assumption is dubious. Indeed, while the local government is invariably one of the targets of insurgents' violence, it is not always the counterinsurgent. In fact, the local government may be controlled or protected by an external power that is responsible for planning the counterinsurgency campaign and fighting insurgents; under those circumstances, the struggle between insurgents and counterinsurgents cannot be classified as an internal conflict or civil war because insurgents would be fighting against an external power rather than an independent local government. For example, during the decolonization conflicts of the Cold War period insurgents fought against colonial governments that simply represented external powers that had conquered and permanently occupied the insurgent territories. Other examples would include campaigns in territories under temporary occupation. The counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam was led by an external power – the United States – that would make the military strategy against the insurgents and deploy over half a million soldiers to combat against the Vietnamese guerrilla in addition to protecting the fragile local government of South Vietnam. Likewise, the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan played a minor role in the campaign against insurgents during the Soviet occupation of the country; the actual counterinsugent was an external power – the Soviet Union – that controlled the local government of Afghanistan and committed its own armed forces against the rebels. Finally, the recent U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq would suggest similar conclusions: the United

[2] Their works will be further considered in the next paragraphs of this chapter and in Chapter 1 as well.

States and its allies were planning and conducting the counterinsurgency campaign, while the corresponding local governments played a relatively minor role. In sum, while it is correct to identify the local government with the counterinsurgent in some cases that would actually count as civil wars, it is inaccurate to do so in other cases like the ones mentioned above. As a result, it is necessary to find a definition of insurgency and counterinsurgency that can also include situations in which the local government is a target of insurgents' violence, but not the actual counterinsurgent.

A comprehensive definition of the concept of insurgency can be found in the recent *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (FM 3-24 2006). While the *Field Manual* was influenced by the above-mentioned authors, including Galula, it does not strictly tie the concept of insurgency to the category of civil wars. The *Field Manual* defines the concept of 'insurgency' as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict" (FM 3-24 2006: 1); importantly, the *Field Manual* specifies that an insurgency would be "an organized protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, *occupying power*, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control" (FM 3-24 2006: 1). Counterinsurgency, therefore, can be defined as "military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat an insurgency" (FM 3-24 2006: 1). Since the *Field Manual* considers that an insurgency can be aimed not only against a local government but also against an occupying power, its conceptual apparatus is fit to address both counterinsurgency in civil wars and counterinsurgency abroad or expeditionary counterinsurgency.

My work is about civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad. By 'civilian targeting' I mean a state sanctioned military strategy based on the intentional use of indiscriminate violence and coercion by the incumbent against the freedom, property, and life of non-combatants in an attempt to defeat an insurgency[3]. According to this definition, measures like curfews, cordon-and-search operations, collective fines, punitive confiscations, mass screening, mass arrests, property destruction, mass deportation, summary executions, indiscriminate bombing, torture and mass killing all qualify as civilian targeting.[4]

As I focus on counterinsurgency campaigns abroad, I only look at conflicts that the incumbent state is fighting outside its national borders. My work, therefore, leaves out

[3] In this work I will use the expressions 'civilian victimization', 'indiscriminate violence' and 'barbarism' as equivalent to 'civilian targeting'.
[4] As we shall see, these measures are associated with different levels of civilian targeting in my model.

counterinsurgency campaigns in which a government is fighting against its own citizens within its own national borders during civil wars.[5] Counterinsurgency abroad can be studied separately from counterinsurgency during civil wars within the incumbent state's borders. Indeed, insurgencies in civil wars threaten the survival of the incumbent state directly as they may result in the territorial partition of the incumbent, the destruction of the incumbent's political regime, and the killing or execution of the incumbent state's rulers. Consequently, barbarism in counterinsurgency during civil wars can plausibly be understood as a function of the threat posed by insurgents: the greater that threat, the more likely the incumbent to target civilians.[6] The insurgencies that a state is fighting outside its national territory, instead, do not pose an existential threat to the incumbent; therefore – as I show in this work – civilian targeting in anti-guerrilla campaigns abroad can hardly be understood as a function of insurgents' military power and should be explained differently.[7]

It should also be clarified that I focus on instances of civilian targeting happening in areas where the incumbent is not involved in a conventional war; consequently, my work will leave out cases of counterinsurgency campaigns mostly aimed to support conventional military operations during an interstate conflict, like the Nazi anti-partisan campaign in the Soviet Union. However, my arguments would still apply to counterinsurgency campaigns which take place when conventional military operations have ceased completely, like the British counterinsurgency campaign against the Boers in South Africa.

Finally, it is important to stress that my work does not relate to the effectiveness of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. Otherwise said, I am not exploring the conditions under which indiscriminate violence contributes to victory or defeat in counterinsurgency. Rather, I am interested in the conditions that extenuate or magnify the willingness of the incumbent state to victimize non-combatants.

One may be perplexed about my decision to separate the issue of the effectiveness of civilian targeting from the issue of the fate of non-combatants in counterinsurgency. Indeed, one may object that the decision to target civilians may depend on the perceived effectiveness of indiscriminate violence. Specifically, one may surmise that states will escalate the level of civilian targeting when decision-makers believe that indiscriminate violence will defeat insurgents; otherwise, they will be self-restrained. While this

[5] For an influential study that focuses on civil wars see Kalyvas (2006). Kalyvas, however, is mostly interested in selective violence rather than indiscriminate violence.
[6] For an article that makes this argument see Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004).
[7] Galula's work on counterinsurgency does not lend itself to grasp this difference because Galula insists that an insurgency is always a civil war (see above).

argument is apparently compelling on the logical level, empirical evidence does not clearly support it. As I show in this work, states have often targeted civilians despite their perception that indiscriminate violence would be ineffective, if not counterproductive, on the military level. Besides, states have been self-restrained in cases in which it became clear to decision-makers that self-restraint would not lead to victory and vice versa. For example, as Jonathan Caverley (2009/10) explains (see below: 41), the United States stuck to a civilian targeting strategy in Vietnam even if both political and military leaders were aware that an indiscriminate and capital-intensive strategy would be inefficient and unlikely to defeat the Vietnamese insurgency. Likewise, the British colonial government in Kenya resorted to measures that would plunge Kikuyu women and children into famine in the early phase of the campaign, even if it was clear to the Governor that mass evictions and the ensuing starvation would compel the local population to join the insurgent's ranks and strengthen Mau Mau's popular base (see below: 100-101). In Cyprus, the British authorities did not deport the hostile Greek population to concentration camps, even if such a measure would destroy EOKA insurgents once and for all (see below: 149). Similarly, Britain never relied on a civilian victimization strategy in Palestine against Zionist insurgents, even if it became clear that self-restraint would not be rewarded by success: indeed, Britain eventually suffered a humiliating defeat but never repudiated self-restraint during the conflict. Finally, during their campaign in South-West Africa, the Germans escalated indiscriminate violence against the Herero insurgents to a genocidal level, even if extreme brutality was unnecessary to defeat an opponent that in fact had ceased to fight almost completely (see below: 48-50, 221-228). In sum, it is not clear at all that the perceived effectiveness of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency will lead to its actual use and vice versa; therefore, the two issues can be addressed separately. In this work, I focus on the causes behind variations of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency, rather than the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence.

This having been said, we can now have a deeper look into the reasons why civilians are a *potential* target in counterinsurgency, before introducing the specific research questions of this work.

Population Control and Civilians as a Potential Target in Counterinsurgency

Counterinsurgency inevitably entails a certain degree of potential coercion and violence against civilians. That depends on the nature of the conflict between insurgents and

counterinsurgents as a struggle over population control that involves completely different types of actors. Indeed, this kind of conflict usually pits relatively small and irregular fighting groups – the insurgent – against the government of a state – the counterinsurgent or incumbent – that can deploy police units and conventional military forces;[8] each side claims the exclusive right to rule or determine the government of a given territory and its population (Galula 1964: 5-7; Trinquier 1964: 8).

The literature on guerrilla warfare spots two ideal types of insurgency: the Marxist pattern – based on the works of Mao Tse-Tung (1965a, 1965b, 2000) about the long struggle of the Chinese Communist Party against Japan and the Kuomintang – and the nationalist or non-Marxist pattern (Galula 1964: Ch. 3). Both patterns stress the vital importance to secure population control for political and military reasons. Indeed, without population control the actors involved in the conflict would be unable to establish, or maintain, their political rule. Besides, without population control the rival sides could hardly destroy the military power of the opponent.

In the orthodox Marxist pattern of insurgency firstly it is essential to create a political party that can promote the revolutionary cause of the insurgent among the people; before resorting to violence, therefore, insurgents may try to seize power legally by establishing political organizations that may even share power with their rivals temporarily; at the same time, insurgents may create a clandestine subversive organization that engages in agitation and propaganda to assist the party in the process of building a political movement with a popular base, thus preparing for an insurgency (Galula 1964: 33-36; Trinquier 1964: 28). While the use of force would be excluded as long as the population supports the rival government, a change in this condition – as perceived by the insurgent itself – will result in an insurgency if power cannot be seized legally (Galula 1964: 36).

Being the weaker side, initially the insurgent will simply try to survive and avoid a direct military confrontation with their conventional opponents. On the tactical level, insurgents will rely on short low-intensity surprise attacks conceived to inflict relatively few military casualties on the adversary and limit the exposure of insurgents to the superior firepower of the enemy (Che Guevara 1998: 18-25; Mao Tse-Tung 1965b: 83-84); in this way, insurgents make it impossible for a conventional army to use its combat power and achieve a decisive victory.

Marxist revolutionaries, however, were clear that an uprising with irregular forces

[8] As explained above, the actual counterinsurgent can be either the local government – when it is actually independent – or an occupying power. I focus on cases in which the counterinsurgent is an external power.

would not be enough to achieve a complete military victory against the conventional forces of the enemy: final victory required the creation of a regular army (Mao Tse-Tung 1965b: 85; 2000: 41-42, 55-56; 'Che' Guevara 1998: 13). War with irregular forces, therefore, was seen as a temporary condition imposed on the insurgent by its own initial military weakness (Mao Tse-Tung 1965a: 241; 2000: 42); it was simply a defensive stage of a wider 'displacement strategy' (Kilcullen 2009: 52) aiming to create a parallel insurgent state that would eventually begin its offensive after building its own conventional forces.

Following an orthodox Marxist pattern, the insurgent would infiltrate areas where the opponent's territorial control is limited, suppress the weak local authorities, build a parallel revolutionary government and administration, win over the local population and eliminate hostile individuals and groups, expand into other areas and proceed in the same way in order to increase its ranks and eventually create a regular army that would gradually face the enemy in conventional military operations (Mao Tse-Tung 1965b; see also Galula 1964: 36-43).

Some Marxist revolutionaries and thinkers – especially Ernesto 'Che Guevara and Régis Debray – would later develop, apply and popularize a variation to the orthodox revolutionary pattern known as 'Foco Theory' or 'Focoism', according to which it would not be necessary for the insurgent to wait until all the conditions for an insurgency are in place – e.g. political preparation of the masses, a decline in government's political legitimacy – as the violent struggle of a revolutionary vanguard can create those conditions (Beckett 2001: 170). Foco theory reverses the first two stages of the orthodox Marxist pattern: while the latter creates a mass political movement as a first necessary step to support a violent insurgency at a later stage, Foco theory advocates the use of demonstrative violence to catalyze the existing grievances of the people against the government and create a revolutionary movement that will further grow into a full-scale insurgency with a vast popular base (see especially Debray 1967). Specifically, the insurgent should deploy small roving irregular bands of fighters – the revolutionary vanguard – in areas where people's discontent about the government has not turned into violent rebellion yet; the insurgent's vanguards should harass the enemy to provoke the counterinsurgent to use indiscriminate repression against the population; that, in turn, would demonstrate the oppressive nature of the opponent, alienate the local population from the counterinsurgent, and expand the popular base of the insurgent; in this way, the struggle of roving bands would serve as a focus – 'Foco', in Spanish – for the local population to join the insurgent's cause and eventually rise

against the counterinsurgent[9] (Beckett 2001: 170-171).

Marxist Foco theory stemmed from the concern that non-Marxist regimes could preserve a sufficient level of popular consent and indefinitely delay the beginning of a revolution by simply avoiding overt violence against the people (Laqueur 1998: 330), hence the perceived need to provoke the opponent to use indiscriminate repression.[10]

The use of force to create a popular base and start an insurgency was not confined to Marxist Foco theory.[11] In fact, insurgencies following a nationalist pattern relied on similar methods (see below). In this path, volent attacks against the government would be used in the first place to get public attention for the cause of the insurgent and attract supporters; after that, the insurgent would resort to selective violence against unsupportive individuals in the civilian population and low-ranking government officials that have frequent contacts with the local population; in this way, the insurgent would isolate the counterinsurgent from the population and would force the latter at least into passive complicity out of fear of reprisals; finally, the population can be mobilized with persuasive methods to create a mass movement hostile to the counterinsurgent[12] (Galula 1964: 43-44; Trinquier 1964: Ch. 4).

If popular support is important to build a political movement and start an insurgency, once the struggle has begun it is equally important to maintain population control. Regardless of the specific path it follows, an insurgency is likely to be a protracted struggle. Being the weaker side and lacking a regular army, the insurgent simply cannot achieve a quick decisive victory over the conventional forces of the counterinsurgent. Indeed, it takes time and resources for insurgent leaders "to organize a revolutionary movement, raise and develop armed forces, reach a balance with the opponent, and overpower him" (Galula 1964: 8).

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[9] It should be observed that Marxist Foco theory does not disdain the creation of a regular army after the general uprising had begun. Focoism simply aimed to spark an insurgency more quickly than the orthodox Marxist path, but it did not aim to achieve victory with irregular forces alone (Beckett 2001: 170-171).

[10] While Guevara and Debray believed that the insurgent's foco should be deployed in rural areas, other Marxist supporters of Foco theory, like Carlos Marighella, proposed that demonstrative violence in urban areas would be more likely to spark an overreaction and catalyze people's grievances. See Marighella (1982: 110-112).

[11] Despite its failure in Latin America, Foco theory is still applied. The Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, for example, reflected the basic logic of Foco (Kilcullen 2009: 86).

[12] It should be observed that most nationalist insurgencies did not aim to build a regular army to destroy the conventional forces of the opponent. In fact, several nationalist insurgencies pursued victory by forcing the enemy to fight indefinitely against elusive irregular forces, sap its resources and erode its political will to fight. Examples would include – but would not be limited to - the Zionist insurgency in Palestine against Britain, the Greek nationalist insurgency in Cyprus against Britain, the F.L.N insurgency in Algeria, and the recent insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq (Kilcullen 2009). An exhaustion strategy is as time-consuming as a displacement strategy and requires tight population control.

While the counterinsurgent can rely on a modern state bureaucratic machinery to secure the resources it needs to fight a protracted war, insurgents do not have such an opportunity and will depend on the cooperation and support of the local population to get essential assets like manpower, shelter, and intelligence about the enemy. Population support is essential not only for material assets, but also for concealment (‘Che’ Guevara 1998: 16-17). Indeed, one of the reasons why guerrilla is difficult to defeat is that irregular fighters can make themselves invisible by mingling with the local population before and after an attack, which prevents the counterinsurgent from spotting and destroying the opponent (Galula 1964: 37; Trinquier 1964: 19; Mao Tse-Tung 2000: 93).

As long as insurgents receive support from the civilian population counterinsurgents will have to cut the link between rebels and non-combatants (Galula 1964: 55-56; FM 3-24: 23). The incumbent state can attempt to do so through political alienation strategies. The counterinsurgent can use means like civic action measures and propaganda to improve the conditions of living of the local population, gain respect and trust, and persuade civilians to side with counterinsurgents (Valentino 2004: 205-206).

However, peaceful alienation strategies and non-military means may not be enough to deprive insurgents of their popular base. Indeed insurgents, especially when supported by a political party or any other kind of political organization, can persuade a part of the local population to cooperate by showing the moral superiority of their ideology. Besides, when persuasion is unsuccessful, insurgents can resort to terror tactics against uncommitted or hostile groups and force them to cooperate. Consequently, in addition to trust-winning measures, counterinsurgents may also need coercive measures like counter-terror, deportation, and property destruction in order to deter the local population from supporting insurgents and deprive guerrillas of the assets they need (Valentino 2004: 200-205).

In sum, civilian targeting is always a *potential* part of counterinsurgency because both sides need population control and that cannot always be established just by way of persuasion.

One may object that my account of the reasons why civilians are a potential target of violence may be outdated because, in the globalized and interconnected world that followed the end of the Cold War, population control would no longer be as indispensable as it used to be. Some authors (Mackinley 2009) contend that insurgents no longer depend on the local population to secure the assets they need to fight; in a globalised world insurgents can plunder the resources of collapsed states and exploit

transnational criminal networks to outsource most of their assets; besides, insurgents could use social networks and global media to mobilize a wider supportive audience – like diasporas of immigrants – located far away from the battlefield: in this way insurgents could not only secure a constant supply of assets and fighters, but they could also spur diaspora groups to perpetrate terrorist attacks against their governments to force the latter to modify their policy in ways that would favour the insurgent (Mackinlay 2009).

Such an argument is insightful but fails to prove that the control over the local population is no longer essential. In fact, it is still crucial. Firstly, just like the insurgents of the Cold War era, even insurgents that can mobilize a wider audience aim to seize political power and rule a specific territory; therefore, control over a local population is still indispensable, even if that population may have become less relevant as a pool of material assets. For example, the Islamic State (IS) can outsource most of its assets but still imposes its taxes and its regulations – more or less formally – over the local population to show and exercise political power. Secondly, while insurgents may be able to outsource most of their material assets, they can never outsource the main asset behind a crucial element of guerrilla warfare like concealment: that asset is simply a civilian crowd that can be physically present on the battlefield when insurgents encounter their conventional opponents. Insurgents can elude or even neutralize the superior firepower of the enemy by mingling with a supportive population in the area where they fight, which is why the control of the local population is still essential.

The U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq shows not only the persisting relevance of concealment in guerrilla warfare, but also the enduring importance of controlling the local population for successful concealment even in the post-Cold War world. Specifically, the reason why Sunni insurgents were able to halt the U.S. offensive during the First Battle of Fallujah is that the insurgent gangs successfully mingled with a supportive population that perceived the occupation of their country as a national humiliation (Malkasian 2007: 166-168, 171). In spite of their military superiority, the U.S. forces were faced with the risk of harming a great number of civilians and lose the already precarious support of all the other sections of the Iraqi society. Insurgents exploited concealment with a sympathetic population that was physically present on the battlefield to neutralize the U.S. superiority in a major battle and scored a clear political victory against their opponent (Malkasian 2007: 171, 174, 176-182). If the local population of Fallujah had been hostile to the Sunni guerrilla and had cooperated with

the U.S. instead of providing concealment for insurgent fighters, the rebels could have hardly thwarted the U.S. offensive.

Besides, the U.S. campaign in Iraq would also suggest that even insurgents that can mobilize supportive diasporas will face devastating consequences if they fail to maintain control over the local population in the insurgent territory. This is shown by the success of the Surge in Iraq. As Stephen Biddle et al. (2012) explain, the Surge succeeded because of an interaction effect between the increase in the number of troops using new tactics and the rebellion of the Sunni tribes against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), known as the Anbar Awakening. The Anbar Awakening weakened the grip of the insurgents over the local population, thinned insurgents' ranks, and provided U.S. troops with valuable information about insurgents' location; at the same time, the increase in the number of troops provided the Sunni tribes with safer conditions for their rebellion against AQI to start (Biddle et al. 2010: 22-36). The loss of control over the Sunni tribes and the Surge seriously affected AQI. Facing an increasingly hostile local population and a renewed effort from the U.S. troops, insurgents found it more difficult to operate and lost momentum.

In conclusion, it must be maintained that population control is an enduring imperative for the insurgent and the counterinsurgent in guerrilla warfare and such an imperative exposes noncombatants to the risk of being victimized. Yet, this does not mean that civilians will be inevitably and invariably victimized in actual fact. The urge to gain population control is constant, whereas civilian targeting is not. In the next section we will briefly consider the issue of variations in the extent of civilian targeting and pose the research questions of this work.

Research Questions: Addressing Variations in the Level of Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency

While civilians are always a *potential* target of violence, in actual fact counterinsurgency campaigns abroad show both diachronic (or temporal) and synchronic (or spatial) variations in the use of civilian targeting. We can see that the same states involved in different counterinsurgency campaigns over the course of decades relied on different levels of indiscriminate violence. For example, the recent counterinsurgency campaigns of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan show a considerably higher degree of self-restraint in dealing with civilians than the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam. Indeed, the United States tried to defeat

insurgents in South Vietnam by establishing 'free fire zones' and resorting to mass deportation, property destruction, and indiscriminate bombing; in Iraq, instead, not only did the U.S. armed forces keep from deliberate violence against non-combatants but they also limited the use of weaponry that could have caused civilian deaths accidentally (Kahl 2007: 14-23). Interestingly, we can also observe other cases where the same state involved in different counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time (or almost in a row) used different levels of indiscriminate violence in each campaign. British counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya (1952-1960) was considerably more taxing and brutal to civilians than the British campaign against the Greek insurgents in Cyprus (1955-1959). While using torture, indiscriminate shootings, scorched earth, mass deportations and property destruction in Kenya, the British avoided those methods in the campaign they were fighting in Cyprus at the same time. Likewise, the Germans relied massively on indiscriminate violence to defeat the Maji-Maji insurrection in East Africa (1905-1907), but during that conflict they never displayed the genocidal intention that they officially set out in their campaign in South-West Africa (1904-1907) (see Dedering 1999b).

This leads me to the main questions of my research:

- What shapes the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad?
- What explains spatial (or synchronic) and temporal (or diachronic) variations in the use of violence against civilians in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad?

Understanding the conditions under which violence against civilians is extenuated or magnified in counterinsurgency may benefit a vast audience, including government officials, humanitarian agencies, and international organizations committed to the protection of human rights. In order to work out their own strategies about how to accomplish that task and restrain counterinsurgents, those actors need an intellectual framework accounting for the factors influencing the extent of indiscriminate violence.

As we shall see in the next chapter, practitioners did not deal with civilian targeting as a dependent variable. Practitioners were mostly concerned with the effectiveness and consequences of civilian victimization rather than its causes, which is why they did not develop any systematic argument that can help us explain and predict variations in the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. As a result, policy advice about the task to relieve noncombatants can hardly come from practitioners' works: indeed, practitioners prescribe that civilian targeting should be avoided because it would be self-defeating (see below), but they never explain what should be done to protect civilians

once the counterinsurgent has deliberately ignored that kind of prescription[13]. Political scientists, instead, have addressed civilian targeting in counterinsurgency as a phenomenon to be explained in its own right. Yet, as we shall see, they provided unconvincing answers. Consequently, in this work I build a new typological model that is fit to explain and predict spatial and temporal variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency; such a model can also help policy-makers interested in the protection of civilians in wartime to understand the potential options and challenges they are likely to face under different circumstances to achieve their goals (see Conclusions). My work, therefore, can be clearly situated in respect to the broader counterinsurgency literature: indeed, my work fills a gap in the literature created by practitioners' relative silence on the causes of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency and political scientists' unconvincing explanations for variations in the extent of indiscriminate violence. In sum, my work asks questions practitioners left aside and gives answers that challenge political scientists' scholarship while assisting policy-makers interested in the relief of civilians.

Introducing my Answer

My typological model is based on the insight that counterinsurgency campaigns inevitably take place in two inevitable contexts: the international system of states and the society of the insurgent territory. Do those contexts have any influence on the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency? If so, how? In this work, I surmise that those contexts influence the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency by shaping leaders' willingness to accept the risks of civilian victimization. Indeed, civilian targeting entails serious drawbacks: indiscriminate violence can exacerbate the local population's resistance, which, in turn, can only strengthen insurgents' ability to fight; besides, the use of indiscriminate violence can provoke domestic unrest and resistance against violent methods used abroad; finally, civilian targeting strategies may spark the intervention of third-party states or group of states through economic or military sanctions. Yet, I suggest that the risks connected to the use of civilian targeting will keep a state from targeting civilians depending on the stimuli and incentives created by the above mentioned contexts.

Building on the basic argument of political psychologists about the importance of leaders' beliefs and perceptions as factors shaping the foreign and security policy of

[13] Practitioners' works, however, can be a source of advice to address the different issue of how to win.

states (see Jervis 1976; McDermott 2004), I suggest that two variables shape the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. The first one is the threat environment of the insurgent territory as perceived by the incumbent state. The concept of threat environment refers to the incumbent state's perception of the willingness and ability of other states to impose their hegemony over the insurgent territory at the expense of the incumbent itself. When the incumbent state's leaders believe – rightly or wrongly – that a hostile third-party state is willing and able to take advantage of unrest in the insurgent territory to include it into its own sphere of influence, then the external threat environment will be unfavourable; otherwise, the external threat environment will be favourable.

The second factor which can extenuate or magnify the level of indiscriminate violence is the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state during the counterinsurgency campaign. By 'local alliance strategy' I mean the association and cooperation policy of the incumbent state towards the different groups in the society of the insurgent territory. The incumbent may look for allies in the local society of the insurgent territory in order to consolidate its rule. When the government of the incumbent state is supporting – for any reason – a group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population, then its local alliance strategy is aligned; otherwise, it is neutral.

Importantly, I argue different levels of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency derive from different *combinations* of values on my independent variables. Since I have two independent variables and each variable has two possible values, there are four possible combinations of values on my candidate causal factors. Each combination corresponds to an ideal-type set of circumstances, or typological scenario, in which the incumbent state has specific incentives to discount (or consider) the potential risks of barbarism and resort to a specific degree of indiscriminate violence. Each scenario, therefore, has a specific outcome on the dependent variable – the level of civilian victimization – and a specific causal logic.

Before providing a preliminary description of the four scenarios in my model, it is convenient to specify that in my work I assign three values to the level of civilian targeting, which can be 'moderate', 'high', and 'extreme'. The level of civilian targeting is 'moderate' when the incumbent uses violence and coercion but without intent to undermine civilians' survival; it is 'high' when the incumbent kills civilians but without intent to commit extermination; it is extreme when the incumbent intentionally tries to

exterminate the civilian population.[14]

This having been said, in Scenario 1 the incumbent state perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable and its local alliance strategy is neutral. Under these circumstances, the incumbent is likely to use a high level of civilian targeting. The incumbent state would have incentives to ignore the risks of barbarism and escalate indiscriminate violence in pursuit of total victory: indeed, the destruction of insurgents would consolidate its control over the insurgent territory and deprive any third-party state of opportunities to interfere, thus protecting the incumbent's hegemony over the insurgent territory from external threats. Since insurgents depend on their popular base, complete victory would entail measures that undermine civilians' survival. So the incumbent can resort to practices like mass deportation, scorched-earth measures, summary executions, indiscriminate bombing, and torture among the other things. Importantly, under the circumstances of Scenario 1, the incumbent would not exterminate non-combatants because it is not supporting any group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population. Such a goal would require a further escalation of violence because a group marked for dispossession and enslavement can be expected to put up fierce resistance. As this objective is not pursued, however, the violence caused by the external threat environment is unlikely to be exacerbated any further.

In Scenario 2, the incumbent state's leaders believe that no other state is willing and able to incorporate the insurgent territory into its own sphere of influence, but the incumbent state is supporting a group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population. Under these circumstances the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency is likely to be the same as the first scenario, but for different reasons: political support for a would-be dominant group would induce the incumbent to dismiss the grievances behind the insurgency and believe that the only way to end the rebellion is by using relentless brutality. The level of violence required to help a would-be dominant group to dispossess and subdue the insurgent population has the potential to become extreme or genocidal but – importantly – under the conditions of the second scenario of my model, the incumbent does not perpetrate a genocide in actual fact. The reason behind the absence of genocidal violence is that the external threat environment is perceived as favourable, therefore the brutality caused by the local alliance strategy is unlikely to be further exacerbated by the perceived need to protect the incumbent's local hegemony from third-party states. Extreme violence may actually spark the intervention

[14] See Chapter 2 of this work for a detailed presentation of all my variables and the values they can assume.

of other states, which is why extermination would be undesirable when the external threat environment is seen as favourable: in other words, when no external threat is perceived, a genocide may create one and that is why the incumbent leaders would not pick that option.

However, according to my model, the leaders of the incumbent state are likely to resort to extreme violence in Scenario 3, that is a situation in which, in addition to perceiving an external threat against its hegemony over the insurgent territory, the incumbent is also supporting a would-be dominant group. In this scenario, civilian targeting is likely to become extreme because the local and international incentives to victimize civilians operate at the same time. Indeed, the goal to strip the insurgent group of all its resources and rights in favour of a would-be dominant group may induce the incumbent to see extermination as a plausible way to prevent or break the expected resistance of the victim group and make sure that the latter cannot recoup its losses in the future; at the same time, the incumbent will not be worried that extreme violence may induce other states to intervene with hostile measures because the external threat environment is already seen as unfavourable.

Finally, in Scenario 4 the incumbent perceives no external threat to the insurgent territory and is not aligned with any would-be dominant group, therefore the incumbent is likely to be the most self-restrained. Under those circumstances the incumbent is likely to see indiscriminate violence as an unnecessary risk and would use repressive measures that do not threaten civilians' lives like curfews, collective fines, punitive confiscations, demolition of houses, cordon-and-search operations, and mass arrests. Importantly, on the logical level, it is possible for a counterinsurgency campaign to be an instance of more than one scenario as long as the values of my independent variables display within-case variations; otherwise, the same case will be an example of no more than one scenario.

Dissertation Outline

The remainder of this work consists of seven chapters. In Chapter 1 I will review the literature on my subject. After considering the major works in the practitioner literature on counterinsurgency, I will address three schools of thought on the topic in the field of Political Science. The first one sees counterinsurgency strategy, including civilian targeting, as a result of the political and military characteristics of the incumbent state. This group of arguments point to factors like regime type, military organizational

interests, force structure and intelligence availability, and military culture as the mainspring of barbarism. The Second School of Thought suggests that civilian victimization in warfare is a function of the identity of the enemy as perceived by the perpetrators of violence. The Third School of Thought, instead, looks at civilian victimization as a product of the strategic calculations of the incumbent state about the military threat posed by insurgents. I will show that the three schools of thought mentioned above have serious logical and empirical flaws and an alternative model is needed.

Therefore, in Chapter 2 I will set out my typological model. I will define all my variables, specify their values, spot my typological scenarios and set out the predictions and causal mechanisms corresponding to each scenario; in particular, I will explain the reason why my study variable – the level of civilian targeting – assumes a specific value in each scenario and not others.

In Chapter 3 I will explain my methodological choices. I will use the case study method to show the plausibility of my model. I will study the cases of British counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960) and Cyprus (1955-1959); French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954-1962) and German counterinsurgency in South West Africa (1904-1907). I selected these cases because they display cross-case variation on the independent variables of my model;[15] moreover, my cases can be considered as easy tests – or most-likely cases – for most of the competing factors I address in my literature review.

In Chapters 4 to 7 I will study my cases. In Chapter 4 I will examine the case of British counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960), which is an example of Scenario 2 in my model. In Chapter 5 I will examine the case of British counterinsurgency in Cyprus. That case would be an example of Scenario 4 in my model. In Chapter 6 I will study the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria as an instance of Scenario 1 in my model. In Chapter 7 I will study the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (SWA) against the Herero and Nama uprising. Due to within-case variation on the values of one of my independent variables – local alliance strategy – this case displays a shift from Scenario 1 to Scenario 3 in my model.[16]

In the last part of this work, I will draw my conclusions highlighting the implications of my work for scholars and policy-makers.

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[15] As I shall explain, the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa also shows within-case variation on the values of one of my candidate causal factors.

[16] Specifically, from January 1904 to May 1904 this case would qualify as an example of Scenario 1. From June 1904 to March 1907 the case would be an example of Scenario 3.

CHAPTER 1

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter I will review the literature on civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. Firstly, I will look at practitioners' major works on counterinsurgency and I will show that they do not provide systematic explanations for variations in the level of indiscriminate violence. After that, I will assess the scholarly literature on the topic. I will present three schools of thought and spot the logical and empirical flaws in each of them. I will conclude that excessive parsimony in theory-making affected current theses of barbarism in counterinsurgency and I suggest that a typological model would be a valuable alternative.

1.1 The Practitioner Literature

Before looking at the way political scientists have explained variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency, one may wonder whether an answer to the research questions of this work may come from practitioners. In this paragraph I will argue that the practitioner literature does not provide an answer.

As mentioned above, practitioners have long studied small wars and counterinsurgency. Most of the major works in the practitioner literature have been authored by military officers that were directly involved in counterinsurgency campaigns in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Unsurprisingly, those officers were mostly interested in the issue of war outcome and how the counterinsurgent could achieve victory over the insurgent. These authors, therefore, did not address the use of civilian targeting as a dependent variable, or a phenomenon to be explained in its own right; they did not seek to develop a thesis about the conditions under which civilians are more likely to be victimized, nor did they specify or test any causal mechanism leading to a specific level of civilian targeting. Rather, they considered violence against civilians only to the extent that it could affect war outcome and assess whether the indiscriminate use of force could favour the victory of the counterinsurgent or not.

As a result, practitioners' arguments about the fate of civilians in counterinsurgency are neither explanatory nor predictive, but simply evaluative and prescriptive. Instead of explaining why states may prefer a specific level of violence and predicting what states are likely to do in the future under a specified set of circumstances, some practitioners tend to describe the practice of counterinsurgency in specific campaigns or operations (often based on personal experience, observations, and recollections), spot strengths and weaknesses in the performance of the counterinsurgent to evaluate whether it was effective or not, and finally focus on what states should do in order to win future campaigns on the basis of past experience as interpreted by the authors themselves (see Callwell 1906; Galula 2006; Gwynn 1939; Kilcullen 2009; Thompson 1966). Alternatively, instead of analyzing specific campaigns or operations, other practitioners rely on their personal experience and observations to speculate on the evolution of warfare and address how states should fight to achieve victory in future campaigns in the light of the perceived changes in the nature of war (Galula 1964; Kitson 1971; Trinquier 1964).

Overall, practitioners tend to coalesce around the prescription that counterinsurgents should refrain from violence against non-combatants because indiscriminate violence would alienate the local population thus undermining the counterinsurgent's chances to win,[17] even if such a prescription is more evident in some works (Gwynn 1939; Kilcullen 2009; Kitson 1971; Thompson 1966) than others (especially Trinquier 1964: 21-22, 28, 48).

The works of British officers usually emphasize the desirability of self-restraint in counterinsurgency, in spite of some occasional exceptions dating back to the early twentieth century (Callwell 1906: 125-149). Addressing the Army's role in restoring civil authority threatened by revolutionary and subversive movements, Charles Gwynn prescribes that "the amount of military force employed must be the minimum that the situation demands" (1939: 14). Such a prescription shows a certain degree of ambiguity stemming from the reference to the constraints of the specific situation: indeed, Gwynn's prescription as formulated above does not exclude that the specific situation may be such that the minimum level of force required would actually correspond to a high level of brutality. While Gwynn cannot eliminate such an ambiguity, he prescribes to avoid "drastic punitive measures" as they may "awaken sympathy with the

[17] Since my dissertation is not about the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence (see Introduction), I will not assess this type of claim. For a recent assessment of arguments about the effectiveness of civilian targeting see Hazelton (2017).

revolutionaries, and in the long run militate against the re-establishment of normal conditions" (1939: 14-15).

Other works written by British officers during the Cold War prescribe self-restraint even more forcefully stressing that the conflict between insurgents and counterinsurgents is all about good governance. In his classic study of British counterinsurgency in Malaya, Robert Thompson maintains that insurgencies derive from popular grievances, therefore counterinsurgents should address those grievances with economic and political reforms in order to weaken the insurgent's cause, win over the local population, and make intelligence gains that will enable the counterinsurgent to use force selectively (1966: 50-55, 112-113); indiscriminate violence and atrocities against civilians, instead, should be avoided as they would alienate the population (1966: 53-54). Other authors, like Frank Kitson, follow the logic of Thompson's argument and stress the role of intelligence collection to spot the enemy and their supporters in the local population and use force without harming civilians (1971: Ch. 6-7). The implicit assumption behind Kitson's emphasis on intelligence collection and selective violence is that indiscriminate violence is counterproductive.

The emphasis on selective violence is less prominent in the major works of French officers that developed their understanding of counterinsurgency based on their own personal experience in the First Indochina War and the Algerian War of Independence. David Galula, for example, admits that as long as civilians fear the insurgent, the counterinsurgent may have to impose its will on civilians by way of coercion, even if he insists that the population "must not be treated as an enemy" (1964: 84). Galula had already made this argument in his intellectual memoir of the Algerian War of Independence published for first time in 1963, but he tends to omit French deliberate atrocities against civilians[18] and – in spite of all historical evidence (see especially Branche 2016) – he is overly keen to dismiss allegations about the use of certain forms of civilian targeting – especially torture – as being "90 percent nonsense, 10 percent true" (2006: 183). Other authors, like Roger Trinquier (1964: 21-22), go so far as to

[18] For example, while Galula stresses that the FLN killed over a hundred civilians in the El Halia massacre, he does not mention that the French retaliated by killing at least 1,200 people indiscriminately in few days (2006: 12). Galula, instead, tends to give credit to the unsubstantiated claim made by French settlers that the French Communist and Christian press were on the side of insurgents and were guilty of treason for exaggerating news of French atrocities (2006: 12, 143). Galula also insists that people deported to concentration camps received educational and social provisions (2006: 185-186), but never considers abundant evidence to the contrary. Historical studies on the Algerian War of Independence used in Chapter 6 (see below: 190, 194, 196-197) completely contradict Galula's assertions. One is left wondering whether Galula's personal background as a settler in North Africa and his involvement in the French repression as an Army officer may have biased his recollections about the way France dealt with Arab civilians, as seems to be the case.

imply that the counterinsurgent could use torture against members of the insurgent's subversive organization to obtain intelligence. Trinquier does not consider that, before using torture on a prisoner, it may be impossible to be completely sure that the victim is actually a member of a subversive organization; in this way, torture would be used on the basis of mere suspicions.

Practitioners would rediscover the works of Galula and Trinquier in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001, the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the protracted insurgencies that followed from those conflicts. Yet, Trinquier's permissive approach to the issue of coercion and torture would be set aside. The attention of practitioners, instead, would focus again on the counterproductive effects of civilian targeting. The counterinsurgency doctrine of the United States formulated in 2006 explicitly and repeatedly prescribes self-restraint in dealing with civilians, while warning that civilian targeting would turn the local population against the counterinsurgent (FM 3-24: Ch. 1, 5). Such a prescription is reiterated in one of the most acclaimed analyses of the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq by David Kilcullen (2009). Kilcullen contends that external military interventions conceived to fight terrorist groups can actually turn the local population into a resistance movement; in fact, terrorist groups would commit atrocities to provoke an external intervention that will outrage the local population, foster armed resistance, and increase insurgent's popular base (Kilcullen 2009: 34-35, 86). While Kilcullen suggests that military interventions against terrorist groups should be avoided (2009: 267-268), he insists that when this is not possible the counterinsurgent should absolutely refrain from indiscriminate violence as it can only exacerbate the hostility of the local population.

Yet, the prescription that indiscriminate violence should be avoided because of its ineffectiveness leaves us with a question: if indiscriminate violence is counterproductive, why do states not refrain from civilian targeting all the time? Interestingly, even if one believes that most practitioners are wrong and civilian targeting is effective, we are left with a similar question: if indiscriminate violence is effective, why do states not target civilians all the time? Obviously, this is the same as asking what shapes variations in the level of civilian targeting, which is the research questions of this work. As a result of their focus on military effectiveness and war outcome, practitioners understand indiscriminate violence only as a deviation from a supposedly optimal course of action – self-restraint – but never explain why or under what conditions states may intentionally choose a supposedly sub-optimal option like civilian targeting, especially when decision-makers are fully aware that civilian

targeting may be counterproductive (see above). For example, practitioners could not explain why Britain decided to evict and starve civilians in the early phase of the Kenya Emergency (see above). Practitioners would condemn that measure as a mistake, but they cannot tell why Governor Baring – one of the key decision-makers – deliberately went for a counterproductive measure even if he was aware that mass evictions and starvation would increase insurgents' popular base. In sum, the practitioner literature does not explain variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency; practitioners' works only leave us with the questions.

If practitioners do not directly explain variations in the extent of civilian targeting, one may still try to use the practitioner literature as an explanatory factor in itself: one may argue that variations in the level of civilian targeting may depend on the willingness and ability of states to follow the practitioner literature's prescriptions about the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. In particular, one may surmise that when decision-makers are familiar with practitioners' works and are willing and able to follow practitioners' prescription that self-restraint should prevail because it would favour victory, then the level of indiscriminate violence may be low; otherwise, the counterinsurgent will be brutal towards civilians. Such an argument, however, would be a dubious explanation as it would imply again that states adopt the level of civilian targeting that seems to be the most effective against insurgents. This may be accurate in some cases or some phases of a campaign, but – as we have seen in the Introduction – counterinsurgents may often choose and stick to a specific military strategy even if they are aware that it is not effective or not necessary to defeat insurgents (see above). Variations in state behaviour should be explained otherwise, then.

In conclusion, the practitioner literature can be very useful to define some concepts that are relevant to my topic (see Introduction), but it does not address or answer the research questions of this work. Political scientists, instead, have addressed the causes of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. In the remainder of this chapter I will assess their theses.

1.2 The Level of Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency: Three Schools of Thought

Like the practitioner literature, several academic works on civilian targeting in counterinsurgency tend to focus on the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence

(Arreguìn-Toft 2003, 2005; Byman 2016; Caverley 2009/10; Downes 2007a; Engelhardt 1992; Lyall 2009, 2010; Lyall and Wilson III 2009; MacDonald 2013; Mack 1975; Merom 1998, 2003; Nagl 2005; Porch 2011, 2013). Otherwise said, civilian victimization has often been analyzed as an independent variable which can explain why states win or lose against guerrilla insurgencies. Unlike the practitioner literature, however, some of those scholarly works do set out explicit self-contained causal arguments explaining why non-combatants get targeted in counterinsurgency (see especially Caverley 2009/10; Merom 2003; Lyall and Wilson III 2009). Besides, a fast-growing strand of scholarly research is addressing civilian victimization as a dependent variable or a factor to be explained in its own right regardless of its impact on war outcome (DeVore 2013; Downes 2008: Ch. 5; Kahl 2007; Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lyndsay 2004; Valentino 2004: Ch. 6; Zambernardi 2010).

Overall, one can spot three schools of thought in the literature on the subject.[19] The first one looks at civilian targeting as a function of the political regime of the incumbent state and the main features of its military organization. So, this school of thought suggests that political and military reforms are an essential step to reduce the risk of indiscriminate violence. The Second School of Thought relates civilian targeting to the identity of the insurgent population as perceived by the incumbent state. In particular, indiscriminate violence would be more likely when the incumbent state vilifies the enemy and its popular base. This school of thought, therefore, would imply that the risk of civilian victimization can be reduced by eradicating any attitudinal support for the dehumanization of the enemy from the national society of the incumbent (Kelman 1973). The Third School of thought, finally, explains indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency as a strategy of late resort deriving from desperation to win and cut combat losses on one's own side. This school of thought suggests that civilian victimization can hardly be prevented or reduced when a state is facing powerful and popular guerrilla insurgencies.

In the next three paragraphs of this chapter I will review each of those groups of arguments and I will show that they are logically and empirically flawed. In each paragraph of my review, I will first describe the main arguments of each school of thought and then I will focus on the problems with their logic and empirical basis. This will pave the way to my model which will be presented in the next chapter.

[19] These 'schools of thought' are, of course, artificial. Authors in each school of thought were not addressing the same aspect of the same problem, nor did they necessarily agree with one another.

1.3 The First School of Thought: The Level of Civilian Targeting as a Function of the Domestic Characteristics of States.

1.3.1 Regime Type and Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency

Scholars positing that regime type affects the fate of civilians in warfare, tend to disagree about the impact of this factor on the use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. Some contend that democracy is a source of self-restraint: democratic states would be less likely than autocracies to target civilians in counterinsurgency (Engelhardt 1992; Merom 2003; Rummel 1995; Zhukov 2007). Gil Merom (2003), in particular, provided one of the most compelling explanations. Merom's thesis is that, while civilian victimization is essential to defeat powerful and popular guerrilla insurgencies abroad, democratic states could not make a prolonged use of indiscriminate violence because influential groups of citizens in their national society would turn the public opinion against civilian victimization strategies, thus pressing political leaders into self-restraint.

The level of violence that democracies could afford to use against civilians would result from a confrontation between the government and the domestic society over the respect of liberal values which stigmatize any form of ill-treatment of civilians including mass killing, intentional starvation, property destruction, deportation, and torture. According to Merom (1998, 2003: Ch. 2), in order to defeat insurgents a state would need to disregard these norms and use violence against non-combatants. He argues that democracies could still resort to indiscriminate violence in the nineteenth century because the limited development of liberal principles in their national societies enabled the government to impose its political agenda on its own citizens: indeed, rulers' legitimacy rested on the consent of a relatively small number of voters; political and civil rights making for freedom of speech were restricted and the understanding of human rights was still tainted by racism (Merom 2003: Ch. 4). This is why, according to Merom, one can find instances of democracies relying on civilian victimization strategies until the aftermath of the Second World War. In contemporary liberal democracies, instead, the ability of the state to impose its will on the national society has significantly declined and the power of public opinion to influence foreign and security policy has reached unprecedented levels due to the expansion of the educated middle class and the spread of voting rights to social groups that had been excluded from political participation in the past; as a result, liberal democratic governments

cannot implement their military policies without the acquiescence of their public opinion (Merom 2003: Ch. 3).

Under these conditions, the use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency has become an extremely risky enterprise for state leaders in liberal democracies. Indeed, Merom argues that civilian targeting would cause a conflict between the state and the powerful liberal forces in the national society over the legitimacy of indiscriminate brutality in warfare. Indiscriminate violence would spark the indignation of educated and influential middle-class groups of citizens who would exploit democratic norms allowing open debate to denounce civilian victimization as morally unacceptable and mobilize public opinion against the government; as a result, the domestic society's moral outrage against the state would mount, pressing the national government into self-restraint strategies (Merom 2003: 18-21). Interestingly, Merom concedes that democratic governments may try to resist public opinion's opposition to barbarism and pursue a decisive victory over insurgents by escalating civilian victimization (2003: 22). However, Merom immediately points out that such a decision would only cause further moral repugnance against the government; at that point, the government would be forced to give up or resort to outright repression of its own citizens thus destroying democracy at home (2003: 24).

It is worth noting that, in Merom's argument, neither moral indignation nor public protests alone are sufficient to induce democratic governments to stop civilian victimization. The reason why leaders would eventually give in to public pressure is that they depend on public consent to stay in power (Merom 2003: 24). Unlike dictators, democratic leaders need electoral support to achieve tenure in office and so they are vulnerable to public discontent. Consequently, once confronted with moral opposition against civilian victimization, democratic governments would be likely to comply with the requests for self-restraint in an attempt to save their popularity.

Other scholars (Downes 2007b) tend to agree that regime type affects the way states fight their wars, but they imply that democracy can fuel, rather than inhibit, civilian targeting. They point out that democratic governments' need for electoral support and vulnerability to public discontent provide democratic state leaders with powerful incentives to stick to civilian targeting strategies. The logic behind this argument is simple: voters bear the burden of war in terms of blood and treasure and their support for the government tends to decline when the costs of war increase; since democratic leaders are aware of that, they will be afraid that high casualty rates may destroy their popularity and result in electoral defeat; therefore, they will look for strategies that

minimize losses on their side: civilian targeting would serve this purpose because it transfers the costs of war to the opponent's population (Downes 2007b).

While this argument refers to civilian victimization in interstate conventional warfare, its logic was applied to counterinsurgency too. Jonathan Caverley (2009/10), for example, looks at democracies' institutional constraints on state leaders to explain why U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam was based on a capital-intensive military strategy that emphasized technological preponderance, overwhelming firepower, and civilian victimization. He contends that such strategies would limit soldiers' exposure to the enemy's firepower and would place the financial and military burden of counterinsurgency campaigns on the shoulders of a relatively low number of wealthy voters; at the same time, capital-intensive strategies would shift the human costs of the conflict to the opponent's population (Caverley 2009/10: 127-139). In this way, democratic governments would limit the costs of war for a high number of less wealthy voters and boost their chances to get tenure in office.

Which of these two arguments is more compelling? Does democracy relent or propel civilian victimization in counterinsurgency? In the next section I will address these questions. I will show that neither argument is fully convincing.

1.3.2 Problems with the Regime Type Argument

In this section I make out that, on a logical and empirical level, the argument that democracy generates self-restraint is not convincing. However, I also show that the opposite argument according to which democracy can fuel civilian victimization is weak on the empirical level. I conclude that both arguments should be set aside.

A serious problem with the logic of Merom's argument is that it unduly narrows down the potential courses of action that can originate from leaders' dependence on public consent to achieve tenure in office. The contention that in liberal democracies civilian victimization causes public moral outrage, even when combined democratic leaders' need for electoral consent to stay in power, is not sufficient to support Merom's conclusion that democratic governments facing public protest will fall back on self-restraint strategies.

Democratic leaders' concern with electoral consent does not necessarily imply that democratic statesmen will try to please public opinion. The fact that democratic leaders depend on public consent to achieve tenure in office simply means that statesmen will be anxious to avoid any political outcome that could undermine their popularity or

prestige and decrease their chances to win the next elections. Now, there are different potential paths leading to electoral defeat; yet, Merom takes only one of those paths into account. Certainly, civilian victimization and the ensuing indignation of public opinion can determine electoral defeat, but that is not the only way to lose elections. Political leaders may also be concerned about the impact of military losses on their fate. In fact, casualties may trouble democratic leaders even more than the violation of the laws of war. Indeed, while indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency aboard harms people in foreign territories, a campaign with high casualty rates would affect the same people – voters – that can oust democratic leaders from power. However, Merom never explains why democratic leaders would believe that they are likely to lose the next elections if they keep on targeting civilians but can still achieve tenure in office if they suffer a humiliating defeat against a guerrilla insurgency abroad. Such an explanatory gap is all the more perplexing because some studies on casualties and public opinion in liberal democracies – especially the United States – show consistently that the popularity of wartime leaders decreases as the number of battle deaths increases[20] (see Gartner 2008; Gartner and Segura 1998; Mueller 1973); other studies indicate that liberal public opinions are averse to civilian targeting, but aversion tends to decrease if civilian victimization makes for force protection (Mueller 2000); finally, still other studies have found that democratic leaders are likely to be ousted from power if the wars they decide to fight become costly and unsuccessful (Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Bueno de Mesquita, Siverson, and Woeller 1992; Bueno de Mesquita, et al. 2003). It would seem, therefore, that the logic of the thesis which points to democracy as a propellant would be more compelling.[21]

On the empirical level, Merom's argument fails to explain the behaviour of democratic governments in some relevant cases, like French counterinsurgency in Algeria and U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Interestingly, Merom did study the case of French counterinsurgency in depth (2003: Ch. 5-10). He convincingly proves that the use of indiscriminate violence – and especially torture – caused influential groups of intellectuals to oppose the war and turned the domestic public opinion against the government's policies. Yet, Merom does not prove that the opposition of the domestic

[20] Gelpi, Feaver, and Rifler (2005/06), however, showed that when public opinion believes that victory is likely, the risk of popularity decline for wartime leaders is lower in spite of increasing casualty rates.

[21] We will see, however, that this is not sufficient to accept the argument that democracy spurs civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. Even if a relationship exists between rising battle deaths and leaders' popularity decline, empirical evidence does not decisively support the hypothesis that the risk of popularity decline will eventually cause democratic governments to adopt to civilian victimization strategies (see below).

society to the use of civilian targeting eventually caused French leaders to fall back on self-restraint strategies. In fact, as I show in this work (see Ch. 6), until the very end of the military campaign, France stuck to a civilian targeting strategy including measures like indiscriminate shootings, torture and summary executions, the destruction of entire villages as a retribution after insurgents' attacks, scorched-earth, and mass deportations of civilians to concentration camps.

Even if Merom did not examine the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Vietnam in depth, his arguments would show the same problem. Indeed, the use of barbarism against Vietnamese civilians sparked moral outrage against the government and exacerbated domestic opposition to the war, as Merom's argument would predict. However, domestic opposition did not change the military strategy of the United States. The U.S. government stuck to mass deportations, scorched-earth, and indiscriminate bombings until the end of the conflict. In sum, the causal mechanism posited by Merom did not lead to the predicted outcome on the use of indiscriminate violence.

Finally, statistical studies on mass killing in counterinsurgency brought up very limited evidence that democracy prevents civilian victimization. Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay (2004) found that democracies are more likely than dictatorships to spare civilians' lives in counterinsurgency, but only as long as insurgents fail to inflict serious losses; the restraining effect of democracy tends to disappear after controlling for the variable of casualties: as casualty rates increase “even highly democratic states are likely to resort to mass killing” (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004: 402) and the impact of regime type becomes comparatively weak. Importantly, even scholars who contend that democracy restrains indiscriminate violence admit that democratic regimes are likely to avoid civilian victimization in counterinsurgency only as long as they take limited casualties (see Engelhardt 1992: 55).

The argument that democracy fuels civilian targeting in counterinsurgency, while more compelling on the logical level (see above), is equally dubious on the empirical level. The contention that democratic leaders will prefer capital-intensive strategies and civilian victimization in an attempt to reduce the domestic costs of war and bolster their popularity would imply that democracies should be more likely than autocracies to target non-combatants when facing powerful and popular guerrilla insurrections. Indeed, if we accept that the need for public consent will induce elected leaders to prefer military strategies based on indiscriminate violence, then it is plausible to presume that leaders who do not depend on electoral consent to stay in power – like dictators – will not need civilian targeting as much as democratic leaders (Valentino, Huth, and Croco

2006: 348-349). Yet, recent research on civilian targeting and mass killing in warfare found no decisive evidence to support the hypothesis that democracies are more likely than autocracies to victimize civilians in counterinsurgency (Arreguin-Toft 2003; Valentino, Huth, and Croco 2006: 369). Rather, some studies show that democracies are slightly less likely than dictatorships to kill non-combatants. Ivan Arreguìn-Toft (2003: 14), for example, found that democratic states used civilian targeting strategies in 15 percent of their wars, including imperial and colonial conflicts, whereas non-democracies deliberately victimized civilians in 21 percent of their wars. While this gap between democracies and autocracies is too small to support the argument that democracy restrains counterinsurgents, these results also contradict the thesis that democracy propels civilian targeting.[22] It is simply not clear that regime type has any relevant causal connections with the use of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency.[23]

If regime type is not decisively related to civilian targeting, where should we look for the causes of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency? Some scholars insist that we should still look to the domestic characteristics of the state that is confronting insurgents. Instead of regime type, however, we should focus on the military organization that is fighting insurgents. In the next section I will present and assess this argument.

1.3.3 Military Organizational Factors and Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency

The insight behind the study of military organizations and indiscriminate violence in warfare is simple: armed forces – not just civilian leaders – plan and conduct military operations; consequently, in order to explain civilian victimization in counterinsurgency, it is essential to focus on the factors that shape and constrain military organizations' preferences about how to fight and civil-military relations. According to the literature on the matter, three different military organizational factors would influence the use of barbarism in counterinsurgency: bureaucratic interests, military culture, and force structure. Therefore, we can identify three arguments accounting for civilian targeting in anti-guerrilla warfare.

The first argument considers the bureaucratic interests of military organizations as the

[22] For a recent work that challenges the dicothomy between authoritarian and democratic counterinsurgency see Ucko (2016).

[23] Democracies, however, are much more likely than autocracies to keep from violence against their own citizens. See Davenport and Armstrong II (2004) and Harff (2003).

main determinant of soldiers' preferences about how to use violence in war (Posen 1984; Snyder 1984). This argument builds on the bureaucratic politics assumption that all organizations pursue the same type of goals: independence from external oversight, control over their own affairs, and financial resources (Posen 1984: 41-59). As a bureaucratic organization, the armed forces would pursue the same kind of goals.

A bureaucratic politics perspective on civilian targeting in counterinsurgency would stress that military leaders tend to prefer capital-intensive attrition strategies conceived to destroy the insurgents' popular base through superior technology and overwhelming firepower; indeed, that type of strategy, while harming non-combatants, would make for higher military budgets and greater control over the conduct of military operations; consequently, indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency is more likely when military leaders are given operational autonomy and civilian leaders are unwilling or unable to oppose military organizations' institutional tendency towards the unrestrained use of force (DeVore 2013: 174-175).

Another argument, which builds on organizational culture research from the field of business studies (Ott 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Smircich 1983), points to ideational factors as the mainspring of civilian victimization. This argument explains the use of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency as a function of military organizational culture intended as "a set of basic assumptions and beliefs that shape shared understandings and practices" (Kier 1995: 69-70). Military culture would reflect military organizations' ideas about their own identity which, in turn, would shape military organizations beliefs about appropriate conduct on the battlefield (Kahl 2007: 37-38). Indeed, the culture of military organizations would "structure their perceptions of their essence and purpose, of the problems they must solve, and of the ways they should solve them" (Hull 2005: 96). Military culture, in sum, causes military organizations to look at some forms of force employment as legitimate or appropriate and dismiss others as incompatible with their own military identity or even 'unthinkable', regardless of the perceived identity of the enemy (see also Farrell 2001; Farrell and Terriff 2002). Importantly, military culture is exclusive: there cannot be two or more cultures within the same military organization at the same time. Once a discourse about military identity and appropriate behaviour becomes dominant, it cannot be easily replaced with a different discourse because military organizations embed it in their routines and is not questioned (Johnston 1995: 45-46; Hull 2005: 92; Legro 1994: 117).

From this perspective, civilian targeting is more likely to occur when military culture emphasizes the relentless punishment of the enemy as the task which defines that

identity and mission of a military organization and civilian leaders are unwilling or unable to restrain the military.[24]

Finally, a third argument suggests that the way military organizations deal with insurgencies would depend on force structure defined as "the specific mixture of materiel and personnel that compromises a military's war-making capabilities" (Lyall and Wilson III, 2009: 72). Force structure affects the balance between manpower and machines in a military organization. Force structure reflects standards of appropriateness in military organizational matters deriving from transnational processes of economic and technological change as well as the peculiar battlefield experience of a state or a group of states (Cohen 1984: 165-177; Lyall and Wilson III, 2009: 72).

According to Lyall and Wilson III (2009), when force structure privileges machines over manpower, military organizations are more likely to resort to indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. Mechanization would reduce the number of infantrymen in relation to the number of machines, like tanks; besides, given the technical complexity of modern military machines, a mechanized military can only be supplied by specialized industries outside the war zone through a logistical system that includes large military bases located far away from populated areas (Lyall and Wilson III 2009: 77). In this way, mechanization would seriously limit the ability of a military organization to interact with the local population, win civilians' trust, and obtain intelligence about insurgents' identity and location. Under these conditions a mechanized military could not distinguish combatants from non-combatants and could only use violence indiscriminately. Instead, when force structure privileges manpower over machines, the incumbent's military is more likely to interact with the local population, collect information about insurgents and their supporters, and use violence selectively.[25]

Are these arguments more convincing than the regime type thesis? In the next session I will argue that the military organization theses have limited explanatory power.

1.3.4 Problems with the Military Organization Argument

[24] For a historical study that shows how military culture shapes the use of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency see Isabel V. Hull (2005).

[25] While the force structure argument includes ideational factors, it is still different from the military culture argument. Indeed, the latter contends that any military culture emphasizing annihilation as the main task of soldiers can lead to civilian victimization, whereas the force structure argument is more specific in that it suggests that military culture is more likely to generate civilian targeting only when it emphasizes mechanization as the appropriate organization of the armed forces. The military culture argument, then, implies that even military organizations that privilege manpower over machines can target civilians, whereas the force structure argument excludes this scenario.

The main problem with military organizational factors is that they have limited explanatory power. Firstly, most military organizational factors are logically unfit to account for spatial (or synchronic) variations in the use of civilian targeting. Indeed, spatial variations can only be explained by causal factors that can vary synchronically. Yet, factors like organizational interests and military culture can change only diachronically. Indeed, a military organization cannot have opposite and equally dominant bureaucratic interests and military cultures at the same point in time. So, once we accept that states deal with civilians on the basis of factors that are deeply rooted in their military institutions and identity, it becomes logically necessary to presume that a state which is fighting insurgents in two different areas of the world at the same time will deal with civilians in the same way. As a result, a case of a state that is adopting opposite counterinsurgency strategies in different areas of the world at the same time will become a puzzle. The military organization arguments could explain cases of spatial variation in civilian targeting only by suggesting – quite problematically – that the same bureaucratic interests and the same military culture of the same military organization observed at the same point in time can generate opposite counterinsurgency strategies simultaneously. That would be nothing but an unsolvable contradiction.

Nor could the problem be overcome by pointing to civil-military relations. Indeed, this factor would have the same limit: civil-military relations in the same state cannot vary synchronically. If civilian control of the military helps to restrain military organizations' institutional preference for indiscriminate violence, then the same country involved in two counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time in different areas of the world cannot be expected to adopt different policies in each campaign because civil-military relations would be the same. It is logically impossible to use civilian control of the military (or viceversa) to explain indiscriminate violence and the opposite outcome by the same military organization at the same point in time.

Force structure, instead, can vary synchronically. Indeed, a military organization may fight a specific counterinsurgency campaign with machines rather than manpower and do just the opposite in a different campaign at the same time. Yet, the explanatory power of the force structure argument would still be affected by a problem that would affect the bureaucratic politics and military culture arguments too. Specifically, military organizational factors will have an important causal effect on the use of indiscriminate violence only when political leaders play a secondary role in the making of military

strategy. Under those circumstances, the use of civilian targeting would reflect military organizational factors and soldiers' preferences directly. By contrast, when political leaders are willing and able to intervene in the making of military strategy and its implementation, the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency would reflect civilian leaders' beliefs and calculations rather than military organizational factors.[26]

The case of Vietnam is an example of that. Against a consolidated strand of research which attributes the massive use of indiscriminate violence to the preferences of the U.S. armed forces (Krepinevich 1986; Nagl 2005), recent scholarship has highlighted the decisive role of President Johnson and his circle in the making of a military strategy oriented to civilian victimization (Caverley 2009/10; Downes 2009: 31-47). President Johnson and his advisers imposed a counterinsurgency strategy which was based on indiscriminate bombing against North Vietnam, mass deportation and displacement, scorched-earth, and the construction of physical barriers; despite their scepticism on the effectiveness of this strategy, military commanders could not press their ideas up the command chain; indeed, the presidential circle repeatedly rejected or ignored any call from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for a pacification strategy aiming to protect the population by deploying more manpower on the field even if it was deemed to be potentially more effective[27] (see Caverley 2009/10).

Besides, one can add that military organizational factors will have more causal importance in the use of civilian targeting when the army is the only agency involved in the repression of insurgents and non-military agencies – like the police – come under the authority of military commanders. Otherwise, military organizational factors may explain civilian victimization only to a limited extent. The case of Britain's counterinsurgency in Kenya can be taken as an example. As we shall see in Chapter 4, the police, the Home Guard, and the civil administration were responsible for most atrocities against civilians, therefore military organizational factors can explain violence against noncombatants only to a limited extent (see below).

In conclusion, this group of arguments would be outperformed by any other thesis that is logically fit to account for synchronic variations and can explain diachronic variations regardless of civil-military relations and the type of agencies involved in the repression of insurgents. There are in fact other arguments that may have potentially superior explanatory power than the military organizational arguments. An alternative school of

[26] For a study that shows the decisive influence of civilian intervention on the conduct of war, see Cohen (2002). While Cohen's work looks at cases of conventional wars, there is no reason why its basic arguments could not be applied to counterinsurgency too.

[27] For this reason, the case of Vietnam would challenge the contention that states target civilians when they believe that indiscriminate violence is more effective than self-restraint (see above: 13).

thought considers civilian targeting as a function of the image of the enemy: when the incumbent dehumanizes the opponent, high levels of civilian targeting would be more likely. This factor can change both diachronically and synchronically and so it would be logically fit to account for spatial and temporal variations in the use of civilian victimization. In the next paragraph I will assess this school of thought.

1.4 The Second School of Thought: Civilian Targeting and the Perceived Identity of the Enemy

1.4.1 Counterinsurgency and the Vilification of the Enemy

The Second School of Thought about civilian targeting points to the perception of the enemy as the main cause behind the use of indiscriminate violence in warfare. Regardless of regime type or military organizational factors, counterinsurgents would be more likely to victimize civilians when the opponent is perceived to be abhorrent and inherently hostile. The belief that one is dealing with an 'uncivilized', 'barbaric' or even 'sub-human' enemy would shape the perception of what is possible, necessary and morally acceptable in warfare in such a way that violence against non-combatants would be seen as legitimate, if not desirable (Salter 2002: 38-42).

This thesis builds upon social identity theory and its basic argument that humans tend to show greater hostility and aggressiveness to people who are perceived as members of out-groups (Rabbie 1989; Tajfel and Turner 1986). This tendency would be even more prominent in war. Indeed, perceived religious, linguistic and racial differences have propelled the use of brutal fighting methods against soldiers, prisoners of war, and civilians. John Dower (1986), for example, points to racial prejudice and hatred between the United States and Japan to explain the frequent use indiscriminate violence and the breaking of the laws of war on the Pacific Front during the Second World War. Samuel Huntington (1996) brings additional support to the social identity theory in his influential essay on the clash of civilizations. Huntington shows that civil wars are likely to result in mass atrocities if the fighting parties perceive their opponents as members of a different 'civilization' or transnational out-group.

The social identity argument can be applied to counterinsurgency warfare too. Indeed, some of the most destructive counterinsurgency campaigns have taken place in areas where the incumbent state ruthlessly dehumanized the local population. German anti-partisan warfare in Soviet Union, for example, was conducted in the shadow of the Nazi

ideology which looked at Slavic people as sub-humans and identified Soviet partisans with the Jews; as a result, in spite of phases of relative moderation in the use of force, Nazi anti-partisan warfare in Soviet Union could hardly be distinguished from Hitler's wider plan to exterminate supposedly inferior populations (Cooper 1979; Nolte 2005; Westermann 2005: 16-18). The perceived image of the enemy may also provide a plausible explanation for the Japanese military strategy against communist insurgents in China between 1937 and 1945. As John Dower (1986: 288-290) points out, anti-Chinese racial hatred was rampant in the political and military circles of Japan before and during the war. The image of the Chinese as an inferior population bound to serve their Japanese masters is apparently reflected in the brutality of the Japanese counterinsurgency strategy: mass killing, scorched-earth measures, and mass starvation were common practices intended to terrorize the Chinese population and keep civilians from cooperating with insurgents (Li 1975: 13-14; MacDonald 1999).

Importantly, the causal factor we are discussing in this paragraph – the perceived identity of the enemy – can vary both diachronically and synchronically and so it has a potentially superior explanatory power than the military organization argument. Indeed, on the one hand, the perceived identity of the enemy can change over the course of the time: in theory, a state can demonize the opponent in the early phase of a campaign and change this perception at a later stage or vice versa. On the other hand, at a logical level, it is possible for the same state involved in two counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time to have different perceptions of different enemies in each campaign. As a result, the perceived image of the enemy could be used to explain why the same state relies on indiscriminate violence in a specific campaign while showing self-restraint in a different campaign at the same time.

Is this argument as the best explanation available? In the next section I will answer this question in the negative.

1.4.2 Problems with the Vilification Argument

Despite its potential explanatory power, the vilification argument performs unconvincingly when assessed against the empirical evidence.

Firstly, if one looks at the experience of Britain in counterinsurgency during decolonization, some crucial predictions of the vilification argument on the use of indiscriminate violence are not confirmed. Between 1945 and 1970 Britain was almost incessantly involved in counterinsurgency campaigns in its declining Empire. During

that period, the British fought against nationalist or anti-colonial guerrilla organizations in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, and Aden in addition to facing minor emergencies. Interestingly, recent historical research on Britain's decolonization conflicts shows that Britain invariably vilified its opponents. The British colonial authorities, deeply convinced of the moral righteousness and superiority of their colonial mission, tended to condemn and demonize their opponents as 'terrorists', 'gangsters', 'bandits', and 'thugs'; the vilification of the enemy was equally rampant among a part of the security forces on the field as a result of the very experience of fighting elusive opponents that successfully adopted frustrating hit-and-run tactics (French 2011: 60-65, 70-73). Importantly, as Britain struggled to gain popular support after prolonged hostilities, the security forces in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden demonized civilians too as a malevolent out-group standing by Britain's enemies (Bennett 2009: 420, 429; Elkins 2005: passim; French 2011: 67-68; Holland 1998: 288).

In sum, the vilification of insurgents and their popular base is a feature we can find in every campaign Britain fought in its Empire after 1945; under these conditions, the vilification argument would predict that Britain should have victimized civilians in all of its counterinsurgency campaigns. Yet, Britain did not invariably use barbarism in those conflicts. The vilification of the opponent correlates with the use of indiscriminate violence in some cases like Kenya[28] and – to a more limited extent – the early phase of the Malayan Emergency, but not in other campaigns like Palestine, Cyprus, or Aden. That would question the causal effect of the image of the enemy on Britain's conduct towards civilians.

Secondly, there are other cases in which the perceived image of the enemy seems to have played almost no role in shaping the use of indiscriminate violence. One of the most striking empirical failures of this factor in a crucial test is the British counterinsurgency campaign in the Second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). The vilification argument would predict self-restraint on the British side in that campaign because the Boers were not perceived as a barbaric enemy by the British. Indeed, the Boers were white people of European descent like the British, French, and German settlers that lived in other African territories. Furthermore, the political organization of the Boer Republics was similar to the European modern state which set the Boers apart from the black native populations of South Africa. Finally, the cultural, racial, and political bonds between the Boers and Europe were acknowledged by Britain to such an

[28] As we shall see, however, the image of the enemy does not convincingly explain the use of barbarism during the Kenya Emergency.

extent that the British government was deeply concerned that the Boer republics could exploit their 'Teutonic' identity to convince other powers in Europe – especially Germany – to intervene against Britain.[29] Considering that the Second-Anglo Boer War involved enemies that shared a European identity, the prediction that the incumbent will be self-restrained in dealing with civilians should be easily confirmed; in spite of that, Britain fiercely victimized Boer non-combatants.[30]

Apart from its empirical weakness, another problem with the vilification argument is that the dehumanization of the enemy leading to civilian targeting may be just a mere consequence of the very experience of fighting. In warfare, opponents often demonize each other, but the vilification of the enemy may reflect a psychological reaction to the risk of being killed, the loss of friendly troops, or the duration of the conflict (Downes 2008: 26) rather than genuine prejudice against the enemy at the top echelons of the government. When the dehumanization of the enemy is considered as an effect of the experience of fighting, the identity perception factor is more likely to affect the behaviour of soldiers who participate in military operations on a daily basis rather than the strategic calculations of political and military leaders. Therefore, the perceived image of the enemy may be fit to explain individual or collective misconduct by the troops deployed on the field resulting in civilian victimization, rather than state sanctioned military strategies conceived to harm non-combatants.

Considering the problems with the two groups of argument reviewed so far, is there a better explanation for the extent of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency? In the next paragraph I will introduce the Third School of Thought which looks at the use of indiscriminate violence as a product of rational strategic calculations in wartime.

1.5 The Third School of Thought: The Level of Civilian Targeting as a Function of Leaders' Strategic Calculations

1.5.1 Civilian Targeting, Population Control, and Insurgents' Military Threat

According to the third group of arguments civilian targeting is neither a product of the military and political institutions of the incumbent state nor a result of the perceived

[29]The British government looked with suspicion at Germany where the pro-Boer propaganda was particularly vociferous and the Pan-German circles pressed the government to side with the Boers against Great Britain. On the Transvaal factor in the context of Anglo-German relations see Butler (1967). On the rivalry between Germany and Britain, see Kennedy (1973, 1980).

[30] For a history of the Boer War see Pakenham (1979). On the fate of civilians during the Boer War see Pretorius (ed.) (2001).

image of the enemy. Rather, indiscriminate violence would result from national leaders' strategic calculations. States would adopt or avoid a civilian targeting strategy on the basis of insurgents' military power and ability to control the local population. In particular, Indiscriminate violence in anti-guerrilla warfare would be a strategy of late resort deriving from the incumbent state's desperation to win before powerful and popular guerrilla insurgencies (Valentino, Huth, and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Valentino 2004: Ch. 6; Downes 2008: Ch.5).

This thesis assumes that states want quick victories with low combat losses every time they fight. This preference would originate from the anarchic nature of the international system. Building on the structural realist theory of International Relations (Waltz 1979), this strand of research insists that international anarchy – the absence of a world government which is willing and able to guarantee state survival – causes states to be concerned with their own security; defeat in war affects the power position of states and is one of the most serious threats to survival, so national leaders want to win every time they fight. Furthermore, since states have to attend to their own survival by themselves but have only limited resources to do so, national leaders would be afraid to get embroiled in a long and costly war which consumes the economic assets and the manpower at their disposal; as a consequence, state leaders want to keep casualties down every time they fight (Downes 2008: 31-32).

According to this thesis, the preference for quick victories with limited losses would make state leaders more likely to refrain from civilian victimization at the beginning of a campaign: indeed, indiscriminate violence may exacerbate resistance from victim groups and cause civilians to side with insurgents, thus increasing the duration and costs of the conflict (Valentino 2004: 4; Valentino, Huth, and Blach-Lindsay 2004: 385-386). Yet, when hostilities last longer than expected, population control is slipping, combat casualties mount, and victory seems in question, then the incumbent state's leaders would become desperate to defeat insurgents and the risks of a civilian targeting strategy would appear less significant than its potential advantages: specifically, barbarism would reduce the risk of military losses on the perpetrator's side, crush insurgents' popular base and make it impossible for insurgents to implement their guerrilla strategy[31] (Downes 2008: 158-160; Valentino, Huth, and Blach-Lindsay 2004:

[31] This argument may look similar to the thesis according to which democracy fuels civilian targeting (see above). Indeed, proponents of that thesis also insist that state leaders can target civilians when casualties go up and victory seems in question. In fact, the two arguments are different. While the democratic propellant thesis suggests that leaders' desperation originates from the specific institutional constraints of democratic regimes and implies that dictators may be more likely to afford a defeat, the desperation thesis does not attribute causal primacy to regime type and the domestic norms or institutions of states. So, while the

386-387).

Therefore, the desperation thesis would predict that civilian targeting will be very limited, if not absent, in the early stage of a counterinsurgency campaign when the incumbent is still confident in a quick victory with limited losses; civilian targeting, however, will escalate as the conflict goes on, but only if insurgents have gained population control and have inflicted serious losses on the incumbent; if, instead, insurgents fail to gain population control and pose only a modest military threat, then the incumbent will remain self-restrained and civilian targeting will not occur at all (Valentino, Huth, and Blach-Lindsay 2004: 386-387; Downes 2008: 165-177, 212-213, 237-238).

In the next section I will assess these arguments. I will argue that the Third School of Thought is insightful but still faces empirical problems as it would fail to explain relevant cases.

1.5.2 Problems with the Argument

Downes' and Valentino's arguments about indiscriminate violence as a strategy of last resort have logical and empirical flaws.

Firstly, the contention that states would try to avoid civilian targeting unless they are desperate to win and reduce casualties is based on the argument that indiscriminate violence works slowly and, consequently, would not meet states' preference for a short war. Before we can accept the contention that, unless they are desperate to win, states would refrain from civilian victimization because it is time-consuming and costly, we should have evidence that selective violence and hearts-and-minds measures are likely to work more effectively and quickly than indiscriminate violence.

Yet, the selective use of violence can be extremely challenging and ineffective for counterinsurgents. Indeed, in order to obtain information about hostile individuals and get the civilian population to deny its support to insurgents, it is necessary to win civilians' trust and respect first. This may take long time as it requires a considerable propaganda effort, a deep knowledge of the local society and its cultural identities, a credible economic commitment to civic-action and state-building measures, an ability to stop the enemy's counter-propaganda and protect non-combatants from insurgents' reprisals, among the other things. Even when the incumbent can deploy those skills and

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democratic propellant argument predicts that different regimes will respond differently to the same military situation on the field, the desperation thesis predicts that different regimes will react in the same way to the same military situation.

resources, quick success is not guaranteed.

In sum, if civilian victimization in counterinsurgency is not more time-consuming or costly than selective violence then states may still have incentives to resort to indiscriminate violence when they are not yet desperate to win and keep casualties down. Otherwise said, on the logical level, desperation to win may not always be a necessary or important condition for indiscriminate violence to occur as a strategy of last resort in counterinsurgency.

The empirical performance of the desperation argument would confirm that. Indeed, on the one hand, there are cases in which states used indiscriminate violence when insurgents were on the verge of defeat. In these cases civilian targeting seems to have occurred when the desperation factor was not clearly present. On the other hand, one can find cases in which the incumbent was self-restrained even if it gradually became pessimistic about its own victory chances in the face of powerful and popular insurrections.

One of the most impressive failures of the desperation argument is the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (1904-1907). Apparently, one may consider this case as a successful test for Downes' argument. Faced with the Herero tribe's uprising against the German colonial rule in January 1904, the German military tried to engage the enemy in set-piece battles and destroy insurgents' forces within the first few months of the conflict. After the Germans failed to achieve a quick victory, military leaders shifted to civilian targeting in an attempt to end the insurgency. The result of this new policy was the genocide of the Herero and Nama tribes.[32]

Historians agree that the German government expected nothing less than a quick and complete victory, which is why Kaiser Wilhelm II replaced Governor Theodor Leutwein with one of the most ruthless German generals – Lothar von Trotha – in June 1904. Besides, despite some differences in the interpretation of the German battle plan (see Drecht 1980: 155), some historians convincingly argue that von Trotha intended to encircle and destroy insurgents' forces once and for all in the battle of Waterberg in August 1904 (Hull 2005: 37-41). That was seen as a unique opportunity to end the conflict because virtually all the Herero people – the warriors and their families – had gathered together near the Waterberg Mountain with all their cattle after suffering heavy losses in previous clashes with the Germans. Finally, it is undisputed that the failure to

[32] Benjamin Valentino classifies this case as one of dispossessive mass killing and territorial conquest (2004: 70). Having claimed that mass killing is likely when states face a powerful and popular insurrection, Valentino also maintains that anti-guerrilla was an additional reason of mass killing in German South-West Africa (2004: 81). However, Valentino leaves unexplained the relationship and interaction, if any, between dispossession, conquest, and anti-guerrilla goals.

trap and crush the Herero at Waterberg greatly frustrated General von Trotha. Indeed, due to a series of mistakes in the execution of battle orders, the German forces failed to encircle their opponents; as a result, over 60,000 Herero could flee the battlefield with few casualties, but only to find themselves in the Omaheke desert with no water to drink and no grass to feed their cattle. After Waterberg the Germans adopted a counterinsurgency policy which was deliberately genocidal. In October 1904 Lothar von Trotha released the infamous 'extermination order' according to which the Herero people would no longer be considered as German subjects and so they would not be given quarter or shelter; no Herero would be allowed to return from the desert; any Herero male still within German borders would be executed at once, while women and children would be driven into the desert by force of arms (Hull 2005: 56). The fact that the extermination order followed the disappointing battle of Waterberg is apparently consistent with the desperation thesis. But is this enough to adjudicate the case? I answer in the negative.

I argue that the sequence of the events is not enough to conclude that German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa is a successful test for the Third School of Thought. Indeed, there are other important elements which undermine the desperation thesis. In particular, there is evidence that German military leaders' confidence in victory progressively increased over the course of the campaign; before and after Waterberg, German leaders acknowledged that the Herero uprising had lost momentum and insurgents' willingness and ability to fight was declining. Importantly, the use of indiscriminate violence escalated to a genocidal level when it was clear to the Germans that the enemy had no chance to win and insurgents actually wanted to surrender.

Even if the Germans were caught by surprise when the insurrection began in January 1904, the Herero warriors only attacked German settlers. By February the army could recover only a part of the lost territory after reinforcements were sent in but insurgents attacks could not be stopped (Hull 2005: 11). Between February and April 1904, Governor Leutwein's troops engaged the enemy in a series of victorious battles where the Herero warriors reportedly suffered major casualties (Hull 2005: 22). In April 1904, after the battle of Oviumbo where the Germans and their enemies withdrew simultaneously (Hull 2005: 22), the government in Berlin relieved Leutwein from supreme military command. Yet, by the time Lothar von Trotha arrived in June 1904, insurgents had already retreated to Waterberg on the verge of defeat; in mid-July, before the battle, some clans tried to surrender which was a clear sign that the Germans were winning (Hull 2005: 44). The willingness of the Herero fighters to capitulate became

even clearer in the aftermath of Waterberg before the extermination order was released: in September most clans conceded defeat and German military commanders received dozens of reports from patrolling units confirming that warriors and their families offered no resistance and repeatedly tried to give themselves in (Hull 2005: 44-51).

The most serious empirical problem with the desperation thesis is that the annihilation policy was adopted in October, after the Herero military threat had drastically decreased and the entire population was facing starvation to death in the desert. The desperation argument would predict self-restraint in the aftermath of Waterberg – when German leaders correctly perceived that insurgents had no way to win. In spite of that, we observe just the opposite behaviour: Germany resorted to genocidal violence when insurgents had become almost completely powerless. Considering the extreme weakness of insurgents after Waterberg and German awareness that their opponents wanted to surrender, one would expect the desperation argument to be easily confirmed; its failure in such a favourable case, then, seriously undermines Downes' thesis. The case of German counterinsurgency would indicate that desperation to win is not a necessary condition for civilian targeting.[33]

French counterinsurgency in Madagascar would point to similar conclusions. The Malagasy insurgency began on the 29th of March 1947 and aimed to independence from France. Insurgents, however, could only take control of the South-East of the island while the other areas remained loyal to France. Importantly, the Malagasy insurgency was seriously affected by severe shortage of guns and ammunition: indeed, overall insurgents could rely on no more than 150 rifles and three heavy machine guns, while most fighters would use arrows, knives, and spears (Clayton 1994: 84).

As the French began to send troops to Madagascar in April 1947, insurgents' situation deteriorated. By October 1947 rebels had run out of food and ammunition; besides, the French troops had inflicted heavy casualties on insurgents (Clayton 1994: 83-84). By February 1949 the insurgency had been defeated and their leaders had been arrested or killed. Due to insurgents' firepower deficiency, France took only 350 casualties in two years; in spite of that, the French did victimize civilians.

Indeed, since the beginning of the campaign France resorted to mass shootings of non-combatants as a reprisal after insurgents' attacks, indiscriminate bombings, scorched-earth measures, torture of prisoners, and rape (Bénot 2003: 528). The number of civilian fatalities is disputed. According to a conservative estimate, the French killed at least

[33] As mentioned in the Introduction (see above: 13), this case would also question the causal nexus between the perceived effectiveness or necessity of civilian targeting and the fate of civilians in counterinsurgency.

11,000 non-combatants from April 1947 to February 1949; however, according to a confidential assessment by the French Army itself, civilian deaths would number 89,000 (Clayton 1994: 85); overall, historians tend to agree that the French killed at least 40,000 civilians (Bénot 2003: 528).

The brutal campaign of France against an insurgency that posed a very limited military threat and lacked modern guns would challenge the desperation thesis. Indeed, under the conditions described above, the desperation thesis would predict self-restraint on the French side rather than civilian victimization.

The desperation argument would also fail other important tests. The U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq seriously challenges the desperation argument. Indeed, the United States refrained from massive civilian targeting even if all efforts to achieve a quick victory over a resilient insurgency proved unsuccessful (Dodge 2006, 2007; Hashim 2006). The Iraqi insurgency had different religious and ethnic backgrounds as well as different political objectives (Hashim 2006: Ch. 2), but all factions pursued the end of the U.S. occupation. After invading Iraq and toppling Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the United States had to confront a guerrilla insurgency involving the Sunnis and Al-Qaida in Iraq. In the following four years the U.S. military suffered approximately 3700 casualties and political stability in Iraq remained elusive.[34] Again, despite insurgents' resilience and increasing U.S. frustration about their failure to pacify Iraq, the United States never embraced a policy of deliberate civilian victimization, which is inconsistent with the desperation thesis.

Addressing the case of U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq, however, Alexander Downes insists that U.S. self-restraint is actually consistent with his argument. Firstly, Downes argues that Iraqi insurgents did not inflict heavy casualties on the U.S. troops: over 3700 deaths in four years would not prove that the United States was facing a serious military threat, so it would not be surprising that the United States did not target civilians (2008: 237-238). Secondly, Downes suggests that the United States did not want to defeat the Iraqi insurgents; rather, the United States simply planned to hold insurgents off and pass the burden of fighting to a stable Iraqi government and its own national troops (2008: 238). In sum, the United States was desperate to leave Iraq rather than desperate to win and so civilian victimization should not be expected in this case.

There are three reasons why this defense of the desperation thesis is not fully convincing. Firstly, Downes' criteria to assess whether a guerrilla insurgency poses a

[34] Figures about U.S. combat casualties in Iraq come from http://icasualties.org, accessed on 13th February 2014.

serious threat are not always clear. Indeed, considering other cases where insurgents were less lethal than Iraqi fighters and counterinsurgents were more brutal than the United States in Iraq, Downes seems to accept that the incumbent state was desperate to win. For example, Downes (2008: 10) mentions the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in the Philippines (1899-1902) as a case in which civilian targeting is consistent with his thesis[35] and implies that the Filipino insurgency posed a significant threat which made the United States desperate to win.[36] However, during the Philippines campaign over 3,000 U.S. soldiers died from disease or other causes, whereas U.S. combat casualties numbered 1037 only (Linn 1999: 550). Now, if the ability to inflict approximately 1000 combat casualties in almost three years is enough to qualify an insurgency as a significant military threat, it becomes necessary to concede that the Iraqi insurgents were also posing a serious challenge to the United States as they killed over 3700 U.S. soldiers in four years. Consequently, U.S. self-restraint in Iraq remains a problem for Downes' argument.

Importantly, if one still insists that the Iraqi insurgency was not a serious threat to the United States despite 3,700 U.S. casualties in four years, then it becomes necessary to concede that the Filipino insurgency was not a serious threat either because it was not more lethal. As a result, the U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines would become an empirical failure for the desperation thesis: indeed, if the United States was confronting only a minor military threat in the Philippines, then Downes' thesis would predict a high level of U.S. self-restraint; nonetheless, the U.S. military victimized dozens of thousands of Filipino non-combatants. In sum, any attempt to save Downes' argument in the case of Iraq by denying the importance of the Iraqi insurgency as a military threat would only expose the desperation thesis to another – and even more serious – empirical failure.

Secondly, Downes seems to disregard leaders' perceptions of the military threats they are confronting. Rather, he seems to be proposing – though not always consistently – an objective criterion to assess the level of threat posed by guerrilla insurgencies. Specifically, he uses the number of casualties per day as a yardstick to evaluate the importance of a guerrilla threat (2008: 237). This approach neglects a basic fact: it is state leaders that assess the level of threat an insurgency is posing and decide the appropriate response to it. So, if we are to explain why states decide to victimize civilians, then we have to focus on leaders' own military threat assessment during a

[35] Over 100,000 civilians died in the U.S.-Filipino war (Valentino 2004: 203-204).
[36] Benjamin Valentino also mentions the U.S.-Filipino war as a case of mass killing in counterinsurgency which confirms his argument (2004: 196).

campaign. Now, U.S. leaders did perceive the Iraqi insurgency as an extremely violent and dangerous one, especially between 2004 and 2007 (Biddle, Fridman, and Shapiro 2012), but did not victimize non-combatants.

Finally, Downes' contention that the United States avoided civilian targeting because the U.S. government was desperate to leave Iraq and not desperate to win is just a restatement of the problem. Desperation to leave an occupied territory where a full scale insurgency is taking place is evidence that the occupying power has become frustrated and sceptical about its victory chances. Frustration about the outcome of counterinsurgency operations and the duration of the conflict is a condition under which states should be likely to kill civilians, according to Downes. This simply takes us back to the question: why did the United States choose an exit strategy rather than an escalation of civilian victimization in pursuit of victory?

More importantly, the contention that the United States did not aim to defeat the Sunni insurgency militarily contradicts one of the basic assumptions of the desperation thesis: under international anarchy, states want to win every time they fight (see above). In the desperation thesis this assumption serves the crucial logical purpose to admit desperation to win as a potential outcome, one that may actually come about depending on insurgents' popular support and lethality. Downes, however, seems to suspend that assumption in the specific case of the U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, thus ruling out the very possibility that the United States could have ever become desperate to win in its long struggle against the Sunni insurgency and al-Qaida in Iraq. While this step enables Downes to save his argument from an empirical failure, one is left wondering why one of the basic assumptions of the desperation thesis would not apply in the case of Iraq.

Another case that would deserve a closer look in is the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960). This case would not apparently challenge the predictions of the desperation thesis on the dependent variable, but it would still question its causal logic. The desperation thesis contends that the incumbent will resort to indiscriminate violence only as a late resort strategy, not as a means to achieve a quick victory. Yet, recent historical studies on the Malayan emergency reveal that between June 1948 and December 1949 Britain chose a counter-terror strategy – including scorched-earth, mass deportation, indiscriminate shootings – based on the belief that it would undermine insurgents' popular base before the rebellion could gain momentum (Bennett 2009). This would run counter the contention that indiscriminate violence is a late resort strategy incumbent states would use only after the promise of a quick victory has faded

away.

In spite of these limits, the insight that counterinsurgency policies are a function of leaders' strategic calculation is a valuable contribution to the understanding of civilian targeting in warfare. Building on this insight, in the next chapter I will present my model.

1.6 Conclusions

After considering the practitioner literature, in this chapter I have assessed political scientists' theses about the use of civilian targeting or barbarism in counterinsurgency and I found that they are unconvincing.

Faced with the dubious performance of their explanations, political scientists may look for alternative causal factors. Yet, the problem with current theses of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency may be the way political scientists have built their theories rather than the causal factors they have selected.

Political scientists aim to find causal relationships among variables which can be generalized to the whole population of cases. In pursuit of this goal, political scientists have displayed a peculiar preference for parsimony in building their theories: "political scientists attempt to explain as much as possible with as little theoretical apparatus as possible" (Levy 2001: 54). Political scientists' preference for simplification derives from their interest in generalization:

> The more complex and nuanced an explanation, the less likely that it will "travel well" across cases. No two cases are exactly alike, and the more one explains what is unique to a particular case, the less one can use the same conceptual apparatus to explain the essential features of another case (Levy 2001: 55-56).

As a result, political scientists will prefer a theory to another if the first explains as much as the second but with fewer causal factors.

The theses assessed in this chapter reflect political scientists' preference for parsimony in theory-making. Indeed, current theses of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency rely on one preponderant independent variable. Excessive parsimony, however, can undermine the performance of a thesis as much as the use of several variables. Specifically, while complex explanations can be difficult to generalize, parsimonious theses may overestimate the explanatory power of the candidate causal factor. The arguments analyzed above show exactly this kind of problem: none of their causal factors can explain civilian targeting in counterinsurgency individually.

Considering the inadequacy of extremely parsimonious explanations, I suggest that typological theory can help us develop a better answer to the research questions of this work. In the next chapter I will propose, for the first time in this work, a typological model of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad.

CHAPTER 2

A TYPOLOGICAL MODEL OF CIVILIAN TARGETING IN COUNTERINSURGENCY ABROAD

In this chapter I will set out a typological model which explains the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency abroad. Firstly, I will shortly explain what a typological model is. Secondly, I will define and discuss my dependent variable (or study variable)[37] and set out its values. Each value on the dependent variable is a specific level of civilian victimization that should be explained. After that, I will introduce my independent variables – external threat environment and local alliance strategy – and specify their values. In doing so, I will suggest how each of my candidate causal factors can shape civilian targeting when considered individually. However, this would not be enough to explain the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. Indeed, in a typological model it is the combination of independent variable values that shapes the outcome on the dependent variable. Therefore, I will explain how my candidate causal factors combine and interact with each other to shape the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. This will clarify what value should be expected on the dependent variable for each combination of values on the independent variables.

2.1 Typological Theory: A Short Introduction

As explained above, political science research on indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency shows an excessive emphasis on parsimony in theory-making which, in turn, derives from political scientists' goal to generalize their theses. While generalization is essential in political science, the emphasis on parsimony can undercut the explanatory power of a theory, as noted above.

Typological theory would be a promising alternative. Indeed, typological theory can

[37]My definition of civilian targeting, however, can also be found in the Introduction.

produce generalizable explanations and predictions without sacrificing explanatory power. Typological theory would rather reduce the level of parsimony in theory-making – without dismissing it completely – thus resulting in models that include more than one causal factor to explain the phenomena of interest.

Indeed, typological theories include at least two causal factors; each factor can assume two or more values. Typological theories identify all the possible combinations of values on the candidate causal factors and explain how each combination – or type – leads to a specific outcome on the phenomenon being studied, thus clarifying all the causal mechanisms behind each outcome (George and Bennett 2005: 233-235). Importantly, typological theories admit equifinality, thus acknowledging that the same outcome can be the product of different types and causal mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 236).

Typological theories do not aim to generate one explanation equally valid for the whole universe of cases indistinctly; rather, typological theories generate as many explanations and divide the universe of cases into as many subgroups as the number of types; each explanation, therefore, is generalized only to one subgroup of cases under the conditions associated with each type (George and Bennett 2005: 236-237). In this way, typological theories accommodate the causal complexity of political phenomena like barbarism while allowing for contingent generalizations. Finally, typological theory would be of greater practical value for policy-makers than parsimonious models as it would permit "more discriminating diagnoses of emerging situations" (George and Bennett 2005: 237). Indeed, each type can be considered as a possible scenario that political leaders may have to confront under specific circumstances.[38]

The interest in typologies and typological theory has been growing in the field of IR. Indeed, typological theory underpins scholarly research on the impact of revolutions on the outbreak of war (Walt 1996), the causes of military interventionism (Bennett 1999), and the sources of military effectiveness (Castillo 2014). IR research on civilian targeting in counterinsurgency, instead, has disregarded typological theory and its advantages. In this work, I try to break the current indifference by building a typological model that can explain why states target civilians with specific levels of brutality in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad.

2.2 The Level of Civilian Targeting as a Dependent Variable: Definition and Values

[38] In the conclusions of this work I will show the different challenges decision-makers may have to face in each of the scenarios of my model.

As I explained in my Introduction, by civilian targeting I mean a state sanctioned policy consisting of deliberate and organized indiscriminate violence and coercion perpetrated by the incumbent state against the freedom, property, and life of non-combatants in an attempt to defeat an insurgency.

Some elements of this definition need to be specified further. Firstly, indiscriminate violence is intended as part of a military strategy approved by the national leaders. Consequently, we need to observe the perceptions and beliefs of political and military leaders. Furthermore, since civilian targeting is intended as a part of an officially sanctioned state policy, indiscriminate violence resulting from individual or collective misconduct falls outside the scope of this study. Likewise, civilian deaths occurred as a consequence of collateral damage fall outside the scope of my research: this work only deals with intentional violence.

Secondly, I focus on the targeting of 'civilians' or 'non-combatants', but what do those terms refer to? By 'civilian' or 'non-combatant' I mean any individual who is not proved to be an insurgent fighter or a supporter of insurgents. Groups of people who are simply suspected to be cooperating with insurgents but cannot be proved to be fighters or insurgents' collaborators would still qualify as civilians or non-combatants. So when the incumbent state targets a group of people without evidence that the victims are actually affiliated to insurgents, that behaviour would qualify as civilian targeting.

Finally, under my definition, violence and coercion against non-combatants are specifically aimed to limit civilians' freedom, deprive them of their property, and endanger or destroy their life. By 'freedom' I mean the right not to be detained or suffer personal restrictions unless there is evidence of participation in combat against the incumbent or active support for insurgents. By 'property' I mean any goods owned by individuals and groups of people as well as public infrastructures that provide a community with shelter, sustenance, and important services. Property would include money, houses, farms, sources of food like crop fields and livestock, sources of water and electricity like wells, dykes, and power stations, among the other things. Finally, by 'life' I simply mean physical survival.

The concept of civilian targeting can assume three different values, which form three different levels of civilian victimization. Each level of civilian victimization represents the type of damage that the incumbent state deliberately inflicts on civilians' freedom,

property, and life. The level civilian targeting can be moderate, high, or extreme.[39]

The level of civilian targeting is 'moderate' when the incumbent employs force indiscriminately to restrict non-combatants' freedom, reduce the amount of resources they can rely on, and limit their ability to use their property. Importantly, when the level of civilian targeting is moderate, force is not aimed to displace civilians permanently during the campaign or undermine their survival: rather, the incumbent intentionally avoids deporting non-combatants or causing civilian deaths. Examples of a moderate level of civilian targeting are curfews, cordon-and-search operations, mass screening, mass arrests, collective fines, punitive confiscations, and intentional damage of property. These measures restrict civilians' freedom for a limited period of time and disrupt non-combatants' conditions of living; however, such measures are not intended to leave civilians homeless or relocate them to concentration camps, cause starvation, or kill non-combatants. Importantly, the incumbent state should not necessarily be expected to use all the measures listed above at the same time. For instance, counterinsurgents can decide to target civilians' freedom rather than property and resort to curfews, mass arrests, and cordon-and-search operations rather than punitive confiscations or collective fines and vice versa. However, when the incumbent state is relying on the measures mentioned above, the level of civilian targeting is moderate.

The level of civilian targeting is 'high' when the incumbent state resorts to indiscriminate violence against civilians' freedom, property, and life but does not intend to exterminate insurgents' popular base. The incumbent uses force with intent to displace and starve, deport, or kill civilians but violence is not aimed to annihilate or undermine the existence of the victim group after the conflict. When the level of civilian targeting is high we should expect to see scorched-earth measures designed to leave civilians permanently homeless and destroy any source of sustenance, mass deportation to concentration camps, torture, the creation of free-fire zones, summary executions, the indiscriminate bombing or shelling of cities and villages, and any other measure that can determine civilian deaths, including the deliberate neglect of the basic physical needs of people in captivity. Again, the incumbent may not use all of those measures at the same time: the level of civilian targeting can be defined as 'high' even if the incumbent relies on some of those measures but not others.

[39] It is convenient to remind my readers here that, as my first research question highlights, the phenomenon I want to explain is the *level of civilian targeting*, not civilian targeting generically. In other words, I do not want to explain why states use indiscriminate violence or not: indeed, as explained in the introduction, it is virtually impossible to have a counterinsurgency campaign in which civilians are not targeted at all. Therefore, accepting that barbarism is inevitable, I set out to explain what makes the level of civilian targeting more or less prominent, that is moderate, high, or extreme.

Civilian targeting is extreme when the incumbent state employs force against the freedom, property, and life of non-combatants in an attempt to annihilate insurgents' popular base. The incumbent wants to end the insurgency by destroying the victim group once and for all. As a result, the incumbent will use the same measures we should expect to see when the level of civilian targeting is high, but it will do so in an attempt to exterminate the victim group.

Based on my definition of the dependent variable and its values we can assess the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. Just to give few examples, the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency was moderate in the case of British campaign in Palestine during the Great Arab Revolt (Hughes 2009; Norris 2008); it was high in the cases of the Second Anglo-Boer war, the Vietnam war, and the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan; it shifted from high to extreme in the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (see Chapter 7). In the next section, I will point to causal factors that can help explain variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency.

2.3 The Independent Variables: External Threat Environment and Local Alliance Strategy

In this section I will define my candidate causal factors and the values they can assume. My independent variables are the 'external threat environment' as perceived by the incumbent state and the 'local alliance strategy' of the incumbent itself. These causal factors are entirely related to the environmental stimuli and constraints that the incumbent state is facing while fighting against insurgents. The insight behind the choice of my causal factors is that counterinsurgency campaigns take place in two inevitable contexts: the international system of states and the society of the territory affected by an insurgency. In spite of this, the role of those two contexts has received scant attention in the political science literature on civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. In my model, instead, I bring those factors back in.

2.3.1 External Threat Environment: Definition and Values

The first independent variable in my model is 'external threat environment'. The literature on the subject examined above tends to consider the confrontation between insurgents and counterinsurgents as a duel involving two actors. As a result, civilian targeting in counterinsurgency is explained as a function of the identity and strategies of

the belligerents. The international context in which counterinsurgency campaigns take place is often disregarded as a potential factor behind civilian victimization. Even Alexander Downes, who takes the potential stimuli of the international system into account, does not attribute a causal role to international factors. As we have seen, Downes considered international anarchy only to explain why states prefer quick victories with low casualties every time they fight (see above); civilian targeting, instead, is presented as a product of the incumbent's strategic calculations in the context of a dyadic interaction between insurgents and counterinsurgents.

In my work, instead, I surmise that international factors play a relevant role in shaping the level of civilian targeting. As mentioned above, the reason why I focus on international factors is that counterinsurgency campaigns – like any other type of armed conflict – inevitably take place in an anarchical international system where states compete for power and territory (Mearsheimer 2001; Waltz 1979). In the competitive context of the international system, counterinsurgency campaigns abroad consume the power and resources of the incumbent and make it potentially vulnerable to other states not involved in the conflict: indeed, when a state is struggling against a powerful and popular insurgency, other states may see the conflict as an opportunity to take advantage of unrest in the insurgent territory and erode the power position of the incumbent state. For example, other states may assist insurgents with diplomatic, economic, or military means. However, what matters most for the purpose of my study is how the incumbent state perceives the intentions and actions of other states, not what other states actually do.

The variable of external threat environment refers to the intentions of a third-party state or group of states *as perceived by the incumbent itself*. Following Robert Jervis' definition (1976: 48), the notion of intention indicates the objectives of a state and its willingness and ability to take risks and bear costs in pursuit of its goals. Therefore, for the purpose of my work, 'external threat environment' is the incumbent state's perception of the willingness and ability of other states to impose their hegemony over the insurgent territory at the expense of the incumbent itself.

Before specifying the values that this concept can assume, a point should be stressed. I consider threats as a function of the incumbent's perceptions of the external environment. I do not try to assess or measure the existence of 'objective threats' to the incumbent's hegemony over the insurgent territory regardless of state leaders' perceptions. The reason behind my conceptualization of external threats as a function of leaders' perceptions is related to my research aim: indeed, I set out to explain the

decisions and behaviour of the incumbent towards non-combatants. Now, external threats can shape an actor's behaviour if – and only if – they are perceived as such. For example, a state can have hostile intentions or take aggressive steps against another state, but if the target state does not realize the nature of such intentions and actions then its behaviour will be unaffected: it would be *as if* a threat did not exist at all, even if in fact a threat does exist; likewise, a state can have peaceful intentions towards another state and act accordingly, but if the latter misinterprets that behaviour as being hostile then its reactions may become alarmed or violent: it would be *as if* there were a threat, even if in fact there is no threat (Jervis 1970, 1976: Ch.1-2, 1978: 174-176). Therefore, if one sets out to explain the impact of external threats on an actor's behaviour, it is essential to focus on an actor's perceptions, not the 'objective' presence of threats.[40] This is why, given the explanatory goal of my study, I focus on perceptions of threat as an independent causal factor and find it unnecessary to assess whether those perceptions are correct or not.[41]

This having been said, the concept of threat environment can assume two values. The external threat environment can be 'unfavourable' or 'favourable'. The threat environment is 'unfavourable' when the incumbent state believes – rightly or wrongly – that a hostile third-party state is willing and able to undermine the incumbent hegemony over the insurgent territory and include it into its own sphere of influence. What does it exactly mean? It means that, based on the incumbent state's perceptions, other states may have an intention to annex the insurgent territory, or turn it into their own colony, or simply turn it into an independent client state and undermine the security of the incumbent itself.[42] Besides, when the threat environment is unfavourable, the incumbent also believes that third-party states have enough military capabilities and political influence to achieve their apparent goals. The threat environment is 'favourable' when the incumbent state believes – rightly or wrongly – that no other state or group of states are willing and able to impose their hegemony over the insurgent territory at the

[40] Examples of works that explain states' behaviour as a function of threat perceptions and perception of intentions include Edelstein (2002) and Walt (1987, 1996).

[41] An understanding of external threats as a phenomenon that matters regardless of an actor's perceptions would make more sense in historical studies of counterinsurgency campaigns where the researcher sets out to assess whether civilian victimization was justified either strategically or morally under specific circumstances. In this case the researcher may try to highlight the gap between leaders' perceptions and the 'actual' or 'objective' presence of threats as they appear to the analyst or the scholar.

[42] Other states can fuel the suspicions of the incumbent state in many ways. For example the leaders of other states can repeatedly express their sympathy for insurgents, get other states to condemn the incumbent as an aggressor, send troops to an area bordering on the insurgent territory, or threaten the incumbent to intervene in the conflict. It is essential to point out, however, that the exact source of the incumbent's perception of threat is not relevant for the purpose of my study. Indeed, I only need to know whether the incumbent perceives the external threat environment as with a sense of alarm or not.

expense of the incumbent state.

I argue that when the incumbent perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable, state leaders may be more likely to authorize brutal counterinsurgency strategies. The logic is that, if other states are perceived as willing and able to impose their hegemony over the insurgent territory at the expense of the incumbent, a military emergency may provide them with an opportunity to act upon their apparent intentions. As a consequence, the incumbent may become anxious to destroy insurgents' military forces and restore order. Indeed, the destruction of insurgents' forces would enable the incumbent to maintain its local hegemonic position and deprive third-party states of opportunities to interfere in the insurgent territory. The goal to destroy insurgents' military forces completely would generate an incentive to separate rebels from their popular base and erode insurgents' fighting power, which may result in civilian targeting as explained in the Introduction (see above).

Importantly, perceptions of threat can vary both diachronically and synchronically. A state can see the external threat environment as favourable – or unfavourable – at a specific point in time and change this perception at a later stage for any reason. Furthermore, a state that is fighting two counterinsurgency campaigns in two different areas of the world at the same time can see the external threat environment of a specific territory as favourable while perceiving the threat environment of a different territory as unfavourable at the same time. As a result, external threat environment is logically fit to explain both spatial and temporal variation in the level of civilian targeting.

2.3.2 Local Alliance Strategy: Definition and Values

The second independent variable of my model is the 'local alliance strategy' of the incumbent state. By 'local alliance strategy' I mean the association and cooperation policy of the incumbent state towards the different groups in the society of the insurgent territory. The reason for including the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state in my typological model is that counterinsurgency campaigns invariably take place in the context of the local society of the territory affected by the uprising, not just the international system. The national society of the insurgent territory may consist of different groups which may be competing against one another for political power and economic resources. A group may want to expropriate another one or protect the political and economic privileges gained in the past. I surmise that inter-group rivalry in the society of the insurgent territory can affect the level of civilian targeting in

counterinsurgency, *depending on the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state*.

The local alliance strategy of the incumbent relates to perceptions of interests. A state that is occupying a divided society may meet with fierce resistance from some groups, while other groups may see the presence of the incumbent as an opportunity to achieve their political goals. However, once again, what matters most for the purpose of my study is the incumbent's perception of an interest to support, appease, or protect a specific group against another. To be clear, a social or ethnic group that wants to become dominant may be willing to cooperate with the incumbent in exchange for protection and support, but if the incumbent believes – rightly or wrongly – that such an alliance would not serve its own interests – no matter how these interests are defined – then it will deny its protection, assume a neutral position, or support a different group.

Local alliance strategy can assume two values. The incumbent state is 'aligned' when it is supporting or appeasing – for the sake of a perceived self-interest – a group in the society of the insurgent territory that aims to expropriate the insurgent group and seize or preserve political and economic power at the expense of the insurgent population. The incumbent's local alliance strategy, instead, is 'neutral' when it is not supporting or appeasing any of the groups that aim to dispossess and subdue the insurgent population; likewise, the incumbent is 'neutral' when it is allied with a group which does not aim to expropriate or subdue any other group; finally, it would be correct to describe the local alliance strategy as 'neutral' even when the incumbent would like to impose a specific group as dominant, but that group refuses the support of the incumbent.

I suggest that when the government of the incumbent state is allied with a group that seeks to become dominant, then the incumbent is more likely to be brutal towards civilians. Indeed, political support for would-be dominant groups can induce the leaders of the incumbent state to dismiss the political grievances behind the insurgency and conclude that violence and coercion, rather than reforms, are the most appropriate way to deal with the insurgent group. Furthermore, even if the incumbent can see the grievances behind the insurgency and is willing to address them in principle, the perceived interest to support a would-be dominant group would hinder a policy of compromise: indeed, any concession to the insurgent group may undermine the local alliance. As a result, the incumbent may be unwilling or unable to negotiate a political solution to the insurgency and counterinsurgents will see unrestrained brutality as the only viable option. By contrast, when the incumbent is neutral, its leaders may be more likely to consider the grievances behind the insurgency and refrain from indiscriminate violence.

Like external threat environment, the local alliance strategy can show diachronic and synchronic variations. On the one hand, a state can decide to support a group in the insurgent territory in a specific point in time and dismiss it at a later stage. Indeed, the incumbent may redefine its interests over the course of the time and conclude that it is no longer convenient to keep up an alliance with a specific party or group. On the other hand, a state that is involved in two or more counterinsurgency campaigns at the same time, may decide to support a would-be dominant group in one case and be neutral in the other. This means that – like external threat environment – this candidate causal factor is logically fit to explain spatial and temporal variations in the use of civilian targeting.

So far, I have described my independent variables and I have simply suggested how each of them can pave the way to civilian victimization. However, that is not enough to explain *the level of civilian targeting* in counterinsurgency, which is the specific phenomenon I want to account for.[43] In order to achieve this explanatory goal in a typological model, I have to set out how my variables *combine and interact* to shape the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency as defined above (see above). Otherwise said, I have to clarify and explain the relation between each combination of my independent variable values – or type – and each dependent variable value – or level of civilian victimization. I will do that in the next paragraph.

2.4 How External Threat Environment and Local Alliance Strategy Shape the Level of Civilian Targeting in Counterinsurgency: Four Scenarios

Considering that each of my causal factors – or independent variables – can assume two values, my model includes four possible scenarios about the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency. In each scenario the level of civilian targeting reflects a combination of values on my causal factors. Each scenario is an ideal-type set of circumstances under which the incumbent state has strategic incentives to escalate or relent indiscriminate violence.

Table 2.1 below summarizes my model, including the predicted level of civilian targeting.

[43] See footnote 28.

Table 2.1. Variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency as predicted in my model.

		External Threat Environment	
		Unfavourable	Favourable
Local Alliance Strategy	Neutral	**Scenario 1:** High Level of Civilian Targeting	**Scenario 4:** Moderate Level of Civilian Targeting
	Aligned	**Scenario 3:** Extreme Level of Civilian Targeting	**Scenario 2:** High Level of Civilian Targeting

I will now explain the causal logic behind each scenario. The starting point of the logic behind my model is the same as the Third School of Thought: civilian targeting is a costly and unattractive option for states involved in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad. Indeed, civilian targeting may backfire: for example, violence against civilians can exacerbate the violent resistance of the victim group or induce other states to intervene with diplomatic, economic, or military means. In spite of that, states will not always prefer a moderate level of civilian targeting. I argue that the incumbent state's willingness to accept the risks associated with a specific level of indiscriminate violence will depend on the interactions between international and local political contexts as perceived by the incumbent itself.

According to **Scenario 1** in my model, when the incumbent state is not aligned with any would-be dominant group in the society of the insurgent territory but perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable, the level of civilian targeting is likely to be high. In Scenario 1, the incumbent state is not afraid to take the risks of indiscriminate

violence because its leaders believe that similar if not bigger risks have already materialized. In particular, the incumbent perceives that other states are willing and able to include the insurgent territory into their own sphere of influence and replace the incumbent as the local hegemon. The insurgency itself would provide third-party states with a potential opportunity to interfere and achieve their goal by providing insurgents with diplomatic or military support, for instance (see above). As a consequence, the incumbent may become more determined to destroy rebels' military forces completely – not necessarily quickly – and pacify the insurgent territory at all costs. Complete military success would enable the incumbent to maintain its local hegemonic position and deprive third-party states of pretexts and opportunities to interfere. Now, an emphasis on military success may lead to a high level of civilian targeting: indeed, in order to destroy insurgents' military forces it is essential to cut all the links between civilians and rebels. This cannot be done only with measures like curfews, cordon-and-search operations, or collective fines as they do not affect the ability of the civilian population to provide insurgents with shelter, information, and material resources. A moderate level of violence, in sum, may not eliminate the insurgency and the incumbent would still be exposed to the interference of another state or other group of states. Therefore, the leaders of the incumbent state would not be afraid to take the risks of a high level of civilian targeting and authorize measures like scorched-earth, mass deportations, the creation of free-fire zones, and indiscriminate bombing.

Importantly, in Scenario 1 civilian targeting would not be extreme or genocidal because the incumbent is not supporting any would-be dominant group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population. The expropriation and submission of a group would require a further escalation of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency because a group marked for dispossession and enslavement may put up fierce resistance or try to recoup its losses after getting dispossessed. However, since this goal is not pursued, the level of indiscriminate violence is unlikely to be further exacerbated. In sum, while alarmed perceptions of external threat environment are responsible for a high level of civilian targeting, a local alliance strategy based on neutrality would prevent violence from becoming genocidal.

When the incumbent state perceives the external threat environment as favourable but is supporting a group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population – **Scenario 2** – my model predicts a high level of civilian targeting again. The reason behind this outcome, however, is different. In Scenario 2 the incumbent state is supporting the political agenda of a would-be dominant group out of a perceived self-

interest. As long as the incumbent is allied with a would-be dominant group, the incumbent state will be unable or unwilling to acknowledge the grievances behind the insurgency and promote peaceful reforms to solve the problems that determined the rebellion. Indeed, if the incumbent negotiated with insurgents, its strategic partnership with would-be dominant allies may collapse and the perceived national interest behind that alliance would be damaged too. A moderate level of civilian targeting, however, may not be enough to appease a group pursuing the dispossession and submission of the insurgent population; besides, moderate violence may not be sufficient to break the resistance of the victim group. Therefore, the incumbent will tend to tolerate the potential risks related to a high level of civilian targeting.

However, in Scenario 2 civilian targeting would not be extreme because favourable perceptions of the external threat environment would make a genocide look too risky and, ultimately, unnecessary. Indeed, a genocidal level of violence may give other states a very powerful pretext to intervene in the conflict with economic and military sanctions. In sum, genocidal violence may quickly create an external threat where there is not one, which is why the incumbent will avoid an extreme level of civilian targeting in Scenario 2.

The external threat environment, however, would provide no deterrent against genocidal violence in **Scenario 3** in my model. In Scenario 3 the incumbent perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable, while supporting a group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population; under these conditions, my model predicts an extreme level of civilian targeting.

Indeed, support for a group that aims to deprive the insurgent population of economic resources and political rights would induce the incumbent to use the amount of force necessary to achieve such an ambitious objective. In principle, the amount of force necessary to expropriate and subdue an entire population might coincide with an extreme level of civilian targeting because a group marked for economic dispossession and political marginalization may put up fierce resistance in order to avoid such a grim fate; besides, the dispossessed group may always try to recoup its losses in the future. A policy of extermination would be a plausible solution to these problems because it would cancel the victim group as a political and economic entity and would make it impossible, or much more difficult, for that group to claim their rights and resources back after the conflict. However, as explained above, the use of a genocidal level of violence entails political and military risks that the incumbent may be reluctant to take, especially when the external threat environment is perceived as favourable. If the

incumbent perceives that no state is willing and able to undermine its control over the insurgent territory, a genocidal policy towards the insurgent group can be counterproductive, as happens in Scenario 2 (see above). By contrast, if the incumbent believes that the external threat environment is unfavourable already – as happens in Scenario 3 – then the international political arena would provide no deterrent against extreme violence and the goal to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population would be more likely to propel a genocidal level of civilian targeting in practice. In sum, genocide would happen because the aim to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population would provide the mainspring for it and the perceived external threat environment would not discourage such an extreme choice.

Finally, when the incumbent perceives the external threat environment as favourable and is not supporting any would-be dominant group, the level of civilian targeting is moderate. In **Scenario 4** the incumbent is most likely see all the risks of indiscriminate violence and be reluctant to accept them. Indeed, on the one hand, as the incumbent perceives no external threats to its hegemony over the insurgent territory, it will be more likely to consider that a high or extreme level of violence against civilians may provoke an external intervention and create a threat where there is not one; besides, high or extreme violence against civilians would be unnecessary because the incumbent state is not helping any other group to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population. As a result, the incumbent will prefer non-lethal measures like curfews, collective fines, cordon-and-search operations, mass arrests etc.

Based on the four typological scenarios described and explained above, we can divide the population of cases into four potential subgroups; each subgroup of cases will be explained by a specific combination of variables or type (see Appendix 1). This marks a relevant difference between the theses analyzed in my literature review and typological models. While the former provide the same explanation for all the cases in the population indistinctly, the latter provides as many explanations as the number of types. In this way, a typological model like mine admits that different groups of cases need to be explained differently and allows for contingent generalizations. Finally, since within-case variations on my candidate causal factors are possible, on the logical level a case can show a sequence of different scenarios: consequently, different phases of the same counterinsurgency campaign may belong in different groups[44] (see Chapter 7).

[44] This, however, is rarely the case. To my knowledge, only the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa happens to be an instance of more than one scenario (Scenario 1 and Scenario 3).

2.5 Conclusions

In this chapter I have presented my model which occupies a clear position with respect to the practitioner and the scholarly literatures. Indeed, my model answer relevant questions that practitioners mostly fail to address directly and political scientists answer unconvincingly. My model should be placed in the Third School of Thought as it builds on an understanding of civilian targeting as a product of the calculations of state leaders. In spite of that, there are major differences between my model the the other theories in the this group of arguments.

Firstly, while Downes and Valentino investigate how the military threat posed by insurgents affect the strategic calculations of state leaders, they disregard leaders' perceptions of political context. In my work, I bring political context back in. Since every counterinsurgency campaign inevitably takes place in the international system of states and the society of the insurgent territory, I investigate how perceptions of those contexts affect leaders' calculations and the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency.

Secondly, while Downes and Valentino tend to focus on 'objective' threats and their impact on leaders' strategic decisions, they pay no attention to leaders perceptions of threat. In this way, they implicitly suggest that leaders will inevitably end up seeing threats as they appear to the analyst or the scholar. Instead, I insist that threats can shape leaders' decisions only through leaders' perceptions. Perceptions and misperceptions are the basis of strategic calculations in my model.

Thirdly, I define civilian victimization more broadly than Downes and Valentino do. While Downes and Valentino consider civilian targeting in counterinsurgency as a military strategy that kills non-combatants, I intend civilian targeting as deliberate violence and coercion against the freedom, property and life of civilians. So, while Downes (2008: 212-213) and Valentino (2004: 229-230) conclude that civilian targeting did not happen in those cases in which the incumbent relied on mass deportation or property destruction but did not kill large groups of non-combatants – like British counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960) – I would still judge those cases as displaying a certain level of civilian targeting.[45]

[45]It is essential to note that when I assessed Downes' and Valentino's arguments in my literature review I evaluated their theses on their own terms. I asked if Downes' and Valentino's candidate causal factors

My model, however, also has limits. Firstly, while my model can predict the level of intentional damage the incumbent will inflict on civilians, it cannot predict the specific combination of violent measures that counterinsurgents will use. For example, my model predicts that in Scenario 1 – unfavourable threat environment and neutral alliance strategy – the incumbent will use a high level of civilian targeting in the form of scorched-earth, mass deportation, torture, free-fire zones, summary executions, and indiscriminate bombing. However, my model does not predict whether counterinsurgents will use all those measures or just some of them. To be clear, my model cannot say if states will resort to mass deportation and torture more often than indiscriminate bombing. My model only predicts that some of those measures should be expected.

Secondly, my model does not make for accurate predictions about the number of civilians that will be displaced, deported, starved and killed when the level of indiscriminate violence is high or extreme. Even if my model implies that unfavourable threat perceptions and political alignment with a would-be dominant group will induce the incumbent to consider the whole population as a target, this is not sufficient to infer the number of civilians that will be victimized. The number of non-combatants targeted by counterinsurgents might be affected by a factors like the size of insurgents' popular base and the size of the insurgent territory.

Finally, while my model can predict the level of civilian targeting that the incumbent will use in a territory under its control, it should not be expected to predict variations in the extent of indiscriminate violence in each region or province of that territory. Such a fine-grained prediction should be based on other factors that vary at a local level.

In spite of that, my model is still useful because it predicts an essential component of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency, namely the *type of damage* that the incumbent state deliberately inflicts on non-combatants. One may surmise that the number of civilians that may suffer displacement, deportation, starvation, torture, or violent death strongly depends on the incumbent's intentions about the type of damage that civilians should suffer – which is a factor my model can predict – rather than geography or population size. In effect, while recent research has found limited evidence that geographical factors like terrain affect the way counterinsurgents fight (Lyall and Wilson III 2009), it would be difficult to imagine a counterinsurgency campaign in which thousands of civilians are killed, displaced, or deported without a

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explained civilian victimization as defined in their own works. This would qualify as a fair approach to the task of testing their theses.

counterinsurgency strategy designed to inflict that level of damage on non-combatants. Therefore, even if my model predicts neither the exact combination of violent measures that the incumbent will use nor the number of civilians that will be targeted, it can still make a relevant contribution to knowledge by predicting how harshly counterinsurgents will want to treat civilians and the range of violent measures that the incumbent will use.

In Chapters 4-7 I will show and test the logic and predictions of my model. Before testing my model, however, I have to specify my methodology. That will be done in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

METHODOLOGY

3.1 Methodology Choices: Case Study

In Chapter 1 I proposed a typological model accounting for variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad and I set out my hypotheses on how my candidate causal factors interact to affect the values on my study variable. As a next step I will carry out a preliminary empirical test to prove the plausibility of my model. I have to increase my confidence that my independent variables shape the values on my dependent variables as I predict in each Scenario of my typological model. Besides, I need to show that my model is more convincing than the other competing explanations assessed in the review of the literature above. Which methods can enable me to accomplish these tasks?

In my work I will rely on the case study method to perform a preliminary empirical test of my typological model. Following Alexander George and Andrew Bennett (2005: 17-18), I understand the case study method as involving both within-case analysis and cross-case comparisons of a small number of cases,[46] where a case is defined as an instance of a class of events which forms a phenomenon of scientific interest.

I decided to adopt the case study method because it makes for a detailed observation of leaders' perceptions, beliefs, and calculations which play an essential role in my model. Indeed, I argue that the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency is related to the way political and military leaders see both the international environment surrounding the insurgent territory and the incumbent state's interests in that territory. I surmise that leaders' perceptions of other states' intentions and the incumbent's beliefs about the most convenient local alliance strategy can extenuate or magnify the level of indiscriminate violence civilians are likely to experience. So, in order to test my model, I need to verify whether state leaders believe that other states are willing and able to

[46] In my work I mostly perform within-case analysis, but comparisons between some of my cases – especially Cyprus and Kenya can be found in my dissertation.

incorporate the insurgent territory into their own sphere of influence at the expense of the incumbent; also, I need to assess whether state leaders' believe that it is convenient to support a would-be dominant group in the society of the territory affected by the insurrection; finally, I need to look for connections between those beliefs and an uncompromising attitude focused on the destruction of insurgents' forces and their popular base. The case study method nicely helps to perform this type of tasks.

One may object that, unlike quantitative methods, the case study method cannot strengthen my confidence in the external validity of my argument. In other words, I could not be sure that my hypotheses are correct and could explain all the other cases in the population which are not directly studied. The external validity problem, however, is relatively mild in my research because, as explained above, typological models like the one I created in this work do not aim to spot causal relationships that hold true in a wide variety of contexts. Typological models only aim to produce contingent generalizations. Therefore, I do not propose one general causal argument which is supposed to apply to the whole population of cases indistinctly. Rather, I identify four different Scenarios which divide the population of cases into four potential sub-groups (see Appendix 1) and I propose a different causal mechanism for each Scenario, as explained in the previous chapter. So, I only need to generalize each mechanism to the specific sub-group of cases in each cell, not the population as a whole. Importantly, in each cell I have a relatively limited number of possible cases. For example, even if there are ten cases that could be instances of Scenario 1 in my model, in the cell corresponding to Scenario 2 I only have two cases; only one case is present in the cell corresponding to Scenario 3; finally, no more than six cases can be found in the cell corresponding to Scenario 4. As a result, quantitative methods are not strictly necessary in my research.

Besides, my decision to adopt case study also depends on the practical difficulties to collect data on the entire population of cases, which is essential to use quantitative methods. Indeed, before I can employ quantitative methods to test my argument about the role of external threat environment and local alliance strategy, I need a database of leaders' external threat perceptions and beliefs about their local alliance interests in each case of counterinsurgency. Such a database does not exist and it would not be possible to build a reliable one in the short run. Leaders' perceptions can be identified through archival research and an analysis of primary sources and secondary sources. However, as I show in Appendix 1, there are at least twenty possible cases of major counterinsurgency campaigns abroad; overall these cases involve at least nine different incumbent states. Therefore, in order to build a database of leaders' perceptions, it

would be necessary to visit archives in nine different countries. This task is more suitable to a research team than an individual researcher working alone with very limited funding, and limited knowledge of foreign languages.

In conclusion, quantitative methods are neither essential nor practical in the specific context of my research, while the case study method is fit to test the type of model I proposed.

3.2 Case Selection and Analysis

Having justified my decision to rely on the case study method rather than statistics, I have to indicate the cases I will study, the reasons why I selected them, the way I will study them, and the way I will face the difficulties related to the method I have chosen. It will be done in this paragraph.

3.2.1 Case Selection Criteria

I will study the following cases: British counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960) and Cyprus (1955-1959), French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954-1962), and German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (1904-1907). It is essential to clarify case selection criteria because the way cases are chosen may bias conclusions by predetermining the outcome of a study: for example, selecting cases on the basis of the dependent variable values can bias the researcher's conclusions by constraining possible variations on the dependent variable itself which, in turn, leads to an underestimation of the impact of the independent variables[47] (see Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990; King, Keohane, and Verba 1994: 129-132).

I selected the above mentioned cases for different reasons. Firstly, since I need to show and test all the possible combinations of values on my causal factors and all the causal mechanisms included in my model, I had to select cases that could be instances of each of the four Scenarios in my typological model. Consequently, I chose those cases because they display cross-case variation on my independent variables. Indeed, each of the above mentioned cases shows a different combination of values on my candidate causal factors. Specifically, a preliminary analysis of primary and secondary sources indicates that British counterinsurgency in Kenya and Cyprus relate to Scenarios 2 and

[47]It was observed, however, that case selection on the dependent variable would not necessarily bias inferences drawn from within-case analysis because process-tracing does not rely on covariation and intuitive regression. See Bennett and Elman (2006: 461).

4 respectively, French counterinsurgency in Algeria relates to Scenario 1, and German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa becomes an example of Scenario 3 after the variation in the local alliance strategy of Germany (see Chapter 7).

The choice of the specific cases to study from each Scenario was partly determined by the number of cases actually available. For example, the German campaign in South-West Africa is the only case in the history of the twentieth century that corresponds to Scenario 3 in my model after the evolution of Germany's local alliance strategy (see Chapter 7). As a result, I had no alternative to test the causal mechanism I posit when unfavourable threat perceptions combine with support for a would-be dominant group. My case selection was also influenced by the need to include instances of states fighting two counterinsurgency campaigns simultaneously in order to account for spatial variations on my study variable. So, the case of British campaign in Kenya and the parallel campaign in Cyprus because were selected because those conflicts are a rare instance of a state confronting insurgencies in two different territories at the same time.

Secondly, in addition to the variation on my independent variables, I chose the above mentioned cases because they offer favourable conditions for the competing arguments I analyzed in my literature review. As George and Bennett point out (2005: 121-122), a case provides favourable conditions when the causal factor(s) of the thesis being assessed is at values that should easily lead to the predicted outcome; if the thesis fails such a test, then we can be less confident that it can explain other cases showing less favourable conditions.

The regime type argument should be easily confirmed in the cases of the British and French campaigns because Great Britain and France ranked among the most democratic states in the world; besides, the regime type factor should explain indiscriminate violence in the case of South-West Africa because Germany was far from being a liberal democracy at the time.

The cases I selected would also provide favourable conditions for the arguments pointing to military organizational factors too. In the cases of French counterinsurgency in Algeria and German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa the military claimed a high degree of operational autonomy. Under these conditions it should be easy to connect military organizational factors to the case outcome.

Also, the campaigns in Kenya, Algeria and South-West Africa should easily support the contention that the perceived image of the enemy is responsible for the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency because racial prejudice against the insurgent population was evident, if not rampant.

Finally, the campaigns in Kenya, Cyprus and South-West Africa would provide favourable conditions for the desperation argument's prediction that the incumbent will be self-restrained when facing enemies that cannot inflict a high number of losses: indeed, the insurgencies in the three cases mentioned above, lacked military power and could inflict a very limited number of casualties on the incumbent. The case of Algeria should easily confirm the desperation thesis' contention that the incumbent will target civilians when facing powerful and popular insurgencies because Algerian insurgents did build up a vast popular base and had considerable military power.

So far I have listed the cases I selected for study and I have explained the reasons why I chose them. Now I have to explain how I will study my cases.

3.2.2 Congruence Method and Process-Tracing.

The internal validity of a model is affected by the way a case will be studied. The concept of internal validity is about the task to prove that the causal relationship of interest is actually operating in the case or group of cases selected.

Internal validity is a relevant issue in the case study method because social phenomena are seldom, if ever, influenced by one factor alone. Given the complexity of the social world, the candidate causal factors of a model may not be the only variables that influence the outcome on the phenomena being studied. While these factors may be neither necessary nor sufficient to account for the case outcome, they may still interfere with the causal process that one sets out to highlight. For example, as I showed in my literature review, the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency may be influenced by such factors as regime type, military organizational interests and culture, force structure and intelligence collection capabilities, the perceived image of the enemy, as well as the strategic calculations of state leaders. Even when those factors do not play a decisive role in shaping the level of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency, they may still affect my study variable, or the phenomenon I want to explain. Hence a question: how can I improve my confidence that my independent variables explain the level of civilian targeting in the cases I will study?

One option might be controlled comparison in the form of the method of difference which is designed to highlight a correlation between the independent and the dependent variables while controlling for potentially disturbing factors. The method of difference mimics the scientific experiment and relies on the logic of elimination. The researcher looks for cases which are similar in all respects except the outcome on the study

variable and the candidate causal factor. The factors that are held constant in this way cannot be responsible for the different outcome on the dependent variable in each case, whereas the factors which were not present in both cases may possibly have had a causal effect on the study variable (George and Bennett 2005: 156; Van Evera 1997: 57).

Controlled comparison, however, is not easy to achieve as the researcher would need to be sure that all the relevant disturbing factors have been identified and eliminated; consequently, the researcher's inferences may be spurious or not valid. More importantly, even if the researcher can think of all the possible background conditions that can affect the case outcome, the higher the number of potential disturbing factors, the rarer the cases that are similar in all respects but one (Lijphart 1971: 688). Indeed, considering the above mentioned disturbing factors in my research, it was impossible for me to find the kind of cases required to perform controlled comparison. Finally, even if the researcher can find two most similar cases, controlled comparison assumes that a specific outcome on the dependent variable can only come from the same independent variable operating through the same mechanism; otherwise said, controlled comparison excludes equifinality, a situation in which the same outcome on the study variable comes by way of different causal paths (George and Bennett 2005: 157). So, when the researcher eliminates some potentially disturbing factors through the method of difference, the researcher may miss alternative paths which would lead to the same outcome. Since controlled comparison does not include different causal paths, it would be incompatible with a typological model like mine which openly acknowledges equifinality and highlights different causal mechanisms behind the level of civilian targeting (see Chapter 2).

Considering the problems with controlled comparison, I decided to focus on within-case analysis. I will study my cases by using the congruence method and, when possible, process-tracing. As Alexander George and Andrew Bennett explain (2005: 181), according to the congruence procedure the researcher works with a model which predicts a specific case outcome on the basis of the values on the candidate causal factors. The researcher observes the variations of the values on the independent and the dependent variables in the case at hand and then compares those observations with the model predictions: if the former are consistent with the latter then “the analyst can entertain the possibility that a causal relationship may exist” (2005: 181).

Such a prudent conclusion is justified by the fact that the congruence method does not require that the investigator should trace a causal process and so a causal relationship

may be inferred on the basis of a mere consistency. In this way, it cannot be excluded that the values on the dependent variable actually derive from a causal factor that the researcher may have missed, especially if the case outcome is also consistent with the predictions of other theories (George and Bennett 2005: 186). In my research, for example, the level of civilian targeting in the case of British counterinsurgency in Cyprus would be consistent with the regime type argument, while the use of barbarism in the case of British counterinsurgency in Kenya would be apparently consistent with the argument pointing to the perceived image of the enemy as a major cause of civilian targeting. So, when relying on the congruence method, one needs to ask whether the predictions of other theories pointing to different causal factors are equally consistent with the case outcome; importantly, one needs to show the causal path connecting the candidate causal factor to the study variable and prove that the alternative causal paths of competing and equally consistent theories are not operating and cannot explain the case outcome. This can be done by using process-tracing.

Process-tracing is designed to show a causal process in all its phases. It highlights the chain of events connecting the causal factors of interests and the mechanism behind that chain as predicted by a theory or a model (George and Bennett 2005: 206). In this way, process-tracing strengthens the plausibility of an argument by highlighting causation, especially when matched with evidence of congruence between the prediction of a model and the variations on the values on the dependent variable. Process-tracing can also be used to assess competing arguments that seem to be consistent with the case outcome (George and Bennett 2005: 207). If process-tracing shows that events unfolded as predicted by congruent rival arguments in the case at hand, then the researcher should rethink his or her own model; otherwise, the model being tested is provisionally confirmed. So, I will use process-tracing as much as possible to highlight the causal process I posited in each Scenario of my model and check the causal mechanisms of rival arguments when the predictions of competing theses are congruent with the outcome of the cases I will study.

Yet, caution is in order. Process-tracing requires a high amount of information on each step of decision-making. This means that the availability of primary sources containing data about leaders' reasons for making a specific decision and not others is essential for process-tracing to be carried out successfully. Besides, even if relevant documents are available, one may still be unable to trace the whole process connecting the causal factor to the phenomenon being studied. Indeed, decision-makers may not even want to consider a specific policy as an option and will not mention it in official documents,

therefore it will be impossible for the researcher to specify the reasons that induced decision-makers to discard that policy.

This may be a problem in my work. Indeed, not only do I aim to explain why civilian targeting is high or moderate under certain circumstances, but I also set out to explain why it is not extreme under the same conditions. Indeed, in the cases of Kenya (Scenario 2), Cyprus (Scenario 4) and Algeria (Scenario 1) state leaders do not even consider extermination as an option; as a result, in official documents state leaders never mention the reasons why extermination should not be pursued. As we shall see, the silence of state leaders about extreme violence in the above mentioned cases is fully consistent with the predictions of Scenarios 1, 2 and 4 in my model; in spite of that, it is not possible to show the causal process behind the rejection of genocidal violence posited in my model. In other cases, information on the decision-making process is very limited because no accurate record was kept, documents have been destroyed or are not accessible yet. For example, in the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria, it would be impossible to find detailed information about the reasons behind De Gaulle's decisions because most primary sources are not accessible.

As a result, the congruence method – which can be applied on the basis of secondary sources – will be prominent in my work and process-tracing will be performed only as long as data are available.

3.3 Data Collection.

My case studies will require data on leaders' perceptions of external threats as well as their calculations about their local alliance strategy. My work will also require data regarding leaders' decisions about the most suitable type of military strategy to confront an insurgency. It is important to specify here that by 'decision on military strategy' I mean both the making of a military plan by political leaders themselves and the approval (or rejection) of plans conceived by other officials that do not occupy a prominent position in the national government. To be clear, a leader can make a decision on military strategy based on his or her perceptions and calculations not only when he or she conceives and imposes a plan about how to fight, but also when he or she rejects or approves of plans made by other actors.

In my work I will collect that type of data through secondary sources like historical studies on the counterinsurgency campaigns I selected and archival research on primary sources like official documents, when available.

The analysis of archival documents seems to be an adequate way to collect my data, considering the type of independent variables I point to in my work. Indeed, leaders' perceptions of external threats and calculations about local alliance strategies are likely to be reflected in the official records and documents of political and military institutions. Importantly, archival documents relating to past events are more likely than other data collection methods to reflect leaders' perceptions, beliefs, and decisions as they developed in the contemporary context (Trachtenberg 2006: 154).

In spite of that, the evidential value of archival material cannot simply be taken for granted. The researcher may draw distorted conclusions from official documents if their specific background is not considered. As George and Bennet (2005: 99) remind us, archival documents are a form of purposeful communication. The content of a document may have been shaped by the goals its author was pursuing under the peculiar conditions of the time when the document was prepared. Therefore the value of its content should be considered in the light of those elements. For example, an official document in which military leaders express great concern to the government about an external threat while a national debate on the military budget is taking place might not be evidence of a genuine threat perception; rather, it might reflect an attempt to influence political decisions about military expenditures, at least to some extent. In sum, when handling official documents, the investigator should not simply focus on what is said, but also on "who is speaking to whom, for what purpose, and under what circumstances" (George and Bennett 2005: 100).

Another potential problem with archival research as a data collection method comes from the impact of cognitive dissonance on the researcher's work. As psychologists suggest (see Festinger 1957), most people tend to focus their attention on data which seem consistent with their favourite interpretations of events and show a propensity to attach evidential significance to those data readily; at the same time, people tend to neglect or resist discrepant information and set a much higher standard for accepting evidence that seems to contradict their pre-existing beliefs or interpretations. Researchers, just like ordinary people, are exposed to cognitive dissonance or a confirmation bias (George and Bennett 2005: 217). In archival research cognitive dissonance may induce the investigator to look for data supporting his or her model, accept favourable evidence readily, downplay discrepant information and evidence consistent with other explanations for the case at hand, or fail to consider alternative

explanations at all.[48]

While the problem of confirmation bias cannot be completely eliminated, some precautions can be taken to reduce its impact on the data collection process. Firstly, one should be clear about the type of evidence which could refute one's own model. Arguably, cognitive dissonance is most likely to affect the collection of data if the researcher has thought of the type of data which can confirm his or her argument but has only a vague idea of the evidence that could refute his or her model. If one has imagined at least a sequence of events which would be inconsistent with the argument being tested, then one may be more likely to develop a clear picture of the disproving evidence to be looked for. In my own research, for example, evidence that unfavourable perceptions of the external threat environment induce state leaders to become restrained about civilian victimization would run counter my model; likewise, evidence that state leaders are ready to escalate civilian targeting to a genocidal level when the incumbent is not supporting any would-be dominant group in the insurgent society would also be inconsistent with my argument, even if I found evidence that genocidal violence correlate with an alarmed perception of the external threat environment.[49]

Secondly, one should be mindful of the type of evidence which could support rival arguments, even if those arguments do not perform well in most cases. Social science theses are probabilistic, therefore some arguments may fail to explain the phenomenon of interest in the majority of cases, but they may still explain the specific case at hand. So, the researcher should still test apparently weak arguments and look for evidence confirming them. In my work, even if I have critically addressed several arguments and questioned their logical or empirical foundations in my literature review, I will still test them and look for evidence supporting them in my case studies.

Finally, one should develop a clear picture of the actors or institutions which played a pivotal role. In this way one can reduce the risk of attaching evidential value to any piece of information which seems to confirm the researcher's favourite interpretation of events (George and Bennet 2005: 100-101; Trachtenberg 2006: 143). A source – either primary or secondary – may contain data which are consistent with the researcher's argument, but if those data reflect the views of individuals or institutions which were not decisively involved in the making of the policy of interest, then it has little evidential value.[50] So, during my data collection work, I will have to bear in mind the

[48] Of course this problem can affect data collection from secondary sources too.
[49] Indeed, when the external threat environment is seen as unfavourable and the local alliance strategy of the incumbent is neutral, the level of civilian targeting should be high, not extreme.
[50] Importantly, my critics should stick to the same principle too. Evidence that actors who are not involved

way decisions about counterinsurgency strategy were made in each of the incumbent states and I will have to focus on the data which reflect the views of relevant actors.

3.4 Conclusions

In this chapter I presented my methodological choices. Firstly, I explained why I would adopt the case study method. After that, I specified my cases: I will study the cases of British counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960) and Cyprus (1955-1959), French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954-1962), and German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (1904-1907). I selected those cases because they show variation on my independent variables but also because they are relatively easy tests for most of the competing arguments I assessed in my literature review. The need to observe cases which show spatial variations on the study variable also influenced my decisions on case selection, which is why I turned my attention to the cases of Kenya and Cyprus. In the next three chapters I will study my cases by adopting the congruence method and, when it is possible, process-tracing; I will collect my data from primary and secondary sources. In doing so, I will take precautions to minimize the confirmation bias.

in the decision-making process on the level of civilian targeting recommend self-restraint when the external threat environment is perceived as unfavourable would not undermine my model.

CHAPTER 4

BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN KENYA (1952-1960)

In the second part of my dissertation – Chapters 4 to 7 – I will test my model using the case study method. All the case studies in this work will be structured in the same way. Firstly, I will introduce the political and social background of the insurgency. Secondly, I will spot the main actors involved in the making of decisions about the conduct of the counterinsurgency campaign. That is essential to understand whose perceptions and calculations define the values on my causal factors and, consequently, influence the level of civilian targeting in the cases at hand. After that, I will specify the initial values on my independent variables, so as to spot the specific Scenario the cases under study belong in. This step will enable me to be clear about the predictions my model would make about the conduct of the incumbent state in the case at hand. After that, I will use secondary sources and – when possible – primary sources to see whether the predictions of my model correspond to the outcomes on my dependent variable as well as the sequence of events. Finally, I will ask whether the arguments I assessed in my literature review (see above) can explain the outcome on the study variable more convincingly than my model. In particular, I will see whether the case outcome is congruent with the main predictions of these alternative explanations and if that outcome came by way of their posited causal mechanism and logic. If alternative arguments fail to explain the level of civilian targeting in the case at hand, I can conclude that the case confirms my model.

4.1 Testing Scenario 2: British Counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960)

British counterinsurgency in Kenya can be considered as an instance of Scenario 2 in my typological model. Indeed, Great Britain perceived no third-party threat against Kenya; at the same time, Britain decided to appease white settlers who struggled to preserve their political and economic privileges they accumulated by expropriating native peoples of their land; at a later stage during the campaign, Britain also

strengthened its alliance with Kikuyu loyalists that were equally pursuing a dominant role in the society of Kenya at the expense of the rest of the Kikuyu population.

I will highlight that these values on my candidate causal factors correlate with a high level of civilian targeting by Britain. Importantly, I will also show that events unfolded consistently with the predictions of my model and the causal logic I posit in Scenario 2.

Indeed, even though civilian and military authorities fully perceived the grievances behind the insurgency, the local alliance strategy of Britain gave the small settler community a disproportionate influence over the counterinsurgency campaign. As I highlight in this chapter, settlers constantly pressed for indiscriminate punishment against the Kikuyu population as the only response to the insurgency. Kikuyu loyalists were equally determined to see Mau Mau sympathizers punished and excluded from the distribution of land and wealth, especially after the villagization programme. As a result, the British authorities consistently privileged repression over social and economic reforms.

Great Britain appeased its allies and involved them in the campaign against Mau Mau directly. I will show that the logic of appeasement explains the resort to mass evictions and starvation of Kikuyu people in the first few months of the campaign despite its military drawbacks, the indiscriminate legislation on capital punishment, the participation of settlers and loyalist in mass screening operations which involved torture, and the systematic ill-treatment of Kikuyu civilians in punitive villages. Importantly, as we shall see, the local alliance strategy of Britain prevented any change in the level of civilian victimization. Attempts to curb the brutality of the security forces were made but ended in a compromise that allowed settlers and loyalists to carry on with their violent punishment of civilians.

At the same time, however, the British metropolitan and colonial authorities firmly resisted settlers' demands that were susceptible to result in the extermination of the Kikuyu population. This correlates with Britain's perceptions of the external threat environment as favourable and confirms the prediction of my model that the incumbent will be reluctant to take the risks of extreme violence when no third-party state is perceived to be willing and able interfere in the political affairs of the territory affected by the insurgency.

4.1.1 The Background of the Mau Mau Insurgency

The insurgency that challenged Britain's colonial rule in Kenya in the 1950s originated

from the Kikuyu tribe. Numbering 1,3 million people out of an African population of 5 million in 1952, the Kikuyu were the largest native group in Kenya when the troubles began. The Kikuyu insurgent movement, which would be called 'Mau Mau' by the colonial authorities and African loyalists, would rise against the European community that dominated the economic and political system in Kenya. Indeed, the European settlement in Kenya gradually forced most Kikuyu and other African groups into a condition of severe economic destitution and political exclusion.

The British penetration in East Africa began in the 1880s and met with little resistance from the Kikuyu tribe. The Kikuyu territory stood out for its fertile lands which made it particularly suitable for agriculture and amenable to white settlement (Elkins 2005: 2-3). Indeed, the number of European settlers increased steadily since the end of the First World War in the Rift Valley and the Central Province. If in 1914 there were only 5,438 white settlers in Kenya, by October 1952, when Britain officially declared the state of emergency, this number had increased to 40,000, most of whom were British (Anderson 2005: 83-84).

In spite of that, the European settlement corresponded to approximately 1% of the whole population of Kenya in the 1950s and it was widely outnumbered even by the Indian minority. The influence of the white community over the colonial administration, however, was far from proportionate to its size. Indeed, white settlers controlled the economic and political life of the colony and perceived themselves as an élite or master group (Elkins 2005: 9-12).

The main source of settlers' wealth and social status was land possession and race. Being white was a sufficient condition to obtain land at the expense of the Kikuyu tribe and social prestige in Kenya. “Whatever his background […] every white man who disembarked from the boat at Mombasa became an instant aristocrat” (Anderson 2005: 78). In sum, still in the early 1950s, when the Mau Mau uprising began, white settlers in Kenya were “a curiously anachronistic community”, a rural aristocracy that felt entitled to political and economic privileges over deferential and submissive African masses. (Anderson 2005: 83).

White settlers had little or no reason to fear that the anachronism of their lifestyle could be eliminated legally by the other ethnic groups. Indeed, settlers dominated the Kenya Legislative Council. While Indians, Arabs, and Africans were represented in the Council, the European community was entitled to the absolute majority of seats. No resolution could pass against the will of settlers.

Faced with land expropriation and political exclusion since the early stages of the

European settlement, the Kikuyu flocked to the Rift Valley and Central Province as squatters on settlers' land. The Kikuyu had right to use the land in African Reserves, which were formally established in 1925. Reserves, however, were systematically overpopulated and the migration of Kikuyu squatters to settlers' property continued and even intensified in the 1930s during the Great Depression; by 1931 squatters had occupied 1,85 million acres in the Rift Valley and the White Highlands (Spencer 1980: 497).

The outbreak of the Second World War, however, gave settlers an unexpected opportunity to regain control of their land and strengthen their political influence on the government. Kenyan farmers were demanded to support the war effort against the Axis by increasing production while the government would guarantee the prices of crops and provide financial support to pay for mechanization, which was essential to achieve greater productivity (Spencer 1980; Throup 1985: 399-400). It was under those circumstances that settlers decided to dispose of African squatters and start a policy of forcible evictions. Also, as military calls deprived the colonial administration of its manpower, the government incorporated settlers' organizations into the economic institutions of the colonial state and recruited cadres from the European minority (Throup 1985: 400). Since the early 1940s settlers occupied key position in the government and the civilian administration and would not relinquish them after the war. By 1945 the colonial government as well as the Colonial Office in London had it clear that settlers were a powerful group to be appeased: no social or economic program in the colony, including African advancement, could succeed without the acquiescence of the white population (Throup 1985: 401-402). As the number of settlers kept growing, their power reached an unprecedented level.

Kikuyu people's economic conditions, instead, generally declined. By 1952 over 100,000 Kikuyu had been expelled from settlers' property and sent back to the African Reserves where demographic pressure on the land became intolerable (Anderson 2005: 26). As a result, African migration to urban areas boosted. In 1952 there were almost 100,000 African workers only in Nairobi: most of them, however, were poor, homeless and hungry (Newsinger 2002: 62).

Since the early 1920s the Kikuyu struggled to improve their conditions of living by engaging into political organizations. In 1921 the Kikuyu Association (KA) was created to lobby European representatives in the Kenya Legislative Council on issues that concerned the Kikuyu tribe. The KA represented an educated minority of Kikuyu leaders which were the product of European missionary churches and Christian schools

(Anderson 2005: 20). Encouraged to participate in the political life of the colony by Christian missions, KA leaders were loyal to the colonial government and pursued economic progress and the modernization for the Kikuyu tribe through gradual reforms. A rival and more radical group, the East African Association (EAA), was created the same year. The EAA was not tied to the churches and aimed to the end of the European settlers' economic and political domination.

Foreseeing the danger of unrest, the colonial authorities tried to prevent the radicalization of the Kikuyu tribe by recognizing loyalist organizations as the legitimate representatives of the African population in Kenya. The government created the Local Native Councils (LNC) to associate loyal Kikuyu chiefs that supported the KA; the EAA reacted by establishing the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) to compete with the KA for African leadership in the LNC. The colonial government eventually decided to ban the KCA in 1940. The ban would be followed by the massive squatter evictions of the 1940s (see above) and left dispossessed Kikuyu without political representation, apart from the loyalist KA. The KCA went underground, but in 1944 radical Kikuyu leaders created the Kenya African Union (KAU) to maintain visibility in public life. As a front for the banned KCA, the KAU engaged in constitutional politics under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta who became president of the party in 1947.

By that time, however, the KCA was already organizing a rebellion (Anderson 2005: 24-25). Reviving the ancient Kikuyu tradition of taking an oath in times of war, since the late 1940s the KCA had been recruiting adherents to a resistance movement which aimed to turn the Kikuyu tribe against the British in a full-scale insurgency. The oath movement, which loyalists and settlers would label as 'Mau Mau', started a campaign of violent intimidation, arson, and murders against African workers employed on European farms, Kikuyu loyalist chiefs, Christian churches and schools, indigenous police agents, and European settlers. Violence and disorder spread across the Rift Valley province, the Central Province and the cities of Nairobi and Mombasa.

On 30th September, Sir Evelyn Baring was officially sworn in as Governor of Kenya. On 7th October 1952 a Mau Mau gang assassinated Chief Waruhiu, the paramount loyalist leader of the Central Province. After the murder, Baring wrote to the Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttelton demanding permission to declare the state of emergency. Baring denounced Mau Mau attacks on Africans who refused to take the oath or deny Christianism and reported that the system of law and order was on the verge of collapse; the Governor also warned Lyttelton that the settler community was extremely alarmed and in the near future they may have taken the law in their own hands plunging Kenya

into a civil war.[51] On 14th October the British government approved and on 20th October 1952 the state of emergency in Kenya was declared.

4.1.2 Identifying the British Decision-Makers

Before highlighting Britain's perceptions of the external threat environment and strategic calculations about their local alliance strategy, I need to spot the actors that participated in the making of the counterinsurgency strategy. In particular, I need to focus on those actors that had the legal authority to forward plans and the power to make decisions about the level of damage that should be inflicted on the freedom, property, and life of non-combatants in an attempt to defeat the Mau Mau insurgency.

The British counterinsurgency campaign against Mau Mau was fought under a firmly established civilian control of the military (Bennett 2013: Ch. 2). The British Cabinet was the paramount institution politically responsible for the use of force. In October 1951 the conservative party won the general elections and Winston Churchill became the new Prime Minister. Within the Cabinet, the British Prime Minister had supreme responsibility for defence matters. Churchill monitored the military campaign in Kenya and occasionally intervened about the use of repressive measures. For example, he advised the Governor of Kenya against the use of simultaneous executions of large numbers of Mau Mau suspects and the inclusion of possession of incendiary materials in the list of capital offences (Newsinger 2002: 80).

The Colonial Office, led by Oliver Lyttleton from October 1951 to July 1954 and Alan Lennox-Boyd from 1954 to 1959, played a more prominent role than the Prime Minister. Indeed, the Colonial Office set the priorities to be pursued in Kenya, consistently privileging the violent repression of insurgents and its popular base over political reforms; besides, the Colonial Secretary had the authority to select (and replace) the Governor of Kenya and supervise his decisions and the progress on the field. Lyttelton monitored the conduct of the campaign by sending envoys or visiting Kenya and reporting back to the Cabinet. The War Office and the Ministry of Defence, instead, barely took any interest in the Kenya Emergency. Finally, the Foreign Office, while keeping out of military matters in Kenya, played an essential role in the assessment of the external threat environment at the beginning of the emergency. As I will show, the Foreign Office analyzed the possible involvement of external powers in Kenyan affairs in the early phase of the campaign and shared information with the

[51] TNA, CO 822/444, Baring to Lyttelton, 9 October 1952

Colonial Office.

Besides the Cabinet – but in a subordinate position – the highest authority was the Governor of Kenya. The Governor was appointed by the Cabinet based on the recommendations of the Colonial Office, therefore he was a representative and agent of the British Government. The Governor was the head of the armed forces deployed in the colony and was responsible for order and security in the territory he administered. During the campaign against Mau Mau, the Governor of Kenya was Sir Evelyn Baring. He presided over the Emergency Committee which had the authority to formulate and approve any policy intended to restore law and order; that included repressive measures as well as social and economic reforms. Baring, however, consistently prioritized repression over reforms. For example, Baring approved regulations allowing the colonial administration to collect punitive taxes, confiscate properties and cattle, and evict suspect Mau Mau sympathizers from their villages (see below); he was behind the emergency regulations on capital offences, which led to the highest number of executions in the history of the British Empire after 1947; finally, the Governor, as head of the colonial government, was responsible for the management of detention camps where civilians were deported and ill-treated (see below). Baring acted in full agreement with the Colonial Office and the rest of the Cabinet, which adhered to the convention of 'trusting the man on the spot' (Bennett 2013: 43). In 1954 the Emergency Committee would be replaced by a War Council, a smaller body with similar functions always headed by the Governor.

In January 1953 Baring successfully demanded a director of military operations in the position of Chief of Staff Officer that would be selected by the War Office. This position was occupied by a military officer. The Chief of Staff Officer was in charge to develop a military strategy and military operational plans in accordance with the Emergency Committee's decisions. In April 1953 the government would create the new position of Director of Operations which would develop and supervise both military and non-military operational plans, but always in keeping with the Governor's decisions. Major-General William R. N. Hinde served as Chief of Staff Officer from February to April 1953 when he was appointed Director of Operations; in June 1953 Hinde was replaced by General Sir George Erskine.

Having identified the main institutions and actors responsible for the conduct of the British campaign against Mau Mau, I can now present their perceptions of the external threat environment as well as their calculations about the local alliance strategy to pursue in Kenya. So, in the next section, I will outline the values on my candidate

causal factors.

4.1.3 Britain's Perceptions of the External Threat Environment

During the Kenya Emergency, Britain never perceived the external threat environment of Kenya as alarming. The British government frequently assessed rumors that the insurgency in Kenya was supported by hostile powers, but eventually dismissed all suspicions.

Since the late 1940s, when Mau Mau violence began to increase, settlers denounced the hostile interference of foreign powers against Britain's colonial rule in Kenya. In particular, the European community insisted that the Soviet Union was involved in the Mau Mau uprising. According to prominent settler leaders, the Mau Mau movement was the potential vanguard of communism in East Africa. Settlers were keen to point out that Jomo Kenyatta – whom the British erroneously considered as the mastermind behind the insurrection – had visited the Soviet Union in the early 1930s apparently embracing the Marxist ideology. The sudden interest of the Soviet and East European communist press in the state of emergency in Kenya in late October 1952 appeared equally suspicious to settlers. More importantly, settlers maintained that Soviet agents had been deployed in East Africa and directed the Mau Mau insurgency from the Soviet embassy in Ethiopia. Sir Alfred Vincent, a prominent settler leader in the Kenya Legislative Council, went so far as to show Oliver Lyttelton some documents supporting this thesis in a meeting with the Secretary of State for the Colonies.[52]

The Colonial Office and the rest of the British Cabinet were not impressed. While the British were fully aware that the Soviet Union had enough power to support the insurgency, it would soon become clear to them that Moscow was neither interested nor willing to do so. The Colonial Office circles considered settlers' allegations as an attempt to divert attention from whites' privileges as a source of conflict and prevent social and economic reforms in Kenya.[53] Lyttelton himself dismissed rumors about possible connections between Mau Mau and the Soviet Union, as no supporting evidence existed.[54] Investigations on the Soviet communist involvement in Kenya would vindicate the scepticism of the Colonial Office. In January 1953 the Foreign Office could already demolish the contention that the Soviet embassy in Ethiopia was

[52] TNA, CO 822/461, Interview of Secretary of State for the Colonies with Alfred Vincent, 31 October 1952.
[53] TNA, CO 822/461, D. L. Busk to R. Allen, 19 December 1952.
[54] TNA, CO 822/461, Lyttelton to Sir Waldron Smithers, 30 December 1952.

the political headquarter of the Mau Mau rebellion. Indeed, the Soviet diplomatic mission was too small and understaffed to be credibly coordinating or encouraging a full-scale insurgency; also, the desert area separating Kenya from Ethiopia would make it very difficult for Mau Mau fighters to contact the Soviets.[55] Further political analysis also questioned Jomo Kenyatta's connections with the Soviets. As the British embassy in Moscow reported in a confidential telegram to the Foreign Office, the Central Soviet Press paid scant attention to the news from Kenya and never referred to Jomo Kenyatta with the same glorifying rhetoric normally used in articles about friendly communist leaders: all that was inconsistent with the thesis of a Soviet intervention in Kenya.[56] These conclusions confirmed the sceptical analysis by the British embassy in Moscow about the connections between the Soviets and Mau Mau. Indeed, the Soviet position about Kenya at the beginning of the emergency was that Mau Mau did not even exist; it was an invention of the British propaganda to justify racial discrimination and violent repression against black people in East Africa. As the British embassy suggested, the dismissal of Mau Mau as a mere product of British propaganda blatantly contradicted the thesis that Mau Mau had received or were receiving support from the Soviet Union.[57]

The British authorities took more seriously the issue of the potential influence of the Union of South Africa over Kenya. The intentions of South Africa towards Britain's African colonies had been a long-standing source of concern for the Cabinet in London. Britain was worried about the racial policies of the South African government and their potential appeal outside the Union. After winning the general elections in 1948, the National Party of South Africa passed the apartheid laws and established racial segregation. Since 1949, the government in London repeatedly questioned whether, and to what extent, Pretoria would attempt to take the white settler communities across the British Empire into its own sphere of influence (Cleary 1990). The National Party made no mystery of its intention to be recognized as the ultimate protector of the European white communities from communism and black-majority rule in Africa and enjoyed the support of white supremacist groups in the settler communities throughout the British colonies in Africa, including Kenya (Anderson 2005: 2). Those groups could have sought closer political relations with Pretoria in order to impose apartheid legislation in the British colonies, and undermine Britain's rule in East Africa in favour of South

[55] TNA, CO 822/461, Foreign Office to Asmara, 26 January 1953.
[56] TNA, CO 822/461, British Embassy in Moscow to Foreign Office, 4 May 1953.
[57] TNA, CO 822/448, British Embassy in Moscow to the Foreign Office, 31 October 1952.

Africa (Cleary 1990: 229).

However, the threat of South African influence was not considered imminent in the specific case of Kenya (Heinlein 2002: 119-122). Other British colonies bordering on South Africa were more directly exposed. Southern Rhodesia, in particular, was affected by massive Afrikaner immigration which formed a potential nationalist base for Pretoria's interference (Hyam 1987). In Kenya, instead, Afrikaner immigration was very limited and the Boer minority was politically marginalized in the European community of the colony, which was mostly British (Anderson 1995: 81). According to the British government, Kenya may have fallen under South African influence only if the Southern and Northern Rhodesian dominos had fallen first (Hyam 1987: 153). Therefore, the Labour government began to contain Pretoria's influence over the Rhodesias. Britain set out to merge Northern and Southern Rhodesia in a federal state – the Central African Federation; the complex institutional arrangements of the Federation were designed to limit Afrikaner immigration from South Africa and increase constitutional safeguards against racial segregation (Hyam 1987). Once at the head of the British government in October 1951, the Conservative party supported the negotiations on the Central African Federation which were completed successfully in 1953 when the Federation was formally established. The protection of the Rhodesias from the influence of South Africa would shield northern territories too – including Kenya – and thus assuage the anxiety of the British government.

Importantly, in spite of the perceived risks deriving from Pretoria's contacts with the white communities in the Empire, South Africa did not seem ready to act upon its putative ambitions and challenge Britain in Africa. Firstly, the South African armed forces were completely dependent upon Britain for its equipment; so both the Labour and the Conservative party in London completely discounted the risk of military threats or outright aggression from Pretoria against the British territories in Africa (Hyam 1987: 172, 1998: 158; Ovendale 1983: 44). Secondly, South Africa seemed to be more interested in cooperation than competition. London believed that the obsession of the white supremacist regime in Pretoria with the possible spread of Soviet communism in Africa would induce the Union to look to Britain as an essential ally to tackle that threat (Ovendale 1983: 44). Indeed, since 1948 the National Party leader and prime minister of South Africa, Daniel François Malan, had been pursuing a defensive regional alliance with Britain and other Commonwealth members against communism, possibly connected to the NATO (Ovendale 1983: 43, 46).

Pretoria's interest in Kenyan affairs during the Mau Mau uprising was treated

accordingly by the Conservative government in London. Britain tended to tolerate Pretoria's political contacts with some white settler leaders on the ground that, as long as Britain had shown its resolve to protect the white settler community from black-majority rule in Kenya, the European population would not seek protection from South Africa. In sum, South Africa was neither able nor clearly willing to take over Kenya at the expense of Britain and the government in London believed that what South Africa could achieve in Kenya depended entirely on Britain itself.

In conclusion, Britain perceived the external threat environment of Kenya as favourable, which means that the British had no international incentives to target civilians.

4.1.4 The Local Alliance Strategy of Britain

When unrest in the colony intensified the settler community was deeply alarmed. Despite their attempts to accuse foreign powers, settlers could hardly ignore that the Mau Mau insurgency was a product of domestic factors. Economic destitution, land dispossession, political submission, and systematic racial discrimination against the Kikuyu and other groups were a direct consequence of white supremacy in the colony. Settlers, therefore, expected to become the main target of Mau Mau violence. In a conflict with the Kikuyu, they had everything to lose. Indeed, Mau Mau victory would predictably be followed by black-majority rule in an independent Kenya, which would have ended settlers' economic and political privileges.

When the state of emergency was declared in Kenya, therefore, settlers were determined to maintain, and even tighten, their grip on political power and economic resources. For most of them, violent repression of insurgents was the priority; limited concessions could be considered, but only after the destruction of the insurgent movement and without affecting settlers' supremacy (Kennedy 1992: 245-247). In the 1950s no settler leader was ready to accept a rapid advancement of the civil and political rights of Africans. Racial integration was out of the question, even for settler leaders like Michael Blundell who gained a reputation as a moderate voice in the European community. A minority of settlers even looked at the racial policies of the Union of South Africa as an example to follow in Kenya. In the eyes of settlers, their supremacy was to be defended (Anderson 2005: 3).

The settler community, however, depended on Britain to maintain their power position in Kenya. White supremacy in the colony had developed under the benevolent

protection of Britain and could hardly survive without it. In spite of their economic and political influence, settlers were a very small group compared to the African population and they could not stop a full scale insurgency alone. So, what was Britain willing to do?

The British government was aware that settlers' supremacy in Kenya was becoming increasingly anachronistic. In the aftermath of the Second World War, and especially in the 1950s, it became clear to British leaders that the international trend towards decolonization could not be stopped or reverted (Anderson 2005: 5). The British could not ignore African and Asian nationalists' aspiration to self-government. Britain, however, intended to preserve its power status which, in the perceptions of British leaders, still depended on a worldwide empire. (Darwin 2009: Ch. 13). Colonies should achieve self-government under British guidance; in this way, Britain would gradually create friendly regimes that would remain in the British sphere of influence even after decolonization (Heinlein 2002: 119). However, British leaders – Labour and Conservatives alike – agreed that there could be no uniform policy in the British Empire: the methods of decolonization and the timing of self-government would vary considerably depending on the specific circumstances of each territory (Heinlein 2002: 119).

In some areas this process could only proceed slowly. In particular, in those colonies with powerful white minorities which kept growing through immigration – like Kenya – Britain had to reconcile the principle of native self-government with the coexistence of different races (Darwin 1984: 199-200; Henlein 2002: 120). In Kenya settlers would not accept equal rights for Africans and would oppose black-majority rule by any means; the government in London was afraid that if Britain had insisted on a rapid political advancement in favour of Africans, then white settlers may have turned against London's policies and may have possibly tried to impose racial segregation on the natives as happened in South Africa (Henlein 2002: 120, 122). This may have plunged Kenya into a race war between blacks and whites: regardless of its outcome, such a civil war could only discredit Britain in the eyes of both groups while increasing the influence of the Union of South Africa over the white population of Kenya (Henlein 2002: 121).

When the state of emergency was declared in October 1952, therefore, British leaders found it essential to appease settlers and reassure them that no political reform in favour of Africans would be actively promoted in the colony before destroying the Mau Mau organization (Percox 1998). This position was also favoured by the Conservative

government's perception of African nationalism in East Africa as underdeveloped: while the British knew that African nationalism could not be ignored in the long run, it was still regarded as unfit for self-government in Kenya and could safely be frustrated in the near future (Darwin 1984: 200; Henlein 2002: 122). The imminent danger the British perceived in Kenya, instead, was for settlers to take the law in their own hands to crush insurgents, pave the way for apartheid, and discredit the self-styled image of Britain as the benevolent supporter of Africans' legitimate aspiration to self-government (Henlein 2002: 121). In such an event, Britain would have lost control over the process of transition to self-government not only in Kenya, but also in other colonies and future independent African regimes may have become hostile to Britain.

While reassuring settlers, Britain left a degree of ambiguity about what would happen after the end of the conflict. A multiracial political setting of an independent Kenya within a federation with Uganda and Tanganyika was presented as a probable scenario (see below), but what would it entail? Would a multiracial arrangement become a synonym for separate development of different races, as some radical settlers hoped? Would it rather include political power-sharing without racial integration, as some among the most moderate voices in the settler community suggested? Or would it entail a rapid African political advancement, racial integration and black majority rule? In the first few years of the campaign, the British colonial authorities would keep from evoking the latest scenario. The appeasement of settlers was a priority in the short run, even if that meant that their supremacy would not be questioned during the conflict.

Britain would also fight with the support of Kikuyu and other African loyalists, but these were not considered as relevant groups to appease in the early stages of the conflict. Indeed, in the opening phase of the campaign, Kikuyu loyalists often switched their allegiance from the Mau Mau camp to the colonial government (Branch 2007: 292-293) and did not have the same power and influence as settlers. Since 1953 loyalists were enlisted in the Kikuyu Home Guard and were responsible for mass atrocities against suspected Mau Mau and other non-combatants. Loyalists' influence began to increase only between 1954 and 1955, when the government started the villagization progamme (see below). As we will see, loyalists would increasingly be rewarded by the colonial government with land and other benefits for their support and began to nurture greater political and economic ambitions at the expense of Mau Mau supporters. Yet, in the first two years of the emergency, when the pattern of violence against civilians was set, loyalists did not shape Britain's reaction to Mau Mau as much as white settlers. When African loyalist leaders complained before Oliver Lyttelton that

the British campaign was resulting in mass ill-treatment of African people who were not involved in Mau Mau activities, their voice was simply ignored in favour of settlers' demands for indiscriminate repression (Bennett 2013: 45).

In conclusion, Britain's local alliance strategy was aligned. Indeed, Britain would appease groups – settlers and African loyalists – that aimed to political and economic supremacy in the colony at the expense of the insurgent population.

4.1.5 The Predictions of my Model

As explained above, the British perceived the external threat environment as favourable; at the same time, they supported would-be dominant groups. These values on my candidate causal factors mean that the case of British counterinsurgency in Kenya is an instance of Scenario 2 in my model (see above).

Under these circumstances, my model predicts a high level of civilian targeting in British counterinsurgency. The incumbent is expected to resort to measures like systematic property destruction, deportations, the creation of free-fire zones, summary executions, torture, and any other practice which can undermine civilians' freedom, property, and life. As explained above, the causal logic is that, when the incumbent state is supporting or appeasing a group that aims to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population or preserve privileges deriving from a process of expropriation and submission of other groups, then the incumbent may be unwilling or unable to address the political grievances behind the insurgency; as a result, the incumbent state would conclude the that violent repression is the only way to deal with insurgents.

So, in the case of British counterinsurgency in Kenya, we should expect to see British decision-makers proposing or approving the kind of repressive measures listed above, while dismissing or failing to address the political and economic causes of the insurgency. We should observe British leaders considering indiscriminate violence as the only way to deal with insurgents and keep up their partnership with settlers.

Importantly, my model suggests that when the incumbent state perceives the external threat environment as favourable, its leaders will have no strategic incentives to accept the additional risks related to the extermination of the insurgent population. Therefore, considering that Britain perceived that no third-party state was willing and able to undermine the British rule in Kenya, we should also expect to see British leaders resisting or rejecting any proposal to use military violence in ways that could have resulted in the extermination of the insurgent group.

In the next paragraph, I will examine the British counterinsurgency campaign to see whether the outcomes on the dependent variable and the course of events are consistent with the level of civilian targeting and the causal logic predicted by my model.

4.2 Civilian Targeting during the British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Kenya

4.2.1 The Opening Phase (October 1952 – June 1953): The Level of Indiscriminate Violence Is Set.

The British authorities used a high level of civilian targeting since the opening phase of their counterinsurgency campaign against Mau Mau. The decision to target civilians' freedom, property, and life had little to do with the military threat posed by the insurgent organization. Indeed, as we shall see, Mau Mau suffered from a chronic shortage of guns, which limited their offensive power. Most of their violent attacks were carried out with knives, spears, and pangas. Victims of Mau Mau assaults were usually hacked to death, which caused outrage and terror among their opponents.

The way victims were killed, however, did not shape the British military response to the insurrection as much as the identity of some of the victims. In the early phase of the emergency, the brutal killing of some members of an increasingly alarmed settler community would have a disproportionate influence over the colonial government. The number of white victims during the whole emergency would be very low: Mau Mau gangs killed only 32 settlers, while killing over 1,800 Africans. Yet, white victims belonged to a powerful group that perceived itself as a colonial aristocracy (see above). Settlers looked at the violent death of each European as an existential threat posed to the white supremacy system and the community which was on top of it; according to settlers, such a threat could only be countered with unrestrained violence while no reform could be conceded (Anderson 2005: 86-88). In the eyes of the settler community, Governor Baring had to act accordingly.

As soon as the state of emergency was declared, Baring authorized Operation Jock Scott in Nairobi which resulted in the detention of 139 KAU members including Jomo Kenyatta, erroneously taken for the mastermind of the insurgency (Percox 1998: 62). On 22nd October a Mau Mau gang killed a prominent loyalist leader, Chief Nderi, while he was trying to stop an oath-taking ceremony. Two days later, Mau Mau insurgents claimed the first white victim. On 27th October Eric Bowyer was hacked to death by Mau Mau assailants.

After those murders, settlers' commitment to a policy based on mere punishment became even more vociferous. The Colonial Secretary, Oliver Lyttelton, had the opportunity to hear settlers' demands by himself. Indeed, two days after Bowyer's death, Lyttelton flew to Kenya to assess the situation on the field. On the 30th October he had a meeting with the European representatives of the Legislative Council. Dissatisfied with Baring's opening moves, settler leaders forcefully called on Lyttelton for a policy of indiscriminate killing, not just mass arrests. According to Michael Blundell, one of the most important settler leaders, almost the entire Kikuyu population was involved in the Mau Mau organization and should experience what he called 'drastic action'; other settler leaders at the meeting specified the meaning of 'drastic action' as entailing a shoot-to-kill and take-no-prisoners policy (Elkins 2005: 50). Lyttelton fully appreciated that settlers' expectations about the brutality and scale of military repression were disproportionate and susceptible to lead to extermination. During the meeting the Colonial Secretary firmly rejected settlers' extreme proposals.[58] In a radio speech the following day,[59] Lyttelton insisted that Britain envisaged a multiracial future for an independent Kenya, therefore the elimination of the insurgent group was absolutely out of the question.

It should be observed that Lyttelton's rejection of settlers' extremism is consistent with the predictions of my model according to which when the external threat environment is perceived as favourable, the incumbent will be reluctant to take the risks of extreme violence even if it is appeasing or supporting a specific group that seeks domination over other groups. The British government never discussed the option of extermination in detail, so there is not enough data to perform process-tracing. Yet, Lyttelton's resistance to settlers' radical proposals and even the complete silence of British leaders are congruent with the predictions and the causal logic of my model.[60]

While opposing the extremism of the European community, Lyttelton and Baring were afraid that settlers could take the law in their own hands. Confronted with settlers' outrage, Baring would show his resolve and reassure the white community. In early November the Governor started a policy of punitive confiscations, collective fines and seizure of cattle against the Kikuyu villages located in those areas where Mau Mau

[58]TNA, CO 822/460, Verbatim report. Meeting of Secretary of State and European Elected Members, held at Government House on Thursday 30 October 1952, at 12:00 pm; TNA, CO 822/460, Verbatim report. Meeting of Secretary of State and European Elected Members, held at Government House on Thursday 30 October 1952, at 5:30 pm.

[59]TNA, CO 822/459, Transcript of speech broadcast by Oliver Lyttelton on 4 November 1952 from Nairobi.

[60] As we shall see, however, the predictions of competing arguments are not even congruent with the level of barbarism in Kenya or their causal logic is not confirmed.

gangs had committed violent crimes. As Baring himself would clarify in a letter to Lyttelton,[61] the purpose of confiscations and seizure of cattle was to punish non-combatants for failing to cooperate in the investigations over Nderi's and Bowyer's deaths by depriving the local population of an essential source of food.

As Mau Mau attacks against Europeans continued and settlers showed mutinous intentions, the British escalated the level of civilian targeting. On 22nd November a Mau Mau gang slaughtered another settler, Ian Meiklejohn. The attack shocked settlers and sparked a wave of violent hysteria: settlers began to create vigilante units to terrorize and expel all Kikuyu people living on Europeans' land (Elkins 2005: 38). Vigilante units would look for Mau Mau suspects, proceed to summary executions and violent intimidation, and evict Kikuyu families from their houses by force of arms (Bennett 2013: 170-171).

The colonial government was aware that settlers' reaction was disproportionate, considering the very low number of white victims. Yet, not only did the government condone settlers' counter-terror, but it also assisted vigilante units in violent evictions (Percox 1998: 66). The Lancashire Fusiliers were unofficially deployed to help settlers remove Kikuyu employees and their families from their homes: by late November 1952 over 7300 people, mostly women and children, had been displaced coercively (Bennett 2013: 14). The use of army and police units to support evictions would become an official policy in December 1952 and forcible evacuations of Kikuyu civilians would become impressively faster. In effect, by April 1953 between 70,000 and 100,000 Kikuyu had been forcibly expelled from settlers' land (Bennett 2013: 173). Once evicted, civilians would be homeless and hungry. Even when deported to African Reserves, displaced Kikuyu people would not have enough food to support themselves because of chronic overpopulation in their new destination. Since early 1953 intelligence reports pointed out that massive evictions were likely to plunge thousands of Kikuyu people into famine and warned that starving civilians would find it convenient to join insurgents in a desperate attempt to survive (Bennett 2013: 173-175). In spite of that, forcible evacuations were not stopped as the colonial government believed that they made for effective protection of settlers (Bennett 2013: 175). In other words, the colonial government was ready to starve thousands of Kikuyu people and increase the number of Mau Mau fighters in order to prevent an already low number of attacks against settlers. The urge to appease a would-be dominant group ostensibly prevailed over military effectiveness as well as social reforms and propelled civilian

[61] TNA, CO 822/438, Baring to Lyttelton, 13 November 1952.

targeting, which confirms the causal logic of Scenario 2 in my model.[62]

The enlistment of settlers in the security forces was another component of British appeasement policies toward the white minority of Kenya. In particular, the government recruited thousands of settlers in the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) and the Kenya Regiment (KR), which allowed them to participate in counterinsurgency operations and interact with non-combatants directly (Bennett 2013: 48). During the emergency over 1,800 settlers served in the KR, which often eluded the Army's discipline (Bennett 2013: 40). Settlers' presence in the Police Reserve was even more outstanding. By December 1953 there were already 4,822 settlers serving in the KPR, which included hundreds of officers (Throup 1992: 141). The enlistment of settlers aimed to contain the phenomenon of vigilante units and reassure the white minority by giving them an opportunity to restore law and order directly. Yet the government's decision to involve the European community in the campaign gave settler hardliners the chance to act on their own murderous intentions on a daily basis. Indeed, settlers in the security forces actively participated in operations that would result in the ill-treatment and killing of thousands of Kikuyu civilians; as we shall see, the government would never inquiry into their conduct (see below).

Settlers' brutality against civilians stood out in mass screening operations, in particular. Mass screening would turn out to be a formidable threat to the physical survival of thousands of Kikuyu non-combatants who went through the corresponding procedure (Elkins 2005: Ch. 3). Governor Baring instituted mass screening operations shortly after the murder of Eric Bowyer. The security forces, with the assistance of loyalist chiefs and the colonial administration, would occupy Kikuyu villages, round up inhabitants, and proceed to interrogations of Kikuyu people for several hours, if not days (Elkins 2005: 63). Prisoners were often taken to settlers' farms to be screened: while this was known to be a technically illegal procedure, Baring tolerated the practice (Elkins 2005: 67). The district administrations – civil authorities – were in charge to organize screening teams (Bennett 2013: 160). Interrogations were carried out by members of the British Army, the King's African Rifles (KAR), the KR, and the KPR. As we have seen, settlers made up the main force in the KR and the KPR. In March 1953, the colonial government created a Kikuyu Home Guard (KHG) which recruited from African loyalists under British officers' command. The Home Guard, that was answerable to the civil administration (Branch 2009: 71), would also join screening

[62]This would run counter the argument that states would refrain from civilian targeting when indiscriminate violence is perceived as counterproductive on the military level.

operations. Screening teams usually looked for judicial evidence of crimes, full confessions, or information about the identity and location of Mau Mau sympathizers, oath administrators, fighters, and their relatives (Elkins 2005: Ch. 3). Mass screening operations in Kenya entailed a systematic reliance on torture, a practice which is associated to a high level of civilian victimization in my model (see above).

Screening teams considered all Kikuyu civilians as potential Mau Mau members until interrogators concluded that evidence to the contrary had turned up (Elkins 2005: 66). When dissatisfied with a prisoner's answer or faced with an apparently reticent attitude, screening teams used violence. According to contemporary observers and survivors alike, beatings, whipping, electric shocks, burning with cigarettes or fire, and mutilations were the most common forms of torture (Elkins 2005: 66). Screening teams also resorted to sexual assault and genital injuries: "bottles (often broken), gun barrels, knives, snakes, vermin, and hot eggs were thrust up men's rectums and women's vaginas" (Elkins 2005: 66); male suspects' testicles and female detainees' breasts were squeezed with pliers; castration and emasculation were often used as a psychological threat and occasionally carried out (Elkins 2005: 68). Summary executions in custody were another form of psychological pressure on civilians. Detainees who failed to answer a question could be immediately shot or stabbed to death while other prisoners were forced to watch; after that, the terrorized witnesses would be interrogated (Newsinger 2002: 78).

By May 1953 over 100,000 Kikuyu civilians had been arrested indiscriminately and almost 90,000 of them had gone through the screening procedures (Bennett 2013: 19). It is impossible to work out the precise percentage of people who suffered torture during screening operations; recorded data about torture are not available. However, contemporary accounts by settler observers (Rawcliffe 1954) and survivors (Elkins 2005: Ch. 3) indicate that torture was routine, not an exception. Documental evidence also confirms that torture was systematic. In a meeting with Lyttelton in December 1952, Baring admitted that large numbers of Kikuyu were routinely ill-treated during screening operations.[63] The Governor was not the only official to acknowledge the relevant scale of torture during the campaign. Shortly after his arrival in Kenya as a Director of Military Operations in June 1953, General Sir George Erskine would denounce to Lyttelton that torture had become a deeply engrained part of screening procedures, and one of early resort (Bennett 2013: 160). Historians plausibly conclude that torture affected several thousands of people (Anderson 2005; Bennett 2013; Elkins

[63] TNA, CO 822/501, Note on a meeting held in the Secretary of State's room on 15 December 1952.

2005).

It must be stressed that, even if screening operations aimed to obtain intelligence about the enemy, the decision of the government to deploy settlers as interrogators shaped the way interrogation was conducted and the fate of civilians. Apparently, settlers' violence in screening operations would point to the relevance of racism as a factor shaping the use of torture; yet, it is essential to note that settlers' racist mentality would not have been a sufficient condition for civilians to be tortured if the government had not authorized the settler-dominated KPR and the KR to take part in screening operations; if Britain had excluded settlers from the campaign, the racism of the European community of Kenya would have been inconsequential; Britain, however, had already decided to support a group that aimed to preserve its supremacy over the insurgent population and the direct involvement of settlers in the interrogation of prisoners was part of a policy of appeasement prompted by the British perceptions of self-interests (see above). In sum, the local alliance strategy of Britain seems to have shaped the fate of civilians during screening operations decisively, which supports the predictions of my model.

Further Mau Mau attacks against settlers in January 1953 contributed to exacerbate settlers' calls for repression. On 1st January 1953 two settlers, Charles Fergusson and Dick Bingley, were assaulted and killed by a Mau Mau gang; the following day another Mau Mau gang attacked two European women who killed some of the assailants. While those attacks did not seriously affect the balance of white victims, the settler community resumed its pressure on the Governor. The European representatives of the Legislative Council communicated to Baring that they would pass a resolution recommending capital punishment for all Mau Mau oath administrators, when the oath included a promise to kill: settlers expected Baring to approve. The Governor immediately informed Lyttelton of settlers' intentions. Baring warned Lyttelton that the European representatives were likely to pass a death penalty resolution even if the colonial government had rejected their demands; in such an event, a political crisis with settlers would have been inevitable.[64] In his reply the same day, Lyttelton immediately authorized Baring to accept the death penalty resolution as proposed by the Legislative Council, but he insisted that the Governor should retain the power to suspend capital sentences.[65] This would show once again the logic of appeasement that prevails under the circumstances of Scenario 2 in my model.

On 16th January 1953 the resolution was passed. The Legislative Council did not deny

[64]TNA, CO 822/439, Baring to Lyttelton, 15 January 1953.
[65]TNA, CO 822/439, Lyttelton to Baring, 15 January 1953.

the Governor's power to suspend death sentences, but in the following months it became clear that Baring had little intention to irritate settlers by using it. In fact, Baring increased the list of capital offences to such an extent that civilians could be associated to Mau Mau crimes and sentenced to death more indiscriminately than ever before. For example, the inclusion of possession of incendiary material in the list of capital offences prompted Churchill himself to warn Baring that one could be executed just for having a box of matches in one's own house (Newsinger 2002: 80).

After passing the capital punishment resolution, the European representatives of the Legislative Council submitted more demands to the Governor. Among the other things, they wanted the settler community to be informally represented in the emergency committees: they urged Baring to request a director of military operations from London and insisted on the need for mass deportations against all Kikuyu people who were suspected to be Mau Mau sympathizers. The Governor was conciliatory on all these points. Some of the demands presented to Baring that day were more radical: the Governor was requested to declare Mau Mau a terrorist organization, transfer control of the police forces in Kenya to a European member of the Legislative Council who would be responsible for law and order during the emergency, and give District Commissioners powers of summary jurisdiction in Mau Mau crimes.[66] Baring refused at once, but European leaders' demands were clear evidence that settlers aspired to direct control over the repression and were ready to destroy the Kikuyu population rather than negotiate on their privileges.

Baring's refusal to empower settlers correlates with a favourable perception of the external threat environment by the Colonial Office and is consistent with the prediction of my model that, under the circumstances of Scenario 2, the incumbent state will resist extreme policies that may lead to the extermination of the insurgent population.

Settlers would continue to press for relentless punishment of the Kikuyu population as more white victims fell under Mau Mau attacks. On 24th January Mau Mau assailants massacred a settler family, including a six-year-old child. The attack enraged the settler community as never before. The white minority was on the verge of outright rebellion and even the settler-dominated KPR overtly encouraged the white population to demonstrate against the government they were supposed to serve (Anderson 2005: 95). The following day over 1500 settlers marched to the Government House; hundreds of them had guns (Anderson 2005: 96). In a show of mass insubordination, they occupied a part of the building and asked for extreme measures: once again, settlers called for a

[66]TNA, CO 822/439, Baring to Lyttelton, 17 January 1953.

take-no-prisoners policy and summary executions (Elkins 2005: 42). Baring refused to meet the crowd which left only when Michael Blundell guaranteed that the Governor would take sterner measures against insurgents (Anderson 2005: 96). Immediately after the incident, Baring insisted to have a commander-in-chief sent to Kenya under the Governor's authority. Settlers' revolt induced the government in London to grant permission.

On 3rd February 1953 Major-General William R. N. Hinde arrived in Kenya as Chief of Staff Officer. During his tour of the colony he often visited European farms and quickly became popular among the hard-liners in the settler community (Anderson 2005: 179). Hinde's pro-settler attitude matched the Governor's conciliatory policy towards the white population: settlers were at the peak of their influence.

Hinde wanted to crush the insurgency quickly as long as it had limited military capabilities. Indeed, in his first appraisal of the situation on the field, Hinde estimated optimistically that insurgents could count on no more than a hundred hardcore fighters and 55 guns.[67] Hinde wanted the security forces to take the offensive, pursue Mau Mau gangs in the forest areas, and destroy them once and for all.

Hinde's offensive strategy entailed measures which characterize the level of civilian targeting as high. Since the beginning of 1953 Britain created free-fire zones – called Prohibited Areas (PAs) – in the Aberdare Forests and Mount Kenya where Mau Mau gangs were supposed to be based. No individual found in a Prohibited Area would be considered a civilian. Within Prohibited Areas the security forces would be allowed to shoot on sight without warning (Bennett 2013: 16). Civilians living in PAs, however, would be given notice to leave. Hinde also started a scorched-earth policy in the areas around free-fire zones. The security forces created one-mile strips along the edges of PAs: within the strips security forces would destroy and burn all properties down after expelling civilians; all sources of food in the strips would also be destroyed; in this way, the terrain would be transformed into a desert where insurgents would find no sustenance (Bennett 2013: 129-130; Percox 1998: 75-76). At the same time, the Kikuyu Reserves would be declared part of Special Areas where security forces could use force to stop, question, search, or detain any individual. The security forces would constantly patrol Special Areas so as to monitor movements from the forests to the Reserves, where Mau Mau fighters could obtain crops or steal livestock.

The strips around the forests and the areas near the Reserves would become killing grounds for hundreds of civilians who would be shot indiscriminately by the security

[67] TNA, WO 276/411, Appreciation of the situation, by Major General W.R.N. Hinde, 5 March 1953.

forces in the next few months. Civilian deaths were often recorded as cases of individuals who had been 'shot while attempting to escape', 'shot after failing to halt', or 'killed while resisting to arrest'. It was not just the Army that used force indiscriminately; in fact, the loyalist KHG and the settler-dominated KPR units were often involved in the shootings. Apparently, the working assumption of the security forces was that failing to obey an order, showing signs of panic, or running away was evidence of one's affiliation to Mau Mau. The Governor would later claim that there had been 430 cases of indiscriminate shootings from October 1952 to April 1953 (Bennett 2013: 168). That figure, however, is unlikely to be accurate because the security forces often failed to record the killing of civilians in Special Areas (Bennett 2013: 169).

Indiscriminate killings and summary executions became a fully accepted practice under Hinde's command, especially after the events at Lari and Naivasha. On 26th March 1953 some Mau Mau gangs attacked the village of Lari. Assailants massacred 120 people, mostly women and children. All victims were African loyalists. Almost at the same time that night, a different Mau Mau gang attacked the Naivasha police station, set almost 150 Kikuyu prisoners free, and stole 47 guns. The loyalist KHG immediately retaliated by shooting on sight any suspect Mau Mau supporter. The KPR joined the reprisals later that night. The Home Guard and police units eventually killed 200 to 400 people (Anderson 2005: 130).

In the aftermath of Lari, the judiciary gave in to settlers' demand to extend the death penalty even further. Between April and June 1953 it became a capital offence “to consort with those likely to carry out acts prejudicial to public order” and “to consort with persons whom it was reasonable to know were carrying arms or ammunitions” (Anderson 2005: 152). Such a vague definition of a capital offence would result in 1090 hangings, an indiscriminate judicial massacre that targeted culprits of Mau Mau attacks and innocent bystanders alike (Anderson 2005: 151-173). The number of executions is even more outstanding if one considers that Mau Mau killed no more than 200 servicemen in eight years: the need to placate the white minority played a decisive role in determining the indiscriminate nature and the extent of executions (Anderson 2005: 174-175).

After the Lari massacre, Hinde seemed to be completely siding with settler hard-liners. In his Emergency Directive No. 1, released on 12th April, Hinde went so far as to claim that Baring would retain constitutional control over the command structure and military

operations, but the general would provide direction on behalf of the Governor.[68] This looked like a challenge to the colonial government's authority. The Director of Operations now seemed to be partaking in settlers' mutinous attitude and avail settlers' view that the colonial government was unfit to lead the counterinsurgency campaign. The Governor was even more concerned about Hinde's overt instigation of settlers' extremism: that may have emboldened an already aggressive settler leadership and result in further pressure on the Governor to escalate the brutality of the repression. When in May 1953 Hinde was widely reported to have declared before a settler audience that '100,000 Kikuyu should be put to work in a vast swill-tub' (Anderson 2005: 180), Baring decided to have Hinde relieved. General Sir George Erskine would take over.

The indiscriminate use of capital punishment and the dismissal of Hinde are both consistent with the predictions of Scenario 2 in my model. Indeed, on the one hand, the indiscriminate legislation on capital punishment was a concession to settlers and contributed to create a high level of violence against the Kikuyu population: this confirms that the incumbent will use lethal violence against civilians when it is supporting a would-be dominant group. On the other hand, the Colonial Office and the Governor were concerned about the potential influence of settlers' extremism on military commanders: by relieving Hinde, the British government tried to prevent further escalations of indiscriminate violence. The resolve of the government to avoid such an escalation correlates with the perception of the external threat environment as favourable: that, in turn, would be consistent with the prediction of my model that the incumbent will be wary of potential risks of extreme violence when it believes that no other state is willing and able to undermine the incumbent's hegemony over the insurgent territory.

The pattern of violence would not escalate to a genocidal level, yet it would not decrease to a moderate level either.

4.2.2 The Level of Indiscriminate Violence after Erskine's arrival (June 1953 – April 1954): a Radical Change?

On 7th June 1953 General Sir George Erskine became the new Director of Operations. Unlike Hinde, Erskine was against the appeasement of settlers. According to Erskine,

[68]TNA, WO 32/21722, Emergency Directive No. 1, Issued by Major General W.N.R. Hinde, Director of Operations, 12 April 1953.

the long-standing oppression and expropriation of the Kikuyu population was the real cause of the rebellion in Kenya; further appeasement of white settlers could only prolong the insurgency and hinder economic, political, and social reforms (Anderson 2005: 260). Since his first weeks as a Director of Operations, Erskine tried to restrain indiscriminate killings and torture by pressing for the prosecution of culprits and their dismissal from the security forces. Under his command, army officers and soldiers responsible for abuses on civilians would face judicial proceedings (Bennett 2013: Ch. 8).

Erskine's attempt to curb the brutality of the security forces, however, did not change the level of civilian targeting in a significant way. Erskine's policies met with fierce opposition from settler representatives in the Legislative Council and received limited support from key institutions like the colonial government and the military itself. Settlers saw Erskine's policies as a threat to their power in Kenya and pressed both military commanders and the Governor to disregard Erskine's directives about the repression of abuses (Bennett 2013: 212). Military officers, on the other hand, were concerned about the consequence of Erskine's investigations on the security forces' morale and will to fight. While commanders formally obeyed Erskine's directives, military and civilian courts showed no intention to crack down on the security forces: soldiers who had killed or abused civilians would secure mild sanctions or complete acquittals, often by virtue of verdicts given by juries of settlers (Bennett 2013: 205-206). Governor himself provided Erskine with little cooperation and occasionally embarrassed the Director of Operations by reinstating convicted individuals in their previous positions.[69]

Faced with the recalcitrant attitude of the colonial government, Erskine compromised. He tried to obtain at least a small number of exemplary convictions in the hope to deter future ill-treatments; besides, Erskine got the War Office to establish a court of inquiry in charge to investigate on major abuses against civilians but only when committed by the British Army: the rest of the security forces would avoid investigations.[70] The court of inquiry, therefore, would not be allowed to look into the conduct of the KPR and the KHG, even if settler police units and Kikuyu loyalists were routinely involved in torture, summary executions, and other major abuses. For example, only three weeks after Erskine's arrival, the Home Guard killed 400 civilians as a reprisal for the

[69]TNA, CO 822/499, Telegram from Sir Evelyn Baring, Governor of Kenya, to Oliver Lyttelton, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 28 November 1953.

[70]TNA, WO 32/21722, Memorandum on the McLean Court of Inquiry, by General George Erskine, Commander-in-Chief in East Africa, 1 January 1954.

assassination of the son of a loyalist chief (Anderson 2006: 164-165).

Erskine's failure to change the level of indiscriminate violence in Kenya confirms the prediction of Scenario 2 in my model according to which officials in the incumbent state may see the grievances behind the insurgency but will eventually be unwilling – like Baring and the Colonial Office – or unable – like Erskine himself – to set aside a civilian targeting strategy: the perceived interest to appease would-be dominant local allies will prevail and will propel brutality instead of reforms.

In spite of his attempt to restrain the use of torture and summary executions, Erskine was fully aware that civilians could not be completely spared from military repression. As long as Mau Mau fighters could obtain food, shelter, and manpower from non-combatants, civilians would be targeted and forced to stop helping rebels.[71] Erskine therefore built on Hinde's military policies and maintained scorched-earth and food denial measures. Under Erskine the military was constantly on the offensive. From June to August 1953 the security forces conducted five major search-and-destroy operations in which the Army and the Royal Air Force (RAF) engaged Mau Mau gangs (Bennett 2013: 20-21).

Erskine also aimed to weaken Mau Mau by encouraging surrenders. In August 1953 he announced the first surrender scheme: Mau Mau fighters who were not wanted for crimes would be offered an amnesty if they had given themselves in. In September 1953 the Director of Operations also decided to suspend mass evictions on the ground that they induced starving civilians to join the insurgents' side (Bennett 2013: 22). Before Erskine's arrival, all warnings that mass evictions would have counterproductive effects were systematically disregarded to appease settlers (see above). Erskine's decision to stop coercive evacuations apparently let military necessity prevail over settlers' interests. Yet, it should be pointed out that, by the time evictions were suspended, they had substantially achieved the goal settlers pursued: at least 100,000 Kikuyu had been removed from settlers' property and, under the emergency regulations, it was impossible for them to return. Furthermore, Erskine deployed military units in defensive positions to protect settlers' farms from insurgents' attacks and reassure the white minority. In sum, even Erskine was not ready to ignore settlers' expectations completely.

In September 1953 offensive operations against insurgent gangs resumed. In January 1954 the British captured one of the most important Mau Mau leaders, Waruhiu Itote, better known as General China. General China's interrogation, which did not entail

[71]As I note in the Introduction, the ability of insurgents to obtain cooperation and assets from civilians explains why there is civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns, but it does not account for the specific level of indiscriminate violence.

torture, produced major intelligence gains for the British. The security forces obtained information about the structure and location of Mau Mau gangs. More importantly, the British secured General China's cooperation in surrender schemes. General China arranged meetings with Mau Mau gangs willing to discuss surrender conditions. Negotiations with insurgents revealed that several Mau Mau leaders and their gangs were ready to capitulate, but they hesitated because they believed that white settlers would force the government to cancel amnesty (Bennett 2013: 137). Erskine called on settler leader Micheal Blundell to make a public statement in support of amnesty policies (Bennett 2013: 137). Once again, Erskine had to acknowledge that settler leaders' cooperation was an essential part of the counterinsurgency campaign.

An accidental shooting during surrender negotiations in early April 1954 undermined future talks; in spite of that, by early June 1954 almost 200 fighters had given themselves in and intelligence reports indicated that more Mau Mau fighters were ready to give up if they had been given an opportunity to do so (Bennett 2013: 140). Clearly, Mau Mau's morale was beginning to crumble down.

However, the insurgency was not over yet. Die-hard fighters driven out of the forest areas by offensive operations returned to the African Reserves where they mingled with the local population and tried to reorganize resistance. Furthermore, insurgents were still very active in urban areas, especially in Nairobi. As the tide was turning in their favour, the British did not want to lose momentum and prepared their final assault.

4.2.3 The Villagization Programme and the End of the Insurgency.

Since March 1954 the colonial government was preparing to crush Mau Mau once and for all. At the institutional level, some preliminary reforms were pursued. A new and smaller emergency body, the War Council, replaced the Emergency Committee. The War Council included only four members: the Governor – who was the head of the Council – the Deputy Governor, settler leader Michael Blundell, and General Erskine.

At the political level, Lyttelton visited the colony again the same month and proposed a multiracial constitution for Kenya. When the first African minister was appointed later that year, it became apparent that multiracialism was no synonym for 'white supremacy' and 'segregation' in the intentions of the British government. In fact, the British government was beginning to plan a transition to African majority rule in an independent Kenya. In order to achieve this goal, the consolidation of African loyalism was becoming more important for Britain as it would favour the creation of a future

African élite wishing to keep Kenya in the British sphere of influence (Heinlein 2002: 122). These, however, were long term plans. In the short term, the appeasement policy towards settlers could not be drastically ended. As long as Mau Mau threatened the British rule in Kenya, the government needed to placate the European minority and prevent further unrest in the colony (Heinlein 2002: 123).

In April 1954 the security forces delivered a fatal blow to insurgents in Nairobi with Operation Anvil that aimed to deport all suspect Mau Mau fighters and sympathizers from the city. The operation began on 24th April 1954 and ended two weeks later. Almost 25,000 people were deported to detention camps: thousands of them would be imprisoned for years without criminal charges (Bennett 2013: 24); another 30,000 Kikuyu would be deported to the African Reserves where the demographic pressure on the land was booming (Elkins 2005: 124).

Most Kikuyu civilians would not stay in the Reserves for long time, though. Indeed, in June 1954 Erskine and the other members of the War Council decided to transfer the whole Kikuyu population to hundreds of new villages under direct government control. In this way it would become impossible for Kikuyu civilians to assist insurgents. The villagization programme was carried out quickly. By October 1955 almost 1,1 million Kikuyu civilians out of a total population of 1,3 million had been deported to 845 villages (Bennett 2013: 223).

The process of mass deportations – associated with a high level of civilian targeting in my model – was coercive. Army and police units penetrated into the Reserves and removed Kikuyu people from their homes by force; after that, non-combatants would be loaded on military trucks and railcars and carried away; deported people would be taken to new villages which had been built by using Kikuyu detainees' forced labour (Bennett 2013: 223). Once they had reached their destination, civilians were physically compelled into the village perimeter where they would be searched, deprived of their belongings, sanitized, and given identical uniforms (Anderson 2005: 310-312; Elkins 2005: 134). Kikuyu civilians were not allowed to leave the villages: they would spend years behind barbed-wire fences under the surveillance of the KHG and the KPR.

While the British military carried out mass deportations, only the Governor and the colonial administration – civil authorities – were responsible for the management of the new villages (Elkins 2005: 131). In theory, the new villages were conceived to promote social and economic reforms and build allegiance to the government (Elkins 2005: 118-119). However, the actual conditions of living in the villages varied. The colonial administration made a distinction between 'model' or 'reward' villages and 'punitive'

villages. In 'reward' of village civilians who accepted to support the government could have access to educational and social provisions; punitive villages, instead, consisted of concentration camps taking in dozens of thousands of alleged Mau Mau sympathizers (Bennett 2013: 224; Percox 1998: 85).

Even if the villagization programme did not directly originate from a perceived need to appease a would-be dominant group, the local alliance strategy of Britain did affect decisively the way villages were managed; that, in turn, shaped civilians' conditions of living (and risk of death) in detention camps more than any other factor. Indeed, Britain would allow settlers and loyalists to play a key role in the administration of the camps; as a result, they prison system would become an instrument of settlers' and loyalist' agenda. European settler leaders – like Alfred Vincent, Ferdinand Cavendish-Bentinck, Michael Blundell, and Group-Captain Briggs – believed that villages should be an instrument of repression rather than social rehabilitation (Elkins 2005: 111-114). When the villagization programme began, the settler community insisted to prioritize its punitive function (see Rawcliffe 1954). According to most settlers, white people should retain their economic and social privileges in a modern independent Kenya; villagization, therefore, was a golden opportunity to seal Kikuyu people's fate as a docile mass of servants (Elkins 2000: 41, 46; 2005: 145). Settlers seized that opportunity by securing direct control over the new villages: indeed, the civil administration in the colony recruited camp commandants, officers, and staff members from the KR and the KPR that were completely dominated by settlers (Elkins 2005: 145). Once in charge of the camps, settlers would act on the supremacist intentions of their community on a daily basis.

Kikuyu and other African loyalists were equally determined to slow down Mau Mau sympathizers' rehabilitation. Loyalists did not shape Britain's counterinsurgency in the early phase of the campaign, but their importance in the British local alliance strategy began to grow during the villagization process. The indiscriminate nature of mass deportations may have prompted other African tribes to join the rebellion, so the British needed to secure their acquiescence and cement African loyalism: as the villagization plans went on, the British rewarded the Kikuyu loyalist minority and other African tribes with jobs, land, and cattle seized from deported people (Percox 1998: 83). In this way, the British were rapidly promoting loyalists to the rank of a new economic indigenous élite that could share power with settlers on top of Kenya's national society after independence (Elkins 2005: 115). Rehabilitated Mau Mau supporters may have demanded radical reforms undermining loyalists' recently built economic and social

position. Loyalists therefore would strive to keep deported civilians in punitive villages as long as possible in an attempt to preserve their hard-won wealth (Elkins 2005: 118). The loyalist HG watching over Kikuyu prisoners in punitive villages would treat civilians as enemies to destroy.

Britain's decision to involve its supremacist local allies in the management of detention camps would disrupt Kikuyu detainees' lives. Coercive labour was a daily part of rehabilitation programmes for inmates; refusal to comply with labour obligations resulted in corporal punishment (Anderson 2005: 316-317). That added to the violence of the whole rehabilitation process. Indeed, suspect Mau Mau supporters in punitive villages could be rehabilitated only after confessing crimes and accepting guilt; confessions were extorted through torture and beatings (Anderson 2005: 316). Violence was not always related to the need for confessions. Home Guard units serving in detention camps quickly achieved notoriety for their lack of discipline towards female detainees and routinely committed sexual assaults on them (Elkins 2005: 269).

Food deficiency made civilians' survival even more precarious. Food and water supplies to detention camps and punitive villages were insufficient. Average individual rations failed to satisfy basic nutrition needs, which meant that inmates were exposed to a risk of starvation (Anderson 2005: 320). Food deficiency in punitive camps also correlated with the outbreak of diseases like scurvy, pellagra, and pneumonia (Anderson 2005: 320). In spite of that, camp commandants could reduce food rations even further as a reprisal after protests against living conditions, which only increased the risk of disease and death (Anderson 2005: 316). Another threat to civilians' survival came from a systematic and deliberate neglect of sanitation, especially in punitive villages. Camp commandants tended to disregard the sanitary conditions of the kitchens, latrines, and dumps; the disposal of night soil was equally neglected and water contamination was common; as a result, typhoid, dysentery, and tuberculosis affected thousands of inmates in punitive camps, occasionally achieving epidemic proportions (Anderson 2005: 320; Elkins 2005: 137). The incidence of disease was compounded by a lack of medical facilities in punitive camps, which made medical supervision desultory at most. Children and the elderly were particularly vulnerable and infant mortality in detention camps was high (Bennett 2013: 224).

Civilians' conditions of living in detention camps and punitive villages were not simply the product of inefficiencies in the organization of the prison system: it was a deliberate policy related to the local alliance strategy of Britain. The colonial government and the government in London were fully informed about the conditions of

Kikuyu prisoners; yet, they were not willing to do anything about it out of fear that any measure to relieve inmates would hinder the growing phenomenon of African loyalism. Baring, for example, refused to create an independent department with full oversight over the rehabilitation in order to protect loyalists' morale (Elkins 2005: 115, 139). The new Secretary of State for the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd, who replaced Lyttelton in June 1954, was eager to support the Governor's policies. When confronted with complaints about the brutality of repression in Kenya, Lennox-Boyd minimized the extent of civilians' suffering in the new villages and stressed the need to keep loyalists' morale up (Bennett 2013: 47; Elkins 2005: 139-141). As Britain acknowledged the importance of loyalism to build a friendly regime in an independent Kenya, loyalists' brutality was condoned and the perpetrators were rewarded with the assets taken away from the victims. This would be consistent with the prediction of my model that support for would-be dominant groups in the context of a favourable threat environment will result in a high level of civilian targeting.

Despite its brutality, the villagization programme effectively demolished Mau Mau's resistance. After villagization search-and-destroy missions targeted an insurgent organization which was now completely isolated from its popular base. With declining food supplies, no place to hide in the Reserves or urban areas, no information about the enemy, and no external help, Mau Mau fighters' ability and will to fight quickly collapsed. As starving fighters were forced to look for food, the movements of the gangs became predictable and became easy targets for British military units. After Operation Hammer and Operation First Flute in the Aberdares forests and Mount Kenya between December 1954 and April 1955, episodes of mass surrenders became more frequent (Bennett 2013: 27-28). British military victory was only a matter of time. Indeed, even if the state of emergency officially ended on 12th January 1960, military operations terminated in Autumn 1956. The British had defeated Mau Mau in four years.

In the process, the British security forces had caused the death of 50,000 people, including 7,000 women and 24,000 children under the age of 10 (Blacker 2007: 225-226); thousands of non-combatants had been tortured in custody; over 100,000 civilians were displaced in the first few months of the emergency and 1,1 million people had been deported to the new villages by October 1955; thousands of them had been tortured exposed to starvation, and disease.[72] The British counterinsurgency in Kenya was a humanitarian disaster for the Kikuyu population and its extent largely depended

[72] While this work is not about the effectiveness of indiscriminate violence, the outcome of the Kenya Emergency would challenge practitioners' prescription that indiscriminate violence should be avoided because it would be self-defeating (see above: 26-30).

on the local alliance strategy of Britain towards settlers and, at a later stage, loyalists.

4.3 Alternative Explanations for the Level of Civilian Targeting during the Kenya Emergency

4.3.1 The First School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Kenya Emergency

As we have seen, the First School of Thought includes the regime type argument and the military organizational arguments (see above). According to a strand of research relating to regime type and civilian targeting, democracies are more likely than non-democracies to refrain from civilian victimization in counterinsurgency campaigns. Gil Merom, in particular, holds that when democracies try to escalate the level of indiscriminate violence in an attempt to defeat a guerrilla organization, small groups of highly educated middle-class citizens who are sensitive to the violation of liberal values abroad would turn the domestic public opinion against the government; consequently, the government would be forced to fall back on self-restraint strategies and avoid civilian targeting (see above).

Observing the Kenya emergency case, one can see that Merom's argument would fail to account for both the outcome on the dependent variable and the process leading to those outcomes. Indeed, since Britain was a liberal democracy at the time of the Mau Mau uprising, Merom's argument would predict self-restraint. More specifically, going by Merom's argument, we should see the British government finding itself under prolonged pressure to stop civilian victimization; we should also see the British government being concerned about the prospect of an electoral defeat following domestic outrage and, eventually, we should observe the government complying with insisting demands for self-restraint.

Yet, as we have shown above, the level of civilian victimization in Kenya was high since the opening phase of the counterinsurgency campaign. Civilian targeting in Kenya did not call the attention of the press or any other significant social group which could spark public protests against the government on humanitarian issues in Kenya. At the beginning of the campaign, the press occasionally focused on the gruesome details of oath-taking ceremonies which were considered as an example of African barbarism (Bennett 2013: 50); instead of challenging the government, the sensationalist and lurid coverage of the emergency by the press nicely supported the government's position that

Mau Mau were completely apolitical. At a later stage of the campaign, torture and ill-treatment against civilians in punitive villages became an issue for public debate in parliament; however, the government was able to play the scale of torture down and defend the villagization programme without perceiving any serious risk of electoral ousting (Bennett 2013: 48-49). In effect, in spite of the large scale of indiscriminate killings, torture, displacement, deportation, starvation, and disease inflicted upon the Kikuyu population, the government was never confronted with any mass opposition movement from the domestic society in Britain.

The level of civilian targeting during the Kenya Emergency is apparently consistent, instead, with the version of the regime type argument that considers democracy as a propellant for indiscriminate violence (see above). According to this argument elected leaders would be afraid that protracted losses of troops may destroy their popularity and undermine their chances to win the next elections; as a consequence, democratic leaders would adopt civilian victimization strategies in order to limit casualties on their own side. So, we should see British leaders becoming concerned about the number of actual or potential casualties and their impact on their chances to secure tenure in office; we should also expect to see British leaders believing that a civilian targeting strategy could reduce military losses and prevent popularity decline.

In fact, while the prediction of the democratic propellant argument about the dependent variable values is confirmed, the corresponding causal mechanism is not. Indeed, there is no evidence that British leaders' decisions about civilian targeting were shaped by the prospect of high casualty rates and subsequent electoral ousting. In effect, the number of casualties the British suffered could hardly justify any concern about domestic politics. Mau Mau lacked modern guns and killed only 200 members of the security forces from 1952 to 1960; unsurprisingly, therefore, Kenya was not on top of the conservative government's calculations about tenure in office and received little attention in Parliament (Bennett 2013: 42-50). In sum, civilian targeting did not happen according to the mechanism posited by the democratic propellant argument.

The First School of Thought also includes a body of arguments which points to military organizational factors as the mainspring of civilian targeting. According to this group of arguments, military organizations would prefer attrition strategies based on the unrestrained use of firepower because those strategies would serve the bureaucratic interests of the armed forces; also, military organizations would prefer civilian victimization strategies when their military culture includes the relentless destruction of the enemy as part of soldiers' identity; finally, military organizations would be more

likely to victimize non-combatants when their force structure privileges mechanization which would make it more difficult for soldiers to collect intelligence about the enemy and use force selectively.

Military organizational factors can convincingly explain some forms of indiscriminate violence in the case of Kenya. For example, historians point out that the principle of non-combatants' immunity was not yet deeply rooted in the military culture of the British Army in the early 1950s; besides, the security forces were affected by a shortage of manpower and faced a serious shortage of intelligence about the enemy. All that may have propelled the use of indiscriminate violence. Certainly the British Army was responsible for the creation of free-fire zones, scorched-earth measures, indiscriminate shootings in Special and Prohibited Areas, and was involved in the use of torture during screening operations; consequently, military organizational factors are related to all these measures.

The main limitation of this group of arguments is that military organizational factors, however, have more causal importance when civilian leaders and authorities take no active part in the repression of insurgents and the army is the only organizational in charge to fight the enemy. In the case of Kenya, British civilian leaders, the civil administration and the police in the colonies – while acknowledging the operational autonomy of the Army – did not yield their authority to the military and were directly involved in the repression of insurgents. Consequently, the organizational interests, military culture, and force structure of the British Army would not be sufficient to explain Britain’s conduct to civilians in important cases.

As we have seen, civilian leaders were responsible for some of the deadliest policies against non-combatants, while the police and loyalist auxiliary units – like the Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) and the Home Guard (HG) – were routinely involved in the victimization of civilians. For example, it was the Governor of Kenya himself – not military commanders – that adopted a policy of mass evictions against Kikuyu people living on settlers’ land since the very beginning of the campaign displacing at least 70,000 civilians – mostly women and children – and exposed them to a serious risk of famine between November 1952 and April 1953. It was the Governor of Kenya under the pressure of settlers – not military commanders – that made the use of capital punishment more indiscriminate than ever before in the colony.

Besides, extrajudicial executions were common and did not involve the British Army alone. In fact, the KPR and the HG, which were under the control of the civil administration in the colony, committed the fiercest reprisals against non-combatants

after insurgents' attacks. As we have seen, after the murder of 120 loyalist non-combatants at Lari, the HG and the KPR retaliated by shooting at least 200 people indiscriminately; few months later the HG killed another 400 non-combatants as a reprisal for another attack that killed only one person (see above). The KPR and the HG were also involved in torture during screening operations and indiscriminate shootings in Special Areas. Importantly, while military commanders like Erskine attempted to restrain the Army, the KPR and the HG escaped military discipline and their conduct towards non-combatants did not significantly change.

Finally, the colonial administration, the police and the HG also stood out for their systematic brutality against civilians deported to new villages after January 1954; the military, instead, had little to do with the conditions of living in detention camps. Indeed, while mass deportations to new villages were carried out by the British Army, only the Governor and the civil administration – not the military – were responsible for the management of the new villages where the police and the HG watched over inmates and ran the infamous rehabilitation programmes based on torture. Besides, as we have seen, the HG and the KPR – not the British Army – inflicted other forms of punishment on inmates like food deprivation, neglect of sanitation, and denial of medical care. Given the marginal role of the British Army in the management of new villages, military organizational factors cannot have had any decisive causal impact on the fate of inmates which included. In sum, explanations based uniquely on those factors would miss a very significant part of British barbarism in Kenya.

So even if military organizational factors can explain some forms of civilian targeting involving the army in Kenya, those factors cannot account for the most significant part of barbarism during the emergency. The local alliance strategy of the incumbent state played a more relevant role.

4.3.2 The Second School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Kenya Emergency

The Second School of Thought posits that the way the incumbent deals with insurgents' popular base is a function of the perceived identity of the enemy. When the incumbent state leaders vilify and dehumanize the civilian population and see it as as 'uncivilized' or 'barbaric' or 'inferior', then indiscriminate violence is more likely to happen.

Interestingly, in the case of the Kenya Emergency there is evidence consistent with this thesis. The British government, the colonial administration and the troops deployed

on the field shared a perception of Mau Mau as an anti-modern movement whose ferocity reflected mere African savagery (Lonsdale 1990). The details of oath-taking ceremonies, which included animal sacrifices, blood drinking, sexual intercourse, and bestiality caused shock and horror in the British government circles and the security forces alike. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Lyttelton, vividly described his feelings about Mau Mau in his memoirs: “I can recall no instance when I have felt the forces of evil to be so near and so strong. As I wrote memoranda or instructions, I would suddenly see a shadow fall across the page – the horned shadow of the Devil itself” (Lyttelton 1963: 380).

Racial prejudice against the Kikuyu population was even more rampant in the security forces as evident in the zoomorphic language that routinely described Mau Mau and their followers as savages that lived an almost “animal-like existence” (French 2011: 72). The dehumanization of the Kikuyu in the security forces was prominent for two main reasons. Firstly, the way Mau Mau killed their victims was psychologically shocking. Mau Mau killed with knives or pangas and routinely hacked and mutilated the bodies of their victims. That practice contributed to exacerbate the perception of Mau Mau as a devilish and atrocious enemy. Secondly, and more importantly, the security forces enlisted thousands of settlers and loyalists which transferred their prejudice into the practice of counterinsurgency. While settlers' prejudice depended on genuine racism against Africans, loyalists' hatred against the Mau Mau and their suspect sympathizers came from an understanding of Mau Mau as a threat to the social and economic positions of the chiefs. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the settler-dominated KPR and the loyalist KHG persistently perpetrated the most serious and systematic atrocities against civilians (see above). Is this enough to conclude that the dehumanization of the enemy was the mainspring of barbarism during the Kenya Emergency? I give a negative answer.

Indeed, racial prejudice and the dehumanization of the enemy became part of the British practice in counterinsurgency in Kenya and affected the level of barbarism during the emergency only by way of the local alliance strategy of Britain. Indeed, the enlistment of settlers in the KR and the KPR was the factor that made it possible for one of the most racist white minorities in the British Empire to interact with Kikuyu civilians and manhandle them on a daily basis. Importantly, Britain involved settlers in the campaign because of a perceived self-interest: reassuring the white minority and preventing a civil war that would only discredit Britain's wider decolonization strategy (see above). As to loyalists, one may argue that the vilification of the enemy was no

more than an intervening variable between Britain's local alliance strategy and the level of civilian targeting. Indeed, as Britain rewarded loyalists with land, jobs, and resources taken away from suspect Mau Mau sympathizers since 1954, the rehabilitation of deported civilians became an increasing threat to the newly found wealth and prestige of loyalists; as a result, loyalist ruthlessly vilified those Kikuyu who could have undermined their hard-won economic and social achievements (Branch 2007; 2009). Perhaps, the ultimate evidence that loyalists' vilification of the enemy did not stem from genuine racism is that fact that loyalists were Kikuyu too. In sum, it is unclear that the image of the enemy had an independent causal effect on civilian targeting during the Kenya Emergency. The local alliance strategy of Britain looks more relevant.

Another problem with the dehumanization argument is that it could not account for the British opposition to a take-no-prisoners policy demanded by settlers. Mass killing would be a plausible consequence of the dehumanization of the enemy. Yet, the Colonial Office, the Governor of Kenya, and commanders like Erskine firmly rejected that type of measures (see above). If the level of civilian targeting during the British campaign against Mau Mau was decisively shaped by a perception of the opponent as devilish, barbaric, or subhuman, why spare an abhorrent enemy from extermination? As I have shown, my model offers a clear explanation for the absence of extermination: I posit that favourable perceptions of the external threat environment makes extermination look like an unnecessary risk (see above). The dehumanization argument, instead, provides no answers to the question above.

In conclusion, the dehumanization argument does not convincingly account for the level of civilian targeting during the Kenya Emergency. The impact of the candidate causal factor of this argument on the level of civilian targeting in Kenya seems to depend on the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state. In addition to that, the argument in question fails to explain why Britain did not exterminate civilians.

4.3.3 The Third School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Kenya Emergency

According to the Third School of Thought, civilian victimization would be a strategy of late resort because states would prefer quick victories with low casualties, whereas civilian victimization works slowly. As a consequence, states would refrain from indiscriminate violence at the beginning of a counterinsurgency campaign. However, when hostilities last longer than expected, casualties mount, population control is

slipping and victory seems in question, the leaders of the incumbent state would become desperate to win and would shift to civilian targeting strategies.

In the case of the Kenya emergency, the Third School of Thought would predict self-restraint, especially in the opening phase of the campaign which was marked by general optimism about the outcome of the conflict. Indeed, insurgents did not pose a serious military threat and the British government never perceived that insurgents were likely to win. As we have seen, Mau Mau were suffering from a chronic shortage of guns and mostly used spears, knives, and pangas to kill their victims. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the number of casualties Mau Mau inflicted upon the British security forces was extremely low. Less than 200 members of the British security forces died during the emergency.

Faced with an enemy which could hardly shoot to kill, British civilian and military leaders did not become desperate to win. In part, military commanders underestimated the number of Mau Mau fighters due to a lack of intelligence. As we have seen General Hinde assessed that there were no more than a hundred hardcore fighters Mau Mau fighters in the forests which could be eliminated quickly (see above). Baring showed comparable optimism about Britain's prospects for victory. In a telegram to the Colonial Secretary in May 1953, Baring wrote “the situation is better and the machine to deal with rebellion greatly improved”; the Governor was relieved to observe that there had been “no significant spreading of Mau Mau rebellion to other tribes” and that “Kikuyu are now coming into the open in increasing numbers in support of the Government”; Baring's conclusion was that victory was within the grasp of Britain: “I remain convinced that if we can now press home our advantage we might finish them [Mau Mau] off quickly”.[73]

The problem with the Third School of Thought is that British leaders authorized a high level of civilian targeting since the beginning of the campaign when, as we have just seen, they were most confident in a rapid victory over an insurgent organization perceived to be posing a limited military threat. Mass displacement, starvation of evicted people, torture, indiscriminate shootings, scorched-earth, food denial, and an indiscriminate reliance on capital punishment became part of the British campaign against Mau Mau since the first few months of the emergency when the main causal factor of the Third School of Thought – desperation to win before a powerful insurgency – was not present. This is a serious flaw in the Third School of Thought: indeed, considering the military weakness of Mau Mau and the very low number of

[73]TNA, CO 822/440, Baring to Lyttelton, 18 May 1953.

casualties taken by Britain, the prediction that incumbent states will refrain from desperation to win and civilian targeting when facing a limited military threat should have been easily confirmed.

The Third School of Thought seems to perform better on the explanatory level with regard to the later stage of the British campaign in Kenya and the villagization programme. One may argue that Mau Mau resilience frustrated Britain, which eventually became desperate to win and made a drastic decision to deport almost the whole Kikuyu population in order to deprive insurgents of their essential popular base. Indeed, through the villagization programme, Britain aimed to crush insurgents once and for all. Yet, by the time the villagization programme was started the ability of Mau Mau to inflict losses on the British forces was not any higher than it was in the opening phase of the conflict; in fact, based on surrender talks organized by General China, the British knew that Mau Mau had taken serious casualties, their morale was collapsing, and hundreds of fighters in the forests wanted to surrender (see above). The villagization programme, in sum, seems to be a measure taken to deliver a fatal blow to a weakened enemy and make the most of an improving situation, rather than a desperate attempt to grab victory from the jaws of defeat. Finally, while desperation to win can account for the decision to deport the Kikuyu population, it is not clear how it could explain the fate of civilians after deportation. Indeed, after the villagization of the Kikuyu population, Mau Mau had no chances to win, yet the ill-treatment of civilians in punitive villages continued. This would suggest that desperation to win is not a necessary condition for civilian targeting to occur.

In conclusion, the case of the Kenya Emergency does not confirm the predictions and causal logic of the desperation thesis. This explanatory failure adds to the failure of the two other schools of thought, which leaves my model as the most valid explanation available.

CHAPTER 5

BRITISH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN CYPRUS (1955-1959)

In this chapter I will study the British counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus. Like the previous case study, I will begin by introducing the background of the insurgency and identify the main decision-makers on the British side. After that, I will specify the values on my candidate causal factors. I will show that the Cyprus Emergency is an instance of Scenario 4 in my model. Indeed, during the insurgency the British believed that no state was willing or able to impose its own hegemony over Cyprus at the expense of Britain. At the same time, Britain was not supporting any would-be dominant group at the expense of other groups in the Cypriot society. Under these conditions, my model predicts that the incumbent state will use only a moderate level of civilian targeting and avoid measures that can undermine the survival of non-combatants.

The logic behind this outcome is that the perceived absence of external threats to the local hegemony of the incumbent state over the insurgent territory makes the leaders of the incumbent state more likely to see the possible drawbacks of indiscriminate violence. Potentially, indiscriminate violence can backfire in several ways: it may strengthen civilians' resistance to the incumbent in the insurgent territory, it may spark protests by the domestic public opinion or political opposition parties, it may induce other governments to undertake diplomatic actions to restrain the incumbent and may even result in external military interventions. Now, if the incumbent state believes that other states are willing and able to take advantage of unrest in the insurgent territory to include it into their sphere of influence, then the incumbent will have incentives to take all the risks connected to the indiscriminate use of force in an attempt to crush insurgents completely and deprive other states of opportunities to interfere (see Scenario 1). If not – as happens in Scenario 4 – the incumbent state will be more likely to take the potential drawbacks of civilian targeting into account and be self-restrained as they will have no incentives to take the risks connected to the use of barbarism. Likewise, if

the incumbent state is supporting a would-be dominant group in the local society of the insurgent territory out of a perceived self-interest the incumbent may again have incentives to disregard the potential drawbacks of civilian targeting and accept the risks of indiscriminate violence to appease their would-be dominant allies. If not – as happens in Scenario 4 – the incumbent will be more likely to consider the potential costs of indiscriminate violence and keep from taking the corresponding risks.[74]

If my model is to be confirmed, then we should see British leaders refraining from measures which may cause the death of civilians; we should also see them showing a belief that civilian targeting is an unnecessary risk; finally, we should see the British decision-makers opposing an escalation of civilian targeting when this is believed to help a group in the society of the insurgent territory to subdue another one.

5.1 Testing Scenario 4: British Counterinsurgency in Cyprus (1955-1959)

5.1.1 The Background of the Cyprus Emergency

The insurgency against Britain in Cyprus derived from the nationalist aspiration of the Greek Cypriot community to achieve enosis, or political union with Greece. When the insurrection began, Greek Cypriots numbered approximately 521,000 which corresponded to almost 80 percent of the whole population of the island. In spite of their numbers, Greek Cypriots could not claim to speak for the whole population of the island. Indeed, the Turkish community, 17 percent of the Cypriot population, bitterly opposed enosis out of fear to become victims of ethnic cleansing or be forced into political submission (French 2015: 253).

Cyprus had been under British control since June 1878 when the Ottoman Sultan granted Britain the right to administer Cyprus without relinquishing formal sovereignty. In 1914 Britain incorporated Cyprus into its Empire after the Ottomans sided with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the First World War. Having lost the war, in 1923 Turkey eventually signed the Lausanne Treaty which committed the Turkish Republic to drop all its claims over Cyprus.

Yet Britain never attempted to build a centralized state on the island which could promote the idea of a common Cypriot identity and left education under the control of

[74]It should be observed that my model does not aim to predict the specific concerns of the incumbent state about the possible drawbacks of indiscriminate repression. My model only predicts that, under the conditions described in Scenario 4, the incumbent will be preoccupied – rightly or wrongly – that civilian targeting may have *any* adverse effects on its perceived interests and so the incumbent will refrain from a high or extreme level of indiscriminate violence.

communal leaders and local institutions. (Morag 2004: 611-613). On the Greek side, the Orthodox Church dominated the education system in Cyprus and thus played a crucial role in inculcating Hellenic nationalism in Greek Cypriot young generations (Joseph 2009: 378-379; Kitromilides 1990: 4-6). The enosis movement, in addition to opposing the British rule, spurned the limited form of self-government that the British conceded in 1882 when they established a Legislative Council including Greek and Turkish representatives. Yet, the enosis movement did not resort to violence to achieve its goals.

This changed in October 1931 when Greek Cypriots sparked riots against the Governor's decision to increase the tax burden on the island and ignore the opposition of the Legislative Council. On 21st October a crowd of 5,000 people attacked and destroyed the Government House calling for union with Greece. The colonial government reacted to the revolt by using repression. Rioters were arrested and alleged ringleaders were deported; the Legislative Council as well as elected Municipalities were dissolved and political parties were banned; censorship was made more pervasive; manifestations in support of pan-Hellenism and enosis were forbidden; two Greek and a Turkish unofficial representatives chosen by the Governor himself was all Britain would leave the Cypriot population with (French 2015: 28-29). Britain's repression ended disorders but did not eliminate the enosis movement. Even if Britain restored self-government in Cyprus after the Second World War, by that time the enosis movement had hardened its positions.

A key event was the election of Makarios II as Archbishop of the Greek Cypriot Church. Makarios II rallied all Greek nationalist organizations under the leadership of the Church in the newly established Ethnarchy Council and demanded nothing less than enosis. Makarios II believed that only under external pressure Britain may have eventually conceded (French 2015: 33). Greece, of course, was seen as the main ally of the enosis movement but the wider decolonization process generated favourable conditions to increase the international support for enosis at the United Nations too. In order to undermine Britain's legitimacy as a colonial ruler in Cyprus, the enosis movement decided to show the extent of Greek Cypriot support for self-determination and union with Greece. Accordingly, in 1950 the Orthodox Church organized a plebiscite asking Greek voters to approve or reject enosis: almost 96 percent of voters chose enosis. The other communities of Cyprus, however, had been excluded from the plebiscite, which confirmed Turkish Cypriots' belief that they would not be considered full-fledged citizens if Cyprus had joined Greece (Gates 2013: 875).

Britain dismissed the plebiscite as illegal, but the Cabinet in London avoided police

repression. Repression would have only embittered relations with Greece where a friendly anti-communist government had recently emerged victorious from a protracted civil war and was still seen as unstable: by sparking a crisis with Greece over Cyprus, Britain would have weakened its Greek allies and the anti-Soviet bloc; besides,the Cabinet considered that a policy of repression in Cyprus would make the states of recent independence more hostile to Britain at the United Nations.[75] The Greek government itself, while staying committed to enosis, believed that a crisis with Britain over Cyprus was more than Greece could afford (Hatzivassiliou 1995; Novo 2013: 200). Athens, therefore, invited Britain to start bilateral negotiations over the future status of the island, but would refrain from denouncing Britain's colonial rule at the United Nations.

The Ethnarchy would not accept this foreign policy line. After the death of Makarios II in June 1950, Michael Mouskos or Archbishop Makarios III took over the movement. The new leader aimed to increase the mass support of the enosis movement in Cyprus by establishing closer relations with farmer unions and creating youth organizations loyal to the Church (Holland 1998: 27-28). Makarios also toured Europe and the Middle East to build an international front in support of the cause of self-determination for Cyprus and persuade the Greek government to bring up the issue at the United Nations (Holland 1998: 28).

Makarios, however, did not limit his action to diplomatic pressure. In fact, he believed that if Britain had resisted diplomatic pressure and popular opposition against its rule in Cyprus, then the use of force could not be ruled out. In July 1952, during a visit in Athens to lobby the Greek government, Makarios and other Greek Cypriot nationalist leaders established a Liberation Committee presided by the Archbishop himself (French 2015: 46). The Committee began to organize an insurgency campaign under the military command of Giorgios Grivas, a retired Greek Cypriot colonel who had fought in the Second World War in the Greek Army.

Grivas began to develop his strategy in 1953. Grivas did not expect to defeat Britain militarily; he rather aimed to undermine its will to fight. Accordingly, Grivas intended to use a guerrilla strategy based on sabotage of government and military installations as well as hit-and-run attacks against the security forces (French 2015: 48). At the same time, the Church would organize riots and mass demonstrations against the British, while friendly governments – especially Greece – would apply international diplomatic pressure on Britain invoking the principle of self-determination at the United Nations

[75]TNA, CO 537/6228, Minute by Fisher, 20 January 1950; TNA, CO 537/6228, Minute by Bennett, 24 January 1950

(Holland 1998: Ch. 2; Newsinger 2002: 91-92). If Britain had responded by increasing repression, that would have supposedly stiffened popular support for enosis and would have made it more difficult for the British government to resist international pressure to concede self-determination (Beckett 2001: 154).

In order to carry out this strategy, Grivas began to build a paramilitary organization in Cyprus. Importantly, Grivas set up an intelligence-gathering system by recruiting informers in the Cypriot police (French 2015: 57-58). This would be essential to foresee and frustrate British police and military operations against insurgents. By the end of 1954 the insurgent organization was ready to fight and Grivas chose its name: Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston (EOKA) or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (French 2015: 52). EOKA members were organized in two broad groups. A group of fighters, consisting of no more than 350 guerrillas, would conduct the sabotage campaign and harass the security forces with short surprise attacks. Fighters were divided into mountain gangs and town groups. The former would ambush the security forces' patrols and vehicles near Cypriot villages in rural areas, while the latter would assassinate British servicemen and intimidate or eliminate government informers in urban areas (French 2015: 56-57). The majority of EOKA members, however, were not fighters: they formed village groups or the passive wing of the organization numbering approximately 750 people. Village groups were in charge to provide food, shelter, additional manpower, and intelligence about the enemy (French 2015: 56). In 1955 EOKA consisted of approximately 1,100 members overall.

The Greek government was aware of Grivas' activities and unofficially assisted the insurgent organization by providing guns and explosives. This marked a tactical change in the foreign policy of Greece. In 1952 a more stable conservative government had emerged under the fiercely anti-communist leadership of Field-Marshal Alexandros Papagos who could count on a single-party majority in parliament for the first time after the war. From the vantage point of Greece, the Cyprus question was still to be solved through negotiations but, apparently, an insurgency to press the British government into talks about the status of the island looked more affordable than in the past, if not inevitable.

Indeed, the British government had constantly refused to negotiate. Britain regarded Cyprus as a necessary asset to project its military power and influence in the Middle East and assist NATO against the Soviet Union in case of war (French 2015: 42). While Greece had committed itself to let Britain have military bases on the island after enosis, fear of domestic instability in Greece and the risk of a communist coup in Athens

increased Britain's concern that Greece would not keep its promises after securing sovereignty over Cyprus.[76] In September 1953 Eden himself dismissed Papagos' offer to negotiate (Holland 1998: 32). The British case against self-determination for the island was apparently stated even more forcefully in July 1954 when the Minister of State at the Colonial Office, Henry Hopkinson, declared in the House of Commons that certain territories in the Commonwealth could "never expect to become fully independent" (Holland 1998: 38).

In September 1954 Greece eventually denounced Britain at the United Nations for denying Cyprus' right to self-determination. The Greek initiative however would end in failure. Indeed, Britain was able to secure Turkey's support against Athens at the United Nations. Ankara would become a close ally of Britain on the Cyprus issue. Turkey saw enosis as a risk for the Turkish minority of Cyprus and shared with Britain the concern that a communist pro-Soviet coup in Athens could expose the Turkish territory to a military threat, given the proximity of the island to the Turkish coast (Bölükbaşi 1998; French 2015: 43; Özkan 2015). In December 1954 the General Assembly of the United Nations decided that the status of Cyprus would not be discussed. Neither the United States nor other NATO members had sided with Greece at the United Nations. The United States accepted Britain's argument that the Cyprus issue could cause a conflict between Greece and Turkey undermining the NATO; accordingly, the United States pressed the Greek government to acquiesce so as to avoid tensions that the Soviet Union may have exploited (Johnson 2000a: 116; 2000b: 230-232; Stefanidis 1999: 271-274).

Yet, the enosis movement in Cyprus had no intention to acquiesce. The diplomatic defeat of the pro-enosis movement at the United Nations eventually persuaded Makarios that the insurgency should begin. Accordingly, Grivas would start his offensive on 1st April 1955.

5.1.2 Identifying British Decision-Makers

Since I am observing the same incumbent state – Great Britain – at almost the same point in time as the case of Kenya, the institutional positions of decision-makers and their formal functions are identical (see above). The individuals in charge to make decisions, however, were different. When the emergency began in April 1955, Anthony Eden was the Prime Minister of the British Government until his resignation in January 1957 when he was replaced by Harold Macmillan. Before becoming Prime Minister,

[76]TNA, CAB 129/69/CC(54)425 Secretary of State for the Colonies and Ministry of State, 21 July 1954.

Macmillan was at the head of the Foreign Office which followed and managed the international political aspects of the Cyprus Emergency. Macmillan was succeeded by John Selwyn Lloyd at the Foreign Office. Given the status of Cyprus as a British colony the Colonial Office also provided inputs under the constant leadership of Alan Lennox-Boyd. As in the case of Kenya, the Governor occupied one of the most relevant positions: he was the supreme commander of the British forces in the island (see above). At the beginning of the insurgency in April 1955, Robert Armitage was the head of the colonial government; he would be replaced by the Chief of Imperial General Staff, John Harding in October 1955; two years later, Harding would resign and his position would be taken by Sir Hugh Foot in December 1957 (Holland 1998).

5.1.3 British Perceptions of the External Threat Environment

Over the course of the emergency Britain perceived the external threat environment as favourable. As the Greek Cypriot insurgency gained momentum, there were two states which were interested in the future status of the island: Greece and Turkey. The former aimed to end the British rule and annex the island according to the will of the Greek majority in Cyprus; the latter, instead, opposed enosis and since 1956 aimed to achieve partition in order to establish a Turkish Cypriot state under Ankara's influence. Did the British authorities believe that either Greece or Turkey could impose their hegemony over the island at the expense of Britain?

The intentions of Greece to incorporate Cyprus into its national territory were unequivocally clear to Britain. Yet, British leaders discounted the ability of Greece to act upon its intentions and impose enosis. The British believed that Greece simply did not have enough military power and diplomatic influence to threaten Britain's rule over Cyprus or coerce Britain to withdraw.

At the beginning of the 1950s Greece was a shattered country devastated by the Nazi occupation during the Second World War and a civil war that ended only in 1949. The right won the conflict but the support of Britain and the United States had been decisive. Bordering on hostile communist regimes – especially Bulgaria – which enjoyed military superiority over the Greek forces, the priority of the post-war Greek governments in the 1950s was the protection of the Greek northern and eastern frontiers from the threat posed by the Soviet bloc; therefore, Greece considered that friendly relations with Britain, the United States, and even Turkey were essential to its national security and, accordingly, Athens decided to join NATO in 1952 (Chourchoulis and Kourkouvelas

2012; Hatzivassiliou 1995). This was perceived in London as a powerful constraint on the Greek foreign policy:[77] as Greece was dependent upon Britain and the other NATO allies for its own survival, Athens could pose no serious threat to Britain's hegemony over Cyprus.

As we have seen, this did not mean that Greece would give up the goal of enosis; rather Athens would pursue it by trying to reassure Britain that enosis would not harm its strategic interests. By 1953, however, after being confronted with Britain's refusal to negotiate over Cyprus (see above), Greece started a diplomatic offensive against Britain at the United Nations and secretly supported Grivas' paramilitary organization. Yet, the British were relatively unimpressed by the Greek efforts to coerce them into talks. Still in Summer 1954 Greece appeared as a "friendly but unstable ally" in the eyes of the British Cabinet (Holland 1998: 38).

Indeed, Greece had little leverage on Britain. Firstly, the ability of Greece to assist the insurgency militarily was limited. Cyprus was far from the coast of Greece and shipments of guns from Athens were erratic. Since 1956 the British navy's operations to seal off the island made it more difficult for insurgents to receive weapons from Athens. After Papagos' death in 1955, the new Greek Government led by Konstantinos Karamanlis saw arms smuggling as an unnecessary risk: evidence of Greek complicity in terrorism against Britain would make it more difficult for Athens to find supporters at the United Nations (French 2015: 60-61). Importantly, the involvement of Greece in arm-smuggling never obscured a basic matter of fact: Greece was a weak NATO ally surrounded by militarily superior communist regimes, therefore Britain had an interest in keeping Anglo-Greek tensions over Cyprus to the minimum and tolerate Greek limited activities in order to contain the Soviet threat. It is revealing that Governor Harding's suggestion that the Royal Navy should engage Greek vessels to hinder arms smuggling from Greece would be immediately rejected by the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet as well as the British Cabinet on the ground that the use of force against a NATO ally would be simply unimaginable.[78]

Secondly, the failure of the Greek initiative at the United Nations in Summer 1954 demonstrated that Greece could perhaps get a hearing from the United States and other members of the General Assembly about Cyprus, but it could not gather enough diplomatic support to achieve its goals. The British government could perceive the

[77]TNA, CO 67/370/3, Norton to Foreign Office, 27 May 1950.
[78]TNA, FO 371/117690, Admiralty telegram to C-in-C, Mediterranean Fleet, 25 December 1955.

reluctance of the United States to support the British colonialism in Cyprus,[79] but at the same time the British Cabinet was sure that the United States did not want to strain Anglo-American relations and would not impose any solution in favour of Greece.[80] In fact, it would be Greece that would constantly find itself under American pressure to avoid a diplomatic conflict with Britain and Turkey on Cyprus which may have weakened the NATO (Johnson 2000a, 2000b; Holland 1995).

Britain's confidence in its ability to neutralize the Greek efforts to end the British hegemony over Cyprus, however, was not simply based on the weakness of Greece. Britain's alliance with Turkey was a major reassuring factor at least until Summer 1958. In 1954 Britain began to entertain the idea of bringing Turkey back into the Cyprus issue against Greece (Hatzivassiliou 1991; Holland 1998: 43). As we have seen, Turkey relinquished all its claims over Cyprus with the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, but Ankara was still determined to block enosis which was considered a threat to the Turkish Cypriot minority and the national security of Turkey itself (see above). By summer 1954 the Foreign Office was planning to let Turkey interfere officially in the Cyprus problem and claim the right to participate in the administration of the island if Britain had ever withdrawn; in this way, Britain would confront Greece with the rigid Turkish opposition to enosis and would justify continuing British rule as the only option which could avoid a conflict over the island that would undermine the NATO.[81] Britain would then propose a limited form of self-government for Cyprus, which Greece would predictably refuse; after that, Britain would blame Greece for the ongoing Cyprus crisis in addition to exposing Athens' impotence.

This plan was successfully carried out in Summer 1955 when Britain invited Greece and Turkey to a Tripartite Conference in London over the Eastern Mediterranean affairs to discuss the future of Cyprus. The conference – held between 29th August and 7th September 1955 – was fully stage-managed by London and Ankara.[82] As the Turkish delegation, in complete agreement with London, claimed that Turkey was entitled to a share of sovereignty over the island in the event of Britain's withdrawal, Greece stood against; in order to show its determination, the Turkish government organized riots

[79]TNA, FO 371/117621, Makins to Eden, 12 January 1955.
[80]TNA, FO 371/112841, Eden, minute, 24 March 1955.
[81]TNA, FO 371/112850, British Embassy in Ankara to Foreign Office, 6 August 1954; TNA, FO 371/112867, Selwyn-Lloyd to Eden, 30 September 1954; TNA, FO 371/112869, Muirhead, minute, 18 October 1954; TNA, FO 371/112875, Wilding minute, 23 November 1954; TNA, FO 371/117626, Nutting, minute, 28 March 1955; TNA, CAB 128/29/55, Cabinet conclusions, 28 June 1955; FO 371/117645, Selby, minute, 23 July 1955.
[82]TNA, FO 371/117643, Macmillan to Foreign Office, 16 July 1955; TNA, FO 371/117643, Macmillan to Foreign Office, 17 July 1955; TNA, FO 371/117653, Macmillan to Eden, 31 August 1955.

against the Greek minority in Istanbul. While Britain had not helped Ankara to organize the attacks against the Greek minority in Turkey, the British had long acknowledged that some riots "would do us nicely".[83] Even though Greece temporarily called its officers back from the NATO headquarters in protest, this move would be irrelevant. The conference ended in failure, as planned by Britain and Turkey.

The London Conference had exposed the impotence of Greece over Cyprus. Having established an alliance with Turkey, the British Cabinet simply stopped worrying about Greece (Hatzivassiliou 2007; Holland 1995: 41) According to the British Embassy in Athens, the Greek government itself acknowledged its limited scope for action over Cyprus even if a nationalist domestic opinion forced the Greek authorities to stay committed to the goal of enosis.[84] After the London Conference, the belief set in the British Cabinet that Greece should not be further provoked but, powerless as it was, Athens would eventually accept any solution Britain and Turkey would agree upon (Holland 1998: 288).

Yet, Turkey would soon show to Britain that its support was based on a condition, one that Turkey would present in 1956 and the British Cabinet was reluctant to meet: partition. As the Greek Cypriot insurgency went on, Turkey aimed to establish a Turkish Cypriot state loyal to Ankara bordering on a Greek Cypriot state. This was intended to protect the Turkish minority from ethnic cleansing and include a part of Cyprus into the Turkish sphere of influence.

Partition was more than Britain was willing to concede in the short term. While the British Cabinet firmly refused self-determination and enosis, it was also aware that territorial partition would mean a basic failure of Britain's colonial rule in Cyprus (French 2015: 189-190; Holland 1998: 156). Yet, since Summer 1956 Britain began to consider the possibility of partition as a last-resort measure. Indeed, according to the British government, evoking partition as a possible political outcome could serve two purposes: on the one hand, it would temporarily appease Ankara and keep the Anglo-Turkish partnership up; on the other hand, the prospect of partition could be used as a threat against Greece and the enosis movement in Cyprus to force them to accept the continuation of Britain's rule as the least of all possible evils (Hatzivassiliou 1991; Holland 1998: 163-165). In December 1956 the British government officially mentioned partition as one of the possible political solution to the Cyprus crisis. This, however, was not enough to appease Turkey. Indeed, Ankara had long grown concerned

[83]TNA, FO 371/112859, Wilding, minute, 14 September 1954.
[84]TNA, FO 371/123918, Lambert to Foreign Office, 19 August 1956.

that Britain, after exploiting the Turkish support against Greece, may have eventually settled the dispute with the Greek Cypriot majority (Holland 1998: 169). Accordingly, Turkey began to press Britain on the matter of partition. What was Turkey willing and able to do in order to attain its goals? The British government would soon find itself dealing with this question.

In June 1956 the Turkish government claimed for the first time that any attempt to transfer sovereignty over Cyprus to Greece would result in a Turkish military intervention. The British, however, tended to discount these threats. While a Turkish invasion of Cyprus was deemed likely in the event of enosis after a British withdrawal from the island, Britain was confident that Ankara would not use force as long as the British troops were deployed in Cyprus even if Britain had allowed some sort of union with Greece.[85]

Even if conventional threats were dismissed, Britain knew that Turkey had another way to interfere in the domestic affairs of Cyprus. The British would discover that Ankara had established contacts with the Turkish Cypriot minority in order to help the latter to set up a paramilitary organization. As we shall see, this was not intended to fight Britain, but EOKA and the Greeks. Since 1957 the Turkish government instigated anti-Greek riots and demonstrations in Cyprus; in Summer 1958 Ankara would order the Turkish minority to escalate attacks against the Greeks, thus sparking a spiral of violent intercommunal reprisals; in this way, Turkey aimed to force the British Cabinet to concede immediate partition by showing that the two communities could not live in the same territory (see below).

Once again, however, the British realized that Turkey's ability to attain its goals and impose its hegemony over Cyprus was limited and, ultimately, fatally crippled by its dependence upon Britain and even Greece to protect its own frontiers. This became evident in the second half of 1958 when Ankara was suddenly forced to change its intransigent stance on Cyprus and halt riots after the outbreak of international crises that threatened Turkey and the very survival of its regime. In particular, Turkey – like Britain – was concerned about the growth of Nasser's influence in the Middle East. After a long series of military skirmishes between Syria and Turkey, in February 1958 Syria accepted union with Egypt and formed the United Arab Republic (UAR) under the leadership of Nasser himself . In July 1958 a military coup in Baghdad toppled the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy and established the Republic of Iraq which denounced the Baghdad Pact designed to contain the Soviet influence in the Middle East. This seemed

[85]TNA, FO 371/123906, Turkish military action in connection with the Cyprus question, 26 June 1956.

to mark the beginning of a domino effect in the region in favour of Nasser and the Soviet Union.

As new hostile regimes threatened Turkey's southern frontier, Ankara could not afford to strain its relations with its British ally any longer (Holland 1998: 269). Under these circumstances, the Turkish government began to rethink its Cyprus policy. Only nine days after the Iraqi coup, the British learned that the Turkish government had instructed the Turkish General Consul in Nicosia to cooperate with Britain, restrain Turkish Cypriot paramilitaries, and help the British to restore law and order in Cyprus[86]. From the British vantage point, this was the decision of a frightened country worried about its own existence and in need for Britain's military support.[87]

Turkey's concerns about its own survival became even more acute in November 1958 when the Soviet President Khrushchev started the Berlin crisis challenging the Western powers. It was Turkey, however, that shared a long border with the Soviet Union. The prospect of a military confrontation with the Soviets, when added to the risk of hostilities with the UAR and Iraq, further weakened the position of Turkey towards Britain and Greece in the Cyprus question. For Ankara the risk of confronting Arab socialist regimes and the Soviet Union while irritating its NATO allies was too high. As a result, after mending its relations with Britain, Turkey would assume a conciliatory stance towards Athens and proposed bilateral negotiations with Greece to end the Cyprus crisis (Holland 1998: 293).

In conclusion, the British perceptions of the external threat environment were favourable. On the one hand, Britain rapidly neutralized the initiatives of a small power like Greece which had limited diplomatic support from its allies, including the United States, over the Cyprus question. On the other hand, Turkey was perceived in London as a partner in the struggle against enosis. In spite of Ankara's demands for partition, Britain believed that Turkey was unwilling to intervene with military means. Finally, even though the Anglo-Turkish partnership seemed to collapse in Summer 1958 when Turkey decided to spark intercommunal riots in Cyprus, Ankara would restore its cooperation with Britain in less than two months due to a perceived deterioration of its own external security which reminded Turkish leaders that Britain and Greece were essential allies to tackle the threats posed by the USSR and Nasser.

5.1.4 The Local Alliance Strategy of Britain

[86]TNA, FCO 141/4489, Burrows to Foreign Office, 23 July 1958.
[87]TNA, FO 371/13634, Wade-Gery minute, 11 September 1958.

As we have seen, the Cypriot society included two major ethnic groups: the Greek community – almost 80 percent of the population – and the Turkish community – 17 percent of the local population. The pro-enosis movement, which only represented the Greek majority, aimed to make Greek Cypriots into the dominant community of the island. This was a consequence of the irredentist ideology inspiring the enosis movement according to which any minority group alien to the Greek civilization could be tolerated, but never considered as equal to the Greek community; this was the case of the Turkish community which – when observed through the lens of Pan-Hellenic nationalism – appeared as Asian barbarians whose political concerns were simply irrelevant (Heraclides 2012: 120-121; Kitromilides 1990: 13).

The Turkish community did perceive that Greek supremacy was the ultimate implication of the Pan-Hellenic ideology that supported enosis. The gradual elimination of the Turkish community from Crete at the hand of the local enosis movement since the late nineteenth century was an example of the intercommunal disparity that union with Greece potentially involved (Şenişik 2010). Britain's rule had protected the Turkish Cypriot community from the same fate as Cretan Turks. Yet, as the Greek Cypriot insurgency broke out and gained momentum, Turkish Cypriots began to seek another form of reassurance: partition. The Turks believed that only in a state dominated by the Turkish community they could escape ethnic cleansing after Britain's withdrawal (French 2015: 253).

What was Britain's policy towards the two communities? The local alliance strategy of Britain was neutral. Britain did not aim to turn either community into the dominant group. Clearly, by opposing enosis, Britain also opposed the submission of the Turkish minority that was a potential implication of union with Greece. Yet, Britain would not try to counter the Greek insurgency by making the Turks into the dominant community of the island.

Certainly, this was not the perception of the Greek community. Since the very beginning of the campaign Britain recruited Turkish Cypriot agents in the police (Anderson 1994; Novo 2012). The recruitment of Turkish Cypriots grew to such an extent that since 1956 some branches of the security forces, like the Auxiliary Police, were ethnically connoted as Turkish. EOKA propaganda would fuel the belief that Britain was supporting a Turkish aggression against the Greek community by delivering the security machine to the Turks (Novo 2012: 415). Yet, the recruitment policy of Britain was prompted by a serious shortage of manpower rather than an actual intention

to let the Turkish community take over the security apparatus of the island. Indeed, as the Greek population sided with insurgents almost unanimously in pursuit of enosis, the colonial authorities looked at the Turkish community as the only and most obvious alternative source of manpower (Anderson 1994).

This further crippled Britain's ability to win Greek civilians' support and undermine EOKA's popular base. At the same time, Britain's recruitment policy placed the Turkish community in a favourable position to press Britain on the issue of partition. In fact, having grown dependent on the Turkish community to perform basic policing tasks in the island, the British colonial government was aware that the Turkish community could have undermined the government's ability to maintain order in Cyprus (French 2015: 259-260).

Therefore, Britain understood that it was essential to reassure the Turks of Cyprus that they would never come under Greek majority rule. Britain, however, would not give the Turks the type of reassurance that they actually sought. Indeed, Britain was unwilling to concede territorial partition and establish a Turkish Cypriot state in which Greek Cypriots may have been oppressed, if not expelled. As we have seen, Britain only thought of partition as a way to press Greece to accept Britain's rule (see above). Instead of partition, Britain intended to protect the Turkish minority from Greek majority rule by opposing enosis and EOKA militarily while conceding a limited form of self-government with separate institutions for each community which would allow the Greek majority and the Turkish minority to decide on their own communal affairs independently from each other (see below).

Not only did Turkish Cypriot leaders resent Britain's reluctance to support Turkish supremacy in an independent Turkish Cypriot state,[88] but they sparked riots against the Greek community under instigation from Ankara (see below). Britain made a limited effort to contain Turkish riots and arrest paramilitaries only to be threatened by Turkish Cypriot leaders that they would stop supporting the colonial government against EOKA if repression against the Turks had continued.[89] As we have seen, this was meant to force Britain to accept partition, but this policy immediately failed as Ankara realized that Turkey could not afford a crisis with Britain over Cyprus while facing other external threats from the Soviet Union, Iraq, and the UAR (see above).

Even if the Greek community repeatedly complained that Britain had given free hand to Turkish paramilitaries in Summer 1958, the fact that the Turkish Cypriot community

[88]TNA, CO 926/643, Minutes of a meeting of the Governor with Dr. Kucuk and other District Representatives of the Turkish Community, 21 December 1957.
[89] TNA, CO 926/643, Notes of meeting between the Governor and Turkish leaders, 23 January 1958.

tried to coerce Britain is perhaps the most decisive piece of evidence that the British local alliance strategy was in fact neutral. In conclusion, Britain opposed Greek Cypriot domination as a potential consequence of enosis and was not promoting Turkish Cypriot supremacy in a Turkish Cypriot independent state as a result of partition.

5.1.5 The Predictions of My Model

Britain perceived that no third-party state was able to end the British rule in Cyprus and impose its hegemony over the island. At the same time, Britain's local alliance strategy was neutral as the incumbent state opposed the domination of the Greek community over the Turkish minority as a consequence of enosis and the prospect of Turkish supremacy over the Greeks in a Turkish Cypriot state as a potential consequence partition. Given these values on my candidate causal factors, my model predicts that the incumbent state will use a moderate level of civilian targeting consisting of measures that restrict the freedom and damage the property of civilians but do not undermine their survival (see above).

The causal logic of Scenario 4 in my model would be confirmed if British leaders talked or at least behaved in ways that would indicate a belief that lethal measures against civilians would be an unnecessary risk. British leaders should mention the risk of provoking external interventions or stiffening the resolve of the insurgent population to keep fighting, for example. As explained in the methodology chapter, when specific lethal measures are not even discussed, it will not be possible to have data on the reasons why self-restraint prevails. Yet, it will still be possible to observe if the failure to adopt a specific measure is at least consistent with the logic and predictions of my model. In order to minimize the risk of biased conclusions, I will also assess whether competing arguments perform better than my model and provide a more convincing explanation for the level of civilian targeting in the case at hand.

5.2 Civilian Targeting during the British Counterinsurgency Campaign in Cyprus

5.2.1 The Insurgency Begins (April 1955 – November 1955)

EOKA's insurgency against Britain began on 1st April 1955. Grivas' paramilitary organization started a bombing and sabotage campaign which targeted government buildings and installations, naval bases, army barracks, police stations, and the houses

of British servicemen in the cities of Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta, and Larnaca. The offensive came with an explicit proclamation of EOKA's political goal: the end of Britain's colonial rule, which would pave the way for union with Greece or enosis (French 2015: 71-72).

Overall, the first spate of EOKA attacks inflicted relatively limited damage and the Cyprus Police could arrest some of the culprits within hours. Besides, important EOKA affiliates – like Grigoris Afxentiou, who was Grivas' second in command – narrowly escaped capture. That, however, reflected insurgents' initial lack of training rather than the efficiency and preparedness of the British security machine. In fact, the colonial government and the police had been caught by surprise and ignored everything about the structure and leadership of the insurgent organization.

The Cyprus Police would be a decisive part in the confrontation between EOKA and Britain. EOKA saw the Police as the main target (Novo 2012: 415). By taking the Police out of the fight, EOKA set out to force Britain to use the Army and intensify repression against the Greek Cypriot majority; that would eventually cause Greek Cypriots to mistrust the colonial government and increase EOKA's popular support (Beckett 2001: 153; French 2015: 48). The new wave of insurgent attacks would pursue this goal.

Between May and August 1955 EOKA concentrated its offensive on the police. In addition to bombing and raiding police stations, EOKA singled out Greek police agents and members of the newly established Special Branch for assassination. EOKA's ability to identify and murder those Greek officers who were cooperating with the colonial authorities indicated that insurgents had successfully infiltrated the police. Indeed, Grivas had established a small intelligence-gathering unit in the police and the administration (Anderson 1994: 184-185; Novo 2012: 420-422).

The British could only witness the effectiveness of EOKA's tactics. Faced with little popular support and a high risk of getting exposed and killed, Greek police agents would simply stop investigating EOKA's activities or even tender mass resignations (Anderson 1994:185; Novo 2012: 421). To limit the disruptive impact of resignations on the police, the colonial government resorted to disciplinary actions against the most recalcitrant agents as a deterrent to all the others. The need to coerce Greek policemen to do their job was revealing: EOKA was slowly gaining the upper hand in the struggle for population control. By Summer 1955 the colonial authorities were forced to acknowledge that the police was too demoralized and intimidated, if not colluding with EOKA, to be of any use in the repression of insurgents (Anderson 1994: 185; Novo 2012: 422). A crisis of trust between Britain and the Greek population of Cyprus was

emerging, according to EOKA's plans.

As the loyalty and reliability of Greek police agents declined, Governor Armitage decided to set up a Mobile Reserve Unit and an Auxiliary Police Force which would recruit exclusively from the Turkish minority (Anderson 1994: 191). This step, however, would end up connoting the police as ethnically alien to the majority of the local population which, in turn, would further undermine Britain's ability to infiltrate the Greek Cypriot community and obtain intelligence about EOKA.

In spite of the hostility of the Greek population and a lack of intelligence about EOKA, the British government did not plan to escalate indiscriminate violence. While the repression of the enosis movement was considered essential to maintain law and order, the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office agreed that friendly relations with Greece – a NATO ally – should be maintained; yet, the repression of the enosis movement was exactly the type of policy that could strain relations with Athens and strengthen the position of Greece in the United Nations.[90] How to save British sovereignty over Cyprus and limit Anglo-Greek tensions then?

According to the Foreign Office, the way to reconcile those goals was by bringing Turkey back into the Cyprus question and cause a diplomatic collision between Turkey and Greece over the future status of the island; violent Turkish objections against enosis would then be used to persuade Athens that self-determination was not feasible in the near future and British rule was still necessary (see above). To carry out this plan Britain would formally invite Greece and Turkey to a Tripartite Conference about Eastern Mediterranean affairs in London. In that context, Greece would predictably insist on self-determination for the island, while the Turkish government would claim that any change in the status quo – Britain's colonial rule – would automatically give Turkey the right to participate in the administration of the island, thus abrogating de facto the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923. The British plan to stage-manage a Tripartite Conference could only succeed on the basis of a secret cooperation with Turkey, which the British had established since Summer 1954 (see above).

As Britain counted on its Turkish allies to neutralize the insurgency on an international political level, the British government was reluctant to declare the state of emergency and use repression. In June 1955, when EOKA resumed its attacks against the police, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd warned the Governor that repression could only irritate Greece and induce Athens to boycott the Tripartite Conference; therefore Lennox-Boyd insisted that “no preparations of any kind for the

[90]TNA, FO 371/117642, Paper on the Future of Cyprus, Colonial and Foreign Offices, 25 June 1955.

declaration of an emergency [should] be made".[91] This confirms that favourable external threat perceptions inhibit the use of civilian targeting by making the incumbent state more prone to consider the possible drawbacks of violence and coercion, as Scenario 4 in my model suggests.

The London Conference was designed to be a major disappointment for the Greeks. As planned, the Conference became the stage of the dispute between Greece and Turkey over the future status of Cyprus. The Turkish claim over Cyprus followed by riots in Turkey paved the way for Britain's final proposal on the status of the island: a tripartite administration by Britain, Greece and Turkey under British sovereignty, but with no promise of self-determination. As expected, Greece refused.

The failure of the London Conference had immediate repercussions in Cyprus. Anti-British riots and demonstrations broke out again with the support of the Orthodox Church and EOKA. The most violent outburst of Greek dissatisfaction took place on 17th September in Nicosia when Greek rioters destroyed the British Institute – the building that served as Government House until 1931 – thus inflicting a fatal humiliation on the colonial government. Deemed unfit to keep order, Armitage was relieved from his position. He would be replaced by the former Chief of Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal Sir John Harding who would become Governor on 3rd October 1955.

Harding's arrival coincided with continuing EOKA's raids against police stations and the looting of guns. At the same time, Harding was instructed to negotiate a political solution to the crisis on the basis of temporary self-government. Between 4th and 11th October Harding met Makarios three times but the talks failed due to the absence of any reference to self-determination. Harding reacted to the failure of the talks by submitting two demands to the British Government: firstly, he claimed the authority to declare the state of emergency and deport members of the Orthodox Church if negotiations had failed;[92] secondly, he pressed the metropolitan Government to work out an official statement which included a reference to self-determination for Cyprus without irritating Turkey.[93] As Eden accepted Harding's requests, the Governor of Cyprus called for another meeting with Makarios.

In the meantime, EOKA continued its bombing and assassination campaign achieving spectacular success. On 28th October, insurgents seized a British cargo of arms and ammunition in Famagusta which increased EOKA's firepower and proved once again

[91]TNA FO 371/117640, Lennox-Boyd to Armitage, 20 June 1955.
[92]TNA, FO 371/117666, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 12 October 1955.
[93]TNA, FO/ 371/117666, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 16 October 1955.

the inefficiency of the Police. The following day Harding took the first step towards the militarization of the crisis by conferring police powers to the Army; besides the garrison was increased to over 12,000 soldiers (Holland 1998: 100). Protests and riots intensified when, for the first time, an EOKA fighter was sentenced to death for the murder of a police constable. The decision was followed by further riots and a major bombing offensive by EOKA against government buildings killing three soldiers on 18th November.

It was in a deteriorating situation that the fourth meeting between Harding and Makarios took place on 21st November: the British Cabinet offered a period of self-government, but – again – self-determination was not guaranteed. After Makarios and the Ethnarchy Council rejected the final British offer, Harding developed a deep distrust of the Archbishop and the Orthodox Church (Holland 1998: 95-96; Novo 2013). The Governor was now ready to use repression. A new wave of attacks against British patrols and Cypriot trade unions' decision to launch a general strike induced Harding to declare the state of emergency on 26th November 1955. Few hours later, EOKA attempted to murder Harding and failed.

5.2.2 Harding's Counterinsurgency Campaign (November 1955 – October 1957)

Both the Cabinet in London and the Governor of Cyprus did believe that victory over EOKA could not be achieved in purely military terms: it was popular support for enosis that was to be eliminated.[94] According to Harding, victory would correspond to "a political situation in Cyprus which will ensure that when self-determination is applied the outcome will be a decision to remain within the Commonwealth, with Enosis finally rejected".[95] Victory, in sum, would depend on population control.

Importantly, at the beginning of the emergency, Harding did believe that Britain was in a favourable position to win over the Greek population. Harding's confidence rested on the idea that the Greek population of Cyprus was willing to side with Britain but – according to the Governor – most Greek Cypriots were simply too intimidated by EOKA and influenced by the nationalism of the Orthodox Church to support the government (French 2015: 79; Novo 2013). Harding, therefore, set out the conditions to achieve victory which included the destruction of EOKA "beyond all hopes of recovery", the imposition of government control over the education system at the

[94]TNA, CO 926/518, Carrington to Hopkinson, 5 September 1955.
[95]TNA, CO 926/548, Harding, The Constitutional Problem in Cyprus, 18 January 1956.

expense of the Church and the ensuing neutralization of the Church as a political actor that indoctrinated the Cypriot youths with pro-enosis sentiments.[96] Once removed EOKA's threat against the local population and silenced the nationalist voice of the Church, Harding believed that the Greek majority would accept Britain's rule.

The destruction of EOKA and the repression of the Church would prove a difficult task. In January 1956 EOKA could count on 68 village groups including 750 members, 7 mountain groups comprising 53 guerrillas, and 45 town groups consisting of 220 fighters; they were responsible for 520 security incidents between October 1955 and March 1956 – 20 per week, or 3 per day – including sabotage actions, raids against police stations, grenade and gun attacks against British patrols, bomb attacks against venues attended by off-duty servicemen, and the assassination of members of the security forces (French 2015: 83). EOKA would also mobilize its popular base with the support of the Church that would spark demonstrations and riots to keep the security forces tied in towns, thus relieving mountain gangs from British military pressure. Support for enosis was particularly popular in secondary schools where riots had reached such a level that by January 1956 10,100 out of 14,700 pupils were on strike or suspended after the government had closed their schools (French 2015: 88).

As part of his offensive against the enosis movement, Harding intended to target the Church by arresting and deporting its members. In December 1955 the Governor requested permission from London to proceed to the deportation of prominent Orthodox clergy members, especially Kyprianos, the ultra-nationalist Bishop of Kyrenia. The British Cabinet hesitated and provisionally decided that no action should be taken against the Orthodox Church before the general elections in Greece in March 1956. The Cabinet had it clear that Orthodox Church leaders were responsible for the popular support behind enosis; it was also well known in London that the Church was EOKA's main financial supporter. Yet, the British government insisted that the detention nationalist Greek Cypriot clergymen would have "an unfavourable effect on the Greek Government"; the British believed that the Greek government "would go some way towards encouraging Archbishop Makarios to resume the discussions with the Governor" but repression against the Greek Cypriot Church would make it more difficult for Greek leaders in Athens to justify a compromising attitude on Cyprus at domestic level; therefore, the Cabinet concluded that "it would be unwise to accede to the Governor's requests".[97]

[96]TNA, CO 926/548, Harding, The Constitutional Problem in Cyprus, 18 January 1956.
[97]TNA, CAB 128/29/45, Cabinet conclusions, 6 December 1955.

The Cabinet's reluctance to accept the risks connected to the arrest and deportation of Orthodox clerics is consistent with the causal logic of Scenario 4 in my model according to which, a favourable threat environment and a neutral local alliance strategy will make the incumbent state more prone to consider the potential drawbacks of indiscriminate repression as unnecessary risks. Accordingly, in a phase in which Britain perceived that Greece would support a negotiated settlement in Cyprus, the Cabinet evoked the risks of coercive measures and hesitated to crush the Orthodox Church despite its "continuing provocation".[98]

Greece did press Makarios to resume negotiations, as the British Cabinet hoped. Athens, however, would not press Makarios to accept limited self-government under British rule instead of enosis. After the failure of negotiations, Harding reiterated its request to deport Orthodox clerics. The Cabinet would eventually grant permission, even though the Colonial Office unsuccessfully attempted to convince Harding that Makarios could be exiled in Athens rather than arrested (Holland 1998: 116). Yet, an indiscriminate deportation of Greek Orthodox clerics would be out of the question. Makarios and few other members of the Orthodox Church were arrested and deported to the Seychelles islands on 9th March 1956.

The deportation of Makarios aimed to deprive Greek Cypriot nationalists of an intransigent leader, but, in fact, it left Grivas as the only authoritative Greek Cypriot leader in the island. Harding, therefore, would focus on the elimination of EOKA guerrillas and the punishment of their supporters in the local population.

Punitive measures would affect the population of those areas where EOKA had attacked the security forces or destroyed government property and installations. Since December 1955 Harding imposed collective fines on entire villages to rebuild any property damaged or destroyed after EOKA attacks, sabotage or street riots.[99] Curfews could be used as an additional form of pressure on civilians to force them to pay collective fines or prevent riots and protect British patrols from attacks. When intelligence was available, the security forces would cordon and search Greek villages – including monasteries and churches – to look for insurgents' hideouts, guns and explosives, or EOKA affiliates hidden among the civilian population. The security forces also had the authority to evict suspect EOKA sympathizers from their houses and demolish or destroy civilians' property and crops when used by insurgents for their activities.

[98]TNA, CAB 128/29/45, Cabinet conclusions, 6 December 1955.
[99]TNA, CO 926/543, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 5 December 1955.

The Colonial Office constantly supervised the repressive measures undertaken by the government of Cyprus as indiscriminate violence could alienate the civilian population, give EOKA propaganda victories, and provide Greece with a pretext to resume its diplomatic offensive against Britain at the United Nations thus relieving Athens from its international isolation on the issue of enosis (French 2015: 169). Correspondence between the Governor and the Colonial Office shows that Harding repeatedly assured Lennox-Boyd that the disruptive impact of coercive measures on civilians would be limited: for example, collective fines would be proportionate to individual wealth and ability to pay so as to avoid financial ruin;[100] evictions would be used only against those individuals who had alternative accommodation in order to avoid homelessness and hunger;[101] property and crop destruction may be followed by compensation depending on the specific circumstances.[102]

Once again, this is consistent with my model and its logic under the circumstances of Scenario 4. Perceiving the threat environment as favourable and sticking to a neutral alliance strategy in the local society of Cyprus, Britain considered lethal violence as an unnecessary risk; not only did the British target exclusively civilians' property and freedom, but they also showed a concern to reduce the risk of starvation and death as a result of fines, evictions, or property destruction. One may observe here how Britain's conduct in Cyprus differed from the campaign the British were fighting in Kenya at the same time. Indeed, as we have seen, in the case of Kenya both the Cabinet in London and the colonial government fully appreciated that collective fines, property destruction, and mass evictions would alienate the civilian population and expose non-combatants to a risk of famine and death; in spite of that, the British authorities decided to carry on with that type of measures on the ground that it was necessary to appease settlers (see above); in Cyprus, instead, Britain's alliance strategy was neutral and concerns about the potentially adverse effects of civilian targeting prevailed.[103]

Collective punishment measures, however, would not achieve their goal: despite a formal show of obedience, the Greek population still refused to cooperate with the government and share information about insurgents (French 2015: 138-139). The government still hoped, however, that the destruction of EOKA forces would change the behaviour of the local population. In particular, Harding considered the elimination of EOKA mountain groups an essential goal as these hard-core trained guerrillas terrorized

[100]TNA, CO 926/543, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 9 December 1955.
[101]TNA, CO 926/543, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 9 June 1956.
[102]TNA, CO 926/543, Harding to Lennox-Boyd" 25 May 1956.
[103] This would also confirm the ability of my model to account for synchronic or spatial variations in the level of civilian targeting.

villagers and exerted an influence "out of all proportion to their numbers".[104]

In Spring 1956 Harding could rely on a garrison of almost 20,000 and start an offensive against EOKA village and mountain groups. Between April and July 1956 the security forces launched four major large-scale surge operations in the Troodos and Kyrenia mountain ranges. The Spring offensive failed to capture Grivas but the security forces could dislodge most guerrillas from their hideouts, seize weapons and ammunition from insurgents, arrest members of village groups, and capture a part of Grivas' diaries which would provide valuable intelligence in the future.

During their operations, the British made a limited use of their superior firepower. Harding insisted with the Army that the loss of civilians' lives should be kept to the minimum; accordingly, the use of airpower and area shelling became the object of restrictive rules which derived from "important political considerations",[105] especially a concern to deny EOKA and the Greek government propaganda victories and turn NATO and UN members against the British (French 2015: 308). This is consistent with the predictions of Scenario 4 my model. In a favourable threat environment in which Greece was considered unable to gather enough diplomatic support from other states and impose its will on Britain, the British intended to maintain such an advantageous situation and were attentive to the potential drawbacks of indiscriminate violence. Accordingly, both the Governor and the British Cabinet focused on reducing the risk of Greek Cypriot casualties so as to deny Athens further pretexts to mount a more effective diplomatic offensive against Britain.

After the Spring offensive, EOKA was forced to call a truce in mid-August 1956 under pressure from Greece. The truce, however, lasted only two weeks. The outbreak of the Suez Crisis drained the garrison in Cyprus and hindered Harding's offensive against EOKA. Besides, the growing presence of troops arriving in the island on their way to Suez gave EOKA plenty of targets to hit, while the escape of prominent EOKA leaders from detention camps restored insurgents' ability to coordinate their attacks (French 2015: 142). Between September and November 1956 EOKA town groups resumed the fight with an unprecedented spate of incidents and assassinations. EOKA kill rate would rise from 10 a month to 26 a month. November 1956, in particular, marked an exceptional growth in urban terrorism. Indeed, after Britain's international humiliation during the Suez crisis, Grivas decided to intensify the attacks against the security forces. EOKA killed 33 servicemen and suspect government informers in the first three weeks

[104]TNA, WO 32/16260, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 7 January 1956.
[105]TNA, AIR 8/1921, Commander in Chief, Middle East Land Forces, to the Air Ministry, 18 June 1956.

of the month (Holland 1998: 154).

Harding and the Cabinet in London responded by extending the mandatory death penalty to possession of guns, increasing the censorship powers of the government, and giving immunity to those public servants involved in the repression of the insurgency.

The mandatory death penalty aimed to deter civilians from supporting EOKA (Holland 1998: 158-159). However, Britain would use the death penalty with parsimony compared to Kenya. Unlike the case of Kenya, Britain was not appeasing any would-be dominant group in Cyprus and – like the case of Kenya – the British perceived the external threat environment as favourable (see above); interestingly, this corresponds to a self-restrained approach of the metropolitan and colonial government to the use of death penalty, according to the predictions of my model in the case at hand. Indeed, while the British government approved Harding's demands on the capital punishment laws, the Cabinet also sought and obtained assurance from the Governor that the prerogative of mercy would be systematically applied and executions would be actually allowed only under exceptional circumstances.[106] By the end of 1958 only nine EOKA fighters would be executed (French 2015: 97).

Importantly, the reasons behind the Cabinet's request to limit the use of the capital punishment reflect the logic of Scenario 4 in my model according to which the incumbent state will be more afraid of the potential drawbacks of indiscriminate violence and see civilian victimization as an unnecessary risk when it is not forced to protect its hegemony from a perceived external threat and is not accepting any pressures from local allies. Indeed, once again, the Cabinet considered the risk that a judicial massacre in Cyprus would only give Greece more propaganda stories to mount a diplomatic offensive against Britain and recover from its international defeat on the Cyprus issue; furthermore, the British government and Harding himself also considered that an extensive use of the death penalty would spark more resistance from the Greek Cypriot population and make it more difficult to resume negotiations with the enosis movement (French 2015: 99).

Immunity for civil servants involved in the repression of the Greek Cypriot insurgency was intended to protect the police and the security forces from allegations of torture. EOKA fighters and suspect sympathizers held in custody routinely complained that the security forces tortured prisoners during interrogations. Immunity for civil servants ended up giving the impression that the Cyprus police had much to hide. In effect, there is evidence that the police and the security forces inflicted beatings on those prisoners

[106]TNA, FCO 141/4412, "Harding to Lennox-Boyd", 24 May 1957.

who refused to provide information (French 2015: 234-235).

Yet, the extent of torture in Cyprus was far more limited than in Kenya and never became a routine practice. Most confessions in custody were not the product of torture; EOKA fighters or supporters often disclosed information about insurgents because they were afraid to be sentenced to death, or were persuaded that other EOKA prisoners had given them away, or simply talked because EOKA had marked them as traitors to be eliminated and cooperation with the security forces would guarantee protection (French 2015: 233). The statement that Britain systematically tortured prisoners was part of EOKA propaganda campaign that aimed to smear the security forces, call the attention of other states on the campaign in Cyprus, and isolate Britain from its allies (French 2015: 194-202).

The British authorities were concerned that the ill-treatment of prisoners and civilians could expose Britain to external interventions in the form of independent investigations and make it more difficult for the United States to stick to its benevolent neutrality in the United Nations, which would only enable Greece to recover from its previous diplomatic defeats (French 2015: 215-216). Accordingly, both the colonial government and military commanders took measures to prevent abuses and restrain the security forces. Instructions to treat civilians with courtesy were mostly respected; investigations over the alleged misconduct of the security forces towards prisoners and civilians were undertaken; the servicemen found guilty would face sanctions, including imprisonment; finally, compensation would be paid to those individuals who had got their property damaged during cordon-and-search operations and instructions that civilians should always have access to food and water during curfews were observed (French 2015: 203-204). Britain's effort to prevent the ill-treatment of civilians and the tendency to consider abuses on prisoners and non-combatants as an unnecessary risk in the light of Greek diplomatic weakness confirms the predictions and logic of Scenario 4 in my model.

The end of the Suez crisis enabled Britain to replenish its garrison which numbered over 30,000 in December 1956. Crucially, the British were building on their intelligence gains. Between December 1956 and March 1957 the security forces could hit EOKA town groups with a wave of arrests which disrupted insurgents' communication and arm-smuggling system in Nicosia, Limassol and Kyrenia (French 2015: 149-150). The elimination of paramount EOKA leaders like Markos Drakos and Grigoris Afxentiou eventually persuaded Grivas to call a unilateral truce in March 1957.

The threat posed by EOKA to the security forces had been temporarily contained and

the British government decided to release Makarios even though he would not be allowed to return to Cyprus. Despite the success on the field it was equally clear that insurgents was far from defeated.[107] In particular, EOKA could still control the local population through terrorism and the nationalist appeal of enosis boosted by the Church. As long as insurgents could count on the local population for support, EOKA could quickly rebuild itself and neutralize Britain's military advantage.

It was on the crucial issue of population control that Harding's counterinsurgency campaign failed completely. During the conflict with Britain, EOKA always retained its ability to kill and intimidate defectors or those who failed to cooperate with insurgents and support enosis. Since April 1955 EOKA issued warnings to the Greek Cypriot population to stay away from British servicemen and join the struggle for self-determination (French 2015: 111). Those who did not comply would be classified as 'traitors' and marked for assassination, assault, and intimidation. The definition of traitor encompassed government and police informers, civil servants, communists, leftist trade-unionists, unsympathetic journalists and editors, teachers, students, and even pupils' parents who refused to adhere to demonstrations, boycotts, and school riots (French 2015: 158-170).

Popular support for enosis, however, was not simply the result of fear. The Greek Cypriot population sought self-determination out of a widespread and deeply rooted nationalist sentiment which, according to the colonial authorities, was kept alive by the Orthodox Church. Harding correctly considered the Church as part of the insurgency and a formidable obstacle to population control for Britain (Novo 2013). In addition to being the main financial sponsor of EOKA, the Church controlled the education system in Cyprus and could indoctrinate the young generations with pro-enosis ideology. Harding tried to undermine the influence of the Greek Orthodox Church on the Cypriot youth by promoting a system of secondary education based on intercommunal schools under direct government control. This policy was unsuccessful. While the Church denounced an attempt to destroy the Hellenic identity of the Cypriot population, EOKA enforced a boycott against intercommunal schools. Most Greek families willingly withdrew their children from intercommunal schools or were forced to do so by EOKA: in September 1957 over 50% of the students enrolled in government controlled schools did not show themselves (French 2015: 182). Once again it became clear that EOKA and the Church controlled the local population.

[107]TNA, CO 926/671, Cyprus Intelligence Committee, Intelligence review for the first half of March 1957, 21 March 1957.

Britain could have attempted to gain population control by deporting the Greek Cypriot community to new villages. Villagization would have made it impossible for insurgents to mingle with the local population and terrorize civilians. Likewise, it would have been impossible for the Orthodox Church to organize mass support for enosis if the British had carried out a villagization programme. Since insurgents had suffered important losses, it seems likely that the villagization of the Greek Cypriot community would have finished EOKA off. Certainly British leaders were aware of the effectiveness of mass deportation to defeat guerrilla insurgencies as Britain had successfully implemented a villagization programme in Malaya and was doing the same in Kenya against Mau Mau (see above). Yet, the mass deportation of the Greek Cypriot population was never discussed among British officials as a potential option.[108]

The absence of recorded discussions on villagization makes it impossible to use data from primary sources to highlight the precise reasons why British leaders did not deport Greek Cypriots. Yet, historians interpret the silence of documents on mass deportation as evidence that coercive villagization was simply unthinkable; importantly, historians find it plausible that mass deportations in Cyprus was unimaginable because it was obvious to the British government that such a stern measure would have undermined the British position in the United Nations and the NATO (French 2015: 169). Britain enjoyed the benevolent neutrality of the United States while Greece was too impotent to impose its will on Britain (see above); the mass deportation of civilians may have ended such a favourable situation by boosting Greek propaganda campaign and alienating the United States. In sum, the complete silence of British decision-makers on mass deportation and the possible reasons behind that silence are fully consistent with the predictions of Scenario 4 in my model and the corresponding causal logic, according to which fear of the potential drawbacks of a high level of indiscriminate violence will be more prominent when the incumbent sees the external threat environment as favourable and its local alliance strategy is neutral.

If Britain was not willing to attain population control by using coercion, the Cabinet in London was equally unwilling to promise self-determination. In part, Britain's persistent opposition to the principle of self-determination in Cyprus was an implication of its cooperation with Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot community. Turkey had played an essential role in the London Conference of 1955 (see above) and the Turkish Cypriot community had replenished the Cyprus Police ranks at the beginning of the campaign

[108]This would also challenge the argument that civilian targeting depends on its perceived military effectiveness as explained in the Introduction (see above: 13).

when Britain needed to replace Greek manpower (see above). Yet, both the Turkish government and Turkish Cypriot leaders demanded partition of the island in return. In the eyes of Turkish Cypriot leaders, EOKA terrorism in support of enosis was a prelude to the submission or exile of the Turkish community after the unification of the island with Greece: partition, instead, offered a way to avoid such a grim fate (see above).

The Turkish Cypriot community under the leadership of Fazıl Küçük and Rauf Denktaş had been demanding partition since 1956 but it was not before June 1957 that Turkish councilors took a provocative step by resigning from all Cypriot municipalities in an attempt to pave the way for separate Turkish institutions. Harding did not underestimate the extent of Turkish Cypriots' resolve and acknowledged that the Turks were ready to fight for partition if EOKA had resumed its offensive to impose enosis.[109] This was a serious risk because of the increasing militarization of the Turkish minority.

As EOKA terrorism ignited fears of ethnic cleansing, the Turkish community organized its own paramilitary gangs. At the beginning of the emergency, the Turkish minority set up an anti-enosis organization – Volkan – aiming to defend Turkish villages from possible EOKA attacks. In January 1957 the colonial government considered Volkan as a small organization with very limited military power. (French 2015: 255-256). Yet by Summer 1957 the Turks had improved their arsenal to support the cause of partition.

From the vantage point of the Colonial Office and the Governor, however, partition was a last-resort plan as it would have testified to the failure of the colonial government to perform its basic functions (French 2015: 190), while the Greek majority would have probably resisted its implementation.[110] Britain's plans about the future status of Cyprus, therefore, would include neither self-determination for the whole island – as demanded by Greece and the Greek Cypriot community – nor immediate territorial partition – as expected by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot minority. Britain did not look favourably at the possibility to turn Cyprus into an undivided independent state either: indeed, the Cabinet shared the view that the pro-enosis movement would quickly take over after independence and join Greece anyway (Holland 1998: 193).

Consequently, in July 1957 Macmillan and his Cabinet announced a new plan which sought to avoid all the scenarios that Britain feared the most. The Macmillan plan consisted of a tripartite administration of the island – or tridominium – involving Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece with a neutral Governor which would operate according to

[109]TNA, CO 926/1095, Harding to Lennox-Boyd, 7 June 1957.
[110]TNA, FO 371/130095, Hayter, minute, 16 May 1957.

the principle of self-government and would be answerable to the three powers. Britain's willingness to share the administration of the island with Turkey and Greece highlighted the changing strategic value of Cyprus for the British. After the Suez fiasco, Britain's only perceived interest in Cyprus was the control of a limited number of military bases, rather than continuing sovereignty over a hostile island[111] (French 2015: 239). Accordingly, the Macmillan plan stated that the three powers would have military bases in Cyprus to safeguard their interests in the island. In fact, the Macmillan plan disappointed both Ankara and Athens (Holland 1998: 201-202).

The lack of a political solution to the insurgency was particularly frustrating for the Cyprus government. Harding knew that EOKA had been contained but Britain's military advantage would not last for long. Harding had been confronted with the prospect of force reduction in the island as a result of the end of the National Service which would decrease the army manpower (French 2015: 238). The reduction of the garrison was all the more disturbing because EOKA had recovered from its previous losses and was ready to resume its offensive against the government.

Indeed, by Autumn 1957 Grivas had successfully restructured his paramilitary organization (French 2015: 246). Since October EOKA came back into the conflict with a sabotage campaign against government installations and military targets. The renewed offensive was so effective that it reduced Britain's ability to support the Baghdad Pact by 12,5 percent, according to the British themselves (French 2015: 246-247). EOKA also resumed its attacks against British servicemen and the Special Branch in addition to intensifying the campaign against the civilian government by targeting village administrators or mukhtars. Mukhtars carried out basic administrative functions and made it possible for the colonial government to rule the villages of the island on a daily basis. By eliminating mukhtars or forcing them into mass resignations, EOKA further disrupted Britain's ability to control the territory and the local population. This would prelude to the creation of shadow institutions run by insurgents themselves in an attempt

[111]Apparently, the decreasing strategic value of Cyprus may explain Britain's self-restraint in dealing with civilians. One may argue that, since Britain's interest in controlling the whole island declined, then the British had limited incentives to crush EOKA's popular base and this is why they used only a moderate level of civilian victimization. This explanation, however, would be flawed as it could not account for Britain's self-restraint before Summer 1957. Indeed, at the beginning of the emergency in 1955 the Cabinet tended to agree with military commanders that control of the whole island was simply vital for Britain to preserve its power position in the Middle East (see Holland 1998); that should have provided the incumbent with powerful incentives to assault the civilian population in the opening phase of the emergency. In spite of that, Britain was constantly self-restrained from the beginning of the campaign against EOKA to its end. In other words the strategic importance argument fails to account for within-case variations on the level of civilian targeting: a diachronic change in the perceived strategic importance of the island does not correlate with a change in the level of civilian targeting, which logically excludes any causal connection between the perceived strategic importance factor and my dependent variable in the case at hand.

to build an alternative EOKA state. Insurgents' offensive against village administrators was unquestioningly successful: as the security forces were unable to provide individual police protection to civil servants, over 75 percent of Greek Cypriot village mukhtars resigned (French 2015: 249). The impotence of the security forces was exposed once again on 14th October 1957 when EOKA assassinated the mukhtar of Dhali, who had long resisted insurgents' intimidation (Holland 1998: 205).

By that time, Harding's confidence in victory had already declined. EOKA's full military recovery, the prospect of force reduction and an administrative breakdown, Greek Cypriots' stubborn support for enosis, the first signs of intercommunal violence, and the lack of a political solution to the emergency convinced Harding to resign at the end of October 1957. As the Governor himself admitted, Britain's failure to gain population control had been a decisive factor in EOKA's survival and comeback. Changing his initial perception of the civilian population as a victim of terrorism and intimidation, Harding eventually acknowledged that most Greek Cypriots had willingly supported enosis and EOKA, thus neutralizing Britain's progress in the military campaign (Holland 1998: 208-209).

5.2.3 The British Campaign under the Governorship of Sir Hugh Foot (December 1957 – March 1959)

Harding's successor – Sir Hugh Foot – arrived in Cyprus on 3rd December 1957. The new Governor had it clear that Britain needed to recover at least in part the consent of the Greek community as no political solution to the crisis could have been implemented against the will of 80% of the population. Yet, the Governor was immediately overwhelmed by the rapid descent of the island into intercommunal violence.

In late November 1957, after the murder of a Turkish police inspector by EOKA, the Turkish community established a new organization called Turk Mudya Teskilat (TMT) or Turkish Resistance Organization. TMT absorbed Volkan and other minor underground organizations. Its main leader was Rauf Denktaş, a Turkish Cypriot lawyer and prosecutor, while Küçük was affiliated only at a later stage. TMT immediately began to interfere with the activities of the enosis movement. After the murder of three Turks by EOKA and further school riots in support of enosis in Nicosia in early December, for the first time Turkish gangs attacked Greek Cypriot premises injuring hundreds before the security forces intervened. By January 1958 TMT leaders had placed their organization under the control of the Turkish government which had been

sending guns to Cyprus and military instructors to train TMT paramilitaries (French 2015: 257-258).

As intercommunal tensions mounted, the Governor prepared a peace plan which could not completely ignore Turkish Cypriots' demands. Foot's plan still excluded the principle of self-determination; however, it entailed partition as a possible option after a transitory phase of self-government of seven years. The British Cabinet approved the plan subject to Ankara's support. Yet, Anglo-Turkish talks failed completely as Turkey expected immediate partition as a reward for its support against enosis. The Turkish government, therefore, ordered Turkish Cypriot leaders to start demonstrations and riots to put pressure on Britain (Holland 1998: 228-230). The ensuing reaction of the British security forces left four Turks dead and hundreds injured (Holland 1998: 228). The incident undermined the relations of the colonial government with the Turkish minority.

The steady deterioration of internal security in Cyprus increased Britain's anxiety to find a basis for negotiation with Athens and Ankara. In February 1958 Britain shifted back to a modified version of the tridominium plan (Holland 1998: 236).

Once again, the new British plan was followed by an upsurge of violence in Cyprus. Perceiving the risk of being marginalized by an international solution, Grivas successfully mobilized insurgents' popular base calling for a boycott against British goods; besides, he intensified the terrorist campaign against the colonial administration and the security forces. Between March and April 1958 EOKA carried out over one hundred bombing attacks against government buildings and military targets; on 14th April EOKA killed a Special Branch interrogator in Famagusta, which proved that EOKA town groups were ready to resume their offensive against the police (French 2015: 248). As Foot admitted to the Colonial Office, EOKA offensive had inflicted a serious loss of prestige on the colonial government while boosting insurgents' popular support (French 2015: 248).

Faced with a resilient enemy, the Governor and the Army differed about the course of action to be taken. The Army, concerned about the oncoming force reduction, had long grown sceptical that the Greek population could actually be won over; in particular, the Director of Military Operations – General Kendrew – echoed the argument of Foot's Administrative Secretary – John Reddaway – that Greek Cypriot consent had been lost forever, therefore the colonial government's only concern should be the preservation of Turkish support; in other words, Foot was urged to escalate repression against the Greek Cypriot community and appease the Turkish Cypriot minority (Holland 1998: 221, 223).

The Governor resisted that type of advise. While reassuring Turkish Cypriot leaders

that the interests of their community would be protected,[112] in his dispatches Foot also insisted that a policy of mere repression against the Greek majority should be avoided as it would further embolden the Turkish Cypriot minority, thus accelerating partition and destroying any possibility of a settlement on the British plan.[113] Importantly, a repressive escalation against the Greek Cypriot community was seen as counterproductive also in the light of the international threat environment. Indeed, the British perceived that the Greek government had eventually acknowledged its own impotence over the Cyprus problem and was now willing to restrain EOKA out of fear that insurgents' violence would plunge Cyprus into a civil war and lead to a Turkish military intervention or violent reprisals against the Greek minority in Istanbul that Athens was unprepared to face (Holland 1998: 233-234, 253). A high level of indiscriminate violence against the Greek Cypriot community may have undermined Athens' apparent willingness to hold Grivas back. The British were also forced to consider that an escalation of civilian targeting, a potential descent into civil war, and the ensuing crisis between Greece and Turkey would leave the United States with the burden of restoring peace in the area, thus straining Anglo-American relations which had recently recovered from their deepest crisis over Suez (Holland 1998: 248).

Foot's opposition to an escalation of indiscriminate violence against the Greeks and the fact that he justified self-restraint by stressing the potential risks of serving the agenda of an ethnic community against another confirms the predictions and the logic of Scenario 4 in my model about the impact of a neutral alliance strategy on the level of civilian targeting. Likewise, the concern that an escalation of violence would put excessive strain on Greece and irritate the United States would corroborate my model's prediction that the incumbent state will be more likely to consider the potential risks of a high level of indiscriminate violence when no other state is willing and able to impose its hegemony over the insurgent territory.

Sticking to self-restraint despite an upsurge of EOKA violence, the British Cabinet adopted the tridominium plan in May 1958 and officially announced it the following month: neither self-determination nor territorial partition were guaranteed. The British Cabinet was not alarmed to see the Greek government rejecting the plan as Athens could not impose enosis anyway. Ankara's dissatisfaction and refusal of the plan was a whole different matter.

The Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and his Foreign Secretary Fatin Zorlu

[112]TNA, CO 926/643, Minutes of meeting of the Governor with Dr. Kucuk and other District Representatives of the Turkish community, 21 December 1957.
[113]TNA, CO 926/1064, Foot, dispatch, 2 May 1958.

looked at the tridominium plan as yet another sign that Britain had deceived them after exploiting Ankara's support against enosis (Holland 1998: 251). Turkey, therefore, decided to undertake a policy of coercion. Firmly pursuing the goal of immediate territorial partition, Turkey provoked an intercommunal conflict to show Britain that the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities could not coexist in the same territory. Ankara ordered TMT paramilitaries to attack Greek villages and expel Greek Cypriot families from those areas where the Turks made up a local majority; at the same time, Turkish Cypriot leaders ordered Turkish people living in Greek-dominated areas to move to the North of the island to escape EOKA's reprisals and establish separate municipalities and institutions (French 2015: 261-262). Responding to calls for ethnic defense from the Greek Cypriot population, in early July 1958 Grivas ordered all EOKA groups to attack the Turkish community. The result was a spiral of violence. Between June and July 1958 Turkish paramilitaries killed fifty-five Greeks and attempted to assassinate another twenty-six, while EOKA murdered fifty-nine Turks and attempted to kill another forty-one (French 2015: 262).

As violence continued, not only was Britain far from crushing insurgents but the intercommunal conflict in Summer 1958 did strengthen EOKA's legitimacy as the only protector of the Greek community from Turkish aggression (Newsinger 2002: 105). At the same time, the alienation of the Greek community from Britain had never been more evident as the security forces occasionally appeared to condone Turkish violence. EOKA propaganda was keen to seize upon incidents between the local population and the security forces to inflate the belief that Britain was deliberately backing Turkish mobs against the Greek Cypriot community (Holland 1998: 255).

The colonial government decided to mount major operations against EOKA and TMT to end the spiral of intercommunal violence. Between 20th and 26th July 1958 the security forces launched Operation Matchbox against EOKA arresting 2,000 Greek Cypriot people under suspicion to be EOKA members or sympathizers; 1,482 of them were eventually detained after a period of 28 days; Operation Table Lighter against TMT on the 23rd July, instead, led to the proscription of the Turkish paramilitary organization and the detention of 54 Turkish Cypriots.

The numerical disproportion between Greek and Turkish Cypriot detainees seemed to prove that Britain was not impartial. However, the above mentioned gap depended on the very different size of EOKA and the Greek population compared to TMT and the Turkish community. EOKA was a far bigger organization than TMT and Greek insurgents could count of the support of 80 percent of the population of Cyprus; besides,

while the security forces only knew the names of approximately 300 TMT members, the British intelligence had identified over 16,000 people in Cyprus who were associated with EOKA (French 2015: 266). By arresting a large number of Greek Cypriots indiscriminately, therefore, the colonial government hoped that a high percentage of EOKA members would be caught in the net, thus reducing EOKA attacks against the Turkish community and decreasing the ensuing risk of reprisals by TMT.

Yet, the wide popular support behind EOKA proved to be a serious obstacle for the British. As the Governor himself admitted, mass arrests had inflicted only limited damage on Greek Cypriot insurgents. Indeed, the police did not have enough interrogators to extract intelligence from over 1,400 prisoners; besides, while the number of Greek detainees was too high for the police to obtain information, it was too low to weaken the popular base of a mass movement like the one supporting EOKA; as a result, most of insurgents' town groups remained operative and out of the security forces' reach (French 2015: 266-267).

Britain was preparing additional repressive measures against Cypriot paramilitaries: the Special Branch, for example, had successfully infiltrated the Turkish paramilitary organization marking 200 TMT members for arrest, including Küçük and Denktaş (French 2015: 267). An escalation of repression, however, would never take place as both Athens and Ankara, after igniting violence, began to cooperate with Britain to end the intercommunal conflict. Indeed, Greece and Turkey developed a strong interest in restraining Cypriot paramilitaries. Britain was aware that Athens had long been concerned about the risk of partition and knew from intelligence sources that Greek leaders were worried to see that EOKA attacks were compelling the Turkish Cypriot population to move to the North of the island; that was a favourable condition for the creation of a Turkish Cypriot state which was exactly the outcome that Athens was trying to prevent (French 2015: 268). Accordingly, the Greek government began to press Makarios – who had moved to Athens after his release – to contact Grivas and persuade him to stop the attacks (French 2015: 268).

The Turkish government had different but equally, if not more, compelling reasons to end its short-lived policy of coercion against Britain. As we have seen (see above), Ankara was increasingly alarmed by the expansion of Nasser's influence in the Middle-East, especially after the unification between Sirya and Egypt in February 1958 under Nasser's leadership. The Iraqi Revolution on 14th July 1958 created yet another hostile regime which immediately denounced the Baghdad Pact, thus breaking the military alliance with Turkey and Britain (see above). According to Turkish leaders, Britain's

support was now essential to tackle the potential military threats posed by the newly established anti-Western regimes against its southern frontiers; as a result, a coercive policy against the British over Cyprus was no longer affordable; likewise, a conflict with Greece – another NATO ally – was no longer convenient (see above). Only nine days after the Iraqi Revolution, Britain was informed that Ankara had instructed the Turkish General Consul in Nicosia and the Turkish Cypriot community to end attacks against the Greek Cypriot community and help Britain restore law and order in the island (see above). Accordingly, in early August EOKA and TMT agreed on a permanent ceasefire.

The British Cabinet was quick to detect that Ankara's vulnerability provided an opportunity to proceed with the Macmillan plan.[114] Turkey accepted the tridominium plan as it was in fact the closest outcome to partition; that, however, was also the reason why the Greek government still refused it. Having long discounted Athens's ability to do more than verbally rejecting Britain and Turkey's decisions (see Hatzivassiliou 2007; Holland 1998: 276, 281), the British government was determined to carry on with the tridominium plan even without Greece and announced that its implementation would begin on 1st October 1958. The underlying thesis on the British side was that the Greek Cypriot majority would eventually concede if faced with an intransigent stance (Holland 1998: 288). Indeed, there were signs that the enosis movement would eventually compromise. Presented with a forceful implementation of a plan which included a sort of administrative partition of the island – even though not a territorial one yet – Makarios informed both Grivas and the Greek government that he intended to renounce the goal of enosis and accept independence for Cyprus after a period of self-government (French 2015: 272).

Yet, Grivas was determined to keep on fighting. Since late August Grivas had been calling on the Greek Cypriot community to refuse cooperation with Britain and Turkey and use passive resistance against the Macmillan plan. His orders would be promptly obeyed, but EOKA's strategy did not entail only passive resistance. Grivas would resume the terrorist campaign in a spectacular fashion and prevent the implementation of the plan, while the Greek government was expected to withdraw from NATO and raise the issue of self-determination for Cyprus at the United Nations (French 2015: 273).

The Greek government in fact firmly refused to withdraw from NATO, but raised the Cyprus issue at the United Nations again in November 1958. The result was another

[114]TNA, FO371/13634, Wade-Gery minute, 11 September 1958.

diplomatic defeat for Athens: the General Assembly rejected a resolution condemning the Macmillan plan, thus exposing once again Greece's impotence on the Cyprus issue. In the meantime Grivas had mounted a major offensive against the security forces. Between September and December 1958 EOKA was responsible for over 430 incidents mostly consisting of sabotage and ambushes against military patrols (French 2015: 274). EOKA also began an offensive against British civilians including civil servants, bank clerks, and soldiers' families. EOKA's attacks against British civilians ended in November but few murders were enough to provoke violent outbursts of indiscipline against civilians by the security forces which would further alienate the Greek Cypriot population from the colonial government. (French 2015: 209). Grivas' strategy had succeeded once again. By sparking a violent and undisciplined reaction of the security forces, EOKA had exacerbated the hostility of the Greek population against Britain, thus destroying any residual chance for Britain to win over the local population.

Under these circumstances, the Governor as well as the Colonial Office did not believe that Britain could actually implement the tridominium plan against the will of the Greek Cypriot majority. According to the Colonial Office without Greek Cypriots' cooperation Britain would simply find itself fighting EOKA indefinitely and sacrifice British lives in pursuit of Turkey's interests only.[115]

In fact even Turkish leaders agreed that, although the Macmillan plan could create favourable conditions to achieve territorial partition in the future, the resistance of the Greek majority was likely to continue and could only drag Turkey deeper into the Cyprus crisis (Holland 1998: 290). In Autumn 1958, this appeared as a dreadful scenario in Ankara because another major threat to the national security of Turkey had come up. On 10th November the Soviet President Khrushev sparked the Berlin crisis (see above). Turkey shared a long border with the Soviet Union and the prospect of a military confrontation with the Soviets seemed to threaten the very survival of the Turkish Republic; as a result, Ankara became impatient to settle the dispute with Greece over Cyprus and secure its full support in the NATO (see above). In early December 1958 Turkey started direct negotiations with Greece on the future status of Cyprus, a move that Macmillan approved especially after the Turkish and Greek governments guaranteed that there would be no objections against British military bases (Holland 1998: 307).

In the meantime, the British resumed their operations against EOKA. While an international solution looked more likely than ever before, the security forces were still

[115]TNA, CO 926/1069, Smith, minute, 18 August 1958.

confronting an opponent which could rely on a vast popular base, a large arsenal, and an efficient organization. The British response to Grivas offensive did not entail a high level of civilian targeting. Rather, the British counteroffensive was based on the use of small dismounted patrols, pseudo-gangs to spot and ambush insurgents, and cordon-and-search operations: between November and December Britain arrested about 150 EOKA members and seized arms and ammunition from Grivas' organization (French 2015: 274-280). Consequently, EOKA's rate of attacks declined by a half by the end of the year even though insurgents retained their ability to spot and assassinate Greek Cypriot collaborators and punish defection (French 2015: 281). EOKA, however, quickly replenished its arsenal with 1,800 sticks of dynamite and detonators stolen from mines in the Troodos mountains, which seemed to prelude to another spate of sabotage operations by insurgents (French 2015: 281). Once again, Britain could only contain EOKA but had failed to destroy it.

It should be noted that Britain's relative self-restraint after the new EOKA offensive is consistent with the predictions of my model. The external threat environment surrounding Cyprus was seen as more favourable than ever before in London due to the persistent international isolation of Greece on the Cyprus issue, Turkey's decision to abandon a policy of coercion and cooperate with Britain, and the first signs of reconciliation between Athens and Ankara; at the same time, Britain had never helped Turkish Cypriots to dispossess and subdue the Greek majority; under these circumstances my model predicts that the incumbent state will use a moderate level of civilian targeting; the British reaction to the last major offensive of EOKA in Winter 1958 confirms this prediction.

EOKA could clearly keep on fighting but could not prevent Greece and Turkey from reaching a final agreement on Cyprus. In their direct negotiations Athens and Ankara agreed that the island would become an independent state; its sovereignty and territorial integrity would be guaranteed by Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain; the Republic of Cyprus would also sign an alliance treaty with Greece and Turkey, while Britain would have exclusive control over its military bases; Makarios himself accepted these conditions (see Holland 1998: Ch. 11). The three powers and Cypriot representatives – both Greek and Turkish – formally subscribed to the plan at the Zurich and London Conferences in February 1959.

This was a fatal blow to EOKA. As Grivas admitted, if EOKA had continued its campaign, insurgents would probably find themselves fighting a civil war pitting Greeks against Greeks; Athens itself would not be behind EOKA anymore, which meant that

insurgents would suffer complete international political isolation (French 2015: 291). Consequently, on 9th March 1959 Grivas ordered EOKA to stop the fight. The disarmament of EOKA clearly proved that previous British operations had only marginally affected the arsenal of a paramilitary organization which still enjoyed a vast popular base (French 2015: 292; Holland 1998: 324-325). Finally, Grivas would be allowed to leave Cyprus and go to Greece where he would be welcomed as a national hero. From April 1955 to December 1958 EOKA suffered 85 casualties while killing 104 British soldiers and 51 members of the Cyprus police; besides, 601 soldiers and 187 policemen were wounded in EOKA attacks and ambushes (French 2015: 307); finally, 263 Greek Cypriot civilians lost their lives; 187 of them were killed by EOKA insurgents (French 2015: 159, 307). The Cyprus emergency was over, but Britain had not defeated EOKA militarily. It was the reluctance of Britain to escalate civilian targeting that permitted EOKA to survive.[116] In this case study I have highlighted that Britain's reluctance to use a high level of civilian victimization depended on a neutral local alliance strategy in a favourable threat environment. Were there other causal factors that played a more important causal role? In the next paragraph I will address that question.

5.3 Alternative Explanations for the Level of Civilian Targeting during the Cyprus Campaign.

5.3.1 The First School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Cyprus Campaign.

The democratic restraint thesis predicts that democracies would refrain from civilian targeting because state leaders would be constrained by liberal norms against indiscriminate violence and democratic public opinion. As we have seen, the causal process is that small groups of highly educated middle-class citizens in liberal societies would reject the victimization of civilians as morally outrageous and would turn the domestic public opinion against the government if state leaders ever adopted a civilian targeting strategy; since elected leaders are vulnerable to public discontent, they would eventually fall back on self-restraint strategies.

Considering that Britain in 1955 was a democracy, the democratic restraint argument

[116] Interestingly, since Britain did not achieve a clear and complete victory over EOKA, the British campaign in Cyprus would not decisively confirm practitioners' prescription that self-restraint should be privileged due to its putative effectiveness (see above: 26-30).

would predict a limited use of indiscriminate violence and coercion by Britain during the Cyprus emergency. This prediction is fully confirmed. As we have described above, Britain only used a moderate level of violence and coercion.

Even if the democratic restraint argument correctly predicts the moderate level of civilian targeting in Cyprus, such an outcome does not seem to come by way of the posited causal mechanism. There was no powerful social group in the British society which was interested in Britain's counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus and challenge the government on the moral implications of colonial warfare. Unsurprisingly, the Conservative government hardly related the use of force in Cyprus to any serious risk of sparking public moral outrage and suffering electoral defeat. Nor did the parliamentary opposition manage to trouble the relative tranquility of the Conservative government about Cyprus. In fact, in the initial phase of the campaign, when EOKA outfought the Cyprus Police and frustrated the security forces' counteroffensive, the Labour opposition to the Conservative government was inclined to keep parliamentary debates on Cyprus to the minimum. The Labour's tendency to avoid public debate about repression in Cyprus was itself the result of a political calculation. Being confident to win the next elections, the Labour party was afraid to undermine its perceived victory prospects by challenging the Conservative government on the repression of insurgents in the colonies; indeed, the fear that public opinion could see the Labour as prone to sell out the Empire induced the opposition party to follow the government in keeping yet another potentially embarrassing emergency from public attention (Holland 1998: 121, 247).

This attitude was not significantly modified when, after EOKA's renewed offensive in November 1956, Harding demanded additional powers to extend mandatory death penalty, establish immunity for colonial officials involved in the repression of the insurgency, and deport suspect EOKA sympathizers. Even if the parliament and the media confronted the British government with a higher level of criticism about the moral implications of colonial repression, the whole debate on the counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus “came and went without any practical consequences” (Holland 1998: 161-162). The Cabinet could therefore give Harding the powers demanded.

In sum, Britain's self-restraint could hardly have been the product of liberal norms or institutional checks and balances. A mildly interested public opinion and an acquiescent opposition in Parliament did not provide the formidable deterrent against indiscriminate violence that the democratic restraint argument sees as the main cause of moderation in the use of force against non-combatants.

The other version of the regime type argument, instead, maintains that democracies may in fact be more likely to victimize civilians in counterinsurgency. Elected leaders would be afraid that their popularity will decline if they place the financial and human burden of fighting on the shoulders of a large number of less wealthy voters; as a result, democratic governments would tend to prefer capital-intensive strategies based on overwhelming firepower because the latter would charge the financial cost of war on a small number of wealthy voters and transfer the human costs of fighting to the opponent's population.

Since Britain was one of the most democratic states in the world in the 1950s, the democratic propellant argument would predict an escalation of indiscriminate violence by counterinsurgents before a resilient EOKA and such a prediction should be easily confirmed. Yet, the case outcome contradicts the predictions of the democratic propellant thesis. Indeed, as we have seen, Britain adopted a moderate level of civilian targeting which consisted of curfews, cordon-and-search operations, mass arrests, screenings of suspects, and collective fines; property destruction and house evictions were also used but, as mentioned above, the colonial authorities took care to avoid famine, homelessness and any other condition that could expose civilians to the risk of death. In conclusion, the Cyprus emergency counts as an unsuccessful test for the democratic propellant argument.

Another set of arguments in the First School of Thought points to the characteristics of military organizations as the mainspring of civilian targeting. As explained above, the bureaucratic politics thesis suggests that military organizations would prefer the unrestrained use of force and overwhelming firepower against the enemy because that would make for higher military budgets and increase the autonomy of the armed forces from external oversight. The military culture argument, instead, suggests that the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency depends on soldiers' ideas about their identity rather than bureaucratic interests: military organizations will prefer civilian targeting strategies against insurgents and their popular base when they consider the complete destruction of the enemy as a defining feature of military identity (see above). When military leaders enjoy operational autonomy from civilian leaders, then counterinsurgency campaigns will reflect military organizations' bureaucratic or cultural preferences for attrition strategies against insurgents and their popular base and a high level of civilian targeting is more likely to occur (see above).

These arguments do not perform convincingly in the case at hand. Even if British military commanders enjoyed full operational autonomy in the conduct of the

counterinsurgency campaign against EOKA and did prefer an attrition strategy against insurgents – especially EOKA mountain gangs – they did not tend to use civilian victimization. Rather, the Army relied on curfews and cordon-and-search operations to spot EOKA fighters in the early phase of the conflict (see above); as EOKA recovered from the search-and-destroy operations of the security forces in 1957 and could respond by resuming its own offensive, later in the campaign the British military emphasized the use of small dismounted patrols and pseudo-gangs to detect and ambush insurgents" guerrilla groups while limiting damage on civilians (see above). The putative effect of bureaucratic interests on the use of force in counterinsurgency was far from evident.

As to the military cultural argument, recent historiography on the British way in counterinsurgency maintains that the military culture of the British Army marginalized the laws of war in colonial warfare and emphasized the exemplary punishment of rebels (see Bennett 2013; French 2011; Newsinger 2002). In spite of that, military commanders rarely insisted with political leaders that the Greek-Cypriot community should be targeted with a high level of violence. Commanders did not demand mass deportations of civilians to new villages, even though military leaders knew that villagization could be decisive to defeat EOKA, as happened in Malaya and Kenya. Likewise, military commanders did not call for for scorched-earth measures, food denial, or summary executions. If the military culture of the British Army emphasized civilian targeting, the self-restrained performance of the security forces against EOKA would suggest that such a candidate causal factor did not decisively shape the level of violence Britain used against non-combatants in Cyprus.

Looking at the military organizational set of arguments, the force structure thesis seems to perform best in the case at hand. According to this argument a military organization would use violence indiscriminately in counterinsurgency when its force structure privileges military machines over manpower, thus making it difficult for a conventional army to collect intelligence about the enemy and use force selectively; conversely, reliance on manpower should enable troops to interact with the local population, win civilians' trust and collect intelligence successfully which, in turn, would favour selective violence. As we have seen, Britain refrained from a capital intensive strategy privileging manpower over military machines and overwhelming firepower, so the force structure argument correctly predicts self-restraint by Britain.

However, a closer look at the sequence of events reveals that the causal chain proposed by the force structure thesis was not at work in the case of Cyprus. The problem with the causal chain of the force structure argument in the case of Cyprus is

that, in spite of Britain's preference for manpower over military machines in the campaign against EOKA, the security forces still failed to win the trust of the Greek population and the security forces struggled to collect intelligence from civilians, especially in the first year of the campaign. Indeed, as we have seen above, it was EOKA that completely outperformed the security forces in collecting information about the enemy in the early phase of the campaign; Grivas' organization successfully infiltrated the Cyprus Police and effectively eliminated government informers during the whole conflict. Yet, Britain did not escalate indiscriminate violence and spared the Greek population from scorched-earth measures, indiscriminate shootings, mass evictions, famine, and coercive villagization which had been used in Kenya.

The offensive against EOKA in Spring 1956 generated Britain's first intelligence gains by the end of the year, which enabled the security forces to use force more selectively against insurgents' mountain, village and town groups thus obliging Grivas to call a truce in March 1957. This may apparently explain British self-restraint since 1957, but the point is that the British had chosen a self-restrained strategy since the very beginning of the conflict and long before making any intelligence gains. In other words, Britain used a moderate level of civilian targeting before and after getting valuable intelligence about EOKA. Variations in the quantity and quality of information about insurgents do not correlate with a change in the behaviour of the security forces towards Greek Cypriot civilians. This would exclude a causal connection between force structure, intelligence collection capabilities, and the level of civilian targeting.

5.3.2 The Second School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Cyprus Campaign.

The main contention of the Second School of Thought is that indiscriminate violence depends on the image of the enemy. More specifically, when the opponent is vilified as part of an abhorrent out-group, then the scope of what is morally acceptable in war broadens to such an extent that it may encompass indiscriminate violence.

Looking at the case of Cyprus, there is evidence that the vilification of insurgents and their popular base mounted as the struggle between Britain and EOKA went on. Since the very beginning of the insurgency, British political and military leaders tagged EOKA fighters as 'criminals' or gangsters that oppressed the population (French 2011: 60). The vilification of insurgents was arguably more bitter among the security forces. This was the result of the frustrating experience of fighting an elusive enemy which

used guerrilla tactics proficiently. EOKA fighters were widely regarded as 'terrorists', 'thugs', or 'gangsters' who shot their victims in the back (French 2011: 71).

The Greek population, instead, was initially seen in a more favourable light than EOKA fighters. The European identity of the Greek population was a factor which seemed to sustain the case for self-restraint. For example, before the state of emergency was declared, Governor Armitage insisted that the methods used in Kenya and Malaya "with the black and yellow races" should not be used in Cyprus, which was called a "cradle of civilization".[117] Besides, Greek civilians were initially considered as victims of intimidation by EOKA, rather than willing supporters of anti-British terrorism. This was Harding's position when he became Governor of Cyprus.

Two years later – and only few days after his resignation – Harding had eventually come to a totally different conclusion: the Greek population had supported EOKA because they approved of its actions and wanted to see insurgents victorious over Britain (see above). In his perception, that was the main reason behind EOKA's enduring elusiveness, resilience, and ability to hit: only the steady support of the Greek majority had enabled EOKA to survive Britain's successful offensive operations between Spring 1956 and Winter 1957. In other words, it was the Greek population which had intentionally neutralized the military progress of the security forces and denied Britain a political victory over insurgents. Harding, however, was only accepting an idea that had already been put very clearly before the Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd when he visited Cyprus for first time in July 1955: on that occasion, the mayor of Nicosia, speaking for a delegation of conservative Greek Cypriot representatives, stated that on the matter of enosis "EOKA and the Greek people of Cyprus are the same".[118]

Once identified with EOKA 'criminals' and 'gangsters', the Greek population of Cyprus became the object of a vilification process which depicted all Greek Cypriots as willing accomplices of terrorism, while Cyprus itself became the 'terror island'. After EOKA attacks against British servicemen and civilians, the British propaganda would give details of Greek people's rejoicing attitude or cruel indifference on the murder scenes. After two British servicemen were assassinated in Limassol in August 1958, for example, the official radio would describe how a Greek bystander, ostensibly delighted at the view of British victims' blood, had refused to help staunch the wounds of one of the soldiers on the ground (Holland 1998: 268). The shooting of two British women in

[117]TNA, CO 926/259, Armitage to Lennox-Boyd, 23 August 1955.
[118]TNA, CO 926/190, Minutes of meeting at Government House with right-wing mayors, 10 July 1955.

Famagusta in October 1958 was followed by similar propaganda stories about Greek crowds observing the murder scene with a grin of approval (Holland 1998: 286). EOKA's murders, therefore, did not simply prove the evil and criminal nature of insurgents; they were taken as unmistakable evidence of "the moral delinquency of the Greek Cypriots" as a whole (Holland 1998: 288).

Importantly, the vilification of the Greek Cypriot community included the Orthodox Church itself (Novo 2013). The British Cabinet tended to consider the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus as a morally corrupted institution exerting its "malignant power"[119] to turn young Cypriots into EOKA assassins. The eventual failure of negotiations with Makarios only strengthened the colonial government's perception that the Church was nothing less than 'the cover organization of the whole terrorist conspiracy' (Holland 1998: 187). This position had been forcefully stated in official terms in late 1956 already, when the government of Cyprus published a propaganda paper titled "The Church and Terrorism in Cyprus" which explicitly pointed to Makarios as a terrorist leader.

The growing vilification of the Greek Cypriot community and its Church should have led to an escalation of civilian targeting by the British. That never happened. Britain never resorted to mass executions, indiscriminate bombings, scorched-earth measures designed to induce famine, or mass deportations. The relatively limited use of torture against EOKA fighters or supporters in custody could be possibly linked to an abhorrent image of the enemy, not least because ill-treatments were often inflicted by police agents recruited from the Turkish community that ostensibly feared and vilified EOKA and the Greeks. Yet, as we have seen, it was self-restraint – not torture – that dominated the British campaign against the Greek Cypriot insurgency and the Second School of Thought cannot account for that, thus failing the test of Britain's counterinsurgency campaign Cyprus.

5.3.3 The Third School of Thought and Civilian Targeting during the Cyprus Campaign.

According to the Third School of Thought indiscriminate violence would derive from state leaders' strategic calculations. When the incumbent state suffers more combat losses than expected, population control is slipping in favour of insurgents, and victory seems in question, then the leaders of the incumbent state would become desperate to

[119]TNA, FCO 141/4682 Beresford to Administrative Secretary, 14 July 1956.

win and resort to indiscriminate violence. By contrast, when insurgents can inflict only limited casualties and fail to gain population control, then the leaders of the incumbent state would be confident in victory and refrain from civilian targeting.

Apparently, this argument would successfully explain Britain's self-restraint. Indeed, one may argue that, since EOKA killed no more than 155 members of the security forces in approximately three years (see above), British political and military leaders never became desperate to win and so Britain kept from civilian targeting. A closer look at the Cyprus emergency, however, reveals important problems with the causal chain posited by the Third School of Thought.

A relevant flaw is that, even if insurgents' kill rate was comparatively low, British leaders still grew pessimistic about their chances to defeat EOKA. The main cause behind that pessimism was an obvious failure to secure the cooperation of the Greek Cypriot majority. As we have seen, during the campaign the colonial government as well as the Cabinet in London did appreciate that victory over EOKA required population control, but they just realized that Britain was unable to gain it. Even after the successful offensives against EOKA's mountain groups in Spring 1956, optimism on the British side was short-lived. Grivas' paramilitary organization remained active in urban areas and could gradually rebuild itself due to the support of the Greek population. Indeed, insurgents proved capable of retain population control and hit their opponents even after the truce Grivas declared in March 1957 (see above). The emerging perception within the colonial government circles in 1957 was that EOKA had been temporarily contained, but the goal to crush insurgents 'beyond all hopes of recovery' and make sure that Greek Cypriot willingly repudiate enosis – which were the conditions of victory officially set out by Harding (see above) – had been missed.

Harding's initial optimism about winning over the Greek population had faded away by October 1957 when the Governor eventually recognized that EOKA's popular support was not simply the product of fear, but stemmed from a deeply rooted nationalist sentiment which Britain was unable to suppress (see above). The complete alienation of the Greek Cypriot majority, the likelihood of a renewed insurgent offensive, the prospect of force reduction in the island, and the first signals of intercommunal violence, undermined Harding's confidence in Britain's chances to end the emergency on favourable terms. Harding's mounting scepticism manifested itself in the most evident way when he eventually resigned from his position in October 1957.

Harding's successor, Sir John Foot, would soon fall even deeper into pessimism. Indeed, not only did EOKA resume its offensive against the security forces, British

civilians, government informers, and the colonial administration, but under Foot's governorship intercommunal violence reached its highest level. As Turkish mobs attacked the Greek population with the apparent complicity of Britain, EOKA would invariably strike back killing more Turks and British servicemen; in this way EOKA would further strengthen its own legitimacy as the protector of the Greek population. Unlike Harding, Foot would not resign but his desperation to come to terms with EOKA mounted to such an extent that in April 1958 the Governor went so far as to take a daring step: with the help of the Consulate of the United States in Nicosia, he sent a secret message to Grivas and proposed a meeting to negotiate the end of the sabotage offensive (Holland 1998: 243).

Scepticism about final victory grew within the British government in London too. Even after the Macmillan plan was officially adopted, by August 1958 there was little hope in the Colonial Office that insurgents could be put down or defeated. The implementation of the plan was considered virtually impossible because the Greek majority – over 80 percent of the population of the island – would keep supporting EOKA which was still seen as a powerful insurgent organization; interestingly, the Colonial Office saw insurgents' will to fight as superior to Britain's resolve in the long run and concluded that "some form of British withdrawal is now becoming inevitable […] The question is whether it is more dishonourable to seek to postpone withdrawal until it is carried out by somebody else, than to take steps to effect it oneself".[120]

Now, the fact that a pessimistic view on Britain's victory chances was there even if insurgents inflicted only limited casualties on the security forces is inconsistent with the causal mechanism of the Third School of Thought. As we have seen, according to Downes, low combat losses on the side of the incumbent should correlate with confidence about victory, but that is not what we observe in the case of Cyprus. The Cyprus emergency rather suggests that a failure to secure population control was sufficient for the colonial and metropolitan authorities to develop a belief that victory was in question, if not unattainable.

Consequently, another problem with the causal chain of the Third School of Thought is that Britain's frustration with EOKA's resilience and ability to fight – surprisingly emerging on the British side despite low combat losses – did not cause counterinsurgents to adopt civilian victimization strategies. Indeed, despite evidence that EOKA had recovered from the setbacks suffered before March 1957 and a perception that the Greek Cypriot community was stubbornly loyal to insurgents,

[120]TNA, CO 926/1069, Smith, minute, 18 August 1958.

Britain never concluded that it was necessary to drain the sea in which EOKA was swimming and kill or deport the entire insurgent population as happened in Kenya (see above). As we have seen, Britain rather tried to take advantage of the opportunities provided by a favourable threat environment and defeat EOKA diplomatically, which is inconsistent again with the Third School of Thought.

In conclusion, it is by no means clear that this group of arguments performs well because pessimism about victory unexpectedly came about despite low combat losses on the British side and the awareness that civilians supported insurgents almost unanimously did not result in mass deportations or lethal violence against non-combatants. The failure of rival groups of arguments, therefore, further corroborates my model as a valid explanation for the case at hand.

CHAPTER 6

FRENCH COUNTERINSURGENCY IN ALGERIA (1954-1962)

In this chapter I will study the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954-1962) as an instance of Scenario 1 in my model.

As explained above (see Chapter 2), under the conditions of Scenario 1 my model predicts that the incumbent state will resort to a high level of civilian targeting. The incumbent will restrict the freedom, destroy the property, and undermine the survival of non-combatants but without intent to exterminate insurgents' popular base. In Scenario 1, the incumbent will accept the risks of a civilian targeting strategy as a way to neutralize a perceived external threat to its hegemony over the insurgent territory; indeed, by defeating insurgents completely, the incumbent would deprive third-party states of a major opportunity to interfere in the political affairs of the insurgent territory. As a result, the incumbent state will be keen to destroy insurgents' military forces and restore order, dictate the conditions of peace, reaffirm its local hegemonic position.

Now, an emphasis on the total defeat of insurgents may result in a high level of civilian targeting: indeed, if insurgents' military power is to be destroyed, then it is essential to prevent civilians from assisting rebels. A moderate level of civilian targeting is unlikely to achieve that goal: measures like curfews, mass arrests, and collective fines can only temporarily affect civilians' ability to provide insurgents with shelter, intelligence, or material assets; besides, those measures would not prevent insurgents from reorganizing their intelligence and logistics network in the civilian population once it has been disrupted by mass arrests, for example. Therefore, the incumbent will use measures that undermine civilians' survival like scorched-earth, torture and the indiscriminate use firepower.

Importantly, in Scenario 1 the incumbent sticks to a neutral local alliance strategy and does not aim to expropriate and subdue any group in the society of the insurgent territory. Such a goal would require further escalation of indiscriminate violence simply because the victim group can be expected – rightly or wrongly – to put up fierce

resistance. Therefore, under the conditions of Scenario 1, the high level of civilian targeting generated by an unfavourable threat environment is unlikely to be further exacerbated. That is why in Scenario 1, indiscriminate violence does not escalate to the outright extermination of the insurgent population.

In this case study I will show that, by the time the insurgency began, French leaders perceived a Soviet and Egyptian threat to Algeria; such concerns intensified over the course of the conflict to the extent that French civilian and military leaders came to portray the counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria as a struggle against international communism and anti-Western pan-Arabism and Islamism (see below). France also grew wary of the intentions of the United States in North Africa. The French developed a belief that the United States was possibly willing – and certainly able – to replace France as the regional hegemon in North Africa. At the same time, the local alliance strategy of France can be described as neutral. Indeed, France did not intend to confront the Algerian insurgency by promoting or preserving the domination of a specific community over the others. As we shall see, civilian and military leaders were rather pursuing – even though tentatively and unsuccessfully – the integration of all the local communities into a broader French Algerian society – Algérie Française or French Algeria – where all members could have equal citizenship rights, regardless of their ethnic background.

Therefore, the use of indiscriminate violence by France was mostly the product of French leaders' concerns about the intentions and ability of third-party states to incorporate Algeria into their own sphere of influence at the expense of France; I will also point out that French leaders' intention to reduce the social, economic, and political gap between the different communities in the Algerian society kept the French counterinsurgency from becoming genocidal.

6.1 Testing Scenario 1: French Counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954-1962)

6.1.1 The Background of the Algerian War

From 1954 to 1962 France faced a guerrilla insurgency that would end its rule over Algeria after 132 years of colonial domination. France invaded Algeria in June 1830 and rapidly overwhelmed the Ottoman defenders. Armed resistance from the local population, however, continued until 1847. Arab resistance would be revived by the humiliating defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War in January 1871; the French

repression, however, broke the back of the revolt by July 1871; the rebellion of 1871 would be the last major Arab insurgency against the French before 1945 (Ferro 2003a). Even though Algeria was formally annexed to France as a department in 1875, its territory would be ruled as a colony. Indeed, the legislation applied in France was not entirely applied in Algeria; besides, France created yet another separate legal regime in the South of Algeria that was placed under direct military rule (Evans 2012: 21-22).

In this context, settlers could build their political and economic supremacy. The European minority clearly owed their power position to the protection of the metropolitan government. Yet, they still looked at France with suspicion. The interventions of the French government in the social, economic and political affairs of Algeria were especially unwelcome (Evans 2012: 29). Settlers' representatives in the National Assembly in Paris would sabotage any policy aiming to promote the educational, professional, and economic advancement of the Arab majority.

In spite of that, the issue of native advancement could not be ignored for long. The outbreak of the First World War and the contribution of the Arab population to the French victory would raise the issue again. Native advancement and liberation were understood very differently in the metropolitan political landscape. The French Communist Party (PCF), created in 1920 after two-thirds of the French Section of the Workers' International (SFIO) delegates broke away at the Congress of Tours, adhered to Lenin's Third International which supported anti-colonial nationalism as part of the anti-capitalist struggle. To the embattled minority that remained loyal to the SFIO this was nothing but a threat to the position of France as a world power and a complete denial of French universal values. The SFIO looked at native advancement in the French Empire through the lens of French patriotism and civilizing mission: far from conceding political independence to its colonial subjects, France should rather maintain its control over overseas territories and fulfill its universal mission of liberation by promoting equal rights between Europeans and colonial subjects (Evans 2012: 46-47). From this vantage point, reforms and assimilation were alternative to colonial exploitation and Communist anti-colonialism.

The reformist position of the SFIO would prevail in Paris. The cause of assimilation, however, could not count on a mass movement in Algeria where only a small political group led by Ferhat Abbas supported it. The idea of independence, instead, successfully penetrated into Algerian politics under the leadership of Messali Hadj and other anti-colonial nationalists close to the Third International. The financial crisis of 1929 that severely affected the Algerian economic system further increased the appeal of anti-

colonialism among dispossessed Arabs. As exports plummeted, Arab craftsmen, farmers, and workers were the first to plunge into poverty and hunger.

It was the Second World War, however, that decisively boosted Algerian nationalism. The fall of France in May 1940 and the subsequent creation of a collaborationist regime in Vichy reaffirmed settlers' supremacy, but the Anglo-American liberation of Algeria in November 1942 rekindled Arab nationalism. The Arab population could see that a foreign power had defeated France quickly for the second time in two years. As the myth of French invincibility crumbled down, Arab nationalists looked at the promise of self-government in the Atlantic Charter as the beginning of the end for French colonialism. Muslim revolt eventually broke out in the town of Sétif and other areas in the Constantine department on 7th May 1945: in three days 200 settlers were murdered. The French repression, ordered by a left-wing government claiming to embody the values of anti-Nazi Resistance, was fierce and indiscriminate: overall, at least 6,000 Arabs were killed (Evans 2012: 85-89).

Repression, however, did not extinguish Algerian nationalism. Messali Hadj would create a new legal party, Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD) – Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Freedoms – which pursued a non-violent strategy aiming to gather overwhelming Algerian electoral support for national independence, win the sympathy of the international public opinion, and press France out of Algeria.

This strategy would fail. In October 1946 the new French constitution was approved. Mostly the product of Socialist, Radical, and other left-wing parties, it included no reference to self-determination for overseas territories. The Constitution established instead the French Union, which consisted of France and its overseas territories based on equality of rights and obligations without distinction of race and religion; local assemblies and representative groups in the National Assembly were created to empower the native populations of the Union. Within this legal framework, Algeria was given a new Statute in 1947. Algeria would be divided into three departments under the authority of a Governor-General and the Ministry of Home Affairs in Paris; an Algerian Assembly of 120 members would apply the laws; elections for the Assembly would involve two electoral colleges with sixty seats each; the first college included almost 460,000 settlers and 58,000 assimilated Arabs, while the second would represent 1,400,000 Muslims (Evans 2012: 102).

Yet, the vote of the Muslim majority would be neutralized. In February 1948 Marcel-Edmond Naegelen, a prominent member of the SFIO, was appointed Governor-General

of Algeria. Fiercely anti-communist and anti-separatist, Naegelen saw Algerian nationalism as a vehicle of Soviet and Anglo-American influence in the French North Africa (Evans 2012: 105). During Naegelen's mandate between 1948 and 1951, the French authorities resorted to systematic electoral fraud and police intimidation to deprive Messali's MTLD of its victory in the second electoral college (Ferro 2003b: 508-509).

Having witnessed the failure of a peaceful ballot-box strategy, in June 1954 a small group of twenty-two young leaders who had left the MTLD created a new organization pursuing the political independence of Algeria through an armed struggle: it was called Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) – National Liberation Front. The FLN would include a military branch, L'Armée de Liberation National (ALN) – National Liberation Army. The FLN planned to start a guerrilla insurgency in Algeria, while mobilizing international support for Algerian independence. Accordingly, the FLN dispatched a delegation abroad – including future Algerian President Ahmed Ben-Bella – to secure foreign support. The external delegation was based in Egypt where Colonel Nasser's Pan-Arab regime accepted to support the insurgency diplomatically and militarily. The insurgency would begin on 1st November 1954.

6.1.2 Identifying the French Decision-Makers

During the Algerian War France experienced a constitutional change which marked a transition from the Fourth Republic, created in 1946, to the Fifth Republic in 1958. The 1946 Constitution established a parliamentary system in which the Cabinet was formally elected by the Parliament and had executive power under the leadership of the President of the Council. The President of the Republic had a symbolic role despite being the Chief of the Army. During the Fourth Republic the Cabinet was responsible for the making of foreign policy and national security. Therefore, I will have to look at the perceptions of the Cabinet about the external threat environment and their position about the local alliance strategy to pursue in Algeria.

The Cabinet, as we shall see, would experience chronic instability (see Evans 2012: passim). Several leaders, therefore, took the charge of Prime Minister and led left-wing coalition governments from 1954 to 1958 including Radical Party leader Pierre Mendès-France (June 1954-February 1955), Edgar Faure (February 1955-January 1956), SFIO leader Guy Mollet (February 1956-June 1957), Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury (June 1957-November 1957), Félix Gaillard, (November 1957-May 1958), and Pierre Pflimlin

(May 1958).

The constitutional reform marking the transition to the Fifth Republic created a semi-presidential regime. The President of the Republic, elected directly by the people, be would be the chief executive authority in addition to preserving its role as the Supreme Commander of the armed forces. The Prime Minister, instead, would be appointed by the President subject to approval by the Parliament. Charles de Gaulle served as President of the French Republic from 1958 to 1969: showing a pervasive leadership style, he personally directed and controlled the making of national security and foreign policy decisions hardly allowing any debate (Connelly 2002: 174-175). Therefore, in order to test my model, it will be crucial to observe De Gaulle's perceptions of the external threat environment as well as his understanding of the relationship between France, French settlers and the Arabs of Algeria.[121]

Before De Gaulle's return to power, however, the French campaign in Algeria was not shaped only by the metropolitan government. The Governor-General of Algeria, in particular, would play a prominent role. The Governor-General, appointed by the Cabinet, was the chief of the government and security forces in Algeria; he was responsible for the conduct of the campaign under the authority and supervision of the government in Paris. A key figure in this role during the Fourth Republic was Jacques Soustelle whose ideas about the integration of the Arab community into the French Algerian society significantly contributed to shape France's local alliance strategy (Evans 2012: 132-133). Soustelle, who became Governor-General in January 1955, would be replaced by Robert Lacoste in February 1956 after settlers opposed Georges Catroux's appointment as Soustelle's successor (Evans 2012: 154). Like Soustelle, Lacoste was a staunch supporter of integration based on equality of rights between Europeans and Arabs until the end of his mandate in May 1958.

The French Army strongly supported integration too. The Army was a crucial actor in the Algerian war not just because it carried out the campaign against the FLN and its popular base, but also because it claimed an independent political role with regard to the definition of the future status of Algeria (Evans 2012: 133-134). Indeed, during the Algerian war, the French military would intervene in politics twice: being concerned that the chronic instability of the French government in Paris could result in the abandonment of Algeria, in May 1958 the armed forces staged a successful coup in

[121]It is impossible to analyze De Gaulle's calculations and perceptions of the external threat environment on the basis of primary sources because most of De Gaulle's papers are not accessible. Yet, historians have based their analysis on De Gaulle's public speeches and actual decisions and behaviour. They tend to conclude that there is no indication that De Gaulle wanted to concede independence to Algeria when he returned to politics. See Connelly (2002); Evans (2012); Wall (2001).

Algiers which ended the Fourth Republic and brought De Gaulle back to power; however, as we shall see, the Army would soon become disappointed with De Gaulle's policy too; as a consequence, the Army attempted another coup to topple the government and maintain Algeria under French control in April 1961. Given the Army's intervention in politics and its role in the conduct of the campaign, I will have to consider Army leaders' perception of the external threat environment and their position about the local alliance strategy of France when explaining the level of civilian targeting in Algeria

6.1.3 France's Perceptions of the External Threat Environment

French leaders' perceptions of the external threat environment of Algeria can be put in the context of the decline of France's power position after the Second World War. France lost its great power status after the military defeat of May 1940 and the ensuing occupation of its national territory. The liberation of France in 1944 and the victory over Nazi Germany did not restore France's great power status. Yet, the French could regain control of their colonies in North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and South-East Asia; that kept the French ambitions alive. The French hoped that, by restoring its own empire, France could still maintain its international standing, project its influence in the world, and affirm its independence from the USSR and the United States (Ageron 1991: 103; Evans 2012: 195). These hopes would be frustrated. The protracted communist insurgency in Indochina, the final defeat of the French in 1953, and the simultaneous growth of anti-colonial movements in Tunisia and Morocco confronted France with a further erosion of its international power position. By 1954, France had lost its Asian colonies and faced the risk to lose North Africa too under the pressure of Arab nationalism, while the United States and the Soviet Union maintained their hegemony in Europe. When the FLN started its revolt, therefore, the French political and military leadership considered the preservation of sovereignty over Algeria as the very last opportunity for France to remain a relevant actor in a bipolar world (Ageron 1989). The conventional wisdom in Paris was that if Algeria had fallen, the remnants of the French Empire in Sub-Saharan Africa would follow soon and France would eventually become a minor power (Evans 2012: 130-131, 194-195).

In this context of frustrated ambitions and fear of decline, the insurgency in Algeria was understood as part of an international conspiracy against France and the West (Connelly 2002: Ch 3). Since the beginning of the insurrection, the political and military

leaders of the French Fourth Republic showed a deeply engrained belief that unrest in Algeria had been ignited from abroad. In particular, French leaders pointed to the Soviet Union and Nasser's Arab nationalist regime in Egypt as the main culprits. According to the French, these two powers were trying to incorporate North Africa into their own sphere of influence in an attempt to encircle the Western power bloc in Europe (Connelly 2002: Ch 4; Evans 2012: 159-162). The main implication of this thesis was that the FLN was not simply a local insurgent organization pursuing its own political goals, but a pawn of Nasser and the Soviets; France, therefore, was not fighting the FLN to defend an oppressive colonial system; it was rather fighting to protect the Western bloc from the threats of communism and pan-Arabism.

The French Army was by far the most resolute supporter of this thesis. The generation of officers that would fight in Algeria, still marked by the experience of the humiliating defeat in Indochina, tended to consider the very use of guerrilla tactics by anti-colonial movements as an unmistakable sign of communist revolutionary infiltration. According to key senior officers like Paul Ely, Paul Cherrière, Henri Lorillot, Raoul Salan, Jacques Massu, Colonel Lacheroy, Marcel Bigéard and others, the experience of Indochina taught that the communist bloc was carefully avoiding an open conventional conflict with the West; yet, the Soviets had not abandoned their world struggle against capitalism; they would keep fighting the capitalist powers by supporting anti-colonial movements in Africa and Asia so as to destroy the European Empires (Droz and Lever 1982: 135-136; Paret 1964: Ch.1; Thomas 2000: 159). From this vantage point, Algeria was a Cold War frontline and the struggle against the FLN-ALN was the stage that followed the Indochina War (Evans 2012: 134).

The French authorities in Algeria were in complete agreement with the Army. According to the Governor-General of Algeria, Roger Lèonard, insurgents were following “foreign instructions” (Connelly 2002: 70). His successor, Jacques Soustelle, would be even more specific about the Soviet plans in North Africa:

> “It would be extremely dangerous for the Soviet forces to attack from east to west across the European peninsula. In view of this, they would find it greatly to their advantage to detach North Africa from the strategic area of the West and to establish there either anarchy or direct Communist rule or dictatorships similar to that of Egypt” (Soustelle 1956: 125-126).

If the Soviets were recruiting allies in the Third World to crush the European Empires in North Africa – at least according to the French – Nasser's pan-Arab regime in Egypt was perceived as the most powerful and ambitious client of the Kremlin (Evans 2012:

160, 183). French leaders insisted that Nasser aimed to "recreate the empire of Islam around Egypt", as Prime Minister Guy Mollet would put it (Connelly 2002: 91). In order to fulfill his expansionist ambitions, Nasser had joined the Soviet alliance system as the arm deal of Egypt with Czechoslovakia in September 1955 seemed to confirm (Evans 2012: 160) At the same time, according to the French, Egypt was infiltrating the FLN to impose the influence of Nasser over Algeria. The FLN was nothing but "a section of the Egyptian special services" and Algeria was part of "a gigantic global conflict where a number of Muslim countries […] are trying through Hitlerian strategies to install an invasive dictatorship on a section of the African continent" as Minister-Resident (Governor-General) Robert Lacoste would put it (Connelly 2002: 82, 106).

In such conflict France felt entitled to the unconditional support of its Western allies, especially the United States. The support of the United States was all the more important because the FLN was mobilizing countries of recent independence against France in the United Nations. The Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung in April 1955, for example, recognized the right of Algeria to self-determination and vowed to take the issue to the General Assembly of the United Nations in September 1955. The UN would repeatedly intervene in French colonial problems in North Africa (Thomas 2001) but, French leaders' expectations about U.S. support would be disappointed.

According to the United States government, the Soviets were not interfering in North Africa, nor was the FLN the spearhead of communism in Algeria; in fact, during the conflict the Eisenhower administration stuck to the belief that the Algerian uprising could result in an anti-communist pro-Western regime, just like the anti-colonial movements in Tunisia and Morocco and Arab nationalism in general (Wall 2001: 15). Consequently, the Eisenhower administration was reluctant to give France the unconditional support that Paris expected. The United States was afraid that Arab nationalists would turn to the Soviet Union, if the U.S. government had backed French colonialism. In sum, Franco-American relations during the Algerian war reflected opposite beliefs about the Algerian problem: while France maintained that only continuing French rule could save Algeria and North Africa from Soviet and Egyptian influence, the United States believed that it was exactly French colonialism and repression that would eventually increase Soviet and Egyptian influence over North Africa (Wall 2001: 22-23).

This left the United States facing a dilemma: support for France would push Arab nationalists towards the Soviets, but support for the Algerian nationalists would alienate France possibly undermining the NATO and the European defense system against the

Soviet Union. If the need to preserve the NATO implied that French calls for assistance could not be disregarded, the United States would constantly press France to carry out political reforms in North Africa to end the Algerian insurgency before French repression could alienate pro-Western Arab nationalist leaders, like King Mohammed V in Morocco and Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia (Wall 2001: 23).

Even if the French Prime Minister Pierre Mendès-France eventually accepted to negotiate independence for Tunisia and Morocco, the pressures of the United States to do the same with Algerian nationalists strengthened French leaders' perception that the external threat environment was unfavourable. Since the Anglo-American liberation of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria 1942, France had looked at the United States and its anti-colonialist foreign policy as a potential threat to French hegemony in North Africa. The French authorities attributed the Sétif revolt in May 1945 to the United States' encouragement of local nationalism (Evans 2012: 79); the FLN insurgency in 1954 revived French fears. Indeed, if the French counterinsurgency campaign in Algeria was genuinely understood in Paris as a stand against the threat of "pan-Islamism, which conspires with Soviet pan-Slavism" (Connelly 2002: 91), the sceptical reaction of the United States to the conspiracy thesis and Eisenhower's anti-colonial positions exacerbated France's long-standing suspicions about the real intentions of the 'Anglo-Saxon' powers in North Africa.

The French government did not believe that the United States would actively assist Algerian nationalists militarily. Yet, the conservative circles and left-wing parties alike – both in Paris and in Algiers – agreed that the United States deemed a French defeat very likely and so the U.S. government was preparing itself to fill the ensuing power vacuum in North Africa (Wall 2001: 17-18). The French authorities in Paris and Algiers as well as the French representatives in the United Nations routinely denounced that the State Department and the U.S. consulates in Algeria had established contacts with FLN representatives, U.S. oil companies negotiated concessions with rebels rather than the French government, Algerian nationalist propaganda was unrestrained in the United States, and the U.S. Information Services and trade unions overtly supported Algerian independence; Governor-General Soustelle virtually ceased all contacts with the consulate of the United States in Algiers and placed U.S. personnel under surveillance (Wall 2001: 24-25). When the General Assembly of the United Nations announced it would discuss the Algerian question in September 1955, the French government blamed the United States for failing to block the Assembly's initiative. All this reinforced the French public opinion's belief that the United States wanted to see the end of French

rule in Algeria. As French Prime Minister Guy Mollet would put it, the Americans were not playing a double game, but a game on two tables: providing limited support for France, while pressing the French to make concessions in an attempt to win the sympathy of Arab nationalists and incorporate North Africa into the U.S. sphere of influence after the French defeat (Wall 2001: 24-25).

France, however, would not simply wait for the support of the United States to improve. The belief that Nasser was the mastermind of the Algerian insurgency led the French government to a dramatic decision: toppling Nasser by force of arms. Paris believed that, once the Egyptian regime had been eliminated, the Algerian insurgency would have also faded away. The nationalization of the Suez Canal by Nasser gave the French the opportunity they were looking for and guaranteed Britain and Israel's support. Started in October 1956, the military intervention resulted in a political failure. The United States, fearing that the invasion would alienate Arab regimes, imposed a cease-fire and demanded a withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops; at the same time, the Soviet threatened to use nuclear weapons against Britain and France if their troops had not been withdrawn; the French demands for the United States to counter the Soviet threats fell on deaf ears in Washington.

The Suez crisis strengthened the French perception of the external threat environment as unfavourable. The reluctance of the United States to side with France had now turned into outright support for Arab nationalist regimes. The United States had saved Nasser's regime thus keeping the FLN alive. According to French leaders and public opinion, the U.S. intervention against France during the Suez crisis proved once again that the United States aimed to drive France out of North Africa and include the region into the American sphere of influence by winning over Arab nationalism (Wall 2001: 59-60).

This kind of belief was strengthened by the American efforts to build friendly relations with Tunisia that had gained independence from France in March 1956. The Tunisian government had made no mystery of its support for Algerian independence and the FLN had established its bases within the Tunisian territory along the border with Algeria. FLN frequent attacks against French patrols from the Tunisian territory in 1957 would propel tensions between France and Tunisia (Evans 2012: 231).

The main clash between France and Tunisia took place in February 1958 when the French Army bombed the Tunisian village of Sakiet after Tunisia's President Habib Bourguiba failed to restrain FLN raids into the Algerian territory. The bombing, which was approved by the Ministry of Defence and the Army without the full consent of the Prime Minister (Wall 2001: 108), provoked the intervention of the United States in

favour of Tunisia. Always afraid that the French campaign in Algeria could alienate pro-Western North African leaders like Bourguiba, the United States pressed France to accept an American good offices mission to start negotiations with the FLN; had the French refused, the U.S. loans to France would have been at risk and the United States would have supported Tunisia diplomatically (Wall 2001: 122; Connelly 2002: 165). The U.S. intervention was received in France as unmistakable evidence that the United States had both the ambition and the power to end the hegemony of France in North Africa (Connelly 2002: 167).

Having grown dependent on U.S. loans and military equipment, the French government eventually gave in. The National Assembly, however, rejected the government's decision and provoked a political crisis. The institutions of the Fourth Republic themselves were called into question. The Army, the Gaullists, French settlers, and left-wing political personalities like Jacques Soustelle were determined to end the chronic instability of the Fourth Republic and resist the interference of the United States: in May 1958 the Army took the power in Algiers successfully calling for De Gaulle's return to politics. The Fourth Republic was over.

De Gaulle's return to power did not coincide with a significant change in the external threat perceptions by France. Even if De Gaulle would maintain in his memories that foreign pressures played no role in his decisions, historians see such a claim as a reaction to the perceived preponderance of external threats to French hegemony in North Africa (Connelly 2002: 176). De Gaulle was in fact aware of the prominent international dimension of the conflict and aimed to defend and restore France's status as a regional hegemon in North Africa and a great power in Europe (Wall 2001: 157-159). In this respect, De Gaulle's foreign policy does not look any different from that of the Fourth Republic.

De Gaulle constantly strived to exclude the 'Anglo-Saxons' from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa: his memorandum to the U.S. and British governments in September 1958 calling for a three-power directorate to lead NATO policies on world affairs was strongly related to the pursuit of that goal. Indeed, as the French ambassador to the United States Hervé Alphand explained, the three-power directorate would be supposed to adopt and support the policy of the power which was most directly involved in the specific issue being addressed in a given area of the world; in North Africa, including Algeria, France was the main power and its policy aimed to crush insurgents and set the conditions for peace. Therefore, through his memorandum De Gaulle was essentially inviting Britain and, more importantly, the United States to

recognize Algeria as part of the French sphere of influence (Wall 2001: 176-177).

De Gaulle, however, would receive the same reaction as the Fourth Republic's governments from the Eisenhower administration: as the tripartite talks revealed, the United States had no intention to back French policies in Algeria, interrupt its contacts with the FLN, and stop supporting Tunisia's and Morocco's pro-FLN regimes (Wall 2001: 183). After a year of unfruitful negotiations, De Gaulle eventually accepted that France could not hold Algeria for long without the support of the United States; he realized that if the conflict had gone on, the United States would have intervened to end it which would disintegrate French influence in North Africa; he abandoned the idea of French Algeria and in September 1959 and announced that he was ready to offer Algerians a choice among full integration with France, federal association, and full independence. This step, however, was still far from a concession to the U.S. influence. Indeed, De Gaulle's offer of the independence option came with a major military offensive – Plan Challe – which would crush the ALN (see below); that was still an attempt to end the Algerian war on French terms and conditions before the United States intervened again to force a solution upon France and impose itself as the local hegemon (Wall 2001: 187-189). De Gaulle, therefore, still aimed to keep an independent Algeria in the French sphere of influence by destroying the FLN.

In conclusion, during the whole campaign, French leaders constantly perceived the external threat environment as unfavourable. They believed France was confronting Soviet and Egyptian expansionism while struggling to keep the United States out of North Africa.

6.1.4 The Local Alliance Strategy of France

By the time the FLN insurgency began the major communities in Algeria were the European settlers, which numbered over a million, and the Arab and Berber Muslim community which consisted of almost seven million people.[122] As we have seen above, despite the legal fiction declaring Algeria as a French department, what France had established in Algeria was a colonial system in which the European community had expropriated and subdued the Muslim majority. Settlers had no doubt that in an independent Algeria they would be unable to preserve their political and economic power. When settler leaders Ortiz, Lagaillarde, and Achiary insisted that Algeria should remain part of France, therefore, they implied that only limited changes should be

[122]The Jewish community, which numbered 140,000, was mostly neutral in the conflict.

introduced in the social, economic, and political organization of Algeria.

Was the French government willing to support settler domination over the Muslim community and preserve the existing gap between Europeans and Arabs as a way to face the insurgency? Far from quietly aligning with settlers, the governments of the Fourth Republic were against settlers' domination over the Arab community; besides, after De Gaulle's return to power, the relationship between the European community and the French government was marked by mutual distrust, overt hostility, and violent revolt.

From 1954 to 1959 France pursued the goal of Algérie Française – or French Algeria. French leaders in Paris and Algiers intended that goal differently from the way the settler community understood it. Indeed, while settler leaders mostly saw French Algeria as a mere restatement of the status quo, the French authorities in Paris and Algiers saw it as a an ambitious plan to foster complete social, economic, and political equality between Europeans and Muslims (Tyre 2006).

Looking at the Algerian conflict through the lens of Socialism and class struggle, the left-wing coalition governments of the Fourth Republic dismissed self-determination as a "deceptive right"; instead of conceding independence, France would pursue reforms which would eventually liberate the Arabs by improving their conditions of living and turning them into full-fledged French citizens (Stora 1998: 76). The French government was aware that Arabs' desire for self-determination was exacerbated by poverty, dispossession and a lack of political representation. According to French leaders, the responsibility for Arabs' dispossession and revolt laid squarely on the shoulders of a wealthy minority of settler hardliners – les grands colons – represented by the colonial lobby in the National Assembly; while most settlers were ready to support equality of rights for Arabs – at least according to the French government – this combative European minority was determined to defend their privileges and neutralize all reforms (Evans 2012: 156-157). At the same time, another hardliner minority in the Arab community – the FLN and its Egyptian patrons – was trying to terrorize Arabs into supporting independence and expropriate or expel the settler community from Algeria. Therefore, according to the French 'the government's role was to prevent one ethnic group from subjugating the other. It was about creating a shared Franco-Muslim community based on toleration, respect, and equal political rights' (Evans 2012: 156).

Jacques Soustelle, Governor-General of Algeria from January 1955 to February 1956 , was arguably the most prominent and influential supporter of the French Algeria ideal. In Soustelle's view, French Algeria was not assimilation under a different name. While assimilation aimed to absorb the Arabs into the French cultural community, French

Algeria entailed that France would recognize the cultural identity of the Arab and Berber communities; at the same time, Muslims would have the same citizenship rights and responsibilities as European settlers and would elect representatives in the National Assembly in Paris, which would spell the end of settler domination; finally, Algeria would be gradually integrated into the French economic system as an essential condition for full equality (Horne 1977: 108; Tyre 2006: 278).

The left-wing governments of the Fourth Republic attempted to improve Muslims' conditions of living and civil rights. Measures were taken to increase Arab workers' wages, reduce unemployment, boost industrialization, promote agrarian reforms and land distribution, increase access to education, and give Muslims equal political representation.

The military fully supported the idea of French Algeria and shared the Socialist government's analysis of the Algerian conflict as a struggle of a dispossessed population against a wealthy group of settlers: accordingly, a sentiment of mistrust and despise towards les grands colons was deeply rooted in the military circles in Algeria (Droz and Lever 1982: 135). Confronted with the realities of social, economic, and racial discrimination against the Arabs, the Army understood itself as a redeeming institution that would play a crucial role in reaching out the Arab community, spread out the universal values of the French Revolution, enforce reforms, and stop the influence of Communism and pan-Arabism in the Algerian society (Evans 2012: 134). Through the Sections Administratives Specialisées – Special Administrative Sections – established by Soustelle, the Army would be at the forefront of the reformist effort providing primary education and health care, tackle unemployment, oversee local elections etc. (Evans 2012: 132; Johnson 2016: Ch. 2).

The French government's efforts, however, would be thwarted. As the ALN targeted settlers and pro-French Muslims with unrestrained and indiscriminate brutality (see below), the Eurpean community regarded all Arabs as potential or actual FLN supporters; as a result, the French government's reforms to improve Muslims' conditions came to be regarded as a show of weakness or a threat to settlers' security (Evans 2012: 140-141). As the settler community showed a persistent fear of abandonment and looked at the Fourth Republic's institutions with increasing distrust, the colonial lobby in the National Assembly sabotaged most French reforms by introducing amendaments.

As Pierre Mendès-France liquidated the French Empire in Indochina and started negotiations on the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, settlers denounced that Paris was ready to abandon Algeria too. Settlers' fears were ignited again when Socialist

Prime Minister Guy Mollet replaced Jacques Soustelle with General Catroux as Governor-General of Algeria in February 1956. Catroux's involvement in the negotiations for the independence of Morocco and Tunisia led most settlers to believe that negotiations with the FLN for the independence of Algeria would begin soon (Evans 2012: 148-151). Settlers' distrust resulted in street riots during Mollet's official visit to Algiers the same month which forced Catroux to resign.

Settlers' violence did not change the reformist agenda of the French government. Still in January 1957 in his comprehensive assessment of the situation in Algeria, Mollet made it clear that the government's policy was to ensure the coexistence of the European community and the Muslim community 'without either one being able to oppress the other' (Evans 2012: 193). Settlers would soon realize that Catroux's successor – SFIO member Robert Lacoste – was determined to crack down on settlers' extremism. Lacoste banned the Organization of the French Algerian Resistance, which was responsible for organizing the riots against Mollet, and dissolved all the local councils, which were the strongholds of European political influence.

This, however, did not curb settlers' radicalization and hostility to the Fourth Republic. As the ALN launched a campaign of terrorism in Algiers – the Battle of Algiers – and external pressure on France to negotiate with the FLN increased (see below), settlers insurrectional mood raged on again. In January 1957 settler hardliners tried to kill the new military commander of the French Army in Algeria, Raoul Salan (Evans 2012: 191). It is therefore ironic that Salan would in fact become one of the plotters that overthrew the Fourth Republic. The Sakiet incident, the subsequent U.S. intervention in support of Tunisia (see above) and the perception that Fourth Republic was ready to abandon Algeria under U.S. pressure led to a major political crisis. Military leaders – especially Raoul Salan and Jacques Massu – and former Fourth Republic officials like Jacques Soustelle with the support of settlers, established a Public Safety Commitee in Algiers in May 1958 which successfully called for De Gaulle's return to power and ended the Fourth Republic.

Once in power, De Gaulle visited Algeria receiving the most enthusiastic welcome from the Army and the settler community. De Gaulle publicly praised integration, but did not clearly commit to French Algeria. The fact that most of De Gaulle's papers are still inaccessible makes it impossible to have an accurate idea of his long-term plans in May 1958: in particular, it is controversial if De Gaulle went to power with an intention to make Algeria independent, as the General himself would claim in his memories, or if his initial commitment to French Algeria was as genuine as he let the settler crowd

believe during his first official visit (Evans 2012: 236-237; Tyre 2002). As seen above, historians believe that, at the beginning of his mandate, De Gaulle had no new formula compared to the Fourth Republic's governments. De Gaulle, however, would eventually dismiss the idea of full integration between the Arab population of Algeria and the French community, as he believed that the former would eventually outnumber the latter and impose their own culture (Connelly 2002: 179). Independence, instead, would allow the French nation – including settlers – and the Arab nation to develop separately, which basically meant that settlers would have to leave Algeria and return to France.

When De Gaulle for first time included independence among the possible options he offered to Algerians in September 1959, the European community felt betrayed and began to prepare another rebellion against the Republican institutions. The transfer of General Jacques Massu to France in January 1960 eventually sparked settlers' revolt. Settlers looked at Massu as the man who had defeated the FLN in the battle of Algiers (see below) and a staunch supporter of French Algeria; his removal, together with De Gaulle's call on the FLN to start a peace process, was seen as a prelude to a sell-out of Algeria.

On 24th of January settler leader Pierre Lagaillarde and his paramilitaries occupied the University of Algiers building barricades; as 20,000 Europeans joined the paramilitaries the next day, the French police clashed with the settler crowd; in the ensuing firefight 14 agents were killed and another 123 were wounded (Evans 2012: 272). The French public opinion, disgusted at settlers' violence, backed De Gaulle's refusal to make any concessions; the Army itself did not side with settlers. By 1st February the revolt had ended in failure and Lagaillarde fled to Spain. The Week of the Barricades, as it would be known, would leave a long-lasting mark of infamy on the settler community: far from regarding settlers as a group with legitimate demands and aspirations, the French government and public opinion would look at the European community of Algeria as a threat to France and its institutions (Evans 2012: 275).

In January 1961 settler leaders created a terrorist group, L'Organisation de l'Armée Secrète (OAS) – Organization of the Secret Army – in Madrid. Its goal was to keep Algeria under French control. In pursuit of this goal, the OAS would target French officials, including De Gaulle, and whoever supported negotiations with the FLN both in Algeria and in France. The most spectacular action was the assassination of the mayor of Evian, the city where Franco-Algerian talks were taking place, in March 1961.

At the same time, OAS members in the Army would organize a military coup. In April 1961 a military junta formed by Generals Salan, Challe, Jouhaud, and Zeller took the

power in Algiers. Yet, the Army remained faithful to De Gaulle, the coup failed and plotters went into exile. The OAS would continue its fight not only against the FLN in Algeria but also against the French government itself until March 1962 when Algeria gained independence and European settlers left the country.

In conclusion, France was not supporting settlers' domination, but was trying to promote Arabs' integration in a wider Franco-Arab community. Even if the objective of full equality was never achieved, France's local alliance strategy did not aim to impose settlers' domination over the Arab community. More importantly, as the settler community's fears of abandonment intensified, since May 1958 the relationship between France and the settler community became one marked by distrust, conflict and overt hostility. As the European population tried to impose their will on the French government by way of riots, terrorism, and military coups, settlers were perceived as a threat to the Republican institutions.

6.1.5 The Predictions of my Model

The values on my candidate causal factors shown above indicate that French counterinsurgency in Algeria is an instance of Scenario 1 in my model. The corresponding prediction is that the incumbent state will use a high level of civilian targeting. Therefore, we should see France resorting to measures that threaten civilians' freedom, property, and life like scorched-earth, food denial, mass deportation, indiscriminate bombing and reprisals, and torture but without intent to commit extermination. Besides, the use of indiscriminate violence should correlate with French leaders' concern to achieve complete military victory on the field as a way to affirm France's control over Algeria and prevent or neutralize potential diplomatic and military interventions by third-party states. In other words, fear of external intervention should fuel leaders' pursuit of victory at all costs, which should cause civilian and military leaders to authorize the victimization of civilians. Finally, we should observe at least a correlation between French leaders' concern to improve the political and economic rights of the Arab community and the absence of genocidal measures.

6.2 Civilian Targeting during the French Counterinsurgency Campaign in Algeria

6.2.1 The Early Stage of the Campaign (November 1954 – December 1956)

The FLN began its insurrection on 1st November 1954. Insurgents committed sabotage and arson attacks to damage infrastructures and settler property; the ALN also attacked French barracks, police stations, Arab civilians, and French settlers. Yet, six months after the beginning of the insurgency, the FLN was still a small organization which recruited by word of mouth and could count on less than 800 fighters (Evans 2012: 126). Despite France's persistent belief that the USSR and Egypt were assisting insurgents, in the beginning of the campaign the ALN lacked military training, logistical support, and heavy equipment. In most of their attacks, insurgents used sporting guns. The FLN and its leaders were almost completely unknown to the Arab population of Algeria. Insurgents' activities, therefore, were restricted to the Constantine department and the Aurès mountains, while the limited FLN network in urban areas was quickly dismantled by police repression (Stora 1993: 9-10). Unsurprisingly, the French initially considered the FLN insurgency appeared as a local tribal uprising (Clayton 1994: 115).

In November, however, the French government called in its paratroopers from Indochina to increase the garrison in Algeria which only numbered 65,000. Paratroopers engaged ALN insurgents in the mountain areas with some success: ALN gangs would suffer heavy casualties in their early clashes with the French and insurgents' local leaders would be arrested or killed (Horne 1977: 102-103). The military also undertook large sweeps in the mountain areas which included mass screening, mass arrests, and ill-treatment of civilians.

There is evidence that abuses on prisoners after mass arrests were already widespread in the opening phase of the counterinsurgency campaign. In March 1955, the Mendès-France government ordered an official investigation on the use of torture in Algeria in response to complaints that the police and the Army had adopted it as a routine procedure. The investigation resulted in the Wuillaume report – after the name of the senior civil servant in charge of the investigation. Not only did the report confirm that torture was a routine practice of early resort, but it also recommended that the government should encourage torture and provide Army and police officers with immunity from prosecution (Horne 1977: 197). The French government did not formally adopt Wuillaume's recommendations, but it let the security forces carry on with torture without enforcing any measure to prevent and discourage that practice.

Under military pressure and with limited population support, insurgents could hardly survive the winter in the Aurés mountains. However, the brutality of French military operations quickly alienated the local population and the ALN could replete its ranks since early 1955. Indeed, despite directives from Paris to avoid the indiscriminate

bombing of Arab settlements with napalm and high explosives and Governor-General Jacques Soustelle's prohibition of reprisals against civilians, the Army identified the FLN uprising with an international communist conspiracy and increasingly turned to a collective responsibility doctrine (Horne 1977: 100).

Military commanders would allow the retributive shelling and the aerial bombing of Arab villages after insurgents' ambushes; the Army also resorted to the indiscriminate deportation and the summary execution of civilians under suspicion to be supporting the ALN (Clayton 1994: 118; Horne 1977: 100). In May 1955, Commander-in-Chief Paul Cherrière eventually delegated his subordinates in the Constantine region "powers to decide, depending on the circumstances, employment of machine-guns, rockets and bombs on bands in new rebellion areas. Collective responsibility to be vigorously applied. There will be no written instructions given by the Governor" (cited in Horne 1977: 114). As a result, indiscriminate bombings and shootings would set in as a routine practice.

It is relevant to note that the use of a high level of indiscriminate violence correlates with the French perception that the external threat environment was deteriorating. Indeed, before the Army decided to enforce collective responsibility, the FLN had achieved a major political victory on the international level. Indeed, the conference of non-aligned countries held in Bandung in April 1955, which included Egypt, officially supported Algeria's independence and would successfully press the United Nations to discuss the issue in the General Assembly. The French government once again saw the shadow of the USSR behind the Bandung Conference. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antoine Pinay, reacted by denouncing the putative alliance between the participants in the Bandung conference and the Soviet bloc as "the gravest threat to the stability of the world" (Connelly 2002: 93). This would confirm the predictions and logic of Scenario 1 in my model.

In the light of the increasing international support, ALN leaders in the region of Constantine decided to launch a spectacular uprising to show to the international public opinion that the FLN was the only representative of the Algerian people and press reluctant Algerians to side with the FLN (Evans 2012: 140). On 20th August 1955, after spreading rumors that the Egyptian troops were ready to land and support the uprising, ALN leaders mobilized thousands of peasants around the coastal town of Philippeville. Armed with sticks, knives, and axes, rebels attacked and massacred French and Algerian civilians in about thirty towns and villages. Overall 123 people were killed in three days, including 71 Europeans (Evans 2012: 141). The brutality of the attacks was

particularly evident in the mining town of El-Halia and Philippeville where even children and pregnant women were slaughtered. Victims' corpses were systematically disemboweled and mutilated. ALN leaders intentionally sought that horror to provoke an indiscriminate reaction by the French authorities; that, in turn, would convince uncommitted Algerians to join the FLN.

The French reaction was indeed indiscriminate. Even if settlers spontaneously formed militias that attacked and killed Arabs indistinctly, the repression was led and perpetrated by the French military and the civilian authorities. Jacques Soustelle demanded that the Army track down and punish rebels. The French Army would do so by resorting to summary executions. In El-Halia French soldiers would shoot over 80 civilians on sight (Horne 1977: 120-121); in Philippeville hundreds of suspects would be rounded up, carried to the local football stadium, and executed (Evans 2012: 141). As the French authorities themselves would acknowledge, the Army and local settler militias killed 1,273 civilians as a retaliation for the ALN massacres in the Philippeville area,[123] even if historians believe that 2,000 to 3,000 is a more plausible figure (Clayton 1994: 119). The French repression played into insurgents' hands. Horrified by the scale of the French brutal reaction, moderate Muslims and even assimilation supporters turned to the FLN.[124]

Since September 1955 the French military engagement into the war escalated with the mobilization of reservists. Mobilization further intensified with the victory of Guy Mollet's Republican Front in the elections of January 1956. Sticking to the view that the Algerian insurgency was the outgrowth of Soviet and Egyptian governments' interference (see above), the Mollet government – and the minister of the Armed Forces, Max Lejeune, in particular – decided to intensify the military effort on the field to crush insurgents before the Army got involved in a lingering counterinsurgency campaign like the one in Indochina (Evans 2012: 162). Accordingly, in April 1956 the government launched Operation Valmy that mobilized reservists and extended the military service to twenty-eight months; this measure brought the number of soldiers deployed in Algeria to 381,00 by August 1956 (Jauffret 2001: 22).

The mobilization of reservists met with mass protests and mutiny by reservists themselves, but Operation Valmy responded to the demands of military commanders. The Army intended to take the initiative and establish a tight control over the Algerian

[123] In his memoir, Galula remembers the atrocities of the ALN in El-Halia but not the French indiscriminate retaliation.

[124] This would confirm the effectiveness of the logic behind Foco theory (see Introduction) as well as practitioners' argument that indiscriminate violence would be counterproductive (see above: 26-30).

territory. General Henri Lorillot, who had replaced General Cherrière in June 1955, introduced the quadrillage system (Jauffret 2001: 27). The quadrillage system divided the Algerian territory into sectors which would be occupied by static garrisons supplied by reservists and indigenous troops; paratroopers and other professional soldiers, instead, would pursue ALN gangs and engage in direct combat.

The quadrillage system, however, entailed measures that would be associated to a high level of civilian targeting. In particular, the Army established three types of zones: *zones interdites* or prohibited areas, *zones de pacification*, and *zones d'operation* or operation areas. The prohibited areas were free-fire zones: the Army would remove or deport the whole population and destroy any property and source of food; any individual found in prohibited areas could be shot on sight; in the zones the pacification the Army had lists of inhabitants and movement was checked and controlled; finally, in the zones d'operation the Army pursued the enemy and engaged the ALN in combat (Clayton 1994: 121).

As part of quadrillage the Army conducted large sweeps to spot rebels and win the allegiance of the local population. Yet, the Army's sweeps ended up alienating the Arabs as they involved measures that targeted the freedom, property, and life of non-combatants. Indeed, the Army would systematically burn down those villages under suspicion to support the FLN-ALN and would make use of torture to interrogate people arrested during cordon-and-search operations; after being tortured, victims would often be executed and their deaths would be reported as combat fatalities with the cover-up of military commanders; this added to the indiscriminate shootings of civilians – including women and the elderly – as a reprisal for failure to cooperate after insurgents' ambushes (Evans 2012: 169: Horne 1977: 171-174).

If civilians were routinely victimized, FLN fighters who had been arrested during police and Army operations would not escape death either. By June 1956 the French government had 253 FLN prisoners that had been sentenced to death by guillotine. The Mollet government hesitated to proceed to their execution as France had started secret talks with the FLN in Cairo. Yet, Mollet's peace offers did not include political independence: the French government demanded a ceasefire by the FLN, free elections, and negotiations with the future representatives of the European and Arab communities. When the talks failed, Mollet decided to start executing FLN prisoners (Evans 2012: 181). On 19th June 1956 the first FLN fighters were guillotined.

The execution of FLN members would prompt insurgents to start a campaign of urban terrorism in Algiers. FLN operatives in the city were instructed to attack settlers,

government officials, and members of the security forces; since September the FLN began to make use of women operatives who would pass themselves off as French women to elude controls at checkpoints and place bombs in European bars and cafés. The mastermind of the bombing campaign was Saadi Yacef; he responded to one of the most important FLN leaders: Ben M'Hidi.

In the meantime, the French seemed to score an apparent success when they arrested Ben Bella and other members of the FLN external delegation on 22nd October 1956. This success, however, was overshadowed by the humiliating outcome of the Suez invasion which increased Nasser's international prestige in North Africa and exacerbated France's fears of Egyptian interference (Evans 2012: 183). The FLN would therefore escalate its campaign of urban terrorism in Algiers provoking settlers' retaliations against the Arab population. By the end of 1956 the situation in Algiers was out of control. If in July 1956 the FLN attacks numbered 60, in December this figure had more than doubled (Evans 2012: 190). When one of the deadliest FLN fighters – Ali Ammar, known as Ali La Pointe – killed a prominent settler representative, riots escalated: Europeans assaulted and lynched Muslims indiscriminately. On 7th of January 1957 Robert Lacoste eventually decided to give special powers to the French Army. Lacoste delegated General Jacques Massu, commander of the 10th Parachute Division, to restore law and order in Algiers at all costs. This marked the beginning of the Battle of Algiers.

6.2.2 The Battle of Algiers and the End of the Fourth Republic (January 1957- May 1958)

The escalation of insurgents' attacks in Algiers was related to the international diplomatic strategy of the FLN; therefore, the French reaction can be understood in the light of the external threat environment. Indeed, under pressure from Asian and African countries, the UN General Assembly announced that it would discuss the Algerian independence problem in January 1957; the FLN intended to seize the opportunity to show that the French had lost control over Algeria and the local population now recognized only the FLN as their legitimate representative (Connelly 2002: 125; Evans 2012: 190). Therefore, in addition to the bombing campaign, FLN leaders in Algiers called for a general strike that would start on the 28th January 1957 when the General Assembly debate would begin.

French leaders in Paris and Algiers were alarmed about the timing of the general strike

and the bombing campaign as they were fully aware that the diplomatic position of the French government in the United Nations was unfavourable. After the Suez crisis, most Arab countries had broken their diplomatic relations with France to show solidarity with Egypt and were ready to support Algerian independence; the United States was hostile to the French policy in North Africa on the ground that it would alienate potentially anti-Soviet nationalist leaders in the region; Great Britain was rebuilding its relationship with the United States after Suez and was reluctant to support the French repression in Algeria; that, in turn, strengthened French leaders' perception that the 'Anglo-Saxon powers' were willing to relegate France into the status of a second-rank power (Evans 2012: 192, 198; Thomas 2001: 107).

Yet, the French government remained adamant that France would accept no solution imposed by any third-party. In his official declaration on Algeria on 9th January 1957 – two days after Lacoste empowered the Army in Algiers – the French Prime Minister Guy Mollet insisted that the FLN insurgency was the product of Egyptian expansionism in North Africa and the United Nations had no right to intervene; he maintained that only the creation of a Franco-Muslim community could end the conflict, while independence was out of the question; Mollet invited once again the FLN to accept a ceasefire, free elections, and negotiations with future Algerian representatives (Evans 2012: 192-193). The Army itself subscribed to this analysis. To the officers now in charge to restore order in Algiers the confrontation with the FLN was yet another battle in the world struggle against communism and this time the Army was determined to win at all costs (Horne 1977: Ch. 8; Zervoudakis 2002: 58-60).

The sense of alarm of French leaders about the presence of external threats at the eve of the Battle of Algiers and the ensuing resolve to win correlate with repressive measures that are associated with a high level of civilian targeting, especially torture. In the beginning of the Battle, General Massu's 10th Parachute Division faced a serious shortage of information about the leadership, organization and the numerical strength of the FLN in Algiers. The FLN operatives in Algiers would be recruited and based in the Casbah, the Muslim area of the city, where the local population would provide shelter and camouflage after attacks. Insurgents could rely on 1,500 fighters organized in a structure of independent cells. The FLN also organized a network of bomb-making factories, safe houses, and secret passages in the Casbah for FLN fighters to elude French controls and disappear after the attacks.

As the UN General Assembly was prepared to discuss the issue of Algerian independence, Massu attempted to break the pro-independence general strike that

started on the 26th January. At first, the French forces used propaganda inviting Muslims to go to work under the protection of the military (Evans 2012: 207). When these methods failed, paratroopers used coercion: soldiers broke into houses or rounded people up in the streets to take them to work, while owners would be forced to open their shops. The FLN responded with a renewed offensive, but the security forces were gaining the upper hand.

The French Army would begin by infiltrating the streets of the Casbah with spies and take photographs from helicopters to check movements and spot possible hideouts; heliborne troops would land on the roofs of the Casbah to search houses and arrest suspects on the basis of preliminary information. The interrogation of suspects was crucial as it would allow the French to identify the members of the FLN cells and their ringleaders.

During interrogations the French military routinely used torture involving beatings, hanging and suffocation, burnings, sexual assault, water torture, and electric shocks: the French military tortured and killed at least 3,000 prisoners before secretly incinerating the corpses or dumping them into the sea[125] (Branche 2016; Horne 1977: 197-200). Judicial evidence of the victims' affiliation to the FLN would never turn up. Importantly, civilian leaders in Paris and Algiers were fully aware of paratroopers' interrogation methods and willingly encouraged or supported the use of torture and summary executions. During their visits at the Army headquarters in Algiers, Robert Lacoste, Max Lejeune, and Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury were informed by Massu and other military officers that paratroopers extracted intelligence with torture; civilian leaders would urge military commanders to continue and keep torture secret (Evans 2012: 206).

In spite of their brutality, paratroopers' measures gradually destroyed the FLN network in Algiers. By mid-February 1957 the Army had arrested 448 FLN fighters and captured 87 bombs, 5429 detonators, and 70 kilos of explosive (Evans 2012: 207). On the 23rd February the French Army arrested Ben M'Hidi: few days later the government would announce that Ben M'Hidi's had committed suicide; in fact, he was secretly executed by an Army unit in charge to eliminate FLN leaders under the command of Colonel Paul Aussarèsses with political cover from Paris. By March, not only had the bombing campaign ended, but FLN leaders had abandoned Algiers moving to Morocco and Tunisia.

[125] In spite of evidence, in his memoir Galula repeatedly and blatantly dismisses allegations of torture as propaganda fabrications against the French (2006: 143, 183). Galula's personal background as a settler in North Africa and his involvement in the repression as an Army officer seems to have biased his recollections.

After a short respite, Yacef reorganized the FLN network in Algiers and on 9th June 1957 insurgents' bombed The Casino, a popular venue regularly attended by Europeans. The FLN offensive resumed shortly after a political crisis over public spending that ended Mollet's government in May 1957. Mollet's fall however did not affect the French campaign: the new Prime Minister, Maurice Bourgès-Maunoury, would keep providing the Army with political cover for indiscriminate violence. Therefore, not only did the Army stick to its brutal methods, but the military successfully recruited spies and double-agents among demoralized FLN prisoners (Evans 2012: 221). These measures destroyed the FLN networks. In September 1957 Yacef himself was arrested with some of its operatives and on 5th October paratroopers killed Ali La Pointe, thus ending the Battle of Algiers.

It should be observed that the use of torture and summary executions during the Battle of Algiers is fully consistent with the predictions and logic of my model under the conditions described in Scenario 1 (see above). Indeed, according to my model, when the incumbent state's leaders perceive – rightly or wrongly – the external threat environment as unfavourable and its local alliance strategy is neutral, then the incumbent will use a high level of civilian targeting in an attempt to crush insurgents and deprive other states or group of states of pretexts or opportunities to intervene. As we have seen, during the Battle of Algiers French civilian and military leaders were deeply concerned about the ability and willingness of third-party states to interfere in favour of the FLN through the United Nations; this concern was further exacerbated by the reluctant attitude of the United States and Great Britain to support French hegemony in North Africa. This induced French leaders to seek victory at all costs to reaffirm French hegemony over Algeria when it was clearly exposed to international criticism and external intervention.

Even if the FLN had been completely crushed in Algiers, insurgents remained active in the mountain areas. More importantly, the FLN had established headquarters abroad, especially in Morocco and Tunisia where the FLN was successfully recruiting fighters from Algerian refugees. The Tunisian government, in particular, was perceived in Paris as one of the most resolute supporters of Algerian independence (see above). The FLN in Tunisia could rely on a formidable force. If the FLN had 2,000 fighters in 1957, this figure would rocket to 8,000 by 1958. Besides, the ALN in Algeria received military equipment and supplies from Tunisia on a regular basis.

The French government and the Army reacted by locking the frontier with Tunisia in an attempt to cut insurgents' supply lines. In June 1957 the Minister of Defense, André

Morice, approved the construction of a barrier along the Tunisian border. The barrier would be known as the Morice Line, after the Minister himself. The Morice Line, which would be completed in September 1957 and further expanded in the next few months, was designed to detect and repel FLN units attempting to cross the border. The Line was 300 km long and consisted of a complex system of barbed wire, electrified fences, land mines, and radar stations supported by aeronaval surveillance; paratrooper regiments, artillery units, and air forces would stand behind the Line to attack and destroy FLN units trying to break the barrier (Vernet 2001: 260-263). This marked the beginning of the so called 'Battle of the Frontiers', a series of clashes between the French Army and insurgent units trying to cross the Algerian border. In this battle insurgents had little hope to prevail. FLN units trying to cross the border would systematically suffer heavy casualties (Horne 1977: 265-266). Gradually, the Morice Line left the ALN in Algeria without supplies; more importantly, the barrier system separated the ALN in Algeria from the vast military forces that the FLN had built up in Tunisia.

The construction of the Morice Line involved measures that correspond to a high level of civilian targeting like scorched-earth, the destruction of entire villages along the Tunisian border, the mass deportation of Arab civilians to makeshift concentration camps, and the creation of free-fire zones (See Vernet 2001). That is consistent with the predictions of my model under the conditions of Scenario 1. Indeed, the French authorities correctly looked at Tunisia as a close ally of the FLN and an imminent threat to French hegemony in Algeria (see above). As the French perceived the external threat environment as unfavourable, my model would predict that the incumbent would use indiscriminate violence to undermine civilians' freedom, property and life in an attempt to crush the insurgency and prevent political and military interference. The policy of scorched-earth, mass deportations, and free-fire zones along the Tunisian border confirms that prediction.

Despite the effectiveness of the Morice Line, however, the French could not completely stop FLN activities from the Tunisian territory. Insurgents' ambushes would cause twenty-three diplomatic protests from France against the Tunisian government between July 1957 and February 1958 (Evans 2012: 231). The tension between France and Tunisia peaked on 8th February 1958 when the French Army bombed the village of Sidi Youssef Sakiet in Tunisia as retaliation for an insurgent attack from the Tunisian territory. The bombing was indiscriminate killing 70 people including women and children. The Sakiet bombing was a propaganda victory for the FLN, but – as described above – its most relevant consequences were the intervention of the United States in

favour of Tunisia; the fall of the French government following the National Assembly's refusal of the U.S. good offices mission, the military coup of May 1958 ending the Fourth Republic, and the eventual return of De Gaulle to power (see above).

6.2.3 The Plan Challe and the End of the Campaign (May 1958 – March 1962)

The demise of the Fourth Republic did not affect the level of indiscriminate violence used by the French. Indeed, like the leaders of the Fourth Republic, De Gaulle perceived the external threat environment as being unfavourable to France (see above). According to De Gaulle, a political solution to the Algerian problem could only follow from a complete military victory enabling France to resist external pressure and dictate the conditions for peace (see above).

Accordingly, De Gaulle carried on with the measures previously adopted by the French Army, especially mass deportations of civilians to concentration camps. Over a million civilians had been relocated by 1958 (Horne 1977: 220). In most concentration camps the conditions of living posed a major threat to inmates' survival. Camps were isolated and invariably overpopulated; inmates often lived in makeshift tents or huts; food deficiency was a persisting problem that the French hardly addressed, nor did the military authorities consider sanitation and hygiene worthy of any attention (Ageron 2001: 331-332). In 1958 a Figaro correspondent described the effects of the French policy of mass deportation on civilians' conditions of living:

> Crammed together in unbroken wretchedness, fifteen to a tent since 1957, this human flotsam lies tangled in an indescribable state. There are 1,800 children living at Bessombourg […] At the moment, the whole population is fed entirely on semolina. Each person receives about four ounces of semolina a day […] Milk is given out twice a week: one pint per child […] No rations of fat have been distributed for eight months. No rations of chick-peas for a year […] No rations of soap for a year (cited in Horne 1977: 221).

Unsurprisingly, malnutrition and disease in concentration camps were described as widespread and severe by French military officers themselves and infant mortality was high, even if accurate data are not available (Ageron 2001: 331-332). Importantly, the French policy of mass deportation disrupted agricultural production, which further compounded food deficiency and increased the risk of starvation for the local population: by 1960 in some areas the number of hectares under wheat cultivation had decreased by 75 percent, while the loss of livestock suffered by nomadic herders amounted to 90 percent (Sutton 1977: 287-288). In spite of that, inmates' conditions of living were never significantly improved: still in 1961 the French authorities talked

about "important levels of mortality" in concentration camps and villages due to starvation and disease[126] (Ageron 2001: 345-346).

Despite their brutality mass deportations and the fortified barriers along the borders eroded the FLN fighting power. Defeated in Algiers, separated from most of its popular base, and deprived of supplies and reinforcements from Tunisia, the insurgency began to lose momentum. De Gaulle was now ready to crush the FLN-ALN in the mountain areas where insurgents had their last strongholds. In December 1958 General Maurice Challe took over Raoul Salan as a Commander-in-Chief in Algeria. Under his command, the French military prepared a major offensive: it was the Plan Challe.

According to the Plan, the French forces would move from West – were the insurgency was relatively weak – to East – where the FLN was most powerful. The military would divide the territory into three areas to be cleared from insurgents before moving to the next: the Oranie, the Algiers region or Algérois, and the Constantine region. Mass deportations would be intensified in those areas. When the offensive began in January 1959 Challe could count on 385,000 troops, including 50,000 harkis, Arab Algerian soldiers with a deep knowledge of the terrain. The Challe offensive delivered a fatal blow to the FLN-ALN which suffered very heavy casualties and lost approximately 50 percent of its combat power (Griffin 2010: 572).

The Plan Challe ended the military phase of the insurgency (Griffin 2010: 572). The FLN-ALN would never recover from its losses and would not be able to pose a serious threat to the French troops anymore. From April 1960 onwards the French Army would conduct mop-up operations against an insurgent organization that was now seriously crippled and demoralized. The FLN had been defeated militarily but France would not be able to retain its sovereignty over Algeria. Despite the defeat of the insurgency, the brutality of the French counterinsurgency campaign had alienated the Arab population which remained committed to the goal of national independence. Algeria eventually achieved independence in March 1962 through negotiations between France and the FLN.[127]

It should finally be observed that De Gaulle's commitment to victory at all costs, including a high level of civilian targeting, correlates with his resolve to oppose any political solution imposed by third-party states, especially the United States. While

[126]In his memoir of the Algerian War, Galula (2006: 185) only remembers that prisoner camps were open to inspection by the International Red Cross (ICR), but he never mentions that the French Army itself was aware of that inmates in concentration camps were exposed to hunger, disease, and a serious risk of death.

[127]The case of Algeria tends to corroborate practitioners' arguments about the ineffectiveness of indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency (see above: 26-30): indeed, while the French defeated the FLN-ALN militarily, they eventually lost Algeria as they alienated the local population.

historians agree that since 1959 De Gaulle had it clear that France could not keep its sovereignty over Algeria for long, they also stress that De Gaulle wanted to dictate the conditions of Algerian independence (see above); that, in turn, made it imperative to achieve complete military victory. Victory at all costs implied that the protection of civilians' lives would not be the priority. Mass deportations and the deadly conditions of inmates in concentration camps indicate that De Gaulle was ready to starve and kill civilians to prevent external interventions and negotiate a favourable solution to the Algerian problem. That confirms the predictions and logic of my model under Scenario 1 conditions: when the external threat environment is seen as unfavourable, the incumbent's leaders will authorize a high level of civilian targeting in an attempt to achieve a crushing military victory and thwart or prevent external interventions into the incumbent's sphere of influence.

Before concluding the study of this case, a question is in order: why was the French counterinsurgency campaign not genocidal? It would be impossible to answer this question on the basis of the sources available – either primary or secondary – because French civilian and military leaders never mentioned or discussed extermination as an option. Yet, it is plausible to argue that the idea of French Algeria and the corresponding pursuit of full equality between the Arab community and the European community – which corresponds to a neutral local alliance strategy in my model – made certain military options unthinkable. The civilian and military leaders of the Fourth Republic did acknowledge that the Arab community had been systematically discriminated and exploited by settlers; consequently – as Guy Mollet would put it – the solution to the Algerian insurgency should not simply entail a complete military victory on the field, but also a vast plan of economic and social reforms which could turn the Arabs into full-fledged French citizens (see above). De Gaulle would initially adopt the same position as the Socialist governments of the Fourth Republic. During his first official speech in Algiers in June 1958, De Gaulle addressed the crowd by claiming:

> La France considère que, dans toute l'Algérie, il n'y a qu'une seule catégorie d'habitants : il n'y a que des Français à part entire avec les mêmes droits et les mêmes devoirs. Cela signifie qu'il faut ouvrir des voies qui, jusqu' à présent, étaient fermées devant beaucoup. Cela signifie qu'il faut donner les moyens de vivre à ceux qui ne les avaient pas. Cela signifie qu'il faut reconnaître la dignité de ceux à qui on la contestait. Cela veut dire qu'il faut assurer une patrie à ceux qui pouvaient douter d'en avoir une.[128]

The annihilation of the Arab community, therefore, was incompatible with the socially

[128] http://www.charles-de-gaulle.org/pages/l-homme/accueil/discours/le-president-de-la-cinquieme-republique-1958-1969/discours-du-forum-d-alger-4-juin-1958.php. Accessed on 30th May 2016.

redeeming mission that the Socialist governments of the Fourth Republic and De Gaulle set out to accomplish.

In conclusion, French leaders' pursuit of full equality between the settler and the Arab communities correlates with a complete absence of debate on genocide as a potential option and a complete lack of extermination measures in practice. This would confirm the predictions of my model under the conditions associated with Scenario 1.

6.3 Alternative Explanations for the Level of Civilian Targeting during the French Campaign in Algeria

6.3.1 The First School of Thought and Civilian Targeting in Algeria

As we have seen above, there are two versions of the regime type arguments. The democratic restraint argument contends that democracies would not be able to make a prolonged use of barbarism because civilian targeting would violate the principles liberal democracies adhere to. Small groups of educated middle-class citizens would exploit democratic norms allowing open debate to denounce civilian victimization as morally unacceptable and would turn the domestic public opinion against the government. Faced with mounting protest and moral indignation, elected leaders would eventually give in to public pressure and fall back on self-restraint strategies.

Interestingly Gil Merom (2003) – the main proponent of the democratic restraint thesis – looks at French counterinsurgency in Algeria to test this argument. Merom focused on war outcome rather than civilian targeting per se, but a necessary part of his argument is that barbarism would spark public protest which, in turn, would force democratic state leaders to dismiss civilian targeting strategies.

While Merom convincingly proves that the use of indiscriminate violence caused mounting outcry in France and that public opinion gradually turned against the French government, he does not demonstrate that political leaders eventually abandoned civilian targeting strategies due to public pressure to spare civilians' lives. In fact, as we have seen, the leaders of the Fourth Republic stuck to a civilian victimization strategy despite increasing opposition from the French population against the use of torture and other forms of barbarism in Algeria. Rather than falling back on self-restraint, French political leaders became concerned with keeping the most outrageous forms of civilian victimization from the public opinion. For example, as we have seen above, during the Battle of Algiers, political leaders inspecting interrogation centers insisted with military

commanders that torture should not be suspended but it should be kept as secret as possible.

The downfall of the Fourth Republic did not change the level of civilian targeting in any significant way. While De Gaulle acknowledged that the French public opinion was increasingly against the war and the brutal methods used by the French, he nonetheless believed that France should dictate the conditions of peace, which could only be done by crushing the FLN-ALN militarily. That entailed a high level of civilian victimization. As we have seen, during the Challe offensive mass deportations intensified and the conditions of inmates in the camps remained a formidable threat to civilians' survival. The French public opinion was against indiscriminate violence, but this did not change the government and the Army's conduct towards civilians.

The democratic propellant argument would apparently perform better as it would correctly predict the use of civilian targeting by democratic France. Yet, a closer look at French counterinsurgency in Algeria suggests that the causal logic of the democratic propellant argument was not at work. Indeed, the democratic propellant argument maintains that elected leaders would be reluctant to charge the human and financial costs of fighting non-existential wars on their population: indeed democratic leaders need electoral support to win the next elections, while a long and costly war would undermine popular support to the government. Consequently, democratic governments will prefer a capital-intensive strategy based on civilian victimization over a labour-intensive strategy so as to charge the financial and human costs of the war on a minority of wealthy citizens.

Yet, the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria indicates that French leaders did not hesitate to charge the human costs of the conflict on their population. This was particularly evident when French leaders decided to resort to the mass mobilization of conscripts to fight the FLN-ALN in Algeria. Mass mobilization soon met with resistance and even revolt by draftees who called for the independence of Algeria (Evans 2012: 163-167). Mutinies by conscripts escalated in 1955-1956, but French leaders did not back down. Mass mobilization of conscripts went on and over 450,000 soldiers – most of whom were French citizens – would be sent to fight in Algeria. From then on French households would directly experience the war and combat deaths, which would undermine French leaders' popularity. By the end of the conflict, France had suffered over 25,000 casualties. French leaders certainly used a civilian targeting strategy based on preponderant firepower, but it would appear that it was not a way to save the French population from the costs of fighting and increase their own chances to

win the next elections. In other words, the causal logic of the democratic propellant argument was not operating in the case at hand.

A second group of arguments in the First School of Thought points to military organizational factors as a determinant of civilian targeting. Factors like military organizational interests and culture, force structure and intelligence collection capabilities would definitely help explain some forms of civilian targeting, especially torture. It is widely acknowledged that the French military had developed a perception of itself as an institution that had to stop French international political decline and restore the French prestige after the defeat in Indochina; it is equally clear that the generation of officers that had experienced the humiliation of Dien Bien Phu developed an anti-guerrilla doctrine that included torture as a fully appropriate method to defeat insurgents based on the perceived identity of the French Army (Horne 1977: Ch. 8); besides, one could hardly dispute that during the battle of Algiers torture derived from the need for intelligence on the FLN-ALN network in the city. Yet, the explanatory power of military organizational factors should not be overstated. Some considerations are in order.

Firstly, civilian leaders were behind indiscriminate violence measures as much as military officers, therefore the level of civilian targeting in Algeria cannot be decisively attributed to military organizational factors. Indeed, civilian leaders authorized and encouraged the armed forces to target noncombatants in Algeria and provided the Army with essential political cover-up when needed. This is especially the case of torture (see above).

Since the very beginning of the campaign, French political leaders in Paris and Algiers showed little concern with the use of torture as a counterinsurgency method. They rather shifted from acquiescence towards torture in the first few months of the insurgency to overt encouragement of that practice. As we have seen since 1955 the Wuillaume report praised the effectiveness of torture and recommended that it should be formally adopted; even though Mendès-France and Soustelle did not accept Wuillaume's recommendation, they would soon change their position. Jacques Soustelle, in particular, would overtly approve indiscriminate repression, including torture, after the Philippeville massacre (see above). His successor – Robert Lacoste – would take even more decisive steps during the Battle of Algiers: as a civilian leader, he gave the Army full authority to restore law and order in Algiers at all costs in agreement with the government in Paris. What followed – including torture and the summary execution of over 3,000 people in French barracks and military interrogation centers – was the

product of an order given by political leaders. Importantly, during the Battle of Algiers, civilian leaders made sure that the Army could obey their orders and perpetrate torture in a condition of complete impunity: as we have seen, Lacoste, Lejeune, and Bourgès-Maunoury visited military headquarters and verbally encouraged commanders to go on with torture promising that lethal violence on detainees would be kept secret (see above).

Secondly, the leading role of the government in Paris would become even more evident after the fall of the Fourth Republic. Taken to power by the military, De Gaulle would immediately dispose of the military officers that could threaten his supreme command – especially Salan and Massu – and successfully resisted a military coup in 1961. It is widely accepted among historians that De Gaulle conceived himself as nothing less than the embodiment of France and that he established a pervasive control system over his civilian and military subordinates (Connelly 2002: 174-175). Civilian targeting after May 1958, therefore, was the product of the decisions made by the civilian leadership. The creation of free-fire zones, indiscriminate shootings, the continuing use of torture, mass deportations and the ensuing starvation and disease affecting civilians in concentration camps during the Challe offensive were supervised and approved by De Gaulle himself (Horne 1977: 331).

In conclusion, military the extent of civilian targeting in Algeria cannot be explained by military organizational factors alone. Besides, as we have seen above, military leaders were framing the Algerian insurrection as part of a Soviet Communist and Egyptian plot to drive France out of North Africa, which suggests the conduct of the military towards non-combatants was influenced by the perception of the external threat environment as unfavourable.

6.3.2 The Second School of Thought and Civilian Targeting in Algeria

According to the Second School of Thought the level of civilian targeting depends on the way the incumbent state perceives the enemy. When insurgents and their popular base are dehumanized, civilian targeting would occur; otherwise, self-restraint will prevail.

In the case of French counterinsurgency in Algeria, the image of the enemy would account for some forms of civilian victimization like indiscriminate reprisals. Indeed, the French forces did vilify the FLN-ALN and its followers. The dehumanization of insurgents was arguably the product of racial prejudice against the Arab population and,

perhaps more importantly, the very experience of fighting a resilient enemy that deliberately killed its Algerian and French opponents in an extremely gruesome way. The victims of FLN insurgents often showed signs of torture and mutilations. The FLN would inflict a particularly horrible death on Arab civilians that supported the French or Messali: loyalists would often be castrated or emasculated and their bodies would be hacked, which only strengthened the perception of the FLN as an abhorrent enemy.

Yet, a closer look at French counterinsurgency would question the vilification argument and its causal logic. Firstly, while France did vilify the FLN, it is not clear that French civilian and military leaders also dehumanized the Arab population indistinctly. Indeed, it was only a part of the settler community that despised the Arab population as an inferior mass to be subjugated to the will of the European minority. The leaders of the Fourth Republic and the Army instead stuck to the idea of French Algeria, a larger Franco-Arab community in which both Europeans and Arabs could enjoy equality of rights. Governor-General of Algeria, Jacques Soustelle, was the main supporter of the French Algeria idea. While it should be stressed once again that France failed to achieve the goal of full equality between the two communities, that objective was nonetheless pursued. Looking at the Algerian problem through the lens of class struggle, the Socialist governments of the Fourth Republic insisted that the Algerian insurgency was exacerbated by economic and social discrimination against the Arabs. Accordingly, the French governments undertook economic, social, and political reforms in favour of the Arab community in an attempt to win the support and the cooperation of the Muslim population. After the downfall of the Fourth Republic De Gaulle continued the policy of his predecessors. He launched the Constantine Plan aiming to redistribute land, create jobs, and grant the Arab community access to education. This is incompatible with the perception of the local population as a subhuman entity to be destroyed.

Secondly, violence against civilians was not perpetrated only by French soldiers, but also by Arab soldiers. France increasingly relied on Arab loyalist troops – known as Harkis – to counter the insurgency (Evans 2012: 250-255). Indeed, around 60,000 Arab soldiers would join the French ranks during the conflict. Many harkis recruited in the last phase of the campaign were in fact former FLN fighters who had defected. Harkis were routinely involved in torture, rape, scorched-earth and summary executions of non-combatants so that it would be difficult to contend that racial prejudice against the Arab community was always a decisive factor to explain the abuses perpetrated by the troops against the local population.

Finally, while indiscriminate reprisals after insurgents' attacks are apparently

consistent with the vilification argument, several other repressive measures cannot be explained by that factor. In particular, mass deportations and scorched-earth during the Battle of the Frontiers had nothing to do with the image of the enemy. The construction of electrified barriers, the destruction of villages, the forcible deportation of people to concentration camps, the creation of free-fire zones along the Eastern border after 1957 were rather justified by French officials as a way to prevent insurgents' infiltration from Tunisia where the local government was supporting the FLN. This relates to the external threat environment rather than the image of the enemy. Likewise, mass deportations and scorched-earth measures during the Challe offensive were part of De Gaulle's plan to create a favourable military situation on the field so as to dictate the terms of peace before the United Nations and the United States intervened to impose their own solution in the Algerian war (see above). The use of torture during the Battle of Algiers would apparently fit the explanation based on the image of the enemy. Yet, one should be mindful that French soldiers were operating under powerful time constraints. The use of torture derived from the need to extract information about the FLN cells in Algiers before they could carry out more bombing attacks. Importantly, additional pressure on the Army came from the diplomatic offensive that Algerian nationalists had started at the United Nations, as we have seen above: the French authorities needed a complete victory in the battle of Algiers to rebuff the interference of the United Nations in the Algerian conflict. This would point to the relevance of the external threat environment.

In conclusion, while the Second School of Thought can shed light on some aspects of French counterinsurgency in Algeria, it cannot produce a comprehensive explanation for the level of indiscriminate violence in the case at hand.

6.3.3 The Third School of Thought and the Level of Civilian Targeting in Algeria

The Third School of Thought maintains that civilian targeting is a strategy of late resort depending on insurgents' military prowess and popular support. State leaders would prefer to avoid civilian targeting in the beginning of a campaign because indiscriminate violence would work slowly and may increase insurgents' popular support. However, when hostilities last longer than expected, combat losses mount and victory seems in question, then state leaders would become desperate to win and would shift to civilian victimization.

The main problem with the desperation thesis is that it could not account for the early resort to indiscriminate violence by the French. Indeed, as we have seen above,

practices like indiscriminate bombing, summary executions, the destruction of villages as a reprisal after insurgents attacks, and torture were part of the French campaign since the early phase of the conflict when FLN insurgents were still poorly trained, lightly armed, had few hundreds fighters and did not have a vast popular base. In the beginning of the campaign the FLN insurgency was confined to the Constantine region and – as explained above – the insurgent organization was almost unknown in other parts of Algeria. The number of recruits and the quality of their weapons began to grow after the French reprisals for the Philippeville massacre; yet, the offensive power of the FLN was limited. In the first two years of the campaign French combat losses were not high: indeed, in that period the FLN killed no more than 500 members of the French security forces while suffering about 3,000 casualties (Clayton 1994: 123). In that phase, FLN violence was mostly aimed at Arab civilians, especially those who were members or sympathizers of rival Algerian political organizations – like the MLN – or those who sided with the French. FLN violence against non-combatants proved once again the limited popular support that the insurgency enjoyed in the early phase of the conflict. Unsurprisingly, French leaders did not believe to be confronting an overwhelming military threat in the beginning of the conflict, nor did they doubt that they could win. Under these conditions the desperation thesis would predict self-restraint on the French side in the early stage of the conflict; in spite of that, the French did target civilians.

The desperation thesis, however, could account for the level of indiscriminate violence from 1957 onwards. One may convincingly argue that, as the FLN increased its ranks and imposed itself as the only representative of the Algerian population by way of terror against civilians, the French were confronted with a formidable military threat backed by a very high level of popular support; as a result, France grew desperate to win and targeted civilians indiscriminately in the Battle of Algiers and the aftermath. Yet the level of civilian victimization in the early phase of the campaign would still remain unexplained. A theory that can account for the level of civilian targeting since the beginning of the French campaign in Algeria would have greater explanatory power than the desperation thesis in the specific case at hand. As we have seen, my model provides such an explanation, thus outperforming the desperation thesis.

CHAPTER 7

GERMAN COUNTERINSURGENCY IN SOUTH-WEST AFRICA (1904-1907)

In this chapter I will study the case of German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (SWA). After introducing the background of the insurgency, I will identify the key decision-makers on the German side. As a next step, I will specify the values on my candidate causal factors and the corresponding predictions on the case outcome.

Overall, this case shows within-case variation on one of my independent variable: the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state. Indeed, even if in the first five months of the campaign Germany was not clearly aligned with any group seeking domination, since June 1904 the German government and the Army would decisively support the German settler community that aimed to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population, namely the Herero and Nama tribes. Besides, in the context of its Weltpolitik, Germany saw the rebellion as a direct challenge to its status of great power and the Army – which had almost absolute power in the protectorate during the campaign – developed suspicions that Britain aimed to weaken Germany's influence in South Africa by prolonging the conflict and depriving Germany of a decisive victory. As a result of within-case variation on the variable of local alliance strategy, the case displays a shift from Scenario 1 to Scenario 3.

We have already examined the predictions of my model under the circumstances of Scenario 1 in the previous chapter and there is no need for repetition here. It is necessary to remind, instead, that under the circumstances of Scenario 3, my model predicts that the incumbent will become heedless of the dangers of indiscriminate violence and will use an extreme level of civilian targeting. The causal logic behind that outcome points to the joint effect of external threat perceptions and local alliance strategy on the use of indiscriminate violence. It is essential to point out that neither a negative perception of the external threat environment nor political support for a would-be dominant group is individually sufficient for an extreme level of civilian targeting to occur. It is the combination of those two factors that create incentives to commit extermination in a counterinsurgency campaign.

Indeed, on the one hand, support for a group that pursues the expropriation and submission of the insurgent population would induce the incumbent to use the amount of force necessary to achieve such an ambitious goal. In principle, the amount of force necessary to expropriate and subdue an entire population may coincide with an extreme level of indiscriminate violence, if for no other reason than that a group which is marked for economic dispossession and political submission may resist fiercely in order to avoid such a horrible fate or may try to recoup its losses after the conflict. However, as we have seen, the use of a genocidal level of violence entails political and military risks that the incumbent may be very reluctant to accept, especially when the external threat environment is perceived as favourable. Indeed, if the incumbent perceives that no state is willing and able to include the insurgent territory into its sphere of influence, a genocidal policy towards the insurgent group may be counterproductive as it would provide third-party states with a pretext to intervene; by contrast, if the incumbent perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable already – as happens in Scenario 3 – there would be no international political incentive to avoid extreme violence against non-combatants and the aim to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population would propel a genocidal level of violence against civilians. In sum, extermination would be possible because the goal to dispossess and subdue the insurgent population would be the mainspring behind it and the perception of the external threat environment as unfavourable would not discourage the use of extreme violence.

7.1 Testing Scenario 3: Germany's campaign in South-West Africa (1904-1907)

7.1.1 The Background of the Insurgency

South-West Africa (SWA) became a German protectorate in 1884. A barren land populated by 200,000 natives, the protectorate was inhabited by three major tribes: the Ovambo in the North, the Herero in the central regions, and the Nama in the South. The German settler community, instead, amounted to few thousands individuals. In 1904, when the insurgency began, there were no more than 4,700 settlers in South-West Africa.

Germany's penetration into the territory of SWA was slow and difficult. The German administration in Windhoek – the capital city of the protectorate – had limited financial resources and could rely on very few infrastructures; with a small military garrison of

few hundred soldiers, the German colonial administration struggled to establish its influence over the Northern regions of the protectorate where the Ovambo kingdoms were virtually independent from Germany (Hull 2005: 8). Germany, however, could establish its territorial control in the central regions – Hereroland – through a system of treaties that exploited inter-ethnic rivalry. By 1890 most clans in the central and southern areas had agreed to recognize German sovereignty over SWA in exchange for German military protection from rival clans and a level of autonomy for the tribes (Wallace and Kinahan 2011: Ch. 4). The Nama, under the leadership of Hendrik Witbooi, initially refused any agreement with Germany, instead.

Germany began to consolidate its power in the protectorate in 1894 when Theodor Leutwein became Governor of SWA. Leutwein tried to force the Nama to accept German protection and led a military expedition against Witbooi in the South between August and September 1894. The short conflict ended when Witbooi recognized German sovereignty and signed a protection treaty allowing him to preserve his position as a Nama chief and keep most of his land and cattle; at the same time, Leutwein intervened in the succession politics of the tribes and imposed Samuel Maharero as a paramount leader of the Herero people in addition to forcing other native leaders on specific clans (Wallace and Kinahan 2011: 131-135).

Leutwein's interest in Herero's succession politics was not accidental. Indeed, Leutwein looked at Hereroland as the main area of expansion for Germany as it hosted most of the best land and cattle. Leutwein aimed to push African herders and land owners within agreed boundaries that would be defined through negotiations (Wallace and Kinahan 2011: 137). Local alliances with native chiefs were indispensable to achieve this goal, especially in the light of the limited military assets that the colonial government could rely on.

Leutwein's plans were certainly facilitated by Herero chiefs who, in most cases, were keen to increase their income and buy European manufactured goods by selling their land to the German government, settlers, and land companies (Gewald 1999: 143). Herero's sales of land would intensify after a rinderpest epidemic in 1896 that affected the natives' cattle and made Herero chiefs impatient to recoup their losses of income (Gewald 1999: 143). The willingness of the Herero chiefs to sell large tracts of land, however, rested on their peculiar understanding of land as a common good with usufruct rights (Hull 2005: 8); therefore, Herero leaders did not perceive that they would permanently lose the land they had sold and felt entitled to claim that land back for their cattle after recovering from the losses of the rinderpest. Leutwein himself realized that

Herero's failure to appreciate the legal consequences of land sales would become a major problem in the future: indeed, if the Herero had been prevented from using the land they had sold, they could have tried to take it back by force; in that case, the small German garrison would have been forced to fight the Herero tribe to defend Europeans' land in the immense territory of the protectorate (Bley 1971: 135-136). In fact, local rebellions related to land disputes and payment of debts proliferated. It was for these reasons that Leutwein, under pressure from Christian missionaries, decided to establish reserves where the natives would have inalienable rights over the land; Leutwein also created a credit system designed to slow land sales down (Gewald 1999: 144). In sum, by making it more difficult for the Herero to sell their land, Leutwein wanted to limit unrest and prevent a future conflict that may have undermined the German rule in SWA (Bley 1971: 136).

Yet, Leutwein's policy infuriated settlers and the colonial bureaucracy. By giving the Herero inalienable property rights in the reserves, Leutwein would stop the expansion of German settlers' farms. Indeed, German settlers could afford to buy land only from the Herero because German companies had bought land to speculate and would sell it at inflated prices (Gewald 1999: 144). Leutwein's restrictions exacerbated settlers' rivalry with the natives. If settlers could not buy all the land they coveted, they were ready to take it by force. In fact, the settler community had long demanded a war of conquest against the Herero and an immediate expropriation of all their land and cattle (Bley 1971: 81; Wallace and Kinahan 2011: 150). Leutwein had always opposed a war of aggression and dispossession, but his decision to prevent further sales of land resulted in renewed pressure by the German minority.

As Leutwein would complain, settlers perceived themselves as a master race and ignored that Germany had committed itself to protect the tribes and respect their customs (Bley 1971: 84, 95, 97-98). Settlers found it surprising that they could not exercise absolute mastery over Africans; likewise, the settlers community found it deeply humiliating to see that Leutwein explicitly recognized the authority of the chiefs (Bley 1971: 85).

The colonial bureaucracy where settlers served and the Army would express this frustrated sense of superiority in the negotiations with the Herero chiefs to determine the borders of the reserves (Gewald 1999: 145). Indeed, during the negotiations, German military and settler delegates would display all their spurn for the natives and Leutwein's policy towards the tribes. Repeated provocations, blatant offenses, and violent threats against the Herero people and their delegates during the negotiations

culminated in an incident caused by a junior officer which would be the spark of the rebellion (Gewald 1999: 167-168).

Ending his cooperation with the German government, Samuel Maharero himself would become one of the paramount leaders of the insurgency. Little is known about the making of the decision to rise against Germany, but historians agree that the deep causes of the insurgency are to be found in the injustice of the colonial system (Bley 1971; Gewald 1999; Hull 2005: Ch 1). In his letters to Leutwein, Samuel Maharero pointed to the persistent judicial discrimination, lack of effective protection, settlers' violent attitude to the natives, and increasing poverty as the main grievances of the Herero nation (Gewald 1999: 167-168). Historians believe that Maharero did not aim to end Germany's colonial rule but simply wanted to restore the balance of economic and political power between the colonial government and the Herero nation; arguably, a limited campaign ending with a negotiation with Leutwein is what Maharero envisaged at the beginning of the insurgency in January 1904. Yet, the Germans conducted the counterinsurgency campaign as if it were an existential war and Maharero and his tribe would face a genocide. Who made the relevant decisions on the German side?

7.1.2 Identifying the German Decision-Makers

The German campaign in SWA was conducted by the Army with little supervision and control by the civilian government in Berlin, especially the Chancellor and the Colonial Office. Yet, as the supreme political leader, the German Emperor or Kaiser was ultimately responsible for the decisions made during the campaign and played in fact a key role (see Hull 2005: 8). In particular, the Kaiser had the power to issue instructions to the Army and the government departments and was responsible for the coordination of operations. Crucially, the Kaiser decided that the General Staff in Berlin would deal with the military and political aspects of the conflict, thus excluding the Colonial Department from the making of decisions (Bley 1971: 157-158; Hull 2005: 12). Therefore, during most of the campaign the Chief of the Army Staff – General Alfred von Schlieffen – exercised his influence on issues like the conduct of peace negotiations and the terms and conditions of surrender. The General Staff had the power to appoint and remove military commanders on the field in addition to issuing directives and orders to them in keeping with the Kaiser's instructions (Hull 2005: 12).

The highest political and military authority in SWA was the Governor who was answerable to the Colonial Department in Berlin. From January 1894 to November

1904, Theodor Leutwein was the head of the colonial government; he was also the highest authority in the protectorate, but only for the first five months of the campaign. In April 1904 Leutwein was relieved from military command and was virtually suspended from the position of Governor; the Emperor would transfer full political and military authority to the Army in SWA under the command of General Lothar von Trotha; the latter would only be answerable to the Chief of General Staff in Berlin and the Kaiser (Bley 1971: 159). As a result, von Trotha would establish an outright military dictatorship in SWA. Considering his almost absolute power, von Trotha's perceptions and decisions would play a major role in shaping the level of civilian targeting during the campaign.

In October 1905 von Trotha was replaced ad interim with Colonel von Dame until Major-General von Deimling eventually took over as new military commander on a permanent basis. However, Deimling would not have the same level of almost absolute power as Lothar von Trotha: indeed, after von Trotha's departure, the authority of the Governor would be restored and Friederich von Lindequist would be chosen as the new head of the colonial government (Bley 1971: 159). However by the time the Governor's authority was restored, the Kaiser, the General Staff in Berlin, and von Trotha in SWA had already set the level of civilian targeting as extreme and Lindequist would do little to change the fate of non-combatants.

7.1.3 Germany's Perceptions of the External Threat Environment

The Emperor, the General Staff, and the Army commanders in SWA did not understand the Herero insurgency as a simple colonial revolt in the periphery of the German Empire, but looked at it as a war of national self-defense which was to be won at all costs (Bley 1971: 156). The resolve to achieve victory in SWA at all costs can be put in the broader context of Germany's foreign policy. Indeed, by the time the Herero revolt broke up, Germany had embarked upon a policy of international prestige based on colonial expansion, better known as Weltpolitik or world policy (Geiss 1990; Schollgen 1990).

As a latecomer in the race for a colonial empire, Germany had a relatively limited number of overseas territories, especially when compared to France and Britain. This seemed to pose a threat to Germany's national security in the long term: indeed, according to the German government and embattled sections of the nationalist public opinion, in the age of imperialism no European great power could maintain its status in

Europe for long time without building and preserving a large colonial empire (Schollgen 1990: 123-124). This belief was the political and logical basis of Germany's Weltpolitik and the ensuing attempt to increase Germany's colonial gains.[129] Germany coveted Congo and Portuguese Angola and, after the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France aimed against Germany, the German government began to assert its interests in Africa by sparking diplomatic disputes with France and Britain, as the first Moroccan crisis indicates (see Anderson 1966). Far from expanding its Empire, however, Germany would soon find itself struggling to preserve its limited territorial possessions.

Seen through the lens of Weltpolitik, the Herero and Nama insurgency in SWA did not look like a local revolt, it was rather understood as a challenge to Germany's status of great power and its policy of international prestige (Hull 2005b: 39). Had Germany failed to tame the insurrection, other states could have taken advantage of German difficulties to erode its power position in South Africa and in the international system.

The German authorities in SWA, and the Army especially, had long suspected that Britain was willing to undermine the German presence in SWA and few doubts existed that the Germans' powerful neighbour was able to do so. The relations between Germany and Britain in South Africa had been marked by mutual suspicion and distrust since the beginning of Weltpolitik and the ensuing expansion of the German fleet.[130] Anglo-German relations in the region had been tense during the Second Anglo-Boer War and underwent further strain during Germany's campaign in SWA.

The conflict in German SWA was indeed a major source of concern for the British authorities. The British were afraid that the native insurgency in the German protectorate could spread across the border with the Cape colony which had been recently pacified after the Boer insurgency. Britain was reluctant to assist the German military effort against the Herero and the Nama tribes. One of the main reasons behind Britain's reluctance was that the native populations living near the border with SWA had ethnic, economic, and political ties with the natives in German SWA. The Cape authorities were afraid that if Britain had assisted the Germans, the native populations could have rebelled against the British rule (Dedering 1999: 4-5; 2000: 46-47; 2006: 278-279). Besides, a German victory in SWA could have emboldened the Boer

[129] Of course, different social and economic groups and interests were behind Germany's Weltpolitik (see Smith 1978: Ch. 11), but the actors that made most of the decisions during the German counterinsurgency in SWA did share the view that the ability to expand a colonial empire was an essential requisite of a European great power and that Germany was far behind Britain and France in the race to the colonies; as a consequence, the insurgency in SWA could question the very position of Germany in the international system.

[130] On Anglo-German rivalry see Kennedy (1980).

community that had taken shelter in the German protectorate after the defeat in the Second-Anglo Boer War: Britain was constantly concerned that Boer guerrillas could come back from SWA, rejoin their community in the British colonies and rekindle violent resistance against Britain (Dedering 2000: 48-49; 2006: 279). Not least, on the British side there was genuine surprise and persisting suspicions that Germany's military build-up in SWA was not exclusively aimed against insurgents and could be used to threaten Britain's sovereignty over the Cape colony and Bechuanaland after the war (Dedering 2000: 46; 2006: 278).

While Britain's reluctance to assist the Germans was based on purely defensive concerns, this simple matter of fact was far from evident to the German military authorities in Berlin and SWA. The success of Germany's military operations against insurgents totally depended on Britain's good will and cooperation, a situation that the German Army – including von Trotha – saw as a humiliation and a threat to the security of the German protectorate (Dedering 1999: 4). Indeed, as SWA lacked a suitable harbour, most German goods and military supplies could reach the German protectorate only through the Walvis Bay which was under complete British control (Dedering 2006: 281-282). Had Britain refused to cooperate with Germany or imposed restrictions on the amount of goods that could transit to SWA, the German Army would have experienced major setbacks while insurgents could have carried on with their resistance.

Besides, as Herero and Nama insurgents usually crossed the border after their ambushes against the German troops in order to escape counterattacks, Germany had to resort to Britain's assistance to track guerrilla gangs and their leaders down, even if the German troops often pursued their enemies in the British territories ignoring British protests (Dedering 2000: 47). Nama warriors also sent their families to refugee camps in Britain's Cape colony and Bechuanaland, thus reducing the consumption of water, food and other assets by women and children: the resources spared in this way could therefore be used to support guerrilla operations; the smuggling of weapons across the frontier with the Cape colony was another major issue that concerned the Germans as the Nama could replenish their limited arsenals easily once they reached the British territory (Dedering 1999: 4; 2006: 284, 286-287).

Confronted with all these issues, Germany repeatedly called on Britain to lift all restrictions on the transit of German goods and military equipment and prevent Nama warriors from taking shelter and buying weapons in the British colonies. Germany's demands often fell on deaf ears. As Germany struggled to achieve a decisive victory over the elusive Nama guerrilla, the German authority were faced with apparent shows

of hostility. Not only did Britain let guerrilla gangs cross the border with SWA, smuggle weapons and send their families to the neighbouring British colonies, but the British authorities in the Cape colony imposed restrictions on the amount of goods that could be sent to SWA from the Walvis Bay. Crucially, the most severe restrictions imposed by the British authorities affected the amount of military equipment shipped to the German Army in SWA; according to von Trotha himself, Britain's restrictions were responsible for Germany's shortage of weapons and ammunition during the conflict (Dedering 2006: 283). Overall, Britain closed the border with SWA ten times during the war, thus immobilizing the German Army (Dedering 2006: 282).

In the eyes of German observers Britain's behaviour was a show of hostility towards Germany deriving from Britain's expansionist ambitions, rather than security concerns. Indeed, the conduct of the British authorities strengthened the belief in the German military and diplomatic circles that Britain secretly aimed to take over SWA. According to the German diplomatic and military circles, Britain was in fact saving rebels from defeat and was intentionally trying to bog Germany down in a long war of attrition in SWA "in the hope of acquiring the territory 'below its value' once the Germans had exhausted their strength" (Dedering 1999: 5). Britain's concern that a friendly policy towards the Germans in SWA could have caused a native uprising in the British colonies was dismissed by Germany as incomprehensible softness in dealing with the natives (Dedering 1999: 5). As Britain emerged as a key actor wielding enough influence to shape the outcome of the conflict, Germany increasingly looked at it as a hostile third-party state willing and able to undermine Germany's power position in South Africa.

7.1.4 The Local Alliance Strategy of Germany

The local alliance strategy of Germany during the campaign in SWA shifted from a neutral position to an aligned position. From January to May 1904, when Leutwein was commander in chief, Germany did not decisively support any group that aimed to expropriate and subdue other groups in the society of the protectorate. Since June 1904, when Lothan von Trotha took over as the supreme commander in the colony, the local alliance strategy of Germany in SWA became aligned. Indeed, von Trotha supported the settler community, a would-be dominant group which aimed to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population.

As explained above, when the Herero turned against the Germans, the settler community counted approximately 4,700 individuals. Most settlers served in the

colonial bureaucracy in Windhoek and had little or no knowledge of the society and political situation of the tribes living in the protectorate (Bley 1971: 77). While a minority of the settlers that emigrated to SWA in the 1880s and 1890s looked at the local tribes as political and military entities to be recognized, most German settlers considered the native population as an obstacle to their plans of economic conquest. The German settlement in SWA coveted Herero's and Nama's cattle and land; settlers aimed to turn SWA into a full-fledged German colony where the German minority would completely dominate the political and economic sphere. Importantly, as more German immigrants arrived in the protectorate, the settler community called for an outright war of conquest to destroy the tribes' autonomy, expropriate all their resources, and turn the natives into a mass of slaves deprived of any sort of political and social affiliation (Bley 1971: 79, 81-82, 95). What were the German authorities willing to do? Was the German colonial government ready to expropriate and subdue the Herero and the Nama and turn the German minority into the dominant group in SWA?

Governor Leutwein did not agree with the plans of the settler community. As the head of the colonial government, Leutwein certainly intended to consolidate the German control over SWA. Yet, he believed that this objective should be achieved through a system of treaties and local alliances with tribe leaders. Leutwein explicitly recognized the tribes as political, economic, and military entities; the Governor went so far as to oppose the sales of land by the Herero people and acknowledge their inalienable rights over the land in the reserves. As we have seen, by preserving the Herero as an economic entity, Leutwein wanted to limit unrest and prevent a major conflict in the protectorate.

That was simply the opposite of what settlers wanted. Unsurprisingly, the settler community was deeply resentful towards Leutwein and his policy of political recognition and economic protection of the tribes; they found it humiliating to see that the Governor valued the system of alliance with the tribes more than the German minority's political demands (Bley 1971: 84-85, 98; Dedering 1999b: 208).

As long as Leutwein was in charge as a supreme commander during the campaign in SWA, Germany's local alliance strategy was neutral as it did not aim to impose settlers as a master group in the colony. As we shall see, during the conflict, Leutwein simply aimed to inflict enough losses on the insurgents and negotiate a peace treaty that would restore the political situation that preceded the insurgency.

The local alliance strategy of Germany would change with the appointment of Lothar von Trotha as a supreme commander and the beginning of his military dictatorship. Indeed, after von Trotha's arrival in SWA, Germany's local alliance strategy became

aligned with settlers. Trotha's ideas about the goals of the counterinsurgency campaign were in complete harmony with settlers' political and economic objective to create an entirely white society in SWA where the natives would be landless servants or slaves. According to von Trotha, any military effort would have been vain if Germany had not imposed settlers' supremacy over the natives once and for all; indeed, the general believed that a negotiated peace sparing the tribal system and saving the economic rights of the Herero would have just paved the way for another major insurgency against the white minority and the German rule in the future (Dedering 1993: 84, 1999b: 210; Hull 2005: 25). Trotha's commitment to the elimination of the natives would even exceed settlers' expectations; yet, as we shall see, the disagreement between the white minority and von Trotha was not about the goal to be pursued – expropriation and submission of the natives. The disagreement was about whether that goal had been safely achieved or not. Even on this issue, however, settlers would not be consistent: fear that the tribes could be rehabilitated and restored as political and economic entities eventually dominated their behaviour. Over the course of the campaign, settlers never really disagreed with the German authorities on the fundamental goal to dispossess and enslave the insurgent groups.

7.1.5 The Predictions of My Model

If my model is to be confirmed, we should see Germany using lethal measures against civilians during Leutwein's time as a supreme commander, but without intent to commit extermination. Indeed, during Leutwein's governorship Germany's local alliance strategy was neutral. After the arrival of von Trotha and the subsequent alignment of Germany with settlers, we should see that external threat perceptions and von Trotha's decision to impose the settler community as the dominant group in SWA at the expense of the insurgent groups correlate with the extermination of the Herero and Nama tribes. Indeed, as we have explained above, it was von Trotha who completely shared settlers' goals and agenda. It would also be important to see that German decision-makers dismissed or downplayed the risks of an extreme level of violence when they were already concerned about the presence of external threats. This would support my contention that, while genocidal violence in counterinsurgency stems from the goal to dispossess and submit the insurgent population, the external threat environment does not provide any deterrent against extreme violence when the incumbent state already perceives that another state is willing and able to undermine the incumbent's hegemony

over the insurgent territory. Importantly, it is the combination of these two factors that would make for an extreme level of violence.

7. 2 Civilian Targeting during the German Counterinsurgency Campaign in SWA

7.2.1 Leutwein's Campaign (January 1904 – May 1904)

Relying on 8,000 warriors armed with light weapons, insurgents attacked and raided settlers' farms, sparing only women and children from death (Hull 2005: 11). In two weeks the Herero gained control of the central regions and besieged the few German troops deployed in the protectorate (Hull 2005: 11). The Germans had been caught by surprise and were almost defenseless. Indeed, when the insurrection began, Governor Leutwein was heading southwards to tame a local rebellion.

The news of the Herero insurrection immediately reached the German Foreign Office and sparked a wave of nationalist outrage in Berlin. Hereros' initial success was seen as an international humiliation for Germany and a challenge to the policy of international prestige pursued by the Reich (Hull 2005b: 39). The Kaiser himself decided to send reinforcements to SWA and ordered the General Staff to conduct military operations during the conflict (Hull 2005: 12). The Governor of South-West Africa would still be the commander-in-chief in the protectorate but he would be answerable to the Chief of Staff, general Alfred von Schlieffen. The Kaiser, the General Staff, and the German public opinion expected nothing less than a complete military victory to protect Germany's international prestige as a great power.

In the first month of the campaign insurgents retained their advantage, but they also committed crucial strategic mistakes: they failed to disrupt the telegraph line and the limited railway system which was essential for Germany to mobilize the few military units at its disposal; also, while insurgents besieged German military outposts, they never exploited their temporary superiority to finish the German strongholds off (Hull 2005: 11). These blunders gave the Germans enough time to recover from the initial surprise. Germany achieved its fist military success when the colonial troops relieved an encircled outpost at Omaruru from siege on 4th February 1904; three days later the first German reinforcements arrived and on 11th February Leutwein eventually reached Windhoek. While Governor Leutwein began to exchange letters with Samuel Maharero to understand the causes of the insurrection, the General Staff immediately intervened to forbid all negotiations and pressed Leutwein to counterattack (Gewald 1999: 168). At

this point in the campaign, the Kaiser, the General Staff, and the public opinion in Germany perceived negotiations as a humiliating show of weakness.

Insurgents, however, began to shift to hit-and-run tactics while trying to avoid set-piece battles with the German troops. Exploiting their superior knowledge of the terrain, the Herero carried out their surprise attacks effectively against the Germans. According to Isabel Hull "the Herero used cover so expertly that soldiers rarely glimpsed them, even in battle. Afterward, the Herero melted away into the landscape, taking their dead and wounded with them, so that the Germans rarely knew how many casualties they had inflicted" (2005: 16).

Interestingly, in the first five months of the war, when the Herero's guerrilla tactics were most successful at frustrating their opponents, the level of civilian targeting in the German counterinsurgency campaign under Governor Leutwein was high, but not extreme. For example, Leutwein ordered to spare villages which would surrender their weapons and forbade a take-no-prisoners policy (Hull 2005: 17-18). Even if measures that could have resulted in extermination were avoided, lethal violence was still used indiscriminately. The Army would frequently execute prisoners, including the wounded (Hull 2005: 19). Leutwein authorized court-martial and capital punishment for suspect ringleaders and people who had committed murder or raided settler farms. Court-martial proceedings were summary and were not designed to ascertain individual responsibility. Proceedings were conducted by field courts of three military officers which would have death sentences executed on the spot immediately after the verdict. Extrajudicial executions were common practice. Spies, in particular, could be shot without trial. Spying, however, was defined so broadly that indiscriminate executions became frequent: indeed, any African who did not live in the same place where he was encountered, or showed an apparently curious attitude, or ran away when seeing German soldiers could be assumed to be a spy and shot immediately regardless of gender and age (Hull 2005: 19-20). The extrajudicial killing of suspect plunderers was equally indiscriminate: indeed, the Army could shoot any native carrying goods on the assumption that the goods themselves were sufficient evidence of robbery in settler farms (Hull 2005: 19).

The way Leutwein and the Army dealt with civilians in this phase of the campaign is relevant to my model as it shows the conditions of Scenario 1 and their effect on the level of civilian targeting again (see above). As explained above, under the governorship and command of Leutwein the local alliance strategy of Germany can be described as neutral. Indeed, as we have explained above, the Governor was firmly against settlers'

ambition to expropriate and subdue the natives. Leutwein's policy was instead based on political recognition of the tribes and their inalienable economic rights over the land, especially in the reserves. Under these conditions, according to my model, an extreme level of civilian targeting is unlikely (see above). The firm opposition of the Governor against a take-no-prisoners policy is consistent with that prediction. My model also predicts that, even if genocide is an unlikely outcome when the local alliance strategy of the incumbent is neutral, the incumbent can still use some measures that correspond to a high level of indiscriminate violence when decision-makers are concerned about the external threat environment. Interestingly, the General Staff in Berlin – which was above the Governor in the chain of command (see above) – and the Army were indeed concerned about the impact of the rebellion on Germany's international prestige and security and opposed any negotiated solution to the insurgency: that can explain the use of measures corresponding to a high level of civilian targeting like summary executions.

While punishing civilians, the Germans tried to engage the enemy in combat to exploit their superior firepower and wear the Herero forces down. The German effort was gradually rewarded: in April the colonial troops fought insurgents at Onganjira where Herero warriors suffered heavy casualties to artillery and machine-gun fire; few days after that victory, Leutwein's troops fought insurgents again at Oviumbo forcing the Herero warriors to withdraw towards the Waterberg mountain (Hull 2005: 22). Despite his success at Oviumbo, Leutwein decided to suspend the offensive due to a serious shortage of food, water, and ammunition: the Governor eventually opted for a tactical withdrawal (Hull 2005: 22).

The decision to withdraw sealed Leutwein's fate as a commander-in-chief in the protectorate. Leutwein was relieved from supreme command and replaced with general Lothar von Trotha. In the eyes of the Kaiser and the General Staff in Berlin, Leutwein's withdrawal before African forces was an unacceptable humiliation. That the German Army could retreat before Africans – who had in fact decided to quit the battlefield themselves – potentially questioned the very position of Germany in the international system of states. As explained above, in the context of Weltpolitik and its emphasis on international prestige through colonial expansion, the belief that Germany could hardly preserve its status as a great power if it had accepted a negotiated peace was prominent in Berlin; as a result, the Kaiser himself ordered von Trotha to crush the rebellion by any means (Hull 2005: 28).

The Kaiser's order did not explicitly mention extermination, but it provided a permissive condition for it. As we shall see, when the extermination policy actually

began, the Kaiser and the General Staff would be reluctant to change it in any meaningful way. By dismissing Leutwein and choosing von Trotha as a successor, the German leadership showed that it was now oriented to dismantle the social system created by Leutwein and impose the German minority as the dominant group.

7.2.2 The German Campaign under Lothar von Trotha (June 1904 – October 1905): Exterminating the Insurgent Population.

Lothar von Trotha's appointment as a supreme military commander in the protectorate marked a shift in the local alliance strategy of Germany from neutral to aligned. Indeed, while Leutwein firmly opposed and ultimately dismissed settlers' demands for expropriation and outright enslavement of the natives, von Trotha believed that the creation of a settler-dominated regime was essential to consolidate Germany's control over SWA. According to Lothar von Trotha, the conflict in SWA was not simply a local rebellion, but it was part of a world-wide struggle between blacks and whites in which the former were destined to 'give way' (Hull 2005: 30). Even though von Trotha's understanding of the war reflected the racism that dominated colonial politics at the time, it is essential to grasp that the general's intentions towards the natives rested on the pursuit of a political goal: the transformation of the local society in SWA. If Leutwein's arrangements with the natives still included the tribes as autonomous political and economic entities willingly accepting German sovereignty in exchange for protection, the post-war society that von Trotha envisaged in SWA included the Africans as a mere mass of slaves stripped of all property rights and deprived of any political or tribal identity (Dedering 1993: 83, 1999b: 210; Gewald 1999: 175; Hull 2005: 44). That was exactly what settlers had long demanded.

Despite the Kaiser's orders, Leutwein – who still retained his position as Governor, at least formally – sent a new message to the Herero inviting them to surrender and promising amnesty to those who had not committed murder or robbery (Gewald 1999: 169). Once again, the General Staff ordered Leutwein to stop negotiations (Gewald 1999: 169-170). Yet, Herero leaders saw Leutwein's message as a sign that Germany was willing to restore peace by diplomacy and suspended all attacks (Gewald 1999: 170).

By the time von Trotha arrived in June 1904 after declaring the martial law in the protectorate, the Herero were in a critical situation. Indeed, in addition to having taken heavy casualties in their previous battles with the Germans, the Herero had lost

thousands of their cattle heads which were their main source of wealth and sustenance. The situation was becoming all the more favourable to the Germans because after the battle of Oviumbo virtually all the Herero population – the warriors and their families – gathered together near the Waterberg mountain which was the last source of water before the Omaheke desert. Apparently, no further retreat was possible. The Germans had now a unique opportunity to trap insurgents and end the conflict. Certainly that was von Trotha's intention. The new commander-in-chief was planning to encircle and destroy insurgents' forces in a single annihilation battle at Waterberg; after that, prisoners would be sold as slaves and the Herero would have been deprived of all their land and cattle (Hull 2005: 37-41).

Before the battle of Waterberg took place, however, insurgents' will to fight was already declining. As the rainfall season ended, the Herero had to face a steady reduction in water and grass supplies in Waterberg, which would quickly lead to further losses of cattle; that, in turn, would result in the starvation of warriors and their families (Hull 2005: 34). With little hope to reverse the course of the war, some Herero clans offered their surrender in mid-July, which was a clear sign that Germany was winning (Hull 2005: 44). Governor Leutwein, who had been stripped of all military authority, recommended an amnesty in order to encourage further surrenders and then negotiate peace on favourable conditions for Germany; von Trotha firmly refused (Hull 2005: 31). He would neither accept a surrender nor concede amnesty before crushing insurgents by force of arms. On the German side, there was a clear – and correct – perception that final victory was within the grasp. Indeed, since their retreat to Waterberg, insurgents had ceased to pose any sort of military threat. Trotha's optimism went so far as to order the construction of concentration camps for the thousands of prisoners he expected to take at Waterberg and sell as slaves (Hull 2005: 42-43).

The battle of Waterberg, which was fought on 11 August 1904, would be a major disappointment as the German forces failed to encircle their opponents; as a result, over 60,000 Herero fled the battlefield but only to find themselves in the Omaheke desert with no water and no grass to feed what remained of their cattle. Despite von Trotha's frustration, Germany had actually won. Civilian and military leaders alike were aware that it would be impossible for insurgents to keep fighting from the desert; this was even clearer to the Herero that attempted to surrender once again and sent peace-feelers to approach the colonial authorities. Leutwein contacted German Christian missionaries to persuade von Trotha to accept insurgents' surrender, but the latter refused again (Hull 2005: 44-45).

Not only did von Trotha dismissed Herero leaders' offer to surrender and Leutwein's pressures to negotiate, but he also decided to pursue the whole Herero population in the desert and force them to fight to the death in an attempt to eliminate them. Apparently, the reason behind this policy was a concern that negotiations would preserve the Herero as a political, economic, and military entity that could have risen again against Germany in the future. According to von Trotha, if Germany had given insurgents the opportunity to return from the desert, surrender and be reintegrated in the economic and political system of the protectorate, the Herero could have recovered their wealth and military power and possibly rebelled again: in the eyes of the supreme military commander the only way to secure German hegemony in SWA was by eliminating the insurgent tribes as political and economic actors and impose settlers as the dominant group (Dedering 1993: 83-84, 1999b: 210; Gewald 1999: 175; Hull 2005: 45). In sum, "it was for political, not military reasons, that von Trotha wanted to decimate the Herero population [...] The 'resistance' von Trotha hoped to uproot once and for all was not military resistance, but a resurgence of the social core of the Herero population, 'the old tribal organizations'" (Dedering 1993: 84). Importantly, a policy of complete elimination of the insurgent group correlates with the decision to impose white settlers as the dominant group in the protectorate; it also correlates with the concern that the international standing of Germany was at risk and that Britain was ready to take advantage of German difficulties in SWA; all that is congruent with the predictions of Scenario 3 in my model.

The pursuit of the Herero in the desert would confirm once again that insurgents did not want to fight anymore. As military diaries and reports from army patrols indicate, the colonial troops would shoot Herero people on sight to provoke a reaction and start a battle in keeping with von Trotha's orders (Hull 2005: 51-52). The Germans also occupied the few known waterholes in the desert in an attempt to force insurgents to fight for water at least. Yet, fleeing Herero warriors and their families never put up any resistance when encountering German troops and invariably tried to give themselves in; when shot and harassed, the Herero simply resumed their escape. By the end of September, with water and food supplies running low, von Trotha eventually decided to stop the pursuit.

Yet, von Trotha had not changed his plan to eliminate the Herero. In fact, the general's intentions became even more explicit. On 2 October 1904 von Trotha ordered his troops to hang all male prisoners taken until that moment; after that, he released the infamous extermination proclamation according to which the Herero would no longer be

considered as German subjects and so they would not be given quarter or shelter; no Herero would ever be allowed to return from the desert; any Herero male found within the borders of the protectorate would be executed at once, while women and children would be driven back into the desert by force of arms (Hull 2005: 56).

General von Trotha notified the extermination order only to the General Staff in Berlin on 4 October. Leutwein, instead, would not become aware of the order before 23 October. Horrified at the proclamation, Leutwein called for negotiations with the defeated Herero people but only to meet with von Trotha's opposition. Acknowledging his irrelevance, Leutwein eventually resigned from the position of Governor on 30 October. By late November, the Colonial department and the Chancellor von Bulow in Berlin were eventually informed of Trotha's proclamation by the Chief of Staff. The Chancellor immediately pressed General Schlieffen to cancel Trotha's proclamation, receive all the Herero who wished to surrender, and start peace negotiations with the Herero leaders.

Interestingly, Chancellor Bulow and the Colonial Office mentioned the risk that the extreme brutality of the extermination order could damage the protectorate's economy and cause other backlashes, including foreign diplomatic interference in SWA (see Hull 2005: 64). Yet, as we have seen above, the civilian government had been stripped of all authority with regard to the conduct of the campaign in SWA and played no role in the corresponding decision-making process; only the Kaiser, von Schlieffen, and von Trotha had the power to make decisions about the use of force against the insurgent population. Yet, while von Trotha's local alliance strategy led to extermination, concerns that negotiations would be seen as a sign of weakness by other powers made the General Staff prone to resist Bulow's objections about the possible drawbacks of the extermination order. Eventually, the Kaiser and the Chief of Staff dismissed Bulow's arguments about the risks of extreme violence and went so far as to praise the intentions of von Trotha, even if the General Staff deemed the extermination order difficult, if not impossible, to put into practice (Hull 2005: 63-66; Zimmerer 2008: 51). With the international prestige of Germany at stake during the conflict, in December 1904 the Kaiser and von Schlieffen only conceded that the Herero who had not committed crimes could be accepted as prisoners, but offensive military operations against the tribes would continue, there would be bounties on the heads of Herero leaders, and negotiations with the Herero would be strictly forbidden (Bley 1971: 167-168; Hull 2005: 65). The dismissal of Bulows' concerns would be consistent with the prediction and logic of Scenario 3 in my model that when the incumbent is supporting a would-be

dominant group and is already concerned about the international threat environment, decision-makers will not be impressed with the risks of extreme violence.

General von Trotha took notice of Schlieffen's orders and began to accept prisoners in January 1905. Yet, it would soon become clear that the limited concessions that Bulow obtained from the Kaiser were purely cosmetic. Schlieffen personally reassured von Trotha that the new orders should be interpreted in the most narrow way possible (Bley 1971: 167). In actual fact, neither von Trotha nor his masters in Berlin believed that the insurgent population had been effectively eliminated as a political and economic entity. Fear that after making peace the Herero would get back their old status and economic rights at the expense of settlers still loomed large on the German side: the rehabilitation of the tribes could only mean that Germany would be forced to 'start all over again', as von Trotha himself put it (Gewald 1999: 174).

The persisting resolve to strip the Herero of the political and economic rights they used to enjoy before the insurgency correlates with an extreme level of civilian targeting. The conditions of living that von Trotha created and insistingly maintained in detention camps with the support of the Chief of Staff were such that most prisoners would die in captivity. Based on the high mortality rate in the German concentration camps, historians tend to agree that von Trotha and his successors used imprisonment as an opportunity to carry out the extermination proclamation in a different form (Hull 2005: 70; Zeller 2008: 78). Thousands of naked, exhausted, starved, and ill Herero people would reach collection camps after their long and taxing escape in the desert. The Germans would allow only a short recovery time before moving their prisoners to labour and detention camps run by the military itself.

In spite of their poor health conditions, the Herero prisoners would be massed in improvised huts which provided little shelter from the cold weather, the heavy rain, and the strong wind at night; in some camps, like the one located in Shark Island, indoor accommodation was almost completely absent and most prisoners would sleep half-naked outdoor even in Winter; the military administration under von Trotha's instructions provided no warm clothes and only few blankets would be made available for hundreds of prisoners in each camp; food rations were far below the subsistence level; sanitation was equally neglected and prisoners would sleep surrounded by night soil in some camps; deficiency and viral diseases, like scurvy and dysentery were widespread, but medical assistance was provided on rare occasions and was cursory at most; in addition to that, prisoners would experience forced labour, physical ill-treatment, and beatings by guards on a daily basis (see Erichsen 2008; Hull 2005: 73-

82; Zeller 2008; Zimmerer 2008: 53-58). Unsurprisingly, the mortality rate among the Herero was very high.

Christian missionaries visiting the camps and civilian authorities advocated an improvement in prisoners' conditions of living, only to meet with von Trotha's opposition. When camp commandants tried to provide new clothes and blankets or improve food rations on their own initiative, von Trotha would personally intervene to have any relief immediately taken away from prisoners (Hull 2005: 76-77). Interestingly, von Trotha would also forbid private companies employing prisoners to pay token wages to their workers on the ground that no economic right could be recognized to prisoners (Hull 2005: 74). This type of objection against any for of compensation for prisoners' labour would confirm that von Trotha was still concerned that the old social and economic status of the tribes could be slowly restored: in sum, according to the general, the goal to expropriate and subdue the insurgent population had not been secured yet.

Lothar von Trotha's commitment to extermination did not decrease even when settlers began to complain about the complete destruction of the insurgent group on the ground that extermination policies would reduce the number of people that could be used as slaves (Hull 2005: 68). It is very important to stress that the disagreement between von Trotha and the settler community was not about the goal to expropriate the insurgent population and impose a settler-dominated regime in SWA: in fact, there was complete harmony between von Trotha and the German minority on that point. The disagreement was about whether that objective had been safely achieved or not: while von Trotha believed that the Herero could still recoup their losses and restore their old social status in the future, the settler minority was prone to believe that the goal to strip insurgents of their economic and political rights had been secured and no further step was possible or necessary; hence their calls on von Trotha to relent violence.

The precise nature of the disagreement between von Trotha and settlers is relevant because it reveals that the very foundation of the alliance between Germany and settlers had not really disappeared, despite a disagreement about the progress to be made to secure the common goal of dispossession and submission of the Herero. Indeed, it should be reminded that the local alliance strategy of the incumbent state in my model hinges upon the type of goal to pursue (see Chapter 2). Again, the white minority never called into question the goal that von Trotha was pursuing, that is the elimination of the tribes as economic and political actors: in that particular phase of the campaign settlers simply believed that those goals had been attained. It is even more important to stress

that settlers' apparent confidence that they had achieved their supremacist goals should not be overstated. Indeed, as we shall see, when Governor von Lindequist tried to ameliorate the rights and living conditions of prisoners after von Trotha's departure, settlers' old fears about the ability of the tribes to recover their old status would turn up again; as a result, settlers would protest against the benefits conceded to prisoners and the mass deaths of civilians in concentration camps would no longer cause any complaint (see below).

The extermination policy against the Herero would have another counterproductive effect: it caused the Nama tribe in the South of the protectorate to rise against Germany. By the end of 1904, therefore, the conflict had expanded. The Nama would prove a more elusive opponent than the Herero. Unlike the Herero, the Nama warriors would fight in small groups; they showed greater mobility and would use a guerrilla strategy more effectively than the Herero (Hillebrecht 2008: 151). The Nama, however, numbered only 20,000 and could count on no more than 1,000 to 2,000 warriors, whereas the Herero had 8,000 to 10,000 fighters; besides, the Nama were poorer than the Herero as they owned far less cattle (Hillebrecht 2008: 151).

As the conflict expanded, Germany faced increasing difficulties. The southern regions of the protectorate were relatively unpopulated and there was no railway in the area; as a result, Germany's dependence upon Britain to secure military supplies and other assets from Walvis Bay would drastically increase (see above); yet, as we have seen above, the British authorities would give Germany only limited assistance, which would further hinder Germany's military operations. In spite of that, the General Staff ordered von Trotha to start his offensive against the Nama at once.

Forced to attack immediately, the Germans surprised and defeated the Nama warriors at Naris and Koes in early December 1904 and again at Gross-Nabas in January 1905. The Nama insurgents took over 120 casualties and retreated to the Kalahari (Wallace and Kinahan 2011: 167-168). In April 1905, von Trotha released another proclamation threatening to exterminate the Nama like the Herero if they had not surrendered (Zimmerer 2008: 51-52).

Interestingly, von Trotha's new extermination threat correlates not only with the persisting intention to secure the position of the German minority as the dominant group in the protectorate, but also with growing concerns about the intentions of Britain and its influence over the outcome of the war. Indeed, as we have seen, the success of Germany's military effort depended significantly on Britain's good will; Britain, however, was reluctant to help Germany and occasionally took steps that the German

interpreted as a show of hostility (see above). According to the German military and diplomatic circles in South Africa, including von Trotha, Britain's reluctance to assist Germany indicated that the British aimed to weaken Germany's influence in South Africa and impose their own hegemony over the whole region (see above). This would confirm the predictions of my model that a combination of unfavourable perceptions of external threat and an aligned local alliance strategy will result in extreme violence against civilians.

The Nama would eventually have the same fate as the Herero: destruction, submission and expropriation. Skilled as they were in guerrilla warfare, the Nama suffered a major blow in October 1905 when their paramount leader, Hendrik Witbooi, was killed in the battle of Vaalgras (Hillebrecht 2008: 152). The General Staff claimed victory and relieved von Trotha from command in November 1905. He was replaced by General Deimling as military commander, while Friederich von Lindequist was appointed as a Governor. Would the level of violence decrease?

7.2.3 After von Trotha (November 1905 – March 1907): The Extermination Continues.

Before Lindequist arrived, the Kaiser signed a decree that formally expropriated the Herero and Nama of all their land (Hillebrecht 2008: 154). The new civilian leadership in the protectorate accepted to improve the conditions of living of prisoners. Indeed, as Lindequist took office, he pledged to replace the prisoner-of-war status of the Herero with a system of low-wage labour, improve the amount and quality of food and clothes in collection camps, concede longer recovery time before work, oppose the separation of prisoners from their relatives in captivity etc. (Hull 2005: 82-83). In practice, however, Lindequist would not significantly change the policies of his predecessor, thus producing very similar effects. In actual fact, the elimination of prisoners in concentration camps continued. As hundreds of Nama gave themselves in after Witbooi's death, they would experience the same conditions of imprisonment as the Herero. The poor health of inmates when taken in the camps, malnutrition, neglect of sanitation, lack of medical care, and a systematic reliance on starved and ill prisoners as a source of forced labour resulted in the nearly complete annihilation of the Nama (Hull 2005: 83-88; Erichsen 2008: 90-97; Zimmerer 2008: 52-58). Considering Lindequist's commitment to improve the living conditions of prisoners, why did death rates not decline?

First of all, we should consider settlers' anxiety that the tribes could be slowly rehabilitated: Lindequist found himself under pressure to limit the improvements he had promised. Despite their complaints against von Trotha's explicit extermination order (see above), settlers were alarmed about the relative freedom and limited benefits that the Nama and Herero prisoners enjoyed in some collection camps after Lindequist's arrival in SWA; that looked like a sign that the tribes could recoup their losses; it was to calm settlers' anxiety that Lindequist eventually closed some collections camps and resumed military operations against displaced people in the desert (Hull 2005: 84). Besides, both settlers and the Army were impatient to exploit Herero and Nama prisoners as a source of forced labour, even if it was clear that most prisoners were simply too ill to work and would die after few weeks of intense physical effort (Hull 2005: 83-84; Zeller 2008: 77-78). In spite of that, Lindequist chose to appease the German minority. Besides, the Army was concerned about the possible recovery of the Nama resistance (Hillebrecht 2008: 155), especially in the light of the military difficulties exacerbated by a powerful and apparently hostile neighbour like Britain (see above). The frequent escapes of Nama prisoners to the neighbouring British colonies only increased the fear of the Army and the colonial government that the Nama could continue the conflict from the British territory. As the deportation of the Nama to other German colonies was deemed too expensive, the solution adopted by Lindequist was simple: he decided the all the Nama should be deported to Shark Island, one of the most infamous concentration camps located far away from the border with British colonies (Erichsen 2008: 91; Hull 2005: 85).

Lindequist was fully aware that the Shark Island camp had an extremely high mortality rate; yet, he simply did not care about the fate of prisoners. In fact, Lindequist would go so far as to claim that the mass deaths of the Nama would be beneficial because the reduction in the number of prisoners would also reduce the financial cost of potential deportations in the future (Erichsen 2008: 91). Therefore, it comes as no surprise that Lindequist himself was keen to use ill and debilitated prisoners as a source of labour in government-sponsored projects, like the construction of a deep-sea harbour in the South of the protectorate. The predictable consequence was the death of almost all the prisoners; the most frequent reaction of the colonial government to the mass deaths of the Nama was to look for more prisoners – no matter how starved and ill – to replace those who had died (Erichsen 2008: 91-93). In sum, the continuing use of extreme violence against insurgents' popular base correlates with Governor Lindequist's appeasement of the German settler community and the persisting concerns of the Army

and the colonial government itself about the potential recovery of the Nama tribe in the light of Britain's perceived interference in the military campaign in SWA. This would corroborate the predictions of my model that a combination of unfavourable perceptions of the external threat environment with an aligned local alliance strategy leads to extreme violence against non-combatants.

Even if the Nama guerrilla was never uprooted completely and insurgent gangs frequently took shelter in British South Africa, by the end of 1906 the insurgency was on the wane. When Germany officially declared the end of the war in March 1907, 66 to 75 percent of the entire Herero population had perished with almost 50 percent of the Nama people[131] (Hull 2005: 88). The colonial troops instead, had taken less than 700 combat casualties, while another 700 German soldiers had died of illness or other causes (Hull 2005: 88).

7.3 Alternative Explanations

In the previous case studies I have analyzed competing explanations individually to see if their causal logic and predictions could explain the case being observed. In this chapter I will proceed differently. I will look at the three schools of thought at the same time. This is possible because all the competing arguments analyzed in the literature review chapter share a common flaw: they are indeterminate as they do not explain why the incumbent state may choose a policy of civilian targeting which aims to annihilate the insurgent group rather than one that undermines civilians' freedom, property and survival but without intent to commit genocide. In other words, they can generically predict civilian victimization, but are silent on the conditions under which the incumbent may escalate civilian targeting to a genocidal level.

The democratic restraint version of the regime type argument, for example, would correctly predict violence against civilians. Indeed, Imperial Germany was not a liberal democracy, which should result in the use of a civilian targeting strategy. That is exactly what we can observe in the case at hand. However, the regime type argument only predicts that non-liberal democracies will use lethal indiscriminate violence, but does not say anything about the circumstances under which civilian victimization will be taken to the extreme and result in the extermination of the insurgent group.

[131]While my work is not about the impact of civilian targeting on war outcome, one may observe that the German victory does not necessarily prove the effectiveness of extreme indiscriminate violence in counterinsurgency. Indeed, by the time the Germans resorted to genocidal violence, they had virtually defeated their opponents already; consequently, practitioners' warnings against the ineffectiveness of civilian targeting would not be decisively undermined by the case at hand.

The arguments pointing to military organizational factors display the same type of problem. Those arguments suggest that the incumbent will kill civilians when indiscriminate violence can serve the parochial interests of military organizations, or when force structure hinders intelligence collection, or when military culture emphasizes the relentless punishment of the enemy as the ultimate task that defines the military identity. Yet, on a logical level there is nothing in these arguments that can explain why an incumbent would prefer a genocidal level of violence to a high level of civilian victimization. While those factors do include genocide as a potential outcome, nothing is said about the specific conditions under which military organizations would not be content with the death of large numbers of civilians but would intentionally go for a genocide and viceversa. In other words, a high level of civilian targeting is apparently consistent with these arguments as much as an extreme level of indiscriminate violence.

Besides, it is important to add that the case of the German campaign in SWA – which was mostly conducted by the military with little interference from the civilian government – does not clearly reflect the logic of the arguments pointing to military organizational factors. Indeed, while those arguments presume that the indiscriminate violence will follow from purely military bureaucratic, structural, or cultural reasons, the actual reasons behind Germany's policy of extermination instead were mostly political, not military (Dedering 1993: 83-84). In particular, as we have seen, Trotha's decision to eliminate the Herero and Nama tribes reflected the general's conscious political design to transform the society of SWA by destroying the tribal system once and for all and imposing settlers' hegemony over the natives in order to prevent future uprisings and consolidate Germany's control over SWA. Some historical accounts of the German campaign that point to military organizational and cultural factors (Hull 2005) tend to neglect that Trotha's quest for a decisive battle and the following policy of pursuit and extermination were means to a political end and not an end in itself.

The argument pointing to the image of the enemy and the desperation thesis would perform unconvincingly too. Of course, racism was rampant among the German military circles of the time, which may have propelled the use of indiscriminate violence against the Herero and Nama to some extent; yet, racism could cause a high level of civilian targeting as much as an extreme level of indiscriminate violence and there is nothing in the logic of the vilification argument that can help us to understand why the incumbent would choose the latter rather than the former level of brutality.

Besides, the vilification argument cannot explain why Leutwein and von Trotha chose

different levels of civilian victimization. Leutwein was as prone as von Trotha to racial prejudice against the natives. More specifically, Leutwein fully embraced the social Darwinist belief that the white race was superior to the black race and would inevitably gain the upper hand in economic terms in the long run: therefore, the violent expropriation and submission of the natives would be superfluous and counterproductive (Hillebrecht 2008: 149). Since Leutwein and von Trotha shared the same ideas about the inferiority of the African race, the dehumanization argument would predict that the two leaders should have chosen a similar level of civilian targeting. Yet, Leutwein firmly opposed a policy of extermination, while von Trotha was keen to use a genocidal level of violence. The difference between von Trotha and Leutwein was not about their racial beliefs; it was about their ideas about the local alliance strategy that Germany should pursue to achieve the inevitable triumph of the German race over allegedly inferior Africans. While Leutwein believed that a peaceful relationship and a tactical alliance with the tribes would be in the best interest of Germany, von Trotha completely disagreed. Interestingly, the disagreement between Leutwein and von Trotha correlates with different preferences about the level of destruction that the insurgent groups should suffer, which would confirm the predictions of Scenario 3 in my model.

As to the desperation thesis, again, this argument simply predicts that the incumbent will use indiscriminate violence when it gets desperate to win, but does not specify the conditions under which the level of violence will be high without becoming genocidal or viceversa. Finally, even if this problem did not exist, the desperation thesis would still perform unconvincingly in the case of the German campaign in SWA for the reasons that have already been explained in the literature review chapter of this work (see above).

CONCLUSIONS

In this work I have addressed the causes behind spatial and temporal variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency campaigns abroad. In doing so, not only did I aim to advance our knowledge of the conditions under which civilians may be victimized in counterinsurgency, but I also set out to assist policy-makers interested in and committed to the protection of civilians in warfare.

I built a typological model including two causal factors that combine and interact with each other: the external threat environment of the insurgent territory as perceived by the incumbent state and the local alliance strategy of the incumbent itself. Each factor can assume two values: the external threat environment can be favourable or unfavourable, while the local alliance strategy of the incumbent can be neutral or aligned with a would-be dominant group. As a result, on the logical level, there are four possible types or combinations of independent variable values; each type can be understood as a specific Scenario in which a particular level of civilian targeting comes by way of a specific causal mechanism.

I posited that the level of civilian targeting is moderate when the incumbent is not appeasing any would-be dominant group and perceives the external threat environment as favourable. The level of civilian targeting is high when the incumbent is not appeasing any would-be dominant group, but sees the external threat environment as unfavourable; the same outcome, however, occurs when the incumbent is allied with a would-be dominant group but perceives the external threat environment as favourable. Finally, the level of civilian targeting will be extreme when the incumbent is supporting a would-be dominant group and perceives the external threat environment as unfavourable.

Clearly, I did not produce an overarching explanation equally valid for all the cases of counterinsurgency campaigns abroad indistinctly; rather, my model produced four different explanations and suggested that the potential population of cases should be divided into different groups which should be explained differently. In other words, my typological model only produced contingent generalizations.

On the empirical level, I studied a case for each type or Scenario of my model in order to show the corresponding predictions and causal logic. Using secondary and – when it

was possible – primary sources, I showed that the outcome of the above mentioned cases is congruent with the predictions and logic of my model. When enough data were available, I showed the process behind some repressive measures as posited by my model (e.g. mass eviction and ensuing starvation of civilians to appease settlers or the indiscriminate use of capital punishment in Kenya to appease settlers and loyalists). At the same time, I showed that alternative theses may account for a part of civilian targeting in the above mentioned cases, but they fail to provide a comprehensive explanation.

My work can be clearly situated in respect to the broader counterinsurgency literature: by building a typological model that can explain and predict spatial and temporal variations in the level of civilian targeting in counterinsurgency abroad, my work fills a gap in the literature created by practitioners' relative indifference to the causes of civilian targeting and political scientists' flawed explanations for variations in the level of indiscriminate violence.

The most prominent works on counterinsurgency in the practitioner literature paid scant attention to civilian targeting as a dependent variable; practitioners rather addressed the different issue of war outcome and considered civilian targeting only to the extent that it may affect the victory chances of the counterinsurgent: in other words, practitioners were only interested in the military effectiveness of indiscriminate violence. As a result of their focus on war outcome and military effectiveness, practitioners offer prescriptions about how the counterinsurgent should treat civilians in order to achieve victory, but they never produce a systematic testable thesis explaining spatial and temporal variations in the way counterinsurgents actually deal with civilians. Most practitioner authors believe that self-restraint is the optimal course of action and deem civilian targeting as an error, but they cannot explain why and under which conditions states may still want to target civilians even when decision-makers are aware that indiscriminate violence would be ineffective or counterproductive. Political scientists, instead, have sought to explain the causes behind variations in civilian targeting more systematically and rigorously than practitioners have done; yet, their current theses are unconvincing. My work, therefore, asks important questions that practitioners did not specifically address and provides answers that can outperform political scientists' theses of barbarism.

My dissertation, however, would not have a purely theoretical value. It would also address the policy-making community committed to the protection of civilians. Admittedly, I do not set out any specific plan to prevent civilian targeting or rescue non-

combatants in counterinsurgency. Yet, my work would still assist policy-makers by pointing to leaders' perceptions of threats and opportunities in the international and local contexts as factors that policy-makers should try to manipulate. The contention that the level of civilian targeting depends on four possible combinations and interactions between the incumbent's perception of external threats and its local alliance strategy means that there are good news and bad news for policy-makers.

The good news is that the incumbent state will be strongly averse to take the risks of indiscriminate violence when it is not supporting any would-be dominant group and is not alarmed about any external threat to its hegemony over the insurgent territory. Under those circumstances – Scenario 4 in my model – there is no urge to carry out costly diplomatic, economic, or military interventions against the incumbent to protect civilians. Indeed, fear that indiscriminate violence may backfire will be prominent in the strategic calculations of the incumbent state; that, in turn, would be sufficient to cause the incumbent state itself to protect non-combatants' lives out of self-interest during the counterinsurgency campaign.

Importantly, under the conditions of Scenario 4, premature interventions by actors that share humanitarian concerns about the fate of civilians are by far the greatest risk to be averted. Humanitarian agencies and observers from other states might see arbitrary mass arrests, punitive confiscations and fines, mass screening, cordon-and-search operations or curfews as a prelude to an escalation of civilian targeting; consequently, they may call for sanctions against the incumbent. Yet, any government and interstate international organization with a genuine interest in the fate of civilians should keep from preemptive sanctions against the incumbent because early interventions may only exacerbate the level of indiscriminate violence. Indeed, the incumbent state may interpret diplomatic and economic sanctions as evidence that a third-party state or group of states are willing to impose its own hegemony on the insurgent territory. In this way, a premature intervention may turn Scenario 4 into Scenario 1 and cause an escalation of civilian targeting from a moderate level to a high level. This risk is particularly serious if the incumbent believes that the actors responsible for preemptive sanctions have enough power to impose their hegemony over the insurgent territory. Interestingly, therefore, the protection of civilians is guaranteed by simply doing nothing apart from maintaining peaceful relations with the incumbent and keeping from spending resources on ineffective and counterproductive sanctions. This is where good news end.

Once Scenario 1 comes about, the protection of civilians from the brutality of the incumbent state becomes much more demanding. Non-intervention would no longer be

enough, but external interventions to protect civilians are by no means bound to succeed. External interventions to protect civilians should aim to reassure the incumbent that its hegemony over the insurgent territory will not be threatened. This is not always possible. Firstly, the incumbent may be correct in its belief that a third-party state is willing and able to take advantage of unrest in the insurgent territory to become the local suzerain. If this is the case, then those actors sharing humanitarian concerns about civilians should help the incumbent to neutralize hostile interferences and protect its hegemony. Yet, this may not be a palatable option. Indeed, the protection of the incumbent from hostile powers may clash with the interests of those actors that are supposed to reassure the incumbent itself. For example, during the Algerian War of independence the United States was reluctant to adopt an aggressive foreign policy against Egypt and Tunisia to reassure France that Algeria would remain French: indeed, the U.S. government knew that if the United States had associated itself too closely with the brutal colonialism of the French, the support of pro-Western Arab leaders against the Soviet Union in North Africa and the Middle-East could have been lost (see above).

Secondly, even if the incumbent perceives a threat that in actual fact does not exist, such a perception may still be strengthened by powerful intervening factors that will make it more difficult for actors sharing humanitarian concerns to persuade the incumbent that its hegemony is not threatened by other powers. Nationalism as well as fears of a domino effect, for example, can magnify the sense of alarm about the presence of external threats to such an extent that any attempt to reassure the incumbent will be received with suspicion. During the Algerian War of independence France was literally obsessed with the prospect of its own decline as a world power (see above). The national humiliation of the defeat in Indochina and the belief that another defeat in Algeria would result in the rapid collapse of French rule in the rest of Africa magnified civilian and military leaders' resolve to retain control over Algeria. In this context, the scepticism of the United States about the objective presence of a Soviet and Egyptian threat against France in Algeria only exacerbated French leaders' suspicions that the 'Anglo-Saxon powers' were patiently waiting for another French defeat to establish their own hegemony over North Africa. Interestingly, U.S. military aid to the French Army would not be enough to reassure France about the intentions of the United States. In sum, when an incumbent is already alarmed, external interventions to reassure the incumbent may be necessary but may achieve very little.

Scenario 2 would be equally difficult to handle for those interested in saving civilians. In principle, actors sharing humanitarian concerns about the fate of civilians should aim

to destroy the alliance between the incumbent and a would-be dominant group; in this way, Scenario 2 would be turned into Scenario 4 in which the level of indiscriminate violence will be moderate.

Yet, the prospects of success will depend on the specific reasons that shaped the local alliance strategy of the incumbent. If a state is supporting a would-be dominant group for ideological reasons or foreign policy calculations, its local alliance strategy may be very resistant to change. For example, Britain's decision to appease white settlers was based on major concerns about the wider process of decolonization and Britain's power position in Africa and the world (see above). This type of concerns may make the incumbent deeply reluctant to dismiss local allies that aim to subdue and expropriate the insurgent group.

If, instead, the incumbent is supporting a specific group for purely material reasons, then attempts to manipulate the local alliance strategy may meet with success. For instance, if the incumbent is appeasing a would-be dominant group as a way to tackle a chronic shortage of manpower and material assets that could not be solved otherwise, actors that aim to protect civilians may assist the incumbent by providing military and police units that may be employed in non-combat operations. In this way, the strategic value of a partnership with groups that aim to subdue the insurgent population may decline and Scenario 4 may eventually come about. Of course, actors sharing humanitarian concerns would still face obstacles. For example, the public opinion of democratic states may be strongly sympathetic with insurgents and oppose any form of assistance to the incumbent; the incumbent itself may not believe that external interventions are actually prompted by purely humanitarian concerns and may reject any help; finally, would-be dominant groups that benefit from the local alliance strategy of the incumbent may not quietly accept to be dismissed and may organize violent resistance to in pursuit of their own goals.[132]

Yet, these problems are not impossible to solve. Democratic states, after all, have frequently cooperated with brutal incumbents despite the scepticism of their public opinion. For example, the United States supplied France with modern military equipment during the Algerian War of independence, even if the U.S. public opinion was hostile to French colonialism. Besides, the incumbent's reluctance to accept external help may be overcome by involving small states or international organizations that would have no interests, let alone the power, to do more than assist the incumbent

[132] Obviously, this is not intended as an exhaustive list of all the potential obstacles that may hinder this type of interventions.

in non-combat operations. Finally, would-be dominant groups might be too weak and unpopular to impose their agenda once the incumbent has decided to resist them. For example, during the British campaign in Cyprus the Turkish minority could not coerce Britain to concede partition; this is remarkable if one considers that Britain's security apparatus depended on the cooperation of the Turkish community.

Under the circumstances of Scenario 3, actors committed to the protection of civilians would have to face the challenges of Scenarios 1 and 2 at the same time. Indeed, theoretically, those actors would have to reassure the incumbent that its hegemony over the insurgent territory is not threatened, while changing its local alliance strategy. Yet, in actual fact, it would be difficult for governments and international organizations to cooperate peacefully with a state that is already perpetrating a genocide in order to change the conduct of the incumbent. In modern and contemporary history there are no examples of genocides that were stopped with the peaceful cooperation of the perpetrator. In Scenario 3, therefore, it will be necessary to challenge the incumbent. This may be done by preparing escape routes for civilians in areas bordering on the insurgent territory, as some scholars suggest (Valentino 2004). However, the incumbent may close escape routes and trap civilians before they can leave. Under these circumstances, forcible humanitarian intervention would be the only alternative to a policy of non-intervention.

APPENDIX 1

The classification of cases in this Appendix refers to the values on my independent variables as they appeared at the beginning of hostilities, which does not exclude that within-case variations over the course of each campaign are possible. In fact, as I explain in Chapter 2, as long as there is within-case variation on my causal factors, the same case can be an instance of more than one scenario.

Importantly, it should be stressed that this classification should be considered provisional because it is the result of a preliminary and ongoing effort to define the potential empirical base of each Scenario in the population of cases. The data comes mostly from the secondary sources included in the bibliography of this work. An analysis of primary sources from Dutch, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, Russian, and U.S. archives would be necessary to confirm that classification and may prompt changes.

Appendix 1.1 Potential cases for each Scenario or typology.

Scenario	Potential Cases
Scenario 1	• British counterinsurgency in South Africa (1900-1902) • German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (January 1904-May 1904)[133] • British counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960) • Spanish counterinsurgency in Cuba (1895-1898) • U.S. counterinsurgency in the Philippines (1899-1902) • Dutch Counterinsurgency in Indonesia (1945-1949) • U.S. counterinsurgency in Vietnam • Algerian war (1954-1962) • Soviet counterinsurgency in Afghanistan (1979-1989) • Portuguese colonial wars (1961-1974).

[133] This is the phase in which Leutwein was still Governor and commander.

	• Second Italo-Sanusi war (1923-1931)
Scenario 2	• British counterinsurgency in Kenya (1952-1960) • German counterinsurgency in East-Africa (1905-1907)
Scenario 3	• German counterinsurgency in South-West Africa (June 1904 - March 1907)[134]
Scenario 4	• British counterinsurgency during the Great Arab Revolt (1936-1939) • British counterinsurgency during the Zionist uprising (1945-1948) • British counterinsurgency in Cyprus (1955-1959) • U.S. counterinsurgency in Afghanistan • U.S. counterinsurgency in Iraq

[134] This is the long phase following the dismissal of Leutwein.

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