Conceptualising the regular-irregular engagement: the strategic value of proxies and auxiliaries in wars amongst the people

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Chapter 5: Conceptualising the Regular-Irregular Engagement:

The Strategic Value of Proxies and Auxiliaries in Wars amongst the People

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Introduction

The notion of ‘war amongst the people’ is a central feature of the twenty-first century security environment. Introduced by Rupert Smith in his ground-breaking *The Utility of Force*,¹ ‘war amongst the people’ captured a reality long in the making, whose historical lineage could partly be traced back to the origins of war itself. The appeal of the concept came from combining the simplicity of the label with its strong analytical power. Smith shifted the strategic mindset towards the socio-political construction of violence in a way that allowed Western strategic thinking to grasp realities that did not conform to mainstream strategic expectations: first, the transformation of civil society into a battlespace dominated by fragmented non-state actors pursuing various and often contradictory political goals; second, the blurring of key strategic conceptual binaries such as ‘peace–war’ or ‘victory–defeat’ and third the increasing media visibility of such development and interactions and its taxing pressures on policy and decision-makers.

In doing so, Smith identified ‘the people’ as the *locus* and *anima* of fighting and made the case for the absence of any form of boundaries around them, physical or not. More recently, Thomas Marks and Paul Rich described the value of violence in war amongst the people as a

twofold process: ‘to carry out the normal functions of military warfighting, neutralisation of the armed capacity of the enemy; but, more fundamentally, to carve out the space necessary for the political activities of (alternative) state-building achieved through mobilisation and construction of capacity’. This shows how ‘the people’ became the object of contention or what needed to be won over, while Western strategic thinking adopted the famous ‘hearts and minds’ model to varying degrees of success.

This chapter addresses a significant gap in this debate by looking at how these wars are often fought against an adversary; not just amongst the people, but with and alongside the people. To highlight the intricacies of war amongst the people, it identifies two complementary strategic models of integrating ‘the people’ into warfighting: the auxiliary strategic model and the proxy strategic model, both of which speak to different patterns of interaction between regular and irregular forces. The former delineates a close regular–irregular military synergy in which the irregulars complement the regulars and are usually co-employed in the fighting. The latter describes a strategic relationship of political and military value in which the irregulars work for the regulars through a process of delegation. The chapter, therefore, builds a case for differencing proxies from auxiliaries, based on the former’s politico-strategic role compared to the latter’s military-tactical utility. To capture these differences, the argument presents the proxy and auxiliary relationships as variations of dynamic and flexible strategic interaction processes between types of forces (regular and irregular).

Historically, both models demonstrate strategic appeal. The auxiliary model can be traced back to the 17th century, continuing into the 19th century with partisans acting in concert

with emerging European armies and in many wars of colonial domination. The proxy model also has a rich historical tradition which reaches fruition with the Cold War and its ensuing superpower confrontation, which plunged the so-called Third World into the hot wars of the era. Both models survived the post-Cold War security environment and have become a staple of recent military adventurism in the Middle East and South and Central Asia. However, their strategic appeal (even less the strategic differences between auxiliaries and proxies) are seldom discussed comparatively, if at all. As Scheipers observed about auxiliaries, ‘the failure of Western officers and strategic thinkers to engage in a debate over the strategic value of native auxiliaries is puzzling, given the ubiquity with which local


auxiliaries were – and continue to be – used’. 6 This chapter addresses this gap and uses Afghanistan’s history of war as a theory-building case study.

Afghanistan’s war history is instructive in multiple ways. First, through its long history of military interventions and civil war, it has become a paradigmatic case of ‘war amongst the people’. From the 19th century British and Russian imperialist interventions to the decade-long Soviet agony prefacing the end of the Cold War, through to the post-9/11 American interventionist failure, Afghanistan has become synonymous with complicated violent people’s struggles leading to the impossibility of success and the certainty of defeat. The Taliban conform to Smith’s prototype of insurgents who integrate the ‘people’ in a complex manner and by blurring the civilian-military distinction. While hierarchically structured, the movement comprises various networks, such as that led by Sirajuddin Haqqani, or integrates a complicated web of regional and provincial tribes, such as those of Baz Mohammed and Mansoor Dadullah. 7 More importantly, current conflict resolution approaches have favoured peace deals and a welcoming of the Taliban to the negotiating table. These developments come against the background of a recent Taliban resurgence, 8 which has legitimised the


group in the on-going peace talks. As Afghan President Ashraf Ghani observed during 2018, it is the Afghan people who demanded peace in the hope that decades of war amongst the Afghan people make way for decades of future peace.

Second, Afghanistan’s historical trajectory has been widely presented as having been shaped by regional and international geopolitical struggles. This gave rise to the mainstream argument that Afghanistan devolved from a somewhat sovereign buffer state into a war-torn proto-state, manned by warlords and violent factions that were always willing to barter the future of the country. This has translated into analyses of Afghan violence that use the labels ‘proxy’ and ‘auxiliary’ in an interchangeable fashion and with significant analytical consequences. This is even more puzzling as Afghanistan has been subject to a vast array of scholarship that has analysed its violence on macro, meso and micro levels. As will be demonstrated, the employment of local forces as either auxiliary or proxies and the disregard of their core differences led to significant setbacks on the battlefield, be it political or military. Not every local force or militia working with or for the regular forces was always a proxy, nor was it always an auxiliary. The two models of regular-irregular interaction co-

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existed and, by providing a trans-historic analysis, the chapter seeks to theorise this often-recurring problem.\textsuperscript{12}

Overall the chapter seeks to present the proxy-auxiliary issue as part of the broader narrative of war amongst the people. By underlying their fundamentally strategic differences, the argument developed here tentatively helps to overcome problems surrounding issues such as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism\textsuperscript{13}, or democratisation and reconstruction,\textsuperscript{14} all of


which have revolved around the centrality of the ‘people’. Finally, given the recent advent in the practice of proxy wars, with wars such as those in Syria, Ukraine, Yemen or South Sudan, and considering the growing use of auxiliary forces in recent counterinsurgency campaigns, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the chapter furthers the understanding of the strategic differences between the two roles – proxy and auxiliary – as part of the volume’s aim to conceptualise and clarify the ever-present puzzles of contemporary war amongst the people.

The chapter unfolds in two parts. First, it presents the theoretical argument. Here the focus is on drawing a theoretical demarcation line between the auxiliary and the proxy model by employing the strategic interaction framework. Simply put, strategic interaction refers to a decision-making process in which one actor’s options and decisions are taken in relationship with another’s alternatives and commitments. The choice of this framework is not incidental, but rather speaks to the core of Smith’s conceptualisation of war amongst the people as essentially complex political processes. A second substantive section uses Successful Interventions: Stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan’, *International Studies Perspectives* 16 (2015), 388-405.


Afghanistan as a theory building case and tracks the historical evolution of the proxy and auxiliary strategic models.\textsuperscript{18}

**The Missing Link: Strategy, Proxies and Auxiliaries**

The attempt to use the strategic interaction framework in order to explain variation in the employment of irregulars in operations with regular forces follows a recent, albeit slow, turn in conflict research.\textsuperscript{19} More widely, however, it responds to both a call for abandoning non-strategic analyses of wars\textsuperscript{20} and the need to think creatively about political violence in contemporary conflicts.\textsuperscript{21} To assess the proxy-auxiliary difference through the idea of ‘strategy’ might seem futile, given the latter’s controversial nature. Strachan famously decried the loss of meaning of ‘strategy’ and its ever-growing banal use,\textsuperscript{22} while Freedman postulated, at the very beginning of his study, *Strategy: A History*, that ‘there is no agreed-


\textsuperscript{21} Paul Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime Political Orders’, *Perspectives on Politics* 10:2 (2012), 243-64

\textsuperscript{22} Hew Strachan, ‘The Lost Meaning of Strategy’, *Survival* 47:3 (2005), 34.
upon definition of strategy that describes the field and limits its boundaries’.  

Without bypassing the importance of this debate, the chapter employs Betts’ definition of strategy as ‘the link between military means and political means, the scheme for how to make one produce the other’. What is relevant from the notion of ‘strategy’ is its ability to translate actor behaviour in a dynamic way. It simply does not assume it ex ante, but allows for intent to be constructed through interactions: with one’s goals and means, with one’s targets, with the targets’ goals and means, as well as with the context and operational environment. Strategy serves, therefore, because it is fundamentally relational, hence why the chapter draws on the theoretical value of ‘strategic interaction’. As Lake and Powell put it, strategic interaction refers to ‘each actor’s ability to further its ends depends on how others behave, and, therefore each actor must take the actions of others into account’.

This framing of the proxy and auxiliary models helps to overcome difficulties arising from the often messy and covert processes though which irregulars assume these roles. This is achieved because, with strategic interaction, the focus is on how parties act, react, anticipate, presume or negate behaviour in relations to other actors and to the context. Critically, it links two problems: first, who is involved, namely the regular and irregular actors and second, why

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26 Lake and Powell, *Strategic Choice and International Relations*. 
and how they interact. As Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan argued, the failure to specify who fights hinders the discussion on why they do it.\textsuperscript{27}

This is critical to our understanding of the ‘people’ component in the overall concept of ‘war amongst the people’, particularly if one views the ‘people’ as more than simply the object of a ‘hearts and minds’ campaign. Smith’s formulation of the notion aimed to capture the political agency of the many non-state actors and their tremendous ability to segment the political space in ways that states did not. From this point of view, a strategic analysis of how the ‘people’ contribute to fighting brings to the forefront the very issue of the agency of the ‘people’. Accordingly, it is the strategic intent behind both actors’ behaviour and their individual goals that shape the choice of proxy and auxiliary, as well as their willingness to assume strategic responsibilities.

Having explained the choice of theoretical framework and why strategic interaction works to explain the differences between the proxy and the auxiliary models, it is possible to conceptualise the two relationships thus: proxy forces serve a \textit{político-strategic} role, whereas auxiliaries present a \textit{military-tactical} value. This is consistent with the limited attempts in the literature to distinguish between the two types of force.\textsuperscript{28} On the one hand, auxiliaries have been defined as ‘military forces that support the military efforts of regular armed forces of a

\textsuperscript{27} Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two: A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome’, 571.

state’\textsuperscript{29}, while, on the other, proxy forces have been defined through the wider phenomenon, namely proxy war. This has been defined as ‘the indirect engagement in a conflict by third parties wishing to influence its strategic outcome’.\textsuperscript{30} The definition is also complemented by what can be called a structural definition, one that presents the unique structuring of a proxy war as a relationship between ‘a benefactor, who is a state or non-state actor external to the dynamic of an existing conflict, and their chosen proxies, who are the conduit for weapons, training and funding from the benefactor’\textsuperscript{31}.

To better underline the fact that proxy forces serve a politico-strategic role (whereas auxiliaries present a military-tactical value), the chapter draws two modes of interaction that demonstrate the differences in employing proxies and auxiliaries, by showing how they either conserve or modify the number of parties involved in fighting [see Figures 2 & 3 below]. The emphasis here is on how the parties interact and not on why they engage in such roles or, for that matter, to what end. The literature provides some answers,\textsuperscript{32} yet a full discussion of the questions of why and to what end exceeds the limits of this chapter. For example, research has shown that a proxy war is the result of a colluding effort,\textsuperscript{33} understood as a form of covert


\textsuperscript{30} Mumford, \textit{Proxy Warfare}, 1.

\textsuperscript{31} Mumford, \textit{Proxy Warfare}, 11.

\textsuperscript{32} Mumford, \textit{Proxy Warfare}, 13.

delegation of violence ‘often entailing specific cooperative modalities’. In terms of their purpose, the literature has used the case of the Russian annexation of Crimea to note that auxiliaries played ‘the role of justifying and legitimizing the intervention with their actions being portrayed as supportive to the covert military intervention.’

With a focus on how the regular-irregulars interact, it is necessary to distinguish between proxy forces - in which the irregulars fight the adversary for the regular forces- and auxiliary forces, where the irregulars fight the adversary with and alongside the regulars. In the case of the proxy forces, the fighting dynamic is altered because the fighting between the regulars and their targets is shifted onto the proxy. This is why proxy forces modify the number of parties involved in fighting, effectively shifting the burden of war. Conversely, in the case of auxiliary forces, these do not change the nature of who engages the adversary because they act as force multipliers – in the same or in a different theatre – for the regulars. That is why they conserve the number of parties involved in fighting. An auxiliary becomes part of a direct, overt alliance where the effort of the third party is cooperatively integrated into that of the party requesting it. There are many historical examples of campaigns involving auxiliaries: tribal chiefs working with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) against Rhodesia/Zimbabwe; the Mau Mau Kikuyu auxiliaries helping the British Army during the Mau Mau uprising in Kenya; the Tropas Nomadas assisting the Spanish in Western Sahara and the tirailleur regiments, the moghnaznis, or the harkis fighting alongside the French in Algeria.


35 Rauta, ‘Proxy Agents, Auxiliary Forces, and Sovereign Defection’. 
What is particular to the proxy model is that the relationship between the Beneficiary, Proxy Actor and Target results in an overlap of three interactions: the Beneficiary-Target (the lighter circle in Figure 2), the Beneficiary-Proxy Agent (the semi-dotted circle in Figure 2) and the Proxy Agent-Target (the darker circle in Figure 2). The specificity of the proxy model is that it amounts to a proxy war: the indirect projection of violence onto the
Beneficiary-Target interaction via the Proxy Agent-Target interaction through the Beneficiary-Proxy Agent interaction. This is different to the employment of an auxiliary, which does not result in the formation of a distinct war but marks direct, cooperative strategic behaviour. In fact, throughout history, the degree of collaboration with the auxiliaries saw their quasi-assimilation into army ranks, such as the role of Native Americans before and during the American War of Independence (1775-83). Here, the combination of European conventional forces with unconventional auxiliaries was common; George Washington’s success in Carolina owed much to the employment of irregulars under and alongside his regular soldiers. Moreover, accounts of the war emphasise how the British found themselves entrapped ‘by the all too often formidable combination of the regular Continental Army screened and supported by militias’. 36

In highlighting this positional understanding of the differences between proxy and auxiliaries the chapter moves the debate beyond its current treatment of the issues according to which auxiliaries are essentially ‘distinct from proxies, which are defined as receiving merely indirect support’. 37 In doing so, it addresses the under-studied character of the problem and places it into the broader issue of war amongst the people. 38

The chapter now turns to placing its theoretical observations into an empirical setting, namely Afghanistan and its long history of people’s wars. As one of the paradigmatic contemporary cases of war amongst the people, Afghanistan witnessed both a conventionally soldier-heavy,  


regular military strategy and a light footprint one, to which irregulars were key. Recent research has argued that the failure to address the Afghan strategic challenges post 9/11 was due in part to the reliance on security partnership with local allies whose unreliability became a strategic liability. In drawing the proxy-auxiliary difference, the chapter points to the significance of this discussion as addressing a key determinant of success in contemporary war by offering an explanatory variant which underlies the importance of the distinction to successful warfighting.

The Proxy and Auxiliary Models in Practice: Afghanistan’s Wars amongst the People

As Ayub and Kouvo argued, despite being richly documented, Afghanistan’s wars are yet to be very well understood. This can be observed in an oft-encountered push for explanations based on mere historical analogies. Spanning across more than two centuries, Afghanistan’s relationship with political violence has challenged historians, anthropologists, conflict


researchers, political scientists and policy-makers alike. In many ways its complex war history seems to have contradicted history’s ever-present sense of chronology, with its commitment to linearity and belief in progress. Critically, Afghanistan postulates historical repetition not as error, but as specificity. Indeed, it is now a common practice to claim that the history of the Afghan wars exerted a certain magnetism for major power intervention. As Hilali remarked, ‘since the 19th century…..Afghanistan has continued to suffer from superpower politics, external pressure, and chronic instability’. It is even more common to expand on the country’s ability to reject it. While Gibbs presented Afghanistan as one of the few countries in Central Asia never to be subject to direct colonial rule, Yousaf and Adkin claimed that, with the exception of a shared religion, it was only foreign invaders that united the Afghans.


What is less common is an appreciation of Afghanistan’s multitude of inter-related conflicts – international, national and sub-national – in a way that demonstrates that political violence, expressed either directly or indirectly, rarely takes place in ‘isolated pairs, but rather in a networked system’.  

A key feature of this problem is the treatment of the uses and roles of the irregulars as proxy and auxiliaries in Afghan wars in a literature that otherwise has produced a veritable exegesis of its subject. It has so far been embedded in the broad narratives of strategic struggles: expansionist, geopolitical, ideological and religious. This marginalised the key differences between proxies and auxiliaries, as well as the conditions allowing for the two strategic models to evolve: the extensive Afghan tribal factionalism and the structuring of social practices into kinship-based, patron-client relationships. 

Taken together, these have placed the Afghans at the centre of a stream of wars waged against, with, for, amongst and alongside them. The Afghan people accommodated, waged and distributed violence among their patrons and between themselves, outside and alongside their customary practice of badal (vendetta) or tarburwali (cousin rivalry). Yet most analyses paint the Afghans as insurgents, with the existing appreciation of the Afghan


Gibbs, ‘The Peasant as Counter-Revolutionary’, 43.

irregular effort generically linked to the country’s Cold War struggle, which has now become synonymous with the country’s origins of proxy wars. That Afghanistan, ‘more than any other location, was the high point of the Cold War’, is common knowledge, with the mujahedeen’s fight against the Soviets central to any study of Cold War historiography. Galster, prefacing the National Security Archive’s online volume of declassified documents, Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War, called it the ‘battleground for the bloodiest superpower proxy war of the 1980s’. Similarly, Blum argued that ‘Afghanistan was a cold-warrior’s dream: The CIA and the Pentagon, finally, had one of their proxy armies in direct confrontation with the forces of the Evil Empire’.

However, by the time the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, precipitating another West-East proxy war, the Afghan warriors found themselves in a familiar situation, albeit a century apart. The 19th century saw Afghanistan develop as a buffer state between the British and Russian empires. The second half of the chapter begins by presenting the proxy strategic model starting with the Soviet intervention of 1979. Against this background the auxiliary model will be compared and contrasted, observing the theoretical differences explained previously. Understanding the contemporary value of the two strategic models requires a longer historical perspective because it allows the development of an understanding of

52 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 2005), 120.


proxies and auxiliaries that is not context dependent, but instead shows their strategic utility through time.

Rubin’s exceptional study on the transformation of Afghanistan over the last few decades argued that the country’s encounters with the phenomenon of proxy war – and thus with the first strategic model presented here – began with the Cold War.\textsuperscript{55} The key event is the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979. Afghanistan’s geographical positioning vis-à-vis the Soviet Union had always produced a special relationship\textsuperscript{56} and the threat of losing the country to the Americans altered the Soviet view of the strategic context, pushing for direct military intervention.\textsuperscript{57} After all, the Chinese absorbed Tibet in 1951 and the US ran a path-breaking proxy war in Guatemala in 1954. Having an assertive power policy concerning one’s own backyard – or front yard – was an ordering principle of the Cold War. For the US, on the

\textsuperscript{55} Barnett R. Rubin, \textit{Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror} (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 25.

\textsuperscript{56} Blum, \textit{Killing Hope}, 339.

other hand, Afghanistan, by itself, was of little importance.\textsuperscript{58} However, the loss of Iran as their ‘policeman’ in the Middle East, following the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty in 1979, and the prospects of the Soviets becoming entangled in a Vietnam war of their own, informed the decision to be ‘more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to preserve their country’s independence’\textsuperscript{59}. These were the mujahedeen, holy warriors aggregated in small battalions or \textit{jabhas}\textsuperscript{60} that would become, next to the contras in Nicaragua, the most recognisable proxy actors for the US. The proxy model began with President Jimmy Carter’s modest efforts and was overridden by President Ronald Reagan’s outspoken and overt support of the mujahedeen. The outside support brought Afghanistan’s domestic conflict into the ‘geopolitical logic of the Cold War’\textsuperscript{61} and ensured that the process of building the mujahedeen army would be extensively traced.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{58} Galster, \textit{Afghanistan: The Making of US Policy}.


First, the weaving of the Afghan war throughout the 1980s into the broader geopolitical balance speaks of the politico-strategic role of the proxies, as presented previously. Indeed, for the US, supporting the mujahedeen was part of their strategy of managing systemic relations with the USSR, which culminated in National Security Directive 166, whose ultimate goal was ‘to push the Soviets out’.63 Second, US support consisted of military and financial assistance to the mujahedeen as proxies. In the context of the proposed theorisation, the fighters fought for the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan and did so for the US as well. This was not without problems. For one thing, using Pakistan as a conduit for transport and allocation of support diverted the strategic effort. Problems mounted as both sides searched for proxies. This was the case with the Hazara and the Afridi tribes, who, after being enlisted by the Soviets to stop the mujahedeen near the Pakistan border, turned against their patrons, ‘trapping the Soviets in a crossfire with the resistance’.64 Of relevance here is also the fact that the veiled expression of ‘defeating the Soviet infidels’ did little to help, for the resistance was undermined from inside by lack of unity, factionalism and splintering, as well as by repeated shifts in their support for each other.65 The fiercely independent nature of the mujahedeen proved its strategic hubris and derailed both international and regional proxy wars.

Nevertheless, what this highlights in relation to the difference between auxiliaries and proxies is that the initial fighting dynamic is changed by the irregular force that assumes a grant of authority from a third party, whether it be the US, USSR or Pakistan. As discussed above,


notwithstanding the negative course the model can assume, what is significant here is the extension of the party interactions to the inclusion of the so-called Beneficiary. In the context of Afghanistan in the 1980s, the political appeal overrode concerns over potentially negative outcomes to such an extent that sponsorship of militias and rebels was extensive and proxy war networks were established not just by the US, but also by the Soviets, the Afghan communist government, the UK, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and China, as well as by militias and local tribes.\textsuperscript{66}

The Chinese, for example, clashing with the Soviets on ideological and territorial grounds, provided the mujahedeen with Chinese manufactured AK-47s.\textsuperscript{67} Interestingly, strategic isolation in the international system and fears of Soviet encirclement informed China’s involvement, despite remaining largely unacknowledged.\textsuperscript{68} The UK established a strong relationship with Ahmed Shah Massoud, the ‘Lion of Panjshir’\textsuperscript{69} The Afghan government financed the members of the Hazara tribe who, a century before, had been bludgeoned, first


by the British, who punished them for refusing to sell fodder by burning their fields, and, later, by Abdur Rahman when trying to forge the Afghan state. This Islamic Shiite minority guarded the Hindu Kush Mountains and ‘went even further and actively fought for the Communist government against their hereditary enemies, the Pashtun mujahedeen’. However, their strategic aim was political survival and so, to maximize its success, it turned to the new regime in Iran. As Iran stepped in, waging yet another proxy war in this already complex network of conflicts, the homogeneity of the Hazaras proved essential. By supporting Hazara religious leaders, Iran assisted in constructing an effective political administration, once again showing the politico-strategic utility of proxies. However, as the tribe reconfigured along ethnic roots at the expense of its religious outlook in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal, ‘Iran decided to accept the fact that its Hazara proxies would not be able to establish an Iranian-style regime in the heart of Afghanistan’.

As anticipated by the US, the Soviets had envisioned a short intervention without ever imagining they would be ‘involved in the middle of a civil war on extremely rugged terrain where the Soviets….would carry the bulk of the combat burden’. Ten years later, as they withdrew, Afghanistan collapsed into a civil war where ‘the mujahedeen, along with the remnants of the army turned into feuding warlords and ethnic militias’. The conflict soon

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71 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets: From Jihad to Tribalism’, 934.
73 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets: From Jihad to Tribalism’, 943.
75 Rubin, *Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror*, 25.
became even more multifaceted, pulling and pushing local, national and regional actors in the violent web of small and quickly shifting proxy wars. As Fielden and Goodhand remarked, the Afghan conflict could be characterised as ‘part regional proxy war and part civil war’ for it has ‘shifted from a bipolar war to a multipolar regional proxy war, involving neighbouring powers, China, Iran, Pakistan and the Central Asian Republics’.76 Rubin expressed a similar view that, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, multiple funding channels emerged, some of which involved non-state actors.77 The conflict moved from an international level with the end of the bipolar system, into a regional one to an extent that surpassed the regional involvement of the 1980s.78 The proxy relations swiftly shifted in terms of strategic content, pushing the war amongst the Afghan people into a veritable web of wars amongst the people of South and Central Asia in a way that demonstrates how the proxy model changes the dynamics of war amongst the people in general. While some groups, such as the one led by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, continued their relationship with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, those led by Burhahuddin Rabbani and Ahmed Shah Massoud welcomed Russia, Iran and India and their own policies of covert aid, as was theorised above.79

In the context of the discussion of the proxy model as part of the wider issue of war amongst the people, this had tremendous implications. In line with what Smith argued, the increasing plethora of non-state actors took a distinctively active and political role. Earlier, the chapter


77 Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror, 30.


noted Iran’s sponsorship of the Hazaras as a proxy. Before the end of the Soviet intervention, they had been a conduit for a proxy war against Saudi Arabia and Riyadh’s support for Wahhabism in Afghanistan. However, in search of political survival and representation, the Hazaras reconfigured themselves politically and socially, slowly rescinding even the indirect cooperation with Iran. The agency of local actors and its pursuit through strategic interaction is evident here, as in the case of the mujahedeen, for the Hazaras transformed the jihad of Hazarajat into the plight of an ethnic-based movement. This also qualifies the implications of working for a Beneficiary as a strategic model subject to volatility and rapid shifts. As such, by the time the US intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 and itself began providing support for anti-Taliban militias and warlords – albeit to a different end – a complex combination of states and non-state actors already had a two-decade long history of using proxy forces, either Afghan mujahedeen or the Taliban. Having drawn a picture of the evolution and implications of the proxy model, the chapter now turns to detailing the specificities of the auxiliary model, which became a feature of the 2001 intervention.

Through its intervention in Afghanistan, the US sought to create an inhospitable base for extremism, which, as an aim, was different to the country’s historical experience of foreign interventions. The aim paled in comparison and effort to that of the Soviet Union and the fear of burying itself in the ‘graveyard of empires’ impacted significantly on the shape of US strategy: a combination of airpower and a light footprint with the cooperation of local forces. Having dislodged the Taliban from the official seats of power by 2002, the war effort concentrated henceforth on stabilisation and defeat of an ebbing and flowing insurgency.

81 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets: From Jihad to Tribalism’, 944.
82 Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in Afghanistan.
During these phases, the power of local entrepreneurs of violence was harnessed in accordance with the precepts of American counterinsurgency as auxiliaries. In this case, the Northern Alliance came to be the auxiliary prototype. However, it is important to note that the chapter focuses on the irregular forces that are co-opted to work with the regular one in what can be called informal tactical alliances and not with grass-roots forces that end up subordinated and embedded in local, regional or national structures of authority. This would be the case of the local defence forces who, as Strandquist showed, despite being effectively tribal militias aimed at fighting the Taliban, remained subordinated to the central government as part of the Community Defence Initiative. It also does not include official forces such as the Afghan National Auxiliary Police (ANAP), Afghan Local Police Program or the development and employment of the Afghan National Army (ANA) as a US auxiliary force. There is indeed considerable overlap between the roles these forces play and those of the irregular auxiliaries within the counterinsurgency spectrum of operations, but they are not the focus of this chapter.

The use of irregular auxiliaries became a key provision of Western doctrine in the aftermath of the US intervention in Afghanistan. The 2004 Field Manual Interim 3-07.22, Counterinsurgency Operations highlighted the imperative to expand and employ strong and


able native forces. For the UK, General Sir Michael Jackson acknowledged that the use of local indigenous forces, either inherited or built up ab initio, had been of increasing importance. The relationship with such auxiliaries has also been scrutinised carefully, the role of irregulars often described as following an informal security and military contracting pattern run from the shadows by certain US government institutions, chiefly the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the DoD:

For more than a decade, wads of American dollars packed into suitcases, backpacks and, on occasion, plastic shopping bags have been dropped off every month or so at the offices of Afghanistan’s president — courtesy of the Central Intelligence Agency.

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Critically, however, whilst detailed, criticised or revered, a common problem was the lack of conceptual clarity as to both the functions the local forces carried out and their capacity to undertake such tasks. More precisely, their role was presented in both research and policy in an interchangeable fashion as either proxy or auxiliary. This was the case for the Northern Alliance and other irregulars. The baseline argument saw them operating once US airpower degraded the theatres of war and with US Special Forces as a screen against enemy attack. In both the battle of Tora Bora and Operation Anaconda in the Shah-e-Knot valley, local forces were used. They were part of the light footprint strategy and were employed in various roles, such as launching attacks on enemy targets or, during Anaconda, to act as shock troops whose effort was aimed at uprooting al-Qaeda fighters from their bases. As detailed analyses of these key points in the war showed, the local forces’ tactical skills were critical. As such, they worked with and alongside and assumed the military-tactical value of an auxiliary as described above. They became part of the official US strategy as a tactical complement and, as such, conserved the numbers of parties involved in fighting in a different way to the proxy strategic model. Seen through the lens of war amongst the people the auxiliary model points to the emergence of multiple pathways through which the ‘people’ react to and in such war contexts. The general understanding of the ‘people’ as either insurgent or support base is changed and both the auxiliary and proxy models demonstrate how insurgencies shift as the fighting assumes new courses.


The difference between auxiliaries and proxies becomes clear during the years following the American intervention in 2001. While the invading regular forces developed close cooperation with auxiliary forces, such as the Northern Alliance, the proxy model took a distinctive regional turn. From the very moment the Taliban emerged victorious from the civil war in 1996, Pakistan assumed charge of the strategic bargaining through proxy wars to such an extent that violent dynamics in Afghanistan came to be all about Pakistan as well.92 As Jones put it, ‘the link to Pakistan was not a surprise, though the reality of outside support was much darker’.93 Pakistan’s wielding of proxy wars was both inward and outward looking and saw an important shift from collusion with the heroes of the Cold War to the Taliban.94 Internally, Pakistan was driven by the imperatives of preserving state boundaries in the face of secessionist threats. Preoccupation with domestic stability reacted to and made recourse of sub-state ethnic groupings and the Taliban came to be the response to the Pashtun problem, as well as an instrument of Pakistani policy.95 It was the very lens of the proxy strategic model that became the key to the current regional dialogue aimed at ending the Afghan-Taliban conflict. As a response to Pakistan’s interference in the Afghan conflict, the Afghan government had, for a long time, supported Pakistani rebel groups, especially the Tehrik-e-

Taliban. Using the proxy as a bargaining chip in combination with a mix of political and diplomatic moves, President Ghani slowly pushed for a rapprochement with Pakistan aimed at bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table, which currently continues to develop at a slow pace. By understanding the critical value of the extension of its war amongst the people into wars in which the people participate in various ways, Afghanistan’s president has sought to shift decades of wars amongst the Afghan people towards potential peace.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has sought to use the case of Afghanistan’s wars amongst the people in order to determine two models of strategic interaction that have shaped both the course and outcomes of these conflicts. In drawing a distinction between the proxy and auxiliary models, the chapter emphasises the complexity of contemporary wars amongst the people, which, as Angstrom and Honig observed, are never conducted in a vacuum, but encompass a complicated set of actors who reproduce their interests in multiple ways.96 To this end, strategic interaction became a lens for locating the differences between the auxiliary and proxy models. The starting assumption was that, in the case of Afghanistan, most of the time auxiliaries had been conceptualised as proxies and vice-versa under the pressures of a tightly defined political context.97 Yet the problem was far more pressing because it ignored the degree to which the two sets of dynamics changed the character of war amongst the people as strategic environments for which strategic solutions are sought and implemented. The chapter shows how two models of regular–irregular interaction fragmented and segmented


Afghanistan and, more importantly, for how long. One of the most recent expressions of this fragmentation process came in April 2017, when former Afghan mujahedeen Gulbuddin Hekmatyar issued a call for peace in Afghanistan: ‘I invite you to join the peace caravan and stop the pointless, meaningless and unholy war’. The archetype of the proxy warrior – who waged holy war against the Soviets, who tried to rule Afghanistan through and with Pakistani support and who finally rebelled against the Taliban – was now pursuing a radically different strategy: of ending wars. Such shifts demonstrate the complex nature of war amongst the people, which are made possible by the very extension of these wars through proxy and auxiliary dynamics. As they have been a feature of such wars for decades now, both military and scholarly thinking should assess their strategic value and, more importantly, their consequences, with greater precision and acuity.

References


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