Insight into the thought of St. Anselm

Article

Published Version

Evans, G. (1975) Insight into the thought of St. Anselm. Reading Medieval Studies, I. pp. 1-15. ISSN 0950-3129 Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/83244/

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing.

Publisher: University of Reading

All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement.

www.reading.ac.uk/centaur

CentAUR

Central Archive at the University of Reading

Reading’s research outputs online
INSIGHT IN THE THOUGHT OF ST. ANSELM

The moment of illumination, the intuitive understanding of the implication of the novel grouping of familiar ideas, is an experience which some Gestalt psychologists have called 'the AHA reaction'. Anselm would have recognised the aptness of the description, as would Augustine. In Chapter VI of the Monologion Anselm describes how his meditation led him suddenly to an important insight, which filled him with delight:

ad magnum et delectabile quiddam me subito perduxit
haec mea meditatio.

The ontological argument came to him in the same way, despite, rather than because of, his efforts to work out a means of proving the existence of God. Eadmer describes how distracted Anselm was in the days before the solution thrust itself upon him as an inspiration. Suddenly, he grasped the notion towards which his seemingly turbulent thoughts had been driving him. 'I embraced it eagerly,' he says, 'I thought that what I had been so delighted to discover would please anyone who read it, if it were written down.' Perhaps the reason why intuitive apperception gives delight lies in its apparently close relation to the effect of that juxtaposition of the incongruous which seems to be one of the triggers of laughter. Two frames of reference brought together for the first time often stimulate a novel perception which then strikes a double response of intellectual understanding and emotional release. Arthur Koestler names the response of laughter 'the HAHA reaction', and points out its logical and emotional components. In Anselm, the emotional element is a feeling of delight rather than of amusement; it is a religious emotion, and it is, for him, an essential part of the creative experience. The intellectual comprehension of meaning meets with an emotional assimilation and acceptance. In this way faith and reason work together in Anselm's thought.

I want to suggest that the originality of Anselm's mind may spring from his capacity for forming just such novel associations between areas of discourse and frames of reference, and that he was free to do this in a way that the scholastic philosophers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries were not — precisely because they possessed a much more advanced technique of argument. They had a 'whole', rather than an incomplete, Aristotelian logic, a technical vocabulary of increasing precision, and, above all, a strong sense of demarcation,
of the limits of application of their methods of argument. Anselm applies the methods of argument of one art to the field of another – of logic, for example, to a grammatical problem – without questioning their applicability. As a result, his thinking throws up from time to time such doggedly persistent ideas as that on which the ontological argument rests, concepts as impossible to pin down by definition as his notion of a “necessary reason” or of *convenientia*.

Part of the attractiveness of Anselm’s thought resides in its resistance to exhaustive analysis; there is always more behind. A word in Anselm’s hands may seem to hold a number of meanings. Where Aquinas would seek to clear up ambiguity, Anselm sometimes enjoys exploring the possibilities of ambivalence. *Intueri* itself, in the *Monologion*, seems to imply both understanding and perception or vision; sometimes it carries one sense, and sometimes both. Anselm lived at a stage in the development of philosophical Latin when it was possible to employ words in philosophical argument according to their common usage, their *usus loquendi*, as well as their technical senses. Education and inclination together made him acutely aware of language as an instrument on which it was possible to play many kinds of music. The performances of his youth have a ‘virtuoso’ quality in that they display a range of consciously-practised artistry (something much admired by his contemporaries, to judge from the demand at an early date for copies of his *Prayers* and *Meditations*). In thought and language Anselm displays a willingness to bring together distinct areas of study so as to illuminate a common patch of ground.

Anselm had at his disposal at least four main areas of contemporary learning: the grammar, logic and rhetoric of the trivium, and the devotional writing of the cloister. In the *Proslogion*, logical and devotional writing together reflect two fundamentals of Anselm’s thought and writing: reason and faith. Anselm was, unlike the majority of his scholastic successors, a scholar who was also a monk. Religious emotion is as strong in him as intellectual curiosity, the *anima amans* as the *anima rationalis*. Both were active in the composition of the *Proslogion*. In the *De Grammatico*, logic and grammar, semantics and syntax, are brought together. In the *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm seeks, through both logical and rhetorical methods of argument, to convince all kinds of men of the necessity of the Incarnation. These three examples, considered against a background of attitudes to thought and language inherited by eleventh century writers, may serve to illustrate Anselm’s willingness to let the areas of his educational
experience overlap, and to demonstrate the sometimes startling discoveries which result.

Anselm assumed the universal validity of all the laws of argument he knew. He had a capacity for understanding simultaneously a whole cluster of related concepts under a single term, thus enabling him to bring a range of ideas under scrutiny and to ‘see’ their common factor. In his view of the universe there was a proper place for everything, an absolute harmonia, which guaranteed that truths could never contradict each other and that there must be a right outcome for every argument. The universe enjoys an ordo whose beauty can be disturbed by sin, but never seriously damaged or destroyed by it. Anselm has only to make his arguments convenientes and decentes; he has only to make them fit into the pre-existing pattern and to demonstrate truths already known by faith. Of course his reaction to a new insight must be one of delighted recognition; he has discovered something already put there by God to delight him. God is for Anselm as for Augustine what Étienne Gilson calls ‘un maître intérieur’ who illuminates the understanding.

The terms Anselm uses to describe this view of the universe occur in the writings of his contemporaries — especially in the theological works of the School of Laon. They are not unique to Anselm. His view of the universe is not peculiar, but one substantially in keeping with contemporary attitudes as well as with a long and ancient tradition of learning and interpretation.

Many critics have pointed out that Anselm argues towards a forgone conclusion; but in his view of the universe all possible conclusions are there before he begins to seek them. A ‘necessary reason’ is not merely one whose logic is compelling. It is reasonable because it satisfies the rational faculty implanted in man by a ‘reasonable’ God. It is necessary because it fits into its context precisely and inevitably. Sustained by such a universe, Anselm’s intellect explores in safety; all right laws must hold in every area of the universe:

Voluntas namque dei numquam est irrationabilis. The will of God is never irrational. For all things there is a rectus ordo, a right order.

In this infinitely reliable universe, language, too, has a proper place. The doctrine of the Word of God, the Verbum Dei, makes language far more than a means of communication to Anselm, and
consequently presents him with a number of philosophical problems. How can there be a word for evil or falsehood, when the Word is pure Truth? How can there be more than one word when the Word is One and Indivisible? The close relation between word and meaning in Anselm’s thought depends heavily on the theory of language developed by St. Augustine, as well as upon the work of Boethius. Such theories make it impossible for Anselm to separate the three arts of grammar, logic and rhetoric, (the arts which govern the use of language) from questions concerned with the divine origins of language itself. The right use of language remains, for Anselm, a profoundly theological problem.

The very terms, noun and verb, nomen and verbum, compound the problem. The Name and the Word of God respectively share the terms used to describe technical grammatical aspects of language. It is on such facts of common terminology, and on his acceptance of paradoxical double-truths and compound meanings, that Anselm's respect for language and his care in using it are grounded. He was encouraged by the nature of the vocabulary available to him, and by the traditions of the Christian theory of language, to adopt a view of language which we must seek to understand by an effort of historical imagination. It seems to him utterly consonant with the nature of universal order.

The only language known to Anselm in which philosophical ideas could be discussed, was Latin. He knew of the existence of Greek, but not more than a few chance words of the language. None of the vernaculars of his time appears to have been a comparably adequate vehicle for abstract thought. Even Latin had its limitations: despite the efforts of Cicero and Seneca to develop the capacity of the language for the expression of philosophical ideas, Latin remained an eminently ‘concrete’ language. One aspect of the problem of paronyms discussed in Anselm's De Grammatico arises from the lack of definite and indefinite articles in Latin; grammaticus may mean either ‘literate’ or ‘a literate man’. Further, the lack of sophisticated languages of comparison meant that Anselm had no means of knowing what other ideas it might be possible to formulate in another language; he could not know what economies of demonstration might be possible in sign-language or in symbolic logic.

D.P. Henry sees him as striving to distinguish between the ordinary and the technical uses of words, to establish a technical vocabulary. Certainly, compound concepts made out of two or
more words (for example, *Deus-Homo*, *ratio-necessaria*, *usus-loquendi*, *significatio-per-se*, *significatio-per-aliud*) suggest that Anselm is at times hard put to it to stretch Latin to fit his needs. The very notion of a concept is often viewed as a twelfth-century invention, perhaps an innovation of Abelard’s.19 This characteristic of Latin—above all, its possession of a ‘concrete’ vocabulary—gave Anselm an immensely solid grasp of what we should call abstractions. He saw, perhaps, no difference in kind between the abstract and the concrete, but rather a difference of order. To say that ‘that-than-which-no-greater-can-be-thought’20 must exist in reality is to set it at the apex of the order of ‘thoughts’ where the abstract is also the real. The very words in which Anselm expresses his arguments reflect this fundamental, and perhaps limiting, characteristic of the Latin language: there existed a shortage of abstract nouns ending in -itas, a shortage which was to be made good by the scholastics.

A statement, for Anselm, was composed of a series of separate items, solid verbal building-blocks, joined together in a structure governed by certain linguistic laws, some of them syntactical, others, semantic. The laws of structure were analogous with those of the universe, where men and angels stood as separate beings held in a fixed relationship to one another. His knowledge of language gave Anselm little precedent for grasping by means of argument alone the idea denoted by the compound phrase ‘that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought’; it was the result of a leap of intuitive perception made in the context of a devotional exercise into which logic had been introduced.

Conventional training in logic and grammar did nothing to shake the view of language as composed of a number of bricks cemented together. The rules of the Aristotelian logic Anselm knew21 involve the reduction of each proposition to a number of semantic units linked by copulas. The ancient Boethian diagrams, some of which are printed in Migne, express the relationships between the categories, or between the possible combinations of propositions with valid conclusions, in terms of a series of enclosed spaces joined by lines to other enclosed spaces. The whole forms a tree or a square, or some other recognisable pattern, but the pattern is always made up of separable units of meaning linked together.

Similarly, the textbooks of grammar analyse each part of speech in turn into its component subdivisions; they consider the separate aspects of the subject: the letter, the syllable, the foot; the accent;
spelling; etymology; errors, and so on, and the ways in which the component parts may be put together into schemata and tropi and further compounded into history or fable. The habit of separating the elements of language, whether syntactically or semantically, and expressing their relationship by joining them together in various ways might have imposed a severe restriction on Anselm’s flexibility of thought and perhaps even made of him a dialectical casuist like his opponent Roscelin. But the influence of rhetorical and devotional writing developed in him the capacity to express his emotional spirituality in a warm rush of overwhelming eagerness; in this way he seizes on essentials with the directness and immediacy of apprehension of Augustine’s persuasive eloquentia. His temperamental affinity with Augustine is limited; but his vast reading in Augustine seems to have marked the style of his devotional works with an Augustinian penchant for antithesis and parallelism, climax and paradox. This rhetorical style is found in a number of other eleventh-century authors, and it no doubt owes something to the direct influence of the style of the Psalms which Augustine himself emulated, but it is not characteristic of the philosophical writings of later scholastics. Anselm’s is a fides quaerens intellectum, a faith seeking understanding. The demonstration of the truth by means of reason comes after its perception and acceptance by faith. Anselm weeps and rejoices; he often sweeps his readers into emotional acquiescence with his argument before he seeks to convince their reason.

Yet Anselm saw the universe in such terms that no intended disharmony was possible and in a way which made it necessary simultaneously to understand logical, grammatical and rhetorical principles of argument as distinct and yet as all one, as interchangeable and universally valid. It is in this context that he brings together the methods of argument of grammar and dialectic, the methods of persuasion of rhetoric, the affirmations and yearnings of devotional writing, making discoveries which delight both intellect and emotion.

First, the Proslogion: it is striking that it and the Monologion were written at about the same time as Anselm wrote the majority of his Prayers and Meditations, or soon afterwards, and during the period when he composed some of the most elaborately emotional of those letters of monastic friendship which, it may be argued, amount to works of devotion. Anselm was in his forties and had begun to write for circulation after a period of about ten years spent at Bec silently living a monastic life of exemplary quality, as his
biographer Eadmer describes it. The Proslogion has often been treated as if it were a purely logical work hung about with redundant chapters which add a great many sentiments but little matter to the argument. The ontological argument itself has been removed from its context and attacked as though it were intended to be something which it is not. If it is seen as the central insight of a meditation, that is, as part of a devotional exercise, a truth to which the soul as well as the understanding may gain access, it begins to appear in the light of one of Anselm’s ‘discoveries’, the fruit of a new bringing together of logical and devotional writing.

Anselm himself describes the Monologion as a meditatio on the Divine Essence. In the Preface to the Proslogion, its sequel, he explains that the process of meditation is one of silent or interior reasoning (tacite secum ratiocinando). The Monologion, he says, is made up of a series of arguments connected like the links in a chain. It is an example of the use of the technique already discussed of joining separate items in a process of reasoning. When he had written it, he began to wonder whether one single argument might be found which would prove not only that God really exists – quia deus vere est – but also that He is the summum bonum, and at the same time be sufficient to prove every other point of faith about the Divine Essence. The ontological argument, it seems, was intended not merely as a single elegant proof of the existence of God, but as a framework of argument into which other matters of faith might be fitted with a view to demonstrating their credibility by reason. The treatise in which the ontological argument is set contains a number of examples of alternative and developed uses of the argument. Seen as part of Anselm’s original purpose they do not appear redundant, nor do the chapters which contain nothing but rhetorically expressed affirmations of faith seem mere decoration when the whole is considered as a devotional work.

But it is in the ontological argument itself that Anselm felt he had made a discovery. It is there, then, we must look for evidence of the fruitfulness of the marriage of logic and devotional writing. The argument of the second chapter has a deceptive simplicity. It achieves economy by directness. Anselm assumes the acceptance of certain principles which seemed to him self-evident. He does not, for example, pause to demonstrate how ‘greater’ is interchangeable with ‘better’, or what precisely are those things which ‘it-is-better-to-be-than-not-to-be’, or that the whole structure of the universe, hierarchically ordered, with God at its apex, is analogous with the
hierarchically ordered structure of thought and language, image and reality. Exhaustive logical demonstration might demand that he should begin by defining his terms, rendering them exact, squaring off his blocks of meaning. The eager certainty of his perception of the truth means that Anselm dispenses here not only with such formal preliminaries, but with extended syllogistic exposition. In saying that what exists in thought must also—in this special case at least—exist in reality, Anselm has offended later critics of his argument; he assumes that arguments about words are arguments about reality. If, in Anselm’s universe, there is no difference in kind, but only one of degree or order, the problem did not exist for him. The idea of God, which is the highest of all ideas, must, in the order of things, possess reality; too. Anselm’s certainty arose from established assumptions common to other writers of his period combining with the emotional experience of delighted recognition which came to him at the moment of insight. The directness and boldness of the strokes with which he sketches the outline of his argument are the result of the confident certainty of his faith.

That it was a novel practice to set passages of quasi-logical demonstration in the context of a devotional work is suggested by the fact that his prayers and the other meditations are devoid of such ‘arguments’. Anselm found it necessary to defend the Monologion against Lanfranc’s criticism of its logical elements by saying that it contained nothing at variance with patristic authority, and most especially, nothing which contradicts Augustine. This suggests that the introduction of logical demonstration into a work intended as a devotional aid was sufficiently new to require justification.

The logical passages in the Proslogion are stylistically distinct from the purely devotional. Anselm was following Augustine’s principles of Christian rhetoric in separating the rich style suitable for the expression of devotional feeling from the plain one in which dialectical argument is made clear. The preservation of two distinct styles within this single work seems to underline Anselm’s awareness that he was uniting two distinct kinds of argument, the persuasive and the rationally convincing. If we accept this view, the Proslogion represents a conscious attempt to apply logic to a devotional exercise, to bring together the intuitive perceptions of faith with intellectual understanding. The ontological argument which results still has the capacity to spark off the reaction of delighted recognition because it satisfies on two levels, the emotional and the intellectual, where it has sometimes failed to satisfy on one level alone.
A similarly clear awareness of what he was doing in bringing together separate areas of study shows in Anselm’s handling of the central problem of his *De Grammatico*, an elementary introduction to dialectic. He was to say in the *De Casu Diaboli* that we must not become enmeshed in a net of words used in so many ways that the truth is obscured by the multitude of meanings. To say that a word for Anselm may mean a number of things at once is not to say that he fails to distinguish between those meanings. He approaches the analysis of language in two ways, as a logician and as a grammarian. In Chapter XVIII of the *De Grammatico* he differentiates between logicians, who deal with words according to their meaning, their semantic context, and grammarians, who ‘tell us that ‘stone’, ‘rock’, ‘slave’ (*lapis*, *petra*, *mancipium*) are masculine, feminine and neuter respectively’, and who thus make a statement about morphology not semantics. What interested Anselm — and other grammarians such as Abbo of Fleury a generation earlier — was what inference could be drawn as a result of setting together grammatical and logical methods of linguistic analysis.

The problem posed by the pupil at the beginning of the *De Grammatico* is whether *grammaticus* is a substance — ‘a grammarian’ — or a quality — ‘grammatical’. The example is a standard one discussed by Priscian and Donatus as well as by Aristotle and Boethius. It is an aspect of the larger problem of the relationship between such pairs of words as *grammaticus*/*grammatica* — the standard paronyms. *Grammaticus* may be used as a noun or as an adjective; but the ancient grammarians saw the adjective as a species of noun, not as a separate part of speech, so that this partial solution was not open to Anselm. Anselm comes triumphantly out of a labyrinth of demonstration and analogy with a distinction between direct and oblique *signification*, *significatio-per-se* and *significatio-per-aliud*. *Grammaticus*, he concludes, signifies ‘literate’ or ‘grammatical’ directly, and ‘a literate man’ or ‘a grammarian’ indirectly or obliquely. His methods of ‘testing’ his process of argument include the grammatical as well as the dialectical. If ‘*grammaticus*’ signified literacy appellatively, that is, if it were the name by which ‘literacy’ were referred to in ordinary usage, we should find ourselves saying *grammaticus est grammatica* when we set out to describe literacy. ‘And that,’ says Anselm, ‘is not common usage’. The error shows up because it generates a piece of grammatical nonsense. Elsewhere, Anselm tests his argument by formal syllogism. ‘Set the four propositions you have formulated in two syllogisms’, he instructs his pupil in the dialogue. By means of such techniques he extends
and refines his definition of meaning and its forms. The extension he is able to make is at least partly the result of the new dimension of understanding which is opened to him when he brings logic and grammar to bear on the problem together.

He does not claim to have ‘discovered’ the problem himself; it had evidently been picked up from its Boethian source at least by the dialecticians of his day. He tells his pupil to keep an open mind when he discusses the question further, and to be open to the arguments of the dialecticians who debate it nostri temporibus. The novelty of Anselm’s contribution lies in his synthesis of a grammatical with a logical problem, in his capacity for ‘seeing’ a new solution to an old question as a result of setting the rules of grammatical argument — that is, the laws of syntax — against the rules of logical argument.

The culminating achievement of Anselm’s synthesis of methods is the Cur Deus Homo, where rhetorical and logical elements are fused together. In this later work, written twenty years after the Proslogion and the De Grammatico, there is no overt separation of the elements of its thought and composition. The work forms a stylistic and argumentative whole. Anselm says that he intends it to convince all sorts of men, literati and illiterati, those capable of appreciating the cogency of his arguments on a technical level, and those whose assent must be won by the persuasiveness of his arguments on a much simpler level. The reason given for the Incarnation should be:

\[
\text{omnibus intelligibilis et propter utilitatem et rationis pulchritudinem amabilis,}^{35}
\]

intelligible to all, and delightful because of the beauty of its reasonableness. He seems to be offering again to share his own experience of delighted recognition of the truth by means of logical demonstration of an intuitively perceived certainty.

Boso, Anselm’s companion in the dialogue, agrees with his master that rectus ordo exiguit, right order demands that we should first believe the profundities of the Christian faith, and then seek to understand what we believe. As before, we have the elements of faith and reason brought together. Some modern commentators have seen Anselm as ‘groping his way confusedly towards... a distinction’ between the spheres of faith and reason as though they were irreconcileably distinct in his thought. This line of argument leads M. Charlesworth to the conclusion that since Anselm does not appear
to use the terms involved with complete logical consistency, his ideas must be 'incomplete and confused and undeveloped'.

If, on the other hand, Anselm saw faith and reason as mutually supportive and mutually illuminating means of approach to the truth, whose terms of reference are interchangeable within one universe of discourse, as united rather than opposed principles, then this particular difficulty largely disappears. Anselm is deliberately bringing together faith and reason in order to perceive what they jointly reveal, and to show his discovery to his readers.

Reason is represented in the *Cur Deus Homo* by logical demonstration, faith by rhetorically persuasive expressions of devotional feeling. In Book I, Chapter IV Boso proposes that the rational certainty of the truth should first be shown:

Monstranda ergo prius est veritatis soliditas rationabilis

Then, that the fact may shine the more brightly, the contributing necessities should be explained. There is, then, a double task, that of the logician in showing how the necessity for the Incarnation becomes irresistibly clear to human reason once the truth is understood, and that of the rhetorician in making the beauty of the truth apparent, by polishing it until it shines.

The role of rhetoric in the *Cur Deus Homo* is rather different from that of the devotional style in the *Proslogion*. The massive piling-up of stylistic devices such as antithesis and parallelism, rhyme and rhythm, assonance and alliteration, gives way to a more understated gracefulness of style. There are other elements of the rhetorician's art present in the *Cur Deus Homo* which seem to derive not from Augustine, but more directly from the study of the few classical rhetorical authorities available in the eleventh century—the *De Inventione* of Cicero, the *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and, just possibly, Quintilian's *Institutes of Oratory*. The first deals primarily with the structure of a composition and with methods of argument rather than with points of style. 'Proof' and 'argument' have rhetorical meanings quite distinct from their logical sense, and when in the *Cur Deus Homo* Anselm claims to 'prove' by 'arguments' he is often demonstrably not doing so in the classical logical sense of the term— as his critics have pointed out.

Rhetoricians were trained to make their arguments convincing by multiplying illustrative detail. This seems to be what Anselm's companion proposes that he should do in order to make the *corpus veritatis* shine more brightly. Quintilian advocates this method of
convincing the listener in Book V of the *Institutes of Oratory* as greatly superior to the use of the syllogism alone. If logicians, he says, examine every point with the utmost minuteness and scrupulosity, they convince only those with enough knowledge of dialectic to follow their formal reasoning; orators must persuade people of little education – and Anselm, too, says that he wants to convince all kinds of men, not merely dialecticians. Unless orators ‘attract men by force and occasionally excite their feelings’, says Quintilian, as well as illustrating their arguments with ‘richness and brilliance’, they will fail to convince the majority of men.

*Probatio* and *argumentum* in Cicero may mean ‘the material of evidence’. Anselm’s ‘necessary reasons’ may ‘prove’ in the sense of furnishing evidence for the view that the Incarnation was unavoidable. ‘I think I have shown clearly enough by the above reasons’, says Anselm, and: ‘whether the truth has been demonstrated irrefutably by one argument or by many, it is defended against all doubt’.

One argument is enough to prove what is true by logical means, yet Anselm furnishes several, as he himself admits. An orator collected evidence because a number of reasons are collectively more persuasive than a single one. When Anselm uses the term *monstrare*, ‘to show’ or ‘to demonstrate’, he is explaining what is the function of these arguments. They consolidate a certainty by formal proof and by illustration, by both logical and rhetorical means. They fulfil his stated purpose of convincing all kinds of men, and they do it by his intended method, one which unites the virtues of the logical and rhetorical arts of argument.

It seems possible, then, to argue that in this work of his maturity Anselm achieves an integration of the potentialities of two of the arts of the trivium. He was able to understand simultaneously what we might see as very different meanings of the same technical terms of argument, of proof, or demonstration. There is no reason to suppose that Anselm saw the problem in complicated terms, or that he sought to make distinctions. His overall purpose is to show how all kinds of evidence work together to confirm the rightness of his faith; there can be no confusion or contradiction of method; the principle of order rules that out.

In this respect Anselm appears as a master of the resolution of paradoxes. He delights in reconciling logical contradictories and in the rhetorical practice of setting startling paradoxes before his reader. The *Proslogion* contains a number of chapters with such
titles as:

- How God can be omnipotent, although there are many things He cannot do.
- How God can show mercy justly to the wicked.
- How God alone is limitless and eternal, although other spirits are limitless and eternal, too.

In the *De Grammatico* Anselm contrives that the argument should come logically to the point where one would be forced to say *grammaticus est grammatica* if it were not grammatical nonsense. We have the statement that ‘a man is a non-man’ and that ‘Socrates is a man-who-knows-grammar-man’ or ‘a man-who-knows-grammar-man-man’, and so on. It is from the reconciliation of such logical paradoxes that the supreme synthesis of the *Cur Deus Homo* emerges – the idea of the *Deus-homo*; the God-man is the only solution of the paradoxical demands of the human situation. Only man ought to pay the penalty for sin, but he cannot. Only God can pay, but He ought not. Only a God-man both owes and is able to pay the debt. His last completed work, the *De Concordia*, is a masterpiece of paradox resolved, in which free will and predestination are shown to be all one.

In passages of rhetorically-composed devotional style we find evidence of the same fundamental characteristic of Anselm’s mind. ‘If you are everywhere, Lord, why do I not see you here?’ ‘I sought peace and I have found sorrow.’ ‘I hoped for joy, and behold! how thickly my sighs crowd upon one another.’ This habit of bringing opposing ideas face to face distinguishes Anselm’s style as clearly as it does his thought.

It is this habitual exercise of mental gymnastics which gave Anselm his skill in outwitting his contemporary opponents. With ebullient delight he perceives the ambivalent solution which makes a unity of seemingly contradictory notions. The energy of his powerful intellectual and emotional curiosity still discharges itself in such a way that the modern reader still experiences with Anselm the delighted recognition of a perceived truth, the ‘AHA reaction’.

Reading University

GILLIAN EVANS
NOTES


4 S I.93.19-21.


6 For a list of recent articles on the subject, see J. Hopkins, A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm, Minneapolis, 1972, p.261-5.

7 See, ibid., ff for a number of articles on this topic.

8 e.g., S I.25.4-7; S I.73.8-10, 16-8; S I.77.21-4.

9 See Letters 10,28,55,70.

10 See Cur Deus Homo I.xv (S II.73.6-9).

11 Collected in O. Lottin, Psychologie et morale au xii* et xiii* siècles, Gembloux, 1947-60, 6 vols., Vol. V.

12 CDH I.viii (S II.59.11).

13 Monologion XXXII (S I.50.16-8).

14 Monologion XXXIII (S I.52.4-7).

15 Cf. the numerous references to the De Trinitate identified by Schmitt.


17 He asks Maurice, his ex-pupil, to be particularly careful in copying Greek words in the gloss on Hippocrates' Aforismi which Maurice is working on at Canterbury. See Letter 60.

18 See The Logic of St. Anselm, Chapter 2.

19 But see a passage in Gilbert of Poitiers, Commentaries on Boethius, ed N.M. Haring, Toronto, 1966, p.189.66-190.75, remarks on the Boethian phrase: communis animi conceptio.
Chapter II (S 1.101-2).

21 Probably chiefly those to be found in the Categories and the De Interpretatione. See D.P. Henry op.cit.

22 Cf. Proslogion I (S 100.18-9).


24 S I.7.3.

25 S I.93.2-4.

26 Letter 77 (S III.199.19).

27 De Doctrina Christiana Book IV.

28 Preface to De Veritate (S I.173.6-8).

29 S I.235.8-12.

30 S I.164.

31 S I.157.7-8.

32 S I.147.21-2.

33 S I.168.8-9.

34 S II.48.5-8.

35 Ibid.

36 S II.48.16.


38 Ibid. p.39.

39 S II.52.3.

40 S II.94.15-6.

41 S I.157.8.