Unintended Outcomes of Ethiopia’s State-Led Development

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By
Mark Neuse
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Declaration

I confirm this is my own work, that the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.
Abstract

Ethiopia’s centralized programmes of economic growth and social development are bringing the nation towards achievement of its goal of becoming “a middle-income country by the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11). Significant advances in social programmes have resulted in longer life spans, increased incomes, and a much better educated population. Yet, unexpected outcomes are inadvertently threatening the state. The emergence of a thriving middle class, especially among those employed in service industries in the metropolis of Addis Ababa, has resulted in a demand for better and more comfortable housing. However, residential and other construction has only been possible through the expropriation of land along the periphery of the city and this is displacing hundreds of thousands of smallholders. At the same time, the federal government has considerably increased educational opportunities. Although this has been widely beneficial, it has also resulted in secondary school leavers and university graduates who substantially outnumber current employment opportunities. While issues of developmentally induced ousting and youth unemployment pertain to other areas of Ethiopia, they are occurring particularly rapidly along the periphery of Addis Ababa. Ousted smallholders must quickly adopt new non-farm livelihoods while a better-educated youth cohort must find suitable and proper employment. A sense of groupism has moderated the reactions of smallholders to their ousting even as the frustration of unemployment among youth groups is manifesting in anti-government disturbances. These issues existentially threaten Ethiopia’s political and social order.

This thesis explores the reactions of smallholders and students to Ethiopia’s successful social and economic development through a conceptual examination of the role of in situ and ex situ displacement narratives. It finds that different groups have exhibited significantly divergent reactions to their circumstances. It concludes that while Ethiopia’s form of centralized development has undeniably benefitted the nation, those benefits are, themselves, inadvertently resulting in secondary issues which impinge upon stability and individual prosperity.
Dedication

In remembrance of ‘Professor’ Norm Kearney, a pilot who flew in the Berlin Airlift and who sparked a life-long interest in foreign affairs, and dedicated to my wife, Mona, without whose help and assistance this would not have been possible.
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Chapter 1
An Examination of Displacement in Ethiopia

1.0 Introduction to the Thesis

This research interrogates the unforeseen consequences of successful growth and development programmes in Ethiopia, in particular focussing attention upon two groups, development-displaced smallholders and educated but socially displaced youth. While Ethiopia’s development has resulted in a more stable and prosperous economy, its beneficial outcomes have been unevenly experienced, especially by these two groups as the process and outcomes of development have different meanings for individuals and groups.

Following a period of highly erratic economic growth, in 2002 the federal government of Ethiopia initiated a suite of state-led development plans. The outcomes have had substantial positive effects such as calming the erratic economy and reducing mortality rates for infants and children under five years old. Key among Ethiopia’s programmes has been the almost universal availability of education at the basic levels (MoE, 2015; Seid, et al., 2015; CSA, 2016). The success of these plans has dramatically increased economic and social development, creating a prosperous middle class who are now seeking new and more comfortable housing outside of the urban core (Mohammed, et al., 2017) Ethiopia’s economic development has led to a more prosperous society overall. However, it is also resulting in the wholesale ousting of rural residents in some areas and social dissension among students in others (Desalegn, 2016) these affected groups have had significantly divergent reactions to their physical and social displacement.

Beginning with its 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan, the national government has primarily emphasized labour-intensive agriculture and a highly specialized service sector rather than the creation of lower-level manufacturing opportunities that newly displaced smallholders might aspire to (Clapham, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017). Though the economy remains vibrant, in the absence of appropriate employment youth at both the secondary school and university levels are finding too-few work opportunities. Their frustrations are resulting in destabilizing civil disobedience (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).

This thesis examines the critical transitional period for these groups, during which their displacement is both physical and social; a time during which neither smallholders nor students have fully transitioned to new lives. While specifically revealed in Ethiopia, the larger issues precipitating these changes are likely to apply throughout Africa as the development and population of the continent substantially increases during the 21st century (UNESCO, 2015).
1.1 Ethiopia’s Successful State-led Development

Countries from the global North were initially attracted to sub-Saharan Africa for purposes of colonization and resource extraction, but their interest later expanded to include the strategic value of the Horn of Africa during World War II and its political value throughout the Cold War (DoD, 1990). Once the Cold War ended, Northern states, particularly the former Soviet Union and the United States, lost much of their interest in the area. Since then, Ethiopia’s development has become a primarily indigenous and therefore a more sustainable process (Chanyalew, 2015).

The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) came to power in 1991 following a 17-year civil war with the Marxist-slanted Dergue government. The EPRDF initially governed through a decade of highly erratic economic growth which was interrupted by droughts and cross-border wars. To better control that growth, in 2002 the national government initiated an iterative programme of centrally directed state-led development. The introduction of these programmes by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi quickly stabilized the erratic economy and by 2005 Ethiopia’s GDP growth rate had risen to 12.6% annually (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017). Ethiopia’s economy has continued to be a success story and the nation has been generally peaceful. It is now considered to be “one of the most stable states in Eastern Africa” (IMF, 2016; Shiferaw, 2017).

Garland, et al., (2018: 38), however, caution researchers not to conflate GDP growth with social success, stressing that “economic growth is a component of progress, not synonymous with it.” Such measures of growth may not fully discriminate between beneficial and harmful effects. As example, expanding industrial output is an indicator of economic improvement, yet a corresponding increase of serious health issues resulting from industrial pollution may undermine or limit further growth. Thus, this research examines the unintended outcomes of successful development programmes, specifically the confounding and seemingly disparate issues of displacement of smallholders in peri-urban areas and the under-employment of Ethiopia’s educated youth, despite the carefully planned and delivered social programmes. Both groups are displaced, physically and socially, as neither can return to their physical place

---

1 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) was known during the war period, 1975 until 1991, as the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front. It was led by Meles Zenawi, who was then a member of the Marxist–Leninist League of Tigray. Zenawi served as President of the Transitional Government of Ethiopia from 1991 until 1995, and subsequently as Prime Minister until his sudden death on 20 August 2012. For brevity sake, the few references to the TPLF will read EPRDF.
of origin nor easily move forward, as the social/political structure they had relied upon no longer exists for them.

Caldentey (2008: 28) contends the “developmental state refers to a state which [positively] intervenes and guides the direction and pace of economic development.” State-led development programmes pursue growth strategies that are unique to the particular nation, and at their basic level, they demonstrate “the state can play a central role in economic growth” (Radice, 2008: 1153). Thus, Fantini (2013: 2) asserts Ethiopia’s exceptional growth and development have occurred through a focus upon “public capital investments” particularly those in employment producing infrastructure projects such as new housing and roadways, dams and power plants, “as well as a high degree of investment in poverty reduction programmes and basic service delivery” such as community health care. Development however, results in more than better housing or power plants. According to Kelsall (2011: 4) it represents “the transformation of the economy and personal well-being expressed through a positive change in growth, per capita income, life-expectancy, access to education, healthcare, and clean water.” Yet, as Bellu (2011: 2) warned, benefits accruing to “one part of the system may be detrimental to the development of other parts, giving rise to conflicting objectives.”

Ethiopia’s state-led\(^2\) development policies have, however, generally by-passed the industrialization phase of economic growth. The initial state-led plans prioritized the polar opposites of labour-intensive agricultural development and a high-technology service sector (SDPRP, 2002; PASDEP, 2006\(^3\)) and its evolving educational policies have reflected those primacies. Its current development plan, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, strongly advocates the sequenced construction of new infrastructure and employment through industrial development (NPC, 2015; Wondifraw, et al., 2015). Yet, even as manufacturing and industrial

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\(^2\) The 1933 *Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States* defined ‘the state’, as a person in international law, as possessing “(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) a government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states” (Montevideo, 1933: 3).

\(^3\) While PASDEP (2006: 14) (*Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty*) advocated industrial development as “the driving force for the overall development of the economy” it specifically promoted micro and small businesses as employment generators. It gave emphasis to low-skill, and essentially subsistence enterprises, such as “animal breeding, poultry farming, silk production, honey production, small-scale sewing and metal works, construction work, waste collection and disposal activities, car parking services, maintenance services as well as establishment of miniature stores.” Leidholm (2002) found those micro-businesses in lesser-developed countries are often short-lived cottage industries whose sales cater to easily met consumer needs. Such ventures are often acts of last resort rather than a response to an emerging market opportunity. Literature regarding Ethiopia notes the speed with that medium and small enterprises enter the market, briefly succeed, fail and then exit the market (Gebreeyesus, 2007; Bekele & Worku, 2008; Adam, 2014). Their rapid failure makes them a poor choice for newly educated youth who are seeking long-term economic stability in their own right as well as representing a risky investment for transitioning smallholders.
development have become a national priority, they remain generally confined to low technology outputs such as sugar and leather products and so government policies at all levels continue to rely upon agricultural labour for the bulk of employment (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015). This does not meet the employment needs of a better educated youth cohort and the lack of suitable opportunities for this group are resulting in civil disorder (BBC, 2015; ILO, 2017). However, there are enough well-paying opportunities within the metropolis of Addis Ababa to create a substantial demand for new and better housing outside of the urban core and this is causing widespread displacement among smallholder farmers who reside there (Home, 2016b).

1.2 Background of the Problem

Increased income levels among a highly educated and occupationally focussed core of service industry professionals in the capital city are allowing urban workers to purchase land in the peripheral areas of the city for new and better housing. New home construction will displace hundreds of thousands of smallholders (Home, 2016b) who generally have few non-farm labour skills with which to transition to peri-urban livelihoods (UNESCO, 1975; AU, 2007; Belete, 2011). As their farmland is expropriated for residential and commercial construction or infrastructure development, displaced rural residents disburse and move into neighbouring villages and towns, typically in larger numbers than those communities can absorb. They consume services as well as drive down the incomes of other unskilled labourers and this is inherently antagonistic and destabilizing for established residents (Crisp, 2002).

Displacement is also social. Ethiopia’s substantial investment in its education system has created a better-educated youth cohort, particularly in the urban areas (UN, 1989; Nordas & Davenport, 2013; Azeng & Yogo, 2015; Desalegn, 2016; Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017). However, after its peak of 12.6 percent annual growth, the levelling GDP growth rate (NBE, 2017; WB, 2017b) is resulting in fewer employment positions that require those higher levels of education. Cerra & Saxena (2007: 10) found “the years immediately prior to recessions tend to experience significantly lower growth” and if sustained, unemployment and civil unrest can result. Consequently, newly accomplished young men and women are now discovering they

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The National Bank of Ethiopia was established by government Proclamation 83/1994 and later amended by Proclamation 591/2008 that, in Section 5-13, provides it with the mandate to “collect data from any person and prepare periodic economic studies...and other relevant statistical indicators for analysis and for the formulation and determination of monetary, saving and exchange policies as are useful to the Ethiopian economy.” As such, its analyses and reports are considered by this researcher to represent the position of the Government of Ethiopia. The Banks’ analysis of current growth rates is triangulated using the analyses of other international banks and agencies (Figure 4.3) that agree that Ethiopia’s GDP growth has slowed since 2005.
have fewer prospects following their formal education and thus are becoming unemployed or
der under-employed. During this liminal period, students find they cannot return to the lives they led
prior to their schooling because their educational experiences have fundamentally changed
them (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010; Murcia, 2018).

In the Ethiopian context, as elsewhere, work provides more than financial means, it is
“both a response to poverty and a vital source of respectability and self-worth” (Crivello & Van
Der Gaag, 2016: 28). Critically, without employment educated youth cannot begin independent
lives as socially recognized adults (Honwana, 2013) and therefore they are likely to become
marginalized and socially displaced (Brookfield, 2005; Bezu & Barrett., 2012). Hence, while
peri-urban smallholders are being physically displaced from their homes, their peers and
livelihoods, Ethiopia’s better educated youth are becoming socially displaced from their past but
cannot successfully transition to their future. Moreover, unmet expectations among a better-
educated youth cohort are resulting in predictable patterns of civil unrest (Pape, 2005; Seid, et
al., 2015; Brechenmacher, 2017) similar to those recently witnessed in other North African and
Middle Eastern nations (Honwana, 2013; Mulderig, 2013; de Chatel, 2014).

**Certainty of Displacement in Sub-Saharan Africa and Ethiopia**

Macro-level development-induced displacement among agriculturalists is well studied
(Erman, 1998; Doutriaux, et al., 2008; Tadele, 2009; Chaudry, 2010; HRW. 2012; Veilleux,
2013; Yirdaw, 2013; Gebregziabher, et al., 2014; Randell, 2016; Mohammed et al., 2017). The
2008 World Development Report (WB, 2008: 8) found that “inefficient, labour-intensive
subsistence-level agricultural practices are not able to replicate the level of production, nor the
economies of scale, necessary for developing nations to compete in a modernizing world.” That
report further predicted the continued use of subsistence agricultural methods such as the hoe
and plough, which remain common among Ethiopian smallholders, will be inadequate to meet
the food security demands of a rapidly increasing African population which is predicted to more
than triple by the year 2100 and which is disproportionate to the population growth of every
other continent (Figure 1.1).

The World Bank’s conclusion was that consolidation of land into medium and large-scale
commercial farms, led by an emergent entrepreneurial class, will become the future of sub-
Saharan Africa’s agricultural sector. However, it also found that few ousted smallholders will be
sufficiently skilled to survive the technological transformation required as nations rapidly
develop, nor will they have the social or educational background to adapt to the new demands brought about by changing market forces, including urbanization and industrialization. Ethiopia’s modernisation programmes and economic and social policies have precedent in the Marxist-oriented eastern European states of the former Soviet Union, a system from which the Dergue government drew its inspiration and support between 1974 and 1991 (Grigoriev, et al., 2014).

Figure 1.1

This thesis contributes to current displacement literature by filling gaps in the array of outcomes of successful mezzo-level development. Hence, this research contributes to a more
comprehensive understanding of the range and scale of the results of pro-poor development programmes and strategies.

Ethiopia in Transition

Ethiopia is in a transitional phase. As a nation that has been dependent upon the production of primary agricultural commodities such as unfinished animal hides and raw coffee beans, it is now reorienting itself towards a market based, industrial and service economy (NPC, 2015). These urban-oriented policies have resulted in physical and social transformations which are compelling change in the very basics of the lives and livelihoods of the rural population. As its upstream economic growth has increased the relative wealth and position of some groups, the downstream effects have been uneven, adversely impacting other groups or entire communities as development-induced displacement occurs.

This disparity is often overlooked. In their article on the process approach to development, Bond & Hulme (1999: 1340) discuss close “relationships between the beneficiaries and the project management.” Their model does not include consideration for ameliorative actions to address the physical and social needs of communities or individuals who will be adversely affected by very large, or ‘mega-projects’. Rather, they state, the focus is primarily upon the economic benefits of those projects and developers minimize the effects upon those who are displaced, especially minority populations, the poor and disadvantaged.

Hence, as circumstances beyond their locus of control eliminate the livelihoods they have practiced for generations, displacement may induce already poor and disadvantaged smallholders to become withdrawn and to isolate themselves in a small group of their peers (Mogues, et al., 2009; Akram, 2013). Youth, though, may respond more violently if their social progression is impeded (Pape, 2005; Azeng & Yogo, 2015). This thesis contributes to a better understanding of those outcomes at the meso- and micro-levels.

The Significance of Youth Unemployment and Under-employment

Similar to the unemployment among displaced smallholders that is resulting from a lack of marketable non-farm skills, recent literature describes a parallel condition of under-employment among educated youth. This cohort is increasingly unable to find employment to adequately utilize their newly acquired skills and knowledge (Adamu & Addamu, 2012; Desalegn, 2016; IMF, 2016; Yirdaw, 2016). Under-employment has been defined by the International Labour Organization (ILO, 1998: 4) as the “under-utilization of the productive
capacity of the employed population, including those arising from a deficient national or local economic system.” Barnichon & Zylberberg (2015: 6) contextually define unemployment in terms of “an individual with some university (or more) who is employed in an occupation which requires at most a high-school [6th form] degree.”

The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2013: 17) found that in Ethiopia “unemployment has been a problem particularly of those with a senior secondary education, among whom the unemployment rate has been higher than all other educational groups.” A more recent report notes a combined 54% unemployment/under-employment rate among the cohort aged 15 - 24 (ILO: 2017). At the same time, Ethiopia’s educational system enrols more students than the number of available and properly skilled educators can accommodate. Tessema (2009) notes this too-rapid expansion of university enrollment has led to the hiring of less-qualified instructors who, in turn, produce less well-prepared graduates. In a trend analysis of quality assurance among higher education institutions, Tessema’s conclusion was substantiated by Adamu & Addamu (2012: 842) who found “Quality culture is not a well-developed notion in Ethiopian higher education.”

Seid, et al., (2015) conclude the too-rapid expansion of university programmes, and their increasingly poor quality, directly contributes to high unemployment and under-employment among the youth cohort. They, too, note the economy is unable to absorb the influx of new graduates, or even better educated youth, and that “the imbalance between the increase in the supply of, and demand for, workers in Ethiopia has resulted in a high unemployment rate and long unemployment durations, particularly among the youth” (Seid, et al., 2015: 10). The domino effect of under-employment was described by Barnichon & Zylberberg (2015: 3) who noted that as “high-skill workers move down the job ladder, they take the jobs of less-skilled individuals, who are in turn driven out of their market or further down their own occupational ladder.”

As a result, under-employment among the better educated youth decreases the employment opportunities available to displaced and unskilled smallholders (Bryceson,1996; Hoffman & Stein, 2003; FAO, 2012). This not only establishes new strata of rural and urban poverty, it also undermines social stability. It is, however, precisely this younger age cohort who are most likely to engage in civil disobedience due to under-employment and lack of social momentum (Pape, 2005; Whitmore, 2010). Therefore, the thesis has focussed on these two seemingly unconnected groups. These issues are exacerbated by the general absence of the
social, entrepreneurial, and management skills necessary for a reliable industrial labour force (Bekele & Worku, 2008; Yirdaw, 2016).

Uncertainty regarding their futures also connects and correlates the interests of displaced smallholders and graduating students. Uncertainty was described by Williams and Balaz (2012: 168) as “the unpredictability of the future.” For displaced smallholders who may already live at or near the poverty line this uncertainty (Akay, et al., 2009) has to do with the loss of their livelihoods following ousting from land which may have been held by their families for multiple generations. For secondary school and university students it may be the consequence of under-employment as the Ethiopian economy slows and fewer employment opportunities for graduates are available (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017).

Throughout the study, six recurring themes unmistakably presented themselves. Those were: (i) the effect of Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies; (ii) the outcome of its education policies; (iii) the issues which have delayed the rise of Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector; (iv) employment and employment choices, including the active choice to remain unemployed; (v) the often unrecognized issue of liminality among physically and socially dislocated individuals; and (vi) the important, but what appears to be the under-studied, issue of groupism especially among older workers. Individually, their impact appeared peripheral yet in combination, and as their frequency of mention during interviews is extrapolated to the wider population, their chemistry poses a substantial social impact. As the study progressed, these themes set the direction of the research; including both the initial and follow-up questions posed to individual respondents and in the later analysis of the 104 responses obtained.

1.3 The Research Question

In the study area, as smallholders’ land is expropriated for new development they are paid a formulaic sum for their property but are not forcibly resettled or relocated, they are simply ousted *ex situ* with no further assistance. In this environment ousting is also economic and social as their livelihoods are being rendered obsolete by urban growth (Hyndman, 2012). Their dispersal and the atomization of their communities denies them the friendship bonds of security and trust necessary to recover. Moreover, their displacement renders them socially and economically undetectable; they become politically unimportant and therefore their future becomes invisible as only the positive outcomes accruing to the beneficiaries of development are accentuated in planning documents (Bond & Hulme, 1999; Admassie & Abebaw, 2014;
Aleman & Kim, 2015). Youth, including, better educated students are finding that while still robust, the economy is slowing (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017). They are increasingly unable to obtain employment which is commensurate with their new knowledge, skills, and expectations.

**Establishing Place Attachment**

Regarding smallholder displacement, agricultural livelihoods develop strong place attachments that represent social touchstones for which people typically have no substitute. These connections are especially resilient among people who consider their personhood as being indivisibly linked to their occupational peer groups, while their individual place identities have been shaped by collective values, behaviours and experiences (Mehretu, 2012; Rijkers & Soderbom, 2013; Abay, et al., 2016; Leu & Muller, 2016). “Identities are not construed by individuals alone but negotiated in social interaction processes between individuals” (Reitz, et al., 2014: 281) and so their disruption through displacement can create voids which impair the already limited political voices of the poor and socially marginalized as they become physically and socially separated from familiar settings (Robinson, 2003; Brown, 2005; BMI, 2015).

However, it is the better-educated and skilled youth cohort who are most likely to engage in civil disobedience and anti-government violence in response to a perceived lack of proper employment (Whitmore, 2010; Richardson, 2011). Therefore, while pressure is exerted upon all levels of government to provide for the needs of unskilled, displaced smallholders policies must also mitigate the demands of youth.

Ethiopian government planning documents promulgated at the federal level, and the wider academic literature pertinent to the subject, conclude that states cannot sustain economic growth without ensuring a combination of the complimentary issues of ‘peace’ and ‘stability’ (SDPRP, 2002; Newman & Richmond, 2006; Nir & Kafle, 2011). Development theorists and practitioners, including Berdal & Malone (2000), Collier & Hoeffler (2004b), Pape (2005), and Stewart (2011) describe a range of factors responsible for increasing levels of instability and conflict which can slow an economy and reduce employment demand (ADBG, 2017).

If the literature suggests that state-led development leads to different experiences and outcomes for different groups within society, then it is important for this research to focus on the question:

“**In what ways does development unintentionally contribute to new strata of poverty and internal instability?**”
At its root, this question is motivated by the paradox of development processes wherein some members of society may substantially benefit and profit, while others lose their livelihoods and still others are unable to realize their reasonably anticipated social and economic advancement. This undermines the potential of otherwise highly successful programmes (defined here as ‘resulting in the intended effects when carefully evaluated’) and initiatives where an increasing number of citizens are unable to fully participate in national success. It is also important to understand the process by which this takes place for different groups.

The question is inspired by the works of Michael Cernea, a social scientist who questioned the moral, social and economic sustainability of involuntary development-induced displacement and the resettlement of populations. Cernea (2004) noted that once ousted from their property, the poor are almost never made economically or socially whole again. He described a concept of impoverishment risk which derives from displacement, a condition which is compounded by the loss of life-long social and place identities and occupational interdependencies, especially among marginalized groups (see also Jansen, 2008; Docena, 2015; Lowe, et al., 2015) whose political voices are further weakened as they are physically and socially dispersed (Cernea, 1995; Robinson, 2003).

It is also informed by Victor Turner (1987), who described the transitional periods that people, particularly youth, must negotiate when leaving their past place experiences and group associations for new ones, a time during which they belong to neither group and that is inherently destabilizing. Turner closely investigated the emotional ambiguity experienced during these liminal periods of uncertainty as individuals move from one social paradigm to another. Particularly where students have ‘played by the rules’ and have a reasonable expectation of economic and social advancement, the absence of opportunities and new social belongings can lead to destabilizing civil unrest (Gurr, 1970; Halevy, et al., 2010; Ostby & Urdal, 2010; Maasho, 2016). Three points regarding (i) the certainty of displacement; (ii) the transitional nature of Ethiopia’s economy; and, (iii) youth unemployment and under-employment provide further background for the research question.

1.4 The Research Approach and Objectives

State-led development is useful for synchronizing the energies of private industry and federal government policies in order to facilitate the growth of markets. However, development is often structurally inequitable in the opportunities it presents (Huang, 1995; Ferraro, 2008) and
as its outcomes are unequally distributed or result in other unintended consequences (Del Castillo & Bunche, 2015; Galbraith, 2016).

Thus, while Ethiopia’s state-led development has been substantially successful, there is a growing level of social and economic disparity between the traditional and the newly developing economy. Moreover, the increasing gap between employment opportunities and the surplus of potential workers is not adequately addressed by the developmental government. As a result of Ethiopia’s state-led programmes, we can observe (i) continued forced displacement; (ii) a need to re-establish income producing livelihoods, (iii) a likelihood of increased internal instability, and (iv) a tendency for the national government to rely on social and political repression to manage unrest. Therefore, two objectives are presented:

**Objective 1:**

*To examine the role of Ethiopian state-led development policy in delivering outcomes that support equitable and inclusive pro-poor growth.*

**Objective 2:**

*To identify the social, cultural and economic dynamics of these government-led development programmes on two social groups: young graduates and smallholder farmers, within and around the city of Addis Ababa.*

Using Ethiopia as a case study, and by combining these two objectives, this study addresses the effects of unforeseen outcomes of the successful development which is inducing the displacement of smallholders, and of an educated yet under-employed youth cohort who may experience social displacement through unemployment and their new liminal dislocation within society. Both groups experience displacement and unemployment or under-employment in different ways, and the two objectives help to focus questions about Ethiopia’s pro-poor programmes and its educational policies; the need for new employment through increased manufacturing; liminality and groupism, and the surveillance society which the national government has created.

A constructivist perspective will be adopted to allow the research to develop an explanation of the primary concerns of the respondents in the study area. Grounded theory has been widely used in participatory education research and assessments and has been recently recommended “as a powerful tool to tackle new subject areas where existing theoretical tools have hit a road block in explaining the real world” (Tucker, 2016: 436). The application of grounded theory here “makes sense out of researcher experiences and analytic sense out of
their meanings” (Charmaz, 2006: 11). This is enabled through an extraction of the key relationships within social processes which derive from the empirical data when suitable literature and knowledge does not exist (Ng & Hase, 2008).

1.5 Why Study Change in Ethiopia?

Case studies are a well-established method to examine the interrelationship of environmental and micro-level social systems, allowing the researcher to ‘unpack’ meaning and increase understanding (Hancock & Algozzine, 2006; Piekkari & Welch, 2011). The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Ethiopia) was selected as the case study for this thesis because it presents three interesting characteristics not found elsewhere on the continent and therefore exogenous factors are limited.

First, unlike other sub-Saharan African nations Ethiopia was never colonized. A significant body of research concludes that European colonization of African nations had long-term adverse developmental effects as their wealth was extracted, while at the same time their indigenous political and social development was artificially repressed (Boahen, 1985; Bertocchi & Canova, 2002; Austin, 2010; Heldring & Robinson, 2012; Ziltener, et al., 2017). Ethiopia lacks that colonial history and since 2009 substantial legal restrictions have been placed on foreign non-government organizations operating there, including those who are interested in democracy, agriculture and land reform, or human rights (Barnes, 2006; Carter, 2009; Proclamation 621/2009). Consequently, social development and economic growth have become more indigenous and potentially more sustainable, making Ethiopia’s course of development its own (Chanyalew, 2015).

Second, Ethiopia is a non-resource intensive and non-coastal state. Its trade must cross borders that it does not control and it has few revenue-generating exports. It is surrounded by neighbours with whom it has had both lengthy and intermittent conflicts, and it has experienced a recent and significant influx of refugees from neighbouring South Sudan. Ethiopia’s population is predicted to double, reaching 187 million by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and this is expected to cause substantial changes in age cohorts and settlement patterns. This will drive further social transformation as urban areas almost triple in their population density, eventually housing approximately 41% of the nation’s population (UNHABITAT, 2007). That new degree of urbanization will cause significant physical and social change among the 86% of the population
who are now rural and the 80% who currently draw their livelihood directly from agriculture (Getahun, 1978; CSA, 2012).

Third, especially in urban areas, Ethiopia’s basic educational system has expanded significantly while university programmes are producing far more enrolments than any other nation in the Horn of Africa per capita (see Figure 5.3). This has resulted in a population that is better educated than at any time in its history, but also one which is creating new social, political and economic demands on each level of government. The federal government has initiated a series of state-led development programmes which have catalysed economic growth and social development and in turn, health care, agriculture, education, and infrastructure have all shown significant improvement. Nevertheless, insufficient employment that could otherwise absorb both displaced smallholders and a better educated youth cohort is being generated.

**Outcomes of Ethiopia’s Growth and Development**

Beginning with former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s ambitious 2002 state-led development policy, Ethiopia’s “economic growth is owed to the unprecedented level of public investments in infrastructural schemes and public enterprises, funded by borrowing and foreign aid” (Haylemarian, 2017) and this growth has been coupled with its similarly successful effort to improve health and education programmes. Zenawi’s policies have now created an emergent middle-class, though currently one within a narrow services sector that relies upon digital technology and therefore it is a highly skilled and precisely educated work force (WB, 2016). However, those policies have not equally benefitted other segments of society through the creation of industrial employment despite the evolving strategies now generally, though not exclusively advocate it and so inequalities result (Galbraith, 2016, Oqubay, 2018).

Ultimately, the outcomes of Ethiopia’s growth and development are resulting in the displacement of hundreds of thousands of smallholder farmers, and others, and the disarticulation\(^5\) of a growing number of newly educated youth who are increasingly under-employed. Employment among students who have become better educated is depressed by a slowing economy because they have fewer opportunities than in the past, even as the national government is preparing new infrastructure to stimulate industry (ADBG, 2017; Clapham, 2017; NBE, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017). Increased unemployment and under-employment has resulted in

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\(^5\) Huang (1995: 167) described disarticulation in terms of “missing linkages among economic sectors”, including the forward and backward flow between industries that create demand for products and services and especially in the lack of demand for a skilled or higher educated work force.
a widening avenue of civil unrest among a restless youth cohort, which has, in turn, resulted in an increase in repressive measures (Desalegn, 2016; HRW, 2016). As generally similar conditions of unemployment and under-unemployment are likely to occur throughout sub-Saharan Africa, Ethiopia provides a unique opportunity to understand and address the potentially adverse outcomes of too-rapid development and imbalanced initiatives within this important region.

Geographic Scope

This thesis presents a focus upon the areas to the east and north, immediately contiguous to the capital city of Addis Ababa which are now included in part of the Oromia Special Zone Surrounding Finfinne (Tadesse & Imana, 2017) though this plan itself is formally referred to as the “Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan” (Proclamation Number 17/2004). While the thesis presents examples from two other regions of the country to inform and provide nuance, these are not intended to represent a comprehensive analysis of economic conditions nor of displacement in all areas of Ethiopia.

1.6 Structure of the Thesis

The thesis consists of seven chapters. Following Chapter 1, Chapter 2 provides a review of the global literature as well as literature which is specific to the Ethiopian experience regarding state-led development and poverty. It explores groupism, formal and informal displacement, as well as risk aversion related to the aging process. It highlights the literature pertaining to loss of place and group identity and their cumulative effects upon individual and community health, as well as the effects upon educational choices parents may select for their children.

Chapter 3 describes the primary methodologies used, including social constructivism and grounded theory which allow hidden concepts to emerge. These are particularly useful where there is little literature pertaining to the subject. The chapter describes the selection of research sites, including Sheshamane where rapid economic transformation was taking place and Lalibela where environmental and agricultural conditions were resulting in both youth and adult smallholders leaving their farms to relocate to both vibrantly growing and economically depressing urban areas. These communities approached population and economic change very differently and their experiences provide salient comparisons to the primary study area east and north of Addis Ababa.
Chapter 4 examines the history of Ethiopia, including the structure of its government and the legal basis for the expropriations that are being carried out as a result of successful development programmes. It demonstrates that Ethiopia’s current policies are often the legacy of Cold War superpower interventions and of the culturally formed mengist belief in the omniscience of government leaders (Lefort, 2007; Vaughan, 2011). However, this cultural tenet is now under attack by better-educated and under-employed youth whose civil disobedience is challenging Ethiopia’s developmental policies as well as the traditional authority of the state.

Chapters 5 and 6 present the result of fieldwork and the data obtained.

Chapter 5 analyses the successful process of development which was introduced by former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. This allowed the federal government to better control an erratic economy by stimulating improvements where culture and tradition had impeded social development. Early growth policies focussed upon employment in labour-intensive agriculture and the development of a service sector. It was not until the introduction of the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) that these policies more clearly emphasized industrial and manufacturing capacity as an avenue to increase employment even as agricultural employment remains central to the national imperative.

Chapter 6 describes Ethiopia’s educational system, including the now almost universal availability of basic education and the substantial increase in university attendance. The rapid expansion of the university system has resulted in an imbalance of educated youth vis-à-vis the ability of industry and commerce to absorb them. This is resulting in a wide spread issue of under-employment which, at its extreme, is causing the unemployment of unskilled displaced smallholders and a growing vulnerability to internal instability. In addition to Turner (1987), Field & Morgan-Klein (2010) and Brookfield (2005: 51) describe issues of cultural and social separation which can result among individuals who reinvent themselves through education or skills training and who then “risk being excluded from the culture which has defined and sustained them up to that point in their life.”

Chapter 7 revisits these issues in terms of the research objectives that were established for the thesis. It provides a more detailed discussion of how the research objectives were met and what their implications may potentially lead to, both for Ethiopia and for sub-Saharan Africa; as well as reflecting on some remaining research challenges.
Chapter Two

A Review of Literature Concerning the Effects of Development on Poverty, Place Identity, and Displacement

2.0 Introduction

Development, in its many forms, is often assumed to be positive. A substantial body of literature describes it in positive terms of trade and economic growth which gives rise to increased income levels; of improvements in health care and educational programmes; of modernizing infrastructure improvements ranging from hydro-electric dams to rural feeder roads (Bradshaw, 2006; Bellu, 2011, Crush, 2012; Dorius, 2012, Haller, 2012; Fantini, 2013; Dom, 2016; Stifel, et al., 2016; Zahanogo, 2016; Clapham, 2017; Shiferaw, 2017). Theorists suggest development reduces the incidence of social violence (Collier & Rohner, 2008); that it increases education levels (Aghion, et al., 2009); and, that an educated and peaceful labour force is central to increasing national prosperity (Okafor, 2017).

Although well planned and properly sequenced infrastructure and other physical development projects “work best in conjunction with sound economic policies, transparency, and good governance” (Sachs, 2014: 1), there often appears to be inadequate debate during the planning process regarding their foreseeable social outcomes (Bond & Hulme, 1999). In the study area, land expropriation precipitated by physical development is causing a loss of place and identity, of social support and cultural grounding, particularly among poor and older populations (Norvy, 2013; Ghatak & Mookherjee, 2014; Fukunishi, & Machikita, 2017). Simultaneously, educational and vocational training programmes increase the capacity of human capital. Yet the liminal effects of education and training can separate individuals and groups from their past (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010) resulting in social disarticulation and instability (Brookfield, 2005; Tadele, 2009; Soliman, et al., 2016).

This chapter provides a review of the development literature, summarizing core issues of development including poverty, the loss of individual place identity, and attachment which results from formal displacement practices as well as ambitious educational policies.
2.1 What is Development?

Economic growth and social development are generally considered a ‘social good’ in that they elevate living standards. Whitmore (2010: 169) contends that practitioners often assume “development itself is a benign process which simply needs to be steered in the right direction; that if one avoids certain key pitfalls and obstacles, good will result.” However, the definition of ‘development’ is imprecise and varies from author to author and from place to place.

Udogu (2005: 2) describes development as “a social condition in the nation state in which the authentic needs of its population are satisfied by the rational use of natural resources and systems.” Growth and development are, according to Pereria (1984: 6), “a total social process in which the economic and political structures of a country undergo continual and profound transformation and a historical process which occurs through stages and eventually becomes self-sustaining.” Kelsall (2011: 4) defined development as “the transformation of the economy and personal well-being expressed through a positive change in economic growth.” However, he carefully noted his definition was limited and did not address changes in political freedoms. Fukuyama (2001: 8) further concludes that social development results in greater human capital and cooperation and so it advances economic innovation that it is necessary if, for nothing else, than “as a means of achieving selfish ends.”

Dudley Seers (1969: 3) asserts development occurs “with the reduction and elimination of poverty, inequality and unemployment within a growing economy.” Yet he noted not all outcomes of development are positive, that some have decidedly negative effects upon groups and individuals, a proposition that is explored here. According to Feldman, et al., (2016: 6) development has “the objective of creating prosperity and increasing citizens’ quality of life.” Feldman, et al, continued, saying this can create social tensions as different life-styles and cultures suddenly come into contact. Urama & Acheampong (2013) determined “societies which enjoy economic affluence aren’t truly prosperous if that affluence benefits only a privileged few, rather than being spread throughout society.” Further, Cigdem, et al., (2009: 10) noted that profound social changes resulting from different forms of development might create conditions of forced mobility and rural-to-urban migration.

Indeed, developmental advances often give rise to displacement and as Schmidt & Bekele (2016: 1) note “the literature argues that as an economy grows, the location and
structure of labour transitions from primarily rural, agricultural-focussed activities to more urbanized activities in the industrial and service sectors.” Hence, development may perform as a negative accelerant. Under-educated and technically unskilled workers who may have been successful in other locations and occupations become marginalized as “development of one part of the system becomes detrimental to other parts, giving rise to conflicting objectives” (Huang, 1995; Schedler, 2006; Bellu, 2011: 2).

While some of these changes occur through the process of forced displacement which is required for new infrastructure and other construction, others follow social displacement as individual circumstances and outlooks inevitably change through educational experiences (Van Gennep, 1909) and which Turner (1987) noted become individual social transitions. As cities expand, the need for educated, technically capable workers for industrial and other activities normally increases while the overall demand for unskilled labour decreases. As individuals are either pushed out of their previous lifestyles by displacement or choose new lifestyles through education, they can become socially placeless during the liminal period bridging their previous experiences and the uncertainty of their new lives (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).

2.1.1 The Bretton Woods Conference and the Modern Development Era

Within the literature (Boahen, 1985; Bertocchi & Canova, 2002; Austin, 2010; Ziltener, et al., 2017) there are significant assertions made that colonization of the African continent occurred in order to plunder its natural resources, with the colonization process having been formalized, at least among the delegate European nations, during the Berlin Conference of 1884. This had long term effects as African wealth was being extracted while at the same time indigenous social development was suppressed by the colonizing nations. African social development was of little concern for the delegates and industrialization of the colonial holdings located in the global South, in their own right, was essentially an afterthought (Terborgh, 2003). These events continue, in theory, to result in the current underdevelopment of sub-Saharan nations.

Modern efforts to facilitate improvements in economic and social conditions, as well as the agricultural and commercial sectors of lesser-developed countries, can be traced to the World War II Atlantic Charter agreed in 1941 by President Franklin Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill (DoS, 1941). While most of that Charter was specific to the war effort, its fifth point related to post-war economic reconstruction and development including the promise for:
“fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labour standards, economic advancement and social security” (Department of State Executive Agreement Series No. 236)

Subsequently, the policies of isolationism and neutrality which had helped to lead the world into war were overturned by innovative post-war economic plans agreed at the 1944 Bretton Woods conference (Kennedy, 2002). These plans resulted in a continuing era of Northern political, economic, and humanitarian interventions.

The Bretton Woods Framework

Bretton Woods sought to establish a framework for post-war global financial management and monetary policy (Escobar, 1992). At the time of that conference, “most of the developing countries were still colonies and only a relatively few, mainly independent nations of Latin America, were invited” to attend (Helleiner, 2015: 5). Though Bretton Woods concluded that unrestricted international trade was essential for global economic growth, attendees initially favoured programmes which would benefit the already developed nations and their primary focus was rebuilding Europe following World War II.

Nevertheless, Haque (1999) noted that, over time, theoretical and ideological shifts in development paradigms take place circularly. They evolve from centralized state-led schemes to a greater reliance upon market forces and job creating commercial competition, back to state-led development. Moyo (2008: 10-26) confirmed this circular economic theory and found that it is differentiated according to seven broadly evolving political and ideological conditions which were first enunciated with (i) the 1944 declarations of Bretton Woods, (ii) and then as development and reconstruction began in earnest in 1947 with Marshall Plan aid designed by the major western powers to reconstruct a war-ravaged Europe and stabilize the American post-war industrial base.

Development took on a greater re-industrialization emphasis in the 1960s (iii) when, according to Skocpol, et al., (1987) Cold War tensions heightened. This resulted in ideologically motivated perspectives of the developmental-state and a shift towards (iv) poverty alleviation in the 1970s that in the 1980s (v) transitioned to a period of Northern-imposed structural adjustments during the Reagan and Thatcher era. Those adjustments required aid-recipients to

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6 Bretton Woods was a gathering of financial and political delegates primarily from the industrialized Northern nations. With additional invitees, the conference eventually numbered 44 nations who worked to plan post-World War Two economic recovery through a series of measures pertaining to international exchange rates and open markets, global monetary systems and international development programmes.
adopt neo-liberal market reforms which minimized the active role central governments have played in African states. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990’s\(^7\) (vi) the overall focus of international aid programmes turned towards democratization and good governance rather than rapid cash infusions. Moyo (2008: 26) describes the current path (vii) of western development theory which has taken place following the millennium as becoming a period of glamour aid whose way has been “paved by an army of moral campaigners, including pop stars and movie stars, and new philanthropists.” This succeeded in “capitalizing on the success of raising cash for emergency aid, and extending it to a platform of raising development aid monies” (Ibid). Beyond the evolutionary economic principles of Bretton Woods, Weinstein (2005) concluded that international development practice oscillates between a humanitarian perspective and a collective security perspective; that Northern policy makers view regionally destabilizing civil violence as a failure of local leadership; and that internal conflict and state instability are the result of inadequate governance.

Chandler (2013) asserts traditional societies often face a no-win dilemma, acquiesing to external demands for the adoption of modernizing social and economic practices or to renounce those changes in order to “retain their cultures, institutions and individual convictions” (Whitmore, 2010: 173). Some developing countries have chosen not to adopt the structural adjustments demanded by Northern economists following Bretton Woods, including calls for reductions in government subsidies to businesses and the contraction of the public sector (Ibid). They chose not to initiate too rapid modernization and cultural change which might inadvertently extinguish useful government, social or religious institutions thereby displacing local traditions, including communal practices or group identities in order to suit the framework recommended by Northern donors and developers.

Ethiopia’s response was to choose what Gebreeyesus\(^8\) (2014: 3) described as a “defiant attitude” towards this neo-liberal advice and pursued its own “strong state role to guide the private sector in the development process.”

\(^7\) Superpower contestations, including aid and development programmes in the Horn of Africa are discussed in Chapter 4.

\(^8\) Naming conventions in Ethiopia do not include family names. Children are known by their given first name and then the name of their father. Thus a child named ‘Zemenfes Gebregziabher’ carries his own name and that of his father. Following this convention, succeeding generations will not have the same easily traceable western-style surnames. In order to ensure transparency and to facilitate ready identification of the author(s) as they appear in print, the University of Reading recommends the same referencing convention for all authors as their names appear on the title page of journal articles, reports, or other reference sources. Other naming conventions used in official documents are similarly vexing. The Central Statistics Agency sometimes refers to itself as the Central Statistical Agency and the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan may be referred to in government
2.1.2 State-led Development

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2015: 71) lists five conceptual traits which developmental states engage in. Those are (i) explicitly favouring certain sectors; (ii) commanding competent bureaucracies; (iii) placing robust and competent public institutions at the centre of development strategies; (iv) clearly articulating social and economic goals; and (v) deriving political legitimacy from their record of development. Their choices set the direction of limited budgets regarding, for example, whether to expand educational access or procure more military armaments, all of which suggest that politics and the economy are inseparable. While there is no single definition of what a developmental state is, the definitions which were offered above are situationally dependent upon the location, circumstances, and their socio-political realities (Radice, 2008; Caldentey, 2009). Razvija (2007: 105) contends developmental states are “conceptually positioned between a free market capitalist economic system and a centrally planned economic system.”

State Power and Development

As Skocpol et al., (1987: 4) introduced, state-led development occurs as national governments situationally “adopt development as a purpose to which state power is put.” Such initiatives are common practice. Governments at all levels build infrastructure and provide services for the common good, thereby stimulating the economy. Such state-led development may be particularly necessary following periods of economically and socially debilitating conflict9 such as those experienced in Ethiopia (UNDP, 2008; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013). These occurred after the overthrow of the Selassie monarchy in 1974 and was also followed in 1991 after the violent overthrow the Marxist-Dergue government, both of which resulted in periods of fierce reprisals and repression (Zenawi, 2012).

2.1.3 Centralized Development in Ethiopia

Prior to defeating the Dergue and taking control of the nation in May, 1991, the EPRDF had already begun its transformation to a functioning governmental structure. Even as a guerrilla organization it had provided services and stability throughout the areas it was

9 A border war with Eritrea lasted from 1998 – 2000; war with Somalia occurred from 2006 – 2009, and border skirmishes with each of its neighbours continue to occur from time to time. These conflicts divert limited public funds away from economic growth and social development to the military.
incrementally occupying. It organized political committees and village councils and it established laws and courts to reduce banditry and other crime. During that period it established its still-current practice of payments which are made for land expropriations as it ensured the provisions and transportation assets required by its advancing military forces were compensated rather than commandeered (Hailu, 2014).

The administrative experience which the EPRDF had demonstrated during the war (Chinigo & Fantini, 2015) substantially increased popular pressure upon it to rapidly impose a governance structure over the entire country once the Dergue had been defeated. Bach (2014: 108/113) described this as the transitional period “from rebellion to government” and this included the need to rapidly address Ethiopia’s “economic potential in a country which had to be rebuilt.” The literature notes the practical complexity of this task in post-conflict states is compounded by the competing need to deliver political and social changes which have been promised during conflict, yet simultaneously control a population that remains psychologically divided by civil war (Murthy & Lakahminarayana, 2006; NYU, 2016). A primary concern of the new government in Ethiopia was to distance the nation from the strongly authoritarian economic and social policies of the Dergue regime while moving towards a more market oriented economy (Shumuye, 2015).

**Early Economic Growth in Zenawi’s Ethiopia**

While there are different interpretations, economic growth is often characterized in the literature as progressing through three stages (Acs, 2006: Bhattacharya & Das, 2008). In this theory (i) economies begin with subsistence agriculture and smallholder agricultural production, leading to specialization and small sole-proprietor/family enterprises and light manufacturing. As industrialization takes place (ii) the economy transitions from agricultural production to small but then increasingly larger manufacturing interests, until it ultimately transitions (iii) to a service and information oriented economy. Former Prime Minister Zenawi (2006: 36) took an Ethiopia-centric approach, appearing to reject much of this economic theory by asserting it promoted “fragile, unstable democracy that is not only incapable of evolving into a stable and mature democracy but actually hinders the development of an alternative path of democracy.” His Ethiopia-centric economic theory was contemporaneously analysed by Fritz & Menocal (2006: v) who recommended that “rather than focusing on what the ‘right’ role of the state is or should be as a normative issue”, government should concern itself “with why some states have been more capable and more supportive of development than others.”
Since 2002, state economic intervention in Ethiopia has taken this conceptual direction and enunciated it through four (to date) five-year development plans, including the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan 2002-2005; and the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty 2006-2009. The vision of the first Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010-2014 was to “build an economy that has a modern and productive agricultural sector with enhanced technology and an industrial sector which plays a leading role in the economy” (MoFED, 2010: 7). In GTP I, infrastructure and social development received an increased degree of emphasis over what had been articulated in the two previous plans. The Second Growth and Transformation Plan, for 2015-2019, continues to promote agricultural as the primary source of national employment. It also introduces programmes which endorse greater individual savings and it provides a very substantial state investment in both the energy and overwhelmingly in the infrastructure sector, which is necessary to properly sequence later industrial development. Clapham (2017: 5) links these investments in physical infrastructure and manufacturing to the emphasis of state-sponsored university programmes which are now comprised of “40% student enrollment in engineering programmes, 30% in other sciences and 30% to arts and humanities” (see also MoI, 2013: 12).

Nevertheless, Fantini (2013) predicted the federal government’s continued rate of public investment in job-producing infrastructure would be unsustainable in the long term. The IMF (2014: 14) also foresaw a slowing of investment as sources of funding became scarce and, as one example, noted the federal government imposed a requirement “that civil servants sacrifice one-month’s pay to buy Renaissance Dam bonds” to fund national infrastructure projects. Clapham (2017: 6) concludes the continued high rate of investment in infrastructure is dependent upon “the government’s success in hoovering up any source of funds within the domestic economy to support its infrastructural drive”, including such centralized programmes as forcing banks to invest their deposits in government bonds. While the literature confirms that GDP growth and social development continue along a beneficial arc, the rate of infrastructure construction has slowed, in part, due to funding constraints (IMF, 2016b; ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017, and WB, 2017b).

Zenawi and Job Creation

The literature and data concerning large scale job creation outside of the agricultural sector following the implementation of Zenawi’s state-led development is thin. Schmidt & Bekele (2016: 3) note that Ethiopia’s 2013 National Labour Force Survey (CSA, 2014d)
collected and categorized workers differently than the previous survey and this gave a false impression of employment gains. For example, rural workers who listed ‘firewood gathering and water collection’ as their occupation were counted as having been employed in 2013 but not 2005. Once Schmidt & Bekele controlled for them, the total “share of people working in agriculture decreased by only 3%” after the introduction of Zenawi’s centralized policies. The Labour Force Survey also found formal work opportunities remained minimal in a nation with a 2013 population of about 87 million. Such categories as ‘stationary plant and machine operators’, including mining and mineral processing workers; metal processing and finishing plant operators; textile fur and leather products machine operators employed only 150,200 labourers and the category of ‘business and administration professionals’ employed just 126,100. The number of higher-educated science and engineering professionals in formal employment numbered 64,700, while tela retailers (home brewed beer) employed 178,300 workers (CSA 2014d: 187).

2.2 What is Poverty?

Poverty is widely addressed in development literature; it is a concept which is theoretically and practically related to problems and issues of underdevelopment and to the sometimes imbalanced attempts to modernize a nation. Poverty is also a fluid concept, spoken of in terms of unequal availability of social resources and often considered to be the result of inequality of opportunity (Kuznets, 1955; Graff, 1998; Mancini; 2005). Its definitions are relative and often based on social and economic expectations which are situationally constructed (Townsend, 1979; Bigsten & Shimeles, 2004; Cleaver, 2005).

Bradshaw (2006: 4) described poverty generally, as a lack of necessities including “basic food, shelter, medical care, and safety.” However, he is careful not to generalize what constitutes the state of poverty since necessities in one cultural circumstance may not be as important in other instances. Walker (2015: 3) takes a wider approach to it, hypothesizing that “poverty is not just an absence of income, money or the money-like resources required to meet needs. It is the multiple consequences of resource absence which are simultaneously experienced by people in poverty.” In terms of economic growth programmes, Sen (1999: 3) concluded poverty reduction programmes must “contribute to expanding human freedom … that development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom [sic]: poverty.”

Oscar Lewis (1966: 19) described popularized concepts of ‘the poor’ as existing along a subjective continuum from the “blessed, virtuous, upright and serene” to those who are
“shiftless, mean, sordid, violent and criminal.” He noted that situations of poverty transcend national and regional boundaries; that it includes all races, and is both rural and urban in its setting. Lewis went on, distinguishing between poverty and what he felt was a distinct ‘culture of poverty’ in that the poor remain poor due to a pattern of enculturated and value-laden decisions. Being poor, he concluded, shapes friendship networks and determines spending patterns which contextually channel available problem resolutions to an ever smaller field of possibilities.

Other theorists disagreed with Lewis’s overall approach to a defined culture of poverty. For example, Small, et al., (2010: 9) argued that regardless of social or economic circumstances there is not a pre-determined set of poverty-associated decisions. Instead, they found that regardless of income “people differ substantially in the coping strategies they employ” rather than engaging in similar actions based on little more than economic status. Walton (2011) took another view, contending the individual’s *habitus*, including personal economic circumstances, familiar place surroundings, social history and particularly the opinions of peer group members play a highly significant role in limiting the resolutions and opportunities available to the poor. Future behaviours are, he contends, substantially moulded by current associations, including the influence of place and culture.

In marked contrast, Daubon (2005: 5) removed the economic and resource qualifiers and defined it in terms of exclusion from political participation, asserting:

“Poverty is not the lack of things, it is the lack of power to change the circumstances that generate the lack of things.”

Gergen (1999) took a political direction similar to Daubon, finding that cultural, youth, or other groups who are excluded from main-steam power sharing often develop their own forms of activism. Without access to sufficient opportunities, their peer-group identities and place associations may become improperly channelled and potentially manifest in violent and destabilizing outcomes. Knowing this, Igoe (2006) concludes, allows elite members of the community to manipulate and exploit the marginalized and politically invisible, providing just enough social benefits to satisfice the needs of ostracised groups who then become temporarily co-opted. Taydas & Peksen (2012) detailed this process of co-option, especially by semi-authoritarian regimes, as being intended to shape the perceptions of the population by minimally meeting social demands, particularly for health care and distress food distribution. In this way benefit programmes relieve today’s deprivation while maintaining its usefulness for tomorrow.
This dependence upon often crucial, government-supplied, benefits limits the likelihood of political agitation and so poverty is used as a means of social control. Thus, poverty reduction must be seen as a layered phenomenon formed by an array of economic, social and political actors whose end goal may not be its long-term eradication.

**Chronic and Transient Poverty**

Two types of poverty are germane to this thesis: chronic and transient. Bayucan-Dacuycuy & Lim (2014) described their shared characteristics as including a generally low educational level of the head of household; individual employment in unstable and economically risk-filled occupations such as fishing or farming; a lack of adequate health care, especially following a catastrophic injury to the primary earner\(^{10}\); and a high dependency-burden ratio within the family unit that drains resources.

Chronic poverty is generally described as long term and determined by household incomes which, over time, continuously fall below locally defined markers. It may result in potentially undermining horizontal inequalities as otherwise equal actors escape it and become disproportionately successful in economic, political or social terms (Cloke, et al., 1995; Black, 2003; CPRC, 2005; Liu & Werker, 2005). Justino (2011) adds that chronic poverty establishes distinct social barriers to opportunities which might have otherwise been overcome to elevate family income (see also SDPRP, 2002; Brainard & Chollet, 2007; Collier, 2009).

Other theorists (Muller, 1997; McKay & Lawson, 2003; Devereux, et al., 2012) contend poverty is more often transient than static, and therefore it is not truly chronic. Instead, the poor move in and out of it in response to temporary economic or social conditions such as may occur after a poor harvest or due to the economic destruction which can take place during civil disturbances. Thus, it is the repeated exposure to shocks that results in transient poverty becoming chronically long-term. This supports Elhadi, et al., (2012) who found that households with historically higher earnings, or that had relied more upon non-farm employment are less likely to become transiently poor due to the diversification of their economic portfolios. In places such as Ethiopia, where rural populations have been highly dependent upon precarious agricultural production or have few non-farm income alternatives to mitigate their risk, chronic

\(^{10}\) This is not a situation confined to developing nations. Himmelstein, et al., (2009) found that in the United States, fully 60% of family bankruptcies were due to medical costs following illness or injury.
poverty is likely to result from events such as forced displacement which are outside of individual ability to control or recover from.

2.2.1 Deepening Poverty in sub-Saharan Africa

In researching economic growth for the OECD, Maddison (2001) noted that after 17 decades of development (including the colonial period) sub-Saharan Africa had, by 1992, only achieved the average per capita income Western Europe had attained in 1820. The European Union’s “European Security Strategy, 2003” found that “In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns … [that] sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago” (EU, 2003: 2). A decade later, the United Nations Millennium Development Goals Report confirmed the trend identified by both Maddison and the EU, noting “that sub-Saharan Africa is the only MDG region which saw the number of people living in extreme poverty rise steadily, from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010” (UNDP, 2012: 7). Thus, what are essentially time-lapse studies conducted by the OECD, the EU, and the United Nations suggest that regardless of the intensity of development efforts, results may not end in beneficial outcomes if the social and political system does not provide sufficient economic opportunity.

2.2.2 Poverty in Rural Ethiopia

Conceding there are no simple definitions or causes, the World Bank noted that poverty in Ethiopia is most prevalent among the uneducated and agriculturalists (WB, 2005). The Bank concluded that a complex mixture of a highly dense rural population and severe land shortages; recurring drought and declining soil fertility; inadequate access to inputs such as seed and fertilizers, as well as limited market opportunities contribute to an overall situation of pervasive rural poverty.

Poverty among the rural population is, in part, also attributed to issues pertaining to land distribution. Due to the extraordinary amount of individual labour which is able to be devoted to smaller holdings, the literature (e.g., Ali & Deininger, 2014; Helfand & Taylor, 2017) tentatively finds an ‘inverse relationship’ between farm size and higher productivity which can be realized by smallholders who are prone to intensively cultivating their plots\textsuperscript{11} and therefore can maximize

\textsuperscript{11} The literature is limited and suggests the ‘inverse relationship’ phenomena has not yet been adequately researched in Africa and so generalizable conclusions, or conclusions specific to Ethiopia, may be premature.
their harvests. Yet even so, small-holdings in Ethiopia are often not of sufficient size to provide adequate incomes.

Using findings from the *Ethiopian Rural Household Survey* to interrogate these assertions of productivity, Savastano & Scandizzo (2017) concluded that while there is indeed a relationship with labour-intensity, ultimately it is individual skill, self-efficacy, and a willingness to innovate that are most important to success. At the same time, the expense of seed and fertilizer, the lack of credit, and the decreasing number of agricultural development agents limits access to new techniques which might increase family income. Moreover, small holdings are often too fragmented to be economically viable (Akay et al., 2009; Paul & wa Gĩthĩnji, 2017). This fragmentation requires smallholders and their draught animals to walk longer distances from their homes, consuming valuable time which might otherwise have been spent working the fields or in off-farm employment.

Further, as described by Moges (2013: 96) economic growth in Ethiopia is not neutral and most often obtains to those who “have the capability to initiate growth and it eventually reaches those economic agents who get employment opportunities and those who produce factor inputs for the production process.” Small holder farmers and other rural residents may be among those who are most excluded from new off-farm opportunities, for example, by time constraints from farming or by their physical and social isolation. While some may have the ability needed, their time is spent in labour intensive agricultural pursuits and so they lack the chance to fully participate through observation and adaptation in the employment opportunities that emerge as other sectors of Ethiopia’s economy develop. Thus, poor rural populations simply have fewer technical and social opportunities to increase their income and, regardless of effort or inputs, poverty is still not significantly reduced.

### 2.2.3 Job Creation and Under-employment in Ethiopia’s Formal and Informal Economy

Among Ethiopia’s skilled and/or educated urban labour force, unemployment is a relatively new phenomenon. Seid, et al., (2015) conclude this situation results from the unsustainable expansion in the number of university graduates who annually enter the labour market and a lack of suitable job creation. The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2013: 17) found particularly high and destabilizing rates of unemployment among educated youth (Figure 2.1) that was most profound among secondary school leavers. Broussard & Tekleselassie (2012) specifically note that while there has been significant improvement in
educational attendance, the new jobs which have been created have not provided sufficient employment opportunities for Ethiopia’s now better-educated youth. Similarly, Nayak (2014: 35) concludes that lower rates of economic growth “manifest in low economic activity, and low

Figure 2.1

Ethiopia’s Urban Population-to-Employment Comparisons by Age Cohort

Total Urban Population vs Total Urban Employed Population, 2014

Employment to Population Ratio

Addis Ababa Employment to Population Ratio
National Employment to Population Ratio

(CSA, 2014)

investment entails low overall job creation” (see also CSA, 2011; Richardson, 2011; and ADBG, 2017).

Formal and Informal Sectors
The formal sector of Ethiopia’s economy generally consists of employment which includes normal work hours and regular wages upon which income taxes are reported and paid; and within this sector businesses are registered and regulated (Spring, 2009). In addition to these criteria, Hart (1973) suggested a useful distinction between formal and informal employment is whether labour is permanent and persistent or casual and temporary. The informal sector is further characterised by low investment and low levels of productivity, poor working conditions, and lack of job security (Herrera-Iddragga, et al., 2013). Agricultural employment is the mainstay of rural employment and the availability of wage-paying non-farm labour is scarce. Lemi (2009) noted that aside from temporary day-wage employment on neighbouring farms, there are simply too few employment opportunities in most rural areas.

The Informal Economy and Beginnings of Under-employment

The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2009) concludes the informal economy arises from the transformation process in a developing state and exists because the formal economy is not yet able to offer employment opportunities to a sufficient portion of the labour force. Thus, while it may employ a substantial number of individuals, the informal sector is indicative of an unstable economic system which is unable to create standardized opportunities for its population. Benjamin & Mbaye, (2012: 5) found the overwhelming majority of businesses throughout sub-Saharan Africa are small and informal, selling primarily “low quality products to other micro-enterprises and low-income households in a highly competitive market”; that these enterprises are rarely engaged in exports and that they “operate in a completely unregulated labour market where their employees have no social security protections.” Dibie & Diebe (2014) find although Ethiopia’s federal government has introduced regulatory reform such as prohibiting child labour and that it facilitates the creation of micro-enterprises, neither of these measures creates sustainable nor decent employment opportunities.

Employment in informal enterprises in Ethiopia is dominated by those with low educational levels. Loening & Imru (2009) found there is substantial competition for low and unskilled employment. The 2011 Central Statistics Agency (CSA, 2011) report “Urban Employment Unemployment Survey” found the informal economy supported approximately 36% of workers in the metropolis of Addis Ababa, while the Central Statistical Agency reports a still high rate of 24.8% in 2014 (CSA, 2014c).

2.3. Locus of Control, Self-efficacy, and Risk Aversion
While some researchers continue to define the poor primarily by their lack of material goods, others conclude it is a symptom of a lack of visibility, economic opportunity, social mobility and voice (Pettit, 2013: 9). Recently, Onu, et.al (2013) and Abay, et. al (2017) described poverty as the result of a flawed self-perception, that people are deeply influenced by their ‘locus of control’ whereby events are determined by individual ability and willingness to adopt new technologies or to advance their educations. Those with a high internal locus of control, such as may be present among successful students, gives the individual license to believe in their own capacity for success and goal achievement. Here, Avtgis (1998) gives the example of the development of a personal ethic that social mobility is possible with sufficient application of energy and perseverance. In contrast, an external locus of control indicates a belief “that the task at hand, whether it be schooling or in the workplace, is futile because however much effort is applied the desired [positive] result may not occur” (Lenton, 2014: 6). Rashid (2016: 3) likewise posits that imagined incidents of discrimination, or abstractly hostile social conditions, “tend to result in self-fulfilling expectations, that people with a high external-locus of control realize failure far more often than those with a high internal-locus” and that responses to personal experience are often as responsible for continued poverty or joblessness as genuine discrimination by elite groups.

Among Ethiopian smallholders with a high external-locus of control, Abay, et al., (2017: 98) conclude that advanced cognitive skills often remain weak in the absence of supporting factors. This results in an inability to resolve complex problems such as whether to use a newly introduced fertilizer whose result they have not witnessed despite “substantial efforts and investments to promote modern agricultural technologies.” In an earlier study of Ethiopia, Abay, et al., (2016: 108) attributed this to ‘hyperbolic discounting’, meaning that smallholders typically decline to think in terms of a distant future; that the limited “psychological capital (locus of control) of farmers” helps to explain their decision-making processes in those cases where there is little ability to control events. This supports Legesse & Drake’s (2005: 388) earlier research which found these traits of internal and external locus of control were similar for male and female Ethiopian smallholders, and that it is primarily individual experiences and education levels which tend to influence the life-approach taken by the individual.

**Self-efficacy**

Parallel to locus of control, individual change and transformation are the result of self-efficacy, the belief or lack of belief in one’s own ability to succeed or to accomplish specific
tasks. Wuepper & Lybbert (2017: 2) conclude “Individuals who were not capable of something in the past due to external constraints are less likely to be capable of it in the future” even when circumstances may have changed dramatically, such as a result of land expropriation or education, and that their tendencies are coloured by “their experiences [and] their peers’ experiences” (Ibid, 8). Thus, self-efficacy tends to be a learned response to either success or failure, and risk-averse behaviour is often intensified by peer group inclusion.

The findings by Legesse & Drake (2005) and Abay, et al., (2016) are congruent with behavioural studies asserting successful goal achievement as being realized through an internal locus of control, especially in the completion of life-altering educational or vocational training regimens (Zimmerman, 2000; Zhao & Hills, 2005; Artino, 2012). Bandura (1982: 122) noted that in general “the higher the level of internal self-efficacy, the higher the performance of individual accomplishments.” Hence, it is individual adaptability which may determine successful outcomes in a rapidly changing social and economic environment. These changes can include instances of displacement such as are occurring in the study area or through vocational training and education and which may have the effect of separating the individual from the support of past group associations but fail to provide a future pathway.

**Risk Aversion**

According to Logan (2009) and Pawson, et al., (2011) the coping methods commonly exhibited by smallholders within sub-Saharan Africa suggest they are highly familiar with risk since reliance on erratic, rain-fed agriculture for one’s livelihood is inherently risk-prone behaviour (Zinn & Taylor-Gooby, 2006). Wilkinson & Pickett (2010) similarly found smallholders were fully aware of risk, including the potential for crop disease and price fluctuations; livestock mortality, or debilitating personal injury and illness. While these common risks are known and accepted as part of farming, smallholders are likely to attempt to avoid additional risk. Hence, Henrich & McElreath (2002) and Yesuf & Bluffstone (2009) conclude that when presented with unproven and unwitnessed strategies Ethiopian smallholders display a strong tendency to choose the course which leads to the least risk and lowest probability of failure. Henrich & McElreath (2002) likewise find smallholders are likely to retain familiar yet low-return techniques rather than implement untested innovations that might result in higher output, but which might also end in crop failure. Rijkers & Soderbom (2013) conclude that in Ethiopia this risk aversion may easily extend to the choice of whether to invest in vocational training programmes.
Unsurprisingly, youth are more likely to adopt new behaviours to more actively shape their own futures. Hence, it is often youthful students who may discount political and social risk, feeling their education and the rightness of their demands will protect them and provide entrée to opportunity even where it is no longer available (Eight, 2013; Mulderig, 2013; IMF, 2016) in sufficient quantity.

2.3.1 Business Risk Aversion and Cultural Obligations

Micro-enterprises engaging in direct-to-consumer retail sales are the most likely to fail (Gebreeyesus, 2007; Bekele & Worku, 2008; Adam, 2014). For risk-averse subsistence farmers with little excess capital to invest, and who accept lower returns for limited risks, the decision to open a micro-enterprise can be potentially costly and personally traumatic.

Alby, et al., (2013) found that in traditional sub-Saharan social networks sharing is an important cultural norm which most people do not breach, while at the same time accumulation and conspicuous wealth are not virtues to be emulated. Successful family members, Alby contends, have an obligation to share their earnings and resources with needier relatives. Those obligations, however, directly impede investment in one’s on-going enterprise or the establishment of a small business. Therefore, rather than support those relatives, many smallholding Ethiopians choose to consume their earnings as rapidly as possible rather than to meet cultural obligations (Eenhoorn & Becx, 2007; Hailesellasie, et al., 2013).

Nevertheless, the economic importance of small business start-ups and growth to the nation cannot be overstated and, as Muske, et al., (2007) detail, small and micro businesses employ local residents even if only for a short time. Small businesses cause cash to move throughout the local economy and their owners to remain in the community rather than migrating to larger cities, thereby stabilizing the most productive and innovative residents (Aurick, et al., 2017). Enterprises which rely upon some non-perishable and low-technology vocationally-acquired skills such as tailoring, joinery, or furniture making are the least likely to close within a year of their initiation (Tybout, 2000; Kibert, et al., 2013). Yet, it is unrealistic to expect a majority of individuals to possess the acumen to engage in a business of their own. Thus, the development of durable and marketable non-farm skills, short of dedicated business development programs, may be especially useful for livelihood regeneration following displacement.

2.3.2 Horizontal Inequality
In studies of Ethiopian children’s educational outcomes, inequality is assumed to be a result of structurally imposed differences between groups with essentially common identities (Tesfay & Malmberg, 2014). Stewart (2000: 249) defined the multi-dimensional nature of horizontal inequalities as resulting from “strongly shared group circumstances” which may include the inability of a culturally defined group\textsuperscript{12} to access the political process. Group membership provides social stability and helps to define norms of conduct among its constituents. It nurtures socialization and cooperation, resulting in a depth of reciprocal identity, with communal affiliations becoming based on an exclusivity derived from limited entry and the internal reinforcement of its members’ behaviour (Goette, et al., 2006; Swann, et al., 2012). However, this exclusiveness fosters a lack of adaptation, limiting members’ own human-capital development and agency. Wilkinson & Pickett (2010: 18) concluded “among these, and other social problems, almost all are more common at the bottom of the social ladder and are even more common in more unequal societies.”

\textit{Income Inequality and Poverty}

Income inequality, described as the earnings gap between the rich and poor, has widened in developing nations during the past decade and result in significant social problems (Maddison, 2001; EU, 2003; UNDP, 2012). Those include shortened life expectancy associated with lifestyle, exposure to higher crime rates, and increased mental illness. They also include lower achievement levels in school which has a long-term impact on earnings that further increases social stratification (Larsson, 2006; Webster & Kingston, 2014). In terms of income inequality, Eriksen & Lind (2009: 818) contend that “change has uneven outcomes and inherently conflicting interests” because individuals and groups experience it at different rates. Moreover, social and economic disparities trap some people in generational poverty while allowing others to prosper, collectively widening already existing societal fissures (Rao, 2006).

Horizontal inequalities may easily destabilize social systems including those among groups of people who otherwise share common interests and identities (Stewart, 2002; 2008; & 2011). This is an especially salient issue among younger males who are unable to find employment which is commensurate with their expectations after acquiring education or labour skills (Pape, 2005; Eight, 2013) and who are most likely to act upon their frustrations. This

\textsuperscript{12} As defined by Stewart (2002: 2) “groups encompass common cultural identities.” She very broadly extends her definition to a range of affiliations and identities, including a common language or history; lifestyle, values and behaviour; ethnicity or religious belief; regional differences, class or, most germane here, occupation.
further suggests instability is an outcome of inequality in the distribution of education and therfore economic benefits. It likewise challenges the belief that higher education is always beneficial or that education will force ‘development from above’ to create new employment opportunities (Irizarry, 1980; Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006). Thus, horizontal inequality also results, in part, from educational-bias.

**Income and Horizontal Inequality**

Theories of persistent income inequality, described by Durlauf (1996) and Fukunishi & Machikita (2017) suggest the level of human capital investment in children is related to both the community in which a family resides and the economic ability of children’s parents to invest in their education. Smeedling (2013: 3) found these tendencies towards social stratification and the group associations of parents “are transferred to children by an early age; that in no country do low-SES\(^{13}\) children start out as equally prepared for schooling” as higher status children. This has an effect on both early education and later life aspiration to higher social status and earnings.

Just as Oscar Lewis (1966) had suggested thirty years earlier, poverty shapes friendship networks and determines spending patterns. Durlauf (1996: 77) found strong evidence of internal causation for social stratification and group identity where “the tendency is for agents with similar characteristics to interact only with one another.” Despite their essentially equal origins, some individuals do attain higher levels of social status, education, and wealth. Once it is sufficiently achieved, they begin to associate with others who they have become more alike and eventually they may even physically move house to be in a position to better associate with their new economic peers.

However, the consequence of their movement to different social groups leaves behind increasingly isolated islands of poverty which may be characterized by scarcity, indigence, and illiteracy (Cooper, et al., 1993). This isolation sustains itself over time. It results in a tendency towards chronic inter-generational poverty which, in circular fashion, leads to a loss of interaction with mainstream society including the association with its more successful members who could provide role models for displaced smallholders or appropriate employment opportunities for recent graduates.

\(^{13}\) Socio-economic status.
2.4 Relative Disparity, Youth and the Beginning of Violence

Reynolds & Baird (2010) conclude that unrealized expectations, especially among younger adults, result in feelings of depression, isolation and social disarticulation. They note the emotional dissonance which results when people have envisioned their future yet have only attained lesser results, depends in significant measure upon the degree of adaptability which the individual possesses. Baland (1989: 521) concluded that in developing nations, social disarticulation results from disparaties in employment and the resulting income inequalities. However, nationally improved economic conditions do not automatically result in equitable distribution of opportunity (Huang, 1995). Newly educated or trained youth, for example, may find it difficult to obtain employment if the economy has slowed (Cerra & Saxena, 2007) or if it has become imbalanced through an emphasis upon only some sectors, i.e., agriculture rather than manufacturing, rather than through a broad approach to growth and employment.

*Peer Group Sustainment*

Consequently, there may be negative outcomes if the individual is socially sustained only by others who have also failed to attain their goals, such as the personally unrealized expectation of finding employment following the completion of an educational or training programme. Pape (2005) concludes that among youth, the real or imagined feelings of unmet social and economic mobility following education, and the disparities involved, are likely to become shared sources of frustration, of mounting anger and potential violence. This concept supports Stewart’s (2008) views of horizontal inequalities and relative deprivation which she, too, contends can lead to violence. Taspinar (2015: 78) also explained the destabilizing effects of youth under-employment and their influence upon violence and security issues. He noted “It is precisely when people develop high expectations, aspirations, and hopes for upward mobility that we have to pay more attention to the potential for frustration, humiliation, and radicalization.” Thus, there can be negative effects of social disarticulation (Huang; 1995) which incite the activities of some group members and which, taken to the extreme, ultimately infringe upon the security of the larger society.
Fjelde & Ostby (2010) found that it is a combination of uneven access to economic goods, including education, that often lead to the differentiations which trigger destabilizing inter-group division and potential violence. The socio-economic status of student’s parents has been shown to accurately predict entry to tertiary educational experiences and this is because households with greater incomes tend to demand better educational outcomes (Considine & Zappala, 2002; Jerrim, 2014). Higher income parents, including those in rural Ethiopia purchase more and better-quality education for their children which prepares them to take advantage of subsequent employment opportunities (Lundberg, 2013; MoE, 2015).

In Ethiopia then, the children of higher income rural parents may benefit from secondary and tertiary educational access more than the equally talented children of lower income parents (Dohmen, et al., 2005; Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017). Despite initially high unemployment rates (ILO, 2017) school completion generally results in eventual financial earnings for the student who can then better support her own family and it elevates household-economic status in relation to that of neighbouring families. Germane to this study, Stewart (2002b) and others (e.g., SDPRP, 2002; Mancini, 2005; Ostby, 2008; UNICEF, 2015) conclude that unequal availability and access among youth which results in horizontal disparities can lead to violent internal conflict, particularly within a still developing nation. This can occur, for example, when scarce funding is disproportionately directed to programmes which would temporarily pacify a younger population through educational attendance, but which do not also result in sufficient employment if later opportunities are not available.

Comparisons regarding unequal opportunity and relative deprivation tend to weaken with age and over time the potential for violence is reduced (Suls & Mullen, 1982; Smith, et al., 2012). Suls & Mullen suggested older populations do not engage in unrest due to their gradual disengagement from society especially as they begin to isolate themselves within familiar social groups, and particularly as their cognitive and physical capacities begin to deteriorate. As their social and time horizons shorten, the reactions among older workers to obvious and on-going developmental inequalities are not as sharp or as violent as those of younger cohorts, even though their attachment to place and group identity often becomes stronger.

2.5 Displacement Through Development

Displacement is often associated with eviction or ousting from a place and this occurs for multiple reasons including conflict, rapidly developing natural disasters, slow-onset environmental change, or through other types of physical development. Yet, it is the individual
connection to the land that Terminski (2015: 11) described as the “fundamental point of economic, social and cultural reference.” The UNHCR (2015) estimated that, on a global scale in 2015, 12.4 million people were displaced by conflict including some 8.6 million people who were internally displaced. However, this is fewer than the 15 million individuals Terminski\textsuperscript{14} has estimated are displaced annually by development projects, though this type of forced displacement receives relatively little popular attention. Eviction ultimately results in what Cernea (1996: 1515) had described as “changes in the status quo and such change usually entails social disruptions and undesirable consequences for some population segments.”

2.5.1 Common and Intersecting Categories of Displacement

There are three primary categories of displacement: refugees, displaced persons and oustees. The internationally accepted definition of a refugee was established by the 1951 United Nations Convention on Refugees as someone who has been forced either by on-going war or by well-founded threats of violence or persecution to flee his/her country (Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1(A)(2), 19 U.S.T. 6259, 6216). The Convention, though, applies only to persons who have crossed international borders. A second category includes internally displaced persons (IDP) who are defined as:

“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border” (UNHCHR, 1997: 5; UNOCHA, 2004: 11).

A third, and the most numerous category of displacement includes oustees, most often people who are forcibly displaced due to infrastructure construction, industrial, commercial or residential development. Development–induced displacement is considered by some subject matter experts to be a ‘human-made disaster’ (Mason: 2000; Mehta & Gupte, 2003; Turton, 2003). However, the literature notes that while international responses are often raised for natural or conflict-induced displacement (Cernea, 1999; Robinson, 2003; Terminski, 2015) few efforts are made for developmentally induced ousting, even though its results are equally disruptive and more long term. The former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative, Francis Deng (in Pettersson, 2002: 17) explained this lack of organized response regarding

\textsuperscript{14} An estimate conducted by the World Bank 20 years prior to Terminski found that 10 million people were, on a global scale, being displaced annually by dam construction, residential development, roads, electrical transmission lines or other infrastructure projects (WB, 1994). Terminski shows the raw number of people who are being displaced as a result of development is increasing over time.
oustees, noting “governments naturally fight harder to maintain the concept of national sovereignty when the perpetrator of displacement is the state itself.” Unlike other groups, oustees have no international legal protections (Horst & Grabska, 2015). They remain the responsibility of their own governments, which Ferris & Winthrop (2010: 8) concluded “is obviously problematic in cases where national authorities have contributed to the displacement.”

Refugees, IDPs, and oustees, however, go through essentially the same loss of identity and social disintegration; they lose not only their physical place but also “undergo a major disruption in their patterns of social organization and culture” (Cernea, 1996b: 295; Ujang & Zakariya, 2015). Mehta & Gupte (2003) described oustees as a subset of the internally displaced, noting both groups are similarly uprooted from their surroundings; from their traditions, livelihoods, and familiar associations by circumstances beyond their control as their land is repurposed.

2.5.2 In situ and Ex situ Displacement

Displacement is discussed in the literature as either in situ, in the original place, or ex situ in terms of the permanent loss of property rights and place. These may emanate from development or other expropriation through the process of eminent domain which takes property for new infrastructure, housing, industrial parks or for other reasons which usurp land ownership rights (White, et al., 2013).

Feldman, et al., (2003) depicts in situ displacement as resulting in exclusions, including the loss of welfare benefits, civil rights, and other entitlements. Chaudhry (2010: 623) conveyed the phrase as it might apply to slum clearance programmes, stating “informal settlements and slums should be regularized, legalized, and upgraded in situ, where possible.” Patel et al., (2015: 232) suggest in situ displacement is the failure of developers to budget for basic services and replacement housing “within the profit-making projects that displace” urban poor. Finally, Hindman, et al., (2015: 17) used in situ to recommend inner-city redevelopment techniques which provide “temporary accommodation for slum-dwellers until [new] construction is complete.” Each of these definitions suggest economic growth or resource related in-place eviction, yet sanitizes the issue of the forced loss of livelihoods among an occupationally competent and still productive population.

In contrast, ex situ displacement is defined by Burkett (2011: 346) as “forced from their original place of being.” Vanclay (2017: 3) notes that ex situ displacement occurs as “large-
scale development or infrastructure projects typically require land and sometimes very large tracts of land.” Consequently, current tenants are forced to permanently relocate and the effect of these projects is to interrupt livelihoods and social networks; they disrupt place attachments, irretrievably damage income generation, and irreparably separate entire communities.

Zimbabwe’s programme of coercive land acquisition is a combined example of both in situ and ex situ displacement. Large and generally profitable commercial farms, which were primarily owned and operated by white farmers who, though born in Zimbabwe were seen by the national government as colonialists, were nationalized. Magaramobe (2010: 361) describes how this resulted not only in “an exodus of white farmers from their properties, but the loss of jobs and livelihoods for thousands of farmworkers.” Local workers, who were not forced to relocate, suddenly found themselves jobless, having “lost regular incomes as well as their access to basic social services such as housing, health and education” that had been made possible by the ousted farmers (Ibid).

The incremental loss of rural land as the result of urban expansion and the construction of urban-use buildings in peri-urban areas is described as ‘rurbanisation’ by Bevan (2016) and results in its own form of ex situ displacement. This occurs as the process of urban sprawl consumes land along the periphery of the municipal boundaries and heralds the gradual transformation of those areas from rural to urban uses (Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2017). While this is clearly one form of the displacing development occurring in the study area, its incremental nature does not require the wholesale expropriation of large areas of land for the construction of new dwellings, something that is explored in chapter 4 as occurring in relation to the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan (Proclamation Number 17/2004). Yet the importance of ex situ displacement is that it is essentially invisible and creates no external constituency group to advocate for its oustees.

2.5.3 Success Amongst Oustees

Ousted smallholders are invested psychologically in their land, and its loss results in physical and social rootlessness and a lack of purpose (Relph, 1976; Pierce, et al., 2001). Importantly, in addition to the outcome of landlessness once they have been ousted, smallholders often become jobless because they have few marketable non-farm skills with which to transition to another viable livelihood (UNESCO, 1975; AU, 2007; Belete, 2011). As they become disassociated from their previous agricultural environments, including their “beliefs, attitudes, norms, and roles” (Hung & Chen, 2007: 148) they must seek employment in
whatever work is available locally, including that which may be found in culturally and socially unfamiliar circumstances such as manufacturing operations. In Ethiopia, a study by Belda (2016: 3867) found these necessary personal adaptations may be hindered due to structural issues, that federal and regional policies “have slowed the rural-urban transformation” and have actively restricted labour migration. However, the social forces of groupism and identity which were developed and enculturated over the course of a life-time may also form barriers to the acquisition of new employment skills which would threaten the loss of important personal and social identities, and so resettlement and livelihood change are delayed by the desire to maintain group membership and identity (Douglas, 1992).

Gebre (2002) found a broad continuum of success among internally displaced individuals, concluding those who voluntarily relocated were invariably more accepting and more successful in their new environs than those who had been forced to relocate by administrative fiat. People who have been involuntarily ousted often lack the motivation to fully participate in displacement programmes or to help them succeed. Gebre concluded they tend to be resistant to acculturation within their new communities or within a new livelihood, and typically spend their time planning ways to return to their former places or identities. Ultimately, when they do become employed they are more likely to obtain part-time and much lower paying work than they had before (Brand, 2014). Therefore, the manner in which individuals or groups are displaced, being either voluntary or forced, and whether through education or development, is important to their outcomes especially as social systems are disrupted and their support networks are no longer functional.

2.5.3 Groupism and Social Systems

Groups and group membership result from shared conditions and associations and represent “complex interactions of individuals with their communities” (Galbin, 2014: 84) which can be correlated with the social influences and pressures of ‘being authentic’. Authenticity is the condition wherein individuals “need to be like others and to get on with them” (Owen, 1995: 166). It occurs when “people’s behaviours and choices converge to match the behaviours and choices of others” (Berger & Heath, 2008: 123) through assimilation. While group members continue to display their individualities, groupism ensures they do so within bounded norms (Park, 1921). In a more recent study, Mildenberger & Tingley (2017: 2) found that

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15 Park (1921: 171) found that social groups “maintain their own organization, agencies and formal methods of behaviour on a basis and in a setting of instinct, of habit, and of tradition”; that groups have their own internal cultures.
Assimilation, Belonging and Liminality

Assimilation is highly dependent upon the shared personal interactions over the course of time. These result in a communal sense of belonging and place. Acquaintances and personal histories form our worldviews and shape our decisions, and their loss in order to pursue a new livelihood or obtain training or education might come at the cost of leaving behind comfortable peer group associations. The loss of that sense of belonging can create feelings of agitation until the individual has transitioned into, and been accepted, in his new environs. Turner (1987: 95) characterized this as the period of “betwixt and between the positions assigned and arrayed by law, custom, convention, and ceremony.” This liminal period, which can be applied to both social and educational experiences, “changes one’s sense of who they were” and so it is both disorienting and isolating (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010: 4). Supportively and in terms of social risk, Brookfield (2005: 52) described the “emotionally sustaining groups of peers” who are consistently spoken of as “a second family” or as “the only people who really understand what I’m going through” but whose contact may be lost as the individual changes his position relative to that of other members of the peer group. Zinn & Taylor-Gooby (2006: 37) found this perception of social risk is best understood “against the background of individual embeddedness in their social-cultural background and identity as a member of a social group.”

The liminal period is the “transition from the old to new being and understanding” (Rutherford & Pickup, 2015: 706). During this passage the oustee and student are no longer what they were, but are not yet what they will become and divergent responses by each group are made under conditions of uncertainty regarding their individual and group futures (Brookfield, 2005; Akay et al., 2009). In the case of smallholders, it reinforces a sense of groupism and insularity, while among youth it may lead to a rise in risky civil disobedience (Douglas, 1992; Williams & Balaz, 2012).
Assimilation into other groups, though, has been suggested as being patronizing; that in some cases it imposes cultural and ethnocentric requirements upon minority, and therefore weaker, social groups (Alba & Nee, 1997) who are conforming to the different standards of the majority. The pursuit and acquisition of wholly new experiences, of new vocational skills and formal or informal education which all require some degree of assimilation, leading to decidedly different expectations and lifestyles, may threaten existing group cohesion. Swift (1940: 220) noted these group influences are often pervasive and compelling, that they:

“penetrate the lives of individuals so completely and in such subtle and illusive ways that it is not strange that some have come to believe it is really the group in the individual rather than the individual in the group.”

Swift went on to discuss the dilemmas of groupism, including selflessness and sacrifice by the individual to the group. Extreme kinship and social relationships may develop through place identity and attachment, through shared conditions such as farming or unemployment following displacement, or by under-employment after education. In some cases he says, subordinating oneself to the group will hinder personal growth, change, and achievement among otherwise effective, productive and intelligent individuals.

Groupism helps to distinguish social classes that are, in part, recognized through habits that are defined as “the unconscious actions and out-of-awareness choices and assumptions that include beliefs, attitudes, and values” (Rossiter, 2012: 89; Durmaz & Tasdemir, 2014). At the group level, habits reflect Lewis’s (1966) ‘culture of poverty’, revealing other local culture and providing an understanding of preferences either for change, such as occurs among students, or for social stasis. Individuals, acting as members of groups, become habituated to the reciprocal roles they play within that group and it is through on-going relationships with intimate peers that they maintain their sense of identity, whether as smallholders or students.

Erikson (1975) contended that in times of significant personal and group change, such as during a forced displacement, people tend to cling to their previous habits and familiar social structures for emotional support. Under duress, they solidify existing bonds with others who come from the same culture or who have similar religious or ethnic backgrounds. These reinforce past lives and experiences; they validate a sense of both individual identity and group uniqueness in response to otherwise untenable circumstances of social change (Berry, 1974). Changes to those relationships are difficult. The acquisition of advanced education or new skills training, and the subsequent employment which may result outside of the experience of other group members, can threaten the homogeneity of that group and potentially sever relationships
which had been based on shared conditions of identity or place over time. The tendency, then, is to avoid potential threats or perturbations to the peer system.

**Social Systems and the Family**

Social systems are highly developed patterns of interaction consisting of group associations, of personal networks or cultural ties to the community, and were defined by Parsons (1951:14) as “a mode of organization of action elements” that incorporate individual personalities into the existing cultural system. They may reflect the stratification of class structure, education or labour distinctions among members of either politically powerful or politically invisible groups (Blau, 1977).

Gunduz (2004: 5) has posited that “a right establishes a relationship between a right-holder, who has a title to the content of the right in question, and a duty-bearer, from whom it is claimed.” This important social resource is lost when rapidly imposed displacement disrupts kinship relations and neighbour-networks and, with little time for adjustment, long-standing business, marketing, and social ties are terminated (Asthana, 1996). Regarding the system-consequences of displacement, the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights noted that social and physical group dissolution:

> “breaks up families, cuts social and cultural ties, terminates dependable employment relationships, disrupts educational opportunities, denies access to such vital necessities as food, shelter and medicine, and exposes innocent persons to acts of violence, disappearances and rape.”

*Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, (UNHCHR, 1997)*

**Impacts on the Family Structure**

Mahler (1999) noted that in the family systems of more traditional societies, men tend to be the primary or sole source of family income. Their position of status within the family unit can be threatened by the displacement-induced loss of livelihood, especially if their wife suddenly begins to earn as much or more money. This can result in significant intra-family disturbances, particularly in cases where downward social and economic mobility is taking place and where men are unable to find suitable employment. Males who lose their provider status may become despondent or violent, and increases in spouse abuse are frequently seen (Fernandes, 2007; Mogues, et al., 2009; Akram, 2013). Thukral (1996) and Gallo (2001) noted the much higher incidence of divorce following displacement as unemployment, economic insecurity, and
alcoholism become common and family poverty deepens, all of which have destabilizing effects upon society. Further, the resettlement of displaced individuals and families tend to create local animosities as the influx of job seekers disrupts and overwhelms existing employment opportunities. This also drives down local wages, pushing established families towards poverty (Crisp, 2002; Du & Dong, 2008).

While men in developing countries are likely to provide the majority of household income, women often predominate in home garden production for the sale of vegetables in weekly markets. The consequences of displacement reduces or denies this (and other) important source of secondary income over which women tend to have greater control and its loss may intensify intra-household economic inequality. With the loss of farm and home-garden income, positive coping strategies for women, especially those without husbands, may be particularly difficult to re-establish. Without the income of that primary wage earner, girls within the family may be forced to marry, or leave school to take low status and low pay employment at early ages. They may take employment through international brokers where they easily become the victims of organized crime and trafficking (Babarinde, 2014).

2.7 Economic and Conflict Displacement in Ethiopia

The World Bank (WB, 2016b) noted that “forced displacement is a crisis centered in developing countries that host 89 percent of refugees and 99 percent of internally displaced persons” (see also Ferris & Winthrop, 2010). A subsequent World Bank report (WB, 2017: 48) further states that “Among potential safe destinations, and to the extent they can do so, the forcibly displaced are likely to move to places which are more developed, and where they might have better chances of avoiding impoverishment”, including movement to urban areas where greater economic and social development have occurred. Yet, even strong central authoritarian states are not able to provide certainty regarding employment or social status and so social displacement occurs as well.

Conflict Displacement

An example of the consequences of rapid social upheaval involves the internal displacement of Bosnian villagers following the civil war which lasted from 1992 to 1995 and resulted in the sudden dissolution of lifestyles and social relationships. Post-conflict, survivors reported high levels of stress resulting from their inability to assimilate into new urban
surroundings even though they may have only relocated a few miles from their former homes and mountain villages. They lost their livelihoods and position of social status in the historically familiar places where their families had resided for generations. They also had great difficulty finding new housing and in obtaining alternate employment in urban areas due to skills mismatches (Plante, et al., 2002). Jansen (2008) noted that displaced men had significant difficulty adjusting to their new environs and the loss of their previous livelihoods:

“These men tended to stubbornly cling to their remembered personhood and to the place they recalled as having counted as someone. That place was no longer present in Bosnia-Herzegovina, only in the remembered forms of organized society in the same geographic location.” (Jansen, 2008: 181)

Effects of Displacement in Children

Displacement also had an effect on the education of children. In Bosnia, as in Ethiopia (Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017), parents were required to purchase school supplies such as textbooks and uniforms. For an unemployed and displaced family, these can represent a significant financial outlay. As a measure of future orientation Das, et al., (2013: 24) found that even small family expenditures made for “childrens stationary, classroom materials, and practice books” are related to positive educational outcomes. Yet, internally displaced Bosnians were more likely to withhold this funding if there was a lack of employment and especially if there was continued uncertainty regarding the possibility of subsequent geographic or social displacement. Uncertainty and lack of assimilation was still found five years after the end of the war, as Eder (2014) discovered, when displaced Bosnian families continued to spend far less on childrens’ educational needs than similar families who had not been displaced. Moreover, many of the displaced children were not attending school and so their own concept of place and future orientation had not yet formed. The ability of families to restore their lifestyles and livelihoods was degraded by a lack of employment opportunity as well as their lack of transferrable technical and social skills and this reverberated to their children whose educations suffered. These examples reveal the effects of displacement may occur within a short distance, or over no distance at all.

However while the effects of displacement are gaining attention in failed states, the bulk of the literature shows that Ethiopia is not a failed state. Its workers are not being ousted due to a lack of national political viability nor by the collapse of its chosen socio-economic system. In

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16 In 1996/1997, this researcher was the NATO liaison to the UNHCR in Sarajevo and responsible for monitoring refugee returns from Europe, including their successful repatriation throughout the former conflict area.
the study area, smallholders are losing their land and livelihoods as a result of a thriving economy and pro-growth infrastructure policies.

2.7.1 Displacement through Infrastructure Construction and Land Investment in Ethiopia

As urban areas grow, the predicted shift between rural and urban populations will require government at each level to take proactive measures to properly sequence physical developmental projects. New infrastructure will be necessary to enable the delivery of services and to facilitate industrial growth. If properly ordered, this will result in increased opportunity for manufacturing and trade and the subsequent creation of employment opportunities.

In the study area, other large scale expropriations and displacement are occurring as a result of urban population growth and the sprawl of existing peri-urban boundaries. Infrastructure projects include new roadways, additional water transmission lines and electrical generation facilities. These projects often meet the demands of a growing population for new housing, as well as the need for new social service facilities such as medical clinics, courts, and schools. While some projects are still underway in Ethiopia or have already been completed, others, including additional rail lines and modern roadways, are still being planned. Throughout Ethiopia, populations are being displaced for important infrastructure improvements, including construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as well as by the practice of bundling and leasing agricultural land to international corporations.

Despite their downstream benefits, each of these projects will to some degree force the displacement of residents whose land will be required for their construction (Abebe & Hesselberg, 2013; Megento, 2013). The literature shows the destabilizing human security elements resulting from large projects are often ‘administratively minimized’ in written reports prepared by planners during the concept phase (Bond and Hulme, 1999; Veilleux, 2013) even while their technical characteristics and societal benefits are emphasized (Polzer & Hammond, 2008; Admassie & Abebaw, 2014; Aleman & Kim, 2015). Two examples of large, displacing projects are provided here.

The first, construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, demonstrates both the need and beneficial outcome of projects. The second demonstrates forced displacement through foreign investment, yet finds once the adverse impacts are recognized, Ethiopia’s

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17 Human security in this context was defined by El-Nashar & Elyamany (2017: 2) as “the stability, safety, and access to opportunity of an individual and a related community now and in the future.”
elected and administrative officials have been willing to take corrective action to limit and mitigate their effects. Both, though, demonstrate that in a developmental nation such as Ethiopia displacement based on growth is inevitable.

*The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam*

In Ethiopia “energy is the driver of development” (Chen & Swain, 2014: 11), it facilitates technology and education; it enables industrial innovation and expands manufacturing capacity which encourages new employment opportunities. The development of sustainable and renewable sources of electricity contribute to the federal governments’ goal of becoming “a middle-income country by the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11). To that end, a hydro-electric project, the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, located approximately nine miles from the Sudanese border along the Blue Nile River is under construction and when complete will produce 5,250 megawatts of electricity. Ethiopia’s electrical grid is presently capable of reaching “52% of the population” (Chen & Swain 2014: 12) while earlier estimates were as low as 17% (Tegenu, 2006). This suggests that a significant degree of improvement has taken place across the grid. However, in addition to the dam itself, new supporting infrastructure including overhead transmission lines (Photograph 2.1), as well as receiving and distribution stations will be required and at least some portion of these will necessitate further displacement.

The benefits of electrical generation, irrigation, flood control, and a reduction of down stream siltation derived from the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam are emphasized in the engineering estimates for the project (Tesfa, 2013; Basson, et al., 2014; Mulat & Moges, 2014). Displacement, though, did not figure prominently, if at all, in these reports and so the contentions made by Bond and Hulme (1999) regarding the general emphasis upon project management and beneficiaries rather than those who are being displaced and who will require some form of vocational rehabilitation or other livelihood generation, apply. Indeed, in a speech

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18 Multiple government sources list different estimates of the generative capacity of the dam once it is complete.
delivered on 2 April 2011 during the official ground breaking ceremony for the project, former Prime Minister Meles Zenawi emphasized its beneficial impacts regarding rapid economic development throughout both Ethiopia and neighboring states and its effect towards the goal of poverty eradication. He accentuated the technical benefits of the project, stating:

“The Dam will greatly reduce the problems of silt and sediment which consistently affect dams in Egypt and Sudan. This has been a particularly acute problem at Sudan’s Fosseiries dam which has experienced reduction in output. When the Dam becomes operational, communities all along the riverbanks and surrounding areas, particularly in Sudan, will be permanently relieved from centuries of flooding.” (Zenawi, 2013)

However, Zenawi did not address the displacements that would occur as a result of its construction nor how they would be mitigated. Similarly other government sources, including the head of Ethiopia’s Environmental Protection Authority, discounted the displacing effects and adverse social outcomes of the project, asserting instead that since financial payments had been made to local inhabitants little actual harm will have been done:

“With regard to displaced people, I think the number is around 100 families. When you consider the employment opportunities it gives - including to them - and the fact that they are being given land and money to resettle, it’s not an issue. There is no development that doesn’t have a negative impact; only a country must be cautious and correct in its response to those negative impacts, and in this case those negative impacts of displacement are being taken care of.” (Worldegebriel, 2013)

Regarding the displacement which the dam will necessitate, Hathaway (2008) suggested a better estimate of the direct physical dislocations required by this project reach approximately 10,000 people. Yet at least one other prediction, by Soliman, et al., (2016: 10), suggested the overall indirect social impacts are much more encompassing, and the “resettlement of millions of families” throughout the Nile basin will occur as water levels fluctuate from historic norms, and their livelihoods and relationships are irretrievably altered.

Foreign Land Investment

In addition to the displacement caused through the modernization of Ethiopia’s infrastructure, an issue of investment in agricultural land which involves its bundling and leasing to international food processing companies has arisen. Though not confined to Ethiopia this issue, too, is resulting in widespread ousting and the loss of livelihoods.

In response to the global food shortages of 2007-2008, food insecurity was “no longer a problem only of the poor and the underdeveloped, its reach was global and its consequences felt as much by the wealthy in developed countries as by the poor nations” (Said, et al., 2012: i).
When international business interests found that markets could not be trusted to provide an uninterrupted supply of food stuffs they began to invest heavily in a more secure source of production: the land itself. The literature describes this as a system of long-distance farming whereby large agricultural areas are leased, farmed, and the production is then exported without entering the local economy (Lavers, 2012; OI, 2013; Rahmato, 2014).

Deininger, et al., (2011: 10) noted that “countries such as Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Sudan have transferred millions of hectares to investors in recent years” essentially removing the land from local production and displacing an unknown number of families and communities. The number of ousted smallholders is unknown because insufficient records of leases are kept. This has resulted in a serious gap in public awareness of the prices and terms agreed to or of the size of the areas involved. Consequently, the number of families who are displaced remains opaque.

Zoomers (2010: 429) described the acquisition process as land grabbing in that “large-scale, cross-border land deals or transactions are carried out by transnational corporations or initiated by foreign governments”, and by Franco, et al., (2013: 3) as “capturing the control of land and other associated resources like water, minerals or forests, in order to control the benefits of its use.” Regarding record keeping, the Oakland Institute (OI, 2011) found the total land area leased to international investors in Ethiopia is undeterminable since both the federal and regional governments have authority to expropriate land and then lease it to investors. There is insufficient information exchange between those administrative levels regarding what properties have been leased and so the total acreage is uncertain (Rahmato, 2014).

Keeley, et al., (2014) conducted an investigation into Ethiopian land leases and development projects in the Afar, Benishangul-Gumuz, Gambella, Oromia, Somali and SNNPR regions. They, too, concluded that without a transparent and comprehensive registry the total leased area remains concealed and therefore, the number of oustees is unknowable. Keeley, et al., (2014: 20) go on to describe the evolving efforts to gain back the programmatic control of the leasing process which was lost in the early days of international land leasing. They observed that federal Ministry of Agriculture agents inspect properties under their control for compliance with lease terms and that in some cases the Ministry has unilaterally reduced overly-large holdings, giving the example of one holding that was reduced from 300,000 hectares to 100,000 hectares because the property was not under active cultivation.
Large Scale Leasing as Federal Policy

The importance here is that these displacing leases represent federal policy. Ethiopia’s first Growth and Transformation Plan 2010-2015 (MoFED, 2010: 19) stated “Smallholder agriculture will continue to be the source of growth and the private sector will be actively supported in large scale commercial farms.” International corporations are, the plan said, expected to realize a major increase in their investments and during the Plans’ implementation period the federal government anticipated “over 3 million hectares of land would be identified, prepared and, ensuring it will be used for the desired development purpose, will be transferred to investors” (Ibid, 26). Despite record keeping issues, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015, 127) continued to endorse these seizures, stating “The total land identified for investment in GTP II period is estimated at 500 thousand hectare and this increases the total land identified so far at national level to 4.315 million hectare by 2019/20.”

2.7.2 Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan

The Integrated Development Master Plan, officially announced in April, 2014, can be traced to the City of Addis Ababa Proclamation 17/2004 which is entitled “To Provide for the Preparation, Issuance and Implementation of the Addis Ababa City Master Plan.” The Plan was necessitated, according to Melesse (2005), by substantial and too-rapid population growth which had outpaced the ability of the city to provide necessary infrastructure and social services. Wide spread squatter settlements had developed and were consuming large areas of the periphery which were not controlled by adequate planning. The initial Proclamation was straightforward as an enabling document for planning purposes and did not direct any outcomes. However, over the course of the project the Plan became a highly controversial attempt to expand the boundaries of the municipality of Addis Ababa by 1.1 million hectares.

Changing Developmental Imperatives

Early in the Oromia Special Zone process, Yntiso (2008: 53) noted that as incomes among some sectors of the urban labour force increased, the objective of urban planners became one of making Addis Ababa a ‘world class city’. The World Bank (WB, 2015b: 26) agreed with Yntiso’s characterisation of the evolving nature of the Integrated Development Master Plan and synopsized its three objectives. Those were, the Bank stated, to create “(i) a safe and liveable city; (ii) to ensure the national goal of becoming a middle income country; and (iii) to become Africa’s diplomatic capital and a world class city.” Outcomes began to coalesce
and “the process of relocating people from the inner city to resettlement sites in the outskirts disrupted the relocatees’ business ties with customers, broke their informal networks of survival, caused loss of locational advantage and jobs.” Upon completion, this development had the potential to displace “hundreds of thousands of farmers facing the threat of being evicted from their land” (Home, 2016). While the previous Dergue government had sought to minimize the degree of income disparity in Ethiopia, Belachew (2014) observes that social and political conditions now highlight those inequalities.

In order to accomplish this degree of widespread gentrification, Beyers (2013: 965) theorized that “forced relocations of poor people, or those deemed undesirable, is undertaken to preserve city centres as preserves of dominant class power.” Planel & Bridonneau, (2017) contend this is precisely what is taking place in Addis Ababa as the urban poor are relocated to surrounding areas where new cities are built and former residents now reside not in single story shanties but in multi-story condominiums with few employment opportunities. However, in the study area, including projects to the east of Addis Ababa, development is occurring in a manner different than Beyers had predicted. These suburban areas are becoming characterised by “gated residential homes and communities” (Belachew, 2014: 1; Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2017).

Thus in the study area, the usual rural-to-urban resettlement paradigm was, in part, being reversed. Degraded and slum areas in the city centre were being cleared of their occupants for commercial projects, office blocks and new hotels. This gentrification is resulting in the clearing of large areas for redevelopment and the movement of thousands of urban oustees to residential developments located on the outskirts of the metropolis where there are few amenities or social networks such as were available to them in the city (Megento, 2013; Planel & Bridonneau, 2017). Even in their short-distance resettlement the poor lose their social grounding as large new residential areas are constructed for the emerging middle class who are seeking more comfortable living conditions.

**The FinFinne Special Zone**

Opinions found in Ethiopia’s legal journals maintain that despite being constitutionally designated as a ‘special district’, Addis Ababa remains a municipality with no greater authority to unilaterally change or expand its boundaries than any other city (Abdo, 2013; Stebek, 2013).
In 2008, the *Finfinne* Special Zone was created to better control the poorly planned and unregulated growth of Addis Ababa as peri-urban land was being haphazardly expropriated for industrial zones, private construction projects, infrastructure needs and other uses.

The Finfinne Special Zone is administered by the Oromia regional state, not the city government of Addis Ababa and includes the six weredas of Akaki, Berek, Mulo, Sebeta, Sululta, and Welmera along with the eight surrounding towns of Burayu, Dukem, Gelan, Holeta, Legetafo, Sebeta, Sendafa and Sululta. The zone was intended to better protect the interests of smallholders and others whose land was being condemned and taken through legal processes (Kumsa, 2011). Tadesse & Imana (2017) state the genesis of the Special Zone lay in smallholders who had had their land expropriated and were being forced to rapidly change their livelihoods with little ameliorative assistance. The payments smallholders receive for their property are spent, Tadesse & Imana say, on basic family needs since these farmers have lost their ability to engage in agricultural production and have few other earning opportunities. Smallholders who had previously relied upon agricultural production for their livelihood suddenly became consumers who were often ill-equipped to transition to non-farm employment and an urban lifestyle.

*Proxy Reactions to Resettlement and Relocation Programmes*

Megento (2013: 131) found slum clearance and relocation programmes were already being carried out by the city of Addis Ababa before the official mid-April 2014 announcement of the Integrated Development Master Plan and these were intended to support the public purpose of development. They resulted in an increased “level of poverty, loss of livelihoods and asset bases, unavailability and/or lack of service facilities, poor housing conditions and unaffordability of condominium houses.” Ethiopian Proclamation No. 455/2005 (*To Provide for the Expropriation of Land Holdings for Public Purposes and Payment of Compensation*) defines development in the name of a ‘public purpose’ very broadly, stating:

“A wereda or an urban administration shall, upon payment in advance of compensation in accordance with this Proclamation, have the power to expropriate rural or urban landholdings for public purpose where it believes that it should be used for a better development project to be carried out by public entities, private investors, cooperative societies or other organs, or where such expropriation has been decided by the appropriate higher regional or federal government organ for the same purpose.”

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19 *FinFinne* is the word for Addis Ababa in the Oromo language.
The evolving provisions of the Integrated Development Master Plan, which are consuming agricultural land and displacing large numbers of both urban and rural dwellers, have been referred to as one of the catalysts for the civil disturbances and violence now occurring in the Oromia region, particularly among university students (Home, 2016b; HRW, 2016). In a more global context, Klandermans (2014: 2) had predicted similar protests by students even though they may have little or no actual connection to either agriculture or vested interest in the expropriations of smallholders. He found that social identity is a personal characteristic related to self-image and a collective identity, it refers to something shared by “members of a group or category.” Klandermans concluded that people who may not be personally associated with a particular circumstance or grievance “take part in political protest because they want to change their own circumstances or to express their views and feelings.” Furthermore, people’s decisions to “participate in such [proxy] actions revolve around feelings of anger based in perceived unfairness, which are typically associated with relative deprivation theory” (van Zomeren, 2017: 3). Protest movements, such as are now taking place in some areas of Ethiopia, fulfil a need to express similar political and social views even if those views are only peripherally tied to the issue of land use (see also Mannarine, et al., 2009; Stewart, 2011; and Taspinar, 2015).

As a result of widespread public opposition and the increasing violence, the Integrated Development Master Plan was officially rescinded in January 2016. However protests continued and this can be interpreted as confirming Klandermans prediction of proxy violence. A new plan, the 10th Addis Ababa Integrated Development Master Plan which encompasses just 52,000 hectares, was approved by the city council on 13 July 2016 (EBC, 2017) but that plan is outside of the research period and scope of this thesis.

2.8 Social and Educational Displacement

At one time land appeared to be an almost inexhaustible African asset. However both rural and urban populations have increased, in part due to developmental interventions. In Ethiopia, these interventions have included better diet and advancements in maternal and infant health care that have resulted in much higher infant survival rates, and elder care programmes which lead to longer lives (Singer & Ansari, 1988; ADBG, 2013; WB, 2017c). This will,

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20 The Ethiopian Broadcasting Authority was established as an autonomous federal agency by Proclamation 533/2007 and is therefore an official source of information.

21 Infant and child mortality rates are considered basic indicators of national health care and socio-economic growth (UNDP, 2007). Throughout Ethiopia, women in Addis Ababa are the most likely to receive a postnatal check-up within two-days of giving birth, while in the immediately surrounding region of Oromia they are least likely to meet with
inevitably, lead to significant and potentially destabilizing social change within the population as its redistribution from rural to urban areas alters the current agrarian character of Ethiopia.

Migration may be temporary, circular, or permanent; either forced or voluntary; cross-border, regional, or rural-to-urban (Kettlewell, 2010; Vargas-Silva, 2011). It allows individuals and families to escape poverty or conflict; and to abandon environmentally degraded agricultural lands for the considered potential of better employment, educational, or religious prospects elsewhere (Bruntland, 1987; Werz & Conley, 2012). Thus, migration decisions are “shaped by multiple pull and push factors, primary among them are economic growth and its disparities” (IOM, 2003: 4). Agriculturally, push factors include small farm size and rapid population growth while pull factors, especially among youth, include the expectation of higher economic returns from education and the lure of potential employment in urban areas (Bezu & Holden, 2014; Wolf, et al., 2014).

**Different Forms of Displacement Outcomes**

Rural-to-urban migration was defined by Rhoda (1983: 36) as “residential relocation from a predominantly agricultural area to an area in which a majority of employment is in non-agricultural activities.” His definition of migration did not distinguish between refugees, migrants, or displacees, nor did he define its distance or the size of the non-agricultural settlement relocatees adopt. However, he did note that decisions which are more participatory in nature are associated with higher levels of individual or family education and that voluntary, rather than forced relocations, are often more successful. Kurekova (2011: 4) found that neoclassical explanations for migration are reliant upon the “underlying assumption that it is stimulated primarily by rational economic considerations of relative benefits and costs.” Satterthwaite, et al., (2010: 2813) concluded that in lesser developed countries “urbanization is overwhelmingly the result of migration in response to low returns from agricultural occupations and the anticipation of realizing better economic opportunities in urban areas.”

The urban development process is defined as the “social, cultural, economic and physical development of cities, as well as the underlying causes of these processes” (UiO, 2013: 3). As economic growth increases disposable income, especially among the more educated elements of the urban population, prosperity leads to the parallel demand for

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a physician. The incidence of neonatal visits was found to increase in proportion to the education and wealth of the family (CSA, 2016).
improved living conditions, manifesting in short-distance migration to new commercial centres, more comfortable housing stock, and ever better employment opportunities (Harris & Todaro 1970). Yet, as Ethiopia’s rate of growth and development increase, economic opportunity and improvements are not distributed equitably and, while smallholders are usually compensated for their expropriated property, they are rarely provided with alternative livelihoods or livelihood training that would restore their former economic status (Huang, 1995; Cernea, 1997; Gebregziabher, et al., 2014).

In the case of Ethiopian migration, Mberu (2005: 9) defined it as most commonly a “movement out of either a rural or urban place of origin which lasted for at least six months” regardless of destination, including local, regional or international migration. Crush (2012: 2) found that under normal circumstances “migration is rarely a one-way one-time move, that new urban dwellers continue to speak of and feel attached to their rural home and that there is an expectation of returning home again.” Thus while movement is not entirely unusual, it is most frequently circular and undertaken as a temporary measure with the implicit expectation of returning rather than being a permanent, forced condition which results in a highly disorienting loss of livelihood. Despite social and cultural experiences and expectations, displaced smallholders lose their social grounding as they are forced from the land with little support other than the cash payment they have received for their property and so they cannot return.

2.9.1 Ethiopia’s Education Policy

Ethiopia’s fifth, and most current, *Education Sector Development Programme* (ESDP V) (MoE, 2015: 11) concludes that while agricultural production remains “dominant in economic composition and is the source of livelihood for a great majority of the population,” it is declining in its relative share of importance. The predicted rural to urban population shift will have far reaching consequences, yet ESDP V confirms that despite a new emphasis upon industrialization, agriculture remains of “critical importance to livelihoods” (Ibid: 11). Paradoxically, ESDP V concludes the service and industrial sectors are ascending and their significance within the economy is increasing. It notes that while youth literacy had improved from just 34% in 2000 it remains low, and at 52% it is “still one of the lowest rates in sub-Saharan Africa” (Ibid, 36).

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22 ESDP V is consistent with the evolutionary objectives and developmental strategies found in the 2002-2005 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme; the 2005-2010 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty; the 2010-2015 Growth and Transformation Plan; and particularly the 2015-2020 Second Growth and Transformation Plan that emphasizes economic growth and industrialisation (MoE, 2015: 12).
At the opposite end of the educational experience, it recognizes the need for a better matching of outcomes between the educational system and the employment-market as high rates of unemployment are particularly prevalent among secondary school educated youth\(^{23}\). The focus of ESDP V (MoE, 2015: 34) is upon six areas, including (i) capacity development for improved management; (ii) general education quality; (iii) general education access, equity and internal efficiency; (iv) adult and non-formal education; (v) technical and vocational education and training; and, (vi) higher education.

According to the plan, capacity development will involve internal improvements to the education system while greater access will increase the availability of pre-primary education and access to local schools. Improvements to general educational quality are intended to motivate school children to complete their education through secondary school. Adult and non-formal education will continue to focus upon basic literacy courses and community education, while technical and vocational education centres will increase the relevance of courses and technologies as well as their transferability to industrial settings. The government intends higher education to promote knowledge and technology transfer based on national developmental as well as community needs.

**Enrolment and Goals**

Relative to the previous national educational plan, ESDP V notes “No coherent model for planning and delivering a relevant continuing education and lifelong learning programme at the federal and regional level was developed during ESDP IV” (MoE, 2015: 86). The instant educational plan, released in August, 2015, emphasizes programmes to reduce illiteracy in the adult and youth population which it carefully notes has formed a barrier to Ethiopia’s goal of becoming a middle-income economy by the target date of 2025. These will be reached, in large measure it predicts, through its fifth objective: the expansion of the current system of technical vocational education training. ESDP V establishes an enrolment goal of 564,000 students in these vocational centres who will participate in ‘market driven’ programmes (described in Chapter 6).

Seid, et al., (2015) note the number of students who were enrolled in technical and vocational institutions has already increased dramatically, from just 5,264 in academic year

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\(^{23}\) Education, including the words ‘student’ and ‘graduate’ is used here to mean the range of experiences, from completion of basic levels of schooling to obtaining a university degree. Vocation training provides credentials while education results in a diploma of some sort.
1999–2000 to 271,389 students by 2014–15, while university enrolment has increased from about 10,000 students in 1990 to more than 360,000 in 2015. In terms of higher education, ESDP V states there were 36 public universities (at the time of publication) throughout Ethiopia and announced plans to establish an additional 11 institutions, as well as a goal of 94 private universities. Ultimately, the enrolment capacity of these institutions will be approximately 600,000 undergraduate and graduate students. While the dramatic enrolment goals of ESDP V may be reflective of Ethiopia’s increasing population and its political aspirations, they strain pedagogical basics which rely upon the limited supply of educationally qualified instructors. Competent instructors who can achieve the desired outcomes are scarce, and the quality of university education has degraded. This may account for instances of under-employment among graduates who discover they are not as capable as they are led to believe (Hanushek, 2013; Regassa, et al., 2013; Yirdaw, 2016).

Despite its continued robust economic growth, and as the number of university students and better educated youth has increased, Ethiopia exhibits a significant level of unemployment, especially in urban areas (Kibru, 2012; Nayak, 2014). An update of its unemployment statistics occurred with the 2014 Urban Employment / Unemployment (CSA, 2014b). That survey, compiled by the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency found an unemployment rate of 38% in urban centres. In the municipal area of Addis Ababa that are contiguous to the study areas unemployment rates differ dramatically by age group, with the 15–24 year old cohort suffering particularly high unemployment though this spikes again in the 60-years and older age group.

2.9.1 Social Displacement Resulting From Education

Social displacement (liminality) can occur following educational curriculums as students often outgrow and no longer cognitively belong to their prior social circles (Rutherford, & Pickup, 2015; Murcia, 2018). However, education may not result in all of the desired effects and can fail to result in higher earnings or employment. In the United States, workers with advanced educational degrees are not necessarily hired for positions that are commensurate with those skills. The wage penalty for these over-educated workers is greater than among lesser-educated but adequately skilled employees (Tsai, 2010). A similar study of German workers by

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24 The Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency was established by Proclamation 442/2005. Section 6 of that proclamation provides it the mandate to “collect, process, analyse and disseminate the necessary socio-economic and demographic statistical data through censuses, sample surveys, continuous registration and administrative recording systems” and this applies to all federal government “economic, social and demographic data collection, compilation and dissemination.” While the establishing proclamation titles it the “Central Statistics Agency” many of its own reports use the title Central Statistical Agency.
Leuven & Oosterbeek (2011: 20) concluded that while some “over-schooled workers move upwards, a large fraction remains over-schooled” and that where workers have more education than is required by the needs of their employment, relatively few have the practical skills necessary to function at higher levels. In both instances, the over-educated often displace less-educated workers who might otherwise perform adequately.

Herrera-Idarraga, et al., (2013) found specific negative effects of over-education in lesser-developed countries such as Ethiopia. They determined that a massing of qualifications earned at university do not necessarily improve national industrial characteristics; that a larger number of tertiary educated graduates may not result in an increase in the number of positions which require technical or even higher general educations. They conclude that while tertiary levels of schooling are not intrinsically unproductive, the availability of employment opportunities constrain the ability of workers to utilize their skills.

Regarding displaced smallholders who might enrol in rehabilitative training programmes, McGivney (1990: 4) noted that people who have no reported employment which might impose time constraints upon their activities are generally the most unlikely to participate in adult educational or training programmes. She concluded that a combination of attitudes and expectations prevents them from taking advantage of whatever training opportunities are available. Continuing education or training is, McGivney found, “not part of the value system and behaviour pattern of a disturbing number of people.” Arnason & Valgeirsdottir (2015) also found people who are “unemployed and/or economically inactive; who have short formal educational experiences; and who are older” are frequently unmotivated to participate in rehabilitative educational programmes.

Paladanius (2007) determined that low self-esteem was a major contributor to this lack of motivation among older adults to reengage in education or vocational training; that considerations of habitus and maintaining the social order are their key concern, not self-improvement. Adult education, Paladanius posits would “be interpreted as a suggestion to be positioned as a child once again” (Ibid, 5) rather than recognition as an adult who had accumulated meaningful life-experiences. Kispalne-Horvath (2012) found that a significant level of anxiety occurs among returning adult learners who would be required to sit for comprehension testing at the end of the educational modules.

Where adults do participate in vocational training programmes, Fukunishi & Machikita (2017: 9) confirm “in the context of the Ethiopian labour market, an increase in graduates
induces displacement of unskilled workers.” Their research found that an increase in the number of vocationally educated students fails to generate labour demand and it actually harms the ability of some trainees to obtain employment. Paradoxically, the found that a 10% increase in the number vocational centre graduates results in a 4.9% reduction in the “probability of having a formal job” (Ibid: 18) for young males. This is due, they contend, to a close matching of training with employment demand that results in an over-supply of newly trained workers. Graduates who begin vocational training with less formal education or only lower-secondary education, rather than upper level, are particularly susceptible to unemployment or under employment following vocational training. Thus, while vocational training is effective in transferring skills, it does not appear to be nimble enough to compensate for its' own success and an over-supply of workers results.

High and Low Context Participation

Across studies of those who enrol in adult education, a pattern has evolved which demonstrates it is “higher social classes, the young, and those who are already well educated who participate more often” (Crowther, 2000: 479) while non-participants tend to be those who are minimally educated, working class, and older.

Yamazaki (2005) contends that national cultures can be grouped and studied in terms of their high- and low-contextual patterns and that these often rely on peer group relationships. Low-context individuals tend to place greater importance on symbolic representations during individual and group learning. Their learning style is less dependent on personal relationships while being more reliant on rational, scientific experiences. Yamazaki offered Germany and Switzerland as examples of low-context cultures. According to van Everdingen & Waarts (2003) workers in low-context cultures tend to seek information from reports and data bases rather than obtaining it primarily through close association with their social or place networks and peer groups.

High-context cultures such as Ethiopia’s (Baker & Campbell, 2012), are generally more traditional and rely on personal relationships and place attachments. Actors in these cultures depend on non-verbal communications and the physical environment to develop social meaning among peers and events. High-context actors are better served if they are situated in familiar surroundings and circumstances where exchanges of concrete experiences and close social interactions among peers result in, and from, similar perceptions. These cultures often build on
more emotional responses to events and the social environment, but there may be strong uncertainty avoidance among their members. Individuals in higher-context cultures will, for example, wait until they have seen substantial evidence of a new technique’s success before making changes to familiar and proven patterns of behaviour than do people from low-context cultures who are prone to abstract conceptualization. In this context, ‘new techniques’ also means enrolling in vocational training programmes which could be personally transformational, and Akay et al., (2009) found this to be particularly true in rural Ethiopia.

Everdingen and Waarts (2003) describe low-context (focused on quantifiable information and reports) and high-context (based more on personal relationships) cultures. Yama & Norhayati (2012: 2553) suggest the distinction is generally explained as the difference “between individualist and collectivist cultures”; that in high context cultures there is often less social variability and therefore less overall experience in responding to change. In high context cultures individuals rely more upon the attitudes and experiences of their peers and co-workers for information and examples and therefore, they change slowly. In low context cultures workers are more likely to rapidly adopt changes in technologies or livelihood practices. For the purposes here, high-context can describe smallholder and subsistence farmers while recently educated students whose experiences and familiarities have become broadened may be better described as being more accepting of a lower context. Hence, this may help to explain the differences in how each group has reacted to the social and economic environments which are changing around them, including the multi-dimensional physical and economic characteristics of development induced displacement as well as the liminal and social displacement which results from education.

Group differences within these contexts can create power gaps between elites and secondary individuals who follow the example of the elite. Ethiopia’s agricultural development agents, for example, have educational qualifications as well as administrative and bureaucratic power and therefore their elite status can easily influence individual and small group decisions. To willingly leave a high-context culture, or to step outside of the peer networks upon which they are based, is assumed to be an extremely difficult step to take among generally isolated and now displaced smallholders in the study area who may have little external support. Doing so at a disorienting time of *ex situ* ousting, or post-educational liminality, would require an extreme re-evaluation of relationships and at least partial abandonment of past livelihoods and place attachments.
2.9.2 Enculturation

Culture is difficult to define and there is not complete agreement regarding what it entails. Definitions include “the shared set of implicit and explicit values, ideas, concepts, and rules of behaviour that allow a social group to function and perpetuate itself … as the dynamic and evolving reality which exists in the minds of social group members” (Hudelson, 2004: 345). Lewis (1966: 19) more succinctly described culture as “a way of life handed on from generation to generation and which provides a ready-made set of solutions for the problems typically encountered.”

Social capital derived from culture and one’s role within that culture is developed through place identity, from the sense of community and the degree of interpersonal support available within that community (Wind & Komproe, 2012; Lowe, et al., 2015). In one study in the United States, the degree of social capital and closeness of personal relationships was tied to the degree of support they had depended upon, and continued to require, following a devastating and displacing natural disaster (Docena, 2015). People who were wealthier and more independent were better able to withstand the perturbation of disaster displacement while the poor, who had previously relied upon a deeper reservoir of group support within the community, were far less resilient when their social network became displaced and dispersed. The post-disaster support networks which this second group of individuals had relied upon were often no longer available and the loss of their social connections and contextual relations was correlated to increased levels of post-traumatic stress.

Enculturation is a life-long process which begins in infancy and continues throughout adulthood. It encompasses the conscious and unconscious processes of assimilating “the totality of traditions which include the economic, social, religious, and linguistic reservoirs of culture” (Shimahara, 1970: 144). The process of enculturation was described by Berger & Heath (2008) as the adoption and internalization of the standards of the social group. Those may include the assumption of a specific occupationally-oriented vocabulary, styles of clothing, and other mannerisms needed for entry or acceptance into groups and which discourage others from attempting to breach these barriers. Enculturation is especially strong when it is continuous and undisturbed and has been reinforced by institutions such as the local educational system; by the certainty that local laws, customs and mœres represent; and, through the development of norms and values which are learned and absorbed over a lifetime (Nekby, et al., 2007; Rudmin, 2009).
2.9.3 Place Attachment and Farming

Place, place attachment, and contextualized feelings of belonging, are well researched concepts in the literature. Hauge (2006) discussed ‘place’ in terms of the built environment having influences that are as important as those of genetics, social or cultural influences. Place gives coherence to social memories; it provides strong emotional attachment, not only to the location itself but also to the enduring memories of communal associations and lifestyles.

Scannell & Gifford (2010: 3) propose “in general, individuals may connect to a place in the sense that it comes to represent who they are” and that those connections are formed at varying emotional levels (Figure 2.2). These social connections are formed through religious and cultural norms; and by membership in friendship networks that develop within physical environments. As a result of those processes, memory, behaviour, and group identities are moulded around shared lifestyles (e.g., I am a coal miner; I am a Texan) which are difficult to change in older individuals.

Figure 2.2

As a livelihood occupation, farming is a shared and exclusive group experience which is not easily entered except through birth or inheritance. Its life-long enculturation process forms strong, culturally distinctive bonds that are reflective of place identity, place attachment, and prevailing social structures. While gate-keeping restrictions differ from nation to nation the literature (Laband & Lentz, 1983; Elder, et al., 1996; Leu & Muller, 2016) broadly suggests agriculturalists in such diverse settings as Sweden, the United Kingdom, or the United States display similar patterns of social behaviour.
Elder, et al., (1996) posited that as members of a distinct occupational group with its own social standards, farm children in the United States are enculturated differently than urban children. Counterintuitively, their relative isolation develops a collective rather than an individualistic social pattern. They form life-long agriculturally-related group dependencies which are characterised by particularly strong friendship bonds among their peers. However, Elder, et al., found those childhood bonds may become self-destructive as they become adults if they are not allowed the personal growth and recognition of the maturity that comes from economic independence, such as through taking control of their own farm or entry into a non-farm occupation. Correspondingly, McLaren & Challis (2009: 263) found that among isolated and generally solitary Australian farmers, the development of social networks which are defined through place acculturation generate “a significant source of personal support which provide a sense of communal belonging; they create a sense of being needed, of personal value and relevancy.”

In Ethiopia, Bezu & Holden (2014: 261) found “youth in rural areas often live with their parents in a household where they may have only limited influence on their own labor allocation” and so they may also be unable to exert sufficient control over their personal situations to be considered adults in their own right. Thus, while their place attachment may be strong, their individual identity is often weak. In the instant context, losing one’s agriculturally productive livelihood due to ousting leads to a loss of purpose and value as a member of an exclusive group. It creates a loss of self-value and increased instances of adverse psychological conditions (Easter, 1996).

2.9.4 The Process of Place Acculturation

Redfield, et al., (1936: 149) described acculturation as “those phenomena which result when groups of individuals from different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact with changes occurring in the original cultural patterns of either or both.” Acculturation has effects upon both the newcomer and the host community, and may be viewed as positive, neutral, or negative. Murcia (2018: 2) described this place identity as forming “strong social, psychological and emotive attachments.” Erman (1998) for example, found that Turkish migrants who shared a common past, including origination in the same town or village, similar social strata or livelihoods, tend to follow earlier relocatees to the same new location. Yet older migrants, especially, tended to insulate themselves from becoming fully acculturated into their new surroundings. Rather than socialize broadly, migrants often maintain previous contacts and
customs, isolating themselves by predominantly frequenting such familiar touchstones as coffee houses, restaurants or shops that stock customary food items (Sumption, 2009; Kanas, et al., 2011).

2.9.5 Enculturation and Path Dependence

Path dependence has a multiplier effect upon enculturation. Individual practices among smallholders are not isolated from their larger agricultural groupism. These may reflect local food preferences, technical and educational norms, and standards for relationships (Oakley & Garforth, 1985). For example, although in open market economies the choice of the crops that are planted is not necessarily inevitable, “farming is not divorced from previous relationships” (Clark, et al., 2010: 248) between the climate, soil conditions and the enculturated experiences of the community.

Being contractually or otherwise invested in the production of a particular crop helps to determine pathways which lead to life-long group identities and the development of personal and community networks. Pathways that are based on production actively determine social relationships, including membership in commodity-specific growers associations; participation in communal demonstrations provided by farmer training centres; or, as a result of similar childhood educational experiences in farm-community schools. Ultimately, these result in norms and values that are organically based and which contribute to the development of a distinctive localized culture (Stuiver, 2006) whose bonds are difficult to break even when the need to maintain membership in that social group is no longer necessary.

Deculturation, on the other hand, is the process of ‘unlearning’ and discarding conscious, though obsolete methods or memories. It is accomplished by the over-learning of new experiences (Thomas, 2011) although Clark, et al., (2008) contend that previous social experiences, including values or place attachment cannot actually be unlearned. These experiences remain within individual memory and this explains why they are often referred back to if the individual becomes cognitively overloaded. This is something which might happen during a disorienting social or physical displacement process that induces a reversion to group

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25 Path dependence was described by Walker (2000: 126) as “choices made in the past, technologies embodied in machinery and product design, firm assets gained as patents, specific competencies or labour skills acquired through learning, influence subsequent choices of method, design, and practices. It does not mean a rigid sequence determined by technology and the past, but a road map in that an established direction leads more easily one way than another and wholesale reversals are difficult.”
associations and norms or as an equally muddling educational experience causes personal change.

*The Social Loss of Place Identity and Culture*

The literature examples demonstrate that communities are spatial, emotional, and temporal; they provide a sense of continuity and social identity which binds individual attachment to small-groups and to a larger whole (Stedman, 2002). A ‘place’ can be considered the communal centre of individual meaning and personal experience; it is often the touchstone of formative social relationships which represent ways of life, practice and customs. The ideation of ‘belonging’; of social familiarity, individual rootedness and of being personally vital within the community can be derived from ‘place’ (Fried, 2000; McLaren & Challis, 2009). Social norms are adopted through membership in relatively closed communities and through the support networks that are afforded by personal connections (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015) while attachments are strengthened by the shared meanings which are derived from historic events.

‘Place’ and community identity are often the primary source of social contact and memories. Najafi & Kamal (2012: 7639) contend “people’s image of themselves is related to the physical places where that image developed.” Nagel (2002: 718), for instance, described strong place attachment and nostalgia for Beirut, Lebanon, remembered as being a centre of “glamour and warmth, openness and kin-based insularity” prior to its self-destruction during the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s. In Beirut, place memory advanced a post-conflict effort by residents to reconstruct its previous physical appearance in order to replicate their earlier associations and identities. Walmsley & Lewis (1984) contend this sense of belonging to a distinctive community makes individual recovery from adversity far more likely than if there are no group interactions available. Such attachments may be especially strong among people who consider their ‘personhood’ as being indivisibly linked to an occupation such as farming or through some other constructed memory and identity, including educational status.

Displacement from one’s home or surroundings results in the loss of culture and identity, and Dreyfus (1991: 45) noted “When we inhabit something it is no longer an object for us, but becomes part of us.” Thus, displacement terminates a fundamental means of personal and social control and the loss of culturally familiar places or group experiences engenders a sense

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26 Similar behaviour was exhibited when the ‘Long Market’ (Długi Targ) of Gdansk, Poland and the ‘Old Town Square’ (Staroměstské náměstí) of Prague, Czech Republic were rebuilt to historic appearances after having been destroyed during World War II.
of abandonment as social connections are breached (Alexopolous, 2005; Rebok, et al., 2012). This arouses sensitivities of sadness, distress, and grief as strong support linkages are broken. Consequently, older displaced persons may have a tendency to revert to thoughts of the past and “after an initial period of increased well-being, some become alienated from the host society. They either retreat into a troubled private world or show anti-social behavior” (Eisenbruch, 1991: 673).

2.9.6 Loss of Place and Cultural Bereavement

As noted earlier, the displacement literature does not clearly distinguish among migration distances and so there is no reason to consider displacement in purely geographic terms. Rather, the literature actually describes transfers between familiar and unfamiliar social paradigms. Among younger people, structural factors that include limitations upon their educational or employment outcomes often account for the abandonment of their physical and cultural environment and their migration from rural-to-urban areas (Kettlewell, 2010; Bezu & Holden, 2014) to obtain an education or to build their future. However, the literature shows this results in a loss of support mechanisms, especially during the liminal period where students no longer fit within their village or previous peer groups but are not yet accepted by professional society (Turner, 1987; Brookfield, 2005; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010). In explaining the wider communal loss that results from the rural-to-urban migration of better-educated youth, the Australian Bureau of Statistics concluded:

“Rural areas that young people are moving away from usually experience associated declines in population and increasingly older age profiles. In some areas, these population changes also coincide with a decline in key industries and the withdrawal of services, both public (e.g. schools and hospitals) and private (e.g. banking and retail). In turn, such changes may make living in rural areas less attractive to young people, and further impact upon the wellbeing and sustainability of the remaining older community.” (ABS, 2003: 22)

In older people the loss of familiar physical places, such as when neighbourhood schools are closed; commercial centres and local shops that are replaced by office blocks; or when long-time industries such as coal mining abruptly end, can pose especially acute physical and emotional challenges. In his study of urban development and displacement in the United States, Fried (2000: 196) concluded older individuals who have been ousted from their homes and other places continued to “maintain a strong attachment and felt a profound sense of post-relocation loss that resulted in widespread grief and mourning among the displaced residents.” His results showed it was the uncertainty of the future which made their loss so important, that
the dissolution of long-held place and group relationships was the catalyst of that grief process and which most delayed individual recovery and adaptation. Place attachment and fear of separation from the known social environment are “particularly strong among people with few independent resources like poor, lower status groups” (Ibid: 196). Among the poor, place attachment may become central to individual memory when there are few alternative social or economic opportunities. Among those who voluntarily transition to a new status, such as students who obtain an education or others who choose a new livelihood, the loss of previous place associations and belonging may continue to result in substantial social and cultural dissonance.

2.9.7 The Effects of the Loss Place Attachment in Rural Ethiopia

In the literature, Stratford (2009: 796) described our attachment to place in terms of “historical and cultural values, economic and social uses”, while Devine-Wright (2010: 267) noted that ‘place’ pertains to “personal roles and attributes, the belonging to social groups or categories.” Marshall, et al., (2012) referred to place in terms of livelihood attachment, while Kebede (2013) described it in terms of a memory of consistent values.

Conversely, the sense of ‘placelessness’ was posited by Relph (1976) as a social condition which is exhibited primarily as a result of there no longer being a significant attachment and no opportunity to adequately develop new connections. This sense of being ungrounded is also documented in refugee and oustee literature (Cernea, 1997; Mooney, 2005; Raymond, et al., 2010; Norvy, 2013). Placelessness and a lack of grounding, though, are not exclusively geographic nor do they require physical movement.

In this study of smallholders who have been ousted ex situ, place attachment refers generally to personal connections made to the land and livelihoods, to cultural and social surroundings. Those decisions are often based on individual experiences with weather conditions and land degradation; upon the advice received from agricultural development agents or governance policies, all of which to some degree influence and shape young farmers’ decisions of whether to remain on the land or to adopt some other livelihood. These issues similarly obtain to the students who are also subject of this thesis. Individual choices to maintain an agricultural livelihood or to diversify into off-farm or non-farm income generation are made using an assortment of information and decision making tools (Bezu, et al., 2012).
Acerbi & Parisi (2006) suggest local culture is transmitted vertically between generations and between the modern and traditional, but that behaviours and values are learned horizontally from other individuals within the community, especially among peers of the same generation. Problematically in the terms presented here, older risk-averse Ethiopian smallholders may be unwilling to adopt innovative practices or techniques, or to change their own peer and friendship networks, and so their successful assimilation into a new livelihood paradigm becomes less assured (Schwartz, et al., 2006). Bezu, et al., (2012) found that younger farmers, with their own friendship networks, may be more willing to leave the land yet face equally uncertain futures.

**The Value of Friendship Networks**

Friendship networks play an important role in risk reduction and the mitigation of economic shock in rural Ethiopia. Shocks may derive from a variety of sources, such as the injury or death of a family member, crop damaging pest infestation, or the loss of key draught animals. Pan (2007: 6) found in addition to “external aid from government sources and limited assistance provided by NGOs, mutual support is very common in rural Ethiopia” and so peer networks are important. However, also specific to Ethiopia, Todo, et al., (2014) found that few smallholders have meaningful personal or economic ties outside of their neighbours. When external ties do exist they are most often limited to agricultural extension agents who represent the wereda government and whose job is to promote both new agricultural technologies and to sell government controlled seed and fertilizer.

A similar study by Spielman, et al, (2011: 195) regarding knowledge transfer and external innovation derived essentially the same results, finding that Ethiopian’s are often limited by the short distance of social networks and that agricultural development agents “exert a strong influence over smallholder networks, potentially crowding out market-based and civil society actors” who might provide different expertise or perspectives. This isolation not only limits the range of coping mechanisms post-displacement, it also reinforces existing peer-group ties and place-derived culture. Among a close group of similar individuals, it restricts the information which flows from outside actors regarding more complex technologies than are already at hand.

Vaughan & Tronvoll (2003: 31) were also concerned with stake holding-local power elites who control access to local government; who determine the level of individual standing throughout the community; and, who govern land use decisions and therefore individual economic development and prosperity. Highly germane was their estimation of the control
these elites have over “the social distribution of knowledge”. They found that knowledge, belief, and convention are entwined and amount to individual and group expressions of social culture.

Hofstede & Bond (1984: 417) held “culture does not only affect psychological processes, but also the sociological, political, and economic functioning of social systems.” Their work suggested four generally distinguishable dimensions of national culture. Those are: (i) power distance, where decisions are made by the elite and less powerful members of society acquiesce to them; (ii) risk aversion and uncertainty avoidance, where people feel threatened by unknown and ambiguous outcomes of their own decisions or the decisions made by others; (iii) the polar opposites of individualism and collectivism, as people choose to belong to useful collectives and peer groups or are excluded from participation in them; and, (iv) masculinity vs. femininity, stressing the competitive values of acquisition and economic success or of more inclusive and cooperative relationships.

2.10 Summary

In this chapter, peer-reviewed and grey literature regarding poverty and place attachment, including personal connections to local culture, have been explored. On a global scale millions of people are formally ousted each year in favour of modernization which provides benefits to the greater population. The physical results of development-induced displacement such as are experienced through infrastructure or residential construction are unambiguous across the literature. In the study, area physical development is displacing hundreds of thousands of smallholders (Home, 2016a), resulting in a loss of land and livelihoods, of individual and place identity. Educational experiences also result in the loss of individual and place identity as the student transitions from one social paradigm to another.

Where smallholders are concerned, the stress that social and economic displacement creates can be associated with vascular disease and alcoholism, spouse abuse and divorce. Its effects solidify feelings of separation from the previously known community which, among a generally risk-averse group who had relied upon the support of life-long social contacts, are especially difficult to contend with. Place attachments that develop over the course of a lifetime are key to building and maintaining individual identity but are also contingent upon the on-going maintenance of shared economic conditions, occupations, and social status. Among these close-knit peer group memberships, symbolic and physical connections are shared through experiences of enculturation, of physical and social connections to locations and people, and
transitioning to a wholly new occupational identity is challenging (Tulloch & Lupton, 2003). Consequently, the literature suggests those who are formally displaced through the expropriation process may choose to isolate themselves within what remains of their social group rather than adopting new livelihood solutions, potentially creating new strata of poverty.

A similar informal displacement and social disarticulation can also occur as individuals choose to leave their prior status to participate in educational or training programmes. These can, first, socially separate them from their place identities and peer groups and are especially disorienting during the transitional period when one has left the former group but has not yet been accepted into the new group (Turner, 1987; Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010). Then a second time, when they are unable to find employment and return to their place of origin, migrate, or accept under-employment. In the case of education or skills acquisition, the consequences may be especially disruptive if sufficient opportunities are not available to accommodate the irreversible social transition that education imposes. Where insufficient opportunity is available, youth, especially, may be prone to engage in destabilizing civil disobedience (Pape, 2005; Whitmore, 2010).

Significant feelings of groupism, achieved through the enculturation process and one’s sense of potential loss of those connections often inhibits older, risk-averse smallholders from attending vocational training courses. Although university students may have suffered few actual impacts from the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan, they appear to have used the on-going expropriations and ousting as a proxy for other social demands including improved employment possibilities (Desalegn, 2016; van Zomeren, 2017) and this has resulted in an increasing degree of violence which is challenging basic social assumptions in Ethiopia.
Chapter 3
Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter discusses the study’s approach and rationale, describing the methodology and sampling strategies used during the desk research and field work phases to answer the question: “In what ways does development unintentionally contribute to new strata of poverty and internal instability?” It begins with a discussion of the preparation for the field work and the revisions necessitated by conditions on the ground as they were encountered.

The research began with an examination of a wide body of literature regarding urban and rural development and migration throughout sub-Saharan Africa, including a review of educational programmes; conflict periods; agricultural and environmental conditions (Tadesse, 2007; HRW, 2010; Ali, et al., 2011; Peluso & Lund, 2011; Leigh, 2012; Gizaw, 2013; Liu, et al., 2013; Keeley, et al., 2014). During that review, a substantial body of information was found that indicated Ethiopia is engaged in massive, forced relocation programmes wherein hundreds of thousands of smallholders are being uprooted and resettled in distant areas (Jemma, 2004; Hammond, 2008; Yntiso, 2008; Tadele, 2009; HRW, 2012; Lavers, 2012; Hagos & Holden, 2013; Makki, 2014). This literature indicated these resettlement programmes were being carried out for three primary reasons: to relieve environmental pressures caused by intensive and unsustainable subsistence farming; to bundle small properties for their long-term lease to trans-national agricultural producers following the global food crisis of 2008; and to build massive new infrastructure. However, little literature was oriented to the community level effects of displacement and upon arrival, evidence of this displacement was not observed, though that does not discount its occurrence. What was found in the study area indicated other causes for ousting.

Field investigation, utilizing constructivist and grounded theory approaches revealed the issues relating to development-induced displacement among smallholders are complicated: the involuntary physical displacement of farmers creates social displacement, while youth who participate in education become socially displaced when they are unable to secure appropriate employment. Interviews with a wide variety of respondents revealed that centralized policies are not providing sufficient employment opportunities for either group. Older displaced smallholders described feelings of social isolation yet remained in their peer groups. For similar reasons of marginalization, younger Ethiopians have begun to engage in anti-government demonstrations and security forces have met those with increasing violence.
3.1 Research Approach and Rationale

During the desk-study phase, the forced relocation of Ethiopian’s described in the literature appeared to present opportunities for the observation of the generational transfer of agricultural knowledge in unique and highly stressful conditions. Dislocated farmers were assumed to find themselves in a position which required them to ‘unlearn’ (Clark, 2008; Thomas 2011) the agricultural techniques used in their previous regions; to adopt new methods of production learnt from other smallholders who may have lost part of their own property to the new comers; and then instantaneously transfer that new knowledge to their children since time is of the essence in such volatile circumstances.

However, as field interviews progressed in each of three study areas and a large number of people were contacted, no respondents professed any knowledge of on-going physical relocation programmes. What displacement was observed was found to be, essentially, an issue of evictions taking place in the peri-urban areas of the capital city that were the consequence of successful upstream programmes of economic growth. Thus, the information presenting itself during interviews in the three field locations did not support the earlier desk research but did reveal an issue not previously found during the literature review.

Among those who were being ousted, a pattern began to emerge. Older smallholders and particularly men, needed to learn non-farm livelihood skills in order to cultivate alternative means of livelihood and income generation. However, they were resisting the necessary personal and group changes needed to support new livelihoods. Despite being physically, economically and socially displaced, they were observed as remaining passive, choosing not to engage in activities which would lead to the development of new, non-farm skills.

In discussion with other respondents it became apparent that a second issue had also developed: that unemployment and under-employment among recently educated or vocationally trained youth, ages 15-24 was similar to smallholder displacement as their social displacement and disarticulation posed equally interesting questions. Although youth in Ethiopia are achieving historically unprecedented education levels, the slowing economy (IMF, 2016b; ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017) is resulting in too few employment opportunities for them to achieve economic independence and to realize their own social legitimacy (Honwana, 2012; Nayak, 2014). The outcomes range from limiting their ability to marry to increasing the likelihood of anti-government civil disturbances (Pape, 2005; Whitmore, 2010). Thus as the economy
matures and changes, Ethiopia’s otherwise successful development programmes are sometimes resulting in unintended and undesirable social outcomes.

Consequently, when this much different set of facts was confronted the direction of the project and the initial research questions required modification. To gather and analyse the phenomena as they began to present themselves, a combination of research approaches were utilized including social constructivism and grounded theory analysis (Andrews, 2012).

3.1.1 Social Constructionist, Constructivist, and Grounded Theories

Tendencies towards a culture of poverty and self-isolation described by Lewis (1966) and Reynolds & Baird (2010) following displacement; a loss of locus of control referred to by Onu, et al., (2013) and Lenton (2014); and the loss of place identity following dispossession noted by Jansen (2008), can be observed through the lenses of complementary social theories. In combination, social constructionism and grounded theory help to explain their outcomes. These serve to illuminate and frame what may be the sub-optimal responses of some disarticulated smallholders to remain unemployed and isolated in their peer groups and of students who elect to protest their own liminal displacement and under-employment through increasing incidents of civil disobedience (Crossely, 2008).

Social Constructionist and Constructivist Theory

Social constructionist theory derives meaning from experiences and cognitive processes. It is used here to draw together the shared paradigms of poverty and identity, of place and culture, income disparity and horizontal inequality which smallholders have experienced. Social constructionist theory was described by Gergen (1985: 266) as “primarily concerned with the processes by which people come to describe, explain, or otherwise account for the world in which they live.” Gergen also noted that human nature is partially explained through ‘groupism’, the tendency to think, act and generally conform to the immediate cultural environment. Owen (1995: 161) contends that aside from “inherited and developmental aspects of humanity, social constructionism hypothesizes that all other aspects of humanity are created, maintained and destroyed in our interactions with others through time.” These paradigms especially “emphasize the significance of context” (Cohen, et al., 2000: 133).

Mills, et al., (2006: 2) conclude constructivist theory “denies the existence of an objective reality” even as the researcher performs a constant comparison of the data as it presents itself. Marton (1981: 181) described this in terms of “what is thought and what is lived”; that people who participate in research interviews, for example, are often unable to distinguish between
their own experiences, including their values and behaviours, and that their thoughts regarding those experiences are generally unformed and poorly articulated. Though individual and place values are not immutable, they are immovable without significant difficulty since identity and place assignments originate externally and are assigned by wider social forces than the individual can control (Burr, 2003; Daubon, 2005).

Young & Collin (2004: 375) describe constructivism as being the method by which “each individual mentally constructs the world of experience through cognitive processes.” They suggest people mentally construct meaning from practices which are internal to the individual who synthesizes their experience and knowledge for assimilation into a group or community. Taber (2011: 40) notes constructivist learning theories assume “the learner comes to knowledge by recognising the meaning of what is found in the environment” and states “in human societies most of the knowledge we acquire is based on what is already part of the pool of available cultural knowledge.” Galbin (2014) concludes social constructivism describes causality, that it underscores the complex interactions of individuals within their communities and peer groups and it emphasizes the importance of individual experiences and group social interactions. This occurs during the construction of knowledge which is “inherently dependent upon communities of shared intelligibility” (Ibid: 84) and the degree to which two actors can understand each other. The constructivist learning style is different than rote memorization in that it “suggests that humans construct knowledge and meaning from their experiences” (Bada, 2015: 68). Taylor & Hamdy (2013: e1561) contend that constructivists “consider that learning is the process of constructing new knowledge on the foundations of what you already know.”

Knowledge is often highly contextual and dependent upon the associations one enters into or is prevented from entering. In analysing the establishment of programmes such as vocational training, Caffarella & Merriam (1999: 5) noted that constructivist theories posit such questions as “whose interests are being served by the programmes being offered; who really has access to these programmes; and, who has the control to make changes in the learning process and outcomes.” These are economically, socially, and politically charged questions and so constructivist paradigms may lead or force changes in power dynamics, including the shared experiences of poverty or relative deprivation. Hence the processes involved in social constructivism are unique to the experiences of the individual (Cohen, et al., 2004; Mojtahed, et al., 2014) and therefore they are suitable for use during qualitative research.

Social constructionism similarly helps us to view society in terms of its shared experiences and meanings (Andrews, 2012); that our understandings are shaped by our identity
and place in society; and normative and cultural values are experientially based. Thus, the views of respondents may be coloured by socio-political conditions which have become transparent to them. Their compliance with government policies is influenced by pressure which becomes transparent. Those perceptions become the structure through which life-decisions are made.

A positivist approach to the research would suggest that knowledge of the social setting is gained through observation. Positivist views propose that individual experiences can be explained through the application of rigorous scientific method, and that ‘truth’ and certainty are measurable quantities (Collins, 2010). While positivism relates to a gathering of the facts, a more phenomenological approach would concentrate on the meaning of the research, demonstrating a greater interest in the ‘human aspects’ of the observations as they are made (Crowther & Lancaster, 2008).

**Grounded Theory**

Grounded theory is described by Elliott & Lazenbatt (2005) as providing an understanding of behaviour through continuous discovery. It begins, according to Charmaz (2008: 156) with systematic “explication and emergence”, inquiring into and then explaining the nature of the question by utilizing open-ended methods to explore surrounding and contributing issues as they emerge. This causes researchers to reconsider and include points which do not fit well with preconceived notions, such as those which had been derived from a desk review of literature that could not be personally authenticated in the field. Grounded theory’s qualities of discovery and emergence, therefore, allow researchers the latitude to pursue incongruities and to investigate unanticipated avenues of inquiry.

Hancock & Algozzine (2006) remind us that while grounded theory seeks to explain actions and interactions, it is the researcher who is the crucial data-collection instrument as he attempts to explain specific, though every day, situations. Grounded theory relies on a continuous cycle of data collection and analysis. It takes iterative steps throughout the process rather than being a series of singular or distinct strides, and so it does not lend itself to a line of rigidly predetermined questions or data collection strategies. Rather, it relies upon the emergence of an incremental line of inquiry as information begins to coalesce and the researcher constantly analyses the evolving data for comparisons with initial data.

Starks & Trinidad (2007: 13) likewise conclude the goal of grounded theory is to develop an explanation of “basic social processes that are studied in the environment in which they
“occur” and that data is accumulated through a series of individual interviews and conversations; from focus groups; or by other methods. Malterud (2001: 486) though, had cautioned against assuming that a simple accumulation of a large amount of data will necessarily guarantee more accurate understandings. An inquiry which only relies upon a large number of interviews may simply lead to a superficial level of analysis as the quality of the information obtained is replaced by its sheer quantity.

Thus, as the information and observations regarding displacement were gathered from educators, smallholders, rural shop owners, government officials at all levels, and others, issues of social processes and group dynamics began to coalesce, including the emergence of strong place and group identity. Displaced smallholders, in particular, were observed to associate their identity as being that of a farmer despite the permanent loss of that livelihood and lifestyle. Among those interviewed, ousted smallholders displayed generally similar behaviour in regards to their ousting, choosing to remain within their peer groups rather than seeking training for new employment opportunities. Statements made by local observers confirmed this tendency and are referred to throughout this thesis.

Discussions with staff at four universities in the urban areas of Addis Ababa, Adaama, and Sheshamane revealed specific issues pertaining to students who obtain a tertiary education but then have insufficient opportunities to utilize their new knowledge and skills. Interviews conducted in Technical Vocational Education Training centres in Lalibela and Sheshamane demonstrated the utility and adaptability of vocational training curricula to meet local employment needs. In the aggregate, these interviews and conversations helped to better frame the characteristics of educational-induced displacement process and its social impacts upon a wider audience. Interviews helped to explain how education often leaves students with few options other than to take lower employment positions than they are qualified for; that they are frequently coerced by circumstances to either return to their villages and family farms, or to emigrate. Thus, observations made at each location are important to the outcome of this thesis.

3.1.2 Power Typologies

Understanding the different types of social power was also important during the field work phase and helped to explain behaviours and activities. Five types of power were identified by French & Raven (1959) who concluded that while overlaps may occur among them, not all actors possess each type of power. Those include (i) legitimate power such as that which is inherent in a government position; (ii) reward power, which includes neo-patrimonial and clientelist relationships that may result in the provision, or withdrawal, of support such as
distress food assistance in return for political support; (iii) expert power, which is based on in-depth or special knowledge and expertise, though this may easily be independent of education levels; (iv) referent power that tends to emanate from the personal characteristics of a political leader or other respected individual; and, (v) coercive power, that imposes compliance through the threat or the use of repressive force. Each of these helped to guide the selection of individuals and groups for interview.

Gaventa (2016: 29) simplified French’s & Raven’s five power types to just three, including “viable power”, that includes political power and the institutional ability to enforce rules and decisions; “hidden power”, through informal influence mechanisms imposed by individuals or organizations; and “invisible power” which shapes the psychological and ideological boundaries of participation through the processes of socialization and enforced culture. Pettit (2013: 9) suggests that a lack of power equates to a “lack of opportunities, resources and security”, that it is one more dimension of poverty, and unequal power relationships based on economic status which reinforces the conditions leading to individual or group marginalization. Pettit found a combination of age and poverty diminish individual and group political and social influence and this supports Daubon’s (2005) conclusions described in Section 2.2.

**Knowledge and Experientially Based Power**

Social actors can be defined by the power positions which are delineated by the normative activities they engage in (Ostrom, et al., 1994; Walton, 2011). Subsistence-level smallholders, for example, are not in the same position of legitimate power as the local government officials who issue the land use certificates that are used as evidence of property ownership during expropriation proceedings. Local officials generally do not possess the same degree of expert power as does a business school dean with a detailed knowledge of university graduation rates and the conditions of under-employment which affect various groups within the economy. Yet, neither government officials nor the university dean are likely to possess the same level of expert power of smallholders regarding local soil types or the micro-effect of erratic rains. Though each actor has a stake in a complex interrelationship of rural matters, their stakes are firmly planted in different areas of the agricultural field and so they are

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27 The 1994 Ethiopian constitution (Article 40) provides that all property is in the collective ownership of the state. However, tenants have rights to compensation when that property is expropriated and these are discussed in section 4.3.
able to offer unique perspectives of the same issue even though their abilities to influence events are unequal.

Being open to these different levels of expertise and power helped to focus the research methods. These methods included conducting a literature review which encompassed a wide variety of sources, the incorporation of key informant interviews; the review of agricultural, business, government and educational policies; and, close interaction with respondents in farm fields, shops, mills, and Ministerial offices. These coalesced to describe and frame behaviours and situations common to groups of displaced smallholders and to their communities, while also illuminating the employment concerns and sometimes discordant reactions of students (Ostrom, et al., 1994; Matsaert, 2002).

3.1.3 Positionality and Ethics

An important aspect of any inquiry is the need to “minimize preconceived ideas about the research problem” (Charmaz, 2006: 155). Bourke (2014) notes the process of research is a continuous one; that it carries on after the field work has been completed, and it includes not only the act of data collection but also the summation of findings as they are being reviewed and their implications are weighed. During data collection and analysis, Bourke (Ibid: 3) states “positionality represents a space in which objectivism and subjectivism meet” and that to “assume one can achieve pure objectivism is a naïve quest.”

Thus, it is proper to recognize that one’s personal or educational history; cultural and familial background, race or country of origin; prior research or professional affiliations, all combine to create biases which may elicit unconscious judgements regarding unfamiliar social norms (Merriam, et al., 2001; Baker & Edwards, 2006; Ganga & Scott, 2006). Working through one’s positionality, then, relies on the self-conscious awareness the researcher has of relationships between himself, respondents, and even of the interpreter who filters the words of respondents. Recognition of the presence of bias, based upon the positionality of the researcher, is of paramount importance.

As interview responses accumulated they began to reflect this researcher’s own background in government and interests in both adult education and urban planning. My background is one coming from a generally agricultural community and who later worked as a regional land use planner responsible for the compliance review of large scale development projects (5,000+ housing units) for their transportation, environmental and infrastructure impacts.
to both the built and natural systems. Despite local idiosyncrasies, my educational background and 30 years of working in various government agencies ultimately allowed me to more effectively observe that the bureaucratic processes of Ethiopia’s federal, regional and wereda governments (different than political processes) were generally similar to those I have encountered before and so they were relatively easy to understand and interpret. Thus, while I was cognizant of the point of view of the smallholder farmer, I also understood the position of the project developer and that of wereda governments. Ultimately, my personal and professional background allowed for a more detailed inquiry into the consequences of displacement that ousted smallholders were experiencing, as well as the recognition of under-employment among young adults as a long-term social problem that can become a security and stability issue (Pape, 2005; Brainard & Chollet, 2007; McDonald, 2008).

Positionality and bias were, though, assumed to be reciprocal. Expectations and judgements were also being made from the cultural and experiential position of those who were being interviewed. My status as an ethnic and cultural outsider in remote, often mountainous or otherwise isolated rural communities of Ethiopia was obvious. At times it was a cause of temporary celebrity as well as substantial suspicion. Therefore, throughout the field phase it was recognized that a combination of biases might influence the presentation of interview questions, the veracity of responses, and how those responses were recorded in narrative form after the interview had been completed. This caused me to conduct more interviews than planned with related stakeholders whose broadly common interests allowed for the triangulation of opinions and observations regarding displacement; adult education; as well as emergent issues of youth over-education in light of too few fitting employment opportunities.

**Research Ethics**

One of the most important ethical principles of research is to respect the anonymity and safety of the participants. According to Bryman (2012) research participants should be considered as ‘informants’ rather than ‘objects’; that during interviews they should be made aware their privacy will not be infringed upon, and that no harm will come to them. In all instances the participants were informed of the researcher’s intent and that their responses and opinions would remain anonymous. However, due to the sensitivities of conducting research in Ethiopia, including the semi-authoritarian and invasive nature of the Ethiopian government at each level (Aalen, 2006), there was no guarantee that notebooks or computers left in the hotel room would not be searched during the day. Respondents were assured their participation was
entirely voluntary and this was guaranteed by neither asking their names nor recording any personally identifying information\textsuperscript{28}.

The interview responses quoted throughout this thesis include the category of respondent (i.e., smallholder or entrepreneur) with the month they were recorded but not the location of the interview. With the nature of some of the responses providing their location might have allowed their individual identification. This degree of anonymity, however, severely limited the amount of demographic data which could be collected and made it very difficult to conduct follow-up discussions or to provide statistical analysis of respondents’ characteristics. Nevertheless, these caveats ultimately worked to the benefit of gathering qualitative data as participants became more open to conversation once they accepted they could not be identified at some later date.

\textit{Interview Format}

During the beta-test phase of interview questions in the Arat Kilo area of Addis Ababa, it was found that displaying a prepared format to record individual responses was obtrusive and provoked strong negative reactions among the micro-entrepreneurs who were interviewed. These initial participants were young men who were living in the capital city without sponsorship or government permission. Questions regarding how local taxes are levied and paid were a particular source of concern especially when the reply was noted on a form and this was true even when no personal information had been solicited. Therefore, to avoid the perception of recording identifying information, previously prepared questionnaires were simplified and then reviewed on a frequent basis with the interpreter to re-familiarize their content. Interviews were thenceforth conducted in an informal, anecdotal and conversational manner even as they kept to predetermined lines of inquiry.

A description of the research to be undertaken and the period during which it would be conducted; the proposed number of participant interviews; as well as protocols to ensure the anonymity of participants was submitted to the University and on 12 June 2015 ethical clearance was granted. A majority of respondents encountered could neither read nor write. In order to meet the intent of ethical compliance it was especially important to observe that all participants had in a recognizable way physically indicated their consent to participate rather

\textsuperscript{28} One exception to this exists, that of the interview with the Federal Ministry of Education’s Chief of Curriculum Development who gave his express permission for his specific position to appear.
than simply verbalizing it in another language through the interpreter or by signing a form they
could not understand.

Responses were recorded in a journal shortly after their conclusion and at some
distance from where interviews had taken place. Recollections were verified by summarizing
the notes with the interpreter, even following the occasions when English was used as the
medium of communication. These were transcribed later each night. This created a system of
internal audit to verify what had been heard and recorded, especially in terms of the accuracy of
the specific statements used throughout this thesis. This procedure worked to further include
the interpreter in the project. This active participation maintained his interest since the same
questions were repeatedly asked and it helped to generate discussion regarding other avenues
for exploration among respondents.

3.2 Research Methodology

The purpose of this thesis is to fill a gap in the literature concerning the unintentional
outcomes of successful development practices, including landless and jobless smallholders who
are physically displaced and students who become socially displaced. The essential outcome
of research is the production of knowledge and understanding and so the process is not
necessarily limited to a single pathway (Hammersley, 2000). Denzin (2009: 142) describes the
politics of evidence, noting that qualitative research does not always collect countable and
measurable information which can be analysed in a laboratory, and cautions that such
“evidence is never morally or ethically neutral.” He likens this process to the difference in
investigative paradigms which utilize the mirrored approaches of looking at ‘causes and effects’
as opposed to ‘effects and causes’.

3.2.1 Competing Research Approaches

This study takes a social constructivist and grounded theory approach, however
research methods have often been divided along ideological fault lines, with authors suggesting
there are essentially three types of research, including Quantitative, Qualitative and Mixed
Methods (Mayoux, 2006; Cresswell, 2007; Driscoll, et al., 2007; Katsirikou & Skiadas, 2010;
Pashaeizad, 2010). Tuli (2010: 107) states these differences in approaching research problems
raise the question of “the relationship between the knower and what is known.” Perspectives

29 The interpreter was a 44 year old male who had recently completed a three year course at a private university in
tourism development. He was unemployed and awaiting a semi-annual government examination to become licensed
as a tour guide.
leading to the proper research method are often as dependent upon the cultural and professional background of the researcher as they are upon the subject matter itself.

Quantitative Method

Wright, et al., (2004: 749) described quantitative approaches as physically measuring social phenomena rather than indirectly obtaining the information desired, despite where “the consequence of indirect measurement is some degree of error.” In quantitative analysis, data is gathered in reliably measurable nominal (group); ordinal (place or size ranking); or interval (distance between two or more measurements) quantities and is variable-centered in terms of ‘what’ rather than meaning-centered and ‘how’. Quantitative research defines ‘what is’ rather than the divergent reasoning of what ‘ought to be’ and as such leaves little room for social interpretaton without the employment of some other method to put the results in context (Sukamolson, 2010).

To be credible, quantitative research must be accurate in order to facilitate its use in the interpretation and evaluation of comprehensive policies. Further, it must be considered accurate, and this is a far more subjective standard. Research used for secondary studies must “provide sufficient information to assess the internal and external validity of the data” so as to preclude the need to conduct primary research for each new study (Hui & Phillips, 2014: 373; Johnston, 2014). While quantitatively weighing and measuring the harvest may show the outcome of that year’s production it does not provide a depth of information and understanding of the personal activities of farmers; of their views regarding economic and social stability; or their perceptions of the changing climate and the impact of local market changes which may have influenced the decisions which produced that harvest. Similarly, it is comparatively easy to quantitatively measure the number of students that universities graduate each year, but accurately measuring the percentage of people who are under-employed is more difficult. Thus, the method chosen for research must engender a high degree of confidence in its reliability and validity in terms of application to new project proposals (Heale & Twycross, 2015).

During interviews significant limitations were presented by the aversion to any recording instrument which would have reliably documented responses to prepared demographic questions and this disallowed reliable accuracy through the data coding of responses based on word usage. While the interpreter was adept at several local languages, linguistic nuances could change rapidly and often within the space of a few miles. These issues limited the reliability of their quantitative analysis of word usage.
**Qualitative Method**

Singh (2007: 28) notes qualitative research covers “the spectrum of the socio-development sector”, and therefore it is fundamentally different than quantitative research. While quantitative research is grounded in statistical descriptions, qualitative studies focus more on the investigation of the intangible outcomes of programmes and policies. The difference in purpose between quantitative and qualitative measures was summarized by Beck (2006: 349) who posited that it matters “whether our interest is in finding some general law-like statement or in explaining a particular event.”

Importantly, the aim of qualitative studies is “not to be representative of the population”, rather it is the validity and meaning of the information gathered and the richness of its content that is important (Hardon & Hodgkin, 2004: 64). The goal is to reach a point of saturation of similar responses, arriving at a place where the researcher is confident that no new information is likely to be discovered through additional interviews and that enough parallel replies have been triangulated to credibly substantiate the findings.

Saturation, according to Hardon & Hodgkin, begins to occur when responses are sufficiently redundant and so the size and breadth of the sample needs to be large enough to reflect what may be important divergences and variations in the experiences or attitudes of the population. Charmaz (2006: 114) advanced that small and incremental studies with “modest claims” tend to reach the data saturation point more rapidly than studies which purport to make wider findings and so their smaller analysis may be more reliable. Yet it remains the responsibility of the researcher to explore the contextual meanings of the responses in order to determine when that point has been arrived at and to analyse them in an unbiased manner. When saturation is achieved, the core features of the issue have been revealed and no further themes are likely to be generated by the respondents.

Qualitative studies “stress the socially constructed nature of reality” as they explore “entities, processes and meanings which are not experimentally examined or measured in terms of quantity, amount, intensity, or frequency” and stress individual opinions regarding social experiences (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005: 10). Qualitative research, then, is appropriately applied to the social consequences of physical or social displacement since it is intended to elicit the
views, and determine the anticipated outcomes pertaining to a wide variety of stakeholders who will be either negatively impacted or positively benefit from the result. However, there is a danger the interviewer and respondent will understand the questions used in qualitative analysis to mean different things, especially where there are cultural or language barriers. This complicates the interpretation of open-ended responses when the subsequent analysis of the discourse is undertaken.

**Mixed Methods**

This research takes a constructionist perspective. Primarily a case study, it uses mixed methods including purposive sampling and ‘snowballing’; formal one-on-one interviews, focus groups and informed opportunity meetings to answer the research question. Case studies are most appropriate when the researcher is seeking answers to ‘how and why’ questions, where explanations are sought rather than historical date or specific outcomes. Yin (1994: 4) states the choice of method depends upon three factors “(a) the type of research question posed, (b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.”

Combining available methods recognizes that any of them, in isolation, have inherent limitations but that a combination may provide a more holistic interpretation of events and conditions (Creswell, 2003). Bryman (2012) concludes the use of the term *mixed methods* presupposes that quantitative and qualitative approaches are insufficient without some form of adaptation. Brannen (2005) and Morgan (2007) each confirmed the importance of merging methodological approaches to achieve more reliable and generalizable results. This combination utilizes both models to some degree and bridges the fault dividing them, strengthening the evidence and validating observations when a single methodology may not be adequate to the task (Palinkas, et al., 2013).

Finally, once the collection of responses is completed there is no guarantee they will accurately reflect local attitudes over a long-term period. Thus, perception gathering during social science interviews was likened by Gellner (1984) to temporary and issue-oriented public opinion assessments. However, if recorded in an unbiased manner those perceptions reflect the revealed thoughts and concerns of the respondents relative to the questions and are, therefore, “the unassailable cultural norms of the place and the moment” (Ibid, 567). The number of similar responses and their varied sources as presented here demonstrate their reliability.
3.2.2 Document Review

Document reviews provide the researcher with an opportunity to unobtrusively learn about the conditions of an area as well as to triangulate the statements of respondents. Documents constitute widely varied sources of information. Each source must be judged for its own legitimacy and need not be afforded a similar level of credibility since they may reflect the biased views of the responsible government agency, the organization, or the individual who prepares them.

Bryman (2012: 381) found four salient points to assist in the determination of a documents' empirical credibility. Those are: “(i) authenticity, that the evidence is genuine and of unquestionable origin; (ii) credibility, concerning whether the evidence is free from error; (iii) representativeness, that the evidence is typical of its kind; and, (iv) meaning, that the evidence is clear and comprehensible.” A nuanced consideration of documents helps the researcher to build both current and historic constructs regarding the information as it is communicated by the authors and then as it is discussed by informants in the field. Numerous documents and reports prepared by the Ethiopian government, by non-governmental organizations or other sources concerning forced relocations which were reviewed prior to the field phase were found to be inapplicable when compared to the conditions observed in the study area. This does not, though, suggest they are incorrect in other contexts throughout Ethiopia.

In general, the population, social, and economic data utilized in this thesis come from just a few sources, including the family of United Nations agencies; the World Bank; and various Ethiopian ministries and agencies. This represents a conscious decision to avoid chasing data sources that supported any preconceived findings, thereby reducing the tendency towards confirmation bias. That said, in his own review of Ethiopian government policy documents, Di Nunzio (2014: 54) succinctly described many of them as being written in the “donor-friendly language of citizen participation.” Vaughan (2011) also noted the tendency to wrap Ethiopian developmental policies in the softer terms of the provision of pro-poor services and programmes to its citizens in order to become more palatable to international scrutiny. Despite the sometimes overly positive verbiage of some documents that called their reliability into question, the information provided by government sources such as the Central Statistics Agency or the National Bank of Ethiopia represent some of the most authoritative sources available.
Content Analysis

Content analysis is not used in this research, though it is recognized as a powerful method for qualitative analysis to facilitate the development of interpretations about a subject of interest. The content analysis process searches for distinct verbal elements of the conversation and anecdotes and becomes one of “organizing communication content in a manner which allows for easy identification of content relevant to research questions” (Kondracki, et al., 2002: 224) to identify emergent themes. Hsieh & Shannon (2005: 1279) found the advantage of content analysis is to “gain direct information from study participants without imposing preconceived categories of responses.”

During field interviews, however, significant limitations were presented by the aversion to any recording instrument that would have more reliably documented the responses to a series of predetermined interview questions. Therefore, due to the lack of a highly accurate record; the potential for translation inaccuracies; and the possibility of unconscious linguistic biases made by the interpreter, a highly reliable documentation of recording units could not be guaranteed. Thus, content analysis is not utilized here.

Triangulation of Responses

In sum, the instant research employed a mixture of methods. It relied heavily upon the selection of knowledgeable individuals for sampling and purposive qualitative interviews, while a reliance upon social constructivism and grounded theory helped to consider emerging information in order to analyse local perceptions of encroaching urbanization and the loss of livelihoods by the rural population. Importantly, employing a variety of methods enabled the researcher to triangulate information and this revealed the issue of under-employment among students. Triangulation utilizes multiple sources to better ensure validity and it helps to substantiate some statements while disproving and discarding others. The significant advantage of triangulation is that it increases confidence in the interview data by using evidence derived from a diverse array of sources which will either verify or discredit new sources, though this must be approached carefully as outlier statements might be found to be true (Guion, et al., 2002).

3.2.3 Interview Access and Sample Size
Interviews are a primary source of data collection in social science research and are used to access people’s perceptions of events and their constructions of reality. They are, according to Punch (2005: 168), “one of the most powerful ways we have of understanding others.” Qualitative interviews of a range of key informants30 were conducted to capture the “insights, experiences and activities of consumers, family members and agency directors” (Palinkas, et al., 2013: 6) in order to provide the necessary depth of the chronicle.

**Access**

This research required both formal and informal arrangements to gain access to information and key informants. Interviews were conducted in farm fields, homes, government offices, and places of business such as coffee houses and financial institutions, flour mills and construction sites. A series of semi-structured interviews were employed to ascertain the experiences, views, and concerns of stakeholders.

Smallholders were purposefully encountered by walking along rural roads and the edge of farm fields. Walking, instead of driving, afforded more frequent opportunities for non-invasive and randomized meetings with both men and women in a variety of social environments. This method was specifically chosen to provide a closer connection to the individual and it avoided surprising anyone with the team’s arrival. Chance meetings with smallholders in their fields or with other residents proved a fruitful means of information gathering and were, by definition random encounters that helped to verify and deepen the understanding of the research environment. Because villages tended to be visited on successive days the same respondents might be coincidentally encountered on several times and this gave the opportunity to verify the information gathered during previous discussions. This also allowed for the ‘snowballing’ of key informants to obtain similar interview opportunities.

As noted, the study used multiple methods of data collection but relied primarily on individual interviews. These were weighted towards smallholder farmers who constitute the group considered to be most negatively and directly influenced by the encroaching urbanization process. Figure 3.1 chronicles the number of interviews, their location and the broad occupational groups involved. Using a constructivist approach, the objectives of the study,

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30 Key informants are defined as “a select group of individuals who are likely to provide needed information, ideas, and insights on a particular subject” (Kumar, 1989: 1). Two criteria are essential for key informant interviews. First, that only the views of a small and manageable number of informants who have useful information are solicited. Second, that interviews are essentially qualitative in their nature, with the interviewer developing detailed notes of the questions asked and answers given that, in turn, enables a probing for deeper answers when necessary.
including the examination of Ethiopia’s state-led development policy and the identification of the social, cultural and economic dynamics of government-led development programmes, were informed by the viewpoints of the participants during conversation regarding their daily lives. While this occurred during individual interviews, opinions were also gathered during interactions among small groups (Mojtahed, 2014). Participant opinions regarding such diverse topics as rainfall and crop prices, the sale of land and employment following displacement were recorded and, in the aggregate, demonstrated a sense of loss regarding disappearing livelihoods. While generally well informed about issues central to their livelihoods, displaced smallholders were progressively ill-equipped to address emerging issues as they became larger, further from the farm, and more complex. This context was reflected in the later reconstruction of these discussions during data analysis (Mills, et al., 2006).

Relatively few conversations which occurred during field observations were of sufficient importance to be recorded as interviews and farmers, especially, were unable or unwilling to carry on a detailed enough exchange for a suitably long period of time to be considered an interview. While this was often due to work exigencies and impatient cattle who wanted to continue ploughing the field, it also appeared to be the result of an embarrassing inability to communicate thoughts about matters that they’d given little attention to, such as how they went about teaching their children to farm or what they might do once their land was expropriated. Fruitful interviews were conducted with eleven educational institution professionals. Those respondents were especially vital to understanding the issues involved with students who are finding fewer employment opportunities than were available to their parents, a phenomena described by Davies (1974). Instructors at both university and vocational centres have had long experience with student aspirations and possess a keen understanding of the social pressure to find employment upon the completion of their studies.

**Sample Size**

Different circumstances may affect sample size. Financial and time constraints unavoidably and legitimately limit the time spent in the field and therefore the number of respondents who can be contacted (Bartlett, et al., 2001; Lenth, 2001; Kondracki, et al., 2002). In this case time was of the essence due to Ethiopian visa restrictions. Moreover, the availability of busy officials and their willingness to respond to queries, and even the issue of transportation were valid considerations in completing the research process. As noted, although the volume of interviews must be numerous enough to achieve saturation their number
must remain small enough for analysis. In the end, the depth and quality of interviews is important since there is no firm criteria regarding when the saturation point occurs in the sample process.

The interview population included 104 informants who ranged from smallholder farmers, to government officials, to managers of financial institutions and informative conversations were conducted with hundreds of other individuals, including university students. Because interviews were often conducted in fields when multiple family members were present it is difficult to accurately differentiate according to gender, however the 104 records roughly indicate the primary spokesperson was male 81 times and female 23 times. Women who were individually interviewed were equally likely to operate farms and coffee houses as they were to own construction material shops. Too few respondents could accurately relate their ages to be a useful metric, however most smallholders who were interviewed could easily recall childhood memories of the overthrow of Emperor Halie Selassie in 1974 and so their ages are assumed to
be at least 50 years. Reported education levels ranged from illiterate with no schooling, to elementary education, to those who held doctoral degrees. Respondents who displayed business ownership tendencies gravitated towards the lower-mid range of education and appeared fairly evenly divided among both male and females.

In the majority of cases, office interviews with government officials were obtained by scheduling appointments with Ministries. When the purpose of the study was explained federal officials were usually receptive to meeting and were often helpful in arranging subsequent interviews with regional officials, a process which was considerably simplified by the co-location of federal and Oromia regional ministries in the city of Addis Ababa. Admittance to regional and wereda officials, though, necessitated adherence to a very formal system of obtaining
permissions and presenting a letter of introduction from the higher level ministry to them. They could then choose to meet, possibly providing similar letters of their own to subordinate offices.

These letters of introduction were taken very seriously and not all federal or regional officials were willing to provide one. Their absence complicated matters and meant lower level officials might not agree to discuss their programmes. Government officials representing specific programme offices, such as regional transportation ministries or land registration agents, were often very officious. Letters of introduction were only accepted by the specific offices described in the document and conversations could not veer from the subject in the letter. However, at some steps along the way interventions were made by persons of local importance. University deans, for example, intervened with wereda officials and city mayors who then agreed to facilitate meetings with the sub-officials who were responsible for programme delivery.

At the lowest level of government, the neighbourhood kebele, letters and introductions were generally not needed and the chance encounter with a foreign researcher appeared to be a surprising distraction, though a business card with the University crest facilitated the exchange. Not all villages have the same social services or administrative infrastructure and so interviews could not be evenly distributed across the communities visited. Therefore, no office-to-office comparison was possible.

**Focus Group Discussion**

In addition to interviews with government officials, discussions with local business owners and random meetings with smallholders in their fields, focus groups were also employed (Gill, et al., 2008). Focus groups are defined by Bryman (2012: 712) as "a form of group interview in that there are several participants and there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular, fairly tightly defined topic within the group." Bryman is not, however, specific about how these groups come together. During the field experience smallholders and others were interviewed in peer groups representing common interests as they worked in cattle and grain markets; as they gathered in multiple-family groups to weed adjoining fields; and in the more affable environs of tela\textsuperscript{31} houses. To facilitate a deeper local understanding, the team visited the same tela houses and coffee shops while in the same village and this helped to form a familiarity with the proprietors, who were often women in their mid-30’s with small children.

\textsuperscript{31} Home brewed beer.
That, however-briefly established familiarity, assisted in evoking a spontaneity of responses during individual and group discussions when the owners entered the conversation and legitimized the subsequent interactions.

Groups would vary in size from four to six persons to maintain manageability and control to the point where the interpreter could distinguish between the speakers for later recording of their comments. It was generally easy to meet with small groups who had already gathered and while none expected to be paid for their participation, they uniformly indicated they should be provided with in-kind remuneration. This did not seem to pose any ethical dilemmas. Thus, in locations where they already felt comfortable smallholders were queried in small groups about their work, their views regarding the availability of educational, health care, and social services and how the advancing urbanization of the area might affect their own land; including their economic future and the future of their children. Locations other than tela houses, such as local restaurants, were used when it was more appropriate to the social status of wereda officials or kebele administrators and their assistants.

During a qualitative process the depth of individual interviews may not be substantial due to the time constraints of the respondent as he ploughs his field or attends to customers in her restaurant. A balance of more measurements with length and depth was used to provide reliability of responses though relatively few of the conversations engaged in were detailed enough to be considered interviews. This was considered likely to provide a better thematic sample of opinion, leading towards a more contextual appraisal of local conditions.

3.3 Study Area Characteristics

Ethiopia is located just beyond the extreme eastern edge of the Sahara desert in northeast Africa, between 3 and 15 degrees North latitude and 33 and 48 degrees East longitude (Map 3.1). It is a poor, landlocked country surrounded by the six nations of Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan.
Collier (2007) writes extensively about the trade and development barriers inherent to landlocked nations, pointing out that states with coastlines are better able to trade in the global market, while landlocked nations are restricted to trade along and through their borders. Their economic potential, he says, is dependent upon the infrastructure of bordering countries and the absence of trade-inhibiting wars with their neighbours. He further observes that where war or border conflicts exist there is little chance for development. Gallup, et al., (1999: 180) had also described the influence of geography upon states and regions and they, too, noted that landlocked countries have far greater challenges in their economic and agricultural development.

**Environmental Characteristics**

Ethiopia’s population is predicted to double from the current 94 million to 187 million by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012). The population distribution is heavily rural, with approximately 86% of Ethiopians living in agrarian, non-urban settings and fully 80% of all Ethiopians are directly engaged in farming activities. Agriculture accounts for approximately 36.7% of Ethiopian GDP and though its importance in relative terms has lessened somewhat in recent years as the service sector has grown, the population imbalance has not changed appreciably since at least 1978 (Getahun, 1978; CSA, 2012; Seid, et al., 2015). Climatically, while a slight increase in precipitation is expected, temperatures in Ethiopia are anticipated to increase by 1.7 to 2.1 degrees Celsius by the year 2050. These changes will shorten agricultural growing seasons by as much as 20% (Tadege, 2007; UNDPE/S, 2012; Kassie, et al., 2014). As agricultural conditions worsen, the potential to cause smallholders to voluntarily leave the land is elevated, eventually aggravating food security issues and increasing the density of urban populations. This was readily observed in Lalibela.

**3.3.1 Field Work**

The original date of field work was delayed due to the national elections which were conducted in May, 2015 and the possibility of national violence. No violence was noted following the election and the outcome seemingly had no effect upon the research as it was being conducted. Although 104 interviews were conducted, and hundreds of casual conversations occurred, no respondent mentioned the national elections and the only overt
The field work was conducted between June and September, 2015 and this coincided with Ethiopia’s heavy summer (Meher) rainy season that occurs during June, July, and August. The time frame also enabled research to be conducted as the lighter autumn (Belt) rains of September, October, and November arrived. Despite often wet conditions, roadways and walking paths were generally clear and there were no transportation issues which limited access to even the most remote areas. Thus, data collection bridged the ploughing and planting season as well as the weeding season after crops had germinated. Both periods presented ample opportunities to obtain easy access to smallholders and their families as they were working in their fields. It also afforded entry to smaller urban areas, particularly in Lalibela, at the beginning of the ‘hungry time’ when local government food distribution programmes become necessary as stored stocks began to run low. It provided an opportunity to observe those distribution programmes and the selection process used to choose recipients. The interval between the two climatic periods, when fewer smallholders were in their fields, was used to conduct interviews and conversations with government officials, university instructors and students, local business owners, manufacturing plant managers, and others who have a connection to agriculture or to other aspects of Ethiopia’s development.

Therefore, the methods of data collection included extensive desk research; field observations, in-depth individual and focus group interviews, household and farm field visits; interviews of officials at the federal, regional, wereda and kebele levels of government; and conversations with shop owners, smallholders, and other residents. These provided a good cross section of the different types of knowledge and power described by French & Raven (1959) and Gaventa (2016) regarding access to an array of informants.

3.3.2 Research Locations

The study population was observed in three geographically distinct locations throughout Ethiopia (Map 3.2), each of which presented a useful set of local characteristics including agricultural, industrial, and commercial developments. These included the area surrounding Addis Ababa, consisting of eight smaller towns as far as 80 kilometres east and north of the city. Those included the communities of Entoto, Haregenion, Karaa, Legadado, Legatafo, Sabata,
Sendaffa, and Suluta that are included in the *Oromia Special Zone Surrounding Finfinne* (Tadesse & Imana, 2017). Field work included secondary sites in and around Sheshamane including the towns of Adaama and Bishoftu, located some 260 kilometres south of Addis Ababa; and in Lalibela, 650 kilometres north of Addis Ababa.

These three sites were selected following extensive discussions with aid and development workers who had long experience in Ethiopia and the decision to include them was finalized upon arrival in Addis Ababa following further discussion with United States and British embassy personnel, and with non-governmental agency and agricultural development staff employed by non-profit organizations. Selection was intended to include a range of environmental influences, social conditions, and ethnicities. Other towns, such as Dire Dawa and Ambo were not included in the study due to safety concerns and restrictions imposed by the University of Reading which were confirmed at the time by the regional security officer at the United States embassy in Addis Ababa.

*Lalibela*

Lalibela was chosen as a research site due to its gradual transition from an agricultural to a more urbanized centre of increasing regional significance as a result of its growing population. Lalibela is best known for its religious importance to the Ethiopian Orthodox faith and for its eleven stone-hewn churches that are UNESCO World Heritage sites. These include the frequently photographed Church of St. George, a monolithic structure carved into a hillside from a single block of living rock under the direction of King Gebre Mesqel Lalibela (r: early 13th century).

Satterthwaite, et al., (2010: 2813) found that in lesser developed countries, “urbanization is overwhelmingly the result of migration in response to low returns from agricultural occupations and the anticipation of realizing better economic opportunities in urban areas.” The steep mountainsides (Photograph 3.1) surrounding Lalibela remain agrarian in character even
as smallholders there are voluntarily leaving the land. Their movement is precipitated by agriculturally adverse weather conditions and by the frequent choice of their children to leave the farm (Wolf, et al., 2014) a situation which makes it more difficult for them to earn a sufficient living. As elsewhere in Ethiopia, land in the Lalibela area is becoming a scarce commodity and the Central Statistical Agency (CSA, 2012b) notes the average farm size throughout Ethiopia is 1.22 hectares, while the average size of a household is seven persons. As inheritance further subdivides and reduces the size of holdings, farms are simply becoming too small to sustain new families and the movement of youth to local towns is increasingly common. Bezu & Holden (2014: 266) contend that in Ethiopia livelihood choices are made by rural youth based on their rational observation of returns on their labour. Specifically, they say that if the land is unable to support them, youth will seek other employment options. Push factors such as “population pressures, land scarcity, lack of alternative livelihoods, and weather shocks” can become incentives for youth to migrate to urban areas.

Lalibela’s population growth has resulted in added stress upon social services as more students attend local schools and more patients are being seen in medical clinics. The population shift from surrounding areas has strained the employment capacity of the town since there is little commerce or industry other than religious tourism during observances in the months of October, December and January. Seasonal tourism-related employment is one of the relatively few livelihood options (Crisp, 2002; de Chatel, 2014). The towns’ population increase is leading to wider unemployment and a downward trajectory of local wages as the supply of unskilled labour exceeds demand. Local officials noted petty crime rates are beginning to climb and that additional food distribution programmes are now required to accommodate the needs of residents, when in the past those programmes had only served the rural population. Thus, Lalibela is a town and population in transition, though this transition is voluntary rather than programmatically induced by planned development or forced resettlement. It provides an example of local government response to increasing population pressures which
were generally similar to those of the peri-urban municipalities receiving oustees in the primary study area.

Lalibela demonstrated the issues inherent in a rapid influx of unskilled smallholders who possessed few marketable skills. Despite its challenges, Lalibela has a vibrant and well attended Technical and Vocational Education Training centre and its director has designed his curriculum to capitalize upon known labour shortages and economic opportunities. As discussed further in Chapter 6, he has introduced new programmes that are intended for rural workers who are relocating, offering an example of a successful local government adaptation to changing population concentrations and as well as the relocation of unskilled workers.

Sheshamane

Sheshamane is actively engaged in social and economic change as it rapidly evolves from a small agricultural crossroads to a thriving regional commercial centre. An extensive building programme in its increasingly dense central-business, commercial, and services area is employing the bulk of the construction-curriculum graduates from the local vocational centre. These changes made it an attractive location to investigate social and economic resettlement and the expectations of increasingly educated and vocationally trained youth who were either enrolled in the local vocational training centre or a satellite branch of Africa Bezu University.

At the time of the field work, an area of drought was forming about 150 kilometres west of Sheshamane and its predicted encroachment was a cause for concern among the agricultural agents at the local Farmer Training Centre. In response, smallholders were adapting to reduced rainfall by planting crops which required less moisture, such as teff instead of maize. New crops however, cause changes in local diets as well as induce wider modifications to agricultural activities including long established marketing relationships (Magnan, 2016). Managers at the Farmer Training Centre said local markets were, at the time of field work, responding well to the change to teff and that no farmers had left the land as a result of the decreased rains. While Sheshamane was described during interviews and conversations as changing in character to that of an important trading crossroads and employment centre, there was no forced displacement noted. No individuals or families where being ousted from the land. Rather, what relocations into the increasingly urban area were occurring were gradual and voluntary.
Without a rapid influx of additional workers, employment prospects remained generally good in Sheshamane for graduates of the vocational centre who had carefully chosen their field of study, though prospects were reportedly less so following university. Poorly chosen academic programmes were a significant cause for concern among university instructors who recognized that a majority of students were not going to be successful in obtaining their employment goals; that they would need to settle for work which is outside of their field of study. Discussions with university instructors at the Africa Bezu University in Sheshamane revealed specific issues pertaining to students who obtain an advanced education but then have insufficient opportunities to utilize their new knowledge and skills.

In addition, conversations with university students suggested an over-estimation of their economic value in the employment market. These conversations helped to explain how education often leaves students with few options other than to take lower positions than they felt themselves to be qualified for; to better understand their return to their villages and family farms; or, or take decisions to emigrate. Those interviews and conversations were particularly helpful in better framing the characteristics and social impacts of under-employment. Sheshamane was valuable for the insights gathered regarding a more orderly resettlement and the skills-training offered by the local vocational centre and which are almost immediately put to practical application in the rapidly developing urban core. Each town provided useful insights into general relocation issues; the gentrification process; and unemployment among former smallholders as well as the outcome of youth education as students sought employment upon graduating from university or following completion of vocational training.

Addis Ababa and the Surrounding Area

Addis Ababa is a thriving metropolitan area with a fast growing and increasingly prosperous population. The areas to its east and north became the primary study sites, though the city is clearly expanding in all directions. Founded in 1886 by Emperor Menelik II, and named by his wife Empress Taytu Betul, Addis Ababa (meaning ‘New Flower’) is a comparatively young city. While the official population is about six million, the presence of undocumented and unsponsored residents was unofficially reported by respondents, including a former city transportation department director, as increasing the figure to approximately ten million. As a result of its growth and actual population, Addis Ababa is expanding to accommodate its emerging middle-class, a newly prosperous group who are increasingly relocating from the crowded urban core to more comfortable suburban lifestyles.
As noted, the primary study area came to be east of Addis Ababa, extending to the town of Sendafa, a rural zone that consisted of smallholders whose work primary concerned growing teff and wheat. Extremely rocky soil prevents the introduction of mechanized agriculture even though most fields are flat to gently rolling. It is here that large residential developments are being built along existing roadways which parallel newly installed electrical and water transmission lines. Another distinct study area extended north of Addis Ababa as far as Chancho that, according to local agricultural officials, is a dairy producing region. There, new roadways and rail lines are planned to open trade routes to the west-central area of the country and thence to Sudan. These two areas, north and east of Addis Ababa, provided the researcher with suitable access to smallholders and others who were in some stage of the displacement process, or who had already been displaced either from rural or urban homes. Their location enabled easy access to federal, regional and wereda ministries for the triangulation of data as it was being gathered during field interviews.

Yet, city growth is rapidly engulfing the small peri-urban municipalities surrounding Addis Ababa and whose de facto boundaries are expanding into these catchment areas (Map 3.3). Addis Ababa is designated in Ethiopia’s Constitution (Article 49) as the capital city of the federal government and it is referred to in that Article as ‘being located in Oromia’. It is one of the two ‘special districts’ listed in the Constitution, a designation which grants it a general degree of autonomy and self-governance making it, at least partially, independent of the Oromia regional government. The city administration is exerting its status as a special district, and as the national capital, to engage in both the redevelopment of its internal core and to build new residential and commercial areas along its periphery. Areas within the urban core are being cleared for new high-end commercial, office and hotel construction as the city continues to entice continental and global governmental agencies to locate there (Yntiso, 2008; WB, 2015b) and this is adding to resettlement pressures in peripheral areas.

The significant expansion of its boundaries is considered in Ethiopian legal journals to be an unlawful land grab that would substantially increase the size and political power of the city at the expense of smaller communities (AACG, 2012) and of the Oromia region. The Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan was proposed in April 2014 by the city administration as a way to manage its rapid growth and redevelopment (Abebe & Hesselberg, 2013). The Plan was authorized by the Provisional Government of the city Addis Ababa though planning staff relied upon its own Revised Charter of the Addis Ababa City Government (Proclamation Number 361/2003) for legal authority to proceed.
Prior to the adoption of the Plan, city authorities in Addis Ababa were already creating an environment conducive to investment, re-development, and gentrification which required significant, large-scale displacements of the population. Gentrification of the area is forcing the poor to relocate and a large development, consisting of over 18,000 flats, is being built to the immediate east in the town of Yeka Abado to accommodate them (Planel & Bridonneau, 2017). Construction of other single-family housing areas along the periphery of Addis Ababa are also displacing large numbers of people in the peri-urban and rural areas (Belachew, 2014; Noorloos & Kloosterboer, 2017). Yntiso (2008: 54) noted “carried away by the euphoria of nation building, policy makers tend to view the disruptive effects of urban development on certain sections of society as justified sacrifices for the greater good” and found most dislocated households in Addis Ababa suffered from loss of income, higher rents, smaller homes and a social disarticulation which resulted from the loss of friendships and networks. This was observed to be occurring in rural areas bordering the city as it continues to expand and the farmland along its periphery is converted to urban uses.

Land in rural and peri-urban communities is the mainstay of crop and livestock production and therefore of rural livelihoods and earnings. As small holds are expropriated for development those livelihoods and their complimentary social networks are disrupted, often with no income generating alternative. At its zenith, the new city boundaries created by the Plan
would have extended as far as 100 kilometres from the current city centre, ultimately annexing up to 1.1 million hectares of land and potentially displacing hundreds of thousands of smallholders and their families (ARC, 2016; Home, 2016). Thus, the municipal expansion and gentrification process was forcing smallholders in the study area to relocate as their properties are expropriated by the city and wereda government and then resold to developers who build residential, commercial or industrial structures with higher-use purposes.

Illustrative Value of the Three Study Areas

The selection of Lalibela and Sheshamane as secondary study sites allowed for the illustration of the differences in the approach those two municipalities have used regarding movement and displacement versus that of the kebele and wereda governments located near Addis Ababa. Resettlement issues in those two communities appeared to be similar to the primary study area, though nearer to Addis Ababa they were greatly accelerated. Specific issues noted in each area included the need for job creation, youth and older cohort unemployment, and newly overcrowded schools and medical clinics. The slower and more voluntary resettlement in Lalibela and Sheshamane afforded social systems such as schools to better accommodate resettlement and other needs of the community even if these may have come at the price of closing and relocating some rural services. The ability to changing municipal needs was discussed with local administrators in Lalibela, Suluta, Sheshamane, Legatafo, and Sendaffa as an on-going planning and funding problem.

3.4 Conclusion

The purpose of a research study is to answer the question posed by providing results which are reliable and objective. Social science research is useful in evaluating the effectiveness of existing policies, identifying shortfalls in those policies, and providing practical and implementable recommendations to their resolution. Results though must be derived from reliable sources and interpreted properly with minimal bias. Qualitative studies may not be entirely replicable since opinions change according to the social circumstances and temporal conditions of the individuals or groups interviewed. Thus, they reflect only an instant in time.

Regardless of the method employed, whether qualitative or quantitative, results must be compelling. While gathering the data, a triangulation method was employed and the facts and

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32 The centralized ownership of land; the method of land expropriation; and individual compensation rights in Ethiopia are described throughout section 4.3.
opinions that were being presented were compared to the literature, government documents, and interactions with stakeholders who represented a variety of differing views of the same issue. In this case, a reliance upon secondary sources was heavily dependent upon accounts published in the grey literature. These represented the views of non-governmental organizations because of the almost complete absence of academic articles depicting Ethiopia’s ousting of smallholders for residential development. The recent nature of student protests meant that little reliable academic literature was available regarding their demands.

In summary, the methods used for this study were varied and sufficient responses were collected to provide internal reliability. Their importance lies in the overwhelming acknowledgement that displacement in the study area is not unanticipated and that smallholders often avoided the inevitable consequences, with few personally mitigating actions being taken among those who were encountered.

The following chapter describes the history of Ethiopia’s land use laws which enable the expropriation of smallholder properties. It also describes Ethiopia’s history; the structure of its government; the iterative state-led development plans and pro-poor policies that the federal government has initiated.
Chapter 4

Stage Setting

4.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of Ethiopia's extensive history. It describes the origins of its constitutional authority to expropriate property and the evolving system of state-led developmental programmes which the federal government has introduced.

Ethiopia is a society whose political landscape has evolved dramatically in the past 45 years. In 1974, Emperor Haile Selassie’s absolute monarchy was overthrown by the Dergue, a revolutionary government strongly influenced by the Soviet Union and the nation rapidly transitioned to a totalitarian governance system which curtailed social and economic rights and imposed wide ranging political repression. The Dergue levied reforms wherein properties were seized without compensation and land became centrally owned by the federal government. Almost immediately a period of continuing revolution began, and in 1991 the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democrat Front (EPRDF), that was influenced by its own version of Marxism, ultimately took power. The current political structure remains influenced by a period of Cold War-era hegemony, especially the lingering political and social influences of the former Soviet Union.

Following its assumption of power, EPRDF policies resulted in a time of euphoric economic growth and the higher standards of living which tend to accompany the end of civil conflicts (ILO, 2010; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013; Del Castillo & Bunche, 2015). Though Ethiopia’s economy quickly expanded post-1991, it did so erratically until a series of state-led development plans, first introduced in 2002, brought greater stability. However, slowing economies are common in the second decade post-conflict. In 2005, the cycle began to show slower GDP growth and therefore less plentiful employment, including among a better educated and potentially restive youth cohort who had witnessed the earlier success enjoyed by their parents following the EPRDF’s seizure of power (Pape, 2005; Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017; IMF, 2017b; WB, 2017d).

The slowing economy is making it more difficult for youth to find appropriate employment opportunities and their expectations for economic and therefore social mobility are going unmet (Honwana, 2013). Further, a semi-authoritarian government has now evolved that restricts individual freedoms and political expression and Ethiopian “democratisation, which made generally acclaimed progress … seems to be seriously reversed” (Pausewang, 2009: 549; Aalen & Muriass, 2017).
4.1 Historical Synopsis of Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s history has witnessed the earliest emergence of civilization. It has survived the ebb and flow of the great religions and endured numerous internal and external political threats and wars. While more ancient finds of human habitation have been made elsewhere in Africa, the story of Ethiopia generally begins with "Lucy”, one of the earliest examples of a bipedal walker whose 3.2 million-year-old skeletal remains were unearthed in 1974 in the north-eastern Awash valley.

The first recognized Ethiopian emperor was Menelik I, who began his rule circa 950 B.C. Thereafter, economic and social advancement came quickly. As early as 300 B.C., Ethiopians held the regional advantage by employing technologies that were not widely used anywhere else in sub-Saharan Africa, including such innovations as the wheel and the plough; dry-land farming that included the cultivation of drought-resistant crops; the employment of moisture conservation methods; and the introduction of sophisticated irrigation practices. These techniques resulted in larger harvests than regional competitors could achieve. As an early nation-state, Ethiopia developed higher-level cognitive concepts including a formal written language and numeracy that accelerated its agricultural and trade dominance. The wealth which accumulated from those practices enabled the early development of Ethiopia as a formidable regional power. By 330 A.D. Christianity had become the state-religion under King Ezana, though scriptural verse attests to its even earlier arrival when Philip the Evangelist converted a visiting court official in the 1st Century A.D.

“But an angel of the Lord spoke to Philip saying, ‘Arise and go south to the road that descends from Jerusalem to Gaza.’ And he arose and went; and behold, there was a Ethiopian eunuch, a court official of Candace, queen of the Ethiopians, who was in charge of all her treasure; and he had come to Jerusalem to worship.”

(Acts 8:26-38, KJV)

This biblical reference is not gratuitous. A wave of European colonization of the African continent began with the Berlin Conference of 1884 yet it by-passed Ethiopia, which may have been spared because of the dominating influence of its Christian religion (Marcus, 1994; Heldring & Robinson, 2012). Despite its malignant conditions, European colonization brought modernising influences to the continent such as railways, formal education, and rudimentary centralized governance systems (Said, 1978; Rabinow, 1989; Stoler, 1995). Thus, other African nations were better prepared for entry into the modern world of global trade networks than was Ethiopia which had been insulated from technological development and so it had fallen behind relative to the colonized nations.
4.1.1 **Emperor Menelik II**

Three thousand years after the reign of Menelik I, the first modernizing emperor was Menelik II (r: 1889 - 1913) who is credited with bringing schools and printing presses to Ethiopia. Those machines allowed the publication of newspapers and other materials including the first indigenously written textbooks. Those books were used in a fledgling secular educational system introduced in 1908 as the *Ecole Imperiale Menelik II*, though the Ethiopian Orthodox church had operated religious schools and seminaries for centuries. Instruction in this new, non-religious school was reserved for the sons of the nobility and initially its curriculum focussed on mathematics, law and calligraphy (Bishaw & Lasser, 2012). Menelik’s schools were quickly mimicked by regional nobility and by 1935 over 100 others had been opened throughout the country.

Given the lack of formally educated Ethiopians who were qualified to teach in his schools, Menelik II imported a succession of foreign educators. This resulted in a period of non-indigenized education when, from 1908 to1935, instructors were primarily Egyptian and French. Upon Menelik’s death in 1913, his grandson, Lij Iyasu took the throne but his conversion to Islam so thoroughly alienated the powerful Ethiopian Orthodox church he was deposed in 1916 (Negash, 2006). Menilek’s daughter, Zawidtu, subsequently became empress (r: 1916 to 1930) and his eldest nephew Ras Tafari, a graduate of Menelick’s II’s school and later known as Haile Selassie, was appointed heir.

4.1.2 **Emperor Haile Selassie I**

Upon Empress Zawidtu’s death, Emperor Haile Selassie I (r: 1930-1974) ascended the throne. He began the present modernization of Ethiopia and introduced innovative systems of centralized government. He constructed roads to facilitate communication and economic growth; instituted anti-slavery programmes and advocated religious liberties. He also increased the number of elementary and secondary schools, expanding their offerings to include arithmetic, the natural sciences, social studies and agriculture, eventually broadening the curriculum with instruction in physics, chemistry, civil engineering and veterinary science (Marcus, 1994). In 1931, Selassie’s wife, Empress Menen, established the first Ethiopian school for girls, though initially its syllabus only provided instruction in dressmaking, drawing, and home management including basic sanitation and hygiene. These were skills thought to be essential to diplomacy since proper wives and a well-managed and presentable home would reflect well upon the nation when visitors were invited to meet with government ministers.
Though it is perhaps a distinction without a difference, Ethiopia was never colonized, even though it was occupied by Italian forces beginning in 1935. Upon taking control, the Italians closed Ethiopia’s schools and these remained shuttered until 1942 when they were reopened shortly after British military forces defeated the Italians. During the British period, educational curriculum became focused upon the development of a workforce that could serve as government administrators. The schools came under American influence from 1954 as yet another set of foreigner’s exerted influence over Ethiopia until 1974, when the Dergue assumed power and adopted an eastern-European, Soviet-influenced model of government (Bishaw & Lasser, 2012).

**Property Rights in Selassie-era Ethiopia**

Over the 44 years of Selassie’s reign, a system of land ownership evolved which strongly favoured the wealthy and influential. Tenancy became common among the poor and rental contracts were taken by 80% of farmers across Ethiopia. This resulted in subservience to landlords and it created a significant level of personal risk and financial uncertainty regarding whether to make needed improvements to property from which they could be ousted at any time (Clapham, 1988; Chala, 2016).

During the Selassie period, three forms of property rights which favoured the elite were common. In the northern areas of Tigray, where the early leadership of the EPRDF originated, risī land tenure was hereditary and assured by residency in local villages (Ayalew, et al., 2005; Gebremeskel, 2011). While risī was simultaneously very individualistic and farmer-oriented it was essentially a communal system of ownership. Property disputes were adjudicated by local custom or through tribal proceedings rather than by central courts or a review of other records (Teklu, 2005). Under risī, third-party sales of land parcels were prohibited even as the farmer’s individual choice regarding how to use the land was virtually absolute. The risī system, though, did not apply universally across Ethiopia. Large tracts, especially in the fertile southern areas, were often appropriated by the Selassie government for presentation to local nobility (maderia tenure) and their gifting was used to cement fidelity to the crown. In other instances, land was appropriated by powerful church interests (samon tenure) or it was lost through debt foreclosure. In these and other ways, land could find its way into private ownership (gebbar tenure) and this often resulted in a poor, dispossessed, and landless population (Jemma, 2004; Crewett, et al., 2008; Makki, 2014; Srur, 2014).
Toward the end of his 44 year reign, Selassie’s monarchy began to collapse under the weight of external events and internal pressures. Following the 1967 Egyptian / Israeli war, the Suez Canal was closed by Egypt. This substantially raised the price of goods imported into Ethiopia from European and southern Mediterranean ports. The canal’s closure constricted exports as well and this resulted in widespread unemployment in Ethiopia’s influential markets for coffee and unfinished animal hides. The 1973 Yom Kippur war further constrained shipping and the price of imports, especially of food and petroleum, increased sharply (Singer & Ansari, 1988). In 1974, a combination of international economic and trade issues, and uncontrollable environmental conditions, triggered a revolution that ended the 3,000 year line of Ethiopian monarchy.

4.1.3 World War II and the Cold-War Influences

Ethiopia’s current system of state-ownership of the land, and its educational and governance systems, are traceable to World War II and its later status as a Cold War proxy-state. During the era of the 1960’s and 1970’s, the developing world was often characterised by political and economic fragility. One theory as to why sub-Saharan Africa states remained constantly fragile, despite their increasing self-determination, was their status as proxy states for the competing superpowers of the Soviet Union and the United States (Hemlan & Ratner, 1992). Article 1 section (2) of the 1945 United Nations Charter confirmed the principle of “equal rights and self-determination of peoples.” However, as put into practice this principle often worked to their detriment as emerging nations in the developing South could not adequately sustain themselves economically and socially without the political patronage and support of one of the superpowers.

Policy makers and military leaders on both sides of the ideological spectrum used various types of aid for economic development including military foreign aid and humanitarian foreign aid to better exploit local conditions in order to achieve their global political goals (Morgenthau, 1962; Stokes, 2003; Warmerdam & de Haan, 2011).

Super Power Contestations

Even before the United States formally entered World War II in December 1941, President Roosevelt had declared that Ethiopia was eligible for military aid in order to resist the Italian occupation that had begun in 1935. At about the same time Roosevelt made his determination, British and Commonwealth forces seized Ethiopia from the Italians. They took
control of a communications base, a regional listening post consisting of a 3,400 acre facility known as Kagnew Station in Asmara, now the capital of Eritrea. The following year, 1942, the British granted combined access to the United States military and the Americans established what would become a permanent Cold War facility which monitored events across the Middle East, including shipping traffic through the Red Sea (Lefebvre, 1992).

In 1948, the British invoked a long dormant provision of the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian treaty that had been agreed with Emperor Menelik II. This affected the transfer of Somali grazing areas in the Ogaden region, now known as Ethiopia’s Somali region, to Ethiopia and that transfer resulted in a protracted border war between Ethiopia and Somalia (Zolberg, 1989). Beginning in 1972, and in return for permission to build naval support facilities, the Soviet Union began to supply Somalia with a US$100 million military equipment and training package and the cross-border war intensified.

Though the United States had long supported the Ethiopian government, in May 1977 as part of an emerging policy emphasis on human rights advocated by the newly elected Carter administration, the United States withdrew its military contingent from Dergue-controlled Ethiopia and ended its 35-year presence at Kagnew station (Keller, 1992; Lefebvre, 1992). That withdrawal created an expansionist opportunity for the Soviet Union which quickly improved its diplomatic and military relations with Ethiopia”33. It brokered a short-lived peace agreement with Somalia and, as relations rapidly warmed, provided Ethiopia with a US$400 million military aid package. Russian support continued to grow. As the Dergue government became increasingly friendly towards the Soviet Union, it began to more closely emulate that political and social system, eventually “adopting overtly Marxist policies” (Darch, 2006: 138; Vaughan, 2011; Mehretu, 2012) including state-ownership of land. Thus, remnants of World War II and on-going Cold War politics in the Horn of Africa facilitated Ethiopia’s transition from an absolute monarchy which was a nominally pro-western ally, to a repressive regime supported and protected by the Soviet Union.

4.2 The Dergue Government 1974 - 1991

In 1973 a ruinous drought occurred in the Tigray province though conditions were, at their outset, ignored by the Selassie government in Addis Ababa. When a response was finally mounted, relief efforts were badly managed and famine-induced deaths reached more than

33 During the field work phase of this thesis an aging former member of the Dergue security apparatus said “the KGB was easier to work with but the CIA paid better.”
300,000 (Eshete, 1982). The survivors, desperate people who had exhausted their family food stocks, sold their remaining assets and migrated to larger towns to seek relief. Once there, they spread stories of government indifference to their plight.

Early the following year, a small demonstration by military personnel which was initially fuelled by complaints of low pay, the lack of proper food and other issues was joined by teachers, university students and workers who were reacting, in part, to the continued plight of Tigrayian famine victims\(^\text{34}\). The demonstration grew into general strikes and these led to even wider protests over general social conditions (Lefebvre, 1992, Klandermans, 2014, van Zomeren, 2017). Ultimately, a group of military officers known as the “Coordinating Committee of the Armed Forces, Police, and Territorial Army” (colloquially known as ‘the Dergue’) and whose leadership was predominantly from the Tigray province where the famine had developed, deposed Emperor Selassie on 12 September 1974\(^\text{35}\). Led by Mengistu Haile Mariam, an Ethiopian army major, the Dergue quickly consolidated its power by merging the legislative and executive branches of government into a single entity known as the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) (Jembere & Woldemelak, 2011).

The Dergue sought to correct imperial excesses of class and wealth differentiation by implementing a hard-line socialist system. To accomplish this goal, the PMAC began to enact a series of pro-poor social and economic reforms. These included a far reaching system of land redistribution that was intended to prevent the restoration of the rural oligarchy that had formed under Selassie (Rahmato, 1984). In response to growing internal opposition among the intelligentsia to its policies, in 1975 the Dergue closed universities and secondary schools. It confiscated properties, including banks and insurance firms; took control of every important manufacturing or commercial enterprise throughout the country and seized and nationalized rural lands.

\subsection*{4.2.1 Dergue Land Distribution and Resettlement}

The vehicle to accomplish those land seizures was Proclamation Number 31 of 4 March 1975, \textit{Public Ownership of Rural Lands}. Chapter 2, section 3(1) stated “as of the effective date of this Proclamation all rural lands shall be the collective property of the Ethiopian people.”

\(^{34}\) Regime change is rarely a direct result of food insecurity and, in isolation, scarcity seldom causes civil unrest. However, when combined with other conditions such as environmental change, high unemployment among youth, or general housing shortages, food insecurity can create political fragilities that propel a society towards increased lawlessness, civil disturbances and civil war (Gutner, 1999; Johnston, 2007; Taydas & Peksen, 2012).

\(^{35}\) Selassie died 27 August 1975 under uncertain circumstances, though his death is often attributed to Mengistu Haile Mariam who allegedly smothered the 83 year old emperor in his bed.
Section 3(2) further clarified “No person or business organization or any other organization shall hold rural land in private ownership.” Consequently, virtually all real property in Ethiopia then held under any of the existing tenure systems became the possession of the state. Large farms were seized by local Dergue committees, divided, and then reallocated to peasant farmers according to formulae based on family size and land quality. But, the allocations made were often too small to achieve sustainable production and Kiros (2006: 56) found that following redistribution “the majority of holders cultivated tiny plots, the largest of which was no bigger than 0.25 hectares.”

**Provincial Origins of the Dergue Leadership**

The executive leadership of the Dergue was primarily from the Tigray province and so the fundamental characteristics of its land redistribution programme paralleled the cultural and institutional norms of the *rist* system with which they were most familiar. Following its distribution, rural land became for practical though not legal purposes, family owned and controlled. Farmers retained usufruct rights and were allowed to choose their own methods of cultivation. Land could be subdivided and passed to the sons within a family, but sales to third parties were prohibited. Nevertheless the Dergue’s land proclamations went further, even prohibiting farmers from hiring non-family labourers to work their fields. This had the unintended effect of reducing output by constricting the availability of additional labour when it was most needed during planting or harvesting. It also eliminated the livelihood alternatives of day-workers who were not themselves land holders. Still, the Dergue’s system of collective land ownership did have the positive effect of preventing its alienation through distress sales, especially in circumstances of famine or other economic failure. This not only precluded the formation of a landless class of dispossessed smallholders (Gebreselassie, 2006) it also prevented the return of the social stratification that had resulted from the concentration of land, and therefore wealth, into the hands of a small elite.

**Forced Resettlement and Food Shortages**

To accomplish its goal of land redistribution, in 1984 the Dergue began a series of wide-scale forced resettlements of the population. A 10-year development programme was announced to relocate approximately 33 million Ethiopians, a sizable majority of the population then estimated to be 42,600,000 (CSA, 1991). According to Marcus (1994: 208) the Dergue government approached the resettlement issue “as if it were a military campaign, not a humane programme” and by 1986, some 600,000 people had been moved. In its zeal the Dergue had
broken up families and villages but failed to sufficiently prepare receiving areas, which had only been fitted with minimal housing and wholly inadequate social services such as schools and medical clinics. Resettled families were often sent to where the land and moisture conditions were dissimilar to their own farms and where they had no experience with local pests, crop or livestock needs.

Contemporaneously, Steingraber (1987) described the Dergue justifications for resettlement, including the concentration of scattered homesteaders into central communities, as being necessary for ecological reasons including land degradation from over-population and over use. Contrary literature though, contends resettlement was an effort to prevent the formation of an agricultural middle-class that might have become powerful enough to challenge the Dergue. Hammond (2008) suggested this resettlement was really the ‘invisibilization’ of recalcitrant groups and was carried out by selectively relocating those who were politically opposed to the Dergue. Lavers (2012) also described how these forced resettlement programmes were used to combat the rise of guerrilla groups opposed to the Dergue regime.

The problem of food shortages created by resettlement increased as the Dergue attempted to pacify potentially restive municipal areas. Agricultural policies were implemented that forced the delivery of artificially low-priced grain to urban markets, however price controls discouraged production and further impoverished producers since their own input costs were not similarly controlled by the government (Henze, 1989). Rahmato (1984) described how a complex agricultural tax assessment system which had developed during the Selassie monarchy was over-simplified. The Dergue imposed an assessment of ten Ethiopian birr for agricultural production along with another ETB 10 for a land use tax, which at the time were very large sums. The imposition of these taxes was seen as being highly inequitable since all farmers paid the same amount regardless of their output or the size of their holding. At about the same time the Dergue government began its resettlement campaign a wide spread drought resulted in another famine that became an internationally-publicized relief effort to once more feed a starving population (Keller, 1992; Seleshi & Zanke, 2004). The attention given to these simultaneous events was highly embarrassing to the Dergue since it had been a weak reaction to a previous drought and famine which had triggered the overthrow of the Selassie monarchy.

4.2.2 Educational Reforms

Under the Dergue, education reflected Soviet ideals. An expanded delivery system was introduced which, often for the first time, brought schools to rural villages where few educational
opportunities had been available before. A highly centralized curriculum was introduced that focussed on instruction in agriculture, industrial technology, political education, home economics, and business (Negash, 2006; Engel & Rose, 2011). To assist in the Dergue’s curriculum development, policy advisors arrived from the politically hard-line Soviet-satellites of East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary. Further, to eliminate possible urban unrest and to diffuse potential counter-revolutionary movements, the Dergue instituted a Development Through Cooperation campaign and through it, six thousand university students, primarily those who had participated in the revolution, as well as almost 50,000 secondary school students who had only completed the 12th year of school, were sent as untrained teachers to work in rural schools (Balsvik, 2009; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012). However, rather than provide a well-rounded educational experience which would be useful in an industrial and commercially advancing economy their focus was on political indoctrination, centring on "better serving the interests of the masses" (Zewdie: 2000: 79).

Combined with the newly politicised curriculum, the infusion of untrained teachers who lacked basic classroom skills resulted in generations of deficient educational experiences as their poorly prepared students eventually became Ethiopia’s teachers whose own students now attend university. Proclamation Number 31 also created Soviet-style Peasant Associations. These were highly politicized and became responsible for implementing both Dergue land reforms and for the indoctrination of farmers and their children regarding the political and social goals of the revolution.

As the wider Soviet system began to collapse beginning in 1989 its food, financial, and military support for outer-ring satellite states such as Ethiopia dwindled. Following a protracted struggle with the EPRDF, the political and military collapse of the Dergue government in May 1991 narrowly predated the fall of the Soviet Union in December of that year.

4.3 The Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, 1991-present

Upon taking control of the nation in 1991, the EPRDF quickly announced that it would decentralise power away from a small group of political elites in Addis Ababa in favour of greatly expanded local authority over issues of governance, agriculture, and educational matters. Decentralization was considered a viable method to more directly address the root causes of Ethiopia’s on-going poverty, including its underdevelopment and recurring famines (Vaughan & Tronvoll, 2003). In practice however, while more responsibility had been given to officials at the wereda and kebele levels of government, political authority remained concentrated in Addis
Ababa among the central party apparatus (Aeynew, 2002; Alemu, 2015). Consequently, local officials are charged with service provision but have little authority to set policy and few local decisions are made which are not directed by the federal ministries and then communicated to subordinate levels of administration (Egziabber, 1998; Chanie, 2007). This has obvious implications for governance as the reorientation of scarce programmatic funding, that might otherwise be shifted between accounts in order to meet rapidly developing local needs, is inhibited in order to meet distant national goals.

4.3.1 Constitutional Articles and Current Property Takings

Continuities are visible between Dergue policies and those of the EPRDF, including weak property rights which, in modern liberal-democracies, tend to be based on guarantees of transferability (sale or rental) and right of ownership that include exclusionary rights (who may enter) (Klein & Robinson, 2011). However, property takings that result in the permanent loss of individual ownership of land are sometimes necessary to achieve wider goals (Azuela & Herrera-Martin, 2009; Katz, 2010) and ultimately it is the state that has supreme authority to determine the highest and best use of land, including its redevelopment.

Such government-initiated development projects are routinely deemed to be in the public interest and the right of government to expropriate property is a matter of settled law in even the most egalitarian of political systems (Dyrkolboltn, 2016). In the United States, for example, the power of eminent domain is provided to all levels of government through the 5th Amendment to its Constitution (the Takings Clause). In Britain, a series of ‘Inclosure Acts’ were passed between 1604 and 1914 which resulted in a wide-spread loss of tenancy. Those Acts forced population transfers and enabled the enclosure and privatization of approximately 11,000 square miles of previously common lands. In assessing their impact upon the social make up of Britain, Thompson (1991: 237) noted the Inclosure Acts were “played according to the fair rules of property and law laid down by a Parliament of property owners and lawyers.”

On 8 December 1994, the federal government adopted a new Ethiopian constitution, including Article 40 that closely resembled the Dergue’s Proclamation Number 31. It stated “The right to ownership of rural and urban land, as well as of all natural resources, is exclusively vested in the State and in the Peoples of Ethiopia.” Proclamation 89/1997, Rural Land Administration subsequently reiterated that land is held in public ownership and confirmed that it can be expropriated by the wereda through administrative condemnation processes. More recently, Proclamation 455/2005, titled To Provide for the Expropriation of Land Holdings for
Public Purposes, explicitly authorized expropriation for the purpose of development, reasoning that:

“Whereas urban centres of the country have from time to time been growing and the number of urban dwellers has been increasing and thereby land redevelopment for the construction of dwelling houses, infrastructure, investment and other services has become necessary in accordance with their respective plans as well as the preparation and provision of land for development works in rural areas has become necessary.”

Thus, the unambiguous intent of the national government to accommodate urban expansion through the expropriation of land from rural owners for the purposes of construction and physical development was codified. Therefore, both constitutionally and administratively, smallholders have no standing to contest such takings because no actual ownership rights are involved. After its expropriation, land continues to remain in state ownership even as the federal and regional government bundles and transfers it through a lease system “that has led to the de facto sale and purchase of lands” (Hagmann & Abbink, 2011: 585). As described in Chapter 2, leasing places land in the long-term control of private interests who consume it in ways which may permanently remove it from local agricultural production. Land taken from smallholders is required to be paid for, but following its expropriation there is no further government responsibility to educate, train, or in any other way consider the needs of ousted individuals and families.

4.3.2 The Structure of Ethiopia’s Federal and Subordinate Governments

An understanding of the differing levels of government and their authorities is necessary to an appreciation for the state-led development process (Figure 4.1). The essential supremacy of government and the people’s subservience to it, especially among rural and mountain Ethiopians, is described by the word ‘mengist’ indicating “that God and the mengist are the same” (Vaughan, 2011: 622) and that Lefort (2007: 254) defined as accepting of government’s “absolute nature of power that is immanent and intangible.” This has repercussions regarding who the people will support in elections and their acquiescence to the expropriation of their land. This deference is not, Gaventa (2006: 24) notes, specific to Ethiopia or even to developing nations. He found it was also common in highly developed, yet poor areas of the United States where “violations of democratic rights, enormous inequalities in wealth and appalling environmental living conditions” resulted from the enforced acceptance and inevitability of the living conditions that were imposed upon coal miners by powerful owners and reinforced by politicians and social structures.
Federal Ethiopia

The first tier of government in Ethiopia is the federal level that is differentiated through a tripartite model establishing a separation of powers (Fiseha, 2007). Constitutional Article 50 describes the “Structure and Organs of the State” and provides that government shall have executive, legislative and judicial branches. It defines the highest level of national government as including the bicameral House of People’s Representatives, that has the power to levy taxes and to enact legislation (Article 55) and the House of the Federation which has authority to interpret the Constitution and to determine the division of the revenues realized through tax levies (Article 62). The highest executive authority is vested in the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers (Article 72).

4.3.3 Regions

In 1995, Ethiopia reorganized its primary administrative jurisdictions, then consisting of 13 provinces, into nine ethnically based regions (kilils) and two special administrative zones of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The exact authority of the two administrative zones, especially as
they pertain to annexation of land outside of their established boundaries, is the subject of intense debate among those who are opposed to the development that is now taking place along the periphery of Addis Ababa (Kumsa, 2011; Abdo, 2013; Srur, 2014). Their argument is, essentially, that administrative zones are little more than large local governments which have no inherent ability to act unilaterally or contrary to the interests of the region. Article 49 of Ethiopia’s constitution supports this interpretation. It provides that “Addis Ababa shall be responsible to the Federal Government” yet it also states “regarding the provision of social services or the utilization of natural resources and other similar matters, as well as joint administrative matters arising from the location of Addis Ababa within the State of Oromia, the interests of Oromia shall be respected.”

The nine regions (Map 4.1) which now constitute the second tier of government, were drawn to generally align with tribal boundaries rather than follow recognizable geographic features. Their design had the intention of giving “tribalism a central role in governing by dividing Ethiopia into regions with tribal designations” (Mehretu, 2012: 119). Kefale (2010) describes the issues inherent in the redrawing of regions along tribal boundaries, that establishing boundaries along ethno-linguistic lines imposes limitations upon which groups are recognized as either ‘a nation, nationality or people’ and therefore the rights and privileges of groups who are not recognized are problematic.

Map 4.1

Provinces and Regions
These ethnically based regions have politically and socially isolated people, including those who do not choose to identify with a particular tribe or who refuse to declare their membership in a particular ethno-linguistic group, and so they essentially have no homeland, with no political voice or identity (Ayele, 2014; Bach, 2014; Moreda, 2015). Consequently, minority linguistic groups have not been included in the power sharing arrangements with majority groups and the choice to include or exclude persons within those groups has ramifications relating to access to “entitlements or representation which is otherwise reserved for members” (Aalen, 2006; Kefale, 2010: 621). In practice, politically motivated officials may choose to withhold selection for food distribution or selection for ‘Work for Food’ programmes from minority members. Further, regions can become exclusionary zones that result in the persecution of people who do not belong to the dominant social structure. In this way blame and responsibility for communal strife or shortages can be more easily shifted to unpopular minorities or other groups, such as students, who may originate from other regions of the country and are attempting to relocate to urbanizing areas.

Balcha (2008: 4), though, offers other justification for establishing these ethnically oriented regional areas. He posits they can give direction and certainty to populations who have been marginalized and persecuted by government. They build cultural identities and facilitate state formation and they form supportive links among their residents that reinforce local cooperation. However, Fiseha (2012: 436) likens regions to the same “ethnic federalism” that eventually led to the fragmentation of the states within the former Yugoslavia presented in Chapter 2 as resettlement examples.

The decision to pursue regional loyalties following the EPRDF’s assumption of power visibly distanced itself from the policies of the Dergue, that had been to build a strong and unifying sense of a singular Ethiopian identity. However, this more laissez-faire regional strategy changed dramatically during the 1998-2000 war with Eretria when the EPRDF government found it was too difficult to mount an effective military campaign without having first established internal loyalty to a single, national government. Thereafter, the central government began to build a more encompassing national identity which has now been solidified by the EPRDF’s own semi-authoritarian political influence and repressive brand of governmental authority (Hailu, 2014)36.

36 The French historian and philosopher Ernest Renan (1882: 10) noted that “What makes a nation is not speaking the same language or belonging to the same ethnographic group, it is having done great things together in the past.
Regional Government Structure

Each of the Ethiopia’s nine regions are empowered with their own executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and are further divided into subordinate administrative levels of government that include weredas (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008; Bach, 2014). Wereda are roughly equivalent to an American county or a British district and it is at this level of government that the controversial expropriation of property from smallholders actually takes place. At the lowest level of administration, 18,000 kebeles were formed from the remnants of the Dergue government’s system of Soviet-oriented Peasant Associations (SDPRP, 2002). Neither weredas nor kebeles have the authority to set tax rates, since those are fixed at the federal and regional levels. Their responsibility is in the equally political process of assessing and collecting taxes and then providing direct services (Ayele, 2014).

4.3.4 The Wereda

Weredas are the fourth tier37 of government and are responsible for providing local services and administration for approximately 100,000 citizens. Thus, the total number of weredas per region are not fixed and fluctuate with population growth. Wereda administrators prepare annual development plans and budgets; they select local infrastructure improvement projects and, in so doing prioritize the expenditure of the taxes collected. This evokes a return to Caffarella & Merriam (1999) whose interpretation of constructivist theories ask questions regarding the intent and audience of government programmes. Following the initial EPRDF decision to decentralize the authority of the government in Addis Ababa, weredas gradually became responsible for providing all manner of basic services such as water, road maintenance and agricultural development programmes; for the administration of health care services, the operation of local schools and farmer training centres, as well as providing land registration and certification, and for carrying out expropriations of small holds (Ayele, 2014).

Land Valuation at the Wereda

Regarding the process of expropriation, it is important to understand the non-linear ways in which land is valued and the legal mechanisms that allow its taking. Despite the

37 The third tier of government in Ethiopia is the zone. These are administrative units that play active oversight roles in some regions but that are almost non-existent in others, including the Oromia region (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008). Where they do operate they tend to be technical in nature and engage, for instance, in the letting of contracts for labour and materials to construct large infrastructure projects.
Dergue’s history of the seizure and nationalization of land, and the current constitutional articles that confirm state-ownership, small holders have compensation rights. In Ethiopian law when land is taken, section 8(1) of Proclamation 455/2005 requires that smallholders are “paid displacement compensation that shall be equivalent to ten times the average annual income he secured during the five years preceding the expropriation of the land.” This calculation is dependent upon the accuracy with which farmers had reported their taxable earnings and those who under-stated their income will be compensated accordingly. To press larger claims, smallholders would be required to explain the reporting discrepancies.

Valuation assessments are made by a committee who have been appointed by the wereda administrator (Belachew, 2013). The system takes into account both the square metres involved in the sale and any physical or structural improvements made to the property. As a practical matter though, the smallholders interviewed related that during the expropriation process they would ask a reasonable sum for their property and all said that despite formulae, valuations, and proclamations to the contrary, they were usually paid the asking price by the wereda which then recoups its cost from the developer through the subsequent leasing process. In practice, the price paid by the wereda to smallholders fluctuates with the time of year and when food stocks are low, land is cheap.

**Land Registration Certificates**

As expropriation has become more frequent, smallholders are turning to systems that measure the dimensions of their property, then map and record it. They are then provided with either a First or Second Stage certificate as evidence of their claim. The authority for certificate programmes is derived from Proclamation 456/2005 which includes the phrase “using cultural and modern measurement equipment” to conduct mapping. Section (6)3, states “Any holder of rural land shall be given holding certificate to be prepared by the competent authority and that indicates size of the land, land use type and cover, level of fertility and boarders (sic), as well as the obligation and right of the holder.” Certificates confer not only the right to access and

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38 Proclamation 456/2005 states that compensation paid will be made in proportion to “the development he [the smallholder] has made on the land and the property acquired.” Proclamation 455/2005, section 7(2) states “compensation for property situated on the expropriated land shall be determined on the basis of replacement cost of the property” and other physical improvements that have been made and section 4(2) provides that 90 days notice will be provided for each expropriation action. Smallholders are, therefore, entitled to replacement costs for the improvements made and these are added to the initial compensation that is determined through a review of the taxable income claims previously made by the farmer.
manage the land, but also the ability to exclude others from the property, even as the national government retains final ownership.

First Stage certification involves the demarcation of properties, and their subsequent registration without the use of global positioning systems or other digital mapping strategies. This process is inexpensive, it requires little technology, and relies primarily on field markings such as a large immovable rock or a recognizable tree stump as well as the individual memories of land holders and their neighbours. In Ethiopia, where millions of individuals had been relocated during and since the Selassie period individual or communal memory is often missing and so the accuracy of First Stage certificates is tentative, at best. More precise Second Stage certificates (Figure 4.2) are based on a far more formal process of geo-referencing to arrive at the exact measurement of land parcels and they also depict the boundaries of adjoining parcels for greater clarity.

Yet, while certificates provide an accurate description of the property, and the digitized land registries maintained by the wereda more accurately depict its location in relation to adjoining properties, they do not protect the owner from expropriation or other seizure by government. Their best use, according to the registrars interviewed, is to document the size of the parcel and this gives the owner an accurate measurement and description of the land if it is, ultimately, expropriated.

Field discussions with land use registrars in municipalities north and east of Addis Ababa indicate that most farmers are unable to provide the accurate, legally acceptable proof of long-term tenancy that is necessary to obtain either form of land certificate (Interviews 51 & 71). That proof may be letters showing long-term occupation; bills of sale; church records, or similar documentation that the committee of appointed officials use to verify the claim. In cases where evidentiary record of possession is missing, the wereda registrars said no summary dispossessions are carried out and farmers remain on their land even though they cannot be issued a certificate.

While land certificate programmes are increasing in their popularity and use, not all farms have been registered and so the national system of mapping and registration is incomplete. Thus, an accurate and comprehensive record of tenancy is not yet available for analysis and the true extent of the expropriation and internal displacement issue remains unknown. This constraint impedes the larger study of expropriation and has been noted by previous researchers (i.e., Azuela & Herrera-Martin, 2009). However, as the accumulation of
digitized information pertaining to individual tenancy becomes more common further analyses of its effect upon social groups will be possible.

Figure 4.2
Second Stage Land Use Certificate

In addition to expropriation, smallholders may also lose their property to administrative determinations that find they have not sufficiently ‘improved’ the land. In conversation with court officials, Srur (2014) found that seizure of property may take place if good stewardship is not maintained or improvements are not made:\footnote{Constitutional Article 40(7) states “Every Ethiopian shall have the full right to the immovable property he builds and to the permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labour or capital. This right shall include the right...”}

39 Constitutional Article 40(7) states “Every Ethiopian shall have the full right to the immovable property he builds and to the permanent improvements he brings about on the land by his labour or capital. This right shall include the right...”
“If this concept of improvement is taken seriously in the Ethiopian context, peasant and pastoralist ... have been using their land for centuries; they yet still find it difficult to eke out a living. They are either bad improvers or are incapable of being improvers; in both cases, they ought to be dispossessed and hand over their land to real improvers.” [sic] Supreme Court judge of Oromia Regional State, 29 April, 2013 (in Srur, 2014: 295)

Therefore in law and practice, smallholder farmers who cannot afford to make improvements to their property are subject to ousting and the property will be redistributed to other farmers. This further impoverishes the ousted smallholder by creating landlessness within what may be an already poor or marginally performing family and the prospect of a quick cash payment may facilitate their acceptance of the expropriation of their land.

4.3.5 Kebeles

Kebele are neighbourhood councils and as the lowest official administrative level of government are the first point of citizen access to programmes and administrators (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008). The kebele system is not native to Ethiopia. It was introduced by the Soviet-inspired Dergue government as peasant associations. The current government has found kebeles to be a useful administrative tool to provide services and for monitoring the loyalties of residents (HRW, 2005). The kebele is responsible for tax collection but has no budgetary authority of its own; they operate social courts which resolve minor disputes; they select and organize local work parties to perform the community labour required to complete wereda directed infrastructure projects; and they arrange social and political activities within villages to demonstrate support for the wereda and regional government (Tadesse, 2007; Hanjra, et al., 2009; Cohen & Lemma, 2011).

Kebele councils are made up of 300 elected members (Badwaza, 2015) and include an executive cabinet usually consisting of a chairperson, the kebele manager, the local agricultural development agent, judges from the kebele social court, local police and military officials; and school directors. Council leaders determine and control the receipt of social benefits (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008; Ayele, 2014). All of these actors serve as gate keepers to enforce political and social compliance with the dominating structure of the EPRDF government.

An illustration of the very real coercive power of the kebele is that wereda-level medical clinics often require an official letter which verifies an individual’s place of residence in order to receive treatment (Interview 100). Without the support of the kebele administration in return for to alienate, to bequeath, and, where the right of use expires, to remove his property, transfer his title, or claim compensation for it. Particulars shall be determined by law.” As Srur found, and as opined by the court, this clause creates a proactive duty on the part of the land holder to make improvements to the property.
individual or family compliance with, for example, local work requirements or having expressed the proper amount of support for the wereda government, those letters are easily withheld. Kebele administrators are also responsible for selecting which families will have access to government food distribution programmes during the ‘hungry time’ prior to the harvest. Therefore they have multiple tools to enforce social and political compliance among the population.

4.3.6 Local Observations of Expropriation Outcomes

In the study area smallholders are being displaced by encroaching development with no practical potential to re-engage in similar agricultural livelihoods because no nearby land is available that will not also be expropriated, nor are they in most cases qualified to be admitted to vocational training programmes due to a lack of prior educational attainment. Similar observations were made by locally elected officials. One kebele manager, who said he had been forced to conduct evictions of his neighbours, neatly summed the results of the social dispersion which is occurring as a result of the development-induced displacement east of Addis Ababa as:

“The government is doing nothing to support farmers who are being forced from the land. The payments they are given for their property can support a family for one or two years, but once the money is gone most of them become low paid day labour. There are no programmes for farmers who have lost their livelihoods and so they are left entirely to their own to obtain a living.”
Kebele Manager, August 2015 (Interview 52)

Each of the four elected kebele officials who were interviewed in the area east of Addis Ababa said they deal with ousting issues on a daily basis. Their anecdotes and comments clearly indicated they did not, as a group, support the current expropriation and eviction of their neighbours and constituents, but admitted they are powerless to resist or influence decisions made at the wereda. They related the payments made for expropriated land are most often spent in local beer houses rather than in the pursuit of vocational training or in some other livelihood investment. When the money is gone, transiently poor families often become chronically poor but they are now landless as well and so they have no means of support. The kebele managers interviewed considered the current developmental-displacement programmes to be inadequate to the long-term coping needs of their constituents but had no alternative programmes to recommend. Previous research (Cernea, 1997; Yntiso, 2008; Tadele, 2009) substantiates the observations of the kebele managers, confirming that cash compensation programmes can actually lead to further impoverishment since individuals tend to spend their
payments on alcohol or transitory luxury items rather than reinvesting in housing, in property, or in the development of a new skill or business enterprise.

In summary, differing bundles of Ethiopian rights are in conflict. Various Articles and Proclamations regarding land ownership have created protections for smallholders. These have provided inheritance and usufruct rights to agricultural land while reducing smallholder’s exposure to impoverishment through distress sales, yet they have effectively eliminated any legal basis to oppose expropriations (Crewett & Korf, 2008). Displaced smallholders can scarcely claim legal protections on the one hand while disputing the coercive qualities of those same policies on the other.

However while expropriation causes immediate displacement, in the instant case eviction does not necessarily result in forced geographic movement. Their situation resembles the displacement noted by Thompson’s (1991) earlier comment regarding land rights having been determined by property owners and lawyers. Rural youth to the east of Lalibela related they are finding it increasingly difficult to engage in farming due to the ever-smaller size of farm plots and the increasingly tentative nature of residency and they are increasingly choosing to engage in non-farm employment or higher education (Bezu & Holden, 2014). Yet without sufficient opportunities, they are often only able to obtain low-paid, unskilled labour and therefore they remain in competition with older, displaced smallholders for employment (Paul & wa Githinji, 2017).

4.4 Development-induced Displacement and Mega Projects

Expropriation, displacement and the subsequent loss of productive land to permanent redevelopment are not issues which pertain only to Ethiopia. They are international in their character and annually displace millions, yet they also provide benefits to millions more. However, there may be few employment alternatives for those who are displaced and the training and education programmes available do not necessarily result in employment for displaced smallholders or their children (Cernea, 2004). Even higher education among youth cohorts does not always result in employment because there are so few opportunities available in the nearby areas where smallholders chose to resettle.

Urbanization
In developing nations such as Ethiopia, Henderson (2002) contends urbanization results from individual shifts out of subsistence agriculture towards the higher level economies where technology is inherent in commercial and industrial processes. Satterthwaite, et al., (2010: 2810) described the urbanization process as “the increasing share of a nation’s population living in urban areas” while Hove, et al., (2013) find that in an historic context, urbanization occurs in countries where industrialization and sustained economic growth are already occurring.

This economic and cultural shift, though, requires a skilled and educated labour force rather than a simple massing of people who are resettling from the land. The urbanizing paradigm was described by Harris & Todaro (1970:126) as when “the bright lights of the city act as a magnet to lure peasants into urban areas.” Their relocation choices are based on an often false assumption that anticipated incomes will exceed their current subsistence levels, rather than the more frequent reality of the pervasive poverty experienced by unprepared rural-to-urban migrants. Yet, a too rapid influx of migrants can change the economic dynamics of an area where there are insufficient employment opportunities or where there is an over-educated cohort. Without proper skills or applicable opportunities, individuals who relocate to peri-urban or urban areas may only deepen their poverty. Thus, an ill-coordinated expansion of training or education programmes may only compound the problems of horizontal inequalities, of the under-employment and unmet expectations that result from a failure of rural people “to acquire new skills, new attitudes and new technology” if opportunity is insufficient (Luvalo, 2014: 1207; Bohnet, et al., 2016).

As noted in Chapter 2, social invisibility and marginalization are the result of “being unable to exert enough influence to change the conditions under which people live or to even speak for themselves, given their position in the arrangement of power” (Hammond, 2008: 518). This reduces the ability of smallholders to recover from external threats to their lives and livelihoods (Keck & Sakdapolrak, 2013), especially threats that result from mega-projects which increasingly consume large areas and permanently displace entire populations.

4.4.1 Mega-projects

The term ‘mega-project’ is used to identify ventures that are very large-scale; focused upon a single purpose; and which create irreversible structural commitments. Van Marrewijk, et al., (2011: 591) described mega-projects as “complex infrastructure projects usually commissioned by governments and delivered through partnerships between public and private
organizations, with multiple partners, high uncertainties, and considerable political stakes.” While there are other definitions of what a mega-project entails (see Bornstein, 2011; Dixon & Woodcraft, 2013; Othman, 2013; Lehtonen, 2014; Littau, et al., 2015) most are in agreement regarding their support of government objectives regarding economic growth and social development. Mega-projects necessitate the coordinated use of both public and private capital, and they often rely upon the coercive power of the state to displace existing populations such as is occurring in the primary study area. Once built, mega-projects have little other direct use beyond their original design. Hydroelectric dams, for instance, often have secondary benefits but they cannot be fundamentally repurposed.

In the extreme, mega-projects uproot, displace and disperse entire communities. In a study of the effects of mega-projects in Canada and Botswana, Scudder (1996) noted that relocated people are apt to take resources and jobs away from the population they are being assimilated into. Employment disputes arise when oustees are relocated to nearby receiving areas which are not prepared to suddenly incorporate them and the oversupply of workers drives wages down (Crisp, 2002; Buryan, 2012; Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016). Without adequate planning, social services also become strained due to over subscription or as children contend for seats in already crowded local schools. Adverse impacts also occur with the loss of habitat and bio-diversity that nearby residents may have depended upon for their most basic forms of sustenance-by-gathering or hunting. Conflict may erupt as already-occupied agricultural land is redistributed by government officials to resettled families, thereby reducing the earnings capacity of the original owner.

Large scale projects, such as the Three Gorges dam in China and the Hirakud dam in India are two specific examples of development which generate permanent change in the physical landscape as well as perturbing the political and social structure of the communities into which oustees are resettled. As a result, the existing livelihood networks of both the displaced and host communities were disrupted (Terminski, 2015). In China, the Three Gorges dam inundated 140 towns and villages, displacing 1.2 million people by creating an inland sea approximately 1,000 square kilometres in size (Stein, 1998). Similarly, India’s Hirakud dam displaced 22,000 households with a lake 743 square kilometres in size.

However, the conclusion can also be drawn that the needs of competing stakeholders in any mega-project are simply too complex to manage to the point of creating no harm. Any analysis of the adverse consequences must be measured against their benefits. At peak
capacity, the Three Gorges dam provides 18,000 megawatts of electricity through its 26 turbines and is predicted to generate 3% of China’s energy needs, providing service to roughly 48,000,000 people (Priddle, 2000). Though tens of thousands of hectares of land was permanently inundated, the dam reduces the need to construct new coal fired electrical generation plants. Similarly, the Hirakud dam generates 290 mega-watts of electricity and the lake region it created has become a major tourist attraction, creating jobs in secondary and tertiary hotel and fishing industries as well as providing the originally planned source of irrigation water (Baboo, 2009).

Yet, re-employment following dislocation by mega-projects may be slow since sufficient industry is not always locally available to absorb displaced workers, especially those without the necessary skill sets. To address this issue, the local government of Chongqing is responsible for rehabilitative training for displaced smallholders whose land was inundated. Municipal planning included the relocation of one million people with the goal of providing vocational retraining to just one member of each effected family within five years of their ousting (Yuqing, 2007). This indicates the enormity of the problems inherent in the vocational rehabilitation of a large population and the limits of even a well organized, centrally planned government to respond quickly to the consequences of displacement.

Ethiopian Mega-projects

In Ethiopia, a ‘mega real estate project’ was defined in Proclamation 721/2011, Lease Holding for Urban Lands, section 2(16), to mean “a housing development involving the construction of at least 1,000 residential units with a view to alleviating the shortage of housing in urban centres by way of sell or rent.” Section 4(26) of that Proclamation describes the power of the local government “where it is in the public interest, to clear and take over urban land upon payment of commensurate compensation.” The land throughout the study area has been redesignated by the regional government from ‘agricultural’ to ‘residential’ uses and it has become de facto urban even if it has not yet been properly annexed (Yirdaw, 2013). In urban development parlance, this creates ‘the highest and best use’ of the parcel, meaning its new designation will generate a higher tax rate and this has been precisely the case in the study area where the land was redesignated. Among impacted residents “poor treatment during the expropriation process; vulnerability to corruption; and non-participatory urban planning policies

40 ‘Land Use Designations’ determine the larger categories of land use, including agricultural, residential or industrial, while zoning determines the particular use allowed, such as multi-family structures at a density of eight per acre.
creates public distrust and unsolved grievance in the peri-urban areas” (Mohammed, et al., 2017: 4).

**Minimalist and Maximalist Takings**

Takings can be either minimalist or maximalist in their orientation and in an article appearing in Ethiopia’s *Mizan Law Review*, Abdo (2013: 185) differentiated between these in terms of the Addis Ababa and Oromia Special Zone Integrated Development Master Plan. From a minimalist point of view, a taking must achieve a public interest, meaning “property taken through eminent domain must provide its intended use to the public.” This perspective would preclude the wereda from initiating an expropriation which would transfer the property from the ownership of one person to the control and benefit of another. Therefore, subsequent to a taking, the public would be entitled to use and enjoy the land as a park, a government building, or to benefit from it in some other way. However, Abdo (Ibid: 189) continued, in a maximalist context takings are seen in a much broader setting and include “anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial energies … or that leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new resources.”

As a result of these maximalist taking actions a large area of predominantly subsistence agriculture will be depopulated (Home, 2016) and turned over to other uses. Therefore, the government of Ethiopia has assumed the same responsibility, albeit on a smaller scale, to train displaced workers that had resulted from China’s own Three Gorges dam project. Ethiopia, though, has not instituted programmes which adequately fulfill this obligation (Mohammed, et al., 2017).

**4.5 State-led Programmes of the Developmental-state**

As a result of numerous pro-poor policies, international interventions, and state-led development programmes, Ethiopia achieved an economic growth rate that peaked at 12.6% in 2005 (WB, 2014, NBE, 2017, Nyasha, et al., 2017). The successful implementation of its pro-poor policies and developmental programmes resulted in an overall diminution of pervasive poverty; it created a newly prosperous urban middle-class; and a small wealthy class (Seid, et

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41 Public interest is defined in Proclamation 721/2011 section 2(7) as meaning: “the use of land defined as such by the decision of the appropriate body in conformity with urban plan in order to ensure the interest of the people to acquire direct or indirect benefits from the use of the land and to consolidate sustainable socio-economic growth” [sic].
The stimulus for Ethiopia’s mega-projects, including the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam; new electrified rail lines connecting the nation internally and externally; and new motorways, are derived from a confidence in the economic future of the nation. While those projects displace local populations they are a positive outcome of the centralized development which has occurred in Ethiopia.

Four iterative plans have become foundational during Ethiopia’s process of development and economic growth. Those are (i) the *Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan* (SDPRP, 2002); (ii) the *Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty* (PASDEP, 2006); (iii) the *Growth and Transformation Plan* (MoFED, 2010); and (iv) the *Second Growth and Transformation Plan* (NPC, 2015). Since their recommencement in 2002, these and other plans have been effective in reducing volatility in the economy (Figure 4.3) and have avoided the unpredictable economic swings Ethiopia experienced during the first decade following the defeat of the Dergue.

Figure 4.3

The National Bank of Ethiopia estimated real GDP growth was 12.6% in 2005 but had fallen to a still robust 8% in 2016.


Quasi-government agencies, including the International Monetary Fund; the World Bank; and the African Development Bank Group, as well as the private market research firm *Trading*
Economics, were used to construct the above graph which demonstrates the GDP growth rate peaked at 12.6% in 2005. The African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2017) concluded that real GDP in Ethiopia grew by approximately 8.0% in the 2016 reporting period and that this represented a slowdown from the 10.4% rate it had estimated during the previous year. The ADBG (2017) predicted a 2017 growth rate of 8.1%, attributing slower growth to both the agricultural sector which has been affected by drought and to civil disturbances in the Oromia region which were the result of concerns about political and economic marginalisation and violent demonstrations42.

The private-sector market-research firm, Trading Economics, calculated the growth rate for 2016 at 7.6%, and attributed the slow down to “systemic trade deficits, an under-developed financial system, and unemployment.” The World Bank estimated 2016 GDP growth at 7.5%, noting "An economy's growth is measured by the change in the volume of its output or in the real incomes of its residents" and which slowed economic growth may result in higher unemployment. The International Monetary Fund’s estimate for 2016 was 8.5%. While robust at any of the estimates, Ethiopia’s economy slowed since the inception of the five-year development plans in 2002 and the 2005 high. Each of these sources remain optimistic about the future and suggest that the sequencing of infrastructure, as well as the end of the current drought in the south west, will allow a return to previous growth rates.

4.5.1 Ethiopia’s Developmental Plans

The iterative and centralized state-led development plans are supplemented by documents which are crafted by individual agencies and give greater detail for their implementation. Policy formulation according to Chanyalew (2006: 81) “is determined in the political arena and policy decisions are fundamentally political decisions.” Chanyalew goes on to note that, beginning with the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan Ethiopia’s series of five year economic and social plans have set a guiding strategic framework for economic growth and social development.

A reading of these plans, which have been released at regularized intervals beginning with the first five-year plan during the Selassie monarchy (1958-1962) finds that, until recently,

42 In 2017, Ethiopia’s GDP growth rate rebounded from its 2016 low of about 8% to a much more robust 10.6% (WB, 2018). This was well above previous predictions and driven, according to the African Development Bank Group by a lessening of the drought in the south west that resulted in substantially increased agricultural production; by increases in the services sector; and, the completion of infrastructure especially electrical generation capacity and transportation facilities (ADBG, 2018). However, this much improved growth rate also demonstrates that forces that are not responsive or controllable through economic planning have a disproportionate effect on growth.
they had remained essentially reliant upon continued and increased rain-fed agricultural production that is labour-intensive in nature rather than upon industrial development which might employ an increasingly educated youth cohort or displaced smallholders. However, the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, that is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, has now reversed that trend and industrialization has become a more clear focus of planning though agriculture remains the primary employment driver. In the rapidly urbanizing environment in which displaced families are finding themselves, the inculcation of non-farm technical or vocational skills is becoming of increasing importance to the stability of the developmental government.

Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan, 2002-2005

On 15 August 2002, the national government transmitted the first of its four iterative plans, the Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP) to the managing director of the International Monetary Fund. In its opening pages, the SDPRP concluded the main feature of economic growth in Ethiopia would be a continued dependence upon labour-intensive agriculture. The SDPRP (2002: 20) noted that over the previous 40 years, economic and social development in Ethiopia had been inconsistent and a generally downward trend in capital formation had worsened an already low concentration of industrial capacity. Further, the report described how wars with Eritrea (ibid: 44), and other ‘civil strife,’ had interrupted and dramatically slowed the national growth process. This was gradually causing the loss of the nation’s ability to produce goods as human capital was atrophying and infrastructure was becoming degraded due to age and a lack of upkeep.

SDPRP Development Strategies

The development strategies of the original SDPRP (2002, 38) were built upon “four pillars (building blocks).” Those were (i) Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization; (ii) reforms within the justice system and the civil service; (iii) a decentralization of government including the empowerment of local officials; and (iv) capacity-building in both the public and

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43 Two additional plans, for the periods between 1963 and 1973, were also advanced. The process was curtailed following the 1974 revolution and only revived in 2002.

44 The SDPRP (2002: 17) specifically noted Ethiopia’s intent to increase the cultivation, local and international sale of “a new export crop,” the mildly narcotic khat. The primary psychoactive component of the plant Catha edulis is “cathinone” that may cause hyperactivity and disrupted sleep; cause aggressiveness or anxiety; and worsens some pre-existing mental health problems. Carrier & Klantschnig (2012: 19) conclude that heavy khat consumption is particularly problematic among younger, jobless males who have “little in the way of opportunity, but regular access to remittances sent from abroad.” The use of khat has an obvious effect upon the ability of those young males to obtain employment and to hold their positions.
private sector. Ethiopian poverty was primarily rural, and the SDPRP noted “the proportion of people who are classified as poor are 37% in urban areas and 45% in rural areas” (Ibid: 7). The plan made little attempt to advocate the development of manufacturing as an employment strategy, instead only noting that local industry utilized outdated technology and its workers operated at very-low skill levels.

Criticism of the SDPRP found it had not been adequately socialized at the regional or wereda levels and consequently the policies it introduced were neither broadly accepted nor what the local governments felt was required to achieve sustainable growth (Haile, 2015). Ethiopia attempted to include the usual industrialization phase of economic and social development. SDPRP (2002: 23) noted “the service sector has been an important source of growth, especially in the past decade. In order to translate this growth into both employment enhancing and redistributive policies, new business enterprises and employment among blue-collar classes are necessary.” However, subsequent plans noted little overall progress in reducing joblessness and chronic poverty among the lesser educated in the rural areas. Rather than industry and manufacturing, Ethiopia concentrated on the development of a ‘National Network of Information System’.

The National Network of Information System was developed by the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology and new sub-agencies were created, including The Ethiopian Information and Communication Technology Development Agency; The Ethiopian Telecommunication Agency; and The Ethiopian Telecommunication Corporation. These communication facilities and agencies set the stage for the development of the insurance and banking industries which are now creating a wealthier middle class who are, inadvertently, displacing smallholders. They also created the framework for electronic monitoring of the internet and of cell phone users as well as the ability to view every bank account in the country. These resulted in employment opportunities for a relatively small and narrowly educated segment of the population but did little to increase employment among rural residents whose on-going poverty was seen as an existential threat to the authority of the central government (Gebresenbet, 2014; HRW, 2014). They did result in an increased ability of the government to conduct internal surveillance of the population.

The SDPRP explicitly stated “Ethiopia harbours a large poor population which by itself is a threat to the basic foundations of prosperity, stability and peace” (SDPRP, 2002: 25) and so the “public issue of poverty was changed into a security problem” for the Ethiopian state.
securitization of public issues such as poverty, which is declared to be a threat to the state, is characteristic of semi-authoritarian governments (Nwaka, 2008; Fisher & Anderson, 2015). Securitization limits the discussion of individual concerns and the exploration of problem resolutions.

**Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty, 2005-2009**

The priority of Ethiopia’s second planning document, the *Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty* (PASDEP, 2006: 2), was to:

“Accelerate the transformation from subsistence to commercialization of smallholder agriculture through attaining increased productivity and increased share of marketed production and continued support to pro-poor basic agriculture within the framework of the national food security programme.”

Like the SDPRP before it, the PASDEP was similarly pro-poor in its focus. Its programmatic emphasis remained upon agricultural populations with the intent to achieve poverty reductions through better rural health care programmes; specialized education for farmers; and the deployment of agricultural development agents who would provide location-specific information rather than a generalized national perspective of production. PASDEP (2006: 3) continued to rely upon Ethiopia’s “most abundant resource, *labour*” rather than upon the development of industrial enterprises that might employ smallholders in non-farm enterprises or the increasingly educated cohort of younger people who were leaving the farm (Bezu, et al., 2012) and who are now demanding non-farm employment opportunities.

**PASDEP Reliance on Agricultural Employment**

As with previous government policies, PASDEP concluded that technical advances in rain-fed agriculture would be able to increase production yet essentially neglected other strategies for improved non-farm employment opportunities. The approach used by the Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Development was to expand the land area under cultivation by 3% and to provide training to smallholders which would assist them in increasing their yields. In this case, the national government had selected a target-growth rate in a single sector rather

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45 Other reports, including a 2005 *‘Report on the Ethiopian Economy’*, were not as supportive of the continued reliance upon agricultural production as the primary means of development. That Report stated “Even though considerable increase in production can be attained through intensification of the rain-fed agriculture, it is bound to fall short of the ever increasing population” (EEA, 2005: 224). It particularly cites "low technological inputs, soil degradation, diminishing farm size and the dependence on the vagaries of nature" (Ibid, iii) as inhibiting both increased production and the future employment which might be generated by a continued emphasis in a single market sector. It also notes that for many, agricultural employment is “unstable, casual work paid on a daily basis” (Ibid, 127).
than broadly increasing the overall capacities of its human resources to achieve more holistic national growth (Dercon & Zeitlin, 2009) or to employ a more diverse cross-section of the population. In its original 104 pages, though, the Plan uses the word ‘education’ just four times to describe its policies and programmes and while it advocates the development of vocational training, it uses that term just one time. It does not contain even a single use of the word ‘manufacture’ and ‘industry’ is also used only once.

However, throughout the PASDEP implementation period, modifications were made to its emphasis upon agriculture and new areas of developmental focus were incrementally added to supplement non-farm sector policies. PASDEP began to tentatively address industrial production and employment by slowly emphasizing the need for urban development. Over time, the programmatic emphases of PASDEP were modified and the federal government began to accentuate the construction of new infrastructure. It promoted the empowerment of women and youth (but not necessarily that of men); and sought to deepen the capacity of government though this was only narrowly defined in terms of “Inadequate capacity for domestic revenue collection” (MoFED, 2010: 5).

*Growth and Transformation Plan, 2010-2014*

The first *Growth and Transformation Plan* (MoFED, 2010), that followed the PASDEP, was prepared by the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. It continued the national focus upon agriculture as a means toward development with what it characterized as a shift towards high value crops, including the creation of a niche export market in cut flowers shipped to Europe (Box 4.1).

The *Growth and Transformation Plan* declared “The agricultural sector continues to be the major source of economic growth” (MoFED, 2010: 10). However, it began to set the stage for industry by advocating the development of modern infrastructure to improve the conditions that are conducive to increased manufacturing. It advocated a new focus upon “telecommunication, railway, road, energy and irrigation development” (Ibid), all of which result in labour intensive employment that can substitute for agricultural work among the semi-skilled population and these improvements have better positioned Ethiopia for industrialization.
The Growth and Transformation Plan also began to advocate increased emphasis upon education and training, with a particular focus on women and girls[^46], and it promoted the Technical Vocational Education Training (TVET) system as the mechanism best suited to initiate the technology transfer that is needed to increase capacity among small and medium enterprises. However, the plan relied to a significant extent upon “higher education and adult education” as the engine of employment and entrepreneurship (Ibid, 10) and these were seen as the key to reducing poverty and unemployment. That argument, however, is addressed in Chapter 6, which will show higher education is a significant contributor to Ethiopia’s youth under-employment problem since appropriate opportunities in the industrial sector have failed to match educational output.

[^46]: In the context of educational opportunities, Crivello & Van Der Gaag (2016: 7) noted the revisiting of the “assumption that boys do not need the same attention as girls because they benefit from the status quo”; that boys and young men may be ignored in the development paradigm, and this results in irreparable economic harm as “their life chances” are increasingly inhibited.
**Industrial Development Strategic Plan 2013 – 2025**

A corollary to the Growth and Transformation Plan is Ethiopia’s “Industrial Development Strategic Plan 2013 – 2025.” That document noted the primary industrial sectors of the economy continued to be comprised of “textile and garment, leather and leather products, sugar processing, flowers and high-value fruits and vegetables” (MoI, 2013: 2), production that does not require a skilled, literate, or educated labour force. Because of the oversupply of unskilled labour, the IDSP found little employment stability existed in these industries and there was little wage growth.

The IDSP recognized the importance of micro and small-enterprises as the bulwark of employment generation and it noted that in the 2011/2012 reporting period “job opportunity was created for about 1.7 million youth and women” though it omitted men from its written assessment (Ibid, 2). It further contemplated that, as individual skill sets developed, small and medium businesses would eventually lead to the establishment of large-scale industries and that national employment stability would become based on the industrial need for workers who possess technical and manufacturing skills. Both the first Growth and Transformation Plan and the Industrial Development Strategic Plan advocated increased central coordination of economic growth to “create a conducive environment and direct support for selected sectors” (Gebreeyesus, 2014: 22). It relied upon aspirational changes in governance, financial, and legal reforms that would make industrial and commercial development both less risky and less corrupt. This, however, required the further development and sequencing of industry-supporting infrastructure and the training of skilled and effective workers.

**Second Growth and Transformation Plan, 2015-2019**

The period of the first Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) resulted in a more predictable macro-economic environment although there was a period of hyper-inflation when the rate spiked from 7.6% in January 2010 to 40.6% in August 2011. This inflation was primarily due to a drought that affected domestic food production and occurred concurrently with steep increases in global food costs resulting from increases in oil prices. Inflation returned to a more manageable 7.1% as of December 2014 as oil and food costs stabilized and drought conditions abated (WB, 2014). However, the economy has not fully recovered and data continued to show a sustained downward slope in the GDP.
To facilitate further reductions in poverty levels, the *Second Growth and Transformation Plan* now better emphasizes employment generating industrial development as well as construction related activities to increase employment. Further, the Plan has inaugurated behavioural changes such as a national savings programme which created a category of bank accounts specifically for the purchase of new homes. Unlike previous plans, GTP II strongly advocates labour intensive agriculture. However, to stimulate mass employment it promotes light manufacturing that would be located in planned industrial parks near new transportation infrastructure. If sustained, this approach is anticipated to eventually develop the broader economy and the stimulation of heavier industry (NPC, 2015) as a pool of increasingly better skilled labourers becomes available.

Most importantly though, the *Second Growth and Transformation Plan* was not written by an individual agency. It was centrally coordinated by the “National Planning Commission” established by Council of Ministers Proclamation 281/2013. The Commission is now responsible for advancing both the vertical economy, that meets the needs of specific market sectors such as agriculture, while concurrently crafting horizontally coherent policies to increase the availability and demand for the skills necessary for industrial development. These polices, Ocubay (2018: 15) contends, have been generally ineffective due to a lack of coordination “among and across government agencies” that substantially increases administrative costs.

### 4.6 Post-conflict Economies

Ethiopia was in a state of permanent revolution from the time the Dergue deposed Emperor Selassie on 12 September 1974 until the EPRDF assumed power on 21 May 1991, when Mengistu Haile Mariam fled the country for Kenya and the civil war ended. However, Collier, et al., (2006) note the high likelihood of states which have recently been engaged in a civil war returning to civil disorder and that the potential for violence is particularly elevated if there is lingering high-unemployment. They further note that spending by recent-conflict states military armaments and security remain high in order to guard against a recurrence of fighting and so the term ‘post conflict’ should not be mistaken for the simple cessation of hostilities without the resolution of underlying animosities. Maintaining a large residual military force drains capital which could be used to rebuild damaged infrastructure and stimulate the economy, thereby creating the jobs in which the younger cohort or displaced smallholders would become employed.
Cevik & Rahmati (2013: 5) concluded that while the duration of a conflict and the loss of key infrastructure as a result of battle damage have a strong negative effect upon economic restoration, it is the presence of strong “human capital and institutional factors” that most contribute to economic recovery. However, recovery should not simply recreate the conditions which led to the conflict in the first place (Luckham, 2004) and significant changes to the economic and social structure are required for sustained growth and development. Dobbins, et al., (2007: 14) found this is especially true where there exists a cohort of young males who have been militarily trained, since employment “bolsters security, offering former combatants an alternative to violent crime.”

*Post-conflict Peace and Stability*

Del Castillo & Bunche (2015) contend that for successful post-conflict peace and stability, there are four distinct and predictable social and economic stages. Those are (i) the transition to public security, including the control of street crime, violence and the collection of taxes which are used to repair infrastructure; (ii) a political transition during which repressive government authorities must allow the rule of law and democratic institutions to prosper; (iii) the social transition, which includes the difficult reintegration of former fighters and enemies, who are sometimes neighbours, back into their villages; and (iv) the important period of economic transition, during which imbalanced economies must reduce their military spending in favour of civilian sector growth and development. These stimulate individual and national stability through the provision of employment and elevates artificially low per capita income while motivating the economy.

The initial decade following conflict is crucial, but may become illusory. Collier & Hoeffler (2004: 1130) found that while the ability to utilize foreign development aid in the first three years of the decade immediately following a conflict is minimal, it increases substantially during the rest of that decade as the economy becomes more robust and this was seen in Ethiopia’s 2005 GDP growth rate. However, they also found those economies typically “follow a pattern”, that while during the first first post-conflict decade growth and development come rapidly, it tends to slow dramatically in the second decade. Ethiopia’s economy has followed their predicted pattern, though it was also adversely affected in that first decade by a cross-border war with Eritrea which took place between May, 1998 and June, 2000, and by local droughts (IMF, 2016).
One by-product of Ethiopia’s predictably slowing post-conflict economy is a rapidly growing youth bulge (Figure 4.4) for whom there are fewer prospects for social or economic advancement. Urdal (2006: 612) found that “when countries respond to large youth cohorts by expanding tertiary education, it produces a much larger group of highly educated youth than can be accommodated in the normal economy.” This results in social grievances if the ability of that cohort to achieve an adult status goes unfulfilled (Honwana, 2012; Carling, 2015).

**Figure 4.4**

*Ethiopia’s Youth Bulge*

Ethiopia’s State-led Development and the Middle-class

State-led development has enabled a recognizable middle-class to emerge in larger urban areas, but this newly prosperous group is displacing smallholders in contiguous rural areas with their housing demands, all while failing to generate sufficient compensatory employment or livelihood retraining for the displaced population or for socially displaced youth. Schmidt & Bekele (2016) found that while each of Ethiopia’s iterative five-year plans has led to increased prosperity, their over-all effect upon industrialization and non-farm employment has remained minimal without the growth necessary to accommodate a rapidly expanding population. They conclude (ibid, 936), as did the Central Statistical Agency (CSA, 2014d), that rates of “economically active people working in agriculture only decreased by approximately 3.6% between 2005 [peak GDP growth] and 2013.” Thus, in rural areas the federal government...
has continued to rely upon labour intensive agriculture for the majority of national employment and centralized policies have only recently begun to emphasize employment through industrial development. Those plans have not yet produced the type or quantity of employment that is necessary to accommodate a youth bulge that has resulted from other highly successful social and health care policies and the greater availability of better educational opportunities (Nordas & Davenport, 2013).

4.7 Chapter Summary

Ethiopia's early history was one of great power that was based on its early development of a written language and the adoption of innovative agricultural techniques that allowed it to dominate regional trade relations. Since the overthrow of Emperor Selassie in 1974 Ethiopia's social system has been dominated by political repression and continuing revolution, it has weathered tectonic political and economic shifts, changing from the rule of an absolute monarch, to a Marxist Soviet-style government, to one nominally less repressive and more actively development-oriented.

Following the EPRDF's victory over the Dergue government in 1991, droughts, cross-border wars and poor educational delivery have hindered its economic advancement. While there had initially been a focus upon state building rather than nation building, this changed with the Ethiopian-Eritrean war as a new focus was recognized. Following a period of significant economic upheaval, Prime Minster Zenawi introduced a strong system of centralized development that generally rejected Northern neoliberal ideas of governance in favour of a programme that is more indigenous in nature. Zenawi's economic theory resulted in a quick stabilization of the economy and rapid economic growth. However, the previous rate of growth has declined since its peak in 2005, though it was still enviable at about 8% in the 2016 reporting period.

Continued Reliance Upon Agricultural Employment

Zenawi's planning documents and subsequent national policies have stabilized the economy but, they continue to rely upon agriculture for the majority of employment. This is not surprising given the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians continue to reside in rural areas and fully 80% of citizens are engaged directly in subsistence farming for their livelihood. However, a growing population now requires new solutions. Small plot sizes and continued high birth rates make the continued subdivision of farms untenable. The Second Growth and Transformation
Plan now better prioritizes manufacturing and industry as employment generators and Ethiopia has engaged in a programme of infrastructure construction which is placing the country in a better position to industrialize. This will enable the creation of both low and medium-skill blue collar jobs for the working poor including displaced smallholders, as well as employment opportunities for the more highly educated youth.

Educational programmes over the course of Ethiopia’s modern history have been inconsistent in their quality. While the Dergue government significantly expanded educational availability, instructors were often unqualified and untrained in pedagogical techniques. Current programmes have expanded significantly in their reach yet are now increasingly reliant on instructors who themselves had received a substandard education during the Dergue era or were taught by minimally qualified instructors (despite the presence of foreign educated instructors and government ministers) who had been relocated to the countryside by the Dergue. Their charges are now secondary school and university students who are vying for limited employment opportunities.

With the stage now set, Chapter 5 discusses Ethiopia’s state-led development programmes facilitating economic growth. These have led to a vibrant middle-class that is seeking better housing opportunities outside of the urban core. Their desires for more comfortable accommodations are displacing farmers along the periphery of Addis Ababa and this is affecting hundreds of thousands (Home, 2016) of smallholders whose land is being expropriated. Though smallholders are paid for their land, they have few non-farm skills with which to engage in alternative livelihoods. Once ousted, they have few options other than to take low paid work in the communities they have relocated to, but their increasing numbers then drives down the price of labour for other workers in those towns.

Chapter 6 describes the state-led educational system that has increased the availability of basic educational opportunities, which are now almost universal. Chapter 6 will show this is resulting in strata of youth who are better educated than at any time in Ethiopia’s history. A large number of those secondary school leavers subsequently enter university but at the completion of their studies they are finding there is insufficient employment available for them. They have few options other than to either remain unemployed, to emigrate, or to become under-employed. This situation of under-employment causes a cascade effect which impacts lesser skilled workers. The inability to find employment has other significant outcomes. It
prevents these youth from being accepted into adult-hood and so they cannot marry nor begin independent lives as socially recognized adults.

A combination of these issues is resulting in civil disturbances that have begun to destabilize the nation. Students are increasingly likely to be under-employed while displaced smallholders eventually become only minimally employed. Under-employment has been shown to have a cascading effect that ultimately results in the unemployment of the least skilled in society. It also has shown to have long term effects on the ability of workers to later obtain employment that is commensurate with their educational backgrounds or previous skill levels.
Chapter 5
Ethiopia’s Development and In Situ and Ex Situ Displacement

5.0 Introduction

This chapter analyses Ethiopia’s evolving programmes of development and addresses the first objective of the study: to investigate the effects and challenges to its pro-poor development policies. Since their introduction in 2002, Ethiopia’s centrally led development initiatives have steered substantial national economic growth, calmed the erratic economy, and built critical infrastructure. Pro-poor policies have also facilitated social development (IMF, 2016, Shiferaw, 2017) and created improvements ranging from health care delivery, to expanded access to education. While these policies have led to cumulative improvements in living conditions, some have exacerbated smallholder displacement, particularly where rural and peri-urban small holders are being ousted to construct new development projects, thereby creating conditions which often lead to their poverty and group isolation.

Until recently, the primary emphasis of Ethiopia’s development policies has been the promotion of labour-intensive agricultural production (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015; Seid, et al., 2015). This is changing as Ethiopia’s population approaches the predicted figure of 187 million by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and a 2017 World Bank report projects the number of available workers will increase to 82 million by 2030 (WB, 2017c). This labour force will necessitate a substantial revision of the development focus to maintain social and economic stability (MoE, 2015; Shiferaw, 2017) among those who require suitable non-farm work. Thus, pro-poor development policies must meet the capabilities and demands of the current and future work force (Pape, 2005). This will include those of development-ousted smallholders who are displaced *ex situ* and educated youth who are socially displaced *in situ* if Ethiopia is to continue its substantial economic growth and social development.

Where the economic growth rate has slowed (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017) and sufficient opportunity does not exist, a destabilizing environment of un- and under-employment is emerging. Students are demanding more economic opportunities and some demonstrations have erupted into violence, only to be met with a disproportionate use of government force (Balzacq, 2005; Trombetta, 2007; Fisher & Anderson, 2015). However, Ethiopia’s history of absolute monarchy and the legacy of the Marxist Dergue have facilitated a semi-authoritative government, while too-rapid growth and strong cultural obligations have challenged development and modernization.
5.1 Ethiopia's Development Approach

Centralized development occurs as national governments “adopt development as a purpose to which state power is put” (Skocpol, 1987: 4). These initiatives build infrastructure, provide services for the common good; and stimulate the economy. Whyte (2009: 375) asserts there are two primary approaches to development. The first is his “big bang approach”, reminiscent of the economic and social revolution that occurred in 1917 Russia and again as the Soviet Union rapidly dismantled and restructured its economy almost in its entirety after the Second World War (Woodward, 1995). This strategy is resource intensive and inherently destabilizing; it emphasizes the establishment of heavy industry and agricultural mechanization at the expense of labour-intensive agriculture. The second approach, according to Whyte, emphasises utilizes a far more gradual strategy which incrementally modernizes a nation while retaining much of the existing labour intensive agriculture. According to Whyte (2009: 375) China best exhibits the latter approach, steadily replacing traditional institutions with a locally acceptable “form of capitalism and semi-private enterprises” under central direction.

Though the Chinese model maintains a focus upon agricultural employment, it also initiated a series of very large and modernizing infrastructure projects such as the Three Gorges dam. This project provided electrical energy for tens of millions but was also socially and economically disruptive to hundreds of thousands of smallholders who were forced from their farms and villages as they were inundated by rising waters. To compensate for their ex situ displacement (“forced from their original place of being” (Vanclay, 2017: 3)) China invested in academic education and rehabilitative-vocational training for displaced families, while also investing in new technology and manufacturing industries (Galipeau, et al., 2013; Wong, 2014). These, in addition to other strategies, have proven to be largely successful, leading to the International Monetary Fund’s conclusion that China has become the second largest economy in the world.

State-led development not only centralizes and focuses the process of economic planning and implementation, it also provides the cohesive and coercive force sometimes required for development and modernization. Such centralized economic stimulus is often necessary following periods of conflict, such as those experienced in Ethiopia after first overthrowing the Selassie monarchy in 1974 and then as the Dergue were violently ousted in

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47 Marshall (2015:42) contends that when former Chairman of the Central Advisory Commission of the Communist Party of China, Deng Xiaoping “coined the phrase socialism with Chinese characteristics, he actually meant total control by the Communist party in a capitalist economy.”
1991 (UNDP, 2008; Cevik & Rahmati, 2013). As early as 1888, Marx and Engels described the destabilizing tensions which stem from rapid economic growth and its inherent social changes. While changes which are too aggressive, that cause a too-rapid growth and too hasty modernization might lead to elevated incomes, they may also create social inequality as uneven development alters the social order in fundamental ways (Collier & Hoeflfler, 2004; UNDP, 2008; Shiferaw, 2017). Paffenholz (2008: 17) asserts such aggressive developmental transformations are not only intrinsically destabilizing, but those “countries in transition from traditional to modern forms of society have a much higher likelihood of suffering violence.” As economic gains are not shared equally people lose their community grounding and social group, and this may set nations on a path towards civil conflict.

5.1.1 Prime Minister Zenawi’s Development Vision

In his unpublished doctoral thesis, former Prime Minister Zenawi posited “economic and social stagnation can grip nations and slow their growth” (Zenawi, 2006: section 6.3). In another article published after his death, Zenawi (2012: 164) further stated that lesser developed countries such as Ethiopia “often fall into a sort of downward spiral” which is generated by a powerful combination of a lack of education and cultural aversion to technological modernization. He characterized Ethiopia’s then-economic malaise as having become “deeply rooted in pervasive market failures that create poverty traps” (Brechenmacher, 2017: 2). This, Zenawi said, had led to a national inability to absorb innovation which had in turn, fundamentally undermined Ethiopia’s growth and development. His conclusion was that where market forces are non-responsive due to local tradition, culture, or social constraints it becomes an imperative of the state to proactively rebalance and artificially stimulate growth through centralized development. Zenawi caveated this, saying “development is a political process first and an economic and social process later” and noted that developing nations cannot simply purchase the latest technology, that it must be accumulated, assimilated, and only then distributed throughout the society (2006: section 6.3). Therefore, his conclusion was that social actors should become subordinate to the needs of the developmental government and in this way the Ethiopian-state would rekindle its sluggish economy.

Given Ethiopia’s largely agricultural economy, Zenawi established a state-directed version of development which was more reminiscent of China’s model than it was of the Soviet model (Hess, 2015). Beginning in 2002 and in the midst of an economic downturn (Figure 4.3), the government adopted Zenawi’s innovative state directed development policies and rejected the structural adjustments recommended by Northern donors and development organizations
(Moyo, 2008). Zenawi’s plan stressed agricultural development and the rural employment it was expected to generate. However, the small size of agricultural holdings, averaging just 1.22 hectares (CSA, 2012b), coupled with a declining yet still high birth rate (Seid, et al., 2015) and traditional inheritance practices which further subdivide small holds, make it difficult to earn a living through agriculture. Such small plots are, though, also a cultural and structural form of economic displacement. Unable to undertake a viable agricultural livelihood, rural youth often seek non-farm employment in urban and peri-urban areas. Increasingly however, their high number and sudden arrival are changing the employment dynamics of those labour markets (Schmidt & Bekele, 2016). Historically, construction sector employment has been able to absorb these rural youth, yet as infrastructure projects are reaching their completion and as the availability of funding for new projects is becoming scarce employment is declining. This is producing a new stratum of urban poverty among relocated youth (Fantini, 2013; NPC, 2015; Clapham, 2017).

**Basic Manufacturing Skills**

As noted earlier, the priority of Ethiopia’s development programmes has chiefly focused upon labour-intensive agricultural output. Yet, this strategy has led to unemployment and under-employment as the rural population increased while land availability remained generally constant (MoI, 2013; MoE, 2015; Shiferaw, 2017). Although growing, the employment-generating manufacturing base remains embryonic and Ethiopia continues to chiefly produce very basic items, including “sugar, cement, liquors, flour, plastic, soft drinks, structural metal, textiles, basic iron and steel, and detergent and soaps” which require little innovation or higher-level industrial skills (NPC, 2015: 15). Seid, et al., (2015) contends that agriculture still accounts for about 37% of Ethiopia’s GDP and observed that during GTP I, the employment generating manufacturing sector continued to account for only 4.4% of GDP. This suggests that, thus far, the manufacturing sector is insufficient and will be unable to absorb the natural population growth or accommodate the labour force which is predicted to become available in the next 12 years (WB, 2017c; Oqubay, 2018).

Moreover, the national government has promoted technical and academic education without concurrently creating the conditions necessary for employment producing

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48 The Second Growth and Transformation Plan generally confirms this, finding that at the end of the GTP I period the industrial sector had “an average annual growth rate of 20%” that “the share of the industry sector in overall GDP has reached 15.1% (manufacturing 4.8%, construction 8.5%, electric and water 1% and mining 0.8%)” It particularly noted that industrial sector growth “has been largely driven by the construction sub-sector” (NPC; 2015: 28).
industrialization. This is demonstrated by high unemployment and under-employment rates among Ethiopia’s youth (CSA, 2014c; ILO, 2017). Despite these issues, the World Bank predicts that if the development pattern achieved over the previous decade can be sustained, Ethiopia’s rate of growth will allow it to rise from its current status as a lesser developed nation to achieve “its goal of becoming a middle-income country by the year 2025” (MoE, 2015: 11; WB, 2016: 86). To that end, Ethiopia’s planning emphasis has changed and with the Second Growth and Transformation Plan (NPC, 2015) the government has elevated the priority of industrial investment and the creation of employment through manufacturing.

5.1.2 National Development Priorities and Transformation Plans

National plans and budgets delineate government priorities (Muhumuza & Rwakakamba, 2015) and in Ethiopia the timing and sequencing of government policy indicates the evolution of its political and social policies (Chanyalew, 2006). Ethiopia’s original development plans, including the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Plan (SDPRP); the 2006 Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP); and, the first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) released in 2010, provided little direction regarding the development of industry and manufacturing. Rather, they primarily emphasized agricultural production to generate sustained employment for smallholding and subsistence farmers who constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

According to the initial priorities of the first national plan, the SDPRP (2002: i), Ethiopia’s primary focus was “rapid export growth through production of high value agricultural products.” However, a 2003 progress report submitted to the International Monetary Fund had already identified issues including population growth and limited human resource capacity which were hindering accomplishment of its mid-term targets and the larger developmental goals. Specifically, that report (MoFED, 2003) noted the overall lack of sufficiently skilled workers who were available to implement large, though often localized, infrastructure projects such as road building, rural electrification, or the construction of water purification plants. This absence of suitable workers highlights the known challenge presented by “the low percentage of the population that has completed their primary education” (Ibid: 11). The report further concluded that “reasons for falling short of the target included shortages of equipment, slow labour mobilization and a shortage of skilled manpower, and poor management of the projects” (Ibid, 78).
The priorities found in the second national development plan, the PASDEP (2006: 1), built upon those of the first plan and similarly stated that its foremost resolution was “on growth in the coming five-year period with an emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture”\textsuperscript{49}. PASDEP asserted that “in order to accelerate and expand industrial development and increase overall economic growth, it is essential to develop the agricultural sector which is crucial to ensure both the provision of inputs for industries as well as to fulfil food security requirements” (Ibid: 6). Ethiopia subsequently initiated the first of its two growth and transformation plans to meet this evolving objective of national modernization.

5.1.3 The Growth and Transformation Plans

The first Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP I) “focus(ed) on growth with a particular emphasis on greater commercialization of agriculture in order to accelerate and expand industrial development … [and] to ensure that agriculture becomes the main source of growth for the next five years, the key strategy to be pursued concerns scaling up the best practices of modern smallholder farmers” (NPC, 2015: 23). The underlying strategy of GTP I had been to “support strongly the intensified production of marketable farm products for domestic and export markets” (ibid: 22) but this required only an updating of low-level skills. Industrial development that was independent of agriculture has remained a secondary priority.

The GTP I states further that “in the industrial sector, the government will focus on strengthening micro- and small manufacturing enterprises because they are the foundation for the establishment and expansion of medium and large-scale enterprises” (NPC, 2015: 24). GTP II notes this did not happen, that micro- and small manufacturing enterprises performed far below expectations (NPC, 2015: 28). The educational objectives of GTP I, developed in concert with the Ministry of Education, included both academic education and vocational training. Henceforth higher education institutions were expected to provide well rounded academic experiences which focussed on the general social needs of the nation and the requirements of “manufacturing industry in particular” while vocational training would meet similar industrial needs (Ibid: 88).

\textsuperscript{49} Etana & Tolossa (2017: 62) note that poverty remains rampant in urban areas and those with higher education levels are guaranteed neither economic success nor even basic food security. Their study of two sub-cities of Addis Ababa (Arada and Akaki-Kaliti) found that while 96% of those who had only completed primary school are food insecure, fully 78% of residents with a tertiary education are food insecure as well. However, Frankenberger and McCaston (1999: 31) caution that “it is misleading to treat food security as a fundamental need independent of wider livelihood considerations.” It requires they say, “a comprehensive understanding of relationships”, among them are the “political economy of poverty, malnutrition and the dynamic and complex strategies that the poor use to negotiate survival” (Ibid).
The *Second Growth and Transformation Plan* (GTP II) (NPC, 2015: 29) was initiated to address the shortcomings of GTP I. It noted that while the emphasis during the GTP I period had been given to “micro and small enterprise development in order to stimulate employment; manufacturing efficiency, productivity, competitiveness, technological and working systems”; these remained “limited by the low level of skill and efficiency of human power.” Moreover, and as Fantini (2013) had predicted, GTP II described that even the unskilled export industries of “flowers, fruits and vegetables, coffee, sesame and cereals” had fallen short of their targets (NPC, 2015: 16) and this has restricted export earnings (Oqubay, 2018). Moreover, GTP II found that despite the planning emphasis upon the establishment of new manufacturing industries, the relatively low-skilled construction subsector, rather than manufacturing, had been the major driver in terms of employment and national growth and was therefore largely responsible for the bulk of Ethiopia’s gross domestic product (NPC, 2015: 7).

*First Post-Zenawi Plan*

The GTP II was the first post-Zenawi plan and a significant departure from previous agriculturally-intensive plans, signalling an acknowledgement of the need to further stimulate and substantially redirect the economy. It charted a new strategy and direction which emphasized manufacturing as an employment generator, and refocussed investment in the establishment of “light manufacturing industries that are labour intensive” (NPC, 2015: 28) to facilitate economic growth. While it continues to strongly encourage agriculture, GTP II stressed the construction of capacity-enabling infrastructure such as roads and especially industrial parks which are intended to concentrate mutually supportive manufacturing in designated zones.

According to Gebreeyesus (2014: 4), despite the advances made through its development policies, industry in Ethiopia “in the modern sense of the term only emerged at the turn of the 20th century” but that it has not fundamentally improved since then. He notes Ethiopia’s relatively few manufacturing plants are technologically outdated and increasingly uncompetitive across international markets. Low skill and low technology manufacturing, such as food and beverages, textile weaving, and bespoke furniture-making continue to be the most common employment generators within the manufacturing sector. This emphasis upon a technically capable labour force impedes industrial investment (Hanushek, 2013; Yirdaw, 2016) and subsequently the anticipated employment that is suitable for university graduates.
Infrastructure and Exports

Foremost among Ethiopia’s improvements are the reestablished rail link connecting Addis Ababa to the Port of Djibouti\(^5\) and numerous roadways radiating from the capital to support future industrial development. While infrastructure alone cannot substitute for the lack of employment opportunities, Bezu & Holden (2014) assert new infrastructure facilitates manufacturing and encourages rural-to-urban migration of better educated youth who feel their prospects for employment will be improved in large cities rather than in their villages. As the only country to share common borders with all of the nations in the Horn of Africa, Ethiopia is poised to assume the role of a job-creating transportation corridor. Yet, Ayogu (2007: 115) asserts “building infrastructure may not overcome an unskilled labour force” rather, systems and skills must develop simultaneously rather than waiting for the other to be completed. In this way technical and manufacturing skills become available at the time infrastructure enables industry to develop. However, for Ethiopian’s to once again enjoy high economic growth rates, appropriate employment must be created for the millions of new workers entering the labour force (WB, 2017e) as well as for existing workers who are being displaced both ex- and in situ.

Ultimately, Ethiopia’s export market for finished goods is undeveloped and consequently has not attracted foreign direct investment in manufacturing which would lead to either employment opportunities or demand for higher-level technical skills than are currently available (Ocubay, 2018). Thus while Zenawi’s iterative policies have led to substantial growth and development, his approach is no longer sufficient to encourage the creation of the upper-lower class and lower-middle class employment opportunities which will be necessary to meet the demands of a better educated and much larger population (CSA, 2014b; Nayak, 2014; NPC, 2015; WB, 2017).

5.1.4 Development and Land Expropriation at the Micro-level

Beginning with the absolute monarchy of Halie Selassie, an evolving combination of internal and external changes have substantially transformed Ethiopia’s governmental role in development, these extended past the Marxist Dergue regime in to the current system of centrally directed development. These changes have clearly enriched and improved the lives of those who have been able participate in, or adapt to, the social and economic transition that is

\(^5\) The rail line from Addis Ababa to Djibouti was initiated by King Menelik II and completed in 1915. The refurbished link was built with Chinese funding and opened at about the same time China established its first overseas naval facility, also in Djibouti.
occurring. Nevertheless, other groups have been impoverished, particularly those who are physically displaced by development and who have not been able to otherwise genuinely assimilate into the new economic model.

**Extent of Expropriations**

Smallholders in the study area to the east of Addis Ababa explained they have been notified of their wereda’s intention to expropriate and convert their land to residential development (Interviews 61, 70, 73 & 80). Smallholders as far east as Sendafa (Interviews 62, 63) described how they had been opposed to development related changes but also submitted they are powerless to contest them and recognized they have few livelihood options once their small holds are taken. An assistant kebele manager (Interview 52) encountered while he was inspecting a recent series of expropriations and oustings, stated that an area extending to a hillside some 10 kilometer’s from the main road will be taken for development to accommodate the population increase which Addis Ababa is projected to experience over the next 35 years. He confirmed that no specific plans for rehabilitative training programmes for displaced adults, or their children, will be offered to prepare them for a life which is not farm related, nor were there plans to relocate residents to any other location to renew their agricultural livelihoods. This circumstance is likely to contribute to permanent economic and social displacement and poverty in two ways.

First, according to kebele officials, tela house owners, and manufacturing plant managers (Interviews 19, 52, & 75) who were interviewed, smallholder social networks are formed among highly independent agriculturalists who cooperate throughout the planting season for mutual benefit. Thus, when smallholders are dispersed, their support network in times of hardship is lost. Second, displaced smallholders who were observed in the areas east of Addis Ababa as well as in the hillsides surrounding Lalibela displayed difficulty responding to change. Particularly among the older smallholders who were being ousted a consistent theme was a self-acknowledgement that they are ill equipped to renegotiate their new lives; that they have neither suitable non-farm employment experience, nor other coping skills. Critically, they believed it is unlikely they would be able to develop the skills necessary to work in the new industries being established in the area surrounding Addis Ababa, thus their economic failure appeared certain to be tied to a lack of internal locus of control:
“When we were younger we could dream of the things we’d do, the land we would
farm and good lives we would lead. We had those lives for years and years but now we have
nothing and there is no way for us to restart, none of us can work in the mills they’ve built.
We’re too old to begin again.”  Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 72)

Their observations support similar arguments found in academic literature and those
made by former Prime Minister Zenawi (in Brechenmacher, 2017), describing the inability of
high-context cultures to take full advantage of technical opportunities (see also Schwartz, et al.,
2006; Todo, et al., 2014; Arnason & Valgeirsdottir, 2015). Thus, unskilled smallholders are
particularly vulnerable to unemployment and chronic poverty after their displacement as they
become economically and socially unmoored from their communities and livelhoods. Some
smallholders however, both dismissed the inevitability of displacement and feared the already
observed consequences of too-vocally protesting their ousting:

“My farm is very far from the nearest road and the steep hillsides mean there’s little
chance of it being taken by the government for development. But, I know many of my
neighbours are concerned about losing their land as they watch the new houses and the new
mill coming closer and closer. They’ve discussed organizing against the wereda but they’ve
seen what happens to people who resist the government.”  Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 63)

At the same time smallholders are being ousted by a process of development that is
creating increased prosperity among a select urban population, youth and student groups are
becoming socially displaced by their new education when they cannot find appropriate
employment (Taylor, 2008; Dorosh & Schmidt, 2010). They, too, must adjust to their changing
paradigms as slowing economic conditions are making employment more difficult to secure.
This condition among better-educated youth is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 6.

5.1.5  Smallholder Response to Developmentally Imposed Changes

In terms of the expropriation that is taking place, land prices in the primary study area
were discussed by smallholders who were interviewed outside of a wereda land registration
office. They recognized that increases in value were occurring due to an influx of new resident
who were relocating from Addis Ababa and who were building new homes in what had recently
been farm fields. While several of the participants in the group were generally satisfied with the
price they had received for their property, most understood that once they sold their land they
were left with few options other than to take menial day labour jobs. This has resulted in a loss
of identity among them which becomes a fundamental form of social displacement:
“Land prices are increasing and some farmers I know are selling their property to receive better prices than if the government takes it. They are paid what they ask for it, but after they’ve sold it most of them have no support. They have no skills and once the money is gone they can only take menial day labour jobs that other people in town used to do. They are not who they once were in the community and are not as well thought of.”
Smallholder, July 2015 (Interview 67)

“We all have neighbours who’ve sold their land because they see that living on a farm is becoming much more difficult as the town expands. People from town buy land and build houses on it and you can’t blame them for wanting someplace nicer to live. But once you’ve sold your property and spent the money on new things like a television or even a car you’ve got nothing left. You can start a small vegetable window from your house, but too many people are doing that and selling a few onions is not a way to make a living.”
Smallholder, July 2015 (Interview 68)

Although some of those who have become displaced were able to begin a business or find non-farm employment in nearby peri-urban areas, a majority of the 41 smallholders who were interviewed in areas peripheral to Addis Ababa related they had not re-established themselves financially and no assistance had been provided to them by the same government which had forced their displacement (Ferris & Winthrop, 2010). Of those who had found new livelihoods, fewer than 15% felt they would ever be able to recoup the income or the lifestyle they had previously enjoyed. They explained they were offered menial employment as night guards to watch over the construction site which had taken their property (Interview 90), or that they might find sporadic and unskilled employment on small construction sites. In no case did any displaced smallholder report the offer of a steady income or employment which provided the same autonomy they had previously enjoyed.

Moreover, respondents felt they had little control over the events reshaping their lives especially as the political process and social services become less responsive to their daily needs. These smallholders recognized they no longer constituted a recognizable voting bloc, and at least 50% of the smallholders offered that elections increasingly represent a meaningless community participation requirement rather than opportunity for political and social change (Carter, 2009; Badwaza, 2015). Thus, a sense of marginalization51 emerged from the discussions among oustees and revealed an undercurrent of vulnerability and futility stemming from the lack of employment or other opportunities. Smallholders in the study area were also keenly aware that potential alternatives, including those obtained through any political pressure they might have previously been able to bring, are rapidly diminishing. Hence as their own

51 Cernea (1997: 1574) described the beginning of marginalization as when “families lose economic power and slide on a downward mobility path; when middle income farm households become landless and when small shopkeepers and craftsmen are forced to downsize and slip below poverty thresholds.” It occurs when displaced families cannot use their prior skill sets in their new locations and so their human capital is lost.
group numbers decrease due to displacement, oustees recognized they are essentially on their
own with little outside support:

“We used to have a large farmers association with more than 50 members and we
could talk to the wereda leaders about our problems. But now that the land is being taken
there are fewer than 15 members and they won’t listen. In the past, the association would
provide training to younger farmers and their children, or it would help to plough the fields
and assist wives who had lost their husbands due to accidents or divorce. Now, there are not
enough of us left and so we cannot help each other or fight being forced from the land.”
*Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 72)*

5.2 Pro-poor Policies in Ethiopia

Ethiopia’s federal government is committed to development through its pro-poor policies
and as early as 2002, released its *Industrial Development Strategy* (MoI, 2002). That plan
detailed a programme of institutional reform which would stimulate non-agricultural employment.
It outlined budgetary commitments to rural education and health care, agriculture, and
infrastructure development including rural electrification and new roads (Altenburg, 2010; IMF,
2015; Gebreeyesus, 2016). These foundational improvements are now enabling the current
developmental policy, the *Second Growth and Transformation Plan*, to provide a new emphasis
to manufacturing and industrial growth, yet years later continues to lag (Mbate, 2016).

An update to the Industrial Development Strategy was released in 2013 entitled: *The
Ethiopian Industrial Development Strategic Plan (2013-2025)* (MoI, 2013). This revision to the
core plan for industrialization specifically identified structural constraints which were limiting
further development of the sector including “inadequate human resource capability (both
technical and managerial); an unstable supply of electrical power; and lack of access to efficient
and effective credit and other services” (MoI, 2013: 1). Like planning documents before it, the
new Plan found the majority of Ethiopia’s existing manufacturing base required few technical
skills and concluded that within the sector “38% of the persons are engaged in the manufacture
of food products and beverages, 8% in the textile industry, and almost 11% in non-metallic
mineral products” (Ibid, 18) rather than being employed in value-added manufacturing for either
domestic use or export. The repetitious nature of these findings suggest that on-going issues
have been well explored by Ethiopia’s economic planners but that few clear resolutions have
been devised or implemented.

Although poverty reduction is a core goal of Ethiopia’s pro-poor developmental policies
including accelerated, sustained and people-centred economic growth and development, the
outcomes have been uneven among groups. Urban areas have grown and prospered even as
they continue to harbour high unemployment rates and poor living conditions (WB, 2005; CSA, 2014c; MoE, 2015). Rural areas have remained generally less educated and poor, and labour-intensive subsistence-farming prevails as the dominant livelihood among the 86% of the population who live there. Despite the solid economic development which Ethiopia has experienced since the initiation of former Prime Minister Zenawi’s development plans, and its goal of becoming a middle-income nation, the country continues to be ranked among the world’s poorest nations (Oxford, 2017). Hence, while pro-poor programmes are vital, it is “their outcome that is the important unit of analysis” not the policies themselves (Blum & Grangaard, 2018).

5.2.1 Adaptation and Social Obligations

Farmers form specialized social groups (Klandermans, et al., 2004; Price, 2011) within a generally closed occupational category that is not easily entered other than through birth and heritage. Students, too, constitute a distinct social group. Like farmers, they participate in activities which distinguish themselves from non-students, often adopting distinctive signs of their status such as clothing, hair styles or vocabulary. The shared internal dynamics of these groups form the basis of strong and lasting peer linkages which can be resistant to change and that survive after their farming livelihoods are lost or their university associations become obsolete (Stedman, 2002; Young & Collin, 2004; Berger & Hearth, 2008; Galbin, 2014).

Ethiopia’s fast-growing economy has created strong group and place identifications among both smallholders and students in terms of resistance to change. This may impair individual willingness to participate in necessary rehabilitative programmes after ousting or ease their adaptation to new situations, including the unexpected lack of employment following the end of education or training. Common reasons for resistance to change include existing cultural mores, potential loss of economic security; the perceived personal risks that are inherent in new social relationships; and the likely loss of known friendships, lifestyles, and place. Yet, culture and resistance to change has three important implications for the livelihood retraining of displaced smallholders and for the industrialization envisioned by Ethiopia’s developmental policies (Picchio, 2015).

First, Ethiopia is not a saving culture (Lusardi, 2007; Abera & Gebreslassie, 2016). Instead, there is a strong social obligation for individuals to share earnings with extended families or within their group after one has met personal obligations. In a survey conducted in preparation for the Second Growth and Transformation Plan, the federal government found that
just 7% of households held a savings account in a financial institution (Hailellasie, et al., 2013). The same survey determined if there is “excess money after fulfilling expenditures the last option will be saving that money” (Ibid: 7) due to these social pressures.

**Social Sharing Obligations**

The obligation to share with family members and social groups was more fully described during an encounter with two recently ousted smallholders (brothers) and two wereda land use agents sent to monitor a recent set of expropriations which were conducted to allow a textile manufacturing plant to expand its facility (Interview 75). As the agents arrived the former owners of a small plot had just finished ploughing the final furrow of what had recently been their property (Photograph 5). The brothers stated they were attempting to grow one more crop before the ground was broken for construction. The agents explained that many former owners do not understand that once their land has been expropriated and paid for they are no longer allowed to cultivate it and that construction was scheduled to begin in a matter of weeks. Furthermore, the agents explained that because of the social conventions obligating them to share the proceeds, displaced smallholders quickly spend the payment for their land on luxury items or among their small peer group rather than saving or investing it in a new business. As a result, after about two years these windfall financial resources are exhausted and displaced smallholders have nothing with which to rebuild their livelihoods.

**Photograph 5.1**

Ploughing expropriated land outside the MNS textile mill
Second, while describing the acculturational difficulties endemic to migration and change, including the loss of place and status, Phinney, et al., (2001) noted the tensions of balancing personal and social incongruities. This includes adaptation of new ideas, values, and behaviours which must be juxtaposed with deeply held ideas of acceptable conduct.

The land use agents were in agreement that few of the displaced smallholders have taken employment in the textile mill which now occupies their property. Instead, the overwhelming majority have taken lesser-paid but personally appropriate work as unskilled labourers at outdoor construction sites. They went on to say this, too, has been locally destabilizing. Not only are the unskilled displaced smallholders competing for the same employment opportunities as other unskilled workers in the town or villages, but their high numbers have caused wages to drop dramatically, causing new hardship throughout the wereda.

**Difficulty in Hiring Displaced Smallholders**

A floor manager at the MNS textile mill who was encountered shortly after the land use agents departed echoed their observations (Interview 75). He also described the difficulty in hiring smallholders who are accustomed to working at their own time schedules. He stated that despite manufacturing work paying almost three times the daily wage of an unskilled labourer at construction sites, most oustees are unsuited for industrial labour. His own observation was that they are too often unable to transition from outdoor work to the rote processes of milling and that the routine and repetitious manufacturing processes only magnify the loss of autonomy which smallholders had previously enjoyed (Bandura, 1982; Pierce, et al., 2001). Operating a machine both deepened smallholders sense of loss of self-efficacy, it underscored the lack of control they now have over their daily activities when they had recently been successful independent business owners who set their own schedules. Thus, while non-farm employment opportunities are available, ousted smallholders generally display a strong preference for unskilled construction work or for unemployment in order to remain within their peer groups.

Third, worker health and reliability were consistently identified by key informants at educational institutions as being culturally based issues that adversely affect local industrial development and export markets. As an example, a business school dean whose field of expertise is in the development of medium and large manufacturing enterprises described the impediments to more rapid Ethiopian development. He affirmed infrastructure shortages such as a reliable source of electricity that is necessary for the continuous operation of machinery
and computing systems; a water supply which has been purified to the point of being useful during manufacturing; the lack of a robust internet system free of censorship and political interruptions are hindering industrialization. He highlighted cultural and behavioural issues among workers which affect their dependability in the manufacturing process:

“Ethiopian workers are unreliable. The younger workers especially, choose to drink or engage in risky behaviors such as khat chewing instead of showing up on time. The country could easily develop itself economically if this were not the case; workers are easily trained in about six months and are potentially as productive as any others. But their health conditions also hinder development. The sanitation here is terrible and every individual I know has some sort of stomach parasite from the water. These may sound like small issues, but they prevent employees from showing up to the job and they hurt productivity. This makes, I think, Ethiopian workers about 40% as productive as workers in other developing nations and it inhibits investment and national growth.”

Dean, Business and Economics Department, July 2015 (Interview 4)

At the same time, the frequent lack of seemingly post-education employment among secondary school and university graduates was also noted by Farmer Training Centre staff who have observed that upon receiving degrees in their chosen academic disciplines, an increasing number of youth are unable to find professional work. At least some of these graduates are returning to farm and in their villages, but as they do they bring a much different and more cosmopolitan perspective back to the community. Staff at each of the eight Farmer Training Centres visited independently noted that despite some reintegration difficulties returning graduates have frequently become model farmers and de facto community leaders. Graduates are, staff said (Interview 36) likely to successfully advocate for improvements to the local infrastructure and increased social services for their villages from the kebele and wereda governments then those who have never left are able to achieve.

5.2.2 Gender Bias in Agricultural and Development Programmes

In his research of gender and identity among farmers, Brandth (2002: 191) asserts that “for men, the farm represents a place of birth, a workplace, a residence, and a lifestyle … Women on the other hand, never anticipate being a farmer, a masculine coded occupation.” Price (2011: 2) echoed that conclusion, finding that in Northern nations “from birth, men are usually socialised as ‘a farmer’s son’ while daughters have been shown to learn, predominantly, to be supporters of farming men.”

These conclusions regarding gender role assignments made by Brandth and Price contrast sharply with observations throughout the study areas. Field encounters with informants
consistently showed women, especially land owners, hold the same deep personal and social connections with the land and to their livelihoods as men and that they likewise benefit from agricultural training and assistance:

“My parents were farmers here and taught me at a very early age. When they died in an automobile accident nine years ago I took over the farm. Now I have 10 dairy cows, I grow maize and other grain in the fields across the roadway to feed them and I raise chickens. I also run this tela house in the evening for extra money. Today our women’s group [24 women who each own their farm] from the Farmer Training Centre are coming over to help build the shed where we will operate the refrigeration unit and the cream and butter separator the Africa Agricultural Production Programme provided us. That will allow us to gather milk for several days at a time rather than making daily trips to town to sell it.”

Female Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 82)

“The [farmer] association is good to belong to because I can purchase seeds and fertilizer cheaper than in town, but the training centre is where we learn new techniques and where my children go to play. The children watch and see things and come home to ask why I don’t do them. I used to want to live in town but now that I’ve worked this farm for many years I can’t see myself doing anything else.

Female Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 82)

Model Farmer Participation in Government Programs

Farmer Training Centre staff who were interviewed related they identify model farmers as those with high production but also specifically select those who display other important ‘lifestyle’ criteria, including good health and hygiene practices, and income saving (Interviews 39 & 40). These tend to skew the selection of model farmers towards women in relation to the total number of land title holders. In most Farmer Training Centres approximately 20% of all the farmers listed were model farmers and about 20% of the names of model farmers were those of women, despite there being numerically far fewer who owned title to their own farms. Therefore, women farmers are assumed to have the same sense of attachment and loss of group attachment when their small holds are expropriated.

Model farmers are provided with additional instruction regarding how to apply the newest technologies including irrigation, row cropping and improved animal hygiene. In addition to their farming expertise, selection and continued inclusion in this programme is also made for political reasons. Regardless of gender, training centre staff who were interviewed were clear that personal advocacy and support for the wereda government would result in additional individual assistance being provided to this group of farmers:
“This is a large wereda and in our 37 kebeles we have about 6,330 farmers, with just 190 men and 21 women being model farmers who we use to teach and train the others. We give the model farmers a bit more seed and more fertilizer and they show the others what can be done with extra work and what can happen for them when they support the government.”

Framer Training Centre Staff, July 2015 (Interview 34)

Bias in Business Development

Ousted smallholders must find other sources of income when their land has been expropriated for development. However, the opportunity to enter into a new business venture often appears to be more supportive of women then men and Ethiopia’s small-scale business training programmes and business loans have been predominantly focussed towards assisting women (Berhane & Garderbroek, 2011; Campbell, 2015). During interviews, managers from five lending institutions demonstrated a clear bias towards women which affected the ability of men, including displaced male smallholders, to obtain loans. In Sheshamane, where very substantial small-commercial development was occurring, women were seen by those managers as being far more likely to obtain a business loan than were men:

“Our policy is to charge farmers, especially men, a higher rate of interest than any others who take out loans. Women get a smaller interest rate because they pay us back more often. There are not many new businesses here but those that do open are mostly operated by women who have attended the vocational centre. They've been guided into courses that will assist them in opening a business, even if it’s small. Men most often think in a short-term way and attempt to sell products for that the market is already saturated and their businesses fail."

Financial Institution, September 2015 (Interview 42)

“Women are generally more risk averse than men. This makes them better loan candidates for us than men and so 85% of our loans are to women. Women are now owning most of the businesses in this neighbourhood, from small food sellers to construction material shops. They will soon dominate the area and in time they will change the entire make up of Sheshamane.”

Financial Institution, July 2015 (Interview 46)

Similarly, financial institution managers in the study area east of Addis Ababa, asserted that as a group men were not a priority for lending since they are seen as being short-term in their thinking and therefore a poor risk. These managers also related that rural women tend to take out loans for durable agricultural purposes such as livestock; to purchase machinery; or for clearly commercial ventures, whereas men often tend to take out loans to purchase a small

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52 The business management courses taught at vocational centres date to the 2002 Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme (p. 95).
amount of produce to sell in the local market but if they do not sell that produce they cannot repay the loan.

New businesses observed in each of the three study areas were overwhelmingly operated by women of all ages and a majority of the owners related that they had relocated from larger urban areas to seized upon the opportunities which were available. The development of their micro-businesses often appeared to be based on experience in non-farm employment and in rural areas this was especially common with younger women. Among the business-owning respondents who were interviewed was a woman who had previously been employed in a coffee house in Addis Ababa (Interview 27). She had erected a small tent just outside of an Orthodox church which draws hundreds of tourists each week and from which she now sells her own coffee and hand crafted baskets as souvenirs. Another woman who had been relocated from Addis Ababa to redevelopment in the core city, opened a coffee and lunch shop that catered to the construction workers in a nearby housing project. Still other women had left their positions with federal government ministries and opened construction material shops which supplied those projects. A director of the federal Micro and Small Enterprise programme related the social changes that his agency is attempting to create through his agencies’ small business development policies that favor women:

“As a programme we make loans to almost any type of individual business. Our programmes are actually conducted at the wereda levels; even the kebele administrators become involved because they know the people better, and whether they are likely to succeed or are deserving enough. People who are anti-social don’t get our loans very often. We’ve been trying to filter out those sort of people and make a better country because of that. Women are much better loan risks while men tend not to be able to pay back the loan due to frequent crop failures rather than any fault of their own.”


This has two significant outcomes. First, it tends to relegate men to a secondary status and impedes their ability to adapt to changing economic realities through the development of non-farm livelihoods. Second, when their land is expropriated older unskilled men remain distanced from local development opportunities while at the same time younger entrepreneurial males are also less able to secure capital to form a new enterprise. Although such barriers to obtaining a business loan do not close all other avenues for income generation for men, they limit the available opportunities and in some cases may contribute to family poverty following expropriation.
A similar degree of entrepreneurialism among older, male oustees was not observed and a lending institution manager in Lalibela noted most farmers are concerned with developing their farms rather than being interested or having the time to devote to a new commercial enterprise. Smallholders, he said, are seen as generally having neither the education nor the vision to begin a business. During a visit to a rural health clinic east of Lalibela, approximately 20 smallholders and their families were waiting for treatment. In conversation, they both affirmed that medical care is becoming less available and less affordable and that none of them had had time to consider opening a business of their own. Further, none of those who were engaged said they had any particular skills to sell other than their agricultural abilities.

Although vocational programmes exist to help establish a non-farm enterprise, lending managers and business developers who were interviewed concluded there is little interest among smallholders and often little success when they leave their current lives and social networks for the unknown:

“I don’t know of any farmers who are ready to start a business. They’re too busy to give it any time and most just have no interest or aptitude, even when they’ve lost or sold their land. Farmers who come in from the countryside are usually disappointed because they thought things would be easier for them here. But, there are few jobs if you don’t have a skill and they are now causing wages for unskilled workers to decline. There are not as many services as we used to have and there are lines of people waiting at the medical clinics when there never used to be.”  
Financial Institution Manager, July 2015 (Interview 44)

Still, the 2013 Ethiopian Time Use Survey (CSA, 2014e) found that while women make important contributions to family income, it remains men who are the primary wage earners. Smallholding men though, appeared to have become functionally unskilled and unemployable even as women may be gaining useful non-farm business skills by operating their own small enterprises. Thus, while men have undoubtedly benefited economically and educationally from their gender-status in the past, they now require renewed assistance as the expropriation and ousting process leave their families landless. To date, no policies or programmes were found among Ethiopia’s developmental plans that specifically addressed the needs of displaced rural men. Thus, coupled with men’s tendency for greater risk taking and short-term planning, business development assistance and loans often favored women.

Family-based Farm Loans

Family-based loan policies provide a unique means for families, rather than individuals, to receive assistance, and their use has produced strongly positive outcomes. Eligible families
not only receive a monetary loan, but must also participate in life-style enhancement instruction and the varied topics include the importance of children’s education, citizenship, and household financial management. These classes are reminiscent of the instruction found in Empress Menen’s original schools for girls that had included lessons in home economics, basic improvement in sanitation, hygiene, and child nutrition. Requirements to obtain a farm loan were explained by one lending institution manager north of Addis Ababa who related the clear intention of the regional government to use them to change rural behaviours:

“Farm loans come with the stipulation of social training that includes family planning, that is a primary focus of the government, as well as hygiene instruction and money management. This is a training programme that is mandated by the Oromia regional government and applies to all farm loans. Here we have three staff members who provide this training. Those staff members are university educated with a background in social welfare. I think this has helped to reduce the default rate for this branch.”

*Credit Union Manager, July 2015 (Interview 43)*

Farm loans are made to small cooperatives that are generally composed of two or three neighboring farmers. Hence if an individual defaults, the loan is subsequently collected from the other members of the cooperative. This helps to ensure repayment is made by spreading the risk the institution takes. In all cases, lending managers stated the location of the farm often has a significant impact on loan approval. Smallholders who reside in austere and mountainous areas such as those surrounding Lalibela related they are increasingly unable to produce adequate crops due to changing weather conditions, and are becoming unable to repay the loans. Consequently based on low production, smallholder loan applications are often denied and so they are increasingly relocating to where they consider to be a more favorable, often peri-urban, location.

Uncontrollable climactic conditions and the inability of smallholders to obtain loans were typical explanations given by both adults and their children for their departure from hillside smallholds, even as they tend to possess few skills that are in demand in the nearby municipalities (Bezu & Holden, 2014). Hence, many of the same issues pertaining to forced *ex situ* displacement also applied to voluntary relocation. However, in the study area nearest Addis Ababa the displacement effects are rapidly accelerated, affecting thousands of smallholders in a densely populated area each year (Home, 2016b).

### 5.2.3 Youth Small Enterprise Development

Overall, observations of small business owners in the study area suggest the more successful economic adaptees tended to be younger and surprisingly few business owners
were university graduates. Successful entrepreneurs in the study areas appeared able to easily migrate from one location to another and from one livelihood to another quickly, without a prolonged period of nostalgia or remorse for their earlier lives and group associations. This appeared especially true if they had not yet become fixed upon a career path, such as long term agricultural employment.

In instances of recently graduated students, some were found who had quickly solidified their career decisions and this limited the range of their choices just as it did among smallholders who chose to remain farmers even after their land had been expropriated. One graduate, who had been awarded a master's degree in psychology, related in a conversation that he had turned down offers to work in the marketing department of large retail shop because he felt the positions were not commensurate with his education. In contrast, older oustees were the least likely to change their livelihood paradigms, avoiding employment in new occupations that would have disrupted and redefined their group identity.

Interviews (#12, 19, 21) confirming this were taken with entrepreneurs who owned the only commercial establishments in small villages: tela houses. Regardless of location, the consensus observation among these business owners was that smallholders feel the government has forgotten their hamlet and that there are no social services offered. Further, their patrons say there are no longer any governmental or local non-governmental organizations to assist in agricultural development. Proprietors, though, said that a large part of the problem is that ousted farmers do not want to work in any other occupation; that these smallholders say they and their families have always been farmers and don’t know any other way of life. They speak, each of the tela house owners said, about the ‘old days’ but have little view of the future for themselves or their families even as they confirmed the development of a small business is relatively easy to engage in:

“My grandfather started this tela house almost 70 years ago. I have no education and no business training but it’s easy to make a good living from the farmers who come in here every day. They complain that once they lost their land the government forgot them; that there are no jobs. But there are plenty of jobs just in the next village and it’s easy to get to them using the footpath, but they say it’s the younger crowd who apply for them.”

*Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 19)*
“I bought this tela house about 2 years ago and hope to have the loan paid off in another 5 years. I gave up farming after just a few seasons because I could make more money from this. The farmers you see sitting here could have done the same thing with the money they were paid for their property, but they chose not to take a risk. They no longer farm and are here waiting for me every day when I open. I ask them why they don’t try to get work in town or take a job at the new clothing factory, but they tell me they’ve got no interest. They say they’re farmers and that’s what they will always be.”

*Entrepreneur, July 2015 (Interview 21)*

These first-hand observations made by long-time residents affirmed that displaced smallholders in the study area are resistant to leaving their social groups and their place identities in order to establish new livelihoods. Over the course of their life-time smallholders in the area have been acculturated through their vocational attachment to the farm, the land, and their peer groups (Klandermans, et al., 2004; Gebregziabher, et al., 2014). Engaging in a sea-change to their identity, including the attitudes and values of their farming community to that of some other livelihood or industry through new training or educational experiences would irreversibly change their social status and group associations (Ujang & Zakariya, 2015). Further, Arnason & Valgeirsdottir (2015: 3) found that “people with less formal education participate proportionately less in organized learning activities than people with a higher level of formal education.” None of the respondents who were interviewed were aware of any government programmes that could assist them in making a life-transformation nor had they sought out information from the government that might have addressed their fundamental fear of a loss of group identity through new educational or vocational experiences. These opportunities are discussed in Chapter 6.

5.3 Ethiopia’s Authoritarian Structure

Upon taking power, the EPRDF repealed Dergue programmes including the previous policies of the forced sole-use of the Amharic language in schools. Rather, it installed a form of ethnic federalism based on a system of tribalism and the recognition of local ethnicities. The EPDRF reversed the previous highly centralized government structure and returned more responsibility to the regional and wereda governments. Restrictions on private enterprise were likewise substantially eased by the more growth-friendly EPRDF (Aalen, 2006; Chanie, 2007; Balcha, 2008; Mehretu, 2012; Alemu, 2015). However, the federal government has now imposed a system of electoral authoritarianism that enables it to enforce developmental authoritarianism.

According to Bach (2014: 107) the challenge put to this developmental government was to proactively create “a regime capable of absorbing the inherent tension of state-building” in
what Tronvoll (2008: 49) had described as a “new era of minority and group rights protection”, all while simultaneously integrating the different tribal and linguistic groups into a coherent character. However, the implementation of Ethiopia’s vision of ethnic federalism, with an empowered local authority, was ultimately incompatible with an encompassing central party whose principals of development. This depended upon direction by a single political authority rather than true regional autonomy or local independence (Aalen, 2006; Zenawi, 2006). This has now contributed to the establishment of the present semi-authoritarian governance system.

**Semi-authoritarian States**

Ota (2003: 146) contends there are three types of political systems53: “democracy, authoritarian regimes, and totalitarian regimes.” These can be imagined as being arranged in a triangle with each system holding one of the points, though no nation is completely represented by a single point but by a combination of them. The hybrid practices of individual states will be located somewhere within that triangle, being closer to one point than the other during different stages of political, economic and social development or as perceived threats may require temporary political resolutions. The term ‘semi-authoritarian’ describes political regimes somewhere within the triangle that are not totalitarian but neither are they genuinely democratic. Ethiopia best fits the semi-authoritarian model, as its structure restricts human rights, especially the right of free speech and the right to redress the government (Terfa, 2012).

To maintain its current hegemony, the EPRDF-led national government holds close control of the political and social process (McDonald, 2008). At the authoritarian point, it has established a *de facto* single party-rule that makes citizens reliant upon the government for social benefits that range from state-sponsored health care, to local employment, to the sale of agricultural fertilizer and seed. To solidify its monopoly the federal government established an organizational structure that extends from the federal level to the village and even to blocs of individual households, known as ‘*lema’t budin*’ (Figure 5.1, repeated from Chapter 4) (Yilmaz & Venugopal, 2008; Bach, 2014). This structure gives the appearance of local governance but acts as a controlling mechanism of the central government.

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53 No single definition is adequate to describe democracies, authoritarian or tyrannical regime types. Abridged definitions include that of the Canadian Parliament (Parliament, 2017) which describes democracy as occurring when “all eligible citizens have the right to participate, either directly or indirectly, in making the decisions which affect them.” Hadenius & Teorell (2006) describe authoritarian systems as generally consisting of monarchies, relatively short-lived military regimes, and repressive electoral regimes that can ignore the demands of the populace; while Flavius (2014: 107) contends totalitarianism exists where “the force of law has been replaced by the law of force.”
Aalen & Muriass (2017: 58) note the EPRDF’s “outright military victory [in 1991] produced an authoritarian result” and conclude that while elections are now regularly held, they “are by no means democratic” or representative. The pervasive semi-authoritarian political organization not only limits opposition, it suppresses individual initiative which might challenge official development policies that would otherwise provide wider avenues of mobility out of poverty. Political and economic policies typically remain beyond the influence of individuals and this restrains the social choices which smallholders can demand from the government.

**Figure 5.1**

Local Political and Social Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Government</th>
<th>Legislative</th>
<th>Judicial</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>President, Prime Minister &amp; Federal Ministries</td>
<td>House of Federation</td>
<td>Supreme Court Inferior Courts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Regional Government**

- Tigray
- Amhara
- Oromo
- SNNP
- Somali
- Afar
- Benishangul - Gumuz
- Gambela
- Harari

**Nationality Zone**

- Liyu Wereda
- Afar
- Amhara
- Benishangul Gambella
- SNNP

**Regional Council**

- Wereda (Rural)
- City Administration

**Kebele Government**

- Elected Council
- Administrative Managers
- Social Court
- Development and Security Staff

Authoritarian governments direct the core features of development, such as Ethiopia’s decision to facilitate the industrial sector through university education policies that strongly weight science and technology programmes over other fields of study (Mol, 2013: 1). They become electoral-authoritarians when they impose restrictions upon groups that might organize a credible political opposition to the policies of the government (Hadenius & Teorell, 2006; Terfa, 2012; Fisher & Anderson, 2015). The imposition of Ethiopia’s systems of electoral and developmental authoritarianism directly impact both smallholders and job seeking youth who are affected by the controlling nature of the state and who cannot be separated from it.
5.3.1 Electoral Authoritarianism

For a nation to be considered a democracy its electoral system must, at a minimum, be characterized by uncertainty in the outcome of elections and by a reliance upon the irreversibility of those outcomes no matter how unfavourable they may have been to the incumbent (Schedler, 2006). Ethiopia's form of electoral authoritarianism is a wilful, organized system of achieving power and then maintaining it through generally legal means in order to marginalize the voice of the opposition and to limit political agitation (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Abbink, 2017). Electoral-authoritarian regimes hold regular elections but those exercises do not meet the requirements of democracy and their outcome is all but preordained (Aalen & Tronvoll, 2009; Fisher & Anderson, 2015). In them, competition between viable parties is not allowed and political contests are little more than a means to keep the dominant party in office and to limit social dissent (Abbink, 2017).

Although there is a democratic constitution and Ethiopia is at least superficially amenable to multiple political parties, its system of electoral-authoritarianism has become one premised upon outcomes which favour the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (Schedler, 2006; Badwaza, 2015). Kebede (2013: 272) described this type of capture of government administrative and legislative systems dominated by a single political party as where a “small pool of people may be simultaneously the principal actors in government or business; fluidly regrouping as needed.”

Electoral Peril and EPRDF Responses

During the 2005 elections the EPRDF came perilously close to losing its majority and soon thereafter, the federal government severely limited “political opposition and civil society, coupled with the launch of new and repressive laws and the expansion of local structures of control and coercion” (HRW, 2010: 19; Proclamation 621/2009). Abbink (2017) described the authoritarian political traditions in Ethiopia which had reasserted themselves following those elections. These resulted in legal limits being placed upon the efforts of democratizing non-governmental organizations and in additional candidacy requirements that have limited legitimate political opposition.

Changes to candidacy requirements began with the 2008 elections for kebele and wereda posts, creating almost insurmountable requirements for opposition parties to be placed on ballots (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009). In particular, the government increased the number of
seats required at the lowest level of elected representation, the kebele councils, from 15 to 300 and simultaneously required that challenging parties nominate a complete slate of candidates for each of those seats (Badwaza, 2015). Hence the government did not legally prevent local challenges, but it did cripple opposition parties who could not immediately muster 300 candidates. This constricted the formation of emergent groups opposed to the authority of the ruling party and limited their ability to demand political and social reforms, including an end to wide-spread land expropriations. These changes ultimately resulted, as of the May 2015 national elections, in the complete EPDRF control of each of the 547 seats in Ethiopia’s Parliament. However, this was an increase of just one seat from the previous legislature and so the practical consequences of that election may be minimal.

To accomplish this degree of pervasive control, the national government has imposed a number of barriers which maintain its dominance while leaving a credible through not possible political opposition in place to challenge the ruling EPRDF. These barriers include the imposition of arbitrary registration requirements for voters who support other parties; conducting frequent purges of voter registries; and, the repeated redrawing of electoral districts to dissipate the influence of local opposition groups.

While Davies (2009: 53) noted “a functioning multi-party system is vital for a healthy democracy”, electoral authoritarianism should not be confused with simple, substandard election procedures in which ballots are not delivered or where polling places are not opened (Carter, 2009). Rather, as Freedom House concludes, to maintain its one-party dominance Ethiopia’s “leaders devote full-time attention to the challenge of crippling the opposition without annihilating it and flouting the rule of law while maintaining a plausible veneer of order, legitimacy, and prosperity” (FH, 2014: 3). This veneer of democracy complements findings made by Vaughan (2011) and Di Nunzio (2014: 454) regarding Ethiopia’s frequent use of “donor-friendly language” to maintain sources of foreign aid and other international support while its use of soft power maintains tacit dominance.

**Developmental Authoritarianism**

Nevertheless, since the inception of its centralized development policies Ethiopia has maintained a high economic growth rate. Its pro-poor policies have included quick improvements in the delivery of health care and an almost universal access to basic education. The construction of new roadways has rapidly opened the country to increased trade possibilities and other modernizing infrastructure projects have demonstrably, if perhaps only
temporarily, increased employment in the construction sector (Wondifraw, et al., 2015). However, rapid improvements may also come at a social cost that Matfess (2015:182) broadly described as developmental authoritarianism. This refers “to nominally democratic governments that provide significant public works and services while exerting control over nearly every facet of society.”

In a global framework, Matfess continues, governments that are characterized by developmental authoritarianism are similar to semi-authoritarian regimes in that they impose severe constraints upon social freedoms. These may include the freedom of association; freedom of speech; and of communication, that have eventually led to anti-government demonstrations opposing its developmental and political decisions.

The literature asserts the developmental state is derived from a combination of the usual executive, legislative and judicial functions which are dependent upon the pre-existing capacities of the authoritarian governments’ bureaucratic and administrative machinery (Gupta, 1995; Trouillot, 2001; Vu, 2007). These are enabled by a close relationship between the leadership of the government and that of supportive business interests in which success is defined in terms of mutual self-interest rather than by more democratic outcomes which benefit the greater society. Leftwich (1995: 409) had suggested that to achieve its developmental goals the government bureaucracy must be kept separate from the influence of special interests. This includes both those voices demanding immediate though short-sighted economic relief for the poor, as well as those of an elite segment of society which might be seen as advocating a too-rapid or too-political change that “subordinates or marginalizes political groups, organizations or socio-economic classes” standing in the way of otherwise self-interested goals.

According to Evans (1995), at their extremes the degree of autonomy which developmental states exert is widely divergent. They can be predatory, extractive, and socially restrictive, or they can demonstrate a surprising degree of cooperation that results in significant economic improvements benefitting a far wider audience. Evans gives formerly authoritarian South Korea and Japan as examples. Pritchett & Werker (2012: 26) found that in terms of overall economic development, autocracies often have a wider variance in their growth rates than more democratic governments. However, in the instant case of Ethiopia and as graphed at Figure 4.3, the degree of economic volatility which took place during the highly authoritarian Dergue period flattened soon after the EPRDF had taken control even though it, too, imposes a significant degree of social control especially in its single party dominance of the electoral cycle.
Saez & Gallagher (2009: 91) found there is no clear association between authoritarian governments and economic growth. They conclude that while periods of fast growth may occur in centrally planned economies “the relationship between GDP growth and socio-economic development is not uniform” and therefore developmental authoritarianism can be considered just one more form of control rather than a lasting economic imperative.

Regarding the Ethiopian context, former Prime Minister Zenawi specifically advocated for a limited form of developmental authoritarianism, saying “Structurally it [the state] has the capacity to implement policy effectively, that is the result of various political, institutional, and technical factors that, in turn, are based on the autonomy of the state. This autonomy enables the state to pursue its development project without succumbing to myopic interests” (Zenawi: 2012: 167), yet this remains predicated upon the imposition of repressive electoral authoritarianism to maintain control.

5.3.2 Using Soft Power As Means of Repression

De Meritt (2016: 2) contends repression occurs when force is employed by a variety of “agents including military forces, militia, and mercenaries” and may be imposed through either institutional means or by physical force. Soft power was described by Gallarotti (2011: 11) as when “relations are embedded within some greater constellation of social dependencies and which thereby influence final outcomes.” and it promotes change without the use of hard power, including force or violence.

The World Bank particularly recommends the use of soft rather than hard power to stimulate the economy and to influence the populus through the introduction of programmes which encourage employment and meet demands for equity and social stability (WB, 2017b). This active use of influence can achieve ends where force and compulsion might have resulted in resistance and rebellion, and therefore it obviates the need for violent repression. Soft power can be used to either increase social services as a reward or to terminate them as a form of punishment or social coercion (Nye, 1990; Gallarotti, 2011). Soft power is also particularly effective when it uses the distribution of government services to tacitly change behaviour, such as through increasing or decreasing access and availability of higher education and vocational training; providing or withholding health care and other services; or offering entrepreneurial training and other small business opportunities.
5.3.3 Soft Power and Service Deserts

To facilitate the ousting which is necessary for the on-going gentrification process in the study area east of Addis Ababa, the government is creating ‘service deserts’, areas from where social benefits and other services are being withdrawn. Service deserts are characterised by the closure of medical clinics, schools and other facilities; reduced routine maintenance of local roads; or the withdrawal and reassignment of agricultural development agents (Beaulac, et al., 2009; Jiao & Dillivan, 2013; Hillman & Weichman, 2016). Where targeted expropriations of smallholder property are planned, the wereda government withdraws its support and becomes increasingly unresponsive to community or group needs. This use of soft power can serve as a political attack on communities and groups by simplifying the ex situ expropriation of land as it becomes more difficult for smallholders to remain in place without the benefits and services upon which they are dependent.

The elimination of development agents, in particular, represents one of the most evident forms of coercion (Liverpool & Winter-Nelson, 2010; Todo, et al., 2014) which induces some smallholders to leave their land (Interview 78). According to smallholders in the study area, development agents who had been key to the dissemination of new cropping techniques have been withdrawn from areas where residential developments are planned. At a time of changing climates and growing seasons in Ethiopia (Morton, 2007) this eliminates a primary source of information regarding weather forecasts and innovative agricultural methods, especially the proper application of recently modified fertilizers which the government has more precisely tailored to individual agricultural areas (Interview 68, 83). If these fertilizers are not correctly applied and then quickly followed by rainfall they can easily burn crops. Development agents provide the training for smallholders to avoid those crop losses. Other informants related that local schools had been closed and health clinic staffing has been reduced. Recent oustees were able to display a keen awareness during interviews and conversation of the economic deprivations and the social instability they now endure as an outcome of the loss of these services.

54 Of the 46 smallholders who were interviewed in nine towns and villages, 33 stated the autumn, Belg, rains have become unpredictable and are often arriving more than ten days following the traditional date by which seed must be planted. When the rains do arrive, they have become strong enough to wash away much of the seed, further contributing to existing poverty traps.
Smallholder Recognition of Government Hegemony

However, informants also concluded they are powerless to contest the series of government decisions that are dramatically impacting their families:

“Most of us do not want to sell our land. We know that we are not wealthy, but we are better off owning our own property than we would be if we’re forced to move into the town. We fight as best we can but the government is just too big and powerful. In the end, we all leave and have nothing.”
*Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 78)*

Several smallholders perceived the withdrawal of services is intended to force them to relocate away from the peri-urban agricultural areas which have recently been designated for residential development. Although not all smallholders have been physically compelled to sell their property, they generally felt they are given little actual choice in the matter and were aware of the outcome of becoming landless:

“Once the land is taken there are no jobs. We are not able to find work because all we know is farming. The government had always encouraged us to stay as farmers and to increase our production but now they are forcing us out and we have no say in the matter because they do it slowly enough that we don’t see it coming. Our children can go to school and then to the vocational centre just down the road, but there is nothing for any of us once we are forced to move.”
*Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 71)*

“When I was very young, boys learned about farming from their fathers, they went to the fields and tended the animals as a natural thing and never thought about what or how they were learning. The emperor brought schools and we began to learn about the world. But the village is changing and the wereda has told us our land is going to become housing. Because of that they ended the farmers associations and development agents no longer help us with marketing our crops or learning to apply new techniques.”
*Smallholder, September 2015 (Interview 100)*

Local residents and smallholders indicated the withdrawal of services is widely perceived to be a threat to communal and group solidarity. During an unusually frank discussion, an elderly farmer and his wife who live near Lalibela described the differences between government policies today and those of the former Dergue regime (Interview 100). Their memory of the Dergue is that it was far more willing to assist farmers and to guarantee their livelihoods. Under the Dergue their recollection is of a government which taught agriculture in schools and of children who learned to work the farm with new methods. Today, they say, the schools have no such classes and so children essentially learn only what their parents know. If their parents are poor farmers, she says, the children only learn poor methods. This leads to
smaller harvests, poverty traps, and to children leaving both the land and the community in search of better opportunities. Other services such as health care are also degrading they said and she further contended the rural health clinic near Lalibela has become unable to see the same number of patients as in the past due to budget and staff cuts. Health care professionals are adept, she said, at only very limited treatments. Anything of consequence increasingly needs to be taken to a private clinic but, she continued, those are very costly and few people in the area can afford to travel to them or pay for treatment.

Official’s Recognition of the Withdrawal of Local Services

Kebele officials to the north and east of Addis Ababa confirmed the general validity of these individual observations, acknowledging that services were being withdrawn from the study area. A first-hand account of this tactic was obtained from one official east of Addis Ababa who pointedly stated that decisions to reduce social services are being made by the wereda with the intention of forcing people out of the newly designated residential and commercial development areas:

“The entire area that you see here is now designated for residential development and so people's property taxes have tripled. The regional and wereda governments have been working to force farmers from the land by reducing the number of teachers in the local schools and they are reducing staff in the health clinic, all to make it uncomfortable to live here.”

Kebele Manager, August 2015 (Interview 52)

Wereda employees further confirmed these events, describing how funding is being repurposed to primary and secondary roads rather than to the maintenance of rural feeder roads which facilitate easier marketing for crops (Stifel, et al., 2016) and that rural schools are being closed and moved towards the more urbanized areas of the wereda. The almost surgical precision of these reductions in social services and the precisely targeted land expropriations have curtailed the ability of affected farmers to remain on their small holds and two who were interviewed described the effects upon their livelihoods and their families:

“My father and I had more than 4 hectares of land, but five years ago the kebele forced us to sell one to build a new school. Then the army made us sell two more along a tree-lined ridge for what they said was going to be new soldier housing, but there are no soldiers here. The school was built but so far the military has not constructed the barracks. Land near the road is being used to build new homes and I think that is the plan the military has, too.”

Smallholder, August 2015 (Interview 80)

“I've seen people who were forced from their land, not physically but who sold parts of their property to the developers for quick money to pay bills or send their children to school and they are now unable to earn a living. They've got nothing to fall back on because
they have no other skills; they've become desperately poor even by the standards here. Our women's groups have tried to help them but at some point you need to take care of yourself.” *Smallholder, July 2015 (Interview 66)*

Hence a slow marginalization of smallholders resulting in their political and economic invisibility, makes government decisions to oust them increasingly uncontested (Admassie & Abebaw, 2014). Pressure to vacate in favor of residential development has become highly destabilizing as it results in the loss of group networks and individual income streams.

Further, neighbors are increasingly unable to provide each other with support and, as smallholders lose their farms to development, they also lose their social positions in the milieu. Their powerlessness is magnified by their individual dispersion as they find whatever housing and employment is available in the nearby peri-urban municipalities, while adaptation to their new situation is made difficult by a lack of useful non-farm skills (AU, 2007; Belete, 2011) even in municipalities where manufacturing employment is being created. The imposition of these deserts creates hardships as shortages of services and economic opportunity are artificially created and social deprivation ensues where it was not present before (Brinkman, et al., 2013; Must & Rustad, 2016).

5.4 Vote Buying Through the Absence of Choice

Despite the threat of expropriation, the loss of services, and the semi-authoritarian nature of the political process, the Ethiopian public remains loyal to the government. This continued and overwhelming public support for the incumbent party was explained by Lefort (2007). Lefort notes that mountainous and rural people tend to be risk averse and often demonstrate an extraordinarily high social need for stability and the maintenance of deference for the hierarchy of government authority. This often leads them to vote for the party or person already holding office, and decreases the possibility of political change or social upheaval.

Among a still largely-illiterate smallholder community that is often dependent upon government food distribution or health care programmes, it becomes “immediately beneficial to vote for the likely ‘winner’ of an election rather than a candidate from a minority party who might only begin to represent local interests in the unknowable future” (Logan, 2009). Nevertheless, Lipset (1959: 71) noted that political systems will destabilize if “peaceful play” and meaningful political inclusion is disallowed for those who are not in positions of power or economic prominence.
Local Perception of the Lack of Social Choice

During field interviews there emerged little perceived ability or desire among rural residents to alter their social environment through the electoral process and smallholders acknowledged that voting results in few changes that will benefit from. They saw little capacity to shape social issues of importance to them or their families. Among the few conversations where smallholders offered their opinions on this issue, most had concluded that voting for the party candidate who is likely to win the election is the only effective means to ensure continued receipt of government social benefits or assistance from the remaining agricultural development agents. Friedman, et al., (2016: 3) confirms this, finding the poor are more accepting of repressive political systems because they have had their votes ‘bought’ by the government through such in-kind programmes as ‘Food for Work,’ or for selection to receive other distress food assistance during the ‘hungry time’ when household stocks are low. Maintaining vital individual or family inclusion in those programmes comes at the small cost of voting for the presumed victor once each lustrum (Singer, 2009).

This degree of political authority and control, as well as the mengist ethic of support for the government, is so pervasive that it even influences the ability of youth to obtain what might be considered marginal work in local shops, nascent small industries, or other occupations:

“I am from this town and so it was easy to get a job as a horse cart driver and to become a member of the association of drivers. There are lots of small businesses that were started by people who’ve relocated here from Addis Abba, like the coffee houses and food shops. But I don’t know of anyone who’s gotten a job in one of them who didn’t also come from here. The elders in the village control who can work and who can’t. That way they keep an eye on who lives here and who supports the wereda government and who doesn’t.”

Horse Cart Driver, July 2015 (Interview 25)

This absence of choice perpetuates the political and social status quo and frustrates a growing, educated youth cohort. As example, in a study of Kenyan secondary school students, Friedman, et al., (2016) note while higher education among youth does not necessarily increase latent tendencies to become politically engaged, it does reduce their willingness to accept the status quo. More specifically, they found that a higher level of education has a direct correlation to an acceptance of violence as a legitimate tool to force change when the political process has proven itself to be unresponsive (see also Davies, 1974; Pape, 2005; Stewart, 2002b). Hence, Ethiopia’s large educated youth cohort whose growing numbers and increasingly frustrating
unemployment has been described as “an economic and social problem, which is increasingly feared to create political problems” (Krishnan & Shaorshadze, 2013: 6).

5.4.1 Youth Related Political Instability

Stewart (2000; 2008; 2011) asserts that horizontal inequality and political instability in developing countries, particularly among youth, almost directly leads to civil war. Collier (1992: 2) had earlier noted “If young men face only the option of poverty they might be more inclined to join a rebellion than if they have better opportunities”. Smallholders, though, do not appear to present an existential threat to the government and in their own analysis, Must & Rustad (2016: 2) concluded “horizontal inequalities may be widespread but they do not always trigger mobilization.”

Urdal (2006), though, is less certain than Stewart whether inequality among youth, alone, leads to political instability (and civil war) even when educational achievement concludes with a frustrating lack of economic and social mobility. The youth bulge, who Urdal (2006, 608) defines “as large cohorts in the ages 15–24 relative to the total adult population” tend to be less willing to accept the status quo. He concludes this age group tends to be responsible for a majority of civil disturbances, and like Collier, finds youth’s lack of employment rather than any inherent revolutionary passion is the underlying issue. Pape (2005: 200), too, emphasises it is economically disaffected youth that is otherwise “educated, socially integrated, and highly capable people” who are the most likely to foment civil disturbances. Tying these together, Annan (2014: 2) more recently expressed that conflict and civil strife are “a violent expression of disagreements and frustration often arising from unmet needs and aspirations.”

Thus, in Ethiopia, high youth unemployment, internal displacement, and a failure to attain wide-spread and equitable economic growth have resulted in a new political and social fragility (Okafor, 2017: 209). This condition is particularly acute among the under-employed youth (Kibru, 2012; Eight, 2013) such as those in the Oromia region’s university towns of Ambo, Adama, and Dire Dawa (HRW, 2016). In these towns there are both highly educated youth and new transportation infrastructure, which is a precursor to industrial development, yet there is simultaneously an absence of appropriate non-farm income prospects and hence, significant unemployment (CSA, 2014d). Moreover, as these areas modernize, there are increasing losses and disruptions to traditional lifestyles. These have collectively contributed to a climate of unrest in the university towns, rising to a series of demonstrations as students are demanding
employment, and those demonstrations have challenged authority and threatened the stability of the Ethiopian government (Map 5.1).

Map 5.1

Protests Following Infrastructure Corridors

The government has declared this potentially radicalized segment of its population “a threat to the basic foundations of prosperity, stability and peace” (SDPRP, 2002: 25) and considers itself to be “existentially threatened” by student civil disobedience (Home, 2016: 6). In December 2015, Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn warned his government “will take merciless legitimate action against any force bent on destabilizing” the Oromo region (BBC, 2015). Yet, the Prime Minister later acknowledged unemployment and not politics was the actual catalyst for the protests among students, stating:

“The root cause of protests in this country is not politics. It is having so many young people who are unemployed. We haven’t addressed the unemployment problem in Oromia and also in other parts of the country. We have a 16.5% unemployment rate, that is very big. It’s higher among the youth, and 70% of our population is below the age of 30. Even though we are trying our best, we haven’t addressed it properly. The protest is triggered by unemployed youths. If you create hopefulness in this society, then it’s possible this kind of unrest will be vanishing. We want to focus on the young people and creating jobs as quickly as possible. We must be very fast in creating jobs for the youth – both in self-employment as well as in wage employment. If we don’t do that, then unrest will be there.” (Desalegn, 2016)

Government Response to Student Demonstrations

Despite acknowledging their need for employment, the student-led disturbances which erupted in 2015, and again in 2016, have not only been directly met with violence by security
forces but the families of protestors have been punished administratively. Reports by non-governmental organizations claim security services “have used excessive lethal force against largely peaceful protests” with over 400 people killed and thousands injured (BBC, 2015; HRW, 2016: 24). Demonstrators have reported the government withdrew social support from their families including access to health care benefits; termination from employment; and, exclusion from food distribution programmes (HRW, 2016).

This soft, yet highly coercive social and economic control gives the government the ability to moderate individual and group behaviour and encourages the concentration of power into a dominant class of political actors. This is reasonably assumed to also dampen the enthusiasm of observant smallholders to demand additional assistance from the government especially since they may have developed little political organization in their new peri-urban areas. Their lack of political presence has led to the local government devoting fewer assets to increasingly atomized groups of invisible poor. This targeted neglect contributes to oustees’ own fragility as it diminishes their ability to make demands for critical rehabilitative vocational training programmes or by student groups who are seeking appropriate employment after their education.

5.4.2 Delaying the Youth Employment Problem

Industrialization has not yet created sufficient decent work for the youth cohort that would be necessary to adequately meet the employment needs of the future labour force in Ethiopia. Indeed, Mbate (2016: 93) notes Ethiopia’s leather industry, responsible for a significant amount of the nations’ export trade, had only expanded from 6,989 workers in 2000 to 10,700 workers in 2010.” Coincidental with the introduction of its five-year development plans the government began to expand university enrolment to address the potential of the unemployed youth cohort (Figure 5.2). This initially delayed, but ultimately exacerbated the problem of under-employment and unmet expectations among youth as significantly more students compete for fewer openings at their now increased education level (Eight, 2013). This imbalance of graduates-to-employment opportunity is affecting both the youth cohort and newly displaced unskilled smallholders who are also seeking employment in peri-urban areas where

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55 Decent work was defined by the International Labour Organization as “work that is productive and delivers a fair income, security in the workplace, social protection for families, freedom for people to express their concerns, to organize and participate in decisions that affect their lives and equality of opportunity and treatment for all women and men” (ILO, 2013: i).
sufficient non-farm development has failed to keep pace with the rapidly growing pool of workers.

This absence of employment opportunity, and the increased visibility and recognition of horizontal inequalities gained through education, has allowed some of the better-educated youth to conclude they are being marginalized as the benefits of development by-pass them, and as they have left their traditional ways of life for what should be secure employment opportunities (Turner, 1987; Brookfield, 2005; Friedman, et al., 2016). Thus, as Must & Rustad (2016) assert, the current elevation in violence among this broad youth group should not be surprising.

![Horn of Africa University Enrolment, All Genders per 100,000 population](http://data.uis.unesco.org/)

Figure 5.2

Moreover, the cumulative effects of groupism and fraternalism; of economic and social inequalities, are not exclusively reserved for older smallholders, they also apply to younger segments of Ethiopian society. This conjecture supports Stewart’s (2000; 2002; 2008; & 2011) predictions of the outcome of economic, social, political or cultural inequality that, if not properly addressed she says, will conclude in violence. Likewise, Goldstone (2002: 10) found that rapid population growth, especially in the bulge of newly educated youth (Figure 5.3) where there are few opportunities for employment and restricted freedom of movement, explicitly increases the risk of developing economically de-stabilizing anti-government violence. He finds “conflict can be avoided if the urban industrial economy provides sufficient jobs to absorb an expanding population.”
Ironically, these societal threats from youth are exacerbated by the longer average life expectancy which has been achieved through pro-poor health-care programmes. The older population is not only living longer, but remaining physiologically and economically viable longer as well. This phenomenon generates a need to accommodate their continued employment in addition to the new employment opportunities for youth that are needed to compensate for the delayed retirement of older workers.

### Figure 5.3

![Educational Attainment Among Age Cohorts](image)

5.5 **Movement Restrictions and the Surveillance Society**

Where populations remain locked into a subsistence level of existence, even governments with strong social development and education programmes are likely to be unstable (Collier, 2009). A tendency toward rebellion increases as education and income increases (Pape, 2005) though only until a certain per capita income threshold is met which Collier & Rohner (2008: 534) suggested is “around US$2,750” in 2008 dollars (see also Zakaria, 2003). Beyond that income level, and as literacy continues to rise, a decrease in the likelihood of rebellion is noticed as the population begins to accumulate sufficient assets which might be damaged or looted during fighting. Bhatia & Ghanem (2017: 8) likewise conclude “the tendency toward violent extremism falls with increased income” and that “where a person [physically] lives
does not seem to affect their views on violent extremism.” Thus, in growing economies such as Ethiopia’s, where per capita incomes are rising, yet barely reach US$600 per year, and as the level of education has dramatically improved, the potential for rebellion remains high, hence repressive means become a rational response to maintain social control despite other uses of soft power.

Aalen & Tronvoll (2009b: 197) assert the EPRDF’s shaping of place and identity by all levels of government is made possible through the “party’s network of control through local administrative structures [that] enables it to pressurise many rural voters.” Accordingly, there is little room to express individual choice due to the perceived consequences of casting a ballot in opposition to the EPRDF. This ‘pressure’ on the voters is part of a pattern, Levitsky & Way (2002: 52) assert, of electoral-authoritarian governments that they characterized as simply “diminished forms of democracy”, wherein agents spy on journalists, and members of opposition groups are routinely harassed, jailed, or exiled.

Therefore, to avoid detection or punishment, activities and interactions which are external to trusted group members were observed to be defensively self-limited. This has the effect of restricting political diversity and constrains information exchange. As the population is collectively unable to make informed decisions about their own future or that of the nation, or to organize a peaceful opposition, individuals isolate themselves into small peer groups. It is this political marginalization of the population which the African Development Bank Group contends has contributed to the student-led demonstrations and responding security force violence, which are ultimately attributed to Ethiopia’s markedly slower rate of GDP growth (ADBG, 2017).

5.5.1 Movement Restrictions and Illegal Residents

The population of Ethiopia is predicted to double by the year 2050 (UNDP, 2012) and as noted in Chapter 1, substantial changes in settlement patterns will almost triple the density of municipal areas (UNHABITAT, 2007; UNESCO, 2011). However, despite the long-term and sustained imbalance of rural-to-urban population ratios, Ethiopia’s semi-authoritarian government has introduced restrictions which effectively limit spontaneous relocation. Mandatory individual registration creates an official place identity, verifiable by kebele and wereda administrators; it regulates residency transfer between weredas and ensures government control of too-rapid population movement. Registration also limits undocumented

56 The per capita annual income of Ethiopia was estimated to be US$590, as of 24 April 2017 (WB, 2017b).
access to government social resources that municipal budgets have not been funded to accommodate. Thus, individuals must locally register themselves, residency requirements must be met and individual identity cards must be presented to obtain government benefits (Dorosh & Schmidt, 2010; IRB, 2014).

**Self-relocation to Urbanized Areas**

Interviews and conversations conducted in both Addis Ababa and the surrounding areas confirmed relocation requires that a willing sponsor, usually a relative or family friend, is present in the new urban area. That sponsor assumes legal responsibility for the actions of the migrant, including the payment of any debts which may be incurred; for any criminal activity that may be engaged in; and, for ensuring the sponsored individual maintains employment or attends school (Interview 15). While official restrictions significantly inhibit movement, they do not fully prevent the arrival of unregistered rural workers in urban areas. The intended effect of these movement restrictions is to discourage smallholders or newly educated graduates from leaving their current wereda in search of better employment conditions elsewhere which would destabilize urban labour markets (Fukunishi & Machikita, 2017). Young men who were interviewed in Addis Ababa were often from farming communities and explained they were unable to earn a living on the family farm or in their villages. They had been encouraged by their parents and teachers to resettle in larger urban areas where it was thought better prospects would be available to them:

“I was encouraged to move here by my parents when I completed elementary school and my father said he could not give my brothers equal shares of our small farm. I arrived in Addis Ababa as an unregistered individual and didn’t have a sponsor. Without a sponsor you can’t get an identity card and so you can’t get medical care, you can’t open a bank account, and you can’t even go to school. They say the population of Addis is only 6 million, but that’s because they don’t count those of us who come illegally.”

*Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 14)*

Speaking informally, two former Addis Ababa city officials who were encountered east of that city acknowledge that because of these registration requirements the actual population of the city is under-reported by at least four million persons. This ultimately has a negative effect upon budgets and programmes. Without accurate population figures areas can become under-served (McCabe, 2013) as rural-to-urban migrants who are employed informally consume basic services such as police enforcement or communal water sites without being taxed to pay for them.

**5.5.2 Securitization of Dissent and the Surveillance Society**
Semi-authoritarian and single party systems can give the veneer of social homogeneity through the imposition of strong central control, leading to a state in which few competing ideals of political choice are allowed. Although the power of the Ethiopian state is nearly certain, social activists are viewed by the government as an existential threat to its continued political dominance and to the fabric of society (Nwaka, 2008). Hence the student-led demonstrations that have occurred on university campus’s and in towns throughout Oromia are indicative of the scope of the problem of under-employment (Desalegn, 2016) and are becoming a political as well as a social issue. While the government has often publicly explained these demonstrations are in support of smallholder’s in the study area whose land is being expropriated, it seems unlikely that university students are reacting to the conditions of ousted smallholders as their primary catalyst.

In describing “identity politics” where groups who have been excluded from the political process engage in their own forms of organization and protest, Gergen (1999) predicted youth and other groups would engage in a form of activism which could develop into violence, and as former United States President John F. Kennedy stated “Those who make peaceful revolution impossible will make violent revolution inevitable” (Kennedy, 1962). Hence Marshall & Cole (2014) contend that protests and civil disobedience are not simply exercises in free speech or emerging democracy. They are also indicative of a political and developmental process which has failed to recognize the legitimate concerns of the citizenry.

**Political Dissension and the Securitization of Speech**

This political dissension provides an opportunity for the securitization of demonstrations, and other speech acts, that are declared existential threats to the fabric of society rather than a threat within the society. Securitization defines “acts as a threat to survival, which in turn enables emergency measures and the suspension of ‘normal politics’ in dealing with that issue” (McDonald, 2008: 567). While internal and external threats do exist for any government, Buzan, et al., (1998: 5) reminds that securitization must mean “something more specific than just any threat or problem.” In Ethiopia “the successful process of labelling an issue a security issue results in the transformation of the way of dealing with it” (Trombetta, 2007: 2). The repression57 of speech has in some cases escalated to a general use of force and following demonstrations “in many locations security forces went door-to door-at night arresting” students

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57 Repression is defined by Davenport (2007: 487) as “coercive socio-political control used by political authorities against those within their territorial jurisdiction.”
who had been identified as protestors and whose locations had been quickly ascertained through identification card address registries (HRW, 2016: 2).

The influence of these student protests extends beyond their immediate outcomes. DeMeritt (2016: 4) found with each successful protest that ends in concessions by the government, new demonstrations and “internal dissent can spread” sympathetically. This makes the escalation of anti-government opposition leading to the ouster of the government more likely. Hence, the imposition of violent repression becomes likely if displaced smallholders, who have little discernable economic future, should begin to take part in their own protests as “the relative magnitude of labour market under-utilization” increases (Wilkins, 2007: 148).

5.5.3 Displacement and Liminality

In a similar way that an influx of refugees will eventually over-burden a host community, Ethiopia’s ousted smallholders create high demands for limited local resources including health care and employment. Their ex situ release into the labour market drives down the wages for existing groups of other workers in the community (Crisp, 2002; Buryan, 2012). As finite social resources are increasingly consumed by new arrivals, animosities towards the newcomers are created among the established residents who have long ago formed their own group associations and who are resistant to increased competition for jobs and services (Plante, et al., 2002; Rossiter, 2012; de Chatel, 2014; Fakih & Ibrahim, 2016). Hence, an influx of landless smallholders or newly-educated job seeking youth may become a locally incendiary issue as new and existing groups become economic rivals.

Brookefield (2005: 51) asserts this is a form of cultural suicide wherein those who develop new skills or obtain a new education become socially estranged from their peer groups and cultural grounding. As a result, when the newly skilled or educated are most likely to need the social support of their peers they have become alienated: they no longer fully belong to their previous group nor have they been accepted into their new group.

These destabilizing effects are not only economic and physical but also psychological as the obsolescence of one’s previous social or occupational position becomes apparent (Atherton, 1999). The severing of these connections creates a loss of group status and individual identity where one may have previously been a respected member of the community. However if identity among smallholders is about how individuals see and define themselves, then to
radically transform through the acquisition of new occupational skills may become a threat to an already eroding sense of group cohesion and therefore, to their own identity (Easter, 1996).

This is a condition which Turner (1987) described as the liminal period between significant social transitions. It was further illuminated by Noble & Walker (1997) as a period of personal and social instability that occurs during a significant transitional period. In youth, this can occur as they enter an educational or vocational programme which presents them with new information and challenges that are substantially different than their previous experiences. For smallholding adults, it can occur as they are forced from their land through the *ex situ* expropriation process and are forced to physically relocate, often to a more urbanized area. This requires them to transition from their familiar and comfortable role as an independent agriculturalist to a foreign one as a factory employee, a construction worker, or to adopt some other lifestyle in which they no longer control their own schedule nor make independent decisions.

### 5.5.4 Shoe Shine Surveillance

In the semi-authoritarian state of Ethiopia, opinions which challenge the government are often reported through kebele leaders. Political reprisals for anti-government speech can result in internal exile, or in extra-judicial detention by military and police forces (HRW, 2016). This reduces the ability of either displaced smallholders or graduated students to make even reasonable demands from the government.

One of the most common means of community-level surveillance to monitor counter-government opinions is through the ‘shoe shine boys’ who are ubiquitous in Addis Ababa and the streets of other municipalities throughout the study area. They monitor the comings and goings of the neighbourhood; watch for thieves and pickpockets; and they are responsible for reporting when outsiders are in the neighbourhood. They are particularly aware of, and report, anyone who might agitate politically or voice too-strenuous objections to government policies including such issues as expropriations or the lack of employment following graduation from vocational or academic institutions.

Shoe shine boys who were interviewed in two municipalities reported that if they are not properly registered with local police, they will not be allowed to operate as a micro-business (Interviews 1 & 14). Those who do not make frequent political reports to the police can lose their licenses. That would deprive the (mostly) young, generally poorly educated rural men of a very lucrative urban livelihood which reportedly earns many of them as much as ETB 450 per
day when casual labour at nearby construction sites pays just ETB 80 per day. Thus, their reports are compelled, they said, through the very real threat of the loss of their livelihood:

“Being a shoe shiner gives me a better income than I could have ever had on the farm where I grew up. It lets me live here in the city where life is easier, and I’m hoping to get into other businesses once I have enough money. We’re registered with the police and because we’re on the same corners all the time we get to know the neighbourhood. We know who belongs here and who doesn’t and the police ask us what we’ve seen and heard about new people or about the feelings on the street.”

*Entrepreneur, June 2015 (Interview 14)*

The fear of having their seemingly innocuous opinions overheard by any of a variety of informants was suggested by several ousted smallholders as one reason they remained within a tightly knit group of their peers, rather than engaging in casual conversation with new acquaintances in shops or on the street. This limited the formation of new groups who might eventually challenge the government. With little means to organize into new social or political groups, existing peer associations remain highly important and insular. The wider consequence is a substantial loss of individual and social freedom and this contributes to their social isolation and the further diminution of their political voice (Ritter, 2014; ADBG, 2017). Thus, while the lack of employment opportunity among both students and smallholders may be an inadvertent outcome of an imbalanced education and development process, Ethiopia’s surveillance society which limits political activity has been its active invention.

*Surveillance and Societal Repression*

During the interview process, a majority of the 46 smallholder respondents who were interviewed displayed a palpable fear of political reprisals including a concern for their own incarceration by military and police forces for speaking against the government or for discussing unpopular policies such as their ex situ displacement. Thus, the ability of both smallholders and newly educated students to organize into forward thinking and politically self-interested groups appeared to be limited by a fear of the repressive nature of the state.

Academic researchers have found political and social repression is inversely proportional to the degree of government effectiveness, concluding that where a government can provide reasonably expected protections and benefits there is little need to subjugate the citizenry (Nordas & Davenport, 2013; DiPietro, 2016; Brechenmacher, 2017). Political and social repression in Ethiopia exists along a continuum including a gradual loss of rights, where intrusion may begin with the occasional visit by local police officers; escalating to arrests, detention, and eventually the disappearance of anti-government agitators as the level of
violence increases. Political repression consists of a wide variety of means of social control, including electronic and physical surveillance, censorship of political views, arbitrary arrests based on political speech, and violent police actions (Davenport, 2007). Disappearances suggest that individuals are seized by government forces and imprisoned without rights or trial (Hagmann, 2014)58.

5.5 Summary and Emerging Findings

This chapter has explored the outcomes and effects of Ethiopia’s legacy of development and pro-poor policies by examining the destabilizing effects which rapid economic and social change create. Successful growth and development have unintentionally contributed to economic instability and social fragility (Huang, 1995; Paffenholz, 2008) for smallholders who are ousted by development and for newly graduated students who are unable to find suitable employment.

Ethiopia’s centrally directed development programmes and political and economic choices have resulted in a significant rate of economic growth and social development at all levels of society and for improvement in the living conditions of millions of citizens. Those programmes have restructured the national economy, changing it from one which has traditionally been reliant upon labour-intensive agricultural employment towards becoming a more modern, service and information-oriented economy of white-collar workers, even though agriculture remains the dominant employment generator (NPC, 2015; Seid, et al., 2015). While there have been undeniable benefits from the national programme of economic growth and social development, an adverse consequence of success is that a large area encircling Addis Ababa is being cleared of its residents in order to construct housing for newly prosperous urban residents.

In the study area to the north and east of Addis Ababa, displaced smallholders were frequently observed to have been unable to adapt to non-farm employment including in-door manufacturing labour. They chose to remain within their sheltered peer groups rather than enrol in unfamiliar and threatening vocational retraining programmes or to take repetitive, indoor industrial employment. Thus, despite the success of Ethiopia’s economic, social and

58 These techniques have been primarily applied by the Ethiopian police and military in the areas that are experiencing student-led civil disturbances. There has been little use of these within the study area due to the current docility of ousted smallholders (BBC, 2015).
educational development programmes, improvements are also leading to new stratum of rural poverty as the expropriation of land is displacing hundreds of thousands of unskilled smallholders who become unemployed (Home, 2016b).

A return to agricultural employment, and therefore to the identities which displaced smallholders once knew, is not an option since the land in the study area is either already occupied by other farmers or has been designated for intensive residential development. As a result, groups of rural smallholders who are displaced *ex situ* are increasingly atomized and marginalized without political identity, economic livelihoods, or social voice (Moreda, 2015). This creates both landlessness and joblessness among internal-migrants who must find livelihood alternatives or become chronically poor within their own community (Admassie & Abebaw, 2014).

Concurrent with the joblessness stemming from expropriations, successful education programmes have significantly increased the number of secondary and university graduates. Expectations of appropriate employment are not being fulfilled since opportunities are currently, though not inevitably, unavailable in adequate quantities. This is likely to lengthen the liminal transitional periods each group experiences as they transition from their previous lifestyles (Mbate, 2016).

Outside of the study area, in university towns such as Dire Dawa, Ambo, and Adaama this cohort of better educated students are among those who are unable to find employment that is appropriate to their new educational level and this has led to the activism Gergen (1999) had predicted nearly two-decades earlier. A continued lack of employment and conditions of social and political marginalization have erupted into student-led civil disobedience. These in turn have attracted the attention of a government which considers such civil disobedience to be an existential threat to the state. It has met demonstrations with aggressive responses and violence by security forces, despite the African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2017) warning that the escalation of that violence was a contributing factor in the slowing of the Ethiopian economy.

Throughout the study area multi-level systems of government surveillance and political control have led to the substantial loss of human rights and social freedoms. These restrict the establishment of civil society organizations which might contest the decisions made by the local government. The securitization of protests and demonstrations reduces the ability of smallholders and rural residents to petition for new government programmes which would
provide rehabilitative job training following expropriation and ousting, or for students to call for a new developmental direction which would create additional employment opportunities. Thus, the combination of movement restrictions and a sense of pervasive surveillance effectively inhibits the mobility that might stimulate greater economic growth and stability in Ethiopia.

Therefore, successful growth and development have unintentionally contributed to economic instability and social fragility. While it may appear to be in the developmental interest of the government to continue to commit substantial financial resources to youth education and training programmes, considerable numbers of displaced and older smallholders are equally jobless. Although they are not now the instigators of social violence, their own economic needs are as great as those of youth. Therefore, in addition to stimulating the creation of employment which students are demanding, the government should consider programmes to offer retraining to displaced agriculturalists in work fitted to their own needs and capabilities in order to continue the long-term objective of a prosperous and stable Ethiopia.

Chapter 6 analyses Ethiopia’s educational and vocational training structure. It describes the history of Ethiopia’s present curriculum and demonstrates that even among the Ethiopians who become educated beyond the mandatory eight years of elementary school, opportunities for social and economic advancement are limited. As already introduced in this chapter, as the economy fails to grow in proportion to the number of newly educated youth an increasing number are becoming un- and under-employed, contributing to social and political unrest, eventually deepening the impoverishment of displaced smallholders.
Chapter 6

Ethiopia’s Education and Training Systems

6.0 Introduction

Ethiopia’s centralized system of development has enabled the nation to achieve a rapid rate of growth through the focus of government programmes and institutions. This chapter addresses the second objective of the study, to identify the social, cultural and economic dynamics of these government-led development programmes, and this is particularly true as its education and training programs relate to displaced smallholders and students. Importantly, these programmes have helped to direct business objectives and achieve national development goals. In addition to economic growth and social development, these programmes have resulted in increased agricultural output, reduced child mortality rates and longer life spans.

Since 1991, the national government has very substantially broadened the availability of education programmes at all levels. This has produced two highly significant yet unintended and adverse outcomes. First, the quality of instruction has declined as a sufficient number of properly qualified educators have yet to be trained. This results in graduates who are less well prepared for employment than in the past (Semela, 2011; Adamu & Addamu, 2012; Regassa, et al., 2013). Secondly, while Ethiopia’s newly emerging service sector has expanded and employs an increasing number of educated individuals, the overall number of graduates produced each year exceeds demand (ILO, 2013) as there is insufficient employment in all sectors to absorb these youth (Broussard & Tekleselassie, 2012; CSA, 2014c; Nayak, 2014). University graduates are therefore increasingly under-employed as they take positions below their skills and abilities. This intensifies the effect of unemployment among lower-skilled workers and further affects smallholders who are forced to take positions below their own often meagre skill levels.

This adverse spiralling effect throughout the labour market directly influences downstream opportunities and social development; it contributes to new stratum of poverty among both graduates and oustees; and it weakens public confidence in the Ethiopian government (Barnichon & Zylberberg, 2015; Yirdaw, 2016). Coupled with policies which have emphasized agricultural rather than industrial development, the unintended outcomes of increased secondary and tertiary education act to undermine Ethiopia’s modernization even as other developmental conditions have clearly improved.
6.1 Background of Ethiopia’s Education System

Education, as with all social or economic benefits of government, is ultimately political in nature. Ethiopia’s education programmes, that are selected from a range of policy alternatives to develop human capital, contribute to further stratification within the society as they result in widening income gaps and horizontal inequalities (Buchmann & Hannum, 2001; Geda, et al., 2009; Belachew, 2014).

As discussed in Chapter 4, Ethiopia’s secular education system emerged in 1908 when Emperor Menelik II opened the doors to the first non-religious school. Since then, the system has substantially expanded and it now provides almost universal availability of elementary education and greater access to secondary school. The system has also increased the availability of opportunities to attend either university or vocational training. However, disparities in the access to education for rural children due to long distances to junior elementary and secondary schools; their hidden cost; safety and security concerns; and, the need for farm and household labour precludes at least some children from attending (Pereznieto & Jones, 2006). Further, prospects for employment among rural youth who attend additional schooling are few. The development of the industrial and manufacturing sectors, including its export markets, have not kept pace with the increasing numbers of secondary school leavers and so unemployment among that group is particularly high (Desta, 2012; ILO, 2017; Oqubay, 2018).

6.1.1 The EPRDF’s New Educational Direction

Education for all Ethiopians was a major policy initiative based upon the Soviet-styled social and political system that was adopted by the Dergue, where its emphasis was to accelerate modernization and to move the largely agricultural nation toward industrialization. Following the 1974 ousting of Emperor Selassie, curriculum developers from East Germany, Bulgaria, and Hungary replaced British and American educational advisors as they instituted a highly centralized syllabus. Their instruction focussed on agriculture, industrial technology, political education, home economics, and business, all of which sought to instil a common communist identity and nationalist values (Marcus, 1994; Negash, 2006; Engel & Rose, 2011) as much as train technical skills.

In 1991, upon seizing power from the Dergue, the EPRDF government eliminated the Marxist-oriented syllabus, including instruction in agriculture, from elementary and secondary schools and abolished the fees that had been required to attend school. It also implemented a decentralized system which was more open to local cultural characteristics. ‘Mother-tongue’
languages were, for example, again allowed in the classroom in order to promote the social and cultural norms of each region rather than the exclusive use of the Amharic language which had been mandated by the Dergue in their attempt to form a national-collectivist identity\textsuperscript{59}. These and other reforming policies dramatically increased the number of students who attended school and who have now become better educated, even if not all complete their studies (MoE, 2015).

As a result of this rapidly expanded educational system three interrelated and unintended issues have emerged. First, while the ubiquity of elementary schools provides almost universal availability, hidden social and cultural barriers mean access is not similarly available. As children grow older, their home responsibilities increase and completion rates for more advanced schooling decrease. Second, there is insufficient employment for better educated youth and this has an effect on student attendance (ILO, 2017). Third, even among those who do attend and graduate from secondary school or university too few employment opportunities exist to fully utilize their education and so they are forced to take offers that are both outside of their field of study and below their technical abilities. This can result in social dissonance and civil disobedience as their reasonable expectations for economic mobility go unmet (Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).

This third outcome is particularly significant. High unemployment among an educated, youthful population “is one of the most destabilizing and potentially violent phenomena in any regime” (Urdal, 2006; Azeng & Yogo, 2015: 4). As Honwana (2012) notes unemployment results in the inability of young men (and women) to marry, to begin a family, and to be recognized as ‘adults’ in society. Yet, these issues notwithstanding, Ethiopia’s education system has contributed to economic growth and social development which have improved living conditions, resulted in better health and longer life spans, as well as increased income levels for a majority of the nation’s citizens.

6.1.2 What Comprise Ethiopia’s Education System

Taking a broad view of growth and development, the purpose of Ethiopia’s educational programmes is to provide a foundation of more advanced human capital (MoFED, 2005). This includes people who can perform in low and semi-skilled, blue-collar manufacturing positions as

\textsuperscript{59} There are 77 recognized languages in Ethiopia, though the most prevalent are: Amharic; Gurage; Oromo; Sidamo; Somali; Tigrinya; and Wolaytta (MoE; 2015). In the primary study area near Addis Ababa, Oromo is spoken most frequently followed by Amharic, though local dialects were common.
well as in the middle-level management openings that are expected to develop as the economy grows.

Ethiopia's educational system begins in kindergarten at about age five, colloquially described as when a child is physically developed enough to reach over his head to touch his left ear with his right hand. The availability of basic education for Ethiopia's children is almost universal and achieving its standards is increasingly common. Completion of secondary school remains a pre-condition for admission to informal vocational training centres or formal university (Figure 6.1). The formal education system leads to bachelors and master's degrees, and culminates in advanced degrees in veterinary and medical sciences, in law and in Doctorates of philosophy.
Ethiopia's Ministry of Education notes there are over 32,000 elementary schools serving both rural and urban areas, dropping to just 2,330 secondary schools, or grades 9 -- 12, as these schools are located in “urban places” with far higher student concentrations to make them more cost effective (MoE, 2015: 17). As a result, availability and access to schooling decreases as rural children advance through the system, chiefly due to the distance to secondary schools, and the cost of transportation to them, or for safety issues especially for girls. The most current national plan, the *Education Sector Development Programme V*, acknowledges “The urban/rural divide disadvantages those living in more isolated rural areas and those of lower socio-economic status who do not have equal access to education after Grade 4” (MoE, 2015: 77).
Since admittance to career producing vocational centres depends heavily upon the completion of secondary school, an unequal distribution of training opportunities is experienced among lesser educated populations. Thus, while geographically concentrating secondary schools provides economies per student, their distant location forms economic barriers to rural attendance that continues on among adults, including displaced smallholders.

6.1.3 Ethiopia’s Educational Objectives

For the basic and general levels of schooling, the national educational objective developed by the Ministry reads:

“to provide all children with access to pre-elementary education for school preparedness and access to nearby institutions in that they can complete the full eight years of elementary and two years of lower secondary education” (MoE, 2015: 35).

The overarching goals of the current national policy directive for elementary and secondary programmes are twofold. They are (i) to improve access to quality education, ensuring children attain the competencies that will “enable them to participate fully in the development of Ethiopia” and (ii) to provide sufficient availability of secondary educational opportunities to “bridge the demand in the economy for middle- and higher-level human resources” (MoE, 2015: 14).

The Ministry has accomplished much of its first goal by increasing the number of elementary schools, resulting in expanded access and a surge in attendance from an estimated enrolment of 3 million students in 1994\(^{60}\) to reportedly more than 18 million in 2015. The second goal however, remains aspirational. A cooling economy and still-slow industrialisation has created little demand for middle- and higher-level human resources within the manufacturing sector (ILO, 2017). Yet students continue to choose to attend university in the hope of increasing their competitiveness for employment, adding to the surplus of university graduates who must be accommodated within the economy (Bloom, et al., 2014).

The implications of the lack of employment opportunities are interconnected and lasting. First, the imbalance of education-to-opportunity has led to the under-employment\(^{61}\) of better

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\(^{60}\) The total population of Ethiopia was estimated to be about 54 million in 1994, approximately half of the current population (CSA, 2012; 2014).

\(^{61}\) In an American context, Abel, et al., (2014: 1) characterized under-employment among university graduates as “working in jobs that typically do not require a bachelor’s degree.” In the Ethiopian experience, the issue was more broadly defined by the International Labour Organization (2017: 5) that stated “Under-employment is prevalent. Due
educated attendees and this eventually creates a frustrating lack of prospects for lower- or unskilled workers who are pushed out of the job market by better qualified applicants (Barnichon & Zylerberg, 2015; NBE, 2017; Nunley, et al., 2017). While the expansion of the education system may have served to delay the issue of youth unemployment by temporarily removing that cohort from the market, it has also deepened the problem of unemployed and under-employed youth (ILO, 2017). Second, the Ethiopian government heavily subsidizes student education, thus unemployed graduates are unable to contribute to maintain schools and universities through repayment to the government for their education. Third, the scarcity of employment increases the likelihood of cronyism and corruption which undermines public confidence in the government and threatens its own national investment and goals for development and modernization.

6.1.4 Rural Literacy

Kirschner, et al., (2006: 77) state the goal of education is “to give learners specific guidance about how to cognitively manipulate information in ways that are consistent with a learning goal, and to store the result in long-term memory.” Sustainable economic growth in Ethiopia, as in other developing nations, requires a literate and skilled workforce to support an innovative society. Ethiopia’s Education Sector Development Programme IV for 2010 – 2015 had recognized this outcome in terms of economic and social development, particularly as adults are concerned, and it notes:

“A literate population is a precondition for any nation to become competitive within a global economy. Without a significant increase in the adult literacy rate Ethiopia will not be able to achieve a middle-level income status within a foreseeable time.” (MoE, 2010: 13)

Yet the Ministry of Education has defined literacy at a very low threshold, concluding that it is achieved:

“When people have adequate knowledge and skills and are able to use the tools of reading and writing for any purpose for which they need those skills” (MoE, 2006).

The Ministry asserts this situational level of literacy is acquired in different ways, through both passive and active means, including the acquisition of skills and learning which occur in the home, in social situations, and in schools. Nevertheless, despite social improvements, pockets of the rural labour force continue to be functionally illiterate even by Ethiopian standards and the

to the high level of poverty, individuals seek some form of employment, even if no full-time job is available. As a result, the informal economy is gaining in importance.”
Central Statistical Agency estimated the rate as low as 2.5%\(^{62}\) in some pastoral areas. These lower, or virtually non-existent, literacy skills tend to be more prevalent among those who derive income through pastoral and subsistence agricultural activities in which 80% of the population is directly involved, including workers throughout the informal labour market (CSA, 2012). Yet even with the governments’ greater focus upon industrialization, labour intensive agriculture still remains its primary employment strategy (NPC, 2015) and literacy has not increased concomitant with the skills that are required by an industrializing society. Thus, Ethiopia is faced with a mix of policy choices regarding whether the continued emphasis should be placed upon a narrow theoretical and higher-level education or the accentuation of lower-level industrial and labour related skills which would be applicable to the majority of the population (Bloom, et al., 2014).

**EPRDF Restructuring of the Educational System**

Shortly after assuming power, the EPRDF made substantial policy changes to the Dergue’s educational system via the governments’ first *Education and Training Policy* (MoE, 1994). Despite early post-conflict enthusiasm, curriculum changes did not always meet local needs, especially those of the 80% who are subsistence smallholders living in rural areas. As example, the 1994 decision to remove agricultural instruction from rural classrooms has resulted in a noticeably decreased level of interest in agricultural careers among early school goers and in their later interest in crop sciences at university. This was specifically described by a local primary school teacher who, over the course of almost four decades, has witnessed the shifting programmatic emphasis. While his opinion was valuable, further investigation of the school, and conversation with local farmer training centre staff confirmed his statements regarding the lack of agricultural instruction:

“The government no longer allows us to teach agriculture to our students. We used to have small demonstration plots where they could learn about farming and experts from the farmer training centre in the village would visit to instruct the children. I have been a teacher here for 38 years and saw the government discontinue agricultural training about 20 years ago. Since then I have seen much less interest among the children to learn about agriculture.”

*Elementary School Teacher, August 2015 (Interview 11)*

However, the federal government has recognized that some of its early political decisions were overly hasty; potentially counter-productive; and, that some require revisiting. At the time of

\(^{62}\) This is an extremely low literacy rate and clearly does not apply throughout Ethiopia. It is indicative, however, of the substantial challenges the government faces.
field work, the federal Ministry of Education was reviewing its early decision to eliminate agricultural instruction from the rural school curricula:

“After the 1991 revolution, we saw many knee-jerk reactions by the new government. Dergue policies were discarded with little thought for their usefulness. In those days, inexperienced overly zealous bureaucrats saw no need to teach urban children how to plough a field and so in a time of overreaction all agriculture instruction was removed from the classrooms. We’ve only begun to look at things again because it had other serious consequences as well.”


Thus, the Ministry demonstrated itself to be receptive to curriculum changes that are proving themselves necessary for the future of Ethiopia’s rural students, especially those who continue to depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods.

6.2 Ethiopia’s Formal and Non-formal Learning Systems

Education is rightly believed to enhance development; it increases personal income; it improves civic skills; and it results in greater social and political participation (Franzese, 2001). It has been associated with economic growth and it elevates the “human capital inherent in the labour force; it increases innovative capacity throughout the economy; and facilitates the diffusion and transmission of knowledge needed to process information” (Hanushek & Wossmann, 2010: 245). While the quality of a nation’s educational system is a close predictor of its ability to develop economically and socially, competency in very basic skills such as reading and simple mathematics arguably provide greater returns on investment than does an expansion of education at university level until that nation is ready to utilize those advanced capabilities (Tripney & Hombardos, 2013; Shiferaw, 2017).

During the design of Ethiopia’s modern educational system, a key planning consideration of the Ministry has been that children whose parents are literate tend to stay in school longer (MoE, 2015). To encourage parents and other adults to engage in their own “lifelong learning opportunities so that all can contribute and benefit from rapid growth and economic change” (MoE, 2015: 13) the Ministry of Education adopted three broad forms of adult learning, each of that achieves different goals:

(i) **Formal learning**, wherein systems are organized and have explicit intentions that ultimately lead to recognized diplomas or degrees. In a formal system, information is transmitted through structured, written syllabi that are characterised by defined aims and objectives (Misko, 2008). Three criteria distinguish formal programmes: their duration, fixed curricula, and whether completion leads to a recognized qualification (Werquin, 2007).
Non-formal learning programmes that can be any organized activity that takes place outside of a formal, disciplined and structured system. Non-formal learning is semi-structured in nature yet it delivers information and develops hands-on skills that facilitate personal growth and meet industry requirements. In adult education, non-formal programmes are usually highly flexible and closely contextualized. For older learners, especially, a strong participatory approach to meet immediate and practical needs is required (Knowles, 1973; Kolb, 1984).

Informal learning is “a residual category to describe any kind of learning that does not take place within, or following from, a formally organised learning programme or event” (Eraut, 2000: 114). For example, people who lack reading skills frequently gain knowledge through such means as observing and imitating those around them. Informal learning is most often experiential and achieved through “the combination of grasping and transforming an experience” (Kolb, 1984: 41). These experiences build upon group roles. Familiarity and practice are important in the adult learning process and occur when observations are assimilated and result in the internalization of previously abstract concepts. However, without a continuous stream of new and more technically complex examples to learn from, the acquisition of higher level skills is difficult to achieve and the learning and skills acquisition process stagnates (Scribner & Cole, 1978; Fanta-Vagenshtein, 2008).

Particularly among adults, educational goals vary with age and so these three educational models address the needs of very different audiences and their goal orientation. Malcolm Knowles (1973) observed adult learners are more focussed in their learning needs than children; and that adults have a ‘deeper pool of knowledge and experience’ from which to draw. Hence, adult learners are more involved in their learning process and they tend to become more open to their own internal-locus of control and self-efficacy to achieve their goals (Onu, et al., 2013; Abay, et al., 2017). Yet at the same time, adults are more prone to remaining within their previously established peer groups and fields of endeavour, and as Mildenberger & Tingley (2017: 5) note, “an individual’s second-order [group] beliefs may shape or constrain their first-order [individual] beliefs.”

Thus, while adults may have a more defined self-concept and a greater readiness to learn that enables them to direct their own programmes, their individual focus is often limited to refining their present experiential base in order to immediately apply their new skills (Kolb, 1984). This utilitarian motivation often limits adults’ avenue of exploration to current interests rather than attempting to master a new subject field.

6.3 Elementary and Secondary Education

After decades of foreign influence, including educational systems introduced by the Egyptians, French, British, Americans and Bulgarians, Ethiopia now follows an essentially western model of education (Negash, 2006; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012). However, to understand
the principal drivers of Ethiopian under-employment a review of its educational system is required.

6.3.1 Elementary Schools

Several hidden barriers to entry are associated with Ethiopia’s educational institutions. Rural basic elementary schools, intended for children ages 5 – 12 and grades K - 6, are located in each kebele. They are often within eyesight of small hold farms and so students can safely and easily walk to them (MoE, 2015) (Interview 59). However, junior elementary schools, grades 7-8, are often located further from home than basic elementary schools. They are usually located in towns and village areas that may require a walk of one hour or more. Although schools are ‘free’, structural issues such as the cost of school uniforms and books were described by respondents as often being unaffordable. Thus, by the end of the elementary school stage at grade 8, the rural student completion rate is just 47% nationally (Pereznieto & Jones, 2006; MoE, 2015).

An absence of school resources poses an additional impediment to student completion. Teachers interviewed during an elementary school registration day described the funding issues which further degrade the educational experience. The wilful creation of educational service deserts (Hillman & Weichman, 2016) was a recurring theme among the educators east of Addis Ababa who were interviewed and it was their general opinion these were being implemented to more easily displace smallholders in the study area:

“Over the past 15 years the government has reduced funding for rural schools. We have no facilities to teach here except bare walls - not even a chalkboard. There are no books or paper or other supplies. The government pays no attention to people who live off the paved road and this is their way of forcing them to move from the land so the government can sell it to investors.”

Elementary School Teacher, September 2015 (Interview 59b)

Parents were equally troubled. Field journal notes indicate that among a crowd of approximately 30 who were inside a classroom that was being used to register children for the new school year, nine willingly voiced their own concerns regarding the low levels of funding and the unavailability of supplies including text books and, they too, recognized this as leading to inadequate learning outcomes. Just as the school’s teachers, parents recognized the adverse local changes that have occurred in recent years regarding rural education and their statements reinforced the earlier noted observations of kebele and wereda employees regarding the general withdrawal of social services, including adequate schools. Collectively, these and
other barriers constrain rural students from receiving a satisfactory early education or attending secondary school.

6.3.2 Secondary Schools

To achieve greater economies of scale the Ministry of Education locates the majority of secondary schools in urban areas where there is a higher concentration of students to attend them (MoE, 2015). However, the daily transportation costs from rural or peri-urban municipalities, though low, are often a prohibitive expense for subsistence-level rural families (Dom, 2016). Hence, economic disparities become educational disparities, which are then carried forward as rural students are unable to qualify for higher education or vocational training. This tends to reinforce opportunity-inequality and often results in negative social stereotyping of rural students. In addition, it reduces self-esteem and undermines economic growth within under-served rural areas (Tawil & Harley, 2004). As early disparities persist through adulthood the insufficiently educated rural class remains unable to qualify for the opportunities created by Ethiopia’s new service economy, even as farming livelihood prospects continue to shrink.

Compounding the structural lack of access to secondary education is Ethiopia’s rural drop-out rate, especially where children decide at a very early age not to finish school. This is described by Desta (2012), who confirmed that children in Ethiopia’s junior elementary and lower-secondary schools see previous students or older friends who have graduated yet have few employment prospects. Their individual observations, even at a very young age, suggest to them there is little benefit from continued school attendance; they become discouraged and quit school. Desta (Ibid: 19) asserts this lack of opportunity, observed by young students in their slightly older friends, makes secondary schools the beginning of “fertile grounds for agitation and the arousal of the students’ unrest against some of the economic policies that are initiated by the existing political order.” Among the unintended results is a less literate rural population that cannot compete in the changing employment environment that Ethiopia’s otherwise successful developmental programmes are creating, and in which displaced smallholders now increasingly find themselves.

6.3.3 Upper-Secondary Education

Upon successful completion of 10th grade and the attainment of sufficient entrance examination scores, students may choose to enter upper-secondary education in preparatory schools that constitute grades 11 – 12. Here they are groomed for placement testing and potential entry to university. During these 11th and 12th years, rural students must take
transportation to a larger city where the preparatory schools are located. Here too, living and travel expenses form barriers that limit attendance to students whose families can either afford daily transportation or who can afford to house the student in the city during the week, something that also foregoes the labour that student would provide to the farm (Interview 85). In the case of chronically poor rural families, these educational expenses can be prohibitively costly. Nevertheless, it is this upper-secondary age group that is “markedly more likely … to have five-year ambitions; more likely to have detailed plans; and, more likely to see themselves as having a career” (Anderson, et al., 2005: 146). Critically, it is among this age bracket of secondary schoolers that Anderson found a large percentage of youth formalize a view of their own future and initiate long-term life-decisions. It is where they begin to “lay out well-developed plans that would take them right through to retirement” (Ibid).

6.3.4 Elementary and Secondary Education Exclusions

Notable disparities exist between rural and urban school attendees and these are often gendered. Drop-out rates among rural girls in junior elementary and secondary school are especially high and by the time they reach grades 11-12, girls account for just 27% of graduating students (Van Deuren, 2013; UNESCO, 2015). In addition to the financial costs of education and the demand for their household labour that increase as they age, physical safety issues limit the ability of girls to attend secondary schools. Several respondents in the study area described the frequent threat of marriage by abduction that often occurs as maturing girls walk to school. This creates especially dire consequences for rural women’s educational achievement (MoE, 2015) and as they reach puberty girls begin to stay within the safety of the home enclosure. Thus, while they participate in the activities of farming and take on an increasing role in household reproductive responsibilities, they may also become educationally and socially isolated from the larger community (Tafere & Woldehanna, 2012).

This cloistering contributes to chronic rural poverty as girls come of marital age (Dom, 2016) and results in nearly 70% of rural women being functionally illiterate (Tafere & Woldehanna, 2012). This directly reduces their ability to participate meaningfully in the employment market once their family farms have been expropriated. Therefore, the cumulative failure of girls to attend and complete even a general level of education may have a disproportionately high effect upon Ethiopia’s larger industrialization and developmental success as their lack of education fails to prepare them for non-agrarian work.
The physical demands of farming impacts boys’ education as well. At about the same age girls reach puberty, boys become physically capable of tending livestock or handling ploughs. They provide an immediate source of family labour and several respondents related they had kept the most promising farm worker from school to utilize that labour (Interview 78). Counterintuitively, smallholder families stated the embryonic accumulation of household wealth actually discourages their children’s attendance at school. As home and farm assets such as cattle or land accumulate, more labour is needed to manage them. Hence, the formal education of the most talented boy may come to an end if he is also the best farm worker.

Therefore, bright and innovative children may be denied educational opportunities until the family becomes economically comfortable enough to divert their children’s useful labour to non-productive activities including time consuming attendance at primary and secondary school (Frost & Roleston, 2013). As a result, rural students, including potential business operators or entrepreneurs, tend to remain only marginally educated and are also denied the opportunity to obtain skills through formal manual trades’ instruction at Ethiopia’s vocational training centres because they have not met the compulsory educational qualifications (MoE, 2008).

6.4 Tertiary Education and Vocational Programmes

According to Kolb, et al (2010), education increases the quality of labour inputs and enhances workers’ abilities to adjust to new challenges. Educated people are likely to be more abstract in their thinking and pioneering in their utilization of emerging industrial or agricultural technologies and they have a greater ability to analyse, synthesize and apply innovative practices (Kolb, et al., 2010). Therefore, they are able to contribute to Ethiopia’s growth in ways that lesser-educated workers cannot. Hence, the Ministry of Education’s statement of its higher education goals opens with the phrase:

“To produce competent graduates who have appropriate knowledge, skills and attitudes in diverse fields of study; to produce research that promotes knowledge and technology transfer based on national development and community needs …”
(MoE, 2015: 37)

Moreover, the goals conclude with:

“… to ensure that education and research promote principles of freedom in exchange of views and opinions based on reason, and democratic and multicultural values.”
(MoE, 2015: 37)

These ambitious national goals are likely to raise the expectation of social mobility among both vocational and university students who are led to believe their education will result in the attainment of economic success and greater social freedoms.
Tertiary education in Ethiopia includes two types of programmes: those that are academically and theoretically inclined and those that are vocational and not intended to lead to university level credentials. The *Education Sector Development Plan V* notes there were 98 private and 36 publicly funded universities in Ethiopia in the 2013/2014 reporting year (MoE, 2015). The majority of these private institutions are located in the capital city of Addis Ababa though some have branch campuses in smaller municipalities such as Sheshamane, Dire Dawa or Ambo. Vocational centres are similarly distributed in both urban and peri-urban areas.

### 6.4.1 The Paradox of Tertiary Education

Contrary to expectations, increased tertiary education has not resulted in a generally developed upper-level economy. The overwhelming majority of the nation continue to engage in subsistence-farming despite those who are employed in the narrow service sector. Relatively few positions are available for the highly educated (Abate, 2016).

Tertiary education creates, in general, four conditions (Collier, 2007; Eight, 2013). Those include: *(i)* employment, as graduates obtain positions that are commensurate with their expectations, or *(ii)* unemployment, when either no work is found or offers are not taken. Relatedly, students may have graduated university or received training certifications in fields for that there are too few opportunities in Ethiopia, thus *(iii)* they may leave the country in search of work elsewhere; or, *(iv)* they succumb to various forms of under-employment. Critically, this latter group takes lesser positions which lesser skilled and displaced smallholders might otherwise aspire to. Consequently, lesser skilled groups are socially displaced as they are pushed further down or entirely out of the employment market (Bashshur, et al., 2011; Barnichon & Zylerberg, 2015). Under-employment and its downward mobility are not merely unpleasant social and economic conditions. They result in significantly decreased family income potentials; increased substance abuse; and, social stagnation. This ultimately increases the likelihood of new strata of poverty among the displaced (Wilkins, 2007) and the affected groups lose their political and social influence.

Skills-related under-employment, where the individuals’ technical abilities or schooling are in excess of the requirements of the job also result in an inefficient utilization of scarce educational resources (Bhatia & Ghanem, 2017). While under-employed graduates have work

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63 Tertiary education includes academic and vocational education. Its goal is to achieve a higher level of theoretical complexity or vocational skills specialisation then are achievable at lower educational levels (UNESCO, 2011).
and are therefore better off than the unemployed, they may work in areas that are far outside of their educational fields and, over time, lose the skills and up-to-date expertise they acquired at government expense (ILO, 2007).

Ethiopia’s developmental policies, that until recently relied primarily upon low-skill and labour-intensive agricultural employment, have been augmented by educational policies that are delivering substantial opportunities to engage in higher education (NPC, 2015). Though Ethiopia’s service sector is rapidly growing and is now the economically dominant segment of the economy, it is not able to absorb all the university graduates who are produced annually. Consequently, the presence of better-educated university graduates bids down the price of their labour as well (Geda, et al., 2009). A downward drift of higher educated and higher skilled workers causes pay to become depressed and economically displaces lesser educated workers.

Workers who are over-educated for their positions generally earn more than their lesser-educated co-workers, yet they earn substantially less than their scholastic colleagues who have found more appropriate employment (Irizarry, 1980; Herrera-Idarraga, et. al., 2013). Yet, even this lesser employment is not guaranteed and this situation was noted by a local TVET director whose own educational background over-matched his employment:

“I can earn more money as the director of a vocational centre than I could after five years of training at university to become a doctor of veterinary medicine. But my supervisors here are uncomfortable with my education. They say I am over-qualified for this position and that they have other people with skills that are less than mine who need a job. They ignore my success here and want to terminate my employment.”

TVET Director, July 2015 (Interview 8)

Cascading under-employment tends to result in stress and psychological issues, including depression characterized by low self-esteem, eating disorders, alcoholism or drug use (Catalano, 1994; Dooley, et al., 2000). As under-employment becomes the norm, social mobility stagnates. This also perpetuates the period of liminality that graduates experience as their education has separated them from their previous life-experiences and peer groups but they have not yet been accepted into a new social strata, new peer groups, or achieved economic success (Field & Morgan-Klein, 2010).

Politically, as the rate of economic growth slows, the imbalance of education to opportunity-outcomes sustains the contention that government is subsidizing unnecessary university attendance at the expense of training programmes and employment strategies that
may benefit the rural poor, including displaced smallholders (Frost & Roleston, 2013). This issue was elevated by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs as it chronicled the lack of appropriate economic opportunity in Ethiopia:

“The narrow base of the modern industrial sector in terms of job creation in the face of rural-urban migration is believed to have contributed to increased poverty levels.” (MoLSA, 2009: 5-8)

6.4.2 Educational Standards

As part of its overall modernization and development programme the government has increased capacity throughout the publicly-funded university system, especially in comparison to its neighbouring nations (Figure 5.2). In doing so, it has broadened the range of available curricula as well as built new university infrastructure and facilities to accommodate greater numbers of students (Tessema, 2009). Yet, it is not simply the availability of Ethiopia’s expanded number of educational institutions that is important to economic development, its social growth, or to under-employment rates. Quality and depth of instruction are also crucial and in Ethiopia the supply of educated instructional staff has not matched demand (Materu, 2007; Regassa, et al., 2013; Masino & Nino-Zarazua, 2016). Moreover, in his report entitled Higher Education Quality Assurance in sub-Saharan Africa, Materu (2007: 14) concludes that a reduction in Ethiopia’s educational standards has taken place as a result of a too-rapid expansion of the system and that “rapid enrolment growth was intended to meet increasing social demand.” Importantly, Materu found the physical growth of Ethiopia’s university facilities was not necessarily to meet the educational requirements of the developing nation so much as it satisfied demands for “political patronage that flowed from contracts for construction, equipment, supplies and other needs” (Ibid, 16).

Despite earlier success in establishing a system whose quality of instruction approached international standards at the turn of the 21st century, a pattern of underfunding and employment of poorly qualified teachers have caused substandard schools to reappear. Semela (2011) found that instructors possessing only a bachelor’s degree were teaching bachelor degree-level courses, and so educational quality deteriorated. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s secondary schools and universities were reported to have become “regimented in their management and conservative in their intellectual orientation, they displayed declining

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64 Recall that following the 1974 revolution, the Dergue sent almost 50,000 secondary school students to villages as teachers (Zewdie: 2000; Balsvik, 2009; Bishaw & Lasser, 2012). Their own students were completing secondary school and university at the time these reports were being written.
educational content and were weak in their research output” (Saint, 2004: 86). The World Bank (WB, 2003) likewise observed that productivity gains and standards in Ethiopia’s secondary schools and universities were eroding. These independently produced reports only slightly predated the gradual slowing of the Ethiopian economy following its 2005 peak (ADBG, 2017; NBE, 2017). Although these findings were made over a decade ago, current sources confirm insufficient improvement has been made, and that other social issues have emerged which adversely affect industrialization.

For example, Arega Yirdaw (2016), chief executive officer of MIDROC Ethiopia Technology Group noted the dissatisfaction some larger employers have with recent graduates including issues that are beyond the scope of their education. Yirdaw found that in many cases, graduates from Ethiopia’s universities must be retrained not only in technical matters but also in fundamental life and business skills such as proper diet, timeliness, and sobriety before they are able to become productive employees. Other education professionals, who both research and teach business development in Ethiopia’s universities, concur with Yirdaw’s assessment of the personal deficiencies exhibited by a significant number of university graduates as well as those among blue collar workers:

“Approximately 10% of all Ethiopian’s have earned a bachelor’s degree, yet Ethiopia has a very unreliable work force. Even when they are highly educated and paid a good wage, workers here spend their money on alcohol and other unhealthy lifestyles that result in high rates of absenteeism from their jobs.” University Instructor, July 2015 (Interview 9)

Lenton (2014: 6) found individual personality characteristics often correlate with educational attendance. Specifically, high “internal and external locus of control, conscientiousness and extroversion” are connected traits, and that among male employees it is extroversion rather than the technical competence achieved through education which employers actually seek. Similarly, Lundberg (2013) also posited that what Ethiopian employers want is not necessarily subject matter expertise so much as it is the personal qualities that are displayed by graduates. Those include an openness to new experiences and ideas; a conscientiousness in their organizational abilities, and a level of agreeableness which reflects a

65 Declining educational standards and the slowing economy also roughly preceded the 2005 national election which almost resulted in electoral losses for the EPRDF. Ethiopia suddenly faced system-wide social, political, and economic problems that threatened the continued hegemony of the party.
66 MIDROC (Mohammed International Development Research and Organization Companies) is owned by Ethiopian-born Mohammed Hussein Ali Al-Amoudi, who is the largest individual investor in Ethiopia. Al-Amoudi has holdings in Ethiopia's gold and silver mining industries and its oil production; in cement manufacturing and the construction industry. He introduced industrial steel production to Ethiopia. Thus the observations and opinions of his CEO, Dr. Arega Yirdaw, concerning the state of education and labour training in Ethiopia are relevant and timely.
cooperative personality. These traits, Lundberg finds, are essentially qualities of internal locus of control and which are imitated through the examples set by educated and/or successful parents (UNESCO, 2012; MoE, 2015).

However, hiring graduates who must be re-trained in basic skills increases the risk to the employer who may not be able to absorb either the socialization costs or the losses involved after having hired an under-skilled and underperforming worker. Hence, business expansion may be slowed by the lack of social skills exhibited by recent graduates.

6.4.3 University Education and Under-employment

The over-production of university graduates is not peculiar to the developing nation of Ethiopia. Indeed, expanded access to higher education is a frequent strategy of governments to delay youth entry into the employment market (Dvorkin & Shell, 2015). It is also seen as an attempt to force change from above (Irizarry, 1980; Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006; Bloom, et al., 2014). In those cases, economic growth is expected to occur through the sheer force of educated professionals whose numbers in society are considered likely to spontaneously stimulate innovation and entrepreneurial activity. However as several key stakeholders asserted, and the literature strongly suggests, a diploma or vocational training completion certificate may actually increase the likelihood of post-graduation unemployment as graduates demand salaries that are in excess of those paid to other workers who perform adequately but do not hold a degree or certification (Oketch, 2007; Kibru, 2012; ILO, 2017) (Interview 10).

In Ethiopia, students require three to five years to obtain an undergraduate degree; and two additional years are typical for a master’s degree. Doctoral programmes are offered at a small number of universities in Addis Ababa, Dire Dawa and Ambo (Shibeshi, 2005) with completion times varying by subject. Notably, Dire Dawa and Ambo are the primary locations where student demonstrations have occurred (MoE, 2015; UNESCO, 2015).

The Focus of Ministry of Education-operated Universities

Ministry-operated universities continue to focus on science, engineering or other technology curricula. In contrast, private university administrators stated they had reached an accord with the Ministry of Education to provide instruction in liberal arts, concentrating on degree programmes such as business administration, finance, and information technology.
Regardless of the field of study, the number of graduates has risen much faster than national economic growth and industrialization can absorb (ILO, 2017). Interviews with educators in university settings likewise found that increased enrolment has exacerbated both unemployment and under-employment as the number of graduates exceed market requirements. Several university educators (Interview 5, 9 & 10), noted this presents additional issues for the government:

“There are not enough quality employment positions anywhere in Ethiopia for all of the university graduates each year, especially if they have not carefully chosen their field of study. Because of the lack of good jobs when they do find employment, graduates are often displacing other workers who have fewer skills and less education. Even business degree graduates cannot find work and so many take small positions or return to their farms. But that has an effect, too. They become better farmers and better community leaders and they are putting pressure on the government to provide more social services, but it doesn’t repay the nation for its investment.”

Dean, private university, July 2015 (Interview 10)

The administrator of a private business college also noted that graduates are frequently employed in positions which are below their educational levels:

“Many of my students do receive job offers from businesses before they graduate though the offers are for lesser positions than the student is capable of. Still, it’s a way to enter the job market so most accept the offer.”

Administrator, Business College, July 2015 (Interview 6)

Thus, the utility of a university education becomes increasingly questionable, even detrimental, as the combined over-supply of university graduates, poor employment readiness-skills, and increased wage pressures force them to accept employment that is below their education level. This is likely to continue until market conditions can improve sufficiently to justify a greater demand for educated professionals. In the interim, the under-employment of a large educated youth cohort contributes to social and political instability (Pape, 2005).

6.4.4 Technical Vocational Education and Training

Mouzakitis (2010: 3915) asserts “general education is often too academic and does not prepare young people adequately for the world of work and vocational education and training have a closer and more direct link with their professional development.” Especially in rural areas where resources and adequately trained teachers may be scarce, “math, science,
language, and social studies” are far more relevant to the educational needs of developing nations than are courses in “Greek mythology, prime numbers, or tectonic plate movement” (Epstein & Yuthas, 2012: 19).

While “improving access to primary education has been recognised as having the highest economic returns in developing countries” (Masino & Nino-Zarazua, 2016: 53) it is crucial to the industrial development of the nation that relevant vocational instruction is available to enable the development of a widely-based, employment–generating, manufacturing sector (Graff, 1998; MoE, 2008; Aghion, et al., 2009).

Early Vocational Training Pilot Programme

To facilitate growth and to promote manufacturing, the government has heavily invested in primary infrastructure, from improved rural feeder roads to electrified rail lines linking the capitol to the sea port of Djibouti (Stifel, et al., 2016). This investment in infrastructure created an environment in which construction projects resulted in thousands of temporary jobs for workers who possess the requisite skills. Thus, to meet the demand for these skills non-formal adult vocational training became an increasingly important element of Ethiopia’s poverty reduction strategies (MoE, 2015; NPC, 2015). Vocational training was defined in UNESCO’s Shanghai Consensus as:

“Those aspects of the educational process involving, in addition to general education, the study of technologies and related sciences and the acquisition of practical skills, attitudes, understanding and knowledge relating to occupations in various sectors of economic life.” (UNESCO, 2012)

In 1965, the government of Ethiopia petitioned the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) for assistance in organizing and implementing a ‘work-oriented, adult literacy’ pilot project whose aim would be to teach basic literacy and numeracy skills. Five demonstration sites were established in the towns of Jima and Agaro; in Wolamoh and Asela; and, within the population and commercial centre of Addis Ababa. In addition to teaching basic literacy and numeracy to adults, this was a broad-based test that included a range of agricultural and farm cooperative education; industrial manufacturing, including sugar and coffee refining; and construction skills. It also introduced home weaving as a potential cottage industry for family income generation (UNESCO, 1975). Though the weaving programme proved untenable due to equipment maintenance issues, other outcomes were encouraging. Soon thereafter a nascent system of Technical and Vocational Education Training
centres (TVET) emerged which were intended to meet the Selassie government’s developmental goals and which were “motivated by the fact that the labour productivity in Ethiopia was very low” (Krishnan & Shaorshadze, 2013: 11).

6.4.5 Adult Learners and Threats to Ethiopia’s Political Hegemony

As a group, adult learners are practical in their information needs and tend to engage in retraining programmes that concentrate upon acquiring specific new skills which they can readily apply rather than being interested in larger theoretical concepts. Their personal qualities of motivation, focus and perseverance tend to make the adult learner a more engaged, problem-centred, and goal-oriented student than are younger learners (Kolb & Goldman, 1973; Knowles, 1978). Moreover, once the individual decision has been made to seek retraining, adults tend to arrive in the classroom with a substantial reservoir of personal experience which they channel into fields that are already familiar to them (Dollisso & Martin, 1999). Hence it can be said adult learners may not learn something new, so much as upgrade their existing knowledge and skills. However, in an industrializing society learning to be a better subsistence farmer has limited utility.

Older adult learners pose additional challenges. As they begin their non-formal programmes, these students may be in a highly insecure state, having significant practical expertise but no theoretical foundation or experience in their chosen vocational subject. Thus, while they bring previous knowledge, beliefs, and attitudes to their retraining programmes these may be obsolete or false, something which Taylor & Hamdy (2013: e1564) describe in terms of “the dissonance between this and the concrete experience that is provided as the learning opportunity.” Adult learners often require the internalization of unfamiliar basic theory even in fields with which they are familiar in order to assimilate new knowledge. Consequently, at the same time smallholders are being displaced from their livelihoods and homes, they may also need to undergo other uncomfortable changes in their traditional attitudes and behaviour if they enrol in a vocational training program (Gordus, 1986; Clark, 2008). Yet, Hammond & Feinstein (2005: 266) found that while more self-efficacious adults have a higher likelihood of engaging in continuing education, it is the decision to participate in the experience of adult learning itself that “raise levels of self-efficacy.” The decision itself marks a life changing moment, leading to greater ability to accept new information. Nevertheless, education is empowering as it promotes a greater degree of awareness and prospect for economic and political participation (Bellu, 2011; Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017).
Sanborn & Thyne (2013: 778) have noted the educated are more willing to “take to the streets to force the government to make meaningful reforms.” At the same time, adult education has not been demonstrated to directly change attitudes or political opinions. Instead, it may only result in better trained individuals who maintain the same social attitudes but who are more apt to vocalize their demands (Preston & Feinstein, 2004; Friedman, et al., 2016). Thus, increased adult education may also be perceived as a possible threat to the semi-authoritarian control by the Ethiopian government due to an increased demand for greater democratic freedoms and economic opportunities in rural areas, just as students are demanding them in urban places.

**Ethiopia’s Vocational Training Audience**

In a report titled the *Art of Adult Learning and Education*, Ethiopia’s Ministry of Education asserts non-formal adult education programmes enhance the ability of rural youth to diversify their vocational experiences into non-farm employment (MoE, 2008). TVETS are stand-alone tertiary educational institutions which result in terminal educational outcomes (Oketch, 2007) to prepare students for work in blue-collar occupational and manual trades as well as offering very rudimentary training in the operation of select small businesses.

The basis for the programmes are found in Ethiopia’s foundational pro-poor policy, the *Productive Safety Net Programme*, had identified TVETs as the vehicle to deliver training for employment via “curriculum for livelihood pathways” (MoA, 2014: 5-6). Notably, Ethiopia’s vocational training is not a continuation of secondary school instruction. The African Union describes the positive and wide-ranging impact which these vocational programmes can have regarding the reduction of chronic poverty among its target audience:

> “One of the most important features of TVET is its orientation towards the world of work and the emphasis of the curriculum on the acquisition of employable skills. TVET delivery systems are therefore well placed to train the skilled and entrepreneurial workforce which Africa needs to create wealth and emerge out of poverty. TVET institutions can respond to the training needs of learners from different socio-economic and academic backgrounds, and prepare them for gainful employment and sustainable livelihoods. The youth, the poor and the vulnerable of society can therefore benefit from TVET.”
> *(AU, 2007: 17)*

### 6.5 The Challenges of Community Training Centres and TVETs
The curricula of the non-formal educational programmes observed at each of the vocational centres visited were similar. TVETs provide a range of training or retraining instruction in twenty distinct fields (Figure 6.2) emphasizing construction, service, and industrial occupations, while micro-business development courses are offered at the Community Skills Training Centres (Biazen & Abegaz, 2009).

Figure 6.2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Construction and Service Occupations</th>
<th>Aligned Trades Programs</th>
<th>Industrial Occupations</th>
<th>Aligned Trades Programs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Metal manufacturing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity/electronics</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Leather technology</td>
<td>11</td>
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<tr>
<td>Business and services</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Agro-food processing</td>
<td>23</td>
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<tr>
<td>Automotive</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Industrial laboratory</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hotel and tourism</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information technology</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Water technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Metrology</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Craft</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Textile technology</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Other</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Culture</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Defense</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>Sport</td>
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(Biazen & Abegaz, 2009; ESDP V, 2015)

Community Skills Training centres provide literacy and numeracy classes as well as short courses through a limited range of 15-day business development courses. The 15-day subject specific courses are followed by an additional 15-day general course of basic business management skills such as money management and market forecasting. Although these short courses are only intended to develop very simple skills they have been highly impactful in helping residents transition to ownership of a micro-enterprise.

The men and women who were observed in TVET classrooms and shops during field work tended to be enrolled in longer-term industrial arts programmes such as furniture making and construction rather than offerings such as basic book keeping, information technology, or health care occupations. In some fast-growing peri-urban locations of Ethiopia, construction and related services accounted for as much as 65% of local earnings, hence TVET programme offerings are particularly weighted towards those subject areas (UNDP, 2014). From entry to completion of the programme, individual TVET courses have five progressively difficult, and costly, levels of instruction (Figure 6.3) and participation decreases as the instructional complexity increases.
Course offerings are limited by the availability of qualified instructors especially at the higher levels of instruction (Hunde & Tacconi, 2017). Particularly in rural areas where languages and dialects can change substantially within the space of several miles, there is little opportunity to centrally organize a wider pool of instructors to support several TVETs. This limits the number of vocational programmes that can be offered as well as the number of students who can be enrolled (Awgichew & Seyoum, 2017), thereby frustrating any economies of scale. Where land is being expropriated, programmes that could be used to re-educate and retrain displaced smallholders were said by TVET administrators to be unable to accommodate a surge of recently displaced smallholders due to a lack of qualified instructors.

Administrators noted that while annual Ministry of Education funding is routine, TVETs are also funded by student fees. Unlike university education, attendance at a TVET requires the payment of course fees immediately upon registration and as the fees increase for more advanced courses, students rapidly drop out of the programmes (MoE, 2015). To an outsider, the TVET fee schedule appears reasonable, but as the administrator of one vocational centre explained, many families cannot afford them and therefore otherwise well-qualified and promising students who would benefit from vocational training do not complete the full programme. As a negative consequence of depressed enrolment due to fee schedules, course offerings and programmes remain small since Ministry of Education subsidy formulas fund TVET centres based upon previous year student numbers. This results in both long term socio-economic inequalities and a slowing of Ethiopia’s economic growth due to a lack of qualified workers.

Gendered Aspects of Vocational Education and Training

(MoE, 2015: 28)
As Knowles (1973) described, adult students tend to focus their non-formal education programmes in subject areas with which they are already familiar. An administrator of the Lalibela TVET noted that his urban agriculture programme, which was just one-year old at the time of the field interview, already comprised 15% of the increasingly rural student body and that women made up the bulk of those enrollees. Women were especially interested in his poultry-raising program because that field is quickly and predictably profitable and they saw the long-term earnings potential upon which their prior agricultural experiences could build.

In order to correct past biases, Ethiopia's vocational programme strategy promotes non-formal programmes which “cater to the education needs of out-of-school children and adults, with special emphasis on women” (MoE, 2008: 12). Reduced entry requirements compensate for the traditionally low level of emphasis that both families and the school system have given to girl's education (Belete, 2011; MoE, 2010). Thus, each of the eight vocational centres visited had enrolled women with lower entrance scores than men must attain. Yet, according to each of the centre administrators who were interviewed, women graduated with the same degree of proficiency as men. A representative response from administrators was:

“Women come here with lower scores than men have achieved but the Ministry policy is to admit them. They generally turn out to be very good students and are very practical minded. They take classes to develop business opportunities. Sometimes a wereda or kebele official will ask me to admit a woman who can't pass the entrance exam and since they control my budget I don’t see any problem with doing a small favour for them. Often, those women turn out to be some of our best students.”
TVET Director, September 2015 (Interview 2)

Women, who slightly outnumbered men in the eight TVET institutions visited, were more likely to register for curriculums that resulted in long-term employment opportunities such as furniture making rather than in a field such as construction which rapidly expands and contracts according to economic pulses. Perhaps not coincidently, women own 65% of Ethiopia’s micro-enterprises and 26% of its small manufacturing shops (Adam, 2014). However, several TVET administrations stated women’s programmes tend to lack connectivity within other departments of government. Coordination between vocational training and micro-credit programmes, for example is both uncommon and ineffective, and so larger returns on the investments made in woman’s training may be lost (Cohen & Lemma, 2011) until these differences are addressed.

While women are rightfully recognized as having been denied adequate primary and secondary educational opportunities, the vocational centre administrators interviewed also felt the current emphasis upon women may be failing to take into account the growing retraining
needs of displaced adult men who are losing their livelihood to land use changes and expropriations. Thus, a gender-based admittance policy may artificially limit the availability of vocational and livelihood training opportunities for male smallholders who are culturally the primary family wage earners. Ultimately as with academic programmes, the effectiveness of vocational training is not only dependent upon standards of quality assurance but also whether it addresses the short and long-term needs of the community (Baraki & van Kemenade, 2013).

6.6 TVETs and Stakeholders

Stakeholders within the TVET programme include students and administrators, as well as local business owners who meet with programme administrators to exchange the newest techniques and discuss the short term occupational needs of local markets. Administrators at each of the TVET centres described this as a powerful feedback mechanism to improve the quality of instruction and to make curriculum changes, as well as to learn why some graduates were not being hired. Their meetings produced three reported observations.

First, TVETs and Community Skills Training centres are operated by the Ministry of Education, not by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. This results in a gap between the vocational programmes offered and the needs of the community as anticipated by labour surveys (CSA, 2014d). Thus, a simple expansion of the capacity to enrol additional students in a vocational training programme that is unsupported by economic and labour market forecasts could easily result in an under or oversupply of manual trades workers as those markets cyclically shift their requirements (ILO, 2017).

Second, as Cernea (2004) asserts, while new skills can be adequately learned through vocational training experiences there are few times where local demand for those skills is not already being filled by the market. In practice therefore, a too-rapid growth in the availability of newly-trained carpenters, electricians, brick masons, equipment operators or some other transiently popular programme may only depress local wages if sufficient and suitable employment is not available to absorb new workers. This is a condition that mirrors the situation created by an over-supply of university graduates where course curriculum is not matched to projected needs throughout the national economy.

Third, despite what should be observable market demand most male students have short-term planning horizons and frequently enrolled in courses for which there was an immediate shortage of workers rather than taking a longer view of local employment markets or
national economic trends. Although TVET administrators advise these students avoid the situation of labour saturation, administrators and career counsellors concluded that it is ultimately the student’s decision regarding what programme they will enrol in:

“We want to be known as successful and so we always advise students regarding what sort of jobs we think are going to be available, though we don’t have access to any market surveys to prove our recommendations. Students enrol in the classes they want to enrol in and we hope they are successful. Many are, but many others are not because there just isn’t a need for all of our offerings. Currently, construction and furniture making are popular choices because building projects are all around us and workers have money to buy furniture. But if the economy slows there will be fewer construction projects and the workers will no longer be able to afford furniture.”

*TVET Administrator, July 2015 (Interview 7)*

The consensus of the TVET administrators who were interviewed was that if the student, including both younger and older students, insists upon making the wrong career choice; is unable to assimilate into non-farm employment; or is simply not adept in the chosen occupational field, there are no curriculum adjustments that can guarantee successful employment.

### 6.7 Older Vocational Students

To build on TVET success, a programme known as “Integrated Functional Adult Education” (IFAE) is available to youth and adults from the ages of 15 to 60 years and who have not been able to attend or complete earlier schooling; with instruction in reading, writing and arithmetic skills. The principal objectives of this programme are to create measurable improvements in basic adult literacy, sustained economic development that is achieved through non-formal education programmes, and improvements in democracy and governance (MoE, 2010). Successful graduation from this two-year programme allows the individual to apply for admission to local Technical Vocational Education Training centres without having graduated from secondary school (MoE, 2015).

In their study of ‘Integrated Functional Adult Education’, Awgichew & Seyoum (2017: 90) found IFAE was likely to provide a range of primary and secondary educational outcomes including “literacy, numeracy and other skills development … making use of inputs from other development workers” and so its influence is, potentially, very broad. Yet, among the older smallholders interviewed none were aware of the programme or its potential to provide them with an alternative pathway to enter TVET (MoE, 2008; MoE, 2015).
As people age, they associate greater meaning and emotional attachment to group and place than they do to personally expansive goals (Carstensen, 2006). Where training is intended to provide new information that is not simply a reinforcement of past experiences the choice to participate is, Atherton (1999) posited, strongly influenced by the social outcome the potential learner considers may result from that education or training. This becomes especially so among older individuals as they see life changing outcomes as a potential threat to their long-held group identity, one which may challenge their “emotional investment in beliefs or practices, or by the greater disturbances caused by efforts to change them” (Ibid: 78). Those challenges are not necessarily, Atherton continued, posed by ‘big issues’ that directly assault social norms but more often by those which create a series of small confrontations regarding their individual behaviour and beliefs, or threaten their group membership.

These group memberships are important to whatever degree of civil resistance smallholders might be able to mount in response to their displacement. As Shock (2013: 282) noted, mobilization occurs through formal and informal ties to the community, although “the tendency for traditional mobilization is to be defensive rather than change oriented.” Without those group ties however, there is no foundation for social organization.

### 6.7.1 Older Smallholders and Vocational Training

The aging process itself has an influence upon the decision to enrol in adult learning. Reitz, et al., (2014: 287) noted that friendship networks become increasingly important as people age and the size of their social networks decreases, forming “an increasing focus on a few close relationships across adulthood.”

Writing about adult education and vocational training in the United Kingdom, Crowther (2000: 479) concluded that attendees tend to be the least disadvantaged in society and this includes those who are younger; from higher social classes who can afford to participate in educational programmes; and, those who are already educated. Non-participants are “typically older, working class; with a minimum of education; from lower socioeconomic groups, women and the unemployed.” In the United States, Maurer (2001) found a lack of willingness among trainers to engage with older workers who will not have sufficient time left in the employment market to make their training cost effective, and noted this is reinforced by a frequent lack of self-confidence among older workers. Thus, older displaced smallholders easily fit the profile of those who typically choose not to participate in adult education and who may be shunned by the
programmes designed to assist them. This becomes even more noticeable with the avoidance of individual risk which is motivated by the possibility of failure (Henrich & McElreath, 2002; Yesuf & Bluffstone, 2009).

Time Horizons of Older Students

In Ethiopia, the shorter planning horizons of older smallholders\(^{67}\) may explain why they are less likely to seek rehabilitative training or to learn new skills which are outside of their previous life experiences. As a result, they may become more willing to acquiesce to their displacement with its diminished social and economic conditions rather than learn new employment skills. Several vocational centre administrators explained their own admission priorities in terms of the length of time younger attendees might use their new skills as opposed to the shorter-lived economic returns of older students:

“\textit{We have no older students here because they do not have the academic background needed to apply, even though most could learn the trades we teach if they wanted to do that. Our focus is on younger workers. Younger workers have a longer period they can use their skills and so it makes sense to train them instead of older people who might only work three or four years before they choose to retire.}”

\textit{Vocational Center Administrator, July 2015 (Interview2)}

Though the government does offer rehabilitative training opportunities for older workers, such as the 30-day short-courses at the Community Skills Centre or the Integrated Functional Adult Education programme, only a small number of displaced smallholders appeared to take advantage of them. TVET administrators explained several issues pertaining to the degree of acceptance and internalization of the instruction by older students and how this also influenced their selection of older, displaced smallholders for matriculation:

\textit{“Few of our students are older, those who are usually do not take our short course information seriously. They want to keep doing things the way they've always done them, even though their circumstances have changed greatly from their farms to their lives in town where agriculture is different. We ensure our instructors visit the new businesses former students start to help us better prepare future classes, and so we see our instruction is simply ineffective for many of the older students. The short courses are otherwise well attended by people who are trying to start their lives over.”} 
\textit{Vocational Center Administrator, July 2015 (Interview 10)}

6.7.2 Success Among Older Vocational Students

\(^{67}\) Life expectancy in Ethiopia is currently 67 years for women and 64 years for men (WB, 2017).
Success among Ethiopia’s older vocational graduates does occur. A field interview which began in the office of the administrator of an urban TVET quickly progressed to a visit to a local poultry raising site whose operators had attended a 30-day short course. After completing training, a married couple who had been displaced from a nearby small hold by residential development rented a plot of ground and began to raise egg laying chickens. In the seven months since they had begun their business they were able to establish a brood of approximately 400 chickens whose eggs are sold in local markets for ETB 3 each, for a net income of approximately ETB 10,000 per month. This micro-entrepreneur said the operation provides her with:

“a very quick way to earn a lot of money with the help of a micro-business loan. Our problem now is to find a new, larger location where we can raise even more chickens but one that will [also] reduce the possibility of a single sickness wiping out our entire flock.”

_Urban poultry producer, July 2015 (Interview 8)_

However, older smallholders are often unwilling to undertake radical change and learn new non-farm skills. Thus, it is unlikely they will find suitable employment because there remain younger and newly experienced applicants who do not pose the same physiological or skills limitations older workers do (Crowther, 2000). This situation was neatly summed by a graduate of a TVET east of Addis Ababa who had joined with nine other graduates to form their own construction business:

“Some of our parents still farm their plots near here but many have been bought out and lost their land, so most of us had no option other than to learn a trade instead of becoming the farmers we’d imagined as children. The ten of us met five years ago while we were studying at the vocational centre and afterward we formed our own construction business. For people who want to work hard and learn to do new things, going into business is easy though we’ve been very lucky. The project here is a new government center with a medical clinic attached. We hire extra workers as we need them and pay ETB 80 per day, which is not very much but the work is not skilled. Mainly it involves carrying materials from one spot to another or holding things for the more skilled workers to finish. Many of our workers are older farmers who our families know, but who’ve developed no new skills and so we can’t pay them more because that would upset the skilled workers.”

_Entrepreneur, Legatafo, August 2015 (Interview 31)_

This realization of physical and aptitude limitations appeared to influence smallholder decisions to forego livelihood retraining where it was available and as they regressed into familiar peer groups and social settings, only choosing to partake in training or to find work when it was absolutely necessary after their land payments are exhausted. Rather than enrolling in vocational programs themselves, older smallholders in the study area were strongly supportive of the programme of instruction delivered through TVETs as a legitimate and potential means for their children to obtain a more secure livelihood.
6.8  Emigration

As described earlier, Ethiopia’s educational system has resulted in the over-qualification of graduates relative to the employment opportunities available. This imbalance has resulted in increased emigration of graduates with advanced skills out of Ethiopia. Long-term emigrés have typically completed programmes in engineering, agricultural technology, and medical specialities, making them among the most expensively educated and skilled graduates in Ethiopia (Nunn, 2005; Demissie, 2018). During field interviews, educators at the university level noted Ethiopia’s trend towards under-employment and several described emigration as one method their students are using to cope with the poorly performing employment market. One instructor succinctly described the social costs of emigration to the process of national development:

“There are not enough good jobs for graduates here and they are often able to earn far better salaries in other African countries, in Europe or the United States. That deprives us of the people and talent needed to expand our manufacturing industries.”

*Maths instructor, private university, July 2015 (Interview 9)*

Figures for total emigration indicate that it had declined in both real numbers and as a percentage of the population during the economically expansive post-conflict years of the 1990’s as predictable growth and development patterns were directing the economy. However, expatriation began to increase again among both the youngest and oldest age groups as the economy began to slow (UNDESA, 2013) (Figure 6.4). One explanation for the continued decline within the 25-to-44 year age groups is that emigration is often undertaken by unmarried people who are able to easily relocate (Interview 20). The stability of marriage temporarily decreases the likelihood of mobility due to the birth of children (Vertovec, 2007; Fransen & Kushminder, 2009). The subsequent emancipation of their children as they reach adulthood releases the now older and potentially better-skilled parents who are once again in search for employment opportunities or new life experiences choose to emigrate.
Although attendance at Ethiopia’s elementary and secondary schools is free, university education is not (Johnstone, 2003). The losses incurred by the nation as a result of emigration are two-fold. The first, and most obvious, is that the student takes her education with her. This deprives the nation of her potential contributions to its economic and social development. The second is less apparent as repayment of university fees only becomes required once the graduate is employed and her name is sent to the Ministry of Labour for cross-matching with the Ministry of Education to ascertain what is owed (MoE, 2015). Repayments are then deducted through structured salary garnishments. Departing the country for work abroad enables the graduate to avoid repayment. This creates a simultaneous financial and intellectual drain as the government neither recoups its financial investment nor gains a social benefit. This minimizes Ethiopia’s scarce resources as well as reduces the ability of the nation to alleviate poverty in rural areas, as fewer and less-capable graduates remain, adding to Ethiopia’s on-going development challenges (WB, 2003).

**Emigration Destinations**

Highly skilled émigrés often choose western nations to practice their skills. As example, “the nation's health minister has complained there are more Ethiopian doctors in Chicago [USA] than in his own country” (Foreman, 2013: 2). However, poor and unskilled workers also
emigrate. Among them, poor men often find themselves becoming barely-paid labourers on remote construction projects or operating dangerous equipment in hazardous conditions. Poor Ethiopian women without formal education were often found to have migrated to nations in the Middle East where there is a high demand for unskilled labour such as housekeepers and cooks (Demissie, 2018). Numerous examples of unskilled women who had taken employment outside of Ethiopia were found during the field work. In each case, their experiences were disappointing and resulted in their return to Ethiopia, though they were still unskilled and in at least three cases these women had forfeited their opportunities to complete junior elementary or lower secondary schooling:

“I moved here after I got divorced. The only thing I knew how to do was make tela. It was a good business until the wereda widened the road for the new housing project. Now people pass by too quickly to notice that I’m here, but without any education there are no other jobs from a woman like me. My daughter left school when she was 14 years old to work in Saudi Arabia as a servant. We arranged her employment and travel through a broker, but when she arrived there she was almost kept as a prisoner. They took her passport and refused to pay her for the work she did. She escaped after two years and returned here but now she is too old to attend school. She has no skills and no job other than helping me make tela.”

Entrepreneur, July 2015 (Interview 24)

Yet, it is this group of social and cultural risk-takers who are the engine of national economic redevelopment. Thus, the collective loss of both the highly educated and the ambitious poor to countries outside of Ethiopia wastes resources and undermines the very growth and development it seeks.

6.9 Conclusion and Emerging Findings

This chapter began by describing the educational process in Ethiopia, noting that shortly after the revolution in 1991 the nation’s educational system had achieved an increased level of quality, innovation and professionalism which has since been lost. While Ethiopia’s educational system is now able to provide almost universal access to elementary level education, only 47% of students complete the eighth grade (MoE, 2015). Paradoxically, the same system produces a surplus of secondary and university educated graduates who often become unemployed or under-employed for lack of appropriate opportunities (ILO, 2017).

The chapter also explored the second objective of the thesis regarding education and its economic and social disparities. It highlighted that vocational retraining programmes for displaced smallholders are technically available but generally out of their reach due to social or educational reasons and that even newly degreed professionals may be unable to find
employment in their professions. As unemployment looms even for professionals, they are frequently forced into situations of under-employment. This displaces workers with fewer skills who then displace workers with even fewer skills. Yet, under-employment not only drives down wages, it has adverse psychological consequences that have been shown to result in political instability and violence, which then cause further economic slowing and loss of employment (Desta, 2012; Desalegn, 2016; ADBG, 2017).

Access to education at the elementary school level is almost universal. Rural students however, are at a disadvantage as the distance to secondary schools often create insurmountable transportation costs which virtually precludes their attendance. In addition to the cost of transportation, safety concerns among girls, and the withdrawal of government funding for local schools that create educational service deserts, prevent further attendance by the majority of rural students. These barriers create horizontal inequalities between rural and urban areas and deepen existing conditions of poverty and unemployment. As rural youth remain educationally unqualified there are fewer pathways available for them to access skills-producing vocational training or higher-level academic education.

Numeracy and literacy programmes are available that might lead to admittance to vocational training for older workers. However, few had knowledge of them, especially older displaced smallholders, thus few had the ability to make an informed choice as to whether to attend them. Even if those smallholders had been aware of these programmes, vocational centre administrators were reluctant to admit them since space is limited and the working life of an older smallholder is far shorter than that of a recent secondary school graduate. Older workers too, noting a loss of their physical abilities, may limit attempting a new vocation and prefer to remain with their peer groups.

The observations of the public and private university researchers who were interviewed, and both grey and academic literature, find the decline in Ethiopia’s educational quality, initially noted in 2003 (Saint, 2004) was a result of a too rapid-expansion in enrolments. That decline accompanied by other socio-cultural influences, has subsequently increased labour costs as new hires must frequently be trained, educated and socialized before they can become productive employees. Manufacturing sector leaders state this need for retraining delays expansion and diversification of the industrial centres which might become a more suitable generator for the employment of both graduates and the displaced smallholders who are increasingly becoming assimilated into urbanized areas.
Emigration has historically been a means for the best educated to provide for themselves and their families, or as an escape from local poverty or other adverse social or political conditions. Emigration drains both the best educated, and greatest risk takers, groups critical for social and economic development. At the same time, the current derth of appropriate employment opportunities for both displaced smallholders and better educated youth is resulting in groups whose need for economic stability and social mobility are increasingly similar and unmet.

Exclusion from personal economic advancement is occasioning an already politically and economically damaging increase in civil disturbances among the educated. Bandura (1982) and Udogu (2005) suggest that as this group has already experienced personal success as they had advanced through the educational system, this may lead to elevated expectations for the future. Thus, unemployed graduates may be less willing to accept their situation, and therefore more willing to engage in civil disobedience to draw attention to wider economic and employment conditions (Desalegn, 2016; Okafor, 2017).

Finally, both academic and vocational institution administrators observed that while students often made poor career training choices, there are simply not enough formal employment opportunities available in Ethiopia. However, among the unskilled, a narrowly tailored training course, such as urban poultry raising, was observed to be highly successful and profitable. These courses met specific market needs and satisfied local demand for services.
Chapter 7

Conclusion

7.0 Introduction

The objective of this thesis was to interrogate the ways development unintentionally contributes to new strata of poverty and internal instability. There is a rich literature concerning the displacement resulting from Ethiopia’s infrastructure projects and international land leasing, yet a similar examination of the effects of expropriation and \textit{ex situ} ousting due to residential development such as is occurring east and north of Addis Ababa is largely absent. Ethiopia’s successful economic growth and social development policies and programmes have clearly benefited the majority of the population. They have resulted in higher real incomes; improved healthcare; greater access to education; and, better quality of life. Yet, unintended adverse effects have also emerged.

Among these are the permanent ousting of hundreds of thousands of smallholders in Addis Ababa’s peripheral areas (Home, 2016) to accommodate the housing needs of an increasingly prosperous urban middle class. This has permanently displaced smallholders who have few skills with which to begin new livelihoods. At the same time, a substantial expansion of educational opportunities has taken place, extending from elementary school to the university level. Yet, Ethiopia’s employment policies have remained closely tied to agriculture while little social investment has been made in the expansion of the manufacturing base or the inculcation of the necessary work and life skills that are required by employers (Mbate, 2016). Thus, while improved access has resulted in a more highly educated youth, a substantial number of that cohort are unemployed or under-employed and they have become socially displaced \textit{in-situ}.

Desk research first considered the highly erratic economic growth subsequent to the assumption of power by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front in 1991, followed by the calming effect of former Prime Minister Zenawi’s development plans which were introduced in 2002. Growth in national GDP reached a peak of 12.6\% per annum in 2005 though that rate slowed to a still robust 8\% in 2015. Although recent information suggests GDP is rebounding, there is not yet enough data available to indicate a clear upward trend (NBE, 2017). These outcomes have contributed to conditions leading to both new strata of peri-urban poverty among displaced smallholders and civil unrest among an educated youth which ultimately undermine Ethiopia’s investment in its economic and social development.
7.1 Main Findings

This research had two main objectives. First, to examine the role of Ethiopia’s state-led development policy in delivering outcomes that support equitable and inclusive pro-poor growth. Second, to identify the social, cultural, and economic dynamics of these government-led development programmes among two disparate groups: young graduates and smallholder farmers, particularly within and around the city of Addis Ababa. The findings are formed of six interrelated themes which reveal unintentional outcomes of the physical, economic, and social displacement resulting from development. These themes are: Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies; its education policies; delayed manufacturing starts; employment; liminality; and groupism.

Displacement is a pervasive and cross-cutting issue. Ethiopia’s successful policies have created a more prosperous urban-middle class who are now causing the ousting of smallholders who lose their primary means of livelihood and income. Yet, of the 46 smallholders interviewed, fully 37 spontaneously offered that they continue to consider themselves to be ‘farmers’ before they are anything else. This strong group self-identification was confirmed by informed local residents who have watched as smallholders are displaced from their livelihoods yet often choose not to take alternative employment until it has become absolutely necessary. When they do take employment, it is most often menial, outdoor, and low paid work which somewhat resembles their previous work as farmers.

Conversely, conversations with students who have become liminally displaced indicated they are no longer the same person following their education. Their accomplishments and educational experiences had made them ‘larger’ and different than during their previous lives and, in the case of rural students, they knew they have become capable of far more than returning to plough the fields. Of the approximately 35 students who were encountered, most related they had taken positions whose demands are well below their original expectations and new abilities.

In both circumstances, displacement has resulted in a state of liminality, where displacees neither belonged to their previous lives and livelihoods, nor had they fully entered the next phase of their lives. In this sense, both smallholders and students have become physically and socially displaced (See figure 7.1).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Expected Findings</th>
<th>Observations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Pro-poor Policies:</strong> to investigate the effect of Ethiopia’s centralized developmental policies</td>
<td>Social and economic policies would result in significantly greater opportunity and enhanced lifestyles for Ethiopians.</td>
<td>While Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies have resulted in longer life spans, increased access to medical care, and distress food distribution programmes, access to those, and others benefits, is often predicated upon support for the elected government rather than individual or family need.</td>
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<td><strong>Educational Policies:</strong> to observe and investigate the delivery and outcome of instruction at each level of the system.</td>
<td>Educational programmes would provide a greater access to employment and this would elevate the earnings of all Ethiopians.</td>
<td>While access to education is generally universal, and strongly supported by rural parents, non-completion rates are high among students who observe their peers have not benefitted from even junior secondary school. Older students were often jobless or under-employed due to a lack of demand for their educational background.</td>
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<td><strong>Delayed Industry &amp; Manufacturing:</strong> to better understand the lack of industrial and manufacturing enterprises in the study area.</td>
<td>Industry and manufacturing would be in the early stages of growth and that industrial training programmes would be available to meet employment demand.</td>
<td>Although several small industries and clothing mills were observed in peri-urban communities, managers stated they had great difficulty hiring suitably skilled workers. Rural workers were generally unable to assimilate into the rote indoor manufacturing processes that industry requires.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Employment:</strong> to investigate the generally subsistence level of employment among urban and rural residents.</td>
<td>Employment generating industries, businesses and services would easily hire displaced smallholders, newly graduated students or other youth.</td>
<td>Cultural and group-based traditional practices continue despite their often detrimental effect on modernization. Potential workers still eschew employment in manufacturing, hindering national development.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Liminality:</strong> to better understand the process of personal change.</td>
<td>Personal transitions from rural to urban lives or from educational to employment paradigms would be smoothened through educational and social programmes.</td>
<td>Both graduated students and displaced smallholders were frustrated with their inability to enter into new lives and livelihoods. They were often not socially accepted into new groups and struggled to develop new identities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Groupism:</strong> to observe the impact of peer group relations.</td>
<td>That while important socially, there would be relatively little other influence of groups; that groups could be easily entered or departed.</td>
<td>Peer groups where enormously important to the social and economic navigation of smallholders. They determined the livelihood direction of smallholders following their ousting. As a result, smallholders remained within their established peer relationships, often to their own detriment.</td>
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While there is no assertion made here that smallholder displacement contributes to youth unemployment, research finds a strong effect upon the employment of displaced smallholders as students / youth take jobs for which they are overqualified. This does, however, result in unemployment among unskilled workers, including displaced smallholders (Barnichon & Zylberberg, 2015). Therefore, development policies must be comprehensive and address such foreseeable unintended outcomes early in the planning process.
A Constructivist Approach

Selection of the three study areas was based on discussions with aid workers; with United States and United Kingdom embassy officials; and others with extensive professional knowledgeable of conditions in Ethiopia. Population movement was successfully and regularly observed in each of those areas. However, forced displacement and its effects were only observed in the primary study area to the east and north of Addis Ababa.

Taking its cue from those who are experiencing both individual and shared displacement, the research question ("In what ways does development unintentionally contribute to new strata of poverty and internal instability?") is answered through a constructivist approach in terms of “what is thought and what is lived” (Mills, et al., 2006: 2) as it examined Ethiopia’s development objectives and pro-poor strategies. Each of the three geographically dispersed study areas is contending with increased growth and different forms of development. Interviews of key informants throughout each area revealed locally recognized and significant issues of under-employment among newly educated youth, especially among secondary school and university graduates as well as the generalized lack of motivation by older small holders who have left their fields to participate in the labour market.

While observations of expropriation and rurbanization were limited to the areas contiguous to Addis Ababa, the findings here are not intended to suggest that forced displacement is not occurring elsewhere in Ethiopia. Moreover while the opinions provided by key informants, and the researchers own observations, apply only to the study areas and are therefore not assumed to be entirely replicable in other localities in Ethiopia, there are useful generalizable conclusions.

7.1.1 Pro-poor Policies

Since the 1991 revolution which overthrew the Marxist-oriented Dergue government, Ethiopia’s centralized, pro-poor social interventions have resulted in better diets and advancements in health care, especially in maternal, infant and elder care. These have resulted in much healthier and longer lives. Overall poverty has been reduced, and per capita income has increased from US$133/GB£85 in 1995 to $590/GB£471 as of April 2017 (WB, 2017b). Likewise, new roads are paved or cobblestoned and access to electricity has significantly improved. Key to achieving these results, and the stabilization of the erratic post-war economy,
was former Prime Minster Zenawi’s evolving programme of centralized economic growth and social development. From the initiation of his first plan in 2002, Ethiopia’s economy grew quickly and then stabilized.

Inadvertently, the success of Zenawi’s policies have now created a series of oustings as small holds in the urban periphery of Addis Ababa are expropriated to accommodate new demand for residential dwellings and commercial space. Observations suggest this ousting has atomized rural communities and their social networks. It prevents political organization by former residents who might contest their ousting and their newly degraded economic condition. Thus, pro-poor policies have not evenly, nor necessarily, benefited all segments of society and in spite of its high economic growth rate, Ethiopia continues to be among the poorest nations in the world (Gebreeyesus, 2014) since many of the poor remain poor.

These outcomes are not representative of the post-conflict economies that are predicted in the literature (i.e., Cevik & Rahmati, 2013; Del Castillo & Bunch, 2015) but are a reflection of Ethiopia’s own form of government and the development choices and policies it has chosen to pursue. Nyasha, et al., (2017) conclude that pro-poor policies do not always have a positive impact upon the very poor, and they found Ethiopia’s policies have been more instrumental in improving the economic circumstances of the new middle class. As discussed in Chapter 5, Ethiopia’s pro-poor policies have addressed many issues, but have not resolved the multi-dimensional character of poverty including its “voicelessness and powerlessness” (Daubon, 2005; Haile, 2015: 14).

7.1.2 Educational Policies and Outcomes

The developmental policies which Ethiopia has instituted, and which were explored through Chapter 6, have dramatically increased access to elementary and secondary schools, and the federal Ministry of Education (MoE, 2015) is rightfully credited for achieving the almost universal availability of local schools. Yet while far more children than ever before are being educated, for a variety of reasons attendance is often low and completion rates are disappointing, especially for rural children.

Throughout the field work area, children who would have been expected to be in school were observed to be engaged in the informal labour market, often as horse cart drivers, shoe shiners, or in other unskilled work. Such jobs do not provide these youth with the training or
problem solving skills necessary to take more appropriate employment as they come of age and their adult needs change.

Without the ability to obtain decent employment, their social acceptance into adulthood is delayed. Consequently, they can often neither marry nor begin the next stage of their lives as independent men and women (Honwana, 2013; ILO, 2013). In a larger context, their lack of education and skills frustrates the development of the nation as investors and foreign manufacturers who are attempting to establish new facilities are unable to find suitable workers. This hinders the ability of the nation to evolve from a primarily agrarian society to one which creates employment through manufacturing and technology (MoE, 2015).

The Effects of Too-Rapid Growth in Tertiary Educational

Given Ethiopia’s fast growing population, the rapid growth of its education system has also meant that training and education resources are stretched extremely thin and this affects the quality of instruction. Key informants observed that Ethiopia’s educational and cultural structure have not given sufficient emphasis to the development of appropriate work habits and social skills for what will become a potential labour force of some 82 million by the year 2030 (Yirdaw, 2016; WB, 2017c). The cultural lack of proper work habits and interpersonal skills manifests in four principal ways. These include (i) a failure to show up for work or to meet work deadlines; (ii) continued engagement in risky personal behaviour (Carrier & Klantschnig, 2012); (iii) a reluctance to train in new skills; and (iv) the propensity to reject employment or training options which would lead away from personal and place identities in ways that might threaten long-held peer group associations (Galbin, 2014). Therefore, in addition to what has become a lower quality educational process, the active failure to acquire ‘modern’ habits and skills preclude many smallholders and graduates from a successful entry into the labour market. This further restrains Ethiopia’s manufacturing expansion.

Similarly, as a lack of appropriate employment opportunities increasingly force graduates into circumstances below their educational expectations, they lose confidence in and become impatient with the Ethiopian government. While public demonstrations are viewed by the government as threats to the fabric of society, participation in them by students has become more frequent as employment opportunities are scarce and paternalistic social benefits are offered in their place. The sometimes violent civil dissension of youth who are demanding decent work is being securitized by the government as an existential threat to Ethiopia’s core
tradition of mengist social and cultural values, and has been met by increasingly repressive measures.

7.1.3 Delayed Industry & Manufacturing

Despite developmental advances and decades of social and economic progress, the overwhelming majority of Ethiopians remain smallholding subsistence-farmers who possess few non-farm skills (CSA, 2012; Bohnet, et al., 2016). Both the literature and field observations strongly suggest the dual emphasis by the government upon labour-intensive agriculture and higher education has contributed to the slowed expansion of entry and mid-level manufacturing enterprises. This has simultaneously, and circularly, resulted in a deficit of employment opportunities for graduates. As late as 2014, the manufacturing sector accounted for just 4.4% of GDP (see footnote #49) a figure which was “only 0.2 percentage points higher than its share in 2005” (Seid, et al., 2015: 7). The lack of manufacturing capacity and other commercial employment is restricting the growth of manufacturing and employment opportunities are not capable of keeping pace with Ethiopia’s rapidly increasing population or its now better-educated youth. Consequently, as noted in section 1.3, a large segment (54%) of that youthful cohort is currently either unemployed or under-employed (Yirdaw, 2016; ILO, 2017).

Younger smallholders were particularly frustrated by their lack of useful non-farm skills and by the inadequacy of the training opportunities that are available to them (AU, 2007; Belete, 2011). Post-displacement, few of the younger smallholders who were interviewed had been able to find employment that approached their previous earnings or which provided them with similar levels of autonomy their families had enjoyed on their farms. While rural children and early teens were sometimes able to become relatively well paid horse cart drivers or shoe shine boys, those jobs are not culturally appropriate for adults to engage in.

Economic Impact Upon Nearby Communities

Several kebele officials who were interviewed stated the ousting and rapid movement of large numbers of unskilled smallholders into the nearby villages and towns has now adversely affected the employment options and earnings of peri-urban residents. As noted in Chapter 2, newcomers drive down local wages and they and their families consume finite housing and social services such as health care and education in the communities into which they relocate. Thus, the localized movement of displaced smallholders has a wide-ranging and observable
socio-economic impact, portending an environment poised for increased levels of poverty and social animosity.

New training and educational opportunities have delayed the entry of youth into the labour market, and this temporarily relieves the immediate pressure upon the government to stimulate employment (Eight, 2013). While vocational graduates are finding fewer opportunities to work in the trades due to the slowing construction sector, professional graduates are increasingly unable to find adequate employment within their fields of study. Here, the absence of suitable employment degrades their perishable academic and technical skills and results in a loss of currency in their specialization. Therefore, educational-over subscription begins a chain of under-employment which can push many low and unskilled workers, who may already be at the bottom of the labour structure, out of the job market and potentially into persistent poverty.

7.1.4 Employment

Although economic growth and social development policies have dramatically improved living conditions for a majority of Ethiopia’s population, some groups have been injured and others have not fully realized the anticipated outcomes of their efforts. This is leading to widening class divisions, fraternal relative deprivation, and horizontal inequality among the rural poor (Jayne, et al., 2014). At the same time, as described by eight of the educational experts who were interviewed and by the former Prime Minister, better educated youth are becoming increasingly under-employed as the economy is unable to absorb their growing numbers or to use their more highly developed skills. These graduates are rejecting compensatory forms of social net protections and are increasingly demanding decent and appropriate employment, sometimes violently.

In the short term the lack of proper employment opportunities has led to unrest and political violence among some segments of the youth cohort. In the long term this has resulted in a further slowing of the economy as violence and the increasing potential of political discord reduce foreign investment in the very manufacturing enterprises that might otherwise create employment for both blue-collar workers and entry level managers (ADBG, 2017). Likewise, as export markets remain generally under-developed, the lack of skills, and individual acumen among workers also inhibits the creation of employment in value added industries. This has contributed to an increase in emigration, graphed in Figure 6.4. The continued lack of professional employment in Ethiopia entices an increasing number of the most highly educated to emigrate. This directly reduces the developmental capability of the nation through the loss of
the most talented individuals, while posing a substantial financial cost to the nation as the recoupment of their university attendance fees is not possible. Thus, the successes of development and education have inadvertently resulted in other forms of under-employment and unemployment, and Ethiopia’s growth and developmental success has by-passed many among its neediest population.

However, several of the educational experts who were interviewed did state that students who, for various reasons, return to their villages following graduation tend to improve local conditions by advocating for additional social services or for more frequent access to agricultural development agents. Thus, while their formal educations might not be fully utilized at least anecdotally, the effects of their education are seen as changing social conditions in positive ways. In this limited respect, over-education was having a positive effect upon the society.

7.1.5 Liminality

As defined by Rutherford & Pickup (2015: 706) liminality is a state of “transition from the old to a new being and understanding.” In the study area, developmental displacement results in liminal situations among both smallholders and students. Smallholders who are no longer farmers tend to possess few skills that are useful in their transition to a more urban environment (AU, 2007; Belete, 2011). Likely due to their physiological state or proximity to the end of their working lives, older workers tend to have shorter planning horizons. The social pressure to find work may be individually reduced and replaced by what Douglas (1992) attributed to strong social cohesion and a culturally low level of freedom of movement outside of their peer group experience. For younger children, the absence of observed employment opportunities following even elementary school is causing an increasing number of them to lose faith in the education process (Desta, 2012). Many discern few benefits of education and leave school at an early age. As they grow older and are no longer children, youth become economically displaced in their own environment through a lack of qualification for acceptable employment and this makes it difficult to be recognized as having become fully adult.

Particularly for those who leave their farms, villages, or urban neighbourhoods to obtain a tertiary education, many students become separated from their past and so they no longer fit in with their former friends nor have they obtained suitable employment or formed new professional relationships. Among these students, the social losses incurred through educational change are not necessarily tied to a place so much as to a past. Graduates and
better-educated youth become separated from their previous life-experiences and peer groups. Their new rootlessness resembles Murcia’s (2018: 2) description of those “who no longer have a place to call home.” It sets in motion the potential for anti-government sentiments and violence (section 5.4.1) among a segment of society who suddenly realize their future social and economic opportunities as adults are substantially limited.

7.1.6 Groupism

One outcome of this liminality is the observed tendency among displaced smallholders to remain within their social groups. As described in chapter 5 by land use agents, tela house proprietors, and textile plant managers, they often eschew offers of new employment to remain within their groups. This was a particularly surprising finding.

Legally mandated payments for expropriated land were reported by both smallholders and government officials as sufficient to sustain ousted families for approximately two years, however most of the oustees who were observed appeared to ignore the time limited nature of their windfall payments. Displaced smallholders in the study area typically took payment for their land and then resettled into the nearby peri-urban municipalities, finding housing as they could. They were observed to have retreated within small, tightly-knit peer groups who found it difficult to transition to new employment or wage earning opportunities. This was explained by local observers during interviews, including by tela house owners who described the individual and collective reluctance of smallholders within peer groups to be known or socially recognized as anything other than a farmer.

The social forces of identity and groupism which had developed over the course of a lifetime appeared to form barriers to the acquisition of new employment among former smallholders, especially if it might threaten the loss of personal and social identities. Similar attitudes of groupism, highlighted in section 2.6, were observed during informal conversations with students who perceived they were not able to achieve a level of personal or economic success that was similar to their parents’ when they were the same age. Ironically, and as explored in sections 2.3.2 and 6.4.3, in developing nations, rapidly increased educational opportunities for the youth cohort has often been intended to stimulate economic growth through ‘development from above’ and through the sheer number of educated individuals within the economy (Rasmussen & Sorheim, 2006; Bloom, et al., 2014). Lacking that developmental outcome, frustrated and restive students were not interested in compensatory social benefits provided by the government. Rather, they continued to demand honourable employment
commensurate with their educational attainment and to be accepted as adults within the community.

Realization of meaningful employment, as related in conversations with graduates, is not socially possible for them without the suitable opportunities that come from a more diversified economy, including manufacturing and its secondary employment effects. Several university educators who were interviewed concluded many youth are becoming exasperated with the limited prospects that are open to them, leading some to participate in violence related to their own group identity as students. However, the resultant social instability results in losses to the economic growth of the nation as foreign investment is slowed (ADBG, 2017).

7.2 The Implication for Pro-poor Policies

The contribution to knowledge of this thesis is the correlation of development and economic policy choices with displacement and under-employment among ousted smallholders and better-educated youth. It has shown that otherwise successful government policies and programs have had unintended and adverse outcomes as hundreds of thousands of smallholders are being ousted from their land and livelihoods, while at the same time an increasingly large youth cohort is becoming unemployed or insufficiently employed. These issues are particularly evident in the areas to the north and east of Addis Ababa, where rapid physical and social changes are taking place.

There are four key findings that contribute to the body of knowledge of Ethiopia’s development and which may inform future policy.

- **Physical Displacement**
  First, although living conditions, including infrastructure, health care, income, and education have unmistakably improved throughout Ethiopia, the growing economy has created structural inconsistencies in both opportunity and outcome. As better paid urban workers pursue new and more comfortable housing options outside of the city, smallholder displacement is occurring as an inadvertent result of the ‘rurbanization’ of peri-urban areas. In the study area, this modernization and development is inexorably displacing hundreds of thousands of smallholders (Home, 2016) ex situ. Their place attachment, social grounding, and a sense of bereavement at the loss of their identity was consistently communicated by oustees who had lost the place and past which they had known as home. Consequently, many struggle to establish a new personal or group identity.
Critically, the absence of farm employment coupled with a lack of non-agricultural skills places this group into a condition of chronic and persistent poverty among a densely concentrated urban population cluster where it had not existed for them previously. Their poverty is causing a secondary effect within the peri-urban communities into which they have resettled as the price of labour is being bid downwards and social services are becoming over-subscribed. Thus, their displacement is creating consequences which are beyond the immediate effects suffered by individually ousted smallholders and for which few plans have been made. Therefore, policymakers must actively engage, and more universally address, who may be harmed by successful development, including both oustees and the communities into which they resettle.

- **Educated Youth Un/Under-employment**

Second, an increasing percentage of Ethiopia’s youth have undertaken lengthy courses of study and, as graphed in Figure 5.3, educational attainment among the age cohort 15 to 29 years has dramatically improved. However, Ethiopia’s primary employment emphasis has long been upon agriculture, hence manufacturing and light industrial aspirations have been slow to materialize and insufficient employment opportunities are being created for entry-level managers. Thus, Ethiopia’s economic policies are inadvertently producing a surplus of university graduates relative to the availability of appropriate employment opportunities (ILO, 2017). Consequently, expectations for social and economic success among those students is increasingly unrealized (IMF, 2016).

As this educated youth cohort is inevitably forced to take positions that are well below their newly attained education level they, in turn, displace less educated and skilled individuals. This new form of joblessness and under-employment was recognized by former Prime Minister Desalegn in 2016 as a cause for the civil dissension and violence that is increasingly occurring among some groups of youth and students. The African Development Bank Group (ADBG, 2017) contends that violence has been at least partially responsible for Ethiopia’s recently slowed economic growth rate as foreign investors perceive increased political, social, and therefore economic instability.

**Extended Liminality**

The over education and under-employment of youth results in the third finding, as individuals and communities move from a known to an unknown physical and social environment. During this liminal period, both physically and socially displaced individuals are
not yet accepted or comfortable in their new surroundings, but cannot return to the former environment. While this state is often a normal and temporary situation, potentially resulting from such commonplace activities as marriage or retirement, the *ex situ* displacement of smallholders and *in situ* displacement of un/under-employed youth has resulted in an extended period that promotes a social instability which is inhibiting investment in Ethiopia’s modernization. Suitable work provides self-worth and a sense of social respect which Crivello & Van Der Gaag (2016: 33) assert “becomes even more important for youth in contexts of both economic and political marginalization.” For Ethiopia’s youth, an extended period of social placelessness results in the inability to be fully recognized as an adult. This impairs their ties to the community and may ultimately affect the stability of Ethiopia’s political and social system (Section 5.4).

Similarly, displaced smallholders are not only physically separated from their past, they are often unable to visualize and engage in their future. As they are paid for their land and then ousted, they become separated from the political and social system and are left landless and voiceless. While the majority of smallholders continue to conform to the mengist traditions (Vaughan, 2011) and rarely challenge the government, it is unwise to assume the hundreds of thousands of displaced smallholders and their families will continue to endure their circumstances in silence (Chapter 5) or continue to give allegiance to the local and national governments that have been responsible for expropriating their property yet who fail to provide alternative employment. Thus, policy makers should actively pursue programs and methods to better integrate these disparate, yet similarly affected, groups into the social milieu.

- **Changing the Emphasis from Subsistence Agriculture to Manufacturing Employment**

Finally, the current national development plan, the *Second Growth and Transformation Plan* as well as the concurrent *Education Sector Development Plan V*, continue to prioritize the polar opposites of subsistence agricultural employment and higher education. Although the current prioritization of agricultural employment is understandable given the population distribution of Ethiopia, those policies are not preparing the nation for its near-term future as the population approaches its predicted doubling by the year 2050 and little new agricultural land is available for cultivation (UNDP, 2012).

As has been shown, agricultural holdings are often too small to continue to support a growing rural population and so their subdivision is no longer possible. Substantial numbers of
rural children can be expected to resettle into already crowded Addis Ababa or other municipalities where youth unemployment is high. Without new means of employment, chronic poverty is likely to become desperate poverty and this will further threaten the stability of the nation. Policy makers should, therefore, seek methods to increase manufacturing and other industrial employment in parallel with more focussed training programs that increase the potential of Ethiopia’s human capital. These should be based on further economic development programs, including the creation of value-added exports, and should be made in concert with labour market projections rather than continuing to rely upon temporary employment through the current program of infrastructure development.

7.3 Recommendation for Future Research

This thesis has shown that while Ethiopia’s developmental policies have benefitted much of the population, they have also created adverse outcomes. As the thesis began, it noted Cernea & Kanbur (2002: 22) endorsed a reorientation from “the economics of compensation to the economics of resettlement.” The study has shown that while development has clearly had positive consequences, not all social problems will be resolved through increased access to education and that the economics of resettlement are not fully resolved. The inadvertent outcomes and likely undesirable effects of development can be addressed through further study. Specific recommendations for further study include:

- **Reassessment of Ethiopia’s Industrial Sector Investment and Development Plans**
  Much of Ethiopia’s current economic growth is the result of infrastructure construction rather than employment in manufacturing, however funding for infrastructure is becoming scarce and major projects are reaching completion. As fewer new infrastructure projects are undertaken, an increased number of newly unemployed men and women will be returned back into the economy (Wondifraw, et al., 2015; Clapham, 2017) and this may create additional destabilizing effects.

  Therefore, a comprehensive study of the future and potential of Ethiopia’s manufacturing sector, its entry into new export markets, and the inculcation of the non-farm employment skills which are necessary to meet the needs of the youth bulge, is warranted.

- **New Vocational Training Centre Entry Requirements**
  Participation in vocational education is impeded by the cost of the curriculum as well as by the strict academic qualification requirements that form barriers, especially among older
students, including among displaced smallholders. In conversation with vocational centre instructors, with the federal Ministry of Education, and with local business community leaders, it was not apparent there is significant interest in establishing a greater level of access for older displaced smallholders, or older students in general, despite their need for livelihood training. Further, the lengthy time frame which remedial academic training requires before application can be made to attend a TVET also appeared to significantly dissuade older, displaced workers who possess informal skills that might otherwise be positively channelled into industrial uses.

Therefore, research regarding the potential outcome of modifying the entry requirements for this older age cohort, including conducting evaluations of their mechanical aptitude, might demonstrate their informal skills. This may result in a greater acceptance of their training potential by vocational administrators. Research might also include an examination of the character traits of successfully retrained smallholders to promote the general acquisition of non-farm skills and the development of the social skills needed for reemployment.

✓ Cultural Regeneration

Ethiopia has a long history of using social programmes to facilitate its continued development towards a modern, adaptive society. These extend from Empress Menen’s school for girls which taught basic hygiene, to the current requirement for Oromo smallholders who apply for farm improvement loans to participate in social betterment classes such as family planning and money management instruction. These behavioural modification techniques have, according to several key informants, resulted in strongly positive effects throughout the Oromo region.

Therefore, research might profitably be conducted regarding the leveraging of smallholder group identities to provide a broader and more socially acceptable structure to participate in livelihood retraining. Included in this analysis should be the effects of cultural, educational and labour policies that contribute to under-employment. Particularly where investment in industry has lagged due to the lack of capable and skilled workers, training small, already cohesive, and interdependent groups may foster greater participation in non-farm employment and therefore stimulate the industrialization of Ethiopia’s economy through a larger and more engaged labour pool.
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