Decoding and Deconstructing the Muslim Brotherhood's Political Communication Strategy: 2013-2016

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Abstract

This study explores the political communication strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood following Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi's dramatic removal from power in July 2013. Combining content and discourse analysis to comprehensively examine the Arabic communiqués issued by the Brotherhood from July 3, 2013, to March 22, 2016, the study seeks to provide a better understanding of the movement's identity, evolving ideology, communication practices and its politics amidst a heated debate amongst scholars about these topics.

The thesis makes an important theoretical contribution to social movement theory, suggesting that propaganda techniques can be used to systematically codify precisely how the organisation has sought to frame itself and its opponents. It thus contributes valuable knowledge to existing literature about the Muslim Brotherhood itself and social movements in general. It argues that since 2013, the Brotherhood have followed a political communication strategy that seeks not only to resist regime representations of the movement as a terrorist organisation but frames itself to domestic, regional and international audiences as a moderate movement committed to democracy and progress.

The thesis argues that the movement designed its political communication strategy to achieve three strategic goals: (1) discrediting and delegitimizing the military regime that ousted President Morsi (2) winning the hearts and minds of the public and constructing itself as a legitimate representative of the Egyptian people and the Islamic faith (3) establishing the group as a legitimate political actor by presenting itself as a moderate, non-violent movement that upholds and adheres to democracy and a civil state. Accordingly, this study shows that social movement theory's concept of legitimacy as a crucial moral resource has been central to the Brotherhood's communication strategy in the face of widespread demonization. The Brotherhood's communication thus suggests an ideology that has become more politically pragmatic and moderate in tone. Indeed, the content of what the Brotherhood say about themselves has arguably consolidated the movement's ideological evolution from hard-core Islamists to avid defenders of democracy and advocates of minority rights. In particular, the Muslim Sisters have served as crucial female human resources as the group faces unprecedented persecution by Egyptian regime. Paving the way for the emergence of female leadership, this suggests that negative political opportunity can lead to the empowerment of marginalized groups within a social movement.

Contrary to much existing literature that suggests a repression-radicalisation nexus, I argue that moderation has been the movement's official response to the state's demonization of the Brotherhood. To reinforce its moderation, the movement has introduced a new term, not previously in the Brotherhood's dictionary: "the peaceful Jihad," thereby articulating an alternative conceptualisation of religious struggle. The ousting of Morsi afforded a political opportunity to deploy cultural and moral resources of legitimacy, moderation and democracy manifested through strategic self-framing.

Finally, the thesis examines the discursive mechanisms the Brotherhood has used to communicate these messages. Using strategic framing as a theoretical framework and the seven devices developed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in the late 1930s as a deductive tool, the thesis demonstrates that the Brotherhood's communication strategy strongly aligned with the seven devices developed by the IPA: more than one technique was identified in 98% of the movement's communiqués. The thesis thereby advances scholarly understanding of "strategic framing" by suggesting that the IPA's persuasive techniques can be used to reveal the specific mechanisms through which the Brotherhood seek to achieve their communication goals. By raising awareness of these techniques as a critical means of setting the Brotherhood's agenda, the thesis also serves to empower audiences and policy makers consuming these messages.

Declaration of Original Authorship

I, Moeen Koa, confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Acknowledgements

Dedication

To my beloved father who wished to see me return to my homeland having succeeded in my pursuit of this academic level, but returned to his lord before this happened

To my dear mother, may God preserve her, who did not desist from providing her encouragement, supplication and beautiful words of wisdom on my mission.

To my soulmate Asmaa, who endured patiently during my absence and preoccupation, whilst supporting me and my children in this endeavour.

To my carbon copy Leen, my sweetheart Rewaa, and the newest addition to my family, Eyas born and raised in my absence and who, despite this, I miss wholeheartedly.

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Abbreviations

- Content Analysis: CA.
- Discourse Analysis: DA.
- The Freedom and Justice Party: FJP.
- The Islamic Resistance Movement: Hamas.
- The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria: ISIS. Also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant: ISIL.
- The Justice and Development Party: AKP.
- The Revolutionary Command Council: RCC.
- The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces: SCAF.
- The First World War: WWI.
- The Second World War: WWII.

Chapter One: Introduction

Introduction

On June 24, 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi became Egypt's first freely elected civilian president after defeating his competitor Ahmed Shafik by more than 900,000 votes. He secured 51.7% of the vote, compared to 48% for Shafiq (Guardian, 2012). On June 30, 2013, after simply one year in power, millions of Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square and jammed all the main routes around the presidential palace calling for Morsi to "Erhal", or "Get out." These protests were even larger than the 2011 demonstrations that culminated in the resignation of Mubarak. Consequently, most of the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters were ransacked and burnt and clashes between the movement members and Egyptian protesters were rife. The next day, Tamarod or "Rebellion," the movement that organised the demonstrations, called for Morsi to step down or be forcibly removed. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF) backed their calls with a 48 hour ultimatum. On July 3, 2013, Defense Minister Abdel Fatah al Sisi overthrew Morsi and established an interim government with Head of the Supreme Constitutional Council, Adly Mansour as President (Spencer, 2013).

Despite the Brotherhood's dramatic removal from the helm of the Egyptian state in 2013, the movement remains one of the key actors in the political landscape of the Middle East. Understanding the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood since its establishment in 1928 has therefore been a primary concern of Western policy makers. From the 9/11 attacks to the election of Hamas in Gaza, Hezbollah's growing influence over Lebanese politics, and of course the spread of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in recent years, seminal developments in the region have led to a renewed interest in political Islam and the role of Islamist groups in regional and international politics. In 2015, Former British Prime Minster David Cameron informed parliament that "as the Muslim Brotherhood continues to evolve, so must our understanding of it" (Cameron, 2015).

The Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the largest and the most influential Islamic movement in the world (Matusitz, 2014, p. 181; Teitelbaum, 2011, p. 213), is described by many authors such as Pargeter (2011) and Zahid (2010) as a complex and controversial movement due to its ideological foundations and evolving political stances. For instance, while the movement "declares that [its] ultimate aim is to establish an Islamic state," it also "asserts its willingness to participate in the democratic process". Moreover "it broadly rejects the West and Western values, yet is increasingly anxious to be seen in Western eyes as a moderate organization that can represent the voice of Muslims" (Pargeter, 2011, p. 9). A wide and ever-increasing body of scholarship has sought to unpack these contradictions and follow the evolution of the movement through the critical lenses of social movement theory, to which this thesis makes an important contribution. In this regard, it contributes to the growing literature on social movements in four ways. The thesis asks: (1) How has the movement's ideology evolved post July 2013 and how does social movement theory help to explain this change? (2) How do Islamist social movements communicate to influence and how do they circumvent media bias? (3) How has political opportunity affected the Brotherhood's communication methods (i.e. cultural resources)? (4) How do Islamist social movements frame themselves and their rivals?

Objectives and Definitions

The main aim of this study is to decode the Muslim Brotherhood political communication strategy in order to provide a better understanding of the movement's identity, evolving ideology, persuasion tools and its politics, whilst also making a contribution to social movement theory.

Strategy is a term frequently used in the literature, but "notoriously difficult to define," since there is no consensus on its meaning (Farwell, 2012, p. 153). Communication strategy is described as "the most inclusive, although conflicting and contradictory, descriptions of the field of communication practice" (Holtzhausen & Zerfass, 2015, p. 9). It can be deployed to refer to a purpose, or

suggest a response or a choice. Alternatively it can signify a pattern of behaviour, a broader perspective or a plan (Jones, 2008, p. 7).

Christopher Paul stresses that "if you gathered 10 strategic-communication practitioners or experts around a table and asked each to define and describe strategic communication, you'd get 10 different answers" (Paul, 2011, p. 18). This thesis relies on a definition of strategic communication provided by James Farwell: "the use of words, actions, images, or symbols to influence the attitudes and opinions of target audiences to shape their behaviour in order to advance interests or policies, or to achieve objectives" (Farwell, 2012, pp. xviii-xix). Thus, communication strategy constitutes an intentional manner of communication to ensure meaning is created between a social movement and the public, which in turn seeks social change or political action. Accordingly, communication strategy can be defined as "purposeful use of communication by an organization to fulfil its mission" (Hallahan, Holtzhausen, Van Ruler, Verčič, & Sriramesh, 2007, p. 3).

Scope and Context

Lynch (2016) persuasively argues that the Muslim Brotherhood as examined in the literature over the past years no longer exists. He believes that "the principal characteristics that defined the Brotherhood's internal organization and strategic environment, and which guided political science research about it, no longer operate." He makes the bold claim that the Brotherhood after July 2013 lost their presence in Egyptian society, suggesting that the movement's organization has been shattered, and that it has no clear ideology and strategy. He considers that this has significant "implications for long-standing hypotheses and assumptions about the Brotherhood and Islamist politics more broadly. Researchers should therefore admit to greater uncertainty about the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology, organization and strategy than ever before". Moreover, "arguments that held up well five years ago no longer necessarily apply" (Lynch, 2016, para. 7).

Responding to this claim, this study focuses on the period from July 2, 2013, to March 22, 2016. The period consists of a critical stage of the Muslim Brotherhood's

history. It is the period that followed Mohammed Morsi's removal from power on July 3, 2013, by the former Field Marshal Abdul Fattah el-Sisi, who was elected in May 2014 as the sixth president of Egypt. As described by different media sources, this period can be considered as the most challenging for the Brotherhood due to unprecedented attempts by Egyptian regime and its allies to exclude it from the political sphere. More importantly, the Brotherhood's communication strategy in this period has thus far not been investigated. This period marks one in which there has been a significant metamorphosis of the Brotherhood's ideological and political agenda and a sustained analysis of these shifts may indicate how the movement could adapt in a crucial phase for both Egypt and the wider Middle East.

The empirical material analysed include the entire range of communiqués, entitled "Public Statements" issued by the Muslim Brotherhood from July 2, 2013, to March 22, 2016 alongside a range of illustrative, visual images. This online database constitutes the organisation's "official letters" to the public on different occasions and were chosen in this study because they formalize the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, these are deliberately constructed political messages in which the movement presents their thoughts and issue positions. Using official Public Statements helps to avoid any confusion between personal views of the Brotherhood's leaders and its "official" opinions. This choice of sources addresses an important and recurring methodological obstacle that scholars studying the Muslim Brotherhood face. As Wickham (2011) highlights, "the group encompasses a wide range of opinion, and we don't know which views prevail in what corners of the organization and why. For example, when [a Brotherhood leader] makes a reassuring statement or [another] makes an alarming one, it is difficult to gauge whether they are voicing a personal opinion, representing the views of a particular faction, or speaking on behalf of the Brotherhood as a whole" (Wickham, 2011, p. 218). Whilst such official statements may not encompass the range of views within the movement, they reflect the dominant frames of reference and discursive "habitus," prevalent within the "official thinking" of the movement. Bourdieu's concept of habitus situates discourse within a set of *dispositions* which incline agents to act and react in certain ways to reveal the practices, perceptions

and attitudes which are "regular" without being consciously co-ordinated or governed by any "rule" (Bourdieu, 1991, p. 12). Bourdieu's concept is therefore useful because it suggests both conscious and unconscious modes of discursive representation. Thus while official statements are clearly intentional in their attempt to communicate the organisation's position, a close reading of the language deployed also reveals the unconscious ways in which the Muslim Brotherhood regard themselves and their enemies.

Key Debates in the Literature

The Identity of the Brotherhood and its Ideological Evolution

The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in February 1928 by Egyptian schoolteacher Hassan al-Banna. It was to some extent a *revolutionary* movement against the predominance of Western secularism in the country. According to Commins (1994) "an observer of Egyptian society during the 1920s might have concluded that the tide of Western secular culture would soon sweep away Egypt's Muslim culture" (p.128). Al-Banna himself acknowledged this motivation in his memoirs as he called for "an organised movement to undo the dangerous influence of western culture" (Al-Bannā, 1981, p. 126). Though Egypt gained formal independence from British occupation in 1922, Western influence was promoted by political elites and members of the middle and upper social classes of Egyptian society (Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Al-Banna created the movement believing that all the problems of Islamic societies would be eradicated by a return to *sharī'a* law; that is, a full commitment to Qur'anic principles and the Sunnah (Campo, 2009). Specifically, since al-Banna believed that the West was the major cause of social degradation in Egyptian society, the legal, social and political structures of daily life must be replaced by the governing principles of *sharī'a* (Rosyad, 2006, p. 85). Therefore, the Muslim Brotherhood's initial aim was to inculcate a correct understanding of Islam and liberate Egypt from Western intellectual and cultural control over Egyptian people (Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 39). Al-Banna expressed this in his own memoirs, published in Arabic after his death:

> After the last war [First World War] and during the period I spent in Cairo, there was an increase in spiritual and ideological disintegration in the name of intellectual freedom. There was also a deterioration of behaviour, morals, and deeds in the name of individual freedom. … I saw that the social life of the beloved Egyptian nation was oscillating between her dear and precious Islamism which she had inherited, defended, lived with, and become accustomed to, … and this severe Western invasion which is armed and equipped with all the destructive and degenerative influence of money, wealth, prestige, ostentation, material enjoyment, power, and means of propaganda (Hassana al-Banna, cited in Abu-Rabi, 1996, p. 65).

In essence, al-Banna wanted his movement to be a mini-state in a state (Campo, 2009, p. 506). In February 2, 1939, at the movement's Fifth Congress in a famous letter called "the Muslim Brotherhood under the banner of the Quran," he defined Muslim Brotherhood as "a Salafi call [...], a Sunni way […], a Sufi truth […], a political body […], an athletic group […], a cultural-educational union […], an economic enterprise […], and a social idea […]" (Al-Bannā, 1939). Envisioning an all-encompassing force, al-Banna argued that there was no separation between the state and the religion, distinguishing the Brotherhood from other religious movements at the time (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982, p. 76). Al-Banna continued:

> It is our conviction that the rulings and precepts of Islam are comprehensive and organize the affairs of this life and the next. Whoever believes that those precepts are only concerned with worship and spirituality is mistaken. Islam is creed and worship, country and nationality, religion and government, action and spirituality, Book [the Qur'an] and sword (Hassan al-Banna, as translated by Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 40).

Since its establishment, the Brotherhood advocated two key slogans, which served to attract a wide range of people in the Egyptian society and beyond, particularly Muslim youth: *"Islam is the solution"* and *"Allah is our end; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our constitution; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our supreme wishes"* (Cesari, 2014; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009; Kassem, 2004; Voll, 2013). Revealingly, the contemporary logo of the Muslim Brotherhood conveys the same message. It is placed within a green circle and features two swords crossed beneath the book of Allah (the Quran), which has engraved on it the

phrase, *"Truly, it is a generous Quran"* (Arabic: إِنَّهُ لَقُرْآنٌ كَرِيمٌ), verse 77 of Surat Al-Wāqi`ah.[1] Underneath the swords reads, *"Be Prepared/ Make Ready"* (Arabic: وَأَعِدُّوا), taken from verse 60 of Surat Al-'Anfāl (see Figure 1).[2]

Figure 1. The original logo of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement

Thereby, the Muslim Brotherhood's contemporary logo abbreviates the movement's ideological principles. The presence of a Quran symbolizes that it is the constitution and the source of their code of conduct. The elements of the logo are embodied on their most famous slogans; *"Allah is our end; the Prophet is our leader; the Quran is our Constitution; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our supreme wishes."* The swords and the words "Make Ready" denote jihad.[3]

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[1] Al-Wāqi`ah (The Inevitable) is the 56th surah (chapter) of the Qur'an. The total number of verses in this surah are 96.

[2] Al-Anfāl (The Spoils of War) is the eighth surah (chapter) of the Qur'an, with 75 verses.

[3] Jihad is highly a contested term and possesses a range of meanings. "The word 'jihad' means 'struggle' or 'striving' (in the way of God) or to work for a noble cause with determination; it does not mean 'holy war'…. Unlike its medieval Christian counterpart term, 'crusade' ('war for the cross')" (Knapp, 2003, p. 82). However, in the modern era, the term was first introduced by Sayyid Abu al-A'la Mawdudi, (1903-1979), a Pakistani Islamist philosopher and writer. For him "jihad

It is perhaps not surprising therefore that when the Brotherhood won the Egyptian parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012, various foreign governments were puzzled about how best deal with the first Islamist government in a country so vital for Western geopolitical interests in the region. The UK, for example, commissioned an official evaluation of the Brotherhood in April 2014. The Committee concluded that: "The Government is committed to developing a much better understanding of groups which have been or are alleged to have been associated with extremism and terrorism, and has made further resources available for that purpose. The research into the Muslim Brotherhood will continue. The subject matter is complex, with significant domestic and foreign policy implications" (OGL, 2015).

According to Dr. Maria Holt, "Islamic involvement in politics is viewed by many in the West and some Western governments as being inherently 'dangerous' and probably undemocratic" (The House of Commons, 2016). Generally speaking, most Western states seem to conceive of Islamists movements as centring around the theme of radical Islam with the implication that they are an unreliable political actor in terms of shared interests and values (Amghar, 2007). A framing analysis of the broadcast transcripts of CNN and Fox News during the Egyptian Revolution 2011 reveals that the Muslim Brotherhood "most often was associated with radical Islam or as a threat to the democratic ideals" (Glover, 2013, p. 131). This perception of the Brotherhood could be why, according to World Time Correspondent Zalewski (2013), the U.S. State Department performed "all sorts of

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was akin to war of liberation, and is designed to establish politically independent Muslim states" (Knapp, 2003, p. 86). Some Egyptian Islamist thinkers, Sayyid Qutb for one, who was one of the Muslim Brotherhood's leaders, adopted Mawdudi's conception of jihad.

By contrast, the Brotherhood's original concept of jihad, as advocated by al-Banna, was an intellectual, spiritual activity and self-purification (Abed-Kotob, 1995; Yo, 2005). Umar al-Tilmisani, the third General Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood (1972–1986), reinforced that jihad was an important obligation for each Muslim. He stressed the existence of a holy interdiction against aggression and offensive attacks. Al-Tilmisani asserts that jihad prescribes "justice toward enemies and the guidance of Muslims to show mercy in this respect" (Umar al-Tilmisani, as cited in Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 332).

semantic gymnastics to avoid defining the Egyptian army's ouster of the country's Islamist President Mohamed Morsi as a coup."

Morsi made important claims to try to allay Western fears in the build-up to his presidential victory in 2012. He affirmed his commitment to the democratic process, promised not to turn Egypt into a cleric-led theocracy, and claimed to respect the rights of all religions (Aljazeera, 2012). Scholars and international observers questioned whether these claims reflected shifts that had taken place within the Brotherhood itself as regards its own ideological underpinnings and political agenda, or merely tactical plays for power and acceptance.

One prominent school of thought within this literature consider the movement as primarily a religious group that seeks power. Indeed, some of the more extreme of these studies consider it as a radical movement and a source of terrorism (Ehrenfeld, 2011; Lebl, 2014; Mura, 2016; Tausch, 2017). For example, Ehrenfeld (2011) argues that the Brotherhood conveys a fundamentalist dogma and the well-organized grassroots and mosques supported the movement to promote its "false image" as a tolerant, peace loving, and progressive organization (p. 80). Tausch (2017) considers the Brotherhood as equivalent to other radicalized factions even as it presents itself as "moderate." He believes that the movement has provided fertile ground from which armed terrorists can develop. Lebl (2014) has gone so far as to warn that immigrants from the Muslim Brotherhood would influence Western politics and society as they increase in numbers highlighting the potential conflict between Muslim Brotherhood values and Western interests (p. 118). With a strong focus on the origins of the movement, such interpretations tend to neglect the contemporary discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A more "moderate" wave of scholarship Khalil (2006a); S. Tadros (2011); Tibi (2008) argue that that there are no significant shifts in the ideology and the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood. They identify merely *marginal* changes that have not affected the central vision of the movement, which remains to establish an Islamist state. Some scholars note evolution of the Brotherhood's ideology in certain areas

such becoming more tolerant and pragmatic, but have highlighted ambiguous areas such as women's rights and broader civil and political rights in which more traditional ideals prevail (Brown, Hamzawy, & Ottaway, 2006; Harnisch & Mecham, 2009; Pahwa, 2013; Pevná, 2014; Wickham, 2015). For example, Pevná (2014) argues that despite the Brotherhood becoming more tolerant and pragmatic, it still understands rights of minorities and women through the lenses of Islamic law.

The most dominant, revisionist scholarship conclude that the Brotherhood has evolved to incorporate democratic ideals as part of their rhetoric and ideology (Dagi, 2006; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Ranko, 2015; Reda, 2014; Wickham, 2011; Wilmot, 2015; Zollner, 2009). Social movement scholars tend to relate such ideological evolutions to political opportunity structure. Political opportunity structure includes for example the configurations of resources and historical precedents of a social movement that enable its development in some instances and constrain it in others (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58). Based on this concept, three hypotheses have been established by researchers. These can be summarised as: repression-radicalisation; repression-moderation; and inclusion-moderation.

The repression-moderation hypothesis presumes that applying pressure and repression on Islamist movements combined with limited accommodation in the political process will lead to their moderation. Advocates of this premise include for example Dagi (2006); El-Ghobashy (2005); Ranko (2015); Wickham (2004b); Wiegand (2016); Yavuz (2009); Yenigün (2016). According to Yavuz (2009) repression by itself is not a sufficient condition to achieve moderation. Regime repression cause splits within a movement as repression provide new opportunities for more moderate groups to separate. A splinter group therefore must be given the opportunity to participate and, if elected, to rule. When the party is in government, it must avoid confrontation and seek further moderation in order to sustain its domestic legitimacy. Throughout this process, Islamists become more moderate as a result of learning and internalizing democratic values and norms. The argument

advanced is that in order to end authoritarian state repression, Islamists come to realize the virtue of democracy and pluralism (Yavuz, 2009, p. 10).

Oppositionally, the repression-radicalisation hypothesis proposes that mounting repression could lead to Islamist radicalization. This hypothesis is supported by many scholars (Anderson, 1997; Ashour, 2009; Burgat, 1997; Dalacoura, 2006; Esposito, 2002; Hafez, 2003; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Leiken & Brooke, 2007). The main argument of this hypothesis is that individuals and groups who experience the suppression of their human right to freedom of religion are radicalized (Lenz-Raymann, 2014, p. 23) because "in struggling for social justice, equal treatment before the law, and freedom of expression, these movements" are forced to "choose between a radical or gradual approach" (Wahid, 1993, p. 55). For example Esposito (2002) maintains that political repression played a significant role in the radicalization of Islamists during Nasser regime. Suppression radicalized elements of the Brotherhood and led members to transform the ideology of modernist Islamists into militant Jihadists (Esposito, 2002, p. 56).

Finally, the inclusion-moderation hypotheses suggests that Islamists will moderate their ideology the more they directly participate in political systems (Brooks, 2002; Brumberg, 2002; Driessen, 2012; S. E. Ibrahim, 2007; Kubíková, 2009; Schwedler, 2006, 2007; Tezcür, 2010; Willis, 2004). In turn, the "pothole theory" of democracy argues that the responsibilities and practicalities of governing force Islamists to depart from ideological appeals and focus on delivering on the bread-and-butter problems that people likely care about most (Berman, 2008, p. 6). Schwedler (2006) maintains that institutional changes such as political liberalization force Islamist movements to justify new strategies, such as establishing a political party. Islamist movements make persistent efforts to justify these new strategies that eventually generate new opportunities for future strategic changes that used to be "unimaginable." A virtuous cycles ensues in which 'ideological justification demands the justification of even more "unimaginable" [and moderate] choices (Schwedler, 2006, pp. 122-127).

Thus far, little attention has been given to the Brotherhood's political agenda and ideological evolution after the downfall of Morsi in light of these competing hypotheses. Building on such scholarly efforts, part of the current study considers how the political opportunity provided by the removal of Morsi in July 2013 allowed (or indeed forced) the Brotherhood to reformulate and reframe their communication strategies in response to unprecedented repression and exclusion post-July 2013. Therefore, this study attempts to develop an in-depth understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as a central Islamist social movement in the Middle East facing unprecedented challenges. In particular, it asks:

RQ1: *How* does social movement theory help to explain the evolution of the movement's ideology since July 2013?

Offering an empirically grounded analysis of the movement's communication strategy, can in turn provide a better understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood's self-identity, and its relationship to the Egyptian people and state, indicating the evolution of its agenda and ideology. This scholarly engagement with the Brotherhood's own politics through analysing its communication strategy after Morsi's removal is urgently required.

The Evolution of the Brotherhood's Strategic Communication

Before the Egyptian revolution of January 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood was acting mostly in the shadows of Egypt's political space. However, between 2011 and 2012, the movement was able to successfully lead the movement to victory through democratic elections. The Brotherhood's ability to communicate its points of view and socio-political messages, and thus its ability to attract growing numbers of Egyptians and influence them to gather around its ideology and political projects, demonstrates the value that a specific political communication strategy had for its success (Al-Arian, 2014). After its removal in 2013, the movement established an armoury of communication platforms in various refuges, such as the Turkish-based TVs; *Mikammilin* (We are continuing), *Al-Sharq* (The Orient), *Misr Alaan* (Egypt

Now) and *Rābiʿa TV*. This indicates the quest of the movement to communicate with the public despite its removal from the formal political sphere by the regime.

Generally speaking, Islamist groups pay great attention to communication. The Hezbollah's Deputy Secretary General Naim Qassem said that the camera is "an essential element in all resistance operations" (Matar, Alshaer, & Khatib, 2014, p. 53). Osama bin Laden went so far as to claim that, "it is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles" (Holbrook, 2011, p. 280). Donald Rumsfeld cited the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, making a similar claim for the important of communication: "More than half of this battle is taking place in the battlefield of the media.[4] We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims." Rumsfeld aptly observed that Islamist movements established "media relations committees [that] meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words" and that al-Qaeda had "proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communication" (Alexander & Kraft, 2007, p. 546).

Taking into consideration the significant differences between armed and unarmed Islamist movements, these quotes signify the importance of the communication practices for Islamist groups in the political sphere of the Middle East. Thus, understanding communication is vital to how we understand these movements, their power, ideologies, and practices. It for this reason, that by means of an-in-depth case study of the Muslim Brotherhood's political communication, this study contributes to our understanding of the Brotherhood as the largest, and arguably most important, Islamist movement in the region. It will also provide insight into *how* it has sought to influence its followers and public audience

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[4] This was during his speech entitled "Using Media to Fight Terror," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, February 17, 2006.

revealing both the communication strategies and the tactics that the movement uses in its communication while challenging the incumbent regime.

Many scholars attempt to study the communication of Islamist movements exploring radical groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda (See for example Childs, 2015; Corman, Trethewey, & Goodall, 2007; Klausen, 2015; Salem, Reid, & Chen, 2006; Weimann, 2016). In general, these studies focus on how Jihadists are exploiting cyberspace for the purpose of recruiting followers and will be discussed in detail in chapter two. The communication of Hezbollah (the Party of God) has been a principal focus of scholarly literature on Islamist social movements (Matar et al., 2014). The study of Matar et al. (2014) examined Hezbollah's communication strategy from 1982-2000, during which time the period the group transformed from an exclusivist Islamist jihadi movement acting outside the Lebanese political fray into a more inclusive political party operating within the Lebanese system. Akin to the Muslim Brotherhood during Mubarak's regime, Hezbollah's political communication strategy endeavoured to legitimise its role in Lebanon, synchronising this with social and charity activities and establishing new media channels in order to reach wider segments of audience, especially Lebanon's Shiites.

In works that have examined the communication of the Muslim Brotherhood, the majority of previous published studies have focused on the official English website of the Muslim Brotherhood www.ikhwanweb.com. (See for example Breuer & Khashaba, 2014; Chami, 2015; Dhar, 2011; Eissa, 2014; Mohamed & Mohamed, 2016). Scholars have concluded that this source base seeks to convey an image of the movement to Western societies that is modified for Western expectations (Selim, 2015, p. 143). Thus, they may not reveal some of the more controversial, or culturally specific ideas that might appear in the Arabic versions of the Brotherhood's communication mediums. This dissonance between the English and Arabic language version of the movement's websites was acknowledged by the sixth report of session 2016–17 of the Foreign Affairs Committee, the UK's House of Commons that was investigating political Islam;

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> In terms of their messaging, we have seen evidence that some political Islamist groups vary their message to different audiences and, in particular, that they vary content depending on whether the message is in English or Arabic. This is hardly a trait confined to political Islamists alone. But, in some communications, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood, the English and Arabic messages have proved contradictory (The House of Commons, 2016, Paragraph 60).

Accordingly, both intellectually and practically, there is an urgent need to subject the Brotherhood's communication in the Arabic language to sustained analysis.[5]

Theoretically, this study considers the political communication strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood as part of how social movements mobilise resources. In particular, the thesis considers the Brotherhood's communication within a cultural resources framework that includes beliefs, values, identities, and behavioural norms of a social movement that direct and facilitate their actions. Cultural resources also encompasses a movement's cultural productions such as music, videos, literature, social networks, blogs, and websites that help the recruitment and socialization of new supporters and help movements sustain their readiness (Edwards & Kane, 2014, pp. 215-216). Considering the antagonistic context in which the Brotherhood currently operates, this study attempts to understand how the production of cultural resources could help Islamist social movements avoid authoritarian restrictions. Specifically, its asks:

RQ2: *How* do Islamist social movements circumvent authoritarian regimes restrictions and media bias?

RQ3: *How* does political opportunity structure affect the development of Islamist social movements communication methods (as cultural resources productions)?

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[5] According to paragraph 60 of the above mentioned report of the House of Commons, there is an urgent need to "take account of this in its dealings with, and analysis of, the Muslim Brotherhood's communications in different languages in order to assess the sincerity of their public statements" (The House of Commons, 2016, Paragraph 60).

In particular the thesis uses the concept of moral resources including legitimacy, authenticity and solidarity support (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 217) to reveal how the Brotherhood attempts to use stated values to gain support, delegitimize the incumbent regime, and legitimize and brand themselves in the face of unprecedented repression.

The widespread demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood post Morsi's downfall

On August 14, 2013, the military's crackdown against a Brotherhood sit-in undoubtedly constituted the most notorious and brutal public massacre in Egypt's modern political history. This took place at *Rābiʿa al-Adawiya* Square where the pro-Morsi sit-in and protests had been ongoing since Morsi's removal. Egyptian security forces killed 817 protesters while they were trying to disperse Muslim Brotherhood supporters after 40 days (Guardian, 2014). On December 25, 2013, the government declared the Brotherhood a terrorist group (Guardian, 2013a). This came just nine months after acquiring their legal standing; the Muslim Brotherhood only registered legitimately as a civil society association under the Civil Association Law in March 2013 (Al-Awadi, 2013). On August 9, 2014, the Egyptian High Court dissolved the Brotherhood and its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (Aljazeera, 2014). Consequently, many of the Brothers' senior figures, including the movement's General Guide Mohammed Badie and ex-president of Egypt Mohamad Morsi, were detained. On May 16, 2015, Morsi and more than 100 others were sentenced to death (Guardian, 2015) and currently await execution, even it is recently claimed that if his treatment and medical care in Egypt's Tora prison does not improve soon, he could face a premature death (Independent, 2018).

These local repressive measures found much regional support. On March 7, 2014, Saudi Arabia formally designated the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organisation along with two jihadist groups fighting with the Syrian rebels; the Nusra Front and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (BBC, 2014d). On November 15, 2014, the United Arab Emirates designated the Muslim Brotherhood

and local affiliates *al-Islah* group as terrorist groups (Reuters, 2014). The Western world reacted ambiguously to this wave of anti-Islamist sentiment within Arab states. The UK conducted an intensive 18-month review into the philosophy, activities of the Brotherhood, and the government's policy towards the movement, led by Sir John Jenkins, the UK's ambassador to Saudi Arabia. As a result, while the UK did not ban the group, the Prime Minister, David Cameron, said that the Brotherhood had a "highly ambiguous relationship with violent extremism. Both as an ideology and as a network it has been a rite of passage for some individuals and groups who have gone on to engage in violence and terrorism." He also described the Muslim Brotherhood as "deliberately opaque, and habitually secretive" (Cameron, 2015).

Interestingly, the results of the UK review were condemned by a spokesperson from the Obama administration, asserting that "political repression of non-violent Islamist groups has historically contributed to the radicalization of the minority of their members who would consider violence. The de-legitimization of non-violent political groups does not promote stability, and instead advances the very outcomes that such measures are intended to prevent" (Emerson, 2015). Indeed Hillary Clinton described Morsi's election a "milestone" for Egyptian democracy (Gertz, 2016). Following President Donald Trump's election in 2016 however, the House Judiciary Committee in the USA approved legislation on February 24, calling on the State Department to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee, said, "The Muslim Brotherhood's embrace of terrorism and the very real threat it poses to American lives and the national security of the United States make it long overdue for designation." Rep. Mario Diaz-Balart, who introduced the bill, asserted, "the Muslim Brotherhood continues to pose a global threat." He insisted that "the United States must recognize and sanction the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization as part of [USA] national security strategy" (CNSNews, 2016).

The controversy as to whether the Muslim Brotherhood acts as a conduit for terrorism or moderation has raged unabated for long time. There is an urgent need

to address such debate at the time the Middle East is being reconfigured. In this thesis, I examine the Muslim Brotherhood views on terrorism in an attempt to establish the organisation's stated relationship to political violence. The question of whether the Brotherhood is being demonised or if it is in fact encouraging radical extremism in its communication is one that lies at the centre of this thesis. Therefore, the study asks:

RQ4: *How* do Islamist social movements use specific communication devices to delegitimize rivals and legitimize themselves?

To answer these questions, the study utilizes the concept of "strategic framing." Social movements theorists argue that movements frame relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential audience, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). However, strategic framing scholars have typically focused on the type of frames deployed rather than *how* such frames are generated (see for example Al-Anani, 2016b; Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Hafez, 2003; Ranko, 2015; Robinson, 2017; Wickham, 2004a). Accordingly, the current study attempts to fill such gap and make an original contribution to social movement theory by arguing that propaganda techniques can be used to explain how social movements communicate to influence, revealing the specific mechanisms through which frames are set.

Summary of methodological approach

Adapting Lasswell's now classic formula: *"who says what to whom via which channels with what effects?"* (Lasswell, 1927, 1948), in order to answer the above questions, this thesis asks, "*What does the Muslim Brotherhood say via their communiqués, to whom, how, and with what objectives?"* Modifying Laswell's formula allows us to understand the Brotherhood's communication more fully and to understand the defining elements of the Brotherhood's political communication and, in turn, gain a better sense of the Brotherhood as a social movement.

The study followed a pragmatic epistemological approach and was conducted in the form of mixed method research design combining content analysis and discourse analysis. In this study content analysis was deployed to measure the how frequently a certain persuasive technique was used. This provided an accurate, replicable, and valid inference about their messages (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 24). It was also used to measure the quantity of each code (A. A. Berger, 2012, p. 135) by coding text into categories and then quantifying the frequencies of occurrence within each category (Ahuvia, 2001, p. 139). This served to provide objective, systematic, quantitative description of the manifest content of the Brotherhood's communication strategy (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). Quantifying elements of the Brotherhood's political communication strategy also allowed me to deploy the *chi-squared* test to ensure that the frequencies of each category were not due to chance; the statistical significance of the Brotherhood's strategy was assessed using *chi-squared* test with a significance level of $P < 0.05$. Without deploying content analysis, it would not have been possible to test the null and alternative hypotheses that were raised to evaluate objectively the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of each persuasive technique utilised by the Brotherhood and to make sure that the appearance of each one was not due to chance.

However, despite the above advantages of content analysis, a purely quantitative approach alone would have significant limitations. Quantitative content analysis fails "to capture the context within which a media text becomes meaningful" (Newbold, Boyd-Barrett, & Bulck, 2002, p. 84). To overcome this obstacle, discourse analysis was deployed to fully understand the text's deeper meanings and comprehend how a certain message works in a particular social, cultural and historical context how the Brotherhood message may appeal to an Egyptian audience (Dresch, Lacerda, & Antunes Jr, 2015, p. 34).

The study used many strategies to ensure its reliability including reporting the process of the method accurately and the use of software, frequent debriefing sessions, peer debriefing (peer examination), face validity, and inter-coder

reliability (investigator triangulation). These methodological issues are discussed in Chapter Three.

Thesis Structure

The overall structure of the study takes the form of nine chapters. Chapter One introduces the research problem, questions, scope and objectives. It also summarises the means of inquiry and the data collection methods used. Chapter Two introduces the theoretical framework emerging from social movement theory and a literature review of studies on the Muslim Brotherhood. The first part of the chapter presents the theoretical foundation of the study and how it contributes to social movement theory. This section maintains that the current study provides original contributions to three branches of social movement theory; resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and strategic framing. The chapter moves on to discuss previous studies exploring the Brotherhood, identifying three main debates in this literature that the thesis contributes towards: The Brotherhood's identity and ideological evolution; the movement's communication strategy; and the widespread demonization of the movement since 2013.

Chapter Three presents the methodological approach, explaining how the study's data was generated, organised, collected, analysed and reported. It presents the research design and the mixed methods deployed showing that deductive and inductive content analysis was used in conjunction with discourse analysis. This is followed by a discussion and presentation of the procedures and the steps that were followed to operationalize the categories. Finally, the study's trustworthiness and methodological limitations are discussed.

Chapter Four traces the development and evolution of the media channels through which the Brotherhood has communicated. This chapter considers these channels as a crucial cultural resource through which the Brotherhood promote their beliefs and values and seek to mobilise followers. The chapter shows that such channels serve as cultural platforms through which the Brotherhood establish their identities and behavioural norms that direct and facilitate their actions. While some

social movement theorists argue that most social movements respond to extreme media selectivity and bias by adaptation, —acceptance or the exploitation of the rules and criteria of mainstream media to influence coverage positively— this study argues that the Muslim Brotherhood have responded by establishing their own media platforms in which their cultural resources can be mobilised. Benefiting from new technologies, such platforms help social movements to circumvent authoritarian regime restrictions and media bias.

The chapter shows how the Brotherhood have consistently incorporated new technologies and contemporary communication mediums. From its founding in 1928, the group relied on communication and media to recruit members. It adopted print media and published several periodicals beginning in 1933 with its first weekly newspaper, *al-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn*. In 1947, for the first time, the movement published a satirical periodical, *al-Kashkoul Al-Jadid,* which was comprised of text and caricatures to respond to and attack its rivals. In 1950, the movement published a judicial periodical, *al-Mabaheth* (the Detective), to challenge the government on legal grounds. Other print periodicals were published by the Brotherhood, but all were periodically interrupted and banned by the government. With the advent of the internet, the movement adopted this medium to circumvent the political regime's barriers and to reach audiences locally and internationally with activities varying from news distribution, to blogging, to social networking. A turning point occurred in April 2011, after Mubarak's resignation, with the launch of its first official TV station, *Misr 25* (Egypt 25), along with several websites and other media outlets designed to promote the group's candidate, Morsi, and his presidential campaign. As the Brotherhood was removed from power in July 2013, and with the subsequent ban of its media outlets, the movement proceeded to launch an arsenal of internationally based mediums to communicate, including three TV satellite channels from Turkey, in which the Brotherhood found a political opportunity to circumvent the Egyptian regime restrictions.

Chapter Five shows how the Brotherhood have sought to discredit the military regime that toppled Morsi. I explain how Islamist social movements attempt to

delegitimize rivals and the way they portray them. The discussion focuses on two concepts of social movements theory; legitimacy (considered as a crucial moral resource) and strategic farming (as a technique to demobilize antagonists). The chapter argues that the Brotherhood conducted a smear campaign to incriminate the regime and to damage their image, credibility, and reputation. Several strategies were deployed as part of this campaign to undermine the post-2013 order. These strategies include exposing the regime's transgressions, linking the regime with Zionism, stereotyping the regime and its institutions with corruption, and generally discomfiting the regime in the hope of winning people over at the expense of the regime.

This chapter argues that the Brotherhood deployed many tactics to expose the regime's transgressions. These tactics comprise questioning the regime's intentions, magnifying the negative impacts of the state's projects and plans, and portraying the regime as violating traditions, religion, and social taboos. Within the strategy of negative stereotyping the regime and its institutions, President Sisi has been described as "a butcher," "putschists leader," "traitor," "liar," "terrorist," "loser," and perverse." They also portrayed the government led by Sisi as "criminals," "dictatorial," "a tool at the hand of colonization and Zionism," "traitors," "fascists," "gangs," "thieves," and "the people's enemy." The Brotherhood portrayed the Egyptian media as misleading, serving putschists and "hypocrites." The judicial system also was presented in similar ways: corrupt and oppressive. Moreover, the clerics backing the government were portrayed as "hypocrites." This in turn explains how Islamist social movements endeavour to delegitimize rivals and the way they frame them. By deploying such negative frames, the Brotherhood attempts to demobilize antagonists.

Chapter Six reveals how the Muslim Brotherhood attempt to legitimize themselves and how they frame themselves in reaction to *domestic* attempts to demonize them. The first half of the chapter focuses on three concepts of social movements theory; legitimacy and authenticity as important moral resources, and strategic framing as a technique to garner bystander support. The second half of

the chapter deploy two further concepts of social movements; political opportunity structure and human resources. It highlights the role that political opportunity structure may play in empowering marginalized groups e.g. women in social movements.

Therefore, the chapter argues that in parallel with the smearing campaign to discredit the government, the Brotherhood has clearly attempted to win the hearts and the minds of the Egyptian people by launching a sophisticated branding campaign to burnish its image. As part of this campaign, the movement deployed several strategies. Central among these was appearing to speak on behalf of the people. Through this strategy, the Brotherhood has presented itself as representing the whole public, a grassroots movement that works to achieve the people's demands of "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity." Countering claims that the group was sectarian in nature, it stressed its commitment to put people's interests ahead of their own. I argue that as part of this strategy the movement adopted various forms of "love-bombing" to win new followers and increase its popularity. In addition, the group portrayed themselves as the primary representatives of the 2011 revolution and indeed of the free people. As part of this strategy, the Brotherhood claimed that the conflict between the Brotherhood and the regime is an extension of the original revolution of January 25, 2011, and that their sacrifices make them vanguards of the 2011 uprising.

The Brotherhood cultivated positive stereotypes of the movement. They presented Morsi as representing the 'free will' of the people, as just, courageous and steady, patriotic, a saviour, and devout believer. His toppled government was portrayed as the only leadership with constitutional legitimacy. The Brotherhood also portrayed itself as a divine movement, the right in the face of falsehood, protectors of democracy, patriots, martyrs for the freedom of the people, and the nation's hope. In addition to these strategies employed within the branding campaign, the group promoted equality between men and women in the revolutionary context. I argue that this in turn has paved the way for the emergence of female leadership and increased the chance of more political participation of the

Muslim Sisters, revealing how negative political opportunity can create the conditions to empower marginalized minorities.

Chapter Seven explains how the movement has framed itself in reaction to *regional and international* attempts to discredit the movement after July 2013. Hence, it argues that in parallel with the above two strategic goals (to discredit the regime that ousted the Islamist President Mohammed Morsi, and to win the hearts and the minds of the Egyptian people) the Brotherhood has attempted to appear as a key political actor in the Middle East's political sphere. The chapter relies on the cultural resources of social movement theory to explain how the Brotherhood is using the notion of democracy to present itself as a reliable political actor.

The chapter examines the contemporary Brotherhood's view of democracy and its principles, such as human rights, women and gender issues, pluralism, and minorities' rights. The chapter argues that fundamental shifts appear to have taken place in this regard, with potentially major implications for the broader political project of the movement. The Brotherhood has defined itself as the primary defender of democracy in Egypt, claiming that it is 'more democratic than democrats' themselves. This democratic agenda is being stressed at the expense of more traditional commitments to apply *sharī'a* law, free the Muslim world from foreign control and establish a free Islamic state. The movement appears convinced that democracy and political pluralism is a significant guarantor of its existence in the polity and the political arena. Brotherhood statements have demonstrated a commitment to the principle of the sovereignty of people and have explicitly linked the country's advancement and prosperity with the achievement of the peoples' sovereignty and their freedom. The chapter also argues that the Brotherhood has both rhetorically and practically endorsed the full citizenship rights of minorities. Indeed, on the human rights front, the Brotherhood has highlighted the selective behaviour of Western countries toward democracy and human rights. The movement has not only endorsed the goals of human rights and freedoms but also installed them within its communication strategy and stated agenda.

Theoretically, this suggests that the Brotherhood uses the notion of democracy as a cultural resource to achieve legitimacy, which is in turn a moral resource. More precisely, the Brotherhood deploys the concept of democracy to legitimize themselves and simultaneously attempts to delegitimize the regime through undermining the relationship between the Egyptian regime and the West by presenting the Egyptian government as an undemocratic dictatorship, and fundamentally untrustworthy. In light of the ongoing negative political opportunity structure embodied in the movement's exclusion and repression, it is likely that the movement will keep calling for democracy, for two reasons. Contrary to much existing literature that suggests a repression-radicalisation nexus, I argue that government crackdown on the Brotherhood has led to further emphasis on democratisation, rather than radicalisation. This means that the cultural and moral resources of Islamist social movements are highly affected by political opportunity structures which in this case is most prominently manifest through the self- framing of the group as *the* key defender of democracy in Egypt.

Chapter Eight engages with the controversy of whether, at the rhetorical level, the Brotherhood acts as a conduit for terrorism or moderation and whether the state's demonization of the movement after the downfall of Morsi is based on new authentic fears of radicalization in the group's discourse. It shows how the Brotherhood was able to frame itself as a moderate movement, in response to its framing by others as affiliated with terrorism. Theoretically, this chapter engages with the repression-radicalisation and repression-moderation hypothesises showing that the movement's persistent commitment to a moderate ideology and the tactics it advocates to ensure its members abide by moderation and peacefulness, challenges the argument of scholars that doubt the consistency of the Brother's moderation in light of the state's brutal repression of the movement, at the level of discourse at least.

The Brotherhood has used a range of reasoning and tactics to reinforce the idea of its moderation and peacefulness and to guarantee their activists commitment to such an approach. The group issued *"fatwā"* to endorse the peaceful approach and

refute violence also employed Qur'anic verses and the Messenger Mohammed's sayings and practices (Hadith) to promote its moderation and peacefulness, considering the "Peaceful Revolution" as the "Greatest Jihad." Contravening such teachings would cast a major challenge to the movement and considerably damage its reputation and integrity.

In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood has struggled to refute Qutb's legacy that has haunted them over the years and was successfully exploited by its rivals to challenge the movement and demonise it. Therefore, the movement knows the dear price of retreating to such ideology that would provide more legitimate cover to the state's repression. Accusing not just the Egyptian regime, but also its ally, the US, of sponsoring of terrorism allows the Brotherhood to be seen as a peace sponsor; an image that the movement is endeavouring to develop into a positive stereotype. Hence, the official statements of the organisation insist upon their absolute and constant condemnation of violence and terrorism. The Brotherhood has also strategically framed peacefulness as an act of devotion and worship. Accordingly, they have increasingly redefined jihad as a peaceful act or the "peaceful jihad," stressing that anyone who might be killed following these teachings dies as martyr. In this, the movement provides an alternative conceptualisation of jihad that diverges from radical Islamist groups.

Chapter Nine seeks to reveal exactly how the Brotherhood's arguments have been reinforced. Providing an original contribution to social movement theory, it argues that propaganda techniques can be used to explain how social movements communicate and the precise mechanisms by which frames are set. Accordingly, the chapter discusses the persuasive techniques that were deployed by the movement to show how political Islamist movements utilize persuasive techniques to advance their strategic communication campaigns and achieve their political goals. Using "strategic framing" as a theoretical framework and the propaganda devices developed by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) in the late 1930s and other persuasive devices as a deductive tool, this chapter demonstrates that the Brotherhood's communication strategy strongly aligned with these devices: more

than one technique was identified in 98 percent of the movement's communiqués analysed.

These findings indicate that persuasive techniques are being used by the Brotherhood as strategic communication devices to serve the goals of 1) discrediting the current military regime 2) winning the hearts and minds of Egyptians and 3) establishing themselves as a legitimate political actor. This case study advances social movement theory by suggesting that the persuasive techniques reveal the specific mechanisms through which the Brotherhood seek to achieve their communication goals. By raising awareness of these techniques as a critical means of framing the Brotherhood's agenda, this chapter also seeks to empower domestic and regional audiences consuming these messages.

Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review

Introduction

The chapter consists of two main parts. The first explains the theoretical and analytical framework used to analyse the Brotherhood's political commination strategy and give meaning to the MB's communication statements. The section argues that integrating propaganda techniques with social movement theory provides valuable analytical tools to understand the mechanics of the political communication strategy of Islamist movements. Accordingly, I start with explaining social movement theory and its three main approaches; resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and strategic framing. I then go on to introduce propaganda techniques, making the case that that such techniques can be used to explain how a group or social movement communicate and the mechanisms by which frames are set strategically.

The second part addresses related previous studies upon which this thesis builds and the literature to which it hopes to contribute. These are divided into three themes, considering works that explore: The Brotherhood's identity and its ideological evolution, the widespread demonization of the movement, and the movement's communication strategy.

Social Movement Theory

The study of Islamist movements and groups has been a subject of debate and disagreement among academics, to the extent that as "more literature is produced, less agreement among scholars is reached" (Al-Anani, 2016b, p. 14). Numerous studies analysing the Muslim Brotherhood have deployed social movement theory to understand the group's appeal and development (Mellor, 2018; Ranko, 2015; Richter, 2011b; Wickham, 2015; Wiktorowicz, 2004). However, other scholars have excluded religious groups from the category of social movements alleging that religion does not exercise serious challenges to the prevailing political or social

order (Beckford, 2003, p. 161). It seems clear from the below categorisations however that the Muslim Brotherhood should be regarded as a social movement. Social movements may be conceptualised as:

1) A network of individuals, groups and/or organizations;
2) Condensing around a common purpose and shared identity;
3) To challenge and interact with their targets, using conventional and unconventional actions;
4) In order to achieve specific movement goals (Cable, 2017, p. 186).

Social movement theory is a framework that is precisely geared toward explaining collective action and offering a logical framework intended to clarify the appearance, organization, strategies, potential social, cultural, and political consequences and possibility of success of social movements (Kuumba, 2001, p. 47).

The analytical framework of the theory comprises three key approaches; resource mobilization, political opportunity structure, and strategic framing. These concepts are helpful in decoding the political communication strategy of the Brotherhood as they comprise an explanatory schema of conditions of development and strategies social movements follow to achieve their defined goals.

Resource mobilization

Resource mobilization researchers seek to explain how social movements or rational and marginalized social actors mobilize successfully to pursue their desired goals (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 205). These scholars argue that resources are a fundamental link between grievances or the desire for change and the ability to mobilize around that desire (Edwards & Kane, 2014; Mahoney & Tang, 2017; Zald & McCarthy, 2002). Whilst "the existence of strain and relative deprivation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of social protest" (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 59), resources become critical for a successful social movement (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Jenkins, 1983). These resources include five categories as classified by

Edwards and Kane (2014); material resources, human resources, social-organizational resources, cultural resources, and moral resources.

Material resources

This category includes financial and physical capital; monetary resources, property, office space, equipment, and supplies (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 212). The clandestine nature of the Brotherhood makes it impossible to approximate the movement's material resources. U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, described the Brotherhood as "deliberately opaque, and habitually secretive" (Cameron, 2015), a view echoed by academic scholarship (Al-Anani, 2016b, p. 15; Milton-Edwards, 2016, p. 165). Scholars have found however, that Islamist movements do not struggle to fund their campaigns (Koa, 2007) and that the Brotherhood owns well-developed networks that ensures its financial survival (Metz, 2014, p. 209). Revenues of the movement have derived primarily from; "membership fees, contributions, legacies, and the profits from its economic enterprises, publications, and sales of emblems, pins, seals, and the like" (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, pp. 180-181). Their funding also include financial contributions from some Arab regimes, donations and alms (Metz, 2014, p. 209). As this study attempts to explain the Brotherhood's political communication strategy since Morsi's removal, it will shed light on how the movement's material resources have been used for media purposes.

Human resources

This category comprises resources such as leadership, workforce, experience, skills, and expertise (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 213). Human resources are critical in a successful social movement, with scholars highlighting leaders' skills as a central element. Leaders are essential to social movements as they "inspire commitment, mobilize resources, create and recognize opportunities, devise strategies, frame demands, and influence outcomes" (Morris & Staggenborg, 2004, p. 171). The Brotherhood founder Hassan al-Banna's leadership abilities no doubt contributed to the quick expansion of the movement. At the time of al-Banna's assassination on February 12, 1949, the movement's membership was estimated to have reached

500,000 (half-million) active members, excluding sympathizers and supporters (Campo, 2009, p. 506; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 199; Zahid & Medley, 2006, p. 293). According to R. P. Mitchell (1993), by the start of World War II, al-Banna and his close associates used their organizational skills and leadership to make the Brotherhood one of the most important actors in the Egyptian political scene (p.12). The movement's "membership became so diversified as to be virtually representative of every group in Egyptian society. More important, it made effective inroads into the most sought-after of these groups—the civil servants and the students—and the most neglected but potentially powerful, the urban labourers and the peasants" (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, pp. 12-13). Indeed, Mitchell described the death of al-Banna as having a "debilitating effect on the movement" (p. 299). Vidino (2010) has emphasised the literary ability of leaders to inspire and influence social movements noting that Qutb gained a following among the Brothers because of his writings while in prison (Vidino, 2010, p. 24). More recently, scholars such as Al-Anani (2016b) have argued that today's leadership of the Brotherhood lacks al-Banna's charismatic skills (p. 50). This study will suggest that women have become increasingly important human resources for the movement, with the potential for greater leadership by the Muslim Sisters. My argument is further supported by Biagini (2017), who provides a gendered examination of the Muslim Brotherhood, examining the activism of the Muslim Sisters post July 2013. She similarly argues that negative political conditions allow the emergence of female leadership. She maintains that repression of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013 has allowed the emergence of women's leadership within the movement because its survival became increasingly compromised since its re-designation as a terrorist group in December 2013.

Social-organizational resources

This category includes formal organizations that serve as the mobilizing structures for social movements, infrastructures, social ties and networks, affinity groups, and coalitions (Edwards & Kane, 2014, pp. 213-214). Tombaugh (2013) argues that the electoral victories of the Brotherhood in 2012 were predictable because their

organisational capabilities gave them a grass roots capability with "boots on the ground" (p. 50). However, Lynch (2016) argues that after Morsi's removal in July 2013, the group no longer enjoys a strong presence in the Egyptian society, that the movement's organization has been shattered, and that it has no clear ideology and strategy. Responding to this claim, this study focuses on the period followed Morsi's ouster in mid-2013 to indicate how its communication strategy has sought to confront the widespread demonization of the movement and restore (or compensate for) its social-organizational resources.

Cultural resources

This includes beliefs, values, identities, and behavioural norms of a social movement that direct and facilitate their actions. It also encompasses a movement's cultural productions such as music, videos, literature, social networks, blogs, and websites that help the recruitment and socialization of new supporters and help movements sustain their readiness (Edwards & Kane, 2014, pp. 215-216). Literature suggest that values are particularly important in mobilizing audiences. According to Metz (2014), some Islamist movements benefited from their resort to Islam, stressing their commitment to morality, family values and the goal to liberate Palestine (p. 213). Touraine and Macey (2000) maintain that "most Islamists, not least the Muslim Brotherhood, are modernizers who want to mobilize the cultural resources of their countries so as to resist foreign domination and reconcile economic openness with their cultural identity" (p. 136). Wickham (2002) aptly suggests that religious or, more broadly, cultural ideas, are resources in the struggles between regimes and opposition movements for legitimate authority and power (p. 207). To mobilise cultural resources, social movements rely on media, seeking news coverage for their ideas and activities. However, this is not always obtainable. Social movement theorists have identified several factors through which a social movement could attract news coverage and values: (1) The number of people participating in activity; (2) The degree of disruptiveness or radicalness; (3) Creativity in activity and its accompanying symbolic features; (4) The public prominence of individuals or groups supporting or participating in grievance

activities (Rucht, 2013, p. 257). He argues that "the greater the extent of one of these factors and the more of these are combined, the greater is the likelihood of ample media coverage" (p. 257). Mass media are selective in what they cover and their presentation; they mediate the audience's perception of the world by choosing the elements for audience to focus on and guiding the interpretation of these elements through framing (Bisplinghoff, 1994, p. 344). The reasons behind the imbalance of media coverage are varied and could include political leanings, partisan biases and ideological underpinning of outlets' owners or employees (Sobbrio, 2014, p. 300).

However, in response to the extreme selectivity of mass media in terms of coverage and framing, social movements react by abstention, attack, adaptation, or alternatives (Rucht, 2004, p. 31). Dieter Rucht argues that based on successive negative experiences with established media, a social movement has several options. It can cease to make further attempts to engage and withdraw to inward-directed group communication. Alternatively, a social movement can move to explicitly critique and sometimes incite violent action against mainstream media. A more collaborative approach is adaption: the acceptance or the exploitation of the rules and criteria of mainstream media to influence coverage positively. Established movements follow this strategy through hiring communication consultants or establishing a public relations department to deal skilfully with the media. Finally, established social movements can find alternatives by creating their own media in order to compensate for a lack of media coverage or bias and correct the distortions portrayed by biased media (Rucht, 2004, pp. 31-32). While Feigenbaum, Frenzel, and McCurdy (2013) argue that *adaptation* is a significant aspect of social movement media relations, this study argues that in the case of Islamist movements *alternatives* are more likely to be the way in which cultural resources are mobilised because the Egyptian state has successfully co-opted mainstream media into its political discourse against the Brotherhood. Therefore, this study traces the development of the Brotherhood's media channels, suggesting that Islamist social movements create their own media outlets to circumvent authoritarian regimes restrictions and media bias and that they tend to establish new

media structures when a political opportunity allows. As social movements fuelled by new communication technologies (El-Tantawy & Wiest, 2011; Harrison & Melville, 2010, p. 16), this study shows how the Brotherhood capitalized on these technologies post Morsi's downfall.

Moral resources

This grouping includes legitimacy, authenticity, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 217). The roles of each one of these resources are varied, for example, "celebrities can increase media coverage, generate public attention, open doors to influential allies and generally increase the recipient's ability to access other resources" (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 217). Public support is also a crucial resource for any social movement. For example, a key reason for the success of environmentalism, relative to that of most social movements, is that its goal of environmental protection is widely supported by the general public (Stedman, 2012, p. 65). Other scholars focus on legitimacy as a critical resource. For example, Hudson (1977) described legitimacy as an "indispensable political resource" for Islamist movements (p. 2). He argues that the lack of legitimacy "largely accounts for the volatile nature of Arab politics and the autocratic, unstable character of all the Arab governments" (Hudson, 1977, p. 2). Indeed, many Arab states encountered a crisis of legitimacy that helped the ascendance of Islamists groups and legitimized their cause. This trend of scholarship that focused on legitimacy as moral resource also highlighted the role of the Arab defeat in the Arab-Israeli wars, which weakened the Arab nationalists' secular ideology and fuelled Islamism. For example, Milton-Edwards (2016) claims that the Israeli victory over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in the Six Day War of 1967 was a watershed in the fortunes of the Brotherhood as the promises of Arab secular nationalist leaders such as defeating Israel and liberating Palestine proved futile. According to Haddad (1992), Islamists exploited this situation to delegitimize Arab regimes by contending "that the war was punishment for misplaced trust in the promise of alien ideologies that had been fostered as a means of mobilizing for modernization and development. The defeat was devastating

because the margin of deviance from the faith was great" (p. 267). She notes the change over time whereby "the attraction of Arab nationalism and socialism, dominant in 1967, has declined dramatically, while revivalist Islamism has risen" (Haddad, 1992, p. 266).

Deploying the concept of "moral resources," this study demonstrates how the Brotherhood attempts to use values of legitimacy, democracy and moderation to gain support, delegitimize the incumbent regime, and legitimize and brand themselves. Theoretically, this study argues that social movements tend to focus on the government's transgressions and sensationalize malpractices in times of political strife. This supports the arguments of established scholarship that "the crucial element of a social movement is its overt challenge to authorities" (Kriesi, 1995, p. 196).

Political opportunity structure

The current study adopts the recommendation of Edwards and Kane that how and when groups mobilise resources is "very relevant to analysing the full spectrum of contemporary movements" (Edwards & Kane, 2014, pp. 206-207). After resource mobilization, scholars must consider how the "political opportunity" to mobilise comes about and how social movements "frame" their cause (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 208).

Political opportunity structure is defined as "specific configurations of resources, institutional arrangements and historical precedents for social mobilisation, which facilitate the development of protest movements in some instances and constrain them in others" (Kitschelt, 1986, p. 58). Some social movements function in political environments that shape opportunities for success, while some regimes make it impossible for social movements to operate: namely repressive totalitarian political regimes that suppress any form of collective action.

Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that political opportunities and constraints form the calculations of Islamist movements and support them in making rational decisions.

Masoud (2014) contends that political opportunity contributed to the Brotherhood's success in post-Mubarak Egypt. He argues that, in theory, Egypt's dire socio-economic circumstances with 40% of the population surviving on less than GBP1.5 per day, should have primed it for class politics with workers and peasants voting for leftist opposition parties (p. 3). Why therefore did they instead elect the Brotherhood? Deploying the concept of political opportunity, he argues that impoverished workers and peasants were unable to wait for government welfare and redistributive policies to come into force. They favoured instant gratification in the form of election-day payoffs and patronage as the Brotherhood had the cash and links to provide such relief. Masoud (2014) claims that these economically disadvantaged citizens preferred the Brotherhood because they believed that the Brotherhood were more interested in social justice and redistribution than were leftists. This was a message that Islamists were spreading through their already dense and established social networks online and offline, whereas leftists were still attempting to build active ways to communicate with people. Secondly, the vastness of informal labour in the Egyptian cities, and the dominance of small and medium landlords in the countryside, blurred the lines of class struggle. Thirdly, both Sadat and Mubarak had systematically devastated the institutional basis for leftist power, while the state turned a blind eye to the proliferation of neighbourhood mosques, Islamic schools, charities, and communication channels, which together allowed for the Brotherhood's mobilization (Masoud, 2014, p. 25).

The overthrow of Mubarak clearly provided a "political opportunity" in terms of mobilising support and developing a communication strategy that culminated in an electoral victory. However, can these negative political developments also constitute a political opportunity? Abdelmajeed (2010) holds that the regime's repression of the movement had a positive impact on their popularity as it increased the number of sympathizers. He argues that the 2005 election, where the Muslim Brotherhood won 20% of parliamentary seats, shows a positive correlation between repression and electoral success. Similarly, Al-Anani (2016b) argues that the Brotherhood not only accommodated Mubarak's repression; they exploited it to expand public support and to maintain cohesiveness among the movement's

members. Al-Anani (2016b) asserts that the movement capitalized on the Egyptian regime's repression by generating the *mehna* (affliction) narrative. This narrative helped the Brotherhood to frame themselves as victims of the regime, encouraging citizens to sympathise with them (p. 10). Contributing to this literature, this thesis considers how the Brotherhood were forced to reformulate and reframe their communication strategies in response to an unprecedented negative political opportunity: extreme repression and exclusion post-July 2013.

Strategic framing

Social movements "frame, or assign meaning to, and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists" (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Social movements usually employ vocabulary and symbols from a "cultural tool kit" to offer common interests and values to people which forms a sense of solidarity that can trigger political action (Hannerz, 1969, p. 187; Swidler, 1986, p. 273). This helps social movements to frame political struggle in ways that resonate with the public and mobilize sympathizers (Okruhlik, 2004, p. 251). Wiktorowicz (2004) argues that Islamist movements employ framing as interpretive devices that convey grievances and recognise opportunities, transforming them into mobilization of resources and activism. Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) have highlighted the significance of meaning production in Muslim politics. This rotates around contesting both the interpretation of symbols and the control of the institutions that manufacture and sustain them (p. 11). Islamist movements have been successful in framing activism as a "moral obligation" that requires unwavering commitment to the cause of religious transformation (Wickham, 2004a, p. 232). Commenting on the power of framing, Gunning (2009) maintains that "it was this framing, drawing on existing ideologies and religious master frames that made high-risk activism seem imperative, whatever the costs" (p. 167).

Studies that focused on framing as an approach of social movement theory have predominantly discussed the type of frames without exploring *how* such frames are

generated (see for example Al-Anani, 2016b; Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Hafez, 2003; Ranko, 2015; Robinson, 2017; Wickham, 2004a). Al-Anani (2016b) contends that the Brotherhood's framing of regime repression as *mehna* (adversity or affliction) reinforced members' loyalty and support to the movement's leadership (p. 10). In Ranko's examination of Brotherhood's frames vs. the regime, she analysed two bodies of text. The first represents the Brotherhood, and the second represents the state's view. She addressed the two corpora with the same question: "How is the Brotherhood portrayed?" (Ranko, 2015, p. 34). She argues that the Brotherhood utilised different frames in different periods. For example, from 1981-1987 the movement framed itself as a moderate movement and presented itself as a "wannabe counsellor" to the state in cultural and religious affairs (p. 107). However, from (1987–1995), as the movement became the largest opposition in Egypt, the relationship between the two rivals became increasingly confrontational. The movement transitioned from framing itself as the regime's counsellor to the political opposition (Ranko, 2015, p. 109). According to some scholars, youth have been particularly susceptible to such framing strategies. Wickham's examination of the Brotherhood strategies of recruitment, emphasized by rational-actor models of collective action and "frames" of moral obligation, highlighted how the organisation helped motivate the educated youth to join the movement (Wickham, 2004a, p. 247). Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) argue that Islamist movements framed the authorities as infidels *(Kufar)* or as ignorants *(juhal)* in order to delegitimize them. They also framed Egypt as the land of unbelief *(dar-al-kufr)* because of the failure to implement Islamic law in life and governance (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12). This raises the following questions: Do the contemporary frames that Islamist social movements assign to authorities to delegitimize them differ from those employed in the past? How should one perceive the role that contemporary frames play in relation to the ideological evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood?

Therefore, by addressing the mechanisms by which frames are developed and consolidated, the current study attempts to fill a gap in the literature and make an original contribution to social movement theory. It will be argued that propaganda

techniques can be used to explain how social movements communicate as well as the mechanisms in which frames are set (Koa, 2018b). The following section introduces these propaganda devices and how they can be integrated into social movement theory.

Propaganda techniques

To achieve goals and gain the widest possible appeal, politicians make use of various persuasive techniques to be more strategic in their communication and approaches (Negrine, 2008, p. 195). Hence, to reach their ends, especially in competitive situations, political communication benefits from other disciplines such as marketing, advertisement and public relations through professionals and media consultants (McNair, 2017, p. 7). Analysing such techniques will help identify how the Brotherhood shapes the perceptions of their audience. To further advance the strategic framing approach, this study adopts the taxonomy of propaganda techniques created in 1937 by the Institute for Propaganda Analysis (IPA) as a tool to analyse how the Brotherhood communicate and frame rivals, events and ideas. The IPA was established in 1937 by Columbia University Professor Clyde R. Miller to educate Americans on the threats of propaganda from different sources, including advertisements. In the second issue of their monthly bulletin in 1937, the IPA published its well-known seven common "devices" under the article "How to Detect Propaganda" (Guyer, 2013; Jowett & O'donnell, 2014). The devices are tools or techniques to sway opinions through persuasive appeals. In this study, those devices will be called "techniques". This plethora of techniques consists of seven main devices; "name calling," "glittering generality," "transfer," "testimonial," "plain folks," "card stacking," and "bandwagon."

The IPA's goal was to provide the public with the skills required to distinguish potentially misleading messages by identifying specific techniques prevalent in propaganda messaging. This was in response to alarm raised "about the public's seeming vulnerability to extremist propagandists" (Sproule, 2001, p. 168). Today, similar fears have been articulated by academics (Badawy & Ferrara, 2017; Houck, Repke, & Conway III, 2017), governments, and media outlets as modern tools like

social media are being exploited to promote reactionary politics and religious fundamentalism (CNN, 2017b). Whilst this study does not presume the success of these attempts, it does seek to raise the awareness of audiences to identify and evaluate the persuasive methods that political actors and social movements like the Brotherhood use to influence them. Scholars suggest that once the audience is aware of the persuasive techniques, the effects of those techniques diminish, and it becomes the audience's decision to accept the message or reject it (Jowett & O'donnell, 2014, p. 167).

Indeed scholars have found that religious themes are particularly susceptible to the IPA's seven devices (Allen, 2002, p. 41). Allen utilized this plethora of techniques to show how religious rhetoric is an integral component of crisis speeches. For example, he demonstrated how Bush attempted to unite and rally Americans through an increased use of religious rhetoric after the 9/11 attacks. This taxonomy of techniques also was employed as a useful framework by Conway, Elizabeth Grabe, and Grieves (2007) to compare Father Charles Coughlin, who was a notorious radio commentator in the late 1930s and Bill O'Reilly, a contemporary presenter of the O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News Channel. They consider the toolkit, a "systematic and dispassionate approach" through which to focus on "rhetorical strategy and presentation of people and ideas" (Conway et al., 2007, p. 198).

Building on such work, this study rejuvenates the use of propaganda devices as persuasive techniques to explain how the Brotherhood advance their agenda and frame political events, ideas, themselves, and their rivals. More broadly, it suggests that this taxonomy of persuasive techniques can be used to explain how a group or politician communicate and the mechanisms by which frames are set.

Therefore, the following null and alternative hypotheses are offered:

H0: there is no significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analysed communiqués.

H1: there is a significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analysed communiqués.

These techniques are explained below:

Name Calling

In "name calling," a communicator intentionally attaches an emotional-laden idea or symbol to a target (Shabo, 2008). The use of this technique in politics was first noted during the two world wars. For example, during WWII, the American military and media made use of insect epithets to label the Japanese; "reptiles," "insects," "rats," "cockroaches," "vermin," and "baboons." The goal of using labels was to justify any action necessary for victory by the western allies (Steuter & Wills, 2008, p. 45). In the aftermath of the bombing of Pearl Harbour, America created a poster that derogatorily depicted the Japanese as rats. The poster displays in bold the words "Jap Trap" to brew anti-Japanese sentiment and hatred among the Americans. Many Americans used the term "Jap" as a derogatory phrase to refer to the Japanese (p. 46). See Figure 2.

Figure 2. An American poster from WW2 depicting the Japanese as rats (Campbell, 1943).

In a similar vein, this technique was the most commonly used technique by Father Charles Coughlin. Coughlin was a notorious radio commentator in the late 1930s. He was one of the first political leaders to use radio to reach a mass audience. Through his broadcasts that were called "a variation of the Fascist agenda applied to American culture," he supported some of the policies and agendas of Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Emperor Hirohito. Coughlin utilised the "name calling" technique 3.42 time per minute (Conway et al., 2007, p. 206).

More recently, "name calling" was the central technique used by the European press in France, Spain, Italy, the UK and Germany during the war in Kosovo in 1990 to build up negative social images of the characters involved and to direct the audience's attention to the emotive dimension of the conflict. Using this technique, the Italian newspapers compared Milosevic to Hitler and Saddam Hussein. He was called by *Il Corriere della Sera* the butcher, the Saddam of the Balkans, the last Stalin and the monster without a heart. This in turn made it possible to present a positive image of NATO (Savarese, 2005, p. 212).

In 2003, the USA and its allies used "name calling" to justify their war against Saddam Hussein. They demonised him with terms such as: "dictator," "tyrant," "murderer," "brutal," "madman," "cheat," "butcher," "repressive," "outlaw," "sadistic," "global menace," "despot," "terror-monger," "a monster, "bully", "thug" and "megalomaniacal" (Ryan & Switzer, 2009, p. 55). In addition, the technique was employed in the American political context. For example, Bill O'Reilly, the presenter of the O'Reilly Factor on the Fox News Channel, used the technique 8.88 times per minute. In 2005, his broadcasts called academics who criticized the Bush war policy as "anti-American voices" and labelling the estate tax that Republicans were attempting to eliminate, as the "death tax" and "un-American" (Conway et al., 2007, pp. 205-206). This technique has been used extensively by the American President Donald Trump to discredit his political rivals. For example, he referred to Hilary Clinton as the Devil and "crooked Hillary." He also labelled U.S. Senator Ted Cruz, his former primary opponent, "lying Ted" and called Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida "little Marco" and Jeb Bush "low-energy Jeb" (Dunbar, 2016).

Glittering Generality

While "name calling" attempts to make people form a judgment and renounce the credentials of an opponent, "glittering generality" urges the public to accept and approve political authority without investigating the evidence. It appeals to the popular emotions of fraternity, generosity and love by using "virtue words" such as "constitution-definer," "loyalty," "progress," "security," "change," "choice," "the right to," "glory," "justice," "freedom," "truth," and "honour" (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Sproule, 2001).

In the WWI, billions of dollars were obtained in the name of "Liberty," a pleasant term that nonetheless has no precise meaning (Shabo, 2008, p. 30). Some glittering generalities are effective in appealing to specific groups. He gives as an example the Nazi campaign to encourage farmers to return to work in their groves. In this campaign, Nazi's campaign based on the theme of *Blut und Boden* (blood and soil) (Yourman, 1939, p. 150). (See Figure 3).

Figure 3. A propaganda Poster by Nazis, entitled Blut und Boden (blood and soil) (Köhler, 1939).

Domatob (1985) who studied propaganda techniques in Black Africa, argues that this technique is "so pervasive that we hardly notice it" (p.196). He maintains that Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire (1965-1997), used this technique as part of his campaign to promote authentically African values and social practices, as a means of achieving national integration and economic development in the mid-1970s. For that purpose, he presented "authenticity," impressing many Africans states that adopted it, such as Gabon, Senegal and Burundi. Other powerful "glittering generalities" included: "African Soul," "African Personality," and "African Solidarity" to create images of unity and harmony (Domatob, 1985, p. 196).

In today's political fray, "glittering generality" is common. The USA and its allies used the term "war on terror" to rally support for its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many glittering generalities were used to justify the war on Iraq, such as "regime change," "Saddam is bad," "bring freedom to Iraqis," "make the world safer," "self-defence," and "combat terrorism" (Ryan & Switzer, 2009, p. 50). More recently, Trump's campaign slogan, "Make America Great Again," is an illuminating example of this technique (Dunbar, 2016).

Transfer

"Transfer" encapsulates the idea of carrying the prestige, respect, authority and sanction of something that is already respected to make something else revered and accepted. This technique can also work in reverse whereby something that is disrespected can make an associated object rejected (Jowett & O'donnell, 2014; Sproule, 2001). In this study, I distinguish between "positive transfer" and "negative transfer". According to Sproule (2001), such techniques are typical when the communicator tries to establish identification between a political project and the audience's respect of national or religious symbolism.

As with all other techniques, it was employed in the two world wars. In WW1, Figure 4 shows a terrifying gorilla with a pickelhaube helmet, labelled "militarism," holding a bloody club, labelled the German word "kultur," and a half-naked woman

in his grasp as he stomps onto the American shore. In this recruitment poster that aimed at attacking Germany, they transferred the brutality of the gorilla to the Germans to encourage Americans to enlist.

Figure 4. American Propaganda Poster published in 1918 using 'Negative Transfer' (Hopps, 1918).

The "transfer" technique has also been used to stop violence and wars. It was the most used technique by *Le Monde*, a French newspaper, during the war in Kosovo, to associate Serbia's situation with that of Kosovo in a way that "the West does not want to replay the Bosnian film again." Thus, by association, this worked as a reminder of the feelings already felt regarding other events, which were implicitly transferred to feelings on Kosovo (Savarese, 2005, p. 212).

The "transfer" technique is popular in contemporary political posturing. For example, the US Republicans usually represent Jeffersonian ideals in political debates as positive transfer (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004, p. 165). In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, President Bush was portrayed as "a leader whom the nation could follow," providing implicit backing for the administration's rejoinder

to the attacks (Ryan & Switzer, 2009, p. 54). Drawing on Carl Schmitt's "friend-enemy distinction" it serves to legitimize the actions politicians take and can buttress their authority at critical times (Schmitt, 1996).

Card Stacking (Selective Omission)

"Card stacking" effectively involves telling half-truths. The phrase was first coined with regards to gambling, in which card players attempt to stack the deck in their favour (Tidwell, 1958). It is the selection and use of facts or falsehoods, illustrations or distractions, logical or illogical statements to give the best or the worst possible case for an idea, program, person, or product. This selective presentation or framing of issues seeks to win the target audience's support for the politicians themselves, their organization or ideas, beliefs, and groups (Jowett & O'donnell, 2014; Sproule, 2001). It involves presenting information out of context or providing obscure significant facts (Shabo, 2008).

Success or failure depends on how successful the politician is in selecting facts or "cards" and presenting or "stacking" them (Vincent, 2007, p. 251). When 'Card Stacking' involves falsehood, it might arouse hatred. It was used in this way by Hitler to influence the Germans and rally the people against the Reich's enemies (Yourman, 1939, p. 158).

Plain Folks

Politicians attempt to convince target audiences through language or actions that convey that their ideas are good because they are "of the people," the "plain folks", giving themselves the common touch with the targets. They try to appear as if they are from humble origins and carry the peoples' interests at heart and, therefore, should be trusted (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Severin & Tankard, 2013). From the World War context, the U.S. Government Printing Office published a poster in 1942 to make its point showing the famous, professional world heavyweight-boxing champion, Joe Louis, charging with bayoneted rifle and says; "We're going to do our part, and we'll win because we're on God's side" (see Figure 5). Louis fought for the USA during WWII. In the poster, he was portrayed

as an average soldier. Pvt. in the poster stands for "private," that is the lowest rank in the American military.

Figure 5. "Plain folks" poster showing champion Joe Louis charging with bayoneted rifle (Government Printing Office, 1942).

For instance, the US senator George McGovern's 1972 presidential campaign used a poster of his face blended in among the smiles of 'Plain Folk' of different ages, ethnicities, and professions (Shabo, 2008, p. 58). Similarly the President of Cameroun (1960 –1982), Ahmadou Ahidjo, and President of Nigeria (1979 –1983), Shehu Shagari, frequently wore overflowing gowns, embroidered and beaded caps to identify themselves with their constituencies in northern Cameroun and Nigeria (Domatob, 1985, p. 199).

Other Islamist groups have deployed similar strategies. In particular, the Hezbollah's veteran leader, Hassan Nasrallah, was successful in presenting himself as a "plain folk." This was an image that provided him with huge popularity to the

extent he was "described as a man of the street and a brother among equals" (Matar, 2014, p. 165). The people pronounced Nasrallah as "one of us;" an image that was boosted by his austere and simple lifestyle. His actual translation of "plain folk" as attitudes in his lifestyle reinforced his image as an organic leader with concrete links with the people (Matar, 2014, p. 166). This image of Nasrallah was utilised to restore Hezbollah's reputation after their ideological hegemony was destabilised after the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, and following establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon to investigate the incident and indicted Hezbollah (Matar, 2014, p. 177). In a more recent vein, Vergani and Bliuc (2015) argue that ISIS has been increasingly utilising internet jargon (net-speak) to adapt itself to the internet environment and connect with the identities of young people. This can also be considered a form of "plain folk" as ISIS seek to deploy the most commonly used discourse by the social media users who are their primary constituency.

Testimonial

"Testimonial" consists of having some respected or admired person endorse a given idea, program, project, product or person, hoping that the targeted audiences will follow their example. The British Parliamentary Recruiting Committee used this technique as part of their recruitment campaign during WWI. See (Figure 6) that depicts a British soldier in his respected British army apparel carrying his rifle over his shoulder, calling citizens to follow him and enlist, as he looks directly at the viewer. The soldier serves as the best testimony, since he is the one who is sacrificing his blood for his country.

This technique can also work in reverse by using a hated, unqualified or disrespected person to present or endorse an idea or project, which can yield a negative outcome (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004; Jowett & O'donnell, 2014). An example of "negative testimonial" might be; "I'm Bill Clinton, and I believe in chastity and self-denial" (Johnson-Cartee & Copeland, 2004, p. 166).

In recent political fray, Donald Trump used many prolific businessmen to endorse his campaign such as Colony Capital CEO Tom Barrack, who delivered a testimonial for Trump at the party convention in July 2016 (Horsley, 2016).

Figure 6. Testimonial: A British poster from WWI, published in November 1914, depicting a soldier in army apparel calling people to follow him and enlist (Kealey, 1914).

Bandwagon (Peer Pressure)

The metaphorical label of the "bandwagon device" goes back to the late 19th century in American politics and "alludes to the wagon in a parade that carries the band and attracts a large crowd of followers marching behind it to enjoy the music" (Schmitt-Beck, 2016, p. 57). The goal of this technique is to make people follow the crowd and accept the politician's agenda. The "bandwagon" device relied on the idea that "everybody is doing it!" Therefore, you should be doing it too (IPA, 1939, p. 97). The "bandwagon effect" is also referred to as "contagion effect" (Schmitt-Beck, 2016, p. 57). The communicator here appeals to the masses' desire

to be a part of a phenomenon and that their peers are accepting the program or the idea and they should join in rather than be left out (Jowett & O'donnell, 2014; Sproule, 2001). According to Sproule (2001), the communicator usually appeals to ties of nationality, religion, race, vocation, region, sex, or occupation to do this. This technique exploits what is called "the herding instinct," whereby people prefer to belong to the majority and hate being left out. Hence, (Shabo, 2008, p. 18). For example scholars have found that when voters learn that a party is gaining in the polls, other voters will be more likely to vote for it (Dahlgaard, Hansen, Hansen, & Larsen, 2016). The mechanism of this technique can be explained through the Spiral of Silence theory. This theory assumes that people are less likely to present their thoughts if they feel that others do not share the same opinion. As a consequence, people prefer to be congruent with prevailing opinion because they fear isolation (Littlejohn & Foss, 2009, p. 625).

In the context of WWI, the Allies and the Axis used this technique to urge people to enlist. For example, the USA in (Figure 7) aims to convince the audience to enlist in the army as "fifty thousand men are going over to relieve." Therefore, this is "your chance" to join the cause and fight for your country; otherwise, "you" will lose the chance to serve your country as others are doing because contributing is a duty for every patriot.

Figure 7. Bandwagon: A USA poster from WW I aimed at urging citizens to enlist in the army (Grant, 1918).

Assertion

This technique involves stating arguable ideas as facts without any explanation or justification such as saying "The Middle East will never be at peace" (Shabo, 2008, p. 11). According to Manning and Wyatt (2011) the USA, for example, used the assertion that Saddam Hussein colluded with al-Qaeda in the 9/11 attacks to justify its war on Iraq.

"Assertion" is a form of the (Big Lie) technique that was introduced by Adolf Hitler in his 1925 book, *Mein Kampf*. Hitler considered the lie as so "colossal" that nobody would believe that somebody "could have the impudence to distort the truth so infamously" (Hitler, 1939, p. 185). He believed that this technique was typically utilised by the Jews. For example, according to him, they used it to blame the loss of Germany in WW1 on Erich Ludendorff, a German Military officer.

False dilemma

This technique is based on "reducing a complex argument to a small number of alternatives and concluding that only one option is appropriate", for instance, claiming that one party is saving the country, while the others are ruining it. During the two world wars, this technique was deployed heavily. For example, during WWI, a British Poster from 1915 targeted women of Lancashire as part of the Recruitment Campaign during the years 1914-1916 (see Figure 8) urging them not to "keep back a son or sweetheart" because, if they do, they "are prolonging the War and adding to the peril of those who have gone." Hence, this technique is usually described as "either this or that" and as "omissions of choices" (Bennett, 2012, p. 198).

Figure 8. False Dilemma: A British Poster from 1915, targeted "Women of Lancashire" (Imperial War Museums, 1915)

During WWII, Germans used a poster with the following caption, *"Shame on you, chatterer! The enemy is listening. Silence is your duty!"* The poster aimed to encourage the audience to stop talking, because otherwise they would be assisting Germany's enemies (Shabo, 2008, p. 36). See Figure 9.

Figure 9. False Dilemma: A German poster from 1943, entitled "Shame on you, chatterer! The enemy is listening. Silence is your duty!" (Schroff-Druck, 1943).

On November 17, 2015, the Daily Mail Newspaper used the "False-Dilemma" to incite Europeans against Muslim refugees, especially those who fled the war in Syria, in an attempt to stop them from crossing the European borders seeking shelters. The newspaper published a cartoon by Stanley McMurtry, who is known as MAC, depicting refugee Muslim men with big noses and beards, one of them carrying a prayer mat and another one with a gun, a Muslim woman with big nose wearing the hijab, and rats crossing the European borders (See MAC, 2015, for the Daily Mail) or Figure 10 below. In this cartoon, MAC attempts to convey a message; we let them cross the borders with their rats (dirtiness), guns (terrorism),

and religion or we keep them out and thus, keep Europe clean, safe and Christian. It attempts to confirm a range of negative stereotypes and instil fear in the Europeans hearts.

Figure 10. The Daily Mail Cartoon "Europe's Open Borders" (Dailymail.co.uk, 2015).

In fact, this contemporary example illustrates how propaganda techniques are more frequently deployed by media than we think, existing in the daily advertisements that we encounter virtually everywhere.

The lesser of two evils

Unlike the false dilemmas technique that offers good and bad choices, this one offers only two bad options. It is usually used on occasions to convince people to accept ideas they will often be cautious to take. To convince the audience, the communicator may present the worst choices as the least offensive alternative or as being the only other option. This technique argues "that an imperfect option is, at any rate, better than the horrendous alternative" (Shabo, 2008, p. 41). An example of this technique is the slogan adopted by Orthodox Christians in the Balkans during the escalation of the Ottoman Empire as Constantinople fell to the Turks in January 1454. The slogan of *"Better the Sultan's turban than the Pope's Mitre"* implies

that being ruled by the Muslim Ottoman Empire (the turban) would better for them because at least it would allow them to preserve their current religion, while being ruled by Western Roman Catholic authorities (the mitre) would mean forcible conversion to the Catholic doctrine (Trepanier, 2007).

Pinpointing the enemy (Scapegoating)

"Pinpointing the Enemy" attempts to simplify a complex situation or set of problems by presenting or pointing out a specific cause or a specific group or person as the enemy who can be blamed. It is infrequent to find a political problem originating from a single cause, but politicians profit from pointing out a single enemy and placing all the blame at that target without investigating the complexities of the problem (Shabo, 2008, p. 52). For example, African Leaders created a myth that Black Africa's internal and external problems are continuously caused by "imperialists" and "saboteurs" (Domatob, 1985, p. 204). The Sisi regime has also made recourse to similar conspiratorial claims (Gordon & Oxnevad, 2016, p. 30).

Hot potato

In this technique, the communicators attempt to spring a surprise, an event or a trap upon their opponents, allowing most audiences to understand it or interpret it to undermine their rivals. "Have you stopped beating your wife?" (Lee, 1945, p. 134) is an example of the technique. For its effectiveness, "Hot potato" was categorised by Lee (1945, 1952) as a strategic technique because it is usually used to embrace and discomfit rivals by demanding answers for something beyond their control. During live debates, the power of this technique derives from accusing opponents and leaving them to prove their innocence. While politicians usually use such a technique during debates, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to use it in their written Public Statements, challenging the state to provide a response to its claims.

Rhetorical questions

Rhetorical questions have established historical precedents. During the World Wars, such questions were frequently deployed through propaganda posters. For

example, it was utilised by the Central Recruiting Committee, as the following Figure 11 illustrates. The poster, which was made in 1914 in Toronto, Canada, for the purpose of recruitment during the WWI, attempts to influence citizens to enlist for the war as it reads, "Your Chums are fighting, why aren't <u>YOU</u>?"

Figure 11. Rhetorical Question: A Canadian poster from WWI. Published in 1914. Reads, "Your Chums are fighting, why aren't YOU?" (Central Recruiting Committee, 1914).

"Rhetorical question" is something of a cousin to "monopolizing the question" or "Hypophora." "Hypophora" involves raising a question in such a way that it simultaneously and immediately provides an answer to it (Baden, 1906, p. 31). Accordingly, the key difference between a "rhetorical question" and "Hypophora" is that in a "rhetorical question," the answer is not provided, while in "Hypophora," the communicator first poses a question and then provides the answer immediately.

"Hypophora" is extensively used by American presidential candidates. For example, William Jefferson Clinton, in his acceptance address of the presidential nomination at the Democratic National Convention in New York on July 16, 1992,

attempted to convince the people that he was the right candidate using the "Hypophora" technique.

> What is George Bush doing about our economic problems? Now, four years ago, he promised 15 million new jobs by this time, and he's over 14 million short. Al Gore and I can do better. He has raised taxes on the people driving pickup trucks and lowered taxes on the people riding in limousines. We can do better. He promised to balance the budget, but he has not even tried. In fact, the budgets he has submitted to Congress nearly doubled the debt. Even worse, he wasted billions and reduced our investments in education and jobs. We can do better (Clinton, 1992).

This study will use these propaganda devices detailed above as persuasive techniques to explain more precisely how the Brotherhood advance their agenda and frame political events, ideas, themselves, and their rivals. Theoretically, it suggests that this taxonomy of persuasive techniques can be used by social movement theorists to explain how a group or politician communicate and the specific mechanisms by which frames are set.

Key Debates on the Muslim Brotherhood

The Identity of the Brotherhood and its Ideological Evolution

Numerous studies have attempted to understand the ideological evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood through their writings and practices in different periods of time (Biagini, 2017; Bokhari & Senzai, 2013; Brown et al., 2006; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Mohamed & Momani, 2014; Pahwa, 2013; Pevná, 2014; Ranko, 2015; Reda, 2014; Schwedler, 2011; S. Tadros, 2011; Tibi, 2008; Wickham, 2015; Wilmot, 2015; Yenigün, 2016; Zollner, 2009). Nevertheless, a very crucial phase, namely after Morsi's removal, is still missing. These studies can be divided into three main schools of thought. Traditionalists such as Khalil (2006a); S. Tadros (2011) suggest no significant shift in the attitudes and the agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood. They deny that changes have affected the central vision of the movement, which is ultimately to establish an Islamist state.

Brown et al. (2006) represent what can be called the "moderate" stream. They identified six ideological "grey zones" in the thinking of the mainstream Islamist movements, including the Muslim Brotherhood. These "grey zones" are the application of Islamic law (*sharī'a*), the use of violence, political pluralism, civil and political rights, the rights of women, and religious minorities. For example, while the Brotherhood calls for full-fledged democratic reforms, it remains reluctant to endorse equal rights for Copts.

However, the most dominant, revisionist scholarship conclude that the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved to incorporate democratic ideals as part of their rhetoric and ideology. These include, for example, El-Ghobashy (2005); Pahwa (2013); Ranko (2015); Reda (2014); Wickham (2011, 2015); Wilmot (2015); Zollner (2009). El-Ghobashy (2005) argues that one of the most observable by-products of the Muslim Brotherhood's political engagement is its decisive move away from the uncompromising notions of Sayyid Qutb toward a cautious reinterpretation of the thoughts of al-Banna. This has transformed the Muslim Brotherhood from a religious group to what looks very much like a modern political party that is committed to democracy.

Ranko (2015) attempts to analyse how the Brotherhood presented itself to Egyptians through its behaviour and its ideology as expressed in the movement's political writings and media statements during Mubarak's rule (1981-2011). To do so, she relied on interviews and qualitative content analysis. She analysed two bodies of text with the first representing the Muslim Brotherhood, and the second representing the state's view. She addresses the two corpora with the same research question: "How is the Brotherhood portrayed?" (Ranko, 2015, p. 34). The framework of her study is based on the concept of Gramsci's "War of Position." Ranko conceptualizes Gramsci's "War of Position" as the struggle between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood to win publics over. The Muslim Brotherhood attempts to create societal hegemony by winning the hearts and minds of the people, while the regime aims to contain the credibility and attractiveness of the Muslim Brotherhood through disseminating a negative "counter-picture" of the movement

(pp.32-33). She concludes that the negative image that the Egyptian regime portrayed of the movement pushed the group increasingly to engage with and accept many liberal democratic tenets, such as party pluralism and rotation of power through election.[6] However, Ranko's work suffers from many methodological weaknesses. We are told in the methods section that the study relies on interviews and content analysis. Bearing in mind that the main objective of the study is to analyse how the movement portrayed itself against the regime, it is questionable what the interviews add to the study. Furthermore, it is unclear what criteria were established to choose the interviewees; it appears that the interviews were conducted randomly without any rigorous explanation. In addition, all the interviews are anonymous which means that, as readers we do not know how credible these sources are and to what extent they are familiar with the Brotherhood's politics. Perhaps most importantly, nothing about the ethical approval process is mentioned (Koa, 2018a, p. 219). Regarding the use of content analysis, several issues also arise. Firstly, we are told little about the data corpora sample or if a census of all materials was used. Secondly, nothing was mentioned about the unit of analysis. Thirdly, in qualitative content analysis, researchers can support the trustworthiness of their study by reporting the process of the method accurately; however, we find no such explanation in Ranko's work. Fourthly, because meaning is subjective, different scholars can interpret a single piece of text differently, and so a certain reliability coefficient is required (Koa, 2018a, p. 320).

Representing perhaps the most optimistic camp, Wickham (2015) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood have not only accepted democracy, pluralism, and human rights tenets, but has also adopted them as part of its agenda. Thus, this in turn, according to Wickham, induced change in the Muslim Brotherhood's rhetoric and behaviour. Hence, she believes that political participation generated new, actual

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[6] The struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Mubarak regime is discussed in four phases in Ranko's work. In each, the author discusses the material features of the War of Position, the ideational aspects of it, and finally how the Muslim Brotherhood's behaviour and ideology have developed in light of the material and ideational struggle with the regime (Koa, 2018a, p. 219).

behavioural and ideational patterns inside the Muslim Brotherhood, e.g. diluting their obligation and adherence to the application of *sharī'a* law.

Several studies have focused on the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology since the January 25, 2011, revolution and during Morsi's rule (Mohamed & Momani, 2014; Pahwa, 2013; Reda, 2014; Wilmot, 2015). Surprisingly however, few of these studies have neglected to explore how the commitments of the movement toward systematism and democracy were reflected in their communication strategy or writings. Exceptions include Pahwa (2013) who suggests that the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood has evolved significantly. However, she argues for the movement's partial adaption of democratic and secular political thoughts by reframing them in religious terms. This has led to a hybrid "secularized" Islamism that has both enabled and constrained the Brotherhood's adaptation to democracy. She argues that during the 2012 election campaigns the movement's discourse continued to straddle religious and secular terrain. While they promised to build an Islamic state, they asserted that the people, not religion, were the source of all power. Thus, she asks "What explains these contradictions, and what do they tell us about the Brotherhood's apparent adoption of political and ideational pluralism and democratic values?" (Pahwa, 2013, p. 189). She believes that this hybridization has both enabled and constrained the Muslim Brotherhood's adaptation to democracy during the time they were in power. Mohamed and Momani (2014) similarly argue that the Muslim Brotherhood's identity under Morsi's rule was torn between political pragmatism and religious conservatism, both of which shaped its political actions.

On the other hand, Lynch (2016) argues that before the Arab uprising, the Muslim Brotherhood served as a firewall against more violent extremists by clearly articulating an ideology of nonviolence and democratic participation. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood competed with extremist groups such as al-Qaeda in ways that state elites and liberal groups cannot do because they challenge such groups on religious bases. Lynch (2016), believes that despite the regime's propaganda and arrests of the Brotherhood leaders and members after Morsi's removal, there is very

little to substantiate the charge that the movement behaved like a terrorist group or embraced violence either ideologically or strategically. Nevertheless, he believes that there is a serious lack of fine-grained data to determine whether the case will remain the same. Thus, he suggests that previous evaluations of the group's ability to act as a firewall against violent extremism need to be updated. This claim forms part of this study's goals.

So far, few studies have examined the post July 2013 period. Biagini (2017) offers a gendered examination of the Muslim Brotherhood by investigating the activism of the female wing of the movement post July 2013. She argues that informal Islamist networks can be conducive to female leadership under negative political conditions, contrary to most academic literature that considers Islamist movements' conservative gender ideology and sexual division of labour as a force that prevents female political leadership. She maintains that repression of the Brothers following the Morsi downfall allowed the emergence of women's leadership within the Muslim Brotherhood Movement because the survival of the movement became increasingly compromised since its re-designation as a terrorist group in December 2013. Notwithstanding, Biagini's analysis does not take into account how this issue is reflected in the Muslim Brotherhood's discourse, nor does she place it in historical context. For example, when the Muslim Brotherhood was banned on December 8, 1948, and its leaders were imprisoned, the Muslim Sisters continued and created several groups to support the detained Brothers and their families. A similar situation existed in 1954 and 1957 (Ikhwanwiki, 2011e).

Building on the above literature, one of this study's goals is to update our understanding of how the Brotherhood's rhetoric and ideology has responded to the most intense period of state persecution has faced since the 1950s and 1960s and how its ideological and how its ideological evolution has affected the movement's identity. Theoretically, the study updates our understanding of the Brotherhood through the critical lens of social movement theory. In other words, the concepts of cultural resources, moral resources and political opportunity structure are used here in order to explain how the ideology and identity of the movement evolved.

Accordingly, part of this thesis is concerned with answering the following questions; how did the Brotherhood's ideology evolve after its removal from power in July 2013 in response to the new, if negative, "political opportunity" it faced? How did the political agenda of the Muslim Brotherhood evolve after July 2013? What shifts have there been in the movement's rhetoric regarding controversial issues such as the establishment of Islamic state and applying *sharī'a* law, the commitment to democracy, women's political participation, and equal citizenship of Christian Copts? How might these be explained and what can this tell us about the Brotherhood's identity?

The Demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood

The relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime has traditionally been complex. Since its establishment, the movement has been embroiled in a struggle with the regime and faced many coercive campaigns that have fluctuated in ferocity. During King Farouk's reign from 1936 – 1952, the Brotherhood struggled with the Egyptian monarchy culminating in the assassination of the movement's founder, Hassan al-Banna on February 12, 1949 (Ramadan, 2006, p. 24). Under the Nasser regime from 1956-1970, the Brotherhood faced a severe wave of repression as the movement was accused of being behind the failed assassination attempt against the President in October 1954 (Ramadan, 2006, pp. 9-10). Under President Anwar el-Sadat's rule from 1970-1981, the group was used as an ally against Sadat's leftist Nasserist enemies and therefore tolerated but kept under the watchful eye of the Egyptian security apparatus (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982). Under Mubarak (1981-2011), the Brotherhood was incorporated into the political and electoral sphere but not spared harassment and remained legally banned (Ranko, 2015). It was only after the "political opportunity" of the 2011 revolutionary transition that the movement was able to mobilise enough popular support to rise to the presidency. Since Morsi's overthrow however, the Brotherhood has been demonised by the state and non-state elites as an existential threat to the Egyptian body politic in an unprecedented fashion.

This recent campaign builds on earlier efforts to undermine the organisation. As Ranko (2015) highlights, from 1987 the Egyptian regime drew a highly negative image of the Muslim Brotherhood and portrayed them as an enemy of the Egyptian nation. They painted the Brotherhood as an anti-democratic and terrorist group that were opposed to Egypt's legal political framework. In response, the movement attempted to present itself as a non-violent and moderate movement that was in line with Egypt's legal political framework. Abdelmajeed (2010) argues that between 1990 and 2005, the state's discursive strategy in linking the movement with terrorism focused on two areas. Firstly, the Brotherhood was depicted as the organ of terrorism, and thus, was responsible for the consequences. Secondly, the state argued that Brotherhood leaders and professionals support terrorism. For example, in April 1995, the security apparatuses accused Brotherhood members in the Doctors' Syndicate of sending youths abroad to be trained on how to use weapons (Abdelmajeed, 2010, p. 137).

Such negative portrayals of the Muslim Brotherhood served as an important prelude to tangible repression. On November 23, 1995, the Egyptian Supreme Military Court imprisoned 54 leaders of the Brotherhood for their membership in an illegal organisation (Campagna, 1996, p. 278). In his article, Campagna (1996) argues that this move was designed to amputate the movement's gains within the public and weaken their ability to garner more grassroots support. This was due to the regime's perception of such support as a formidable threat to their own deteriorating legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Ranko (2015) reinforces the idea that between 1995-2000, the position of the regime shifted from political inclusion to exclusion and it resorted to applying repression towards the movement. To refute the regime's negative portrayal and retain popular support, the Brotherhood continued to portray itself as non-violent and moderate. This runs contrary to the assumptions of the repression-radicalization literature, which suggests that repression and exclusion is likely to lead to radicalization and violence (Ranko, 2015, p. 24). Ranko concludes, however, by warning that the longer the exclusion and repression period continues, the potential for radicalization only increases. Similarly, Pevná (2014), argues that the recent repression of the organisation may

work as a break on its further moderation. According to Bokhari and Senzai (2013), repression of Islamists during the 1950s and the 1960s caused ideological stagnation within Islamist movements and some groups turned to armed revolt.

In contrast, Yenigün (2016) argues that the Brotherhood will maintain its moderation despite repression and do so even in the face of the most brutal massacres they have ever confronted. He relies on two justifications to support this claim; Firstly, that other Islamist groups such as jihadists can more effectively compete for radicalised recruits within the Islamist political sphere making "moderation" a more pragmatic choice for the Brotherhood. Less cynically, he suggests that the principle of public interest (*al-maslaha al-'amma*) plays a central role in the Brotherhood's political theology (Yenigün, 2016, p. 2314).

Thus, there is some contention as to what role the state's attempts to demonise the Brotherhood has played in the ideology of the movement. On one hand, there is an extensive body of literature that suggests that repression leads to radicalisation. [7] This mostly supports the related hypothesis of inclusion-

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[7] **Anderson (1997)** believes that as Islamist movements become radicals as an outcome of repression and exclusion, thus accommodation and inclusion may yield to moderation. **Ashour (2009)** analyses the Brotherhood, the Egyptian Islamic Group, and the Egyptian AL-Jihad Organization; the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army and the Algerian Salafi Group for Preaching and Combat to answer two research questions: why do radical Islamists revise their ideologies, strategies, and objectives and initiate a de-radicalization initiative? And under what conditions will this process be successful? He defines de-radicalization as the transformation toward non-violence. De-radicalization is the dependent variable in Ashour's study, in which he argues that de-radicalization consists of three dimensions; behavioural, ideological, and organizational. According to Ashour, based on the degree of development on each one, three forms of de-radicalization may arise. (1) Comprehensive de-radicalization, which happens when am Islamist movement lays down arms, overtly denounces violence, and dismantles armed wings. (2) Substantive de-radicalization, which occurs when groups change their behaviour and ideology but does not dismantle all arm wings. (3) Pragmatic de-radicalization, which happens groups dismantle armed wings but do not ideologically condemn violence. In his analysis he points out several times that repression is a key motivation of radicalization. However, he argues that repression may yield to de-radicalization when complemented with other three variables he discussed. Notably **Burgat (1997)** has made the case that political parties in the West could become terrorist organizations in weeks if exposed to similar

moderation, which suggests that including Islamists in the political process is likely to yield moderate ideology. These scholarly endeavours usually follow the findings of the inclusion-moderation theory as applied in Europe to extreme left wing and religious parties post World War II. Some of these studies draw on the idea of what Huntington (1993) called a "participation-moderation trade-off," as a type of "democratic bargain" (p.169). The inclusion-moderation of Islamist movements hypothesis is further supported by many other scholarships, such as Brooks (2002); Brumberg (2002); Driessen (2012); S. E. Ibrahim (2007); Kubíková (2009); Schwedler (2006, 2007); Tezcür (2010); Willis (2004).[8]

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levels of repression to Islamists (p.45). **Clubb (2016)** maintains that repression is a doubled-edge sword as it may lead to greater mobilisation, suggesting policing path as more effective. **Dalacoura (2006)** concludes that political exclusion and suppression of Islamist movements urged some of these movements – not all- to adopt terrorist methods and that the non-violent nature of some Islamist movements is an outcome of being included in the political process, such as in the cases of The Turkish Justice and Development Party, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Tunisian Nahda and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood/Islamic. **Hafez (2003)** concludes that the radicalization of Islamist movements is primarily a reaction to the predatory actions of the regimes endangered by Islamist movements upsurge. Therefore, states curb Islamists political ambitions through demonising them as a pretext to exclude them from states institutions. **Hafez and Wiktorowicz (2004)** suggest that reactive regime repression of Islamist movements is likely to lead to violent mobilization as state confines the tactical choices available to the Islamists. This likely to yield an exclusion of the moderates and boosts only the credibility of the violence advocates within such movements. **Leiken and Brooke (2007)** maintain that the *takfiri* element within the Muslim Brotherhood arose under repression to create the jihadist group.

[8] **Brooks (2002)** asks what can be done to arrest the growth of the Islamist militant groups? In his article he argues that there are three key solutions that seem plausible. Firstly, repressing fundamentalist Islamist movements. This solution has been ineffective in addressing the popular groundswell of support for Islamist movements. Secondly, undermining fundamentalist Islam sentiment itself. However, he highlights that any attempt to do so may backfire and enhance the Islamist groups' legitimacy in the eyes of their followers. The third and most effective strategy is legalizing Islamist movements and encouraging the liberalization of political systems in the Arab world. **Driessen (2012)** evaluates two Islamist political parties in Algeria; the MSP-Hamas and Ennahda-Islah. He concludes that inviting religious actors into the public democratic space produces dynamics of both political moderation and religious change. **S. E. Ibrahim (2007)** argues that the closer Islamist groups are to political power in a democratic process, the more they moderate their ideology and behaviour "rule-and-moderate". His argument is based on the rhetorical and behavioural modifications towards moderation within Islamists movements and groups such as the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Brotherhood in Egypt throughout electoral phases and after electoral successes. **Kubíková (2009)** argues that the

Other literature by scholars such as El-Ghobashy (2005); Ranko (2015); Wickham (2004b); Yenigün (2016) has advanced the notion that in response to the state's demonization of the Brotherhood, they have worked to highlight their peaceful, moderate credentials.[9] Indeed, Abdelmajeed (2010) believes that regime suppression against the movement has had a positive impact on their popularity as it increases the number of sympathizers. The result of the 2005 election, where the Brotherhood won 20% of parliamentary seats, arguably shows a positive correlation between repression and electoral success. Moreover, he argues that the government's restrictions have very limited impact in this technological era which has allowed the movement to reach people easily and contest state narratives. Thus, the Brotherhood's media campaign successfully exposed abusive practices against the movement, which in turn had a positive impact in raising its popular support. This argument is reinforced by Ranko (2015), who believes that the movement successfully managed to employ the state's increasing recourse to repression in its discourse, which was translated in the election outcome.

The Mubarak regime frequently resorted to legal amendments to hamper the Brotherhood. In March 2007, the regime instituted 43 legal amendments, calling them "reforms," to counter the political ascendency and the resurgence of the Brotherhood. They justified the "reforms" as the need to modernize the Egyptian

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international community could influence the moderation of Islamist groups and bring about a decline of such groups' radicalisation by simply including and accommodating them because political exclusion and intimidation is likely to lead to radicalisation. She argues that the violent seizure of power in the Gaza Strip in 2007 by the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" was a result of the dominance of the radical wing within the movement as a result of the international community's hostility to the group. The political isolation of the Hamas government and the economic sanctions imposed by the international community on Palestinians after their sweeping victory in the parliamentary elections in 2006 contributed to the tilting of the internal balance within Hamas in favour of the radicals. **Schwedler (2007)** argues that inclusion is more likely to attain an overall moderate political sphere, though it is unlikely to clear all forms of radicalism. **Willis (2004)** makes a similar argument but mainly focuses on the case study of the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) in Morocco during the legislative elections held in September 2002.

[9] **Wickham (2004b)** argues that increased repression can sometimes bring ideological moderation as demonised groups moderate their agendas and ideologies not only to seize political chances but also to circumvent political constraints. She suggests that the formation of the Egyptian Islamist *Wasat* party was a strategic move by leaders in the MB to evade repression. **Yenigün (2016)** argues that repression may indeed lead to moderation in the well-entrenched mainstream Islamist groups.

constitution (Abdelmajeed, 2010). As Al-Awadi (2004) argues, during Mubarak's era, the government monopolised all means of communication and the education system to confront the Muslim Brotherhood through two integrated policies. Firstly, a policy of disinformation designed to create a negative stereotype about the Brotherhood in the minds of people and, secondly, through a policy of drying up religious resources. This policy was known in Egypt as "reform, development and modernisation of the education system" (Al-Awadi, 2004, p. 219).

In response to this challenge, Ranko (2015) claims that the Brotherhood not only presented themselves as moderate and pro-democratic, but they also started to mirror the state's depiction of the movement as an enemy of the nation, increasingly depicting Mubarak's regime as the enemy of the Egyptian nation and anti-democratic. The Brotherhood denounced the regime as a terrorist actor because of its excessive use of torture and violence against Egyptians. Thus, the Brotherhood presented itself as the force that would save the country from this threat via pro-democratic political reform.

Three sub-debates can be derived from the above review; the first relates to the contention as to what role the state's attempts to demonise the Muslim Brotherhood have played in the ideology of the movement. This debate is presented through three hypotheses; repression-radicalisation, inclusion-moderation, and repression-moderation. Since the removal of the group from power in July 2013, a new rein of repression against the movement has started. How the Brotherhood responds to its exclusion from the political scene and how it portrays itself since the downfall of Morsi is still largely unaddressed in the academic literature. Thus, this thesis will serve to test the two hypotheses of the repression-radicalization and repression-moderation.

The second interesting debate is the outcome of repression on the Brotherhood's popular support. Scholars in the above discussion argue that the state's demonization of the Brothers has served as a source of support for the movement and the outcome of this was clear in the ballot boxes. However, after 2013, the

Brotherhood have lost not just popularity but sympathy among Egyptian masses. How has the Muslim Brotherhood responded to this shift? Are there signs that they may be able to rehabilitate their reputation?

Thirdly, most of the above literature argues that repression of the Brotherhood was based on the state's fear that religious-political opposition might dominate and influence the political sphere because of their growing popularity as grassroots movements. Therefore, repression aimed at eradicating the Brotherhood and discrediting them. I attempt in this thesis to investigate whether the state's demonization of the movement after the downfall of Morsi is based on new authentic fears of radicalization as represented in the Brotherhood's public proclamations ((i.e. their cultural resources: beliefs and values.) Are there any rhetorical indicators that the movement will retreat to Qutb's legacy?

The Communication of Islamist Groups

Communication is essential for politics. As Anders G. Romarheim eloquently enunciated, "Politics without communication is like having blood without veins and arteries: it's not really going anywhere" (Romarheim, 2005, p. 6). The issue of Islamist groups' political communication strategies has been a controversial and much disputed subject within the field of political communication in light of recent developments and upheavals in the Middle East. As armed operations fail to defeat radical groups, scholars attempt to find counter communication strategies in the race to win over hearts and minds. For instance, Schmid (2014) raises the question; "What could be an effective counter-narrative to win the 'battle of ideas' and reach the 'hearts and minds' of those vulnerable to al Qaeda's narrative?" Thus, we see the importance of communication practices in the politics of Islamist movements as well as for those who seek to counter political Islam in the Middle East and in the international political sphere.

Most studies of the communication of Islamist groups have focused mainly on radical groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Such mainstream literature usually

attempts to examine Islamist groups' social media and online presence.[10] Notably, most of these studies focus simply on the *goals* of the communication strategy, such as legitimizing, propagating, and intimidating, rather than the *mechanics* of communication, i.e. *how* the message is shaped and communicated to persuade or to achieve its goal. These studies include Amble (2014); Corman and Schiefelbein (2006); Rogan (2007); Saad, Chamoun, and Bazan (2015).[11]

One of the more interesting studies in this field is Winter (2015). He argues that ISIS's communication strategy is much more than a matter of inciting, dissemination, and intimidating. It operates to sustain the group's global relevance and provide their supporters with proof to persuade potential recruits to be active followers. He argues that the group's communication strategy is calculated carefully, with jihadist videographers creating bespoke messages for a wide-range of audiences. This strategy is based on six non-discrete themes: brutality, mercy,

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[10] See for example, J. Berger and Morgan (2015); Bertram (2016); Bieda and Halawi (2015); Farwell (2014); Klausen (2015); Nissen (2014); Weimann (2010).

[11] **Corman and Schiefelbein (2006)** attempt to investigate the communication strategies of Al-Qaeda during wars in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 by analysing translated statements of Jihadi-leaders and other sources such as speeches and online content. They found that there are three strategic goals of communication that jihadists pursue; (1) *Legitimating* their group through creating a social and religious viability (2) *Propagating* their group through disseminating messages to sympathizers in parts where they desire to expand. (3) *Intimidating* their enemies, i.e., both, their existing Westerns opponents and supporters in the Muslim countries who might ponder of turning against the group. Based on these findings **Rogan (2007)** confirmed these goals, adding three additional strategic goals to those addressed above; *education of supporters, dialogue between members of the movement, and community-building*. **Saad et al. (2015)** attempts to understand the communication strategy of ISIS. They argue that ISIS communication strategy aims at building a polarization of the perceptions of its audiences and gain the support of the population they target to control, promote politico-military actions, and brand the concept of Caliphate. Not far from the above findings, **Amble (2014)** analyses the media of Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Movement of Striving Youth), more commonly known as Al-Shabaab (The Youngsters) in Somalia. The group's media often seeks expansion and spreading to other parts. It aims at persuading indigenous tribal leaders and militias into aligning themselves with the group. Amble (2014) also analyses statements from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) that posted on Jundullah Studios (Studios of God's Soldiers). The result reveals that 60% of the group's communiqués issued between 2009 and 2011 include words of "martyr" or "martyrdom" to convey the idea that the suicide-bombers represent the heroic defenders of a Muslim population under siege.

victimhood, war, belonging and utopianism.[12&13] Further studies have focused on the written materials of ISIS: Gambhir (2014); Ingram (2016); Vergani and Bliuc (2015) analyse *Dabiq* magazine, the official ISIS' internet magazine in English.[14]

As can be conceived from the above, part of the communication strategies of jihadists aim at intimidating enemies, expansion and mobilisation. This relates to the context of the war in which they are operating. However, as militant groups, their communication strategies might differ from those operating in the political sphere through participation in elections.[15]

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[12] He demonstrates that *brutality* is the most salient narrative in the West, while *utopianism* is the key narrative for ISIS's propagandists as it is the group's utopian offer to new recruits. The brutality content is intended for ISIS's active or potential opponents. However, the *mercy* theme is frequently highlighted in tandem with brutality. Victimhood is repeatedly used in tandem with brutality, too. The narrative of *victimhood* aims to convey the message that Sunni Muslims are being victimised at the hands of global war on Islam. The narrative of *war* focuses on highlighting the group's military gains and their military equipment to instilling fear in hostile forces and elevating warriors' morale, as well as providing supporters with manipulated understanding of its successes and its proliferation to obfuscate realities. Finally, the theme of *belonging* seeks to emphasise the notion of brotherhood in the caliphate.

[13] From another mechanism of analysis, **Leander (2017)** maintains that the strategy of recruitment videos of ISIS is not only manifest in violence, brutality, religious zeal or apocalyptic vision, but also, digital and commercial logics brand the practices re producing the regime of (in)visibility of the videos. This is reinforced by Spiller, Breidenich, and Hilgers-Yilmaz (2016) who argue that ISIS utilizes commercial motifs that serve to manifest power over mechanisms of fright, superiority and brutality.

[14] Among what **Gambhir (2014)** argues is that *Dabiq* devotes a great number of resources to clarify why ISIS is religiously correct and superior to rival groups. **Ingram (2016)** analyses nine issues of *Dabiq* magazine to discover the strategic logic of ISIS's communication campaign targeting Western Muslims. He concludes that *Dabiq* uses dichotomy-reinforcing messages to leverage both rational-choice and identity-choice appeals. He also maintains that the architects of *Dabiq* constantly seek to magnify the echo of the group's message by a litany of closely unified macro- and micro-level levers. **Vergani and Bliuc (2015)** state that the group has been strategically utilising emotions that are a significant mobilizing dynamic and that the group language shows a growing concern with females. They provide a quantitative content analysis of the language of the first year of *Dabiq* magazine including 11 Issues. They conclude that that affiliation is an increasingly essential psychological motive for ISIS. The group has been strategically utilising emotions that are a significant mobilizing dynamic, the group language shows a growing concern with females, and that the group has been increasingly utilising internet jargon (net-speak) that demonstrates that ISIS tries to adapt itself to the internet environment and to connect with the identities of young people. **Gambhir (2014)** examines the contents of the first issue of *Dabiq*, explaining the significance of this strategic messaging approach by ISIS in conjunction with the announcement of a Caliphate. She concludes that *Dabiq* is not propaganda. She believes that the magazine is an outward-looking articulation of group's Caliphate vision.

[15] A comparison of the communication strategies between both types of groups are worthy of further examination, but beyond the scope of this study

In contrast to much literature on the communication strategy of radical Islamist movements, relatively few works have looked in detail at the mechanics of the Muslim Brotherhood's communication. Some exceptions include Bardhan (2014); Breuer (2014); Breuer and Khashaba (2014); D'Urbano (2012); S. M. Ibrahim (2013); Richter (2011b). However, the majority of these studies are limited to English versions of the Brotherhood's websites that are mainly oriented to foreign or Western audiences.

Breuer (2014) provides a brief overview of the media experiences of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt from 1928 to 2011 and argues that the "communication strategy" of the movement has progressed in step with the different relations it sustained with Egypt's administrative elites in different periods. This result is based upon a brief history using the available literature (secondary sources) rather than primary material. While this study claims that it examines communication strategies of the Muslim Brotherhood, it views strategy as position or as a pattern of behaviour. A communication strategy is arguably a much more complex process, involving "the use of words, actions, images, or symbols to influence the attitudes and opinions of target audiences to shape their behaviour in order to advance interests or policies, or to achieve objectives" (Farwell, 2012, pp. xviii-xix).

Richter (2011a) examines the Brotherhood's website ikhwanonline.com using content analysis to identify key themes. She frames comparisons of them with those of the Egyptian main stream media during the week of February 13-19, 2007. She concludes that there was a decrease of religious topics in the movement's agenda as well as a decrease of direct Islamic framing of its issues, in order to gain more publicity and reach a larger audience. The results also show that a political agenda was established on ikhwanonline.com that clearly aimed to challenge the Egyptian regime. This finding is reinforced by S. M. Ibrahim (2013), who

examined various Brotherhood media outlets during Morsi's rule. [16] She argues that the Muslim Brotherhood's media during Morsi's short period in power concentrated on political issues more than religious ones. These results further support the idea of Ḥarūb (2012), who argues that before the January 25 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic media were mainly focused on the education and interpretation of Islam, while after the revolution, its focus shifted to propagating the political ideologies of Islamic movements and acted as a political forum to achieve their political agenda.

The mainstream literature has mainly examined the English language versions of the movement's websites. D'Urbano (2012) examines Ikhwanweb http://www.ikhwanweb.com, but before the January 25, 2011 revolution, to examine the online political communication practices of the Muslim Brotherhood using a historical or archival approach. The research concludes that the political role of new media is in its capacity to store information through assembling digital archives that enable social movements to organize and produce knowledge.

Similarly, Breuer and Khashaba (2014) analysed the official English websites in the week preceding the Egyptian constitutional referendum of December 15th, 2012. This was an effort to investigate how the Muslim Brotherhood uses the internet for political communication using a combination of feature analysis and frame analysis. The feature analysis suggests that the two websites mainly provide three functions, to: provide information, foster interaction and dialogue with

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[16] S. M. Ibrahim (2013) attempts to examine how the Muslim Brotherhood group and its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party use their media to present their ideologies and reach their goals. To do so she examines three official media outlets of the Muslim Brotherhood; *Misr 25* television satellite channel, Ikhwanonline.com, and Freedom and Justice Newspaper along one week only during March, 2013. She uses the agenda setting theory and media priming as theoretical framework for her research, which means that the focus of her study mainly on examining the topics covered by the three Brotherhood outlets mentioned above to discover whether the movement highlights specific issues and ignoring others. The study concludes the Muslim Brotherhood uses these channels to present its ideology and its vision to the audience by highlighting the news of their activities. It can be argued that this result should be assumptive because the Muslim Brotherhood is a political movement and works to advance its mission, interests and political ideology. Moreover, the researcher fails to provide clear live examples of how the movement applied the agenda setting and the priming rather than just providing the percentages of the discussed topics by the Muslim Brotherhood media.

visitors. Moreover, the study notes that the call for any collective action was absent from both websites during the time of observation. Hence, they conclude that the main function of the websites is to convey an image of the movement as a moderate and liberal religious power (Breuer & Khashaba, 2014, p. 11). Analysing the English version of the Brotherhood's websites that target primarily Western audiences is arguably misleading however. It seems more likely that any call for collective action would be on the Arabic versions that target local citizens through social networks.

Likewise Bardhan (2014) examines the same website http://www.ikhwanweb.com. She finds that the instrumental function of the Brotherhood's rhetoric on the website aimed to change Western communities' views of Islamists who saw them as radical, undemocratic and inflexible.[17] During Hosni Mubarak's presidency, the website was used as a "communicative medium to demonstrate to the West the Egyptian Brotherhood's need to be valued and respected regardless of ideological differences, understood rather than essentialized, stereotyped, and prejudged, and supported as a pragmatic, political entity within Egypt" (Bardhan, 2014, p. 235).[18]

It is clear that the majority of previous published studies claiming that they are investigating the Brotherhood's communication are limited to English versions of the Brotherhood's websites that are mainly oriented towards foreign or Western audiences. Moreover, much of this literature constitute short-term studies and as such do not necessarily show changes over time of the movement's communication strategy. More crucially, to date, previous studies have failed to provide a detailed analysis of the mechanics of the Brotherhood's political communication strategy.

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[17] Instrumental function: "it is, in one way or another, a vehicle for responding to, reinforcing, or altering the understandings of an audience or the social fabric of the community" (Bardhan, 2014, p. 236). This definition is based on (Gill & Whedbee, 1997).
[18] Bardhan (2014) aims to answer these two questions: "What was the ideology manifest in the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood's cyber-rhetoric in Ikhwanweb during the years immediately preceding the 2011 Egyptian Revolution?" and "What instrumental function did this rhetoric serve?" (p. 242).

As communication plays a key role in recruiting supporters, it is vital for us to understand how the Brotherhood communicates to provide a better understanding of the movement's resilience support, social-organizational resources and its way into the hearts and minds of its followers and audience. Accordingly, the following questions are asked to respond to these needs: What are the goals of the Muslim Brotherhood's Political Communication Strategy from July 2013 – April 2016? How has the organisation used new ways of communication since 2013 to challenge the military regime? How do the Brotherhood use persuasive techniques to influence their audiences?

Conclusion

Despite the many contributions of social movement theory in the study of Islamist movements, more work is needed to gauge its ability to explain the communication strategies of Islamist movements. This thesis makes the theoretical contribution that propaganda techniques should be incorporated into the analytical framework of social movement theory in order to help us to understand, and systematically codify how frames are set strategically by social movements to contest narratives and gain support.

The literature review reinforces the need for an in-depth examination and analysis of the Brotherhood's communication strategy after its removal from power in Egypt in 2013. This is to provide a better understanding of the movement's political agenda, its ideological evolution, and its desire to communicate and to mobilize audience particularly in light of the claim that the Brotherhood after Morsi's removal in July 2013 "as examined and studied in the literature over the past several decades no longer really exists" (Lynch, 2016). Social movement theory provides important concepts such as political opportunity structure, resource mobilization, and strategic framing through which to understand the Brotherhood's development and its communication strategy.

As the political opportunity concept includes both positive and negative political conditions that may facilitate the development of social movements or constrain

them, it projects the calculations of social movements and help them in making rational decisions. Therefore, this concept is also useful to examine the hypotheses of repression-radicalization and repression-moderation. The concept of resource mobilization in social movement theory is particularly valuable in revealing the human resources, social-organizational resources, cultural resources, and moral resources adopted by the Brotherhood. Regarding human resources, the study argues that the current political opportunity structure embodied in the revolutionary context lays the ground for building a female leadership within the movement and may increase the political participation of the Muslim Sisters in general. The social-organizational resources concept helps us to understand why the Brotherhood's ideology has evolved and how its communication strategy developed to confront the widespread demonization of the movement. With regards to cultural resources, this study traces the development of the Brotherhood's media channels used to mobilize cultural resources and suggests that social movements create their own media outlets to circumvent the restrictions of authoritarian regimes and media bias, suggesting that Islamist movements tend to establish new media structures when political opportunities allow. Finally, it is clear that the theoretical concept of moral resources explains the Brotherhood's attempts to gain solidarity, undermine the incumbent regime, and legitimize and brand themselves.

Chapter Three: Methodological Approach

Introduction

This chapter follows Creswell (2014) who maintains that the broad research approach involves the intersection of philosophy, research designs, and specific methods (p. 5). Accordingly, this chapter starts with the discussion of the research paradigm to allocate the study within a specific ontological and epistemological orientation to allow a specific methodology to emerge. Then, it presents three research designs: quantitative qualitative, and mixed methods to show how these have contributed to the current project research's design before detailing the appropriate method that was utilized to answer the research questions. With the research method established, the next section discusses the design of the method. It explores the practical issues and details how exactly the method is used in the study based on qualitative content analysis phases, namely; preparation, organising and reporting. Finally, the last sub-section demonstrates the validity and the reliability of the study.

Philosophical worldview and research design

Philosophical worldview is "a basic set of beliefs that guide action" (Guba, 1990, p. 17). It is also known also as an epistemological stance (Bryman, 2016). Epistemology is concerned with what should be considered as acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman, 2016, p. 24). In this study, the accentuation is on the research problem that is embodied in decoding the Brotherhood's political communication strategy and the approaches available to understand it. Therefore, I define myself as a pragmatist, who is "not committed to any one system of philosophy and reality" (Creswell, 2014, p. 11).

For the purpose of this study, I analysed the entire range (a census) of Arabic language communiqués known as "Public Statements" issued by the Brotherhood from July 2, 2013 to March 22, 2016. The census measures the data of the study strictly, ensuring no sampling error and data corpus (Tella, 2015, p. 239): A total of 132 public statements were analysed (see the full list of the statements that were

analysed in *Appendix A)*. The public statements consist of official letters to the public on different occasions. The public statements were chosen because they are official letters to the public on different occasions. Communiqués formalize the actual political agenda of the Brotherhood. They are political messages in which the Brotherhood presents their thoughts and issue positions (Koa, 2018b, p. 7; Zahid, 2010, p. 123). These communiqués all begin with the label "Official Statement" followed by a subject specific title, suggesting that these are deliberately constructed, and official political messages designed for public consumption.

Accordingly, I consider the public statements issued by the Brotherhood as the closest representation available of the movement's existing leadership and spokespersons. They constitute and reflect the movement's values, agenda, ideology and interests. Using official Public Statements helps to avoid any confusion between personal views of the Brotherhood's leaders and its official opinions. This addresses an important methodological obstacle that scholars studying the Muslim Brotherhood face. As Wickham (2011) highlights, "the group encompasses a wide range of opinion, and we don't know which views prevail in what corners of the organization and why. For example, when [a Brotherhood leader] makes a reassuring statement or [another] makes an alarming one, it is difficult to gauge whether they are voicing a personal opinion, representing the views of a particular faction, or speaking on behalf of the Brotherhood as a whole" (Wickham, 2011, p. 218).

Pragmatist scholars possess freedom of choice. They are free to select the methods and procedures of enquiry that best accomplish the researcher's objectives and needs (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2011, p. 23; Creswell, 2014, p. 11). Accordingly, a mixed methods approach is utilised, combining both quantitative and qualitative data (Creswell, 2014, p. 14). This provides a more complete understanding of the Brotherhood's political communication (Creswell, 2014, p. 19). Qualitative research is implemented for exploring and understanding the meaning (Creswell, 2014) of the Brotherhood's public statements. Quantitative research is also employed to quantify the Brotherhood's political communication

strategy, identifying benchmarks against which qualities can be compared to make precise inferences about the strategy.

A Mixed Methods Approach

An assessment of the Brotherhood's political communication strategy begins with what has been said in their texts and how they said it. Analysing communication texts helps researchers to understand the power of texts, i.e., "the ways in which power relations are encoded in texts and how texts exert power over us and in society" (Gillespie & Toynbee, 2006, p. 2). In this study two methods of analysing text are deployed. Content analysis is used to identify and quantify dominant frames in the Muslim Brotherhood's political communication strategy. However, discourse analysis is also deployed to examine the cultural and historical significance of these frames in the group's communication strategy with a view to understanding how the organisation seeks to project its identity and why it does so in these specific ways.

Content analysis is "a research technique for the objective, systematic, quantitative description of the manifest content of communication" (Berelson, 1952, p. 18). It is employed in this study to helps us understand the Brotherhood's objectives in their communication. It is therefore likely to lead to "an accurate inference of the intention of the message source" (Hicks, Rush, & Strong, 1985, p. 58). In particular, Holsti (1969) has argued that content analysis can be used to analyse techniques of persuasion (p. 43). In this study, content analysis allows quantification of a certain persuasive technique and other themes of the message which provides an accurate, replicable, and valid inference about the Brotherhood's message (Krippendorff, 2013, p. 24). Content analysis is based on quantification e.g. counting instances of violence (A. A. Berger, 2012, p. 135) by coding text into categories and then summing the frequencies of occurrence within each category (Ahuvia, 2001, p. 139).

However, despite the above advantages of content analysis, a purely quantitative approach alone would have many limitations. Quantitative content

analysis fails "to capture the context within which a media text becomes meaningful" (Newbold et al., 2002, p. 84). To overcome this obstacle, discourse analysis is required to fully understand a text's deeper meanings. cIt also allows us to comprehend how a certain message works in a particular social and historical context and in what way the Brotherhood's messages may function in the Egyptian environment (Dresch et al., 2015, p. 34).

Discourse analysis has been a common method for analysing public communication (Neuendorf, 2017, p. 11). Discourse is "a group of ideas or patterned way of thinking which can be identified in textual or verbal communications, and can also be located in wider social structures" (Lupton, 1992, p. 145). Discourse analysis offers an understanding of how bodies of communication or texts function in their specific situated context (Gee & Handford, 2013, p. 3). Therefore, content analysis is combined with discourse analysis to discuss the cultural and historical significance of specific terms used. For example, content analysis revealed that the most common historical analogy deployed by the Brotherhood in their statements is portraying Sisi as Pharaoh. Since this discursive frame appeared in more than 6.5 percent of the analysed statements; it was discussed in relation to its cultural and historical significance. According to the Qur'an, the Pharaoh divided his people into factions, oppressed them, and slaughtered their sons, as the Qur'anic verse (28:4) adduced. In appealing to this familiar and powerful historical figure, the Brotherhood has been able to frame the government as following in footsteps of the oppressive Pharaoh. The Brotherhood thereby presents the regime as faithless, brutal and consequently a force that must be denounced and abolished.

The method's design

Defining the Universe

In the preparation phase, the practical dimension of content analysis begins with defining the boundaries. This includes deciding on the data corpus, the sample of

data that will be analysed, choosing the unit of analysis, and the timeframe (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Wimmer & Dominick, 2014).

The data set consists of the entire range (a census) of Arabic language communiqués "Public Statements" issued by the Brotherhood from July 2, 2013 to March 22, 2016. The average communiqué consists of around 1300 words. As all the communiqués were in Arabic, the coders were fluent Arabic speakers and all translations used in this study were crosschecked by an independent researcher who is a professional bilingual. All the communiqués were first published on the Brotherhood's Arabic official website www.ikhwanonline.com and then posted by the Brotherhood's Media Centre via their social media pages and other affiliated websites. Most of these communiqués were also shared by sympathizers, members and followers on social media. For the purpose of this study, I gathered and saved all these statements on my personal computer and on the university's server, usually on the day of publication. See two examples of typical Muslim Brotherhood's public statements in *Appendix B*. All statements are available in the attached CD.

The unit of analysis is the particular element that was analysed in the data (Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015, p. 211). In this study, the unit of measurement was any published public statement by the Muslim Brotherhood during period under examination. However, there were two units of analysis; the first one was the "sentence" as the study followed the strategy of coding line by line. The second unit was the "word" as the MAXQDA software was used to search for the frequency of specific words benefiting from the option "Lexical search" available within the software. For example, using this option to search for the word "Pharaoh" shows that the word used in 8 of the analysed documents with total of 13 times. See Figure 12.

Search results — ALL: فرعون — 13 hits in 8 documents and 1 document groups

Document	Search string	Begin	End	Preview
MB Public Statments\1...	فرعون	4	4	مرددا بلسان الحال مقالة فرعون (مَا أُرِيكُمْ إلا مَا أَرَى ومَا
MB Public Statments\1...	فرعون	3	3	الانقلابي يلغي ذلك كله وكأنه فرعون الجديد الذي يقول للناس (مَا
MB Public Statments\1...	فرعون	2	2	...وقد حكى لنا القرآن الكريم أن فرعون الطاغية الظالم قال عن موسى
MB Public Statments\2...	فرعون	13	13	...الانقلابيين وهم يسيرون على خطى فرعون – بل يتجاوزونه – يريدون
MB Public Statments\2...	فرعون	6	6	استبدادهم، يُرَدِّدون مقالة فرعون: (مَا أُرِيكُمْ إلاَّ مَا أَرَى
MB Public Statments\3...	فرعون	7	7	وهو فرعون- وملئه عبرة لكل من جاء بعدهم {فَلَمَّا أَسْفُونَا
MB Public Statments\3...	فرعون	17	17	لهم الحق، وتعرضوا لتهديد فرعون، فـ{قَالُوا لَنْ نُؤْثِرَكَ عَلَى مَا
MB Public Statments\3...	فرعون	23	23	..مهما كانت وحشية وضراوة الآلة الفرعونية الانقلابية، وسيهزم صمودن
MB Public Statments\3...	فرعون	6	6	..التحدي الانقلابي والاستعراض الفرعوني للقوة يتساءَلُ البعضُ بإشف
MB Public Statments\8...	فرعون	7	7	...وفي المقابل يحكي عن فرعون - نموذج الظلم الأكبر في الوجودالإن
MB Public Statments\8...	فرعون	14	14	إن سحرة فرعون عادوا إلى الحق فور أن رأوا الآيات، ولم يستنكفوا أن
MB Public Statments\8...	فرعون	14	14	...بل ضحوا بمستقبلهم في بطانة فرعون، بل ضحوا بحياتهم في سبي
MB Public Statments\8...	فرعون	21	21	...وحينما قام فرعون خطيباً في قومه يستخفهم ويضللهم بحجج واهية

Figure 12. Lexical search for "Pharaoh"

A range of visual images were also used to support the analysis, not least because scholars have found that "the idea of visual framing continues to be underexplored"(Cacciatore, Scheufele, & Iyengar, 2016, p. 19). In particular, caricatures were extracted from the Brotherhood's websites to show how non-textual images were used to bolster the Brotherhood's communication strategy. Visual communication is particularly important in supporting strategies as images exhibit superior recall and recognition of political information better than textual communication (Geise, 2017, p. 26) and they also attract an audience's attention more effectively. For example, a study by Adobe (2013) found that posts on social media that contain images produce an engagement rate that is 600 percent higher than text-based posts. However, the main difference between textual and visual strategic communication is that textual communication is usually based on argumentation and reasoning. Visual images follow the logic of association, connecting different meanings that would not necessarily make sense if written down or communicated orally (Knieper & Saleh, 2017).

Organising Phase

I utilized MAXQDA 12 Analytics Pro software to enable the organizational aspects of structuring the research data. MAXQDA is a professional software for qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods data analysis. MAXQDA Analytics Pro is the most advanced version of MAXQDA as it integrates a module for statistical analysis of qualitative data. All documents were named according to the date of issue, then all were imported to the software and organised in chronological order as it is shown below in Figure 13. Part of the document system.

Figure 13. Part of the document system.

I then created the code system after adapting Harold Lasswell's five-question model: "Who says what to whom via which channels with what effects?" (Lasswell, 1927, 1948). Most mass-communication scholars have implicitly followed Lasswell's ground-breaking work in this regard (Fiske, 1990, p. 30). Lasswell's model is ideal for analysing communication and ostensibly comprehending any act of communication because his formula suits all types of communication. According to Lasswell, to comprehend political communication, scholars need to

learn more about the source of the message (who), the content of the message (what), the audience (whom), the medium (channels), and the potential effects of the message. Therefore, to decode the Brotherhood's political communication strategy and understand its political and ideological agenda, this study dissects the components of Lasswell's formula as an analytical framework. However, I modify Lasswell's aforementioned communication model by adding the *how* here to investigate the communication or persuasive techniques that the Muslim Brotherhood uses to influence audiences and to correspond with the strategic framing element in social movement theory, thereby pushing forward scholarly understanding of the mechanisms through which the Muslim Brotherhood "frame" their commination. Accordingly, I argue that the following modified formula allows us to understand the Brotherhood's communication more fully: *The Muslim Brotherhood says what via their communiqués, to whom, how, and with what effects?* Figure 14 demonstrates the initial code system accordingly.

Figure 14. The initial code system.

The code system was reviewed and approved by my first and second supervisors. Later, numerous categories and themes were developed after the coding process started and progressed. In each paragraph of the data set, the following two questions were asked: what or who is being framed? What are the frames assigned to them? Under the main category of portrayal three other fundamental categories were emerged: The Brotherhood's portrayal of itself, the Brotherhood's portrayal of its rivals, and the Brotherhood's portrayal of events and ideas. Under each of these three main categories, many themes emerged. For example, Figure 15 illustrates one of them.

Figure 15. The Brotherhood portrayal of itself themes.

Similarly, many themes emerged under the Brotherhood portrayal of Sisi Vs. Morsi as the screenshot Figure 16 displays. As many as 18 themes emerged under the Brotherhood portrayal of the regime as Figure 17 demonstrates. Moreover, other themes emerged under the Brotherhood's portrayal of Egyptian media, security apparatuses, judiciary, cleric and other pro-regime figures as Figure 18 shows.

Figure 16. Emerging themes of the Brotherhood portrayal of Sisi Vs. Morsi.

Figure 17. Emerging themes of the Brotherhood portrayal of Egyptian regime.

Figure 18. Emerging themes of the Brotherhood portrayal of Egyptian media, security apparatuses, judiciary, religious people pro-regime.

Coding

Coding is the process of generating key ideas and concepts and distinguishing them with labels through clear standards that aid the researcher in organizing and interpreting data (Benaquisto, 2008). Prior to coding any statement, I read each one several times to make contextual sense of it. I asked the following questions while reading each statement to get familiar with it as recommended by Elo & Kyngäs: Who is telling? Where is this happening? When did it happen? What is happening? Why? (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 109). Additionally, I used the following questions recommended by Benaquisto: What is going on? What was done? How is it being done? Who did it? What are the goals? What was the meaning of it? What was the intent? What feelings or thoughts are being communicated? (Benaquisto, 2008, p. 86).

In this research, two approaches to content analysis were used to create themes: inductive and deductive categorizing (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 108; Langmann & Pick, 2018, p. 105; Martin & Hanington, 2012, p. 40; Roller & Lavrakas, 2015, p. 234). I used the inductive approach when there was not enough former knowledge about the category, thus creating my own categories (Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015, p. 210). This approach was deployed to investigate: (1) the key goals of the Brotherhood's political communication strategy (under "with what effect" main category); (2) frames the Brotherhood assigned to ideas, people, and projects (under "portrayal" main category); (3) the target audience (under the main category of "to whom"). This process included 3 phases: open coding, creating categories and finally, abstraction (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 109). For the open coding phase, I benefited from the feature called "Creative Coding" available in MAXQDA 12 pro to support building categories from open coding. This feature offered a plain map where I visually arranged and re-arranged codes, added new codes, built hierarchies and integrated the structure I built as my code system. After reading each communiqué several times, line-by-line to understand fully what was said, recurrent manifest and latent concepts were coded. I then created the various categories according to which the data could be classified on the bases of similarities and

dissimilarities to reduce the number of categories (Elo & Kyngäs, 2008, p. 111). For example, when analysing the why question in the open coding stage, I generated 53 codes. These codes were then reduced into 22 coherent groups during the classification stage as Figure 19 simplifies.

Figure 19. The classification stage that followed open coding for the *why* question.

When I analysed the *says what* question in the open coding stage, I generated 98 codes, then reduced into 26 coherent groups during the classification stage as the screenshot Figure 20 illustrates. The classification was processed according to the meaning in the same context as "to understand and evaluate the classification one needs to understand and, to a certain degree, be part of the social context in which the classification is used" (Mai, 2011, p. 721).

Figure 20. The classification stage that followed open coding for the says what question.

The last step was abstraction, which involved a general description of the underlying data "themes" that generated the entire discussion around the salient issues of the Brotherhood's communication since 2013 and overarching objectives of their 2013 – 2016 communication strategy. For example, the following is a paragraph from the Brotherhood's communique issued on January 23, 2016, entitled "No Compromise, No Reconciliation with Murderous Coup Regime."

> With every new revolutionary wave, false rumours are spread alleging the start of negotiations, understandings or agreements. Each time, the Muslim Brotherhood reaffirms and reiterates that: We will not negotiate with the murderers and criminals. We will not compromise on the rights of martyrs, prisoners, the wounded and all those tragically impacted by the junta and its coup. We will not compromise

on the legitimacy of our elected President Mohamed Morsi. We will
not compromise on the full rights of all the Egyptian people.

During the open coding process, the above paragraph was coded initially under the code "delegitimizing the government," but during the abstraction process was moved to the more comprehensive theme, "delegitimizing and incriminating the incumbent regime."

To find out what persuasive techniques the Brotherhood deployed to delegitimize the regime in the above paragraph, the deductive approach was used. Deductive content analysis is usually employed when the codebook is structured on the basis of previous knowledge (Kyngas & Elo, 2008, p. 109; Roller & Lavrakas, 2015, p. 234). According to Elo and Kyngäs (2008), if a deductive approach is selected, the next step is to construct a categorization matrix and to code the data according to the categories. In the current study the IPA taxonomy of persuasive techniques (name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, bandwagon) and some further techniques identified by other scholars (assertion, false dilemma, the lesser of two evils, pinpointing the enemy, hot potato) were used to develop the code system (codebook) in the MAXQDA software as Figure 21 shows.

Figure 21. The taxonomy of persuasive techniques which used as part of the code system (codebook).

Following this, all the communiqués were reviewed for content and coded for correspondence with the categories (Elo et al., 2014; Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2007). For example, to code for persuasive techniques in the example above, I examined the availability of each technique one by one. For example, I found several "name callings" such as "murderers, criminals, and junta." The Brotherhood also deployed numerous "assertions": "We will not negotiate with the murderers and criminals. We will not compromise on the rights of martyrs, prisoners...." Moreover, the Brotherhood utilized the "glittering generality" technique referring to "rights of martyres," "legitimacy," and "the full rights of all the Egyptian people."

After I analysed all documents for propaganda techniques to ensure that the frequencies of each technique was not due to chance, the statistical significance of the Brotherhood's strategy was assessed using *chi-squared* test with a significance level of $P < 0.05$. The test was conducted to evaluate objectively the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of each persuasive technique and to test the following null and alternative hypotheses:

H0: there is no significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analysed communiqués.

H1: there is a significant difference between observed and expected frequencies of each technique in the analysed communiqués.

Reporting Phase

After the coding level finished, the full report was generated using the "Smart Publisher" service available in MAXQDA. The report contained 667 pages, 183913 words (see the attached CD for the full report). The report contained all codes and sub-codes with the coded segments and was used as the basis for the discussion and analysis in subsequent chapters.

Trustworthiness

Within the constructivist paradigm, the concepts of transferability, credibility, dependability, and confirmability stands for generalizability, internal validity, reliability, and objectivity in positivist research. Trustworthiness is "the ways in which qualitative researchers ensure that transferability, credibility, dependability, and confirmability are evident in their research" (Given & Saumure, 2008, p. 895). However, many authors in qualitative content analysis still use the concepts of validity and reliability to insure the trustworthiness of their studies. See for instance, (Burla et al., 2008; Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015; Elo & Kyngäs, 2008; Krippendorff, 2013; Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). As I followed the pragmatic approach using a combination of deductive and inductive content analysis and qualitative discourse analysis a mixture of the above terms is used here. To insure trustworthiness of this study, I followed several strategies:

Reporting the process of the method and the use of software

In inductive content analysis, researchers can support the trustworthiness of their study by reporting the process of the method accurately and in detail (Elo et al., 2014, p. 112; Joshee, 2008, p. 641; Shenton, 2004, p. 69). Therefore, this chapter details the procedures I implemented to generate results. Moreover, the

trustworthiness "depends upon the integrity of data gathering and analysis, the robustness of processes, and the demonstration of thoroughness." Using software such as MAXQDA to manage these tasks well "enables a researcher to demonstrate the integrity, robustness, and therefore, trustworthiness of an investigation" (Smyth, 2008, p. 563). In this study, MAXQDA was used throughout the research process and the calculations of the inter-coder reliability as explained later at the end of this section. Inter-coder reliability is the amount of agreement between different coders (Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015, p. 213; Neuendorf, 2017, p. 166). This process is also called coefficient of inter-rater agreement or a reliability coefficient (M. L. Mitchell & Jolley, 2013, p. 166).

Frequent debriefing sessions

Debriefing is another method for establishing credibility. In a credible study, the researcher makes sure that he has accurately represented the data (Given & Saumure, 2008, p. 895). Frequent debriefing sessions regularly conducted between my supervisors and myself, bring to bear their experiences and perceptions on the research. In such meetings, the supervisors provided a sounding board for me to test my developing ideas and interpretations (Leech & Onwuegbuzie, 2008, p. 200; Shenton, 2004, p. 67). They reviewed the codebook several times, approved the emergence of categories, and revised the report.

Peer debriefing (peer examination)

After I analysed 10% of the data, it was reanalysed using the same software by a second researcher as an initial check for bias. A detailed discussion regarding the development of the code system was conducted and reported to supervisors (Croucher & Cronn-Mills, 2015, p. 220).

Ensuring Validity

Validity is "the degree to which an instrument actually measures what it sets out to measure" (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014, p. 180). This study relied on validation technique called "face validity." This technique "assumes that an instrument adequately measures what it purports to measure if the categories are rigidly and

satisfactorily defined and if the procedures of the analysis have been adequately conducted. Most content analyses rely on face validity" (Wimmer & Dominick, 2014, p. 181). Hence, Schreier (2012) argues that it is vital that the researcher reports how the findings were formed to show the validity of the method. This is achieved through the methodological discussion in this chapter.

Ensuring Reliability

Reliability in content analysis can be defined "as agreement among coders about categorizing content" (Riff, Lacy, & Fico, 2014, p. 94). For frequencies of certain terms used by the Muslim Brotherhood, this study utilized the MAXQDA software benefiting from the "Lexical search" service to search for such terms. Computer content analysis is reliable as it gives the identical search term lists. It "unvaryingly produces the same results on a given sample of texts" (Benoit, 2011, p. 275). Thus, no reliability examination was needed for this stage. However, in the coding process of content analysis, the meaning depends on the context and subjective matter, so each text can be open to different interpretations by different scholars. Therefore, a certain coefficient of agreement or an inter-coders percentage is needed. According to (Julien, 2008), a reliability coefficient of .60 agreement between different coders is sufficient (p. 121). Accordingly, an inter-coder was employed for the purpose of reliability check (see Appendix D: Inter-coder letter of acknowledgment). The second researcher was fluent in Arabic and English. He was fully trained by me to be familiar with the codebook and definitions of categories (Riff et al., 2014).

There is no consensus on the amount of data that should be coded by the inter-coder. Wimmer and Dominick (2014) recommend a sub-sample "between 10% and 25%" of the data (p. 175). Lombard, Snyder-Duch, and Bracken (2010) suggest 10% of the total sample. Kaid and Wadsworth (1989) believe that 5-7% could be sufficient. In this study, 15% of the whole data was recoded by the inter-coder as a satisfactory and adequate percentage. Practical procedures of inter-coding included:

a) The independent intercoder was fully trained on the software and became familiar with the code system and the code definitions. He also coded two statements out of the sample as a means of "rehearsing" the process.

b) Choosing the sample: a random sample of the census of statements was conducted. In this sampling design, every element of the population has an equal (non-zero) chance of inclusion in the sample subjects (Kothari, 2004; Trochim, Donnelly, & Arora, 2016; Wimmer & Dominick, 2014). Therefore, this sampling design can be considered as rigorous sampling.

The public statements were sorted ascendingly from 1-132 according to the date of issue (see Appendix A: The Muslim Brotherhood's public statements July 2, 2017 – March 22, 2016). Then, the Research Randomizer website www.randomizer.org was used to generate the sample from the public statements (20 out of 132). The website generated the following statements as a random sample 7, 10, 11, 14, 19, 24, 28, 46, 70, 71, 83, 84, 89, 90, 101, 108, 121, 124, 125, 130 (see Figure 22. Results of sampling generated by Research Randomizer.)

RESULTS   PRINT   DOWNLOAD   CLOSE

1 Set of 20 Unique Numbers
Range: From 1 to 132— Sorted from Least to Greatest

Set #1

7, 10, 11, 14, 19, 24, 28, 46, 70, 71, 83, 84, 89, 90, 101, 108, 121, 124, 125, 130

Please note: By using this service, you agree to abide by the SPN User Policy and to hold Research Randomizer and its staff harmless in the event that you experience a problem with the program or its results. Although every effort has been made to develop a useful means of generating random numbers, Research Randomizer and its staff do not guarantee the quality or randomness of numbers generated. Any use to which these numbers are put remains the sole responsibility of the user who generated them.

Figure 22. Results of sampling generated by Research Randomizer.

These numbers correspond to the following statement:

Table 1. Random Sample for Inter-coding.

#	Translated title to English	Original title in Arabic	Date of issue
7	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood commenting on the speech of the Field Marshal, el- Sisi	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين تعليقا على ما جاء في خطاب الفريق السيسي	July 24, 2013
10	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the Putschists' press conference	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص المؤتمر الصحفي للانقلابيين	August 17, 2013
11	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the killing of 37 citizens detained in a deportation car at the hands of the Ministry of Interior	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص قتل ٣٧ مواطنا محتجزا في سيارة ترحيلات علي يد وزاره الداخلية	August 18, 2013
14	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in connection with the murder of detainees under torture	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص جريمة قتل المعتقلين تحت التعذيب	August 20, 2013
19	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: We will not sleep or rest until we regain the revolution	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين انتهى عهد النوم والراحة حتى نسترد الثورة	September 1, 2013
24	Peaceful … Peaceful ... Peaceful: A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	سلمية .. سلمية .. سلمية رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	September 13, 2013
28	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the intention of the Putschists to bomb some schools	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص نية الانقلابيين في تفجير بعض المدارس	September 20, 2013
46	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the brutal aggression of the Ministry of Interior on university students	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول عدوان الداخلية الوحشي على طلاب الجامعات	December 13, 2013
70	A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood on the adjudication of executions issued by the coup's courts in Egypt	بيان من جماعة الاخوان المسلمين حول أحكام الإعدامات التي تصدرها محاكم الانقلاب في مصر	April 28, 2014
71	A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood: The Brotherhood and the state's institutions	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين الإخوان ومؤسسات الدولة	May 09, 2014
83	The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: Prophet's migration and hopes of victory	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين الهجرة النبوية وآمال النصر	October 28, 2014
84	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the forced displacement Sinai people	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول التهجير القسري لأهل سيناء	October 30, 2014
89	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: To the free people in all over the country	بيان من "الإخوان المسلمون" إلى الأحرار في شتى ربوع الوطن	November 28, 2014
90	A message from the Muslim Brotherhood: Ah! Verily, the help of Allah is (always) near!	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين ألاَ إنَّ نَصْرَ اللهِ قَريبٌ	December 03, 2014
101	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the putschists targeting the nation's values and the fundamentals of Islam	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين حول استهداف الإنقلابيين قيم الامة وثوابت الاسلام	April 19, 2015
108	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the continuation of the abduction of four members of the Guidance Bureau and hundreds of the revolution's cadres	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول استمرار اختطاف 4 من أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد ومئات من كوادر العمل الثوري	June 14, 2015
121	"To the revolutionaries and to all people."	"إلى الثوار وإلى الناس كافة"	January 24, 2016
124	Statement	بيان	February 04, 2016
125	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the charter of the group	بيان من جماعة الاخوان المسلمين حول لائحة الجماعة	February 07, 2016
130	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of the International Women's Day	بيان من الأخوان المسلمون بمناسبة يوم المرأة العالمي	March 08, 2016

c) The original MAXQDA project was duplicated to create a second version called (project A). In the new version, all the statements that do not belong to the list above were removed with their codes (see Figure 23. Project A).

Figure 23. Project A

d) A new MAXQDA project was created to be used by the independent researcher called (project B). The same statements above were imported to the project to be coded and reanalysed by the inter-coder (see Figure 24. Project B.)

Figure 24. Project B.

e) The independent researcher coded the documents independently and deductively using the final codebook I created.

f) After he finished coding, both projects were merged to have one MAXQDA project file that contains both documents. Hence, the project file became ready to check for inter-coder agreement; document by document.

g) This study used Cohen's Kappa to assess the agreement between the two coders. Cohen's kappa coefficient κ "relates the number of concordant ratings to the number of discordant ratings while taking into account the agreement of ratings that could be expected by chance" (Burla et al., 2008, p. 114). It is one of the most widely employed coefficients in social sciences and is the most frequently used in general (Von Eye & Mun, 2014, p. 1).

The resulting Kappa ranging between -1 and +1 as +1 means absolute agreement between the two coders and 0 indicates a purely incidental agreement. All values below 0 indicate an agreement worse than chance. The values "between .41 and .60 can be regarded as moderate, and values above .60 as satisfactory or solid agreements. Values above .80 are regarded as nearly perfect agreements" (Burla et al., 2008, p. 114). Table 2 illustrates the solid nature of the inter-coding process. See also (Appendix c: The Inter-Coder Coefficient Kappa calculations) for the full calculation of the Inter-Coder Coefficient Kappa. The attached CD provides both files of the inter-coding process.

Table 2. Code Frequency and Inter-Coder Coefficient Kappa.

#	# as in the Sample	Statement Date of issue	Code Frequency in the document - Correlates	Intercoder Coefficient Kappa	Commenting on Coefficient Kappa
1.	7	July 24, 2013	85.71%	0.60	Moderate
2.	10	August 17, 2013	92.52%	0.63	Solid agreements
3.	11	August 18, 2013	93.71%	0.65	Solid agreements
4.	14	August 20, 2013	90.92%	0.62	Solid agreements
5.	19	September 1, 2013	95.43%	0.67	Solid agreements
6.	24	September 13, 2013	92.57%	0.66	Solid agreements
7.	28	September 20, 2013	92%	0.63	Solid agreements
8.	46	December 13, 2013	91.43%	0.60	Moderate
9.	70	April 28, 2014	89.71%	0.56	Moderate
10.	71	May 09, 2014	96%	0.81	Perfect agreements
11.	83	October 28, 2014	93.14	0.79	Solid agreements
12.	84	October 30, 2014	91.43%	0.50	Moderate
13.	89	November 28, 2014	96%	0.56	Moderate
14.	90	December 03, 2014	90.86%	0.70	Solid agreements
15.	101	April 19, 2015	96%	0.68	Solid agreements
16.	108	June 14, 2015	97.14%	0.76	Solid agreements
17.	121	January 24, 2016	94.86	0.68	Solid agreements
18.	124	February 04, 2016	95.43%	0.67	Solid agreements
19.	125	February 07, 2016	99.43%	0.83	Perfect agreements
20.	130	March 08, 2016	99.43%	0.77	Solid agreements

Methodological limitations

The methodology of this study could have been stronger if content analysis was triangulated with another method such as elite interviews. Interviews are widely accepted as a central method of data collection in many research approaches (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013, p. 357). Researchers conduct interviews to seek a

participant's experience and view in a field (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013). It helps the researcher "to gain complex in-depth information from a participant" and they are appropriate when a researcher seeks "sensitive or confidential" information (Savin-Baden & Major, 2013, p. 358). However, this study was less concerned with covert information than the messages the group sought to convey and the impression they seek to project to their audience. This is information that can be gained through the analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's documents, which makes such a limitation a minor one.

In addition, Savin-Baden and Major (2013) argue that the success of the interview depends on the honesty of the interviewee. The potential for deception is much more pronounced in an interview setting. Moreover, different elites will have different accounts and interpretations depending on their agenda. It is also likely that those within the Brotherhood may be suspicious toward scholars investigating the movement and they may be more reluctant to honestly share the values and beliefs that they hold. More critically, I also seek to deal with historical data that may be difficult for the elites to remember accurately. Interviews do not allow a detailed analysis of change over time. Finally, there would be practical concerns to contend with. Investigating the question *how* the analysis formula would require explaining the communication techniques which would require considerable time. As Savin-Baden and Major (2013) argue, while interviews have credibility among many researchers they can be unduly time-consuming (p. 187).

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, many events and the continuous cycle of violence in Egypt has made it difficult to reach the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and conduct elite interviews. Since December 2013, the Egyptian government has deemed the Brotherhood a terrorist group (Guardian, 2013a) and on August 9, 2014, the court in Egypt dissolved the movement and its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) (Aljazeera, 2014). Consequently, dozens of its senior figures, including its general guide, Mohammed Badie, and the ex-president, Mohamad Morsi, have been detained and are awaiting execution after an Egyptian court sentenced Morsi and more than 100 others on May 16, 2015, to

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death for their part in a mass jailbreak in 2011 (Khomami, 2015). Thus, the elite interviews method was excluded in favour of a more rigorous and appropriate methodology for the objectives of this study.

Conclusion

This chapter offers a research strategy that clarifies how the study's data was generated, organised, collected, analysed and reported. The study modified Lasswell's communication model as an analytical framework to investigate the different parts of the Muslim Brotherhood's communication strategy: *The Muslim Brotherhood says what via their communiqués, to whom, how, and with what effects?* To decode the movement's political communication strategy, deductive and inductive content analysis was used in combination with discourse analysis. While content analysis was used to quantify the strategy in order to make a rigorous inference about the message, discourse analysis provided a deeper and more holistic examination of the historical and cultural context of the techniques used in the communiqués. To insure the trustworthiness of the study, I employed many strategies including; detailed description of the phenomenon under scrutiny, frequent debriefing sessions, peer debriefing, face validity, and inter-coder reliability. Cohen's kappa coefficient (κ) was used to assess the agreement between the two coders. A satisfactory result was achieved which indicates that rigorous procedures were followed as the research was conducted.

Chapter Four: Communication Channels as Mobilization Resources

Introduction

This chapter traces the Brotherhood's use of media channels since the movement's establishment to answer the fourth and the fifth research questions of this study: *How* do Islamist social movements circumvent authoritarian regimes restrictions and media bias? *What* role does political opportunity structure play in the development of Islamist social movements communication methods (cultural resources productions)? The chapter argues contrary to the conventional wisdom that social movements are likely to adapt to the rules and criteria of mainstream media to influence coverage positively. Rather, it suggests that in response to extreme media selectivity and bias Islamist movements tend to establish their own media platforms in which cultural resources are mobilised. Taking advantage of new technologies, such platforms help social movements circumvent authoritarian regimes' restrictions and media bias. The chapter reveals that the Brotherhood adapts readily and swiftly to incorporate new technologies and contemporary communication mediums.

The chapter also argues that political opportunity contributed to the development of the Brotherhood's communication mediums post-2013 and the movement's political communication strategy in general. It suggests that in response to repressive totalitarian regimes' efforts to curb the voice of Islamist social movements, such movements endeavour to find alternative methods of communication rather than attempting to contest the narratives of mainstream media. They search to find supportive environments where they can establish and develop new communication methods that allow them to reach and address constituencies.

To support the study's argument, the chapter examines the evolution of the Muslim Brotherhood's media channels since its establishment to complete the discussion of precisely "how" the Brotherhood communicates its strategic goals.

The chapter presents these channels as crucial cultural resources through which the Brotherhood promotes their beliefs and values as well as to establish their identity and behavioural norms.

The Muslim Brotherhood's communication and publicity agenda have always played a substantial role in the organisation's growth and resilience. Naguib (2006) argues that this was particularly important among the new middle class emerging in the interwar period, who formed the primary audience of the Brotherhood's publications. The statistics reveal something of an exceptional phenomenon. When the movement held their first conference in 1933, the movement had only 15 branches. In mid-1936 the number increased to between 100-150 branches, then in mid-1937 reached to 216, then to 500 in 1941, to peak in that decade at 1000 branches in 1943 (Naguib, 2006, p. 34). At the time of al-Banna's assassination in 1949, the movement's membership was estimated to have reached 500,000 (half-million) active members, excluding sympathizers and supporters (Campo, 2009, p. 506; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009, p. 199; Zahid & Medley, 2006, p. 293). Scholarly consensus is that communication played a vital role in the movement's success (Maréchal, 2008, p. 32; Mellor, 2018, pp. 17, 32; Milton-Edwards, 2016, p. 172). Moreover, the Brotherhood's publications over the years have "significantly influenced the course of public debate" (Denis J. Sullivan, 2004, p. 189). The Brotherhood media has been a fundamental tool in implementing the movements strategies. It "provided an opportunity for the Brotherhood's leading members and supporters to enforce and consolidate their cultural capital (knowledge and practice of their faith) and symbolic capital (their sacrifice in prison and as subjects of state persecution); it provided a platform from which to dispel accusations by its opponents; and it facilitated the branding of the movement as a successful group with massive grassroots support (even if the perimeters of this support may be overstated), thereby enforcing a sense of shared identity: without a shared identity, there will be no sense of collectiveness or unified motivation and commitment to mutual goals" (Mellor, 2018, pp. 32-33). The Brotherhood's adoption of the latest

forms of communication to connect with people, reinforces the significant attention that the movement gives to their communication strategy.

The Brotherhood's Adoption of Print Media

Since its foundation in 1928, the movement relied on communication and media to recruit members. In late 1933, the second congress of the movement focused on this issue. The participants in the congress endorsed the establishment of a printing house for the movement (Naguib, 2006, p. 32). Thus, the movement made effective use of print media to disseminate their message (Campo, 2009, p. 507). After the congress, they launched several periodicals in Egypt. In June 1933, they published their first weekly newspaper, *al-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn* (the Muslim Brotherhood). (*Figure 25*). However, this publication ceased on November 04, 1938, due to a dispute which occurred between al-Banna and the Newspaper's editor-in-chief, Mohammed Shafi'e. Al-Banna believed that the materials of the publication were deviating from the official Brotherhood line (Ikhwanwiki, 2011c).

Figure 25. The first issue of the first Muslim Brotherhood's weekly newspaper al-ʾIkḫwān al Muslimūn, published in June 1933.

Within just 40 days the Brotherhood was able to overcome this obstacle. On December 16, 1938, they launched *el-Kholoud* (the immortality). The rate of production el-Kholoud was fairly rapid. In a period of less than 4 months (from December 16, 1938 to March 10, 1939), the group published 12 issues (Ikhwanwiki, 2011f). The movement continued issuing publications that included weekly and monthly newspapers, magazines, and other periodicals. On May 30, 1938, the first weekly magazine, *al-Nathier* (the Herald) Figure 26, was published but quit as the official mouthpiece on January 08, 1940, because of the defection of the concessionaire, Mahmoud Abu Zeid (Ikhwanwiki, 2011c). Abu Zeid and other members of the Brotherhood criticized the movement, accusing it of being lenient with the government, so they split from the movement and founded the "youth of

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Muhammad group." Issue 44 of *al-Nathier* published on January 08, 1940 was the last one under the Brotherhood as it became the official mouthpiece of the "youth of Muhammad" (Ikhwanwiki, 2014b).

Figure 26. The frontpage of the first weekly magazine, al-Nathier (the Herald) published by the Brotherhood in 1938.

A content analysis of *al-Nathier* under the Brotherhood revealed that religious topics such as Qur'an commentary, Hadith (sayings of prophet Muhammad), jurisprudence, principles of jurisprudence, theology, Islamic values, and mysticism. constituted 25.8 percent of its materials, while the same topics constituted 65.18 percent of the aforementioned *al-ʾIkḫwān al-Muslimūn* periodical (Ghobashi, 2000). This suggests that initially, the group attempted to mobilize their audience solely through teaching them Islam through the vision of the movement, while during the time of *al-Nathier* there were voices from inside the movement criticizing the

Brotherhood's passivity, forcing the movement to focus more on political and social issues; 45.5% of *al-Nathier* topics (Ghobashi, 2000).

The Brotherhood took over *al-Manar* (the Lighthouse) in 1939 after the death of its editor-in-chief, Mohammad Rashid Rida. Al-Manar was the most popular Islamic reformist magazine which began publishing in 1898 until the death of its founder in 1935 (Ryad, 2009). The publication then stopped for two years, resuming in 1939 by al-Banna, who published 6 issues of al-Manar. In September 1940, the publication stopped permanently due to a lack of financial resources (El-Kumi, 1992). However, on February 17, 1940, the Brotherhood published *al-Ta'aruf* magazine (see Figure 27). It continued publishing 12 pages each Saturday and reduced the number to 8 pages after issue 20. The magazine was later stopped after issue 29 on September 7, 1940, after confiscation by the government under Prime Minister Hassan Sabry Pasha (Ikhwanwiki, 2011d).

Figure 27. The first issue of the al-Ta'aruf magazine which was published on February 17, 1940.

The Brotherhood's ability to publish depended on fraught negotiations with the Egyptian government. In 1940, the Muslim Brotherhood published *al-Shu'aa'* (the Beam), which was stopped in the same year (Ghānim, 1992). In 1942, the movement launched a weekly magazine called *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin* (the Muslim Brotherhood). This came as one of several concessions the Muslim Brotherhood received under a deal which granted them a voice but simultaneously prevented them from participating in that year's election (Abdelmajeed, 2010). This was replaced by a daily newspaper under the same name in 1946 (Campo, 2009, p. 507), followed by a monthly magazine on November 16, 1947 called *al-Shahab* (the Meteor), which was published for only one year (See Figure 28). On December 8, 1948, both stopped publication upon the banning of the movement (Ghānim, 1992, p. 367), clearly revealing the effect of political opportunity structure on print media.

Figure 28. The frontpage of the fourth issue of the monthly magazine al-Shahab (the Meteor) published by the Brotherhood in February 1948.

September 8, 1947, marked something of a turning point in the style of material produced by the Brotherhood. *Al-Kashkoul Al-Jadid* (the Patchwork Magazine), a weekly satirical magazine comprised of text and caricatures was published for the

first time. Its goal was to respond to and attack its rivals with critical humour. It was the first magazine by an Islamist movement deploying satire as a mobilization resource. No one knew that it belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood, until its initiators, Mahmoud Assaf and Amine Ismael, resigned from the movement (Ikhwanwiki, 2011b). Only 59 issues were published of the *Al-Kashkoul al-Jadid*, the last one of which was on November 27, 1948, just a few days before the movement was banned. Al-Kashkoul Al-Jadid was stopped because of a disagreement between the founders and the leadership of the group regarding its periodical editorial policy (Ikhwanwiki, 2012). See Figure 29. An example of al-Kashkoul Al-Jadid front page. Issue 16, December 22, 1947. After it was stopped, satire seems to have disappeared from the Brotherhood's communication armoury until after the 2011 revolution, only re-emerging as a significant force after 2013.

Figure 29. An example of al-Kashkoul Al-Jadid front page. Issue 16, December 22, 1947.

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The focus on religious teachings through the cultural resources of the movement arguably obscured another face of the Brotherhood. On March 22, 1948, two members of the group assassinated prominent court judge, Ahmad Beik Al-Khazndar because of his verdict against the movement members. In particular, he sentenced a Muslim Brother to prison for the youth's attacks on British soldiers in a club in Alexandria (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, p. 62). The two Brotherhood members belonged to the Special Apparatus (al-Tanzim al-Sirri), also known as the "Secret Apparatus", which was a secret paramilitary group advocating violence against the Egyptian regime (Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 40). However, al-Banna consistently condemned the apparatuses' violent attacks against the regime. For example, after the bombing of a courthouse by the special apparatus in January 1949, al-Banna described the assailants as if they were not Brotherhood members or even Muslims (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, p. 68). Consequently, on December 8, 1948, the general military ruler banned the Brotherhood with all their divisions throughout Egypt, confiscating their funds and property (El-Menawy, 2013). Therefore, the cycle of violence ended with the assassination of Egypt's second prime minister al-Nuqrashi Pasha, under monarch King Farouk, as a revenge for the government's crackdown and his orders to dissolve the movement (Campo, 2009; El-Menawy, 2013; R. P. Mitchell, 1993). Although al-Banna's promptly condemned al-Nuqrashi assassination, stating that violence is not acceptable in Islam (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, p. 69), the government assassinated him on February 12, 1949 in Cairo and fingers pointed towards King Farouk and his Iron Guard for culpability of the assassination (Carstens, 2014). After the movement was banned, all the Brotherhood's publications were shut down, compromising the group's cultural resources (Campo, 2009, p. 507).

However, on May 30, 1950, after some of the Brotherhood's leaders were released from the Egyptian prisons, they published *al-Mabaheth* Magazine (the Detective), which was a judicature periodical. It started as an educational publication until it began dealing with political issues. In January 1951 it was replaced by *al-Daawa* magazine (the Call established by Saleh Ashmawi, the first

head of the Secret Apparatus(Ikhwanwiki, 2014a). The creation of *Al-Daawa* was an attempt to strengthen the movement which was reeling from the sudden loss of al-Banna, its founder and charismatic leader (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 1981). With the 1952 Revolution by the Free Officers led by Mohammed Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) banned all political parties in Egypt, crafting a one-party system under the Liberation Rally (Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 41). The Brotherhood was excluded from the decision because they presented themselves as a preaching religious group. Their General Guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi, who succeeded al-Banna declared to Suleiman Hafez (Deputy Prime Minister and Interior Minister) stated that the Brotherhood was "a dawaa [preaching] religious organization whose members, supporters and components do not work in the field of politics and do not aim to achieve their aims via means like elections" (El-Menawy, 2013). The tactic of presenting the Brotherhood as preaching group protected the movement from dissolution by the state. Deploying the cloak of religion was arguably the most effective approach to ensure public support and the publication's survival. According to Al-Anani (2016a) the MB faces a key hurdle, or "founding defect" due to its dual identity as a religious organization and political actor.

However, *al-Daawa* magazine (the Call) was banned in early 1956, due to the emergence of a negative "political opportunity." According to Ali Ashmaway, the last leader of the Secret Apparatus of the MB, although the first two years of the Revolution of July witnessed cooperation between the RCC and the Brotherhood, this relationship quickly became antagonistic by the fall of 1954 (Ashmawy, 2006, p. 3). In October 1954, the Brotherhood attempted and failed to assassinate Gamal Abdel Nasser while he was delivering a speech about the British troop's evacuation from the Suez base. A crackdown against the Brotherhood ensued, culminating in 2943 of jailed Brothers including the General Guide by October 24, 1955 (Ramadan, 2006, pp. 9-10). Many of the movement's leaders were sentenced to death by military tribunals while others fled Egypt (Zollner, 2007, p. 413). *Al-Daawa* issued very few sporadic numbers without actual distribution to maintain

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the license of *al-Daawa*. The minimum requirement of any monthly periodical was the printing of five copies until it was completely banned in early 1956 (Ikhwanwiki, 2014a).

It was not until Sadat's rule in the 1970s that a new, more positive, political opportunity presented itself. Sadat pursued a policy of tolerance toward the Brotherhood to accommodate the movement as a part of his camp and consolidate opposition against Nasserites and Communists (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982). Politically, fear of leftists and Nasserites undermining Sadat's legitimacy made him draw on the Brothers for support against these groups (S. E. Ibrahim, 2002; Denis Joseph Sullivan & Abed-Kotob, 1999; Wolf, 2014). Therefore, Sadat gradually released Brotherhood members who had been jailed by Nasser, allowed them to return to their headquarters and to resume their traditional publication *al-Daawa* (Ranko, 2015, p. 68; Wolf, 2014, p. 133). In 1976, the inauguration of the revived *al-Daawa* saw nearly 60,000 copies published and distributed across Egypt to rise to 78,000 only seven months later in January 1977 to around 100,000 copies in some later issues (Al-Arian, 2014, p. 182).

In November 1977 after President Sadat announced his historic visit to Israel to make peace, the tone of the magazine shifted from preaching, staying out of politics, and avoiding criticism of President Sadat and his policies to explicit attack and clear condemnation. *Al-Daawa*, which was the only mouthpiece of the Brotherhood at that time, launched its most vehement attack against the peace initiative with Israel, expanding its rhetorical attacks to condemn the entirety of government policies during the following four years (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982, p. 77), until it was permanently shut down by Egyptian authorities in 1981 (Campo, 2009, p. 507). For example, the periodical attacked el-Sadat's call for the democratization of Egypt. They perceived his calls for democracy and respect of law as "a thin veneer hiding a despotic authoritarianism." In 1981, on the tenth anniversary of the May 15, 1971 "Corrective Revolution," the Brotherhood attacked what is they called "facade democracy" in the area of civil rights. They published, through *al-Daawa* an article

entitled *"The Corrective Revolution is in Dire Need of Correction"* (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982, p. 84; 2002, p. 42).

Al-Daawa also had a strong social component. It attacked the way the government dealt with education, housing, transportation, and inflation issues. For example, in its January issue of 1977, the Brotherhood published an article entitled "Is there an end to this night? Corruption is All Over the Place and the Treatment Provided by the Government is Just Absolute Nonsense Speeches." (See Figure 30, the original article.) It called for the government and parliament to resign or to be forced to quit. For example, on the editorial of the November issue 1980, Umar al-Tilmisani, the third General Guide of the Brothers and the president and managing editor of *al-Daawa* wrote an article entitled "This Government Should Resign or Must be Sacked out Forcibly and this Parliament Should Dissolve itself or Must be Dissolved" (See Figure 31, the original article.)

Figure 30. An article published in *al-Daawa*'s January issue of 1977, entitled "Is there an end to this night? Corruption is All Over the Place and the Treatment Provided by the Government is Just Absolute Nonsense Speeches."

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Figure 31. The editorial of *al-Daawa*'s November issue of 1980 by Umar al-Tilmisani, the third General Guide of the Brotherhood.

Unsurprisingly perhaps, *al-Daawa* was banned by the regime in September 1981 as el-Sadat changed his stance fearing the threat of growing opposition. This represented a distinct negative political opportunity structure for the Brotherhood as el-Sadat cracked down on Islamists and student groups arresting nearly 1,600. In response to this move and other unpopular domestic and foreign policies, on October 6, 1981, el-Sadat was assassinated by a military cell led by Lieutenant Khalid Islambouli (Campo, 2009, pp. 597-589). Islambouli confessed during his trial that he was part of a 24-man al-Jihad cell (Schanzer, 2005, p. 35). The Brotherhood condemned the violence and refuted any relation with Sadat's assassination (Samak, 2011). This political opportunity served to maintain the Brotherhood's popularity among people by presenting itself as a moderate movement that does not violate the tenants of Islam. It also helped boost its resilience and support by appearing as victims subjected to unjust accusations (Ranko, 2015).

Therefore, when Mohammad Hosni Mubarak succeeded to the presidency upon the assassination of el-Sadat on October 6, 1981, he tolerated the movement presuming that as a new leader such policy would boost his political legitimacy (Al-Awadi, 2004). Although Mubarak's regime enacted decisive repression against militant Islamic groups, the Brotherhood represented the moderate wing of Islamists in Egypt, so the regime tacitly tolerated the movement as a means of countering the threat from radical Islamists (Al-Awadi, 2004, p. 146). Therefore, the Brotherhood was allowed to re-enter into the political mainstream and participate in parliamentary elections from 1984 (Koa, 2018a; Wickham, 2015). Paradoxically however, the ban on the Brotherhood since 1954 remained in effect, effectively used as blackmail so that the regime could restrict the group's activities. Notably, it did not allow them to establish their own media. Hence, from 1980 to 1990, the Muslim Brotherhood took over the weekly periodical *Liwa al-Islam* which was originally established in 1947 by Ahmad Hamza (Banner of Islam) (Hassan, 2002).

Benefiting from the political opportunity provided by the January 25, 2011 revolution that toppled President Mubarak, the movement established many media outlets. On April 30, 2011, the Brotherhood announced the formation of the Freedom and Justice Party headed by the movement's politburo member, then-President Mohammed Morsi (BBC, 2011; CNN, 2011; Dawn, 2011). Therefore, in October 2011, the Brotherhood established a newspaper under the name of their political wing to be an official voice of the newly established party that won the 2012 Egyptian elections - *the Freedom and Justice Newspaper*- (Ahram, 2013). On June 24, 2012, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood was proclaimed Egypt's first elected civilian president. After just one year in power, on June 30, 2013, millions of Egyptians occupied Tahrir Square and jammed all the main routes around the presidential palace calling for Morsi to "Erhal", or "Get out". The Brotherhood's headquarters were ransacked and burned after huge clashes between the Brotherhood members and protesters (Spencer, 2013). The next day, Tamarod or "Rebellion", the movement that organised the demonstrations, gave Morsi a

deadline of July 2, 2013, to step down (Spencer, 2013). On July 3, 2013, the military overthrew Morsi claiming that they were executing the will of the people. As a result, most Brotherhood's media outlets were banned immediately. On September 25, 2013 the Egyptian authorities shut down the newspaper headquarters following the September 23, 2013 court ruling that banned the Brotherhood and ordered its funds to be seized (Al-Jazeera, 2013a; Reuters, 2013). It was banned officially from printing on December 26, 2013 after the cabinet declared the movement a terrorist group (Ahmed, 2013; Ahram, 2013). This provides a clear evidence that the Brotherhood use of print media was reliant upon the political opportunity structure provided by the regime's acquiescence or repression of the movement.

Tracing the Brotherhood's unyielding obduracy in use of print periodicals, despite the state's obstacles, shows the movement's understanding of the importance of media and its desire to communicate with people and disseminate their ideology. Political opportunity played a critical role in the movement's acquisition of print media. At times when the Egyptian regime followed an accommodation policy, the movement was allowed to print its periodicals, however, most of the time the government banned the Brotherhood's periodicals particularly when directly commenting on political matters. Thus, political opportunity also impacted the content of the Brotherhood's periodicals with a focus on religious teachings and avoidance of political issues until political opportunity allowed otherwise.

The Brotherhood Adoption of the Internet Communications

The Brotherhood's extensive use of media outlets throughout its history indicates the importance that the movement attributed to whichever effective channels of communication were available to disseminate their message. Therefore, it comes as little surprise that as the Muslim Brotherhood was prohibited from owning any types of media outlets, especially print and audio-visual networks, the movement focused on the multi-media function of the internet. Its first move in this regard

was the establishment of a website on May 20, 1998 called *aldaawah.org*. The archived copy of this website (which is no longer available) contains many electronic copies of *al-Daawa* magazine. This was followed by *al-shahed* (the Witness) *for strategic studies ashahed2000.tripod.com* at the beginning of 2000. *Alshahed* was launched with purpose of election monitoring. The website provided updates until September 2002 and is still available because it was hosted by a free web hosting website called TRIPOD. Tripod.com is a web hosting service that officially launched in 1995 and initially designed its services to benefit college students and young adults in the quest to build online communities (Elliott, 1997). On February 22, 2000 another website called "Islam is the Solution" *khayma.com/islamissolution* was launched and hosted on a free web hosting website called Khayma. See Figure 32, an archived copy of *IslamIsSolution* from June 21, 2001.

Figure 32. The home page of *IslamIsSolution* on June 21, 2001 (web.archive.org, 2001b).

On March 29, 2000 another website called *al-Haq'iq Misriya* (Egyptian Facts) was launched. See Figure 33, an archived copy of *egypt-facts.org* from June 17, 2001. This was shut down several times in its first year by the Egyptian authorities,

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encouraging the movement to launch their own proxy servers (Richter, 2011b, p. 93).

Figure 33. The home page of egypt-facts.org on June 17, 2001 (web.archive.org, 2001a).

Since then, the movement focused its efforts on the Internet to circumvent the restrictions imposed by the Egyptian regime. Many websites and blogs followed. On September 30, 2001, the Muslim Brotherhood in Alexandria of Egypt launched their own website, *Amal-elomah* (the Hope of the Nation)*,* www.amlalommah.net (Statstool.com, 2015a). The website served as an active news website, but with many sections such as the Brotherhood's thoughts and the Brotherhood's standpoint. Arguably, the most important section was called "the Muslim Brotherhood's standpoint" in which they provided their view of political events. On February 24, 2002, they launched their official website, *ikhwanonline.com,* in order to approach the Egyptian and Arab public (Statstool.com, 2015c). While the current version of the website focuses on incriminating the state and exposing their malpractices, it has other sections that focuses on the movement's image and ideology. On December 2, 2002, the movement launched *Egypt Window,* Egyptwindow.net, which is one of the most active Brotherhood's news portals (Statstool.com, 2015b).

It is clear that the Brotherhood at this stage considered websites as an essential cultural and mobilisation resource. In particular, online communication was regarded as a crucial means of connecting with a rapidly increasing youth population. A number of websites concerned with students in universities, were set up, including:

- Gameaa Online (University Online), *gam3aonline.com*, the Brotherhood Students at Alexandria University, founded on September 15, 2001. See Figure 34, an archived copy of the home page of the website.

Figure 34. The home page of gam3aonline.com on November 02, 2005 (web.archive.org, 2005a).

- Yala Talaba (Come on, students), *yallatalaba.com*, the Central Student Department Secretariat, established on March 25, 2004.
- Bass Shabab (Only Youth), *Shababwebas.com*, the Secretariat of the secondary schools, founded on September 2, 2004.
- Kol al-talabeh (All Students), *alltalaba.com*, the Brotherhood at Cairo University, established on September 29, 2004. See Figure 35, an archived copy of *alltalaba.com* from November 11, 2005.

Figure 35. The home page of alltalaba.com on November 11, 2005 (web.archive.org, 2005b).

- AlGameaa.com (the University.com), *algam3a.com*, the Brotherhood at Helwan University, established on December 13, 2004.
- Azharwai (Belonging to Al-Azhar), *azharway.com*, the Brotherhood at Al-Azhar University, founded on December 18, 2004.
- Sharqawi Online, *sharkawyonline.com*, the Brotherhood at Zagazig University, founded on September 16, 2005.
- Bahrawi, *ba7rawy.com*, the Muslim Brotherhood students at al-Buhayrah, founded on September 19, 2005.

Moreover, during the 2005 parliamentary elections, the Brotherhood, for the first time in its history, launched websites for its electoral candidates. Figure 36 shows an archived website created in October 2005 for Dr. Makarem al-Dairy, a female Brotherhood candidate for the People's Assembly.

Figure 36. The home page of the website of Dr. Makarem al-Dairy a Brotherhood candidate for the People's Assembly in the Egyptian parliamentary elections of 2005 (web.archive.org, 2005e).

The Brotherhood's conviction in such websites as an essential cultural and mobilisation resource became clearer as within the same governorate more than one website was launched to cover the activities of the Brothers' candidates. For example, in October 2005 in Cairo governorate, the Brotherhood launched a website for the Brothers in East Cairo ikhwansharq.com and another concerned with the Brothers of North Cairo (Shoubra district) ikhwanshubra.com. None of these websites are available today, however, see Figure 37 for an archived copy of *ikhwansharq.com* on November 30, 2005 and Figure 38 for an archived copy of *ikhwanshubra.com* from November 28, 2005.

Figure 37. The home page of *ikhwansharq.com* on November 30, 2005 (web.archive.org, 2005c)

Figure 38. The home page of *ikhwanshubra.com* on November 28, 2005 (web.archive.org, 2005d).

In the 2005 election the Brotherhood achieved their best showing during Mubarak's era, winning 88 out of 444 seats and constituting 20% of the parliament

(Abdelmajeed, 2010). Using websites as cultural resources, the Brotherhood was able to project their own philosophies unmediated and unedited by media gatekeepers suggesting that these websites have been an effective means of resource mobilization, particularly in the face of authorities' restrictions and media bias. According to Bessant (2018) movements use websites and digital technology to extend their reach and to mobilise millions of young people "in ways hitherto unimaginable" (p. 146). They allow for direct and uncensored communication with audience. Websites enables social movements "for the sidestepping of gatekeepers thereby enabling unmediated communication" (Bessant, 2018, p. 147). Online communication allowed more pluralism and challenged the centralized political system (Badr, 2018, p. 161).

On October 16, 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood launched their official English website, *Ikhwanweb.com*, to reach an international audience, though with dubious success. The mission of the website was "to present the Muslim Brotherhood vision right from the source and rebut misconceptions about the movement in western societies" (Ikhwanweb, 2005). Their main office is based in London, benefiting from the British tradition of hosting exiled political refugees and groups fleeing repression. The office was also situated in this location perhaps in the hope of recruiting native English speakers thus benefiting from young Muslim volunteers who understand the Western context and can communicate to an international public sphere accordingly. In addition, they most likely sought to circumvent the Egyptian government's constraints, and thus avoid the experience of the *al-Haq'iq Misriya* website that was shut down several times by the regime.

Political observers have observed an unnerving duality in the language used by the Brotherhood in English and Arabic websites. In September 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood's English-language Twitter retweeted a message from the Muslim Brotherhood Deputy Guide, Khairat al-Shatir, to the US Embassy in which he said he was "relieved none of @USembassycairo staff was hurt". Nonetheless, the US Embassy replied: "Thanks. By the way, have you checked out your own Arabic

feeds? I hope you know we read those too." In Arabic, the Muslim Brotherhood's Twitter and their official website, Ikhwan Online, had been praising demonstrations incurred by the US embassy (AhramOnline, 2012; Basyouni, 2013). This issue was clearly identified in the sixth report of session 2016–17 of the Foreign Affairs Committee investigating political Islam;

> In terms of their messaging, we have seen evidence that some political Islamist groups vary their message to different audiences and, in particular, that they vary content depending on whether the message is in English or Arabic. This is hardly a trait confined to political Islamists alone. But, in some communications, particularly from the Muslim Brotherhood, the English and Arabic messages have proved contradictory *(Paragraph 60, The-House-of-Commons, 2016).*

From 2004, all the Brotherhood's offshoots in the Egyptian 27 governorates launched their own websites in order to communicate with their local constituencies and mobilize followers. For instance, on September 18, 2004, the Brotherhood in Sharqia Governorate launched their own website *Sharkiaonline.com*; on October 12, 2004, the Brotherhood in Port Said Governorate launched their own website *ansarportsaid*.net; on October 17, 2005, the Brotherhood in Gharbia Governorate launched their website *gharbiaonline.com*; on June 28, 2006 the Brotherhood in Dakahlia Governorate launched their website *dakahliaikhwan.com*; on July 09, 2006, the Brotherhood in Damietta Governorate launched their website *domiatwindow.net*; on May 30, 2007, the Brotherhood in Kafr El Sheikh Governorate launched their website *kfrelshikh.com*; on December 07, 2009, the Brotherhood in Ismailia Governorate launched their website *ikhwanismailia.com*.[19] However, the Brotherhood at Beheira Governorate preceded their comrades from the other governorates in this endeavour as they launched *Elbehira.com* on August 02, 2001. To date all these websites are still active. Yet, many other seem to be deactivated such as the Brothers' website at Minya Governorate, *miniaonline.com*;

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[19] All these websites were checked using "Online Whois Checker." Retrieved on June 17, 2018 from http://www.seocheckpoints.com/whois-checker

the Brothers' website at Giza Governorate *gizaikhwan.com*; the Brothers' website at Monufia Governorate *mnfonline.net*; the Brothers' website at Suez Governorate *ikhwansuez.net;* the Brothers' website at Ismailia Governorate *ismailia1928.com.*

The extensive deployment of such websites shows that the movement started using websites as strategic communication channels and mobilizing structures that enabled the group to enrol supporters of the movement. Internet mobilizing structures help mobilization by rapidly expanding the network and coordinating the different resources enrolled within a social movement. "Without mobilizing structures, it will be impossible to mobilize" (Berntzen, Rohde-Johannessen, & Godbolt, 2014, p. 19).

At the beginning of January 2007, the movement launched its website nowabikhwan.com to publish its MPs' news and activities to the public and spread its parliamentary work as well as the background of its bloc in the parliament. The website is no longer available, but it shows how the Brotherhood was using websites as a means of one-way communication and mobilization resource, promoting what they were doing in Parliament for their constituencies and to promote themselves as "the people's voice." See Figure 39, an archived copy of *nowabikhwan.com* from January 10, 2007 that shows the websites' sections which include for example: "Voice of the people," "meet the MPs," "from inside the parliament," "hot issues," "the Brotherhood in the parliament," and "learn about the Brotherhood." This argument was reinforced by Williamson (2009) who concludes that "MPs' focus remains largely on promoting themselves through reportage of their efforts in the House or constituency and by linking to ideologically similar commentators or websites" (Williamson, 2009, p. 3).

Figure 39. The home page of nowabikhwan.com on January 10, 2007 (web.archive.org, 2007)

It seems clear therefore that the Brotherhood has become more reliant on cyberspace as a strategic communication channel. In late 2006, the movement's activists were involved in blogging (Richter, 2011b, p. 93). In October 2006, young journalist, Abd Al Moneim Mahmoud created his blog Ana Ikhwan (I am a Brotherhood) to become the first blogger to explicitly identify himself as a Brotherhood member (Radsch, 2008, p. 7). According to Radsch (2008), "the history of the Muslim Brotherhood blogs parallels that of the larger blogosphere in that it began with a small core group of activists and has since expanded and diversified" (p. 7). Brotherhood bloggers felt compelled to freelance on the side of their studies because the movement does not have its own newspaper or channel (Radsch, 2008, p. 6). Somaya Badr, a Muslim Sister's blogger, said that the

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blogosphere is a great power revealing much about Islam and society's problems (Radsch, 2008, p. 6). By early 2007, the Egyptian Blog Ring comprised of more than 1400 blogs including many more young Brotherhood members, men and women, and few key leaders like Esam el-Erian and Khaled Hamza who encouraged talented youth to start blogging (Radsch, 2008, p. 7). The Brotherhood exploited the opportunity provided by the blogosphere and employed blogs as strategic communication channels because "blogs created a publishing mechanism beyond state control" (Radsch, 2008, p. 7).

Simulating YouTube, on August 12, 2007 the movement launched *ikhwantube.com* (Trafficip.com, 2015). The website specialized in videos and includes many channels or sections, such as: the Military Coup Channel, President Mohammad Morsi Channel, Khairat el-Shater Channel (the deputy chairman of the Brotherhood), the Brothers Channel, the Brothers' MPs Channel, Palestine Channel, International Political News Channel, Education Channel, Satellite TV Channel, Exclusive Videos Channel, Human Rights Channel, Gaza Songs and Chants, Elections Channel, the Documentary Channel, the Brotherhood Heritage Channel, Hassan al-Banna Channel (the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood), the Zionists War Crimes Channel, the Military Trials of the Muslim Brotherhood members Channel, Syria Channel, Jordan Channel, January 25 Revelation Channel, the Freedom and Justice Party Channel, and finally the Sport Channel (which only includes videos about political sport such as for example; a message from the athletes to the coup and clashes between the Egyptian police and sports fans in stadiums). The sections of the website show that the Brotherhood employed *ikhwantube.com* as a strategic channel for resources mobilization and strategic framing to discredit the incumbent military regime and win the hearts and minds of Egyptians (Koa, 2018b).

Moreover, in a simulation of Wikipedia, on April 2, 2009, the movement launched its Arabic Wikipedia *ikhwanwiki.com*, which acts as an online encyclopaedia. The purpose of this website as stated in the "about" section of the

wiki, is to document the Muslim Brotherhood's history and to gather all books, research, studies, articles, pictures, videos and the old Brotherhood's magazines that are available for interested scholars to study the Muslim Brotherhood (Ikhwanwiki, 2011a). It provides thousands of accessible articles in different areas related to the movement, such as its history and events in which they participated or those considered to be closely tied to the Muslim Brotherhood's causes. The launch of such websites indicates how fervently the movement has deployed recent technological advances to disseminate its ideas and market its ideology.

Following the aftermath of the 2011 Egyptian revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood declared their intention to establish the Freedom and Justice Party as the political wing of the movement. The party acquired its legal status on June 6, 2011 and is headed by Mohamed Morsi (Shehata, 2011) who won the 2012 presidential election. Consequently, on February 21, 2012 the Movement launched the Freedom and Justice Gate *fj-p.com* (Statstool.com, 2016). The website has an *English version* as well *fjponline.com* which its domain is registered on May 21, 2011 (Trafficip.com, 2016). This shows the Brotherhood's interest in communicating with the West as well as with their local constituencies given that they created the Freedom and Justice English website before even acquiring legal status within Egypt. Its legal sanction was obtained on June 6, 2011 and they registered the English domain nine months before the Arabic one.

It seems clear that the Brotherhood's utilisation of specialized websites and online forums were deployed as mobilization resources and strategic communication channels. In turn, these websites provided a crucial political opportunity for the Brotherhood to circumvent the authority's restrictions and to disseminate their ideas as a cultural resource, particularly around electoral activities.

The Brotherhood's post 2011 adoption of Satellite TV Channels

In the aftermath of the Egyptian revolution, in April 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood launched its first official TV station, *Misr 25* (Egypt 25) along with many other websites and other media outlets. The TV satellite channel, according to Shuman (2012), played a pivotal role in promoting Mohammad Morsi's presidential campaign. Unsurprisingly therefore, on July 3, 2013, the day Morsi was ousted, the military forced the channel to shut down along with other two Islamist satellite channels, *Al-Hafez* and *Al-Nas* and many other Muslim Brotherhood's outlets (Guardian, 2013b; Telegraph, 2013a).

In the wake of Morsi's removal from power, the movement was outlawed and dozens of its senior figures were imprisoned. Consequently, all its publications and media outlets were shut down, except for websites that survived because the regime did not have authority over cyber outlets. In order to circumvent the Egyptian government's prohibition of the Muslim Brotherhood's established media outlets, in August 2013, the movement launched a new TV station called *Al-Shar'iyah* (The Legitimacy) broadcasting from Turkey. This played a significant role during *Rābiʿa* sit-in, one of the central demonstrations of pro-Morsi protests. The station was showing a non-stop live feed from the square, featuring intensely emotional and rousing speeches delivered by Islamists addressing the protesters. During the dispersal of the sit-in, footage of protestors was combined with video clips displaying piles of dead bodies and numerous charred carcasses. One of the urgent screen captions carried by TV read: "We cannot count the number of martyrs filling all of the mosque's rooms, and we cannot take them outside the square" (BBC, 2013a). The station played a pivotal role in showing the world the massacres occurring in the square and refuting the claims of mainstream Egyptian news channels such as Channel One, Nile News, ON TV and CBC. These media outlets were harshly critical of the protesters, insisting that they were armed and responsible for murdering many members of the armed forces (BBC, 2013a).

On December 22, 2013, in the wake of *Rābiʿa* massacre, the Brotherhood launched *Rābiʿa TV* (the name of the square and the Mosque where Morsi's supporters protested against his ouster and became a symbol of resistance by the Muslim Brotherhood). The channel is based in Istanbul and adopted "the pulse of freedom" as its official slogan (Today's-Zaman, 2013). On May 1, 2015, the French-based satellite provider Eutelsat stopped the broadcast of *Rābiʿa* Station due to pressure from the Egyptian government on Paris. The Sisi regime claimed that the channel was inciting violence. As a rejoinder, a few days later, on May 8, 2015, the Muslim Brotherhood launched *al-Thawra* (the Revolution) Channel from Turkey (Egypt-Window, 2015). Such incidents clearly demonstrate the great importance the movement attaches to media to ensure its survival and growth.

The Muslim Brotherhood also launched three other TV satellite channels from Turkey; *Mikammilin* (We are continuing), *Al-Sharq* (the Orient), and *Misr Alaan* (Egypt Now). All those broadcasters have their own active news websites. On February 11, 2014, *Mikammilin* (We are continuing) was launched (Arabi21, 2014). The channel was designed to be interactive and to broadcast on the internet. Once the website's visitors enter the main page of the channel website, www.mekameleen.tv, the live stream broadcasting starts immediately. Upon its launch, the director of the channel stated that the goal of the channel is to "end state monopoly on television as it will rely mainly on internet broadcasting, thus it won't be subjected to state censorship" (Middle-East-Monitor, 2014). The channel is still one of the most active mediums within the Brotherhood's media armoury.

On April 25, 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood launched *Elsharq TV* (the Orient) www.elsharq.tv from Turkey (Moheet, 2014). It takes "The Orient, for all Egyptians" as its official slogan. In February 2015, the channel became infamous after it published leaked recordings reportedly of President Sisi and other top officials discussing Morsi's imprisonment. In the leaked tapes, Egyptian generals were plotting to convince the world that Morsi was in a civilian rather than a military prison, and thus, not the victim of an army coup. The transcripts of the

conversations go back to 2013 but were authenticated in 2015. It provided valuable evidence that the Morsi's Muslim Brotherhood was deposed unconstitutionally, a fact that Sisi has constantly denied (Fisk, 2015). The significance of the leaks is evidenced by the fact that the United Nations considered the recording as an evidence that exposed the Egyptian generals' story as a lie. Another compromising tape was leaked in February 2015, where Sisi made offensive remarks claiming that the Gulf Countries have more money than they need, and that Egypt should have a share, saying, "they have money like rice" (Alabbasi, 2015; AlJazeera, 2015). During the conversation, Brigadier General Abbas Kamil, the manager of Sisi's office, branded the Gulf states as "half-states", who should "pay up" because they "are living a fancy life and have piles of money" (Alabbasi, 2015; AlJazeera, 2015). These leaks, broadcast on the Brotherhood's new satellite channels aimed to drive a wedge between Egypt and their Gulf financiers by presenting the Egyptian regime as untrustworthy and duplicitous.

On November 17, 2014, the Brotherhood launched *Misr Alaan TV* (Egypt Now), www.misralaan.tv, from Turkey (BBC, 2014a). The channel consistently portrayed Sisi, as a "killer" who headed a "coup" against the "freely-elected" Mohammad Morsi. The promotion material of a programme launched on the channel, called "the Tyrant," features images of Hitler, Mussolini, Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi and Sisi, thereby clearly attempting to reinforce Egypt's new president as a dictator. In addition, at intervals, the channel airs footage of what it says is police brutality against civilians and peaceful protesters. From time to time, the footage is accompanied by revolutionary songs (BBC, 2014a).

On June 24, 2015, *Misr Alaan* TV (Egypt Now) stopped broadcasting, after it was removed by its satellite provider company, Noorsat due to pressure from the Egyptian regime. (Al3asema-News, 2015). However, its Facebook page still actively posts incriminating news of the Egyptian regime and portrays it as an ally of Israel. On July 6, 2015, a spokesperson of the Channel, Mohammad Jamal, confessed in a live meeting on *al-Thawra* (the Revolution) channel that the Muslim

Brotherhood made a mistake in broadcasting through one satellite provider. This shows the ferocity of the media war between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime given the way in which allies of both have been forced to take sides. In addition, it reveals the extent of the Brotherhood's obsession with media and their responsive reactions to obstacles on that front. On July 9, 2015, one of *Misr Alaan's* senior presenters, Mohammad Nasser said, "war is a competition" (Youtube.com, 2015) to describe the way the regime closed the channel and the Muslim Brotherhood relaunched it.

Conclusion

Since its establishment the Muslim Brotherhood has often been ahead of the curve in terms of how it uses media to disseminate their ideology and political stances. However, political opportunity structure embodied in the regime's restrictions controlled the movement's acquisition of print media and also controlled the content of such outlets. When the Internet appeared, the movement adopted this medium to reach people locally and internationally and to circumvent the political regime's barriers and media bias. The Muslim Brotherhood's activities were in line with technological developments, developing from one-way news distribution, to social networking and blogging. As McNair (2017) argues, new media has opened up more attractive channels for campaigning and communicating political messages "unmediated," as it were. The Brotherhood's success in this regard also reinforces the argument of Etling, Faris, and Palfrey (2010); Lewis, Kaufhold, and Lasorsa (2010) who maintain that the Internet undermines the influence of gatekeepers by allowing the emergence of citizen journalists. Moreover, the findings lend support to Howard (2010)'s conclusion that Islamist movements use the Internet as an alternative domain for public discourse and that they quickly adapt to the new information and communication environments. The development of satellite channels is particularly important since most Egyptians have a TV whereas the current Internet penetration is still limited: only 50% of the population has Internet (Internet-Society, 2018; Statista, 2018). Their experience with electoral

campaigning using *Misr 25* highlighted the powerful role that such channels could play in conveying political messages.

Theoretically, this chapter suggests that the Brotherhood's use of print media was dependent upon the political opportunity structure. The proliferation of online websites helped the Brotherhood circumvent the negative impact of the political opportunity structure on the cultural resource production process of the movement. When the Brotherhood established their Satellite TV channels the effect of the political opportunity structure manifested again because such channels needed more tangible material resources to operate, such as property, office space, equipment, and supplies. Thus, it can be concluded that the cyberspace is the most suitable place for social movements to connect with their audiences and to circumvent the effect of the political opportunity structure embodied in authoritarian regimes' restrictions.

Chapter Five: Framing the Egyptian Regime

Introduction

The results of the analysis show that the Muslim Brotherhood conducted three parallel campaigns to achieve its goals: a smear campaign to discredit and delegitimize the regime that ousted the Islamist President Mohammed Morsi; a branding campaign to win the hearts and minds of the Egyptian people and to legitimize the movement, and an identification campaign to appear as a key political actor in the Middle East's political sphere.

This chapter is devoted to exploring the negative campaign in an attempt to answer the following research question:

RQ4: *How* do Islamist social movements attempt to delegitimize rivals and legitimize themselves?

Theoretically, this chapter explains how Islamist social movements endeavour to delegitimize rivals and the way they frame them through focusing on two concepts of social movements theory; legitimacy which is considered as a crucial moral resource, and strategic farming as a technique to demobilize antagonists. The chapter argues that the Brotherhood conducted a smear campaign to incriminate the regime and to damage their image, credibility, and reputation. The movement strategically deployed a range of negative frames that were used to condemn the regime, its institutions, ideas and leaders as part of this campaign to undermine the post-2013 order. Therefore, this chapter argues that strategic farming can be considered as a technique to demobilize antagonists and not just for the mobilization of supporters of social movements.

Defining Smear Campaigns

Smear campaigns are usually referred to as negative campaigning. Negative campaigning is "trying to win an advantage by referring to negative aspects of an opponent or of a policy, emphasizing his negative attributes or damaging policies"

(Samoilenko & Icks, 2016, p. 115). Negative campaigning is a central component of contemporary politics (Vaccari & Morini, 2014, p. 19). Smear campaigns are common in most Western democracies (Vaccari & Morini, 2014, p. 22) as well as the Arab world. Many studies argue that smear campaigns are effective (Kahn & Kenney, 1999; Kaid & Johnston, 1991; Lau, Sigelman, Heldman, & Babbitt, 1999). However, according to Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1995) smear campaigns are more effective when focused on partisan rather than uncommitted audiences by reinforcing partisans' perceptions.

Smear campaigns therefore require a well-planned strategy in order to be realised and turn obstacles into opportunities. According to Vaccari and Morini (2014), such campaigns can quickly spread and achieve momentum if they are not met by an equivalent response. Therefore, competitors must be ready to resist such attacks with similar means when necessary (p. 40). A good example of a counter campaign is Barack Obama's response to a smear campaign against him during the 2008 election. His campaign launched *FightTheSmears.com* to refute negative allegations and give his supporters ways and tips to respond to criticisms. It also aided the media to reject falsehoods and fabrications about him. The website effectively offered a line-by-line refutation of major rumours and criticisms with supporting evidence (Neville-Shepard, 2014, p. 508).

The Internet has undoubtedly made the launch of smear campaigns easier, more convenient and cost-effective than ever (Morini, 2014, p. 917). Today the Muslim Brotherhood is benefiting from its media armoury broadcasting from Turkey that launched after Morsi's removal to discredit the Egyptian state. It is also taking advantage of the unlimited capabilities offered by social media. Social networking opened up more attractive channels for campaigning in order to communicate "unmediated" political messages (McNair, 2017, p. 102).

Strategies of the Brotherhood's Smear Campaign

In order to maintain public support and expand its followers' network, the Brotherhood appears to have designed its strategy to discredit the regime in the eyes of the Egyptian public and beyond, while presenting the movement as the only reliable alternative. To achieve this strategic goal, the movement uses different key communication strategies including: 1) exposing the regime's transgressions; 2) linking the regime with Zionism; 3) stereotyping the regime and its institutions with corruption; and 4) discomfiting the regime to win the people over. These will be discussed in turn below.

Exposing the regime's transgressions

The Muslim Brotherhood created a strategy to expose the regime's abusive practices framing them as violating taboos relating to human rights, religion, and indigenous traditions. Previous studies, such as Abdelmajeed (2010); Ranko (2015) argue that the Brotherhood's communication exposing the state's abusive practices against the movement during the Mubarak era, has had a positive impact on the Brotherhood's popular support. They believe that the Brotherhood succeeded in employing the state's increasing repression in the movement's discourse and that this translated into a positive electoral outcome in 2005 (Ranko, 2015, p. 173). Thus, increasing repression against the movement had a positive impact on their popularity as it increased the number of sympathizers. Therefore, in March 2007, the regime resorted to legal amendments to hamper the Brotherhood, as an alternative to physical repression. The regime instituted 43 legal amendments calling them "reforms." The regime justified the "reforms" through the need to modernize the Egyptian constitution, but in fact, it aimed at countering the political ascendency and the resurgence of the Muslim Brotherhood (Abdelmajeed, 2010; Brown, Dunne, & Hamzawy, 2007, pp. 3-4).

For instance, a third clause was added to chapter 5 of the constitution stipulating that the Egyptian political system was based on party pluralism. The new item specified that "political activity or political parties shall not be based on any

religious authority or foundation, or on any discrimination on the basis of race or gender" (Ismael, Ismael, & Ismael, 2011, pp. 371-372). Such an amendment prevented the Muslim Brotherhood from being recognised as a political party. In addition, Article 62 changed the Egyptian electoral system from the individual candidate system to a mix of party lists and individual districts, which restricted the Muslim Brotherhood's electoral chances. They benefited from the individual candidacy scheme as they used to run for elections under the independent candidate umbrella. By this move, the regime created the number of individual districts to be around ten percent of the parliament, which limited the electoral opportunities of the movement (Brown et al., 2007, p. 4). Article 76 banned independent candidates from running for presidency and limited presidential candidates to legal parties (Stilt, 2014, p. 128). This article prevented the Brotherhood from running a presidential candidate. As article 5 blocked the Muslim Brotherhood from formation of a political party as religious group, article 76 barred the movement completely from running for the presidency as currently only registered political parties can stand for presidential elections. Moreover, the reforms (article 179) gave the authorities and security services extensive powers and expanded their abilities, such as detaining suspects and restricting public gatherings (Ismael et al., 2011, p. 372). Moreover, according to Al-Awadi (2004), the government followed the policy of cutting religious resources, framed by the Mubarak regime as "reform, development and modernisation of the education system" (p. 219). In so doing, the government targeted the religious assets of the Muslim Brotherhood.

After deposing Morsi, the incumbent regime escalated this approach, combining repression with legal amendments in a multi-pronged approach to eliminating the organisation. In mid-January 2014, a new constitution was approved in a referendum, with 98% of popular support. The results were announced on January 18, signed off by the interim president, Adly Mansour, and came into effect immediately. The new constitution replaced the November 2012 Constitution draft that was crafted under the administration of Morsi without the input of Christian and secularists who boycotted the process. Unsurprisingly, the 2014 constitution

bolstered the authority and autonomy of the military, granted them superior privileges especially in issues related to its budget (article 203) and their right to prosecute people before military courts (article 204). It also reinstated presidential power that had been circumscribed. For example, the president has the right to assign 5% of the MPs in the House of the Representatives. This constitutes 23 MP's out of the 450 members (see article 102). The 2014 Constitution restored the 1971 constitution's embargo on political groups with a religious reference (see article 74). It also prohibited the use of worship places and non-governmental organizations for political purposes or election publicity (article 87). Such modifications aimed at barring the Muslim Brotherhood from electoral politics and giving the military an unequivocal right to curb them.

Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood created a strategy to expose the regime's abusive practices to exclude them from the political arena. For example, the movement expressed scepticism towards the new constitution's referendum results. In a statement commenting on the constitutional referendum, the group presented evidence revealing that the regime counterfeited the constitutional referendum by exploiting conflicting statements between people who worked within the campaign claiming that numbers of voters reported by the regime's media were not in conformity with the actual numbers they have. The key message that the Brotherhood wanted to convey is that the regime is a liar that cannot be trusted.

> The null and void referendum was rigged which was as and impartial observers expected.
>
> We know how the Putschists and their followers falsified the figures. Some time ago, one of the leaders of the "Kamil Jameelak" that called for the nomination of the Sisi for President resigned, saying that they managed to collect only 8500 signatures. Therefore, his colleagues emerged in the media declaring that they collected 5.5 million signatures. Some newspapers affiliated to the coup reported that 4000 Egyptian citizens in Japan voted in favour of the constitution whilst we know that the number of those registered to vote is 423 people, and those who actually voted for them only amounted to 34 people (Brotherhood, 2014l, Paragraphs 1&5).

Such a strategy certainly has historical precedents. It was used by the Muslim Brotherhood during Mubarak's era as well as the Sadat's period. As early as the 1970s, the Brotherhood alleged that the calls for democracy and respect of law was "a thin veneer hiding a despotic authoritarianism." On the tenth anniversary of the May 15, 1971 "Corrective Revolution", the Muslim Brotherhood attacked what they called facade democracy in civil rights. They published through al-Daawa magazine (the Call) an article entitled "The Corrective Revolution is in Dire Need of Correction" (S. E. Ibrahim, 1982, p. 42; 2002, p. 84).

However, what appears to have changed is the vehement *intensity* of these claims in the post-2013 period. Whilst previously the Brotherhood's discourse reflected "the swing of a pendulum, seesawing between moments of self-assertion and moments of self-restraint" (Wickham 2015, 96), now the Brotherhood is relentlessly condemning the regime. It remains to be seen whether exposing the incumbent regime's abusive practices will serve to discredit the regime in the eyes of public and increase the number of the sympathizers with the Muslim Brotherhood.

In smearing the regime, the Brotherhood have clearly been responding to a concerted campaign of demonization by the Egyptian regime. Since Morsi's ouster, the Muslim Brotherhood has been outlawed, all its assets have been seized, its media has been banned, its leaders and active members have been incarcerated. The movement has thereby returned to its historic status as an illegal underground group. Moreover, many national and international media outlets have been prevented from even acknowledging the group under the pretext of provoking sedition. For instance, the pan-Arab broadcaster, Al-Jazeera, is considered by the Egyptian regime as a mouthpiece of the Brotherhood. Three of Al-Jazeera's journalists in Egypt are jailed for portraying Egypt as being in a state of "civil war" and allegedly aiding the banned Muslim Brotherhood, which was designated as a terrorist

organisation by an Egyptian court.[20] The regime has thus clearly driven a campaign by compliant state and independent media to demonise and smear the Brotherhood (Al-Anani, 2015). Indeed, the Egyptian Minister of Culture, Helmy el-Namnam, went so far as to compare the Muslim Brotherhood with Moshe Dayan, the Israeli Minister of Defense during the Six-Day War in 1967 and the 1973 October War. Dayan is notorious as one of Israel's biggest war criminals who killed and arrested thousands of Egyptians during the Arab -Israeli wars and is associated with a racist and colonial state. As el-Namnam put it, "Moshe Dayan did not do to Egypt what the Muslim Brotherhood and the Supreme Guide's gang did to it" (Al-Anani, 2015).

With the Egyptian regime's hegemony over both state and private mainstream media, the Muslim Brotherhood has thus been forced to find alternative bases to spread their word and challenge the regime, deploying technology and new media. Since the removal of Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood employed a concerted strategy to expose the regime's malpractices to discredit it in the eyes of the people and delegitimize the regime. They attempt to reveal what the regime's media never tell and to uncover what they call the "crimes" of "the putschists" against the Egyptian people. This theme of "exposing the regime's malpractices" appeared 39 times in 132 Brotherhood statements suggesting that it is a major component of their communication strategy.

One of the tactics used for such a purpose is exploiting national and international events to delegitimize the regime by presenting it as criminal, corrupt and untrustworthy. For example, on March 8, 2016, the Brotherhood took advantage of International Women's Day to expose "regime practices against Egyptian women," while presenting themselves as respectful of women's performance and achievements. According to the statement,

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[20] These three Journalist are; Australian Peter Greste, Canadian-Egyptian Mohamed Fahmy, and Egyptian Baher Mohamed. In June 2014, they were sentenced to up to 10 years in jail, but their convictions for disseminating false news to aid a terrorist group were overturned on appeal and they were released on bail in 2015 (BBC, 2015).

> Criminal coup authorities were not to miss the chance to celebrate International Women's Day in their own way. Since the July 2013 coup against legitimacy, women became one of the putschists' favourite victims. They killed nearly 100 women and girls, expelled 526 female students from Egypt's universities. Under military junta rule, 304 Egyptian women and girls suffered general assaults, harassments and violations, while 24 of them were unjustly tried before military courts, and 24 more were raped or assaulted in coup prisons […]. Injustice has crossed all limits. Egyptian women's suffering under this coup has reached unprecedented levels (Brotherhood, 2016l).

The Muslim Brotherhood's claim subverts the traditional view relayed by the Egyptian state that it is the principal protector of women's progress. In 2000, by a presidential decree, the government established the National Council for Women (NCW), which was composed of 30 members drawn from the regime, academia, and civil society. The council was devoted solely to addressing concerns of Egyptian women to address challenging problems facing them, such as sexual harassment, violence against women, female genital mutilation, and low female political representation. In a repudiation to the Brotherhood's discourse, the council accused the Brotherhood of using women in violent university protests and criticized their "degradation of women." Adopting the regime's discourse, the council stressed their support of the June 30, 2013, demonstrations that exposed the Brotherhood's regime that "had degraded [women] in every way possible" (AbdelRahim & Fracolli, 2016). In opposing such narratives, the Brotherhood have been quick to highlight the regime's transgressions against women.

Questioning the regime's intentions is another tactic used by the Muslim Brotherhood to discredit and delegitimize the regime. The Brotherhood is highly sceptical of the high-profile projects initiated by President Sisi. For example, the Brotherhood attacked the new Suez Canal project that began on August 5, 2014 and was first used a year later. The new project aimed to increase the Suez Canal's revenues by 259% to about $13.226 billion dollars in 2023 compared to the canal's current return of almost $5 billion (Kenawy, 2016, p. 284). In January 24, 2015, the movement warned participants of the Egypt Economic Development

Conference (EEDC), held in the Egyptian Red Sea resort of Sharm El-Sheikh, that the allocated funds would be squandered.

> To all states and governments: participating in the donor's conference for the leaders of the coup will only drain and squander your money. The coup regime in Egypt has failed to establish any successful economic project and you will soon see the inevitable abject failure of the new Suez Canal project. For a year and a half, they have not achieved stability, safety nor development for the Egyptian people. Be confident that your money will be lost by this bunch of criminals (Brotherhood, 2015f).

This was a particularly important statement that received wide media coverage because the movement reference a leaked conversation in which Sisi allegedly made offensive remarks about his Gulf sponsors. Sisi apparently claimed that the oil rich states "money like rice" and that Egypt should have a share. The Brotherhood alleged that these leaks prove that "the real religion of the regime is the dollar" and that their "real Qibla of the regime is the Whitehouse and Tel Aviv" (Brotherhood, 2015f). Qibla is the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays during Ṣalāt̄ and is fixed as the direction of the Kaaba in the Hejazi city of Mecca. Through such theological and cultural references, the Brotherhood attempted to delegitimize the Egyptian government by implicitly alleging that they are not real Muslims and that their intentions are not to be trusted.

The Brotherhood have also been quick to blame the regime for political crises. For example, one popular topic of discussion of the movement has been the siege of the land, air, and sea imposed on the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt from June 2007 to the present. Egypt and Israel closed their borders crossings with Gaza because the Fatah affiliated forces fled and was no longer providing security on Gaza's borders and Hamas took control of the strip (Roy, 2011, p. 192). The movement assigned the Sisi government responsibility for the Gaza Strip blockage and portrayed the regime as a Zionist ally (Brotherhood, 2016k).

> The Muslim Brotherhood maintains that the coup regime, imposed on our Egyptian nation is directly cooperating with the

blockade imposed on the Gaza Strip by the Zionist occupier, and offers to the latter unreserved support. This does not represent the position or view of the Egyptian Nation towards its besieged brothers or its support of the Palestinian Cause […]. The coup authorities, since the military coup led by Sisi have consistently shown full support for the Zionist entity. This is completely in contrary to the understanding and doctrine of the Egyptian people, and its stance towards the Zionist entity that has killed so many of our compatriots and is still killing and besieging our brothers in Palestine (Brotherhood, 2016k).

In particular, the Muslim Brotherhood's media took advantage of the Egyptian regime's attempts to destroy the underground tunnels that the Palestinians used to bring goods into Gaza because of the siege. Their narrative exploited the regime pumping salt water from the Mediterranean into Gaza's underground tunnels by presenting the regime as co-partner in the siege. For example, on August 27, 2016 a cartoon published by the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood on their website www.fj-p.com, presented Sisi and the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as flooding Gaza. The caricature is originally credited to Carlos Latuff, a Brazilian freelance political cartoonist. See Figure 40.

Figure 40. Cartoon presenting Sisi and Benjamin Netanyahu as flooding Gaza (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2016b).

Another interesting tactic used by the Muslim Brotherhood to expose the regime's practices is presenting them as a violation of cultural norms or indeed,

transgressing taboos. These include arresting and killing women, desecrating of mosques, killing worshipers during prayers, and desecrating the book of Allah.

> They crossed all red lines; besieging mosques, killing worshipers, burning some mosques, burning Qur'ans, detaining women and girls at midnight after killing others in Mansoura and Rābiʿa. They did all of these in less than two months (Brotherhood, 2013an).

It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood are seeking to present themselves as the representatives of an "authentic" Egyptian cultural identity as a way of legitimizing themselves. Achieving legitimacy has been the central concern of their statements, as for instance in their statement commemorating the military victory of October 6, 1973 against Israel. They exploited this day of remembrance to discredit the regime and pass a message to the public that they, rather than the military, encompass legitimacy.

> This coup is a coup against legitimacy and the will of the people. It is a betrayal of trust and a break of covenant. The Minister of Defense [el-Sisi] swore by God to protect the system and to respect the constitution and the law and to obey the Supreme Commander of the Army, the president-elect [Morsi] (Brotherhood, 2013d, paragraph 12).

Many social movements in opposition frequently try to construct themselves as representatives of their country's cultural identity, while presenting their rivals as violating such authentic cultural norms. Among such is the Chinese Falun Gong, that according to Zheng (2011), "constructs itself as an authentic representative of the Chinese culture by various discursive strategies that highlight the positive quality of the movement and the achievements of its culture performance" (p. 175). In addition, the Movimento Sociale Italiano or the Italian Social Movement (MSI) (1946 – 1995) attempted to present itself as the harbinger of an authentic Italian cultural identity. According to Gentile (2009) the claimed to be the only interpreters and authentic representatives of the "real Italy," against the fake Italian or anti-Facsists (p. 307). Similarly, the Brotherhood echoed these movements as they

presented themselves as the representatives of an "authentic" Egyptian cultural identity.

The Muslim Brotherhood has historically been depicted by the state as a threat to Egyptian identity. According to one scholar, the regime detested the "peculiar character" of the movement and its international extensions. The "deep state" during Morsi's rule thereby considered themselves as the "guardians of the national interest and identity of the country" (El-Sherif, 2014, p. 8), portraying the Muslim Brotherhood as "a threat not just to constitutional freedoms but to the very identity of Egypt" (Hersh, 2013).[21] SCAF portrayed the movement as "composed of nothing more than opportunistic thugs hell-bent on ruining the country — a mad dog that has to be put down" (Bowden, 2014). It seems that the regime's attempts to define itself as both authentic and at the same time modern is being countered through the Muslim Brotherhood's narrative in which the movement portrays itself as representative of an "authentic" Egyptian cultural identity, as well as democracy advocators (discussed in Chapter 7).

To sum up, the following Figure 41 illustrates the tactics that are used by the Muslim Brotherhood in support of its strategy of exposing the regime's transgressions.

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[21] The term "deep state" is a translation of the Turkish "derin devlet." It was first originated in Turkey during the 1950s when the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secret Intelligence Service of the UK, recognized a clandestine intelligence and armed operations group called "Operation Gladio" under the NATO to counter the "communist threat" in many member countries. The Turkish Gladio was established under the code name "Counter-guerrilla" after the country joined the NATO in 1952. Its official title was the "Special Warfare Department." Over course of time, this body moved away from its primary purpose which was to defend the regime and its ideology based on a secular, monolithic nation-state approach. It engaged in many activities including to destroy political dissidences, subverting governments and assassinating politicians and individuals (Söyler, 2013, p. 316). Accordingly, the "deep state" is being used to describe the way that the military is ruling beneath the surface of politics through set of structures. In its present Egyptian avatar, "deep state" denotes the "deep political system" of the old regime and the bureaucratic bedrock that was settled over the 60-year rule of military generals before the Muslim Brotherhood arrived at the helm of power.

Figure 41. The Brotherhood 's communication tactics in support of exposing the regime practices strategy.

Discomfiting their rivals

Discomfiting rivals is yet another strategy the Muslim Brotherhood uses to discredit its opponents in the eyes of the public and international entities. The Brotherhood seeks to convey that the regime is a liar that cannot be trusted, and that the Brothers are more reliable. Commenting on the death of thirty-seven Islamist detainees who were allegedly killed in gas leak inside the Abu Zaabal prison on August 18, 2013, the group attempted to discomfit the regime by claiming that the detainees were killed under torture with burns, ruptures and scars on their bodies as well as gunshot wounds appearing on the corpses.

> Yesterday we issued a statement condemning the killing of 37 Egyptian citizens who were detained by the Interior Ministry of the coup. Our suspicion is that they were suffocated with gas as claimed by the Putschists. Although gassing is an unforgivable crime, the ugly truth emerged today when families went to receive the bodies from the morgue. It became apparent that they all died under brutal torture, evidenced by the burns, ruptures and scars on their bodies as well as gunshot wounds […] (Brotherhood, 2013w).

Discomfiting their rivals is a strategy is being used by the Muslim Brotherhood in order to discredit the Egyptian regime. It appeared in 17.4% of the analysed documents. It is another way of presenting the state as fraudulent. The Brotherhood uses this strategy as a one-way oriented communication. The feedback is the least important element here for the Muslim Brotherhood as they aim at discrediting the state through bringing related controversial issues to the forefront.

This strategy was also used by segments of the clergy under the leadership of Khomeini in Iranian aftermath of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–1911) to marginalize rivals. The Khomeinists aimed to gradually displace and eliminate their rivals, dismissing the contributions of other forces in the revolution and laying exclusive right to the revolutionary spoils (Azimi, 2008). Similarly, the Muslim Brotherhood is using this strategy to discredit the regime and present themselves as a legitimate alternative.

Linking the regime with Zionism

On May 14, 1948, Israel was created on the land of Palestine after the 1948 Palestine war, in which hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were killed and forcibly expelled from their homes and lands. The Palestinians were replaced by hundreds of thousands of Jewish immigrants under the supervision of the Jewish Agency, headed by David Ben-Gurion. Since then, several wars erupted between the Arab countries and Israel such as the 1967 War, the 1956 Suez War, the Tenth of Ramadan War on October 6, 1973, the 1982 First Lebanon War, the 2008 Gaza War and many others. In these wars, hundreds of thousands of Arabs and Palestinians were killed at the hands of the Israeli forces.

American support has been notoriously central to Israel's survival as a state. When David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the establishment of Israel, the American President, Harry S. Truman, was the first one to recognize it on the same day. Since then, the USA has been the main ally and backer of Israel. Egypt was colonized by several nations throughout history such as the Ottoman Turks, the French and the

British. The French Napoleon Bonaparte invaded the country in 1798. Great Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 after the Anglo-Egyptian War to maintain British strategic interests and ensure trade and economic solidity (Al-Sayyid Marsot, 2007; Cleveland & Bunton, 2009). Millions of Egyptians and Arabs sacrificed their lives to gain independence from colonial powers. Great power support for Israel thus become strongly associated with colonialism and pervasive negative perceptions of Zionism following the establishment of Israel intensified as the Israeli-Arab conflict developed (Jaspal, 2016, p. 47).

With frequent reference to this history, the Brotherhood links the Sisi regime directly with Zionism, and sometimes with colonialism. Direct links with Zionism were found in 20.4% of the public statements issued during the period studied. One can argue that the Brotherhood's strategy of linking its rivals with Zionism and colonisation is a smear strategy to discredit its national foes in an attempt to delegitimize them. When it seeks to discredit the regime, the West becomes (re)colonial. However, in a somewhat contradictory fashion, the Muslim Brotherhood also runs a campaign to convince these "Colonial Countries" that they are a moderate and a reliable alternative to the Egyptian regime. For example, Bardhan (2014); Breuer and Khashaba (2014) argue that the main function of the Muslim Brotherhood English website is to change Western communities' views of the movement who view it as radical, undemocratic and inflexible. Accordingly, the analysis of the Brothers communication in English tends to downplay antagonism toward Israel or its allies in many Western countries, further evidenced by the Muslim Brotherhood's advocacy and support of the Turkish-Israeli agreement discussed above. Even after the January 25, 2011, revolution, the Brotherhood conducted a Public Relations campaign aimed at presenting the movement as potential ally to the West. Abdel Moneim Abou el-Fotouh, a Senior Leader in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Secretary General of the Arab Medical Union, wrote on February 9, 2011, a Washington Post article entitled "Democracy supporters should not fear the Muslim Brotherhood." He stressed in his article that

the "the West and the Muslim Brotherhood are not enemies" and that they seek the support of Americans to pursue a democratic process.

> The people of Egypt will decide their representatives, their form of democratic government and the role of Islam in their lives. For now, as we verge on national liberation from tyranny, Egyptians in Tahrir 'Freedom' Square and all over the country are hoping Americans will stand by them in this crucial hour (Abou el-Fotouh, 2011)

He also affirmed that the Muslim Brotherhood would respect all the treaties signed by the old regime, implicitly referring to the peace agreements signed with Israel. As they condemned Sisi's call for the expansion of the peace process with Israel and called him traitor, they asserted their respect of the peace agreement with Israel.

> Our track record of responsibility and moderation is a hallmark of our political credentials, and we will build on it. For instance, it is our position that any future government we may be a part of will respect all treaty obligations made in accordance with the interests of the Egyptian people (Abou el-Fotouh, 2011).

In practice, the Brotherhood themselves have had an ambiguous relationship with Israel. When the Brotherhood arrived at the helm of power, Morsi vowed to respect the Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979 (Blomfield, 2012; Greenberg, 2012). At the start of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, days after Morsi's election, Israeli President, Shimon Peres, sent a greeting to Morsi. In his response, Morsi pledged to work to put Middle East peace efforts back on track.

> I am looking forward to exerting our best efforts to get the Middle East peace process back to its right track in order to achieve security and stability for all peoples of the region, including the Israeli people (Morsi as quoted in the news report of Greenberg, 2012).

Notably, Morsi was lauded internationally for brokering the cease-fire between Israel and Hamas during the war that erupted in November 2012. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton praised Morsi accordingly:

> I want to thank President Morsi for his personal leadership to de-escalate the situation in Gaza and end the violence. This is a

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critical moment for the region. Egypt's new government is assuming the responsibility and leadership that has long made this country a cornerstone of regional stability and peace (Clinton as quoted in the news report of Ninan & Hughes, 2012).

Thus, for the brief period they were in power, there was much continuity with the Mubarak presidency in the Brotherhood's approach to Israel. Arguably then, anti-Zionism is just a communication tactic deployed by Islamist movements (and indeed states in the Middle East) in a quest for legitimacy to acquire people's compliance, gain their support, and smear their rivals' reputation to delegitimize them. The Brotherhood links the Sisi regime directly with Zionism, and sometimes with colonialism and foreign powers to disgrace and delegitimize it in the eyes of the people.

> Certainly, when treasonous spies, agents of foreign powers, hold on trial the honest and patriotic people of this country, this is an unacceptable fall, an injustice that will not last long before the growing revolutionary tide witnessed in streets and squares across Egypt (Brotherhood, 2015j).

In October 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood described the Egyptian military operations in Sinai, which led to the displacement of some of the residents of the area for the establishment of a buffer zone, as evidence that they are a tool at the hands of Americans and Zionism. Simultaneously, the movement describes Morsi as the hero who stood against the fulfilment of the Zionists' scheme in Sinai.

> What the Putschists are doing in Sinai is merely to implement the American-Zionist project of handing over Sinai to the brutal Zionist enemy. The legitimate president of the country, Dr. Mohamed Morsi was aware of this beforehand and thus enthusiastically began reconstructing Sinai to abort this heinous scheme and enacted a national plan to protect this land (Brotherhood, 2014k).

The Sinai territory was lost to Israel in the 1967 war and only regained after the 1973 surprise attack on Israel and subsequent negotiations that led to the Camp David Accords. This is therefore a space thus has important symbolic significance in the collective memory of Egyptian people. In another cartoon, Sisi was portrayed as a trivial scarecrow in army apparel as Israeli warplanes flew over the Sinai,

failing to lift a finger in response to the violation of Egyptian territorial borders. On February 21, 2017, the Muslim Brotherhood published a caricature on its website, Egypt Window, to mock Sisi after an Israeli drone killed four jihadists from the ISIS Sinai Provision. The Israeli Defense Minister, Avigdor Lieberman, stated that Israel was behind the drone strike in an apparent response to four rockets fired by ISIS earlier the same month at the resort city of Eilat by the Red Sea. The Arabic words on the cartoon reads, Lieberman: confess responsibility for Sinai strikes (See Figure 42.).

The regime's imbrication with Israel has important implications for Sisi's authority as President. On October 19, 2014, the Brothers' political wing, Freedom and Justice, published a caricature on their website portraying Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minster, as a puppeteer manipulating Sisi, who is portrayed as a puppet in army apparel (see Figure 43). As is clear in the caricature, Netanyahu is much larger than Sisi, while Sisi is depicted as clumsy and idiotic: both literally and symbolically belittling the Egyptian President. The Muslim Brotherhood aimed to convey a message that Sisi is a perfidious, if insignificant, Zionist stooge.

Figure 42. A caricature portrays Sisi as a trivial scarecrow in army apparel (Egypt-Window, 2017).

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Figure 43. A caricature portraying Benjamin Netanyahu as a puppeteer and Sisi as a puppet (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2014).

In a statement entitled "Patriotism between Fact and Allegation," they claim that they are the real patriots and love the country more than others do, all the while accusing the regime of helping the Zionists.

> Under the banner of protecting National Security, the Putschists exposed the nation's back to the Zionist enemy, cooperating with the enemy themselves! Has Egyptian history ever known such an absurd situation? (Brotherhood, 2014b, Paragraph 18).

The Muslim Brotherhood explain how the prophet Mohammed loved Mecca, his homeland, and that they are following his steps. In contrast, they accuse the regime of betraying their country and the people who sacrificed their lives for its independence by allying with a historic enemy. The only solution, according to the Brotherhood, is that the people get rid of this regime if they want the country to flourish.

> We are facing a coup that feuds with its own people and homeland and befriends their enemies. Thus, this country will not progress until this fascist coup is brought down, and its leaders subjected to just retribution (Brotherhood, 2014b, Paragraph 19).

In many statements, the Brotherhood attempt to convey the theme "we are more Egyptian than the regime". On February 28, 2015 the Egyptian Court of Urgent Matters designated Hamas a terrorist organization. This was relayed by the Brotherhood as an adoption of the Zionism vision and agenda, serving to portray the regime as merely an agent that executes Zionist orders.

> The disgraceful verdict was not issued against "Hamas", which upholds the honour of the nation and its identity but is a damning verdict the proves the Putschists are betraying the Egyptians, against the Palestinian Cause and merely implementing the Zionist enemy's orders and adopting its vision and agenda (Brotherhood, 2015l, paragraph 2).

The Muslim Brotherhood is aware of the popularity of Hamas in the Arab and Islamic World. Since Hamas took over Gaza in 2006, they fought three fierce wars against Israel in 2008, 2012, 2014. Therefore, it is considered by the vast majority of resistance supporters as the hero who stands against the villain (Dunning, 2016, p. 85). Understanding this, the Muslim Brotherhood's narrative discredits the regime in the eyes of all Hamas supporters around the world through presenting the state as an inferior villain, while they appear as representing the free people who stand against the regime that betrays the covenant of the martyrs.

> The Muslim Brotherhood confirms that the judgment made by the 'Egyptian Court of Urgent Matters' considered the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas" a terrorist organization is a void and null decree that has no value, wisdom nor legitimacy. We will never recognise its content or wording nor will the Egyptian People nor the Arabs, nor will advocates of justice, humanity and freedom around the world. None will accept it but the Zionists and their mobs (Brotherhood, 2015l, paragraph 1).

Just recently, on March 28, 2017, the movement issued a statement to address the 28th regular Arab League summit that was held at the King Hussein bin Talal Convention Centre in the Dead Sea area of Jordan with kings, presidents, princes and heads of Arab delegations. The goal of the summit was to discuss the Palestinian issue and the situation in Syria, Iraq and Libya, as well as the issue of terrorism. In contrast to the Brotherhood's usual discourse, for the first time the

movement used the phrase "state of Israel" instead of "the Zionists" (Brotherhood, 2017b). This discursive transition is no doubt an issue that requires further investigation by other scholars. However, the Brotherhood's strategy of linking its rivals with Zionism and Colonisation serves as a propaganda device to damage the image of its political counterparts and discredit them in the eyes of the people. This strategy works as described by George Washington, "one of the expedients of party to acquire influence [...] is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other[s]" (D. B. Harris & Bailey, 2014, p. 4).

power of this strategy stems from its appeal to the hate and fear toward Zionism and colonialism, inextricably linked in people's minds and hearts with bloodshed and traumatic memories. In the meantime, the Brotherhood presents itself as a ubiquitous force and a populist alternative to its rivals, especially to the Egyptian regime, which suffered frequent armed defeats by Israel and is now presented as a tool in the hands of Zionists.

Negative stereotyping of the regime and its institutions

Stereotypes "are qualities perceived to be associated with particular groups or categories of people" (Schneider, 2005, p. 24). The modern phrase was first used by the journalist Lippmann (1922) to describe judgments formed about other people on basis of their ethnicity. Thus, stereotyping depends on "attributes that an individual ascribes to a social group" (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p. 104). Stereotyping is problematic because it labels every member of a group with same characteristics ascribed to the entire group. It is overgeneralised and has an exaggerated negative or positive value depending on the type of the stereotype (Ting-Toomey, 1999). Negative stereotyping aims to incite people to reject an idea or a labelled group (Sarwal, 2015). It is another strategy that the Muslim Brotherhood uses to discredit its rivals in the eyes of the public. Using this strategy, the movement seek to assign attributes to the state that can easily be prompted when the Egyptian incumbent regime or its institutions are mentioned, as in the following examples:

- President Sisi is <u>traitor.</u>

- The Egyptian military regime is <u>dictatorial.</u>

- The Egyptian Judiciary system is <u>oppressive.</u>

- The Egyptian media is <u>misleading.</u>

- Clerics who are pro-regime are <u>hypocrites.</u>

After its ousting in 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood began to focus its efforts on portraying the regime, its leadership and its institutions as corrupt and illegal and thus, what comes from such corruption, is considered as unacceptable (see **Table 3** for the full stereotypes and frequencies).

Table 3. The Muslim Brotherhood portrayal of the regime and its institutions.

The institution	Portrayal	Frequencies
President Sisi		
	The mass-murderer (safah and mujrim)	43
	The Putschists leader	24
	Traitor	22
	Contempt for democracy	14
	Liar	11
	Perverse (munharif)	7
	Corrupt (fasid)	6
	Unjust (zalim)	5
	Loser (fashil)	3
	Terrorist ('iirhabi)	2
The incumbent regime led by Sisi		
	Criminals	36
	Dictatorial	31
	Tool at the hand of colonization and Zionism	27
	Fascists	20
	Disingenuous	23
	Terrorists	22
	Has no values for the Egyptians souls	22
	Corrupt	22
	Against the constitutional legitimacy	20
	Liars	19
	Illegal	16
	They are looking for vested interests	15
	Gang	14
	Traitors	12
	Losers	10
	Against human rights	8
	Thieves	7
	The people's enemy	4
Judiciary System		
	Tool at the hand of Putschists	14

	Corrupt	12
	Oppressive	8
Media		
	Misleading	11
	Tool at the hand of Putschists	7
	Hypocrites	3
Clerics' pro-authority		
	Hypocrites	4

The movement attempted to deliver a message that Sisi is a dictator and a bloodstained authoritarian leader. As one of many examples, on July 1, 2015, thirteen Muslim Brotherhood members were killed in Cairo by Egyptian forces. The Brotherhood claimed that these men were arrested and then executed in cold blood by "criminal bandits affiliated with the traitor coup perpetrator."

> The group further stresses that its martyrs, assassinated by the traitorous coup commander's criminal militias, had been detained inside a house and then killed in cold blood without any investigations or charges. Thus, Egypt is transformed into a State of outlaw gangs. The Brotherhood denounces violence and murder, in the Sinai and elsewhere. It holds the criminal Sisi and his gang fully responsible for these crimes […]. Assassination of Egypt's finest men, such as […] pushes the situation onto a very dangerous curve and makes the entire scene highly volatile. This reminds the whole world of its responsibility towards the crisis into which Egypt is being forced, as plotted by the heinous murderer Sisi. The criminal Sisi did not stop at dragging the homeland towards a fateful end, by issuing fascist laws to facilitate mass executions of those who reject the military coup, but turned to the assassination of honourable patriotic people in their homes (Brotherhood, 2015b).

The Muslim Brotherhood also portrayed and accused President Abdel-Fattah Sisi as being traitor. The theme appeared in the group's narrative 22 times. In the past, such allegations posed a serious threat to the state. For example, President Anwar el-Sadat was branded a traitor, and later assassinated (Agdemir, 2016). The Brotherhood's comics even framed him as the "Cohen of Egypt," as in Figure 44. Eli Cohen was an Israeli Mossad spy best recognized for his espionage mission in 1961–1965 in Syria, where he established close ties with the political and military hierarchy and became the Chief Adviser to the Minister of Defense. For years, Cohen impersonated a wealthy businessman named Amin Thabit. The information

he provided to Israeli intelligence before he was uncovered is said to have been a significant influence in Israel's victory in the Six-Day-War of 1967. Syrian counterintelligence division uncovered Cohen and condemned him under pre-war martial law, sentencing him to death and he was executed in Marja Square of Damascus (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2017b). Such stereotyping of Sisi could find its echo in Egypt where Cohen is notorious for establishing an espionage cell inside Egypt as he was born in Alexandria on December 26, 1924 to a Jewish family. He is known also for the alias "John Darling", who was responsible for a terrorist cell that had targeted American and Western installations in Cairo and Alexandria to damage ties between Egypt and other powers (Sayed, 2018).

Figure 44. An example of the Brotherhood's portrayal of Sisi as "Cohen of Egypt" (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2017a).

Sisi and his regime are also framed as in contempt of democracy. Commenting on Sisi's speech delivered on July 22, 2013, during a military graduation ceremony at the Military College in Cairo, the Muslim Brotherhood argued that:

> He [Sisi] insists on betraying the oath, overthrowing legitimacy, misusing the Constitution and holding democracy in contempt. His attitude is an invitation towards any subject in any institution to overthrow their president and cause chaos so that leadership is gained through force (Brotherhood, 2013s, point 3).

In this statement, the Muslim Brotherhood presents Sisi as a Mafia leader kidnapping democracy. In addition, the Brotherhood presents the incumbent regime as enemies of democracy. In its statement aimed at congratulating the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Turkish people for the results of the Turkish election of 2015, the Brotherhood exploited the event to discredit the Egyptian state led by Sisi by presenting them as enemies of democracy.

> What happened today in the Turkish Parliamentary elections is the clearest response to the bloody Putschists; the enemies of democracy in Egypt and Syria […] (Brotherhood, 2015o, paragraph 1).

Such portrayals seek to urge democracy supporters to turn against the Egyptian regime. This tactic is supported by stereotyping the regime as "against human rights" to lobby public opinion and urge human rights organisations to sue the state before international tribunals.

> The Human Rights Council of the United Nations issued a report accusing the coup forces of carrying out the worst massacre in Egyptian history, in Rābiʿa and el-Nahda square. It likewise condemned the use of excessive force and brutal violence without justification against civilians and protestors. A few days ago, 27 states in the Human Rights Council of the United Nations issued a report condemning the bloody regime of committing human rights violations and crimes against humanity. Such events combining with efforts to bring these murderers to international courts (Brotherhood, 2014n, paragraph 1).

Another common stereotype associated with the regime is that of thieves. This is particularly poignant in a society where poverty rate is high and where the cost of living has dramatically increased since the overthrow of Mubarak. According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics of Egypt, 27.8 percent of Egyptians live in extreme poverty and the rate reaches up to 50 percent in the governorates of Upper Egypt (CAPMAS, 2015a). The Brotherhood portrays the

regime as "thieves," who "are looking out for personal interests." This theme is found 22 times in the analysed statements.

> The Egyptian people refuse to be ruled by a group of thieves, vampires, unscrupulous and ill-mannered (Brotherhood, 2015g, paragraph 1).

> […] They are carrying out a plan for their personal benefit […] (Brotherhood, 2013ah, paragraph 3).

> They are just a group of military men who want to enslave people, rule them with an iron fist and fire power and take over all of the state's resources for their own personal benefit […] (Brotherhood, 2013aj, paragraph 5).

The Brotherhood reinforce this idea in different forms of their communications. Caricature has played an important role in depicting Sisi and his regime as corrupt. Figure 45 is a caricature published on a Brothers website called *Klmety* (My Word) on June 2, 2016. It depicts Sisi in army apparel as bloated, holding a banner with the phrase "we starve for Egypt", while feeding a piece of meat to an eagle representing the Egyptian military. On the other hand, starving Egyptians appearing like skeletons carrying Sisi on their shoulders whilst predators ravage those Egyptians. The predators are unemployment, corruption, poverty, high prices, and the tourism crises. Figure 46, a poignant image, even depicts Sisi stealing the bread from the dreams of beggars. Such presentations aim at conveying a message that since Sisi arrived at the helm of power, the Egyptian people are regressing rather than progressing.

Figure 45. A caricature Published on a Brothers Website Klmety (My Word) on June 2, 2016.

Figure 46. A caricature Published on a Brothers Website Klmety on January 05, 2017.

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In many statements, the Muslim Brotherhood portrayed the regime as "the people's enemy." For instance, in a statement condemning the Minya Criminal Court ruling on March 24, 2014 that sentenced 529 protestors to death in relation to violence (though there have been no executions so far), the Brotherhood claimed:

> The military coup has yet again exposed its ugly face and proved to be the enemy of the people, the enemy of life, the enemy of justice, freedom and democracy, using state institutions against what was created to serve it. Using the media to mislead the people, using the army and police to kill its people, shedding blood in massacres never even committed by a foreign occupation. Now it is using the judiciary to commit a modern, hideous genocide, exceeding that of 'Donshway', one that caused an international outcry (Brotherhood, 2014r, paragraph 1).

The Muslim Brotherhood also attempted to convince the people that the regime attributes "no value" to "Egyptians souls" and it looks only for vested interests. For instance, in the statement issued on August 20, 2013, by the Brotherhood in connection with the assassination of twenty-four Central Security soldiers in an armed attack in Rafah, North Sinai, on August 19, 2013, the movement claimed that the regime left their soldiers prey to unknown groups.

> […] the regime of bloody Putschists gives no value to the lives of the Egyptians. They left the sacred duty of protecting the country and the people in order to seize power. Even if it meant killing people in squares, streets, mosques, and prisons and even if it meant leaving (the duty) to protect borders and leaving soldiers prey to assassination at the hands of unknown groups […] (Brotherhood, 2013v, paragraph 1).

Thus, using a variety of different frames, the Muslim Brotherhood has implemented a strategy to stereotype the regime with negative labels in order to advance the strategic goal of discrediting the regime.

Conclusion

Based on two concepts of social movement theory; legitimacy and framing, this chapter sought to deconstruct the first goal of the Muslim Brotherhood political communication strategy. It also presented the key strategies that were deployed to

advance the achievement of such a goal in order to explain how Islamist social movements endeavour to delegitimize rivals and the way they frame them. The first goal aimed to discredit the regime that ousted the President Morsi. Therefore, the movement conducted a smear campaign, in which the movement sought to intentionally damage and call into question the regime's image, credibility, and reputation. This negative campaign used the Muslim Brotherhood's media to deliberately frame their opponents as foolish, irresponsible, disconnected, and evil as a means of presenting themselves as a more desirable alternative to said opponent. This smear campaign consists of many undermining strategies, namely: focusing the efforts on exposing the regime's wrongdoing, linking the regime with Zionism, and stereotyping the regime and its institutions with corruption. By such strategies, the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to inflict hatred in the hearts of audience towards the regime. Some of the movement's smear campaign elements lack evidential foundation, whereas others have historical, cultural and contemporary resonance. Whatever the "truth" of the claims, scholars such as Kahn and Kenney (1999); Kaid and Johnston (1991); Lau et al. (1999) have concluded, negative campaigns are often effective.

The Brotherhood's attempts to discredit and delegitimize the regime is far from unique. Similar to the Muslim Brotherhood approach, the Chinese social movement Falun Gong focuses its political communication strategy efforts on highlighting negative qualities of the Communist Party of China (Zheng, 2011). The Italian Social Movement also claimed to be the sole interpreters and authentic representatives of "real Italy" (Gentile, 2009, p. 307). Social movements thus commonly construct themselves as authentic representatives of their national culture through discursive strategies highlighting the positive qualities of their achievements and performance and negative qualities of their opponents in order to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of their publics.

Accordingly, this chapter has shown that social movement theory's concept of legitimacy as a crucial moral resource has been central to the Muslim Brotherhood's

communication strategy in the face of widespread demonization. Moreover, strategic framing has been deployed as a technique to demobilize antagonists as well as mobilise supporters.

Chapter Six: Self-Image Management and Branding

Introduction

Winning the hearts and minds of public opinion is the overarching goal of political actors. For example, public diplomacy is increasingly deployed as a strategy for the purpose of winning the hearts and minds of foreign societies (Nye, 2008; Van Ham, 2010). As Van Ham (2010) put it, public diplomacy is a strategy to win over the hearts and minds of audiences, and convince them that their goals, values, and desires are similar to the communicator. Public diplomacy used to neutralize and change negative ideas and distorted images of the communicator that are cultivated in the minds of millions of ordinary people (p. 118). It serves as a form of soft power often implemented when hard power has proven its failure (Nye, 2008). Similarly, the struggle between the Jihadists and the West is rightly identified by scholars as a "war of ideas." As the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, described it "We are in a media battle in a race for the hearts and minds of Muslims" (Alexander & Kraft, 2007, p. 546). Strategies and tactics for winning the hearts and minds of people undoubtedly vary depending on the context and the nature of the society in which specific strategies could be effective.

The Muslim Brotherhood have always been aware of the power of popular support, rooted in its inception as a grassroots movement focusing on charity, education, religion and social work. Indeed, the belief that people possess the ability to create change and grant legitimacy was evident in the Arab uprisings, including of course, the deposition of Mubarak and then Morsi. Considering this, this chapter is devoted to answering the following research questions:

RQ4: *How* did the Muslim Brotherhood frame itself in reaction to national, regional and international attempts to demonize the movement after July 2013?

Theoretically, this chapter relies on the concepts of moral resources (focusing mainly on legitimacy), human resources (particularly leadership), strategic framing (as positive stereotyping), and political opportunity structure situated within social movement theory. Moral resources and human resources are part of resource mobilization. Resource mobilization researchers seek to explain how social movements mobilize successfully to pursue their desired goals (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 205). Resources are a fundamental link between grievances or the desire for change and the ability to mobilize around that desire (Edwards & Kane, 2014; Mahoney & Tang, 2017; Zald & McCarthy, 2002). Moral resources include legitimacy, authenticity, solidary support, sympathetic support, and celebrity (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 217). The chapter argues that the legitimacy concept of social movement theory is useful for understanding how Islamist social movements attempt to present themselves to the public, at the national, regional and international level as legitimate actors. My argument is supported by Hudson (1977) who describes legitimacy as an indispensable political resource for Islamist movements and by Haddad (1992), who argues that Islamists have exploited this concept to delegitimize the Arab regimes.

Human resources also are critical in a successful social movement. Human resource comprises leadership, workforce, experience, skills, and expertise (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 213). In this chapter I highlight the role of political opportunity structure in bringing to the fore leadership of marginalized groups within a social movement. This chapter suggests that women have become increasingly important human resources for the movement, with the potential for greater leadership by the Muslim Sisters. My argument is further supported by Biagini (2017), who provides a gendered examination of the Muslim Brotherhood, exploring the activism of the Muslim Sisters post July 2013. She similarly argues that negative political conditions allow the emergence of female leadership. She maintains that repression of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013 has allowed the emergence of women's leadership within the movement because its survival

became increasingly compromised since its re-designation as a terrorist group in December 2013.

Social movements frame relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists (Snow & Benford, 1988, p. 198). Building on the previous chapter's argument that strategic framing is a technique employed to demobilize antagonists, this chapter argues that strategic framing can also work as a technique to promote the movement and mobilize proponents. The chapter argues that the Brotherhood appear to have implemented a self-image management and branding campaign that included several strategies to reach and win the hearts and the minds of public opinion and mobilize people on their side. These strategies include; appearing to speak on behalf of the people; portraying themselves as the revolution and representatives of the free; appearing to put the people's interests ahead of their own; promoting equality between men and women in the revolutionary context; appearing as a divine movement; appearing as victims and innocent and encouraging positive stereotypes of the movement.

Appearing to Speak on Behalf of the People

As part of its strategy to win over hearts and minds and to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the people, the Muslim Brotherhood frames itself as a grassroots movement. One of the most prominent communication strategies that the Brotherhood uses to reinforce this identity is framing itself as speaking on the people's behalf. Instead of using "the Muslim Brotherhood" in their statements, the group uses the word "the people." This helps the movement to appear closer to the people and reinforces its identity as a popular movement, which represents all Egyptians. The Brotherhood's deployment of such strategy echoes those movements operating in a contentious environment such as the Palestinian National Liberation Movement "Fatah," the largest faction of the confederated multi-party Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). During the first Palestinian intifada (1987 – 1993), Fatah used to open all its communiqués with the same declaration:

"No voice can overcome the voice of the uprising, no voice can overcome the voice of the Palestinian people — the people of the PLO" (Mishal & Aharoni, 1994, p. 27) to stress and reiterate its long-standing position that the PLO is the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" (Hilal, 1995, p. 7).

This strategy was a prominent feature in more than half of the statements examined in this study: 68 out of 132. For example, on April 11, 2014, the Brotherhood issued a statement to condemn the "junta's second terror declaration against the movement." Whilst the repeated designation was against the Brotherhood, they stressed that the regime will not intimidate or terrorize the "Egyptian people" opposed to the government's "illegitimate coup" and they would not "succumb to their usurped authority and let them grab more power and wealth and wreak havoc across Egypt":

> The Putschists must know that the people of Egypt, particularly the new generation, will not be terrified by these unjust court rulings […]. The people of Egypt will not give up their freedom, dignity and sovereignty. They will not live slaves to anyone anymore. They will live free, sovereign and dignified in their homeland, just the way they were born, whatever the price, whatever the sacrifices (Brotherhood, 2014p).

The Brotherhood use of this strategy aims at framing "the anti-coup revolutionary rallies and protest events" as if they were "carried out by the Egyptian people" not by the movement itself, thus presenting them as popular and legitimate events. For example, the *Rābiʿa* and *al-Nahda* protest events were presented as necessary actions to restore legitimacy and achieve sovereignty of the people.

> The Egyptian people took to the streets today to protest against the terrible massacre […] of *Rābiʿa al Adawiyya* and *al-Nahda*. […] the Revolution will continue until the elimination of injustice and falsehood, until the junta is defeated and the coup is reversed, until legitimacy is restored and sovereignty of the people respected, and until retribution is exacted from the cold-blooded killers (Brotherhood, 2013ah).

The Brotherhood's strategy of framing rallies and protests as popular acts is easily recognizable in most of their discourse. The Brotherhood contends that by the suppression of these events, "the coup commanders and collaborators" are seeking "to establish a military dictatorship, a police state, that kills innocent people, arrests honourable citizens, muzzles mouths, and drags the country back to dark ages of repression and fear" (Brotherhood, 2013an).

> On the 30th of August, the Egyptian people from all the governorates of Egypt emerged in unprecedented numbers, even surpassing the revolution of January 25, to declare to all their categorical rejection of this criminal bloody coup. These revolutionists will not rest until this military coup regime falls. The Egyptians will not rest after 30/8 but will fill the squares and the streets every day. They will escalate their peaceful activism and will develop new peaceful means until the retrieval of the revolution. [...] Absurdly, Hazem El-Beblawi the puppet Prime Minister [22] announces that the brutal killings are necessary operations justified in the transitional period. He then describes the relationship between the putschists and their opponents as one of enmity and open hostility, and likens it to the relationship between America and the Axis powers in World War II, and between America and Vietnam during their war" (Brotherhood, 2013an).

The Muslim Brotherhood uses this strategy to appear as if it is supported and legitimized by most Egyptians and can therefore represent the nation. By appearing to speak on behalf of the people, the group establishes shared experiences with the people to win them over through empathy. Creating this sense of common ground serves to gain trust and legitimacy. It might not yield an immediate outcome, but it can result in future fruits (Shea & Brooks, 2003). The movement attempts to make the people feel that they are facing the same circumstances and share the same interests; they encounter the same repression and suffer from the same corruption

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[22] On August 27, 2013, Interim Prime Minister Hazem El-Beblawi said in a television interview on private satellite channel MBC Masr that the dispersal of the two sit-ins (Rābiʿa and al-Nahda) supporting deposed president Mohamed Morsi was "necessary and inevitable as mediation failed because there were no constructive suggestions" (AhramOnline, 2013)

imposed by the regime. Consequently, the movement and the people are united in sacrifice to get eliminate tyranny.

> Despite all the oppression, terrorism, and corruption, the great Egyptian people still demonstrate every day and everywhere around Egypt, rejecting the tyranny of the bloody military coup, and presenting their sons and daughters as martyrs in order to stop military rule and its terrorism and dictatorship (Brotherhood, 2013i).

It seems that the Brotherhood attempts to form a new frontier in the struggle against the regime through the deployment of the "the people" as a collective concept. As Laclau highlights, the notion of "the people" as a collective actor exists through the construction of an antagonistic internal frontier, distinguishing "the people" from power through the naming of demands (Laclau, 2005, pp. 200-203).

In many cases, the Brotherhood's strategy of appearing to speak on behalf of the people operates on two levels mechanistically. First, it establishes a "False Dilemma". "False Dilemma" is a type of logical fallacy that is a claim based on mistaken reasoning. It also contributes to a sense of riding the "bandwagon"- a form of "copycat" behaviour (Koa, 2018b). In the following quote, the false-dilemma is established through claiming that the free people realise that the regime is the cause of the Egyptian nation's collapse, thus if anyone does not recognise this "fact" then they are not freemen. On the second level, if someone recognises this "fact" then they are free and, therefore, should jump on the bandwagon as every freeman does and sacrifice for the cause of destroying this tyrannical regime (Koa, 2018b).

> The free Egyptian people have realized, at their heart the youth, what all free people of the world realized; that allowing these blood-thirsty tyrants to survive is the secret behind the fall of nations. That is why the free Egyptian people have sacrificed their souls in this great revolution. One that that has spawned a group of free people who have taken it upon themselves to end the authoritarian state forever (Brotherhood, 2014f, paragraph 9).

The movement's use of this strategy reinforces the argument of Van Dijk (1998) who suggests that many groups' ideological discourse comprise the picturing of

"Us versus Them." Discursively, the group present "Them" as the regime/their rivals and "Us" as "the people," making themselves symbiotic with the public and agents seeking to achieve the public's interests. This allows the group to claim representation of the whole public and to be viewed as a grassroots movement that works to achieve the people's demands of "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity", key slogans of the 2011 revolution.The Brotherhood's discourse uses stark binaries embodied in basic "Us versus Them" phrases that aim at framing the Egyptian regime as a pariah authority and presenting themselves as a legitimized alternative force. The idea of presenting an opponent in stereotypical expressions has of course long been recognised and discussed in Edward Said's construction of the "Other" (Said, 1978).

Appearing to represent the 25 January revolution and the free people

Egyptian people made great sacrifices to dispose of the old corrupt regime in the 2011 revolution with high hopes of building a new democratic civil state. The Egyptians hoped that the ideals presented in the use of new media during the revolution, such as freedom of expression, diversity of opinion, and human rights, would find expression in the new political makeup of the country after the overthrow of Mubarak. The popular revolt of 25 January represented the hope of Egyptians for a better life in a democratic country that supports equal opportunities. Seeking to win the people's hearts, minds and support, and to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the people, the Muslim Brotherhood employed the technique of appearing to represent the original revolution of 25 January and the free people. This strategy operated through numerous themes summarised in Figure 47.

Figure 47. The emergence of the strategy of appearing to represent the revolution and the free people.

The Muslim Brotherhood claims that their current conflict with the regime is a continuation of the original revolution of January 25, 2011, that deposed Muhammed Husni Mubarak after 30 years of rule. Therefore, they are sacrificing themselves for the freedom of the country and the achievement of the people's ambitions for better living in a democratic country:

> The Muslim Brotherhood confirms its adherence to the full rights of the Egyptian people, and that it will never relinquish efforts to restore the January 25th revolution, its constitutional gains, the democratic process, and retribution for the martyrs, detainees, the injured and the missing. The group will never give up fulfilling the goals of the revolution; better livelihood, freedom, social

> justice and human dignity, as well as, saving the army and other
> state institutions from the risk of a bloody military coup
> (Brotherhood, 2014j, Point 1).

The movement presents the election of Morsi as the product of the revolution, and
thus pledges to continue the revolution until achieving full recovery of its outcomes.

> President Mohamed Morsi is the outcome of the people's
> revolution, and he represents the will of revolutionaries who have
> not left streets or squares for 22 months and until today. He has
> the firm allegiance of every free Egyptian (Brotherhood, 2015r,
> paragraph 4).

As it is clear from the above quote, the movement highlights the notion of
revolutionaries and free people as the subjects of its discourse. The Brotherhood
cannot credibly say that Morsi's election represented the will of "every Egyptian,"
not least because of the narrow margins of his presidential victory. Therefore, they
link themselves to freedom, implying that the Egyptians who are free to choose and
think are on their side. Moreover, they associate themselves/their cause with those
liberals who have also suffered under the repression of the regime. At times they
go so far as claiming to represent all real revolutionary activists as the following
quote illustrates:

> The revolutionaries will continue their revolution until the end of
> the coup its leaders held accountable and retribution is achieved
> for all martyrs of January 25th (Brotherhood, 2014k).

They present themselves as the leaders of the revolution and assert that they are
working to recover the original revolution's gains:

> We call everyone to continue sincerely in their revolutionary
> activity in order to achieve the goals of the revolution, and to end
> the bloody coup, and get rid of the coup's disastrous effects on
> the present and future of Egypt (Brotherhood, 2015k).

There are regional parallels here. It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
is imitating the popular revolutionary discourse of its Palestinian wing, Hamas.
Hamas claims that its "leaders are competing, but not for seats. They are competing
for who dies as a martyr and gets into a coffin" (Hamilton & al-Mughrabi, 2012).

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Similarly, the Brotherhood also presents its leadership as sacrificing their souls at the forefront of the revolution. With the arrest of four members of the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau on June 2, 2015, the movement seized the opportunity to show the people that even its leaders are making sacrifices for the revolution and that the arrest of their leadership would not prevent them from advancing their revolutionary agenda. [23] Such association helps the Muslim Brotherhood to legitimize and frame themselves as a popular movement with a leadership at the forefront of the revolution. Moreover, they depict a leadership that sacrifices itself instead of ordinary members.

> The Muslim Brotherhood declares very clearly, that no matter what happens to its leaders and cadres from unjust arrests and oppressive sentences; this will never discourage the movement from continuing the path of revolution, resistance of injustice and the brutal and bloody military coup (Brotherhood, 2015i, paragraph 2).

Of course, the communication of sacrifice is particularly effective when coupled with actual repression. Again, this is typical of Islamist movements from Hamas to Hezbollah. As Matar (2014) persuasively argues, on September 12, 1997, the image of Hezbollah's Secretary General, changed almost overnight when his 18-year-old son Hadi was killed in a military operation against Israel. Nasrallah's sacrifice of his eldest son placed him in the predicament of many ordinary people and Hezbollah's media armoury helped to present him as an Islamist model of selflessness: labelling him as pure, true and genuine (Matar, 2014, p. 160). In a strikingly similar fashion, the Muslim Brotherhood highlighted the sacrifice of the Secretary General of the Freedom and Justice Party, Mohammed el-Beltagy, who lost his 17-year-old daughter Asmaa. Asmaa el-Beltagy was killed during the August 2013 massacres (Telegraph, 2013b). A picture of Asmaa's body and her bereaved father shrouding his daughter in coffin was spread extensively on social media (see Figure 48).

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[23] The Brotherhood leaders are Dr Mahmoud Ghozlan, Dr. Mohamed Taha Wahdan, Dr. Abdulrahman Ber and Engineer AbdulAzim Sharqawi.

Figure 48. Asmaa el-Beltagy (Facebook.com, 2013; Twitter.com, 2013).

In the same event, Habiba, the 26-year-old daughter of the media advisor of Morsi, Ahmed Abdel Aziz, was killed and the Muslim Brotherhood's General Guide, Mohamed Badie, lost his 38-year-old son Ammar. Ammar was murdered in violent clashes between security forces and protesters in Ramsis Square of Cairo's downtown (Al-Jazeera, 2013c). The movement highlights the sacrifices of their sons and daughters to show the credibility of its leaders and to identify with their followers, the ordinary people or "plain folk" who have made similar sacrifices (Koa, 2018b). Consequently, the Brotherhood is highly successful in depicting themselves as relatable to ordinary people from whom they wish to attain legitimacy. Indeed, the emphasis on being "Plain folks" is key to the Brotherhood's public platform and is a central persuasive technique deployed by the movement (Koa, 2018b). It allows them to claim a mantle of leadership in the original revolution of January 25 and to seem sincerely committed to its goals.

> […] we emphasize that we are members of the Egyptian people's revolution and of its true goals; life, freedom, social justice, human dignity, democratic outputs, retribution against murderers and the restoration of the rights of the oppressed (Brotherhood, 2015p, last paragraph).

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The revolutionary slogan in the above quote; "bread, freedom, social justice and human dignity" was deployed in 17.5% of the analysed statements. By using this symbolic and emotive language, the Brotherhood attempts to bring the people's hopes to the forefront and make clear that the movement stands steadfast in support for any calls seeking to restore these democratic gains of the revolution. The first three demands of the slogan - bread, freedom, social justice - were adopted from the January 25 revolution, but the Brotherhood added human dignity to the slogan. The emotional appeals of the above slogan are the real basis on which the Brotherhood's politics in the context of the revolution rests and by which it operates.

In bringing this strategy to fruition, the movement uses the so-called Ad Nauseam technique. The mechanism is to repeat a notion or a slogan enough times that it may start to be conceived as the truth (Siebers, 1994). As Joseph Goebbels put it, "if you tell a lie a thousand times it becomes the truth" (Preston, 2011, p. 84). The "Ad Nauseam" technique was used in official Serbian propaganda during the stage of the 1995 signing of the Dayton agreement to end the Bosnian War. The mechanism served to place of Slobodan Milošević as "the key factor of peace in the former Yugoslav region" (Sládeček & Džihana, 2009, p. 163). The most frequently quoted slogan of Milošević was "there is no alternative to peace" repeated ad nauseam (Sládeček & Džihana, 2009, p. 163) .

The Muslim Brotherhood has used a similar approach. The movement tirelessly repeats the idea that the Brotherhood are continuing the 25 January revolution to achieve the demands of "bread, freedom, social justice, and human dignity," while they seek to restore the "legitimate" Morsi to power. This technique is common in the Brotherhood's discourse, serving to position their ideas as the truth and beyond challenge. Scholars have found that such technique is effective regardless of the evidence to the contrary, though it is beyond the scope of this study to examine how successful the Brotherhood's strategic mechanisms have been in this regard (Koob, 2015).

To summarise, the Brotherhood's consistent attempts to appear to represent the original revolution of January 25, 2011, is a political communication strategy used by the movement to win over the hearts and minds of the public and to legitimize themselves in the eyes of the people. This strategy uses the following tactics to accomplish its goal: (1) Claiming that the conflict between the Brotherhood and the regime is an extension of the January 25 revolution (2) Claiming that they are sacrificing themselves for the freedom of the country and the original revolution (3) Presenting Morsi as the outcome of the revolution (4) Appearing to speak on behalf of the revolutionists (5) Appearing as the leaders of the revolution (6) Presenting the Brothers' leadership as sacrificing to this end (7) Appearing as "plain folks" that are committed to the revolution's goals (8) Exploiting the original revolution's slogans in their conflict with the regime. This strategy uses the technique of "Ad Nauseam" to convince people that the movement represents the original revolution, in the hope that constant repetition will ensure the idea is perceived by their audience as fact.

Appearing to care and put the people's interests ahead of their own

Love-bombing or the "affectively bombing" is a technique to influence people by lavish and profuse demonstrations of kindness, attention and affection. The term was first applied in the 1970s as part of the recruitment techniques of the Unification Church of the United States where the group promoted an image of happy and comfortable people who intend to support those who have problems. It is an expression of interest, concern, fellowship and friendship (Richardson & Introvigne, 2004, pp. 169, 170). Nevertheless, some scholars consider it a tool of psychological and emotional manipulation to produce unity within a group against another group or a society alleged as aggressive (Tourish & Wohlforth, 2000). Singer and Lalich (1995) believe that love-bombing or as they called it, "the offer of instant companionship," is used as part of a campaign for "luring people" and that it "is a deceptive ploy accounting for many successful recruitment drives" (p. 114). Whilst this strategy is often used by cults for expansion and to influence a growing army of enthusiastic disciples, it is used by the Muslim Brotherhood as

part of its political communication strategy to win over hearts and minds of people and to legitimize itself in the eyes of audience. The technique is typically deployed for religious purposes; however, I argue here that it is being used as part of a political campaigning strategy.

The Muslim Brotherhood adopted various forms of "love-bombing" to win new followers and increase its popularity. The Brotherhood frequently frames itself as caring about the people themselves and their interests, while presenting its rivals as only caring about their own vested-interests. The theme of taking care of the people and their interests appeared in 31.5% of the analysed documents, while the theme that the regime-men only have a vested interest in themselves appeared in 18.5% of the statements. The theme that the Muslim Brotherhood is keen on preserving the blood of Egyptians appeared in 17% of the statements, while the regime was presented in 20% of the analysed statements as not caring for "Egyptians souls." In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood portrayed the regime as criminals 36 times, as dictators 31 times, with Sisi as a mass murder 43 times and as a traitor 22 times. In contrast, it presented Morsi as a patriotic figure who symbolizes the free will of the people. This shows the movement's quest to defeat the incumbent regime by discrediting it and aiming to appear as the most reliable political group, that merits the trust of the public. It is argued by Tourish and Wohlforth (2000) that love bombing generates a feeling of unity within a cult *against* another group perceived as hostile. In the Muslim Brotherhood case, it is usually done through comparisons between the Brotherhood and the regime. See Figure 49.

The Brothers are	The Regime-Men are
caring about the people and their interests	only caring about their own vested-interests
keen on preserving the blood of Egyptians	criminals and mass murders
patriots	traitors
the saviours of the country	the vandals of the country
believe that the people are the owner of the state	dictators
feeling the pain of the people	causing the pain

Figure 49. The Muslim Brotherhood's formation of comparisons between the movement and the regime to reinforce the idea that the Brothers are caring

Comparison as a persuasive means to convey an ideal image is a popular phenomenon within the Muslim Brotherhood's writings. It features in 31% of the public statements analysed. For example, the movement issued a statement on December 27, 2015, to address Egypt's water crisis. In this statement, they condemned the March 23, 2015, agreement of principles on Ethiopia's Grand Renaissance dam project, signed between the leaders of Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan. The Brotherhood claimed that fears that the Ethiopian dam would hamper the flow of the Nile were justified, comparing the regime's position with that of Morsi. While they presented Sisi as conceding Egyptian rights and executing a Zionist policy of undermining the historic achievements of the nation, they presented Morsi as the one who would sacrifice his blood for Egyptians.

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Sisi continues to progress from one failure to another. Further revolutionary confrontations are coming, God willing, in order to save the country and stop the shameful and betraying concessions. We see clearly how simple peasants are paying the price of the water crisis, and all Egyptians and future generations will also pay its price.

The misleading Egyptian media celebrated the agreement signed by Sisi, considering it an achievement! Secrets of the agreement have now been revealed and have proven the extent of how much of the Nile has been conceded. The traitor Sisi is executing a Zionist policy of destroying the historic achievements of Egypt. Here, the world should hear the words of the legitimate President Dr Mohamed Morsi: "If the Nile water reduces by a drop, then our blood will substitute it"(Brotherhood, 2015h, paragraphs 2 &3).

To reinforce this message, Muslim Brotherhood's caricatures portrayed Sisi as transforming Egypt into a barren desert by ignoring the harmful effects of the Ethiopian dam (Figure 50.).

Figure 50. A caricature portraying Sisi as transforming Egypt into barren desert by ignoring the harmful effects of the Ethiopian dam (EgyptWindow, 2017).

This technique of comparison is discussed briefly by Abualrob (2014) in his Arabic book, "Religious Channels: Preaching or Marketing." Abualrob argues that

the discourse of the Hamas movement, the Palestinian wing of the Muslim Brotherhood, is based on binary opposites, such as faith and disbelief, good and evil, and right and wrong. This technique attempts to categorise the most common syntactic frames in which pairs of opposites are used when in the same sentence, for instance X not Y, or either X or Y (where X and Y are the oppositional pair). (Matt Davies, 2007, p. 72).

This language is also clearly demonstrated in statements on Morsi's trial. For instance, on November 31, 2013, the movement alleged that they represent righteousness and right while the regime is immoral and evil.

> The bloody terrorists [the regime] were not content with the abduction and hiding of the legitimate president, who represents the free will of the people and was elected by millions as the first civilian president. But rather, their tyranny took them to putting him on trial on Monday April 11, 2013 for fabricated charges. This is aggression against truth and an overturn of facts and circumstances. Disloyalty prosecutes honesty, dictatorship prosecutes democracy, corruption prosecutes reform and integrity, thugs and killers prosecute martyrs and victims, traitors prosecute patriots, and the bloody Putschists prosecute the will of the people (Brotherhood, 2013p, paragraph 2).

The Muslim Brotherhood asserts that loving people, caring about them and putting their interests ahead of their own, are values embedded into the movement. According to a statement issued on November 6, 2013, those values were established by the Brotherhood founder "Imam Hassan al-Banna."

> …And upon these principles Imam al-Banna established the message of the Muslim Brotherhood saying about himself: "I am a citizen who seeks for his homeland; dignity, freedom, stability and good livelihood under the pure religion of Islam…" And regarding the organisation he said: "we want our people know that we love them more than ourselves. Our souls love that they are sacrificed in exchange for their self-respect, and pay the price for their glory, dignity, religion and hopes. It is impossible for us to see what it is happening to our people and then surrender to humiliation or accept servility or succumb to despair. We work for the people, in the way of God, more than we work for ourselves because we work only for you, not for others, O loved

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ones, and we will never be against you at all (Brotherhood, 2013r, paragraph 3)."

This care for the people has concrete implications for the Brotherhood's conceptualisation of the state and citizenship. In a statement entitled "the Brothers and the Institutions of the State," the Muslim Brotherhood explained their vision of the state and the regulations that control the relationship between the people and these institutions. In the statement, the group focused on the citizen as the owner of the state.

> The People are the real owners of this land and whatever is on it. They are the originators and owners of all its institutions, and have the right to choose who occupies them or define these rules of selection and to put in place institutional regulations and methods of supervision. The people are the masters and the source of all authorities. From here, legislation is imposed and supervised on their behalf. The judiciary dispenses its rulings on behalf of the people. The government implements a program acceptable to the people. The army protects the people and the land, and the police provides internal security and implements court rulings. Therefore, it is clear that all institutions are to serve the people within a system that respects the principles of specialism, independence and cooperation (Brotherhood, 2014u, paragraph 4).

In the above quote, the Brotherhood seem to deploy the technique of "Superficial Charm" in which the communicator appears to be polite, charming and verbally facile (Hare, 1991).

Notwithstanding these failures, the group present themselves as the saviours of the country, while their opponents are portrayed as vandals:

> It is an illegal, coup government that has no legitimacy. One that has burnt and destroyed homes, mosques and hospitals and froze charity funds in order to starve the poor, displace the orphans, leave new-borns in incubators to die and prevent those with kidney-failure, on dialysis from their treatment. This is while the group constructs hospitals and schools; fosters the poor and the orphans and does good, offers free health care and education in all parts of the Republic (Brotherhood, 2013ab, paragraph 4).

This discursive technique allows the Brotherhood to establish an emotional connection with people. They use times of crises to show Egyptians that they are carrying the peoples' interests at their hearts. In the following quote, they are giving themselves the common touch of the people by presenting themselves as feeling the adversity of others:

> The Muslim Brotherhood extends its sincere condolences to the victims' families of the Dahshur train accident and to the Egyptian People. We also pray that the injured quickly and fully recover. We call for an urgent investigation to identify those responsible for the incident, and to hold them accountable according to the law (Brotherhood, 2013l).

To sum up, while the love-bombing strategy was first used by the Church for recruiting disciples, it appears to be an essential component of the Brotherhood's discourse for political campaigning- perhaps not unsurprising considering the group's religious origins. The analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's statements show that the movement use the strategy of appearing to care and put the people's interests ahead of their own to win over the hearts and minds of the Egyptian people. To reinforce this idea, the Brotherhood draws comparisons between the negative practices of the Egyptian regime and the Brothers' positive behaviours. Such comparisons help the Brotherhood appear as an ideal movement and indeed often, as divinely ordained.

Appearing as a divine movement

The Muslim Brotherhood attempt to present itself as a divine movement in over a third of their public statements. This lends their mission a sense of destiny but also made them appear as humble and trustworthy to those with stronger religious sensibilities. It provides ideological supporters and active members with the gratification and pride of belonging to "the right" group. In other words, the concept of a divine movement is being used to instil a sense of purpose, legitimacy and empowerment.

> Praise be to God who made the call of the Muslim Brotherhood a divine one that gathers the hearts, its progress something that

> pleases the sincere, and one that faithful scholars call towards (Brotherhood, 2016r).

This serves as a form of deification discourse in politics. Deification makes an idea appear holy and sacred, and thus, beyond all law. Other opposing ideas thereby appear as treason or blasphemy can even dehumanise a group (Shabo, 2008, p. 139). The strategy is often used in totalitarian regimes whereby the state or the leader is deified (Gentile, 2006) and has longstanding historic origins. For centuries, Kings have claimed that their power is God-Given (Gosman, 2007, p. 40). According to Shabo (2008), by claiming some sort of divine mandate, political movements or leaders can justify almost any position or action.

The Muslim Brotherhood's claim to be a divine movement is similar to those claims made by extremists groups such as ISIS. ISIS claims that it is divinely mandated and that it enjoys divine credibility and, therefore, there is a theological imperative to join it (Rafiq & Malik, 2015; Winter, 2015). In addition, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite Muslim militant group, promise divine rewards for people who follow and respond to their messages. This rhetoric offers a model of compulsion rather than obedience (Matar, 2014, p. 173). Likewise, the Brotherhood frequently assert that they are the right against evil, "Cheer up, the victory of truth and the perishing of falsehood is soon" (Brotherhood, 2014a, last sentence). Thus, Allah will exact revenge for them.

> The day of fair retribution will inevitably arrive. The decree of Allah will always take place and his verdict against those murderers and corrupt has already been issued (Brotherhood, 2015j).

The notion that the Muslim Brotherhood is always presenting themselves as the right against evil is reinforced by Shurafa (2013) in his Arabic book, "Al-Jazaeera and the Muslim Brotherhood: From the Power of Discourse to the Discourse of Power." Shurafa claims that the Muslim Brotherhood uses religious discourse to lure in the public. Accordingly, religious symbolism is used to convince the audience that the Brotherhood is "the" right and accordingly what comes from the

right is right. Hence, logically what comes from others is wrong. While Shurafa (2013) suggests that this theme understood *implicitly* by the audience, I argue that the movement has *explicitly* portrayed its foes as evil. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood present Sisi as someone who does not fear God as he continues his "crimes" despite his attempts to present himself as a believer. A three-page statement was issued to list Sisi "crimes" and bad behaviours, followed by a sardonic question:

> Do such actions stem from a person who fears God as he has claimed repeatedly? (Brotherhood, 2013s).

Here the Brotherhood clearly attempts to transfer the prestige, respect, and authority of Qur'anic verses to them to legitimize themselves and make themselves revered and accepted and to win the hearts of the people. Between July 2013 to July 2017, this persuasive mechanism was found in 44.8% of the communiqués issued by the movement in attempts to establish themselves as a legitimate political actor (Koa, 2018b).

> But you, O members of the Muslim Brotherhood, we remind you of Allah's words (Brotherhood, 2013al, last sentence):

وَلَا تَهِنُوا وَلَا تَحْزَنُوا وَأَنتُمُ ٱلْأَعْلَوْنَ إِن كُنتُم مُّؤْمِنِينَ ۝

> *"So do not become weak (against your enemy), nor be sad, and you will be superior (in victory) if you are indeed (true) believers⟩"* Quranic verse (3:139).

Religious discourse remains an important part of the Brotherhood's persuasive strategy to achieve legitimacy. Indeed, the Muslim Brotherhood deployed 215 Qur'anic verses and 68 Hadith in the 132 statements analysed. The intensive use of religious symbolism demonstrates the movement's heavy reliance on religious discourse. More specifically, my findings indicate that the movement employs more religious discourse in statements that target their members and those that seek to educate people on a specific issue as opposed to those statements that target human rights organizations or political powers. For example, on December 08,

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2014, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement entitled *"The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: From the laws of God in Maintaining Nations,"* the movement deployed eleven Qur'anic verses and seven Hadiths. The statement targeted members and supporters and aimed at educating them in the importance of justice. It argues that justice is key for the development of any nation. The Brotherhood used Qur'anic verses, historical stories, and the Hadith to reinforce their ideas.

Religious discourse has been described as the ultimate instrument of political power (Cull, Culbert, & Welch, 2003, p. 342). It is influential because its existential and spiritual appeal is often able to overrule alternative considerations such as human or property rights, vested interests, and political privileges. Many studies have stressed the influence of religious symbolism in politics (Bourdillon, 1984; Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Iancu & Balaban, 2010; Koa, 2007; Nasr, 2001) to the extent that scientists at the University of Utah have deduced that religion could have a similar effect on the brain as taking drugs (Ferguson et al., 2018). The widespread use of religious symbolism in politics has led to what some scholars call "politicization of religion" i.e. "(ab)use of religion as a political means to an end" (Ognjenović & Jozelić, 2014, p. 1). Of course, this is precisely the accusation levelled at the Brotherhood from Egyptian liberals and regime narratives in the run up to and aftermath of Morsi's deposition. Hence, Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) argue that on one hand, symbolism can be used as a tool of persuasion, and on the other as an instrument of coercion (p. 11). The influence of religion is not limited or unique to Islamic societies. Indeed, politics in some democratic countries, such as Greece and Romania, is also influenced by religious symbolism. Halikioupoulou and Vasilopoulou (2017) argue that the Church plays an influential role in the decision-making and policies that affect the content of the educational curriculum. In Greek schools religion sustained its influence, political relevance, and embedded itself into the polity (Halikioupoulou & Vasilopoulou, 2017, pp. 73-74).

However, when the Muslim Brotherhood targets an international audience or human rights organisations they tend to avoid religious language. Instead, they focus on terms they may perceive as relevant to the target audience and appear to project a message that is coherent with how the movement wants international powers to perceive its identity and ideology. For example, on September 25, 2013, the Brotherhood issued a statement that targeted the General Assembly of the United Nations. The movement urged the Assembly to refuse the visit of Nabil Fahmy, the Foreign Minister of Egypt's transitional government after Morsi's deposition. The statement did not use any religious symbolism. Instead, they focused on condemning and explaining "hideous" acts of violence and "crimes against humanity" that were "committed by the regime." The Brotherhood claimed that Fahmy represents an "illegitimate and invalid government" that arrived to power through a "coup" not through "democratic and free elections." Such language was clearly appealing to the discursive agenda of the United Nations.

The above analysis indicates that the movement may conduct "audience segmentation" before targeting a specific group. Audience segmentation depends on in-depth analyses of the target audience's motivations, attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours (Reichert, 2007, p. 747). A primary goal of audience segmentation is to increase the acceptance of a political idea or practice in particular target audiences. By audience segmentation, communicators can make appeals to specific groups. Strategists use the existing information about the target audience to their best advantage and audience segmentation is a central variable for a successful, professional communication campaign (Manheim, 2011, p. 52). The Muslim seems to engage common beliefs, principles and values accepted by their target audiences.

Of course, this practice is not specific to the Brotherhood. Jihadists from al-Qaeda to ISIS also conduct audience segmentation according to Corman and Schiefelbein (2006) and Winter (2015), indicating that these groups also pursue a sophisticated communication strategy. The use of audience segmentation is an indicator that the movement is conducting a professional, planned political

communication strategy. It is clear from the content that targets a specific group that the Muslim Brotherhood uses a crafted language for different groups, with a tone or messages that may be understood and touch the hearts and minds of the target audience. Thus, while the Brotherhood has deployed religious discourse to influence specific target audiences, they also use modern means to challenge the regime and reach a wider target audience.

Comparatively speaking, the Muslim Brotherhood's claim to be a divine movement is similar to other religious groups such as ISIS and Hezbollah. However, whereas ISIS is attempting to apply divine sovereignty by the sword, the Brotherhood choose to follow a non-violent peaceful approach in which they appear as victims and innocents.

Appearing as victims and innocents of the regime.

In the struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime since 2013, both sides have been contesting the narrative space to gain popular support locally and internationally by applying different communication strategies and tactics to acquire legitimacy and acceptance. In this sub-section, I argue that the Brotherhood has followed the strategy of victimhood as one, but not the only, strategy to convey a threefold message: (1) the Muslim Brotherhood is being victimised at the hands of the military regime. This is to win the sympathy of the people and appeal to their hearts. They thereby exonerate themselves from the violent acts ascribed to them on one hand and delegitimize the regime on the other hand; (2) The regime is criminal and violating the tenets of human rights and, therefore, should be persecuted by the International Court of Justice; (3) The regime is the actual perpetrator of many violent acts allegedly committed by the Muslim Brotherhood. This to present the regime as a criminal and devious "gang," fundamentally unreliable to be in charge or trusted with the nation's wellbeing. For example, on March 6, 2016, the Brotherhood issued a statement stressing its peaceful approach in contrast to the regime's "plots." They attempted to convey the message that they are innocents and that allegations that the Muslim

Brotherhood is involved in violence are simply fabrications made-up by the regime and their media. In doing so, the Brotherhood exonerate themselves from any violent acts perpetrated by individuals or splinter groups.

> The Egyptian Interior Ministry and the coup media have repeatedly laid the charges and allegations of bombings incidents and murders on the Brotherhood to justify the Putschists' crimes and torture and to distract people from the severe crisis that the regime is suffering.
>
> The Brotherhood has repeatedly announced and confirmed its rejection of all forms of violence and bloodshed and has denounced those who do this whoever they may be. The movement's maintains a peaceful approach in its revolutionary activity and what the Interior Minister of the coup announced is false and void (Brotherhood, 2016p, paragraphs 1 and 2).

The use of the victimhood narrative is common in Islamist groups. While the Brotherhood uses it to convey the message that they are being murdered and victimised at the hands of the junta, Winter (2015) argues that this strategy has been used by ISIS to convey the message that Sunni Muslims' are being victimised at the hands of a global war on Islam. According to Winter (2015), ISIS use the theme of victimhood in tandem with the brutality theme to provide justifications of their acts. The Brotherhood however, uses the victimhood strategy to acquire sympathy, legitimacy and support, while tarnishing the image of the regime, rather than for justification purposes.

The suffering of women has played an important and nuanced role in this narrative. According to Rosland (2009), sacrifice narratives were used as political weapons in the Easter Rising of 1916, as part of "a cult of sacrifice" in Irish politics (p.295). She argues, "The traditional image of the grieving mother was an invaluable resource" (Rosland, 2009, p. 311). Likewise, the Muslim Brotherhood has given special attention to the narrative of women's victimhood. In patriarchal societies where men are perceived as protectors of women, female suffering can provoke communities to take action or to at least incite them against the regime. However, unlike the Irish case, the Brotherhood did not focus mainly on

motherhood when depicting women suffering, but has in fact depicted women as *partners* in the struggle against the regime.

> Egyptian women have made many sacrifices facing the brutal military coup. Since the coup, the total number of women martyrs to this day [March 6, 2016] has reached 123. Three hundred and four were subjected to beatings, abuse and physical humiliation. The number of the girls proved to have been raped and exposed to sexual harassment reached 72. Twenty-four were subjected to unfair military trials. The number of women who were sentenced in the unjust courts reached 248. Two thousand women were arrested; 56 of them are still in detention, while 1933 were released. The number of cases of enforced disappearances reached 111, […]. Five hundred and twenty-six female students were expelled from universities and 2.208.500 Egyptian pounds were paid as bail to release girls from custody. The persecution of the Egyptian women by the fascist military coup has continued in an unprecedented way and this has not even happened in a time of foreign occupation (Brotherhood, 2016o, paragraphs 3 & 4).

To sum up, through the victimhood strategy, the Brotherhood attempts to accentuate the oppression and suffering of its members and the public in general. By doing so, it attempts to (1) mobilize people and gain support and sympathy (2) discredit and delegitimize the regime (3) provoke international human rights organisations to condemn the regime (4) disprove regime "fabrications" that the Muslim Brotherhood is behind violent attacks (5) label the regime with terrorism to discredit it in the eyes of major powers. While other groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda also rely on a narrative of victimhood, this is often used to justify violence rather than rally support. The discourse of female victimhood is particularly interesting because women are often portrayed as equals rather than a vulnerable sex in need of protection.

Equality between men and women in the struggle against the regime

On April 26, 1933, the Muslim Brotherhood created, for the first time, the Muslim Sisters (al-Akhwat al-Muslimat) in Ismailia of Egypt (Ikhwanwiki, 2011e). The division grew rapidly and created fifty branches within four years (R. W. Baker,

1990, p. 210). When the Brotherhood was banned on December 8, 1948, and its leaders were imprisoned, the Muslim Sisters created several groups to support the detained Brothers and their families. Two main committees were established. The first group was responsible for the preparation of food and clothing for the Brothers in prison. The second group's mission was to visit the families of the arrested Brothers on a regular basis to provide financial needs and homiletics as well as to file complaints against the regime (Ikhwanwiki, 2011e).

This section suggests that the opportunities for women to play a more prominent role in the organisation emerge when the group has faced persecution. The Muslim Sisters have become increasingly important when the Brotherhood is banned or faced with a crisis as the same duties were carried on by the Sisters in both 1954 and 1957 (Ikhwanwiki, 2011e). Since 2013, the Brotherhood's messaging has focused on encouraging women to be active in participating in and continuing the upheavals, suggesting that the Brotherhood has crafted a strategy that puts women at its heart. Perhaps the fact that so many leaders and members of the group have been imprisoned has forced the group to rely on women to be the fuel of demonstrations. Hence, the Brotherhood have regularly issued special statements to welcome women and urge them to actively participate in the struggle against the regime.

> A greeting of fondness and appreciation to the revolutionists' young and old women of Egypt. You have taught the world how a revolution should be and how striving (Jihad) and sacrifice for the freedom and the restoration of the nation should look. More than one thousand eight hundred days have passed since the beginning of the revolution. Yet you still stand in front of the brutal regime, responsible for killing, arresting and assaulting. This did not cause you to retreat or waver from the revolution and its goals. You have always been at the forefront, and everywhere in the land of Egypt (Brotherhood, 2016r).

In practice, however, the Brotherhood have also indicated a more traditional outlook. The Muslim Brotherhood asserts that women can hold any of the upper echelons in the state including being a Prime Minister, but not the Presidential post

(Ikhwanwiki, 2011e).   Moreover, in the hierarchical structure of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is unlikely to find a woman in any leadership position (Farag, 2013). Accordingly, before the overthrow of Morsi, the Muslim Sisters was given marginal attention within the Brotherhood's leadership structure even while they were at the helm of power of Egypt. This is despite Egyptian women's significant participation in the January 25, 2011, revolution.

> […] the Muslim Brotherhood pays tribute to the active role of women in the renaissance and development of nations. We appreciate the great sacrifices of women in the face of injustice and tyranny, and their powerful role in the Arab Spring revolutions that called for freedom, human dignity and resistance of injustice and tyranny (Brotherhood, 2016o).

The role of Egyptian women is also promoted on the Muslim Brotherhood's visual media. On March 8, 2016, Egypt Window published a caricature by Carlos Latuff, depicting an Egyptian woman standing against an Egyptian policeman and supporting an imprisoned revolutionary activist (see Figure 51). Presenting women as partners in the revolution indicates that the movement has designed a strategy to win the hearts and minds of this segment of society and to legitimate themselves in the eyes of this important part of the population.

> As for you, men and women revolutionaries, you are the conscience of the nation (Ummah) […], the victors of God who carry the banner of truth, dealing with people with justice, callers of good and forbidders of evil, vocal in proclaiming the truth to killers and oppressors. In you, after God, lie the hopes of liberating the nation (Ummah), achieving dignity, returning rights, and achieving justice towards people and between people. So continue, for you are those who prevent the wrath of God from inflicting all, and on your hands, by the permission of God will victory be attained (Brotherhood, 2014c, last paragraph).

Figure 51. Egyptian Women's Days, a caricature by the Carlos Latuff (EgyptWindow, 2016f).

Discursively at least, the movement claims to be in solidarity with the goals of female protestors, the rights of women in general, and equality between men and women.

> The Muslim Brotherhood add their voices to the voices of women in their demands for their rights […]. We will continue to strive in our pursuit for freedom, justice and equality, all of which is exhorted by Islam, raising by them the value of women and men alike (Brotherhood, 2016o, Paragraphs 5 & 6).

Irrespective of whether this represents an ideological or merely tactical shift, this strategy may pave the way for a different role for women within the movement. It may, for example, allow the Muslim Sisters to take an advanced position in the movement's leadership hierarchy. The appointment of a media spokeswoman for the first time in the movement's history may be indicative of this change. On 23 January 2016, Eman Mahmoud was appointed as a spokesperson with other two

youths as the Muslim Brotherhood declared in a communique (Brotherhood, 2016m).

Thus, it might be argued that the Muslim Sisters' suffering, participation in demonstrations along with the political vacuum caused by the imprisonment of leading brothers has led to the emergence of a new political leadership of the Brotherhood in which young people and women are taking important roles. My argument is further supported by Biagini (2017), who provides a gendered examination of the Muslim Brotherhood, examining the activism of the Muslim Sisters post-July 2013. She similarly argues that negative political conditions allow for the emergence of female leadership. She maintains that repression of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2013 has allowed the emergence of women's leadership within the movement because its survival has become increasingly compromised since its re-designation as a terrorist group in December 2013

This argument has precedents from other case studies in Western politics. In the Irish case, Aretxaga (1997); Rosland (2009) conclude that the status of women as victims provided a starting base for their political participation. This was reinforced by the fact that females had to replace men in the roles that they were forced to abandon because of imprisonment. In the world wars, the role of women in the Western world was mostly limited to the domestic domain as servants, housewives, nursing, textiles and clothing (Rotili, 2015, p. 168). However, as Adams (1978); Rotili (2015) maintain, after these wars, women created their own lives, sense of self, and became more independent, also replacing men in their jobs. This granted them freedom and an increased sense of equality as women demonstrated that they were as capable as men. Many campaigns were conducted to entice women into the job market during wartime to fulfil their patriotic duty. See (Figure 52) and (Figure 53) from the American campaign during the WW2. In a similar fashion, the Muslim Brotherhood is conducting a strategic campaign to encourage women to be active replacements of the Brothers.

Figure 52. Poster: "The girl he left behind" is still behind him--She's a WOW (Treidler, 1943)

Figure 53. Propaganda poster: "Do the Job He Left Behind" (R. G. Harris, 1943).

The development of the movement's ideology at the rhetorical level together with the appointment of a female spokeswoman suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood is showing increasing flexibility in many issues that were previously taboos within the group. Moreover, the appointment of a spokeswoman may get the ball rolling for other women's political participation in the organisation by putting a foot in the door for others to enter.

However, scholars have also made counter arguments regarding the significance of female participation. Farag (2013) analysed the level of female political participation within the Muslim Brotherhood before and after the January 25, 2011 revolution. She has concluded that the chances of empowering Muslim Sisters are slim under a religious fundamentalist rule. M. Tadros (2011) suggests that despite the active agency of females in aiding the movement, the gendered structure of division of roles and power within the Muslim Brotherhood has not been reformed but simply reframed through the movement's discourse. This discursive reframing could however, have more substantive implications in expanding the realm of possibilities for female Sisters.

Overall, it could be argued that the communication strategy that the Muslim Brotherhood designed is based on equality between men and women in the revolutionary context and lays the first stone for building a female leadership within the movement and certainly increases the political participation of the Muslim Sisters in general. Nothing within the Muslim Brotherhood ideology can prevent women from being in a leading position. As Mahmoud Ghozlan, member of the Muslim Brotherhood's Executive Bureau put it,

> Women have the right to occupy all positions except the office of presidency. That means that we women are more than welcome to compete for the party's presidency and leadership, and more than welcome to become presidents if they are competent (Ghozlan as stated in a media interview with Ismail, 2008).

The Muslim Brotherhood's call for the democratisation of Egypt further bolsters the opportunities for women within the movement. The Brotherhood knows that such a call has obligations and a price to be paid.

> We will continue to believe that the people are sovereign, that their will constitutes legitimacy, that freedom is sacred, that democracy is the rule of the people by the people, and that democratic mechanisms such as free and fair elections and referendums are the only way to know popular will (Brotherhood, 2014g, Paragraph 16).

The employment of a female Muslim Brotherhood's spokeswoman for the first time suggests some political will for women's inclusion. Moreover, studies have found a strong relationship between female suffering during conflicts and consequently women's political empowerment, especially in the light of the fact that females have had to fill the place that men were forced to abandon because of incarceration. Most importantly however, the movement has explicitly claimed that they are promoting women's voices to achieve their rights. These developments mark a significant change in the tone of the Brotherhood's discourse regarding women's civil and political rights.

Hence, it can be concluded that negative political opportunity structure has played a major role in the empowerment of the Muslim Sisters (female human resources) and paved the way for the emergence of women leadership or at least the Brotherhood's discourse regarding women's rights (cultural resources) in order to achieve the critical moral resource of legitimacy.

Positive stereotypes and portrayals of themselves

Stereotyping is a way to phrase judgments formed about other people. While the Muslim Brotherhood uses negative stereotyping to delegitimize and discredit the Egyptian regime, it conveys positive stereotypes of the movement itself to win the public's hearts and minds and legitimize itself. To that end, the Muslim Brotherhood endeavours to assign positive qualities to the movement that can

straightforwardly be prompted when the movement is named, as in the following examples:

- Mohammed Morsi is a devout believer.
- Mohammed Morsi is just.
- Mohammed Morsi is the first civilian president.
- Morsi's disposed government represents the constitutional legitimacy.
- The Brothers are the nation's hope.
- The Muslim Brotherhood is an ideal movement.

Positive stereotyping of the movement and its leaders is the most commonly deployed strategy by the Muslim Brotherhood to extol the movement and win the hearts and minds of the people, especially in the context of the binary oppositions that discussed earlier (see Table 4).

Table 4. The Muslim Brotherhood Self Portrayal

The Institution	Portrayal	Frequencies
Ex-President Mohammed Morsi		
	The legitimate elected president	36
	Represents the free will of the people	10
	First Civilian president	9
	Just/Ideal	6
	Courageous and steady	5
	Patriotic	4
	Saviour	3
	The kidnapped Mr. President	3
	Devout believer	2
Morsi's government		
	The constitutional legitimacy	91
The movement itself		
	Divine Movement	48
	Right in the face of falsehood	39
	Peaceful and non-violent movement	31
	Moderate movement	26
	Taking care of the people's interests	25
	Upholding and adhering democracy and civil state	21
	Keen on the blood of Egyptians	21
	Innocents	15
	Keen on National Security	13
	Representing the revolution and the free people	12

	Protectors of Democracy	11
	A key political player in the Islamic world	10
	Patriots	8
	Ideal Movement	6
	Representing Islam and Muslims around the world	5
	Sacrificing for the freedom of the people	4
	Revaluation protectors	4
	The nation's hope	3
	Representing democracy	3

In November 2013, marking Morsi's first public appearance since being deposed, the Brotherhood portrayed the leader as dauntless, steadfast, determined and confident. They claimed that despite his appearance in a cage in the courtroom,

> President Mohamed Morsi's persistence, steadfastness, tenacity and confidence amazed the world. This was to the extent of him providing an enormous morale boost to his supporters who came out to strengthen his resolve, one that urged them to remain steadfast and continue in their pursuit of freedom, legitimacy and popular authority (Brotherhood, 2013ae) .

Justifying his strength, the movement have portrayed Morsi as a "devout believer", a "memorizer of the book of Allah" and thus, worthy to be followed and believed. Meanwhile, they have questioned the faith of Sisi. This religious symbolism is used for political purposes such as gaining compliance, influencing the feeling of masses, labelling opponents, and challenging non-religious parties.

> Many people wonder what the secret is behind President Mohamed Morsi's steadfastness and confidence. To answer this questions, we say: (1) His faith: […] (2) his legitimacy: […] (3) his genuine patriotism: […] (4) his devotion and dedication to work, honesty and integrity: […] (5) his belief that the truth is with him and that the accusations are false and fabricated: […] (Brotherhood, 2013ae).

In the same statement, the Brotherhood labelled Sisi as horrified and fearful, and thereby in need of military protection:

> When one [i.e. Morsi] feels that the truth is with him, -and truth is far above power, rather even stronger than if he will not care about the power of armies or the fierceness of tyrants. The illegitimate one and the betrayer of trusts [Sisi] will shudder of

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horror, despite being heavily-armed and surrounded by the walls
of soldiers.

They continue in Hollywood-style depictions, framing the army as fearing the
devout believer:

> The Putschists kidnapped the president and even hid him from his
> family, sending him whilst masked to interrogators, after
> changing the venue of the trial the previous day, gathering more
> than twenty thousand troops to guard the venue of the trial venue
> as well as armoured vehicles and aircraft, and were keen to keep
> the trials secret and off broadcast (Brotherhood, 2013ae).

Such portrayals were reinforced by visual depictions. For example, on May 6, 2016,
the Brothers' published a caricature portraying Sisi in his army apparel sweating in
horror despite being supported by America, Israel, and the Gulf, while he is
standing in front of Morsi. Morsi appears sitting relaxed, putting one leg on other,
despite wearing the red prison garb that is given to those who are awaiting execution
(See Figure 54).

Figure 54. A caricature depicting Sisi sweating of horror in front of the dauntless and confident
Morsi (EgyptWindow, 2016g).

In Islamic and Arab countries, where religion remains an important cultural and social force, presenting politicians as faithful and pious implies that they should be obeyed. According to Eickelman and Piscatori (1996), politicians often deploy Islamic symbols in order to legitimise themselves, their rules and defend themselves against critics. This tendency also has historical precedents in modern Egypt. Anwar Sadat for example portrayed himself as a devout Muslim and called himself al-Ra'is al- Mu'min, "the believing president," in a tactic to insure the loyalty of Islamists and in order to legitimize his political hierarchy (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12; Denis Joseph Sullivan & Abed-Kotob, 1999, p. 21). More broadly in the region, the King of Morocco, Hassan II, who ruled from 1961 until his death in July 1999, used to refer to himself as "Commander of the Faithful" (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996; Maddy-Weitzman & Litvak, 2003). According to Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) this served to legitimize the existing political hierarchy. Similarly, the former King of Jordan, King Hussein, while addressing his parliament said that, "if they wanted to honour him they should call him Sharif Hussein." By this, he sought to affirm his descent from Prophet Mohammed and his great-grandfather who sought to achieve Arab union and defend Islamic holy places (Layne, 1994, p. 37).[24] This cultural symbolism has also been a prevalent feature of Islamist social movements and political parties, for example, Hassan Nasrullah, the third and current Secretary General of the Lebanese Hezbollah, wears a black garb and black turban to signify that he is a descendant of the Prophet Muhammed (Matar, 2014, p. 168).

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[24] Of course, the concept of divine leadership is not specific to the Islamic world. During the French invasion and occupation of Egypt 1798-1801, Napoleon Bonaparte used to begin his proclamation to the Egyptians with the typical Muslim invocation of [In the name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful] aiming to gain indigenous support (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996). One can argue that the source of the message plays a vital role in its credibility and its acceptance by the receivers. In other words, despite Bonaparte's attempt to use Muslim symbolism to show that the Egyptians and he believe in the same God, he failed because of the credibility of the source.

Speaking to this spirit of deification, the Muslim Brotherhood have attempted to portray Morsi as a divine but pragmatic Saviour who has a magic wand to solve Egypt's problems.

> [Morsi] is the man who adores his nation and wants to pull it out from the sinkhole that the previous corrupt regimes threw it down. He sought to establish full constitutional institutions using the appropriate democratic mechanisms, respect for human rights and the provision of public freedoms. He planned for the establishment of giant national projects in order to support the economy, to eliminate poverty and unemployment to attract investment and expand production, to strengthen the army, to improve education and scientific research and to become self-sufficient in food, medicine and weapons. [Through this] he sought to free the nation from dependence and that it treats all nations with respect, expanding its international cooperation so that Egypt regains its place in the world as a respected nation . (Brotherhood, 2013ae, point 3).

This notion is also reinforced through caricature. One example, among many, on the Brotherhood website, Egypt Window, republished on March 1, 2014, Figure 55 is a caricature presenting Morsi as supporting Egypt to flourish. Egypt is depicted as a weak woman that Morsi is helping to stand up. Morsi says, Egypt is framed as a weak woman whom Morsi is helping to stand up. Morsi says, "Stand up Egypt, wipe your tears, everyone in the nation is enthused for your return." Figure 56 also depicts Morsi extinguishing fires fuelled by enemies of the country. This serves as a powerful metaphor for the internal problems created by the deep state to curb the Brotherhood regime and seeks to challenge the widespread narrative that the Brotherhood presided over a period of decline in Egypt.[25]

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[25] In contrast to the picture painted by the Muslim Brotherhood, studies have concluded that Morsi's time was far from satisfactory. For example, unemployment rates increased to 13.2% in the first quarter of 2013, compared to 12.5% in the third quarter of 2012. Government debt grew from $30bn before Mubarak was ousted to around $40bn. Inflation, before the revolution was 3%, and before Morsi's removal stood at between 13% and 18% (Al-Ghitany, 2013; Matthew Davies, 2013).

Figure 55. A caricature presenting Morsi as the Saviour (EgyptWindow, 2014).

Figure 56. A caricature presenting Morsi as the Saviour (EgyptWindow, 2014).

Conclusion

Relying upon the social movement theory concept of moral resources (focusing mainly on legitimacy), human resources (particularly leadership), and strategic framing (as positive stereotyping) of the movement; this chapter sought to explain how the Brotherhood attempts to mobilize resources to pursue their desired goals and how they attempt to legitimize themselves. It also attempts to explain how the

Brotherhood frames itself in reaction to national, regional and international attempts to demonize the movement after July 2013.

The chapter argues that while the Brotherhood attempts to destroy the regime's image, it endeavours to win the hearts and the minds of the public. It constructs itself as legitimate and the ultimate representative of the Egyptians and even Islam. To achieve this strategic goal, the group launched a branding campaign to burnish its image after it fell in July 2013. This campaign deployed several strategies to increase public sympathy with the group: appearing to speak on behalf of the people, portraying themselves as an extension of the 2011 revolution and representatives of the free people, appearing to care and put the people's interests ahead of their own, communicating equality between men and women, appearing as a divine movement, depicting themselves as victims of the regime, and employing positive stereotypes. By such strategies, the Muslim Brotherhood seek to appear as close to the people and appeal to their hearts and minds. In this endeavour, the Brotherhood has framed itself as a force of good against evil, playing to a familiar binary for social movements.

These findings have a number of theoretical implications. Firstly, it shows that negative political opportunity structure has a significant positive impact in highlighting leadership skills of marginalized groups within a social movement. This is clear through the prominent role that the Muslim Sisters played in the movement's recent struggles. Women have become increasingly important human resources for the movement, with the potential for greater leadership by the Muslim Sisters. Negative political opportunity structure played a major role in the empowerment of the Muslim Sisters (female human resources) and paved the way for the emergence of women leadership or at least the Brotherhood's discourse regarding women's rights (cultural resources) in the movement's quest to achieve the preeminent moral resource of legitimacy.

Secondly, the case study reveals strategic framing can be a technique to promote social movements and mobilize proponents, as well as a technique to demobilize

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antagonists as the previous chapter suggested. The is obvious through the Brotherhood's implementation of a self-image management and branding campaign through which the movement applied positive stereotypes of the movement. Finally, the case study reveals that legitimacy is a critical moral resource for Islamist social movements. Thus, the legitimacy concept of social movement theory sheds crucial light on how Islamist social movements attempt to shore up this moral resource and the way they deploy it to frame themselves to the public, at the national, regional and international level in a credible manner.

The Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to paint a desirable picture of the state under their control is not unique. Winter (2015) argues that part of ISIS's communication strategy is designed to attract active followers through what she calls *utopianism*. Through the theme of *utopianism*, ISIS asserts the group as superior to the other jihadist entities. Bright pictures depicting Jihadists practicing their daily life from fishing trips and da'wa caravans to sheep cleaning and road-buildings is used to convince potential recruits that the Islamic State is secure. Establishing *sharī'a* courts, implementing *ḥudūd* punishments and images of children learning and reciting the Qur'an conveys an image that despite the "caliphate" being attacked, it can provide security and stability (Winter, 2015, pp. 28-30). Similar to the failures of ISIS, the inability of the Brotherhood to convert their visons of the state during the time they were at the helm of power makes this vision appear to be merely a marketing ploy or propaganda than a believable reality. A comparative study of the self-branding campaigns of Islamist movements would undoubtedly strengthen and deepen our understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood who seek not only to condemn the regime and promote themselves, but also frame themselves as a key political actor in the Middle East's ongoing political fray.

Chapter Seven: From Hardcore Islamist to Defender of Democracy and Human Rights

Introduction

The Muslim Brotherhood has been disenfranchised and excluded from the Egyptian political system for decades. Once the political opportunity allowed for democratic elections, the movement arrived at the helm of power merely to be overthrown after a year in power. The movement is often presented as a radical religious movement because of some of its foundational texts, both by the Egyptian regime and external observers (Davis, 1987, p. 161; Said Aly, 2018, p. 89; Taras, 2012, p. 122). Others rightly note that the Muslim Brotherhood is a flexible political actor that has been able to adapt to different regimes and circumstances (Akbarzadeh, 2012, pp. 5-6; Blaydes, 2011, p. 150; Ranko, 2015; Wickham, 2015, pp. 133-137). This in turn allowed the movement to establish a political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, when the legal opportunity and political circumstances were apt. Hosni Mubarak's ouster following the January 25, 2011 revolution cleared the way for the Brotherhood to participate openly in Egyptian politics. The first Egyptian Parliament elected after the ouster of Mubarak, marked a watershed moment for Egyptian Islamists, in which a political coalition dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood, won 47% of the seats and an alliance of ultraconservative Islamists won the next largest share of seats, about 25% thereby making Islamists a large majority (New York Times, 2012).

Since the Brotherhood's comprehensive victory in the Egyptian's elections and following Morsi's forced removal, much scholarship has focused on the movement's compatibility with democracy and its relationship to terrorism (Khan, 2014; Lebl, 2014; Mura, 2016; Scott, 2014; Tausch, 2017; Wiegand, 2016; Wilmot, 2015; Zeid & Cook, 2017). However, these studies fail to examine how the movement's ideological metamorphoses and continuities have manifested in the Brothers' Arabic writings since 2013. Accordingly, both this chapter and the

following one explore the issue of the Brotherhood's ideological transformation through their Arabic communiqués.

It is generally agreed that the Muslim Brotherhood was established as a religious group seeking to educate people on the "correct" understanding of Islam and to enact social reform accordingly. However, the Brotherhood became overtly involved in politics ten years after its formation. On February 2, 1939, in the movement society's fifth congress, Hassan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood founder, defined his movement in his famous letter entitled "the Muslim Brotherhood under the banner of the Qur'an". He defined it as "a Salafi call [...], a Sunni way […], a Sufi truth […], a political body […], an athletic group […], a cultural-educational union […], an economic enterprise […], and a social idea […]" (Al-Bannā, 1939). In line with al-Banna's writings, the group can be understood as a social-political movement that frequently deploys religious discourse to achieve political agendas (Richter, 2011a, 2011b). Therefore, this chapter uses social movement theory to clarify how to identify the Brotherhood's ideological evolution, the ways in which the movement's beliefs have changed or remained the same, and how the Brotherhood frames itself in reaction to domestic, regional and international's attempts to demonise the movement after July 2013. The concepts of strategic framing, political opportunity structure, and cultural resources were used from social movement theory to contribute to answering the following research questions introduced in the introductory chapter:

RQ1: *How* has the movement's ideology evolved post July 2013 and how does social movement theory explain this change?

RQ4: *How* do Islamist social movements frame themselves and their rivals?

Accordingly, this chapter argues that in parallel with the early discussed two strategic goals (to discredit the regime that ousted the Islamist President Mohammed Morsi, and to win the hearts and the minds of the Egyptian people) the Brotherhood has sought to frame itself as a key political actor in the Middle East.

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This strategy consists of framing the organisation as a democratic movement, and therefore, a reliable political actor at a time when the geopolitical landscape of the region has been suffering from its most violent period in recent memory. With a multitude of dramatic challenges facing the region such as the increasing repression of political Islam, continual sectarian tensions, the diplomatic shakeups in the Gulf, the Syrian conflict, economic dislocation and political instability in many Arab states, the Brotherhood seek to frame themselves as a moderate, stable and democratic force in regional politics.

The social movement has long recognised the power of the ballot box in advancing their goals. In November 2005, the Brotherhood won a surprising 88 of 454 seats of the Egyptian parliament, making the movement the largest opposition bloc in the country. The Brotherhood's agenda at the time was characterized by a new emphasis on democratic reform (Mohamed & Momani, 2014, p. 197). The movement's messaging since 2013 suggests a continuation of the same narratives. However, the findings of this study indicate that the tone of the Brotherhood's rhetoric appealing for democracy and human rights principles has escalated in urgency as the regime's repression of the movement has increased. This contrast to much literature that suggests repression leads to radicalisation. The Brotherhood's unprecedented emphasis on the values of democracy as cultural resources to achieve legitimacy as moral resource and the way they framed themselves could have potential major implications for the movement's identity as an Islamist movement. There could also be notable effects on the broader political project of the Muslim Brotherhood that now frame itself as *the* key defender of democracy in Egypt, claiming that the movement is more democratic than democrats themselves. This democratic agenda is being stressed at the expense of more traditional commitments to apply *sharī'a* law, free the Muslim world from foreign control and establish a free Islamic state.

Of course, some incorporation of democratic ideals as part of the Brotherhood's rhetoric and ideology is not a new phenomenon. Scholarly discussion of this

include, for example, El-Ghobashy (2005); Pahwa (2013); Ranko (2015); Reda (2014); Wickham (2011, 2015); Wilmot (2015); Zollner (2009). Scholars are divided, however, as to the degree of commitment to democracy within the movement. Ranko (2015) indicates that the Brotherhood is becoming gradually engaged in, and accepting of many liberal democratic tenets, such as party pluralism and the rotation of power through elections. Wickham (2015), however, sustains that the Brotherhood does not only accept such tenets, but also adopts them as part of its agenda. This has in turn induced a change in the movement's rhetoric and behaviour. Developing this argument further, Reda (2014); Wilmot (2015) argue that during the short time that the Brotherhood was at the helm of power, the Brotherhood instead committed itself to electoral politics and adhered to a framework for political transition and the respect of the civil state, in contrast to worries that the Brotherhood might use the democratic process to install an Islamic regime.

However, other scholars argue that the Brotherhood was using its position to extend its Islamist ideals deeper into state structures to consolidate their authority. This was certainly a widespread fear within Egypt at the time, which also explains why there was so much popular support for military intervention in the build up to 2013 (Al-Awadi, 2013; Housden, 2013). Politicians, such as Hamdeen Sabahi and Mohamed El-Baradei, called Morsi "the new Pharaoh," accusing him of dictatorial tendencies (Özhan, 2013, p. 24). This narrative was widely adopted by the "deep

state" media.[26] See Figure 57 a caricature depicting Morsi as "Egypt's new pharaoh" published in many of the "remnants" of Mubarak's regime outlets.[27]

Figure 57. A caricature depicting Morsi as "Egypt's new pharaoh" (EgyptianStreets, 2012).

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[26] The term "deep state" is a translation of the Turkish "derin devlet." It was first originated in Turkey during the 1950s when the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secret Intelligence Service of the UK, recognized a clandestine intelligence and armed operations group called "Operation Gladio" under the NATO to counter the "communist threat" in many member countries. The Turkish Gladio was established under the code name "Counter-guerrilla" after the country joined the NATO in 1952. Its official title was the "Special Warfare Department." Over course of time, this body moved away from its primary purpose which was to defend the regime and its ideology based on a secular, monolithic nation-state approach. It engaged in many activities including to destroy political dissidences, subverting governments and assassinating politicians and individuals (Söyler, 2013, p. 316). Accordingly, the "deep state" is being used to describe the way that the military is ruling beneath the surface of politics through set of structures. In its present Egyptian avatar, "deep state" denotes the "deep political system" of the old regime and the bureaucratic bedrock that was settled over the 60-year rule of military generals before the MB arrived at the helm of power.

[27] Accordingly, it can be seen that the movement might have prompted itself to champion democratic norms in Egypt on the basis that they opposed regimes that were notoriously anti-democratic. Indeed, the way the General Sisi overthrew Morsi's government undermined the military's commitment to democratic norms. The deep state's media framing of Morsi as "Egypt's new Pharaoh" (BBC, 2012a) may have contributed significantly to urge the Brotherhood to refute such claims by offering a counter frame to the misnomer, "Pharaoh."

The findings of this chapter show that the Brotherhood emphasizes different characteristics of democracy such as political pluralism, popular sovereignty, minority rights, human rights and rule of law as essential resource mobilization in the movement's pursuit for legitimacy. According to social movement theory, this explains how the movement is attempting to mobilize their desired goals (Edwards & Kane, 2014, p. 205). Democratic legitimacy and its associated values has been stressed at the expense of other, more traditional cultural resources associated with the movement such as *sharī'a* law.

A Commitment to Democracy

A plethora of scholars claim that Islamists are not compatible with democracy (AbuKhalil, 1994, pp. 683-684; Kepel, 2003, pp. 48-50; Mortimer, 1982, p. 245; Tibi, 2008, p. 47) because the notion of *hukm* or "authority" in the Qur'an establishes the totality of Islamic obligation separation between the realm of God and the earthly realm out of the question. The Qur'an comprises all facets of life, including the realm of politics and governance.

However, Islamists of various stripes have sought to reconcile this apparent contradiction, with different "brands" of democracy that prioritise certain democratic values above others. Erdoğan's Turkey's Justice and Development Party (known by its Turkish acronym AKP) adopted conservative democracy as its identity and the Copenhagen Criteria as its sole political compass of governance (Yavuz, 2009, p. 87).[28] Conservative democracy has been seen as an expression that internalizes international norms, in which political Islam accept human rights, democracy and the rule of law as universal values. While Islamists embrace the dominant Western values they remain committed to conservative (Islamic) roots.

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[28] The Copenhagen Criteria were agreed upon during the June 21-22, 1993 European Council in Denmark. They are the rules that explain whether a state is qualified to join the European Union. According to the criteria, "the membership requires that candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union" (Copenhagen European Council, 1993).

(Duran, 2008, p. 87). Through a moderate conservative democracy model of governance, the AKP attempts to maintain the loyalty of its religious-conservative voters and continue its appeal to a much broader centre-right sector of the Turkish electorate (Özbudun, 2006, p. 544).

The influence of Turkey in the region has led to the AKP's conservative democratic ideals to be mirrored in other countries, such as Ennahda party in Tunisia and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco (Marks, 2017, p. 105). In May 2016, during the tenth congress of the Tunisian Ennahda party decided to separate *daawa* (preaching) from politics and facilitated the membership of non-Islamists (Marks, 2017, p. 108).

The Brotherhood's approach to democracy since the 1990s has shown a similar adaptive brand of democracy, emphasizing different characteristics of democratic process depending on their interests and agenda at the particular political moment in question. The findings of this chapter suggest that the Brotherhood conceive of democracy as fundamentally majoritarian in nature, advancing that the government ought to do what the majority of the people want (Bardes, Shelley, & Schmidt, 2012, p. 11). The Brotherhood promoted the importance of a democratic civil state in 42.9% of the data analysed. This shows the Brotherhood's strong desire to appear as a legitimate political actor that is open to accept and embrace the free political participation of all Egyptians.

In advocating its democratic character, the movement seeks to prove to international powers that it can be trusted and supported as a desirable alternative to the current government. Thus, the Brotherhood responded to Morsi's removal on 3 July 2013 with an ardent defence of democracy:

> The Brotherhood seeks to help establish a climate of healthy democracy, in a civil, modern and enlightened state that resolves disputes and differences with reason, logic and democratic process, away from violence, murder and terror (Brotherhood, 2013ai).

On August 14, 2013, the military's crackdown against a Brotherhood sit-in undoubtedly constituted the most notorious and brutal public massacre in Egypt's modern political history. This took place at *Rābiʿa al-Adawiya* Square where the pro-Morsi sit-in and protests had been ongoing since Morsi's removal. Egyptian security forces killed 817 protesters while they were trying to disperse Muslim Brotherhood supporters after 40 days (Guardian, 2014). However, the Brotherhood's official statements responded with yet further appeals to the democratic process. On August 17, 2013, the Brotherhood claimed that they believed democracy to be the only solution to the political impasse in Egypt. They stated that, "We believe in the rules of democracy in solving all political problems" (Brotherhood, 2013t, line 20). This announcement came only a month after the Egyptian army overthrew the Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi from the presidency and announced a plan for the country's political future that would be implemented by a National Reconciliation Committee (Al-Jazeera, 2013b).

The Brotherhood were consistently advancing this democratic narrative post 2011, not least because they knew what they stood to gain from the democratic process in terms of electoral success. Whether the Brotherhood genuinely embrace democracy, or they are using the notion as a tactic to gain power and legitimacy remains the subject for future scholarly debate. Some argue the Brotherhood professes a commitment to democracy simply to gain credibility, popular appeal, and legitimacy (Harnisch & Mecham, 2009, p. 196). Others consider the Brotherhood participation in elections and the election of the Brotherhood as a pathway to democracy and a vehicle to demonstrate the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Khan, 2014, p. 75).

Amid an unprecedented wave of repression, two months after Morsi was deposed, the Brotherhood averred that democracy is the only way to defeat tyranny of the military. They framed their demonstrations as seeking to protect and fulfil democracy and its principles:

> We must do our very best alongside all the people of our nation to take to the streets and public squares and to devise all peaceful measures to break this bloody coup, restore legitimacy, fulfil democracy, and assert the sovereignty of the people and their free well (Brotherhood, 2013b, deducted from paragraph 11).

In a noteworthy move, the Muslim Brotherhood also started using democracy as a vehicle to discredit the regime. On September 15, 2013, as the government extended the state of emergency, the Brotherhood framed the state as violating democratic principles and attempting to sabotage the achievements of the original revolution of January 25, 2011.

> This confirms that the military coup is restoring the regime of the deposed President [Mubarak's government], turning against the principles and objectives of the January 25 revolution, and toppling all the hopes and aspirations of the people for a free, civic, democratic, and constitutional life (Brotherhood, 2013ad, deducted from paragraph 1).

It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood wants to send a message to the main powers of the world that the military cannot establish a democratic system. The following rhetorical question implies that only the movement is qualified to establish and run a democratic system:

> If they [the Western governments] support the military, then can the military establish a democratic system? (Brotherhood, 2013c, line 52).[29]

In November 04, 2013 as Morsi stood trial in his first public appearance since his deposition, he shouted in a defiant tone "I am Dr Mohamed Morsi and I am the president of the republic. This court is illegal" (Guardian, 2013c). Commenting on his trial, the Muslim Brotherhood has not just framed itself as upholding democracy

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[29] However, we could question the intention of the Brotherhood in this regard. The Brotherhood had a great chance to at least construct the building blocks for democratic system under their short-lived term at the helm of power. Al-Awadi (2014) provided a justification for this arguing that the most concern of Morsi was re-establishing popular legitimacy through providing tangible economic and social achievements to avoid potential reaction of frustrated people who were in revolutionary mood and were impatient to see the change for which they paid a dear price (Al-Awadi, 2014, p. 245).

and adhering to a civil state, but actually framed itself as the primary representative and protector of democracy. The movement clearly identifies themselves with democracy with statements such as *"dictatorship prosecutes democracy,"* (Brotherhood, 2013p, deducted from paragraph 1) whereby, of course, the government represents the dictatorship and the Muslim Brotherhood calls for democracy. frame themselves in this fashion, the Brotherhood have employed familiar binary narratives of "Us" and "Them" to promote their adherence to democracy. This contrasts notably with their historic discourse that was organised around secular vs religious (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996). Contemporary binaries of the movement are organised around good vs evil, democracy vs dictatorship, and freedom vs tyranny. This shows the Brotherhood's resilience and ability to adapt its cultural resources in its quest for legitimacy and reinforces the findings of Okruhlik (2004) that social movements frame political struggle in ways that resonate with the public and mobilize sympathizers.

> The bloody terrorists [the regime] were not content with the abduction and hiding of the legitimate president, who represents the free will of the people and was elected by millions as the first civilian president. But rather, their tyranny took them to putting him on trial on Monday November 04, 2013 for fabricated charges. This is aggression against truth and an overturn of facts and circumstances. Disloyalty prosecutes honesty, dictatorship prosecutes democracy, corruption prosecutes reform and integrity, thugs and killers prosecute martyrs and victims, traitors prosecute patriots, and the bloody Putschists prosecute the will of the people (Brotherhood, 2013p, paragraph 1).

As the regime continued to crack down on the movement, the Brotherhood's commitment to democracy became unprecedented in emphasis and urgency. In April 2014, when the military-backed interim government named the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization for the second time following the December 2013 designation, the Brotherhood escalated their tone to stress their commitment to democracy and the rule of the people.

> We affirm for the umpteenth time that we are against violence
> and terrorism whatever its source. We stand with truth, justice

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and freedom sought peacefully. We are committed to democracy and the rule of the people, respecting their will, and were found at their service in all areas. This is why the Brotherhood were elected in all free elections, from the Student Unions leading to presidency, through to unions, clubs of faculty members at universities and both houses of parliament. It is impossible for the people of Egypt, from all walks to elect terrorists (Brotherhood, 2014p, Paragraph 3).

Brown et al. (2006) claim that mainstream Islamist movements, such as the Brotherhood, have become ardent advocates of democracy as such groups cannot succeed politically in a closed, authoritarian political system. The implication of such work is that democracy serves an instrumental function. While my findings confirm this claim, I suggest that the extent and emphasis of the movement's proclamations in favour of democracy could indicate a more substantive ideological shift, at least at the official level.

One of the most important tactics that the Muslim Brotherhood has used to insure its members' adherence to democratic principles is the "*fatwā*." *Fatwā* is a ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a recognized authority. *Fatwā* here provides a religious obligation to support democratic principles. In May 2014, the Brotherhood stresses that the principles of democracy are compatible with the Islamic *sharī'a* in spirit and letter. In this way, *fatwā* is employed to influence followers' beliefs (cultural resources) under the impact of the unprecedented repression- the political opportunity structure faced by the group.[30]

The constitution supports those democratic principles that emphasize public freedoms, human rights, the civil state, political pluralism, free and fair elections, the peaceful transfer of power, the respect for the majority and the rule of law. In the light of these principles, which are consistent with Islam and the *sharī'a* in spirit and letter, the Muslim Brotherhood believes that the

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[30] As the movement used "*fatwās*" to ensure their followers' loyalty to the movement's goals, it is debatable how much this practice contributes to the democratization of the country long-term. If the Muslim Brotherhood leaders can manipulate public opinion by using religion in this matter, even if it is for a good cause, it is feasible that other future leaders of the Brotherhood might use the same tactic to garner support for authoritarian ideals.

> commitment to them is a religious obligation, and is the way to
> achieving stability, security, justice and loyalty, and to achieving
> development and renaissance (Brotherhood, 2014u, paragraph 6).

In the summer of 2014, the Brotherhood commemorated the first anniversary of *Rābiʿa* massacre. The Muslim Brotherhood framed their refusal to reconcile with the current regime as protecting democracy. They claimed that negotiations would be ceding legitimacy to a regime who arrived to power in a non-democratic way. By this, they seek to protect democracy from violation. By this, they seek to protect democracy from violation. It seems that the movement's position in this matter is an intentional mirror of many governments' refusals to negotiate with terrorists.

> We affirm that we will never recognize the military coup. Thus,
> all the consequents of it are invalid. We will never offer our hands
> for reconciliation with any of those who participated in this
> bloody coup against legitimacy, the interests of the nation and the
> path of the revolution to democracy (Brotherhood, 2014y,
> deducted from paragraph 2).

In April 2015, in the first verdict was issued against Morsi, he was sentenced to 20 years in prison over the killing of demonstrators outside his palace in 2012. In a vain attempt to win over the army and restore public trust, while they described his trial as a travesty of justice, the Muslim Brotherhood pledged to protect democracy, not just as it presents the free will of people, but also as an outcome of the revolution:

> The democracy and freedom endorsed by the January 25
> revolution, and the sacrifices of the faithful Egyptians will not go
> in vain […] (Brotherhood, 2015j, paragraph 5).

The Brotherhood thus frame themselves as the successors of the 2011 revolution. They see them themselves as the ultimate representative of the revolutionaries and frame themselves as being in a state of permanent revolution striving for social justice and human dignity. The movement have consistently avowed that they would keep protecting the revolution's outcomes, including the democratic process. By doing so, they claim that the group is fulfilling their covenant with those who have sacrificed themselves for the success of the revolution:

> The Muslim Brotherhood confirms its adherence to the full rights of the Egyptian people, and that it will never relinquish efforts to restore of the January 25 revolution and its constitutional gains, the democratic process, the retribution for martyrs, detainees, the injured and the missing. As well as the goals of the revolution; better livelihood, freedom, social justice, human dignity, not to mention saving the army and other of the state's institutions from the risk of the bloody military coup (Brotherhood, 2014j, Point 1).

Since Morsi's removal, in each anniversary, the Brotherhood vows to establish a democratic state and asserts that as Egypt deviates from the path of democracy, there will be political tyranny, economic collapse, social unrest, breakdown of the security and justice system, and corruption in all aspects. Thus, "the national responsibility […] requires us to rally all together around the most important national goal of saving the homeland, recovering the gains of the January 2011 Revolution and achieving democracy on the basis of justice and equality" (Brotherhood, 2017c). In June 2018, on the fifth anniversary of Morsi's deposition from power, the Brotherhood called for unity to defeat tyranny and restore democracy:

> Five years have passed since the brutal military coup, whose orchestrated farce began its staging on this 30th day of June 2013, as the destiny of Egypt took an ominous turn away from the path of the glorious revolution of January 25, democracy, progress, pride and renewal. Egypt's destiny turned, through the tyranny of the military dictatorship, into setback, repression, brutality, coercion and humiliation. […]. However, the path of the revolution is still vivid, and its field is still open for everyone who seeks the good for Egypt and its people. We Egyptians still have the opportunity to unite and meet around the common goals that unite us, renounce all differences that undermine our efforts to get rid of the traitor and his gang (Brotherhood, 2018b).

Similarly, in each anniversary of the *Rābiʿa* Massacre, described by Human Rights Watch as "one of the world's largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history" (HRW, 2014a), the Brotherhood calls for the restoration of democracy and describes the event as an attempt to destroy a fledgling democracy in Egypt:

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> The enemies of the homeland were indeed taking notice; they sought to abolish the achievements of the January revolution; destroy the fledgling democratic experience; eliminate Egyptian people's dream of freedom, decent living and social justice; and abort the national liberation project initiated by President Mohamed Morsi that seeks self-sufficiency of food, medicine, and defense (Brotherhood, 2018a).

Commitment to *Sharī'a*

The question of the Brotherhood's commitment to *sharī'a* law, and what this entails for its conception of democracy has long been a preoccupation of scholars and policy pundits alike. Wickham (2011) considers the issue of "whether and how the Brotherhood can reconcile its call for the application of *sharī'a*, or Islamic law, with the principles of democracy" as a fundamental question to understand the Muslim Brotherhood's politics and its scope, limits, dynamics, and future agenda (p. 205). Scholarship is divided on this issue. On the one hand, Pahwa (2013) maintains that during the 2012 election campaigns the movement promised to build an Islamic state. While recognising that the Brotherhood's "official documents are maddeningly ambiguous" in this matter, Wickham (2011, 2015) posits an opposing view. She argues that the Muslim Brotherhood toned down their obligation and adherence to the full application of *sharī'a* law that dominated the movement's agenda during the seventies and eighties of the last century. Sitting somewhat between these polarities, Brown et al. (2006) consider the Brotherhood's commitment to *sharī'a* to be a grey zone; an ambiguous issue, in which the thinking of the Islamist group is unclear.

An analysis of the Brotherhood's statements since 2013 reveals that the movement has not appealed to *sharī'a* law. The movement has instead called upon the proper application of Egyptian ordinary law, which is a largely Napoleonic legal code with Islamic, Christian and secular family law codes. The Egyptian Legal System was formulated during the French occupation of Egypt under Napoleon Bonaparte leading to the subsequent education and training of Egyptian jurists in France (Abdel Wahab, 2012).

This seems to mark a key shift from its origins considering that the movement was created with the goal of applying the *sharī'a* law to all aspects of life. Upon its establishment, the motto of the Muslim Brotherhood was *"Allah is our end; the Prophet is our leader; <u>the Quran is our Constitution</u>; jihad is our way; death for the sake of Allah is our supreme wishes."* The Brotherhood's frequent recourse to civil law also clearly distinguishes the movement from fundamentalist groups such as ISIS, Boko Haram, and al-Qaeda. This change in the ideology of the Brotherhood suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood is prepared to adapt, or indeed renounce, central tenets of their ideology in exchange for political gains. This argument is reinforced by recent scholarship on the ideological evolution of the movement (El-Sherif, 2014).

Despite the Muslim Brotherhood still deploying some forms of religious discourse, they explicitly invoked common practice law in over half (63 times) of the 132 statements analysed. In August 2013, a State of Emergency was introduced after hundreds were killed during and after the clearing of protest camps set up in support of Morsi. On September 12, this was extended for a further two months. In response, the movement resorted to the Egyptian legal system to claim that the extension was against the law.

> The exceptional state of emergency confiscates people of their liberties and rights. It also abolishes natural law, the matters feared by the seizers of power and the thieves of freedoms. For they only work the dark and away from the framework of the law and the will of the people (Brotherhood, 2013ad, paragraph 4).

These examples suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood is shifting from suggesting an entirely *sharī'a* based legal system to retaining the current, largely Napoleonic law codes.

The Brotherhood also responded with legal references to international moves to condemn the organisation. On December 17, 2015, the Prime Minister of the UK, David Cameron, addressed his Parliament to announce the findings of the government's review into the Brotherhood. Among his statements he said, "The

main findings of the review support the conclusion that membership of, association with, or influence by the Muslim Brotherhood should be considered as a possible indicator of extremism." In response, the Brotherhood claimed that his statement "unfairly condemns millions of Muslims and non-Muslims across the world," and that his claim misinterpreted the Brotherhood. They described themselves as the "largest democratic organisation in the Middle East" that was working inexhaustibly to promote the rule of law and democracy.

> This is to fundamentally misinterpret the Middle East's largest democratic organisation and misunderstand what is needed to bring democratic, peaceful and stable governance to the Middle East. The Muslim Brotherhood has worked tirelessly to promote the rule of law and democracy in the Middle East. We are most concerned that the Prime Minister's statement will afford comfort to those regimes in the region that abuse human rights in order to maintain their own autocratic rule (Brotherhood, 2015d, paragraph 5).

Reference to the constitution has featured heavily in this recourse to civil law. The Egyptian constitution (rather than the Qur'an) was mentioned in almost half of the statements examined (60 out of 132), while the word *sharī'a* was mentioned marginally (only 3 times in 2 statements).

Moreover, the movement's participation in the elections implies that they are running under the constitution that was created by human beings rather than by God. Nothing was found in the data examined from 2013 to 2016 calling for the application of *sharī'a* law. As the above example shows, when the regime extended the state of emergency, they appealed to the constitution rather than the Qur'an. They stated, "It is but a peaceful demonstration sanctioned by the constitution and all global human rights documents (Brotherhood, 2013ad, Paragraph 3)." This indicates that that Muslim Brotherhood see themselves as in line with global and international legal norms.

Indeed, references to the constitution were most frequently paired with legitimacy. The phrase "constitutional legitimacy" was identified 91 times in the

analysed documents, i.e. in over 2/3 of their statements. The Muslim Brotherhood clearly judge and seek to convey that they derived their legitimacy from the constitution as they arrived at power through elections endorsed by the constitution; thus, the Brotherhood's government represents "constitutional legitimacy." The prevalence of this phrase suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood clearly regards itself as the only legitimate movement that can lead the country since they came to power through the democratic vote of the Egyptian people.

The "constitutional legitimacy" concept was also the plea that Morsi used to gain the obedience of protesters against his government. On July 3, 2013, in the afternoon of the day he was ousted, Morsi delivered a speech, in which he reiterated the word "legitimacy" 56 times while talking about the constitution, elections and democracy (BBC, 2013b). However, as scholars have rightly noted, the framing of the Brotherhood's government as representing "constitutional legitimacy" can be viewed as an act of political expediency and a tactic to demobilize the street movement against Morsi's rule. By way of comparison with their previous rhetoric on this issue, Tadros noted that on January 19, 2011, just a week before the Egyptian revolution the Brotherhood issued a statement in which they hailed the revolution of Tunisian people and stressed that the overthrow of the Tunisian government showed that "popular legitimacy" was above "constitutional legitimacy" (Tadros, 2012, p. 31). Thus, the social movement are clearly adapting their rhetorical commitment to various democratic tenets in accordance with what they regard to be politically expedient.

Despite this ambivalence, since 2013 the Muslim Brotherhood have consistently sought to frame the regime and their supporters as anti-constitutional and therefore illegal.

> Of the most important objectives of the January 25, 2011 revolution was to establish complete and real, constitutional and democratic life for the first time in Egypt's history. People participated in the construction of its constitutional institutions in five electoral rounds. On every occasion there was someone

> working hard to demolish every constitutional institution built by the people. But the insistence of the people on building a constitutional democratic system was stronger (Brotherhood, 2013q, Paragraph 1).

Rather like their position on democracy, the Muslim Brotherhood communicate that they have not just tried to abide by the constitution, but they are also protecting the constitution from the regime's manipulations- in other words, they are its principal defenders. In October 2016, the Brothers issued a statement urging people to take to the street to save Egypt and stop the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) from manipulating the constitution.

> To the patriotic people of Egypt… the men and women of this homeland – young and old… It is imperative that we move to save the homeland ship which is already on the verge of drowning. All forces must unite to overthrow the treacherous military coup regime, and correct the military's role as set in the Constitution (Brotherhood, 2016b).

Thus, my findings challenge the school of thinking of Harnisch and Mecham (2009); Khalil (2006a); S. Tadros (2011) who suggest that there has been no significant shift in the attitudes and the agenda of the Brotherhood. Instead, this study indicates a fundamental change in the movement's vision regarding the establishment of an Islamic state. Since 2013, the Brotherhood's commitment is clearly focused on the establishment of democratic state, to the extent that they have even issued a "*fatwā*" to reinforce this notion. By contrast, nothing in the Muslim Brotherhood's statements since 2013 indicates an enduring commitment to the application of Islamic law.

Rather, the analysis has shown the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment and adherence towards a democratic civil state. The Brotherhood now asserts that the people, not religion, are the source of all power. Their rhetoric indicates that since the overthrow of Morsi, the Brotherhood's ideology is considerably more politically pragmatic. Scholars such as El-Sherif (2014); Mohamed and Momani (2014) argue that under the Muslim Brotherhood's short-lived experience of governance, the Brotherhood was torn between political pragmatism and religious or conservative.

However, since Morsi's overthrow, the Brotherhood's communication strategy suggest that political pragmatism has apparently superseded the religious concerns that shaped the movement's identity in the past.

Political Pluralism

The jurist Imam Al-Shafi'i, one of the four great Imams in Islam, once said: "I believe my opinion is correct with the possibility of its being in error. An opinion different from mine is in error with the possibility of its being correct" (Al-Qaradaw, 2013, p. xiii). In fact, the words of Al-Shafi'i reflects what is called today pluralism theory, defined as "a theory that there are more than one or more than two kinds of ultimate reality" (Merriam-Webster, 1998, p. 896). His words also are one of the principles of Islam that advocates a spirit of tolerance in a diverse society. Each person should respect and value the choice and preference of other people regardless of their own opinions. Political pluralism is essential to the political systems of democratic states (Hanchard, 2006, p. 210).

Scholars tend to be sceptical about the compatibility of political Islam and political pluralism. Brown et al. (2006) argues that despite the participation of Islamist movements in elections and accepting their results, such parties are inherently against political pluralism. They argue that the Muslim Brotherhood's slogan "Islam is the Solution" does not demonstrate tolerance of other visions. They maintain that such slogans isolate other groups that hold different ideologies, particularly Christian Copts and secularists. In addition, Wickham (2015) argues that the Muslim Brotherhood's first statement on political pluralism in 1994, entitled "The Muslim Woman in Muslim Society and *Shūrā* and Party Pluralism," was narrower than in the secular democratic schemes of the West (p. 69). The Brotherhood wrote:

> We believe in political pluralism in an Islamic society in which there is no need for the authorities to impose any constraints on the formation and activity of political groups and parties, and to leave each group free to disseminate its ideas and clarify its programs as long as the Islamic *sharī'a* is the highest Constitution

> and is the law which an independent judiciary upholds free of political intervention (as in Wickham, 2015, p. 69).

Tadros (2012) cited Sheikh Yusuf Al- Qaradawi, the Muslim Brotherhood's chief jurist, saying in 2007 that political pluralism is possible under an Islamic State; however, that this was conditional on two factors. (1) Political parties must recognise *sharī'a* and Islam and must not oppose or reject it. (2) Political parties must not work with any group or entity that is hostile to Islam. Moreover, atheist political groups are not allowed in an Islamic state (Tadros, 2012, p. 79).

There are some indicators of a shift in this area too, however. In March 2006, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, the seventh General Guide of the Brotherhood (January 2004 – January 2010), stressed that if the Muslim Brotherhood arrived at the helm of power they would allow any type of political party as decreed by the constitution.

> I would set no regulations for the formation of new parties. Every Egyptian would have the right to form a political party, even if it is a party for the Druze or for people who worship the sun. Whoever finds that this party contradicts the constitution can take that party to court. The courts will decide whether or not this party contradicts the constitution and the basic norms of the society (Akef as quoted in Kerr, 2006, p. 6).

Yet, the controversial Egyptian constitution, ratified by Morsi in December 2012, also endorsed the principle of political pluralism. The preamble of the constitution stated: "A democratic system of government, establishing the grounds for peaceful transfer of power, supporting political pluralism, ensuring fair elections and the people's contribution in the decision-making process." This notion was also reinforced in Article 6: "The political system is based on the principles of democracy and counsel, citizenship (under which all citizens are equal in rights and duties), multi-party pluralism, peaceful transfer of power, separation of powers and the balance between them, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and freedoms; all as elaborated in the Constitution. No political party shall be formed that discriminates on the basis of gender, origin or religion" (as translated by Youssef, 2012).

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This suggests that during their time in power, the Muslim Brotherhood did not place concrete ideological boundaries on the creation of secular political parties. Some make the case that this means that these articles were not planned on a discriminatory basis (Fadel, 2014). In addition, these articles did not impose religious conditions, such as piety, for public office. According to Fadel (2014), this affirms that the constitution did not privilege the Muslim Brotherhood or the role of Islam itself in favour of other provisions of the Constitution. Moreover, he believes that the constitution drafted during the Brotherhood's short-lived role carried a more open political system than had prevailed in previous constitutions. It bolstered the power of the Prime Minister, the Parliament and the formal political rights at the expense of the power of the President. Wilmot (2015) argues that "far from steering the country toward an authoritarian outcome, Morsi acted in the interests of enshrining a more inclusive and pluralistic political system" (p. 393). However, the Muslim Brotherhood's short-lived time in power did not allow a clear vision to emerge on how this constitution might manifest in practice.

In this sub-section, I argue that the Brotherhood seems to be increasingly convinced by the importance of political pluralism. Since 2013, they have become advocates of this principle without tethering it to *sharī'a*. The current analysis indicates that the slogan of "Islam is the Solution" is no longer in use by the Muslim Brotherhood. In contrast, they clearly and constantly state that democracy is the solution, as discussed previously. On July 2, 2013, just a day before Morsi's removal, the Brotherhood claimed that all people's differences could be managed through democratic procedures and a respect for others associated with a civil, modern, civilized state:

> We seek to revive all Egyptians in an atmosphere of intimacy and cooperation […] upon righteousness to work towards development and the higher interests of the country in a climate of democracy and under a civil, modern and civilized state. One that resolves its people's differences with reason and logic, and democratically, away from violence, terrorism and murder (Brotherhood, 2013ai, Paragraph 1).

On December 22, 2013, the organisation issued a statement, entitled "A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Honourable Egyptian Army Men." The main message was that the army should stay away from politics and focus on their mission to secure the country and its borders. The movement asserted that political life required the rotation of power, freedom of speech and competition between parties in free elections, relegating the military to the fringes of this process.

> The Armed Forces belong to the people. Its main mission is to protect the country […]. Seeing as the army's job is to protect and defend, it becomes incumbent upon it to master this task and do it perfectly […], and to not be distracted with another task outside this specialty. Just as doctors, engineers or other than them are not fit to lead the army, train it or developing military plans, likewise, the qualified military is not fit to conduct surgery or construct buildings. Therefore, they must respect and appreciate the specialization. Politics is one of these specializations as it relates to civilian life and is based on democratic principles, competition between parties, rotation of power, freedom of opinion and expression and elections (Brotherhood, 2013f, paragraph 4).

The Muslim Brotherhood clearly praised democracy and endorsed the sovereignty of people considering them as the best ways to manage pluralism and political differences, in the process of course, attempting to undermine the legitimacy of the military's return to power in Egypt.

> In democratic systems, respected by the whole world today, the people are the source of all authorities. They choose their rulers through free and fair elections and change them through the same approach. Democracy is the best means by which political differences and ideological pluralism are managed (Brotherhood, 2013f, paragraph 5).

There is an interesting pattern to the Brotherhood's references to the importance of political pluralism since 2013. Mention of this theme was much more prevalent in the first year of the Brotherhood's removal from power, which indicates that the movement may have counted on this notion to restore its legitimacy in the early days of their repression. The theme appeared in 8.33% of the analysed documents. The frequency of statements dealing with political pluralism declined dramatically

to 1.51% after Sisi arrived at the helm of power in June 2014. It is not clear why this is the case and further research would be required to investigate possible causal factors. However, it seems that the Muslim Brotherhood is convinced that democracy and political pluralism is a significant guarantor of its existence in the Egyptian polity and political arena and a crucial means of undermining the regime's legitimacy and building its own moral resources for mobilisation.

Sovereignty of the people

Popular sovereignty emphasises that ultimate political authority is based on the will of the people (Bardes et al., 2012, p. 10). Some Muslim Brotherhood leaders, such as Qutb, previously viewed democracy as an alien concept. It was rejected because, in their perspective, it granted humans sovereignty over God. This interpretation was based on verse 57 of *Al-An'am* Chapter (the Cattle) of Qur'an:

قُل إِنِّى عَلَىٰ بَيِّنَةٍ مِّن رَّبِّى وَكَذَّبْتُم بِهِۦۚ مَا عِندِى مَا تَسْتَعْجِلُونَ بِهِۦٓۚ إِنِ
ٱلْحُكْمُ إِلَّا لِلَّهِ يَقُصُّ ٱلْحَقَّ وَهُوَ خَيْرُ ٱلْفَٰصِلِينَ ﴿٥٧﴾

(Say, "Indeed, I am on clear evidence from my Lord, and you have denied it. I do not have that for which you are impatient. The decision is only for Allah. He relates the truth, and He is the best of deciders.")

(Qur'anic verse: 6: 57)

However, during the 1990s, warding off the state's claims that the Brotherhood was a criminal and illegal entity, the movement sought to emphasise that it was in line with Egypt's legal-political framework through adapting certain democratic concepts, such as popular sovereignty, party pluralism and the separation of power (Ranko, 2015, p. 138). The Muslim Brotherhood used these principles to challenge the regime and dismantle its authoritarian grip over all governmental institutions. Therefore, the Brothers' narrative focused on the loss of popular sovereignty as an authoritarian minority usurped power from the people (Ranko, 2015, p. 183), framing itself as a "force of the people." They presented themselves as a force endowed with the natural predisposition to end authoritarianism and to restore

popular sovereignty (Ranko, 2015, p. 184). After Morsi's removal, a similar narrative was reinstalled by the Muslim Brotherhood and, indeed, reinvigorated with greater urgency and emphasis.

The constitution drafted by the Brotherhood government in December 2012 endorsed the sovereignty of the people. Article 5 stated: "Sovereignty is for the people alone and they are the source of authority. The people shall exercise and protect this sovereignty and safeguard national unity in the manner specified in the Constitution." The first point of the constitution's preamble stressed that "the people are the source of all authorities. Authorities are instituted by and derive their legitimacy from the people, and are subject to the people's will. The responsibilities and competencies of authorities are a duty to bear, not a privilege or a source of immunity" (as translated by Youssef, 2012).

After Morsi was overthrown, the Muslim Brotherhood framed democracy and popular sovereignty as a key condition for the development of any country: "States will never develop until every citizen is given their freedom, dignity, and rights, and sovereignty belongs to the people under a real democracy" (Brotherhood, 2013y, Paragraph 3). Indeed, the Brotherhood has implied that their current struggle with regime is to restore the popular sovereignty. On April 11, 2014, they issued a statement to condemn the regime's second terror declaration against the movement without credible evidence. The movement stressed that this would never discourage their determination to continue their path to restore the fallen sovereignty of the Egyptian people.

> The people of Egypt will not give up their freedom, dignity and sovereignty. They will not live slaves to anyone anymore. They will live free, sovereign and dignified in their homeland, just the way they were born, whatever the price, whatever the sacrifices (Brotherhood, 2014p).

The Muslim Brotherhood reinforced the value of the sovereignty, interestingly, appealing to Abraham Lincoln's view of democracy.[31] Lincoln defines democracy as "government of the people, by the people, and for the people," "equality before the law," and "separation of powers" (Glasberg & Shannon, 2011, pp. 15-16). On May 09, 2014, the Brotherhood issued a statement entitled "The Brotherhood and the State's Institutions" in response to what they called the attempts of "the dictatorship regimes" to demonise and defame the movement. In the statement, the movement explained their perspective of the state in which the power of the people lies at the heart.

> The People are the real owners of this land and whatever is on it. They are the originators and owners of all its institutions, and have the right to choose who occupies them or define these rules of selection and to put in place institutional regulations and methods of supervision. The people are the masters and the source of all authorities. From here legislation is imposed and supervised on their behalf. The judiciary dispenses its rulings on behalf of the people. The government implements a program acceptable to the people. The army protects the people and the land and the police provides internal security and implements court rulings. Therefore it is clear that all institutions are to serve the people within a system that respects the principles of specialism, independence and cooperation (Brotherhood, 2014u, paragraph 4).

Revealingly, the degree to which this idea was deployed varied dramatically since Morsi's deposition. In the first year (from July 3, 2013 – July 2, 2014), the term "sovereignty of people" was identified in 20.27% of the statements, though it was found in only 3.44% of the statements issued between July 3, 2014 – March 22, 2016. This dramatic drop could be explained through various shifts in the circumstances on the ground to which the group was responding. Firstly, in the first year after Morsi was dethroned, the Muslim Brotherhood's focus was on explaining its views regarding many controversial issues such as democracy and terrorism, while the focus shifted more toward discrediting the regime and incriminating them.

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[31] He is the 16th President of the United States, who in office (March 4, 1861 – April 15, 1865).

Secondly, the first year witnessed numerous confrontations between the government and the Brotherhood's activists and a state of emergency was declared. Therefore, the movement stressed the sovereignty of people as a way of mobilising and gathering people around the organisation. Thirdly, Sisi was sworn into office on June 8, 2014; undoubtedly his election rendered the argument of the sovereignty of people less persuasive.

In brief, the Brotherhood's statements demonstrate a commitment to the principle of the sovereignty of people, though this appears to have varied in emphasis as the regime consolidated its power in Egypt. The movement explicitly linked the country's advancement and prosperity with the achievement of the peoples' sovereignty and their freedom. The government crackdown on the Brotherhood has led to further emphasis on people's sovereignty. Accordingly, the findings from the analysis of the movement's discourse suggests that the intensity of social movements' commitment to framing of cultural resources such as popular sovereignty is likely to increase as repression by authorities intensifies, if mobilization appears to be a possibility. When however, mobilisation no longer appears to be feasible, the Brotherhood appear to have pragmatically reduced their reference to this as a cultural resource.

Minority Rights

The Brotherhood have traditionally struggled to manage relations with Egypt's minorities. The Egyptian Orthodox Christian community, Copts, constitute around 10% of the country's population (Witte Jr & Green, 2016, p. 342) while less than 40 Jews live in Egypt (Al-Jazeera, 2014a). Tensions with minorities are not specific to the Brotherhood but also something the regime has frequently had to contend with. This was particularly the case during the Nasser regime when government policies critically intensified the pressure for Jews to leave Egypt (Laskier, 1995, p. 580). Egypt had tense relations with the nascent state of Israel and many Jews were charged for spying and held for sabotage trials accused of working for the Israeli intelligence in Egypt (Laskier, 1995, p. 578). The real turning point in this issue

occurred in November 1956, throughout and after the Sinai Campaign and the Suez War of October 1956 (Laskier, 1995, p. 578).

Christian Copts also faced increased marginalization after the 1952 revolution. Before 1952, the Copts constituted a significant part of the diplomatic service of Egypt as well as its educational and economics elites. Following the Free Officers Revolution, their position declined markedly (Nisan, 2002, p. 145). During the Sadat and Mubarak regimes, Coptic academics were excluded from posts such as the office as a president of a University or a dean of faculty. The upper echelons in the security apparatuses were also free of any Coptic officers (Soliman, 2009, p. 141). Copts frequently complained of poor representation in the parliament and indeed the percentage of Coptic representation in the Egyptian parliament witnessed a remarkable drop: the average percentage of Copts in Parliament from 1924-1950 was 6.13%, declining to 2.54% between 1957-1969, then to 1.65 between 1971-2005 (Fawzi & Morcos, 2012, pp. 5-6). In mid-November 2010, the Egyptian Union for Human Rights Organization (EUHRO) declared that Christian representatives accounted for about 0.5% of the parliament (Al-Arabiya, 2010). Therefore, successive governments began direct presidential appointments of Coptic MPs to parliament in order to compensate for their meagre presence in the political sphere (Fawzi & Morcos, 2012, p. 6). When Morsi became a president in June 2012, he appointed nine Copts in the *Shūrā* council, the upper house of Egypt's parliament, to compensate for the fact that only three Copts were elected to the parliament. He also appointed a Coptic presidential aide, Samir Morcos, who resigned in December 2012, complaining of an unclear job description and lack of consultation by Morsi (Bayoumi, 2013).

The Brotherhood's position on minorities is the subject of some scholarly debate. In April 1995, the Brotherhood's "Statement on Democracy," emphasized the movement's support of full citizenship rights for Copts; as they put it, they "have the same rights and duties as we do" (Wickham, 2015, p. 70). Conversely, in 1997, Mustafa Mashhour, the movement's fifth General Guide (1996 – 2002), revealed

that not all the movement's activists agree with this formula. He stated, "Coptic citizens should be barred from top positions in the army to ensure complete loyalty in confronting hostile Christian states" and should pay the *jizya*, "the tax historically paid by minority religious communities in return for their protection" (Wickham, 2015, p. 70). In response, Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, a member of the movement's Guidance Bureau, vowed that he personally would accept a Coptic president or prime minister (Kerr, 2006, p. 6). Therefore, Brown et al. (2006) believe that while the Muslim Brotherhood calls for full-fledged democratic reforms, there remains reluctance among its members to endorse equal rights for Copts.

During the 2011 Egyptian uprising, Muslims and Christians famously raised the banner "Muslim, Christian, One Hand" (Tadros, 2013, p. xiii). The Crescent and Cross, the Qur'an and the Bible, were lifted high in the sky. The hymns and Friday prayers held in Tahrir Square demonstrated the apex of Egyptian national unity and recalled the 1919 Egyptian revolution against British colonial rule (Tadros, 2013, p. 1). On February 2, 2011, during the notorious "Battle of the Camel," the Muslim Brotherhood activists defended all people without discrimination. [32] Wickham quoted a Coptic Christian protestor praising the Brothers, "They were at the forefront. They defended all of us. This is a fact" (Wickham, 2015, p. 49). Since 2011, Christian Copts have been a target of deadly violence. Some organizations have connected some attacks against Copts to partisans of the Muslim Brotherhood (Brownlee, 2013, p. 3). The violence against Copts keeps the fires of sectarian-sedition alight and has stoked fears of a descent into sectarian war akin to other sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Syria.

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[32] On October 10, 2012, an Egyptian court acquitted 24 officials who were suspected of sending assailants on camels and horses charged through the crowds to break up a protest in Cairo in February 2, 2011, creating mayhem that rabidly degenerated into violent clashes. The incident is called "the Battle of the Camels." It is known as one of the most notorious events of the anti-Mubarak's regime uprising. It left approximately a dozen people dead (BBC, 2012b).

When the Muslim Brotherhood arrived at the helm of power in 2012, it declared its embrace of policies in recognition of the representation of all political, civil, and religious powers. The constitution drafted by the Brotherhood in 2012 did not discriminate between citizens according to religion. Article three of the constitution showed respect toward the Christian and Jewish canon principles and named them as Egyptian citizens: "The canon principles of Egyptian Christians and Jews are the main source of legislation for their personal status laws, religious affairs, and the selection of their spiritual leaders." In addition, article 43 stressed that the freedom of belief is sacred: "Freedom of belief is an inviolable right. The State shall guarantee the freedom to practice religious rites and to establish places of worship for the divine religions, as regulated by law." The notion was reinforced in article 45 affirming that the freedom of thought and expression could not be violated: "Freedom of thought and opinion shall be guaranteed. Every individual has the right to express an opinion and to disseminate it verbally, in writing or illustration, or by any other means of publication and expression" (as translated by Youssef, 2012).

The Brotherhood's discourse since 2013 has denied the possibility of a sectarian war and claimed outright respect for all minorities. The organisation warned of the impact of sectarian conflicts in 6.81% of the analysed statements in an attempt to enlighten the people to the state's manipulation of this threat. It also used this theme to encourage their supporters to abide by a peaceful approach. Yet, as with other democratic ideals, it is difficult to gauge whether the Muslim Brotherhood discourse regarding minorities is genuine or simply a marketing ploy to appear as a reliable political actor and a comprehensive movement for the Egyptian people. Regardless of intent however, it is significant that the movement is nonetheless using this theme as a mobilization resource.

In particular, a supportive discourse of issues relating to Christians appeared in 4.54% of the analysed statements. Again, whether these statements seek principally to condemn the regime rather than win the hearts and minds of Copts for political

support is not clear because all these statements appeared in the context of the struggle with regime. It is perhaps revealing however that when the Muslim Brotherhood established its political wing, the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the movement appointed Professor Rafiq Habib, a Coptic Christian scholar of Islam, as one of its deputy chairpersons. The appointment of Habib in April 2011 surprised many writers. Among them is Meringolo (2011), who quoted Habib saying,

> The Muslim culture can be a way of finding shared values, capable of strengthening a society pulverised in recent decades by a regime wishing to keep people divided. Its fundamental values are shared by the majority of the Egyptian people.

Wickham (2015) also cites the appointment of Habib as a demonstration of the movement's openness to citizens of all faiths.

The aforementioned values stated in the constitution drafted by the Brotherhood in 2012 were reinforced shortly after Morsi's removal. On August 23, 2013, the Brotherhood issued a statement entitled "Tolerance and Peacefulness are the Mottos of our Revolution." In the statement, the movement claimed that the regime was attempting to trigger a sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians in Egypt through "burning of churches or some properties and belongings of the Egyptian Christians citizens." The Muslim Brotherhood described Copts as their brothers and sisters. The movement stated that within its long-standing history that "no one has ever proved that the movement conducted even a single violent action against our Christian brethren." In paragraph four, the movement established affinity with the Copts through shared experience under the repression of the Egyptian state and colonial powers. They claimed that both Muslims and Christians were suffering from the regime backed by colonialism that do not consider and respect places of worship. They claimed that churches and mosques were being attacked without discrimination.

> One of the most distinguishing factors of our revolution is it being an umbrella for all Egyptians, Muslims and Christians from all national streams. It also knows its opponents very well; the Putschists and those who back them of colonial forces. Those that

do not differentiate between Christians, Muslims, a church or a mosque. It also knows very well that the sinful hand that burned mosques […] is the very same hand that attacked churches. Our great, peaceful revolution knows that these sinful malicious attempts will not ruin our national unity, and will not alter the spirit of tolerance, which Egyptians have been known for throughout history (Brotherhood, 2013h, paragraph 4).

By appealing to minority rights, the Muslim Brotherhood clearly seeks to frame itself as a wider, non-Islamist movement. In doing so they hope to reiterate that they believe all citizens to be equal irrespective of religious affiliation.

Attacks against the Copts in Egypt have given the Brotherhood the opportunity to demonstrate the solidarity between Copt and Muslim that was a hallmark of the 25 January revolution. On October 23, 2013, the Church of the Virgin in Warraq neighbourhood of Giza City was attacked. The culprits left 4 dead and 18 injured. Following this accident, the movement issued a statement to condemn the attack. They did not mention the religion of those killed in the attack, referring to them as "citizens", thereby placing the value of human life above sectarian labels.

We are extremely shocked by the news of the terrorist attack against the Church of the Virgin in Warraq during a wedding ceremony, particularly as four citizens were killed and eighteen were injured. We have already issued a statement condemning the criminal incident, consoling the families of the victims and wishing a speedy recovery for the injured. We hold the security apparatuses responsible for its failure to protect its citizens (Brotherhood, 2013am, Paragraph 1).

The movement denied the allegations that the incident was a Brotherhood scheme to spread terrorism, using the priest of the Church as a testimony. They asserted that the priest of the Church witnessed the Muslim Brotherhood's members suffering from the same pain as their Copts fellows.

This accusation contradicts the Brotherhood's Islamic, peaceful ideology, which rejects and criminalizes the shedding of a single drop of blood, much less the taking of innocent lives. Moreover, the church's priest affirmed that among the wounded were three members of the Muslim Brotherhood who were there to congratulate their Coptic brethren for the wedding. The incident

> did not discriminate between them; their blood mixed, as they all
> suffered equally (Brotherhood, 2013am, from Paragraph 2).

The Brotherhood's condemnation of violence against other religions seeks to convey a message that the movement cares about all citizens equally, while the regime does not and simply pursues its own interests.

Attacks further afield gave the Brotherhood more fuel to make this case. On February 15, 2015, ISIS murdered 21 Coptic Christian hostages on the Libyan coast. On February 16, 2015, the movement published a public statement entitled "a Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in Connection with the Egyptians Killed in Libya" in which they denounced the ISIS mass beheading of the Copts.

> The group condemns the murder of the Egyptian Christians in
> Libya and denounces the perpetrator whatever his name or his
> organization. The Muslim Brotherhood extends its sincere
> condolences to the families of the victims and their beloved ones
> and holds the coup's leader and his allies in Libya responsible for
> partaking in this crime. As the Muslim Brotherhood witnesses the
> situation in Libya, they demand the Arabs and at their heart the
> Egyptians to be fully aware. This is to prevent this crime from
> becoming a pretext for the Egyptian coup leader to help his
> failure of an ally, Haftar[33] in Libya, in executing his plans to
> destroy Libya, plunder its resources and endangering the
> Egyptians in Libya. May God save Egypt and all the Arab
> countries from any evil (Brotherhood, 2015m).

Beyond their commentary on specific events, the Muslim Brotherhood have reinforced their respect of all citizens regardless of their religion in more general statements. On December 17, 2014, the movement issued a statement entitled "The System of Values between Fact and Allegation," citing the egalitarian values adhered to by the Prophet Mohammed.

> Higher values that respect humanity, their dignity and spread
> Justice between them without any discrimination based on race,

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[33] Khalifa Haftar is the commander of the Libyan armed forces loyal to the internationally backed government as he was appointed on 2 March 2015 by the House of Representatives. At the time of the Muslim Brotherhood statement, he was the commander of the Libyan Army in the Libyan Civil War of 2014 (Al-Jazeera, 2015).

sex, or religion is of the distinguished things that the great message of Islam came with and were applied by the Prophet, peace be upon him, before humanity even knew such terms […] (Brotherhood, 2014e, Paragraph 1).

Moreover, the Brotherhood stress the authenticity of this interpretation of Islam, claiming that they are following the Prophet Mohammad's teachings. As Qais ibn Sa'd (one of the great companions of the prophet Muhammad) reported: A funeral passed by the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, and he stood up. It was said to him, "It is a Jew." The Prophet said, "Was he not a soul?" (Brotherhood, 2014e, paragraph 8).[34] They contend that they are also following the legacy of the companions of the prophet, as when the son of the ruler of Egypt (640–644), Amr Ibn Al-'As, hit a Copt's son with a whip, the Copt complained to Omar Ibn Al-Khattab (one of the most influential and powerful Muslim caliphs in history 637–640). Ibn Al-Khattab summoned Amr and his son to Madinah. Umar passed the whip to the Copt's son and said, "Now whip this son of noble parents." After he had done so, Ibn Al-Khattab said, "Now whip the bald head of Amr, because his son beat you on account of his father's authority." The Copt answered, "I have already whipped the one who whipped me." Then Ibn Al-Khattab turned his face to Ibn Al-'As and uttered his renowned sentence, "O Amr, since when do you treat as slaves those who were born as free men?" This story was cited by the Muslim Brotherhood to reinforce the principle of respecting minorities regardless of their religion or race (Brotherhood, 2014e, paragraphs 8 & 9).

The Brotherhood stress that their respect of other faiths is genuine. On February 12, 2015, Cordoba Foundation held a conference in the UK entitled, "Islam and Democracy: Exploring the Strategies of Political Islam and the Muslim Brotherhood's Contribution." In his answer to a question of where the Brotherhood stands today and how its thinking is evolving on the question of people of other faiths, Azzam al-Tamimi, a leading British-Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood, alleged that during Hassan al-Banna's leadership, the Muslim

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[34]Original Source of the Hidith: Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī 1250, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim 961.

Brotherhood had Christian members within the movement. He argued that the Brotherhood did not take its chance to govern and to show to the world its credibility and tolerance towards all faiths, as he put it,

> Any progress toward a better system of governance will have to come through practise; we have lots of theory, we have very little of practise. What we were hoping in Egypt would happen is that the democratic process would be allowed to take its course for the first four years at least, and then if the Brotherhood regime did not do well, then the Egyptian people had every right to replace them and change them through the ballot box, but that was not allowed to happen. But definitely, the huge amount of literature we have about Islamic thought, Islam and democracy, Islam and human rights will have to be put in practise and then will be try and error and then it is up to people to judge whether we uphold the principles we claim we believe in or not.

To conclude, I suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood has both rhetorically and (to a more limited degree) practically endorsed the full citizenship rights of minorities in order to demonstrate their commitment to democratic norms and how these can be reconciled with central Islamic tenets. This was reflected in their constitutional draft and the appointment of Professor Rafiq Habib as deputy chairman of the FJP and the appointment of Samir Morcos as presidential aide. As the previous discussion has shown, the theme continues to be addressed in their public statements since 2013 with the purpose of demonstrating that the Muslim Brotherhood can legitimately claim to be a representative of the Egyptian people as a whole. Theoretically, this shows that some social movements founded with tight religious horizons struggle to frame themselves as legitimate grassroots movements. Therefore, in order to acquire legitimacy, they appeal to minority rights to mobilize a wider range of audience.

Human Rights

The United Nations Charter that was adopted in 1945 immediately after WWII articulated the concept of human rights in international law for the first time (Freeman, 2017, p. 274). In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was

adopted by the General Assembly of the UN. It introduced a list of human rights "as a common standard of achievement for all peoples." The list comprises "such civil and political rights as those to: freedom from slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, and detention, freedom of religion, expression, and association, and a number of economic and social rights, such as the rights to education and an adequate standard of living" (Freeman, 2017, p. 275). Such rights served to guard the people from tyrannical states like that of Nazi Germany. They also intended to protect individuals from the economic misery which was thought to have facilitated the rise of fascism. Post-colonial states also accepted human rights in principle, but most developing states still have poor human rights records (Freeman, 2017, p. 275).

Today, respect for human rights is recognised as an essential element of democracy. The Human Rights Council of the General Assembly of the United Nations consistently highlights the interdependent and the mutually reinforcing relationship between democracy and human rights. On April 19, 2012, a UN resolution on "Human rights, democracy and the rule of law" reinforced that:

> Human rights, democracy and the rule of law are strengthened when States work to eliminate discrimination on account of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status and when they strive to ensure equality between men and women in decision-making (Human Rights Council, 2012).

This section argues that Brotherhood statements since 2013, seem to align with and endorse the UN's principles on human rights. On October 3, 2013, responding to the "coup authorities' criminal activities" and to refute "the corrupt coup regime's false slogans of commitment to and respect for democracy and human rights," the Muslim Brotherhood reinforced these notions stressing that their aim was to achieve "the people's sovereignty, freedom, dignity, democracy, human rights and social justice." On April 1, 2014, the movement stressed: "human rights and public freedoms are matters of principle."

The recent adoption of a more international conception of human rights perhaps reflects a generational shift. Wickham (2015) quotes Ibrahim Bayoumi Ghanim, a middle-generation activist, on March 10, 2004, expressing a "dawning recognition of the absolute value of human rights and freedoms":

> Those of us in the new generation, we studied and read widely, and we interacted with those outside the circles of the Islamic movement. This had a huge effect on our thinking. We talked about human rights, respect for human life, democracy, and freedom. We saw that totalitarian regimes are based on a lack of respect for human life, and hence the solution is democracy and freedom. Through our readings, through our travels, and through our participation in public life, we asked questions, we investigated, and we realized that the problem of the system was that it was not democratic. And when we reviewed the legacy of Muslim political thought, we found no contradiction between democracy and Islam (Ghanim as quoted in Wickham, 2015, p. 65).

The Muslim Brotherhood thus regards itself in line with human rights organisations in this regard. On May 24, 2016, Eman Mahmoud, the Media Spokeswoman of the Muslim Brotherhood, issued a press statement to mark International Missing Children's Day. However, the press statement focused on what she called the "coup regime's horrific crimes against innocent children." She provided controversial numbers of different violation acts against children in Egypt.

> On the twenty-fifth of May (International Missing Children's Day) each year, the world remembers children who went missing in war or at the hands of criminals. In Egypt, we mark this day by reminding the world of the military coup regime's horrific crimes against innocent children. Crimes of abduction, forced disappearance, torture and sentencing children to death have become a "normal" daily affair since the July 3, 2013 coup. This is unprecedented in the history of Egypt. Since July 3, 2013 until the end of 2015, coup forces rounded up, arrested and detained 4,000 children (minors, under 18 years of age), tortured more than 1,000 of them, sexually assaulted 80 of them, and subjected 60 to enforced disappearance. Today, more than 600 children still languish in extremely squalid coup prisons. In addition to these methodical, systematic and compound crimes, the coup regime's judiciary issued death sentences to execute three children, and life

The Muslim Brotherhood frequently appealed to human rights from 2013-2016 in the knowledge that the violation of human rights' tenets is something that attracts the West's attention. The violation of human rights was one of the allegations used to justify the first Western invasion of Iraq in 1990. American propaganda paved the way to the war using stories about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. For example, on October 10, 1990, a distraught Kuwaiti teenager told a hearing of the American Congressional Caucus on Human Rights that Iraqi militaries stole incubators from a maternity hospital in Kuwait and left babies to die on the floor. The story subsequently became a fixture in Western human rights stories and was used in President Bush's denunciations of Saddam. It was later discovered that the Kuwaiti teenager did not witness the events by herself but was the daughter of the Kuwaiti ambassador to the USA (Cull et al., 2003, p. 158).

The Brotherhood's appeal to International Human Rights Law is thus another means through which they seek to delegitimize the regime. The appeal to human rights by the movement in the context of its struggle with Egyptian government constitutes two related, though perhaps contradictory issues; firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood have moved away from a recourse of religion to discredit rivals, and instead adopted a more modern, Western discourse in order to convince both their domestic and foreign audience to align with their point of view. In a more challenging move however, the Brotherhood also calls upon the great powers to take actions against the Egyptian regime in the same way that they have done with other countries that have violated human rights.

In the past, the Muslim Brotherhood has rejected foreign intervention in Egyptian's affairs. On April 2, 2013, the FJP issued a statement in which they condemned the USA's "blatant interference" in Egypt's internal affairs. This came in the context of the party response to the US State Department spokeswoman,

Victoria Nuland, who censured the government of Morsi, for allegedly stifling freedom of expression (Freedom and Justice Party, 2013).

They maintained this position at the beginning of their struggle with the military regime that ousted Morsi. On July 21, 2013, less than three weeks after Morsi's removal, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement to explain their vision for an end to the political crisis in Egypt. They called for democratic legitimacy and national reconciliation, rejecting any foreign interference in the affairs of their country.

> The Muslim Brotherhood rejected the military coup since the first moment, and worked within the framework of popular peaceful protest to end the coup. It declares that it is with the people, holds the interest of the people above its own interests. The Brotherhood is working to achieve social peace, rejects any foreign interference in the affairs of Egypt, seeks to maintain the national security of the homeland and the Arab world, and respects the sanctity of all Egyptian blood (Brotherhood, 2013q, last Paragraph).

However, a notable shift in the Brotherhood's position on this matter seems to have occurred in February 2014. In the face of unprecedented repression by the Egyptian regime, the Muslim Brotherhood moved to criticise the passivity of the West regarding the violation of human rights in Egypt. They began to urge the West to impose sanctions to curb the Egyptian government's repression of citizens and to protect human rights. On February 20, 2014, the Brotherhood issued a statement entitled, "Ukraine Crisis Exposes Western Powers Double Standards," accusing the EU, the White House, and the NATO of hypocrisy. They highlighted the inconsistency of threats to impose sanctions on the Ukrainian government in Kiev after a few people were killed by riot police in Independence Square, while ignoring the repeated violation of human rights in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood made a compelling case that: "whereas the West is readying sanctions against those responsible for unjustified use of excessive force by the Ukrainian authorities causing the death of 17 protesters, Western powers ignore murderous military

violence that killed thousands of innocent civilians in Egypt." The Muslim Brotherhood urged strong action:

> While the criminal brutality in Ukraine is certainly reprehensible, it is nothing compared with the coup regime's repressive crimes in Egypt. However, we never see any Western politicians do anything but pay only feeble lip service condemning those crimes, while practically affirming partnership with the illegitimate coup regime, providing it with all support to enable it to survive the crisis and get stronger, which encourages the coup commanders to continue their atrocious crimes against the people, against humanity. Western politicians then turn around wondering: "Why do you hate us?" Your positions not only encourage the murderous repressive coup regime, they amount to full participation and complicity in crimes and hostilities against the Egyptian people. Will you rectify your mistakes? (Brotherhood, 2014i, Paragraphs 6 and 7).

The Muslim Brotherhood has become increasingly vocal about the passivity of Western countries and human rights organisations towards the violations of human rights in Egypt. This theme appeared in 7.75% of the analysed statements. The movement claims that while the Western countries declare that they seek to establish democratic systems in the Middle East, they overthrow regimes striving to achieve such a purpose. Whilst they assert their willingness to support the sovereignty of people, they do not respect their democratic choices. Moreover, they violate all human rights principles in the prisons of Bagram, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.

> The West has long bragged to the world that it represents the free world […] and that they it is the custodian of democratic principles that gives sovereignty to people, recognizes the people's right to self-determination and their right to choose their leaders through fair elections and the rotation of power […]. They also brag about being the entity that dictated human rights, the most important of which is the right to freedom of expression and demonstration, that it is the founder of international and regional human rights organizations and judicial courts that prosecute criminals against humanity and for war crimes […]. However, whilst the West maintains these principles within its own states, its governments overthrew regimes in third-world countries, if it felt that these regimes behaved in ways that conflicted with its

interests, regardless of having arrived to power through a proper democratic process as what happened in Chile. Rather, they did not even hesitate to invade certain countries under false pretexts, even against the United Nation's desires, such as Iraq. One that led to the killing of more than a million people and the displacement of several million, tearing the country apart and provoking sectarian war among them.

As for human rights, what happened at the prisons of Bagram, Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo, as well as kidnapping and torturing of people in some Arab countries completely refutes the West's allegation of respecting human rights. [During the January 25, 2011 revolution,] the West started call for the application of democracy and the respect of human rights and liberties […]. [After the coup] the West began dealing with the fascist, putschist murderers, ignoring all principles of democracy and human rights […] (Brotherhood, 2013c).

It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to establish a counter discourse to Western allegations that they are the strongest defender of democracy and human rights and the main promoter of these values world-wide. They highlight the selective behaviour of Western countries toward democracy and human rights: while advocating these rights rhetorically, the West behaves in a passive, selective way to protect these principles.

The Muslim Brotherhood's rhetorical escalation in this regard was clearly a reaction to what they regarded as an unsatisfactory response from Western countries against the violation of human rights in Egypt. On December 8, 2014, the Senate Torture report was released. Human Rights Watch revealed that the report affirmed that the CIA is following a "horrific torture program" (HRW, 2014b). On December 15, 2014, the Brotherhood remarked on the released report accusing the USA of being the worst violator of human rights.

Against this clear position, the West in general and America in particular claim to respect the system of moral values in theory, but they stomp them with their feet in reality. America has always called itself the leader of the free world. Every year, ministries and institutions publish reports condemning countries of the world of violating of human rights and peoples' dignity. Then emerges the recent US report that reveals the US' brutal torture

methods […] underlining the fact that America is the worst violator of these rights […] (Brotherhood, 2014e, paragraph 10).

The Muslim Brotherhood invites the world to be more sceptical about the US commitment to human rights. They claim that the western concept of human rights is a flawless veneer obscuring a villain that violates these principles. According to the movement, the US has violated human rights in Japan, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, and even in their own country.

> This latest report, nine-tenths of which was not published represents only the tip of the iceberg. Does the world forget America's role in the destruction of many nations and the killing of millions? From with the Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, through Vietnam wherein America killed millions of residents like insects, and its invention of lies to the effect of Iraq possessing weapons of mass destruction to justify its occupation, looting its wealth and killing and torturing millions of Iraqis […]. [Moreover] the destruction of Afghanistan, the application of the worst forms of torture at Abu Ghraib and Bagram and the racism against black Americans. We saw what happened to some of black American at the hands of white American police officers. This proves that the alleged system of values is only an outer veneer. What is happening around us reveals every day more lies about the existence of such a system, one which is being used to justify the blatant American interference in our national affairs […] (Brotherhood, 2014e, paragraph 21).

In this regard, the Muslim Brotherhood has also expressed their resentment towards the UN. On June 23, 2016, Egypt secured membership in the UN's main human rights body, the UN's Human Rights Council (UNHRC), for the period 2017-2021. In a caricature published on the Brotherhood's websites, entitled "Egypt Wins the Membership of Human Rights Council of the UN!" the movement alleged that the UN is providing a legal cover to a repressive government. See Figure 58 that depicts the UN logo as it represents jail cell bars repressing a detained man in an Egyptian jail.

Figure 58. Caricature: Egypt Wins UN Human Rights Council Seat! (EgyptWindow, 2016a).

Their disappointment with international human rights organisations encouraged the movement to establish its own human rights organisations, such as the Human Rights Monitor (HRM) and The Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights (EADHR). HRM was established in August 2013 after the dramatic dispersal of the sit-in in *Rābiʿa* in which, according to AlJazeera (2016), more than 1,100 were killed, 10,000 injured and 21,000 arrested. It is believed by many writers such as Najjar and Abdelhadi (2016); Salman (2014) that the HRM was established by the Muslim Brotherhood to discredit the Egyptian regime. The writers claim that the organisation is headed by the Egyptian Judge Waleed Sharabi, the Secretary-General of the Egyptian Revolutionary Council. Sharabi's Arabic Wikipedia profile declares that he is the Regional Director of the HRM. His Facebook page cover photo was published on October 28, 2013 and shows him flashing the Muslim Brotherhood's sign of *Rābiʿa* (see Figure 59). In August 2014, Sharabi fled to Turkey, where he is believed to be living today. He is still wanted for high treason in Egypt (Haikal, 2014).

Figure 59. Justice Waleed Sharabi flashes the sign of *Rābiʿa*. He is the second from the left. The picture published on October 28, 2013 as his page cover (Sharaby, 2013).

The organisation is based in London and defines itself as:

> An independent, non-profit organization focused on defending and protecting human rights for all individuals with no discrimination based on ethnic, religion, origin, political opinion, colour, sex or race. We believe that all people are equal and deserve to enjoy their basic and full human rights (HRM, 2013).

However, the content and the cases they deal with, as shown on the organisation's website, reveals that the group is primarily focusing on discrediting the Egyptian state. This aligns with the Muslim Brotherhood's broader communication strategy as discussed in chapter five.

The Egyptian Americans for Democracy and Human Rights (EADHR), based in Washington, was established in 2015 (Najjar & Abdelhadi, 2016). The organisation describes itself as international movement, but again focuses mainly on human rights and democracy in Egypt.

> [EADHR is] a global movement of thousands of people who believe in fighting for democracy and human rights. We are

campaigning for an Egypt in which the rights of every citizen are safeguarded and protected. We are an educational and civil freedoms non-profit focused on the status of democracy in Egypt. Our hope is to safeguard and reinstitute the democratic process in Egypt, protect the fundamental human rights of all Egyptian citizens, and stand as a voice of the Egyptian people to the international community around the status of democracy in Egypt.

We preserve, protect and promote democratic principles, whenever and wherever abuses happen. We protect and safeguard fundamental human rights, civil liberties and rule of law for all Egyptians, regardless of identity. We believe in dialogue, collaborative efforts and optimism as the principal mean towards conflict resolution, and in promoting equal opportunities for all Egyptians. By helping global communities work together, we mobilize community resources towards improving the quality of life for all Egyptians (EADHR, 2015).

EADHR co-founder, Akram Elzend, states that it was "founded as the overt arm of the Muslim Brotherhood in America" in 2008. Another EADHR leader is Sameh Elhennawy, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood lobby in America (Mauro, 2014).

The establishment of such organisations by the Brothers shows their strategic thinking where human rights are concerned. They seem to have adopted the same methods of the West to appeal to an international audience and demonise the Egyptian government. As the Muslim Brotherhood establishes its own human rights organisations that professionally master the language of the West in this matter, we may see further ideological change within the Muslim Brotherhood and its politics as they challenge the regime and the West based on their own legal benchmarks rather than religious discourse. These findings reinforce the claim of Wickham (2015) that since the mid-1980s, the Muslim Brotherhood has increased its references to global norms of democracy and human rights. The movement has invoked them in its communication of democracy to challenge the situations of its own exclusion (Wickham, 2015, p. 46). The movement has not only endorsed the goals of human rights and freedoms but also installed them within its agenda and communication strategy to present the movement as a reliable state actor and challenge the state internationally, as the domestic environment within Egypt has

become more restrictive due to negative political opportunity. The government crackdown on the Brotherhood has led to further emphasis on human rights principles as mobilization resources. Accordingly, the findings suggest that social movements commitment and appeal to human rights is likely to increase as repression by authorities intensifies.

However, Vidino (2010) argues that the Brotherhood's adoption of human rights is selective and limited by the immutability of Allah's law. In his opinion the Brotherhood's position on issues such as homosexuality and the possibility of converting from Islam to other faiths highlight "how distant from the concept of liberal democracy" the Brotherhood is (Vidino, 2010, p. 64). Homosexuality is described by Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the unofficial ideologue of the Brotherhood as "depraved practice" (Vidino, 2010, p. 64). Conversion is also problematic- those we leave Islam in private should be given only a "discretionary punishment." However, publicizing conversion and attempt to persuade others to convert is regarded as a major apostasy- according to al-Qaradawi, they must be punished by the death penalty (Vidino, 2010, p. 65).

Notwithstanding these perhaps culturally specific taboos surrounding homosexuality, the Brotherhood adoption of most human rights such as right to life, right to social protection, right to a fair trial, freedom from torture, freedom of expression and the right to political participation indicate a broader commitment to the democratic principle of equality of human life. They have however avoided discussion in their public statements of more controversial issues such as homosexuality and freedom of religion, a policy that no doubt reflects political expediency. The employment of human rights as a resource mobilization to delegitimize the Egyptian regime and establish the movement's political legitimacy likely indicates a shift in target priorities, rather than purely strategic considerations.

Conclusion

The Muslim Brotherhood understands that democracy is essential for their political survival. The increasing "international legitimacy of democracy as a desired form of government was difficult for the Islamists to resist, particularly since their critics accused them of aspiring to theocratic fascism" (Khan, 2014, p. 77). Particularly, after its removal in 2013, the Brotherhood adopted a strategy of its appeals to democracy, selectively emphasising many related characteristics and values that serve their interests and political agenda. Therefore, in self-framing, the Brotherhood presented itself as the flag bearer of democracy and its principles and stressed political pluralism, popular sovereignty, minorities' rights, and human rights. It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood uses the notion of democracy as a shared value with the West to indicate that their interests are compatible and that the group could be a reliable political actor in a turbulent time as the region faces political reconfiguration.

Theoretically, this shift in emphasis indicates that the Brotherhood uses the notion of democracy, and the characteristics affiliated with it as a cultural and moral resource. More precisely, the Brotherhood deploys the concept of democracy to legitimize themselves and to delegitimize the regime. Whilst presenting the Egyptian government as an undemocratic dictatorship, and fundamentally untrustworthy the Brotherhood has framed itself as democratic movement, *the* key defender of democracy in Egypt, and indeed as more democratic than democrats themselves. This self-framing is emphasised at the expense of their appeal to *sharī'a* law that seems to be waning.

This does not mean that the Brotherhood has abandoned religious rhetoric as part of their self-identity. Recourse is still made to the Islam to legitimise these new positions. In November 23, 2016, The Foreign Affairs Committee Review of the Muslim Brotherhood alluded to this marrying of religion and politics claiming that, "the nature of Islam makes it more likely that religion and politics will remain

overlapping for the foreseeable future, and emerging democratically accountable systems will need to accommodate this" (Parliament.uk, 2016).

Considering the ongoing negative political opportunity structure presented by the movement's exclusion and repression, it is likely that the movement will keep calling for democracy, for two reasons. Firstly, the Muslim Brotherhood has realised that adherence to democracy is the best way to be backed by democratic countries. Secondly, the movement's adoption of the principles of democracy is the only way to ensure its political participation in the Middle East's public sphere that is dominated by authoritarian regimes. The findings from the analysis of the movement's discourse preliminarily indicate that the intensity of their commitment to democracy is likely to increase as repression by the regime intensifies.

Contrary to much existing literature which suggests a repression-radicalisation nexus, I therefore argue that the government crackdown on the Brotherhood has led to further emphasis on democratic ideals. Some historical perspective may also be useful here. The Brotherhood could well be following in the steps of the Wasat political party (Hizb al-Wasat); a splinter group of the Brotherhood, established in January 1996. The Wasat (middle) party which was founded by high profile, young Islamist leaders headed by Abou Elela Mady sought to represent the "middle" position between those who advocated a rigid defense of Islamic customs and those who were willing to jettison Islamic traditions in favour of values and institutions adopted from the West (Wickham, 2004b, p. 208). The *Wasat* party perceived *sharī'a* (Islamic law) as compatible with ideological and political pluralism, equal citizenship rights, and popular sovereignty. This was in contrast to the mainstream Brotherhood at that time who perceived *sharī'a* as a fixed and unchanging set of rules antagonistic to Western principles and institutions (Wickham, 2004b, p. 208). Both the historic and more recent ideological evolution of the social movement demonstrate the Brotherhood's resilience in adapting its cultural resources and self-framing capacities in its quest for legitimacy. Perhaps these rhetorical shifts indicate that the Muslim Brotherhood in the process of transformation into an Islamist-

secular movement; one that adopts an Islamic religious rhetoric when needed to achieve political gains, while retaining a commitment towards establishing a democratic civil state.[35]

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[35] My argument is supported by the case of the AKP. It is argued that the AKP has been successful in transforming its conservative–Muslim base and itself towards a more secular democracy as a cost that the party has forced to pay to be in government (Yavuz, 2009, pp. 88-89).

Chapter Eight: The Muslim Brotherhood as a "Firewall" against Terrorism – a Conduit for Moderation and "Peaceful Jihad"

Introduction

On February 09, 2017, Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged Donald Trump, the American President, not to designate the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. The HRW stated that the designation would erode the ability of the moderate Islamic group's affiliates to participate in political life and blur the boundaries with groups that are more radical. As Laura Pitter, a senior US national security council at HRW put it,

> Designating the Muslim Brotherhood a 'foreign terrorist organization' would wrongly equate it with violent extremist groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State and make their otherwise lawful activities illegal. The designation would also unfairly taint anyone alleged to be linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and undermine the exercise of its political rights abroad (HRW, 2017).

However, these appeals fell on deaf ears. Some Republicans, including Trump's erstwhile rival, Senator Ted Cruz, have long been agitating for such a move (Singh Sethi, 2017). On February 24, 2016, a fresh bill was considered as read without objection by the House Judiciary Committee of the USA. This bill emerged to recognise the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organisation and block its financial transactions. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the Committee, claimed,

> I was troubled to learn that the State Department has never designated the Muslim Brotherhood as a foreign terrorist organization. Since the Muslim Brotherhood formed in Egypt in 1928, it has sought to foster the establishment of a global Islamic state and jihadism in Muslims around the world. The Brotherhood's strategic goal, "In America is a kind of grand jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and sabotaging its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers, so that it is eliminated and God's religion is made victorious over all other religions" (Goodlatte, 2016).

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According to HRW (2017), these bills are "based on unfounded arguments that the Muslim Brotherhood is seeking to infiltrate US political institutions." Scholars have backed the claims made by HRW. Lynch (2016) argues that the specific focus on the Muslim Brotherhood "has long been a trope over the last decade of demonization of Islam."

These moves come in response to both domestic and regional fear mongering. Frank Gaffney Jr., founder of the Centre for Security Policy, maintains that the Brotherhood's philosophy mirrors that of groups that are already on the terrorism list such as Al Qaeda and Boko Haram. Therefore, he urged Trump to designate the Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

> The goals of the Muslim Brotherhood are exactly the same as the Islamic State, exactly the same as the Taliban, exactly the same as, you know, Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, Al Nusra Front, on and on, Al Shabab. It is about Islamic supremacism. It is about achieving the end state that is their due (Gaffney as told P. Baker, 2017).

Some scholarship has also backed these claims. Ehrenfeld (2011) argues that the Brotherhood embodies a fundamentalist dogma suggesting that the group's well-organized grassroots including its mosques have supported the movement to promote a "false image" of the organisation as a tolerant, peace-loving, and progressive (p. 80). Similarly, Tausch (2017) considers the Brotherhood the same as other radicalized factions even it presents itself as "moderate." He believes that the movement provided fertile ground from which the armed terrorists could develop. Lebl (2014) has gone as far as to warn that immigrants from the Muslim Brotherhood would influence Western politics and society as they increase in numbers (p. 118). Pevná (2014) argues that despite the Brotherhood becoming more tolerant and pragmatic, it still understands rights of minorities and women through the lenses of Islamic law. This school of thought emphasises the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood's values and Western values and interests, through a strong focus on the origins of the movement.

The American government's move to demonise the Brotherhood in this way mirrors the efforts of regional players in the Middle East. Egypt took the lead on this matter in December 25, 2013, followed by Saudi Arabia on March 7, 2014, and then the United Arab Emirates on November 15, 2014. In fact, the American terrorist designation for the Brotherhood has long been sought by these regional powers, all of whom suffer from substantial political opposition from the Brotherhood in the domestic realm. Since Morsi's removal in July 2013, the Egyptian regime has aggressively pushed to equate the Brotherhood with terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and to blame it for terrorist attacks in Egypt (Lynch, 2016). Some political analysts attribute this negative or increasingly hostile relationship between these countries and the Brotherhood to the group's attempts to brand themselves as Sunni Islamists that call for political participation and electoral legitimacy, framing themselves as the optimal alternative model of Islamist politics to that of these states (Al-Jazeera, 2017).

The European position has been more nuanced. On March 8, 2017, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons of the UK published the eighth report of session 2016/2017 regarding "Political Islam," and the Muslim Brotherhood review. The report characterised the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood "as a fundamentally non-violent group, while acknowledging and examining problematic elements of ambiguity with regard to its relationship with violence." The report acknowledged that the Muslim Brotherhood acted as "firewall" against extremism and played an important role in counter-terrorism. It also made a distinction between moderate and extremist Islamist groups, unlike the stance of some Americans. The committee expressed their concern that locking moderate Islamist groups out the political process or subjecting them to repression might cause previously peaceful individuals to resort to violence for political ends.

> Based on the experience of Tunisia, political Islam could in some countries be a way of providing a democratic alternative for political, social, and economic development and a counter-narrative against more extremist ideologies. However, there are cases where political Islamist groups have inspired individuals to

commit violent acts; the fact that such individuals left the groups to do so does not excuse the groups from some responsibility for inspiring the individual in the first place. Nonetheless, the vast majority of political Islamists are involved in no violence whatsoever. Because of this, and because of their broader status as a 'firewall' against extremism, political Islamists have suffered criticism and attack from ISIL and other extremist organisations. No political movement can entirely control its individual members or supporters, particularly under extreme provocation. Incarceration of political activists without fair trial and the shutting down of political avenues to address grievances is likely to lead some to extremism (Point 57; Paragraph 106 of the Committee's original report).

Academics have also backed the repression-radicalisation hypothesis, suggested by the Committee. This hypothesis is supported by many scholars including for example (Anderson, 1997; Ashour, 2009; Burgat, 1997; Dalacoura, 2006; Hafez, 2003; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Karagiannis, 2010; Leiken & Brooke, 2007; Lenz-Raymann, 2014). The main argument of this hypothesis is that individuals and groups who experience the suppression of their human right to freedom of religion become radicalized (Lenz-Raymann, 2014, p. 23).

The controversy - whether the Muslim Brotherhood acts as a conduit for terrorism or moderation - has raged unabated for long time. To contribute to this debate, the concepts of strategic farming, political opportunity structure, and cultural resources were adopted from social movement theory. In this chapter, I argue that responding to the political opportunity structure of unprecedented repression and the local, regional and international attempts to demonise the movement after July 2013, the Brotherhood has strategically framed itself as a "firewall" against terrorism and a conduit of moderation and "peaceful Jihad." It also argues that the Brotherhood employs strategic framing as a conveyor device of their cultural resources (values) to mobilize supporters.

An empirical analysis of the Brotherhood's public statements has demonstrated its ideologically moderate stance and repeatedly reinforced this position during the struggle with the Egyptian regime. My findings challenge scholarship that is

sceptical of the Brotherhood's rejection of political violence in favour of continued moderation. In fact, their official communication indicates a consistent adherence to peaceful approaches and moderation.

The chapter begins by examining the Brotherhood's conceptualization of terrorism as embodied in their communication statements. It then goes on to show how the movement framed its commitment to moderation and peacefulness and it examines the principle tactics that the movement has used to reinforce the idea. The final part of the chapter suggests the reasons why the movement has adhered to the path of moderation.

The Muslim Brotherhood's Conceptualization of Terrorism

The deposition of Morsi constituted a political opportunity structure in reaction to the local, regional and international attempts to demonize the movement. In response, the Brotherhood has attempted to frame terrorism in a specific manner and convey a key strategic message regarding the accusations levelled against it. The message highlights how the banner of "terrorism" serves as a pretext to silence voices calling for their rights or to condemn those who deviate from the West's school of thinking. This framing of terrorism was found explicitly in more than 10% of the analysed documents. On September 16, 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement, entitled, *"War on Terror Truth and Myth,"* to explain how the Egyptian government attempts to ride the terror wave following the slogan of the West of "anti-terrorism" as a pretext for their vicious aggression against the movement. The Brotherhood assert that the definition of terrorism is kept vague to fit the West's political interests and to demonise Islam.

> In recent years, the West raised the slogan of (anti-terrorism) as a pretext for repeated and vicious aggressions against the Muslim world, in order to divide it and occupy Muslim countries, thus hiding the truth – the evil nature of its atrocities and aggressions. Until now, the definition of (terrorism) remains elusive. In fact, (terrorism) has become the charge commonly used by the West against anyone it finds unfavourable, anyone it wants to demonize, or to wage an unjust and relentless war against.

> Terrorism is the smokescreen behind which Islam and Muslims
> are fought vindictively (Brotherhood, 2014h, Paragraph 2).

Thus, the Brotherhood has framed the so-called "war on terrorism" as a cover for demonizing Islam. Accordingly, the Muslim Brotherhood frame the target as Islam, rather than terrorism per say, using a variety of controversial Western representatives to back their claims. For example, they noted Bush's remarks in October 2001 that, "Operation Enduring Freedom," was a "holy crusade" (Brotherhood, 2014h, line 1 of Paragraph 3). They also cite Francis Fukuyama, who stressed that the West's war is not actually against terrorism, but against Islam itself.

> The West's current conflict is not simply against terrorism, but against the fundamentalist Islamic faith that stands against Western modernity and against the secular state. This ideology represents a greater threat than communism. Therefore, what is required is a war within Islam to make it accept Western modernity, secularism and the Christian doctrine or principle: "Give what is Caesar's to Caesar and what is God's to God" (Brotherhood, 2014h, Paragraph 3).

However, the Muslim Brotherhood maintains that the "real terrorists" are the USA and its allies who waged several wars against innocents around the world. They note that, historically, the USA wiped out native American Indians in forming their nation-state and used the nuclear bomb against Japan who was "on the verge of surrendering." They "destroyed" Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq, and continue to support Israeli terrorism against the Palestinians. They raise the provocative question *"can the worst sponsor of terror fight terrorism?"*

> The US toppled popular civil regimes with bloody military coups in many countries. The US supported dictatorial regimes against their own people. The US provides limitless support to Zionist occupation and terror (Brotherhood, 2014h, deducted from Paragraph 6).

In response to the local political opportunity structure and the government's attempts to label the movement, the Brotherhood frame the Egyptian government as illegitimate actors using the cloak of "terrorism" to implement their agenda

against the movement (Brotherhood, 2014h, Paragraph 4). They claim that terrorism is an imaginary enemy to blame and justify their brutality: "Under the banner of fighting terrorism, the bloody coup invented an imaginary enemy from the sons of the nation to kill, rather than to protect" (Brotherhood, 2014b, Paragraph 19).

> [Sisi] talks about terrorism; the imaginary enemy and the Scarecrow that he uses to distract people's attention from the misfortunes that beset the country because of the coup and to attract external sympathy against the popular rejection of the coup. In fact, the real terrorism is that being exercised by the Putschists (Brotherhood, 2014m).

In this vein, the Brotherhood have framed Sisi as "the biggest terrorist of his time." He and the "Putschists" are depicted as subservient and submissive to their American backers. The Brotherhood portrayed the Egyptian regime as following the American example by using the concept of terrorism as a ploy, in which to conduct the act of terrorism themselves against innocent and peaceful people. Hence, they argue that the regime must be adjudicated before international courts of war crimes. The movement believes that the state feigns terrorism in Egypt to secure support for its alleged war against terrorism, to establish and assert dominance of their rule, and to denounce the movement as an illegitimate actor.

> The most heinous terrorist, the military coup commander, killed thousands of peaceful unarmed people, burnt some of them alive, injured thousands more, and arrested tens of thousands. He certainly deserves trial as a war criminal. However, he is taking advantage of current regional conflicts, demanding the world stand with him in his own alleged war against terrorism, to convince the world community that there is terrorism in Egypt besides his own real terror, or that of his security agencies. The coup commander means to accuse the Muslim Brotherhood of terrorism. He has classified it as a terrorist group, without evidence (Brotherhood, 2014h, paragraph 10).

In response to the regime's attempts to demonise the movement, the Brotherhood seems to adhere to the principle that attack is the best form of defence. Accordingly, they frequently accuse the regime of acts of violence that are attributed to their

organisation. On December 24, 2014, they accused the government of being the real perpetrators of the bombings of the Church of Two Saints that took the lives of 23 people on the New Year's Eve of 2011. Similar accusations were raised in the car bomb explosion at Dakahlia security governorate on December 24, 2013, in which 13 people were killed and 134 injured.

> We warn this gang of failures and the Putschist terrorists of scheming similar bombings to those of their criminal militias, - that have as of yet not been held accountable- in the Church of Two Saints, before the 25th of January [2011] revolution, falsely accusing the free revolutionaries. The coup media admitted that the recent attack against the Dahaklia Security Building, was carried out by a national security informant (Brotherhood, 2014v, paragraph 5).

Thus, due to the negative political opportunity structure provided by this repressive dynamic, the Brotherhood's strategy regarding the issue of terrorism has shifted from defence to offense. The Muslim Brotherhood framed the state led by Sisi as "terrorists" in 16.6% of the analysed statements, going so far as to claim that the regime immolates their soldiers and their own people for political purposes. The movement even alleges that the government carries out bombings every year ahead of the anniversary of the original revolution of January 25 that ousted Mubarak to terrorize and prevent people from taking to the streets. This serves to stop people from reviving revolutionary fervour by calling for their rights and rejecting injustice and corruption.

> Evidence indicates that these suspicious blasts, reoccurring every year ahead of the anniversary of the January 25 revolution, and in which many innocents are killed, whether from the police, the army or civilians, that it is perpetrated by [state] security to terrorize and to prevent them from taking to the streets to demand their natural right to dignified life and reject of injustice and corruption (Brotherhood, 2016q, paragraph 1).

As an effect of the political opportunity structure, the Brotherhood has attempted to mobilize audience's beliefs (a key cultural resource) cultural resource by offering its view on the mechanisms of how terrorism is being generated. In a 2014 statement, "War on Terror Truth and Myth," the Muslim Brotherhood explained

how terrorism is being produced from their point of view. The movement asserts that terrorism is generated by repressive regimes in one of two ways. First,

> Repressive regimes double their oppression, injustice, murder, imprisonment, torture and rape, until some, especially youths, lose control, committing one or two acts of violence. These would readily be focused on and amplified by the powerful military-controlled media machine to persuade the public that there is indeed a huge danger of terrorism. Then, the regime would let loose their now-justified oppression and state terrorism until the opposition completely vanishes and the regime monopolizes power (Brotherhood, 2014h).

In the above point, the Muslim Brotherhood stresses the role of the media in terrorist hysteria. They believe that pro-state media magnifies singular events to manipulate public perception and pave the way for government's repression to uproot their political rivals. In the second mechanism, they reinforce their claim that the state itself conducts terrorist attacks to blame on political rivals, assigns responsibility to them and justifies actions to uproot them.

> Alternatively, repressive regimes may have state security and intelligence agencies set up, train, arm and equip their own terror groups or organizations. Then, they send them out to execute acts of terror they can quickly blame on Islamists, even if those Islamists are totally and exclusively committed to peaceful action and activity (Brotherhood, 2014h, paragraphs 6 &7).

Using framing, the Brotherhood attempts to mobilize the audiences' beliefs as important cultural resources for a movement forced underground. From the above analysis it is clear that the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to convey a key message that terrorism is simply a hoax serving as a tool to silence voices calling for rights and to smear the Islamists' reputation. The movement asserts that there is no precise definition of terrorism adopted by the West and that it is being used selectively for the West's political interests. Therefore, the Brotherhood accuses the regime of terrorism in the hope of undermining the regime's attempts to tag the group with terrorism and to limit repression of the movement under the umbrella of

the "war on terrorism" thereby mitigating the impact of the negative political opportunity structure they have faced since 2013.

The Brotherhood Commitment to Moderation and Peacefulness

Alongside the above, the Muslim Brotherhood has consistently stressed its peaceful approach and moderate ideology through its official statements since the downfall of the movement in July 2013. The movement portrayed itself as a peaceful movement in 35.6% of the analysed statements and moderate in 19.6%. This is not, of course to suggest that the Brotherhood presented itself as extremist or violent in the rest but these percentages reflect statements in which the Brotherhood mentioned moderation or peacefulness explicitly.

Moderation

Moderation in this discussion stands for the avoidance of extremes and the temperance of ideology. In this regard, the Brotherhood have expressed their repudiation of the old extremist Qutbism ideology of "takfir" and notions that violating *sharī'a* law could constitute apostasy from Islam and be punishable by death (Griffel, 2013, p. 40). A statement issued on November 6, 2013, was possibly the most obvious rejection of Qutb's ideology as a cultural resource for the movement. Instead the group expressed their opposition to the notion of excommunication categorically and stressed that they teach people moderate Islam, suggesting that this is now their preferred cultural resource.

> […] the group operates in all areas of life; Da'wah [Islamic Propagation], teaching people proper, moderate Islam [...] and protecting them from extremism and excesses. The group rejects the idea of excommunicating Muslims (Takfir) and rejects the use of violence and terrorism for the implementation of laws. The group relies solely on evidence-based dialogue with its opposers. The group stresses its commitment to a peaceful approach in its preaching and activity […] (Brotherhood, 2013r, Paragraph 4).

On March 7, 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood also reinforced their denial of extremist ideology. The statement was issued in response to its inclusion on the list of

terrorists by the Saudi Interior Ministry. In this statement, the Brotherhood asserted that throughout its history it was the spearhead of spreading moderate Islam and correct Islamic thought and that they have never denounced the government as infidel or apostate. This stands in stark contrast to Qutb who described the government and the community as a *jahiliyyah* (ignorance of divine guidance) and the government as irredeemably evil and apostate (Kepel, 2006, p. 25).

> History has proved that the group has always been at the forefront in spreading correct Islamic thought, without excess or extremism and by the testimony of many trustworthy scholars and people of authority in the Kingdom [Saudi Arabia]. Everyone in the Kingdom knows fully that the truth the group testifies to is its curriculum sourced from the Book of Allah and the example of His Prophet (peace be upon him), based on authentic transmission and evident reasoning.
>
> The group follows clear trends of thought in dealing with political authorities in the Muslim world. At in the heart of such thought is the belief that our communities are Muslim communities. Thus, the relationship between the group and the people and between the group and the various political players, including that of the regime is one of counselling, not excommunication or accusation of treason. The group does not look at state as states as being infidel or apostate states […] hence the movement's relationship with the state is based on giving advice and counsel (Brotherhood, 2014w, Points 2 & 3).

The Brotherhood's refutation of Qutbism has also been confirmed in their commentary on events beyond Egypt. On August 4, 2016, the movement published a statement entitled *"No Threats against Iraqi Defense Minister or Any Other."* In the statement, the movement denied what they described as "a fabricated, crudely drafted statement falsely alleging" that the Muslim Brotherhood has denounced the Defense Minister of Iraq, Khaled Al-Obeidi, as an apostate and an infidel, and threatened to kill him. The Brothers stressed that the goal of such fabricated statements was to demonize the movement. They stress that they are "preachers and reformers, not judges."

> Our fundamental principles and constants dictate that we never call individuals or societies apostates or infidels, or issue rulings accusing them of apostasy. We – as is well known about us, and

as we always declare – are "preachers and reformers, not judges" (Brotherhood, 2016i).

In the above quote, the Brotherhood clearly invoke the moderate ideology of their Second General Guide (1951-1973), Hassan al-Hudaybi, who authored the book, "Preachers, Not Judges" (Du''at la Qudat), to refute Qutb's Islamist manifesto, "Milestones Along the Way" (Ma'alim fi al-Tariq). They emphasise al-Hudaybi method of dialogue to challenge ideological differences and resolve contentions, arguing that "debates and disagreements that arise within communities and societies are only possible to settle through dialogue, not apostasy *fatwās* and death threats" (Brotherhood, 2016i).

Indeed, the movement goes so far as to claim that it is a "firewall" against extremism and violence. It posits that it has saved Egypt from countless dangers and that, despite the fact that huge numbers of its members were wronged and tyrannized during the era of the disposed government of Mubarak, they never exerted violence.

> The Muslim Brotherhood always faced up to deviant thought masquerading as Islam, such as extremism and violence. It saved many hundreds of thousands of young people from falling into those. Thus, the Muslim Brotherhood has protected Egypt from great dangers. Nevertheless, under Mubarak, 50 thousand of its members were arrested wrongfully, yet not one of them used force to defend himself, and none of them raised any weapon (Brotherhood, 2014h, paragraph 10).

The Brotherhood thereby frame themselves as teachers of moderation and the importance of recognising value of the human body as a cultural resource. The movement also highlight that its charitable activities helped needy people in all aspects of life so as not leave them as prey to extremists.

> Indeed, this group teaches its members the sanctity of blood and the enormity of taking a life, which would be a breach of Islamic laws before human rights and the rule of law. It spread true Islam throughout the country. Its charitable work helped millions of needy people with financial, material, medical, educational and cultural support (Brotherhood, 2014h, paragraph 11).

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The movement goes so far as to stress that its intellectual and religious contributions have protected millions of people beyond Egypt, in a variety of different countries from embracing extreme ideologies and participating in acts of violence.

> The Muslim Brotherhood's intellectual and religious contributions have saved millions of young people in many nations from engaging in acts of violence. The group continues to maintain a peaceful approach in the face of the coup, despite the coup exercising all forms of violence against the Egyptian people (Brotherhood, 2014q, paragraphs 6).

In short, the Brotherhood has framed itself as the spearhead of moderate Islam and expressed their clear repudiation of the old extremist Qutbism ideology of "takfir." They stress that they teach people moderate Islam as a replacement for takfirism as a dominant cultural resource. The negative political opportunity structure embodied in repression and demonization has thus led the Brotherhood to deny extremist ideology and frame themselves as "preachers and reformers, not judges." Through this, the Brotherhood clearly invoke the moderate ideology of their Second General Guide Hassan al-Hudaybi as a replacement cultural resource to that offered by radical Sayyid Qutb, reframing a historical narrative of the movement that emphasises its moderate origins.

Peacefulness

In the late 1970s, manifesting the repression-radicalization effect, many young members criticized the passivity of the older generation toward the Egyptian government's repression of political Islam. This caused a split within Islamist groups that saw some adopt the uncompromising notions of Qutb works on the modern *jahiliyya* and the legitimacy of rebelling against the apostate authorities of Muslim countries inspired and urged *al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya* (the Islamic Group) and the Islamic student groups that emerged to take a line of armed jihad against the regime (Soage & Franganillo, 2010, p. 42). Subsequently, a series of violent attacks in the late 1980s and early 1990s were launched against the Egyptian state (Kepel, 2006, p. 25).

Knowledge of this historical background could account for the Brotherhood's vocal rejection of violence. With the fear of history repeating itself, this official position could be seeking to control its members and sustain its unity. At the beginning of the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian state in the summer of 2013, the movement notably devoted four special public statements to reinforce peacefulness as a cultural resource and to endorse it as a key resource for the movement. The first one was entitled "Our Peaceful Approach is the Secret to our Power", the second was, "Tolerance and Peacefulness are the Mottos of our Revolution", the third, "Restoring the Revolution and the Peaceful Countering of Despotism is the Path to Freedom", and the fourth statement "Peaceful … Peaceful ... Peaceful." The statements were published respectively in: August 21, 2013, August 23, 2013, August 29, 2013, and September 13, 2013. The first two months following Morsi's removal was arguably the most critical period of the movement's history. The incumbent regime sought to accuse the group of terrorism to outlaw it and to justify the detention and the arrest of thousands of its members in addition to the group's leadership. This reflects the movement's fear of exclusion from the political fray under the pretext of terrorism. On the one hand, this position reinforces the repression-moderation hypothesis as opposed to the repression-extremist hypothesis, though it should of course be noted that this position emerged after a year of being in power and so also invokes the inclusion-moderation hypothesis.

Framing the movement as a peaceful group appeared in over a third (35.6%) of the analysed narratives. The Muslim Brotherhood has has of course been included in the political system since the 1980s, but this type of discourse was less prevalent in the past (Ranko, 2015). The following discussion explores elements of ideological transformation that have contributed to the advocation of a peaceful approach. The movement has repeatedly stressed the slogan, "Our revolution is peaceful, and it will remain peaceful. Our peacefulness is more powerful than bullets. Our peacefulness is stronger than military tanks, and we, with our peacefulness, are stronger than killing."

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This slogan was first initiated by the movement's currently imprisoned General Guide, Mohamed Badie. He chanted these words in a speech he delivered before the protesters at *Rābiʿa al-Adawiya* Square in July 2013 to urge demonstrators to remain peaceful, even if violently attacked. Since then, it has been used as the main motto for the movement's response to the negative political opportunity of regime repression. On September 17, 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood stressed that they are still committed to their General Guide's words:

> Of the Brotherhood members, thousands were killed and tens of thousands imprisoned, yet it still commits to the peaceful approach in restoring legitimacy and the democratic path. The Brotherhood General Guide said: "Our Revolution is peaceful, and will remain peaceful. Our non-violence is stronger than bullets (Brotherhood, 2014h, point 3).

More recently, the acting Chairman of the Brotherhood, Dr. Mahmoud Ezzat, also reinforced the above motto, alluding to its role as a critical cultural resource in the movement's battle against the state. On September 13, 2016, in a commentary to the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) website, he said: "the Egyptian people will continue their peaceful Revolution. Our motto remains: "Our non-violence is more powerful than bullets" (Ikhwanweb, 2016). Badie's statement thus appears to have replaced the old slogan of the movement, "jihad is our way." Responding to cynicism regarding the movement's relationship to non-violence, the Muslim Brotherhood has framed the peaceful approach as a "doctrine that [they] believe in" and as an "invariable constant path that has always been confirmed throughout [its] standing history" (Brotherhood, 2014x, point 3).

In striking contrast to extremist groups such as Boko Haram, ISIS and al-Qaeda, the Brotherhood depict peacefulness as an act of worship. Whilst these groups consider violence as a cultural resource, the Brotherhood promote peacefulness as a cultural resource and a crucial part of their ideology. On 20 August 2013, the movement issued a statement to condemn the arrest of its General Guide, Mohamed Badie. In the statement, the Brotherhood stressed that this event would not cower or discourage its members from maintaining their peacefulness. Indeed, the

Brotherhood have defined a peaceful approach to conflict as a practice to grow closer to God. This means that as much as a member suffers in this act of worship, he will be rewarded by God accordingly. The sacrifice for peace is thus presented as an integral part of the Brotherhood's religious belief system.

> Regardless of the intensity of security-led attack against the group, the group will hold to its peaceful approach. It is an act of worship and above this, an embedded approach that the group will never deviate from, whatever the circumstances (Brotherhood, 2013x, point 2).

The strict tone of the above quote seems to refute the hypothesis of repression-extremism. On September 13, 2013, the Brotherhood issued a statement to teach its members and supporters the importance of peacefulness. In this message, the Brotherhood stressed that their choice to pursue a peaceful approach is a strategy that stems from a longstanding Islamic cultural resource and the lessons they have learnt throughout history. They vowed that this approach is not an interim tactic nor a manoeuvre to achieve political gains.

> Our choice to pursue a peaceful approach is not a tactic or a manoeuvre, but is based on fundamental doctrine, factual awareness, a correct reading of history and the experience of nations and people (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 4).

More recent lessons of the 2011 Revolution also appear to have been instructive in this regard. The Muslim Brotherhood recognised peaceful protest as the power of the revolution's engine and so appropriated the narrative of the January 25 revolution that propagated the slogan of "Peaceful, peaceful" (Arabic: selmya, selmya) as central to the protests' success. The slogan was first chanted as unarmed protesters armed themselves with calls of *"Selmya Selmya,"* despite being confronted by tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. The chant rocked the country, setting a precedent for future protests (Ali, 2012). Since 2013, the Muslim Brotherhood have advocated this path, whatever the costs, and encouraged its supporters to behave using the Qur'anic verse: ⟨*If you should raise your hand*

against me to kill me – I shall not raise my hand against you to kill you⟩ and instead, simply long for paradise to be bestowed:

> It is necessary to remind the free revolutionaries, those standing in the face of this brutal coup of our fundamental principle, and our firm pillar, that our blessed national revolution stands on to restore the revolution, and to resist the coup is the peaceful approach. Our revolution is peaceful and will remain peaceful. Our peacefulness is the secret to our strength. Our peacefulness is stronger than the bullets of treacherous coup. No matter how hard the Putschists attempt to drag us into a cycle of violence, we will never be dragged, God willing. Our motto will continue to be the words of God: *If you should raise your hand against me to kill me – I shall not raise my hand against you to kill you. Indeed, I fear Allah, Lord of the worlds* (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 3. Qur'anic verses: (5:28-29)).

Indeed, to accentuate the peaceful path, the Muslim Brotherhood even called for their members to be killed as victims rather than to engage in violence. By this, they prove to God that they are better than the "Putschists" are.

> Our honourable, free revolutionary brothers and sisters, be the best of Adam's sons; be the slain not the killer. Be aware of fall into the trap of violence, which the Putschists are planning to drag the country into. And they will never succeed, God willing (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 7).

The cultural resource of martyrdom has served the Brotherhood particularly well. The movement cite the story of Abel and Cain (Arabic: Haabeel and Qaabeel), the sons of Adam and Eve (Arabic: Adam and Hawwa) where Cain killed his brother Abel, committing the first murder ever. As a result, God expelled Cain. The story is explicated in Quran chapter al-Maa'idah [5:27 -31].

وَٱتْلُ عَلَيْهِمْ نَبَأَ ٱبْنَىْ ءَادَمَ بِٱلْحَقِّ إِذْ قَرَّبَا قُرْبَانًا فَتُقُبِّلَ مِنْ أَحَدِهِمَا وَلَمْ يُتَقَبَّلْ مِنَ ٱلْآخَرِ قَالَ لَأَقْتُلَنَّكَ قَالَ إِنَّمَا يَتَقَبَّلُ ٱللَّهُ مِنَ ٱلْمُتَّقِينَ ۝ لَئِنۢ بَسَطتَ إِلَىَّ يَدَكَ لِتَقْتُلَنِى مَآ أَنَا۠ بِبَاسِطٍ يَدِىَ إِلَيْكَ لِأَقْتُلَكَ إِنِّىٓ أَخَافُ ٱللَّهَ رَبَّ ٱلْعَٰلَمِينَ ۝ إِنِّىٓ أُرِيدُ أَن تَبُوٓأَ بِإِثْمِى وَإِثْمِكَ فَتَكُونَ مِنْ أَصْحَٰبِ ٱلنَّارِ ۚ وَذَٰلِكَ جَزَٰٓؤُا۟ ٱلظَّٰلِمِينَ ۝ فَطَوَّعَتْ لَهُۥ نَفْسُهُۥ قَتْلَ أَخِيهِ فَقَتَلَهُۥ فَأَصْبَحَ مِنَ ٱلْخَٰسِرِينَ ۝

And recite to them the story of Adam's two sons, in truth, when they both offered a sacrifice [to Allah], and it was accepted from one of them but was not accepted from the other. Said [the latter], "I will surely kill you." Said [the former], "Indeed, Allah only accepts from the righteous [who fear Him]. If you should raise your hand against me to kill me – I shall not raise my hand against you to kill you. Indeed, I fear Allah, Lord of the worlds. Indeed I want you to obtain [thereby] my sin and your sin so you will be among the companions of the Fire. And that is the recompense of wrongdoers." And his soul permitted to him the murder of his brother, so he killed him and became among the losers. Verse (5:27-30).

The Muslim Brotherhood have reiterated this value – that it is better to be the slain rather than be the slayer - several times in other contexts. In a public message entitled "Our Peaceful Approach is the Secret to our Power," the Brothers promoted this martyrdom discourse, in which they asked activists to maintain a peaceful approach, and know that if they were killed, they would die as servants of God.

> Let us keep our revolution and our movement peaceful, but brave in speaking out right in the face of the Putschists. We will continue in this peaceful performance until God achieves our hopes in freedom and dignity, but if we were assassinated at the hand of treacherous coup, we Martyrs, and God will reward us. God (Alone) is sufficient for us, and, He is the Best Disposer of affairs (Brotherhood, 2013m, paragraph 7).

The death of a martyr in Islam is considered the greatest spiritual honour and the highest degree of faith (Jensen, 2010, p. 140). The martyr is granted seven gifts from Allah, among which; they are forgiven at the first drop of their blood, they will intercede on behalf of 70 members of their families, and they will be safe from

the great fear of the Day of Judgement.[36] The concept of martyrdom was mentioned in different contexts in 21.9% of the analysed statements. This indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood relies on this concept to both rally support and maintain a peaceful but strong position against the Egyptian regime. It seems clear therefore that the Brotherhood uses martyrdom as a resource for mobilization. As scholars have argued, the government's repression creates martyrs and eventually delegitimizes the regime by associating them with intolerable injustice (Karagiannis, 2009, p. 109).

Indeed, giving the impression of strength in the face of persecution is an important consideration in the movement's self-framing strategy. Thus, they frame this approach as a sign of their maturity, rather than a sign of weakness. "Our peaceful approach is a measure of our awareness and maturity, not of weakness or indecision" (Brotherhood, 2013a, from paragraph 5). They Brotherhood deploy Qur'anic verses to reassure their audience that they must remain peaceful because they will be granted victory unwaveringly as God promised them. They present themselves as a consolidated movement despite all the crackdowns against the group, and ask their supporters to be patient, reminding them that after black clouds, comes clear weather.

> The state of despair, which the tyrants are trying to impose on the people will fall apart in front of the faith of these truthful people whose faith in God's victory is unwavering. And who believe that when affliction spreads and the madness of the coup grows, a full and decisive victory will come and tyranny will miserably fall.

حَتَّىٰٓ إِذَا ٱسۡتَيۡـَٔسَ ٱلرُّسُلُ وَظَنُّوٓاْ أَنَّهُمۡ قَدۡ كُذِبُواْ جَآءَهُمۡ نَصۡرُنَا فَنُجِّيَ مَن نَّشَآءُۖ وَلَا يُرَدُّ بَأۡسُنَا عَنِ ٱلۡقَوۡمِ ٱلۡمُجۡرِمِينَ ﴿١١٠﴾

[They continued] until, when the messengers despaired and were certain that they had been denied, there came to them Our

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[36] These granted gifts were mentioned by the Prophet Mohamad. See the Hadith in Musnad Ahmed Tabrani, at-Targheeb wa at-Tarheeb, p.443, vol.2.

victory, and whoever We willed was saved. And Our punishment
cannot be repelled from the people who are criminals.
(Brotherhood, 2014f, Qura'nic verse (12:110)).

"Fatwā" to Reinforce the Peaceful Path

One of the methods that the group used to persuade its members and supporters to refrain from violence is the use of "*fatwā*." Using "*fatwā*," the movement affirm the prohibition of murder. They claim that human life has a great sanctity that is not to be violated under any circumstances or committed against anyone whatever his or her religion. The gravity of the sin of killing is repeatedly reinforced in the Muslim Brotherhood's statements and promoted by quoting Qur'anic verses and the Messenger Mohammed's sayings and practices (Hadith). The Muslim Brotherhood have also asserted that acts of revenge are prohibited and the decision for retribution should be left to the state's law.

> Blood in the Muslim community has great sanctity and is not to be violated in any way, regardless of the person's religion. Neither individuals, nor groups, nor state bodies can designate themselves as judges, ruling that a person is to be killed. Even if someone were known to have killed protestors, it is not permitted for anyone to kill him, but rather he should be dealt with by the judiciary […]. The Messenger of Allah said: «Verily your blood, your property and your honour are as sacred and inviolable as the sanctity of this day of yours, in this month of yours and in this town of yours. Verily! I have conveyed this message to you» [Al-Bukhari and Muslim]. He also said: «Killing a believer is more grievous before Allah than the extinction of the whole world.» (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 5).

They affirm that their peaceful path stems from their correct understanding of Islam. Mohamed, they argue, was above all, the "Prophet of mercy" (Brotherhood, 2016e). Thus, the Brotherhood takes a strong stand against other jihadi groups. On March 27, 2016, a Taliban jihadi suicide bomber blew himself up in a public park in Lahore, Pakistan, in which 72 people were killed and around 300 people were injured (Dailymail, 2016; Guardian, 2016). On March 28, 2016, the Muslim Brotherhood condemned the incident that targeted Christian people, contending, "This bombing is equal to the act of killing innocent Muslims and non-Muslims in Myanmar or

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anywhere in the world" and that such attacks violate God's law as revealed in the Qur'an.

> The group affirms that its doctrine and its understanding of Islam, as taught by Mohamed, the Prophet of mercy (peace be upon him), makes it clear that the perpetrator of this bombing amid a group of innocent people, killing dozens, wounding hundreds and terrorizing even more innocent citizens, whatever his intention, has indeed violated God's law as revealed in the Holy Quran and detailed in Islamic *sharī'a* (Brotherhood, 2016e).

Redefining jihad: "the peaceful Jihad"

By way of reinforcing the peaceful approach, the Muslim Brotherhood introduced a new term, which had not previously been in the Muslim Brotherhood's dictionary: "the peaceful Jihad." In August 2013, they issued a statement to condemn the Arrest of the General Guide, Mohamed Badie, claiming that "Even if they [the state] hide the General Guide in prison, the people will continue their peaceful Jihad until they regain all their rights" (Brotherhood, 2013x, line 7). This demonstrates the power of framing in making "high-risk activism seem imperative, whatever the costs" (Gunning, 2009, p. 167). Moreover, it shows how the Brotherhood has framed activism as a "moral obligation" that requires unwavering commitment for the cause of religious transformation (Wickham, 2004a, p. 232).

The Muslim Brotherhood has described the "Peaceful Revolution" as the "Greatest Jihad," taking the example from the Messenger Mohammad saying, "Indeed, among the greatest types of Jihad is a just statement before a tyrannical ruler" (Brotherhood, 2013m, paragraph 3). Employing this new term, "the peaceful Jihad," and by equating peacefulness with the "Greatest Jihad," the Muslim Brotherhood offers an alternative and updated, moderate frame to the extremist notion of Jihad that is exploited by violent groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda. Here the Muslim Brotherhood transfers the more established idea of the "greater Jihad," wherein the more established individual struggles against sin (jihad of the heart –

the struggle against one's own instincts, sinful inclinations and temptations) (Schmid, 2011, p. 651), to the struggle with regime.

Another key tactic used by the Muslim Brotherhood to appear as a peaceful, moderate and non-violent group is the absolute condemnation of terrorism. The movement condemned violence in 17.4% of the Public Statements that were analysed in this study. This shows the strong propensity of the Brotherhood to appear as a non-violent group that is worthy to be dealt with as an equal by great powers.

> The Muslim Brotherhood contends for the umpteenth time that they are against violence and terrorism whatever its source. They stand with truth, justice and freedom sought peacefully. They are committed to democracy and the rule of the people, respecting their will, and were found at their service in all areas. This is why they were elected in all free elections, from the Student Unions' leading to presidency, through to unions, clubs of faculty members at universities and both houses of parliament. It is impossible for the people of Egypt, from all walks to elect terrorists (Brotherhood, 2014p, Paragraph 3).

The tone of almost frustrated assertiveness in the above quote indicates that this is not the first time that the Muslim Brotherhood have shown their absolute condemnation of terrorism. The violence and terrorism perpetrated in Egypt is attributed entirely to the regime.

> We have repeatedly affirmed that our opposition is peaceful and will continue to be peaceful, safeguarding the security of our homeland, its institutions and facilities. We denounce all forms of violence, all acts of terrorism or sectarian strife. We strongly condemn all that. We hold the putschist plotters and their thugs and police collaborators fully responsible for all violence and terrorism, sabotage and arson. They are only interested in grabbing power, to rule over the necks of the people and to sabotage their constitutional institutions (Brotherhood, 2013k).

Moreover, the Brotherhood frequently issue official condemnation against terrorist attacks that occur beyond Egypt. On March 22, 2016, ISIS launched two attacks on the airport and station in the Belgian capital of Brussels. At least 30 people were

killed in the twin bombings with dozens more injured (The Independent reporter Staufenberg, 2016). On the same day, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement denouncing the attacks as "heinous crimes" and "treacherous events." It also offered its sincere condolences to the people and government of Belgium and deep sympathy to the families of the victims.

> The Muslim Brotherhood strongly condemns the terrorist attacks Tuesday [March 22, 2016] at a Belgian airport and a subway station in the capital Brussels, which left dozens of innocent people dead and injured. The group denounces these heinous crimes, whatever the nationality of the perpetrator, based on its principles, which sanctify innocent human souls, that according to God's commands must not be taken without good cause, and which all divine laws and international conventions have safeguarded (Brotherhood, 2016f).

In addition, on July 15, 2016, they condemned an attack in Nice, France, in which the killer described by ISIS as a "soldier of Islam," ploughed a 19-tonne lorry into holiday crowds who were celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, killing 84 people (BBC, 2016; Telegraph, 2016).

> The Muslim Brotherhood condemns the horrific truck attack that took place last night in the city of Nice, France, and claimed the lives of dozens of innocent people. The Muslim Brotherhood offers its sincere condolences and solidarity with the families of the victims (Brotherhood, 2016d).

Most recently, on March 24, 2017 a terrorist attack occurred outside the Houses of Parliament in London. The Muslim Brotherhood's parliamentary members who fled from Egypt after Morsi's downfall and call themselves "The Egyptian Parliament Abroad" (EPA) issued a statement on the same day of the attack to strongly condemn it and express sympathy with their fellow parliamentarians in the UK. The Muslim Brotherhood described the incident as a "terrorist attack" and described the British Parliament as "the World symbol of Democracy."

Interestingly, the movement seems therefore to make a distinction between British politicians who have refused to designate the movement a terrorist organisation and their US counterparts who have moved to recognise the movement

as a terrorist group. However, the Brotherhood exploited the event to stress its denunciation of all types of violence regardless of the colour, race or religion of those who commit acts of terror. It also took the opportunity to advocate the universal human values of democracy, such as justice, freedom, human rights and peaceful co-existence with all. Indeed, the movement went so far as to present itself as an international bulwark against terrorism and called for the world to be united in this goal.

> The Egyptian Parliament Abroad strongly condemns the terrorist attack against the British Parliament, the World symbol of Democracy. The Egyptian Parliament stands with the families who lost their loved ones and those who were injured. The Egyptian Parliament Abroad reiterates its principled condemnation to all forms of terrorism regardless of the colour, race or religion of those who commit these terror acts. The EPA emphasizes its commitment to the Universal Human values of Democracy, Justice, Freedom, Human Rights and peaceful co-existence with all. The EPA calls upon all democracy supporters to get united against all forms of terror committed by any individual, group or state (Egypt Parliament Abroad, 2017).

By expressing such damning condemnations, the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to draw a clear dividing line between its ideology as a political and social movement and that of the Jihadists they are often associated with. In contrast to ISIS describing the Bastille Day attacker as a "soldier of Islam," (BBC, 2016; Telegraph, 2016)the Brotherhood have clearly expressed an opposing view. In addition, the movement have stated that this denouncement is based on longstanding Islamic principles (cultural resources) that sanctify innocent human souls safeguarded both by divine laws and international conventions.

The Brotherhood's justification of its peaceful and moderate ideology

The Muslim Brotherhood have proven to be highly adaptable in justifying their current peaceful approach. Their multiple justifications represent the flexibility of the movement's strategy and its ability to adapt its discourse for the benefit of its

political agenda. The Brotherhood have justified its peacefulness by the following: Firstly, to deny its opponents a pretext to frame the movement as a terrorist group.

> In order to justify their oppression and the brutality, [the regime] seeks to portray their opponents as terrorists who are trying to use violence to express their disapproval. Thus, is it clever and wise to give them the justification for their terrorism and violence? (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 10).

The Brotherhood called on the people to debunk "all lies and deception" practiced by SCAF,

> We call on all patriotic young people of Egypt to not get caught in what the military junta regime pushes them into – the trap of violence, plotted by the junta's various apparatuses and tentacles with full force. We reject this violence completely. We believe that violence and terror are made up and executed by only one party: the military junta's regime and its apparatuses. They use violence with unmitigated audacity and brazen effrontery. We will not leave our country to fall into this quagmire so set up and plotted for it (Brotherhood, 2015e, paragraphs 7 & 8).

It seems that the Muslim Brotherhood have learned from previous experience in this regard. According to Abdelmajeed (2010); Ranko (2015), from 1987 to 2005, the Egyptian regime focused its discourse on portraying the Brotherhood as a terrorist group that were opposed to Egypt's legal political framework. In response, the movement attempted to present itself as a non-violent and moderate movement that was in line with Egypt's legal political framework. Today, the Brothers continue to label themselves as moderate and peaceful, despite the unprecedented repression they face. Indeed, one might even conclude from the preliminary findings of this thesis that the Brotherhood highlights its peacefulness more emphatically as the repression increases. These findings arguably substantiate the repression-moderation hypothesis; however, the following arguments also point to factors other than repression to explain the Brotherhood's consolidation of a peaceful approach.

As second justification for the group moderation and peacefulness, the movement claims that the Brothers' faith in the gravity of the sin of shedding blood

is not just religious doctrine, but also stems from their respect for the law and human rights.

> [We] believe in the inviolability of blood religiously, legally and morally. [We] believe in the prohibition of corruption and botching of the earth (Brotherhood, 2013t, line 10).

Despite being repressed by the government's security apparatuses, they reinforced these values condemning attacks targeted against the army and the police. On May 8, 2016, four armed members of ISIS shot and killed eight police officers in the southern Cairo district of Helwan (Moore, 2016). The Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement demanding a prompt and honest investigation and blamed the government's negligence in security and safety measures. They urged strict methods "in order to avoid such loss of life in vain, and also to avoid such horrific incidents in the future." The movement stressed that security apparatuses bear full responsibility for the unacceptable failure to preserve the lives of Egyptians.

> The Muslim Brotherhood condemns the vicious attack early on Sunday [May 8, 2016] in which a number of police personnel were killed. The group has always stressed the sanctity of blood, and condemned violence – whatever the motives, as part of its commitment to the faith, moral principles, genuine patriotism and clear and peaceful approach (Brotherhood, 2016a).

Accordingly, the Brotherhood have prohibited killing, labelling such acts as inhuman and horrific atrocities. The Muslim Brotherhood also considered killing people without retribution of criminals as a stain on the face of humanity. Hence, this value is presented by the organisation as genuine credo that must not be violated. The Muslim Brotherhood reinforced this value constantly in the context of the struggle with regime. On April 09, 2017, Palm Sunday, two deadly bombings were carried out by ISIS and targeted two Coptic Christian churches, leaving the death toll to at least 49, including four police officers (CNN, 2017a; Guardian, 2017). The Brotherhood affirmed that the blood of these innocents would be a curse on the murderous culprits who have stained their hands with the blood of Egyptians.

> The Muslim Brotherhood condemns the painfully tragic explosions on Sunday in the Coptic church of Mar Girgis (also known as St George, in Tanta) and Saint Mark's church (Alexandria), which killed and injured dozens of Egyptians, and reaffirms that it has absolutely no involvement of any kind in the shedding of blood. Indeed, the sanctity of blood in Islam cannot be exaggerated (Brotherhood, 2017a).

The third justification assumes that the movement is convinced, through reviewing and learning from other nations' history and experiences, that the most efficient and successful solution to authoritarian regimes is peaceful resistance. They have referred explicitly to the experiences of Eastern European countries in peaceful transitions from authoritarian regimes into democratic states. This indicates the openness and the insights of the movement towards other cultures and could even signify research on these themes is being conducted within the movement.

> Old and modern experiences have proven that peaceful resistance to coups and despotism is the most successful and efficient and incurring of the least human cost. This is what produces real democratic transition, as we learnt from the experiences of Eastern Europe countries. This has also been demonstrated by the glorious January 25 revolution (Brotherhood, 2013n, paragraph 14).

This is not the first time the Brotherhood have referred to the experiences of the Eastern European countries. The movement did so twice after the January 25, 2011 upheavals. On March 22, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement to urge the Libyan President, Muammar Gaddafi, and his Yemini, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to obey the mass demonstrations and step down, urging them to take the lesson from the Tunisians, Egyptians, and Eastern Europeans, such as Nicolae Ceaușescu. Ceaușescu was the Former President of Communist Romania (1974–1989). In December 1989, a popular revolution, backed by the military, pushed him from power and into the courtroom. On December 25, 1989, in a show trial that continued less than an hour, he and his spouse Elena Ceaușescu were charged with genocide and other crimes, led outside courtroom and executed by a firing squad (Biography.com-Editors, 2015; Mungiu-Pippidi, 2006, p. 312).

> The Muslim Brotherhood affirms that tyranny, oppression, violence and terror is fuelling revolutions and prompts silent segments to support protests and share in their insistence on sticking to their demands. Therefore, the tyrants must learn lessons from their predecessors in Tunisia, Egypt and authoritarian rulers in Eastern Europe like Ceausescu (Brotherhood, 2011a).

On April 7, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood used the example of Eastern Europe again, but this time to support the right of the Syrians to a free and dignified life and to reject the state's aggression against protesters.

> When the winds of freedom, human dignity and social justice were blowing strongly across Eastern Europe in the late 1990s, the people revolted against their tyrants who for decades had oppressed their people, and then the people regained their dignity and once again became productive members of society. We waited so long for the Arabs to rise up against corrupt and tyrannical regimes, making them fall one after another as in Tunisia and Egypt. However, the Libyan and Yemeni regimes are still resisting the inevitable change, and are guilty of genocide against innocent and unarmed protesters, but the revolutionary people will be triumphant. What is happening now in Egypt and the Arab world marks the end of an era and will usher in a new era of freedom and democracy (Brotherhood, 2011b).

Finally, the Muslim Brotherhood have expressed that violence yields agony to all and once the circle of violence starts, it never ends. Rather like a snowball; the further it rolls, the bigger it becomes.

> Falling into this heinous crime [killing] will inevitably lead to falling into great affliction, one that will drown men into the circle of reciprocated murder without justification […]. This is what our Prophet, peace be upon him, warned us of as said: (The world would not come to an end until a day would come to the people on which the murderer would not know as to why he has killed and the slain would not know as to why he has been murdered. It would be said: Why would it happen? To which he replied: It would be because of general massacre and bloodshed. And the slaughterers and the slain would be in Fire) (Brotherhood, 2013n).

This way of thinking demonstrates an alternative approach to the group's response to repression in the 1940s when the "Secret Apparatus" (al-Tanzim al-Sirri) was formed. According to Stilt (2010), this group within the Brotherhood opposed the movement's commitment to peaceful approaches and reinterpreted the motto "jihad is our way" (p. 77). On March 22, 1948, after the Secret Apparatus assassinated the Judge, Ahmad Beik Al-Khazndar, the cycle of violence ended with the assassination of Egypt's prime minister, al-Nuqrashi Pasha and the assassination of the Muslim Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, in 1949 (R. P. Mitchell, 1993, p. 62).

The movement's efforts of to distinguish itself from extremists

Throughout the Brotherhood's statements, the movement has clearly attempted to distinguish themselves from extremist groups, particularly ISIS and al-Qaeda. The official statements of the movement have unequivocally condemned ISIS practices and ideology. The current discourse of the movement presents the Brotherhood's moderation and peacefulness as an alternative to the savage and extremist ISIS, who in turn regard the Brotherhood, like other Sunni rivals, as apostates.

In a conference held in February 2015 in London by the Cordoba Foundation to examine the growing interest and critique of political Islam following the Arab Uprisings, with particular focus on the Muslim Brotherhood, Mona al-Qazzaz, the representative of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its special envoy, repeatedly stressed the Brotherhood's peaceful approach and moderation. Al-Qazzaz started her speech by quoting and stressing Jumaa Amin, Deputy Muslim Brotherhood General Guide: "We reject any form of violence, the Muslim Brotherhood's peacefulness is not a tactic or a matter of choice, it is an inherent part of its ideology and whoever condones violence is not a part of our organisation." She used the quote as evidence of the Brotherhood's teaching that campaigning, advocacy, and societal engagement is the way the movement to spread its message. Al-Qazzaz claimed that the Brotherhood is the champion of democracy and moderation and thus should be celebrated by the West, not ignored. She also

claimed that the Brotherhood's moderate ideology was the only means to eliminate ISIS. As she put it:

> The international community should uphold its values of justice and democracy and should not turn a blind eye when the crimes are committed against Islamists. The international community should strive not to make the savage ISIS the only successful example of Islamism in the Middle East. Islamists who uphold democracy and international values of human rights should be supported to succeed because they are the only solution to end ISIS. The Muslim Brotherhood youth and the pro-democracy protesters in Egypt are champions of democracy; they should be celebrated not put under review, they have been protesting peacefully every day for the 19 months to bring back democracy, legitimacy, and rule of law.

Al-Qazaz's speech confirms the findings of the current analysis regarding the strategies deployed by the Brotherhood in its branding campaign. Indeed, she particularly stressed the preeminent role of women in the current struggle with the state, the rule of the law and the narrative of moderation.

> Women are in the heart and in the forefront of the prodemocracy movement. We refuse any attacks of innocence regardless of their religion, gender, race, or background. The perpetrators of crimes against innocents should be held accountable before a just legal system. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt will remain peaceful and will remain defiant until it brings democracy back, until bring social justice, freedom, and rule of law.

On February 12, 2015, in the same conference, Azzam al-Tamimi, a leading British-Palestinian member of the Muslim Brotherhood, stressed that the alternative to the moderate thought of the Muslim Brotherhood is ISIS. As he put it, "We believe in the cause of justice […] if this sort of political Islam is causing a problem to someone […], then good luck with ISIS and likes."

Interestingly, the Brotherhood almost never mentioned ISIS explicitly in the statements analysed. The exception was a single statement issued on April 16, 2014, entitled, "War on Terror: Truth and Myth." The goal of this statement was to show that the banner of "War on Terror," is just a pretext that is being used by the West

to fight Islam and Muslims. The Brotherhood allege that strange organizations and suspicious movements, such as ISIS, were established through "plots of the great demons of politics" to fragment the Muslim world. The Brotherhood claims "that repressive regimes may have state security and intelligence agencies set up, train, arm and equip their own terror groups or organizations to execute acts of terror they can quickly blame onto Islamists and Islamic groups, even if those Islamists are totally and exclusively committed to peaceful action and activity."

> In fact, such regimes did not stop at setting up local terrorist organizations allied to them. Recently, huge cross-border organization appeared on the scene. These possess advanced weapons and a lot of money. They attract fanatic youths with little understanding or awareness. They raise slogans of Islam but apply extreme ideas and act with extreme cruelty and brutality, thus distorting the image of Islam. This gives the enemies of Islam a pretext, an excuse for a new intervention in Muslim countries, to divide and destroy the homelands and kills the people. This is what is happening now with the emergence of the radical organization called 'Daesh', which swept away regular armies in a strangely rapid and dramatic manner, and seized swathes of territory and cities in Iraq and Syria, ruthlessly killing all opponents along the way (Brotherhood, 2014h, Paragraph 8).

While the Brotherhood attempts to draw a line between moderate Islamists presented by the Brotherhood and extremists symbolized by ISIS, their statements avoid mentioning ISIS explicitly. Indeed, contrasting the speeches of the representatives of the Brotherhood international conferences about ISIS cited above, to the absence of this discussion in their statements could mean that the Brotherhood fear that there might be sympathisers among their audiences that they are not willing to lose them and that they frame their messages in effective ways for the target audience. This emphasises the findings of Okruhlik that social movements seek to frame political struggle in ways that resonate with the target audience and mobilize sympathizers (Okruhlik, 2004, p. 251).

Conclusion

This chapter has sought to explore whether the Muslim Brotherhood should be understood as an organisation that acts as a conduit for terrorism or moderation. Therefore, the chapter utilized the social movement theory's concepts of strategic farming, political opportunity structure, and cultural resources as a theoretical framework to examine the repression-radicalization hypothesis and to explore how the movement frames itself in reaction to local, regional and international attempts to demonise the movement. It has also examined whether the regime's repression could lead the movement to radicalization and violence and attempted to investigate whether the state's demonization of the Muslim Brotherhood post-Morsi is based on new authentic fears of radicalization.

My findings suggest that the official communication of the movement has consistently demonstrated its moderation both ideologically, through recourse to religious ideas and practically, in response to domestic and global events. However, refining the hypothesis that repression leads to moderation, I suggest that the Muslim Brotherhood has also demonstrated that moderation is a well-entrenched ideology and cultural resource within the movement. Qutb's ideology appears to have been abandoned and refuted within the Brotherhood, at the official level, even if his intellectual legacy has been adopted by other jihadi groups. The movement are keen to define themselves against these groups, advocating a peaceful path to achieve their political demands. The movement reinforces that this peaceful approach is a doctrine that will never be abandoned and serves as a critical cultural resource in its struggle against the regime.

This approach appears to be based and justified, both on religious beliefs and practical lessons derived from the experience of different nations throughout history, leading the Brotherhood to adapt their beliefs and cultural resources accordingly. Thus, the Brotherhood has framed itself as convinced that violence is not a solution, especially in light of the consequences of the Arab Revolutions, which have morphed into civil wars and the subsequent and ongoing disintegration of Syria,

Iraq, Libya and Yemen. In a claim that marks their appropriation of the revolution of January 25, 2011, that deposed Mubarak, they argue that a peaceful approach is the only effective means of facing tyranny. This reinforces the idea that social movements usually employ vocabulary and symbols from a "cultural tool kit" to offer common interests and values to people which forms a sense of solidarity that can trigger political action (Hannerz, 1969, p. 187; Swidler, 1986, p. 273). However, in relation to the violent political context from which the Brotherhood's communiqués have emerged, theoretically, the study contributes to social movements theory by suggesting that the cultural resources of Islamist social movements are highly affected by political opportunity structure that manifests through strategic framing. This confirms the findings of scholarship arguing that Islamist movements employ framing as interpretive devices that convey grievances and recognise opportunities, transforming them into mobilization of resources and activism (Wiktorowicz, 2004).

Yet, the question that should be raised now: Is the Brotherhood moving to extremism as result of the increasing repression? In recent years, a wave of scholarship has expressed varying degrees of scepticism about whether the Muslim Brotherhood will continue its commitment to moderation under the pressure of unprecedented repression since Morsi's removal (Lynch, 2016; Pevná, 2014; Ranko, 2015). In contrast, and despite the radical trend (Qutb's School of thinking) within the Brotherhood that developed under the torture of security forces in the 50s and 60s, I argue here that the official communication of the movement seems to be committed to peacefulness and moderation. This would therefore make it difficult for the Brotherhood to justify a resort to violence. The backbone of my argument as discussed in this chapter is based on four pieces of evidence that emerged through the analysis of the Brotherhood's statements: (1) The Brotherhood's justifications of its peacefulness and moderate ideology; (2) Evidence from previous periods; (3) Tactics that the Muslim Brotherhood used to convince its supporters to maintain their peacefulness; (4) Efforts of the movement to distinguish itself from extremist groups.

While Brown et al. (2006); Ranko (2014, 2015), have concluded that the moderation of the Muslim Brotherhood is selective, the analysis of the official statements of the Brotherhood from 2013-2016 suggests that the Muslim Brotherhood appears to have more wholeheartedly embraced moderation. It has done so in the face of domestic and international developments that have forced them to consolidate their identity as a moderate and peaceful movement. Ranko (2015) argues that moderation only takes hold when inclusion is coupled with a negative regime discourse towards the Muslim Brotherhood, a thesis which aligns with my findings.

The Brotherhood has used a range of reasoning and tactics to reinforce the idea of its moderation and peacefulness and to guarantee their activists commitment to such an approach. The group issued a "*fatwā*" to endorse the peaceful approach and refute violence. It employed Qur'anic verses and the Messenger Mohammed's sayings and practices (Hadith) to promote its moderation and peacefulness, considering the "Peaceful Revolution" as the "Greatest Jihad." Contravening such teachings would cast a major challenge to the movement and considerably damage its reputation and integrity.

In addition, the Muslim Brotherhood has struggled to refute Qutb's legacy that has haunted them over the years and was successfully exploited by its rivals to challenge the movement and demonise it. Therefore, the movement knows the dear price of retreating to such ideology that would provide more legitimate cover to the state's repression. Accusing not just the Egyptian regime, but also its ally, the US, of sponsoring of terrorism allows the Brotherhood to be seen as a peace sponsor; an image that the movement is endeavouring to develop into a positive stereotype. The Brotherhood has strategically framed peacefulness as an act of devotion and worship. Accordingly, they have increasingly redefined jihad as a peaceful act or the "peaceful jihad," stressing that anyone who might be killed following these teachings dies as martyr. In this, the movement provides an alternative

conceptualisation of jihad that diverges from radical Islamist groups, suggesting that for the time being, moderation will remain the official line of the Brotherhood.

Chapter Nine: Persuasive Techniques of the Brotherhood

Introduction

Persuasive communication is any message that intends to shape, reinforce, or change the responses of audience (Stiff & Mongeau, 2016, p. 12). Purposive communication activities to influence established goals is thus an essential part of any strategic communication campaign (Werder, 2015, p. 81). Today, social movements also deploy persuasive techniques in order to be more strategic in their communication and approaches (Negrine, 2008, p. 195). Hence, to reach their ends, especially in competitive situations, political communication benefits from other disciplines such as marketing, advertisement and public relations through professionals and media consultants (McNair, 2017, p. 7). The study of persuasive techniques in politics goes back to the 1930s when scholars watched with astonishment as Adolf Hitler ascended to power in Germany. Historians note that Hitler attained and maintained this power through his use of propaganda and persuasion techniques (Powell & Cowart, 2015, p. 68; Watts, 1997, p. 76). In this, he benefited from the advices of Paul Joseph Goebbels, his Minister of Propaganda. Through his communication, he was able to develop a grassroots base for Nazi ideology. Academics endeavoured to identify and analyse the persuasive techniques he was using that seemed to be effective (Powell & Cowart, 2015, p. 68; Watts, 1997, p. 76). Analysing such techniques will help identify how the Brotherhood intends to shape the perceptions of their audience. Whilst this study does not presume to determine the success of these attempts, it does seek to raise the awareness of audiences to identify and evaluate the persuasive methods that political actors like the Brotherhood use to influence them. Scholars suggest that once the audience is aware of the persuasive techniques, the effects of those techniques diminish, and it becomes the audience's decision to accept the message or reject it (Jowett & O'donnell, 2014, p. 167).

Theoretically, this chapter argues that persuasive techniques offer a revealing and underexplored tool through which we can understand the substantive and the

affective attributes associated with salient issues communicated by the Muslim Brotherhood in the public realm. In other words, it maintains that persuasive techniques reveal the specific mechanisms through which the Brotherhood seek to achieve their communication goals and how issues are framed and communicated.

For that purpose, this study deploys the IPA's taxonomy of persuasive techniques (name-calling, glittering generalities, transfer, testimonial, plain folks, card stacking, bandwagon) and some further techniques identified by other scholars (assertion, false dilemma, the lesser of two evils, pinpointing the enemy, hot potato). All these techniques are explained in Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework and Literature Review.

This chapter consists of two main parts. The first presents the results, while the second discusses the findings. The discussion section is structured according to the results in descending order from the most frequent technique to that used least: "name calling," "assertion," "glittering generality," "transfer," "false dilemma," "rhetorical question," "card stacking," "plain folks," "pinpointing the enemy," "testimonial," "hot-potato" "bandwagon," and "the lesser of two evil."

Results

Persuasive techniques

The results of this analysis show that the Muslim Brotherhood's communication strategy aligns strongly with the seven propaganda techniques developed by the IPA in the late 1930s. The group also employs other propaganda techniques, identified by other scholars. Propaganda devices were found in the vast majority of the statements issued by the Muslim Brotherhood during the study period. More than one technique was identified in 98% of the 132 statements analysed. For instance, "name calling" was discovered in 86.2% of the statements. "Assertion" was discovered in 61.8% of the statements. "Glittering generality" was spotted in 59.3% of the statements. "Transfer" was observed in 43.9% of the statements. "False dilemma" was detected in 42.3% of the statements. Accordingly, persuasive

techniques were identified 1130 times in different parts of the 132 analysed statements. Significantly, "name calling" is the most dominant device in the documents: identified 336 times in 106 documents out of 132. This followed with "assertion" recording 156 times, "glittering generality" 154 times, and "transfer" 146 times (refer to Table 1 that summarises the whole techniques and their frequency). This extensive and intensive deployment of persuasive techniques by the Brotherhood along the whole period of analysis, suggests that the group have been using such techniques as strategic communication devices to advance their argument, influence the public and achieve their objectives. A brief summary of each technique and how it is used as strategic framing tools explored in the Analysis and Discussion section.

Table 5. Persuasive techniques and number of times they appeared.

#	Propaganda Techniques	Number of times each technique appeared	Number of statements in which each technique appeared	Frequencies of techniques in the statements analysed
1.	Name Calling	336	106	86.2%
2.	Assertion	156	76	61.8%
3.	Glittering Generality	154	73	59.3%
4.	Transfer	146	54	43.9%
5.	False Dilemma	105	52	42.3%
6.	Rhetorical question	71	33	26.8%
7.	Card stacking	64	42	34.1%
8.	Plain Folks	51	40	32.5%
9.	Pinpointing the Enemy	27	23	18.7%
10.	Testimonial	23	17	13.8%
11.	Hot-Potato	16	11	8.9%
12.	Bandwagon	15	5	4.1%
13.	The Lesser of Two Evil	1	1	0.8%
	Total	1130	*N = (132)*	

Results of chi-squared test

The statistical significance of the Brotherhood's strategy was assessed using chi-squared test with a significance level of $P < 0.05$. The test was conducted to evaluate objectively the differences between the observed and expected frequencies of each persuasive technique through simple probability in the analysed 132 communiqués. The following Table 6 shows the results of chi-squared test.

According to the results of chi-squared, the null hypothesis (H0) was rejected for name calling, glittering generality, false dilemma, rhetorical question, card stacking, plain folks, pinpointing the enemy, testimonial, hot-potato, bandwagon, and the lesser of two evil. Therefore, the alternative hypothesis (H1) was accepted for the same techniques. The statistical significance here implies that the differences are not due to chance, which means that the use of such techniques could be planned. In the meantime, the null hypothesis was accepted only for "assertion" and "transfer" as the deviation was small enough that chance might account for it.

Table 6. Results of chi-squared test to evaluate the differences in propaganda techniques.

#	Variable	Propaganda Technique	Observed N	Expected N	Chi Squared	DF	Siq.
1.	Name Calling	Yes	106	66	48.48[a]	1	*0.000
		No	26	66			
2.	Assertion	Yes	76	66	3.03[a]	1	0.082
		No	56	66			
3.	Glittering Generality	Yes	73	66	8.78[a]	1	*0.003
		No	59	66			
4.	Transfer	Yes	54	66	0.12[a]	1	0.72
		No	78	66			
5.	False Dilemma	Yes	52	66	5.93[a]	1	*0.01
		No	80	66			
6.	Rhetorical question	Yes	33	66	0.33[a]	1	*0.000
		No	99	66			
7.	Card stacking	Yes	42	66	55.53[a]	1	*0.000
		No	90	66			
8.	Plain Folks	Yes	40	66	0.48[a]	1	*0.000
		No	92	66			
9.	Pinpointing the Enemy	Yes	23	66	56.03[a]	1	*0.000
		No	109	66			
10.	Testimonial	Yes	17	66	72.75[a]	1	*0.000
		No	115	66			
11.	Hot-Potato	Yes	11	66	91.66[a]	1	*0.000
		No	121	66			
12.	Bandwagon	Yes	5	66	112.75[a]	1	*0.000
		No	127	66			
13.	The Lesser of Two Evil	Yes	1	66	128.30[a]	1	*0.000
		No	131	66			
N = (132)			** is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)*				

Analysis and Discussion

Name Calling

This study found that "name calling" is the overriding technique that the Brotherhood uses to discredit their rivals. To denigrate President Sisi and frame him as a villain, the movement portrayed him as "the mass-murderer," "butcher" (*safah and mujrim*), the "Putschists' leader" *(qayid alainqilabiiyn)*, and "traitor" *(Khayin)*. The terms "mass-murder" and "butcher" were found in almost all statements in which Sisi was mentioned, evidenced 43 times. By this technique, the movement seeks to associate the regime with blood and death. They are the same labels that were assigned by Americans to Saddam Hussein in 2003 to justify its invasion to Iraq. In addition, the same stereotypes were assigned to Milosevic during the war in Kosovo in 1990 by the European press to direct the audience's attention to the emotive dimension of the conflict. Likewise, it seems that the Brothers, by using such frames in their discourse, are attempting to direct the international community's attention to the emotive dimension of the conflict, leading to condemnation and possibly force their inference. Such "name calling" was also presented through the Brothers' caricatures. For example, they published a caricature depicting Sisi in military apparel as "mass-murder" holding a chainsaw dripping blood. It refers to the 1974 brutal, merciless American horror film, Texas Chainsaw Massacre (see Figure 60). In the third memorial of *Rābiʿa* massacre, the FJP published a caricature depicting Sisi taking a bloodbath. The bathtub was given the shape of Egypt's map filled with blood. The cartoon signifies that Sisi is deluging the country with the Brothers' blood (see Figure 61).

Figure 60. A caricature depicting Sisi as "mass murder" (FJP, 2014).

Figure 61. A caricature depicting Sisi as taking bloodbath (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2017c).

Sisi was framed as "the commander of putschists" and "traitor." The first term was mentioned in 18.18% of the analysed statements, while the traitor appeared in 16.66% of the statements. These "name callings" attempt to reinforce the idea that Morsi's removal was a coup, not a revolution. In fact, putschists is a German word mostly linked to the event that led Hitler from a Munich beer-hall in late 1923 to overthrow the government. However, the so-called "Beer Hall Putsch" failed ignominiously and Hitler was arrested and sentenced to five years imprisonment (Doerr, 1998, p. 74). It seems that the message of the movement, by using this frame, is to reinforce their idea that "the coup will fail inevitably," a message heavily stressed in each published statement by the Brotherhood. Sisi is presented as a "dictator" who is unfit to rule and demonstrating a "contempt for democracy." By deploying these terms, the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to speak to pre-existing discourses expressed by international news media and human rights organisations in much the same language with which enemies of the West, such as Saddam Hussein, were described in the past.

Revealingly, the above analysis shows that the Muslim Brotherhood has moved away from using religious "name callings" to demonize the regime. In the past, Islamist opponents of the Egyptian regime during Nasser's rule, and the appearance of Qutb's ideology, used religious "name callings." For example, in order to delegitimize the authorities, they denounced them as infidels (*Kufar*) or as ignorants (*juhal*). They also pronounced Egypt as the land of unbelief (*dar-al-kufr*) because of the failure to implement Islamic law in life and governance (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12). However, none of these was deployed by the movement in the period under examination.

Instead, secular themes, such as contravening the law, was a more common "name calling" technique to discredit and demonise the regime. The movement portrayed the state as "Criminal" in 27.27% and "Illegal" in 13% of the analysed statements. This serves to delegitimise the government and justify the

Brotherhood's insistence and determination to "complete the Revolution until the end."

> With every new revolutionary wave, false rumours are spread alleging the start of negotiations, understandings or agreements. Each time, the Muslim Brotherhood reaffirms and reiterates that: We will not negotiate with the murderers and criminals. We will not compromise on the rights of martyrs, prisoners, the wounded and all those tragically impacted by the junta and its coup. We will not compromise on the legitimacy of our elected President Mohamed Morsi. We will not compromise on the full rights of all the Egyptian people (Brotherhood, 2016j).

The regime was called "dictatorial" in 23.48% of the statements and as "fascist" in 15.15% of the statements.

> The Revolution moved from strength to strength, day after day, while the fascist coup crowd disintegrated and crumbled (Brotherhood, 2016n).

They also called the state "disingenuous" and "deceptive" in 17.42% and "Liars" in 14.39% of the analysed statements, as shown in the following example.

> A few days separate us from the anniversary of the first fascist military statement made by the Generals in which they used political slogans and bogus demands for deceptive cover, while they used blatant lies, deception, violence and terror, and did their worst killing, humiliating and violating the rights of all Egyptians (Brotherhood, 2015e, paragraph 1).

Such "name callings" seek to frame the government as a group that cannot be trusted. They reinforced this by calling them a "gang" in 10.60% of the statements, as in the following example,

> Those who allied themselves with the military junta sold off (and still are selling off) Egypt, its youth, its freedom and the democratic path to the coup gang, seeking a mirage that soon turned into a nightmare for them and the whole of Egypt (Brotherhood, 2016c, paragraph 4).

Indeed, by framing the regime as a gang, the Brotherhood aims to present the regime as an organized group of criminals who share a common identity as thugs who

engage in illegal and violent behaviour. Therefore, they cannot be a real state and cannot be trusted with the people's lives and the country's resources.

The use of this technique can be understood as part of the Muslim Brotherhood's strategy to focus people's attention on the regime's failures. The Egyptian army is the central focus of their campaign, initially framed primarily as murderers. The murderer theme dominated after the *Rābiʿa* massacre, where previously they used to call them "our brothers in the army" and "the hero army." Some Muslim Brotherhood websites and activists shared the Brazilian political cartoonist, Carlos Latuff's, caricature entitled, "Egypt army at their best: shooting their own people!" See (Figure 62).

In addition, they framed the army as "corrupt," a "name calling" that was reinforced through caricature as well. For example, the FJP website on January 01, 2016, published a caricature, credited to Latuff, depicting the army (SCAF) as perusing the revolutionists who participated in the January 25, 2011, revolution against the disposed Mubarak, while calling them "the thugs" whose hands are stained with blood (see Figure 63).

Figure 62. A caricature entitled "Egypt army at their best: shooting their own people!" (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2016c).

Figure 63. A caricature depicting SCAF as corrupt (Latuff, 2016).

The frame of SCAF lining their own pockets at the expense of the poor people was common. In one of many examples, the Brothers published a caricature portraying the army as consuming Egypt's resources (see Figure 64). Egypt is depicted as cow's skeleton that is drained by a large rear (SACF). Despite its exhaustion, it is silently denoting the servility of the Egyptians in the face of the SCAF violations.

Figure 64. A Caricature, portraying the army cleaning out Egypt's resources (EgyptWindow, 2016b).

Another caricature (Figure 65) presents SCAF scoffing down the lion's share of Egypt's food while leaving crumbs to the poor people. This caricature sought to ridicule Sisi's call to people to share their food with each other to alleviate the economic plight.

As can be easily noted from the above caricatures, the army officers are framed as gluttonous hypocrites standing in marked contrast to armies in different countries as fit and devoted to the people and their nations.

Figure 65. A caricature presenting SCAF as consuming nearly the whole share of Egypt's food (EgyptWindow, 2016c).

Through this frame, the Brotherhood attempts to diminish the authority and prestige of their country's army. The Brotherhood also regard the judiciary as an ancillary enemy. They framed the judiciary as a "tool at the hand of the putschists" in 10.60% of the analysed statements, as the following quote illustrates.

> The judiciary in Egypt has become a cheap tool driven by the repressive military junta and the illegitimate coup regime in desperate attempts to break the will of the Egyptian people as expressed in the election of Dr Mohamed Morsi president, the first elected civilian president in the country's history (Brotherhood, 2015j, paragraph 1).

The judiciary is also called "corrupt" in 9.1% and "oppressive" in 6.81% of the analysed statements. Arguably, prior to the overthrow of Mubarak, the judiciary had a relatively good reputation as independent to the regime (Koa, 2018b). However, the Brotherhood believes that it became a tool at the hand of Sisi to administer harsh politicized sentences so that it is no longer administers justice.

> Today, the Egyptian judiciary no longer administers justice. The great many legal irregularities and crimes committed in the trials, murder in the name of law and religion, turning a blind eye to

torture, kidnapping and enforced disappearance, and then topping it all with harsh politicized sentences, have taken the judiciary to an end point where the people can no longer forget or forgive (Brotherhood, 2015a).

The portrayal of the judiciary as a corrupt tool of the regime was reinforced by caricature. Figure 66 portrays Sisi as a drummer who is controlling the media and the judiciary. The judiciary is presented as a clown with the scales of justice placed on its head, while the media follows in a comedic way to the beats of Sisi. The scale moves right and left, leaving the justice scale without balance.

The Brotherhood have also identified the media as a key target. The Egyptian media was framed by the Muslim Brotherhood as "misleading" in 12.86% of its statements, as well as a "tool at the hand of the Sisi's state" in 6.18% and "hypocrites" in 2.21% of the analysed statements. Of course, the conflict between the Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt's mainstream media has historical roots. As El-Issawi (2014) puts it, "Egyptian media have returned to their "natural" role: that of a mouthpiece tasked with replicating the regime's message with no possible input of their own" (p. 303).

Figure 66. A caricature portraying Sisi as a drummer controlling dancing media and judiciary (EgyptWindow, 2016d).

Egyptian clerics have even come under fire. The Brothers' statements regarding pro-regime clerics framed them "Hypocrites" in 3.03% of the analysed statements. The Muslim Brotherhood accused them of interpreting religious texts to justify Sisi's "perverted behaviour" and to "establish subservience to his oppression." This, they argue, is how tyrants are being produced.

> The tyrant [Sisi] is a product of the interaction of various actors. The first of whom is his own deviant self, which makes him feel infallible, incapable of making mistakes and the safeguarded who cannot be disgraced. Thus [he sees that] the world must see what he sees and hear what he hears. [Pharaoh said], "I do not show you except what I see, and I do not guide you except to the way of right conduct." He is assisted by some ignorant and brutal soldiers who just listen and obey unconsciously, without thinking. He is surrounded by evil and corrupt supporters and corrupt individuals from the elite as well as businessmen, failures of politicians, political parties and intellectuals that do not hesitate in luring him to use violence against the innocents. His tyranny is further encouraged by evil clerics; hypocrites who interpret religious texts to justify his perverted behaviour, to consolidate his oppression, and establish subservience to his oppression. In addition to this are the regional and international forces of evil that see the domination of tyrants over their people something that favours their colonial efforts in looting the wealth of nations, controlling their choice, and protecting their thrones from the wrath of their oppressed people. Moreover, the corrupt media rushes to obscure awareness and deceive lay people and materially and morally assassinate free voices (Brotherhood, 2014f, Paragraph 2).

The image that the Brotherhood seek to reinforce is that Sisi is a dictator controlling every single process in the country and being assisted by groups of corrupt people that include the media, clerics, politicians and parliament members. This image was reinforced through caricatures as well, where these sectors were portrayed as "puppets." On January 20, 2016, the Brothers' political wing, Freedom and Justice, disparaged the Egyptian parliament by portraying Sisi as a puppeteer in army apparel manipulating figures in Egypt's parliament, including pro-authority clerics (see Figure 67). The frame deployed here is that of "puppets" to undermine the status of Parliament Members.

Figure 67. A caricature portraying Sisi as a puppeteer manipulating Egyptian Parliament members (Freedom and Justice Gate, 2016a).

In summary, "name calling" is the overriding technique that the Brotherhood uses to frame the whole regime; the state, the president, the military, the media, judiciary and those clerics not affiliated with Brotherhood were all condemned by the movement by labelling them with negative symbols to discredit them and achieve the goals of the smear campaign discussed in Chapter Five: Framing the Egyptian Regime.

Assertion

"Assertion" was not one of the seven devices introduced by the IPA. However, it came second after the "name calling" in the current analysis. It appeared 156 times within 76 public statements out of the 132 statements analysed, i.e. in 61.8% of the statements. The Muslim Brotherhood used "Assertion" to support many of the strategies discussed in the previous chapters. For example, it is used to reinforce the faming of the Brotherhood as a divine movement. The Brotherhood repeatedly

alleged that they will be victorious and will prevail; this is framed as a fact without any explanation or justification, as in the following.

> Whatever efforts the tyrants effect to curtail and besiege this free and faithful group, however dirty a war they wage in its face, however many lies they invented to discredit their goals and their civilized and select nature, Allah will always grant it victory (Brotherhood, 2014f, paragraph 10).

The movement asserted several times that the end of the regime is coming inevitably without giving any explanation as to when and how this might come about. Thus, "assertion" is used to frame themselves as victorious:

> The collapse of the of the bloody military bloody coup is approaching, and the people will pluck it out from its roots like farmers weed out poisonous plants from their fields to allow others plants to grow up, prosper and blossom by the permission of God (Brotherhood, 2013ak).

The Muslim Brotherhood also used "assertion" to frame themselves as stronger than they might seem. They attempted to justify that their peaceful approach does not stem from weakness, but from their contentment with such an approach: "Our peaceful approach is a measure of our awareness and maturity, not of weakness or indecision" (Brotherhood, 2013a, paragraph 5).

The Muslim Brotherhood used "assertion" many times to convey a message that the regime is waging a war of genocide against the Egyptians. Therefore, "assertion" was used to frame the regime as "terrorists" and "criminals."

> The army and police force of the bloody Putschists are essentially carrying out a genocide war against Egyptians opposed to the coup. The numbers killed and injured have risen to astronomical levels (Brotherhood, 2013af).

Thus, it can be implied that this technique was used for incitement- dramatizing and amplifying events in Egypt to frame the regime as "the enemy of the people."

> The Egyptian people are being exposed to extermination with all kinds of weapons by Putschists from the army and police (Brotherhood, 2013af).

This idea is also reinforced through caricature (Figure 68), framing the Egyptian army and police committing a massacre and killing democracy.

Figure 68. A caricature depicting the Egyptian Army and police killing democracy (Egyvoice, 2014).

The Muslim Brotherhood also used the technique to reinforce its peaceful approach and to convey a message that it has renounced violence in the past, and will continue to do so.

> The ideology of the group that it has sought to spread and nurture its members upon for more than eighty years in various parts of the earth from east to west is one that has been published for decades and publicly available. Rather it is one that has been studied by many Muslims and non-Muslims scholars and researchers as well as in research centres. All have concluded and

affirmed the group's peaceful methodology and its dissociation from any form of violence (Brotherhood, 2014t, point 2).

"Assertion" was used by the Muslim Brotherhood to affirm and frame the revolution against the Egyptian regime as incessant no matter what happens.

We affirm to all that the heroic Egyptian people who offered thousands of martyrs, injured and detainees will not stop until they achieve their revolutionary goals, starting on January 25, 2011. They will continue their escalating revolutionary efforts and will restore the rights of their martyrs and the oppressed, God willing. They will never let the coup enjoy stability (Brotherhood, 2014s, last paragraph).

The movement also used "assertion" to accuse the regime of responsibility for many violent attacks. They argue that the military orchestrated attacks against itself to justify their repression of the Brotherhood. They even asserted that the regime was behind the bombings of Christian Coptic Churches. For instance, in the following quote, the Muslim Brotherhood asserts and frames the regime as the real terrorists of the October 24, 2014, armed attacks against the Egyptian army in different two positions in the Sinai Peninsula, in which at least 33 security personnel were killed.

The coup is the backer of terrorism and its official patron. It is the real killer of soldiers, even if it sheds crocodile tears, mourns or exhibits wailing and anguish (Brotherhood, 2014k, paragraph 5).

Thus, the Brotherhood used "assertion" as a fundamental persuasive technique for several purposes: (1) to appear as divine movement. (2) To show its steadfastness and unity despite repression against the movement. (3) For incitement, dramatizing and amplifying claims that the regime is engaging in a genocide war against the Egyptians. (4) To reinforce its peaceful approach and their pledges to stay away from violence. (5) Undermining the regime by saying that the regime is behind some violent attacks (6) To affirm that the collapse of the regime is approaching and inevitable.

Glittering Generality

"Glittering generality" was the third most commonly used technique by the Muslim Brotherhood, , appearing in 59.3% of the analysed statements. They used this technique to win the hearts and minds of people through associating their projects, ideas and programs with virtue. The movement seems to use the "glittering generality" technique primarily to pacify potential supporters and to make the outright persecution they have faced since 2013 more palatable. In the quest to frame themselves as the legitimate representatives of the Egyptian people, they deploy "glittering generalities" that are euphemistic and evocative, framing the struggle with regime as "the path of free people" or "the battle for freedom."

They also impart respect and dignity on fellow participants in the struggle against the regime to encourage others to join and link their movement to appeals for "freedom" and "dignity" that were prevalent in the 25 January revolution (Nour & Nawara, 2011). In such a context, they use vague but emotive phrases, describing their supporters as "the free comrades," "the believers of justice, freedom and human dignity," and "the loyal to the country." Thereby, they attribute legitimacy to their struggle with the regime using terms such as "the popular will," "the rights of the martyrs," and stress their "commitment to democratic legitimacy" to evoke virtue.

> We stress that reporting such false news is a failed attempt to discredit the Muslim Brotherhood by spreading rumours about the group abandoning the peaceful revolutionary path and its commitment to democratic legitimacy and the rights of the martyrs.

Their call to continue the struggle in the face of persecution relies on highly emotive language, such as "the call of the right," emphasizing "the great sacrifices" they have suffered and "lofty" or "noble" goals. By assigning such words of virtue to the cause and endeavours they seek to consolidate the determination and persistence of their members to continue their struggle against an oppressive regime and thereby bolster their legitimacy.

Unfortunately, successive traitorous Egyptian governments carried out criminal foreign plans anticipated by Hassan al-Banna who told Muslim Brotherhood members: "Your call is still unknown to many people. Once they identify it and know your noble goals, they will treat you with harsh hostility and severe enmity. You will find substantial hardships and difficulties, many challenges and obstacles put in your way [...]. The people's unfamiliarity with real Islam will stand an obstacle in your way, too. You will find religious people, even official scholars, surprised at your understanding of Islam and denounce your endeavours for it. Presidents and leaders, those with wealth and power, will antagonize and treat you with contempt and disdain. Governments will stand in your way, and will try to ban or restrict your activity, and place obstacles in your way (Brotherhood, 2014g).

"Glittering Generalities" are not simply used by the Brotherhood to assign their ideas, projects, and movement with virtues to acquire legitimacy and prestige, but also encourage their audience to condemn the government. To this end, they describe "the regime's horrific crimes," "barbaric violence," and "brutal torture.".

The junta-appointed regime's Interior Ministry and media machine continue to lay charges and throw allegations about bombing incidents and assassinations, mostly against the Muslim Brotherhood, merely to justify their own coup regime's horrific crimes, barbaric violence and brutal torture, and to distract the Egyptian people from the severe crises they suffer daily due to the illegitimate putschist regime's colossal failures on all fronts (Brotherhood, 2016h).

Thus, the Brotherhood use "glittering generality" in an attempt to win the people to their cause in the struggle against the incumbent regime through associating themselves, their movement, "revolution" and "revolutionaries" with virtuous characteristics and goals and assigning the state negative generalities to discredit them. Accordingly, this technique contributes to advancing two strategic communication campaigns; the framing of the regime as "bad" and framing themselves as "good".

Transfer

The Brotherhood used the "transfer" technique in its both forms (negative and positive) in 43.9% of the analysed statements. "Negative transfer" was used to disapprove and discredit the regime, while "positive transfer" was used to frame the movement as humble, sanctioned, accepted, revered and respected. In "negative transfer," the Brotherhood used negative qualities of ideas, situations, and characters transferred to the target they intended to condemn. In "positive transfer," the Brotherhood attempted to project the positive qualities of good behaviours, Prophet Mohammed's righteous conduct, and the meaning of Qur'anic verses in order to appear accepted and respected. Below is an illustration of the Brotherhood's use of both sides of "transfer."

Negative Transfer. The Muslim Brotherhood repeatedly seek to associate the regime with the disrespected to make the latter despised and unaccepted. For example, the movement links the Syrian regime's atrocities in their civil war against the Syrian people with the Egyptian repression of demonstrations.

> At the time we [Egyptians] are trying to heal our wounds and wipe away our grief over the martyrs and the wounded in the massacres committed by the military Putschists in Egypt, in which, thousands were martyred and an even greater number were wounded, the Syrian criminal regime has shocked us today with another massacre against the defenceless Syrian people using internationally banned toxic gases. More than one thousand three hundred were martyred, many of whom were innocent children, women and elderly (Brotherhood, 2013aa, paragraph 1).

In this quote, the Brotherhood uses "negative transfer" in a twofold manner; firstly, by linking the Egyptian regime and their actions with the hated Syrian regime, thereby appealing to negative emotions associated with Bashar Asad's brutal acts of violence to serve their agenda of discrediting the government. Secondly, the group transfers the emotions associated with the Syrian massacres that were condemned by international entities and human rights organizations to the Egyptian event, in the hope of persuading their audience that, accordingly, the Egyptian government should also be denounced.

The Brotherhood use a variety of colourful metaphors to set their agenda of delegitimizing the government. For example, they associate the regime with "poisonous weeds" that prevent plants from growing and blossoming, implying therefore, that the populace must get rid of them to allow the country to develop, grow, flourish and prosper. The "transfer" here seeks to depict and frame the regime as harmful to health of the county.

> The collapse of the of the bloody military bloody coup is approaching, and the people will pluck it out from its roots like farmers weed out poisonous plants from their fields to allow others plants to grow up, prosper and blossom by the permission of God (Brotherhood, 2013al).

The statement is targeted at the Dakahlia Governorate, in which, according to the Central Agency for Public Mobilisation and Statics of Egypt, the vast majority of residents live in rural areas (CAPMAS, 2015b, p. 5). Applying this particular analogy within a statement targeting a rural governorate is likely intentional, calling on a familiar grass roots base amongst the peasantry and rural people.

The group also deploys powerful and emotive historical analogies in order to frame their enemy as threatening. They associate the regime with tyrants such as Hulagu Khan, who sieged Baghdad in 1258 and demolished the greatest center of Islamic power. Khan was responsible for the death of more than 100,000 people and destroying grand constructions that had been the work of generations, burning palaces, mosques, libraries, and hospitals to the ground (Banks, 2012, p. 2331).

> There is no doubt that history will remember the leaders of the bloody coup; the killers of their Egyptians brothers alongside Hulagu, Nero and Hitler (Brotherhood, 2013e).

Nero was a Roman Emperor from 54AD to 68AD, who followed Roman paganism and was known for his daily crimes and brutality, including the killing of his own wife, Poppæa (Morgan, 2003). In this image, the Muslim Brotherhood attempted to reinforce the above idea through caricature as Figure 69 shows.

Figure 69. A caricature entitled: Egypt's Nero (EgyptWindow, 2016e).

However, the most common historical analogy deployed by the Muslim Brotherhood in their statements is one that will be familiar to all Egyptians: portraying Sisi as Pharaoh. It appeared in more than 6% of the analysed statements. In the Quran the Pharoah was the biggest tyrant who ever exalted himself on the earth. According to the Qur'an, the Pharaoh divided its people into factions, oppressed them, slaughtered their sons and kept their females alive, as the Quranic verse (28:4) adduced. In appealing to these familiar and powerful historical figures, […] the Putschists are following in footsteps of the Pharaoh (Brotherhood, 2013z), the Muslim Brotherhood aims to frame the regime as oppressive and brutal and therefore a force that must be refused and abolished.

Religion has also served as an important tool in this regard. Qur'anic verses were employed to condemn the regime and their followers through assigning the negative part of the verse to them. For example, on December 08, 2014, the Brotherhood attempted to convince the people to disobey Sisi by transferring the context of Qur'anic verses to the Egyptian context. They reminded readers that the Pharaoh fooled and misled his people. They compare Sisi and his people to the Pharaoh, who earned the condemnation of his followers as a sinful and ungodly people.

وَنَادَىٰ فِرْعَوْنُ فِى قَوْمِهِۦ قَالَ يَـٰقَوْمِ أَلَيْسَ لِى مُلْكُ مِصْرَ وَهَـٰذِهِ ٱلْأَنْهَـٰرُ تَجْرِى مِن

تَحْتِىٓ أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ ﴿٥١﴾ أَمْ أَنَا۠ خَيْرٌ مِّنْ هَـٰذَا ٱلَّذِى هُوَ مَهِينٌ وَلَا يَكَادُ يُبِينُ ﴿٥٢﴾

فَلَوْلَآ أُلْقِىَ عَلَيْهِ أَسْوِرَةٌ مِّن ذَهَبٍ أَوْ جَآءَ مَعَهُ ٱلْمَلَـٰٓئِكَةُ مُقْتَرِنِينَ ﴿٥٣﴾

فَٱسْتَخَفَّ قَوْمَهُۥ فَأَطَاعُوهُ إِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا۟ قَوْمًا فَـٰسِقِينَ ﴿٥٤﴾

And Pharaoh called out among his people; he said, "O my people, does not the kingdom of Egypt belong to me, and these rivers flowing beneath me; then do you not see? Or am I [not] better than this one who is insignificant and hardly makes himself clear? Then why have there not been placed upon him bracelets of gold or come with him the angels in conjunction?" So he bluffed his people, and they obeyed him. Indeed, they were [themselves] a people defiantly disobedient [of Allah].

This association between the Pharaoh and Sisi was repeated several times, both discursively and through images. See Figure 70.

Figure 70. Negative Transfer: A cartoon associating Sisi with Pharaoh (klmty, 2014).

In a more contemporary form of "negative transfer," the movement also framed the regime as Mafia. They described the way the military detained and arrested Morsi as a Mafia operation and even described Sisi as a Mafia leader. In so doing,

they seek to present the regime as an illegal gang that is unfit to rule, suggesting that the regime's behaviour does not reflect the actions of a civilised group. "The legitimate president-elect has been kidnapped and placed far away from the people in an operation similar to that of the Mafia" (Brotherhood, 2013s, point 2).

Indeed, reflecting the organisation's more modern impetus, the Muslim Brotherhood's websites go so far as to present Sisi as an evil pimp. The cartoon below was originally credited to Ammar Abou Bakr and entitled "Vote for the Pimp" انتخبوا العرص as part of an anti-Sisi campaign launched in April 2014 as Hashtag "Vote for The Pimp" begun on Twitter in Egypt and was tweeted hundreds of thousands of times. See Figure 71.

Figure 71. Carton, entitled; "Vote for the Pimp", by Ammar Abu Bakr (Ikhwanonline, 2014).

The pimp is a phrase coined during the British colonial time in Egypt, and is associated with the management of prostitutes (BBC, 2014b). According to Al-Jazeera (2014b), this term is "extremely offensive in Egyptian culture, but its use also mockingly references the North American meaning: showy, impressive, the boss of a gang." The term was also deployed to put down Sisi's supporters as it implied that his devotees are prostitutes, thereby framing the regime as illegitimate.

Positive Transfer. The Muslim Brotherhood frequently uses positive transfer to associate themselves with the prestige, respect, and authority of the Qur'an. It

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serves to make the group revered and accepted in the hope of achieving their goal to win the hearts and minds of people. It is also used to encourage their members to remain united and to be patient in the face of persecution. In the following quote, for example, the movement transfers the character of true, dignified believers to Brotherhood members.

> But you, O members of the Muslim Brotherhood, we remind you of Allah's words (Brotherhood, 2013al):

$$وَلَا تَهِنُوا وَلَا تَحْزَنُوا وَأَنتُمُ الْأَعْلَوْنَ إِن كُنتُم مُّؤْمِنِينَ ۝$$

> *So do not become weak (against your enemy), nor be sad, and you will be superior (in victory) if you are indeed (true) believers.* Verse (3:139).

The dignity and the sacrifices of several famous role models of Islamic history are evoked. On September 11, 2013, targeting Egyptian women, the movement attempted to associate the women participating in the struggle against the regime with many women known as true believers who sacrificed themselves, giving time, money, and energy to Islam. The movement made a connection between the Egyptian women and Sumaya bint Khabbat Om Ammar, who, along with her husband, Yasser, and her son, Ammar, were some of the first individuals to embrace Islam. They were terrorized, tortured and tormented by Qurashis and Abu Jahal promptly upon discovering the family's new beliefs. Her husband was killed in front of her and her son was tortured while she was watching him until, finally, Abu Jahal killed her (Ghadanfar, 2001, pp. 178-181). This period is revered in Islamic history as a time of uncertainty and violence for Muslims from which they learnt many hard and important lessons in patience and self-sacrifice.

> The names of thousands of Egyptian women […] will remain engraved in the memory of the great Egyptian revolution. They were in the battlefield; never fearing death, threats, or potential harm, and playing a major role alongside men and youngsters. These women raised up their resounding voices, calling for legitimacy and rejecting the corrupt military coup. Among them are those who were killed, ascending martyr to the eternal abode

of Paradise, some were arrested or abducted, and others were dragged and subjected to terrible treatment in prisons and police stations. Some were accused of possessing RPGs [Rocket-propelled grenade launchers] and some are still in anticipation [of becoming martyrs]. They are by lofty examples, and on par the likes of Asmaa, Umm Salamah, Khawla, al-Khansa and Umm Nidal, and many other examples, celebrated for their struggle in the history of Islam. The great Islam that makes them equal carriers the God's message (Brotherhood, 2013o, from paragraph 1).

In this way, "positive transfer" was also used to support "assertion" to convey a powerful persuasive message, namely that victory was inevitably coming. This assertion is bolstered by a Qur'anic verse transferring the context of the verses to the movement's current predicament.

The state of despair, which the tyrants are trying to impose on the people will fall apart in front of the faith of these truthful people whose faith in God's victory is unwavering. And who believe that when affliction spreads and the madness of the coup grows, a full and decisive victory will come and tyranny will miserably fall.

حَتَّىٰٓ إِذَا ٱسْتَيْـَٔسَ ٱلرُّسُلُ وَظَنُّوٓاْ أَنَّهُمْ قَدْ كُذِبُواْ جَآءَهُمْ نَصْرُنَا فَنُجِّىَ مَن نَّشَآءُ ۖ وَلَا يُرَدُّ بَأْسُنَا عَنِ ٱلْقَوْمِ ٱلْمُجْرِمِينَ ۝

[They continued] until, when the messengers despaired and were certain that they had been denied, there came to them Our victory, and whoever We willed was saved. And Our punishment cannot be repelled from the people who are criminals
(Brotherhood, 2014f, Qur'anic verse (12:110)).

In short, "transfer," in its both types; negative and positive is employed by the Muslim Brotherhood to support its political communication strategy and reinforce the key frames they intended to convey. The Brotherhood has shown the adaptability of their images and analogies by using both established (religious and pharaonic) and more modern (gang and pimp) discourses as mechanisms by which they can set their framing agenda of smearing the state and demonstrating their legitimacy

False dilemma

The "false dilemma" features 105 times in 52 public statements out of 132 analysed, i.e. 42.3% of the analysed statements. The "false dilemma" was regularly used to reinforce the idea that the Muslim Brotherhood are saving the country, while the others are ruining it. For example, the movement claims that the state burns hospitals, schools and freezes charity funds in Egypt, whilst the Brotherhood constructs hospitals, schools and fosters the poor and the orphaned.

> The illegal coup government burnt and destroyed homes, mosques and hospitals and froze charity funds to starve poor people, displace orphans, leave new-borns to die in incubators, and prevent dialysis from the patients with kidney failure. This is while the Muslim Brotherhood constructs hospitals and schools; fosters the poor and the orphaned and does good, offering free health care and education in all parts of the Egyptian Republic (Brotherhood, 2013ac, paragraph 3).

The Muslim Brotherhood used the "false dilemma" technique to reinforce the idea that the regime is just an agent for Zionism, thusly presenting themselves as the patriots while their opponents are untrustworthy and agents of the enemy. In the following example, the Brotherhood attempts to arouse the hatred of the people against the regime, claiming that the regime is a close ally of Zionism, and that the latter launched diplomatic and advocacy campaigns for the benefit of the regime. In many cases, the regime is presented as untrustworthy and unpatriotic, making the Brotherhood the only devoted and loyal alternative.

> People have become the enemy in the eyes of the tyrant Putschists whilst the Zionists who are the real enemy have been granted safety. The Zionists have even launched an international diplomatic campaign of mobilizing support for the coup regime, attempting to trivialize its crimes and genocide. How astonishing! Israel is acting as the Foreign Minister of the bloody coup! (Brotherhood, 2013g).

In addition, deploying "false dilemma," the Muslim Brotherhood depict themselves as respectful of the Egyptian constitution and democracy while the regime violates those principles.

> This confirms that the military coup is restoring the regime of the deposed President [Mubarak's regime], turning against the principles and objectives of the January 25 revolution, and toppling all the hopes and aspirations of the people for a free, civic, democratic, and constitutional life (Brotherhood, 2013ad, deducted from paragraph 11).

The Muslim Brotherhood used the "false dilemma" to send a message to the main powers of the world that the military cannot establish a democratic system, but they can. *If they [the Western governments] support the military, then can the military establish a democratic system?* (Brotherhood, 2013c, line 52). The implication is that the regime is incompetent whereas the movement is qualified to establish and run a democratic system. They ask the regime, *do you have any respect for the will of the people and their sovereignty?* (Brotherhood, 2013j, line 12). The implication here is that the Brotherhood is respecting the elections and the vote of the people, while the regime is not.

To summarise, the "false dilemma" is a key technique that the Muslim Brotherhood skilfully utilise to reinforce the notion that they are the only option. In "false dilemma" the movement urges the following circular pattern of reasoning: Either claim the *Brotherhood* is true or claim the others is false. If the Muslim Brotherhood claims they are right, then the others are wrong. When the Muslim Brotherhood claims the others are wrong, then this implies that they are right.

Rhetorical Question and Hypophora

the beginning of the analysis, I did not consider "Rhetorical Question" and the "Hypophora" techniques deployed to capture the audience's attention, urge brainstorming, make an argument in a question structure, and impose doubt. However, during the analysis, I noticed the consistency of such techniques in the narrative of the public statements. The effect of raising questions in this way is that the argument is presented as more lively and dynamic, i.e. in the form of a dialogue (Jordaan, 2013, p. 170). The Muslim Brotherhood often use rhetorical questions to create a dramatic conclusion and to introduce an argument or to demand from its audience an implicit but obvious answer. Such questions in public statements have

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a one-way direction. A "Rhetorical Question" is a persuasive question that is asked to make comments or exclamation. It has an interrogative structure but not in function as the answer is completely implied. It has the entity of strong assertion (Chiad & Sabah, 2015, p. 95).

Muslim Brotherhood used "Rhetorical Question" and "Hypophora" 71 times in 33 public statements out of 132 analysed, i.e. 26.8% of the analysed statements; "Rhetorical Question" was used 59 times, and "Hypophora," 12 times. Although not as frequently used as other techniques, when deployed, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to use these discursive techniques skilfully.

In using the "Rhetorical Question," the movement attempts to captivate the audience and deny the answers that may in turn open the door for more interpretations and animate other questions by the audience. For example, through such types of questions, the Muslim Brotherhood urged the countries that were supporting Sisi to make an inventory account for the aid paid to him to know where their money really goes. By this, the Brotherhood attempt to instil doubt in the integrity of the Egyptian government, implicitly framing them as corrupt.

> We call upon those [countries] supporting the coup to carry out an inventory check of the aid paid to the leader of the coup recently to understand where their money has gone [...] to serve the genuine interests of the Egyptian people or to secret accounts, bloated with illegal (Haram) money? (Brotherhood, 2015f, paragraph 4).

The Muslim Brotherhood also deployed rhetorical questioning to serve their technique of assertion. For instance, the group utilised the rhetorical questioning to assert that the majority of the people support them.

> We want to ask the Putschists: do not have eyes to see the millions taking to the streets and squares? Do not have you ears to hear the roar of their voices refusing your coup and saying to you that the majority of the nation wants to adhere to constitutional legitimacy and democracy? (Brotherhood, 2013j, paragraph 3).

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Understanding the goal of such questions depends on the context. For example, some questions aimed to dramatize events using highly emotional words that touch the hearts of people and appeal for political support. In the following quote for example, the Brotherhood magnifies the political situation in Egypt and arouses suspicion against the regime's intentions and faith.

> And we want to ask the putschists: how many massacres you wish to commit? How many souls you wish to kill? How much more blood you want to shed until you satiate your desire to spill sacred blood? Do not you fear God? Are you not keen on the national interest? Do you not respect the people's will and sovereignty? Or have you other interests which transcend all of this? (Brotherhood, 2013j, paragraph 4).

The Muslim Brotherhood frequently uses the structure of the rhetorical questions to emphasise their argument and obstruct rivals in response to political developments. On March 4, 2014, Sisi addressed the Egyptians as Field Marshal and said that he could not avoid the will of what he called the "majority" of Egyptians to run for president, in contrast to his previous claims (Kingsley, 2014). Sisi's claimed to have solutions for the problems that were facing the country, provoking the Muslim Brotherhood to attack him on precisely that ground.

> He also claimed that he has solutions for all the problems facing Egypt, which is odd! So why has he not solved them yet, despite controlling all of the countries capabilities since he committed the coup eight months ago? (Brotherhood, 2014m).

In "Hypophora," the Muslim Brotherhood asks a question and then immediately gives the answer from its point of view. In the following quote, they both question the intention of the regime and provide their view by way of reinforcing their argument.

> A state of emergency is imposed only in three cases: during war, an epidemic or during civil strife. We do not know upon what basis the decision to extend the state of emergency was taken. Did they consider the relationship between the Putschists and the people one of war? Or did they consider the continuing daily mass demonstrations in all governorates and cities as a civil strife? It is but a peaceful demonstration sanctioned by the

constitution and all global human rights documents (Brotherhood, 2013ad, Paragraph 3).

In essence, "Rhetorical Question" and "Hypophora" appear to be intentional types of persuasive techniques used by the Muslim Brotherhood to advance their political communication strategy and support their framing agenda. The Brotherhood does not seek to provoke a genuine dialogue but rather make a point in a question structure. "Rhetorical Question" and "Hypophora" also serve to support and bolster complimentary techniques such as "Assertion.

Card Stacking (Selective Omission)

The current analysis of the Muslim Brotherhood's public statements offers numerous examples of how the movement have used the "card stacking" technique. The Brotherhood used "card stacking" 64 times in 42 documents, i.e. in 34.1% of the documents analysed. The movement employed "card stacking" to influence the people in the direction they desired, most frequently to arouse hatred and rally the people against the regime. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood condemned Sisi's call on Arab countries to expand the peace process with Israel to include more Arab countries. The movement "stacked cards" to conclude that Sisi is a traitor who attempts to annihilate the nation.

> What the traitor Sisi and the leaders of the military are doing now is purely a crime in order to obliterate the nation (Ummah). Perhaps Sisi's call for the expansion of the Camp David agreement between Egypt and the Zionist entity to encompass wider Arab participation, his position regarding the siege of Gaza, his flooding the borders with Gaza with seawater, the displacement of the residents of Rafah and Sheikh Zuwaid, his silence about what is happening in Jerusalem, his support of the Russian occupation of Syria, as well as his support for the tyrant Bashar al-Assad provide proofs beyond doubt of his treason (Brotherhood, 2015q, paragraph 3).

In the above quote, the Muslim Brotherhood attempts to manipulate audience's perception of President Sisi by highlighting one side that supports their argument and repressing another that may refute their argument. For example, from the above

quote, the Brotherhood exploits the people's sympathy with Gaza to condemn Sisi and present him as traitor whilst they ignore that this issue has numerous nuances, notably that the flooded borders with Gaza are mostly smuggling tunnels. The issue has been debated on security, economy, and humanitarian grounds. More importantly, according to Reuters, even during Morsi's time in power, approximately 200 such tunnels were shut down (al-Mughrabi, 2013).

The Muslim Brotherhood has thus used "card stacking" to assign the regime with responsibility for all the country's failures. In line with this strategy, in 2014, the Muslim Brotherhood used different uncorrelated numbers to manipulate the audience's perception of Egypt's international position.

> The military establishment preoccupied itself with economic activity; monopolized the nation's land; and controlled around 40% of the country's economy. The result is a debt of more than 1600 billion Egyptian pounds, national poverty that has exceeded 40%, the unemployment of millions, the highest number of liver disease and kidney failure sufferers in the world, 20 million people living in slums; of which four million live in cemeteries and the loss of transparency. Matters that have led to the failure of Egypt, its weaknesses and its diminished regional and international standing (Brotherhood, 2014u, deducted from paragraph 7).

As can be implied from the above quote, the Brotherhood aims to dramatize or exaggerate Egypt's economic situation to discredit the government, conveniently ignoring that it was even worse during the Brotherhood's Morsi's time in power.[37] As the BBC reporter Matthew Davies (2013) put it: "Egypt's debt ballooned, Mr. Morsi's government continually dipped into the country's cash reserves, which at $16bn today are less than half what they were before Mr Morsi took office." On balance, the Muslim Brotherhood relies upon the "card stacking" as one of its fundamental persuasive techniques. The Brotherhood depends on the selection of

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[37] According to a BBC report: Government debt grown from $30bn before Mubarak was ousted to around $40bn in July 2013. Inflation, was 3%, and by July 2013 stood at between 13% and 18%. Unemployment has climbed to a record 13.2% under Morsi.

facts simultaneously with, or to support, other persuasive techniques aiming at stronger influence.

Plain Folks

The Brotherhood rely heavily on the notion that they are one with the people. Featuring in 32.5% of their communication, they use this technique to frame themselves as legitimate, reliable, representing the people and having the peoples' interests at heart. Frequently this technique appears in the movement's communication when demanding compliance and is also used to set the agenda on national occasions such as the Sinai Liberation Day on April 25 and Revolution Day on January 25. The Brotherhood frequently frame their leaders as men of the people, sharing others' struggles and sacrificing themselves for the country's freedom.

> The group stresses that its leaders, the members of the Guidance Bureau, whom were kidnapped and hidden are the beacon of the nation's struggle, alongside tens of thousands of young men, women and elderly who are confronting the criminals of the military coup with chests that do no fear bullets, detention or torture. We will continue to follow in their steps (Brotherhood, 2015n, last paragraph).

This technique is particularly used to frame moments of crises such as terror attacks on Christian churches or on Egyptian soldiers in Sinai, whereby the Brotherhood take the opportunity to depict themselves as feeling the adversity of others. For example, on November 18, 2013, when a freight train travelling from the city of Beni Suef, hit vehicles at a crossing near the village of Dahshur, the Brotherhood rushed to extend their condolences to the victims' families. Occasions such as this serve as a chance for the group to frame the state as responsible, stating that justifications of, "human error and individual negligence," cannot be acceptable.

> The Muslim Brotherhood extends its sincere condolences to the victims' families of the Dahshur train accident and to the Egyptian People. We also pray that the injured quickly and fully recover. We call for an urgent investigation to identify those

> responsible for the incident, and to hold them accountable
> according to the law (Brotherhood, 2013l).

In short, the Brotherhood employed "plain folks" to frame themselves as an average Joe or a common movement that understands and empathises with the people's concerns. Through this technique, the Brotherhood frame their ideas, projects and revolution as "of the people" and thus imply that the people should accept these ideas and projects because they are for their benefit. The movement deployed this technique to convince the people that the Brothers' views and interests reflect those of the Egyptian people and therefore they should be supported.

Pinpointing the Enemy (Scapegoating)

In the Muslim Brotherhood's communication, two principal enemies are used to simplify complicated situations: the regime and Zionism. This technique appeared in 18.7% of the total statements. Numerous examples scapegoated the regime. For instance, on July 20, 2013, the Brotherhood issued a statement to condemn the killing of three women and a young girl in clashes between what Egyptian security forced called "angry residents" of the delta city of Mansoura and pro-Morsi protesters (AP, 2013). Gunshots and birdshots were fired at Morsi's supporters and the group put the responsibility for the clash with the incumbent regime, ignoring the details of the clashes (Guardian, 2013d).

> We condemn this despicable crime, holding the leaders of the
> military coup responsible as well as the Interior Ministry, and its
> minister (Brotherhood, 2013ag).

The Brotherhood has also used historic events to deploy this technique of scapegoating. The Public Statement published on July 18, 2013, urged the Egyptian public to commemorate the Tenth of Ramadan War 1973. The Brotherhood blamed the return of the military to politics as the cause of the deteriorating political situation in Egypt.

> While we welcome this great anniversary, Egypt continues to
> experience a nightmare that threatens its national security and
> warns of civil war, a clash between the people and its beloved and

> heroic army or a split within the army itself as a result of some military leaders indulging in politics and showing desire for control and leadership through a coup against constitutional legitimacy and the kidnapping of the civilian president-elect […] (Brotherhood, 2013u, paragraph 2).

Using the scapegoating technique, the Brotherhood sought to incite soldiers and their families against the army leadership by framing them as uncaring about the lives of military officers on the borders. On the other hand, the Brotherhood want to appear as respecting and valuing the lives of all Egyptians, even those who turned against them in the "coup".

> The military coup, which failed to protect our troops in the Sinai […], went on to terrorise the people of Sinai without achieving any stability. It disregarded all services and facilities. The economy collapsed and crises erupted at a time it sends our army to fight in external conflicts, turning into mercenaries to whosoever pays more money to the corrupt gang of the coup (Brotherhood, 2014o, paragraph 3).

Zionism was the second main culprit. Commemorating the "42nd" memorial of the October War of 1973, the Brotherhood pinpointed Zionism as the cause of the tribulation that the people of Sinai experience.

> What is happening in the beloved land of Sinai such as the killing of its people; its men, women and children, under the pretext of terrorism, is a conspiracy that the Zionists stand behind. One that seeks to spill the blood of the sons of this homeland, that of the Egyptian army and the people of Sinai and seeking to sow the seeds of hostility between them (Brotherhood, 2015q, paragraph 5).

As is explicit from the above quote, the Brotherhood depicted Zionism as the root cause of the continuous violence in Sinai. Moreover, this was a conspiracy executed by the agent of Zionism: the treacherous Egyptian government.

One of the central messages communicated through scapegoating was that the deposition of Morsi threatened democracy promotion throughout the Middle East. Commenting on the War in Yemen in 2015, the group suggested that the removal of Morsi was the cause of all political crises in the Arab region. The Brotherhood

attempts here to convey a message that the disposal of Morsi by the army urged other groups in the region to follow their way. Among those were Houthi rebels in Yemen who deposed the government from power after they stormed the capital, Sana'a, on September 21, 2014, resulting in an ongoing civil war.[38]

> The Muslim Brotherhood is attentively observing what is happening in the brotherly Yemen. The Muslim Brotherhood confirms that the cause of the regional crises and that of the brotherly Yemen is because of the coup against legitimacy […] (Brotherhood, 2015c, Paragraph 1).

As shown above, "Pinpointing the enemy" or "scapegoating" is a useful technique to avoid condemnation and identify and discredit key rivals. Though there may be other elements and factors involved in the matter, the Brotherhood can paint a simplified picture that relays clear-cut rights and wrongs, thereby framing themselves positively, and the Egyptian regime negatively.

Testimonial

The "testimonial" technique in both its forms appeared during this analysis in 13.8% of the total analysed statements. While testimonials are typically used positively, the Brotherhood is also able to skilfully use it in reverse by assigning the regime with a negative testimonial that is hated and disrespected in the Egyptian context. The Brotherhood specifically deploy this technique to frame the regime as a Zionist agent, thereby undermining its legitimacy. The Brotherhood link the regime with Zionism by using such a technique in sentences that could be understood as: "hey, look who is praising the regime!" For instance, on December 22, 2013, the Brotherhood use the technique to frame the Egyptian Army negatively, bringing to the soldiers' attention that Israeli politicians are praising the Egyptian leadership. Accordingly, the regime cannot be trusted.

> You may have heard the huge praise the leaders of the Zionist entity directed at the leader of the coup, considering him a

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[38] In 2011, following the Yemini's uprising, the former President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, was forced to hand over power. However, the Houthis implemented a coup against the new government.

national hero for Israel. In addition, the statements of Dan Halutz, [the Former Commander-in-Chief of the Israeli Forces], in which he stated that the involvement of the Egyptian army in politics will weaken it for a long time. Does this make you happy? (Brotherhood, 2013f, deducted from paragraph 20).

Using "negative testimonial," the Brotherhood can thereby frame themselves as the true patriots, whilst the regime, who is being praised by a longstanding, historical enemy, is a traitor that is betraying the country and its people. Referring in October 2014, to Egyptian military operations in Sinai, the Brotherhood claim that,

Even the most pessimist patriot never imagined what is currently happening in generally Egypt and particularly in the Sinai and Rafah. The Putschists have done what the Zionist occupation was unable to do. The spokesperson of the Zionist army declared with all his bravado, that what the Egyptian army is doing to the Egyptian people of Sinai and Rafah is being done in full cooperation and coordination with the Zionist enemy! (Brotherhood, 2014a, Paragraph 16).

However, the Muslim Brotherhood also utilised "positive testimonial" to frame themselves as humble, reliable and worthy. The Brotherhood used this technique to promote the idea that the Brotherhood is a democratic group and deny the accusation that it is a terrorist group. They quoted Former US President (1977 – 1981), Jimmy Carter, claiming: "The president Morsi was kidnapped, and the leaders of the Brotherhood were arrested and detained in subhuman conditions, treated like terrorists when they are not" (Brotherhood, 2013ac, Paragraph 16). On December 26, 2013, condemning the inclusion of the group on terrorism lists by the Egyptian government, the movement quoted the title and ideas of an article in the Telegraph Newspaper: "*Who was the greatest champion of democracy in 2013? Unbelievably, the Muslim Brotherhood.*" In this article, Brendan O'Neill, the editor of Spiked Online and a columnist for The Australian, Reason, and The Big Issue, provided a testimony for the Muslim Brotherhood.

Looking back over 2013, what person or organisation has done the most to preserve the ideals of democracy and freedom? Who should win the prize for standing up for democratic rights in the face of autonomy-crushing authoritarianism? I cannot believe I

am about to say this, but I think it is the Muslim Brotherhood, or at least its supporters in Egypt. More than any other group of people on Earth, the Egyptian masses who back the Muslim Brotherhood risked life and limb in 2013 to try to preserve the idea that the people should get to choose their political leaders and should be free to express their political views and anger in public. Where we liberals in the West merely write articles about the importance of democratic rights and freedom of speech, Muslim Brotherhood fans in Egypt have fought tooth-and-catapult for those things; they've even died for them, in their thousands (O'Neill, 2013).

In brief, "testimonial" in its both forms is used by the Brotherhood to achieve its objectives. In "negative testimonial," the movement seeks primarily to discredit the regime and frame it as a Zionist agent. It serves to support their strategy of linking the regime with Zionism and framing the Brothers as the real patriots. In "positive testimonial," the movement seek to frame themselves as humble, reliable and worthy and reinforce the idea that they are a democratic movement and moderate. It is also used to refute attempts to frame the movement as terrorist, bolstering scholarly arguments that emphasize the Brotherhood's commitment to nonviolence (Ranko, 2015; Richter, 2011a; Wickham, 2015).

Hot potato

In the analysed documents, 16 "Hot Potatoes" in 11 documents were identified, i.e. in 8.9% of the total public statements. For example, commenting on the constitutional referendum that was held in January 2014, the group attempted to frame the regime as riggers to disgrace them by surprising people with evidence showing that the regime counterfeited the constitutional referendum. The January 2014 constitution, which was voted for by 98% of the people, replaced the one introduced by Islamists before Morsi was ousted. However, the turnout was 38.6% of the 53 million eligible voters; the rest of the voters boycotted the referendum, dismissing it as a "farce" (BBC, 2014c).

> The null and void referendum was rigged which was as and impartial observers expected. We know how the Putschists and their followers falsified the figures. Some time ago, one of the

> leaders of the "Kamil Jameelak" that called for the nomination of Sisi for President resigned, saying that they managed to collect only 8500 signatures. Therefore, his colleagues emerged in the media declaring that they collected 5.5 million signatures. Some newspapers affiliated to the coup reported that 4000 Egyptian citizens in Japan voted in favour of the constitution whilst we know that the number of those registered to vote is 423 people, and those who actually voted for them only amounted to 34 people (Brotherhood, 2014l, paragraph 5).

In the Egyptian context, the use of the Hot Potato device by the Brotherhood is arguably particularly effective. On the one hand, the regime considers the Muslim Brotherhood as an illegal body that no longer exists as a significant force, hence, any official response by the regime to the Brotherhood may give it significant weight. No response by the regime to refute the Brotherhood's allegations may also give more publicity and popularity to such claims. So, on the one hand, any direct denial by the regime of "Hot Potato" claims benefit the organisation while ignoring the claims also leaves the Brotherhood's messaging uncontested.

The "Hot Potato" is an important vehicle that is being used by the Muslim Brotherhood to discomfit the state. By using it as a persuasive technique within the narrative of the written public statements, however, the Brotherhood deploys the technique in an intentionally linear and sender-focused way rather than in debates that might enable a complete cycle of two-way communication.

Bandwagon (Peer Pressure)

Though the least commonly used of all the persuasive techniques (featuring only 15 times), the Brotherhood also deploy this technique as a means of framing themselves as the majority that people prefer and should belong to. The movement generally employ this technique as a mobilization tactic to urge the audience to participate effectively in the struggle with regime.

> The attempt to overthrow the bloody coup, although primarily the task of the revolutionaries on the ground should also be carried out by every free noble person belonging to this country, as well as it lovers all over the world. This is through councils,

revolutionary coalitions, human rights and media outlets that carry the message of the revolution to peoples around the world. And to all countries, to local and international organizations, to all courts and judicial authorities involved in prosecuting murderers and perpetrators of humanitarian crimes […]. Through this, their honest work will integrate with the growing revolutionary effort (Brotherhood, 2014d, paragraph 9).

In short, the "bandwagon" technique appears primarily as a device in order to encourage mobilization and recruitment and away to frame themselves as the winning majority. This technique may be used less frequently by the movement, in pragmatic recognition that they Muslim Brotherhood no longer carries much popular weight within a majority of Egyptian society and therefore will not be credible amongst its target audience.

The Lesser of Two Evils

In the context of the struggle between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian regime, the "lesser of two evils" technique was only observed a single time. The Brotherhood used this technique to reinforce its peaceful approach and make sure that its followers would not react violently to the regime. Therefore, the Brotherhood claimed that to keep sacrificing while following the peaceful approach is much better than resorting to violence and paying a heavier price.

> The Putschists are following in, or exceeding the footsteps of the Pharaoh, wanting to provoke the nation's youth in general and the Muslim mainstream in particular in order to drag them into a downward spiral of violence and counter-violence and to push them into abandoning the peaceful approach. For this reason, it is upon us, O free revolutionaries from all national streams, to not give them what they seek, nor to leave our most powerful driving force which is our peacefulness. However much we sacrifice, it is still better than countering the violence perpetrated by the bloody coup authorities. We are certain, sure, God willing, that our peaceful revolution will defeat all their weaponry (Brotherhood, 2013m, paragraph 7).

This technique is something of a last resort. Naturally, the Brotherhood prefer to frame themselves and their cause as a positive force, rather than make the case that

they are the lesser of two evils. This perhaps accounts for the infrequent use of this device as part of their strategic messaging.

Conclusion

This study has sought to examine Islamist movements' techniques of strategic framing. It attempted to answer the fourth research question was raised at the outset of the study: How do Islamist social movements use specific communication devices to delegitimize rivals and legitimize themselves? Therefore, The IPA's category of persuasive techniques was applied as the basis of the content analysis index to deductively identify and analyse the Brotherhood's employment of such techniques in order to explain and illuminate how the Brotherhood use them as a means of framing. However, the study also identified other techniques used by the Brotherhood as tools of strategic framing (assertion, false dilemma, the lesser of two evils, pinpointing the enemy, hot potato). These techniques also are used to achieve the overall strategic goals discussed in the previous chapters.

The thesis has suggested that the techniques discussed in this chapter were deployed to support three campaigns that are being implemented simultaneously. (1) A smear campaign to discredit and incriminate the regime that ousted President Morsi and damage its image, credibility, and reputation. (2) A sophisticated marketing and branding campaign to burnish the movement's image to win the hearts and minds of the public and construct itself as a legitimate representative of the Egyptian people and the Islamic faith. (3) A public relations campaign to present itself as a central and legitimate political actor in the Middle East's political fray by presenting itself as a moderate, non-violent movement that upholds and adheres to democracy and a civil state. To illustrate this idea, I created Figure 72 as a sample. The figure presents the strategic goal of discrediting the regime and the strategies used to accomplish it, and then the communication tactics used to achieve each strategy.

Theoretically, this chapter contributes to the strategic framing concept of social movement theory by suggesting that these persuasive techniques serve as an under-explored tool that reveals the discursive mechanisms through which the Brotherhood frames its rhetoric. The analysis of an extensive range of the Brotherhood's textual and visual communication using the techniques developed by the IPA's codebook, clearly advances scholarly understanding of how social movements seek to seek to achieve their goals. It also supports the findings of previous scholarship by Conway et al. (2007) who concluded that IPA's seven devices can be utilized as a common means of measuring political messages and that this approach "provides a template for future content analysis studies, allowing for comparisons across media and programming genres" (p. 198). This systematic approach could also potentially be used to compare discursive changes in the rhetoric of the same actor over time, or between different Islamist groups in order to determine how the goals and techniques of agenda setting and framing change amongst Islamist groups across time and space. The study shows that the persuasive techniques, when combined with discourse analysis of both texts and images, can provide real insight into the strategic goals and values of influential Islamist movements, empowering both policy-makers and audiences. Whether the group consciously study and reproduce these techniques would require further qualitative research, most likely interviews with the organisation's communication strategists. This is beyond the current scope of the project but certainly constitutes a fascinating facet of study for future scholarship.

Figure 72. Discrediting the regime as a strategic goal and strategies with techniques used to achieve it.

Chapter Ten: Conclusion

At the outset of this study, the following research questions were asked: (1) How has the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology evolved post July 2013 and how does social movement theory explain this change? (2) How has political opportunity affected the Brotherhood's communication methods (i.e. cultural resources) and how do they circumvent media bias? (3) How do Islamist social movements frame themselves and their rivals? (4) How do Islamist social movements communicate to influence? Seeking to provide a sustained and in-depth understanding of the Brotherhood's strategic communication, political agenda, ideological metamorphosis, media evolution, and how the Brotherhood sought to mobilize audiences to pursue its desired goals; the study sought to decode and deconstruct the Brotherhood's political communication strategy post-Morsi's removal and present the key elements of such a strategy through analysing central elements of a typical communication plan; key messages, key target audience, key media channels, strategies, and communication objectives (Blythe, 2003; Cwalina, Falkowski, & Newman, 2015; Fill, 2005; Manheim, 2011) as Figure 73 illustrates.

Figure 73. Communication Strategy Cycle.

In order order to facilitate the analytic process, the study utilised the following formula as a means of inquiry; What does the Muslim Brotherhood say via their communiqués, to whom, how, and with what objectives? Social movement theory and propaganda techniques were also used in order to shed light on the mechanics, reasons for, and possible significance of, the Brotherhood's communication strategy since 2013, deploying a combination of content and discourse analysis to comprehensively examine the Arabic communiqués issued by the Brotherhood from July 2, 2013, to March 22, 2016.

Social movement theory is a framework that is precisely geared toward explaining collective action and offering a logical framework intended to clarify the appearance, organization, strategies, potential social, cultural, and political consequences and possibility of success of social movements (Kuumba, 2001, p. 47). Accordingly, the modus operandi of the whole Brotherhood's strategy to restore itself at the helm of the Egyptian power can be summarised in the following Figure 74.

Figure 74. Summary of the Brotherhood's political communication strategy post-July 2013.

The results of this investigation have shown that since the overthrow of Morsi on July 3, 2013, the Brotherhood has been following what appears to be a sophisticated political communication strategy that is evolving in response to the political context on the ground. The thesis suggests that the movement designed its political communication strategies to achieve three strategic political goals; (1) discrediting and *delegitimizing the military regime* that ousted President Morsi (2) winning the hearts and minds of the public and framing itself as a legitimate *representative of the Egyptian people* and the Islamic faith (3) establishing the group as a legitimate political actor by framing itself as a *moderate, non-violent movement* that upholds and adheres to democracy and a civil state.

Social movement theorists indicate that strategic framing has come to be regarded, alongside resource mobilization and political opportunity processes, as a central dynamic in understanding the character and course of social movements (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 611). Social movements use frames to bring individuals

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together and incite them to act. Frames thereby signify a sets of beliefs, views and meanings that stir and legitimate the activities and campaigns of a social movement (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 614). The Muslim Brotherhood is not an exception in this regard. To discredit and delegitimize the regime, the Brotherhood conducted a negative campaign to inflict hatred in the hearts of their audience towards the regime and to frame the state as untrustworthy, incompetent, and immoral. As Chapter Five explores, the movement sought to incriminate the incumbent regime and damage their image, credibility, and reputation. This negative campaign consisted of several framing strategies designed to undermine the regime, such as exposing the government's malpractices and transgressions, linking the state with Zionism, stereotyping the regime and its institution with corruption and questioning their integrity. The Brotherhood's verbal and visual media framed their opponents as foolish, irresponsible, disconnected, and evil as a means of simultaneously framing themselves as a more desirable alternative and as the legitimate representatives of an "authentic" Egyptian cultural identity.

The Brotherhood deployed numerous tactics to expose the regime's transgressions. These tactics included; questioning the regime's intentions, amplifying lapses, magnifying the negative impacts of the state's projects and plans, and portraying the regime as violating traditions, religion, and social taboos. To this end, the movement devoted considerable effort to presenting the government as desecrating places of worship and killing worshipers. Moreover, the state was framed as crossing key red lines - particularly regarding women. This became one of the Brotherhood's favourite targets. The entire Egyptian governmental system was targeted by the negative campaign, from top to bottom. Their principal enemy, President Sisi, was framed as a butcher, a leader of Putschists, a traitor, liar, and mirroring the regime's own framing of the Brotherhood, as a terrorist. The military were portrayed as criminals, dictatorial, fascists, gangs, thieves, and the people's enemy. The Brotherhood painted the Egyptian media as misleading and hypocritical, a tool at the hand of a corrupt regime. The judiciary and pro-government clerics were also framed as hypocritical puppets in service of a broken system.

As Chapter Six while the Brotherhood moved to destroy the regime's image, the movement sought to win the hearts and minds of the public and construct itself as the ultimate legitimate representative of the Egyptian people and the Islamic faith. To serve this strategic goal, the group launched a branding and marketing campaign that deployed framing strategies to increase public sympathy with the Brotherhood and gain support. Key amongst these were their claim to speak on behalf of the people. Through this, the Brotherhood framed itself as occupying a position to represent the whole public in order to be viewed as a grassroots movement that works to achieve the people's demands of "Bread, Freedom, Social Justice, and Human Dignity." In so doing they clearly adopted the popular mantra of the January 2011 revolution in the quest to frame themselves as the legitimate heirs of the uprising against Mubarak. Thus, the Brotherhood have framed itself as occupying the moral high ground, and representing a righteous path against the evil Egyptian state. Cultivating and framing their identity as a "divine movement" that puts the people's interests ahead of their own was key in this regard.

To achieve this goal, the group adopted various forms of "love-bombing" to win new followers and increase its popularity. This technique, used to influence people through lavish and profuse demonstrations of kindness and affection, was first applied in the 1970s as a recruitment technique of the Unification Church of the United States. Similarly, the Brotherhood attempted to create a feeling of unity amongst the people against a hostile regime. In particular, the group have appropriated the symbolism of the 2011 revolution to claim that the ongoing conflict between the movement and the regime is an extension of this popular, emotive and symbolic revolt. In particular, they have highlighted the sacrifices of their members and leaders to show that they are working for the freedom of the people, and therefore, the nation's hope. To this end, they encouraged positive stereotypes of the movement. They framed Morsi as representing the free will of the people, as just, courageous, patriotic and a devout believer. Above all, however, they have stressed that only Morsi's government constitutes constitutional legitimacy. The significance of this theme was evident in the (almost farcical) 72 references to constitutional legitimacy made by Morsi himself on the eve of his fall.

These findings confirm that the positive stereotypes of the movement are no longer simply, or even principally, religious in nature and now encompass more secular, and civil frames through which the Brotherhood seek to cultivate their identity.

Indeed, the movement has increasingly promoted equality between men and women in the revolutionary in the quest to expand their popular support. Chapter Six suggests that this has paved the way for the emergence of female leadership and increased the chance of greater political participation by the Muslim Sisters. This work contributes to existing knowledge of social movement theory by highlighting the role of political opportunity structure in the development of social movements. This case study demonstrates that negative political opportunity structure can have a significant positive impact in highlighting leadership skills of marginalized groups within a social movement. This is clear through the prominent role that the Muslim Sisters have played in the struggle with the regime since 2013. The Brotherhood's communication demonstrates that women have become increasingly important human resources for the movement, with the potential for greater leadership by the Muslim Sisters. Negative political opportunity structure thus played a major role in the empowerment of the Muslim Sisters as critical female human resources. As Chapter Six shows this paved the way for the emergence of women leadership or at least the Brotherhood's discourse regarding women's rights (cultural resources) in the movement's quest to achieve legitimacy (moral resources). This argument is further supported by the latest scholarship on this issue as Biagini (2017) makes the case that negative political conditions allow for the emergence of female leadership.

This attempt to frame themselves as a positive and modern movement serves the third strategic goal of the movement, which is to appear as a key and legitimate political actor in the Middle East's ongoing political fray, explored in Chapter Seven and Chapter Eight. Directly contrasting to the historic origins of the group in its founding form, the Brotherhood has gone to some length to identify itself as legitimate political actor using the theme, and language, of democracy and its associated values. To appear as a reliable alternative to the Egyptian regime, the Brotherhood has framed itself to the world as a moderate, non-violent movement

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that upholds and adheres to democracy and civil state above all else. This move indicates that fundamental shifts may have taken place within the Muslim Brotherhood's ideological underpinnings that could potentially have major implications for the broader political project of the movement. The Brotherhood now present themselves as *the* key defender of democracy in Egypt, claiming that they are more democratic than democrats themselves claim to be. This democratic agenda is being stressed at the expense of more traditional commitments to apply *sharī'a* law, or free the Muslim world from foreign control and establish a free Islamic state. It seems that the movement is convinced that democracy and political pluralism is the only significant guarantor of its existence in the political polity and the political arena.

The Brotherhood's statements demonstrate a commitment to the principle of the sovereignty of people, explicitly linking the country's advancement and prosperity with the achievement of the peoples' sovereignty and their freedom. The Brotherhood's position on minorities is undoubtedly contentious; however, important rhetorical and practical indicators suggest an increasing respect for pluralism, notably the appointment of Copts, Rafiq Habib as deputy chairman of the FJP, and Samir Morcos as presidential aide. The Brotherhood have also taken a firm line on the application of human rights, highlighting the selective behaviour of Western countries who claim to adhere to such international norms, notably the US. The movement has moved from not simply endorsing the principles of human rights and freedoms but to installing these as dominant themes within its communication strategy and, nominally at least, its political agenda.

The Muslim Brotherhood's strategy has allowed the movement to frame itself as a moderate movement, challenging domestic, regional and international representations of the group as affiliated with terrorism. Indeed, there are significant indicators that the Brotherhood has replaced its motto "jihad is our way" with the theme "Peacefulness is our way." As shown in Chapter Eight, the Brotherhood presents its peacefulness as an act of worship and, has introduced the discourse of "peaceful jihad," into its framing lexicon stressing that anyone killed following these teachings dies as martyr. In official statements at least, the

movement seems to have abandoned their slogan that the "Qur'an is our constitution" in favour of a commitment to civil constitutional codes. However, the Brotherhood has also sought to stress continuity with the past in this regard. They have, for example, emphasised their second General Guide, Hassan al-Hudaybi's method of dialogue to challenge ideological differences and resolve contentions. Therefore, their official messaging since 2013 has stressed that they are "preachers and reformers, not judges," reinforcing their denial of the takfirist ideology of Qutb and some Jihadi groups such as ISIS and al-Qaeda, against whom they take a clear stand.

Considering the ongoing negative political opportunity structure embodied in the movement's exclusion and repression and contrary to much existing literature which suggests a repression-radicalisation nexus (Anderson, 1997; Ashour, 2009; Burgat, 1997; Dalacoura, 2006; Hafez, 2003; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Karagiannis, 2010; Leiken & Brooke, 2007; Lenz-Raymann, 2014), these findings indicate that the government crackdown on the Brotherhood has led to further emphasis on democratisation, rather than radicalisation, affirming instead the repression-moderation school of thought (Dagi, 2006; El-Ghobashy, 2005; Weimann, 2016; Wickham, 2004b; Yavuz, 2009; Yenigün, 2016). The thesis also confirms that that cultural and moral resources of Islamist social movements are highly affected by political opportunity structure. Hence, this study makes an important contribution to a literature that seeks to understand the evolution of the Brotherhood's ideology through studying its rhetoric. In contrast to the assertion of some scholars that argue that the central vision of the Brotherhood remains essentially unchanging in its ideological quest to establish an Islamist state (Khalil, 2006b; S. Tadros, 2011; Tibi, 2008), their communication since 2013 suggests that they have responded to persecution by emphasizing their moderate, legitimate status as the ultimate representatives of the democratic state. Setting these findings against existing secondary sources also revealed a significant change in the communication strategy of the Brotherhood as it appears to transition from a predominantly religious to a more secular discursive landscape (Eickelman & Piscatori, 1996, p. 12). This supports the conclusions of recent scholarship that

highlight the Brotherhood's increasing commitment to moderation and non-violence (Al-Anani, 2016b; Ranko, 2015; Reda, 2014; Wickham, 2015; Wilmot, 2015). Further research might also examine more closely the links between cultural resources and political opportunity structure during the time when the Brotherhood was at the helm of power to explore the hypothesis of participation-moderation.

Moreover, the findings from this study show that social movement theory's concept of legitimacy is a critical moral resource for the Muslim Brotherhood and has been central to the Brotherhood's political communication strategy since 2013. This cultural resource is imperative for understanding how Islamist social movements attempt to frame themselves and the way they present themselves to the public, at the national, regional and international level. It is also valuable to understand why movements conduct smear or negative campaigns since such campaigns frequently revolve around this concept. This contribution emphasizes the finding of Hudson (1977) as described legitimacy as an "indispensable political resource" for Islamist movements (p. 2). It also advances the work of scholars who highlight the role of the lack of this resource in undermining governments, such as Milton-Edwards (2016) and Haddad (1992). This thesis has highlighted the sharp divergence between the Muslim Brotherhood's concept of legitimacy against that of other Islamist groups such as ISIS whose violence and brutality their official statements have critiqued but further research might usefully explore comparatively how different Islamist groups "frame" and thereby deploy legitimacy as a moral resource.

In order to reinforce their ideas and agenda, influence people, and support their argument, the Brothers deployed many persuasive techniques, explored in Chapter Nine. The empirical findings of it arguably provide a new understanding of the discursive mechanics of "strategic framing." The thesis suggests that the persuasive and propaganda techniques developed by the IPA reveal the specific mechanisms through which the Brotherhood seek to achieve their communication goals and assign meaning to themselves and their rivals. The extensive and intensive deployment of persuasive techniques by the Brotherhood along the whole period of analysis provides evidence that the movement, whether consciously or

unconsciously, has been using these techniques as strategic communication devices to advance its argument persuasively, influence the public and attempt to shape audience perceptions. Of course, despite a close alignment of the Brotherhood's communication with the IPA taxonomy of persuasive techniques, it remains unclear whether the Brotherhood are consciously modelling their communication strategy on this. Investigating this question would undoubtedly require interviews with the upper echelons of the organization. This presents both practical and methodological challenges, not least in the current political climate when the group faces perhaps unprecedented persecution but such an integrated approach, if possible in the future, would enhance the significance of these findings.

Theoretically, this case study contributes to social movement theory by suggesting that these persuasive techniques serve as an under-explored tool revealing the discursive mechanisms through which the Brotherhood frames its rhetoric and mobilises its cultural and moral resources. The analysis of an extensive range of the Brotherhood's textual and visual communication using the techniques developed by the IPA's codebook, clearly advances scholarly understanding of how underground Islamist movements seek to frame themselves and their enemies, in an attempt to set the agenda in a contested public realm. More precisely, it illuminates the specific mechanisms through which they seek to achieve their goals, supporting the findings of previous scholarship by Conway et al. (2007) who have concluded that IPA's seven devices can be utilized as a common means of measuring political messages and that this approach "provides a template for future content analysis studies, allowing for comparisons across media and programming genres" (p. 198). This systematic approach could also potentially be used to compare discursive changes in the rhetoric of the same actor over time, or between different Islamist groups in order to determine how the goals and framing techniques amongst Islamist groups differ across time and space. The study shows that the IPA's techniques, when combined with discourse analysis of both texts and images, can provide real insight into the strategic goals and values of influential Islamist movements, empowering both policy-makers and audiences as well as scholars.

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Above all, study has found that the Brotherhood has also been remarkably adaptive in how they frame themselves and their enemies. The movement has drawn on a range of established (e.g. Sisi as Pharaoh) and novel (Sisi as Pimp) analogies as well as the emotive discourses of the January 2011 revolution to depict themselves as "one with the people" and a legitimate force to be reckoned with. This not only reinforces previous scholarly findings that social movements usually employ vocabulary and symbols from a "cultural tool kit" to offer common interests and values to people which forms a sense of solidarity that can trigger political action- but it reveals just how diverse and changeable this toolkit can be (Hannerz, 1969, p. 187; Swidler, 1986, p. 273). While Eickelman and Piscatori (1996) argue that Islamist movements previously framed rival political authorities as infidels *(Kufar)* or as ignorants *(juhal)* in order to delegitimize them (p. 12), it is notable that such religious frames are conspicuously absent from the Brotherhood's discourse in the period under examination. Instead, civic themes, such as contravening the law, are more common frames used to undermine the regime, consolidating the central findings of the thesis that the Brotherhood appear to be moving towards more moderate, democratic and secular frames of reference in responding to the negative political opportunity in which they currently find themselves. Whether this discourse of moderation will continue of course, and indeed its practical significance for the broader political project of the Brotherhood, is ultimately left to future scholars to determine through greater empirical investigation than was possible within the scope of this thesis.

However, it is clear that the group have gone to some lengths to frame its identity as fundamentally peaceful, from issuing religious edicts, to describing the "peaceful revolution" as "the greatest jihad." Contravening the numerous Qur'anic verses and Hadith they cite in this vein would constitute a major challenge to the movement and damage its already fragile reputation and identity. Moreover, mindful of history, the Brotherhood have realised the cost of refuting Qutb's violent legacy, a legacy successfully exploited by the movement's rivals to undermine and demonise the organisation. Cognisant of the dear toll of violence, "the peaceful jihad" provides the Brotherhood with a vital moral resource lacking amongst other

more radical Islamist social movements, suggesting that for the time being at least, moderation may prevail.

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Appendices

Appendix A: The Muslim Brotherhood's Public Statements 2 July 2013 – 22 March 2016

#	Translated title to English	Original title in Arabic	Date of issue
1.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood repudiating bloodshed schemes and dissemination of sedition	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين للتبرؤ من مخططات إراقة الدم ونشر الفتنة	July 02, 2013
2.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: A new massacre committed by the police Monday 15 July, 2013	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين مجزرة جديدة ترتكبها الشرطة الإثنين 15 يوليو 2013م	July 16, 2013
3.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in commemoration of the Tenth of Ramadan War	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين في ذكرى العاشر من رمضان	July 18, 2013
4.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the massacre of women in Mansoura (the massacre of shame)	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص مجزرة النساء في المنصورة (مجزرة العار)	July 20, 2013
5.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood clarifying their vision to escape of the military coup crisis	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين ورؤيتهم للخروج من أزمة الانقلاب العسكري	July 21, 2013
6.	Muslim Brotherhood Statement Condemns New Dawn Massacre Tuesday, July 23	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين مذبحة جديدة عند الفجر	July 23, 2013
7.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood commenting on the speech of the Field Marshal, el- Sisi	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين تعليقا على ما جاء في خطاب الفريق السيسي	July 24, 2013
8.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding sabotage plots hatched by the Putschists	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص مخططات التخريب التي يدبرها الانقلابيون	August 16, 2013
9.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the Putschists' loss of temper today and their lack of all values, principles and ethics	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص فقد الإنقلابيين اليوم صوابهم وتجردهم من كل القيم والمبادئ والأخلاق	August 16, 2013
10.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the Putschists' press conference	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص المؤتمر الصحفي للانقلابيين	August 17, 2013
11.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the killing of 37 citizens detained in a deportation car at the hands of the Ministry of Interior	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص قتل ٣٧ مواطنا محتجزا في سيارة ترحيلات علي يد وزاره الداخلية	August 18, 2013
12.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the arrest of the supreme guide Professor Mohamed Badie	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بشأن اعتقال فضيلة المرشد العام الأستاذ الدكتور محمد بديع	August 20, 2013
13.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in connection with the assassination of Central Security (SCF) soldiers in Sinai	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص اغتيال جنود الأمن المركزي في سيناء	August 20, 2013
14.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in connection with the murder of detainees under torture	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص جريمة قتل المعتقلين تحت التعذيب	August 20, 2013

#	Translated title to English	Original title in Arabic	Date of issue
15.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the criminal Syrian regime's massacre of defenceless civilians by the use of poisonous gas	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بشأن مجزرة النظام السوري المجرم باستخدام الغازات السامة ضد الشعب الأعزل	August 21, 2013
16.	A message from the Muslim Brotherhood: Our peaceful approach is the secret to our power	رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين سلميتنا ... سر قوتنا	August 21, 2013
17.	A message from the Muslim Brotherhood: Tolerance and peacefulness are the mottos of our revolution	رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين السلمية والتسامح .. عنوان ثورتنا	August 23, 2013
18.	A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood: Restoring the revolution and the peaceful countering of despotism is the path to freedom	رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين استعادة الثورة والتصدي السلمي للاستبداد طريق الحرية	August 29, 2013
19.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: We will not sleep or rest until we regain the revolution	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين انتهى عهد النوم والراحة حتى نسترد الثورة	September 01, 2013
20.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood two months after the bloody coup	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة مرور شهرين علي الانقلاب الدموي	September 04, 2013
21.	"Get worse, o trouble, so that you may be lifted": A message from the Muslim Brotherhood	اشتَدّي أزمَةً تَنفَرجي رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	September 05, 2013
22.	Salutation and appreciation for the Egyptian Woman	تحية وتقدير للمرأة المصرية	September 11, 2013
23.	The use of cruelty with the citizens between the Islamic regime and the tyrannical regime: A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	استخدام القسوة مع المواطنين بين النظام الإسلامي والنظام الاستبدادي رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	September 12, 2013
24.	Peaceful … Peaceful ... Peaceful: A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	سلمية .. سلمية .. سلمية رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	September 13, 2013
25.	Brotherhood Statement to Coup Commanders, Collaborators: Wake Up Before It Is Too Late	إلى رجال الانقلاب ومن ساندهم أفيقوا قبل فوات الأوان	September 14, 2013
26.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood a month after the massacres of Rābiʿa and Al-Nahda	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بمناسبة مرور شهر على مذبحة رابعة العدوية والنهضة	September 14, 2013
27.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of the extension of the emergency state	بيان من الاخوان المسلمون بمناسبة تمديد حالة الطوارئ	September 15, 2013
28.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the intention of the Putschists to bomb some schools	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص نية الانقلابيين فى تفجير بعض المدارس	September 20, 2013
29.	Moving on: We are Committed to our Covenant with God	على الطريق سائرون وبالعهد مع الله ملتزمون	September 23, 2013
30.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood due to Nabil Fahmy's visit to the General Assembly of the United Nations	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة سفر نبيل فهمي للجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة	September 25, 2013
31.	In commemoration of the victory of October 6, 1973: "we need a new victory" (A Message from the Brotherhood)	في ذكرى نصر 6 أكتوبر سنة 1973 نحتاج إلى نصر جديد رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	October 03, 2013

#	Translated title to English	Original title in Arabic	Date of issue
32.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood to the great people of Egypt because of the demonstrations of the "Friday of Reckoning"	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين إلى شعب مصر العظيم بمناسبة مظاهرات جمعة كشف الحساب	October 13, 2013
33.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of Eid al-Adha	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة عيد الأضحى المبارك	October 14, 2013
34.	The military coup and the farewell speech of Prophet Mohammed: A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	خطبة الوداع والانقلاب العسكري رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	October 14, 2013
35.	The hypocrisy of Western governments General McChrystal: "you will never defeat the Muslims in Egypt": A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	نفاق حكومات الغرب "لن تهزموا المسلمين في مصر أبدا" الجنرال ماكريستال رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	October 20, 2013
36.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: The Egyptian media and the aggression against the Church of the Virgin in Al-Warraq	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين الإعلام المصري والعدوان على كنيسة العذراء بالوراق	October 25, 2013
37.	The real reasons for the coup: A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood	الأسباب الحقيقية للانقلاب رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين	October 30, 2013
38.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the march to the trial of 4-11-2013	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول الزحف إلى محاكمة 4-11-2013م	November 03, 2013
39.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood commenting on the adjudication decreed against it	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة الحكم الصادر ضدها	November 06, 2013
40.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the persistence of President Mohamed Morsi	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بشأن ثبات الرئيس محمد مرسي	November 07, 2013
41.	An official statement about the indications of the Zionist company, Segal, of the corruption of the Putschists	بيان رسمي حول دلالات شركة سيجال الصهيونية على فساد الانقلابيين	November 07, 2013
42.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in memory of Mohamed Mahmoud's events	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص ذكرى أحداث محمد محمود	November 17, 2013
43.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in connection with the assassination of a police officer in front of his house	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص اغتيال ضابط شرطة أمام منزله	November 19, 2013
44.	An official statement: The Muslim Brotherhood grieve for the victims of Dahshur train crash	بيان رسمي عزاء الإخوان المسلمين في ضحايا حادث قطار دهشور	November 19, 2013
45.	To the beloved people of Egypt: A must-clarification of the Muslim Brotherhood's position regarding the events of Mohamed Mahmoud Street, 2011	إلى شعب مصر الحبيب توضيح واجب بخصوص موقف الإخوان المسلمين من أحداث شارع محمد محمود 2011	November 24, 2013
46.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the brutal aggression of the Ministry of Interior on university students	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول عدوان الداخلية الوحشي على طلاب الجامعات	December 13, 2013
47.	A Message from the Muslim Brotherhood to the honourable Egyptian army men	رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين إلى رجال الجيش المصري الشرفاء	December 22, 2013
48.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the criminal bombing of the Dakahlia Security Directorate	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول التفجير الإجرامي بمديرية أمن الدقهلية	December 24, 2013

#	Translated title to English	Original title in Arabic	Date of issue
49.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the inclusion of the group on terrorism lists by the coup government	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول إدراج حكومة الانقلاب الجماعة على قوائم الإرهاب	December 26, 2013
50.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: "What comes after the identification of the bomber of Dakahlia?"	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول "ماذا بعد تحديد هوية منفذ تفجير الدقهلية"؟	December 29, 2013
51.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the press conference of the coup's Interior Minister	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول المؤتمر الصحفي لوزير الداخلية الانقلابي	January 04, 2014
52.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the 'coup's prosecution' rejection for lawyers visiting President Morsi	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول رفض نيابة الانقلاب زيارة المحامين للرئيس مرسي	January 05, 2014
53.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about not bringing the president to the session of travesty on January 8	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول عدم إحضار الرئيس لجلسة المحاكمة الهزلية 8 يناير	January 08, 2014
54.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: Call for boycotting the referendum on constitution of "blood and ruin"	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين دعوة لمقاطعة استفتاء الدم والخراب	January 13, 2014
55.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood commenting on the announcement of the counterfeit results of the blood referendum	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين تعليقًا على إعلان نتائج استفتاء الدم المزورة	January 19, 2014
56.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood to commemorate the third anniversary of the great revolution of January	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة الذكرى الثالثة لثورة يناير العظيمة	January 21, 2014
57.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood to the free Egypt's revolutionists	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين إلى ثوار مصر الأحرار	January 25, 2014
58.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the speech of Adly Mansour "the Appointed"	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول كلمة عدلي منصور "المعيّن"	January 26, 2014
59.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the persecution of Muslims in Central African Republic	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول اضطهاد المسلمين في جمهورية أفريقيا الوسطى	February 15, 2014
60.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood commenting on what Abdel Fattah el-Sisi said	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين تعليقا على ما قاله عبد الفتاح السيسي	March 05, 2014
61.	A Muslim Brotherhood Statement on "Human Rights Council" scandal over Rābiʿa massacre: We swear the blood will not lost	بيان الإخوان المسلمين حول فضيحة "مجلس حقوق الإنسان" بشأن مجزرة رابعة قَسَمًا لنْ تضيعَ الدِّمَاء	March 06, 2014
62.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood on the inclusion of the Saudi Interior Ministry, the group's name on the list of terrorism	بيان من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين حول إدراج وزارة الداخلية السعودية اسم الجماعة في قائمة الإرهاب	March 07, 2014
63.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the coup's prevention of the press conference about the fact the Massacres of Rābiʿa and al-Nahada	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول منع الانقلاب لمؤتمر نشر حقيقة مذبحتي رابعة والنهضة	March 18, 2014
64.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the military judiciary and genocide	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول قضاء العسكر والإبادة الجماعية	March 24, 2014

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65.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of convening the Arab summit in session 25	بيان من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة انعقاد القمة العربية في الدورة 25	March 24, 2014
66.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the declaration of el-Sisi's candidacy for the presidency	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص إعلان السيسي ترشحه للرئاسة	March 27, 2014
67.	A Statement from the Muslim Brotherhood	بيان من جماعة الإخوان المسلمين	April 01, 2014
68.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the second oppressor declaring the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول الإعلان الثاني الظالم لجماعة الإخوان جماعة إرهابية	April 11, 2014
69.	A press statement about the fabrications of the unjust media campaign in Egypt	تصريح صحفي حول افتراءات الحملة الإعلامية الظالمة في مصر	April 25, 2014
70.	A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood on the adjudication of executions issued by the coup's courts in Egypt	بيان من جماعة الاخوان المسلمين حول أحكام الإعدامات التي تصدرها محاكم الانقلاب في مصر	April 28, 2014
71.	A statement from the Muslim Brotherhood: The Brotherhood and the state's institutions	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين الإخوان ومؤسسات الدولة	May 09, 2014
72.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: People has decided the death of the coup	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين الشعب يقرر وفاة الانقلاب	May 28, 2014
73.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the massacre of scientists	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول مذبحة العلماء	June 08, 2014
74.	The Muslim Brotherhood message: The last word is for the free People. Tyranny is the most important reason for the defeat of the nation	رسالة الإخوان المسلمون الكلمة الأخيرة للشعوب الحرة الاستبداد أهم سبب لهزيمة الأمة	June 18, 2014
75.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood: Gaza will not kneel	بيان من "الإخوان المسلمون" غزة لن تركع	July 21, 2014
76.	A press statement on the current situation in Egypt	تصريح صحفي حول الوضع الراهن في مصر	September 06, 2014
77.	The Muslim Brotherhood message: The war on terrorism between claim and reality	رسالة الإخوان المسلمون: الحرب على الإرهاب بين الزعم والحقيقة	September 17, 2014
78.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the visit of the coup's leader to the United Nations	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين: حول زيارة قائد الانقلاب إلى الأمم المتحدة	September 26, 2014
79.	A Muslim Brotherhood Statement: Justice is indivisible	بيان الإخوان المسلمون العدالة لا تتجزأ	September 27, 2014
80.	A Muslim Brotherhood message: Felicitation, pledge, and call	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين تهنئة وعهد ودعوة	October 02, 2014
81.	Greetings to people who refused to be defeated	تحية لشعب رفض الهزيمة	October 06, 2014
82.	Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the Sinai massacre	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص مذبحة سيناء	October 25, 2014
83.	The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: Prophet's migration and hopes of victory	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين الهجرة النبوية وآمال النصر	October 28, 2014
84.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the forced displacement Sinai people	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول التهجير القسري لأهل سيناء	October 30, 2014
85.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian people	بيان الإخوان المسلمون إلى الشعب المصري	November 03, 2014
86.	The message of Muslim Brotherhood: Patriotism between fact and allegation	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين حب الوطن بين الحقيقة والادعاء	November 04, 2014

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87.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the disaster of al-Buhaira's Martyrs	بيان من الإخوان المسلمون حول كارثة شهداء البحيرة	November 05, 2014
88.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the call of uniformity in the memory of the events of Mohamed Mahmoud	بيان من الإخوان المسلمون بخصوص دعوة التوحد في ذكرى أحداث محمد محمود	November 19, 2014
89.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: To the free people in all over the country	بيان من "الإخوان المسلمون" إلى الأحرار في شتى ربوع الوطن	November 28, 2014
90.	A message from the Muslim Brotherhood: Ah! Verily, the help of Allah is (always) near!	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين ألاَ إِنَّ نَصْرَ اللَّهِ قَرِيبٌ	December 03, 2014
91.	The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: From the laws of God in maintaining nations	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين من سنن الله في حفظ الأمم	December 08, 2014
92.	The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: The system of values between fact and allegation	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين منظومة القيم بين الحقيقة والادعاء	December 17, 2014
93.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood on the course of the ongoing events	بيان الإخوان المسلمون بشأن مجريات الأحداث	December 24, 2014
94.	The message of the Muslim Brotherhood: Tyrants industry is fruitless, and the revolution will succeed	رسالة الإخوان المسلمين: صناعة الطغاة صناعة فاشلة والثورة ناجحة	December 30, 2014
95.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about what is happening in Sinai	الإخوان المسلمون بيان بخصوص ما يحدث في سيناء	January 30, 2015
96.	A Statement by the Brotherhood about the leaks of el-Sisi and his gang	بيان من الإخوان بخصوص تسريبات السيسي وعصابته	February 10, 2015
97.	A Statement by the Muslim Brotherhood in connection with the Egyptians killed in Libya	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص مقتل المصريين في ليبيا	February 16, 2015
98.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood concerning the resolution of Hamas as a "terrorist organization" by the "military" regime	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص الحكم الصادر من قضاء "العسكر" باعتبار حركة حماس "منظمة ارهابية"	March 02, 2015
99.	The Muslim Brotherhood statement regarding the events in Yemen	بيان الاخوان المسلمون بخصوص أحداث اليمن	March 27, 2015
100.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: To the kings and rulers of the Arabs	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين إلى ملوك وحكام العرب	March 28, 2015
101.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the putschists targeting the nation's values and the fundamentals of Islam	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين حول استهداف الإنقلابيين قيم الامة وثوابت الاسلام	April 19, 2015
102.	A statement on the judgment session against President Morsi in the Federal travesty	بيان بشأن جلسة الحكم علي الرئيس مرسي في هزلية الاتحادية	April 20, 2015
103.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the pitiful trial of Mr. President and his comrades	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص المحاكمة الهزيلة للسيد الرئيس ورفاقه	May 16, 2015
104.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding (the appeal of Egypt)	بيان من الاخوان المسلمين بخصوص (بيان نداء الكنانة)	May 28, 2015

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105.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the enforced disappearance of Dr. Wahdan and his companions	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين بخصوص الاختفاء القسري لـ د. وهدان ومرافقيه	June 01, 2015
106.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the arrest of four members of the Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول اعتقال 4 من أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد	June 02, 2015
107.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood: A salute to the steadfast in the fields… No retreat from a full revolution	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين تحية للصامدين في الميادين .. ولا تراجع عن الثورة الكاملة	June 12, 2015
108.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the continuation of the abduction of four members of the Guidance Bureau and hundreds of the revolution's cadres	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول استمرار اختطاف 4 من أعضاء مكتب الإرشاد ومئات من كوادر العمل الثوري	June 14, 2015
109.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the comic death sentences against President Mursi and his companions	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول الأحكام الهزلية بالإعدام على الرئيس مرسي ورفاقه	June 16, 2015
110.	Greetings from the Muslim Brotherhood for the holy month of Ramadan	تهنئة من الإخوان المسلمين بمناسبة شهر رمضان المبارك	June 17, 2015
111.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood about the arrest of Dr. Saad Mohammed Aliywa, a member of the Guidance Bureau	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين حول اعتقال د. محمد سعد عليوة عضو مكتب الإرشاد	June 18, 2015
112.	A statement by the Brotherhood regarding the martyrdom of a number of pilgrims in the incident of the Holy Mosque in Makkah	بيان من جماعة الإخوان بخصوص حادثة استشهاد عددا من زوار بيت الله الحرام	September 11, 2015
113.	A statement about the Zionists' attacks on Al-Aqsa Mosque and its guards	بيان حول اعتداءات قطعان الصهاينة على المسجد الأقصى والمرابطين فيه	September 15, 2015
114.	A letter from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Egyptian people and the Islamic nation on the occasion of Eid al-Adha	رسالة من "الإخوان المسلمون" إلى الشعب المصري والأمة الإسلامية بمناسبة عيد الأضحى	September 23, 2015
115.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the Iranian-Russian invasion of Syria	بيان من الإخوان المسلمون حول غزو المحتل الروسي الإيراني لسوريا	October 04, 2015
116.	A statement of the Muslim Brotherhood on the "42nd" memorial of the October War	بيان من "الإخوان المسلمين" حول الذكرى الـ "42" لحرب أكتوبر	October 06, 2015
117.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood to mark the victory of the Justice and Development party in the Turkish elections	بيان من "الإخوان المسلمين" بمناسبة فوز العدالة والتنمية بالانتخابات التركية	November 01, 2015
118.	A statement by the media spokesman of the Muslim Brotherhood	بيان المتحدث الإعلامي لجماعة الإخوان المسلمين	December 27, 2015
119.	Statement from the Muslim Brotherhood	بيان من الإخوان المسلمين	January 23, 2016
120.	A statement by Dr. Talaat Fahmi, the Spokesperson of the Muslim Brotherhood	بيان من د. طلعت فهمي، المتحدث الإعلامي باسم جماعة "الإخوان المسلمون"	January 23, 2016
121.	"To the revolutionaries and to all people."	"إلى الثوار وإلى الناس كافة"	January 24, 2016
122.	To the girls and women of Egypt	الى فتيات ونساء مصر	January 25, 2016
123.	A Statement on Dr. Qaradawi's initiative	بيان بشأن مبادرة الدكتور القرضاوي	January 26, 2016
124.	Statement	بيان	February 04, 2016

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125.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood regarding the charter of the group	بيان من جماعة الاخوان المسلمين حول لائحة الجماعة	February 07, 2016
126.	The Dignity of the People	كرامة شعب	February 12, 2016
127.	O great Egyptian people… O Liberal revolutionaries throughout Egypt	أيها الشعب المصري العظيم.. أيها الثوار الأحرار في ربوع مصر	February 12, 2016
128.	Statement	بيان	March 05, 2016
129.	A statement by the Supreme Administrative Committee official	بيان من مسؤول اللجنة الإدارية العليا	March 06, 2013
130.	A statement by the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of the International Women's Day	بيان من الأخوان المسلمون بمناسبة يوم المرأة العالمي	March 08, 2016
131.	A statement by the spokeswoman of the Muslim Brotherhood on the occasion of the International Women's Day	بيان من المتحدثة الاعلامية باسم جماعة الإخوان المسلمون "إيمان محمود" في اليوم العالمي للمرأة	March 08, 2016
132.	Muslim Brotherhood Condemns Terrorist Attacks in Belgian Capital Brussels	جماعة الإخوان المسلمين تدين الهجمات الإرهابية في العاصمة البلجيكية "بروكسيل"	March 22, 2016

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

رسالة من الإخوان المسلمين

استعادة الثورة والتصدي السلمي للاستبداد طريق الحرية

الحمد لله والصلاة والسلام على رسول الله وعلى آله وصحبه ومن والاه، وبعد؛

فيحدثنا القرآن أن أكابر المجرمين في كل أمة لا يكفون عن ممارسة المكر والخداع للجماهير للسيطرة عليهم، لكنهم في النهاية هم من يبوءون بعاقبة مكرهم: (وَكَذَلِكَ جَعَلْنَا فِي كُلِّ قَرْيَةٍ أَكَابِرَ مُجْرِمِيهَا لِيَمْكُرُوا فِيهَا وَمَا يَمْكُرُونَ إِلاَّ بِأَنفُسِهِمْ وَمَا يَشْعُرُونَ) (الأنعام:123.)

ويحدثنا القرآنُ أنَّ سقوطَ الأمم وهلاكَ المجتمعات يبدأ حين يتسلق إلى الحكم حفنةٌ من هؤلاء المجرمين الطُّغاة الظَّلَمة بغير رضا أو قبول من الأمة، فيمارسون من مواقعِ السلطةِ كلَّ أسلوبٍ من شأنِه أن يؤولَ إلى إلحاقِ التفكُّكِ والدمارِ بالأمةِ التي استبدُّوا فيها بالأمر، إذ يعتبرون رُؤاهم وتشريعاتِهم الذاتيَّةَ الأنانية القاصرةَ المفكَّكةَ هي الحدودَ النهائية للصواب التي لا تقبل التعديل والتصحيح، ويستخدمون أقصى وأقسى درجاتِ القَسْوة والطَّيْش لفرض استبدادهم، يُرِدِّدون مقالةَ فرعون: (مَا أُرِيكُمْ إِلاَّ مَا أَرَى وَمَا أَهْدِيكُمْ إِلاَّ سَبِيلَ الرَّشَادِ) (غافر : 29)، يحدثنا القرآنُ عن ذلك فيقول: (وَإِذَا أَرَدْنَا أَن نُّهْلِكَ قَرْيَةً أَمَرْنَا مُتْرَفِيهَا فَفَسَقُوا فِيهَا فَحَقَّ عَلَيْهَا القَوْلُ فَدَمَّرْنَاهَا تَدْمِيراً) (الإسراء:16–17)

ودائما ما يكون الشاغل الأكبر لهؤلاء المستبدين التسلُّطَ وفرضَ الرأي بالقوة، وتكميمَ الأفواه، وقطعَ الألسن؛ فلا تتحدث إلا في مجالٍ محدودٍ لا تتجاوزه، وبطريقةٍ معينةٍ لا تتغير ، ولا يَدَعُ الاستبدادُ الذي يغشاهم مجالاً لرأيٍ معارضٍ، أو فكرٍ محايدٍ، أو قولٍ صريحٍ، أو موقفٍ غير مؤيِّدٍ للمستبدّ، بل ينطلق الاستبدادُ أحياناً ليحجر على أفكار الإنسان وخواطره، بل يعد عليه أنفاسَه وزفراتِه! ويتحول الحليف

عدوا بمجرد إعلان رأي مخالف في أي قضية، وينقلب الصديق خصما إذا استيقظ ضميره فقال ما لا يعجب المستبدين الطغاة، وهو ما يفعله الانقلابيون الآن في مصر.

ومما يشجعهم على هذا الفساد: اغترارُهم بقوتِهم وأجهزتِهم الأمنيّةِ، التي هي ملك الشعب أصلا، لكنهم استغلوا طبيعتها المنضبطة عسكريا في إرهاب الشعب وتخويف الأحرار. وقد أضاف الانقلابيون إليها جهازا آخر غير رسمي هو جهاز البلطجية الذين صنعوهم على أعينهم ورعوهم بأنفسهم ليروعوا الآمنين، وبذلك تحول الشعب في نظر الانقلابيين الطغاة إلى عدو، وأصبح العدو الحقيقي الصهيوني في مأمن، بل إنه يقوم بحملات دبلوماسية في دول العالم لحشد التأييد الدولي للانقلاب والتهوين من جرائم الإبادة التي يرتكبها، فيا لله العجب! أن تقوم إسرائيل بدور وزارة خارجية الانقلاب الدموي!

ومما يشجع الانقلابيين على هذا الاستبداد أيضا: استصحابُ بطانةٍ من المنافقين من بعض الإعلاميين وبعض علماء الدين الذين يستخفونهم، فيلوون الحقائق، وينشرون الافتراءات والأباطيل، ويلوثون سمعة الشرفاء من الخصوم الأحرار، ويقدمون الفتاوى الدينية الباطلة التي تُزَيِّن للمستبد الطغيانَ والإفساد وتبرر له سفك الدماء وانتهاك الحرمات، فتعمى عليه الْمَرَاشِدُ، وتتبهم عَلَيْهِ المَقَاصِدُ، وتشتد قساوته وتكثر مظالمه، ويصبح مستحقا لدعوة النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم على المستبد حين قال:«اللَّهُمَّ مَنْ وَلِيَ مِنْ أَمْرِ أُمَّتِي شَيْئًا فَشَقَّ عَلَيْهِمْ فَاشْقُقْ عَلَيْهِ، وَمَنْ وَلِيَ مِنْ أَمْرِ أُمَّتِي شَيْئًا فَرَفَقَ بِهِمْ فَارْفُقْ بِهِ»ويشجعهم على استبدادهم وإفسادهم أيضا: مجموعة ممن يسمون أنفسهم بالمثقفين والفنانين، الذين يحرصون على التحلل من قيم الدين وأخلاقه، ويضمرون العداء لكل ما يمت له بصلة، ويسعون إلى نشر ثقافة الإلحاد والفساد الأخلاقي، ولأمر ما حين ذكر النبي صلي الله عليه وسلم أنَّ المستبدين الظلمةَ من أهل النار، فإنه ربط بين الاستبداد السياسي وبين حصول الانحلال الخلقي في الأمة فقال: «صِنْفَانِ مِنْ أَهْلِ النَّارِ لَمْ أَرَهُمَا: قَوْمٌ مَعَهُمْ سِيَاطٌ كَأَذْنَابِ الْبَقَرِ يَضرِبُونَ بِهَا النَّاسَ، وَنِسَاءٌ كَاسِيَاتٌ عَارِيَاتٌ مُمِيلَاتٌ مَائِلَاتٌ، رُءُوسُهُنَّ كَأَسْنِمَةِ الْبُخْتِ الْمَائِلَةِ، لَا يَدْخُلْنَ الْجَنَّةَ وَلاَ يَجِدْنَ رِيحَهَا، وَإِنَّ رِيحَهَا لَتُوجَدُ مِنْ مَسِيرَةِ كَذَا وَكَذَا»

<u>الاستبداد أهم سبب لهزيمة الأمة:</u>

الاستبداد الذي يسعى الانقلابيون لإعادته وترسيخه هو رأس أسباب الانهيار للمجتمعات، وكل أسباب الانهيار والسقوط الأخرى إنما تحصل أساساً –أو على الأقل تنمو وتزدهر– في أجواء الاستبداد والكبت. ففي ظل الاستبداد تشيع الأنانيات الفردية، وتتمزق شبكة العلاقات الاجتماعية، ويتحزب بعض الناس ضد بعض، وتتعطل فعالياتُ العقيدة والرسالة في الحياة، وتموت معنويات الأمة، وهذا ما يسعى له الطغاة (إِنَّ فِرْعَوْنَ عَلَا فِي الأَرْضِ وَجَعَلَ أَهْلَهَا شِيَعًا يَسْتَضْعِفُ طَائِفَةً مِّنْهُمْ) ومن هنا يتهدد الأمن القومي للأمة.

حين يفرض الحاكم المستبدُّ على الأمةِ ألَّا تسمعَ إلا له، وألَّا تسيرَ إلا خلفه، وحينما يمنعُها أن تبديَ آراءَها، وحين يسلبُها حريَّتَها وكرامتَها، وحين يستبيح دماءها، وحين يعصف بحريات الشرفاء، وحين يبذل غاية جهده في تلفيق التهم للأبرياء، وحين يبيع قضاياها الكبرى رخيصةً لعدوها، وحين يفرض عليها ما يريد، ولا يسمح لها أن تعلنَ رأيَها؛ فلا بد أن تسقط الدولة الظالمة وتنهار، ولا تصمدَ أمام عدو، ما لم يتدارك عقلاؤها وأحرارها الأمر ويقوموا بواجبهم في تحريرها من السلطة الاستبدادية، والسير بها في اتجاه الشورى والديمقراطية والعدل.

شتَّان في مجال الدفاع والأمن القومي بين شعبٍ يُحكم بالشورى والعدل، وشعبٍ يُحكم بالبطش والاستبداد والظلم والعتو ويتحول جيشه إلى أداة بطش به لا إلى مدافع عنه.

شتَّان بين دولةٍ أساسُ الحكم فيها السجنُ والتعذيب، ودولةٍ يقول حاكمُها عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه لوُلاته: "يَا أَيُّها النَّاسُ، إنَّ اللهَ عَظَّم حَقَّه فوق حقّ خلقِه، فقَالَ فيما عَظَّمَ مِنْ حقِّه: (وَلاَ يَأْمُرَكُمْ أَن تَتَّخِذُوا المَلائِكَةَ والنَّبِيِّينَ أَرْبَاباً أَيَأْمُرُكُم بِالْكُفْرِ بَعْدَ إِذْ أَنتُم مُّسْلِمُونَ) (آل عمران:80) [أَلَا وَإِنِّي لَمْ أَبْعَثْكُمْ أُمَرَاءَ وَلَا جَبَّارِينَ، ولكِنْ بَعَثْتُكُمْ أَئِمَّةَ الهُدَى، يُهْتَدَى بِكُمْ، أَدِرُّوا على المسلمين حقوقَهم، ولاَ تَضْرِبُوهم فَتُذِلُّوهُمْ، ولَا تُجَمِّرُوهُمْ (أي لا تحبسوهم بغير حق) فَتَفْتِنُوهُمْ، ولا تُغْلِقُوا الأَبْوَابَ دونَهم، فَيَأْكُلَ قَوِيُّهم ضَعِيفَهم، ولا تَسْتَأْثِرُوا عليهم فَتَظْلِمُوهُمْ، ولا تَجْهَلُوا عليهم.»

وصدق النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم حين قال: «إِذَا أَرَادَ اللهُ بِقَوْمٍ خَيْرًا اسْتَعْمَلَ عَلَيْهِم الحُلَمَاءَ، وَجَعَلَ أَمْوَالَهُمْ فِي أَيْدِي السُّمَحَاءِ، وَإِذَا أَرَادَ اللهُ بِقَوْمٍ بَلَاءَ اسْتَعْمَلَ عَلَيْهِم السُّفَهَاءَ، وَجَعَلَ أَمْوَالَهُمْ فِي أَيْدِي البُخَلَاءِ. أَلَا مَنْ وَلِيَ مِنْ أَمْرِ أُمَّتِي شَيْئًا فَرَفَقَ بِهِمْ فِي حَوَائِجِهِمْ رَفَقَ اللهُ بِهِ يَوْمَ حَاجَتِهِ، وَمَنْ احْتَجَبَ عَنْهُمْ دُونَ حَوَائِجِهِمْ احْتَجَبَ اللهُ عَنْهُ دُونَ خَلَّتِهِ وَحَاجَتِهِ.»

وقال صلى الله عليه وسلم: «إِذَا كَانَ أُمَرَاؤُكُمْ خِيَارَكُمْ، وَأَغْنِيَاؤُكُمْ سُمَحَاءَكُمْ، وَأُمُورُكُمْ شُورَى بَيْنَكُمْ؛ فَظَهْرُ الأَرْضِ خَيْرٌ لَكُمْ مِنْ بَطْنِهَا (أى الحياة خير لكم من الموت). وَإِذَا كَانَ أُمَرَاؤُكُمْ شِرَارَكُمْ، وَأَغْنِيَاؤُكُمْ بُخَلاَءَكُمْ، وَأُمُورُكُمْ إِلَى نِسَائِكُمْ فَبَطْنُ الأَرْضِ خَيْرٌ لَكُمْ مِنْ ظَهْرِهَا» (أي فالموت خير لكم من الحياة).

أفيمكن أن تخالفَ أمةٌ هذه المبادئَ الإنسانيةَ العاليةَ وهذه القيمَ الربانية الرفيعة ثم يكون لها شأنٌ أو كيانٌ محترمٌ، ويبقى اسمُها في سِجلِّ الخلود؟!

ماذا فعل بنا الانقلاب: لقد وضعَنا هذا الانقلابُ الدمويُّ الغاشم أمام نظام ظالمٍ متجبِّرٍ مستبِدٍّ عنيدٍ فاقدٍ لأي شرعيةٍ دستوريةٍ أو أخلاقية، أعاد كل الأوضاعِ والشخصيات الفاسدةِ التي ثار عليها الشعب من قبل، ومنع كلَّ الأصوات الحرة، وأغلق كل وسائل التعبير عن الرأي، ودمَّر اقتصاد الأمة،

وبدَّد قوَّتَها، وأفسد قضاءها وقضاتها، وجرَّ جيشها لمقاتلة الأمة وإخضاعها، ونشر قواتها المسلحة في شوارعها بدلا من نشرها على حدودها، واستعمل شرطتها في تتبع المعارضين والأحرار ومداهمة بيوتهم ومحال أعمالهم بدلا من تتبع المجرمين وأصحاب السوابق، وسعى لإذلال الشعب، واغتصب إرادة الأمة، وقتل آلاف المعتصمين السلميين بدم بارد وبشاعة غير مسبوقة، وعذَّب المعتقلين وقتلهم، ومثَّل بجثث الشهداء، وقتل الجنود الأبرياء ليغطي على جرائمه، واعتبر محاربة الأشراف الأحرار من بني وطنه قضية أمن قومي في الوقت الذي أطلق يد أعداء الأمة الصهاينة تعبث في سيناء وتقتل دون رد ولا استنكار.

أفيمكن لهذا النظام الانقلابي الديكتاتوري المستبد أن يقيم دولةً لها شأنٌ وكيان محترم!! ذلك حُلْمُ المغرورين، وأمنيةُ البطَّالين، وما هو إلا كَسَرابٍ بِقِيعَةٍ يحسبُه الظمآنُ ماءً حتى إذا جاءه لم يجدْه شيئًا، ووجد الضياع والانهيار، فالبنيانُ إذا أُسِّس على غير الحق والتقوى كان حريًّا أنْ يأتِيَهُ اللهُ من القواعِدِ، فيهدمَه على مَنْ بَنَاهُ وأعانَ عليه. فهل يقبل الأحرار الشرفاء من أبناء هذا الوطن الكريم أن ينتظروا حتى يذهب الانقلابيون بوطننا إلى هذه الهاوية السحيقة؟ كلا والله، فمصر وشعبها أعز على الله من ذلك، وأعز على أبنائها ومحبيها من ذلك.

دعوة لجموع الشعب:

لهذا فالأمة كلها مدعوة لأن تملك زمام أمرها، وأن تخرج بكل جموعها وأطيافها إلى الشوارع والميادين، وتتصدى بكل الوسائل السلمية لأولئك الانقلابيين الذين يجرون الأمة للهاوية ويحاولون العودة بها إلى عصور الظلام والهمجية، والأمة قادرة بعون الله وتوفيقه أن تستنقذ حاضرها ومستقبل أجيالها، حين تتعاون على إنكار أية شرعية لهذا الانقلاب ولهؤلاء الانقلابيين، وأن تتوحد على هدف استعادة ثورة 35 يناير، وأن تصبر وتثبت أمام كل محاولات التخويف والإرهاب التي يمارسها الطغاة الانقلابيون، فلا تملك قوة كائنة ما كانت أن تحكم الشعب بالغصب طالما بقيت روح الثورة مشتعلة في النفوس الحرة.

ثورتنا سلمية:

من المهم التأكيد المستمر على سلمية ثورتنا وفعالياتنا، وعدم الانجرار لأي عنف، وعدم الاستجابة لأي استفزاز يسعى الانقلابيون لجر الثوار إليه، لمحاولة اتخاذه ذريعة لجرائمهم التي يرتبون لها، فسلميتنا تبقى دائما سر قوتنا وتبقى دائما أقوى من رصاص الطغاة الانقلابيين، ويقينا فإن الله سيقذف بالحق الذي نحمله ونجاهد في سبيله على الباطل الذي يصر عليه الانقلابيون فيزهق بإذن الله، وما ضاع حق وراءه مطالب.

كلمة نوجهها للأحرار الشرفاء من ضباط وجنود الجيش والشرطة وهم الأكثرية: إنكم جزء من هذا الشعب الكريم، وإن الانقلابيين يريدون استخدامكم لضرب إخوانكم المصريين، تحقيقا لمآربهم الشخصية وتوطيدا لسلطتهم الانقلابية غير الشرعية، فلا تكونوا أداة بطش في أيديهم، ولا تطيعوا الأوامر بقتل إخوانكم أو الاعتداء عليهم، فلا طاعة لمخلوق في معصية الخالق، وقد أفتى كل علماء الأمة بأنه لا يجوز للجندي أن يطيع الأوامر التي تصدر إليه بضرب إخوانه المصريين السلميين، واعلموا أنه لدى فشل هذا الانقلاب قريبا إن شاء الله فإنهم سيتبرؤون منكم ومن الأوامر التي أصدروها، حتى يحمِّلوكم وحدكم المسؤولية الجنائية عن الدماء البريئة التي سالت بغير حق، فانتبهوا ولا تقعوا ضحية لخداعهم، وكونوا مع شعبكم وشرعيته، واجعلوا ولاءكم لشعبكم، واحموا ثورته، والله غالب على أمره ولكن أكثر الناس لا يعلمون.

أما قادة الانقلاب ومن ساندهم فنقول لهم: ألا تظنون أنكم مبعوثون ليوم عظيم يوم يقوم الناس لرب العالمين؟ إذا كنتم قد فقدتم الرشد، وماتت ضمائركم، فتذكروا أن الله لا يغفل عن ظلمكم، وأن الشعب لن يستجيب لخداعكم وإرهابكم، بعد أن انكشفت مؤامرتكم، فأدركوا أنفسكم، وعودوا إلى ثكناتكم، واعلموا أن حبل الظلم قصير، وسيعلم الذين ظلموا أي منقلب ينقلبون.

اللهم احفظ مصر وشعبها من شر أعدائها وشر بعض أبنائها. والله أكبر وعاشت مصر حرة.

وصلى اللهم على سيدنا محمد وعلى آله وصحبه وسلم

القاهرة في: 22 من شوال 1434هـ الموافق 29 من أغسطس 2013م

بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم

رسالة الإخوان المسلمين من سنن الله في حفظ الأمم

حفظ الأمة بالعدل من سنن الله التي لا تتخلف:

لله سبحانه وتعالى سنن وقوانين تحكم الاجتماع البشري، مثلما له سنن وقوانين تحكم الكون المادي، وواجب على المؤمنين والعقلاء أن يتدارسوها؛ ليعرفوا الأسباب التي تقود مجتمعاتهم إلى الحياة السعيدة القوية الناهضة، ويتجنبوا الأسباب التي تؤدي بها إلى الضعف والذل أو الهلاك.

من هذه القوانين: أن العدل أساس الملك، وأن الظلم سبب لخراب العمران، لذلك يقول القرآن العظيم ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ لِلَّهِ شُهَدَاءَ بِالْقِسْطِ وَلاَ يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَآنُ قَوْمٍ عَلَى أَنْ لاَ تَعْدِلُوا اعْدِلُوا هُوَ أَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوَى﴾ أي لا يدفعنكم كراهة قوم أو عداوتهم أن تظلموهم.

وَقَالَ ﴿يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا كُونُوا قَوَّامِينَ بِالْقِسْطِ شُهَدَاءَ لِلَّهِ، وَلَوْ عَلَى أَنْفُسِكُمْ أَوِ الْوَالِدَيْنِ وَالأَقْرَبِينَ إِنْ يَكُنْ غَنِيًّا أَوْ فَقِيرًا، فَاللَّهُ أَوْلَى بِهِمَا فَلاَ تَتَّبِعُوا الهَوَى، أَنْ تَعْدِلُوا وَإِنْ تَلْوُوا أَوْ تُعْرِضُوا، فَإِنَّ اللَّهَ كَانَ بِمَا تَعْمَلُونَ خَبِيرًا﴾.

وفي المقابل يحكي عن فرعون – نموذج الظلم الأكبر في الوجود الإنساني – ﴿إِنَّ فِرْعَوْنَ عَلا فِي الأَرْضِ وَجَعَلَ أَهْلَهَا شِيَعًا﴾

ألم يأن للصادقين أن يفيقوا ويفيئوا:

نقول هذا بين يدي حديثنا إلى إخواننا الوطنيين المخلصين الذين انحازوا في البداية إلى الانقلاب العسكري الدموي، بحسن نبية وحسن ظن منهم.

فالآن وبعد سنة ونصف لم ير الشعب فيها إلا القمع والقتل والاعتقال والاغتصاب والظلم، ولم ير المصريون شيئاً مما وعدوا به؛ أن تصبح مصر (أد) الدنيا، وإنما رأينا الفشل في كل المجالات، وبعد مصادرة الحريات، وامتهان الكرامات، وتمزيق نسيج المجتمع، وفجور الإعلام الكاذب، وإفساد القضاء، وتراجع الاقتصاد، والتسول المهين من الخارج، وتنفيذ المخططات الصهيونية بتفريغ سيناء من أهلها، والاستعداد للعمل كشرطي للدولة العبرية يوفر أمنها؛ يأتي التسجيل الأخير ليكشف هذه النوعية من البشر، فلا ضمير ولا وطنية ولا أخلاق ولا أمانة عندهم، ولا خوف من الله، إذ تجتمع عصابة الانقلاب مع مسؤولي النيابة على التزوير والتلفيق للإيقاع بالرئيس المنتخب، بل يفخرون بأنهم مزورون، وكأنهم يرددون مقولة العربي الجاهلي: بغاة ظالمون وما ظُلِمنَا ولكنا سنبقى ظالمينا

فهل يؤتمن هؤلاء على الدولة والمال العام والأمن القومي؟ وعلى نزاهة الانتخابات التي ادعوا أنهم أجروها أو التي يزعمون أنهم سيجرونها؟

لقد برح الخفاء وانكشف الأمر، ليراجع المخلصون أنفسهم، ويغيروا مواقفهم، ويسعوا في رفع الظلم الذي أوقعوه بشعبهم، بالتعاون مع فصيل يعلم الله أنه من أخلص وأنزه الفصائل الوطنية، حريص على وطنه، صادق في حمايته لهذا الوطن الغالي. ورغم كل أكاذيب الانقلاب وأذرعه الإعلامية بأنهم يمارسون الإرهاب، فيعلم الله ويدرك الشعب المصري أنهم براء من كل ما ينسب إليهم، وأنهم يتحملون قتل الآلاف منهم وإصابة واعتقال عشرات الآلاف، دون أن يلجأوا إلى ثأر أو عنف؛ حرصاً على مصر وشعبها أن تتحول إلى ما يشبه دولا أخرى، مما لا نرضاه لشعبنا ووطننا.

<u>أيها الوطنيون المخلصون:</u>

إن سحرة فرعون عادوا إلى الحق فور أن رأوا الآيات، ولم يستنكفوا أن يقال: غيروا موقفهم، بل ضحوا بمستقبلهم في بطانة فرعون، بل ضحوا بحياتهم في سبيل ما آمنوا به؛ لأن سلطان الحق والعدل تغشى عنها الخداع، فهل آن لكم أيها الوطنيون أن تعلنوها قوية واضحة بعد هذا الانكشاف الواضح لزيف الانقلاب: أنكم عائدون إلى ثورتكم، وملتحمون مع الأحرار في ميدان ثورة الحرية والكرامة؟.

<u>الساكت عن الظلم شريك في الظلم:</u>

إن من سنن الله في الاجتماع البشري: أن العقوبات الإلهية تعم الظالم والساكت على الظلم، قال تعالى ﴿وَاتَّقُوا فِتْنَةً لاَ تُصِيبَنَّ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مِنْكُمْ خَاصَّةً﴾ وقال رسول الله صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم: «إِنَّ النَّاسَ إِذَا رَأَوُا الظَّالِمَ فَلَمْ يَأْخُذُوا عَلَى يَدَيْهِ، أَوْشَكَ أَنْ يَعُمَّهُمُ اللَّهُ بِعِقَابٍ»، وَقَالَ صَلَّى اللَّهُ عَلَيْهِ وآله وَسَلَّمَ: «مَا مِنْ قَوْمٍ يُعْمَلُ فِيهِمْ بِالْمَعَاصِي، ثُمَّ يَقْدِرُونَ عَلَى أَنْ يُغَيِّرُوا، ثُمَّ لَا يُغَيِّرُوا، إِلَّا يُوشِكُ

أَنْ يَعُمَّهُمُ اللهُ مِنْهُ بِعِقَابٍ»، ولما قَالَتْ زَيْنَبُ بِنْتُ جَحْشٍ لِرَسُولِ اللهِ: أَنَهْلِكُ وَفِينَا الصَّالِحُونَ؟ قَالَ: «نَعَمْ إِذَا كَثُرَ الخَبَثُ» هذا في حالة الصالحين السلبيين.

ولقد ضرب النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم مثلاً رائعاً للمجتمع، حيث شبهه بالسفينة التي نزل بعض الناس في أعلاها وبعضهم في أسفلها، وكان الذين في الجزء الأسفل إذا احتاجوا إلى الماء صعدوا إلى أعلاها ليملؤوا أوعيتهم، فقال بعضهم: لو خرقنا في نصيبنا خرقاً ولم نؤذ من فوقنا، وهناك يؤكد النبي صلى الله عليه وآله وسلم أنهم إن تركوهم يفعلون هلكوا جميعاً، وإن أخذوا على أيديهم نجوا جميعاً.

<u>خيرية الأمة في وقوفها مع الحق ومواجهتها للظلم:</u>

اعتبر الإسلام فريضة الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر سبباً لخيرية هذه الأمة ﴿كُنْتُمْ خَيْرَ أُمَّةٍ أُخْرِجَتْ لِلنَّاسِ تَأْمُرُونَ بِالْمَعْرُوفِ وَتَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْمُنْكَرِ وَتُؤْمِنُونَ بِاللهِ﴾ وأمر كل مسلم بالقيام بهذه الفريضة بضوابطها الشرعية، فقال صَلَّى اللهُ عَلَيْهِ وآله وَسَلَّمَ: «مَنْ رَأَى مِنكُمْ مُنْكَرًا فَلْيُغَيِّرْهُ بِيَدِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَبِلِسَانِهِ، فَإِنْ لَمْ يَسْتَطِعْ فَبِقَلْبِهِ، وَذَلِكَ أَضْعَفُ الْإِيمَانِ» بل اعتبر هذا العمل أفضل الجهاد في سبيل الله، فقال: «أَلَا لَا يَمْنَعَنَّ رَجُلًا مَهَابَةُ النَّاسِ أَنْ يَتَكَلَّمَ بِالْحَقِّ إِذَا عَلِمَهُ، أَلَا إِنَّ أَفْضَلَ الْجِهَادِ كَلِمَةُ حَقٍّ عِنْدَ سُلْطَانٍ جَائِرٍ»، وعد الشهيد في ذلك سيد الشهداء، فقال: «سَيِّدُ الشُّهَدَاءِ حَمْزَةُ بْنُ عَبْدِ الْمُطَّلِبِ، وَرَجُلٌ قَالَ إِلَى إِمَامٍ جَائِرٍ فَأَمَرَهُ وَنَهَاهُ فَقَتَلَهُ. »

ورفض بكل قوة السلبية في مواجهة الظلم والمنكر، حتى لو كان الشخص السلبي صالحاً في نفسه، فقد أمر الله «مَلَكًا أَنْ يَخْسِفَ بِقَرْيَةٍ، فَقَالَ: يَا رَبِّ، فِيهَا فُلَانٌ الْعَابِدُ، فَأَوْحَى اللهُ تَعَالَى إِلَيْهِ: أَنْ بِهِ فَابْدَأْ، فَإِنَّهُ لَمْ يَتَمَعَّرْ وَجْهُهُ فِي سَاعَةٍ قَطُّ»، أي لم يغضب وينكر ما يحدث حوله من الظلم والفساد قط.

وحينما قام فرعون خطيباً في قومه يستخفهم ويضللهم بحجج واهية وصفهم الله تعالى بالفسوق حين استجابو له ﴿وَنَادَى فِرْعَوْنُ فِي قَوْمِهِ قَالَ يَا قَوْمِ أَلَيْسَ لِي مُلْكُ مِصْرَ وَهَذِهِ الْأَنْهَارُ تَجْرِي مِنْ تَحْتِي أَفَلَا تُبْصِرُونَ أَمْ أَنَا خَيْرٌ مِنْ هَذَا الَّذِي هُوَ مَهِينٌ وَلَا يَكَادُ يُبِينُ فَلَوْلَا أُلْقِيَ عَلَيْهِ أَسْوِرَةٌ مِنْ ذَهَبٍ أَوْ جَاءَ مَعَهُ الْمَلَائِكَةُ مُقْتَرِنِينَ فَاسْتَخَفَّ قَوْمَهُ فَأَطَاعُوهُ إِنَّهُمْ كَانُوا قَوْمًا فَاسِقِينَ﴾.

أما أولئك الإيجابيون الذين يأمرون بالمعروف وينهون عن المنكر ويتصدون للباطل فهم سبب في نجاة الأمم وإصلاحها إن استجابت لهم، وسبب في نجاة أنفسهم في الدنيا والآخرة إن أصرت هذه الأمم على باطلهم.

ولقد حكى القرآن الكريم عن مجموعة من هؤلاء الصالحين الإيجابيين الذين قاموا يعظون طائفة فاسدة من بني إسرائيل، فقامت مجموعة أخرى تثبطهم وتخمد هممهم بدعوى أن هذه الطائفة لن تصلح، فأجابوهم بأننا نعذر إلى الله بأننا أدينا ما علينا، ثم إن أملنا في إصلاحهم لا ينقطع ﴿وَإِذْ قَالَتْ أُمَّةٌ مِنْهُمْ لِمَ تَعِظُونَ قَوْمًا اللَّهُ مُهْلِكُهُمْ أَوْ مُعَذِّبُهُمْ عَذَابًا شَدِيدًا قَالُوا مَعْذِرَةً إِلَى رَبِّكُمْ وَلَعَلَّهُمْ يَتَّقُونَ﴾ كما أن الله تعالى عندما نجى أنبياءه الذين عصتهم أقوامهم نجا معهم الذين آمنوا وشاركوهم في دعوة الآخرين.

وأكد القرآن الكريم أن الله تعالى ينجي أولئك الذين ينهون عن الفساد في الأرض ﴿فَلَوْلَا كَانَ مِنَ الْقُرُونِ مِنْ قَبْلِكُمْ أُولُو بَقِيَّةٍ يَنْهَوْنَ عَنِ الْفَسَادِ فِي الْأَرْضِ إِلَّا قَلِيلًا مِمَّنْ أَنْجَيْنَا مِنْهُمْ، وَاتَّبَعَ الَّذِينَ ظَلَمُوا مَا أُتْرِفُوا فِيهِ وَكَانُوا مُجْرِمِينَ، وَمَا كَانَ رَبُّكَ لِيُهْلِكَ الْقُرَى بِظُلْمٍ وَأَهْلُهَا مُصْلِحُونَ﴾

<u>لا سبيل لإنقاذ الوطن إلا بمواجهة الانقلاب الدموي الفاسد:</u>

إذا كان هناك من يكره فصيلا من الفصائل الوطنية فليكن منصفا، ولا يحمله ذلك على ظلمهم أو المظاهرة على ظلمهم، أو يرضى به.

ومن كان صادق الحب لهذا الوطن العزيز فلا يجوز له أن يؤيد أولئك الذين ثبت بكل دليل فسادهم وخيانتهم وظلمهم وانعدام ضمائرهم واستباحتهم لكل المحرمات والموبقات، وهذا كله نذير شر للبلاد والعباد، ولا يجوز لوطني حر السكوت على كل هذه المنكرات، بعدما أصبحت مكشوفة ومسموعة على أسماع وأبصار الدنيا كلها.

ومن السنن الإلهية أيضاً: أن الإيمان والتقوى سبب في انهمار بركات الله تعالى ونعمائه على العباد ﴿وَلَوْ أَنَّ أَهْلَ الْقُرَى آمَنُوا وَاتَّقَوْا لَفَتَحْنَا عَلَيْهِمْ بَرَكَاتٍ مِنَ السَّمَاءِ وَالْأَرْضِ وَلَكِنْ كَذَّبُوا فَأَخَذْنَاهُمْ بِمَا كَانُوا يَكْسِبُونَ﴾ ولاريب أن العدل والصدق والانحياز للحق وتوخي الخير هي من أهم عناصر التقوى.

أما أنتم أيها الثوار الأحرار والثائرات الحرائر، فأنتم ضمير الأمة وأنصار الله الرافعين راية الحق القائمين بين الناس بالقسط، الآمرين بالمعروف والناهين عن المنكر، والصادعين بالحق في وجه الظالمين القاتلين المفسدين، وعليكم بعد الله ينعقد الأمل في تحرير الأمة وتحقيق الكرامة وعودة الحقوق والإنصاف للناس وبين الناس، فاستمروا فأنتم الفئة الذين تحجبون غضب الله أن يعم، وعلى أيديكم بإذن الله سيتحقق النصر ﴿وَاللَّهُ غَالِبٌ عَلَى أَمْرِهِ وَلَكِنَّ أَكْثَرَ النَّاسِ لَا يَعْلَمُونَ﴾، ﴿وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ﴾

والله أكبر ولله الحمد

الإخوان المسلمون في 16 من صفر 1436هـ

الموافق 8 من ديسمبر 2014م

Appendix C: Inter-coder coefficient Kappa Calculations

Sample # 7, Statement: July 24, 2013

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 59	b = 27	86
	0	c = 11	0	11
		70	27	97

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.61

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 40 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.60

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
   P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.02

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.60

Sample # 10, Statement: August 17, 2013

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 44	b = 16	60
	0	c = 9	0	9
		53	16	69

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.64

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 31 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.63

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
   P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.63

Sample # 11, Statement: August 18, 2013

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 28	b = 9	37
	0	c = 5	0	5
		33	9	42

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.67

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 23 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.65

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
   P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.65

Sample # 14, Statement: August 20, 2013

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 31	b = 10	41
	0	c = 8	0	8
		39	10	49

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.63

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 27 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.62

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
   P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.62

Sample # 19, Statement: September 1, 2013			

Document 1

		1	**0**	
	1	a = 34	b = 9	43
Document 2	**0**	c = 7	0	7
		41	9	50

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.68

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 23 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.67

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.67

Sample # 24, Statement: September 13, 2013			

Document 1

		1	**0**	
	1	a = 73	b = 21	94
Document 2	**0**	c = 15	0	15
		88	21	109

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.67

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 36 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.66

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.66

Sample # 28, Statement: September 20, 2013			

Document 1

		1	**0**	
	1	a = 32	b = 8	40
Document 2	**0**	c = 10	0	10
		42	8	50

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.64

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 24 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.62

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.63

Sample # 46, Statement: December 13, 2013			

Document 1

		1	**0**	
	1	a = 32	b = 12	44
Document 2	**0**	c = 8	0	8
		40	12	52

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.62

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 25 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.60

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.60

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	Sample # 70, Statement: April 28, 2014			

Sample # 70, Statement: April 28, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 38	b = 16	54
	0	c = 12	0	12
		50	16	66

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.58

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 29 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.56

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.56

Sample # 71, Statement: May 09, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 46	b = 7	53
	0	c = 3	0	3
		49	7	56

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.82

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 26 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.81

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.81

Sample # 83, Statement: October 28, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 60	b = 10	70
	0	c = 5	0	5
		65	10	75

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.80

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 25 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.79

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.79

Sample # 84, Statement: October 30, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 24	b = 13	37
	0	c = 9	0	9
		33	13	46

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.52

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 25 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.50

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.50

Sample # 89, Statement: Nov. 28, 2014	Sample # 90, Statement: December 03, 2014

Sample # 89, Statement: Nov. 28, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 24	b = 10	34
	0	c = 7	0	7
		31	10	41

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.59

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 18 = 0.06

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.56

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.56

Sample # 90, Statement: December 03, 2014

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 100	b = 29	129
	0	c = 12	0	12
		112	29	141

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.71

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 28 = 0.04

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.70

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.03

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.70

Sample # 101, Statement: April 19, 2015

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 27	b = 7	34
	0	c = 5	0	5
		32	7	39

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.69

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 19 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.68

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.68

Sample # 108, Statement: June 14, 2015

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 24	b = 5	29
	0	c = 2	0	2
		26	5	31

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.77

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 16 = 0.06

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.76

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.06

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.76

Sample # 121, Statement: January 24, 2016	**Sample # 124, Statement: February 04, 2016**

Sample # 121, Statement: January 24, 2016

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 25	b = 4	29
	0	c = 7	0	7
		32	4	36

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.69

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 18 = 0.06

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.68

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.68

Sample # 124, Statement: February 04, 2016

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 22	b = 6	28
	0	c = 4	0	4
		26	6	32

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.69

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 20 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.67

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:

P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.05

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.67

Sample # 125, Statement: February 07, 2016

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 6	b = 0	6
	0	c = 1	0	1
		7	0	7

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.86

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 4 = 0.25

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.81

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.16

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.83

Sample # 130, Statement: March 08, 2016

		Document 1		
		1	**0**	
Document 2	**1**	a = 12	b = 2	14
	0	c = 1	0	1
		13	2	15

P(observed) = Po = a / (a + b + c) = 0.80

P(chance) = Pc = 1 / number of codes = 1 / 7 = 0.14

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.77

In case of missing values or in case of comparing one code:
P(chance) = Pc = number of codes / (number of codes+1)^2 = 0.11

Kappa = (Po - Pc) / (1 - Pc) = 0.78

Appendix D: Inter-coder Letter of Acknowledgment

See next page Figure 75. A screenshot of the intercoder confirmation e-mail.

MO Mahmoud Odeh
Mon 24/04/2017, 20:05
Moeen Koa ⌄

Inbox

Flag for follow up. Completed on 28 April 2017.

This email is to verify that I Mahmoud Odeh, from the University of Coventry took the role of intercoder (interrater) for Moeen Koa's work. 15% of the whole analysed materials were re-coded by me and we reached the following results:

#	# as in the Sample	Statement Date of issue	Code Frequency in the document - Correlates	Intercoder Coefficient Kappa	Commenting on Coefficient Kappa
1.	7	24 July 2013	85.71%	0.60	Moderate
2.	10	17 August 2013	92.52%	0.63	Solid agreements
3.	11	18 August 2013	93.71%	0.65	Solid agreements
4.	14	20 August 2013	90.92%	0.62	Solid agreements
5.	19	1 September 2013	95.43%	0.67	Solid agreements
6.	24	13 September 2013	92.57%	0.66	Solid agreements
7.	28	20 September 2013	92%	0.63	Solid agreements
8.	46	13 December 2013	91.43%	0.60	Moderate
9.	70	28 April 2014	89.71%	0.56	Moderate
10.	71	09 May 2014	96%	0.81	Perfect agreements
11.	83	28 October 2014	93.14	0.79	Solid agreements
12.	84	30 October 2014	91.43%	0.50	Moderate
13.	89	28 November 2014	96%	0.56	Moderate
14.	90	03 December 2014	90.86%	0.70	Solid agreements
15.	101	19 April 2015	96%	0.68	Solid agreements
16.	108	14 June 2015	97.14%	0.76	Solid agreements
17.	121	24 January 2016	94.86	0.68	Solid agreements
18.	124	04 February 2016	95.43%	0.67	Solid agreements
19.	125	07 February 2016	99.43%	0.83	Perfect agreements
20.	130	8 March 2016	99.43%	0.77	Solid agreements

If you require any additional information, please feel free to contact me.

Your Sincerely,

Mahmoud Odeh
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Figure 75. A screenshot of the intercoder confirmation e-mail.

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