"Understanding The Change Process From The Internal Stakeholders' Perspective In a Large Broadcasting Environment."

A Naturalistic Inquiry

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration

by

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ABSTRACT

The study follows the temporal journey of the BBC’s programme of change over five years from April 1993 - July 1998. The author who is employed by the BBC as a Change Practitioner attempts to combine his role with that of a researcher as insider and theory builder to develop an empirically based understanding of the change processes from the internal stakeholders perspective (Mitchell et al (1997)). The research strategy adopted for the purpose of this study has been to cast the researcher in the role of an investigative journalist whose aim is to tell the story of the change process through the lens of the staff, whilst using his tacit knowledge of the organisation. Exponents of this particular approach include Gummesson (1991) and Barley (1995) to name but two. During the literature review stage, it became apparent that the nature of organisational change was much more complex and contradictory than one first imagined. This was probably best summed up by the contemporary debate between two schools of thought whose views were fundamentally opposed to each other. On the one hand, exponents of the normative school, such as Warner-Burke (1992) and others, who subscribe to the view that change is linear, sequential and can be planned with certain predictable consequences. On the other hand, exponents of the other school which includes among them Pettigrew et al (1990) and Dawson (1994) argue that change is “messy” and “chaotic”. Therefore, in the early stages of the research, I was keen to explore this contentious debate between the two schools of thought and to consider the implications for the management of change. Finally, as the research was under way it soon became apparent that the greatest influence on the change process in the BBC was undoubtedly that of the strong leadership of the DG (Director General). As a consequence, the staff’s perceptions of him and the way the change was managed together with the impact on them, emerges as the predominant theme from the analysis of the data from the research findings.
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this very brief introductory chapter is as follows: firstly, to provide a synopsis of the aims of the research in order to acquaint the reader with my own position and motivation; secondly, to give a brief explanation about the contextual background and my own starting point for conducting the research; thirdly, to elaborate on my role as researcher and change practitioner and refer to those writers who have largely influenced my thinking to date. Lastly, this chapter explains the purpose of the study before providing an in-depth description of the BBC in its historical and political context.

It was decided to adopt a journalistic style of presentation here in order to avoid being constrained by the rules and standards of research.

SYNOPSIS OF THE AIMS OF THE RESEARCH THESIS

Michael Checkland (former Director General of the BBC) wrote in a foreword of the “Producer Choice Document” (October 1991) the following:

“during the last 12 months we have been considering how best to plan the future management of our resources over the next decade. We must be ready to meet the challenge of the 25% quota of independent production in television and the intense scrutiny which will take place in the run up to Charter renewal in 1996. We need to have a clear vision of the BBC’s public service remit and of its place in a pluralist broadcasting world. We shall confidently propose a public service role which is distinctive in provision and quality, and relevant to the broadcasting world of the 1990’s and the twenty-first century” (Checkland (1991: 1)).

Shortly after delivering this message, Michael Checkland was sidelined by the Board of Governors (BOG) and became a “lame duck” Director General (DG). In the meantime the Deputy Director General (DDG), assumed unofficial control of the BBC Board of Management and launched his “Producer Choice” strategy in a speech to all BBC staff through the BBC’s internal communications network, “The Ring Main”, on the 29th October 1991. He began by saying:

“we are launching today an important and far-reaching initiative for the BBC.
From April 1993, television in the BBC will be organised on the basis of a system we are calling "Producer Choice". This system should ensure that the whole business of programme-making at the BBC will become at least as efficient as any of our competitors". (Director General (1991: 1)).

Michael Checkland was reduced to being a passive 'bystander' as his deputy outlined his future vision and strategy for the BBC. Subsequently, he was suddenly relieved of his post of Director General in early 1992 and his deputy was officially confirmed as the new Director General.

Prior to the launching of the Director General's speech on "Producer Choice" in 1991, I had been working since August 1998 as a change practitioner in the BBC. Therefore, from a personal perspective, "Producer Choice", represented the most radical and significant strategic change that I had experienced since joining the BBC. It marked the watershed between the "Old BBC" and the "New" because it involved a complete root and branch change of culture. "Producer Choice" had some implications for me because of the role I was expected to play in leading or facilitating major events, articulating the strategy to BBC staff. In addition, I was also expected to act as a coach, mentor, adviser, facilitator and developer to the managers and their staff. Therefore, in deciding to undertake this study, it seemed advantageous for me to combine my role as a change practitioner in the BBC with that of academic researcher to study the change processes that were taking place.

However, even during the initial stages of the research, it was felt necessary to broaden the study. This would include an understanding of how the change processes evolved over a period of time and an evaluation of the extent to which the BBC has been successful or not in achieving its intended goals as stated in its corporate strategy document, "Producer Choice" (1993). Another objective of the research was to assess both the intended and unintended consequences of the change process (Ashburner et al (1994)). The BBC had initially chosen the "Burke-Litwin Model" (see page 48) to implement its programme of change, before its subsequent demise about half way through the process (Burke-Litwin (1994)). Finally, it was also intended to study the change process from an internal stakeholders' and naturalistic inquiry perspective (Guba and Lincoln (1989)).
Thus, as an employee with a key role to play in this change process, I was presented with a golden opportunity to enhance my understanding of the entire process.

COMBINING THE ROLE OF RESEARCHER AND CHANGE PRACTITIONER

In thinking about my role as a researcher and change practitioner, most of my ideas were developed from a variety of sources and influences. These include Gummesson’s (1991) concept of ethnography and pre-understanding of the BBC, together with Van Maanen’s (1988) suggestions in "Tales of the Field", and Guba and Lincoln’s (1989) hermeneutic dialectic cycle. Rowan and Reason’s (1996), (1988) suggestions about addressing issues of validity in “human inquiry” and “co-operative inquiry” offered me an ideal springboard for developing my own study. Subsequently, I embarked upon a fairly extensive literature review in the field of organisational change and evaluation research. This has been a process of constant iteration and re-iteration and a lengthy process of indecision and uncertainty on my part before finally deciding on the way ahead. Nevertheless, the dominant methodology for my case study is the Naturalistic Inquiry Methodology as espoused by Guba and Lincoln (1985), (1989) and (1994), Erlandson et al (1993), Stake (1994) and others who subscribe to this particular approach. Consequently, in pursuing the research project, I found the empirical and theoretical works of other social scientists particularly helpful in assisting me to clarify my own epistemological and ontological positions, thereby giving me a better focus and direction for the study.

The names of all those researchers who have influenced my thinking are too many to include here, but special mention will be given to a few in the ensuing paragraphs. Yin (1984), (1993) and (1994) has given me a reasonable understanding of the design of the case study as a research strategy and of how to apply it in academic research from a positivistic perspective. The author has also helped me a great deal in clarifying my own thinking of how to identify the unit of analysis for the case study and providing an enlightening definition of embedded case designs. Therefore, I have adapted his ideas where possible to assist with my study. Burrell & Morgan’s (1980) distinction between ideographic and nomothetic
dichotomy in research was particularly useful in enabling me to grasp the various approaches to the organisational change literature.

This was complemented by the dominant literature on organisational change (Pettigrew (1988) and (1990) Wilson (1992) Pettigrew et al (1996), Oswick et al (1996), Ferlie et al (1997)). These highlighted for me the dichotomy between those who approach change from a normative perspective and offer "simplistic recipes" on one hand, such as the business process re-engineering methodology of Hammer and Champy (1993), and those who offer a more theoretical and analytical approach to organisational change (Pettigrew et al (1990), and Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996)). Their work has also been influential in providing me with a thorough understanding of the meaning of case study research methods, particularly Pettigrew's concept of multi-level analysis in studying the processes of complex, strategic changes in large organisations. His work on comparative case methods in British companies in banking, private industry and the Health Service (1990, 1992 and 1994) have enabled me to fully grasp this concept. Other influential concepts include the studying of the change processes over time with an understanding of the context, content and process (Ibid.). Above all, Pettigrew's suggestions of trying to "catch reality in flight" resonated with me, and this was one of the main triggers for conducting this study.

Miles and Huberman (1984) and (1994) have been largely instrumental in offering some useful ideas on the hazards and richness of qualitative data-gathering methods. Their ideas were complemented in the work of Eisenhardt (1989) and in Strauss and Corbin (1990) and (1994) offering some useful guidance on how to develop a theory from the data that emerges from research. Van Maanen (1988), Gummesson (1991) and Barley (1995) were particularly useful in offering ideas on how to conduct ethnographical research by means of sustained participation and observation from a close distance, with the researcher as a key part of the research tool (Barley (1995)). Rowan & Reason (1996) have helped to resolve my dilemma of addressing issues of validity in my research. Finally, the Naturalistic Inquiry methodology of Guba & Lincoln (1985), (1989) and (1994) have played a key part in helping me to decide which methods should be the guiding influence for the study in the BBC. Carnall (1995) further echoed their concept of empowering the stakeholders to play a significant role in the organisational change process. Thus,
in summary, although the dominant methodology used in my research is the
Naturalistic Inquiry; I have incorporated ideas from a range of theories where it was
considered to be relevant in helping to enrich the final theory that would emerge
from my findings.

THE RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE

The research perspective is essentially that of a personal journey as an insider,
change practitioner and researcher.

Shortly after joining the BBC in August 1988, as a change practitioner in the
Management Training Department, I came to the conclusion that this was quite an
exciting time to be a key player in the change process where large scale system
wide change was to take place. The Director General published a major strategy
document entitled “The Next Five Years” which represented the first serious
attempt by the organisation to experiment with medium to long term planning. Bob
Nelson, our divisional head, held a series of meetings with my department to brief
us about the impending changes in the future and told us that we had a key role to
play in that process.

As a consequence of this, I read some of the current literature on organisational
change at the time, for example: Peters and Waterman (1982), Plant (1987),
Nadler-Tushman’s “Congruency” Model (1977) to name but three, in order to
broaden my knowledge about how to implement change.

In the meantime, as the BBC Board of Management continued its preparation for
the introduction of its change programme, it sought professional help and guidance
from a range of external consultants. These had a particular expertise in change
management or organisation development interventions. One of its principal group
of consultants was Warner Burke Associates (an American based company) whom
Bob Nelson, Head of Corporate Management Development, had recruited because
of their track record in implementing large scale system-wide changes in
companies such as Smith-Kline Beecham, British Airways and a number of other
organisations world-wide (Burke et al (1994)).
Bob Nelson was a former Human Resource specialist with British Airways and had previously worked with the Warner Burke and George Litwin Consultancy Organisations, and used their 'casual model of organisational change and performance' to implement the change in British Airways during the mid 1980's. Therefore, it was hardly surprising that he persuaded the BBC Board of Management to adapt the 'Burke-Litwin' model to introduce the change within the BBC. Bob also made a number of presentations to all the internal change practitioners, explaining the Burke-Litwin model and how he envisaged that it would work in the BBC. I also attended a series of BBC Master Classes with both George Litwin and Warner Burke (architects of the model) to get a more in depth understanding of the theoretical underpinning of their model and how they proposed to adapt it for use within the BBC.

They identified two key elements, which they regarded as central to their model viz. transformational and transactional factors. Transformational factors refer to an organisation's mission, strategy, leadership, and culture. Transactional factors, are concerned with the organisation's systems, structure, management practices and climate. The authors claimed that external environment has a direct impact on the transformational factors which in turn impact on the transactional factors. These two factors then directly impact on the staff's motivation and performance, thereby establishing a causal relationship between how performance is affected and how effective change occurs. Elaborating on this, they said:

"we concur with the model that organisational change typically begins with senior management determining how best to respond to the dynamic forces in the external environment and that changing or shaping the culture in the case of Smith-Kline Beecham, which can be considered as transformational change, is fundamental and comprehensive and occurs as a response to the external environment change is depicted in terms of process and content with emphasis on transformational and transactional variables" Burke and Jackson (1991:76-77).

The architects of the model further emphasised its normative nature by suggesting that:
“in large scale or total organisational change, mission, strategy, leadership and culture have more 'weight' than structure, management practices and systems. And culture change, or shaping, must be planned and aligned with the strategy and leadership behaviour” (Burke and Litwin (1992:529)).

Their model is a hybrid of the 7.S. model honed by Peters and Waterman (1982) system, strategy, structure, style, staff, skills, shared values and the inter-relationships of those variables (Pascale and Athos (1981)). However, Burke and Litwin, were critical of the descriptive nature of the 7.S. model because they were unable to ascertain how these seven dimensions were affected by the external environment, or how each dimension affects the other. The authors commented:

“our desire is for a model that will serve as a guide for both organisational diagnosis and planned managed organisational change, one that clearly shows cause and effect relationships and can be tested empirically. We have been involved recently with an organisation where almost all of the model was used to provide a framework for executives and managers to understand the massive change they were attempting to manage e.g. British Airways changed from public to private company in 1987. Burke & Litwin (1992:524).

Finally, they cautioned against the misuse of the model by suggesting that:

“as a guide for what to look for and as a predictor for what and how to manage large scale organisational change, we have found the model invaluable, but we must not allow it to determine exclusively what we diagnose or how we handle organisational change” Burke and Litwin (1992:534).

Having the model explained to me by its originators enabled me to grasp the concept underlying its theory. Hearing convincing evidence of how it was successfully implemented at Smith Kline-Beecham and British Airways presented me with an excellent opportunity to base my own longitudinal research on how the model was implemented in the BBC. I hoped to assess to what degree the results or outcomes of the change processes affected the author’s own predictions. However, my initial plans were subsequently altered as a result of the
abandonment of the Burke-Litwin model during the early stages of the change process, and my research focus was subsequently altered.

Once the change programme was introduced in 1993 permission was sought and obtained from Warner-Burke to use their questionnaire which was specifically designed to test the various aspects of the Burke-Litwin Model (1994), for conducting a pilot amongst some staff to assess their perceptions of the change. Subsequently in early 1994, I conducted a pilot study by interviewing 25 participants on a random sample basis. This group included Bob Nelson, Head of Corporate Management Development, the project Director of "Producer Choice" and a mixture of middle managers and junior staff. The results revealed a stark contrast between the perceptions of the two senior managers mentioned above and the other participants in the pilot study. The senior managers had adopted an overwhelming positive attitude to the early changes within the BBC and its new mission and vision statements and suggested that such actions were also long overdue. They believed that it would help to provide focus and direction for the future of all its employees. In addition, they commented on the need to change the long established culture and to replace it with a business culture, one which was prepared to change and adapt in order to stay ahead of its competition. This was underscored by their desire to see a much leaner and fitter organisation, which provided value for money to its customers as well as being more open and accountable to its licence fee payers. However, they did admit that the BBC managers needed to learn new skills in the area of managing a business, finance, budgeting, marketing, negotiating, business planning, etc. They claimed that the appropriate measures were already in place for these skills to be developed through the business education programme with Bradford School of Management, as well as some 'tailor-made in house programmes'. These two managers further claimed that the BBC had no choice but to introduce the radical change in the way in which it was doing, because of pressures on time.

By contrast, the rest of the staff in the sample study, adopted a completely different attitude towards the change. Although about half of them acknowledged that change was necessary, they said they felt very angry about the way in which it was imposed from the top with no consultation or involvement on their part. They thought that the BBC was embarking on change for change's sake and felt that this
was a pointless exercise. They went on to say "the BBC has always made excellent programmes of quality and distinction and we are afraid that such high standards will be compromised by this unnecessary and costly change" (Felix 1994 pilot study.) These participants also complained about the low morale amongst staff, lack of job security, threats of redundancy, no sense of direction, poor communications with senior management, poor management skills, a feeling of constantly being pressured to deliver more results with fewer resources and having to work longer hours. They also felt that the Board of Management was pandering to political pressures. On the positive side, they claimed that they enjoyed working with the BBC and felt that the job was challenging and interesting. In the meantime the (1993) staff survey which was conducted by Warner Burke Associates published its results one year later (1994). The purpose of this survey had been to find out what staff thought about the BBC at the beginning of a process of considerable change. Staff criticised the lack of clear goals or sense of direction, lack of teamwork among senior managers, poor communication, too much bureaucracy, low staff morale and lack of employee involvement (Staff survey 1993). The above results confirmed some of the earlier conclusions obtained in my pilot survey and this situation showed no improvement when it was subsequently repeated in (1994) to monitor progress.

At this point, I was beginning to experience some reservations about the Burke-Litwin model. It began to present me with some empirical and theoretical difficulties because of its assertions about being able to predict what and how to manage large-scale system-wide organisational change (Burke et al, 1994)). On the contrary, my earlier findings showed the complete opposite. I further encountered a great deal of cynicism and hostility from the staff towards the change programme and how it was being implemented in the course of over 200 forums and seminars between 1993-95 which I co-facilitated. However, this experience was by no means unique to me. My colleagues also informed me that they had similar experiences. Consequently, this experience compounded my negative feelings and led me to harbour some real fears about the feasibility of the research project. There was an apparent contradiction between what the model was espousing and my first hand experience of the change process in the BBC.
In a moment of desperation, I arranged to have an interview with Warner Burke and his associates to try to gain a clearer view of the model and to explore different ways of applying it in my research. They offered some useful advice and suggested using two to three Directorates in the BBC as embedded case studies to compare and contrast how the rate of change was being absorbed (Yin (1994)). In addition, they advised me to select one Directorate where there was evidence of tangible progress with the change programme and another area where progress was less evident. Warner-Burke and his partner, Harvey Hornstein further suggested sending out the Burke-Litwin questionnaire to a random sample of senior managers, junior managers and staff to access their early view of the change. About two years later, the process should be repeated, with the same group, to assess the degree of the progress.

Unfortunately, just as the first batch of questionnaires were about to be sent out, the BBC introduced another major restructuring and some of the participants who agreed to help me with my research were either made redundant or lost interest in the project. It was at that point that I decided to change direction and opted for the idea of conducting a longitudinal case study by the means of retrospective analysis along the lines suggested by authors such as Pettigrew (1990), and Leonard-Barton, (1995). The original idea was to select a group of former BBC employees, some senior managers, middle managers, and junior staff, on a random sample, and to send out the Burke-Litwin questionnaire in three phases - in 1994, 1995 and 1996 to conduct a retrospective analysis of how the participants viewed the change after it was in operation for a while (Van de Ven et al (1995)).

Shortly before sending out the first batch of questionnaires, my work was peer reviewed by my DBA colleagues at Henley Management College and my supervisor Professor Pat Joynt. After some robust questioning and constructive feedback from them, it was suggested that my method needed some rethinking. By this time the methodology presented me with several difficulties. For example, it was very hard to define the unit of analysis in my research. Secondly, it was difficult to define the concept of time and know when to begin the research process. Above all, it was a major challenge for me to combine my role as a participant observer academic researcher and insider. Gummesson (1991). After a further review of the organisational change literature, my ideas became clearer and culminated in a
better focus for the research design of the study. About half way into my study, in 1994, the Director General appeared to have abandoned the Burke-Litwin model. During the early days he had used it extensively as the basis for conducting staff surveys and diagnostic measures to determine the problems of the organisation and also as the basis of a questionnaire for generating a set of management practices for the BBC during the 1990’s and beyond. The model was also used to identify and generate a set of generic senior managerial competencies for use across the corporation. The reasons for the subsequent demise of the model was never made public. Rumours suggest that the Director General had fallen out with Warner Burke, who was until then one of his principal consultants and advisors on organisational change. For this reason very little mention is made about the Burke-Litwin model in the latter sections of this thesis.

However, the thesis covers in some depth the staff’s perceptions about the particular style of leadership, which he subsequently adopted, which was very different from the original Burke-Litwin (1994) model. Thus, it is against this background that the story of the change process will be told, beginning in the next chapter with the BBC in a historical and political context.
CHAPTER 2 THE BBC IN A HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

INTRODUCTION: A ROUTE MAP TO THE STUDY

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a route map for the reader in following the thesis. Therefore, the study, which I am going to talk about, concerns the changes in the BBC with particular emphasis on "Producer Choice" and "Extending Choice". Firstly, these are a logical extension of the Resources Studies, which were carried out by John Birt during 1987-1988. Secondly, the change is based on a theory of change, which is the Burke-Litwin Model (1992). As a consequence, the next chapter will discuss theories of change. This will be followed by a subsequent chapter which is an exploration of the strategic change interventions in the BBC, then an in-depth description and analysis of the naturalistic methodology. The final parts of this study will focus on an analysis of the data, conclusions, recommendations, reflections and significance of the research.

However, in the meantime, perhaps it might be helpful to begin here with an explanation of why I chose to conduct this particular piece of research before a discourse analysis on the political and organisational context of the BBC.

WHY ME?

Lots of research on organisational change seems to be lacking in at least two areas in historical and political context. According to Pettigrew et al (1990:269):

"much of the research on organisation change are ahistorical, aprocessual and acontextual in character".

He goes on to suggest that there are only a few studies of change that actually allow the process to reveal itself in any kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner (ibid). The significance of providing rich and thick descriptions of the contextual background for certain types of qualitative studies is widely endorsed by the following academics and social scientists, Erlandson et al (1993) and professor Kaken Legge (1996). Therefore, as a researcher and change practitioner within the BBC, this presents me with a unique opportunity to undertake a longitudinal study of the change process in a pre-determined "time-bounded" period of my own
choice. However, change brings with it its own problems, particularly for the researcher as an insider and this will be elaborated on in chapter five. (Barley (1995)). Let us now examine the political and organisational context of the BBC, as promised before starting, from its inception in 1922 to present day.

THE ORIGINS OF THE BBC AS A PRIVATE COMPANY

The British Broadcasting Company was originally founded as a private company in 1922. It was a consortium of manufacturers of domestic wireless receiving sets, whose main purpose was to broadcast and transmit radio programmes to the owners who had purchased their legally manufactured receiver sets. The first attempt at Government regulation of the activities of this private consortium was made in 1923 with the setting up of the Sykes Committee 1923. Its main terms of reference were to debate the future role of broadcasting, its ownership and funding. Subsequently, it recommended a blanket license fee of 10 shillings (50p) for all receiving sets and for the first time suggested public control of broadcasting under the responsibility of a Minister of Parliament. Three years later (in 1926), the Crawford Committee was set up by the Government, to examine the future structure and running of the company. John Reith, its Managing Director, gave evidence to the committee, and argued for the BBC to be kept as a public service under 'unitary control' and dedicated to the highest standard. Finally, when the committee reported its findings, it recommended that the company should be turned into a public service corporation and governed by a Royal Charter. Its finance was to be set by the license fee, at a fixed rate of 10 shillings (50p) per year, and the government would appoint its governors to act as the ultimate authority for the newly formed corporation (Crawford Committee Report (cols 448-251) (14th July 1926)). Shortly after the committee made its recommendations the new British Broadcasting Corporation was formed in January 1927, and was granted a 10-year charter. John Reith (later Lord Reith) was appointed as its first Director General, and the new corporation acquired all previous company assets including its plant and staff.

FROM PRIVATE COMPANY TO PUBLIC CORPORATION: THE NEW STRUCTURE

Following the formation of the company into a public corporation, a new structure was created to ensure the delivery of its public service. At the very top of the
structure was the Board of Governors (referred to subsequently as BOG.) and the Board of Management (BOM.) at the next level down. The BOG is a political appointment made by the Queen, on the advice of the Prime Minister. They work part-time, except for the Chairman, and are all empowered to act as trustees to safeguard the broadcasting service in the national interest. Their functions are essentially non-executive and their responsibilities are more general than particular. From the early days of its inception, there have not been any fixed guidelines defining exactly how the Governors should govern. However, in practice, they enjoyed as much or as little power as they chose.

Conversely, the Director General, who is appointed by the Board of Governors, heads the Board of Management. He is the most senior full time executive of the corporation and together with his team of senior managers whom form the BOM, assumes full responsibility for the executing of policy and general day to day administration of the service. The senior managers who sit on The Board of Management with the Director General are referred to as Managing Directors. Each one being in charge of a Directorate, for example, the Managing Director (MD of Network Radio, MD of Television, MD of Regional Broadcasting, MD of BBC Enterprise, MD of World Service, MD of News and Current Affairs. Every Managing Director appoints a Controller of his Directorate as his most senior manager responsible for providing strategic policy direction for his area. He is then represented at the next lower level by a series of Heads of Departments, Managers and Operational Staff. This early structure of the BBC is summarised in the Figure 1 see page 24. (For a more detailed breakdown of the old BBC Management Structure, showing the Director General and his structural and functional relationship with the various Directors, see Figure 2 on page 26.
Figure 1  
BBC STRUCTURE PRIOR TO 1993

(Showing various levels in the hierarchy)

(Felix 1997)
The Director General keeps tight control over his various Directorates via the BOM forums where policy and strategic issues are debated and agreed for implementation at a Directorate and operational level. The main programme making Directorates are identified viz. Network Television, Network Radio, Regional Broadcasting, Education, News and Current Affairs, World Service and International television. On the periphery are the non-programme making areas such as Finance and IT, Personnel, Policy and Planning, Corporate Affairs, Legal Affairs etc, which form the Corporate Directorate. BBC Enterprise, later renamed World-wide, was set up by the BBC as a subsidiary company and is therefore, regarded as a separate entity in its own right. Thus, it is free from some of the constraints of BBC trading policy. It represents the commercial wing of the BBC and is allowed to form strategic alliances with national and international companies in making co-productions. Whatever money BBC World-wide earns is then ploughed back into programme-making areas by the BBC.

The World Service is funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, unlike the rest of the BBC, which is funded by the licence fee.
Figure 2  The Management Structure of the BBC prior to (1993)

Adapted from BBC archival data (1993)

This old structure remained in place throughout the decades of the 1960s -1990s when the current one, following a major restructuring of the BBC in 1997, subsequently replaced it. (See Appendix A for the new structure). The DG and the BOG, which sit at the top of this structure, hold regular meetings to discuss and decide major policy and financial performance of the corporation. At the outset of
the formation of the BBC structure in 1927 to the period of the early 1980’s, the nature of the relationship between the BOG and its Board of Management progressively worsened. The deliberate attempts to undermine the role of Board of Governors have been well documented in a variety of books and reports. See Horrie (1994), Leapman (1987), Cain (1994) and The Lord Anan Committee Report (1977) for more in-depth details on the subject. However, the nature of the relationship between BOG and BOM began to alter with the appointment of three new members of the Board of Governors (Jocelyn Barrow, Stuart Young and William Rees-Mogg). They began to question the orthodoxy of the perceived power and influence of the Board of Management in public utterances. They took the view that the BBC was badly run as a business and was therefore in need of a substantial overhaul. They were rather unimpressed by the incumbent DG and his BOM, because they felt that they had no concept of long term strategic planning to secure the corporation beyond the year 2000. This is highly significant, because most of the subsequent strategic changes in the BBC stemmed from this radical mind shift on the part of the BOG.

However, despite the political infighting between BOG and BOM over the years, the BBC maintained its position as a monopoly broadcaster with the explicit support of the various Governments over the years, until 1954, and the advent of commercial TV (ITV). The ITV companies were financed by advertising revenue, but with their own obligation to provide high quality broadcasting. For 40 years, both the BBC and ITV maintained a sort of cosy monopoly of public and private sector co-existence. Throughout that period both companies competed for audiences, but never really posed any serious threat to each other’s existence. Thus as a reflection of the unique history of the BBC and its reputation as one of the world’s leading public service broadcaster; successive governments over the years have supported it through a substantial licence fee. As a consequence, it experienced a period of continuous and unprecedented growth in its annual income for several decades until the mid 1980s. This was largely due to householders’ conversion of their black and white televisions to colour, thereby raising the fee from £18 to £80 per annum. As a result, the BBC had a guarantee of an annual income of £1,468 million and, employed around 28,000 staff (BBC Policy and Planning 1990). This guarantee and lack of any serious threat from its rival competitor created a sense of
security on the part of the management and staff. It also appeared to have created a culture of intellectual arrogance, complacency, inertia and very little regard for its licence fee payers. Added to that, there appears to have been a prevailing belief amongst the staff of the invincibility of the BBC as an organisation. From an insider’s perspective, one frequently heard the staff claim that “the BBC is the best and that the public will always need it for its distinctive quality programmes”. As its growth went unchecked, during that period it amassed and owned two television channels, five national radio channels, a network of 39 local radio stations and a radio broadcasting operation which broadcasts in 42 different languages around the world. More recently, it introduced world service television, which is beamed by satellite television to most of Europe and the Far East (Policy and Planning 1994). As its success grew from strength to strength, the government demonstrated its commitment to its future security by granting a renewal of its Charter. At this time there were very few broadcasting alternatives to the BBC, these being Independent Television and a few independent local radio stations in the major cities of the United Kingdom. At the beginning of the 1980’s this relative stability of the broadcasting environment and the BBC’s own security came under serious threat and this has continued to the present day.

THE CHANGING CONTEXT: EXTERNAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

The reasons for the dramatic changes experienced by the BBC at the beginning of the early 1980’s are many and varied. Some of these were mainly external environmental factors which had a direct impact on the international broadcasting world, while others were mainly internally driven factors which were specific to the BBC. (See Appendix F for a chronology of key events impacting on the BBC). At the onset of the change the BBC commissioned its own research on the future trends in the broadcasting world and the results predicted that “over the next 15 years, the Broadcasting Industry will change faster than before.” (BBC Extending Choice Document 1992). Before going into any great detail about the principal drivers for the subsequent changes which took place in the BBC, it is important to stress that these factors must not be seen as isolated events but are viewed as part of a much wider context of public sector reforms in Britain and other developed countries during that era.
Ferlie et al (1997:30) suggested that:

"common factors such as the impact of national and world recession and the growth of Government have increasingly led to attempts to control public expenditure, or to restructure public sectors with the aim of becoming more effective and responsive" (See also Kirkpatrick and Lucid 1995).

Consequently, the introduction of market mechanisms in the BBC in April 1993 with the advent of "Producer Choice" was by no means unique to the organisation, similar initiatives were already well established in some areas of the public sector organisations such as Local Government and the National Health Service. In 1988, the Conservative Government introduced the concept of Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) and market testing to local authorities. In essence, this meant that certain key targeted services had to be put out to tender in line with the government Act of 1992. This concept was later applied to Social Services with the aim of increasing choice for non-standardised products and competition between providers in the hope that it would lead to greater efficiency (Painter (1991)). A similar policy was applied to the National Health Service (NHS) along quasi-market principles culminated in the report Working for Patients Reforms (1989), aimed at extending choice to consumers. These reforms created internal markets, which separated service providers (The 'Trust' Hospitals) from the purchasers (GPs regional and District Health Authorities). Therefore, having briefly explained some of the external pressures for change in the BBC, let us now explore the internal factors for change to assess the part played in the process.

INTERNAL PRESSURES FOR CHANGE

The decades of the 1980's onwards witnessed some of the most radical changes ever seen in broadcasting in the United Kingdom. To a very large extent, these reflected world wide events as well as government policies. The new leadership, under Marmaduke Hussey as the new Chairman of the Board of Governors and Michael Checkland as the newly appointed Director General soon began to make public utterances about their commitment to changing the BBC's culture. Consequently, once they were well established in their new roles, they began to strengthen the BBC's position by actively pursuing policies to maintain its competitive position in an increasingly global environment. The BBC had to achieve
all of this during a period of decline in its real income and economic recession. Marmaduke Hussey and Michael Checkland were largely instrumental in orchestrating some of the major internal pressures for change and were the principal architects of the subsequent strategic initiatives in the BBC. Marmaduke Hussey was a key stakeholder in the process.

THE APPOINTMENT OF MARMADUKE HUSSAY

The appointment of Marmaduke Hussey in 1987 as Chairman of the BBC Board of Governors is highly significant for a number of reasons. Prior to joining the BBC, Hussey worked as a newspaper executive on the Daily Mail and the Times. He was appointed a few months after the Peacock Report was published in 1986. This was seen by many BBC staff as political, because he was a known Tory Party supporter and had a tough reputation as an interventionist during his period as a Senior Manager in Fleet Street (Leapman (1987)). Some critics, both internally and externally, saw this as a deliberate move by Mrs Thatcher to "shake up" the BBC and make it more efficient, by introducing a business culture and a new managerial agenda. This point is well made by Andrew Pettigrew (1995), Horrie et al (1994) and the BBC Staff survey results (1994). Some staff saw it as a deliberate attempt by Mrs Thatcher to redress the balance and to have senior executives who were supportive of the Conservative Government policies and reforms. They cited a number of instances in the 1980s, when the Corporation was frequently criticised by Mrs Thatcher and her Government for having a left wing bias (Extending Choice Seminar, 1994-95)). During that period various Chairmen and Home Secretaries of the Government challenged the editorial standards of the BBC and there were also police raids on its studios and premises. Some BBC staff saw this as an attempt to take away its editorial independence. Moreover, the relationship between the then Director General, Alasdair Milne, and the Conservative Party was at its lowest ebb, because of the series of highly publicised confrontations between him and various Home Secretaries and Conservative Party Chairman over BBC programmes. The relationship between the DG and the BOG, which historically had always been difficult, worsened during the period. Nearly all the BBC's most public controversies during Milne's tenure of office stemmed from failure of BBC executives to observe the proper 'reference up' procedures that were supposed to be applied to
potentially troublesome programme decisions. For example, Milne was never told about the BBC six-part series about "Secrecy", written by Duncan Campbell, until it was scheduled for winter 1986-7. Consequently, Milne was not able to tell the Governors until it was too late to avoid the public row with the Conservative Government.

As soon as Marmaduke Hussey was appointed as Chairman of BOG in October 1986, he decided that Milne should be sacked, but delayed informing him until his dismissal on 29 January 1987. Hussey was also aware of the historical and political conflicts between the Board of Governors and the Board of Management and concluded that his most urgent task was to improve the relationship between the Governors and the Board of Management. He was also mindful of the external pressures facing the BBC and felt that he should introduce drastic measures to save the BBC from the threat of global competition. He replaced Alasdair Milne, the Director General with Michael Checkland.

**APPOINTMENT OF MICHAEL CHECKLAND**

The appointment of Michael Checkland, as Director General, was one of the most significant responses to the external pressures. Prior to his appointment his predecessors were all recruited from a programme making background and had had no management or business skills training and experience. Checkland’s appointment was a significant break with the past. Although he was an internal appointment, he was an accountant by training and profession and was also Deputy Director General to Alasdair Milne. Prior to that, he was BBC’s Director of Resources, and had a proven track record as an expert on management accountancy and efficiency within the BBC. He was also highly regarded by the Board of Governors for his financial skills and he made it plain that these were the skills which were needed at the top of the BBC. Some influential people in the media greeted his appointment with derision. Liz Forgan, who was a senior executive at Channel 4 at the time wrote in the "Listener":

> "the appointment showed no obvious sign of human inspiration ... the Governors had taken the easy option... I have never heard anyone utter a bad word against Michael Checkland, but offered a choice among the giants of broadcasting, the Governors have chosen a candidate of lesser stature"

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(Liz Forgan Listener, 1987).

The Daily Mail described Checkland as ‘Mr Nobody’, a safety first appointment (Daily Mail, 1987).

Historically, the BBC has always appointed someone with a programme making pedigree as its DG. Checkland’s background as an accountant was the first of its kind and a break with the established tradition. It was also a clear signal from the BOG that change was in the offing and from now on the priority and emphasis was to be on “efficiency” and sound financial management.

This was also confirmed by Michael Checkland in his acceptance speech on taking up the post when he said:

"From now on the BBC, was to be run like a billion pound business” and the licence fee payers were to be regarded as shareholders in the BBC Plc” (Checkland (1987)).

That same weekend the new DG and the Board of Governors attended a meeting at Ettingham Park Country Hotel in Warwickshire (Leapman (1987). They also invited Douglas Hurd (former Home Secretary) and Tim Bell, Mrs Thatcher’s former image consultant. Bell had been acting as an external consultant to the BBC under the previous regime and Checkland inherited this arrangement. Bell gave a speech criticising the ‘Old Guard’ of the BBC and said that its problems were similar to that of all those in the public sector. He suggested that it was ‘producer driven’ and they needed to see the public not as viewers, but as customers and shareholders. He also advised them to place more emphasis on public presentation and suggested that their adverts should tell people how good the BBC programmes were. Checkland echoed his sentiments and reiterated that the BBC was a ‘billion pound business’ and that he intended to run it like one (Hорrie et al (1994), BBC Policy and Planning (1987)).

After this initial meeting, Hussey turned his attention to finding a suitable Deputy DG to assist Michael Checkland. On joining the BBC, Hussey publicly criticised the BBC News and Current Affairs programmes format and style and said that he was keen to recruit someone with the expertise to improve it. He approached John Birt the Director General at London Weekend Television and offered him the post of
Deputy Director General to Michael Checkland. After some discussions, both
Director General and Hussey concluded that the BBC's problems were the result of
poor management rather than lack of talent. During the process of negotiation Birt
told Hussey that he would not come as a "fire fighter", but would accept the job on
condition Hussey agreed to a new structure and approach in the way the BBC
made its programmes. Hussey agreed to Birt's conditions and the latter was
appointed as Deputy Director General to Michael Checkland without open
competition. He was given the specific brief to revamp News and Current Affairs
(NCA). Throughout the BBC there were rumours amongst the various levels of
staff and articles in the BBC's own internal magazine that the Director General had
also promised Hussey the post of DG; as a major enticement for joining the BBC,
when Checkland retired.

In the meantime, Birt's views on how News and Current Affairs programmes should
be made were well known. In 1975 he had collaborated with Peter Jay to write a
series of articles for The Times. These stated that journalism had a built-in bias
against understanding and ridiculed the broadcasters for providing the sort of
pictures which meant that NCA programmes could wrap news values, giving priority
to material that look interesting, to beef up ratings. They criticised the over reliance
on visual material, because they believed it squeezed out what they saw as TV's
mission to explain (Times 1975). They advocated a centralised structure, similar to
that of a newspaper, with expert correspondents, in subjects such as education and
the arts, who would fill up the programmes rather like separate sections of quality
newspapers. No television company took up those ideas. However, after Birt was
appointed Deputy Director General (DDG) of the BBC and given the specific brief
for NCA, he acted swiftly to implement his long held 'vision' of how news should be
organised and managed. On taking up his appointment with the BBC, one of his
first tasks was to carry out a merger of the News and Current Affairs operations and
to reorganise them along his long held views. In the process of doing so, he sacked
the majority of senior managers and replaced them with younger recruits from
outside - from rival organisations such as London Weekend Television. (BBC News
and Current Affairs Restructure (1987)).
Following this, a number of strategic initiatives were introduced as part of an "efficiency" programme to cut costs. One of the first to stem from this was the formulation of a "five year strategic plan" to cover the years 1988 - 1993.


In 1988 Michael Checkland set up a Committee to review BBC spending in the light of the Peacock Report. He appointed the Director General as its Chairman, with the specific brief to devise a five year efficiency plan to cut overheads, reduce staff costs and vacate expensive premises and to identify how greater use could be made of outside services. He stressed that:

"the strategy was to make good programmes and we have developed management and financial objectives to enable us to do so. We believe these objectives will maintain and improve the range and diversity of programmes for viewers and listeners ensuring they are made of the highest standards". (Checkland (1988: 1)

This was the first time the BBC had prepared a five year framework of policy objectives across the corporation, (at home and overseas including the External Services) which was jointly agreed by the BOG and BOM. The strategy was intended to clarify management aims to define tasks in all areas of the BBC in line with the five year plan from 1988 to 1993. The main goal was to make the BBC more efficient and effective through a series of major cost saving measures in the resources area and redirecting it into improving programme quality.

OTHER MAJOR INITIATIVES AFTER 1990: FUNDING THE FUTURE.

The Board of Governors and Board of Management set up a Committee in January 1991 to identify ways of releasing resources to fund a more competitive pay structure. Ian Phillips, the newly appointed Director of Finance, chaired it. The rationale for this study was that the BBC was facing serious financial constraints as a result of the decline in overall income from the licence fee. After the mid 1980's the BBC's annual income from the licence fee remained constant, or declined in real terms, because one of the recommendations of the Price Waterhouse study (1990) suggested that the licence fee should be pegged at 3% below the annual rate of inflation and to be linked for another four years. The report also
recommended major capital and revenue costs savings of £203m over a five-year period (Television Licence Fee. A Study for the Home Office by Price Waterhouse, December 1990, HMSO).

It was against this background that Ian Phillips, Chairman of the Committee on “Funding the Future” had to find new and creative ways of funding a more competitive pay structure for BBC staff. The Committee reported one year later, in 1991, and made a number of recommendations to the Board of Governors and Board of Management. They only agreed to a few which were worth £75m per annum to be achieved by 1993/94 (Funding the Future Committee 1991)).

THE RESOURCES STUDIES APRIL 1991-92

By the early 1990’s the Director General’s profile within the BBC was increasing day by day. Since joining in 1987, he had continued to play a leading role on a series of high level corporate projects. He became the BBC’s Editor-in-Chief and led the corporation’s negotiations with the Government in Whitehall which increased his power base within the BBC.

As the Director General continued his high profile activities there were internal rumours on the grapevine within the BBC that the relationship between Michael Checkland and Director General was becoming somewhat strained. In the meantime, a Network Television Resources Committee was set up in 1991, with the brief to review all facilities used by the BBC in television in the Regions and in Television Centre in London and to recommend savings where possible (BBC Policy and Planning, 1991)). Once more Birt was appointed as Chairman of this Committee. It consisted of two distinct sets of members: some were pro-Checkland others were pro-Birt. It was alleged that cracks began to show in the relationship between Checkland and Birt. The former was quoted as saying that his supporters on the committee would deliver a report to teach the Director General a lesson about the reality of how the BBC worked. It was also alleged that Checkland confided in his supporters on the committee that he appointed the Deputy Director General in charge of the committee to give him something to do since his reorganisation of the News and Current Affairs Directorate. It was felt that he had become something of a loose cannon, spending too much time courting politicians and governors. Checkland supporters were appointed from among BBC
programme makers, while Birt’s supporters consisted of a team of external consultants and staff from the BBC’s Policy and Planning Unit and Chief Accountants.

At one stage during the reviews Checkland approached his faction on the committee and asked them to brief him on what was going on because Birt kept him in the dark about the Committee’s progress. When Checkland learnt of Birt’s plan to divorce production from editorial aspects of programme making he confided to a colleague “this is far too radical, Birt is going over the top”. As a result, Checkland persuaded his colleagues on the committee to challenge Birt on this issue. Subsequently, when Birt was challenged by some of the committee members he replied:

“you must remember I have a goal and you too have a goal. I know exactly where I want the BBC to be. You cannot change your goal once it has been decided. This is the first rule of effective management. You must not change the vision” (Horrie(1994)).

Birt’s report on Network Resources was published in November 1991. It had cost an estimated £2 million in consultant’s fees (TV and NCA Resources Review, (1991-92)).

The report made a number of key recommendations and introduced the "Centres of Excellence Concept". The aim was to establish Regional Centres which specialised in making certain programmes for the rest of the BBC. Manchester, Birmingham and Scotland were designated as Centres of Excellence and were promised adequate money and resources to specialise in certain programme genres. For example, Manchester was designated as a Centre of Excellence for Religion and Youth and Entertainment, and all BBC programmes about religion and youth and entertainment would be made in Manchester in future. The report also recommended huge staff redundancies and closure of studios and outside broadcast facilities. As a direct result of the review about 7,000 staff in Network television and radio were made redundant between 1986-1993; while an extra 1,000 new jobs were created in areas of enhanced or extended service such as the broadcasting of Parliament, regional journalism and arts programmes on TV (BBC
Policy and Planning Unit, 1994)). Seventeen radio studios, five television studios and 20 outside broadcast studios were closed in the process.

OVERHEADS REVIEWS

The main aim of these reviews was to reduce the overhead activities in both Central and Output Directorates to a point where business units would get rid of excessive overheads. It was critical to the success of "Producer Choice". The review targeted savings of over £70 million by 1996/97 with a reduction in staff numbers of 1,200 in the resources areas. (Touche Ross Report 1994). When the overhead reviews were started in December 1991, £295 million per annum was being spent without being attributed to the appropriate productive activity. The reviews first evaluated the levels of overheads that were needed by the organisation, then identified those fundamental at a corporate level—which turned out to be only 10% of the total overheads and finally classified the remainder for charging out to departments or for allowing departmental choice.

A major part of the overheads review was related to property, because the objective was to develop a full costing system in order to attribute rents to each department as part of the "Producer Choice" costing system. There was also an added incentive that once the appropriate rental figures were set, departments would be encouraged to dispose of any property which represented spare capacity, but at the same time a costly overhead to them. Therefore, the first step was to identify those overhead services such as catering, cleaning, security, transport and travel, printing and stationery. The next step was for them to be market tested against similar external service providers to establish whether they could be supplied more effectively by external agencies.

THE AIMS OF MARKET TESTING

The aims of market testing were, first, to make a systematic comparison of external and internal sources of supply for overhead support services, secondly, to release more money for programmes by testing the requirements; contracting out where a sound financial case existed; generating further reductions in overhead cost base; and enabling the BBC to concentrate on managing its core activities. Thirdly, to
address the uncertainties surrounding impact of new legislation (Trade Union Employment Reform Act (1996 etc.))

As a result of this exercise 1994 saw substantial savings. For example, £2.6 million annual savings from tendering for facilities management were achieved in the regions, and £6 million annual savings from tendering for facilities management services in Network TV. Furthermore, £5.5 million annual savings from tendering for facilities management and engineering services were achieved in Network Radio and £1 million annual savings were made from contracting out computer services (Managing Change Progress Report to the Department of National Heritage (13 September 1993)).

In the aftermath of this exercise the BBC outsourced a number of its services such as security, catering, cleaning, printing and stationery, postal services and some areas of transport services, because it concluded that it was more economical for external agencies to provide these services to the BBC. The majority of these were achieved in the period between 1990 - 93.

THE PRODUCTION EFFICIENCY STUDY

The main aims of the production efficiency study were to generate additional funds for programming by: comparing working practices in programme production departments across the BBC and outside; by identifying best practice and implementing them across the BBC to deliver cost savings and productivity improvements whilst maintaining quality standards; by putting into place a self sustaining pressure on costs and efficiency; by developing a better understanding of programme cost drivers; and lastly by involving those at the heart of “Producer Choice” - the producers themselves - in the search for improved productivity. (Progress Report to the Department of National Heritage 13 September 1993). The study was deliberately planned to take effect after the overhead resources reviews were completed, because the Board of Management felt that it was necessary to identify and establish first of all the proper levels of overhead resources that was necessary for making a particular programme.

Once the data were established, the next step was to compare the internal cost of making programmes in the BBC with that of the external independent productions.
The aim was to establish a BBC benchmark for the rest of the industry, but this was deferred until later because of unforeseen circumstances. Consequently, there was an 18.7% reduction in head count from 1990 to 1993. There was also a reduction in fixed resources and a number of units closed. For example, closures took place at 17 studios in Radio, two in News and Current Affairs, five TV studios, 20 outside broadcast units in radio and seven in TV. There were also closures of nine videotape-editing suits in NCA and 10 in TV (BBC Policy and Planning Unit (1994)).

THE BATTLE FOR SUPREMACY IN THE BOARDROOM

From the moment John Birt joined the BBC, in 1987, he chaired a series of high profile committees in preparing the BBC for the major change programme which it was about to embark upon. He also led all the corporate negotiations with Government ministers in Whitehall to ensure that the BBC Charter was going to be renewed (BBC Policy and Planning (1990 and 1991)). Above all, he had a very good rapport with the Board of Governors within the BBC and this was unprecedented because of the historical rift, which existed between the Board of Management and the Board of Governors. Michael Checkland by contrast kept a very low profile and allowed John Birt a free reign to play a leading role on a number or corporate projects. To complicate things further, Marmaduke Hussey had originally promised John Birt the DG’s post in 1987 as an extra inducement to join the BBC. Therefore, it was only a matter of time before he assumed that role after Checkland’s departure. Some insiders in the BBC claimed that such a promise undermined Checkland’s authority and boosted Birt’s confidence (Horrie et al (1994)).

There was tension in 1991, when the Board of Governors held a secret meeting to consider whether to extend Checkland’s contract for another four years according to custom and tradition. In the end, they agreed to renew his contract for only one year. John Birt was appointed DG with no open competition (BBC Policy and Planning (1991)). This had created a precedent where there were technically two-DG’s; the incumbent and one in waiting. From then onwards, Checkland appeared to have lost the trust and respect of the Board of Governors. Birt’s appointment as Director General of the BBC, without open competition, created great controversy within the Corporation and John Tusa, the former Managing Director of the World
Service, complained directly to Hussey, saying that he should have at least being granted an interview for the job. The Chairman gave him a sharp rebuke and said: "you wouldn't have got it even if you had applied".

Shortly afterwards, Tusa resigned in protest and since then has been a fierce critic of the changes within the BBC. In the meantime, the situation between Checkland and Birt had reached stalemate and it seemed as if neither one was in full command of the BBC's leadership. Nevertheless, the two men remained civil to each other in public. The Board of Governors grew exasperated with Checkland and accused him of being reactionary while they described Birt as proactive during regular Board meetings (BBC Policy and Planning (1991)).

In autumn 1991, the BOG held a meeting and criticised Checkland's achievement as DG. They said to him "After four years into your five year plan, only 5,000 of BBC's 25,000 staff have been shown the door". Marmaduke Hussey said that he had to face constant questions from journalists about the date for staff redundancies, but couldn't give an answer because Checkland never gave him an answer. Hussey also accused Checkland of floundering while Birt, was making the entire running on internal reforms of the BBC. On the other hand, Birt was praised for external lobbying of the planned Green Paper on the "Future of the BBC" Charter renewal in 1996 (BBC Policy and Planning (1992)). Such examples help to illustrate the tension and worsening relationship between Checkland and his Chairman. The Chairman abruptly sacked Checkland in 1992.

John Birt took over as DG and continued with his policies of reform. Since then, he has made several high profile speeches to the Royal Television Society (an annual conference for senior TV executives) criticising both Director General and Marmaduke Hussey. For example, in October 1992 at the Royal Television Society Conference, he criticised Hussey for being too old at 73 years of age to be in charge of the Corporation for the past 10 years and suggested that a younger person was required to fulfil that role when the BBC Charter came up for renewal in 1996.

He went on:
"You need a younger kind of leadership at certain points in the BBC's future; when you talk to the Governors about FM you want to be talking about "Frequency Modulation and not fuzzy monster" (Checkland's speech at RTS (Oct. 1992)).

At that same conference, Checkland complained that Hussey had placed him in an absurd position by announcing Birt as his successor almost two years before he was due to stand down. He described the experience as a ludicrous way to operate and then castigated the Governors as a group of elderly people who were out of touch with the reality of broadcasting. Hussey responded to the claims of Checkland by sending a letter to The Times claiming to represent the views of BOG. It merely said that "Birt was the man for the future and that Birt and Checkland stood 'four square together behind the BBC's editorial vision, its resource policies and all other aspects of the BBC's case (The Times (Oct 1992)).

CONCLUSION

The aim of this chapter was to provide "thick" descriptions of the BBC in a historical and political context in order to give the reader an insight into its background, as a precursor to understanding the subsequent programme of change which was adopted in the period between April 1993 and July 1998. It is clear that the pressures for change within the BBC were triggered by factors which were occurring in the wider public sector as a result of a series of Government Reforms in Britain (Kirkpatrick et al (1995) and Keat and Abercrombie (1991)). As a result, the BBC senior management took the view that it should embrace the wave of change that was sweeping through the public sector organisations in Britain and take appropriate steps to prepare the organisation for a programme of radical change.
CHAPTER 3 – THEORY / LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the chapter is to conduct a selected review of some of the current and more popular theories and models of organisational change literature with specific reference to the Burke-Litwin (1992) Causal Model of Organisational Change and Performance, because of its relevance to the BBC. In addition, the review will also include some aspects of transformational and strategic change and stakeholder analysis.

The aims are to:

- Identify some common and related themes from this disparate literature.
- Clarify their strengths and weaknesses where necessary in order to select the relevant aspects of the literature, which will help me to answer my research questions.
- Create an integrative research framework for the research agenda aimed at building a theory of organisational change.
- Produce a series of key questions or statements outlining the theoretical and methodological rationale for this research on the process of continuity and change in the BBC.

The format for this section begins with a brief statement explaining the rationale for using research questions to drive the choice of research methods; this is followed by a debate on the contradictory nature of the change literature and a series of rhetorical questions, which underscore this point. The next section reviews the Burke-Litwin model and provides some valedictory studies in support of its various claims and then explores the various theoretical perspectives on strategic and transformational change. This is followed by a review of the stakeholder literature. Finally, an attempt is made to develop an integrative framework for the research agenda, leading to some statements and questions about the rationale for the research design. At the onset, it was felt necessary to include a series of questions in the introductory part of this chapter in the hope that it would help to focus the research and provide a stimulus for subsequent debates. This particular format is
very much in keeping with the advice given by some eminent researchers. Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996: 73) suggested that: "researchers need to recognise that research questions should drive their choice of research method, research methods should not dictate their choice of questions" (See also Erlandson et al (1993)).

However, this is preceded by a preliminary commentary about the apparent contradictory nature of the change literature in order to set the context before addressing these questions in the subsequent sections.

THE CONTRADICTORY NATURE OF CHANGE

The apparent contradiction in the literature on organisational change is appropriately summed up by the polarity of views between two schools of thought which appear diametrically opposed to one another. On the one hand, there is a school of thought which views change from the perspective that it is rationalistic, linear and assumes that resistance to change is "mean-minded". Authors who make this claim include among them Burke and Jackson (1991), Hammer (1995) and Johanson (1995) to name but a few. In contrast, the other school of thought adopts a perspective, which views strategic change as "messy and chaotic". They challenge this rational model for ignoring the other evidence that executive rationality is bounded (that is environmental knowledge is limited); that strategic change is emergent, adaptive and recursive rather than pre-planned and linear; and that the actual implementation of change is "messy and chaotic". Authors whom make this point includes among them Kanter et al (1992) and Dawson (1994) plus a few other distinguished ones.

This apparent contradiction in the literature raises a number of issues and questions: Is it possible that one view is right and the other is wrong? Or could both be right? Thus, in attempting to address these issues, it was felt necessary to broaden the debate to include the supplementary questions below in order to develop a better understanding of the change process.
SUPPLEMENTARY QUESTIONS

- How possible is it to achieve successful planned change, given the messy nature of the change (as suggested in some of the OD literature)? Kanter et al (1992) and Dawson et al (1994) have been leading exponents of this viewpoint.

- Do attempts of planned organisational change work in their own terms as suggested by many in the OD literature? See Quinn (1980), Nadler and Tushman (1989), and Mintzberg (1994) for more details on the subject.

- What were the intended consequences of the planned change? Ferlie et al (1997).

- In formulating the strategy, how much collaboration involvement and participation were the staff allowed in the process? Clarkson (1995) and Harrison (1995) among others raise this question.

- How effective was the strategy in delivering the desired change? See Lovelady (1984a), (1984b) and Wilson (1992) for a broader perspective.

- If the change programme was successful, what specific factors contributed to its success? See Foxall et al (1997) and Grundy (1997) for a deeper insight into this aspect of change.


- How significant is the role of power by the ruling elites in bringing about strategic change? Hardy (1996) and (1995).

- Is sustained autocracy more effective in delivering the desired change than participation? Ferlie et al (1997) and Glendon (1992) have made some interesting comments on this topic.

- How significant is the role of culture in bringing about effective strategic change? Some leading experts on this matter include Schein (1983), (1985), (1997), Kanter (1989) and Bate (1996).

- How significant are the changes in cognitive frameworks and mindsets of the stakeholders in bringing about effective transformation? See Hinnings et al


The list of questions above raises some fundamental issues about the nature of the change and whether one views it from an objectivist or subjectivist perspective. Thus, in commenting on this Legge (1984:16), has made some telling comments about the nature of change. She states that:

"much of the literature about social and organisational change assumes without any question that change is an objective phenomenon, that it occurs outside of the mind, that it is a “fact” of life that can be planned, initiated and managed, or if unplanned can be 'reacted to', 'contained' and so forth".

In her subsequent criticisms about this taken for granted assumption about the nature of reality, she pointed out the far reaching implications not only for how a change programme might be evaluated, but whether it was at all possible or appropriate to evaluate it logically. Furthermore, she claimed that:

"an evaluator cannot reasonably regard change from an objectivist ontological position and then seek to evaluate it from even a qualified subjectivist one - or vice versa" (Legge (1984) (ibid.)).

There are at least two consequences from this line of argument from a research perspective. First, even if the researcher chooses to adopt either perspective in analysing a change programme then she should be aware that other stakeholders in the process might not necessarily share her perspective. Second, the implications for the research design appear more complex than one would initially imagine.

Consequently, in reviewing the literature on organisational change, an attempt will be made to explore and identify patterns and trends which contribute towards the building of a theory. (Eisenhardt (1995)). However, the rationale for beginning the next session with a review of the Burke-Litwin model (1992) of organisational
change and performance is because it was the dominant model used by the BBC to implement its change.

THE BURKE-LITWIN MODEL OF ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE & PERFORMANCE

Harvard Business School on "organisational climate" sponsored the original thinking of the Burke-Litwin model which arose from a conference on "Organisational Culture and Climate" in 1967. The results of that conference were subsequently published in two books: Litwin and Stringer (1968) and Tagiuri and Litwin (1986). The significance of this research on organisational climate was that the authors claimed they were able to establish a clear link between the psychological and organisational variables in a 'cause-effect' model that was empirically testable. Using the model, Litwin and Stringer (1986) were able to predict and control the motivational and performance consequences of various organisational climates in their experiments. The model has subsequently been refined by a number of researchers. For example Bernstein and Burke (1989) and latterly Burke and Litwin (1992).

The latest version of the model makes an explicit distinction between culture and climate in terms of their interactions with other variables. Additionally, it seeks to specify the inter-relationships of organisational variables, and draws a clear distinction between 'transactional' and 'transactional' dynamics in organisational behaviour and change. Transformational, in this context, refers to areas in which alteration is likely to be caused by interaction with environmental forces, which in turn require entirely new set of behaviours on the part of organisational members. Expressed differently, the bringing about of cultural changes in an organisation is very difficult because it requires staff to get rid of deeply held beliefs and acquire new ones. Transactional refers to alterations that are relatively short-term, for example, reciprocity among people and groups, a change in the organisation's appraisal systems or procedures, or the introduction of a reward system (Burke (1993)).

The Burke-Litwin model is also based on general systems theory (Katz and Kahn 1978)) where the external environment represents the 'input' and the individual and organisational performance box represents the 'output'. Feedback loops go in both
directions. The remaining boxes of the model represent the 'throughput' aspects of general systems theory. The arrows, which are drawn in both directions, suggest that change in one factor will eventually have an impact on the others (See Figure 3 on page 48). The authors argue that environmental factors have a greater impact on organisational change than any other factor, and qualify this by suggesting that the transformational variables have a greater impact on organisational change than transactional variables (Burke (1993)). Therefore, it would probably be helpful to take a closer look at these variables in more detail and the various factors, which may have a positive or negative effect upon them.
An overview of the Burke-Litwin model

Figure 3  Adapted from the Burke-Litwin Model (1994) of Organisational Change and Performance with the authors’ permission
TRANSFORMATIONAL VS TRANSACTIONAL VARIABLES

Figure 3 provides a synopsis of the transformational factors of the model. As a concept, transformational change in organisations, has been the subject of a number of articles in recent years: Beckhard and Pritchard (1992), Romanelli and Tushman (1994), Blumenthal and Haspeslagh (1994). Although there is a lack of consensus among the various authors as to how the indicators of transformational change may be defined they broadly agree that it is about achieving fundamentally changed outcomes. Burke and Litwin (1992:529) were more specific in defining transformational change, suggesting that:

“It represents areas in which alteration is likely caused by interaction with environmental forces (both within and without), and will require entirely new behaviour sets from organisation members.”

The feedback loop in their model is meant to reflect the kind of influence one variable has upon another. For example, Figure 4 on page 50 starts with organisational change being triggered by external environmental factors (e.g. political, economic, social and technical). These factors can in turn influence any one of the other factors in the transformational boxes, be it leadership, organisational culture, mission, and strategy on individual and organisational performance.
Figure 4 Transformational Factors

Adapted from the Burke-Litwin causal model of organisational change and performance (1994) with authors' permission
The transactional variables, on the other hand, refer to "the primary way" of alteration via relatively short-term reciprocity among people and groups. In elaborating on this Burke and Litwin (1992:530) described it as:

"you do this for me and I'll do that for you".

clearly distinguishes between the Transformational and the transactional leader. He associates the transformational leader with being a visionary, providing focus and direction and bringing about organisational transformation. Transactional, on the other hand, is associated with the leader who is primarily concerned with the "here and now" or short term goals, for example making incremental changes in the systems, procedures etc. Thus all the variables, management practices and systems and procedures, illustrated in Figure 5 on page 52, are easier to operationalise in strategic change, because they only require fine tuning or minor adjustments to the system.
Figure 5 - The Transactional Factors

Adapted from the Burke-Litwin causal model of organisational change and performance (1994) with authors' permission.
In addition Tables 1 and 2 on pages 54 and 55 respectively, provide a summary of a compilation of a variety of studies, validating the Burke - Litwin model. The first column lists the variables; the second column offers a definition of each one; the third column gives examples of the main influences of the respective variables. The final column provides citations in support of each concept.

By presenting these tables with the validation studies, one should not automatically assume that the "Burke-Litwin" model is irrefutable. However, it raises much more fundamental questions about one's own ontological and epistemological viewpoint. For example the researcher who perceives that change can be pre-planned and managed (Burke et al, 1994 and others) will hold a totally different attitude to those who hold the opposite view, that change is messy, chaotic and therefore cannot be pre-planned (Kanter et al (1992)).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Descriptors</th>
<th>Influences</th>
<th>Citations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>External Environment</td>
<td>• Any outside factors which influence an organisations performance e.g. Political, Economic, Social, Technical</td>
<td>• strategy</td>
<td>• Prescott (1986)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Corporate Culture</td>
<td>• Gordon (1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission and Strategy</td>
<td>• Main Purpose for organisational existence</td>
<td>• Structure</td>
<td>• Miles et al (1978)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Means of Achieving the purpose</td>
<td>• Leadership and Culture</td>
<td>• Tregoe and Zimmerman (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Burke (1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>• Executives who act as the organisations role models for staff in providing direction</td>
<td>• Organisational transformation</td>
<td>• Torbet (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Kotter (1995)</td>
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<td>• Burke (1988)</td>
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<td>• Bennis &amp; Namus (1985)</td>
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<td>• Werner and Mahoney (1981)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Smith et al (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual’s Needs and</td>
<td>• The outcomes or results of the individuals and organisational efforts</td>
<td>• Organisational Performances</td>
<td>• Hackman and Oldham (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Variables</td>
<td>Descriptors</td>
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<td>-------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>• The Way we do things here (Deal and Kennedy 1982)</td>
<td>• Reward System</td>
<td>• Kerr and Slocum (1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The Glue that binds the organisation together (Schein 1983)</td>
<td>• Management Practices</td>
<td>• Bernstein and Burke (1989)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Organisational performance</td>
<td>• Wilkins and Ouichi (1983)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>• The formal arrangements of the function and people into special areas and levels of roles and responsibilities to implement the mission and strategy</td>
<td>• Climate</td>
<td>• Joyce and Slocum (1984)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Management practices</td>
<td>• Schneider et al (1975)</td>
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<td>• Schneider &amp; Bowen (1985)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Lawrence &amp; Lorsh (1967) &amp; (1969)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Practices</td>
<td>• The day to day actions of managers to implement the strategy</td>
<td>• Climate</td>
<td>• Bullock and Lawler (1984)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Hammer (1980)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Zuboff (1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems</td>
<td>• Standardisation of policies and mechanisms to facilitate works. E.g. performance appraisal systems, reward systems etc.</td>
<td>• Climate</td>
<td>• Schneider et al (1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Management Practices</td>
<td>• Schneider (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate</td>
<td>• Collective impressions expectations, feelings of work unit</td>
<td>• Productivity</td>
<td>• Rosenberg et al (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task and Skills</td>
<td>• The required behaviour and skills to achieve the task effectively</td>
<td>• Motivation and performance</td>
<td>• Burke et al (1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motivation</td>
<td>• Aroused tendencies leading to goal achievement</td>
<td>• Organisational performance</td>
<td>• Guzzo et al (1985)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual Needs and Values</td>
<td>• Outcomes / results of individual and organisational efforts</td>
<td>• Organisational Performance</td>
<td>• Hackman, J.R. &amp; Oldham, G.R. (1980)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Burke Litwin model appears to provide some very useful assistance and guidelines for the operational managers. For example, it makes four key assertions about the nature of organisational change. First, it highlights what are considered to be the most important variables that need to be considered in trying to predict and explain the total behavioural output of an organisation. Second, it specifies the most important variables to be considered when implementing organisational change. Third, it depicts how the variables affect change. Finally, it asserts that this climate results from transaction.
These assertions either implicitly or explicitly convey the notion that both
transformational and transactional variables seem to play an important role in the
management of organisational change; but the choice of which one adopts may be
affected by the appropriateness and degree of change which is being proposed for
the organisation. In addition, the model specifies that in ‘large scale’ change the
focus should be on transformational variables; whereas in the case of ‘small-scale’
change, the focus should be on the transactional variables, for the reasons already
given above. Therefore, from an operational manager’s perspective these
guidelines and suggestions have many attractions for the busy executive who is
looking for relatively ‘quick and simple’ solutions for planning and implementing
change (Wilson 1992). This is particularly pertinent to the BBC, where the pace of
change has been somewhat unrelenting throughout the last decade and, as in
insider, one frequently hears managers complaining of too much change and being
overworked.

The model appears to be fairly ‘user friendly’ and relatively ‘jargon free’, and it
seems to resonate with the experience of some of the staff who have to implement
the change.

Throughout the BBC, the model has been used fairly extensively as the principal
framework for introducing a series of strategic initiatives in the BBC. The evidence
for that assertion is quite overwhelming; the Staff Surveys (1993) and (1994)
respectively, “Producer Choice” (1992), Extending Choice (1993) development of
the 10 year strategy (1994); development of the Training Strategy (1994), market
testing; development of the BBC’s commercial policy (1994) to name but a few.
However, although these initiatives were developed and implemented no formal
evaluations have so far been carried out to access the benefits, impact or otherwise
of these interventions. Therefore, from the research perspective my interest is
aimed more at seeking to enhance my understanding of the impact of some of the
change initiatives in order to assess both the ‘intended and unintended’
consequences of the change programme, from a pluralistic and naturalistic
dimension (Ferlie et al (1997)). Consequently, the model has shown some
weaknesses in that area.
However, that should not detract from the relatively robust nature of the model, because as we have demonstrated earlier in Tables 1 and 2, it is well validated by a number of studies. It also has a sound theoretical grounding because it is based on the ‘Systems Theory’ of Katz and Khan (1978), which uses the metaphor of the “organisation as a living organism” which is constantly interacting with its environment. In addition, it specifies how certain external environmental factors can in turn affect the internal factors, thereby bringing about a change in organisational and individual performance.

This concept of the “organisation as a living organism” in constant interaction with its environment resonates with my experience of the change process in the BBC. We have seen tangible evidence in Chapter One of the triggers for change in the BBC, and how the Burke-Litwin model was used in a variety of ways in response to the following environmental factors: the economic crisis of the 1970’s and its effect on public sector in the UK; the political pressures from the Government; economic pressures from the decline on BBC’s annual income; Global competition in the broadcasting environment; technological revolution in broadcasting etc. Therefore, from a research perspective the significance of the model should not be underestimated. The authors have produced convincing evidence of how they were able to apply the model in large organisations, like British Airways and Smith-Kline Beecham, to introduce “successful” transformational change. This is well documented in a series of publications by the following authors Burke and Jackson (1991), Burke and Goodstein (1991) and Burke and Litwin (1992).

However, “success” can be a highly subjective concept and this raises questions about the following: What does success mean? Who defines success? What are the success criteria of the change programme? What is the evidence of success? (Legge 1984). Despite the apparent strengths of the Burke-Litwin model, it does appear to have some weaknesses. Therefore, in attempting to build a theory of organisational change from research data (Eisenhardt (1989 and 1995), it seems necessary to explore other perspectives in order to address the perceived short comings of the model, whilst not discarding some of its excellent aspects. However, before doing so let us examine some of these weaknesses.
First, it is ‘normative’ and therefore suffers from the same criticisms as other normative models which advocate ‘the one right way’ approach. Exponents of this approach seem to present a relatively simple and authoritative analysis of what they see as the central problems in modern corporate life and present a universalistic intervention model for overcoming those problems. These include methodologists such as Beer et al (1990), and Schaffer and Thompson (1992). This rather simplistic view of change has been challenged by a number of commentators for example, Dawson (1994:3) argues that:

“change should be viewed as a complex and dynamic process which should not be solidified or treated as a series of linear event”.

Pettigrew (1990: 269) went much further in commenting on the limitations of the linear approach to managing change when he pointed out that:

“any approach which treats change as the unit of analysis where the focus is on a single event or a set of discrete episodes somehow separate from the immediate and more instant antecedents that gives those events form, meaning, and substance, such episodic views of change not only treat innovations as if they had a clear beginning and a clear end but also, where they limit themselves to snap-shot time series data, fail to provide data on the mechanisms and processes through which changes are created”.

Other commentators who expressed their reservations about the effectiveness of change efforts echoed the sentiments. Kanter et al (1992: 370) argued that:

“despite volumes of literature on planned change, legions of consultants, and the best efforts of corporate leaders, organisational change still appears to be a chaotic process. It is frequently mismanaged, beset by unexpected developments, and often largely unfulfilled”.

The polarisation of views between the advocates of the "planned" school of change on one hand and those who advocate “the messy and chaotic” nature of change, has far reaching implications for the research design.

The advocates of the “planned school” of change seem to elevate the change practitioners to a very powerful role and suggests that it is their role to maintain that degree of “fit” between the organisation and the environment in which it operates. They assume that the destiny of change is clear but as we have already shown
above, there are others who take a completely different view. They also presuppose that the organisation knows where it wants to go, therefore, all it has to do is to apply the appropriate skills to achieve the change. This represents a somewhat “closed” view of change and its does not cater for hyperturbulence in a dynamically changing environment. Meyer and Meyer et al (1995) reflect on their own experience of a research project which began with a series of pre-conceptions about the precise methods they would follow but subsequently had to make several changes in the light of unforeseen circumstances. The “Burke-Litwin” model seems to pay little regard to the political or social impact of the change. Authors who debate this theme include Dawson (1994) and Dunphy and Stace (1989) and (1993). Some of the assertions about planned change may be true in a highly static environment, but in a dynamic and turbulent environment such as the BBC, it would probably be more difficult to predict the outcome of any action with a degree of certainty. The model does not take account of technology, nor does it take account of the core competencies that would make the organisation competitive in the market place or effective in accomplishing its mission (Kanter et al (1992)). So, despite the many attractions of the “Burke-Litwin” model, its normative perspective seriously limits the degree to which one could construct a theory of change from a pluralistic perspective. Hence, the literature review was broadened to examine other perspectives such as the strategic and transformational change and stakeholder literature.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON STRATEGIC & TRANSFORMATIONAL CHANGE

The literature on strategic change appears to fall within two schools of thought according to their underlying research questions and specific methodologies. The exponents of the first school, the “content” school, place great emphasis on antecedents and consequences of strategic change, utilising large samples and statistical methods. Authors who make this point include, Ginsberg and Buchholtz (1990), and Gibbs (1993). Exponents of the second school, the “process” school, seems to lay emphasis on the role of managers in the strategic change process, utilising in depth case studies over a number of years. The leading proponents of this perspective include Dawson (1994), Whipp et al (1989), (1992) and Pettigrew et al (1994). According to Rajagopalan and Spreitzer (1996:48):
“although potentially relevant to one another the two schools of thought have evolved independently with little theoretical or empirical synergy, resulting in theoretical and practical gaps in researchers understanding of strategic change”.

Consequently in what follows, no attempt will be made to establish a grand theoretical coherence in the literature on the management of change where some currently exists. Conversely, a set of more modest objectives will be: to identify some common themes from the disparate literature on the subject, to use some assessment criteria to examine the evidence of research, and to clarify their strengths and weaknesses where necessary in the hope of ultimately creating a basic integrative framework for understanding change processes. It is anticipated that from these themes, a statement will emerge outlining the theoretical and methodological rationale for this research on the processes of continuity and change in the BBC. Thus in order to maintain the focus of the debate three questions are suggested below to commence the process.

- To what extent can strategic change be described as transformational in nature?
- Second, what are the empirical assessment criteria for judging whether change is occurring at this level?
- Third, how can managers influence the change process to realise the desired outcomes given the divide between the “process” and the “content” school?

DEFINING THE TERRAIN

Strategic change can be defined as a difference in the form, quality, or state over time (Van de Ven and Poole 1995), in an organisation’s alignment with its external environment. An organisation’s alignment with its external environment is defined as the “fundamental pattern of present and planned resource deployments and environmental interactions that indicates how the organisation will achieve its objectives” (Hofer and Schendel, (1978: 25)). Other commentators have defined strategic change broadly as a major change affecting one or more of the main systems in an organisation, such as strategy, structure, technology, or control systems (Tichy (1983)). He also includes additional factors such as the multiplicity
of the political, structural, and control-aspects of the process required to
successfully achieve strategic change, likening this to the intertwining strands of a
tape.

Others have contributed to the debate by commenting on the process of strategic
change as a process of logical incrementalism, involving both planned and
evolutionary processes. Quinn (1980) and Pettigrew (1990) seem to share a similar
perspective in being diametrically opposed to the rational, linear theories of
planning and change where actions are seen as ordered and sequenced in order to
achieve rational declared ends and where actors behave mechanistically and
altruistically in the pursuit of organisational goals. Pettigrew (1990: 268) went
further by suggesting that:

"the task is to explore the complex, haphazard, and often contradictory
ways that change emerges and to contract a model that allows for an
appreciation of conflicting rationalities, objectives and behaviours. There is
an explicit recognition that change is multifaceted involving political, cultural,
incremental, environmental, and structural, as well as rational dimensions.
Power, change, opportunism, accident are as influential in shaping
outcomes as are design, negotiated agreements and master plans".

Pettigrew's analysis, in particular, is very refreshing because it highlights the
complexities and significance of both external and internal pressures and the role of
crisis in bringing about strategic change.

Although it was possible to explore some of the definitions of strategic change
above, trying to produce a definition for transformational change has proved to be
more elusive. In spite of this the term has become very popular in recent times
amongst some researchers on organisational change, who include Romanelli and
Tushman (1994), and Blumenthal and Haspeslagh (1994). Although none of these
commentators has been able to produce a clear definition of transformational
change, they have conceded that it was a particular form of strategic change,
radical in its impact. Furthermore, they have systematically failed to specify the
characteristics which distinguish transformational change from strategic change.

This definition problem has clearly exposed a major weakness in the
transformational change literature, i.e. its apparent wooliness, which in turn makes
it difficult to access whether such change is occurring in a particular organisation. However, Ferlie et al (1997) have made a valiant attempt in trying to resolve the dilemma over the transformational and strategic change debate by suggesting six assessment criteria for trying to establish whether transformational change has taken place. The six categories are:

1. The existence of multiple and interrelated changes across the system as a whole.
2. The creation of new organisational forms at a collective level.
3. The development of multilayered changes which impact below the whole system, at unit and individual level.
4. The creation of changes in the services provided and the mode of delivery.
5. Reconfiguration of power relations.
6. The development of a new culture, ideology and organisational meaning.

According to Ferlie et al (1997:94)

"transformational change is producing multiple change outcomes, both horizontally across the organisation and vertically up and down the layers of the organisation. Specifically, transformation includes the creation of novel organisational forms and changes in the products and services of the organisation. ...the breadth, scope, and radicality of the changes is greater than would be anticipated for strategic change. It also involves the reconfiguration of power relations and the development of a new culture".

Therefore, if we accept their operational definition for the purpose of this debate, then we are now in a position to use their six criteria above as the benchmark for assessing whether transformational change, has been occurring in the BBC. The first criteria refers to the existence of multiple and interrelated changes across the system as whole. (i.e. organisation wide, Directorate, department, and unit level). In the context of the BBC, the empirical evidence is overwhelming as far as the first criterion are concerned. The introduction of “Producer Choice” (1993) as a corporate strategy has been universally applied across the whole organisation and transcends every directorate, department, and the change in the composition of the Board of Management. The introduction of the 'quasi-market' concept created a
completely new way of management thinking and altered the roles and responsibilities of managers and their staff across the organisation.

In the case of the second criterion, which relates to changes to the intra-organisation structures, we have witnessed the impact of the introduction of the ‘quasi-markets’. A number of business units were created throughout the organisation which in turn precipitated the establishment of contractual arrangements between the programme makers, who became the new “purchasers” of services and the resources staff who became “suppliers” of these services. It is now customary for all purchasing departments to establish service level agreements with the service providers in order to meet the high customer requirements and maintain good relationships (Producer Choice 1993). In the case of the third criterion, there is empirical evidence of multilayered changes which impact on the whole. The fourth criterion which refers to changes to technology and delivery systems has also shown empirical evidence of the widespread application of new technology across the BBC in every aspect of organisational life. For example, the BBC has introduced a number of measures to make programmes more efficiently and effectively viz.: SMART Productions, SMART Venture, Virtual Studios, Virtual Gallery, the Intranet (Gateway), and the development of digital technology. This is clear evidence of transformational change occurring in the BBC (Broadcasting in the digital age (1996)).

The fifth criterion (reconfiguration of individual roles and power relations) have shown widespread occurrences in the BBC. For example, the BBC has been pursuing an active policy of recruiting a number of professional managers from the outside with experience of managing a business in the private sector (BBC HR Planning (1994)). Hence, the mass recruitment of professional accountants, business mangers and marketing managers which has been a constant feature of BBC strategic policy since 1993. We have witnessed significant changes in the roles and responsibilities of managers in the 1990’s. as a consequence, these professionals are now involved in key resource decisions and have significant influence and power (Fitzgerald (1994)). These powers are balanced against the increasing precedence given to managing within the contracts, which places greater weight in the expertise of accountants and frames decision.
The sixth criterion refer to changes in the culture of the organisation. The word culture is somewhat ambiguous and difficult to operationalise although many writers have offered tentative definitions of it. One leading commentator on the subject described it as the 'glue' which holds the organisation together. Schein (1983), (1985), and (1997). Other writers on effective approaches to strategic change who stress the role of culture include Kanter et al (1992) and Nadler (1987). The essence of their argument is that long term organisational change cannot be sustained unless the underlying values and beliefs systems of the members of staff radically shift. Therefore, if one accepts Morgan et al's (1983), definition of organisations as patterns of meaning, values, and behaviours, then organisations are cultures. Pettigrew (1990) challenges the utility of the concept and questions the effect management action could have on culture.

Myerson and Martin (1987) have made an excellent contribution in advancing the debate on culture by exposing the ambiguities and contradictions. Their framework also serves as a very useful way of studying the change in the BBC from a pluralistic perspective. They have identified three paradigms for using culture as a vehicle for studying change. These are culture as an integrative mechanism; culture as characterised by diversity and differentiation; lastly, culture as ambiguity. Briefly, Myerson and Martin's paradigm one, asserts that culture will act as the unifying force for all the different groups in the organisation and therefore, elevates the leader to the very powerful position of having the responsibility to ensure that a consensus of the culture is achieved amongst all its organisational members. The second paradigm adopts a completely opposite view to the first paradigm because it down grades the role of the corporate leader in trying to get everyone to buy into the corporate culture. In contrast, it focuses on the differences at the level of sub-culture and work units. It emphasises the inconsistencies, lack of consensus and non-leader centred sources of culture content. The third paradigm adopts a more holistic and realistic view of organisational life. It acknowledges the concept of inevitability in organisational life and concedes that individuals may share some viewpoints, disagree about some and be indifferent to others. There may be consensus in some cases and less in others. In addition, the chaos and confusion that may ensue may render it hard for anyone to draw cultural and subcultural boundaries.
Emerging from these debates, it is interesting to note that the second paradigm, culture as diversity, embraces and recognises the existence of subcultures in many organisations. In the context of transformational change, Ferlie et al (1997:109), have suggested that:

"more emphasis needs to be given to the patterns of meaning and cognitive frameworks in uses as well as values, if we are to comprehend how organisations change fundamentally".

During the last decade a number of commentators have endorsed the significance of cognitive frameworks and mindsets of organisation members, and assert that other transformational change can only be achieved if these cognitive frames alter. Some of the leading exponents of this view include Bartunek (1993), and more recently Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996).

Therefore given the complexity of the issues around culture at this stage, it appears that the sixth criterion on page 64 is the most difficult for which to produce empirical evidence of the occurrences of transformational change in the BBC. Whatever evidence exists seems rather patchy and anecdotal. It raises a number of issues:

- How believable are the claims that the BBC has experienced a major shift in cultural?

- Is the evidence of the change in the power balance at intra professional level acceptable?

- Is the advent of a new breed of professional managers in the hierarchy reasonable proof that the culture of the BBC has radically altered?

In the absence of any coherent theory on the subject of transformational or strategic change, the recent studies of Rajapolan and Spreitzer seem to be particularly liberating for two specific reasons. First they build on some of the earlier works of theories and models of organisational change. Second, they offer some very useful suggestions for studying strategic change from a pluralistic perspective and offer guidance on developing an integrative framework, although from a normative standpoint. One of the most significant breakthroughs in their research on strategic change is that they were able to draw upon the perspective of three
distinct theoretical lenses: the rational, learning and cognitive lenses (Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996)). Generally, the rational lens perspective captures the theoretical models implicit in the content school, referred to earlier. By contrast, the learning and cognitive lens perspectives are found primarily in the process school on strategic change. The section below provides a synopsis of the three perspectives and highlights some of their main theoretical and methodological differences. The rationale is not to discredit any of these perspectives but to continue the theme of classification of ideas and building on them towards theory development.

Some commentators take the view that strategic change, when viewed from the rational lens perspective, is perceived as a sequential, planned research for optimal solutions for well-defined problems (Mintzberg (1990a)) based on previously defined objectives. Consequently, rational managers may seek to optimise performance by establishing a fit between the firm and its environment through the creation and implementation of a strategic vision. Authors who make this point include Goodstein, Gutam and Boeker (1994). Strategic change is defined as a unitary concept measured through discrete changes in a firm’s business, corporate, or collective strategies. Thus in elaborating on this point Fombrum (1993: 159-160) suggested that "business level changes are meant to improve the competitiveness of a firm's individual business units, corporate level changes address the diversity of businesses under the corporate umbrella and collective level changes explore the relative merits of forming relationships with rivals, suppliers, distributors and other firms". The rational lens perspective brings particular strengths to "researchers" understanding of strategic change, for example, in terms of the explicit operationalisations of the environmental/organisational antecedents and changes in the content of the strategy, thereby enabling one to make comparisons with other studies.

In spite of its strengths Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996) have identified some theoretical and methodological problems with this rational lens perspective. According to them:

"the rational perspective treats the role of managerial actions and cognitions as a black box. Such managerial processes, namely the socio-cultural and
symbolic processes which preserve current ways of doing things, the
cognitive bounds of those who take and influence decisions and the
importance of political processes are central to the strategic change
process”.

This perspective also suffers from its unitarist standpoint (i.e. change is
operationalized solely in terms of the magnitude, likelihood, or direction of changes
in the content of the strategy), and then linked to variations in performance.
Consequently, it overlooks the fact that performance could also be affected by
organisational and environmental factors. Another shortcoming of this perspective
is that it has limited normative usefulness, because the context is assumed to be
deterministic and immutable and managers have little scope for experimentation
and learning. Consequently, this perspective offers little guidance to managers
seeking to intervene in the change process to enhance effectiveness.

By contrast, the learning lens perspective makes a deliberate attempt to address
the problems highlighted above. The learning lens perspective adopts a more
holistic view of strategic change. It views it as an iterative process; managers effect
changes through a series of relatively small steps designed to probe the
environment and the organisation. It accords a central role to managerial actions in
the strategic change process. In addition, the learning lens perspective builds on
the former by regarding strategic change as a combination of changes in the
content of the strategy and changes in environmental/organisational conditions
precipitated by managerial actions in the process of change (Hart and Banbury
(1994)). Unlike the rational perspective, which regards the
environmental/organisational context as being objectively determined this approach
assumes them to be uncertain and dynamic (Quinn (1980)). In this context
managers make a conscious attempt to understand their ambiguous environment
through an iterative process, aimed, not only at understanding the external context,
but also influencing it proactively (Lant and Mezias (1992)). The organisation is also
viewed as a political context (Quinn (1980)) which influences the need for, and
resistance to, strategic change. In addition, strategic change is viewed as an
evolutionary and iterative process as managers learn from experience (Yetton,
Johnson and Craig (1994)).
Theoretical strengths of the learning lens perspective are complementary to those of the rational lens perspective. The researchers who use the learning lens approach provide a rich theoretical description of strategic change by opening up the “black box” of managerial processes, (by focusing on how managerial actions shape readiness and resistance to strategic change and overall outcomes of the change process).

The learning lens is also excellent for identifying interdependencies among organisational, environmental, and strategic factors in the change process because of its holistic approach. This may enable researchers to begin to get a deeper understanding of why a similar change in the content of strategy can be effective in some cases and ineffective in others. This approach may also prove useful in helping to find theoretical and practical explanations about how managers learn during ongoing strategic change.

Despite these advantages, the learning lens perspective has its own set of problems. One of its key weaknesses is that it fails to distinguish between managerial actions and changes in the content of strategies. Consequently, cause-effect relationships cannot be identified and inappropriate actions cannot be distinguished from appropriate actions. Methodologically, it is difficult to generalise across studies, because they do not have clearly defined constructs with regard to managerial actions. Therefore, in spite of the great advancement made by the learning lens perspective over the rational perspective and improving ones understanding of strategic change one needs to look elsewhere to address the problems highlighted above.

The cognitive lens perspective attempts to do just that. However, the challenge here will be to assess to what degree it has been successful in achieving this goal. In making a contrast between the three perspectives Rajapalan and Spreitzer (1996: 66) said:

"overall, we find that the cognitive lens perspective is more theoretically developed than the rational lens or the learning perspectives. It is explicitly focused on managerial cognitions as distinct from actions. This distinction is important because cognitions provide the underlying logic for managerial actions" (Walsh (1995)).
The cognitive lens perspective also shares some of the strengths of the learning lens perspective. Researchers who use it recognise the role of managerial actions, (as they shape and are shaped by the context, cognitions, and changes in content of the strategy), assume those strategic explicit dynamic learning linkages and recognise the non-economic outcomes of the strategic change process. Yet in spite of its strengths, the cognitive lens perspective is also susceptible to some weaknesses like its predecessors. Researchers rarely distinguish between cognitions and actions from changes in the content of strategies, conceptually or empirically. Out of eight cognitive lens studies only one researcher, Cook (1975), measured changes in the content of strategy distinctly from managerial cognitions but failed to measure managerial actions.

The three different perspectives have been divided by theoretical and methodological differences and as a consequence a gap exists between them. It is clear from the review that some of the strengths identified in the literature will go a long way towards contributing to a theory on strategic change from a pluralistic perspective.

However it is interesting to note that from the analysis of the various models, theories and conceptual frameworks debated so far the management of change seems to be viewed mainly from a managerial perspective and scarcely any recognition seems to be given to other stake holding groups in the organisation. Yet a number of commentators have emphasised the importance of the various stake holding groups in the management of change. Kanter et al (1992: 376) suggested that:

"change is affected by many forces which may frustrate and destabilise the process. Moreover, change is effected by a combination of actions. A much more varied group than the literature suggests. Because there are multiple parties, (and stakeholders), involved in making change happen and because their assumptions, perspectives and even agendas may not always converge, there is in fact a natural instability built into the change process".

Another commentator went a bit further in adding to these comments when he argued the case for greater stakeholder involvement in the change process. Grundy (1997:49) claimed that:
“at the very core of managing strategic change is the issue of dealing with
stakeholders both prior to and during implementation”.

Thus, in further highlighting the other benefits of stakeholder involvement, he
stressed the importance of this concept as a useful if underutilisation in research.

He stressed that:

“stakeholder analysis has not been given the central importance that it
deserves by both theorists and practitioners” (Grundy (1997:50); also
Mitchell et al (1997:853)).

This apparent gap in the literature as espoused by Grundy (1997) presents me with
an excellent opportunity to examine further stakeholder literature with the view of
incorporating some of its elements in building a theory of change.

THE ROLE OF STAKEHOLDERS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF STRATEGIC
CHANGE

This section begins with a brief discussion about stakeholder theory, followed by a
debate about the meaning of the concept of stakeholders and what is at stake. The
next section examines a variety of models and frameworks for the identification of
different stakeholder groups and their dyadic relationships with the focal
organisation. The final section attempts to establish a framework for developing a
theory of stakeholders’ role in the management of change from a pluralistic
perspective.

STAKEHOLDER THEORY: MYTH OR REALITY?
AND SOME DEFINITIONAL ISSUES

Whether a stakeholder theory currently exists is a matter of debate within academic
circles. Nevertheless, various efforts by Jones (1995) and Brenner and Cochran
(1991) to create testable stakeholder theory is evidence of a movement toward a
theory explaining how organisations function.

Brenner and Cochran (1991:452) argue that:

“a stakeholder theory of the firm should describe and predict how
organisations will operate under various conditions”.

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Subsequently, in advancing the debate Rowley (1997:889) argues that:

“although existing research provides classifications of the different types of stakeholders influences, it does not explain how firms react to these influences”.

Furthermore, what seems apparent from the literature review is that the development of stakeholder theory seems to focus on two related themes. The first places great emphasis on defining the concept of a stakeholder. The second attempts to classify stakeholders into categories that provide an understanding of individual stakeholder relationships. However, it is noticeable that one of the main challenges in stakeholder analysis has been the construction of a universally acceptable definition of the term, “stake” (Donaldson (1995)). Starik (1994) notes that although there has been an abundance of articles and books using the stakeholder framework since Freeman’s (1984) seminal work, the term “stakeholders” has not been applied consistently. Freeman’s (1984:46) definition of stakeholder as being, “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the firm’s objectives”, still provides the benchmark of what constitutes a stake. Although the debate continues over whether to broaden or narrow the definition, most researchers appear to have utilised a variation of Freeman’s (1984) concept. Some of these include Hill and Jones (1992:133) who define stakeholders as “constituents who have a legitimate claim on the firm”. Carroll (1993) also argues that groups or individuals can be stakeholders by virtue of their legitimacy, but broadens the scope to include those who have power, (i.e. the ability to impact the organisation).

Grundy (1997:50) made a slight amendment to Freeman’s definition by suggesting that, “stakeholders are those key individuals (or groups of individuals), who have influence over either decision making or implementation (or both) either directly or indirectly, covertly or overtly. This influence can be felt in the form of accelerating change, slowing it down, altering its course, or preventing it altogether”.

In contrast, Clarkson (1994:5) offers a much narrower definition of stakeholders as voluntary risk bearers. He suggested that:

“Voluntary stakeholders bear some form of risk as a result of having invested some form of capital, human or financial, something of value in a
firm. Involuntary stakeholders are placed at a risk as a result of a firm's activities: but without the element of risk there is no stake. A stake, therefore, in this sense, is only something that can be lost."


"since Freeman (1984) published his authoritative book, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach, the concept of 'stakeholders' has become embedded in management scholarship and in management thinking".

However, in spite of the popularity of the term, the literature review shows clearly that there is no universal agreement on what Freeman (1984) calls, "the principle of who or what really counts". Therefore, regardless of how Freeman's definition is modified, there is a fundamental idea underlying the stakeholder concept. Under any definition within the stakeholder perspective organisations are required to address a set of stakeholder expectations; thus, management choice is a function of stakeholder influences (Brenner and Cochran (1991)). Consequently, the main objectives in stakeholder research have been to identify who a firm's stakeholders are and to determine what types of influences they exert.

MODELS & CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORKS Re: STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS

It might be helpful to explore some of the models and conceptual frameworks for identifying stakeholders and to assess the type of influence which respective groups exert on managers and the organisation as a whole. It is hoped that an awareness of such data might subsequently help to enhance my understanding of stakeholder analysis and above all may assist in the development of my own theory in researching organisational change. Grundy (1997:50) described stakeholder analysis as.

"the systematic identification of key stakeholders and the appraisal of their influence in (and posture towards) implementation. It may also involve creating a strategy to reshape the influence of existing or new stakeholders".

He then described a process of conducting a stakeholder analysis, which is summarised below in two phases: Phase one involves three steps.
• The first step involves the identification of the key stakeholders.

• The second step involves an assessment of whether these stakeholders have a high, medium, or low influence on the issue in question.

• The third is an assessment of whether at the current time they support the programme or not.

The author also recommends that the process should involve both decision-makers and those involved in or affected by the implementation of the programme. The second phase involves using a range of tactics to ensure maximum commitment to the project. Some examples include: recruiting new stakeholders to affect the balance of the existing group; getting rid of the un-committed ones; marginalisation of those who oppose the program; formation of coalitions; persuading the resistors to play a key role; or as a last resort abandoning the change project altogether.

One of the benefits of this approach is that it can be useful in helping to surface the contentious as well as the non-contentious issues in a new programme, which is being implemented. The manager is then presented with a choice as to what strategy he will adopt to cope with the situation. Grundy offers the stakeholder grid in the Figure 6 on page 75 as a framework for conducting the analysis. Therefore, if we take a hypothetical example of stakeholder analysis, the two-by-two matrix below has identified four distinct quadrants, A, B, C and D. The stakeholder groups represented in the A quadrant are portrayed as the least supportive and least influential of the phenomenon being analysed. Hence, the decision-makers can choose one of the following: make some gestures by trying to gain their commitment, or, conversely, they can choose to ignore or get rid of them because they do not pose any potential threat to the organisation. By contrast those stakeholders in the B quadrant have a high degree of influence and are amongst those who are most opposed to the phenomenon being studied. Therefore, in the context of this analysis the decision-makers may choose to work hard at winning their commitment by persuasion and other legitimate means. As a result they may decide to abandon the policy altogether in the face of strong opposition from this group because of their high level of influence. The C quadrant contains the groups
which are most in favour of the phenomenon being studied, but which have very little influence. However these groups should not be taken for granted because their commitment cannot be guaranteed over a period of time. Finally, groups in the D quadrant represent the stakeholder groups, which have the greatest influence and are most supportive of the issue. But as in the previous group C genuine attempts should be made to ensure their continuing support.
Figure 6 illustrates two bipolar attributes or variables. The horizontal axis depicts low to high level influence of the stakeholder, whereas, the vertical axis shows the scale of those who are completely opposed to the change to those who are in favour of it. This particular grid is useful for the operational manager who is interested in learning the rudiments of stakeholder analysis. However, from a research perspective, it seems rather basic and self-limiting, so it was felt necessary to take a look at other models. A further review of stakeholder literature reveals a diversity of views on how questions of stakeholder identification might be approached.
Mitchell et al (1997:854) conceded that:

"among the various ways of identifying stakeholders, as well as in the agency, behavioural, ecological, institutional, resource dependence, and transaction cost theories of the firm, we have found no single attribute within a given theory that can guide us reliably on these issues".

As a result, Mitchell et al (1997) was quite resourceful and innovative in drawing on the selected themes from the disparate theoretical literature to develop their own theory of stakeholder identification. They started with a broad definition such as Freeman’s (1984:46) to avoid excluding any particular group and established the following criteria for identifying the stakeholders:

1. Stakeholders’ power to influence the firm.
2. The legitimacy of the stakeholders’ relationship with the firm.
3. The urgency of stakeholders’ claim on the firm.

From this typology the authors developed a theory of stakeholders’ identification and salience that permits the explicit recognition of situational uniqueness and managerial perception to explain how managers prioritise stakeholders’ relationships. Mitchell et al (1997) felt confident that they could use this typology to predict managerial behaviour with respect to each group of stakeholders to explain how stakeholders changed from one group to another and hence spells out the implications for managers. Although the theory does not suggest the particular areas for managers to focus on, it specifies how and under what condition managers can and should respond to various stakeholder types. Thus, in elaborating on their theory, they also detailed the implications of power legitimacy and urgency in the operationalization of these concepts. First, there is a recognition that each attribute is a variable, which is subject to change for any particular entity or stakeholder-manager relationships. Second, each attribute is viewed as having multiple perceptions and a socially constructed as opposed to an "objective" reality. Third, an individual or an entity may not be "conscious" of possessing the attribute, or if conscious of possession, may not choose to enact any implied behaviour.

These features of stakeholder attributes are important to the theory’s dynamism in providing a framework for understanding how stakeholders can gain or lose salience to an organisation’s managers.
IMPLICATIONS OF THE THREE ATTRIBUTES

In the context of Mitchell et al (1997) theory of stakeholders’ identification and salience, the word power can take on a variety of meanings. For example, it could be construed as normative, utilitarian or coercive or possibly a combination of all three. Moreover, the possession of power does not mean actual or intended use; nor does possession imply a form of consciousness of such power by the possessor or “correct” perception of objective reality by the perceiver. Therefore, in an operational sense, if a powerful stakeholder in an organisation is unaware of his power and by inference is unable to impose his will on the organisation, then he will not be perceived by managers as having a high salience as far as the management of change is concerned.

In the case of the second attribute, referred to above as legitimacy, the operational problems are somewhat identical to that of power. Stakeholders may or may not perceive the legitimacy of their claims but if their managers’ perceptions are at variance with theirs, then it renders it harmless. The final attribute, which is urgency, is also a socially constructed perceptual phenomenon like power and legitimacy above, therefore, experiences the same practical difficulty when any attempt is made to apply these variables in isolation. Consequently a combination of any of these two attributes is likely to lead to moderate salience between the particular stakeholder group and their relationships with the managers. However, if the stakeholders make a conscious attempt to combine the three attributes together and this in turn is perceived by the managers to be perfectly powerful, legitimate and urgent, then it is highly likely that these managers will afford it a high degree of salience. Hence, the managers are likely to be anxious to resolve the issue with a high degree of urgency. This was appropriately summed up by Mitchell et al (1997:871):

"we propose that although groups can be identified reliably as stakeholders based on their possession of power, legitimacy and urgency in relation to the firm, it is the firm’s managers who determine which stakeholders are salient and therefore will receive management attention. Expressed differently, one can identify a firm’s stakeholders based on attributes but managers may or may not perceive the stakeholders field correctly. The stakeholders winning management’s attention will be those managers perceive to be highly
Mitchell's et al (1997). The theory of qualitative classes of stakeholders is depicted in Figure 7 below.

**Figure 7 - Qualitative classes of stakeholders**

Adapted from Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997)
Figure 7 presents an analysis of the stakeholder classes, which the theory identifies, paying special attention to the managerial implications of each stakeholder. It illustrates the various combinations of attributes: power, legitimacy and urgency. Seven types are examined: three possessing only one attribute, (low salience). Three possessing two, (moderate salience), and one possessing all three, (high salience). According to this model, entities with no power, legitimacy or urgency in relation to the firm are not stakeholders and will be perceived as having no salience by the firm’s managers. This illustrates how important the managers’ perceptions of stakeholders are as the crucial variable in determining organisational resource allocation in response to stakeholder claims.

From this identification typology, the authors devised a systematic framework for explaining stakeholder salience and dynamism. This is illustrated in the Figure 8 on page 80.
Figure 8 - Typology of Stakeholders

Adapted from Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) illustrating Latent, Expectant and Definitive Categories of Stakeholders.

Figure 8 shows three categories of stakeholders with their sub-groupings. The first category are the latent stakeholders: first, dormant, second, discretionary and third, demanding. All subgroups with the latent category group share one common feature by possessing one attribute, for example, power, legitimacy, or urgency. Dormant stakeholders possess only power. Discretionary shareholders possess legitimacy and demanding stakeholders possess urgency. Therefore as separate entities, they do not pose any threat to the organisation and managers may not acknowledge them for those reasons.

In the case of the second category the expectant stakeholders they share a key feature in common, in that they possess any combination of the three attributes: dominant stakeholders possess power and legitimacy. Their influence on the firm
is assured and the manager may actively seek to build good relations with them because of their potential influence. By contrast, the dependent stakeholders possess legitimacy and urgency, but no power. Therefore there may have to rely on the goodwill of other stakeholders in the organisation for power which is not guaranteed.

The dangerous category possesses power and urgency but no legitimacy. Although they may be coercive and could possibly make dangerous threats to the organisation, they may be ignored by the managers in a change programme because of their lack of legitimacy.

The third group, the definitive stakeholders, are likely to be taken very seriously by the managers in the organisation and conscious attempts may be taken to build relationships with them because of their combination of power, legitimacy and urgency attributes elevates them to the level of high salience, unlike the other groupings.

In attempting to build a theory of stakeholder identification and influences, Mitchell et al (1997) model is extremely helpful in a variety of ways. It has the potential to improve upon current practice. In addition, it enables a more systematic sorting by managers of stakeholder-manager relationships as these relationships attain and relinquish salience in the dynamics of an ongoing business. In addition, the three-attribute model enables operational managers to map the legitimacy of stakeholders, therefore, to decide whether to become sensitised to the moral implications of their actions with respect to each stakeholder. In this sense, the model supports and initiates normative thought in the managerial context. Consequently, these refinements contribute to the potential effectiveness of managers as they deal with multiple stakeholders' interests. Accordingly, Mitchell et al (1997:880), in mounting a robust defence of their stakeholder theory, claimed that:

"we believe it holds the key to more effective management and to a more useful, comprehensive theory of the firm in society".

In addition, this theory appears to be a productive strategy for researchers and managers. The typology seems amenable to empirical operationalization for the reasons given above. From a personal research perspective, the conceptual
framework has certainly illuminated my understanding of organisational change, especially the variables or attributes in the context of the stakeholder management relationships. It also helps towards the development of stakeholder theory.

TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A STAKEHOLDER THEORY

In spite of the significant contributions made by Mitchell et al (1997) and the host of other writers on the development of a stakeholder theory they all appear to suffer from some common limitations. Although they should be complimented for their tendency to concentrate on classifying stakeholders into useful categories that provide an understanding of how individual stakeholders influence organisations operations, they all fall short of offering a comprehensive theory of the organisation which goes beyond an explanation of stakeholders influences to one that articulates how organisations respond to these influences. (Rowley (1997)). Thus, while it is not my intention to discredit the work of those eminent researchers who have enriched the debate on stakeholder theory to date, my research interests go beyond these dyadic relationships between individual stakeholders and the focal organisation. My research project could probably be enhanced by an approach to stakeholder theory, which addresses the pluralistic and interdependent interactions that simultaneously exist in the stakeholder environments. This is a view which is championed by Rowley (1997:890) who suggested that:

“although focusing on individual stakeholder relationships is appropriate for classifying types of stakeholders, this analysis cannot be extended to predict firms behaviours because each firm faces a different set of stakeholders, which aggregate into unique patterns of influence. Firms do not simply respond to each stakeholder individually; they respond rather to the interaction of multiple influences from the entire stakeholder set.”

Although Donaldson and Preston (1995:76) stated that:

“stakeholder management requires, as its key attribute, simultaneous attention to all appropriate stakeholders”.

Only one researcher to date has attempted to integrate this concept into a stakeholder theory systematically. The researcher in question is Rowley (1997) who became one of the first to attempt to develop a theory, using social network
constructs to consider the influence of the multiple interactions comprising stakeholder environments on local firm behaviour.

Researchers are increasingly using Social Network Analysis to extend their understanding of many behavioural and social phenomenon. (Wassermann and Faust (1994)). Let us now examine what this social network perspective means. Galsakiewcz and Wassermann (1994: XII) explained it by suggesting that:

"Instead of analysing individual behaviours, attitudes and beliefs, social network analysis focuses its attention on how these interactions constitute a framework or structure that can be studied and analysed in its own right".

Others subsequently endorsed this definition. Rowley (1997:893-894) stressed that:

"The purpose of network analysis is to examine relational systems in which actors dwell and to determine how the nature of relationship structures impact on behaviours. These theorists are primarily interested in relational data, which examines the pattern of the relevant network as distinct from what Scott (1991) refers to as attribute data. Scott (1992:2) suggested that: “attribute data relates to the attitudes, opinions and behaviours of agents in so far as these are regarded as properties, qualities or characteristics, which belong to them as individuals or groups”.

Rowley’s (1997) model for describing the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and for predicting the firm’s responses can be briefly summarised here. It incorporates social network construct, (density and centrality), which move beyond the traditional analysis of dyadic ties and considers structural influences and the impact of the stakeholders who do not have direct relationships with the focal firm but who nevertheless affect how the firm behaves.

The word density in this context, according to Rowley (1997:896):

"is a characteristic of the whole network; it measures the relative number of ties in the network that link actors together and is calculated as a ratio of the number of relationships that exist in the network, (stakeholder environment), compared with the total number of possible ties if each network member were tied to every other member”.

Perhaps this could be better illustrated by Figure 9 on the next page.
Figure 9 illustrates a social network diagram and its respective patterns of relationships. At the core of the network is the organisation; the letters W X Y Z represents the different relationships. Note that each one has a direct relationship with one another.

Two characteristics of density are relevant when examining organisational responses to stakeholder pressures. First, as density increases, (and the number of ties between network member grows), communication across the network becomes more efficient. Second as Meyer and Rowan (1977) suggest, the consequence of dense network structures is the diffusion of norms across the network. These consequences of dense networks - efficient communications and the establishment of shared behavioural expectations - have explicit implications for how stakeholder environments influence the focal organisation's behaviour. Oliver (1991:171) summarises the effects of density on behaviour:
“density facilitates the voluntary diffusion of norms, values, and share information because highly interconnected environments provide relational channels through which institutional norms can be diffused. This tends to create more implicit co-ordination and collectivisation in a given environment and more consensus on diffused norms”.

Given this scenario, the organisation may find it hard to play one group against another if the intention is to win support for a change programme by trying to alienate one group.

Thus the combination of shared expectations, the ease of information exchange between stakeholders and the potential for coalition formation, all of which characterise dense networks, are likely to produce strong unified stakeholder pressures and lead organisation towards conformity. Conversely, sparsely connected networks are more likely to experience multiple conflicting stakeholder influences, since shared behavioural norms are less likely to form (Oliver (1991)).

In contrast Rowley (1997:898) defines “centrality” as “an individual actor’s position in the network relative to others”. Ibarra (1993:476) elaborated on this by making reference to power obtained through the network structure as opposed to power gained through individual attributes. Let me illustrate this in Figure 10 on page 86 which shows the organisation in a highly central position where it has access to all the stakeholders.
Figure 10 - Shows a network with very loose ties.

Adapted from Rowley (1997) Social Network Analysis showing loose ties.

However, by contrast Figure 11 on pages 87 shows a variety of social networks with varying degrees of centrality.
Figure 11 - Shows a Network Structure with Different Degrees of "Centrality".

Adapted from Rowley (1997) Concept of Network Structure, showing different degrees of centrality.

Figure 11 show that B, C, P, Q, R, S have got the greatest ties; whereas D has the least. We have seen how the network density influences the stakeholders ability to impose certain constraints on the organisation. However, on the contrary, the greater the degree of the organisation's centrality, the more likely it is to use its influences to resist any potential threats or subversion by its stakeholders. Therefore, from the two social constructs which I have alluded to above, Rowley (1997) developed a typology of stakeholder influences: organisational responses to stakeholder pressures. (See Table 3 on page 88).
Table 3  A Typology Of Stakeholder Influences And Organisational Responses

CENTRALITY OF THE ORGANISATION

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<tr>
<td>HIGH</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPROMISER</td>
<td>SUBORDINATE</td>
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<td>COMMANDER</td>
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Table 3 shows Rowley's (1997) 2x2 matrix with the vertical axis indicating whether the stakeholder density is high or low. The horizontal axis represents four types of centrality: commander, compromiser, solitariand and subordinate indicating whether one is high or low. In box A where the density is high and centrality is also high it creates a situation of stalemate between the organisation and its stakeholders because they have equal power and influence. Under such circumstances both parties may become compromisers by trying to negotiate a deal which is mutually acceptable to each party. In the case of Box B, the stakeholders density is low but the organisation's centrality is high, therefore, the latter is in a more powerful position to dictate the terms by which agreements can be reached.

Mintzberg (1983) argues that when stakeholders are not united in their pressures on the organisation, as in the low-density networks, they are likely to become passive. The organisation becomes the commander in these situations and may choose to impose its will on the stakeholders because of the apparent weak position, but conversely when the roles are reversed, where the stakeholders density is high and the organisation centrality is low; the stakeholders may adopt
the superior role, while the organisation becomes the subordinate. Again, Mintzberg (1983:98) argues that:

"when the stakeholders speak with a clear voice, the organisation must typically follow suit with a consistent set of goals".

Finally in the low density/low centrality situation, both the organisation and the network of stakeholders are in weak positions because of poor organisation and communication and little influence. Hence, the situation becomes more or less one of peaceful co-existence because none is able to exert pressure upon the other. Rowley (1997) described this role taken up by the organisation as solitario. The following conclusions can be made from Rowley's typology of stakeholder influences and organisational responses and there are several benefits, which could be derived from his approach. First, he has demonstrated the benefits of going beyond the dyadic relationships and has offered a mechanism for describing the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and for predicting the organisation's responses. Second, the analysis enables one to examine the sources of external pressures and consider how the organisation relates to both its stakeholders.

CONCLUSION

The selected review of the disparate literature has been particularly illuminating and revealing in a number of important ways. A key element is probably the extent to which the theories and empirical findings in this area appear to have been circumscribed by the limited frames of references, methodologies and the approach used to study change.

In other respects, the literature review on organisational change seems to be very diverse and lacking any coherence. On the one hand, it ranges from rather simplistic approaches offering management 'recipes' with normative maxims for managing complex change in organisations. Authors who use this type of approach include, Beer, Eisenstat and Spector (1990), Schaffer and Thomson (1992). Conversely, the other approaches offer a more theoretical and analytical framework for understanding and managing organisational change. The authors who maintain this view include Pettigrew et al (1990), Ferlie et al (1997) and Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996). This lack of coherence is compounded by the apparent dichotomy
between the 'content' school Gibbs (1993) and those of the 'process' school, Dawson (1994) and Pettigrew et al (1994) in the context of organisational change. Although the approach of the two schools is potentially complimentary, there appears to be a dearth of empirical and theoretical evidence where efforts are made to bridge the gap between them. In the absence of this, we have witnessed the polarisation of writings and research on organisational change by academic researchers and management consultants advocating primarily prescriptions or descriptive approaches to organisational change (Wilson (1992)).

Pettigrew (1985:23) suggested that:

"all this adds up to some rather poor descriptive theories of change which beyond a shopping list of prescriptive do's and don'ts, sometimes qualified by contextual riders, could hardly be described as adequate guides to inform action".

A particular limiting problem identified in the literature has been the assertion by some authors to consider organisational change in a highly compartmentalised manner, in which the change initiative is regarded as having a beginning, a middle and an end, clearly distinct and unrelated to the context which gives it meaning and substance (Pettigrew (1985a)). This particular view of change is somewhat narrow and self limiting from my research perspective since one of the aims of the research is to adopt a holistic approach to change processes in the BBC in a much wider context, one which explores both vertical and horizontal levels of analysis and their interconnectedness in a temporal sequence over a period of time from a multiple stakeholder perspective. The above review has also identified the contradictory nature of organisational change literature in the debate between 'planned' versus the 'messy' nature of change. It has exposed the shortcomings of the highly rational and linear process models, which underpin the majority of planned theories of change. In the majority of cases these theories of change appear to be highly prescriptive and deterministic in their orientation and lacking any sense of coherence between the different schools of thought.

Figure 12 on page 92 provides a summary of some of the main differences between the 'planned' versus the 'messy nature of change. It is depicted in the form of a typology of change strategies in a 2x2 matrix, which shows the degree of
environmental turbulence on the horizontal axis, ranging from low to high. The vertical axis shows the degree of planned change ranging from low to high. The quadrant labelled A typifies the OD and business process re-engineering approach to change, with some examples of exponents of this particular methodology. This box is also characteristic of the BBC’s initial strategy of developing a highly planned approach to organisational change using the Burke-Litwin model.

The box labelled B is indicative of the strategic approach to change which recognises the futility of developing a planned approach to change, whilst acknowledging its highly chaotic nature and the urgency to initiate some actions in the face of environmental pressures. The illustrations in box C represent a sort of fine tuning, when the environment is relatively stable and the organisation is not under any immediate threat from external factors. Moreover, it also assumes that the staff is in support of the planned change programme. Box D shows a highly stable environment where the organisation is not under any serious threat from internal or external pressures and hence senior managers require no action.
Figure 12 Typology of change strategies

Adapted from Pettigrew et al. (1990); Pettigrew (1994); Wilson (1992); Ferlie et al. (1997);

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<th>STRATEGIC CHANGE</th>
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<td>BPR. Hammer &amp; Champy (1993)</td>
<td>EVOLUTIONARY CHANGE</td>
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<tr>
<td>OD. Burke Litwin (1992)</td>
<td>- Fine tuning Quinn (1980)</td>
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<td>Goodstein et al. (1994)</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Stable environment</td>
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92
This highly segmented and polarised view of change as depicted in the change literature does not appear to reflect my experience of the change process within the BBC.

The review also highlighted some key differences in the approach to organisational change between the exponents of the "content school" Hammer & Champy (1993) on the one hand and those of the "process" school on the other hand (Dawson (1994)). The former seems to adopt a highly mechanistic approach to organisational change which offers a menu-driven approach to change (Wilson (1992)). By contrast, authors from the latter school such as Bridges (1995) and Argyris (1991) tend to place greater emphasis on the human dimension. Yet there is a dearth of empirical and theoretical evidence in the literature to attempt to integrate the two schools of thought, which in turn perpetuates the polarisation of approaches between the two schools (Rajapolan & Spreitzer (1996)).

Harrison (1995:290) in commenting on overcoming organisational defences suggested that:

"our defence mechanisms are part of our make-up and that our defensive behaviours precipitated by organisational change are our coping strategy, so that any attempts to destroy them does not make us more effective; he stressed that, to put it strongly, the destruction of defences does not serve learning, instead it increases our anxiety that we will lose more or less effective conceptual systems with which we understand and relate to the world. We then drop back to an even more desperate and perhaps unrealistic defence, which is the one destroyed. Though it may seem paradoxical, we cannot increase learning by destroying the defences that block it."

Harrison has written extensively over the last 30 years on organisational learning and comments on how leaders have failed to acknowledge the prevalence of fear and anxiety in their organisation and how anger and resentment arise due to a widespread sense of betrayal of trust. In his opinion, the leader’s underestimation of the power of negative emotions contributes to what Harrison (1995a: 389-410) calls the bias and "addiction to action" found in so many companies. Other commentators have endorsed his view by suggesting that "the strength of feelings
is such that organisations are primarily in need of healing before they can learn, change and adapt" (Boydell et al (1996:195)).

Additionally, in noting the levels of exhaustion and burnout among people in the public sector organisations suffering from mandated change'; Harrison (1995a: 166) claimed that:

"public sector organisations were in retreat. Their clients and colleagues were in shock and feeling inadequate as they tried to drum up enthusiasm for upbeat, forward looking programmes in organisations reeling from one imposed change after another."

My discussions with BBC staff convinced me that the Senior Executives should have been more supportive of the staff during the period of change and allow them a little more time for the healing process and to assimilate the change. If there is any truth in the opinions as expressed by Argyris and Harrison then the BBC has certainly failed to take the necessary steps to address the human aspects of its change. In my capacity as a researcher and change practitioner, I have not encountered any evidence where the BBC made any genuine attempt to address the human aspects of the management of change as suggested by Argyris or Harrison.

Yet there are prominent advocates of the human aspects of organisational change such as Ghoshal and Bartlett (1995) and (1996) and Carnall, (1995: XI)

"who argues that "effective management of change is enhanced through careful planning, sensitive handling of people involved and a thorough approach to implementation"."

In presenting some arguments in support of his claim, he endorsed Mintzberg's (1994:6) view of strategy formation being an emergent process and argues that:

"at the core of any major change programme is the process of strategy formation".

A key point in his argument is that during a process of major change, this process of strategy formation is likely to be made more explicit but took the view that its effectiveness could be improved if great care was taken to involve the stakeholders in the process of diagnosis. Carnall (1995:4) also suggested that:
"stakeholders should be involved in the change on them and also in the
diagnosis and planning where possible and appropriate (not always
possible). Careful diagnosis provides a partial assessment of the capability
of the organisation for change and improvement".

This particular view of stakeholder involvement in the change process has been
endorsed by a number of leading exponents in recent times, for example, Grundy

Some of these leading writers and commentators on stakeholders analysis have
shown an overwhelming support for the notion that orientation to the diverse
interests of stakeholders groups is central to strategic planning. In addition they
warn that a failure to address these interests of multiple stakeholder groups may be
detrimental to the company performance (Grundy (1997)). However, Greenley and
Foxall et al (1997:259), in their study of UK companies, designed to elucidate this
association claimed that:

"despite the call by leading writers in the literature, there is no empirical
evidence about the potential orientation to multiple shareholders with
company performance".

In spite of the reservations of Greenley and Foxall et al (1997), about the
association between stakeholders orientation and the company's performance;
other commentators have maintained the opposite view that there is a correlation
between these two variables.

The contributions of other writers on stakeholder literature have proved to be
particularly useful in helping to increase my understanding of stakeholder analysis
and have offered some very useful advice on suggestions for developing a
stakeholder theory. Mitchell et al (1997) in their article entitled "Toward a theory of
stakeholder identification and salience" were particularly illuminating in the analysis
of the topic. In their conclusion they stressed that:

"Using our identification typology, we are able to explain stakeholder salience and
dynamism systematically. This new capability has implications for management,
research and for the future of the stakeholders framework" (Mitchell et al
(1997:880)).
The development of stakeholder theory has been further enhanced by the contribution of Rowley (1997). The real significance of his theory is that it has made a contribution to stakeholder research by providing a mechanism for conceptualising the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and predicting organisational responses to these forces. In his article on “moving beyond dyadic ties: a network theory of stakeholder influences”, he presented a convincing case in support of his arguments. According to Rowley (1997:888):

“I argue that social network analysis offers a worthwhile perspective, both as a theoretical contribution and a methodological tool, for advancing stakeholder theory”.

Rowley’s theory is unique in a sense that it falls into the rare category of a minority of researchers who have gone much further than the traditional researchers who were primarily interested in the identification and influence of stakeholders. However, my only reservation about his approach is that its normative perspective runs contrary to my aim of trying to develop a theory of organisational change from a naturalistic inquiry perspective. Therefore, it was felt useful to create a “hybrid model” of organisational change from a pluralistic and naturalistic perspective (Guba and Lincoln (1989)). As a result a combination of elements were selected from the various theories and models above to create a conceptual framework for studying the processes of organisational change in the BBC.

In spite of some of the excellent qualities of the Burke-Litwin (1992) model as a useful diagnostic instrument in managing change it also failed to offer any meaningful help for my research in a variety of ways. First, its normative perspective is self-limiting for the reasons already given. Secondly, from an ontological perspective, it views the change as an objective reality, which also runs contrary to my wish to adopt a subjectivist standpoint (Legge (1984)). The subjectivist ontology seems to be more appealing to me because of a belief that reality is socially constructed (Berger Luckman (1975)). Thirdly, from an epistemological standpoint the Burke Litwin model (1992) relies on the use of questionnaires to gather most of its data about the organisation and its people which is unitarist in perspective (Wilson (1992)). Conversely, the idea of the researcher as a change practitioner, insider and an integral part of the research tool, while trying to understand the change process from a multi-stakeholder
perspective seems rather appealing to me (Gummesson (1991)). As a consequence, my analysis of the literature also led me to conclude that there is an increased need to develop a theory and knowledge principally aimed at understanding the dynamics of change from a contextual and processual dimension, while simultaneously using a framework of multi level analysis from the shareholders’ perspective.

The review also highlights the difficulty in the use of certain terminology to describe a particular change process. At the outset of this section the question was posed: Can strategic change now occurring in the public sector be described as transformational? (Ferlie et al (1997)). In attempting to answer this question it became apparent to me that contemporary writers and researchers are increasingly making reference to the term “transformational change”. This point was well debated by Beckhard and Pritchard (1994); Romanelli and Tushman (1994). Yet there appears to be no universal understanding of the term. One writer commented on this by arguing that:

"a consensus on what transformation is will not emerge until it is better defined and given a framework so that firms facing similar issues and circumstances can make meaningful comparisons" (Blumenthal and Haspeslagh (1994:101)).

In attempting to address this problem Ferlie et al (1997) made a valiant attempt to develop a comprehensive framework which consisted of six criteria for assessing the viability of transformational change as a concept in organisation. This has already been elaborated so, suffice it to say that they only found tangible evidence of the first five criteria occurring in the National Health Service but were unable to confirm whether the sixth criteria had or was occurring with any high degree of certainty. In this case, the sixth criteria refer to the development of a new culture, ideology and organisational meaning (Ferlie et al (1997)). According to Wilson (1992:42):

"despite a growing body of empirical research which testifies to the difficulties in defining, let alone managing organisational culture, it has remained a seductive concept, imbued with seemingly elixir like quality for facilitating corporate change and renewal".
If we accept Wilson’s (1992) cynicism about culture, then it raises questions about how these issues could be resolved.

Who defines culture? How does one determine whether the majority has changed their behaviour? What constitutes a majority? How long does it take for the culture change to be firmly imbedded in the organisation? It follows that unless these questions are answered the concept of cultural change runs the risk of being perceived as somewhat nebulous. Furthermore, the assessment of whether the majority has changed their behaviour is methodologically fraught, because it makes it difficult to operationalise. The difficulty highlighted in organisational culture debate has led Ferlie et al (1997) and others to suggest an alternative approach which takes into consideration both managerial cognition and managerial actions from a pluralistic perspective. Thus, from a research perspective, an understanding of the differences between managerial cognition and managerial actions will also enable me to get a better understanding of the change process from a pluralistic perspective. This approach appears to have a sound theoretical basis and seems to be more highly developed than some of the other theories and models in the above review (Walsh (1995)).

This particular approach has also been beneficial in its opposition to the rational lens perspective which regards the environment and organisational context as being objectively determined (Gibbs & Boeker (1994)). Critics of the planned change approach tend to adopt a more holistic view of change as uncertain and unpredictable (Quinn (1980)). Change is viewed by them as an evolutionary process and the researcher’s approach to understanding will be to open up the “black box” and study how managerial actions and cognitions shape the readiness and resistance to strategic change and the overall outcomes of the change process. By seeking to differentiate between managerial cognition and managerial actions, the researcher may be able to study the changes in the content and context of the strategy and make explicit dynamic learning linkages. Above all it recognises the non-economic outcomes of strategic change processes (Walsh (1995)).

Thus, having reviewed a variety of literature on organisational change and found that there was no single model which would help with my naturalistic inquiry approach I decided to create my own integrative framework for understanding the
organisational change process in the BBC through the lens of some of the internal stakeholders. In creating this "hybrid" model for understanding the change process some ideas and concepts were borrowed from a variety of academics and social scientists. For example, Rowley (1997), Clarkson (1995), Mitchell et al (1997), Pettigrew et al (1992) to name but a few. As a consequence of my conclusions from the literature review, the model, which I have alluded to above, is explained below.

FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE:

The model developed is illustrated in figure 13 on page 100 with six distinct categories, which are principally aimed at generating the research agenda. To assist the reader, some operational definitions are given on pages 101-103 to explain some of the thinking behind each of the concepts or categories. However, I would like to introduce two caveats. Firstly, the definitions used to explain the model are not necessarily textbook definitions but simply derived from the literature to aid the research process. Secondly, although the original intention is to use the model as the basis for the study, it would not be rigidly adhered to where necessary, because this would run counter to the suggestions of exponents of naturalistic inquiry methodology, who advocate flexibility in their approach (Guba and Lincoln (1989)).
Figure 13 - An Integrative Framework For Understanding Strategic Change From A Multi-Stakeholder And Naturalistic Perspective.

Adapted from a variety of sources viz: Ferlie et al (1997); Burke (1994); Rajapalan and Spreitzer (1996); Dawson (1994); Pettigrew et al (1990); Pettigrew (1992); (1994); Wilson (1992); Grundy (1997); Rowley (1997)
The six constructs illustrated in the model are presented in a multi-dimensional format to indicate the inter-relationships between the various elements and the chaotic nature of the change process. The model assumes that all the variables are equally important and that there is no pre-defined starting or end points. These variables are used to generate questions for the research but before going any further let us briefly explain each one.

VARIABLE (1) - EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT:

This refers to any outside conditions or situations that can influence the performance of the organisation (e.g. market places, world financial conditions, and government policy, licence payers, competition, social conditions). See Burke and Litwin (1992), and Pettigrew (1992) for more details on this subject.

VARIABLE (2) - MANAGERIAL COGNITIONS:

A set of frameworks or patterns of meaning or perceptions in use as well as values that managers hold in the context of comprehending organisational change (Bartunek (1993)). In the context of strategic change it may manifest itself along two dimensions: Perceptions of the environmental/organisational conditions and changes as opportunities and threats. See Dutton and Jackson (1989) and Thomas et al (1993) for more information on this subject. Perceptions of the need for change and the ability to change (Dutton and Duncan (1987)).

VARIABLE (3) - MANAGERIAL ACTIONS:

This relates to the set of actions aimed at the external environment which create a more focused agenda for change, such as monitoring and scanning the external environment, gathering and analysing information, forming task forces and hiring consultants. It involves actions that build environmental support for the changes in strategy such as negotiating with and providing feedback to and lobbying external stakeholders. In addition, it involves actions that are focused on creating an agenda for change which includes monitoring and scanning of the internal environment; gathering information and forming task forces; actions aimed at reducing resistance to change through coalition building, communicating, replacing key personnel, building organisational capability and changing the hiring criteria.
The third type of actions is aimed at shaping the content of the strategy viz: articulating the vision, setting new objectives, analysing and evaluating strategic alternatives, launching new strategic initiatives, changing resource allocations and monitoring results; rewards systems. Argyris (1991) and Rajapalan and Spreitzer (1996) have made some interesting comments on this particular topic.

VARIABLE (4) - LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CHANGE

This refers to the specific actions which link strategic intent and operational change, i.e. ensuring that any changes in the environment are conducive to the context of the firm’s strategies in order to maximise the effectiveness of the implementation of the change. For example, justifying the need for the change, supplying necessary visions, values and business directions and building capacity for appropriate action. In addition, it refers to specific measures which links HRM to business needs and setting up local negotiations and business targets. It involves actions that build environmental support for the changes in strategy such as negotiating with and providing feedback to and lobbying external shareholders. In addition, it involves actions that are focused on creating an agenda for change which includes monitoring and scanning of the internal environment; gathering information and forming task forces; actions aimed at reducing resistance to change through coalition building, communicating, replacing key personnel, building organisational capability, changing the hiring criteria etc.

The third type of actions aimed at shaping the content of the strategy viz: articulating the vision, setting new objectives, analysing and evaluating strategic alternatives, launching new strategic initiatives, changing resource allocations and monitoring results; rewards systems. Wilson (1992) and Mintzberg (1994) have made an excellent contribution to this debate.
VARIABLE (5) - ORGANISATIONAL OUTCOMES

This refers to a synthesis of the learning and cognitive lens perspective, which seeks to understand how managers learn during the strategic change process. It asserts that managerial learning occurs in a continuous reshaping of cognitions as changes in strategy are implemented and as organisational outcomes begin to emerge. This process is not only crucial for understanding outcomes during a discrete change process but also because they may effect the future adoptive capability of the organisation. It also provides data for understanding both the intended consequences and unintended consequences of the goals of the change programme (Rajapolan et al (1996)).

VARIABLE (6) - OTHER MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDERS INFLUENCES

This refers to the mechanism describing the simultaneous influence of multiple stakeholders and for a means of understanding how organisations respond to them in periods of strategic change. It also seeks to understand the relationship between the organisation and its stakeholders and their perceptions of the change process. This new emerging field has seen some wonderful contributions by the following authors: Rowley (1997), Greenley et al (1997), Mitchell et al (1997), Grundy (1997), Clarkson (1995), and Donaldson & Clarkson (1995).

SUMMARY

At the outset, the main purpose of this chapter was to conduct a selected review of the organisational change literature to identify some common themes for the research agenda. In the process of doing so my strategy was to avoid doing a critique of the various theories discussed above, although I may have unintentionally done so at times. However, the intention was to consciously seek out ideas and concepts where possible which would subsequently enable me to develop a set of research questions for the study. Thus, having established some working definitions of the concepts and an integrative framework for assisting with the research process the next step was to develop some 'tentative' research questions.
THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The following research questions are mainly the result of the literature review and my first hand experience of working in the BBC as a change practitioner.

However, at this stage, it must be stressed that these questions should not necessarily be viewed as if they are the final ones that would drive the research because this runs counter to naturalistic inquiry approach. Guba and Lincoln (1989) and Erlandson et al (1993) have consistently maintained that such inquiry should always start with "tentative" questions which can be refined and refocused as the research progresses. Therefore, to simplify the process, it was decided to take each of the variables from the integrative framework separately and design some research questions around each one.

THE TENTATIVE RESEARCH QUESTIONS ON ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

VARIABLE (1) - EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

- What do you see as some of the problems facing the BBC in today's environment? See Burke (1994), Pettigrew et al (1992), Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996) for excellent contributions to this debate.

- What specific actions did the BBC take to win the support of the licence fee payers, staff, politicians, governments and other significant pressure groups in society? See Pettigrew et al (1992), Burke (1994), and Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996) for a general perspective.

- What were the specific drivers for change in the external environment? See Burke (1994).

- How did the BBC respond to these drivers? See Burke (1994).
VARIABLE (2) - MANAGERIAL COGNITIONS


- How do you feel about the change process and the way it is implemented in the BBC? Caplan and Teese (1997), Bridges (1995), Kubler-Ross (1997) have made an excellent contribution to this debate.

- What are the key values held by:
  - The BBC?
  - Senior management?

- How significant are the changes in cognitive frameworks and mindset of the stakeholders in bringing about effective transformation? See the contribution made by Giola and Chittipeddi (1991) and Bartunek et al (1992) on this subject.

VARIABLE (3) - MANAGERIAL ACTIONS

- What were the specific corporate interventions that were introduced by the Board of Management to implement the programme of change? Caplan and Teese (1997).

- What specific corporate initiatives were adopted by the Board of Management to prepare and assist the staff with coping with the change? See Judson (1991), Bridges (1995) and Carnall (1995).

- In formulating the change strategy in the BBC how much collaboration, involvement and participation was the staff allowed in the process? See Burke (1994), and Mintzberg (1994) views on this subject.

- Who were the key people involved in designing and implementing the programme of change? (Caplan and Teese (1997)).
• What actions helped and hindered the change process? See the contribution by Kubler-Ross (1997), Caplan and Teese (1997) on the subject.

• How did the change process evolve over time? (Pettigrew (1990)).

• How did the leadership agenda change overtime? (Burke - Litwin (1992)).

• Which leadership interventions had the most and least impact on the change process? (Kotter (1995)).

VARIABLE (4) - LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CHANGE

• How effective was the strategy in delivering the desired change? (Wilson (1992)).

• What is your understanding of the BBC's vision? (Pettigrew et al (1994)).

• How does the vision relate to initiatives taken at your local level? (Burke et al (1992)).

VARIABLE (5) - ORGANISATIONAL OUTCOMES

• To what extent do attempts of planned organisational change work in their own terms as suggested by many in OD literature? See the comments by Quinn (1980), Burke & Litwin (1992), Mintzberg (1994) on this subject.

• How is it possible to achieve successful planned change, given the messy nature as suggested in the literature? Kanter et al (1992) and Dawson et al (1994) have made interesting contributions to this debate.

• What were the intended and unintended consequences of the planned change? (Ferlie (1997)).

• How effective was the strategy in delivering the desired change? (Wilson (1992)).

• What impact did the change have on the staff? See the contribution by Carnall (1995), Bridges (1995), Kubler-Ross (1997) and Caplan and Teese (1997) to this debate.
VARIABLE (6) - OTHER MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE

- In formulating the change strategy in the BBC, how much collaboration, involvement and participation were the staff allowed in the process? (Mintzberg (1994)).


CHAPTER 4 STRATEGIC CHANGE IN THE BBC:  
"PRODUCER CHOICE" AND IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

This chapter examines the significance of "Producer Choice" and its far-reaching implications in the context of the BBC's history. The structure of this chapter will be as follows: firstly, to explain the background of "Producer Choice"; secondly, to explain the concept and its main principles; thirdly, to describe its launch in October 1991 by the current Director General; fourthly, to explain the implementation timetable, the new commissioning process and the management of information under the new system; lastly, to provide some examples of the types of risk analysis carried out in preparation for "Producer Choice" and to provide a synopsis of the pilot.

The next section will focus on the evaluation studies; their results and how the information was fed back to the staff. This will be followed by a description of the aftermath of "Producer Choice" and some related issues, such as "Extending Choice". In each case the background and rationale for these initiatives will be presented. The penultimate section will focus on the rationale for using the Burke-Litwin Model (1994) in the BBC and some examples of how this same model was used in the BBC and subsequent analysis. The final section provides a summary and establishes a basis for some of the issues that would drive the research agenda in the literature review in Chapter 4.

BACKGROUND

"Producer Choice", adopted in April 1993 represents the most significant change in the history of the BBC. It marked the watershed between the old BBC and the new one and signalled the birth of a dynamic process of radical reforms which amount to a revolution.

The aims of the proposed system were to:

- Promote efficiency and value for money through the exercise of choice for resources and services
• Identify the true total costs of individual programmes and the internal facilities

• Devolve accountability of budgets to the local business units

• Provide comparable measures of the BBC's relative efficiency in the market place.

The essence of the system is that cash budgets would, from April 1993, be allocated to programme makers for purchasing all their production resources. Resource departments would in future only receive income by selling their services to the programme makers. This had clear implications for how programme makers would spend their budgets and how resource departments would recover their costs. Within the framework of this new system, programme makers would be free to spend their money on either internal or outside production resources as they wish. Other factors being equal, such as quality, availability of suitable date, stability and reliability of service - they could be expected to choose the lowest price.

Resource departments would also be required to operate as businesses; setting prices, recovering their costs and running an income and expenditure account with the objective of breaking even. The business unit costs would cover all direct costs incurred, including staff costs, expenses, materials such as tape and film, and administrative costs. They would in future include three other costs. First, a charge for the overhead services which they use; second, a charge for the property occupied, (and this should be related to rent price in the market place); third, a charge for capital - in the independent facilities sector, companies would normally have to pay interest on capital borrowed for investment in plant and equipment. An equivalent notional charge would be placed on BBC resource business units.

These additional charges would, for the first time, give a complete picture of the costs of the various resource operations. Equivalent charges would also be made to programme departments. Under the new system the resource departments were required to break even and programme departments were expected to offer value for money, with the overall goal to reduce costs. As a result, "Producer Choice" would act as an internal market mechanism to increase efficiency. Various rules
were established governing the trading relationships between resource business units and programme departments. Various forms of internal contracts would be used, ranging from individual one-off transactions to block contracts.

THE LAUNCHING OF "PRODUCER CHOICE"

The Deputy Director General launched "Producer Choice" on Tuesday 29 October 1991. He began by saying "We are launching today an important and far-reaching initiative for the BBC. From April 1993, television in the BBC will be organised on the basis of a system we are calling "Producer Choice". This system should ensure that the whole business of programme-making at the BBC will become at least as efficient as any of our competitors" ("Producer Choice" Launch, October 1991:1).

He went on to stipulate that from April 1993, "Producer Choice" will become operational throughout the BBC, and its producers will be given the freedom to manage their budgets and also the freedom to buy resources and facilities for their programmes both internally and externally. In summarising what he saw as the benefits he said, "'Producer Choice' will bring clear information about the full total cost of our programmes, and about the precise cost of our resources. We will have unarguable information with which to persuade a sceptical world - and those who will scrutinise us keenly during the Charter Renewal process - that in a new era of Channel 3 publisher - contractors and a growing independent sector, the BBC is at least as efficient as any of its competitors. With "Producer Choice", the jibes about bloated bureaucracy, over manning and the Indian Civil Service should end" (The Deputy Director General's launch, "Producer Choice" (October 1991:8)).

He concluded by announcing that a whole year commencing from April 1992-April 1993, would be designated as a period of preparation for the introduction of "Producer Choice" and promised that a vigorous training and development programme would be introduced to help business unit manager to develop the new skills that would be required to work effectively under "Producer Choice". Finally, in order to aid the process, he announced the creation of a separate Resources Directorate in January 1993, to ensure the separation of "Purchasers" from "Providers" in order to deliver the advantages of combining all service providers within a single structure. Prior to that, programme making and resources were an integral part and operated as one entity ("Producer Choice": October (1991)).
IMPLEMENTATION PROGRAMME AND TIMETABLE

Once the Steering Group was set up, to design, test and implement "Producer Choice", a detailed timetable was drawn up for its implementation (BBC Policy and Planning, 1991)). The group decided that 1 April 1993 was the fixed date for the system to go live. A master plan was developed to show the main tasks to be carried out and this was supplemented by a more detailed plan with 107 individual activities, and critical paths identified. The main areas were: project management, internal and external communication; commercial structure, covering definition of business units and trading ground-rules, restructuring and training; cost management, covering resources, property, capital and other overheads, and production efficiency; and infrastructure, including accounting systems and management information.

A comprehensive programme of communication was pursued both externally and internally by the Deputy Director General and the rest of the Board of Management to explain the concept of "Producer Choice", starting with the formal launch in October 1991. This was attended by 170 of the most senior managers and staff in the BBC, and was followed up by a series of staff meetings, workshops and question-and-answer forums, supported by the distribution of a 14- page question-and-answer brochure from the Deputy Director General (see "Producer Choice": A new system for Managing Resources, BBC, October 1991). The aim of the 14-page questions and answer brochure was to ensure that all the managers were given prescribed responses to certain questions. In May 1992 a comprehensive loose-leaf manual of guidelines was issued for use by all staff. In September 1992, a video showing the detailed operational requirements for financial systems was made available to back up other forms of communications (BBC Policy and Planning (1991)).

In the meantime a series of one and two day training courses were planned and executed over an 18 month period and over 1,800 staff at various levels from all directorates took part in them. The subjects covered were: planning the business, managing the business, business and finance, introduction to business planning, purchasing and negotiating, working with customers, effective team working and managing change. In addition to these formal courses, workshops were arranged
throughout the organisation for all levels of staff, to encourage discussion and increase awareness.

There were also parallel activities taking place in the cost management initiatives such as overheads review, resources review and market testing. There was an 18.7% reduction in headcount from 1990 to 1993 (Human Resource Planning data on head count (1995)). The overhead allocations to departments, including changes for capital and property, were put in place as planned. However, the project was affected by delays in implementing the production efficiency study, which was needed to compare BBC work with best practice in the industry. In the end, this was deferred until 1994.

THE PILOT

The Project Director commissioned a group of external consultants from the Office of Public Management to design a simulation based on the concept of "Producer Choice". The aim of this simulation was to try to replicate a small scale model of "Producer Choice" over a period of two and a half years worth of programme production and to test all the trading methods being proposed. From the onset, the project team acknowledged that the simulation could not represent all aspects of the real world (for example, the development of business relationships over time or the real quality of a simulated programme). Nevertheless, it still persevered with the experiment. The simulation was called "Fast Forward" and after the design was completed in October 1992 the project team invited 72 senior managers from Network Television to test out the proposed methods over a period of two days at a Management Training Centre.

After the test was conducted, the project team conducted an evaluation of the process to see if any useful lessons could be learned before "Producer Choice" was implemented for real in April 1992. According to the Project Director:

"Its greatest contribution was giving managers the opportunity to find out in advance what the changes would mean and, in many cases, how much they might even enjoy exercising their 'Producer Choice'" (Cloot (1994:9)).

For the project team, "Fast Forward" provided reassurance that the systems they had devised could work and other production directorates found the exercise
sufficiently valuable to run one further simulation each. As far as the business process was concerned, it demonstrated two key requirements for smooth operation: the importance of timely commissioning decisions and the need for consistent and easily produced information. "Fast Forward" underlined the importance of introducing a three-year view, alongside prompt commitment at the commissioning stage.

Finally, after the "Producer Choice" simulation was tested and analysed and some refinements were made based on the data gathered, "Producer Choice" was implemented on April 1st 1993, despite a number of uncertainties and delays in the accounting systems. From the first day of its operation, "Producer Choice" became the responsibility of the line management in each department. The most obvious effects of this were in the flow of funds in the organisation, with all but corporate governance costs (about 2% of the total) becoming the responsibility of individual production departments within each directorate. Also significant was the contractual arrangement with the Channel Controllers, who only paid for programmes on production, not on acceptance of offer, as previously done in the pre-"Producer Choice" era.

The Project Director and his team anticipated that there would be a few teething problems once the system was in situ because of the lack of expertise by those managers who were expected to operate the new system. Most of these managers had no formal training in management or business skills. Their route to management was via their technical expertise as programme makers, yet in this new environment they were required to be competent in areas of business planning, contract negotiations and setting up full cost trading relationships. Above all they were expected to establish good management and financial information systems using the latest computer software package accurately. Therefore, a corporate programme was introduced to provide training, coaching, development and support for those managers in the areas of business skills and financial management. Price Waterhouse, Coopers and Lybrand, Deloittes and a few other external consultants were appointed to provide help to those managers. The project team decided to conduct an evaluation of "Producer Choice" three months after it was implemented to iron out any teething problems.
THE RESULTS OF “PRODUCER CHOICE”

The results revealed a number of practical problems with the system (BBC Policy and Planning 1993). For example, low morale amongst the junior staff who were required to operate the new system, but had no understanding of how it should work. Some claimed that they could not see any benefits from the system. The majority of staff who responded to the questionnaire about “Producer Choice” complained about the unnecessarily high number of business units that were created under the new system. They recommended that the number of business units be reduced, because it made the various transactions between the different business units very hard and managers complained about the mountain of paperwork involved in the process. There were a total of 481 business units created under “Producer Choice” throughout the BBC and managers tended to establish large numbers of small contracts in order to feel their way with the new system (BBC Policy and Planning (1993)). However, the net result was that it created a deluge of paperwork and frustration for those involved in the process. The staff who responded to the survey also recommended that the Board of Management should try to emphasise the link between “Producer Choice” (the BBC’s strategy for achieving efficiency and effectiveness) and “External Choice” the BBC’s vision of its future role. There were also recommendations to improve the gaps in essential financial information; improve strategic planning and commissioning process; improve purchasing and develop pricing as a tool, and give the system time to settle down. The staff also sought further clarification on the property strategy and market testing and their implications for the BBC, because they felt that the original explanations by management were not very clear.

“PRODUCER CHOICE” UPDATE

The project director of “Producer Choice” subsequently produced an update of it, based on a preliminary evaluation study in April 1994. However, no statistics or figures were provided, but just an overview of the staff responses to how they felt “Producer Choice” was operating. The general view from his presentation was that staff felt that the BBC was now providing value for money; there was an improvement of staff understanding of the total cost of individual programmes; and
the BBC has established convincing measures for demonstrating its relative efficiency in the market place, when compared to other broadcasters.

However, the staff felt that there was a need to improve communications on a corporate wide basis and the need to gather more data over a fuller period (Michael Stark’s presentation of “Producer Choice” update to the BBC staff at a seminar held at 35 Marylebone High Street (September 1993)).

Subsequently, the number of units was reduced from 481 to fewer than 200 in April 1994 (BBC Policy and Planning 1994)). Further simplifications were made to the system regarding service level agreements. Under this agreement, resource departments, which provided a regular service to another department, would draw up an annual service level. This Service Level Agreement would be the formal contract between the service provider and the recipient department, detailing the type of service to be provided, the quality and standards, performance indicators, frequency and costs and procedures for dealing with complaints and other after sales service.

In addition, a minimum transaction size of £100 was set to prevent an excess of small items. Further plans were made to conduct an annual evaluation for the next three years to assess progress and to iron out any further problems.

**THE AFTERMATH OF “PRODUCER CHOICE” AND RELATED ISSUES**

At the outset of the process, the Director General explained to all BBC employees, in speeches and written reports, that his rationale for developing “Producer Choice” as a strategic initiative was twofold. First, to ensure that the Charter was going to be renewed in 1996. Secondly, to ensure that the BBC was well placed to provide appropriate broadcast services in Britain in the future (“Producer Choice” (1991)).

However, in the process of implementing this initiative, the BBC came in for some very severe criticisms from a variety of sources including some eminent professional broadcasters such as Mark Tully, a senior BBC India correspondent, Denis Potter, a playwright and John Tusa, its former Managing Director of the World Service. They denounced the changes within the BBC as dangerous and unnecessary and claimed that they ran the risk of alienating its loyal workforce. John Tusa has since given numerous interviews on radio and television ridiculing
"Producer Choice". He scoffed at the idea that the BBC should be managed as a business and criticised its appointment of several business managers who were recruited externally for their commercial skills to manage the business. In one interview he said, "Everywhere in the corridors of the BBC, the names of programme makers have been replaced by new titles of business managers" (Economic Digest 1996). These criticisms were echoed within the Corporation by the staff and also externally by some of its former employees and supporters of the BBC. In the meantime, while "Producer Choice" was being designed, implemented and refined, the BBC was already pursuing other related strategies to complement it.

One of the most significant of these was the publication of its "Extending Choice" document which outlined its vision for the future. Like "Producer Choice" it was a significant part of its radical reforms in the face of the external pressures. From the BBC's perspective, "Producer Choice" was its key strategy for achieving efficiency and effectiveness in the corporation. "Extending Choice" on the other hand, was its vision of its future role in a "Producer Choice" environment.

THE BACKGROUND TO EXTENDING CHOICE

"Extending Choice" was largely the result of the publication of the Government's Green Paper in November 1992 on the "Future Role of the BBC" and the subsequent report by the National Heritage Committee on Broadcasting in December 1993-94. It was a formalised document drawn up by the BBC to demonstrate its contribution to the public debate on its future role. The BBC saw this as a proactive move to influence its political masters in Downing Street, showing that it was ahead of the game and was embracing change quite readily. In preparation for the drafting of this document, the Director General and his Board of Management constituted a "Charter Renewal Group" to co-ordinate the data collected from research and debates about its future role and to draft it into a formal document.

The Charter Renewal Group was composed of 120 BBC middle managers, which straddled the different disciplines of programme making and resource departments. Their terms of reference were to look at the role of the BBC in a multi-channel environment and examine every aspect of its programme output activities. Their
underlying goal was to produce a report with a wide range of fresh ideas about the BBC's "future role" in six months. To assist them in that process, McKinsey Consultants were appointed to guide them through the various stages. From the start, the Group drafted a number of questions to aid the process of debate. Some of the questions they were asked to debate were:

- Do we need publicly funded broadcasting in an expanding market?
- Should the BBC provide it?
- If so, what should be the BBC's public purpose, role and objectives?
- What kind of programmes should the BBC makes and broadcast to fulfil this public purpose?
- How should the BBC develop its international role?
- Should the BBC be a single broadcasting organisation, and if so how should it shape its services to deliver programmes as effectively as possible to their audiences?
- How should the BBC change the way it works as an organisation to ensure that it delivers maximum value for money?
- How should the BBC harness new broadcast technologies which offer the prospect of expanded and enhanced services for viewers and listeners?
- How should the BBC be funded?
- How should the BBC be held accountable to the licence payer and Parliament for meeting its objectives?

The DG also set up 15 Task Forces in March 1991, across the BBC each with a different theme, but with a common brief to "Think The Unthinkable" about the future role of the BBC. While the Task Forces were conducting their internal research, a much wider research, debate and consultation process was taking place within the BBC throughout the United Kingdom. For example, the BBC held 57 public meetings in the various U.K. towns and cities by creating a forum for a
wide cross section of viewers and listeners to have face to face discussions with BBC's management and governors on the themes which emerged from the 1992 Green Paper. These participants were encouraged to write to the BBC with their views about its future role. The BBC also commissioned and broadcast a series of discussion programmes about its future with a random sample of viewers to listeners. In order to complement this, it conducted quantitative and qualitative research about the public's opinion of its future role.

At the end of this extensive consultation process, the data was collated and analysed before the Charter Renewal Group wrote a final report. The results showed that there was a wide range of views and opinions about its future role and purpose. Some people called for radical changes to be introduced in the BBC in the areas of programme making and services to its customers, whilst others simply wanted to preserve the 'status quo'. Nevertheless, they were unanimous about preserving the BBC's status as the U.K. prime public service broadcaster. (BBC Policy and Planning 1994)). To demonstrate that it was responsive to the feedback which it received from the consultation process, The Group combined the data gathered from the research together with the findings of the 15 Task Forces and published its version of the "Extending Choice" document.

EXTENDING CHOICE DOCUMENT NOV. 1992

The BBC published its "Extending Choice" document in November 1992 and listed four main goals as its vision for the future. They were to: - provide an unmatched service of original and high quality programmes; deliver outstanding value for money; become more open and accountable to the licence payers; deliver an effective BBC.

These goals were then amplified in a confidential document which was sent out to managers before the launch, entitled "Extending Choice: The First Year" (Managers' Briefing Materials January 11, 1993). Thus also published an outline timetable for the accomplishment of these goals. They also explained the rationale of each strategy and specified the key actions that were necessary to ensure success. For example, in the case of the Programme Strategy Review, they identified four aims and objectives, they were: First, to involve a wide cross section of the BBC’s best talent and managers in developing a programme strategy and
plans to achieve the broad purposes set out in Extending Choice. Second, to conduct a thorough and fully informed assessment of all BBC programming from a bi-media perspective. Third, to define the role, purpose and specific objectives of each BBC Channel or Service. Finally, to produce for publication a detailed programme strategy for each channel area of programming.

To aid that process Director General identified five questions, which he suggested, should be asked by the Programme Strategy Review Group. They were: -

- **Talent** - Are we working as creatively and imaginatively as we can - and with the best talent available in the field?

- **Society** - Are we alert to the many realities in society, or in the relevant segments of society, that should be reflected in the BBC's programme strategy?

- **Audiences** - What services should the BBC provide for its many discrete and different audiences - of different ages, experiences, needs and outlooks?

- **Competition** - What are our commercially funded competitors providing - and not providing?

- **Distinctive, High Quality Programmes** - How can we ensure that our objectives set out in Extending Choice are aligned to the needs of our audiences?

(Adapted from BBC's Archive data-Extending Choice, 1993)

The Programme Strategy Review was scheduled to take place between February and December of 1993. Its outcome was to draw up a statement of programme and channel strategy, which defined the objectives against which future programmes could be measured, and this was to be endorsed by the Governors. The briefing also outlined four initiatives about how it was going to achieve value for money. They were: “Producer Choice”; second, via the process of conducting a series of overhead reviews to identify areas of over capacity or wastage in order to eliminate them; third, via market testing to compare and contrast the BBC’s “in house services” with outside services to see whether its price and services were competitive with them; fourth, to conduct ‘benchmarking’ exercises to provide the BBC with hard data about “best practices” in the industry, in order for the BBC to learn from them, and adopt some of their excellent practices. Finally, the brief
explained how the BBC was going to conduct a major restructuring process to facilitate the change. It announced the creation of a New Resources Directorate to mark the separation of programme making from Resources and established it as a fully trading business whereby its only source of income would be derived from trade with other directorates. (See Figure 14 on page 121 and Figure 15 on page 122 for illustrations of the re-organised structure). This restructuring was highly significant because it marked the watershed between the formal separation of "purchasers" from "suppliers". In the future, the Resources Directorate staff would start with a zero-base budget and in order to earn their income, they would have to sell their service to the programmers who were the sole purchasers of their services. This also changed the nature of the relationship between the programmers and resources staff, because former colleagues were now considered to be new trading partners.

Figure 14 on page 121 shows the interim organisation structure for Resources, Engineering and Services and their structural relationships with the respective Directorates viz. Network Television, Network Radio, News and Current Affairs, Regional Resources etc.
Figure 14  Interim organisation structure for Resource Engineering and services and their relationships with the directorates

RESOURCES, ENGINEERING and SERVICES

Chief Personnel Officer

Financial Controller

Network Television Resources
Network Radio Resources
N. & C.A. Resources
Regional Resources
Transmission and Engineering Services
Services

Studios
Obs
Film
Design
Post Production
Studios
Obs
GOFs
Radiophonic Workshop
Picture Editing
Location Services
Production Department
Sound Operations
TV Operations
Graphic Design
Scotland
Northern Ireland
Wales
North
Midlands & East
South
Transmission Engineering
Transmission Operations
Corporate Communications
Design and Equipment

Property, Estate
Management
Libraries
Transport
Central
Purchasing
Resources
Training Centre
Recruitment
Services

Figure 15 on page 122 provides an example within Network Radio Directorate and Network Television Directorate to show the new relationships between them and the New Resources Directorate.
Figure 15 Adapted from BBC Archival data

Figure 16 on the next page shows the organisational framework for the BBC, with a synopsis of the New Resources Directorate and all its services in relation to the Network Radio and Television programme production and their integrated links with the commissioning and scheduling process. It shows the ‘buying vs. selling’ relationship between the New Resources Directorate and others.
As soon as the "Extending Choice" official document was published and the "confidential management embargo" lifted, the BBC's Corporate Internal Communications department sent a copy of the document to every BBC employee to inform them of the BBC's vision.

On the 11th of January 1993, the Deputy Director General, formally launched the "Extending Choice" programme to all BBC employees via its internal communications network, popularly known as the "ring main". The theme of his speech was "Turning Promises into Reality - Extending Choice". In his introduction he explained why he felt that the BBC had to respond in the face of the rapidly changing environment and laid out his 'vision' for the role of the BBC in the New
World. He then reinforced his comments by saying "If we can achieve this we will demonstrate that we are able and willing to take hold of our own destiny and win the Charter debate" (Director General speech 11 Jan. 1993). In this speech, he gave detail actions about how the vision was to be realised, based on the Burke-Litwin model of organisational change which he chose as the framework for implementing his plans (See later section for a more detailed explanation of the model and its rationale for use within the BBC). However, in his concluding remarks he promised that a major programme of communication and involvement would start soon, to equip staff to meet the challenges ahead. He confirmed that "There will be a new and enhanced programme of management training; and every single member of staff will be invited this year to join one of a series of day long discussions on the principles of "Extending Choice" and how each can contribute to shaping the future direction of the BBC. I hope wherever possible to joint these discussions myself" (Director General opcit). The speech was later followed up with a personal letter to all the staff, summarising his key points.

He also instructed his Corporate Management Development Division to send out an information pack to all managers containing details of the one day "Extending Choice" workshop, which he promised in his speech, together with a "managers briefing" and a series of questions with his prescribed answers to prepare them for answering questions from their staff. They also received another managers' briefing entitled "The BBC Masters Degree Programme in Public Service Administration" in June 1993. The format was similar to the "Extending Choice" briefing with its rationale for the programme and its predetermined questions (and answers). The rationale for these briefings and predetermined questions (and answers) was to ensure that all the managers towed the party line and gave the appearance of a consistent approach.

The Director General stressed that his aim was to build a modern public sector institution, which preserved the best of the BBC traditions, but also absorbed the best of the private sector. He then went on to say that "If all these initiatives were taken together, I am confident that they will meet the goals of "Extending Choice" to win a new Charter to take it into the 21st Century on the back of a vigorous, responsive and modernised BBC" (Director General opcit).
Shortly after, the DG gave his keynote speech; the staff throughout the BBC received their invitations to attend the ‘one day event’ at the BBC Conference Centre at 35 Marylebone High Street. In the period 1993-95, the majority of staff was strongly persuaded to attend the event. Only those with exceptionally good reasons were granted permission to be exempted from attending. Throughout the series of events, the participants were encouraged to be open and frank about their perception about the BBC and how they felt about the management of the change. The Director General and a few members from the Board of Management attended the final session of each of these events. The purpose of their visit was to demonstrate their total commitment to the programme and to hold an ‘open forum’ with the staff who attended, to discuss their main issues and concerns and to clarify any misconceptions about the strategy. The lead facilitator on each of the events made a record of the key questions raised and formulated it into a report which was then forwarded to the Board of Management for further action.

As a co-facilitator on these events, I was able to observe and discuss at first hand the staff’s concerns about the changes in the BBC. After a number of events were held, the themes, which emerged, seemed to be very consistent. The main ones were to do with poor communications, incompetent managers, uncaring management, lack of training and career development opportunities, job insecurity and low staff moral. Fears were expressed about the BBC’s introduction of the contract culture, because prior to the change everyone had a job for life. However, with the change came many redundancies, and many staff who left were put on short-term contracts. Other concerns were raised about “Producer Choice” and the majority of staff expressed their dissatisfaction with the concept of introducing a business culture in a creative environment like the BBC. Some staff stressed that they could not see the point of it at all. Some staff expressed fears that the BBC was embarking on a “slippery slope” to the point of no return because of the changes. A very vocal section claimed that the BBC was simply pandering to the Government to keep them happy.

From my first hand observation, these comments were the reflection of a wide cross section of staff and not confined to one particular grade and group. Thus, to sum it up, the series of ‘one day events’ received mixed reviews from the participants. Some staff said that they valued the opportunity to meet colleagues
from other areas of the BBC and to exchange experience and to put their views directly to the Board of Management. However, there were others who saw it as an exercise in brainwashing and stressed that this should have been done much earlier before the changes were introduced. Shortly after the BBC published its “Extending Choice” document about its vision and future role, the National Heritage Select Committee Report (Dec 1993 report) recommended the approval of the BBC “Extending Choice” document. As a direct result of this, the Government confirmed a full inflation linking of the licence fee for three years. Subsequently, on that same basis, the BBC Charter was renewed for another 10 years from 1996. The “Extending Choice” one day events came to an end in December 1995; since then there have been a variety of initiatives introduced to complement the “Producer Choice” strategy. Most of these have been based on the Burke-Litwin model of organisational change.

RATIONALE FOR USING THE BURKE-LITWIN MODEL IN THE BBC

The adoption of the Burke-Litwin model for use in the BBC is probably largely attributed to Bob Nelson, the BBC’s Head of Corporate Management Development since 1987. Prior to 1987, Bob Nelson worked with British Airways as a Senior Human Resources Manager under Colin Marshall, former Chief Executive and Dr Nicholas Georgiades (professor, consultant and psychologist). Professor Georgiades was specifically appointed from outside by Colin Marshall as Head of Human Resources to bring about major culture change which the British Airways was about to embark upon. Bob Nelson worked as a senior member of Professor Georgiades team, and while in that role he acquired and developed a range of skills in introducing "large scale systemic" change in British Airways. As a result of that experience he was subsequently head hunted by the BBC’s Director General, Michael Checkland, to lead the major change programme in the BBC.

Bob Nelson’s appointment was seen as a crucial one in the context of the BBC for a variety of reasons. First, there were lots of perceived similarities between the BBC and British Airways. Second, they were both publicly owned companies, which were directly funded by Central Government. Third, they employed a large number of staff; British Airways in 1987, employed about 59,000 and British Broadcasting Corporation employed about 28,000 staff. Fourth, its passengers as BA sometimes
referred to British Airways for "Bloody Awful". The BBC on the other hand was also criticised for its extravagance, bureaucracy and so forth (Burke et al (1994)). Finally, Margaret Thatcher decided that BA had to be privatised and appointed John King, a successful businessman, to be its Chairman. However, in the case of the BBC, Mrs Thatcher and her Government were constantly criticising the BBC and from time to time dropped subtle hints that it had to get its house in order. The first signs, of serious threats came with the major reforms in the public sector in the 1980's, followed by her appointment of Marmaduke Hussey, as Chairman of the BBC. That was perceived by many people, both internally and externally, as a political move to help her to introduce changes in the BBC.

Since there were many similarities between the two organisations, it seems reasonable to deduce that the BBC probably learnt some very useful lessons from the change, which was already in operation in BA. Moreover, in a very short space of time, BA was transformed from a major loss making company in the 1970s to a profit making one in the 1980s, by putting all staff through its "putting people first" customer programme (Burke and Goodstein (1991)). Furthermore, BA had also used Warner Burke Associates (an American consultancy firm) to help it with the implementation of the change. This is highly significant, because Warner Burke is the co-author and former colleague of George Litwin who both developed the Burke-Litwin model of organisational change and performance. Burke used that very same model to implement the change in BA. During that same period, Bob Nelson became a disciple of Warner Burke's approach to organisational change and learned at first hand the "nuts and bolts" of the model. He also became very friendly during the period with Warner Burke and George Litwin. Therefore, when he was subsequently appointed by the BBC to implement the change, it seemed inevitable that he would one-day recruit Burke and Litwin to assist him with his project.

As expected, Bob Nelson persuaded the Director General and his Board of Management to adopt the Burke-Litwin model as the preferred organisational framework for introducing the change in the BBC for two reasons. Firstly, they had a proven track record in their field of expertise, and claimed to have used the model successfully in a few major companies, such as Smith-Kline Beecham, a multinational chemical company (Burke and Jackson (1991)) and British Airways
(Burke & Goodstein (1991)). Secondly, partly because of the experience of British Airways.

Burke (1994) provided a variety of examples, where the model could be used in organisational settings. They are as follows:

- gathering data about the organisation;
- predicting the likely impact and outcome of the change initiatives;
- understanding the particular relationships between features in different organisations;
- improving organisational performance;
- deciding what to do in a change process.

Prior to 1992, most of the change measures within the BBC were done on an 'ad hoc' basis, because they were not aligned to the overall corporate strategy. In September 1992, Bob Nelson published a highly confidential paper, outlining his strategic plan for “Facilitating Change at the BBC”. This paper was circulated to only a handful of very senior managers in the BBC. The essence of the paper was to give a detailed breakdown of how the process of change was going to be managed and facilitated at the BBC over a two-year period. He stressed that the overall purpose of the change was to “demonstrate efficiency and value in an increasingly competitive market so that the Charter and Licence Agreement can be secured on terms which we would wish” (opcit). He went on to stress that the BBC needed to make a major shift in its culture and climate and offered some guidelines on how the process would be implemented.

After the Board of Management endorsed his paper, a series of initiatives were carried out using the Burke-Litwin model. For example, a staff survey was carried out in April 1993 with a stratified random sample of 4,819 members of staff from a total population of approximately 23,500. The purpose of the survey was to find out, firstly what staff thought about the current state of the BBC at the beginning of considerable change within the organisation and how they felt about the BBC as a place to work. Secondly, to establish a benchmark from which progress towards the
Extending Choice goals can be measured. Thirdly, to provide useful information for improving the effectiveness in achieving these goals. The survey was constructed on the basis of the model, with at least four questions asked per variable and a maximum of 28 questions on management actions or practices. A total of 150 items, using a five-point scale, constituted the survey, with three additional open-ended, write-in questions at the end.

INTERPRETING THE DATA FROM THE BBC STAFF SURVEY APRIL 1993

The following provides a brief analysis of the results. Figure 17 on page 130 summarises the main findings of the 1993 Survey. A "+" indicates that respondents replied positively, a "-" indicates a negative response. For example if we examine the transformational section of the model which is represented by the boxes labelled external environment, mission and strategy, leadership and cultures; a number of conclusions can be made.

The respondents showed that they all agreed that the BBC was very responsive to changes in the external environment and this is clearly indicated in Figure 17 by showing a "+" against their perception that the BBC is experiencing rapid change and also its response to legislation. In the context of culture a "+" is indicated against their view that the BBC does demonstrate creativity, excellence, high performance, and honesty.

Regarding mission, safety and strategy, they agreed that the BBC does have goals, which they consider relevant to their work. Above all, they also agreed that it produced high quality work. However, they were quite negative about the abilities of the BBC leadership. They also concluded that the BBC lacked openness, accountability, and involvement and was poor at communicating to its staff. In addition, they regarded the organisation as highly bureaucratic and appeared to have little acceptance of the organisational goals.
Figure 17 Summary of analysis of the 1993 Staff Survey

Adapted from the Burke-Litwin causal model of organisational change and performance (1994) with authors’ permission
In the context of the transactional factors, they appeared to be negative about the BBC’s structure. They cited it as hindering inter-departmental co-operation. They also felt it was top-down and controlling and above all lacking any clarity. They were equally negative in their responses about the apparent lack of information they are given about the organisation overall. The negative responses were as follows: management did not involve them in the decision-making process and regarded them as un-inspiring; the right staffs were not selected for promotion; people felt insecure in their jobs and did not feel valued. Finally, motivation was regarded as low and staff were not regarded for their creative talents. However on the positive side, the respondents felt that the managers stood up for what they believed and knew how to get things done.

At a work unit level, there was a feeling of trust and respect for one another; good work was recognised and felt to be a common bond amongst their colleagues. In addition they believed that their jobs were highly challenging and were able to utilise their skills to the optimum. They also responded positively about being informed about their job and the department as a whole, and considered their team working was among the best; their job was also interesting and valuable. Above all, they believed that they were providing an excellent public service and were very proud to work for the organisation.

It is clear from the survey that the staff seemed to have a greater sense of identity with their own department and work unit and enjoyed the challenge in the job and working in their teams. However, on the more strategic initiatives, they seemed less committed to the bigger picture and what the BBC was trying to achieve. Finally, from the results of the survey, there was an overwhelming recommendation from the staff to act on the following:

- Stronger teamwork, inspiration and visibility at the senior managerial level.
- More involvement of employees in the goals of the organisation.
- A culture that is more adaptive to change and less bureaucratic.
- More consistency in managerial decision making.
- A more clearly defined structure that facilitates horizontal relationships.
- Mechanisms to help people feel more valued in their work.
In effect these initiatives, taken together, comprise a "Change Architecture" put in place to achieve the reforms on which the BBC was seeking to achieve, including "Producer Choice". In this context, the "Change Architecture" is defined as the combination of mechanisms, processes, resources and change initiatives, which, in whole or in part, contribute to the change under discussion, following Carnall (1999). The architecture for any particular change initiatives includes any other change initiatives which create "platforms" offering value to that initiative. For example, the performance Review and the design/implementation of the new Management Information Systems to facilitate "Producer Choice". You cannot understand the success or failure of "Producer Choice" without looking at the timings and success in implementing the other related initiatives. "Producer Choice" cannot work effectively without an appropriate information infrastructure. Similarly, the Business Education Programme was an important parameter. Was it that the 1800 people needed the knowledge or was it also that it was important to build their confidence as they entered the "Producer Choice" era? Wherever, you would place the emphasis, it represented, an important component of the "Producer Choice" Architecture.
Figure 18 Examples of BBC initiatives and how they relate to the Burke-Litwin model

External environment analysed
- Competition (satellite, commercial radio, media conglomerates)
- Political (Broadcasting Act, Charter Renewal)
- Technological (digitisation, CD-ROM)

New Leadership
- Transformational agenda
- Team work
- Leadership Development

Culture mapped in Staff Survey
- Values defined
- Workshop confronts culture

Management actions mapped and standards set
- Extensive training for managers
- Performance Review established
- Communication accountability defined

Core process design
- Resource Directorate established
- BBC Worldwide
- Overheads and layers reduced

New job descriptions and grading system
- Multi-media initiatives
- Bi-media working
- Higher productivity

Staff Survey
- Involvement Initiatives
- Clear Objectives
- Managerial Standards Defined
- Regular Communication

Reward Strategy
- Personal Performance Review
- "Protected" Training Spend
- Business Education Programme

Training Strategy
- Ring Fenced Funding
- Training Need Analysis

Individual performance assessment
- Public performance indicators
- Productivity measures

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We have seen some excellent examples of how the Burke-Litwin model was used in the BBC, but perhaps it is fitting here to draw some conclusions by assessing the implications for the change process in the BBC.

**Conclusion**

At the time when the survey was conducted in 1993, the BBC was in the early stages of a major change programme following external environment pressures and fuelled by the Conservative Government policies. The staff's criticisms of a lack of clear goals or sense of direction, lack of team work amongst senior managers, too much bureaucracy, poor leadership, low staff morale, poor communications are probably symptomatic of any organisation which is in the early stages of introducing change (Staff Survey 1993). The BBC is not unique by any means, but probably a microcosm of what is happening in the wider society. Thus, although the BBC had initially adopted and embraced the Burke-Litwin model (1994) totally, during the early stages of the process, the authors do acknowledge its limitations. For example, it does not account for the organisation's technical strengths, those core competencies that make it competitive in the market place, and make it effective in accomplishing its mission. The model is also very complex and is therefore not easily understood, so those who are familiar with it should only use it. Although it is not the only model that purports to address the key dimensions of organisational change, it is nevertheless very comprehensive and has a proven track record with organisations such as British Airways and Smith-Kline Beecham (Burke and Jackson (1991)).

The model suffers from the shortcomings of the other normative models on planned organisational change, which do not take into consideration that change is often messy and chaotic (Moss-Kanter et al (1992)). Change is a non-linear process, which has to cope with hyper-turbulence and unforeseen factors in the environment (Meyer et al (1995)). Thus, while one accepts that the BBC is still going through a process of change, it is nevertheless too early to draw any firm conclusions about the impact of change or otherwise. Therefore as the pace of change in the BBC increases in momentum in the coming years it is highly likely that it may encounter some of the problems discussed earlier, associated with public sector reforms. For example, it is possible that its different stakeholders may have different and
competing objectives, which may be difficult to reconcile in an environment of disjointed and highly fragmented change programme. Second, the apparent contradiction of the staff being required to improve quality and effectiveness, while at the same time reducing in real terms the cost of public services staff. Third, having to cope with low morale and cynicism as spelt out by the staff survey of 1993, and 1994 respectively, while being required to produce more typifies the type of contradictions that need addressing in the BBC. Previously the types of research conducted in the BBC, especially using the Burke-Litwin model (1994) were quantitative in their approach and offered normative prescriptions (1993 and 1994 staff surveys)). However, these were not able to address the personal perceptions of the staff in a one-to-one situation and as a result often ended up with a sanitised version of their views for fear of repercussions. (Not least because of the perceived culture).

One of the biggest challenges facing the BBC in the current climate is to convince a critical mass of the staff that it is performing well in some areas, while simultaneously, implementing a radical change programme. At the outset of the change programme in April 1993, some of the staff have been very cynical about the change, but have been careful to disguise their feelings in public for fear of getting the sack from their jobs. Quite often, one hear the cries from some staff who murmur

"If it ain't broke then why fix it"

However, that is not to say that the change was opposed by all the staff. In introducing radical change, Senior Management should expect a degree of resistance from the staff during the early stages as the momentum develops. Some may feel confused, angry and harbour thoughts about self doubt. Others may go through a process of soul searching and question their own abilities as to whether they could cope in the new environment (Bridges 1995)).

It has to be tackled through a carefully structured programme of dialogue, providing explanation, understanding, tolerance and using a variety of means to win the "hearts and minds" of the staff in getting them to "buy in" to the programme. Thus, if we accept this argument, then by implication, one has to create a change architecture which enables dialogue to take place, understanding to develop and
be transmitted in order to achieve a "buy in" to the programme. Whilst linked, these are nevertheless discrete processes.

In the case of this case study, the BBC Steering Group worked up a “Producer Choice” strategy. The Project Director and his team devised a simulation to enable the 72 senior managers to test out the concept. This was deliberately intended to get them to lend their support to the initiative. Once they were able to live out the experience of the business world (although through a fictitious role play exercise). The subsequent creation of a master plan, a comprehensive programme of communication, staff meetings, “Extending Choice” workshops, the question and answer forums and so forth.

It is was fairly evident that the concerted effort of the Change Architecture were deliberate attempts to address the above issues. For example, it provided explanation through the communication programme; development of understanding was created through the simulation pilot, and business training programmes. In addition, attempts to get staff "buy in" were made through the workshops.

The central point is that each element of the change Architecture serves as a principal purpose and this should drive who are involved and how. Figure 17 provides an excellent summary of the critical issues facing the BBC. It shows there are both positive and negative aspects of the Change Architecture. There is a given level of inertia, a given level of trust etc. The Change Architecture will build upon the positives. Figure 18 shows how the various change initiatives have been used at the BBC and is directly related back to the previous figure 17.

As a consequence, figure 18 summarises the various initiatives underway at the time. Some are fundamental to "Producer Choice", some are not. Indeed “Producer Choice” is part of the Architecture for other initiatives, in particular for Extending Choice”.

The various strategic interventions were deliberately aimed at creating the right business model, systems, infrastructure, knowledge and understanding to achieve the reforms. The overarching goal in this process was to achieve “Charter Renewal” for the BBC in 1996 for another 10 years.
The literature on change particularly the normative approaches treats change as if it is a phenomenon that could be planned and managed in a highly predictable way as suggested by the Burke-Litwin model (1994). However, the results of the staff surveys of 1993 and 1994 led me to conclude that introducing radical change into an organisation can be more complex and messy than meets the eye.

Therefore, since no one has so far conducted any research about the process of change in the BBC from the staff individual perception, this presents me with an ideal opportunity to conduct an original piece of research about the change process from the internal stakeholders' perspective in order to increase my understanding of this process. Secondly, it provides me with the unique opportunity to study the consequences of the change process on the staff in the “time-bounded” period of April 1993 to July 1998 and to consider the implications for management actions.

Therefore it is against this background that an attempt will be made to provide a detailed explanation of the methodology and the rationale for its adoption in conducting the study.
CHAPTER 5 - METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN PROCESS

INTRODUCTION

The overall purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed explanation of the methodology and the research design process for conducting the study of organisational change process in the BBC. The first section will begin with a philosophical debate about the definitional problems associated with conducting naturalistic inquiry and the subsequent attempts to create an operational definition in order to assist the reader. This is followed by drawing some comparisons between the conventional and naturalistic paradigms in order to underline the differences between their basic assumptions. Then an attempt will be made to elaborate on the hermeneutic dialectic process and the pre-requisites for conducting naturalistic inquiry. This will be followed by a debate on some of the issues and perspectives in case study research to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the case study as a research strategy. Then an attempt will be made to examine the circumstances where it could be applied and to debate some of the challenges facing the researcher with regard to the generalisation of the findings. The penultimate section will debate the relationship between the researcher and the research participants in order to address some key questions which any inquirer would have to face should he decide to adopt this methodology. The next section will focus on a description of the research design process and an explanation of the reasons for the choice of this particular methodology and its limitations. It will also provide a detailed description of the research plan and a variety of research methods used in the conduct of the study as a precursor to the analysis process in chapter six.

DEFINITION OF NATURALISTIC INQUIRY

The naturalistic inquiry paradigm represents a paradigm shift away from the conventional scientific inquiry, which is sometimes referred to as positivism. The former has many aliases, which include the following: ethnographic, phenomenological, subjective, humanistic, qualitative, hermeneutic, case study and more latterly constructivist. As a consequence of these labels, one gets the distinct
impression that the persons who profess to practice it, tend to take different views of what it implies, in the same way that those who profess to be Christians, may nevertheless prefer to be known more specifically as either Catholic, Presbyterian, Anglican or Adventist. They appear to hold on to these more specific labels in an attempt to differentiate their particular doctrines from those of others who they believe have turned away from the true way. This study is also equally guilty of taking a Sectarian view, because it treats “naturalism” in a particular way, and insists on certain interpretations and perspectives, which will be elaborated on in the ensuing paragraphs.

Thus, it is precisely because the matter is so involved that it is not possible to provide a simple definition of what naturalism is. Therefore, it is with some reluctance that an attempt will be made to offer a “working” definition of the concept of naturalistic inquiry in the ensuing paragraphs. Currently there is no such thing as a universal definition of naturalistic inquiry from the literature review, although its exponents admit to some givens in its design process. The variety of definitions offered by several authors is somewhat bewildering to say the least. However, Biklen and Bogdan (1986) and Mary Lee Smith (1986) provide a definition of naturalistic inquiry that is rather appealing to me because of personal preference and expediency. There are some researchers who have attempted to conduct naturalistic inquiry exclusively on the basis of a total rejection of quantitative methods (Guba and Lincoln (1989)). On the other hand, others have combined naturalistic components (such as participant observation and repeated informal interviews with more traditional questionnaires, and structural interviews to create mix-method designs (Easterby-Smith et al (1991)).

However, one commentator took the view that:

“Naturalistic inquiry” should not be seen as a monolithic entity, but as a “generic” term for many different kinds of qualitative appraisals in which “tools and designs used are very similar” (Fetterman (1986:23)).

On the other hand, another commentator in her contribution to the debate took the view that the term qualitative was broader than naturalistic and offered a definition of the qualitative approach as involving:

“The long-term and first hand study of a case by the investigator for the
purpose of understanding and describing human action in the context of that case. Field methods are used to collect data, including direct observation of action in its natural context, clinical interviews to elicit multiple meanings of participants in that case, and the collection of documents. A qualitative approach leads to reports primarily in the form of words, pictures and displays rather than a formal model or statistical findings” (Mary Lee Smith (1986:38)).

Smith’s introduction of the terms natural context and multiple meanings of participants surely adds dimensions missing in the other formulations which I have not encountered before and suggests a break from conventional thinking about inquiry. Nevertheless, the emphasis remains on methods rather than paradigms. Although I found Mary Lee Smith’s definition to be very interesting and revealing in its perspective on naturalistic inquiry, it is nevertheless, limiting because of its orientation towards methods. Therefore, building on Mary Lee Smith’s arguments, Biklen and Bogdan (1986) offers a more sophisticated definition of naturalistic inquiry because of their emphasis on both methods and paradigms. According to them:

“Naturalistic methods can be used in two ways. First and less forcefully, they can be used as techniques in a study that has not been framed from a naturalistic perspective. Second, the evaluator conceptualises the study around what we call “thinking naturalistically”. That is the evaluator approaches reality as multilayered, interactive, shared social experience that can be studied by first learning what participants consider important. In this case the first days in the field are spent learning how participants think about and conceptualise issues” (Biklen and Bogdan (1986:43)).

Thus, from a cursory glance, of the above definitions, it seems clear that the two authors have identified two distinct modes of working with naturalistic approaches as a collection of tools and techniques - i.e. the methods level or as a wholly different way of viewing the world: the paradigm level. They further assert that these two distinct approaches:

“Share some common threads when they are applied to naturalistic evaluations. These common threads include collecting descriptive data in the natural setting, with the evaluation serving as the inquiry instrument;
focusing on “educational issues as they are perceived and experienced by people and utilising and inductive process that focuses and narrows as the evaluation proceeds” (Ibid).

Thus, when naturalistic methods are used simply as techniques, they nevertheless have many properties that are also typical of the approach in which the evaluator thinks naturalistically. Hence, it is hardly surprising that there exists wide spread confusion about whether the term naturalistic denotes technique or paradigm, although many more people adhere to the former than the latter viewpoint. It is possible to used naturalistic techniques alone or as part of a multi-method study, without stirring from the limits of the positivist paradigm (Easterby-Smith et al (1991)). Thinking naturalistically, however, requires a paradigm shift of revolutionary proportions that, once made, inevitably changes both the meaning and practice of evaluation in similarly revolutionary ways. Despite the definitional problems associated with naturalistic inquiry as demonstrated above; I have, nevertheless, been persuaded by the arguments presented by Biklen and Bogdan (1986) with their emphasis on methods and paradigm shift. As a consequence, I have adapted some of their ideas where possible in the process of conducting this study. Therefore, to complement this definition, it would probably be helpful to draw some comparisons between the conventional and naturalistic inquiry paradigms by examining some of their basic beliefs and assumptions in order to give the reader some ideas about my own thinking. Hence, the next section will focus on making these clear distinctions between the two paradigms.

CONVENTIONAL VS NATURALISTIC PARADIGMS: BELIEFS & ASSUMPTIONS

The main reason for making direct comparison between the two paradigms is in no way intended to expose any potential weaknesses of the conventional paradigms; nor should it be construed as a deliberate attempt to become embroiled in what Nathaniel Gage (1989) described as the “paradigm wars”. On the contrary, the aims are threefold: firstly, to provide the reader with a better understanding of my own thinking in relation to the concept of the naturalistic paradigm. Secondly, to highlight the ways in which it differs and even conflicts with the conventional approach. Thirdly, to emphasise the salient points about the two approaches. The
term conventional or scientific inquiry will be used in a generic sense to incorporate positivism (which is both “reductionist and deterministic”) (Hesse (1980)). Conversely, the term naturalistic is used also in a generic sense as suggested before to represent a particular brand of qualitative study which incorporate elements of subjectivity, hermeneutic and constructivist philosophy.

In elaborating on the comparisons between the two paradigms, the focus will be on exploring the basic, beliefs and assumptions governing the following three principles: their ontological, epistemological and methodological perspectives in the context of the conduct of research. From an ontological perspective, the conventional approach asserts that there exists a single objective reality “out there” that is independent of the observers interest in it and which operates according to immutable natural laws, many of which take the form of cause and effect. According to the one commentator:

“truth is defined as that set of statements that is isomorphic to reality” (Erlandson et al. (1993)).

On the contrary, naturalistic inquiry asserts that there exist multiple socially constructed realities, which are ungoverned by natural laws. Unlike the other paradigm, “truth is defined as best informed and most sophisticated construction on which there is consensus. Given these two distinct ontological positions, it is hardly surprising that their concept of truth is fundamentally different. Consequently, their differing views about the nature of reality would inevitable impose some constraints on how the epistemological question is answered in both cases. For example in the case of the conventional approach, since it assumes that there is a “real” world, then what can be known about it is “how things really are” and “how things really work”. Then it follows that only the questions that relate to matters or real existence and “real” action are admissible. Given this scenario, it would seem entirely appropriate to suggest that in addressing the epistemological question, the knower is likely to maintain a posture of objective detachment, free from any value assertions in order to be able to discover “how things really are” and “how things really work”. Expressed differently, the conventional inquirer makes a conscious decision to stand at an objective distance preferably to use the analogy under laboratory conditions behind a sterile screen, to avoid contaminating the research.
Therefore, from a research perspective, the inquirer should not have any impact on the outcome.

Conversely, the naturalistic inquirer, starts from the premise that he does not accept this subject-object dualism, because he believes that the inquirer and the “object” of the inquiry are interlocked with the resultant findings of the investigation being the literal creation of the inquiry process. This particular theme has been commented on by a number of social scientists, for example, Schwandt (19945:132) claimed that:

“We can reject the bid to make sense of the conditions of our lives without claiming that either inquirer or actor is the final arbiter of understanding”.

Reason and Rowan (1996) have also denounced this subject versus object dualism" in research involving participative human inquiry.

On reflection, I am somewhat sympathetic to those authors who challenge the apparent artificial separation between the subject and the object of the research for the following reasons. Firstly, I have been a change practitioner in the BBC at the forefront of implementing organisation change for the last 11 years, where I had first hand account of the staff concerns about the way the change was implemented. Moreover, I have also benefited from the change and also suffered from it at the same time, especially during the period when our department was closed down and most of the staff were made redundant. I have also experienced on numerous occasions, the staff’s hostility towards me with regards to the change programme in over 200 seminars, which I led on organisational change. The staff often saw me as a legitimate target to challenge because I was perceived as being a “mouthpiece” of the Board of Management and its policies. Therefore, having experience of the change programme over a period of six years, it would be somewhat misleading of me to give the reader the impression that I can remain totally objective in conducting this study.

Despite my best efforts, I found it was virtually impossible to suppress my own subjective feelings, values and prejudice about the change process in the BBC. Therefore, it is difficult for me to conceive how the study could be conducted without my own values having an impact on it, despite the claims of conventional inquiry on this point. Furthermore, as a naturalistic enquirer, I consider myself to be
an integral part of the research tool and would therefore use my tacit knowledge and understanding of the organisation, my six senses and experience to influence the nature of the research. In addition, the research will be conducted in its natural context (ie. the Organisation). This is the direct contrast to the other paradigm, which asserts that the study should be conducted under laboratory conditions to avoid contaminating the findings.

In addressing the question of generalisation of the findings in research, the conventional inquiry asserts that such finding could be universally applied across all organisational settings (Eisenhardt (1995)). On the contrary, naturalistic inquiry asserts that the research findings are unique to its context. Therefore, it is left to the reader to be vicariously responsible for making implicit or explicit links to his own organisation, if he feels that it resonates with his experience. However, in relation to the hypothesis debate, conventional inquiry often starts off with a hypothesis, which the researcher then seeks to prove or disprove. Conversely, the naturalistic inquirer does not necessarily commence his research with any a priori assumptions, hypothesis, or hypothetico-deductive logic. Glaser and Strauss (1967). Some of its exponents such as Corbin (1994) and Erlandson et al (1993) have recommended that the researcher should commence the process with a series of broad questions, which becomes more focused and specific as the research unfolds.

In addressing the question of validity, the conventional approach, places great emphasis on replicability (Miles and Huberman (1994)). That is given the same conditions, the results of the research should be able to replicate itself over and over again (Van de Ven and Poole (1995)). The exponents of naturalistic inquiry approach do not entertain the thought of validity as expressed by the other paradigm. In contrast, they lay greater emphasis on what they regard as authenticity criteria (Guba and Lincoln (1989)). One way to accomplish that goal is by means of the concept of “member checking” process where all the respondents in the study were given the opportunity to critique each other’s construction and make the necessary changes before the final report is written. Subsequently, if they all endorse this report, then from a naturalistic perspective, that is all that matters because, the constructions are a “true reflection” of their perceptions of the study’s findings (Denzin and Lincoln (1994)).
This particular point is also linked to the earlier debate about the concept of "truth" from both perspectives. Thus, without trying to re-run the debate here, suffice it to say that, from a naturalistic perspective, I see the role of the inquirer as an investigative journalist whose aim is to investigate the story in the organisation of choice. Although, he may have his own biases and preconceptions his task will be to tell the story through the lens of the staff who work for the organisation. The relevance of this point is to demonstrate the difference in depth of findings between the two paradigms, although, I must hasten to add that both approaches are perfectly valid. Hence, from a personal perspective, the concept of the researcher being cast in the role of an investigative journalist seems very appealing to me as opposed to the conventional inquiry for the following reason. The BBC has conducted a number of researches in recent years about the staff's perception of the change process, using conventional inquiry methodology. The staff surveys of 1993 and 1994 are typical examples of this particular approach. Therefore, as a change practitioner and a researcher as an insider, I felt that the data collected in this research were excellent in providing a general overview of what the staff felt about the change process. However, I felt that the data collected were too general and did not offer scope for further probing of the results in order to understand what the staff meant by some of the statements made in the findings. On the contrary, I feel that naturalistic inquiry as described above allows me the unique opportunity as an investigative journalist to probe deeper and deeper into the comments made by the research participants to gain a deeper understanding of what lies behind their thinking. This is analogous to the peeling of several layers of an onion, which in turn enables the individual to get closer to its core. The essence of this particular anecdote is not to discredit the conventional approach by any means; but to demonstrate the differences in emphasis in the research.

Finally, in relation to the debate on methodology, the conventional inquiry endorses the exclusive use of quantitative methods such as experimental and quasi-experimental means of collecting the data for research (Miles and Huberman (1994)). Conversely, some naturalistic inquirers tend to us a variety of mix-methods such as semi-structured interviews, participant observations and questionnaires (Denzin (1994)). However, there are others who would rule out the use of
quantitative methods altogether and opt for the hermeneutic dialectic process for gathering the data (Rowan and Reason (1996)).

The hermeneutic dialectic process is crucial to the naturalistic inquiry methodology, but before elaborating on it, let me conclude this section by providing a summary of the salient points from the debate about the two contrasting paradigms. This is presented in the form of a table 4 on page 149 to act as a quick reference guide to the reader. The main areas highlighted are in areas of basic beliefs and assumptions in the ontological, epistemological and methodological areas.
Table 4 - Comparison of the Conventional vs. Naturalistic Paradigms (Basic beliefs and assumptions).


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>REALISTIC (CONVENTIONAL) PARADIGM</th>
<th>NATURALISTIC (CONSTRUCTIONIST) PARADIGM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TRUTH</td>
<td>Isomorphic to reality Miles and Huberman (1994)</td>
<td>Story of most informed respondents Erlandson et al (1993)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 also illustrates the respective positions of the paradigms and the way their different positions are presented in order to demonstrate the type of responses to the ontological, epistemological and methodological questions. The key points are organised in a horizontal fashion under the three main headings so that the reader can see at one glance which assumptions or beliefs corresponds to one another in the opposing paradigms.
Thus, in summary the debate above suggests that the differences in the paradigm assumptions cannot be dismissed as mere "philosophical differences" implicitly or explicitly because their respective positions appear to have important consequences for the practical conduct of inquiry and the interpretation of findings and policy choices. As a consequence, naturalistic inquiry, despite its lack of universal definition symbolises a paradigm shift away from the conventional inquiry, for the reasons already given above. Moreover, crucial to the process of naturalistic inquiry is the concept of the hermeneutic dialectic process and this will be the focus for the following section.

THE HERMENEUTIC DIALECTIC PROCESS

The term is used because it is interpretative in character and dialectic because it represents a comparison and contrast of divergent views with a view of achieving a higher level synthesis of them all, in the Hegelian sense. The aim of this process is to try to develop joint constructions of the respondents as far as possible. It is in no way intended to justify one's own constructions or to attack the perceived weaknesses of other participants constructions; but to form a connection between them that allows their mutual exploration by all parties. At no time will any attempt be made to engineer consensus, where it is evident that clear differences exist. However, at the beginning of the process, the first respondent will be selected for convenience or other salient reason, to offer his/her personal constructions about the entity being studied. Some commentators have suggested the use of "purposive" or "theoretical " sampling as a means of selecting respondents for naturalistic inquiry (Patton (1990)). Therefore, the same principle would be used throughout the process.

Once the first respondent is selected, he would be asked a series of the questions about his job, department, directorate, location, years with the BBC, the warm-up questions and research questions including ones about his claims, concerns and issues about the change process. (A claim is any assertion that a stakeholder may express which is favourable to the change process; a concern is one, which is unfavourable to it and an issue is any state of affairs about which stakeholders may disagree). However, I hasten to add that different stakeholders will harbour different claims, concerns and issues and it is the task of the researcher to discover them
them and to address them in the research. During the interview with the first respondent (subsequently referred to as R1), permission would be sought to record the interview and complement this with detailed note taking. At the end of the first interview, a summary would be made of my notes and it would be ‘member checked’ by the first respondent R1, for on its accuracy. Extra care would be taken to maintain confidentiality and anonymity of each respondent especially in circumstances where the issues were either very important or politically sensitive. Revealing the individuals identity might leave them exposed and vulnerable to repercussions by the organisation. Pseudonyms would be used to reinforce this point where necessary.

Once R1 endorses my analysis of his comments, this would be recorded on the chart in figure 19 on page 154 as C1 (denoting his own constructions). Having completed the first interview, R1 will be asked to nominate another respondent who had a completely different view from him. This respondent will be referred to as R2 and the same process will be repeated as before, while taking full care to offer reassurance about confidentiality and maintaining his anonymity. Once the interview is completed, a summary of his comments will be fed back to R2 to check for accuracy and to make the necessary changes where appropriate. The next step in the process involves feeding back R1’s own constructions i.e. (C1) without revealing his identity and asking him (R2) to critique it, then his responses will be recorded as construction (C2). Once more, R2 will be asked to nominate respondent (R3) who has a different perception of the change process to him. This person will be referred to as R3 and the same process as before will be repeated as before. Once this is obtained, R3 will be asked to critique his predecessors’ constructions i.e. C1 and C2, then again his responses will be recorded, but as C3. This particular method of “member checking” for accuracy and constant comparative analysis is endorsed by Corbin (1994) and Eisenhardt (1989). This sequential process of interviewing the prospective respondents will be repeated over and over again until the subsequent respondents have nothing new to say or I feel that most of their comments have been mentioned before. This is what Patton (1990) refers to as saturation maturation. Therefore, it is difficult to stipulate precisely how many respondents should be interviewed at the start of the process. It is only when the research gets to that point of saturation he will decide to call a
halt. However, the research should not necessarily end there, but the researcher could widen the field to seek new respondents whom he thinks have something new to contribute to the study. The same process will be repeated as before, and this new circle of respondents are depicted in figure 19 with Rn as the first respondent in the new circle and Cn refers to his construction. The successive respondents and their constructions will be referred to as Rn2 and Cn2 etc. until the point of theoretical saturation is reached again (Eisenhardt (1995)). The researcher could also explore other possible avenues for new data. For example; official documents, literature review, memos and archival data and personal observations (Denzin (1987)). The aim is to ensure that wide cross-sections of the stakeholding groups are allowed to contribute to the process (Carnall (1995)). Throughout the entire process, the nature of the interviews will be more focused and more pointed questions will be asked in order to focus the research (Marshall and Rossman (1989)). Finally, my own etic (outsider) construction will be introduced and treated with the same degree of criticisms, integration or expansions as the other members of the circle’s constructions. As the process is allowed to continue through a series of iterations and reiterations the participants will be brought together to try and negotiate to see if they could reach a higher level of joint constructions. The final outcome will be to produce a ‘case report’, which will be initially circulated among the respondents for their comments before final submission for the thesis. This particular report is not a depiction of a ‘true’ or ‘real’ state of affairs. It does not provide a series of generalisations that might be applied in other settings that can be presumed to be drawn from the same population of settings. It is definitely not the investigator’s own construction; it does not culminate in judgements, conclusions, or recommendations except in so far as these are concurred on by relevant respondents.

Figure 19 on page 154 provides a summary and a graphic illustration of how the inquiry could be conducted via the hermeneutic dialectic process. R1 represents the first respondent to participate in the cycle, and R2 indicates the second respondent. This process is to be repeated sequentially from R1 - R8 Until the point of theoretical saturation, where no new evidence seems to be emerging. Simultaneously, the construction of the R1 is depicted on the diagram as C1. This
pattern is repeated as above from C1 - C7 Under the same principle until no new data seems to be emerging.

The 'n' represents an extension of the circle to include new respondents. Therefore, Rn represents the first of the new extension of respondents to the circle and Cn represents its construction. This circle was to be allowed to expand to accommodate new respondents until no new evidence was to be found or the research had come to a deadlock where the respondents were unable to reach any consensus because of a divergence of views.

Throughout the process, any extra information gleaned from various sources such as literature review, memos, official documents, observations will be used together with the inquirer's own constructions in order to enrich and enhance the different constructions. They are represented in the diagram outside the external circle.
The Hermeneutic Dialectic Circle

(Adapted from Guba and Lincoln 1989)

KEY
R = Respondent
C = Construction
N = Extension of Circle

Observations from using 6 Senses

Inquirer's etic construction

Other Circles
Official Documents

Literature Review information

Time
However, before embarking upon the conduct of a naturalistic inquiry, some of its leading exponents have stipulated that four caveats or entry conditions must be met before the researcher enters the field. Therefore, these conditions are explained below.

THE FOUR CAVEATS FOR CONDUCTING NATURALISTIC INQUIRY

The exponents of the naturalistic inquiry approach have identified four caveats or entry conditions, which they regard as absolutely crucial for the conduct of the study. They are as follows: natural setting, human instrument, tacit knowledge and qualitative and quantitative methods. These pre-requisites, or entry conditions, are illustrated in figure 20 on page 156. The natural setting is depicted on the periphery of the figure to indicate the parameters of the specific environment in which the research is to be carried out. Furthermore it is presented as a "box", with the assertion that once the researcher enters the environment and climbs into it, his task is to open it up and try to understand what is inside. The other three entry conditions are presented as interlocking circles to indicate their mutual interdependency upon one another. Therefore, none of these variables should be considered in isolation, but must be seen as an integral part of the research process. Let us now elaborate more fully on each of these entry conditions, which are regarded as necessary prerequisites for conditioning naturalistic inquiry.
Adapted from Guba and Lincoln (1989); (1990) and (1994); Erlandson et al (1993); concept of preconditions for entry.

A natural setting is often chosen in naturalistic inquiry as opposed to a laboratory environment, because its proponents felt that it was more relevant for this particular purpose. Guba and Lincoln (1989:175) said:

"If multiple realities are assumed, and they are dependent on time and the context of the constructors who hold them, it is essential that they be carried out in the same time/context frame that the inquirer seeks to understand".
Second, the human instrument is preferred for this particular method, because of the assertion that:

"The naturalistic inquirer initially would enter the field as a learner, not claiming to pre-ordinately know what is salient; consequently, the inquirer may be faced with the prospect of not knowing what he does not know. However, in order to ascertain what is relevant under these conditions requires an instrument, which is versatile".

Therefore, as the authors suggested that:

"human being, however imperfect is nevertheless virtually infinitely adaptable and capable of meeting the specifications we have just outlined" (Ibid.).

Third, the naturalistic inquiry paradigm asserts that:

"while qualitative and quantitative methods can be used, qualitative methods are generally preferred, primarily because they allow for thick data to be collected that demonstrate their inter-relationship with their context"


For example, when using qualitative methods human beings may collect data through a variety of means: archival documents, memos; even, quantitative methods such as questionnaires and attitude surveys to complement the method of collecting the data for the project; and lastly, from the naturalist point of view, "tacit knowledge" (i.e. all that we know minus all that we can say). The latter (all we can say) is prepositional knowledge and is highly recommended. In essence, they believe that tacit knowledge, like values, intrudes into every inquiry whether or not the investigator recognises that fact or is willing to own it. Therefore, from a naturalistic point of view the application of such knowledge is not a problem as far as the research is concerned. In addition to fulfilling those four conditions, the naturalistic inquirer must have a clear idea about the research process, since this often dictates the focus and direction of the study. Therefore, figure 21 on page 158 provides an overview of that process with its four key elements: purposive sampling, Inductive Data Analysis, Grounded Theory and emergent design.
Figure 21  The Naturalistic Inquiry Research Process

Adapted from Guba and Lincoln (1989)
conditions under which it is pronounced or minimised, its major consequences, its relation to other categories, and its other properties”.

However, before one gets too carried away about the constant comparative method as espoused by Glaser and Strauss (1967), it would probably be worth noting that firstly, they pointed out that these authors never made any claims to working within the naturalistic paradigm. In fact, they were more concerned with prediction and explanation of behaviour. Secondly, they used the constant comparison method as a vehicle for deriving grounded theory, and not as a means for processing data. Therefore, for the purpose of this research some refinements will be made to this concept in order to spell out the steps that might be taken in analysing the data. Thus in doing so, the author has followed the guidelines of Guba and Lincoln (1985), who identified two sub-processes which they referred to as “unitising” and “categorising”.

Unitising, in the context of naturalistic inquiry, refers to the units of information, which serve as the basis for defining categories (Spradley (1979)). However, implicit in definition are two key factors. First, it should be heuristic (i.e. aimed at enhancing understanding or requiring the researcher to take some form of specific action. Second, the information, no matter how small, should be capable of standing by itself or being interpreted without the need for further information.

The unit may be a simple factual statement. For example: in the context of this study, the respondents in the BBC may claim that the introduction of business units with the advent of “Producer Choice” meant that each business unit was required to “break even” at the end of the financial year or face the threat of closure and redundancy. Likewise, it may be as much as a paragraph. For example: Respondents believes there are two reasons why programme makers are opposed to the change programme in the BBC.

- Because they see it as completely pointless and an attempt to curb their creative talents.
- because they believe that the BBC is a unique public service organisation and that it is impossible to set hard financial and business targets as one would in private company where the emphasis is on making tangible outputs.
So, as indicated earlier, these units are available from a variety of sources viz: observation, interview notes, documents and records, non-verbal cues etc.

Once the unit is identified, the analyst may choose to record it on an index card. During the early stage, all data is treated as useful; however, as time progresses certain refinements may be made to it in the light of new evidence being made available. The reason for not discarding any information in the initial stage of the process is because information may be hard to retrieve once discarded. Some proponents of naturalistic inquiry, who include Stake (1994) and others, have offered the following guidelines for indexing and coding the data. They suggested that each index card should be coded on the back where it is not immediately evident to the reader. These may include the following:

- A designation for a particular source (interview notes, annual report etc) which indicates the source of the information.

For example, 1-2A might indicate interview respondent number 1, page 2, paragraph B of the interview notes.

- a designation for the type of respondent in order to ascertain whether the cards represents a particular category of staff (e.g. heads of department, middle managers, supervisors, engineers, operational staff)

- designation of site (by location e.g. Elstree, Television Centre, Broadcasting House, or White City)

- Finally, a designation for the particular data collection episode during which the unit was collected, e.g. SV-6, could indicate site visit 6, PI-6 for panel interview etc.

The above process is likely to be time consuming and labour intensive, because of the nature of the inquiry, but as time progresses and the research becomes more focused the difficulty would be much reduced. In the final analysis, the quality of the final report may be a reflection of the time and effort the researcher is prepared to invest in the process.

Once the data is “unitised” along some of the lines suggested above, the researcher is now ready to begin the process of “categorising”. The aim is to try and establish the index cards into provisional categories that relate to the same
content; to devise rules that describe category properties. The process of sorting out the respective cards can take many forms. They could be organised around certain topics, key themes or central questions (Hartley (1997)). Then the data needs to be "interrogated", to see how far they "fit" or fail to "fit" the expected categories (Strauss and Corbin (1990)).

Initial interrogations of the data may lead to unexpected or unusual results, which may mean that the categories need refining or that the event needs to be interpreted in a different way. Questions lead to further questions. All the time the researcher is alert to the possible presence of disconforming data and the existence of paradoxes and contrasts (Hartley (1997)). These may be welcomed (however inconvenient) as indicating that further theory building needs to occur. Eisenhardt (1989) counsels that the writing up of the research should provide enough evidence for each construct used to allow readers to make their own assessment of its fit with theory. Analysing the data is further enhanced by reference to the existing literature and using this to raise questions about whether the researcher findings are consistent with or different from extant research.

Once the inductive data analysis process is established, the researcher is now in a position to commence his "grounded theory" along the lines suggested by Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss (1987). This particular method of theory building follows from the data rather than preceding them and is a result of the naturalistic paradigm which asserts the existence of multiple realities and that generalisation is context specific, rather than being universally applied to all organisations. Glaser and Strauss (1967:3) define grounded theory as one "that will fit the situation being researched, and work when put into use. By "fit" we mean that the categories must be readily applicable to and indicated by the data under study; by "work" we mean the they must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the behaviour under study.

Thus, grounded theory is not nomologically deductive (Ford (1975)), but patterned; it is open-ended and can be extended indefinitely; and it is discovered empirically rather than expounded a priori. Hartley (1997) points to its cyclical nature and the "constant comparison" that is made of interpretations emerging from analysis of a
particular theme or category with the original contextual data. According to Strauss (1987:21) the goal of grounded theory is:

"to achieve a point of 'theoretical saturation' where additional analysis no longer contributes to discovering anything new about a category".

The final part of the process involves the concept of "emergent design" which is a term used to describe the fact that the researcher does not have a clear idea at the start of the process. However, as the research process unfolds and his knowledge and understanding of the field being studied increases, he will be in a better position to impose more focus and structure on the project.

This process is recycled over and over again, in some cases even retracing the original steps until consensus is achieved. However, if consensus cannot be reached the process will highlight areas of difference where further negotiation is required.

The culmination of this dialectic process ends with the production of a case report, which is a joint construction of all concerned. It is not a depiction of a "true" or "real" state of affairs. It does not provide a series of generalisation that might be applied to other settings that can be presumed to be drawn from the same population of settings. Moreover, it is not the inquirer's own construction, nor a series of recommendations, judgements or conclusions except in so far as these are concurred with by other respondents. The case reports is characterised by a thick description that not only clarifies the all-important context but that makes it possible for the reader vicariously to experience it.

Thus in commenting on the case report, one commentator took the view that researchers expect their readers to comprehend their interpretations but to arrive as well at there own. Stake (1994: 243) commented that:

"the methods for casework actually used are to learn enough about the case to encapsulate complex meanings into a finite report but to describe the case in sufficient descriptive narrative so that readers can vicariously experience these happenings, and draw their own conclusions".
SUMMARY

The aim of the above section was to present a general overview of the naturalistic inquiry methodology to assist the reader with a more in depth understanding of how the methodology could be applied in practice, in the following section. Although this has been accomplished, it must be emphasised that the flow chart, Figure 21 on page 158 which provides an overview of the process and its treatment of the various constituent parts should not be construed as orthodoxy or the ideal process. Each study will have its own variation. Producing a design for the methodology has proved to be an enormous challenge indeed, because of the difficulty of trying to depict what is essentially a complex non-linear process in a sort of diagram or figure. Nevertheless, it will serve as a useful reminder to check that nothing has been overlooked. Hopefully, it has provided useful pointers about certain caveats and entry conditions for conducting the study. Above all it, provided a definition and a rationale for adopting it as my preferred choice for studying the organisational change processes in the BBC. However, before going any further, an attempt will be made in the following section to explore some of the practical and theoretical issues and perspectives in case study research. The principal reason for this particular emphasis is largely due to the fact that the nature of my research is a case study based approach. There are also additional reasons for this, but these will be dealt with in the next section.

SOME ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES IN CASE STUDY RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this section is to establish an operational definition of a case study assess some situations where it could be applied, and examine its relationship to theory. Subsequently some of the potential challenges facing the researcher in conducting study research will also be examined.

Case studies have been widely used over the years within sociology, industrial relations and anthropology (Edwards (1992)). They have also been used in studies of organisational behaviour, especially in understanding organisational innovation and change by a plethora of authors such as Pettigrew & Whipp (1991), Leonard-Barton (1995), and Van de Ven et al (1995) to name but a few. However, although
this particular method has been less well developed in the field of psychology, case studies have been significant in understanding both formal and informal processes in organisations. A series of researches has been conducted on technological change by Cassell and Fitter (1992), and Barley (1995). Despite the abundance of practical guidelines in the literature on how to design questionnaires or multi-variate statistical analysis (Miles and Huberman 1994), there appears to be much less information about theoretical, methodical and practical aspects of case studies. However, there are useful contributions made by the following writers: Eisenhardt (1989), Hartley (1994), Yin (1991) and Bryman (1988).

DEFINITION OF A CASE STUDY

One commentator suggested that “a case study research consists of a detailed investigation, often with data collected over a period of time, of one or more organisations, or within organisations, with a view to providing an analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon under study. The phenomenon is not isolated from its context (as in, say, laboratory research), but is of interest precisely because it is in relation to its context” (Hartley (1994)). This definition should not be considered as exclusive to organisations, because it could also be applied to individuals (Abrahamson (1992)). However, the same principle of inductive analysis focusing on processes in their social context, will still apply, but with a somewhat different level of analysis. Yin (1994: 13) suggested that:

“a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are clearly evident”.

Expressed differently, he described it as:

“a comprehensive research strategy with the logic to design incorporating specific approaches to data collection and to data analysis”.

Stake (1994:236) on the other hand offered a different perspective in focusing on cases, which attached to the “naturalistic, holistic, cultural and phenomenological paradigms. He suggested that:

“case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of object to be studied” and compared it with a “bounded system”: - “it has working parts, it probably is purposive, even having a self. It is an integrated system. It is
behaviour patterned. Consistency and sequential ties are prominent. It is common to recognise that certain features are within the system, within the boundaries of the case and their features outside." (Stake ibid.).

Yin (ibid.) was rather dismissive of Stake’s definition and considered it as being too broad because, in his opinion, it tended to treat every study of entities qualifying as objects (e.g. people organisations) as a case study, regardless of the methodology used (e.g. management survey, psychological experiment etc.) (Yin (1994)). His view has been subsequently endorsed by Leonard-Barton (1995) in her own study of organisational change processes, where her main focus was on “how” and “why” questions about a contemporary set of events. (Yin (1984:13)). She argued that the phenomenon being researched always dictates, to some extent, the terms of its own dissection and exploration and concluded that a case study was the logical methodology. According to Leonard-Barton:

“a case study is a history of a past or current phenomenon, drawn from multiple sources of evidence” (Leonard-Barton (1995:40)).

In elaborating on this, she suggested that is a “kind of pattern matching”, which was preferable to starting with a large standardised data set and seeking degrees of freedom. The case study tests “theory with degrees coming from the multiple implications of the theory”. She maintained that a case study approach was the most appropriate in conducting longitudinal research because it enabled the methodology to slice vertically through the organisation, obtaining data from multiple levels and perspectives. However, her reservations about the use of single case study in conducting this research was made evident when she pointed out what she saw as its limitations of generalisability and several potential biases. She opted instead to use multiple case studies to complement the data obtained from the single case method which she deployed in her research on tracking process of technology adoption in three Massachusetts hospitals in the USA (Leonard-Barton (1995)). There is no doubt that issues of validity and generalisability have to be addressed in applying the case study method as highlighted by the dilemma experienced by Leonard-Barton in the above scenario.

However, this particular theme will be dealt with in the latter part of this chapter but let us now consider some of the applications of the case study.
VARIOUS METHODS OF THE CASE STUDY AND RELATION TO THEORY

It is possible to use a number of methods - be they quantitative or qualitative or both, although the general focus seems to be more, on qualitative methods, mainly because of the nature of the questions which are best dealt with by this particular method. Some of the possible choices facing the researcher in this context could be one of an active participant observer where the inquirer is part of the research tool as in the case of Barley (1995). Conversely, the researcher could adopt the role of an objective observer where he/she is distanced from the phenomenon being studied. This is a position, which is normally advocated by proponents of the conventional approach to social science research (Hartley (1989)).

There is a range of other choices open to the researcher. For example, he may choose the unstructured interviews method with a variety of respondents, or use questionnaires to complement detail investigation through observation and interviews (Denzin (1978)). Case studies may also prove to be beneficial to the research in a number of ways. Hartley (1994) identified a variety of applications for the case study. The following represents a synopsis of her suggestions.

Hartley (1994:209-210) claimed that:

"many case study researchers, in their pursuit of the delicate and intricate interactions and processes occurring within organisations, will use a combination of methods, partly because complex phenomena may be best approached through several methods, and partly deliberately to triangulate an thereby improve validity".

Hartley also cited other situations where she felt that the case study could be applied viz: - to provide a theoretical framework for understanding fascinating details about life in a particular organisation. She cited her research in (1980) on the national steel strike and felt that her role as an active participant observer enabled her to observe events as they unfolded which provided her with immediate and rich data, which she could not have possibly gained via the use of a questionnaire. Other examples she listed included building theory from data through the inductive process (Eisenhardt (1989 and 1995)).
Case studies can also be used for exploring issues in depth, in their context, which means that theory development can occur through a systematic process of putting together detailed evidence to generate theory or replicate it. Pettigrew et al (1990) and Yin (1981) likened this to a detective, sifting through the evidence to ascertain which data are relevant in order to build a picture of motive, opportunity and method. (See also Easterby-Smith (1991). Nevertheless, according to one commentator:

"case studies have largely been a minority taste. One reason for this may be that it is a labour intensive method and also it is harder to fit within the standard journal format" (Hartley (1994: 312)).

Therefore, given the widespread application of the case study approach, it may be helpful to examine some of its strengths in the following section.

THE MAIN STRENGTHS OF THE CASE STUDY

One of the main strengths of the case study approach is amply demonstrated by Pettigrew et al (1990) in their research on strategic change in the commercial banking sector and the National Health Service. They illustrated how the comparative case study approach enabled them to study the change in a processual, contextual and temporal manner over a period of time (on a longitudinal basis). They were able to also study the change processes at a "multi-level" layer of analysis. This makes the case study approach more advantageous over the survey method, because it is much harder to ascertain what process lies behind the correlation in the case of the latter.

The case study approach may also be more useful in capturing the ebb and flow of organisational life especially where the pace of change is unrelenting. Conversely, a survey may be too rigid to capture this particular dynamic pattern. Third, as suggested earlier, case studies are ideal for exploring new processes or behaviours or ones which are not yet understood, thereby performing a crucial role in "theory building" or hypothesis generation because of the inductive nature of the process (Eisenhardt (1989)). However, proponents of the inductive method have forewarned that researchers should not go into research with a completely open mind because of the dangers of data overload (Pettigrew et al (1992)). They have entertained the notion of having a "tentative" framework, which may be completely
abandoned, once the research is on the way. The intention is that it will help in the initial stages to provide a little bit of focus and direction to the study (Erlandson et al (1993)).

Case studies may be a very useful method in the case of active participant observation, to enable the researcher to gain access to data such as learning the informal norms, behaviours, and culture of a work unit or organisation. This is something which an objective researcher would be denied access to because his limited visits to the research site may enable him to obtain only snapshots of what is happening at the time of his visit.

This is in sharp contrast to Barley (1995), in his research where he took on the role of an active participant observer. Barley's particular method of longitudinal research represents an example of a researcher who had chosen to conduct his study at a very close distance to the phenomenon being studied. He was quite explicit about his rationale for adopting this approach and was mindful of some of the potential pitfalls even before he started and conceded that:

"I must admit that participant observation is far more likely to be tainted by emotional, social and moral difficulties. To be sure, such problems accompany all forms of research, but they acquire special poignancy whenever researchers decide to use themselves as research tools" (Barley (1995:24)).

Nevertheless, he was determined to persevere with his method. He recounted the great difficulties he experienced from the moment he sought to gain access to the various hospital sites and throughout his entire study, and reflected on how costly the fieldwork was for him in terms of his time, because it took him two and a half years of sustained observation to collect the data. He also learnt that his particular method required a high degree of energy, tolerance and commitment to keep going when the research was not progressing as fast as he would have liked.

There was also clear evidence of biases in his study. For example, his admission of "going native". Above all, his approach to that study was "structuralist in orientation and realist in tone" (Van Maanen (1988)). There is no evidence in the research which indicate the participants' view points, it is more weighted to his own formal analysis. Therefore, it would be misleading to give the impression that Barley's
particular brand of ethnography is typical of that type of research. According to some commentators:

"ethnographic methods, relying substantially or partly on 'participant observation', have a long if somewhat chequered career in the social sciences. Scholars identified with a variety of disciplines have employed them in various guises" (Atkinson et al (1994:24)).

This particular point illustrates the great diversity that exists within the field of ethnography and the example above only represents one of its many faces. Nevertheless, case studies may also be useful to enhance one's understanding of the social processes in an organisational and environmental context. Hartley (1994:212) argued that:

"behaviour may only be fully understandable in the context of the wider forces operating within the organisation, whether these are contemporary or historical".

She cited the example of job insecurity among employees and its dynamics and suggests that it be probably best understood when seen in the context at an organisational level. Therefore, from the variety of reasons given above, it seems evident that despite the fact that the case study approach as a research strategy is still a minority taste among social scientists, there are distinct advantages for conducting research using this method.

However, it will be incumbent on the researcher to exercise great care in the design and the process by which he chooses to collect the data. The case of Barley (1995) cited above shows some of the potential dilemmas that the researcher is likely to encounter, when choosing this particular brand of ethnography which involves acting as an active participant observer at a close distance to the phenomenon being studied. It would be helpful to examine some of these challenges facing any researcher in using the case study as a research strategy in conducting naturalistic inquiry.
ISSUES & CHALLENGES: THE NATURALISTIC INQUIRER & CASE STUDY RESEARCH

Any inquirer using a naturalistic inquiry method is likely to encounter a number of problems or challenges in the pursuit of his study. These may range from problems of site selection, which has been well documented in a number of books written by Harris (1991) and Yeager and Kram (1990), to ideas on sample selection by Patton (1990) and Pettigrew et al (1990, 1992), and data collection and analysis (Guba & Lincoln (1989)). There may be other difficulties to do with issues such as generalisability of the research findings and trying to reconcile the role of the researcher as an insider and active participant observer. The focus in this section will be principally on debating the issues of generalisability and the researcher as an active participant observer. This is a deliberate strategy on my part because these issues have far reaching implications for the type of naturalistic inquiry research which I am pursuing. The supporting evidence will be presented in the subsequent paragraphs below. First, the issues of generalisability will be debated then an examination of the role of the relationship between the researcher and the research participants will follow.

GENERALISING FROM CASE STUDIES: THE NATURALISTIC WAY

Once the data collection and analysis has been undertaken, how can the researcher write up his findings in a way which is both insightful of the case and also generalise about organisational behaviour and processes across different settings? According to Hartley (1994:224):

"It is conventional wisdom to say that case studies are weak in their capacity to generalise to other situations. This, supposedly is in contrast to quantitative studies, where it is possible to generalise from the data by the detailed analyses of means, correlation and other methods".

Therefore, by inference, such comments seem to imply that the term "generalising from data" has only one meaning and this could be universally applied in all cases of research findings. However, the aim in this section is to challenge this taken-for-granted concept of the universal applications of research findings to other settings. The position adopted here is not to berate the concept of generalisability per se in
conventional research, but to illustrate that it has a completely different meaning in
the context of naturalistic inquiry.

Some commentators have challenged the traditional concept of generalisability and
have put forward their own alternative suggestions. In responding to his critics,
Stake (1994) challenged the concept of generalisability as espoused by Leonard-
Barton and others. He argued that:

"generalisations from differences between any two cases are much less to
be trusted than generalisations from one. Illustration as to how the
phenomenon occurs in the circumstances of the particular exemplar can be
valued and trustworthy knowledge" (Stake (1994:242)).

He also pointed out what he saw as a contradiction between case study research
methods and practice. In the case of the former, he claimed that they place great
emphasis on scientific generalisations. By contrast, in the case of the latter, he
suggested that the bulk of case study practice focus on naturalistic, holistic and
interpretative dimensions in seeking to develop an understanding of the issues and
context in their particular environment (Stake (1994)).

Donmoyer (1990) makes an even stronger case for rejecting the traditional notions
of generalisability for those researchers in education and human services who are
cconcerned with individuals and the meaning in their lives. He dismissed the
traditional ways of looking at generalisability as inadequate and saw it as merely a
convenient tool for bureaucrats and policy makers who seem to be pre-occupied
with obtaining aggregated numbers about certain social conditions and could not
see the relevance for those researchers who are interested in questions of meaning
and interpretation of individual cases. He suggested that:

"the traditional view of generalisability limits the ability of the researcher to
re-conceptualise the role of social science in education and human services.
In addition, the whole history of case study research in anthropology,
education, sociology and history stands solidly on its merits. In fact the value
of case study is its uniqueness. Consequently, reliability in the traditional
sense of replicability is pointless here”.

Gummesson (1991) also added to the debate on generalisability when he
commented on the point that researchers and consultants may feel the need to
generalise knowledge: researchers in order to develop and test theories, and consultants as means of improving their expertise, and expressed his reservations about the meaning of the concept. He remarked "I have become increasingly dubious of the meaning of "generalisation". It no longer seems so "obvious" that a limited number of observations cannot be used as a basis for generalisation. Nor does it appear to be "obvious" that a limited number of observations will lead to meaningful generalisations". Gummesson (1991:78). He went on to say:

"Generalising from statistical samples is just one type of generalisation. However, it is not general and it is rarely applicable to case study research. Generalisation from case studies are to be approached differently" (Gummesson (1991)).

Gummesson's line of argument was somewhat influenced by earlier comments made by Normann (1970), who suggested that it is possible to generalise from one or a few cases provided that one has a good assertive or analytical language which enables one to grasp the interaction between various parts of the system and its important characteristics. He claimed that:

"The possibilities to generalise from one single case are founded on the comprehensiveness of the measurements which makes it possible to reach fundamental understanding of the structure, process and driving forces rather than a superficial establishment of correlation or cause-effect relationships" (Normann (1970:53)).

He suggests that the case study is an appropriate method of research, which seeks to bring about organisational intervention. It enables a holistic view of a process: 'The whole can be understood only by treating it as the cultural object of the study In this context, case research seeks to obtain a holistic view of a specific phenomenon or series of events!" (Gummesson (1991:76)). He also added that case studies could be of a particular value in the applied social sciences where they can provide practitioners with the tools to implement findings. In this particular context he pointed out the advantages of familiarising the managers with the language in order to aid data analysis from the case findings. In addition he suggested that:

"The conceptual and descriptive richness of the data gathered enables the practitioner to assess for himself the applicability of the findings to his
Glaser and Strauss (1967:1-15) drew a distinction between theory generation and theory testing. They regarded theory generation as an attempt to find creative ways of approaching reality, and the need to be creative and receptive in order to improve one's own understanding. Conversely, they saw theory testing as primarily the concern of mainstream researchers. The central thrust of Glaser and Strauss' method is that theory and models should be grounded in actual empirical observations rather than be governed by established traditional approaches. They questioned the notion that theories and models, which can purport to have some degree of general applicability, based on a limited number of cases. They commented “since accurate evidence is not so crucial for generating theory the kind of evidence, as well as the number of cases, is also not so crucial. A single case can indicate a general conceptual category or property, a few more cases can confirm the indication” (Glaser and Strauss (1967:30)).

According to Gummesson:

"as long as you keep searching for new knowledge and do not believe that you have found the ultimate truth rather the best available the moment - the traditional demand for generalisation becomes less urgent" (Gummesson (1991:85-86)).

This view is also shared by Guba and Lincoln (1994), who suggested that:

"the aim of inquiry is understanding and reconstruction of the constructions that people (including the inquirer) initially hold, aiming toward consensus but still open to new interpretations as information and sophistication improve. The criterion for progress is that over time everyone formulates more informed and sophisticated constructions and becomes more aware of the content and meaning of competing constructions" (Guba and Lincoln (1994:113)).

Nevertheless, some critics have challenged the notion of placing the inquirer in the role of the participant and facilitator in this process, because, in their view, it seems to expand the inquirer's role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and competence. Carr and Kemmis (1986). Thus whilst acknowledging that the close personal interactions required by the methodology may produce special and often
THE CODING PROCESS

The process began with placing a copy of the research questions alongside the computer in order to use as a reference throughout the analysis process. Once this was established I began the process of coding the data by establishing an Index Tree which served as the base data for the findings from the various methods used in the study. (See Appendix L for a detailed breakdown of the way the codes were structured.) Then at the top of that tree I established codes for job position of the respondents.

Table 11 below gives an overview of the different job positions by grades: for e.g. II indicates job position, III indicates codes for senior manager II2 for head of department etc:

Table 11 Showing job position

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(11)</th>
<th>Indicates the job position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(111)</td>
<td>The code for senior managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(112)</td>
<td>The code for head of department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(113)</td>
<td>The code for middle manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(114)</td>
<td>The code for junior managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(115)</td>
<td>The code for admin. Assistants</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next part in coding process of the base data relates to the location where the respondents are based, this is illustrated in Table 12 below.

Table 12 Showing a sample of job location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(121)</th>
<th>(121) Television Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(122)</td>
<td>(122) Broadcasting House</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(123)</td>
<td>(123) White City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(124)</td>
<td>(124) Centre House</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Please see Appendix L for a detailed break on the Index Tree and its base data. Following on from the location codes, I established codes for Directorates, e.g.
(13); Departments (14); years in the BBC (151) = 0-5 yrs (152) = 6-10yrs in the BBC and (153) 10 years plus.

Other additional codes included (2) for measures of perceptions of change; (3) score on perception of change; (4) managerial actions; (5) managerial cognitions; (6) external influences; (7) linking strategy to operational change; (8) outcomes; (9) multiple stakeholders; (10) summary of respondents perceptions; (11) cumulative summary; (12) list of respondents for the one-to-one interviews; (13) document types; (14) questionnaire; (15) description of the BBC; (17) style of Director General and Senior Managers; (18) threats facing the BBC; (19) departments; (20) reasons for morale; (21) morale; (22) acceptance of change; (23) types of personal values; (24) personal values over time; (25) awareness of external threats; (26) reasons for reaction to change; (27) types of consequences.

(See Appendix L re: base data text).

Once the initial codes were established I revisited the findings and the research questions once more, in order to look for patterns, trends and common themes. Subsequently, I created various meta-plans of the higher order level of patterns and trends and established codes for each category. For example, there was a clear pattern from the respondents' comments about managerial actions in relation to the change process. Consequently, I used the original code (4) for managerial actions as mentioned in the previous section then created some extra sub-codes which stemmed from this to indicate the types of managerial actions. Therefore, if (4) refers to managerial actions then (41) refers to efficiency measures (a type of managerial action), (415) refers to a type of efficiency measure (introduction to the contract culture), (416) introduction of the internal market. Table 13 on the next page illustrates this more fully.
sticky problems of confidentiality and anonymity as well as other interpersonal difficulties. I would hasten to add that there is also the potential risk deception on the part of the researcher if he chooses to hide his intentions in his quest to uncover the respondents' constructions. In addition, hermeneutic/dialectic methodology itself provides a strong but not infallible safeguard against deception (Denzin and Lincoln (1994:115)).

Some other commentators have defended the concept of the hermeneutic dialectic cycle as espoused by Guba and Lincoln (1989). They suggested that issues of traditional research should not be ignored but are shown to be inadequate of human inquiry (Reason and Rowan (1996). The authors claimed that 'If we want to develop an idea of validity in new paradigm research we must base it on an interactive dialectic logic'. Reason and Rowan (1996:240). They also argue that from a new paradigm perspective traditional notions of validity are all about methods and not about people, because in their opinion the focus seems to be more about methods and not about people. One of their key concerns is that not much emphasis is placed on questions of "how will I know and how will they know?" They expanded on this by claiming that "we have learned from hermeneutics that method in itself does not lead to knowledge." and continued, "we are clear that inquiry is a particularly human process."(Ibid)

Therefore, in mounting a robust defence of the human inquiry process, they stressed that:

"we should not acknowledge the subjective - objective divide, but we should learn to think dialectically to view reality as a process always emerging through self-contradictory development, always becoming; reality is neither subject nor object, it is both wholly independent of me, and wholly dependent on me. This means that validity must concern itself both with the knower and with what is to be known; valid knowledge is a matter of relationship: Reason and Rowan (1996:241).

Additionally the authors maintained that a dialectic view of truth as becoming must include the notion that there are always emerging possibilities, which are not yet included. A central plank in their argument on the question of validity concerns 'meaning' - understanding and interpretation of phenomena because they wanted
to go beyond a simple description of what we see to develop an exploration which will account for the things that we observe. They commented:

"we must remember above all the map is not the territory, that our explanation of a thing is not the thing itself and we have learned hermeneutics that the only criterion of the rightness of my interpretation is inter-subjective that is to say, it is right for a group of people who share a similar world" (Reason and Rowan (Ibid)).

Finally, Eisenhardt (1989) differentiates between case research, which seeks to build theory and that which seeks to test theory. In her opinion, "one of the strengths of theory building from cases is its likelihood of generating novel theory and that attempts to reconcile evidence across cases, types of data and different investigators, and between cases and literature increase the likelihood of creative reframing into a new theoretical vision". Eisenstadt (1989:546). She went on to dispel what she perceived to be the myths about investigation preconceptions during field research and suggested that:

"the constant juxtaposition of conflicting realities tends to 'unfreeze' thinking and so the process has the potential to generate theory with less researcher bias than theory built from incremental studies or armchair axiomatic deduction" (Eisenhardt (Ibid)).

She concluded her arguments by stressing that theory developed from case study research is likely to have important strengths, such as novelty, testability and empirical validity, which arise from the intimate linkage with empirical evidence. Above all she claimed that her particular approach to theory building is very well suited to new research areas where existing theory seems inadequate. Her main justification for this claim is that besides its independence from prior literature or past empirical observation, she believed that her method was testable, novel and empirically valid because of its close relationship with the empirical evidence.

**THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESEARCHER & RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS**

Burrell and Morgan (1980) have made a very useful contribution to the debate about the nature of the relationship between the researcher and his participants in conducting field research, in their comprehensive distinction between ideographic and nomothetic theory. The essence of their distinction is that the ideographic
approach to social science is based on the view that one can only understand the
social world by obtaining first hand knowledge of the subject under investigation. It
therefore places considerable stress upon getting close to one’s subject and
exploring its detailed background and life history. The ideographic approach
emphasises the analysis of the subjective accounts which one generates by
“getting inside situations and involving oneself in the everyday flow of life.” They
considered the nomothetic approach to social science research as placing greater
significance upon systematic protocol and techniques. It advocates natural science
methods, which rely upon the process of testing hypotheses in accordance with the
cannons of scientific rigour. This in turn is complemented with scientific tests,
surveys, questionnaires etc. (ibid.). Therefore, it could be argued that one’s own
ideographic or nomothetic perspective of the nature of reality could determine the
researcher’s own ontological, epistemological and methodological approach.

Easterby-Smith et al (1993), have endorsed this viewpoint by suggesting that the
first choice is whether the researcher should remain distanced from, or get involved
with, the material that is being researched. They went on to add that the choice is
strongly influenced by one’s own philosophical view about whether or not it is
possible for the observer to be independent from the phenomenon being observed.
The authors claimed that “the traditional assumption in science is that the
researcher must maintain complete independence if there is to be any validity in the
results produced” (1993:33). Although in action research or action science would
argue that it is possible to be objective and independent in conducting research
some positivists remain sceptical about the value of this particular type of research.

Susman and Evered (1978) have pointed out their reservations about action
research and argued that it is bound to be found wanting when measured against
positivist science, where as it is perfectly justifiable from a viewpoint of other
philosophies, such as phenomenology. Easterby-Smith et al (1993). Reason and
Rowan in co-operative inquiry (1988; 1996) identify a clear role for the researcher
in relation to his participants. They adopt as their starting point that, all people have
(at least latently) the ability to be self-directing, to choose how they will act and to
give meaning to their own experiences. They reject the positivist methods of
studying people as if they were objects under the influence of external forces. Their
particular brand of co-operative inquiry not only focuses on participation, or
experiences and explanations of the individuals concerned but also involves them in deciding what questions to ask and what issues are worth researching. Thus the subjects become partners in the research process in compiling their own story. However, it is not uncommon for some qualitative case researchers to call for letting the case “tell its own story” (Carter (1993)). In endorsing this view, Stake (194:23a) said:

“we cannot be sure that a case telling its own story will tell all or tell well, but the ethnographic ethos of interpretative study, seeking out emic meanings held by the people within the case, is strong”.

The choices of presentation styles are many: John Van Maanen (1988), identified seven of these: realistic; impressionistic; confessional; critical; formal; literary; and jointly told. Eisenhardt (1995; 1989) suggests that it is difficult to know from the outset what the issues, perceptions and theory will be. Some of these factors relate closely to the naturalistic inquiry or constructivism of Guba and Lincoln (1989). Their particular paradigm adopts relativist ontology, a transactional epistemology and a hermeneutic dialectical methodology, whose principal aim is the reconstitution of understanding, whereas the traditional positivist criteria of internal and external validity is replaced by trustworthiness and authenticity (Denzin and Lincoln (1994:100)). In the case of constructivism, the inquirer is cast in the role of participant and facilitator in this process, a position that has been criticised by some social scientists on the grounds that it expands the inquirer role beyond reasonable expectations of expertise and competence.

Some naturalistic inquirers have cautioned against the researcher or the inquirer hiding his intention from the research participants, because they consider it to be destructive, and call for openness between those concerned. They also suggested that the hermeneutic dialectical methodology itself provide a strong but infallible safeguard against deception. Thus in mounting an attack on the traditional scientific approach, they claimed that “the received view of science pictures the inquirer as standing behind a one-way mirror, viewing natural phenomenon as they happen and recording them objectively. The inquirer (when using proper methodology) does not influence the phenomenon and vice versa. But evidence such as the Heisenberg ‘uncertainty principle and the Bohr complementarily principle have shattered that ideal in the hard sciences”. (Guba and Lincoln (1994:107)). They
added that even greater scepticism must exist for social sciences. Indeed the notion that findings are created through the interactions of the inquirer and the phenomenon is often a more plausible description of the inquiry process than the notion that findings are discovered through objective observation as they really are, and as they really work (ibid.).

According to Atkinson and Hammersley (1994):

"much thinking about ethnographic methodology in recent years has been based on a rejection of 'positivism', broadly conceived on the view that social science research should adopt a scientific method, that this method is exemplified in the work of modern physicists, and that it consists of rigorous testing of hypothesis by means of data that take the form of quantitative measurements".

These critics have justified their position by claiming that traditional research relies on artificial settings (i.e., experiments) and what people say rather than what they do (i.e. surveys) because it seeks to reduce meanings to what is "observable", and because it treats social science phenomena as more clearly defined and static than they are, and as mechanical products of social and psychological factors. (Ibid.).

Although, the arguments presented so far seems somewhat polarised between what Burrell and Morgan (1980) refer to as ideographic and nomothetic perspectives, it would be improper for me to make value judgements of the two approaches, especially to say which one is better. This problem was highlighted by Denzin's (1992) and Richardson's (1992) commentaries on Whyte's (1955) classic ethnographic study of Boston's North End. Whyte's pioneering study was concerned with documenting various aspects of the lives of the people in the community, especially the "Corner Boys". Boelen (1992) questions the accuracy of Whyte's account on the basis of some recent interviews, though surviving members of the Corner Boys defend the original account (Orlandella (1992)).

Denzin (1992) and Richardson (1992) dismiss this dispute as pointless on the grounds that all accounts are constructions and that the whole issue of which account more accurately represents reality is meaningless. Atkinson et al (1992) has cautioned against positivism. They went on to point out the diverse nature of the field of ethnography and elaborated on the way in which it embraces many
diverse disciplines in the approach to social science research: e.g. Marxism, feminism, social and cultural ethnography, organisation studies. Above all none of these disciplines can claim to have a universal or single philosophical or theoretical orientation that can lay a unique claim to a rationale for ethnography and participant observation. Hence, it shows a picture, which is marked by diversity rather than consensus.

The examples cited below are illustrative of one type of ethnography for the reasons already stated. Barley’s (1995) longitudinal ethnographic research describes his experience of his research on computerised imaging technologies at three Massachusetts General Hospitals. He chose “sustained participant observation” as his preferred method of conducting the study and conceded that:

“participant observation is far more likely to be tainted by emotional, social and moral difficulties when the researcher decides to use himself as a research tool” (Barley (1995:24)).

The author also cited an example of a particular situation during the study where he was asked to intervene in a dispute between two informants in his research study, but chose to remain neutral because as he claimed “I decided that I could not risk compromising my own position as a researcher” (1995:32). He also admitted “by the end of the year I had certainly gone native on several fronts” (1995:27). Thus, in reflecting on some of the lessons learnt from his study, he said that he had learnt some important lessons for future research projects.

Barley’s experience of acting as an active participant observer under sustained observation raises some questions that the researcher would have to face with this particular method. This has particular relevance and implications for the naturalistic inquiry method, which has been adopted for this study. The sorts of questions that need addressing are as follows:

1. How can I, the researcher, avoid allegations of bias, when my roles as an insider and change practitioner are potentially in conflict with each other?

2. How can the inquirer following a naturalistic inquiry method maintain involvement in the research, but remain equally detached at the same time?

3. How can the inquirer avoid “going native” as we saw in the Barley’s (1995) case?
4. What are the perceptions of the respondents of the researcher as an insider?

5. How can the researcher, be sure that the informants perception of him does not affect the type of information that they him?

6. How can the researcher get to the real issue without prejudicing or compromising his own position as a naturalistic inquirer?

7. How can the inquirer build and maintain trust and confidence amongst the respondents?

These questions require the researcher to give some careful consideration as to how they will be answered. The reason for saying so is because the answers given to the ontological question will influence the epistemological and subsequent methodology positions. For example, in the case of naturalistic inquiry, the exponents have emphasised the existence of multiple realities from an ontological standpoint and refuse to acknowledge the subjectivist - objectivist dualism (Stake (1994)). Therefore, from their perspective, naturalists do not seem to be too worried about allegations of bias as implied in the question above. They would argue that the inquirer and the inquired-into are interlocked in such a way that the findings of an investigation are the literal creation of the inquiry process. Moreover, this particular method welcomes the views of the researcher and the respondents, irrespective of how subjective they may appear. These various social constructions of views are reiterated and recycled over and over again through the hermeneutic dialectic cycle leading to increased understanding and greater consensus amongst participants (ibid.).

However, question (2) highlighted the dilemma of the researcher maintaining his active involvement, but at the same time being detached. This is an incredibly difficult problem to solve. Thus, care must be taken to ensure that the researcher does not impose his views over the participants, because all contributions should be treated equally.

As one commentator suggested “Investigators are themselves stakeholders and social contexts and are not neutral or value free in the problems they address, the way they frame them, the data and interpretations they select”. Burgoyne
(1994:189) made the point about the influence of values on the research in human inquiry. They said:

"it is possible to demonstrate that values do impinge on inquiry, so that the safest and most intelligent course is to admit that fact and use it to one's own advantage. Values enter the inquiry because of the personal choices made by the investigator (often in concert with the values of the founder, the sponsor or other powerful stakeholding figure".

They then went on to list a number of other ways in which values impact on the inquiry process. For example, they cited its influence on the researcher's own choice of theory, the choice of paradigm, and the fact that human inquiry has a local value context.

The contribution of Burgoyne (1994) to the debate on the impact of values in the inquiry clearly show that they must be viewed as inevitable and no one should pretend otherwise. However, it is important to be open and honest up-front about these issues, instead of trying to suppress them. Moreover, one could argue that if values provide the basis for ascribing meaning and reaching understanding, then presumably this is absolutely crucial to naturalistic inquiry, for the reasons already stated. Nevertheless, the naturalistic inquirer should not easily dismiss the issues raised in the questions above, but the appropriate measures must be taken to ensure the authenticity of the findings. These issues will be addressed in the penultimate section on the research design, but in the meantime let us consider some of the advantages and disadvantages associated with being the researcher as the insider.

ADVANTAGES & DISADVANTAGES OF BEING A RESEARCHER AS AN INSIDER

One of the advantages of being a researcher as an insider is that having an understanding of the organisation beforehand is likely to give the researcher a 'head start' in knowing what the key issues are, who are the key stakeholders, and the culture of the organisation. Gummesson (1991:12), commented that:

"traditionally academic researchers' pre-understanding takes the form of theories, models, and techniques and generally lack institutional knowledge of the conditions in a specific company, industry or market, endorsed this
point. They have seldom had the opportunity to apply their skills in an actual corporate setting. Most academic researchers in business administration never had a position in a company where leadership, risk taking and responsibility for results are demanded”.

Another related advantage to being an insider as a researcher is that he is able to use his “tacit knowledge” to get to the salient points very quickly, because of his familiarity with most of the organisational issues. However, as an outsider, it would take the researcher much longer to find out who are the key stakeholders and what are the key issues he should be focusing on. A third advantage of being an insider as researcher is that the inquirer is able to maintain “sustained participant observation”. There are some interesting accounts given by Barley (1995) throughout the period of his research in a hospital setting. The benefit of this is that the researcher is able to observe the events as they unfold on a continuous basis and is able to use his six senses to collect and record the data.

This is impossible to achieve if the researcher’s visits are limited to snapshots or periodic visits. He would have missed some issues or events, which may turn out retrospectively to be very important. In naturalistic inquiry, the researcher is advised to record everything as it happens without deciding what is important at the time (Erlandson et al (1993)). Other advantages associated with being an insider are to do with site selection and gaining access to the research site. This is made very easy for the researcher by virtue of being an employee of the organisation. Moreover, in some cases he may even be sponsored by the organisation to do the research. The researcher as an outsider may encounter great difficulties selecting a site and gaining access to conduct the study. He may have to spend a number of months trying to negotiate entry with the main stakeholders. The difficulties of gaining access to the research sites are well documented in the literature.

Hartley (1994:217) commented:

“gaining access is one thing but maintaining it requires continued attention”.

This could be for a variety of reasons such as changes in personnel and the fortunes of the company. (Also see Meyer et al (1995) for a detailed example of how they were constantly forced to change their strategy because of unforeseen events.) Another advantage of being an insider is that using one’s “pre-
understanding" or tacit knowledge of the organisation, one may have credibility with some of the research participants because of a proven track record in the organisation, or his relationship with them may have already been well established. Therefore, it may be very easy to foster the trust and build on that relationship without a great deal of effort. However, the outsider may find it difficult to build that trust in the early stages of the research because it takes time to achieve this. However, as a counter argument, it may be disadvantageous from the insider's perspective, because the respondents may be reluctant to be open and honest in their relationship with him for a variety of reasons. For example, the researcher as an insider may be seen as an agent of senior management or a spokesperson on their behalf. Therefore, there may be some hesitancy or apprehension on their part to trust him in the early stages of the research. Moreover, the participants may be reluctant to reveal their true feelings because of fears that the researcher may report them to the management, which in turn could jeopardise their position in the company. Being an insider can be difficult in other ways. For example, how can he be sure that what he is told by the participants is a "true reflection" of their innermost thoughts? How can he tell whether they are censored or not? These are very difficult issues to grapple with especially in the case of the insider, because respondents are probably more concerned about their own survival in the organisation and may tell the researcher what they think he would like to hear.

In summary, there are advantages and disadvantages to being a researcher as an insider or researcher as an outsider and it would be misleading to claim, one is better. However, the aim was to try and present a reasonably balanced argument so that one can deduce or appreciate the sorts of issues which the researcher would have to address, depending on whether he chooses to be an "insider" or "outsider". Table 5 on page 186 represents a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of being a researcher as an insider as elaborated above.
Table 5  Advantages and Disadvantages of Being A Researcher - As an Insider

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADVANTAGES</th>
<th>DISADVANTAGES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• The researcher may be sponsored by his organisation to conduct the survey. Erlandson et al. (1993)</td>
<td>• Respondents may become suspicious of the researchers’ motives, as an outsider. Easterly-Smith et al. (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• May have already established credibility because of proven track record. Gummesson (1991)</td>
<td>• Observation is limited to periodic visits. Erlandson et al. (1993)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Able to observe &amp; record events as they unfold. Atkinson et al. (1994)</td>
<td>• Respondents may be reluctant to be open and honest with the researcher, for fear of subsequent recriminations. Hartley (1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Building trust and maintaining relationships with respondents may be easy to establish. Stake (1994), Denzin and Lincoln (1994)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SUMMARY

The overall aim of this chapter was to explain and justify the chosen methodology for this study. However, it soon became apparent that a variety of issues needed further explanation before the research plan could be designed. A review of the literature on qualitative research clearly shows how important it is for the researcher to be clear about his ontological, epistemological and methodological positions at the outset of the study. The rationale for this is that they are all inextricably linked together. Consequently, the way the researcher responds to the ontological question would inevitably constrain how he deals with the subsequent epistemological and methodological questions.

Therefore, having established one’s own research position, it was felt necessary to use the conventional paradigm as a benchmark for comparing naturalistic inquiry
basic beliefs and assumptions. The intention was to provide a contextual background for understanding naturalistic inquiry method.

It seems evident from the literature review that doing naturalistic inquiry is not a very straightforward process and can be complex. However, its proponents have shown that they do not preach orthodox rigidity or universality of approach, although they admit to some givens in the design process. There is an obvious reliance on the judgement choices of the researcher in terms of whom he selects to participate in the research, what issues to focus on or what theory he chooses to guide his research. It is reassuring to discover from the literature on naturalistic inquiry methods how versatile it can be in case study research, especially when the researcher’s aim is to adapt it to his own situation. It applies to very grounded situations and at the frontiers of meta-theory and philosophy. It is adaptable to a wide range of situations and issues. Above all it is able to accommodate a variety of different modes of data collection and analysis that are compatible with both theoretical and applied research objectives, and able to combine them together. It has also shown that it is able to accommodate deductive and inductive hypothesis-led and curiosity-led research.

The attractiveness of naturalistic inquiry approach is even more revealing when we consider its relationship with the case study method. It accepts the latter as a suitable means of data collection and analysis, despite the clear differences that exist amongst scientists about how case study research should be designed (Yin (1994)).

The debate above has clearly demonstrated that case study research is a heterogeneous activity encompassing a diverse range of methods and techniques. It covers single case (Barley (1995)) through comparative cases (Pettigrew 1990, 1992 and 1995) and (Leonard-Barton (1995)), many cases (Van de Ven and Poole (1995)), and differing lengths and level of involvement in the organisational functioning. Additionally, it includes both qualitative and quantitative methods of gathering data.

On balance, the different approaches appear to have both strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, I have opted to use some of the methods which complement, naturalistic inquiry and interpretativist ethnographic perspectives as
espoused by a number of writers such as Stake (1994), and Guba and Lincoln (1989) and others which fall within this camp because they accord with my current thinking and the nature of the research I intend to undertake in the BBC.

Stake (1994) suggested that in the initial stages of conducting research along naturalistic and ethnographic lines, the first step is to bind the case and to conceptualise the object of the study. This will be followed by the selection of the phenomena's themes or issues (research questions) to be studied. Having established the above, an attempt will now be made to describe in detail the various steps which I intend to follow in conducting my research. However, for this particular study the main focus will be to use the BBC organisation as the key unit of analysis, then to apply the concept of embedded case design, i.e. multiple levels of analysis within a single case study (Yin (1984)), to look at levels of analysis at a Directorate level.

For this reason the BBC as an organisation has been identified as the main unit of analysis for the study. It is intended to include embedded cases viz Production and Resources Directorates (i.e. at least two cases within the main case), but it does not exclude the possibility of collecting data from other Directorates.

The case studies which I have identified above fulfil the requirements of Barley's (1995) and Van Maanen's (1988) concept of the ethnography of the researcher as the inquirer and research tool conducting the research via 'sustained observation' at close distance in a single site. It also fulfils Leonard-Barton's (1995) and Pettigrew's (1988) concept of the research process that offers both multi-level or vertical analysis, and processual, or horizontal analysis in a substantially contextual and temporal manner and using a combination of methods which included retrospective analysis. Hence, as Pettigrew (1995) suggested, the focus is on 'catching changing reality in flight and in studying long term processes in their contexts, as a return to embeddedness as a principle of method' (1992:92). Moreover the case studies chosen will pursue Eisenhardt's (1989) and (1995) particular brand of theory building, and will be strongly influenced by Gummesson's (1991), Rowan and Reason's (1996), concept of generalisability which have been elaborated above. The next section provides a comprehensive explanation of the research design process.
THE RESEARCH DESIGN PROCESS

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

The overall aim of this section is to explain the process of how I went about applying the case study methodology to studying the process of organisational change in the BBC. Some of the data for this single case study was collected on a retrospective basis because of pressures of time. The BBC, as an organisation, was chosen as the main case study, but complemented by at least two smaller cases (i.e. the Production and Resources Directorates, providing the majority of respondents). However, data was collected from other areas such as News, Personnel and Training. The latter cases complied with Yin’s (1984, 1993 and 1994) concept of embedded cases. (i.e. multi-level of analysis within the single study). This particular concept has been well illustrated by the Warwick Business School “Study of competitiveness and Strategic Change within Major UK Corporations” (Pettigrew (1992)) which was conducted at two levels of analysis: the industry and the firm.

The methodology draws on the work of a number of other researchers who have discussed both the hazards and richness of qualitative data-gathering methods (Miles and Huberman (1984) and (1994) and Van Maanen (1988) and those who have developed systematic and rigorous approaches to developing theory through comparative case study Yin (1984 and 1994), Eisenhardt (1989 and 1995) Leonard-Barton (1995) and others have demonstrated the value of similar approaches by their own field-based case research. In addition, it has adopted some important concepts of the grounded theory approach of Strauss and Corbin (1990) and (1994), where necessary, to enrich the process of theory building. It also incorporated elements of ethnography from Gummesson (1991), Van Maanen (1988) and the powerful arguments about issues of validity and generalisability in their most recent book entitled “Human Inquiry” (Rowan and Reason (1996)).

The particular phenomenon for the study was the organisational change process in the BBC in a “time bounded” period of April 1993 - July 1998, from the internal stakeholder perspective while using a naturalistic inquiry methodology. The reason for adopting this methodology is explained below.
REASONS FOR CHOICE OF METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

The reasons for adopting this particular methodology as my preferred choice for the study of change in the BBC are threefold. Firstly, the attractiveness of the method stems from its flexibility and versatility. Secondly, the emphasis is placed on trying to study the change processes from the internal stakeholders perspective and this particular approach seems rather appealing to me because it resonates with my own experience of working in the BBC as a change practitioner since 1988. Thirdly, the approach is ideographic and does not make any claims to be able to generalise its findings to other settings, except where individuals who read the report, can draw their own conclusions from their vicarious experience. Therefore, the section that follows, provides a detailed plan of how the study was carried out in the BBC.

Although one of the aims of naturalistic inquiry is to try to reach consensus via the process of the hermeneutic dialectic circle, the approach taken in this particular study has been adapted in the light of practical constraints and expediency. However, no deliberate attempt was ever made during the study to engineer any consensus among the re-constructions or ultimate findings, where there were differences of opinions expressed, since the aim of the study was to “tell the story” from the stakeholders perspective without consciously trying to manipulate their views.

Throughout the research the strategy adopted was to maintain the position that the “different people” who participated in the research were likely to have different perspectives and interpretation of the change processes according to their experience, their status in the organisation, their values and the effects of the change on them. Although I have immersed myself in the diversity of the literature, I have constantly refrained from trying to test any hypothesis deriving from anyone in the study. However, as a naturalistic inquirer, it is hoped that one is able to sense which ones seem to make the most sense to the person concerned.

Finally, before going any further, it may be helpful to note that, given my present situation and the pressure to complete the project, I was faced with three stark choices. Burgoyne (1994:196) nicely summed these up. The three possible options which he identified from the researcher’s perspectives are what he termed "point in
time retrospective - longitudinal; and real-time longitudinal research". He described
the "point in time" option as the collection of data at a point in time about a current
phenomenon and cited examples of surveys and questionnaires. In the case of
retrospective-longitudinal option, he described it as the collection of data in a finite
period via accessing memory and records. Webb et al (1991) provides some
helpful guidance about events over a period prior to data collection. In the case of
his third option, "real-time longitudinal research", he described it as following
through a sequence of events and stakeholders' involvement and experiences as
the events unfold.

The three choices have their advantages and disadvantages and none is superior
to the other, but given the pressure of having to meet a tight deadline and sheer
pragmatic considerations, it was decided to combine options two and three.

The reason for choosing option two was that it afforded me a compromise between
the desirability of a longitudinal approach and the convenience of 'point in time'
data collection. However, I was mindful of the potential difficulties and dangers with
this approach. For example, participants may have difficulty recalling historical
data. They may also be selective in what they choose to remember and this may
bias the research. Therefore, a conscious attempt was made at triangulation along
the lines suggested by authors such as Denzin (1978), Jick (1979) and Leonard-
Barton (1995) to improve the sources of information by cross references and
validation of the historical data, focus groups and follow-up sessions. The reason
for also combining this option with the "real-time longitudinal research" was that it
had the potential to yield current satisfactory data to conduct sound analysis as
demonstrated by authors such as Meyer et al (1995). Since one of the aims of the
research was to study a time based process it seemed reasonable to follow the
combined approach as described above.
THE RESEARCH METHODS

The methods used for conducting the study in the BBC follow very closely the process of naturalistic inquiry as described in the early part of this chapter. However, I had to deviate from time to time because of unforeseen circumstances. An overview is presented in Table 6 below to assist the reader.

Table 6: An overview showing details of the research plan. (See also appendix J)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 1</th>
<th>Contracting</th>
<th>1993</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• obtain funding for the research</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• signing a formal contract with BBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Literature Review and discussion of initial research idea with Supervisor</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Submission of final research design</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>Organising research design plan</td>
<td>17/12/97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This involves drafting some 'broad' research questions to be asked during</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the one-to-one semi structured interviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• drafting of pro-forma and covering letter to send out to participants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• permission to participate in the research, both BBC as an organisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and prospective respondents etc</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>Identifying Stakeholders</td>
<td>06/01/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• this involves identifying prospective respondents to participate in the</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>one-to-one interview respondents chosen on purposeful sampling basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Writing 100 letters and e-mail to prospective respondents and 45 follow-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>up phone call. (see appendix G and H) Patton (1990), Pettigrew et al (1990)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>Respondent replies</td>
<td>07/01/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This involves confirmation of dates for interviews and drafting an</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>interview schedule. Table (10)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Drafting of a few broad questions for the one-to-one interviews.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>07- 09/01/98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Testing the feasibility of the research questions and ironing out testing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>problems involving to colleagues.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• individual interviews (10) lasted an average of 2 ½ hours each</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• minor refinements of the questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 8</td>
<td>Conduction of one-to-one interviews semi-structured and non directive</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• a total of 40 one-to-one interviews were held during June July 1998 each lasted 2 hours</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• about 30 broad questions and a few warm up questions were used</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the interviews were tape recorded (tapes subsequently destroyed) or returned to respondents on request</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• out of the 40 interviews only 1 was discarded because it was incomprehensible</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Out of 60 requests only 40 agreed to participate in the interview.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Planned for 20/01/98 but done June & July 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 9</th>
<th>Initial data analysis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the 40 interviews were transcribed and a preliminary analysis was done to get an overall impression of the various perceptions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| July-Aug 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 10</th>
<th>Follow-up Questionnaire</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• follow-up questionnaire was designed with 42 items, based on some of the data from the one-to-one semi-structured interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Out of 60 prospective respondents only 20 replied (out of that 20, I was lost in the data base due to technical difficulty).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Constantly from end of July 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 11</th>
<th>Collating transcribing and analysing the data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 12</th>
<th>Joint constructions of data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the data from the one-to-one interviews were further analysed in tandem with the one from the follow-up questionnaire to identify common themes and joint constructions of the respondents</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| on going July 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 13</th>
<th>A focus Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• This focus group was conducted amongst 15 middle managers from the Religious Department in Manchester. The purpose was to use the data obtained from the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire to test their perceptions against what seemed to be emerging</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sept 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 14</th>
<th>Transcription and analysis group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• The data from the focus was transcribed and further analysed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Sept 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 15</th>
<th>Introduction to the NUDIST programme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• attended training course and later purchased the programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Using NUDIST as a tool for analysis of research data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Inputting the data from the one-to-one interviews, follow-up questionnaire and focus group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>further data analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Nov-Dec 1998 |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 16</th>
<th>Writing draft case report and member checking process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• draft report was made from the one-to-one interviews, follow up</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Nov-Dec 1998 |
questionnaire and focus group and copies sent to 10 respondents from the one-to-one interviews

- 5 from the follow-up questionnaire
- 5 from the focus group for feedback

| Step 17 | Writing up second draft case report \n\draft to supervisor | Jan 1999 |
| Step 18 | Peer review \n>D.B.A presentation to peer group and supervisor | March 1999 |
| Step 19 | Third draft report \n\review of the integration of chapters 2,3,6 and 7 | March 1999 |
| Step 20 | Final case report | March 1999 |
| Step 21 | Completion of thesis | March 1999 |

Table 9 above gives an overview of the various methods used for the study, but it might be helpful to elaborate on this process more fully, starting with the contracting stage.

**STEP 1: CONTRACTING**

The first phase in the process of this research was to seek funding from the BBC once this was accomplished, I then agreed a formal contract with line manager, on behalf of the BBC to protect both parties from compromising its position, if any, of the confidential issue were disclosed to members of the public. This particular action was necessary as it is an essential requirement of the terms and conditions of my BBC contract. (See BBC Managers Guidelines (1996): Section under Terms and Conditions of employment). Moreover, such action was very much in keeping with the recommendations of Guba and Lincoln (1989), when conducting naturalistic inquiry.

The content of the contract included the following headings:

- Name of the sponsor organisation
- Name of the client
• Identification of the entity to be studied

• A statement of purpose of the research

• Authority to interview the staff

• A brief description of the methodology to be used

• Authority to gain access to official records and documents

• A statement guaranteeing confidentiality and anonymity of information sources where possible

• A description of the reporting mode to be utilised

The process of drawing up the contract was fairly straightforward but the overarching purpose was to ensure that I maintained a professional relationship with the organisation whilst taking great care to avoid bringing the BBC into disrepute by unethical practices on my part. It was equally important to ensure that confidentiality was respected with all those who agreed to participate in the study. Above all, it was important that my position and integrity as a serious academic researcher and insider was not compromised at anytime during the study. Barley (1995) and Leonard-Barton (1993) have provided some useful comments on this subject. (See Appendixes F, G, H, I, for a sample of the letter and contract).

Once the contract was drawn up and signed by my line manager, it was subsequently passed on to the Head of Organisational Consulting and Management Development for approval and funding for the project. This was immediately followed by the next step in the process which was concerned with organising the preliminary stages of the research.

**STEP: 2 LITERATURE REVIEW (1994)**

This involved conducting an extensive literature review and discussion of tactics and strategies with my supervisor and mentor.
STEP 3: SUBMISSION OF FINAL RESEARCH DESIGN TO SUPERVISOR (1994)

This step involved a fairly extensive discussion with my supervisor and he approved making the necessary amendments before the final research design.

STEP 4 ORGANISING

This process began with a revision of the original "tentative" research questions, which were derived from the literature review. (See pages 197-199).

The rationale for such action is that, on reflection, my thoughts have altered slightly since the completion of my methodology chapter. It was felt that the questions were too broad and lacked focus. Moreover, my hunch led me to conclude that some of the questions were not naturalistic in their orientation. For example, two of the questions from the list which were framed as follows:

"To what extent do attempts of planned organisational change work in their own terms as suggested by the many in the OD literature?" Burke and Litwin (1992).

The other question asked:

- "How is it possible to achieve successful planned change given the messy nature as suggested in the literature?" Kanter et al (1992), Dawson ET al (1994) has made some telling comments on this aspect of the change literature.

My discomfort with these two questions stems from my belief that they appear to have a normative tone and presuppose that notions of successful change are universally shared amongst both normative theorists and naturalistic inquirers.

It is for those reasons that I finally decided to revise some of the research questions from the original list on pages 104-106. The aim was to select the ones that would help me with the telling the story of the change process in the BBC, through the lens of the staff. As a consequence, I was more interested in the types of questions which I felt were important but which the Burke-Litwin model (1994) was not able to address about individual perceptions in face-to-face context. However, a deliberate attempts was made to avoid the types of questions which had positivistic implications since I was not seeking to make generalisations from my conclusions.
across different organisational establishments only the BBC. Therefore my revised questions are listed below and were used as the basis for the 40 semi-structured, non-directive interviews.

THE REVISED RESEARCH QUESTIONS RE: ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE

VARIABLE (1) - EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

- What were the specific drivers for change in the external environment? Authors who have written on this subject include Burke (1994).

VARIABLE (2) - MANAGERIAL COGNITIONS

- How did the staff feel that the various interventions affected them? The following authors Judson (1991), Noer (1993), Bridges (1995), Caplan and Teese (1997) Ferlie et al (1997) have commented on this aspect of change.

- How did the staff see the change process evolve over time? Pettigrew et al (1990), and (1985a).

- How did the staff view the leadership interventions? Argyris (1991), Harrison (1990), Carnall (1995), Kubler-Ross (1997) are amongst some writers who have made some interesting comments on this aspect of change.

VARIABLE (3) - MANAGERIAL ACTIONS


- What specific corporate initiatives were adopted by the Board of Management to prepare and assist the staff with coping with the change? The number of commentators on this subject includes the following: Bridges (1995), Carnall (1995), Harrison (1990), Argyris (1991), Caplan and Teese (1997), Kubler-Ross (1997).
VARIABLE (4) - LINKING STRATEGY TO OPERATIONAL CHANGE

What is the level of the staff’s understanding of the bigger picture? Wilson (1992) and Lovelady (1984a) have made a useful contribution to the strategy debate.

How were the local initiatives in the staff work place related to the bigger picture? (Mintzberg (1994), Pettigrew et al (1994)).

VARIABLE (5) - ORGANISATIONAL OUTCOMES


What impact did the change process have on the staff? Carnall (1995), Bridges (1995), Kubler-Ross (1997) and Caplan and Teese (1997) have made a useful contribution to this debate.

What is your overall assessment of the change?

VARIABLE (6) - OTHER MULTIPLE STAKEHOLDER INFLUENCE


As a consequence of this revision, I selected the appropriate questions from the above list to help me address the issues, which I felt, were important but which the Burke-Litwin model (1994) was not able to address.

Once these “tentative” questions were drawn up, I made a list of supplementary questions to be used at the beginning of each interview. These warm-up questions were designed to be non-directive and specifically aimed at building relationships and rapport with the respondents by putting them at ease before asking the more focused and probing questions subsequently. (Whyte (1984) and Erlandson et al
(1993)). The types of warm up questions for the one-to-one interviews are listed below.

**WARM-UP QUESTIONS**

- What is your name?
- How long have you been working for the BBC?
- What particularly attracted you to work for the BBC?
- What is your current job title?
- What particular aspects of your job do you like most? Why?
- What particular aspects of your job do you like least? Why?
- How would you describe the BBC as an organisation?
- How would you describe its culture?
- How do you feel about working for the BBC?
- What led you to seek employment in the BBC?
- How would you describe the management style in your work unit?
- How would you describe the Director General style?

Once I sensed that the respondents appeared to have settled down and a sort of rapport was established with them I began to ask the more probing questions which were aimed at helping me find answers to the main research questions.

Throughout the early stages of the research process great emphasis was placed on asking "tentative" questions, even when asking the main research questions. This strategy was very much in keeping with the advice given by some academic researchers and social scientists viz: Guba and Lincoln (1989), Erlandson et al (1993) and Rowan and Reason (1996). The rationale is based on the perception that for certain types of qualitative research it is acceptable to commence the process with general questions if the goal is not to test any hypothesis or to make
generalisations across other organisational settings. If the goal is to enhance understanding from a naturalistic inquiry perspective then the initial broad research questions would become more focused as the research progresses (Erlandson et al (1993)).

Next, I planned a campaign to obtain local consent at Directorate and Departmental level for volunteer respondents to assist me with the study. From my knowledge and experience of the BBC I was aware that one should not assume that because formal consent was authorised at corporate level the respondents at local level would comply. (See appendixes F, G, H and I)

Consequently, I drafted a programme with the following headings:

2.1 A covering letter asking for their consent to participate in the research (see appendix F).

2.2 A form with my name addresses and phone number seeking consent.

2.3 A statement of the purpose of the inquiry, an explanation of my role as the researcher in the process and how the information was going to be collected from him or her. It also specified how the information would be used in future.

2.4 Re-assurance about maintaining confidentiality.

2.5 Measures to be taken to prevent raw data from being traced back to the informant source (if specifically requested).

2.6 Option for the respondent to opt out of the study if he so wished and a promise to return the raw data collected from him if requested.

2.7 Informed the participant that his contribution was entirely voluntary.

2.8 A signed off space on the form for the participant to say whether they had acknowledged having read and agreed to previous stipulations as a condition of signing.

2.9 A space for the date to be provided (see appendix G).
The negotiation of consent was felt to be important in an inquiry for both legal and ethical reasons; given the nature of the inquiry where respondents are asked to bare their soul and this might leave them vulnerable and exposed. Furthermore the respondents may be threatened if their comments become known to their bosses.

Once this part of the preparation was completed my attention was switched to the next step in the process. This involved the identification of internal stakeholders to act as respondents for the study.

**STEP 5: IDENTIFYING THE STAKEHOLDERS (1998)**

This stage involved working out how to identify the key internal stakeholders for helping out as respondents in the study. The concept of the word “stakeholders” have received wide-spread coverage in the latest stakeholder literature by authors such as Freeman (1984), Grundy (1997), Clarkson (1995), Rowley (1997) and Mitchell et al (1997). However, in the interest of brevity and simplicity, I have elected to use the definition of stakeholder as suggested by Guba and Lincoln (1989).

They made three clear distinctions between the various categories of stakeholders. One group is described as “the agents”, which they referred to as those persons involved in producing, using or implementing the change programme. The second category is referred to as “the beneficiaries”, or those persons who profit in some way from the change programme. The third category referred to is “the victims”, or those who are negatively affected by the change programme (Guba and Lincoln (1989)). However, this should not preclude other groupings but as the research progressed it incorporated others in the process.

Thus having established a working definition of the concept of stakeholders, I went about the task of identifying as many prospective respondents as possible to act as interviewees for the one-to-one semi-structured interviews. During that process I used the concept of purposive sampling as suggested by Pettigrew et al (1990) and Patton (1990) as opposed to random sampling to target my potential internal stakeholders for the interviews.
Some of them were chosen on the basis of my prior knowledge of them in my capacity as a change practitioner who often assists in large and small group facilitation on the change process. Colleagues and acquaintances in the BBC recommended the other candidates to me. However, the only thing which they had in common was that it was felt that they would have something interesting to say about the change process in the BBC either because of their positions in the organisation or for some other reasons.

Therefore, once my mind was made up about the methods of sampling and the target audience, I began the process of writing 100 letters and e-mails and made a total of 45 phone calls to a number of prospective respondents asking for their help with the study. Subsequently, only 40 consented to participate in the interviews. Perhaps it will assist the reader if I explain more fully the content of the typical letter or e-mail which was sent out to all the prospective respondents.

**FORMAT OF LETTER**

**INTRODUCTION:** This part of the letter began with a brief introduction of myself. For example, I am Eversley Felix, a Senior Management Trainer and Internal Consultant, currently working for BBC Training and Development. I have been with the BBC since 1988 and my main responsibility in the BBC is to provide all staff with a comprehensive training, development and consultancy service on a corporate wide basis.

Then I explained the purpose of writing to them was as follows:

**PURPOSE:** I am currently a part time DBA Associate at Henley Management College, studying for a Doctorate in Business Administration. My research thesis is entitled "Understanding the Change Process in the BBC from a pluralistic and multi-stakeholder perspective in the time-bound period of April 1993 - July 1998" I stressed that I was particularly interested in trying to study the change process through the lens of individual staff members. I added that my underlying passion was to try and tell the story of the change process from their perceptions without trying to alter it in any shape or form.
Then I explained that the purpose of contacting them was to seek their kind permission to act as one of my interviewees for the study. In addition, I explained how I intended to collect and process the data.

DATA COLLECTION: The prospective respondents were told that, if they agreed to the interview, it would be held on a one-to-one basis between them and myself in a confidential setting and stressed that it was anticipated that the interview would last for about 1 -1½ hours.

CONFIDENTIALITY: I made an un-conditional declaration and commitment to each prospective respondent in the letter that I would promise to maintain their anonymity and confidentiality at all times in order to protect them from being penalised by the organisation or jeopardise their position because of comments made to me during the interview.

MEMBER CHECKING PROCESS: This was explained by stressing that after the interview was completed a brief summary of their comments would be played back to them to check for accuracy and correction of any misinterpretation on my part (Guba and Lincoln (1989) and (1994)). It was also stated that once the series of interviews were completed the findings would be analysed and a report constructed from the “joint constructions” of all those who participated in the interview.

Then, I offered all respondents the opportunity to read the draft report and make the necessary amendments where necessary before its final publication. The contents of the letter also specified how the information from the interviews would be used.

HOW WILL THE INFORMATION BE USED? It was specified that the data collected from the interviews would result in the compilation of a case report which would be submitted as part of my DBA at Henley Management College. Then I explained the potential benefits of participating in this type of research.

THE BENEFITS TO YOU: The benefits were sold to them on the basis that the thesis would form part of a rich database for BBC staff and could be made accessible to anyone for further research purpose or otherwise.
It was also suggested that the prospective participants would be granted a unique opportunity to participate in an existing research project which was unprecedented in the BBC's history. All previous research in the BBC had been quantitative and conducted by external consultants who spent only a brief period in the organisation and could only be restricted to "snapshots" of the organisation at any given moment in time. By contrast, my particular methodology provided both the respondents and myself the opportunity to conduct an in-depth study of the organisation over an extended period of five years at least, because we were employees of the BBC.

The final part of the letter contained a section which sought a written consent from the respondents. The pilot test immediately followed this process.

**STEP 6: CONFIRMING CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THE RESEARCH PROJECT.**

Once the prospective respondents had given their consent to participate I booked an appointment with each one for the purpose of conducting the interviews and drew up a schedule for the one-to-one interviews. Table 7 on page 205 gives an illustration of this interview schedule for one-to-one interviews by Directorates
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SV: Site Visit</th>
<th>Number of Respondents R1 = Respondent 1</th>
<th>Name of Respondent</th>
<th>Directorates</th>
<th>Date of Interview</th>
<th>Time of Interview</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SV= 1</td>
<td>R1.</td>
<td>JB</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 2</td>
<td>R2.</td>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 3</td>
<td>R3.</td>
<td>PF</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 4</td>
<td>R4.</td>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 5</td>
<td>R5.</td>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 6</td>
<td>R6.</td>
<td>GD</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 7</td>
<td>R7.</td>
<td>LK</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 8</td>
<td>R8.</td>
<td>DF</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 9</td>
<td>R9.</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 10</td>
<td>R10.</td>
<td>RK</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 11</td>
<td>R11.</td>
<td>TS</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 12</td>
<td>R12.</td>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 13</td>
<td>R13.</td>
<td>PW</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 14</td>
<td>R14.</td>
<td>HT</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 15</td>
<td>R15.</td>
<td>ES</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 16</td>
<td>R16.</td>
<td>NS</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 17</td>
<td>R17.</td>
<td>DP</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 18</td>
<td>R18.</td>
<td>SN</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 19</td>
<td>R19.</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 20</td>
<td>R20.</td>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 21</td>
<td>R21.</td>
<td>KM</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 22</td>
<td>R22.</td>
<td>RL</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 23</td>
<td>R23.</td>
<td>DI</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 24</td>
<td>R24.</td>
<td>BG</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 25</td>
<td>R25.</td>
<td>TG</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 26</td>
<td>R26.</td>
<td>PD</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 27</td>
<td>R27.</td>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 28</td>
<td>R28.</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 29</td>
<td>R29.</td>
<td>RC</td>
<td>News</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 30</td>
<td>R30.</td>
<td>FA</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 31</td>
<td>R31.</td>
<td>CR</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 32</td>
<td>R32.</td>
<td>IC</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 33</td>
<td>R33.</td>
<td>JC</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 34</td>
<td>R34.</td>
<td>JB</td>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 35</td>
<td>R35.</td>
<td>SA</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 36</td>
<td>R36.</td>
<td>PC</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 37</td>
<td>R37.</td>
<td>TL</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 38</td>
<td>R38.</td>
<td>RM</td>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SV= 39</td>
<td>R39.</td>
<td>NB</td>
<td>Production</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table is a replica of the interview schedule which was used for the one-to-one interviews. (A total of 40 respondents agreed to participate in the interviews).

The interviews were to be carried out between June and July 1998 and each to last for an average of two hours. The aim was to adopt a style for each interview which was scheduled to take place in a private room or setting within the respective respondents department. The respondents who agreed to participate in the study were mainly from Resources, Productions, Personnel, Broadcast and News Directorates. They were geographically dispersed throughout the United Kingdom viz: Scotland and London.

Once some of the internal stakeholders were identified and an interview schedule was drawn up some additional preparations were made before commencing the research. These include a reformulation of the research problems and a restatement of the purpose of the research.

**STEP 7: PILOT: TESTING THE FEASIBILITY OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

Before entering the research field to commence the interviews with the 40 respondents who had given their consent to participate in the interviews I enlisted the help of 10 colleagues to assist with testing the feasibility of the questions. I tried to follow the same procedure as that intended for conducting the naturalistic inquiry. Therefore, a separate interview was booked with each colleague and conducted in a non-directive and semi-structured manner which lasted on average 2½ hours.

After the interviews were completed some minor refinements were made to the questions based on the feedback received from my colleagues. Prior to entering the research sites a note was made of the following: -
(I) The research topic and its purpose

(II) The outcomes

(III) The research methodology
   - naturalistic inquiry
   - hermeneutic dialectical cycle

(IV) The main research questions which the study was seeking to answer

(V) The integrative framework for understanding the change processes in the BBC.

Some additional notes were made to remind myself of my main role in the process as a naturalistic inquirer whose task was analogous to that of an investigative journalist seeking to tell the story of the change processes in the BBC in the "time-bounded" period of April 1993 - July 1998. Throughout the process the goal was to tell the story in a chronological order as events unfolded while avoiding personal interpretations. Therefore, all data from the interviews were to be collected and written down verbatim. I also decided on a common method for indexing the data to be collected in order to facilitate the subsequent process of data analysis from the interviews. Table 8 on the next page gives an illustration of the indexation and categorisation of respondents that was adopted before any research site was visited.
Table 8 INDEXATION AND CATEGORISATION OF RESPONDENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent 1</th>
<th>Name of respondent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Site visit 1</td>
<td>SV1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grade etc Head of Dept = HD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior manager = SM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle manager = MM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior manager = JM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Admin assistant = AA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Department</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directorate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years in the BBC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date of interview</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The particular method of coding by designation for the type of respondent was adopted to enable me to trace the source of the various information collected in order to ascertain the source category, e.g. heads of department, senior manager, middle manager, junior manager, administration assistant. Coding was also used for designation of site by location, e.g. ELS for Elstree and designation for the particular data collection during which the unit was collected e.g. SV1 = site visit 1 and P1 = paragraph 1.

R1, ELS, SV1, P1 is the code for respondent 1, Elstree location, site visit, paragraph one of the interview transcripts.

Other serious considerations were given to the overall framework for assessing the data to be collected from the interviews and the development of a provisional outline about the case study and the story line.

The outline took account of substantive considerations such as:

- What are the problems facing the BBC?
- What is the content of the change programme?
- What is the context or setting for the change?
• What were the transactions between the various stakeholders?
• What saliences were anticipated?
• What lesson did I think I could learn from this study?

In addition, I reflected on three principle methodological considerations viz: - my own position as an inside investigator, the various methods to be used, the trustworthiness measures that would be taken to ensure the authenticity of the joint constructions which ultimately emerge from the research.

After debating the above my position was further clarified and the prospect of conducting the research seemed very exciting at this stage. It was also at this stage in the process that a note was made of the above issues and I recorded my expectations of what I intended to discover during the interviews. The reasons for doing so are two-fold: firstly, to illustrate my own bias, secondly, to provide a way of estimating the openness of my position as an investigator in the context of the study.

The rationale for taking the above actions was to check whether the case report later confirmed my own expectations or the opposite. Moreover, if my expectations were confirmed then one could assume that the degree of openness was highly suspect.

Finally, after reassessing the challenges, which lay ahead of me with regards to the magnitude of the study, I made a desperate last minute plea to ask three colleagues to help with the interviews. As a consequence, I held a three hour meeting with them to explain the purpose, content, process, methodology, aims of the research, the research questions, outcomes, etc.

After a fairly comprehensive briefing, the three agreed to assist with the research interviews. Each one was given a tape recorder, a set of blank cassettes, a set of the “warm-up” and main research questions, a microphone and some spare batteries. We took turns to role-play the interviews and when all seemed confident and competent with the process, I allocated ten candidates to each of these prospective interviewers. A deadline was set for the completion of the interviews. We all agreed to meet once a week to compare our notes and review progress.
We parted on a very positive note but subsequently, only Debbie Prime (MA in organisational psychology) honoured her promise and conducted five interviews for me (interviews numbers 6-11 or respondents R6 - R11, Resources Directorate). In the final analysis we both agreed to meet three times a week to compare notes and to motivate each other. Once the above issues were resolved the process of conducting the research via the hermeneutic dialectic cycle was commenced.

Let me now explain the general concept before discussing in detail how the research was actually conducted in the BBC.

**STEP 8: CONDUCTING THE ONE-TO-ONE SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS (1998)**

Once permission was obtained from the 40 prospective respondents to participate in the interviews appointment dates were confirmed, an interview schedule was drawn up and the research process began in earnest. See Table 7 on page 205 overview of the interview schedule.

I also sought and obtained their permission to record each of the interviews with a tape-recorder. This was considered essential in order to enable me to give each interviewee my individual attention throughout the interview. It also offered me 100% reassurance that I would have an accurate recording of the interview, since that was a key goal of the study. I also asked for permission to make some notes during the interview to aid my memory in the process. Despite some initial reservations all of the respondents agreed to the use of the tape recorder but wanted reassurance that the tape would be destroyed or returned to them in order to avoid it getting into the wrong hands. Once this guarantee was offered to all the respondents, a plan for coding the data was established by myself to assist with the subsequent data analysis. (Table 8 on page 208 provides an overview of the indexation and categorisation of the respondents' one-to-one interviews).

The “warm-up” questions were followed up by the “research questions”. For more details of the list of revised questions see pages 198-200. At the end of the each interview I summarised the main points and asked the respondent to comment on its accuracy. This is part of the member checking, the process to ensure that the notes of the interview are an accurate reflection of the respondent’s viewpoints.
After the interview ended the initial intention was to follow the exact procedure for conducting the study via the hermeneutic dialectic cycle by asking the respondent to nominate another respondent who had an opposite viewpoint to them. However, this was not possible because it was virtually impossible to organise an interview with BBC staff at short notice. It seemed as if everyone was far too busy coping with the daily demands of their jobs in an environment which had been experiencing severe cuts in resources in the last few years. Moreover, some of the respondents were geographically dispersed throughout the United Kingdom and this therefore negated any idea which I had about asking the candidates to nominate a successor. Therefore, it was felt necessary to deviate from the original plan and improvise as much as possible without necessarily compromising the methodology. Consequently, the rest of the 39 other one-to-one interviews were pre-arranged because of practical expedience and convenience.

The first interviewee, who will subsequently be referred to as Respondent 1 or R1, was a middle manager from the Resources Directorate. She was chosen on the basis of purposive sampling, as suggested by Patton (1990), because of her position in the organisation, her availability and a belief that she had an interesting story to tell about the change process in the BBC. Resources Directorate was going through a process of change like the rest of the BBC but it was an interesting mini-case to study for two reasons. Firstly, unlike the rest of the BBC, it was threatened with privatisation. Secondly, its Managing Director seemed to have taken a head start in embracing the change process by enlisting the help of a variety of external consultants to help him implement the change. In the meantime his peers in the other Directorates seemed to have been moving at a much slower pace.

Prior to the commencement of the interview with R1 a note was made of my expectations with the view of making comparisons with what actually transpired during the interview. At the commencement of the interview we introduced ourselves to one another and dispensed with some pleasantries before settling down to the real task. An informal and non-directive style of interviewing was adopted for the semi-structured one-to-one interview.

I restated the purpose of the meeting and told her that I anticipated that the interview would last between 1½ - 2 hours and gave a pledge to maintain
confidentiality in order to protect her from jeopardising her position in the organisation by my disclosure of sensitive comments made during the interviews.

Once the process was completed with Respondent R1 I replayed the summary of my notes to her to check for accuracy. Once it was endorsed I retreated to a quiet place to write up my notes of the interview while it was fresh in my mind. The respondent also asked me for a copy of the findings once the draft report was ready. Shortly before leaving I asked R1 to nominate another person who had a different view to her. Shortly afterwards I went to interview Respondent 2 (R2) and the same process was repeated as with Respondent 1 (R1). However, one additional factor was introduced to this part of the process. Towards the end of the interview, Respondent 2 (R2) was also provided with a summary of R1 to critique and her comments were also recorded. This process of interviewing the respondents was performed sequentially until the forty of them were completed. All the subsequent respondents were given the opportunity to critique the comments of their predecessors towards the end of their individual interviews.

The aim for allowing each respondent to critique the comments made by their predecessors was to try and achieve their "joint constructions" through the process of constant comparison methods (Strauss and Corbin (1990)). Throughout the entire process the strategy was to record the raw data from the interviews without trying to interpret or seek to achieve consensus where none existed. Another goal was to keep interviewing the respondents until nothing new seemed to be emerging from the interviews. This is the point of maturation or theoretical saturation where no new data seem to be emerging from the data gathering process. It is a good indication to stop the research at this point (Patton (1990)). Therefore, in following this pattern, the one-to-one interviews were terminated after respondent 40 was interviewed.

Perhaps it will be helpful here to provide the reader with an overview of the respondents' profiles. Table 9 on page 213 seeks to do just that. It shows the sequence in which the interviews were carried out and various columns showing the duration of the one-to-one interviews, their job positions, years of service in the BBC, departments, directorates and their geographical location.
Table 9: An overview of the breakdown of respondents’ profile by duration of interview, job, position and directorate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resp.</th>
<th>Observation time</th>
<th>Job position</th>
<th>Base data 0-5 yr</th>
<th>6-10 yrs</th>
<th>10 yr</th>
<th>Production Directorate</th>
<th>Broad. Dir.</th>
<th>Resources Directorate</th>
<th>News Directorate</th>
<th>Personnel Directorate</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
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<td>R4.</td>
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<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
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<td>R8.</td>
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<td>MM</td>
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<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
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<td>WC</td>
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<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>CH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
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<td>R13.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R14.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R15.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R16.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R17.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>TVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R18.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R19.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
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<tr>
<td>R20.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>GLAS</td>
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<tr>
<td>R21.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>HR (Glas.)</td>
<td>Arts, Ent &amp; Features (Glas.)</td>
<td>Science</td>
<td>HR &amp; Training</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R22.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R23.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R24.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R25.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R26.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R27.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R28.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R29.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R30.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R31.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<tr>
<td>R32.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R33.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R34.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R35.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>SM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R36.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>6-10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R37.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R38.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R39.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>R40.</td>
<td>2 hrs</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>10+</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key for Table 9**

Table 9. also shows the group size of the various respondents who participated in the one-to-one interviews by group size, job category, directorate and departments.

There are ten principal columns with five sub categories in the Production Directorate, three in Resources and two in News. The
remainder have only one category each.

The Rep. In column one is an abbreviation for respondents. Therefore, R1-R40 represents the total of 40 respondents who participated in the one-to-one interviews.

Column two shows that each interview lasted for a duration of 2 hours.

Column three defines the job position of the respondents e.g. HD = Head of Department, SM = Senior Manager, MM = Middle Manager, JM = Junior Manager and AA = Admin assistant (as the main categories of respondents who participated in the study).

Column four shows the base data in years, for example 0-5 years indicates that the respondent within the category have spent no more than 5 years in the BBC. 6-10 years indicates that the respondent has spent 6-10 years in the BBC. 10+ indicate that the participants have spent 10 years plus in the BBC.

Column five shows the Production Directorate comprising a variety of departments. Ed. Is an abbreviation for the Education Department, Sp. Refers to Special Projects, HR for Human Resources, Arts, Ent. And Features Glas. Refers to Arts, Entertainment and Features in Glasgow and Science Department is fairly self explanatory.

Columns six shows Broadcast Directorate with respondents from HR and Training who participated in the study.

Column seven shows Resources Directorates comprising of respondents from (Prem. Mgt.) Premises Management, TS. For Television Studio Production Resources and HR. Glas. For Human Resources in Glasgow.

Column eight shows News Directorate with two Departments viz: New. Rm for The News Room and HR & Training for Human Resources.
and Training.

Column nine shows the Personnel Directorate

Column ten shows their location in the BBC. e.g. WC = White City, Els = Elstree, BH = Broadcasting House, HWH = Henry Wood House, Glas = Glasgow, BU = Bush House, TVC = Television Centre
Table 9 also shows number 1 in the columns under the Directorate Heading to indicate the number of respondents who participated in the study. The total group size breakdown is as follows:

**Production Directorate:**

2 respondents from Education Department

2 from Special Projects

2 from HR Glasgow

6 from Arts, Entertainment and Features in Glasgow

10 from Science Department

**Broadcast Directorate:**

2 respondents from HR and Training

**Resources Directorate:**

11 respondents mainly from Premises Management

1 from Studio Production

**News directorate:**

2 from News

**Personnel Directorate:**

2 from Training Department

Once the interviews were completed I had a two-day meeting with my colleague who helped me with five interviews to collate and discuss the findings from the interviews. Then we began the process of transcribing the data from the tape-recorded interviews. Debbie transcribed the first 11 interviews for me and Helen McCathy (a transcription typist) completed the remaining 29 transcriptions.
STEP 9: INITIAL DATA ANALYSIS

After completing the 40 semi-structural interviews and transcribing them it amounted to over 700 pages. Once this process was completed an initial analysis of the data was carried out to get an overall impression of the themes that were emerging from it. At that particular stage I became absolutely overwhelmed by the data and did not know how best to proceed. This was a classic case of death by "data overload" as described so vividly by Pettigrew et al (1990). In the meantime, I had developed in my mind a clear picture of the respondents' perceptions of the change process in the BBC so far but found it difficult to present the data in an interesting way in the form of a case report.

STEP 10: FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS

As a consequence of the initial data analysis I formulated some general impressions of the findings which led me to formulate a 40-item questionnaire. Five respondents who participated (R1-R5) in the one-to-one interviews and the remainder of new respondents, which also included at least four former employees of the BBC, were asked to complete a follow-up questionnaire. The questionnaires were sent out between July and August and replies obtained very soon afterwards. The questions were more focused than the original tentative questions for the one-to-one interviews, and were designed to provide me with the answers to specific issues raised in the first set of interviews. It was aimed at widening the hermeneutic dialectic circle to capture any new data that might enrich the findings. For a more detailed example of this follow-up questionnaire please see Appendix K. However, out of a total of 60 potential respondents who were sent the questionnaire only 20 responded. From the 20 responses: five were from those who originally participated in the one-to-one interviews, 10 were new respondents from BBC staff and five were former BBC employees. (See Table 10 on page 219).
Table 10  Showing the profile of those who participated in the follow-up questionnaire

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Yrs in BBC</th>
<th>Job status</th>
<th>Directorate</th>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<td>25</td>
<td>Ex BBC</td>
<td>Productions</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>BH</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQ2.</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Admin Asst</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Premises</td>
<td>WC</td>
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<td>RQ3.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Ex BBC</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Premises Mgt</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
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<td>MM</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Premises Mgt</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
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<td>RQ5.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Premises Mgt</td>
<td>WC</td>
</tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>MM</td>
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<td>Premises Mgt</td>
<td>WC</td>
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<td>RQ7.</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Ex BBC</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>ELS</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQ8.</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>TV Studios</td>
<td>TVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>MM</td>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>TV Studios</td>
<td>TVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>Productions</td>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Productions</td>
<td>Drama</td>
<td>TVC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>14</td>
<td>MM</td>
<td>Productions</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>BH</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>JM</td>
<td>Productions</td>
<td>Radio</td>
<td>BH</td>
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<td>Drama</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>Presentation</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>JM</td>
<td>News</td>
<td>Today Prog</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>Ex BBC</td>
<td>Productions</td>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Hd of Dept</td>
<td>Personnel</td>
<td>Training</td>
<td>TVC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key: RQ1 = indicates Respondent 1 (Questionnaire), RQ2 = Respondent 2 (Questionnaire) etc. Respondents show the number of participants who participated in the questionnaire (i.e. total of 20) Column 2 shows their years of service in the BBC. Column 3 job status. Column 4 Directorate Column 5 Department. Column 6 shows the location


This step involved collating and transcribing the data obtained from the semi-structured interviews and the follow-up questionnaire. This was a long drawn out process. The next step in the process involved the joint constructions of the data and this is explained below.


Once the questionnaires were returned the data were written up and subsequently analysed with the findings from the semi-structured interviews. Throughout the study, the process of analysing the findings was one of constant
iteration and re-iteration and constant comparisons with the existing data (Strauss and Corbin (1990)). After the findings from the follow-up questionnaire were analysed in tandem with those from the one-to-one interviews, I conducted a focus group with 15 respondents. The questions were based on testing out the faint constructions and other perceptions from the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire.

STEP 13: FOCUS GROUP

I sought and obtained agreement from 15 respondents to participate in a focus group about their perceptions of the change process within the BBC in the time-bounded period of April 1993 to July 1998. The focus group was conducted in late September, after the follow-up questionnaire replies were received, transcribed and analysed. The process began with an explanation of the purpose of the focus group and some background information about my research project. Fortunately, no formal introduction was necessary because I had been working with the group for three days previously on a separate project and we became very familiar with one another. However, at the outset we agreed some basic ground rules for conducting the focus group and I took on the role of the moderator. After agreeing to abide by the rules of strict confidentiality, to protect individuals from the risk of losing their jobs, I asked a series of open questions about their views about the change process. They were encouraged to be as candid as possible and not censor their thoughts. I obtained their permission to take notes during the session. The entire session lasted for one and a half hours and at the end I thanked them for participating and reaffirmed my commitment to maintaining confidentiality.

STEP 14: TRANSCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS

Immediately after the session was over the notes were typed up and further analysed in tandem with the data that was previously collected from the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire. This process then gave me a thorough understanding of the key issues raised by the respondents in the study. Subsequently, I began to experience data overload because I was overwhelmed with the wealth of information that was collected (Pettigrew et al (1990)). The
most difficult thing for me, at that stage, was to try and manage the data in a way that would enable me to write up the final case report.

**STEP 15: INTRODUCTION TO NUDIST PROGRAMME**

I spent the entirety of August and September 1998 reading and rereading the interview transcripts to get an overview of the common themes which seemed to be emerging from the respondents own accounts of the change process. Initially, I became very overwhelmed by the large quantity of data from the interviews, follow-up questionnaire and focus group. At the same period I had a tutorial, with Professor Pat Joynt in September and another with Professor Arthur Money, to discuss my progress.

During the tutorial with Professor Money I made enquiries about the NUDIST software package with the view of using it as a tool to analyse the findings. I came across this particular software package after reviewing the text entitled “Qualitative Data Analysis” by Miles and Huberman (1994). The book provided a synopsis of all the current software packages on the market for analysing qualitative data in contemporary research soon discovered that the NUDIST package was particularly appealing because, as a tool for qualitative data analysis, it fulfilled all my essential criteria. It seemed ideal for the following functions: coding, searching and retrieval of data, database management, memoing, data linking, matrix building, theory building and above all it was user friendly (Miles and Huberman (1994)).

Thus, after discussing the NUDIST package with Professor Money, he recommended that I should contact Dr. Silvana di Gregorio (an expert on the software package) to organise some personal coaching on the use of the package and to find out how to purchase it.

After researching the NUDIST programme and assessing its potential, I then purchased it for use with my study.

During the months of September and October I enrolled on a NUDIST training course to learn how to use the package to analyse the vast amount of data which
I collected from the research. Once I became proficient in the use of the software programme I embarked upon a process of putting my learning into practice.

About the same time I read an excellent article entitled "Qualitative Analysis of Conflict Types and dimensions in Organisational Groups" by Karen Jehn (1997) and this provided me with some basic understanding of how to organise my research findings prior to writing the case study. Thus, armed with this new found knowledge about qualitative data analysis management, I then set about the tedious process of inputting the research data into the Nudist programme for subsequent analysis.

Once the inputting of the data was completed, I re-read the data over and over again to ensure that I had a total overview of the various joint constructions of the respondents. At this stage in the research I found that the years of travelling through the fog had lifted and I had a much greater clarity of vision of the final destination of the study.

In addition, using NUDIST as a tool for analysing the data from the study was a particularly liberating experience. However, I was mindful of an old saying "garbage in, garbage out" (anecdotal). Therefore, I was particularly keen to ensure that I was clear about the research questions which I was seeking to answer in the study and deliberated long and hard before beginning the coding process. This marked the beginning of a rather sophisticated process of analysis of the data and therefore will be the focus of the next chapter. The final stage in the design was to decide how the case report was going to be written.

STEP 16: WRITING THE CASE REPORT

The writing up of the case report was in no way intended to replicate the format of conventional research finding report. Erlandson et al (1993) and other exponents of this approach have strongly advised against this approach and recommend one which shows the joint constructions that have emerged from the hermeneutic dialectic process. As a consequence an attempt was made to write it in a way which hopefully clarified the meaning and interpretations of the joint constructions
of the respondents. The final report was the product of a series of iterations and reiterations and not a straightforward process.

During the early stage of writing the report a draft copy was sent to 30 of the respondents who participated in either the one-to-one interview, the follow-up questionnaire or focus group for their comments. However, only 20 replies were returned from the one-to-one interviews, five from the follow-up questionnaire and five from the focus group. After making some minor adjustments to the document a second draft report was written and two of my colleagues were asked to critique it after some minor refinements. The final report of the analysis was written with the aim of avoiding generalisation to other organisational settings. The goal was to enable the readers to come to their own conclusions by determining for themselves whether the report makes sense to them and if so why? This kind of mindset can only be arrived at via the individual’s own vicarious experience (Rowan and Reason (1996)).

STEP 17: WRITING THE SECOND DRAFT

After receiving some feedback from the respondents who participated in reviewing the case report I re-drafted the report to take on board their comments before sending a copy to my Supervisor.

STEP 18: PEER REVIEW

Once the report was completed I delivered a presentation to my DBA peers and some of the academic staff at Henley Management College. This culminated in receiving some further feedback which I subsequently incorporated into the final version of the case.

Having completed explaining the methods by which the research was conducted and having written up the report, the next chapter will focus on continuing the process of the analysis of the data which was collected from a variety of sources. Initially it will begin with an explanation of the coding process and the reasons for this will be made apparent in the next chapter.
SUMMARY

Initially, the chapter began with a philosophical debate on trying to define naturalistic inquiry, then explored the main differences between the two opposing paradigms. This was followed by an explanation of the methodology and the rationale for such a decision, some key issues in case study research such as advantages, disadvantages and challenges for the naturalistic inquirer and a debate about generalising from a case study. Then we debated the advantages and disadvantages of being an insider and researcher. Finally, a fairly comprehensive description was given about how the research was conducted in the BBC using a variety of methods. However, I must hasten to add that the revised questions on pages 198-200 were used as the focus for eliciting the information from the respondents either during the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group sessions. These questions were based on the integrative model of organisational change on page 100 which was derived from the literature review. Although genuine attempts were made to probe every aspect of the model during the interviews, follow-up questionnaire and focus group, (the majority of respondents seemed more willing to talk about certain aspects of the model more than others did).

As a consequence, I became somewhat intrigued by their reactions and, after probing a bit further, discovered the reasons for their actions. Therefore, in the ensuing chapter a deliberate decision was made to commence the process of data analysis by focusing on their comments in relation to the revised questions and the integrative model of organisational change, which I have alluded to above. However, no attempt will be made to manipulate the data to accommodate the variables in the model or my own preconceptions.
CHAPTER 6: INITIAL ANALYSIS OF KEY ASPECTS OF THE RESEARCH

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is sixfold: Firstly, to establish the context for the conduct of the subsequent analysis of the data which emerged from the study of the change process in the BBC in the “time-bounded period of April 1993-July 1998” with particular reference to the integrative model which was derived from the literature review. In the process of doing so, an attempt will be made to explain briefly, some of the potential limitations in using the model in conducting a naturalistic inquiry of the change process in the BBC and the rationale for deviating from part of the original plan. Secondly, to explain that despite the initial promises to use the integrative model as the basis of the study why the analysis of the findings appears to focus mainly on the DG’s actions and the consequences on the staff in particular. Additionally, why top management and morale were amongst the key issues debated and analysed, whilst other parts of the model were only briefly mentioned in passing. Thirdly, to explain the early steps in the coding process and how the data was subsequently analysed. Fourthly, to explain why and how matrices were created from the data from the study as the basis for subsequent analysis of the findings. Fifthly, to explain the rationale for focusing on particular aspects of the data in the initial stages of the analysis in this section and their impact on the respondents. The final section will focus on drawing some conclusions and making some explicit links with Chapter 7.

THE INTEGRATIVE MODEL: LIMITATIONS; RATIONALE & EMPHASIS ON DG’S ACTIONS

Despite, my intention to study the change process in the BBC, using the integrative model which was derived from the literature review, I found it a bit difficult to adhere rigidly to my original plan for a variety of reasons:
Despite, asking a series of specific questions with particular reference to the integrative model in Figure 13 on page 100 during the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group sessions, it seemed that the respondents were more interested in discussing only certain aspects of the model for personal reasons. As a consequence, the respondents chose to introduce their own agenda during these sessions (see the revised questions and warm up questions on pages 198-200). The rationale for this was to refrain from appearing to be too prescriptive or directive because this would appear to run counter to the aims of the study.

Yet, on the contrary, I was constantly aware of the underlying objective to use the model as the basis for answering the research questions. Subsequently, expediency and pragmatism led me to accepting the respondents' personal stories about their experience of the change process in the BBC. This point has received endorsement from Dr. Steve Downing (Henley Management College), an expert on "Story Telling in Qualitative Research", at a seminar at the College in June 1997. This provided me with a good reason for deviating from the original plan periodically in order to accommodate the new data that emerged from three main sources of collection. However, I must hasten to add, that I was rather intrigued by the respondents' apparent sub-conscious attempts to dictate parts of the agenda. Consequently, after much probing of each respondent during the process, I discovered the reasons for their actions. They seemed in tune with certain aspects of the model (for example the external pressures for change in the BBC) as discussed in great detail in chapters 2 and 4. In addition, they cited examples of the types of external assessments taken by the BBC in relation to environmental scanning. Therefore, a list of the main initiatives is provided below: competitor analysis, benchmarking and market testing exercises (where the BBC's cost of programme making was compared with other facility houses in the outside world); SWOT analysis exercises (where the BBC contracted some external consultants to conduct a variety of studies about its strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats). These, initiatives culminated in a series of recommendations for improvements, which were subsequently incorporated into the BBC's strategic change programme ("Producer Choice" (1991)). During the one-to-one interviews some respondents criticised the BBC for employing a
high number of external consultants and accountants whose brief was to identify areas for efficiency savings. The aim was to demonstrate that the BBC was a well-managed organisation that provided value for money to its customers. However, no one appeared to have understood the corporate vision and this was also true about their knowledge and understanding of the corporate strategy and its links with the activities in their local work unit.

Yet, on the contrary, they spoke with great passion and deep emotions about the other variables in the integrative model because they felt that it had a greater impact on their working lives. The main areas concerned were: managerial cognitions, managerial actions, organisational outcomes and the effects on them; particularly the specific policies of the DG and his senior managers, their attitude to the change and how they saw it evolve over time and how their morale was affected by the entire process. In addition they spoke at great length during the one to one semi-structured interviews and the focus groups about their lack of involvement in the change process (multiple stakeholders' influences). Therefore, despite my best intentions to adhere to the model where possible, the subsequent analysis will show that the respondents wanted to talk more about the aspects of the model which mattered most to them. Consequently, the emphasis on the model will be somewhat lop-sided and show a bias towards issues which related to the managerial actions of the DG and his senior management and the impact on the staff, especially their morale and the outcomes of the policies.

Hence, it is against this background that the initial analysis in the latter part of this chapter and the subsequent analysis should be viewed. As a consequence of this an attempt will be made to elaborate on this in the latter part of this chapter, but, before doing so, let me first explain the coding process of the data which was obtained from the three sources of the study to demonstrate how I arrived at the various categorisations and common themes about the staff's perceptions about the change process. This will be followed by an explanation of why and how some of the matrices were used as the basis for data analysis of the findings before focusing on the staff's perceptions about their experience of the change and the impact of the corporate policies on their lives. Therefore, let us now look at the coding process as promised above.
Table 13  Types of Managerial Actions and their coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(4)</th>
<th>Managerial Actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(41)</td>
<td>Efficiency measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(415)</td>
<td>Introduction of the contract culture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(416)</td>
<td>Introduction of the internal market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(42)</td>
<td>Staff redundancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(43)</td>
<td>Strategic communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(431)</td>
<td>Proactive and dynamic science department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(44)</td>
<td>Consultants involvement in the change process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(47)</td>
<td>Development of systems and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(48)</td>
<td>Fragmentation of the BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(49)</td>
<td>Recruitment of business professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(410)</td>
<td>Director General covert actions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 above shows how the findings were coded for managerial actions and the types of managerial actions.

The same process was repeated for creating other meta-plans and coding for the various categories for senior management style. This is well documented in Appendix L and Table 14 on page 231.

It is not my intention to go through the laborious process of explaining the process of coding the various meta-plans here. I would like to take the opportunity here to focus on a few key areas. The code 17 refers to style and (171) refers to senior management style. The other main categories viz: poor communication, good communication, autocratic, professional, lack of credibility, lack of feedback and management indecisiveness is illustrated in the table.
Table 14 Showing coding for senior management style and the types

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(17)</th>
<th>Style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(171)</td>
<td>Senior Management style</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1711)</td>
<td>Poor communication of senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1713)</td>
<td>Senior manager good at communicating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1714)</td>
<td>Senior management autocratic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1715)</td>
<td>Senior management more professional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1716)</td>
<td>Senior management lacks credibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1717)</td>
<td>Senior management lack of feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1718)</td>
<td>Senior management indecisive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14 above shows how I coded senior management style and the specific comments respondents made about their style, giving rise to 7 qualities or senior managerial traits.

A similar coding was done for the Director General and this is amplified in Table 15 below.

Table 15 Showing Codes for respondents' perceptions of the Director General Style

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(172)</th>
<th>Director General style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1712)</td>
<td>Director General negative impact on talent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1722)</td>
<td>Director General is a visionary and an entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1723)</td>
<td>Director General is a good communicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1724)</td>
<td>Director General autocratic and non-communicative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15, like the previous one, shows the codes for the respondents' perceptions about the Director General style and the types of specific comments made about them. At least four key categories have been identified for the Director General viz: negative impact on talent, visionary and an entrepreneur, good communicator and autocratic and non-communicative.

Table 16 on page 232 shows the findings related to areas of low moral and high morale. (See Appendix L for a more detailed breakdown of this.) The table shows
at least 10 main categories with codes explaining reasons for low morale. The origins of this table, like the previous ones, were derived from the analysis of the data from the one-to-one semi-structured interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group. The code for low morale is (20) and a sub code or derivative of it is (2011). Hence (2011) describes work pressures as a main reason for low morale.

**Table 16 Showing the higher order level coding for low morale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(20)</th>
<th>Reasons for low morale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2011)</td>
<td>Work pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2015)</td>
<td>Specific policy initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2016)</td>
<td>Managerial actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2017)</td>
<td>Psychological aspects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2019)</td>
<td>Style of management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20117)</td>
<td>People like to whinge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20129)</td>
<td>Staff's lack of identity with Directorate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20132)</td>
<td>Teams feel isolated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(20134)</td>
<td>People feel isolated and exposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(201140)</td>
<td>Coming into the real world</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The next section examines the coding process and reasons for high morale based on the respondents' perceptions. Table 17 below shows how I coded the respondents' perceptions of reasons for high morale.

**Table 17 Reasons for high morale**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(202)</th>
<th>Reasons for high morale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2021)</td>
<td>External factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(202116)</td>
<td>Devolution factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2022)</td>
<td>Being successful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2024)</td>
<td>Style of leadership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2027)</td>
<td>Good career structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 17 shows (202) as the code for high morale and (2021) as a sub-category of this, giving external factors as a key reason for high morale.

The final example, chosen to elaborate on the coding process, relates to the consequences of the change process as seen through the lens of the respondents. This particular example was chosen because it highlights some interesting findings about the respondents' perceptions about the change process. It is fully elaborated on in Table 18 below.

**Table 18 Illustrates the codes used for the types of positive consequences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(271)</th>
<th>Positive consequences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(2711)</td>
<td>Efficiency measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2712)</td>
<td>BBC's future security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2713)</td>
<td>More professional managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2714)</td>
<td>Enjoys consistency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2715)</td>
<td>Flexible ways of working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2716)</td>
<td>Performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2717)</td>
<td>Better communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2718)</td>
<td>Greater accountability and openness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2719)</td>
<td>More focus and direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2710)</td>
<td>Excellent management in science department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27111)</td>
<td>Freedom of choice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27112)</td>
<td>Multi-skilling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18 shows (271) as the main category for positive consequences and the sub-codes on the tree indicate the further breakdown. Hence (271) describes one of the main positive consequences and 2712-27112 highlights the rest.

Table 19 on the next page shows the respondents' perceptions of negative consequences of the change process. It shows (272) as the main code for the types of negative consequences with the sub-codes on that tree indicating the further breakdown.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(272)</td>
<td>negative consequences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2721)</td>
<td>Resistance to continual change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2722)</td>
<td>Staff turn over and redundancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2723)</td>
<td>Psychological impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2724)</td>
<td>Managerial actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2725)</td>
<td>All activities cost driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2726)</td>
<td>Loss of creative talent and knowledge base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2727)</td>
<td>High head count</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2728)</td>
<td>Press leaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2729)</td>
<td>Work pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(27210)</td>
<td>De-skilling</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SUMMARY**

The various tables in this chapter were arbitrarily chosen to illustrate different dimensions of the findings and how I went about the coding process. Appendix L gives a comprehensive overview of the various codes used in the base data of the Index Tree.

After the coding process was completed I used the NUDIST software package, not only as a tool to help to manage the data obtained from the various methods but also to look at the relationship between categories, by creating matrices and this forms the basis for the discussion in the next section.

**THE BUILDING OF MATRICES AND THEIR RELATIONSHIPS**

Following the completion of the process of coding the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the first focus group documents, the process of building some matrices was commenced to show the relationship between a variety of categories. This was done purely on an arbitrary basis but in the belief that the ones that were created were designed to produce the most dramatic effects from the analysis of the study. Moreover, it was felt that they would help to answer some of my research questions.
It is not my intention in this section to produce detailed tables of these matrices because it was felt that such actions seemed more appropriate in the next chapter which focuses more on an in-depth analysis of the research. Nevertheless, it seems appropriate to offer here a brief description of the types of matrices.

In all a total of six matrices were created to show their relationships with a variety of categories. The first matrix shows the relationship between the combined responses of the respondents from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire and their perceptions of the style of the Director General. The second matrix shows the relationship between the base data on a departmental basis, and the respective comments about the Director General's style. The third matrix combines the responses from the focus group, the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire and their respective comments about the style of senior management. The fourth matrix combines the style of senior management and their relationship with the base data on a departmental basis (restricted to the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire).

The fifth matrix focuses on the reasons for low morale and the base data by job positions. The sixth matrix examines the relationships between the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group and the respondents who described morale as being low, high or OK.

Having completed the matrices the next step in the process was to commence writing up the first draft of the analysis of the study. Having immersed myself in the initial stages of the analysis it appeared that the respondents had a great deal to say about the Director General (the next few pages).

**AN OVERVIEW OF THE STAFF'S PERCEPTION OF THE DG**

The overview of the staff's perception of the Director General is based on over 700 pages of transcripts which emerged from the 39 (out of 40) one-to-one interviews (I discarded number 40 because it was totally incomprehensible), 19 of the follow-up questionnaire, the two focus groups and my constant observation as an insider in the period April 1993 to July 1998.
For practical reasons I decided to use my editorial skills to the best of my ability to highlight some of the salient points without trying to interpret or dilute the effectiveness of their personal comments. Although there are no set ways of presenting this overview, a deliberate decision was made to illustrate this by presenting a matrix which shows the relationship between various categories. This also offers the opportunity to elaborate on the matrix in order to assist the reader with a general overview of the various perceptions. (see table 20 below).

It also highlights the node data for sub-categories of code (172) style/Director General’s style

**Table 20  Overview perception of the Director General**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Director General negative impact on talent</th>
<th>Director General is a visionary and entrepreneur</th>
<th>Director General is good at communicating</th>
<th>Director General is autocratic and non-communicative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st focus group</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(39) one-to-one interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10.</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>R12.</td>
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<td>28</td>
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<td>R14.</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>R15.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R16.</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>R17.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>R18.</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>R20.</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<td>12</td>
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<td>R21.</td>
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<td>R22.</td>
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<td>0</td>
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<td>21</td>
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<td>R26.</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
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<td>R27.</td>
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<td>R28.</td>
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<td>R29.</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>R30.</td>
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<td>10</td>
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<td>35</td>
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<td>R31.</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>R32.</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
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<td>R33.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>R34.</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>26</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R35.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>R36.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
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<tr>
<td>R37.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>18</td>
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<tr>
<td>R38.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>R39.</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ9</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>RQ10</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>RQ12</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>RQ13</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>RQ14</td>
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<td>RQ15</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQ16</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>RQ17</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ19</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Key: R is used as the symbol for the respondents in the one-to-one interviews. Thus, R1-R39 shows a total of 39 respondents. RQ indicates respondents who participated in the follow-up questionnaire. The phrase 'text units' in the context of this table refers to a one-line comment about a particular variable in the matrix. Therefore, if we take the first column the first focus group in relation to the second column headed Director General negative impact on talent, "16" indicates the number of one line comments respondents made about the Director General’s negative impact on talent. "32" in the third column indicate the number of one-line comments about the Director General being a visionary and an entrepreneur. "0" in the fourth column indicates that the focus group made no comment about whether the Director General was a good communicator. Finally, "33" in the last column is indicative of the number of one-line comments about the Director General being autocratic and non-communicative. The key to understanding this matrix is that where "0" occurs, it merely reflects that the respondents had not made any comment on the particular variable in the column. However, where "1-57" occurs under the various columns this indicates the frequency of one-line comments the respondents have made about that particular variable.

If we were to take a combined snapshot of the implications of the findings of the focus group, the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire, the following inferences can be made. The overall impression from the focus group is that the Director General was seen as a visionary and an entrepreneur (this was mentioned 32 times in the text.) However, he was also considered to have a negative impact on talent (score of 6); and the score of "0" indicates that they did
not regard him as a good communicator. The final column with a score of 33 shows that they regarded him as autocratic and non-communicative.

The same pattern was repeated in the one-to-one interviews and where 38 out of the 39 respondents perceived him to be a visionary and an entrepreneur and 28 commented on his negative impact on talent in the BBC. However, it is worth noting that the 11 who refrained from commenting on his negative impact on talent were from the Resources Directorate (i.e. R1-R11); while the 28 who did comment were from the Production, Broadcast, News and Personnel Directorates (R12 - R39). Only four of the 39 respondents took the view that the Director General was good at communicating. Lastly, 37 believed that the Director General was autocratic and non-communicative. By using a different matrix the analysis can also be displayed to show the dramatic effects of the same data when the staff’s perception of the Director General is represented on a departmental basis. This is illustrated in Table 21 on the next page)
### Table 21 Matrix  Showing staffs perceptions of the Director General.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Department</th>
<th>Director General impact on talent</th>
<th>Director General is a visionary and entrepreneur</th>
<th>Director General is good at communicating</th>
<th>Director General is autocratic and non-communicative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Science</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Resources</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Programmes</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>News</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Premises Management</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Productions (Glasgow)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSPR</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presentation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** The same method is used for analysing the data as in the previous matrix. For example, if we take the Science Department respondents comments, 29 single line text were recorded to indicate their perception of the DG’s negative impact on talent. In the case of his visionary qualities, 97 single line texts indicate the extent of their perceptions. Only nine single line texts reflected their perception about his good communication skills whereas 178 single line texts show the extent of their perceptions of this automatic and non-communicative style. This pattern is repeated throughout for the remainder of departments. Therefore, in continuing this theme of illustrating the perceptions of the Director General let me now focus on selecting a few quotations which paint a negative picture of him.
TYPES OF STORIES: NEGATIVE PICTURES OF THE DG

The purpose of this section is to identify and discuss some of the types of stories which paint a negative picture of the Director General. Although there are no set ways of presenting these respondent perceptions an arbitrary decision was made to use the following format. The first section begins with a matrix, which gives an overview of the respondents’ perceptions, from the data generated from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire.

However, unlike in the earlier matrices, the emphasis here was to show the four common groupings or themes which the respondents identified as negative perceptions of the Director General. Thus, where a “0” score occurs under a particular theme it shows that the respondents have not made any comment about that category; where a score of “1” occurs, a specific reference was made to that particular word or phrase in relation to the style of the Director General. This is illustrated in Table 22 on the next page.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MATRIX SHOWING</th>
<th>NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TALENT</th>
<th>DISTANT AND ALOOF</th>
<th>AUTOCRATIC</th>
<th>NON-COMMUNICATIVE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R3.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R4.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R5.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R6.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R7.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R8.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R9.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R10.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R11.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R12.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R13.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R14.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R15.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R16.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R17.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R18.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R19.</td>
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<tr>
<td>R20.</td>
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<td>R21.</td>
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<td>R33.</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R34.</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>R35.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>R36.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>R37.</td>
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<td>R38.</td>
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<td>R39.</td>
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<td>RQ7.</td>
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<td>RQ8.</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ12.</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ13.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ14.</td>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ16.</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ17.</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ18.</td>
<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQ19.</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** "0" indicates that respondents have not commented on that particular variable; "1" indicates that the respondent has made a specific comment on this particular variable
The above matrix shows amongst other things that all the respondents are of the opinion that the Director General is autocratic and non-communicative. The majority also felt that he is distant and aloof and to a lesser extent had a negative impact on talent. Therefore having presented a graphic overview of the respondents' negative perceptions of the Director General, the following section will focus on elaborating on this by the use of selected quotations.

TYPES OF NEGATIVE QUOTATIONS BY RESPONDENTS

There is no doubt that the respondents were unanimous in their negative perceptions about the Director General, as a number of selected quotes indicate.

In commenting on the Director General's style of being distant and aloof, respondent R18, a middle manager from News Directorate, made a telling statement during the one-to-one semi-structured interviews. She said:

"I certainly feel that he is not someone who is easy to relate to, on occasions when he presents himself in the public arena. He's not someone that is immediately easy to establish a rapport with because he doesn't appear to have strong feelings about things. He's not a passionate type of person, he doesn't communicate in an engaging and likening type of way. Yes I would agree that he does appear distant and aloof..." (one-to-one interviews 1998. R18).

Another respondent, (R21, a middle manager from the Education Department), in endorsing the above comments of the Director General during the one-to-one interview, added a new dimension to the criticism by claiming:

"In terms of him being part of the organisation, it's not that visible, you feel him but you don't see him. I don't get the feeling that he goes and looks at programmes being made. Maybe he is too grand for that now or maybe he thinks he's done it all" (source one-to-one interviews July 1990 R21).

However when pressed to elaborate on this, she said:

"I don't see any evidence or any information about visits he makes specifically to programmes. I don't mean great walk about visits but I think..."
that it wouldn’t do any harm for him to take an interest in what’s going on around the organisation at all levels. Maybe, he regards it as beneath him”.

Other respondents echoed these negative criticisms. For example, during the one-to-one interview a senior manager from New Directorate (Respondent R29) claimed that:

“He sits in a prison, he is the most invisible Director General I have ever known. Previous Director Generals, and I can think of several of them, who when I was working on the Today Programme at 8:00 am in the morning would come and tap me on the shoulder in the studio and say “Hi there, how’s it going?” He didn’t know who I was just “how’s it going and I’ll see you at breakfast”. Then he would come in at 9.00 o’clock when the programme came off the air and he would ask the secretaries, the Presenter, the Producers, the Day Team coming in, the Night Team going out, and sit there over cold coffee and sandwiches, the good, the bad and the indifferent about the programme” (source one-to-one interviews July 1998)

The Senior Manager R29 who made these comments was trying to draw parallels with the current Director General to show how much she appreciated the fact that his predecessors had the common touch with their staff.

The constant criticisms of being distant and aloof were also reflected in the respondents’ comments from the follow-up questionnaire. For example, respondents RQ6, RQ10, RQ11, RQ13, RQ18, to name but a few, made similar comments about the Director General’s style in relation to the above. Perhaps the one which best captures these sentiments was made by RQ7, a middle manager from Television Studio Production Resources (TSPR) when he said:

“The Director General is very autocratic, distant and lacks the common touch” (follow-up questionnaire 1998 RQ7).

There were other equally telling criticisms about the Director General’s autocratic and non-communicative style. Respondent R32, a middle manager from
Resources during the one-to-one interview, appropriately summed this up when she claimed:

"I don't see him as a figurehead, I don't feel he has enthused and taken the majority of the BBC with him. I've seen him but in a formal way. It's been in a question and answer forum where there were a lot of people, so I don't know what his personality and approach is in a small group. But the impression I get is that people working closely to him don't feel as if they can stand up to him. He comes up with ideas, what he thinks the future should be and sends people off to actually project manage these ideas and there does not seem to have been any forum for thrashing these things out, whether these things work" (source one-to-one interviews July 1998 R32).

There was also a myriad of other criticisms about the Director General's autocratic and non-consultative style of leadership. In the interest of brevity a deliberate decision was made to select the following examples which are somewhat typical of the other comments. (See Table 23 on page 254).

The first of these criticisms was made in the follow-up questionnaire by Respondent RQ8, a middle manager from Religious Programmes in Manchester, who said of the Director General:

"He is very political and authoritarian and seems averse to criticisms. He is a strong advocate of the 'quasi-market' philosophy. He forces through his policies without consulting his staff - he does not even trust his Board of Management" (Respondent RQ8 follow-up questionnaire 1998).

A second Respondent, R13, a junior manager in the Science Department, said:

"The Director General knows exactly what he wants, he is extremely decisive, but I don't think he cares much about how he actually achieves it. For example, the way in which the whole of Broadcast Vs Production split was introduced. I think that it could have been implemented in a much more positive and decisive way in terms of bringing everybody along with you. I know as a management decision they will have casualties but I think
the way in which those casualties were actually managed i.e. the 
departments that were closed down, the heads of departments who lost 
their job. I think it was done in a callous and rude way” (One-to-one 
interview 1998 R13).

Thus, while it is tempting to draw some conclusion from these negative 
perceptions, so far, it would seem reasonable to suspend this until the latter part 
of this chapter. The rationale for this is that I am trying to build a total picture of 
the Director General from the data collected from the one-to-one interviews, the 
follow-up questionnaire and the focus groups. It is impossible to achieve this goal 
until all the various types of perceptions are examined. Therefore, the focus for 
the next section is to address the types of stories which paint a positive picture of 
the Director General.

TYPES OF POSITIVE STORIES ABOUT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

The emphasis in this section is to examine the data collected from the one-to-one 
interviews, the following-up questionnaire and the focus groups. To see if there 
are any stories which paint the Director General in a positive light. Therefore, in 
keeping with the format of the previous section, only a few selected quotations will 
be chosen to illustrate the nature of the perceptions. However, having reviewed 
the various documents over and over again, the only positive comment I was able 
to find was made by respondent R21 during the one-to-one interviews. 
Respondent (R21) who is a middle manager in the Education Department made 
the following claims about Director General:

“Undoubtedly he’s got great vision because he has forced the BBC through 
a huge change, whether you like it or not, whether you think it good or 
whether you think it bad, he has done it. The BBC of 10 years ago is 
completely different to now and depending on what camp you’re in, if you 
like, you can say the people that don’t like it are like laggars form the old 
days and you can say that the people who like it are the ones that actually 
value our services. You pay your money and take your choice on that, you 
can’t question that he can drive things through but you can question how 
he chooses to do it” (one-to-one interviews 1998,R21).
This comment about the Director General is rather telling because of its uniqueness. However, what is even more interesting from the data analysis is the magnitude of the ambiguous perceptions, which the respondents have of the him. These are stories, which have a double edge to them, because they begin in a positive tone but end up with a negative comment. This is explored below.

**TYPES OF STORIES: AN AMBIVALENT PICTURE OF THE DG**

Despite an in-depth analysis of the data from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire, the examples of stories, which painted a positive picture of the Director General, seemed rather scant to say the least. However, it is fascinating to see that there were a plethora of stories which painted an ambivalent picture of him but in the interest of brevity only a few examples were chosen to support this claim. The order in which they are presented should not be seen as considering anyone to be more or less important.

On reading the transcripts one gets the impression that the respondents were unanimous in their comments about the visionary qualities of the Director General, but often negated this with a contradictory remark. This will be explored in more detail by looking at some selected quotations. During the one-to-one interviews, respondent R35, a senior Human Resources Manager in Production said the following:

"My view about the Director General is that he is probably the greatest leader since Lord Reith in the sense that he has had a vision of where the BBC should go. He was single-minded in pursuing the vision on the agenda in a way that people hadn't done before. Yes! He is remote, but those of us who have met him know that personally he can be absolutely charming and a very nice, pleasant man to talk to but he comes across as very cold and aloof to people who don't know him. Certainly, in large groups he can appear quite hostile and bullying and this is made worse by the fact that he is a very tall, big man" (one-to-one interview 1998 R35).

These sentiments were somewhat echoed by another respondent during the one-to-one interviews. R12, a junior manager in the Science Department of the
Productions Directorate when asked to state her views about Director General, said the following:

"Although I do not like him personally, because he is very distant and aloof, I believe his greatest strength lies in the fact that he is a visionary and an entrepreneur who is prepared to grasp the nettle and take risks before it is too late" (one-to-one interview 1998 R12).

Respondent R33, from the same one-to-one interviews, summed up another typical comment about his qualities. A middle manager in the Science Department within the Productions Directorate, he/she said the following:

"Even if one isn’t his greatest fan and I think he’s got a lot of shortcomings, I think that if he hadn’t had the radical vision that he did have, frankly there wouldn’t be much of the BBC left and however you whinge about it, I’m afraid that’s a fact. I think that in the area of News and Current Affairs, which was where I was before, he was deeply unpopular with the staff, however, I think he brought a rigour to journalism which I don’t think was there before" (One-to-one interviews 1998 R33).

I hope that these comments give an idea of the ambivalent perceptions of Director General held by the respondents. Let us now also examine some equally ambivalent stories about other aspects of his leadership style. When asked, during the one-to-one interview, to describe Director General’s leadership style, the following comments illustrate typical responses elicited from respondents.

According to respondent R18, a middle Human Resources manager in the News Directorate:

"I think that he tends to be the kind of person that likes to have lots of data and tends to be the kind of person who is pretty clear and decisive about where he thinks the BBC and the public sector broadcasting ought to be going. I think his own personal style has probably not been a terribly involving one. I think that he doesn’t place as much emphasis on communication, in its broadest sense, certainly internally I think that maybe externally he sees the stake as more important, that’s one of the reasons."
He's been around for the last 10 years, which is the amount of time I have been here. That, I think, masks the way we characterise management behaviour generally in the BBC" (One-to-one interview 1998 R18).

Respondent R27, when adding her comments about the Director General, adopted a similar tone. A senior manager in Productions Directorate in Scotland, she described him in the following way:

"Thoughtful, analytical, obsessed with data and I think he believes that continued analysis will solve everything. Not very personable, quite difficult to approach and I think the most discrediting thing I could say about him is I believe his chief executives are frightened of him or not willing to challenge him" (one-to- interviews 1998 R27).

Similar comments were echoed by other respondents during the one-to-one interviews especially in relation to his autocratic style of management. For example, during the first focus group there was a consensus within the group when one respondent made the following claim about Director General.

"He seems to be fully in tune with what is happening in the external market and that is why he relies on the head of McKinsey’s and a few other trusted consultants to help him implement the change. I understand why he does not even trust his board of management because it is difficult for someone in his position. BBC staff seem to enjoy leaking confidential issues to the press. Therefore, it was no surprise that he kept his plans for the last restructuring in 1996 very secret from even his Board of Management and chose to announce it overnight" (focus group 1998).

This perception of the lack of trust and a reluctance to consult or involve staff was also very widespread amongst the respondents. For example, respondent R30, a middle manager from the Training Department within the personnel Directorate said:

"I feel that in the early days when he arrived he saw very clearly what needed to be done. We all know, being realistic, a number of changes needed to be made. It needed to be pruned and trimmed. We all needed
to have a far greater sense of reality in terms of economics and efficiencies. As far as that was concerned he was quite correct. In terms of the style with which he did, it was again with little or no consultation. There wasn't a feeling of collective ownership, rather than this was an imposition from above" (one-to-one interview 1998 R30).

Another respondent R39, a middle manager in Productions in Glasgow remarked:

"This is hard. I think he has lots of good qualities but two major weaknesses. I think he's very logical, very strategic and probably quite commercial. His big problem is that he has a massive insecurity. That is why he surrounds himself with people who agree with him all the time and therefore never has his views challenged. If his views are ever challenged he is very defensive and I think that is his major failing and it is where he may have gone wrong with some of the things he has done" (one-to-one interview 1998 R39)

These claims about the Director General's aversion to his views being challenged received widespread support amongst the respondents but the examples given above will suffice here for the moment. Thus, on reflection, we have dealt with the types of perceptions which painted a negative picture of Director General, those which painted a positive picture and, latterly, those which painted an ambivalent picture of him. The vehicle for achieving this was the use of selected quotations from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire. Therefore, let us now focus on the types of totally negative stories which surfaced during the continuous analysis process.
TYPES OF TOTALLY NEGATIVE STORIES ABOUT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL

Unlike the previous sections, which gave a particular slant on the stories drawn from the analysis process, the focus here will be only on those that paint a totally negative perception of the Director General. In the follow-up questionnaire, respondent RQ15, a middle manager from Religious Programmes in the Production Directorate, stated the following:

"He is very political and authoritarian and seems averse to criticisms. He is a strong advocate of the 'Quasi-Market' philosophy. He forces through his policies without consulting his staff. He does not even trust members of his Board of Management" (follow-up questionnaire 1998 RQ15)

Respondent RQ6, a junior manager within the Training Department of the Personnel directorate in one of his responses to the follow-up questionnaire about the Director General’s leadership style endorsed these sentiments. He described him as:

"Autocratic and makes cosmetic gestures to consultation by setting up of the staff representative body" (follow-up questionnaire 1998 RQ6).

The allegation of an autocratic style of leadership was also supported by respondent R22 a middle manager in the Science Department of the Production directorate during the one-to-one interviews she said

"I think what has really annoyed people is the fact that the corporate restructuring was presented as a fait accompli. Those people involved who were about to be restructured, for example, the Managing Director of World Service, were not aware that it was coming. He played it very close to his chest and then dropped the bombshell and when people challenged him about his leadership style, he said: 'Well I'm sorry there is no room for negotiation; it is the only way'. I agree that some things have to be done but I am wondering whether the method in which it was done was wrong" (one-to-one interview 1998 R22).
Finally, let us now focus on the types of stories where the respondents have no first hand experience of the Director General but their comments were based on what they hear about him.

**TYPES OF HEARSAY STORIES ABOUT THE DIRECTOR GENERAL**

The process for addressing this specific issue is identical to that in the previous sections. Respondent R19, a middle manager in the Science Department of the Production Directorate, summed up an excellent illustration of this

According to him:

"He is just so unbelievably remote from what the rest of us do. It’s very difficult to form an impression. There is a sort of caricature of him as a dalek, but I think the change was necessary, he has driven it through. I think a lot of things that were done had some very positive benefits. As a producer I feel that he has liberated a lot of things with the introduction of "Producer Choice" and has made life pleasanter" (one-to-one interview 1998 R19)

Another typical comment, which was based on hearsay evidence was summed up by the following remark made by respondent R23, a middle manager in the Productions Directorate in Glasgow.

He said:

"He likes people to believe that he takes on board their comments. I have never met the man. I don’t know him personally but the way I perceive it is he would like individuals to think he’s a person who is very interested in what they are doing but I think the underlying impression I get is that he has a fixed agenda. I do think that the way he has managed some to the efficiencies in the BBC, were the right things to do" (one-to-one interview 1988 R23).

The final example chosen for this section was the comment made by respondent R24, a middle manager in the Science Department of the Production Directorate who said:

"I have talked to a number of people that work closely with him. I’ve talked
to people like yourself who experience him a bit. I have talked to two people who have worked for him as his personal assistants at some length and my impression is based on hearsay evidence. Therefore, although I have never met him I have talked to people about him and he comes across as someone who is incapable of inviting counter argument it seems to me. I mean this may be prejudice” (one-to-one interviews 1998 R24).

The respondents in their own unique style have powerfully expressed these perceptions of the Director General, yet there was remarkable consensus in the formulation of their joint constructions about him. Therefore, having presented this overview perhaps this seems to be an appropriate place to bring this section to a close. Inevitably we will return to this again in the latter part of the following section but let us first attempt to try and analyse the data from the categorisation of the various perceptions of him.

DATA ANALYSIS: CATEGORISATION OF TYPES OF PERCEPTIONS OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL.

Once the context was established for telling the story of the change process in the BBC through the lens of the internal stakeholders the focus was then switched to presenting an overview of the types of perceptions of the Director General. To enable me to manage the data from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire, I relied heavily on the NUDIST software package. Although a full account of the process has been well documented in the previous chapter, a brief mention here of how the joint constructions were formulated seems appropriate.

Once the transcripts of the data were ready, two matrices were created to show the relationship between the Director General’s leadership style and the respondents’ perceptions of him. The first matrix focused on the data from the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group to show the combined perceptions of the Director General on an individual basis. Then using the same data, another matrix was created to show the various responses on a departmental basis, as an alternative concept. The next step was to continue the process of data analysis. This led me to formulate a typology of the types of
perceptions, which the respondents appeared to have of the Director General. The main typologies were as follows. Firstly, the types of stories that paint a negative perception of the Director General. Secondly, those that paint a positive perception of him. Thirdly the types of stories that paint an ambivalent picture of the Director General. Lastly, those stories that are based on what the respondents have heard about Director General without even meeting him.

After prolonged deliberations and analysis my overall impression is that there appears to be remarkable consensus amongst the respondents in the study about their perceptions of the Director General. The matrix in Table 23 on the next page shows an overwhelming consensus in four principal areas. Respondents seem to hold the view that he is a visionary and an entrepreneur and some have concluded that such qualities have saved the BBC (see R33, R12 and R21 and their comments from the one-to-one interviews). However, they also regard him as autocratic, non-consultative, non-involving and a poor communicator (see also one-to-one interviews notes of R18, R27 and R30). The matrix also shows that most of the respondents from Production Directorate believe that he has a negative impact on talent and is directly responsible for the exodus of talent within the BBC (see for example R12 comments). To enhance the picture about the types of perceptions of the Director General it was felt necessary to present an overview of the respondents' perceptions of him in the form of a table. Table 23 on page 254 provides this general overview. The primary source of information was a selection of quotations from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire and is relatively self-explanatory.
Table 23  Showing a synopsis of an overview of the categorisation of the types of perceptions of the Director General by words and phrases
(a selection)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TYPES OF NEGATIVE PICTURE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL</th>
<th>TYPES OF POSITIVE PICTURE OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• He is distant and dictatorial. I hope he has the BBC at heart. I sometimes find his decisions odd (one-to-one interview R12)</td>
<td>• His visionary and entrepreneur qualities have saved the BBC (one-to-one interview R33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• He is very political and authoritarian and seems averse to criticisms</td>
<td>• He has got great vision because he has forced the BBC through a huge change (one-to-one interview R21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A strong advocate of the quasi-market philosophy. Forces through policies without consulting his staff. He does not even trust his Board of Management. (follow-up questionnaire RQ15)</td>
<td>• I think he has turned around the BBC for the next century (one-to-one interview R12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• He is extremely decisive but I don’t think he cares much about how he actually achieves it (one-to-one interview R13)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I feel that he is not someone I could relate to (one-to-one interviews R18)</td>
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**TYPES OF AMBIVALENT STORIES OF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The greatest leader since Lord Reith</th>
<th>But</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Clear sense of vision</td>
<td>• Remote and comes across as cold and aloof to people who don’t know him.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Single minded</td>
<td>• Can appear quite hostile and bullying in large groups. (one-to-one interview R35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduced new management practices (one-to-one interview R12)</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personally I do not like him because he is:</th>
<th>But</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Distant and aloof</td>
<td>His greatest strengths are that he is:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(one-to-one interview R12)</td>
<td>• A visionary and an entrepreneur</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prepared to grasp the nettle and take risks (one-to-one interview R12)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>He has a lot of short comings (one-to-one interview R33)</th>
<th>But</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• His radical vision has saved the BBC (one-to-one interview R33)</td>
</tr>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likes lots of data</th>
<th>But</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Clear and decisive about his vision and strategy</td>
<td>Personal style non-involving and non-communicative (one-to-one interview 18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(one-to-one interview R18)</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thoughtful, analytical and obsessed with data</th>
<th>But</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Not very personable and difficult to approach His chief executives are frightened of him (one-to-one interview R27)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(one-to-one interview R24)</td>
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<tr>
<th>Fully in tune with the external market (Focus group)</th>
<th>But</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Does not trust his board of management (Focus group)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On arrival he knew what had to be done in terms of economies and efficiencies (one-to-one interview R30)</th>
<th>But</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Has a massive insecurity, surrounds himself with people who agree with him</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Very defensive (one-to-one interview R39)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### TYPES OF TOTALLY NEGATIVE STORIES

<p>| | |</p>
<table>
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<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Annoys people by presenting the 1996 restructuring as a fait accompli. Strategy of closely guarded secret (one-to-one interview R22)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Autocratic and makes cosmetic gestures of consultation</td>
<td>(follow up questionnaire RQ6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• He is unbelievably remote from us, it is difficult to form an impression of him (one-to-one interview R19)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• He likes people to believe he takes on board their comments. I have never met the man but my underlying impression is that he has a fixed agenda (one-to-one interview R23)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• I have talked to people who have worked closely with him and my impression is that argument is stifled (one-to-one interview R24)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 22-on page 256 presents a graphic illustration of these reviews. The data for Figure 22 were generated from the same source as Table 23 i.e. the one-to-one interviews, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group. The figure portrays the Director General in the centre, with authority and legitimacy entrusted to him by the Board of Governors. This is particularly important in the context of the environment he was operating in, as discussed in Chapters 1-3, also equally important in the context of some of the issues raised in the literature review (Grundy (1977), Rowley (1997 and Mitchell et al (1997)). However, in Figure 22 on page 256 the classification does not differentiate between the various categorisation or typologies. This was a deliberate attempt to achieve simplicity
Figure 22 Respondents perception of the DG while maintaining the focus on the respondents' perceptions.

**Respondents perceptions of the Director General**

- Swift to clamp down on open criticisms
- Strong disciplinarian
- Visionary
- Distant
- Aversion to staff involvement
- Cares more about task than people
- Politically astute
- Rules by fear
- Awareness (high) of external threats
- Highly commercially aware
- Analytical
- Results oriented
- Entrepreneurial & risk taker
- Sees opportunities not obstacles
- Single minded
- Guts and determination to succeed
- Culture breaker
- Logical thinker
- Small circle of advisers
- Strong sense of urgency
- Focused on end goal
- Relies on expert power
- Not open to negative feedback
- Extremely decisive
- Not afraid to sack even his Board of Management
- Autocratic

**Traits/Qualities of the Director General Leadership Styles**

- through the eyes of the internal stake-holders (1998)
AN OVERVIEW OF THE TYPES OF PERCEPTIONS OF SENIOR MANAGEMENT

Perceptions of senior management by BBC staff are probably best illustrated by Table 24 on page 258 with its matrix showing the relationship of senior management from one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire. The matrix displays the seven key themes, viz poor communication, good communication, autocratic, more professional and business-like, lack of credibility, lack of feedback and indecisiveness. A cursory glance at the data shows only one respondent elected not to comment on the apparent poor skills of senior managers. Therefore, one may deduce that the majority believes that senior management is poor at communicating their strategies to their staff. The second column shows the split between those who do not. The third column shows one did not comment on the autocratic style of senior management. An inference that could be drawn from this is that staff regards senior management as very autocratic. The fourth column shows that in total 35 respondents commented on the fact that senior management is becoming more professional and business like. This may be indicative of the new ethos following the introduction of the changes since April 1993. In column 5 approximately 35 respondents from the total sample refer to the lack of credibility of senior managers. In column 6, 20 out of the 36 respondents remarked about the lack of feedback from senior management. In final, column 31 commented on the lack of credibility of senior management. All in all this paints a totally negative picture of the style of senior management in the BBC. This may be indicative of the general climate of change under the Director General’s leadership.
Table 24 Matrix showing relationship of respondents' perception of Senior Management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Poor Communication</th>
<th>Good Communication</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>More professional and business like</th>
<th>lacks credibility</th>
<th>Lack of feedback</th>
<th>Indecisiveness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Focus group</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One-to-one interviews</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
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258
| RQ3 | 2  | 0  | 2  | 6  | 4  | 4  | 2  |
| RQ4 | 2  | 0  | 4  | 6  | 2  | 4  | 2  |
| RQ5 | 3  | 0  | 4  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 4  |
| RQ6 | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 8  | 1  | 2  |
| RQ7 | 2  | 0  | 4  | 0  | 10 | 6  | 2  |
| RQ8 | 4  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 2  | 1  |
| RQ9 | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| RQ10| 4  | 0  | 10 | 0  | 10 | 4  | 1  |
| RQ11| 4  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 2  |
| RQ12| 4  | 0  | 4  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| RQ13| 4  | 0  | 3  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 2  |
| RQ14| 0  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 2  | 3  | 1  |
| RQ15| 0  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 4  | 1  |
| RQ16| 4  | 0  | 1  | 0  | 0  | 2  | 1  |
| RQ17| 2  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 0  | 4  | 1  |
| RQ18| 3  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 2  | 2  | 0  |
| RQ19| 2  | 0  | 2  | 0  | 0  | 0  | 0  |
| 525 | 349 | 505 | 428 | 382 | 341 | 127 |

Key: A score of "0" indicates that the respondent did not make a specific comment about this particular variable. However, where any score between "1" and "29" occurs this indicates the frequencies of the one line test unit which the respondent commented on in this particular variable. A text unit is a line or phrase where the respondent refers to that particular variable. Therefore, a text unit of 1 indicates only one reference to the variable, whereas 10 refers to the number of times the phrase has been mentioned. An alternative matrix is presented in Table 25 on the next page using the same data as Table 24 but depicting the perceptions of Senior Managers on a Department basis.
Table 25 Matrix showing relationships between respondent’s perceptions of Senior Management by Departments.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Documents</th>
<th>Poor communication</th>
<th>Good Communication</th>
<th>Autocratic</th>
<th>More professional and business like</th>
<th>lacks credibility</th>
<th>Lack of feedback</th>
<th>Indecisiveness</th>
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<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Key: A text unit refers to a phrase on single line reference to the variables in the 7 columns. As in the previous table the same principle for interpreting the data applies here. Therefore, “0” indicates no comment and a score of 1-300 indicates the frequencies with which a reference was made about the variable. Without trying to duplicate my previous comments, it is worth noting that the respondents in Science Department believe that their Senior Managers are excellent communicators and good role models although the same people believe that the rest of senior managers in the BBC are poor at communicating with their staff. Respondent R33 made a typical comment which summed up the positive perceptions of the Senior Management, (a middle manager in Science Department of the production Directorate), she said:

"I think this is a very well managed department because I think the face of the management appears to be approachable and fair and those are two key words. It is not that you don’t have to make tough decisions because you do but I think the management appears to be approachable and accountable" (one-to-one in interview R33).

This is a view which was shared by all the respondents from the Science Department who participated in the study.

Another area of the BBC that was singled out for praise about its effectiveness of communication and excellent leadership was the Broadcast Directorate. At least
two respondents, R34 and R38 from Broadcast Directorate, commented on the excellent communication skills of the chief Executive of Broadcast (Will Wyatt). They cited his series of Corporate Broadcast seminars which were held during 1998. They claimed that it was excellent for a variety of reasons. Firstly, that he took time out of his busy schedule to meet the staff in the work place to explain his future vision and strategy for Broadcast Directorate in the digital age. Secondly, he demonstrated that it was a priority. Thirdly, the sessions were interactive, interesting and engaging. Fourthly, the staff felt that they were involved in the process and they felt listened to. However, what is even more fascinating about this is that some of the staff who attended the seminars admitted that although they didn’t necessarily agree with all the changes, they felt that they understood the reason for it (see comments made by respondent R34 and R38 from the one-to one interviews).

Therefore, we have seen the range of negative perceptions of the style of leadership in the BBC, it is nevertheless reassuring to discover that there are rare pockets in the BBC where the staff holds their senior managers in high esteem because of what they described as excellent management skills. This was particularly in the areas of communicating the big picture, feedback skills, being accessible and approachable, being engaging and involving and making the staff feel valued (see respondents R33, R34, R38 comments).

However, it is amazing that such positive examples of good management practices do not seem to be diffused throughout the rest of the organisation. Instead we see the autocratic and non-consultative style of the Director General which seems to be mirrored by the rest of senior management. Therefore, in the next chapter we will seek to analyse the impact of his specific strategic policies and on the rest of the internal stakeholders through their lens. Before doing so let us briefly summarise the analysis so far.
SUMMARY

The original intention in this chapter was to conduct the analysis of the data with particular reference to the integrative model of organisational change (Figure 13 on page 100) which was derived from the literature review. Despite all the best of intentions and asking specific questions from the list of revised ones on pages 198-200, it became apparent that the respondents were more interested in aspects of the model which had a more profound impact upon them. The principal areas of their concern included the following: managerial actions, the specific impact of the DG’s policies on the staff, managerial cognitions and their perceptions of the change and how the change process affected their morale. The other areas where they seemed interested in discussing were, organisational outcomes and both the positive and negative aspects of the policies; their lack of involvement in the change process and the views about such exclusion by top management (other multiple stakeholders influences). We have also seen from the data that they were fully in tune with the variety of external environmental assessments which the BBC had undertaken and were able to cite a wide range of examples. Yet they were not keen to discuss these issues in any detail because they were not able to make the connections with local initiatives in their work unit. Throughout the study it was also apparent that the staff did not know what the strategic vision was for the BBC and could not see its relevance to their day to day activity. Therefore, although I was unable to get the respondents to give equal weighting in their responses to my research questions in relation to the model, I feel that I have gained an excellent insight into what mattered to them most. Consequently, the result of the study is a “true reflection” of their own constructions of their perceptions of the change process in the BBC. As a result the subsequent categorisation and common themes, which emerged from the analysis of the data, were a combination of aspects of the original change model and some of the respondent’s agenda.

The main categorisations and typologies which emerged were managerial actions, perceptions of DG’s leadership style and his senior managers, organisational outcomes, intended and unintended consequences and the effects of specific on morale etc. The overall impression from the data analysis indicated
that the Director General and his senior managers were perceived as fairly
negative and this was directly attributed to their autocratic style of leadership.
However, there were illustrations of positive perceptions of senior management in
both Broadcast Directorate and the Science Department of Productions. Yet, this
model of successful management practice was not diffused throughout the rest of
the BBC. The reason for this is fairly complex but perhaps we should explore the
effects of these policies on the staff in the next chapter, to see what conclusions
could be drawn from the study.

Thus in reflecting back to the original model there are a number of observations
that could be made of the change process in the BBC. It would perhaps be more
appropriate to address these issues in Chapter Seven after the analysis is
completed. Nevertheless, it would probably suffice here to say that out of the six
variables in the model, some yielded more data than others about what the
respondents regarded as important to them. From an in-depth analysis it seemed
evident that they regarded managerial actions, organisational outcomes,
managerial cognitions and other multiple stakeholder influences as having the
most profound impact on them, whereas the other two variables were not
accorded the same degree of importance as the others. This was evident from the
findings of the study. Therefore, after a further reassessment of the model in the
light of some of the emerging themes was somewhat struck by some of the
similarities between the respondents’ perceptions of the change and some
aspects of the Kubler-Ross (1997) transition curve. As a result of this
retrospective discovery I was forced to shift the emphasis away from the original
model and was drawn towards the path of exploring the Kubler-Ross model and
its implications for the findings and the future management of change. The
downside meant that I was not able to pursue the original model to its ultimate
conclusion but this is probably symptomatic of the problem which some
researchers are constantly having to face in dealing with the real world where
certain conclusions cannot always be anticipated beforehand. It is against this
background of having to address the harsh reality of the real world that some
adjustments were made to accommodate unforeseen events.

Nevertheless, the sad irony is that during the literature review stage, I tended to
gloss over models and theories of change like the Kubler Ross, which dealt with
the individual's emotional response to change. I felt it sounded too much like therapy from my own view point and adopted the attitude that the staff in general should be grateful for a job and should stop the moaning and get on with it. As a result I was more interested in the literature on organisational change which focused on hard data and those that offered 'quick fix' solutions to the management of change as espoused by normative theorists such as Burke-Litwin (1992). My subsequent conversion to the human aspects of change school along the lines as espoused by the Kubler-Ross model was somewhat late but, nevertheless an illuminating experience. This was prompted by analysis of the data and first hand accounts of the respondents during the one-to-one interviews and the focus group as I listened intently to the passion in the voices as they described their experience of the change process. This was rather surprising from my own perspective, because, prior to the commencement of the study, I knew some of the respondents quite well through my role as a change practitioner over 11 years in the BBC. During that time I regarded them as confident, assertive and not afraid to speak their minds about things which had a profound impact on their values. The research findings have exposed the flaws in my original assumptions to a certain degree. Finally, in retrospect, I feel that the quality of information gained from doing the research could only have been obtained by the naturalistic inquiry methodology as opposed to the conventional inquiry method. As a result an attempt will be made in the latter part of the ensuing chapter to explore this more fully in tandem with the Kubler-Ross (1997) model of change.

However, before doing so, the section will begin with an exploration of the effects of these policies on the staff.
CHAPTER 7 - ANALYSIS: EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC POLICIES OF THE DG

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this chapter is to continue telling the story of the change process by specifically looking at the effects of the implementation of specific policies and interventions of the Director General through the lens of the staff. The format for this chapter will be as follows: The first section will be an examination of the negative effects of the policies, particularly in relation to low morale, the psychological impacts, the impact of managerial actions and that of the style of management. The second section will focus on the positive effects of the policies particularly in relation to high morale. The third section will assess the consequences of those policies from their perspective before bringing together the overall different types of stories that exist. Before doing so, let us develop an overview of the different perceptions of morale as seen through the lens of the respondents.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS ON MORALE

The issue of low morale was identified by respondents as one of the key consequences of the specific policies of the Director General. However, before examining this in more detail, an attempt will be made to present a general overview of the respondents' types of perceptions of morale.

The matrix in Table 26 on page 266 shows a comparison between the respondents who described their morale as being either low, high or OK, using the data from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire.
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<th>ok morale</th>
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<tr>
<td>R32</td>
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<td>R33</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>R39</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key:** A score of 0 indicates that respondents did not regard that particular aspect of morale as being directly applicable to them. Conversely a score of 1 describes the respondent's personal state of morale during the study. Section (A) shows perceptions of the 15 respondents in the focus group, Section (B) shows the perceptions of the 19 respondents in the follow-up questionnaire and section (C) one-to-one interviews, R refers to respondents. So, R1 refers to respondent R1, and R1-R39 indicates 39 respondents. The total number of respondents for the one-to-one interviews was 39, the focus group had 15 and the follow-up questionnaire had only 19. The symbol RQ1 indicates respondent who participated in the questionnaire. Therefore RQ1-RQ19 indicates 19 respondents who participated in the follow-up questionnaire. In the categories, which show a “1” in more that one column, this indicates an ambivalent response. For example a score of “1” under low morale and “1” under high morale indicates where the respondent said “yes”, morale is low in some areas but my personal morale at the moment is very high, or vice versa.

If we examine the data in the matrix for the focus group in the first column a score of 15 shows that there was a total consensus amongst the group that their morale was low at the time the session was conducted. However, the follow-up questionnaire in section B only one respondent out of 19 described their morale as being high. The remaining 18 described it as being low. In the third section the one-to-one interviews, 19 of 39 described their morale as low, a total of 16 described theirs as high, and 13 described theirs as being OK. There were three instances where respondents described morale both as being high and low.
However, it is interesting to note that all the respondents from the Science Department in the one-to-one interview, with the exception of R12, described their morale as being high (viz R13, R14, R17, R19, R22, R24, R26, R33, R36, R37). The overall impression from the matrix shows that while morale was low amongst the respondents, the perceptions were mixed amongst those who participated in the one-to-one interviews or focus group.

THE EFFECTS OF SPECIFIC POLICIES ON LOW MORALE.

The arguments presented in this section are based on the analysis of the data from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire. It became apparent that some of the respondents had some strong feelings about the reasons why they were experiencing low morale. In using the NUDIST software programme, the data was coded to show the three categories of morale which were identified by the respondents, viz code (211) for low morale, code (212) OK morale and code (213) for high morale. Once these categories were established, further analysis was done to identify some common themes or higher order levels in the information of a meta-plan to map out their reasons for low morale. Once the various themes were identified and mapped another subset of codings was created for each category.

Table 27 on page 269 gives an overview of the negative effects of the specific policies on low morale by key categories and sub-categories.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Codes - REASONS FOR LOW MORALE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<tr>
<td>201937</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII</td>
</tr>
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<td>20129</td>
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<tr>
<td>20134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20118</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 27 shows an overview of effects on morale of the specific policies by key groupings and sub groupings. It shows reasons for low morale as the broad category. The following clusters and their sub-groupings accompany this: work pressures, specific policy initiatives, managerial actions, psychological aspects and style of management, identity and miscellaneous categories.

**RESPONDENTS’ RATIONALE FOR PERCEPTIONS OF LOW MORALE**

The rationale given by the respondents for perceiving their morale as being low are many and varied. Therefore, an attempt will be made here to just focus on a selected few in order to contain the data. The vehicle for exploring their rationale will focus principally on the selected quotes made by some respondents to show the types of consensus of their joint constructions.

In commenting on the effect of the policies on low morale during the one-to-one interviews this is what respondent R2, a junior manager from Premises Management Department in the Resources Directorate, had to say:

"At the moment it is not very good. I would say I’m quite typical. I like working for the beeb. I’m a proper person. I went away and came back. It has changed a lot and it is just so different you felt as if you had friends here, real friends. You’d leave home and you’d come here, not to say you didn’t do a day’s work, but you had people that you could rely on, people who were really knowledgeable, people that had a lot of experience that you could go to for help. A lot of people now don’t have enough time to gain experience in one area before they’re moved on, or they move themselves on. I think there is a quicker turn around of staff and people move along much quicker now, whereas before you had time to build a really good relationship with other people that you worked with”

(One-to-one interview 1988 R8)

There was remarkable consensus among the respondents on issue of frequent changes. A typical comment, which highlighted the problem as they perceived it, came from R4, a middle manager in the Premises management Department within Resources Directorate. He said:

"We’re frustrated now because we’ve had so many management changes
which hinder the department and its technology moving forward. Each new manager/head of department wants time to find out about the department, what has and hasn’t worked. Once they are in a position to make a decision to move things on, there is no money or they move on and we get another manager. New management is slowing it up because they put it on hold everytime they change the management” (one-to-one interview 1998 R4).

Another typical comment about the constant change, staff cuts, work pressure and demands, pressure to learn new skills and the contract culture was summed up by respondent R20, a Human Resources Manager from Glasgow in the Production Directorate. He said:

“I think it would be fair to say morale is not that high. I think there has been an awful lot of change and with that change there’s been an awful lot of cuts. I think you’ll find that the staff are being asked to do more and more with less back up. I think that’s certainly caused a bit of reduction in morale to be honest with you. So, I think there is a problem there, because of constant pressure, year in year out, with cut backs and there comes a time when you wonder how can you keep on delivering this output with these staff cuts. Also, with this new technology which is coming on board you have to take on all these new skills as well. Moreover, because of the contract culture. I suppose some staff are scared to take risks in case their contract is not renewed if they are not successful. So they tend to play it safe and avoid taking risk” (one-to-one interview 1998 R20).

In analysing the data, there is also consensus with the above statement from all the key areas in the study. Hence, the reason for selecting this particular one is because it also encapsulate what others expressed but in a more succinct way.

In commenting on the effects of restructuring there was also consensus among respondents of its impact on morale. Respondent R36, a junior manager from Science Department in the Production Directorate, described his perceptions of morale in another department the following way:

“Morale in Resources is extremely low because of salami-slicing, cut! Cut! Cut!” (One-to-one interview 1998 R36).
Other respondents echoed these sentiments. For example, according to respondent R33, a middle manager in the Science Department:

"In other departments where I have worked I think people have found it quite wearing because it's the constant theme of having to salami slice, year after year because if you end up having to do it for the 7th or 8th year in a row it does become wearing" (one-to-one interviews 1998 R33).

Another instance where there was consensus amongst the respondents was in relation to their perceptions of the split between the Production and Broadcast Directorates which was announced in 1996. In describing the impact on morale, respondent R15, a senior manager in education claimed that:

"The various major shifts that have been, such as the Production and Commissioning split and the internal market, have caused great dislocation and great unhappiness. It has undermined job security which is a big morale driver and once you have insecurity morale drops".

Finally on this specific point it is worth noting that an analysis of the data shows consensus amongst most of the respondents who express deep fear that the BBC will eventually end up like a Commissioning House e.g. ITV. (See comments of respondents R13, R15, R24, R30, R36, R36.)

In relation to the lack of respect for staff as a consequence of the specific policies respondent R12, a junior manager from the Science Department, reflected the typical consensus on this subject when she said:

"I think morale has been permanently dented although I think that there are people who are still very proud to work for the BBC, but I don't think its a two way thing anymore. I don't think there is a sense that the BBC recognises its staff or respects its staff's abilities in the way it used to. I think that is a casualty of the changes" (one-to-one interviews 1998 R12).

These sentiments were widely echoed by others. For example, this is what respondent R8, a middle manager from the Premises Management, had to say about the lack of respect:
"I think the respect has gone for individuals, they’re all very cut throat now. Maybe they were competitive in the past on the broadcasting side but they, perhaps, had a little more opportunity to take risks. The fun side of business seems to have gone. Maybe that is a little bit to do with my age and a certain amount of cynicism" (one-to-one interviews 1998 R8).

On the question of job insecurity, there was also consensus amongst the respondents who directly attributed such perception to the effects of the specific policies. For example respondent RQ15, a middle manager in Religious Programmes Department, made a typical comment, when he said:

"Morale is very low because of lack of job security and the way managers treat their staff" (follow-up questionnaire 1998 RQ15).

In commenting on the relentless pressure of the workload as a result of the changes, again there was consensus among the respondent, but respondent RQ14, a middle manager in the Training Department of the Personnel Directorate, appropriately summed it up, when he said:

"Morale in my area is very low because of total managerial insensitivity and an inability to empathise with my own position. I feel overworked and no one seems to care about me. The severe cuts have caused me great stress and I am at breaking point" (follow up questionnaire 1998 RQ14, also see RQ12).

The aim of this section was to explore a selection of quotes about the negative effects of the policies on low morale. In the ensuing section the focus will be on the positive effects of the policies in relation to high morale.

**POSITIVE EFFECTS OF THE POLICIES ON HIGH MORALE**

Despite the apparent persuasiveness of the negative effects of the policies on lowering morale from the analysis of the data, we have also seen at least 16 out of 38 respondents from the one-to-one interviews who describe their morale as being high and which is well documented in Table 28 with a matrix and comparisons of perceptions between low morale, high morale and OK morale.
To avoid duplication the focus here will be to explore some of the typology of high morale and the reasons for them. Another conscious decision was made here to follow a similar format as in the previous section by the use of a matrix to give an overview of the groupings. Then further exploration and analysis of the quotes, which explained the rationale for high morale, followed this up.

Table 28 on page 275 displays the matrix to show the main themes or groupings of high morale, followed by sub-groupings which elaborate on this. It is derived from an analysis of the data from the one-to-one interviews, the focus group and the follow-up questionnaire after the transcripts were first inputted into the NUDIST database. After several deliberations and continuous analysis of the data some of the key categories of the high morale were identified and given a coding from the NUDIST programme. The coding for high morale was (202) and the main themes or categories identified were as follows: external factors, being successful, style of leadership, efficiency measures, improved management and miscellaneous. Once the categorisation of high morale was completed some sub-categories or groupings were further created for each category and they too were given individual coding, using the NUDIST programme.
Table 28 Overview of results showing effects by key groupings of high morale

**Codes REASONS FOR HIGH MORALE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Reason</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>2021</td>
<td>EXTERNAL FACTORS</td>
<td>devolution factor in Scotland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>vibrant and expanding department.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2022</td>
<td>BEING SUCCESSFUL</td>
<td>great opportunities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>like working on my programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td></td>
<td>lots of commissions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>feel good factor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>high audience figures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>broadcast in the driving seat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>STYLE OF LEADERSHIP</td>
<td>good management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>dynamic leadership in Science Department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>former of Head of Science Department fantastic and pioneering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>new Head of Science Department is great at giving feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>autonomy to do what we want</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>good communication from senior management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td></td>
<td>manager keeps staff abreast of change and reasons for it</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td></td>
<td>good career structure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28 above shows a similar format to the previous Table 29 on page 276. The reasons for high morale are illustrated as the main heading then a series of groupings with the sub-groupings viz: external factors, being successful, style of leadership. The aim was to present an overview of the effects of the policies on high morale to give a clearer picture of each category and to explore some of the relevant quotations which give the rationale for staff’s perceptions of high morale. The claims of high morale were mainly predominant among the respondents from the Science Department during the one-to-one interviews. Subsequent analysis showed that they attributed this to a number of factors, such as the dynamic and charismatic leadership of Jana Benet (the former Head of Department) effective communication skills, being approachable, autonomy, regular feedback and the success of the department in winning commissions for its programmes. Therefore, it maybe useful here to explore a few of these quotes from the
respondents. Respondent R17, a senior manager in the Science Department, said:

"Morale in the Science Department seems quite high at the moment because we are an expanding organisation. Opportunities are coming up; people are able to do their jobs. There is a certain amount of frustration within the Science Department but on the whole, people are able to do what they want to do and are given opportunities to do them" (one-to-one interview 1998, R19).

Another typical comment, which reflects this consensus of high morale within Science Department, was appropriately summed up by R14, a middle manager in the Science Department, when she said:

"There are lots of things being commissioned. We are in a career structure which is good. The success of our department is largely due to Jana Benet, our former Head of Science department. She was fantastic and had a pioneering way about her and she could see that science has become quite trendy. Glynwyn Benson, her successor, people thought, she is great she visits my workplace and gives regular feedback".

(One-to-one interview 1998) (See also R13, R17, R19, R22, R24, R26, R33, R37 from Science Department one-to-one transcripts on R34 and R38 from Broadcast.)

Interestingly, R34 who is a middle manager in the Training Department of Broadcast, and respondent R38, also a middle manager in Personnel from this same Directorate, also expressed similar sentiments about the reasons for high morale within the Broadcast Directorate. It is perhaps useful in passing to say that they identified Will Wyatt, the Chief Executive in Broadcast Directorate as the main person who was responsible for creating an environment of high morale. They specifically attributed this to his excellent communication skills in conveying his future vision and strategy to the staff. He also took time out to visit his staff in their workplace, held regular seminars to communicate his message, treated it as a priority and above all made it iterative by involving the staff. (R34 and R38 one-to-one interview).
TYPES OF POSITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CHANGE

The now well established pattern of previous sections in analysing the data by means of the introduction of tables and quotations is continued here to analyse positive consequences of change. Once the data was entered into the NUDIST data base it was further analysed and a series of higher order level themes were created and coded. The main categories which emerged were as follows: efficiency measures, improved management and miscellaneous. Subsequently, some further sub-categories were created for the main category and coded in a similar fashion. Table 29 below shows the types of positive consequences and their sub-categories.

Table 29 Positive consequences of the change

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27 1</th>
<th>Efficiency measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 1 11</td>
<td>sacking poor performers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 12</td>
<td>cost saving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 12</td>
<td>more money for programme making from savings on resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 13</td>
<td>getting rid of the 'deadwood'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 14</td>
<td>better performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 15</td>
<td>better financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 16</td>
<td>better and tighter monitoring and control of budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 17</td>
<td>greater openness and accountability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 18</td>
<td>a more rigorous financial system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 19</td>
<td>budget holders heightened awareness of cost and its implications</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27 1 3</th>
<th>IMPROVED MANAGEMENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 1 3 1</td>
<td>more professional managers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 3 2</td>
<td>better performance management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 3 4</td>
<td>clearer key performance indicators</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 3 5</td>
<td>appraisal process a key part of performance management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 27 1 3 6 | the new people joining the BBC tend to develop a more positive attitude to the change |
| 27 1 3 7 | more competent managers |
| 27 1 3 8 | opportunity to acquire new skills |
| 27 1 3 9 | got promoted and enjoy the power that comes with the job |
| 27 1 4 0 | positive challenge to embrace |
| 27 1 4 1 | opportunity to become more business like |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>27 1 5</th>
<th>MISCELLANEOUS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 1</td>
<td>BBC's future is secured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 2</td>
<td>enjoys flexible ways of working</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 3</td>
<td>enjoys consistency across the BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 4</td>
<td>better communication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 5</td>
<td>greater openness and accountability to the licence fee payers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 6</td>
<td>better focus and direction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 8</td>
<td>opportunities for multi-skilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 1 5 9</td>
<td>enthusiastic about the change</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The code (271) refers to efficiency measures being one of the main categories of reasons for high morale, and (27111) is a sub-code of this showing poor performance as an example of efficiency measures.
In commenting on the efficiency measures brought about by the change, respondent R12, a junior manager from the Science Department in Productions, said the following:

"I think that there is now much more pressure to get rid of the deadwood. I think when I joined there were people doing their jobs in whatever area, be it film editing or providing and they'd been there for years. They got their role and that was where they stayed. Now that doesn't happen, it seems if people aren't delivering then there's much more of a turnover, which I think is far healthier. I think it is a positive thing" (one-to-one interview 1998 R12).

Others echoed these sentiments. For example respondent R6, a middle manager in Premises Management of the Resources Directorate, made the following claims during the one-to-one interview:

"It seems that since 1993 ("Producer Choice") people are more financially aware of what they've got. Prior to 1993 you could buy anything you wanted. There wasn't the financial constraints on you, although there is still waste as well just now. Prior to 1993 there was always this view that you have got a bottomless pit of cash and if you were told at the end of the financial year that you had overspent the thought from me and my friends was, so what" (one-to-one interviews 1998 R6).

Others made similar comments regarding the demonstrable benefits of "Producer Choice". In endorsing this particular viewpoint respondent R35, a Senior Human Resource Manager in Production said:

"I'm quite clear about the "Producer Choice" thing. It is to do with transparency so we knew what the cost of a programme is, it is to do with demonstrating to government that we are getting ourselves fit and efficient, because charter renewal is in the offing and it is about driving down the cost of resources. And then the latest split, the Broadcast and Production split was about driving down the cost of production" (one-to-one interview 1998 R35).

Another typical comment with regard to the threat posed by the Conservative Government, vis-à-vis the BBC's need to be more efficient, which reflected further
consensus amongst the respondents was appropriately summed up by respondents R18 and R30. According to respondent R18, a Human Resources Manager in News Directorate:

"I think that the government at the time, with the Director General coming to the BBC, was pretty determined that the BBC was not going to carry on existing in the way that it had done over the last 50 years plus. I think that the Director General successfully convinced them that it was changing in a direction that they would find acceptable at the speed which they would find acceptable and that's why we got our charter renewed and we are carrying on being funded by the licence fee" (one-to-one interview 1998 R18)

Respondent R30, a middle manager in the Training Department, shared the central thrust of this perspective, when he said the following:

"In so far as, in terms of the bigger picture, he has allowed the BBC to survive, and there was a time when it looked as if we were in serious trouble, but now we were seem to be managing ourselves in a more cost effective way. Bearing in mind it wasn't our money, it was the licence fee payer's money and therefore government had responsibility to make sure the BBC was not seen as an unproductive, badly managed, badly organised organisation. In other words, if we couldn't put our house in order the BBC may not have had a future. In that respect, it has been successful" (one-to-one interview 1998 R30).

These examples reflect the widespread consensus amongst respondents on the positive consequences of the effects of the policy. However, the list is much more comprehensive than the impression given above but a decision was made to limit the examples in order to contain the data.

NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE POLICIES

The methods used for deriving the various categories and sub-categories for this section were arrived at through the lengthy process of continuous data analysis. Initially, after a comprehensive analysis of the data was carried out, the key themes were identified and coded using the NUDIST software package. Following
that process the sub categories were created and coded to get a better understanding of the rationale behind the respondents' perceptions of the negative consequences of the policies. Table 30 below, shows the culmination of that process.

**Table 30  Negative Consequences**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CODES</th>
<th>NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES (GENERAL)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 1</td>
<td>Resistance to continual change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 2</td>
<td>Staff turnover and redundancy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3</td>
<td>PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 1</td>
<td>Loss of commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 2</td>
<td>Future uncertainties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 3</td>
<td>Lack of job security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 4</td>
<td>Low morale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 6</td>
<td>No career prospects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 7</td>
<td>Family vs career</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 8</td>
<td>Lack of team spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 9</td>
<td>Destruction of the family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 10</td>
<td>Fear of criticising the policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 11</td>
<td>Fear of risk taking</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 3 12</td>
<td>Disillusionment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4</td>
<td>MANAGERIAL ACTION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4 1</td>
<td>Lack of staff recognition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4 2</td>
<td>Poor managerial communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4 3</td>
<td>Fragmentation of the BBC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4 4</td>
<td>Staff resentment due to lack of involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 4 5</td>
<td>Director General not trusted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2725</td>
<td>ALL ACTIVITIES COST DRIVEN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 6</td>
<td>Loss of creative talent and knowledge base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 7</td>
<td>Head count still high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 8</td>
<td>Press leaks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 9</td>
<td>Work pressures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 10</td>
<td>De-skilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 11</td>
<td>Only interested in small picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 2 5 12</td>
<td>Decline in programme quality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The code (272) represents a category of negative consequences and code (2721) indicates resistance to continual change as a type of such consequences. The process is repeated below.

To get a flavour of the types of comments made and the rationale behind each, let us review a few of the questions from the data.

During the focus group, which was held in Manchester with the Religious Programmes Department, when I asked the group a specific question about their perceptions of the negative consequences of the change, one respondent said:

"I joined the BBC because of my belief in public service broadcasting. I liked the values which it stood for and the fact that I was allowed to be creative in the types of programmes which I made for the public. Performing such service for the public is like a vocation, such as the nursing profession, but today I no longer feel committed to the organisation and what it stands for" (focus group 1998).

When I put this to the group to give their reactions to this middle manager's comments, they all agreed with her. Their comments triggered a very lively and passionate debate amongst the participants and I was really moved by the emotions in their voices. Thus, for a brief moment, I felt myself empathising with their deep emotions which rather shocked me because of my previously held belief that the change was long over due. Furthermore, the BBC was under no obligation to give anyone a job for life anymore.

Another typical comment, which reflected consensus within the group, and was directly related to a feeling of disillusionment with the change came from respondent R12, a junior manager in the Science Department, who said:

"I feel totally disconnected from the Director General and his bigger picture. I am more interested in my day to day projects in my Department, therefore, I just get my head down and do my best for my Department" (One-to-one interview (R12).

Respondent R2, an administrative assistant in Premises Department, expressed this sense of detachment and alienation somewhat differently. In making comparison with the old and the new BBC she said:
"To me the BBC is almost a shell compared to what it was before. When you came to work every day you used to be more together with your colleagues, more teamwork and everyone would be helpful. We were quite happy to come to work early or to work late in the evenings. We socialised more, whether we had a good week or a bad week, at the end of it we would unwind on the Friday with a little drink at the bar or maybe open a glass of wine in the office. I find now everyone just comes in and gets the work done and goes home. No one is interested, no one wants to know” (one-to-one interview R2).

This sense of disconnection and fear of losing one's job was a universal theme amongst the respondents and a comment which appropriately summed it up was made by respondent R6, a middle manager in Premises Management Department. He said:

"I think a lot of people are frightened at times, they don't want to speak their mind. Some do but there's a few that don't. I've probably changed over the years, I do tend to bite my tongue a bit more now. I think people are a bit frightened to speak their minds. I don't think this is just in the BBC because it is the same everywhere. It is hard outside you've got to be able to keep your job" (one-to-one interview 1998 R2).

He also went on to articulate another general theme amongst the group when he gave his views about management style and risk taking. He said:

"Some managers rule by fear as well, they tend to shout at us quite a lot. They don't tolerate mistakes and I think ultimately because you do not want to make mistakes you don't take any risks. You don't take chances; you don't want to innovate. You just do the standard routine work and you don't want to try too hard at times in case it backfires on you. The ultimate consequence is that you could lose you job" (one-to-one interview 1998 R2).

These views are widely reflected in the comments of the respondents. On the question of talent retention respondent RQ8, an external consultant and former BBC executive, articulated a view which was mirrored amongst the group of respondents in commenting on the loss of key staff he said:
“There is a continuing lack of rare talent, a departure from the public service ethos. There is a gross wastage of the BBC Resources. Moreover, there is an internal market that doesn’t work.” (Follow-up questionnaire 1988, RQ8).

There were other more widespread comments reflecting their general attitude to the change. A typical comment was summed up by RQ16 when he said:

“Some have been resistant of the way the change was imposed from above but are careful to avoid public criticism in case they get the sack” (follow-up questionnaire RQ16).

REFLECTIONS

The overall impression one gets from reviewing the above data leaves me with a deep sense of sadness because of an overwhelming sense of dismay and despondency on the part of the staff. Although, I must hasten to add, that there were also some encouraging signs, especially in Table 28, which gives a detailed breakdown for reasons for high morale and also Table 29 which looks at the positive consequences of the change.

Conversely, if we examine Table 27 the list of reasons given by the respondents for their low morale and Table 30, which details the types of negative consequences of the change seems very depressing indeed. Although, it is not my intention here to reproduce the tables again I consider it is important enough to remind the reader of the salient points. Therefore, in the interest of brevity, the results of the findings demonstrates that staff’s experience was one of alienation, exclusion, resentment, frustration, depression, stress, confusion, anger, sense of betrayal, bewilderment, lack of self confidence, fear of taking risks, benign resignation, fear of publicly criticising the policy, lack of communication, feeling of being disconnected from the big picture, fear of job security and self doubts about being able to cope in the new environment.

Some of the feelings expressed above appear to be characteristic of the types which an individual may experience during the transition period following bereavement of a loved one (Kubler-Ross (1997)). From an individual
perspective, the model is also useful because of its emphasis on the human aspects of change and its practical suggestions for helping individuals through a traumatic period. The more I reviewed the research data the more I was able to draw some parallels between her concepts of the bereavement process and the impact of the change on the BBC staff. However, in retrospect, I feel that the Director General’s style of management seem to run counter to her model and suggestions for managing personal transition following bereavement where she argues the case for allowing a period of mourning as part of the healing process. The analysis of the data from the study showed that the staff had to make a big leap from their current state to embracing the new ways of working under the new organisation, with its new ethos, without being given appropriate time and help to come to terms with the new environment. The Director General’s leadership style also ran counter to Bridges (1995) suggestions for the management of change during the period of transition. According to him:

“It isn’t the changes that do you in, it’s the transitions. Change is not the same as transition. Change is situational: the new site, the new boss, the new team, the new policy. Transition is the psychological process people go through to come to terms with the new situation. Change is external, transition is internal” Bridges (1995:3).

Consequently, in highlighting this distinction between these two factors he argued that their important differences should not be overlooked. Then he sought to clarify this by stating:

“Transition is different. The starting point is not the outcome but the ending that you will have to make to leave the old situation behind. Situational changes hinge on the new thing but psychological transitions depend on letting go of the old reality and the old identity you had before the change took place. Nothing so undermines organisational change as the failure to think through who will have to let go of what when change occurs” (Bridge (1995:4)).

In essence he identifies three distinct phases. The first phase described is transition as the “Ending”, the second is the “Neutral Zone” and the third is the “Beginning”. However, they should not be seen as discrete or separate stages with clearly defined boundaries but rather as overlapping and more complex than
the suggestion above. In trying to explain this model in the context of having to manage non-stop organisational change he claimed it was analogous to someone conducting an orchestra.

According to him:

"You have to keep track of the different sequences of notes, some starting and others stopping. While keeping a sense of the whole piece, you have to shift your attention from one section to another. It is important for you to have - or to create - an overarching design to the symphony of change. Without such an overall design, every little change will sound like an unrelated melody that must be started or stopped without regard to the music" (Bridges (1995:71)).

The significance of Bridges contribution was particularly useful because it offered real practical guidance for managers and their staff in coping with the various stages of the transition period.

The gist of his ideas are summarised below:

- Managers should recognise the importance of who is losing what and should not be surprised by over-reactions from the staff

- give people information and do it again and again

- clearly define what is over and what isn’t

- treat people with respect

During the Ending phase, he suggested:

- signal a break from the past by some symbolic action

- show how endings ensure continuity with what matters in future

In helping people through the Neutral Zone managers should do some of the following:

- communicate to maintain connection
• communicate to show concern

• communicate the purpose, the picture, the plan and the part the staff have to play in the process.

Finally, his recommendations for helping staff to cope with the organisation during the final phase (i.e. the Beginning) are as follows:

This involves a range of measures which managers must take to help and support staff in coming to terms with the new organisational culture and new way of working. Some of these may include:

• learning new competencies

• being encouraged to take calculated risks

• mentoring and establishing support networks etc., to assist one another in the initial stages of adapting to the new environment.

Therefore, if we assume here for one moment that there is some grain of truth in what Bridges (1995), is suggesting then very few of these measures were adopted by the DG. Moreover, the measures were only token gestures which were only taken at a very late stage in the day and on a retrospective basis. Nevertheless, the level of staff resistance to the policy had escalated to such a high point that all subsequent valiant PR attempts to rectify the situation failed dismally.

The results of the data clearly showed how the staff felt about the change. It was the transition, not the change, that they were fighting against. They resisted the loss of their identity and their world and the disorientation experienced during the neutral zone. Moreover, their expression of fears of the risk of failing in the new beginning and resented their exclusion and alienation from the process. These are all factors which the Director General failed to take into account in introducing the change programme within the BBC.

From my standpoint as “researcher, insider and change practitioner”, (Gummesson 1991) my hunch is that the staff’s experience of the change process
may have been somewhat different if he had taken cognisance of some of the points debated above.

This is not to deny the fact that there are staff in the BBC who have embraced the change enthusiastically and are 100% supportive of the Director General and his modus operandi for a variety of reasons. As shown in tables 28 and 29 respectively on the positive impact of the change, it might be helpful to explore this a bit more fully. The analysis showed that some felt that they had benefited from the change by gaining promotion and greater responsibilities; some admitted to liking change because the BBC had become too stuck in its ways. (See R16, R19, R25, R28, R33, R34, and R38 for comments from the one-to-one interviews)

Furthermore the new staff who had joined the BBC recently, or soon after the change process was in progress, seemed to embrace the change and adopt a very positive attitude towards it. In fact, some of them were brought in specifically as professional accountants, management accountants, marketing, PR, business experts and strategists to assist with the programme.

There were two other categories that seemed to have developed a positive attitude to the change. One of those came from Science Department and they attributed their positive stance to the success of the department in winning commissions and a dynamic and charismatic former Head of Department, who was entrepreneurial, an excellent communicator, with good people skills, approachable, who provided regular feedback, was innovative, encouraged creativity and gave autonomy etc. (see comments from one-to-one interviews of R12, R13, R14, R17, R19, R22, R24, R26, R33, R36, R37). The respondents from this area also stated that their former Head of Department had an excellent group of senior managers who had similar qualities to hers. She was a perfect role model for everyone. They also said that their new manager was also very good. The other group of positive respondents was the staff from Broadcast Directorate, who spoke very highly of their Chief Executive, Will Wyatt. They claimed that he was excellent at communicating his strategic vision and policy to his staff. He had an engaging and involving style and demonstrated that he had time for his staff. (See comments from the one-to-one interviews of R34 and R38). Such compliments about senior management style are pretty rare in the BBC from
my experience of conducting the study and also as an insider and change practitioner who has lived through the entire process from the very start.

The sad irony is that such positive experience and good practice are not translated or diffused throughout the organisation. Professor Edgar Schein highlighted this point in a lecture at Henley Management College in 1997 on the theme of "On Organisational Learning." (An unpublished paper by Schein (1997)). However, from a research perspective, it is interesting to note that although some of the staff in the Science Department have been ecstatic about the department's success and its senior management style this is a view which does not extend to the staff at the lower levels, i.e.: assistant producers, researchers, production assistants, unit managers and secretaries. (See R12, R13, R17 and R35).

The reasons for the above may be somewhat complex and outside the scope of this thesis. In trying to relate the findings to the change model one may conclude that managerial actions and the corresponding organisational outcomes appear to have played a fairly crucial role in shaping the nature and direction of the change programme in the BBC. This certainly confirms some of the earlier findings in Chapter Six.

Therefore from a research perspective, despite some initial difficulties with giving the respondents the freedom to tell their story I believe that this flexibility has enabled me to obtain some useful data about understanding the change process in the BBC. The section that follows provides a general summary of the chapter.

SUMMARY

We began the analysis of the data in Chapter 6 with a general introduction explaining the limitations of the integrative model in studying organisational change processes from a naturalistic perspective. This was followed by an explanation of why the bulk of the data analysis seemed to focus on the actions of the DG and his Senior Managers. It also explained why the emphasis was placed on key issues to do with staff perceptions of morale and the impact of managerial actions on their working lives in the BBC. We described the coding process and explained how matrices were created and the rationale for using them as the basis for the subsequent analysis of the data from the one-to-one interviews,
follow up questionnaire and the focus group. This was followed by an overview of
the types of perception, which the respondents had of the Director General and
his senior management. This enabled me to create a typology of their perception,
which was explored in great detail. The order in which these perceptions were
analysed are listed below

Firstly, the types of stories which painted a negative perception of the Director
General. Secondly, the stories that painted a positive perception of the Director
General. Thirdly, those that painted an ambivalent picture of him. Fourthly those
that painted a totally negative picture of him. Finally the stories which were based
on what the respondents had heard about him without ever meeting him. In each
of the above cases we explained in great detail the method of coding and the
categorisation of the data. We then explored the specific policies and their
negative effects: low moral, high morale and the rationales or such claims.
Finally, we examined the types of consequences of the policies through the lens
of the respondents.

The aim was to provide a general overview to assist in understanding the types of
perceptions held by the respondents in the telling of their story of the change
process in the BBC, using the integrative model in figure 13 as the basis for the
study. Given the nature of the methodology, I felt compelled to report their
personal accounts of the story as they told it during the one-to-one interviews, the
follow up questionnaire, and focus group sessions, even if they deviated from my
original plan. This decision meant that I had to be equally accommodating to their
own agenda whilst simultaneously focusing on the various aspects of the model
and my research questions. As a consequence of this, there was a slight shift in
emphasis from the initial aim of focusing purely on the model to acknowledging
their real issues because, as the research progressed, it became apparent that
the respondents wanted to talk about certain areas which they regarded as
important to them in relation to the change process. I was forced to rethink the
original model in the light of the data which emerged from the analysis, given the
nature of the methodology.

Perhaps one of the reasons for that could be that no model, however powerful,
cannot accommodate all the dynamics of the real world. Throughout the study a
conscious attempt was made to keep an open mind about the final outcome of the research findings therefore, I had no inkling about the type of reactions that I would get from the respondents. It certainly confirmed the unpredictably of dealing with the real world under such circumstances which proved to be a worthwhile and fascinating exercise for me. Despite this I feel that the versatility of the methodology in the end generated some exceedingly rich data about the perceptions of the change process in the BBC. Nevertheless, I feel that the research findings have raised some fundamental issues about the change process in the BBC and mirrors some of the key stages of the Kubler-Ross (1997) Transition Curve. Since this discovery was made retrospectively it was not possible to collect specific data before hand to enable me to plot the exact positions of each respondent on the transition curve. I feel that the richness of the vast amount of qualitative data gathered has enabled me to describe my interpretation in the light of this curve with a fair degree of confidence. I must hasten to add that my position is one of theoretical speculation in terms of what the data told me, but it opens up the possibility of further research in that area. In the process of describing this speculation, which I have alluded to above, a conscious decision was made to illustrate this in figure 23 on the next page.
Generally, figure 23 is portrayed as a negative exponential curve with a summation of the peaks and declines of a sample of respondents who have accepted the change and are thriving under, it versus another sample of those who have also survived but continue to resist it. The Kubler-Ross curve in the model is portrayed as the thickest curve with its seven stages of the transition period beginning with the period of stability in stage one and culminating in the period of acceptance in stage seven. The vertical axis indicates the degree of emotional response an individual may experience as they go through the rollercoaster experience of the change with passive being at the lower end and active being at the higher end. On the other hand the horizontal axis measures time over a given period moving from left to right along the continuum (i.e., 0 years to $x$ years). The straight lines, labelled a-d, represent a sample of respondents who have accepted the change and are fully supportive of it. This particular group included those professional experts who were recruited from outside in the field of accountancy, strategic planning and marketing. It also included a sample of staff from the Broadcast Directorate and Science Department who felt positive about the change. On the other hand the group, labelled e-j, represents a sample of the staff who has survived the change but has remained in the organisation while
continuing to resist it covertly. The gap between the two opposing groups of staff highlights the degree of tension between them. It was clear from the data that the major changes are still not substantially accepted by the majority of staff in the BBC and this is illustrated by the greater number of the curves labelled e-j, which tend to straighten and become much flatter as they complete the roller coaster cycle.

At the outset of the introduction of “Producer Choice” in April 1993, a chasm was created between some of the programme makers who resented the change and those referred to somewhat pejoratively by critics as the “Birlian Guard” (i.e., the professional accountants and other experts who were recruited from outside). The former complained about being marginalised and alienated by the DG, while at the same time, he continued to increase the profile of the latter in what they regarded as the move away from a “programme-led” to a “business-led” culture. They also argued that these financial experts had no clue about the programme making world and regarded their obsession with implementing the DG’s wide ranging efficiency measures as deliberate attempts at “dumbing down” and thereby lowering the quality standards of the programmes. Furthermore, they saw it as beginning the process of the fragmentation of the BBC, thereby, resulting in it becoming a commissioning house like Channel Four with a depleted and demoralised workforce with no career prospects. The latter, on the other hand, often accused the former of not having a clue about living in the real commercial world and this tension was manifested in other various forms as the events unfolded. It was understandable why this particular group of staff were highly enthusiastic about the change. They did not have to go through the same traumatic experience as the others for at least two reasons. Firstly, they were brought in from outside with a mission to implement the change and therefore had no history or axe to grind with the way it was implemented. Secondly, they were given a fair degree of power and autonomy (as some would say) to implement stringent efficiency measures to reduce cost. Incidentally, there was another group of supporters from inside the BBC who loved the change and felt that it was long overdue. They were also among the same group who had gained from the change either through gaining promotions or because their department was expanding due to the injection of extra resources for their operational activities.
However, it must be said that the apparent hostility towards the accountants and their other colleagues who supported the change should be seen within the context as an indirect attack upon the DG and his policies. They were regarded as legitimate targets for the opponents of the change to vent their anger against the programme of change. As a consequence, the DG's position in relation to the change is represented as a straight line on top of the Kubler-Ross curve in figure 23 and it is indicative of his strong commitment to implement the change. We have seen from the data the hostility to the change was fairly widespread and this is largely attributed to the way the change was implemented. I find this amazing because, putting aside for one moment his autocratic style of leadership, he has had some spectacular successes in terms of achieving some of his key strategic goals. For example, he secured the renewal of the BBC's Charter in 1996 for another 10 years. He introduced a transparent system with rigorous disciplines for the management of the BBC's finance on a corporate wide basis, and gave greater accountability to the budget holders. He has completely changed the culture and introduced a strict business culture where almost every staff member now appreciates the need to be cost effective in their day to day activities and budget holders are now fully aware of the total cost of their operations. Throughout the BBC every Business Unit has its own business plans which are directly linked to the corporate strategy. In addition, there has been a reduction in the staff headcount from around 28,000 prior to 1993 to 23,000 in 1999 (Human Resource Planning 1998). The BBC has been spared some of the serious cuts witnessed in other parts of the public sector like the NHS and Local Government (Martinez et al (1995)). Ironically, from the staff's perspective these remarkable achievements have not been attributed to the leadership skills of the DG. Although the pace of change has slightly eased up since 1993, he continues to be unpopular amongst many of his staff. Nevertheless, it is perhaps worthwhile to consider the implications for the BBC and the management of change in general.
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BBC AND MANAGEMENT

The BBC has survived and continues to be a major player as a Public Service Broadcaster in the global environment. One could argue that the direction taken by the DG was inevitable. It is quite likely that there was no other way. As a result his actions may have saved the BBC because the Heritage Select Committee criticised the DG in 1996 for the way he introduced a major restructuring programme that same year without informing his Board of Management until the last minute. As a result of this he was also told off by the Committee for taking the changes too far. They also suggested to him that the BBC needs a period of stability in order for the staff to consolidate the changes. Thus, in a perverse kind of way, this could be seen as a remarkable success because, prior to 1993, the BBC was constantly the focus for many criticisms by politicians of every complexion and persuasion, critics in the media and competitors for being overstaffed, too bureaucratic, over paid, under worked, poorly managed and for not giving value for money. On the contrary, today, this negative image of the BBC has been transformed into a more positive one and this could be attributed to the efforts of the DG.

An important lesson to emerge from this is that not even an autocratic leader with a clear vision and strategy for transforming the organisation should try to impose his policies upon the staff without consultation or their involvement because coercion does not equal compliance. You may think that you have commitment for your policy but in act you may be given bogus feedback. The staff may tell you what you want to hear but privately they may resist and in some cases undermine the policy. Therefore, senior management’s task is to communicate the big picture, the purpose, the plan and the part that the staff will have to play in the process but does not always have to get everyone to buy into the process if their goal is to reject the policy at all cost. As a compromise, Senior Management may need to explain the policy, its implications and listen to their issues and concerns where possible.

I attended a number of seminars in 1998 led by the Chief Executive of the Broadcast Directorate where he took time from his busy schedule to explain to the
staff his vision for "Broadcasting in the Digital Age and Beyond 2000". He explained his vision, discussed the implications for the staff and invited them to discuss their issues and concerns in an open forum with some of his senior managers. He was praised by a number of staff on a number of occasions for the way he went about communicating his message and involving them in the process. A junior member of staff who said the following summed up the best comment:

"I do not agree with some of his policies and what he is trying to do, but I feel that I understand what he is trying to do and will therefore support him".

Another implication from this study shows up the dangers in increasing the profile of one group of staff while giving the impression that others are no longer valued. This only serves to alienate them. The evidence is fairly clear from the data that a group of respondents who at one time claimed that they were highly committed, motivated and loyal to the BBC, have now become totally demotivated by the autocratic and non-consultative style of the DG. An important lesson here is that the DG should have taken the appropriate steps to win the "hearts and minds" of those he is trying to lead, because the likelihood of achieving success with his policy is potentially much greater for the reasons we have seen from the data.

Finally, management should be aware of both the intended and unintended consequences of the change process. As we have seen it is quite easy to measure the tangible outcomes of the change such as head counts, granting of the charter renewal etc. It is more difficult to measure the less tangible ones such as the impact on individual emotions of the change. Thus, in the following chapter an attempt will be made to recap on the study, draw some conclusions, make recommendations and reflect on some of the lessons learnt.
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED

INTRODUCTION

We have, at last, reached the conclusion of the telling of the story of the change process in the BBC through the lens of some of its internal stakeholders using the vast amount of information which was generated from the respondents' responses to the one-to-one interview, the follow-up questionnaire and the focus group. The purpose of this chapter will be as follows: Firstly, to present brief recaps of the overall picture so far; secondly, to complete the analysis of the data in order to formulate some conclusions; thirdly, to provide a summary of the issues debated above; finally, to present some recommendations for change interventions and to reflect on some of the lessons learnt so far from the change process.

RE-CAP ON THE OVERALL PICTURE SO FAR

Initially the story of the change process in the BBC began with a fairly comprehensive and in-depth description of the BBC in a historical and political context, followed by an equally detailed account of the content and process of the change in a "Time-bounded bounded period of 1993-1998" The reason for this was largely influenced by the advice of an eminent academic and social scientist. He said, "much of the research on organisational change is ahistorical, aprocessual and acontextual in character" (Pettigrew et al (1990: 269)). In addition, he also suggested that "there are few studies of change that actually allow the process to reveal itself in any kind of substantially temporal or contextual manner" (ibid.). As a result of his incisive comments a deliberate decision was made to adopt a research strategy which hopefully would ultimately lead to an enhancement of my understanding of the historical, contextual and processual nature of the BBC change programme.

Subsequently, we looked at the implementation of the change process, commencing with the introduction of "Producer Choice" and other associated interventions. As a corollary to this we looked at some of the efforts made by the
Director General and his Board of Management to implement the change programme. This was done using the conceptual framework of the causal model of organisational change and performance by Warner Burke and George Litwin, during the early stages, before its subsequent demise, in the latter stage of the process (Burke-Litwin (1994)). However, I must hasten to add that the model was not made explicit to the entire workforce but to a selected band of managers, including myself. The aim was to limit this to the staff who were expected to play a key role in the implementation process.

Having thus set the scene by describing the background to the above, the next step dealt with a selected review of some areas of the literature on organisational change by exploring a variety of themes to generate a research agenda, culminating in the construction of an integrative framework for the subsequent design of the research questions and conduct of the study.

A theoretical perspective followed this on the research methodology and a detailed explanation of the research design process and analysis of the methods used in the study. In turn this led me to examine the types of perceptions which the respondents held of the Director General and his senior managers. Finally, we examined the types of consequences of the overall impact of the policies on the staff as seen through their eyes. It seems appropriate to now focus on formulating some conclusions from the analysis of the data in the next section.

CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER ANALYSIS

Having completely immersed myself in analysing all the collected data during an eight month period my overall impression of the process of the change and how it evolved overtime is analogous to a "three part drama", punctuated by three distinct eras which will be elaborated upon in a moment. It seems pretty clear from the analysis process that the types of perceptions of the Director General led me to conclude that he was not only the leading actor but also the director, executive producer, lighting director etc in this drama, whereas, the remainder of the cast (i.e. the staff) were merely spectators, with a few exceptions.

Continuing this theatrical theme: Act I: I have arbitrarily chosen to depict the period of the BBC history prior to 1993. Act II is selected on the same basis to
represent the period 1993-1996. Act III, which follows sequentially, represents the period 1996-1998. Let us now elaborate on this more fully in the ensuing paragraphs.

In the case of Act I, this period was characterised by some of the respondents in the study retrospectively, as the “glory days” of Public Service Broadcasting. The nature of management interventions were regarded by them as “mini-side shows” and small scale changes but basically a period of calm and stability in the organisation’s history in comparison to the subsequent years.

The BBC was perceived by the respondents as being a united system, where all the staff shared the same common values as the BBC, especially its public service ethos and remit to provide programmes of quality and distinction for its licence fee payers; to inform, educate and to entertain and to ensure that its programmes are targeted for a diverse audience. Many of them enjoyed the sort of family atmosphere that was fostered in the BBC, where everyone was willing to help each other and pulling in the same direction. One respondent, a middle manager from Religious Programmes Department, said during the focus group:

“We took pride in working for the BBC and never seriously considered working for another organisation but now I just come in and do my work and don’t bother with anything else. I feel disconnected from the big picture” (respondent - focus group).

By contrast, Act II is characterised as “the beginning of the end”, because of what staff described as “creeping fragmentation”, precipitated by the introduction of “Producer Choice” in April 1993. In the immediate aftermath of “Producer Choice” this period was marked by the introduction of a number of associated changes viz: - Extending Choice in the Digital Age, changes in terms of conditions of service, and the creation of the Resources Directorate and its private company, aptly named Resources Limited, which was allowed to trade on the public market.

The pace of change during that era was radical and unrelenting because the entire organisation’s culture was turned upside down. The staff were required to learn a set of new behaviours and business skills overnight to cope with the “quasi-internal market” concept, brought on by “Producer Choice”. (“Producer Choice” (1993)).
Act III is characterised by the respondents as the period of "wholesale fragmentation" of the BBC. This occurred with the Corporate Restructuring in 1996, which was kept a closely guarded secret from everyone, except a few close advisers, before the announcement was declared to the staff (BBC Corporate Restructuring (1996)).

From a researcher's perspective it is noticeable that during the "time bounded period of April 1993- July 1998", which is the focus of this study the nature and pace of the planned change increased in momentum, unrelentingly and with little or no involvement of the staff. The stated intention of the first wave of change programmes was to bring about a radical change in the culture by doing the following:

- to introduce a comprehensive, universal and radically new financial system throughout the BBC for monitoring and controlling its budgets. (Producer Choice launch by Director General (1991)).

- Secondly, to impose a set of robust financial disciplines across the BBC to ensure the transparency of how the money was spent by individual business units.

- it was intended to ensure that greater efficiency savings were made throughout the BBC and that more effective ways were found for making programmes. (Producer Choice Launch (1991)). This was to be accomplished by driving down costs by reducing headcount and getting rid of spare capacity of resources such as studios and other facilities (Resources Review (1991)).

- stated objectives included the following: individual managers with budgetary responsibilities were held personally accountable for their budgets and sanctions were to be imposed if there were financial irregularities.

- all departments were also threatened with closures if they failed to operate at a "break even" level or make a profit (Producer Choice launch (1991)).

- to secure charter renewal for the BBC in 1996 for another 10 years.
• producers were also given freedom to choose "internal" or external resources where they saw fit.

• to demonstrate to the government, politicians and the public that the BBC was a very well managed organisation, which also was open and accountable, provided value for money and provided programmes of quality and distinctions for a diverse audience (Extending Choice (1992)).

Yet, despite those stated objectives we have seen from the respondents’ comments that they were totally alienated, and felt little involvement in the process. Moreover, it is ironic that attempts to prepare the staff in the 18 month period between the Director General’s launch of "Producer Choice", in January 1991 and "Producer Choice" being operational in April 1993, did not appear from the analysis of the data to be fully understood by the staff, nor was it well co-ordinated. For example, out of a staff population of 25,000 during that period (Human Resource Planning, 1992) only 1,800 attended some of the corporate programmes aimed at preparing staff to develop financial, business, marketing, negotiating and team building skills organised by the Project Director, Michael Starks. (Michael Starks training records (1993) and Policy and Planning (1993)). The attitude surveys of 1993 and 1994 were retrospective, measures to assess staff’s perceptions about the change programme, after the process had been in place for a while. The corporate events such as "Producer Choice" and "Extending Choice" seminars were equally retrospective measures by the Board of Management to communicate the rationale for the policies and to answer questions about their issues and concerns.

It is hardly surprising that we have seen the type of respondents’ perceptions and stories of the change process and how it was implemented and managed. The effects of the way the change was designed, implemented and managed by the Director General and the staff’s perceptions are well documented in the previous chapters. It is probably worthwhile recalling that the respondents did not appear to be totally against the change in principle; but their objections seemed to be more against the way it was implemented. From my analysis of the data in Chapter 6 and 7 all appeared to have acknowledged some of the external threats which the BBC was facing during the late 1980’s and 1990’s and the need to take
appropriate steps to protect its future. They were keen to play their part in the process.

I have come to the conclusion that although the Director General has been painted as a "monster" from the findings of the study, I would like to disassociate myself from this view. On reflection, I feel that he was in an extremely invidious position, a classic "no win" situation. It didn't matter what he did he would have still been criticised by certain categories of staff, maybe because of their own personal agenda. As an insider for so many years in the BBC I am aware that tough decisions had to be made at the top in order to avert the threat of increasing global competition and the potential demise of the BBC. There is ample evidence in the public sector to show that the BBC should not continue to remain a "sacred cow", since even the NHS were not spared the impact of Government policies. I felt that although the Director General has been severely criticised, the BBC needed someone like him, with his vision, entrepreneurial drive, ruthlessness and determination to push through his policies in the face of adversity.

As a consequence, I feel that the Director General was a hero of his time but perhaps he should now move on and be replaced by someone who has better people skills and is sympathetic to the needs of his staff. I believe that what is now required in the BBC is a period of healing and stability as suggested by Kubler-Ross (1997). There is no doubt that radical change has taken place in the BBC for the reasons already given but for this to be long lasting there must be some positive reinforcements for the staff by senior managers in order to create an atmosphere where behavioural change can take place. It is against this background that the recommendations for managing change are made.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ENHANCING UNDERSTANDING OF CHANGE INTERVENTIONS

The following recommendations are based on some of the issues debated in the case study, with particular emphasis on the nature and implementation of the change intentions in the BBC. I must add that, given the nature of my naturalistic inquiry study, these recommendations should be viewed cautiously. The reason
for this caveat is to avoid the pitfall of the normative prescriptions, which run counter to my approach.

1. Communicate the corporate vision to the staff in a simple way, which they understand and can relate to it. The reason is to avoid the confusion and frustrations, which we saw from the analysis of the data.

2. The method of communicating the vision should be interesting and interactive because, as we saw from the analysis of the data, the staff from Broadcast and Science Department welcomed such involvement in the process.

3. Explain the rationale and context for the vision and strategy which should be explained to the staff in such a way that they can understand and appreciate the need for change (Bridges (1995)). Additionally, it should highlight the importance of the consequences of maintaining the status quo. Again the staff in Broadcast and Science Department applauded this approach.

4. Ensure that the staff are given an appropriate amount of time to prepare for the change and the opportunity to learn about the new behavioural skills that will be required in the new environment (Caplan & Teese (1997)).

5. Conduct a comprehensive training need analysis of the staff to identify the competencies required, and developing personal development plans with identifiable targets and success criteria for achieving those goals.

6. Provide the staff with feedback on how the policy is working and areas where there are difficulties.

7. Create an environment where the staff are encouraged to take calculated risks in order to enhance creativity instead of punishing them for taking risks.

8. Do not punish staff for unavoidable mistakes, but deal sympathetically with the problem and try to learn from experience.

9. Treat the staff with respect and recognise their abilities and talents.

10. Take care of the well being of staff and not force them to work under extra pressure by working long hours with very little resources.
11. Avoid taking the staff for granted and harnessing their talent by making them feel special and valued and give them opportunities for career enhancement. The aim is to try and retain the knowledge base in the organisation and avoid a drain on talent as we saw from the analysis.

12. Avoid implementing change through fear and provide the necessary support to help them through the difficult stages of the process (Kubler-Ross (1997)).

13. Communicate the remedy and desired state so that the staff have a sense of focus and direction.

14. Demonstrate the compelling need for change in terms of present threats to the organisation and the potential dangers of missed opportunity.

15. Convince people that the cost of doing nothing is greater than the discomfort and current confusion of the transition.

16. Consider the impact of the change on the staff.

Finally just a word of caution about change strategies. Organisation may adopt a strategy of forcing change through, for whatever reasons, but the downside may be that there is passive resistance. You may think you have compliance but in reality the staff may only give superficial commitment for fear of losing their jobs. (R2, R3, R4, R6, R7 and R8) In addition they may tell you what you want to hear, but privately they may say something which is totally different. This was highlighted in the study. The study also shows, amongst other things, that a previously well motivated and compliant workforce have become demotivated and resentful of the way the change was imposed without their involvement. (R2, R3, R4, R6, R7, R8, R27, R28, R29, R30, R36, R18, R33, R39). Therefore, it is against this context that the recommendations should be viewed when contemplating future change programme. Let us now look at some of the lessons learnt from the study of the change process.
LESSONS LEARNT

The main lessons learnt from conducting this study are many and varied. The order in which they are listed below should not be seen as a reflection of their significance, but merely expediency. On reflection, I feel that the power and influence of the Director General was a very important part of the equation in the management of change in the BBC. Had it not been for his particular brand of leadership I doubt whether the BBC would have existed today in its present format.

I also feel that politics can play a crucial role in the management of change and the Director General was an extremely astute politician who aligned himself closely with the politicians of all complexions in Whitehall and lobbied them effectively. This resulted in the BBC being granted a renewal in 1996 for another 10 years. Internal politics also played a key role in the change process because the Director General, who was then Deputy Director General, aligned himself closely to the Board of Governors and outmanoeuvred the incumbent Director General at the time. The result was that he became the “flavour of the month” and the former Director General became a “lame duck”.

As a consequence, the DG was constantly bypassed on key strategic policy and the Board of Managers went directly to his deputy. This had the effect of increasing the Deputy Director General’s profile both internally and externally and he became the name who was associated with bringing about change in the BBC. Ironically, it was his boss who initiated the change in the first place.

Another lesson learnt from the study is to ensure that the Director General maintains a high profile both inside and outside the organisation and be able to devise radical policies and implement them in a short space of time. Part of the reason for sacking the former Director General was that the Board of Governors felt that he was taking too long to implement his policies. This is certainly an area where his successor excelled.

I have also learnt that to accomplish long lasting change the organisation must do everything in its capacity to win the hearts and minds of its staff. This involves
identifying and implementing positive reinforcements to achieve the required
behavioural change. In addition, although it is somewhat cliched, I have learnt the
real significance of communication in managing strategic change. It is not enough
to have videos, pamphlets, lectures, public announcements over the internal
communication system and so forth but the Director General must communicate
the purpose, the picture and the part which staff have got to play in the change
process, whilst offering positive reinforcements to cement the change.

I have realised the staff should not be taken for granted because I have seen
that previously committed staff are now completely switched off by their
experience of the change. On reflection, I have understood the significance of the
human aspects in the management of change and I have undergone something
of a conversion to a softer stance as a result of impact of the Kubler-Ross (1997)
model on the data analysis.

In addition, I have learnt that change is not as straightforward as some of the
books on change which offer "simplistic recipes" and "quick fixes" would lead you
to believe it "messy" and "chaotic" and "unpredictable" as my experience in the
BBC shows. As a consequence, I am more reluctant now than ever before, to
offer quick solutions to clients when asked to address a problem of change. I find
myself adopting a more reflexive and facilitative style when working with clients on
organisational change issues. I will not proceed until I have a fairly good
understanding of the context, the politics and culture of the environment in which I
am asked to work. As a result of having conducted this study, I feel that I am
older, wiser and more confident about doing field research. Above all, I feel more
confident about my role as a change practitioner in the BBC.
A PERSONAL REFLECTION

This study has presented me with the greatest academic and practical challenge of my life to date in trying to combine my role as a researcher and an internal change practitioner. Initially, I was interested in studying the evaluation of the role of training in the change process within the BBC because it was happening at a time when the Director General and his Head of Organisational Consulting and Management Development decided to give training a high profile in the organisation. Prior to that, training was given a very poor status and the programme makers regarded it as a complete and utter waste of time since it dealt only in psycho-babble and the latest management fads.

After delving into the literature on the evaluation of training in the management of change I encountered a number of obstacles and, after some prolonged deliberation, decided to pursue a different line of study. In retrospect, I realised that my research questions were not well defined and therefore I wasted a lot of time trying to refocus my ideas. Then, during the early 1990’s, the BBC began to announce its serious intentions for introducing a radical change programme to address the potential threats in the external environment.

Subsequently, I noticed that there was a mass influx of consultancy firms who were engaged by the Corporation to help out with various aspects of the change programme. They were experts in a variety of disciplines: downsizing; organisational change, organisational development, business strategy, restructuring, business and financial management etc. It seemed as if they were given liberty to assist managers where possible and make recommendations for further change. After a period of operating in the organisation I heard some staff beginning to complain about the activities of those consultants. I changed my research direction and began to focus on the perceptions of the staff in relation to the change. Through an extensive literature search I discovered the work of some researchers such as Guba and Lincoln (1989) and (1990), Erlandson et al (1993), Lincoln and Denzin (1994), Rowan and Reason (1996) and a host of other influential writers works. However, I was most impressed by the Guba and Lincoln
(1989) and (1994) approach to research as Naturalistic Inquirers, because it struck a rather harmonious cord with my experience of the change process in the BBC. There is no doubt that others have had an influence on me but they were by far the most profound.

Having decided that I wanted to pursue naturalistic methodology in studying the change process I struggled for many years with the concepts of validity, reliability, construct validity and internal reliability, i.e. the language of quantitative methodologists. I felt that I had to prove some way of showing my method was equally valid and that it could be applied to other general settings (Erlandson et al (1993)). After struggling and with great difficulties I finally discovered that my goal was to seek to try to tell the story of the change process through the eyes of the staff. By doing so my personal goal was to enhance my own understanding of the change process through their eyes. I also concluded that my aim was not to provide generalisations across other organisational settings but it was specific to the BBC (Rowan and Reason (1996), Guba and Lincoln (1994) and (1989)).

My work was monitored and regularly given feedback by my supervisor, Professor Pat Joynt and a number of amendments were made on his recommendations.

Time constraints and the practical reality of meeting the final deadline does not permit me to elaborate on these difficulties in any great detail. This was a recurring problem throughout the study and was related to the process of data collection and analysis. Periodic bouts of depression and data overload meant that I was tempted to abandon the research on numerous occasions but was encouraged and motivated by my mentor, Professor Pat Joynt, to carry on. However, I had a significant breakthrough when Professor Arthur Money, my second supervisor, recommended that I should contact Dr Silvana di Gregorio regarding learning about the NUDIST Programme. The intention was to use it as a tool for helping to manage the data during the analysis process. Fortunately this marked a breakthrough in learning how to organise and analyse the data. Subsequently under her excellent tutorship, I was able to get a better focus on my research questions and better clarity of the objectives. Once this was accomplished, I constantly reminded myself of the research questions and the objectives. I also had one pinned on the wall in my bedroom to maintain that
focus. I was then able to make steady progress with the analysis process. As a result of my experience of conducting this case study, I have come to the conclusion that, if I had to do it again, I would do the following.

I would ensure that I spend more time with my supervisor in the earlier stages clarifying the research questions as I wasted a lot of time trying to get focused on the central issues.

I would ensure that the methodology is agreed in advance of a great deal of the work.

I would provide my supervisor with more regular progress of my studies instead of trying to do it on my own.

I would attend more regular peer reviews and theme groups.

I would take some time off work, maybe a 6-month sabbatical to concentrate on progressing the work.

I would ensure that once the research questions were agreed, to keep them on my bedside, a desk at work, or in my briefcase to act as a constant reminder to me.

I would ensure that in trying to tell the story, I would not assume that the reader has prior knowledge of my thinking so I would need to make explicit all my thinking and intentions.

I would make a more realistic study plan and stick to it.

Nevertheless, I have emerged from this study more confident, more informed, more resilient and above all more knowledgeable about a subject for which I had only a superficial understanding before. The course of my study has undoubtedly had a profound and positive effect on me. The study of the breadth and depth of change theories and conceptual frameworks has greatly helped in my understanding of organisational change processes from a naturalistic perspective.

Consequently, the models and frameworks in my study have also helped me in passing on knowledge to managers, colleagues and other staff in the BBC.
There is no doubt that the positive impact of my study on the BBC will remain for a very long time to come. The revised model of organisational change will undoubtedly serve as a useful framework for enhancing understanding of organisational change process in the BBC.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Professor Edgar Schein, in a DBA conference which was held at Henley Management College in June (1997), suggested that, "there are at least three ways in which academic research can make a contribution to knowledge. It could contribute to new methods of conducting research, discover novel knowledge of the world or a total discovery of new ideas and theories. Schein (1997) June lecture.

Professor Money also suggested to me, in a recent tutorial, a fourth method of academic research which involves taking a different way of looking at an existing theory. He further added that it is very rare that someone makes a major breakthrough in research. On the basis of these suggestions I have opted for a less ambitious objective which is aimed at making a small contribution to academic knowledge. This research is significant for the following reasons:

1. It has taken a different look at one existing model of managing change and transitions (Kubler-Ross (1997)).

2. Secondly, it contributes to new methods of conducting research. This is particular pertinent in the context of my naturalistic inquiry case study approach for studying organisational change processes. It will provide another perspective on understanding complex change processes in the BBC. This is not to devalue the excellent initiatives and research which the BBC has conducted during the last decade. For example, its use of the Burke-Litwin model to conduct the (1993) and (1994) staff surveys via questionnaire on the generation of a set of generic senior management competencies for the 1990's and beyond. There is no doubt that this internal BBC research provided the Board of Management with a rich source of data on which to base their strategic decisions, My contention is that they went about it in a positivistic manner. In my experience as an insider and researcher, I felt that it did not
allow the staff the opportunity to expand on their personal views in the series of questionnaires which they had to complete for the staff surveys of 1993 and 1994.

I am also aware of the constant cynicism and whinging about the policy amongst BBC staff. They tend to censor that information when answering the above-mentioned questionnaires because of fear of losing their jobs. Yet, in one-to-one sessions or in a confidential forum, they will say the complete opposite by criticising the policy on change. My approach has been different and it gave the respondents a chance to tell it like it is, once I had a secured their trust and confidence. My research is significant on at least two counts; firstly, it conforms to Schein's (1997) criteria of making a contribution to knowledge; secondly, it conforms to Professor Arthur Money's suggestion of taking a different look at an existing theory.

The research is also important for another reason and this could be explained as follows. Although there appears to be a wealth of knowledge in the literature about the application of the case study approach to sociology, industrial relations, anthropology (Edwards (1992)) and in other disciplines of organisational behaviour, (Pettigrew et al (1991) and (1992)) and practical guidelines on how to design questionnaires or multivariate statistical analysis (Miles and Huberman (1994), Marshall and Rossman (1989) and Fetterman (1989)) there is a dearth of information about theoretical, methodological and practical aspects of case studies (Hartley (1994)). There are also some useful contributions from Eisenhardt (1989) and (1995) on building theory from case studies, Yin (1993) and (1994), Rose (1991), Bryman (1988) and (1994) and Barley (1995), but increasingly practitioner research is gaining momentum in the public sector (Rowan and Reason (1996)). Therefore, this study will contribute to knowledge about practitioner research. The study is also significant in that it attempts to integrate some aspects of the content school of thought which advocates a normative perspective. Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996) also highlighted the need for an integrated approach to the management of change.

This study is also significant because it has successfully linked the data from the BBC with the literature review. Finally the study is significant because it adopts
an integrated approach to understanding complex organisational change processes from a naturalistic inquiry methodology perspective.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY

The suggestions for future work outlined here relate to Easterby-Smith et al's (1991) thoughts on the continuing development of new methods of research, for instance developing concepts of the change practitioner seeking to integrate his role with the development of a theory to enhance the understanding of organisational change processes. As suggested by Professor Arthur Money, "research can also take a fresh look at an existing theory, as opposed to research, which yields, to completely new knowledge" (Money (1998)). Professor Edgar Schein also commented on this during a seminar at Henley Management College in 1997 when he pointed out that it is only very rarely that there is a totally new breakthrough in research.

As a consequence my suggestions for further research must be seen against this background. There is still an opportunity to conduct naturalistic inquiry in public sector organisations such as the BBC because currently there is a sparsity of such research especially in combining the work of the "researcher as an insider with that of an internal change practitioner" (Gummesson (1991), Guba and Lincoln (1989) and (1994), and Erlandson et al (1993)). In addition the area of research into organisational change from the internal stakeholder perspective is also somewhat sparse (Rowley (1997), Mitchell et al (1997), Rajapolan and Spreitzer (1996) and Greenley and Foxall (1997)). Therefore, there is an opportunity to conduct further research in that area. More research is needed on understanding organisational change processes at a multi level layer of analysis where the emphasis is on understanding the context, content and process (Pettigrew et al (1990), (1994) and (1997)).

Hartley (1994) highlights that there is a dearth of information about theoretical, methodological and practical aspects of case studies. More research is needed in this area. There appears to be a sparsity of theoretical and practical information on case studies which seeks to study organisational change in a climate of hyperturbulence and revolutionary change (Van de Ven and Poole (1998)) therefore more research needs to be conducted in this field.
Finally, given the experience of the BBC case study on the alienation of the staff as a result of how the transition was managed and which runs counter to the advice of Kubler-Ross (1973) and (1997), Bridges (1995) and Caplan & Teese (1997) more research is required to take a fresh look at how the three models of these authors could be combined to enhance an understanding of the change process. This thesis presents an excellent opportunity for researchers to extend such a study.
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Appendix A

NEW BBC STRUCTURE
BOARD OF MANAGEMENT

DIRECTOR GENERAL

- Director of Personnel
  - Chief Executive News
  - Chief Executive Resources
- Director of Finance
- Director of Television
- Chief Executive Production
- Chief Executive Broadcast
- Chief Director Corporate Affairs
- Director of Policy and Planning
- Managing Director World Service
- Director of Radio
- Director of Regional Broadcasting
- Director of Education

Adapted from BBC archival data (1998)
Appendix B - TV LICENCE FEE 1970 - 1995 COMPARED WITH RPI
(FELIX 1998)

Adapted from BBC archival data 1998
Appendix C - Growth in the licence fee revenue in real terms against base rates

Rates Jan 1970 = 100

Adapted from BBC archival data 1998
APPENDIX D

LICENCE FEE COMPARED WITH RPI (1970-1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Annual Licence Fee</th>
<th>Increase %</th>
<th>Licence Index</th>
<th>RPI January 1970-00</th>
<th>Licence Fee in real terms £</th>
<th>Income per Accounts (£m)</th>
<th>Assuming Zero Inflation (£m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-71</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>100.00</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>93.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975-76</td>
<td>18.00</td>
<td>50.00</td>
<td>163.64</td>
<td>169.72</td>
<td>18.67</td>
<td>146.4</td>
<td>86.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985-86</td>
<td>58.00</td>
<td>26.09</td>
<td>527.27</td>
<td>508.76</td>
<td>55.96</td>
<td>775.2</td>
<td>152.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-92</td>
<td>77.00</td>
<td>8.45</td>
<td>700.00</td>
<td>727.27</td>
<td>79.97</td>
<td>1,486.1</td>
<td>204.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994-95</td>
<td>84.50</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>768.18</td>
<td>788.91</td>
<td>86.78</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995-96</td>
<td>86.50</td>
<td>2.37</td>
<td>786.36</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from BBC Annual Report and Account 1995
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>Jan: BBC Funding the Future committee recommends big cuts. Phillips Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun: Strategy meeting to counter BBC1 ratings slide.</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Oct: Panorama investigation of Conservative funds</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov: Margaret Thatcher resigns. BSB collapses and merges with Murdoch's Sky TV.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec: TV Licence Fee (Price Waterhouse Study). Broadcasting Act</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Broadcasting Act</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1984 | Jan: Public row over the screening of The Secret Diary of a Merrie Monarch. Rupert Murdoch sets up |
|      | Maggie's Million Tontsley.                                                                      |
|      | Nov: Michael Grade becomes Controller of BBC1.                                                   |

<p>| 1987 | Jan: Alastair Milne resigns as Director General.                                                |
|      | Feb: Michael Checkland appointed Director General.                                             |
|      | Jun: Director General appointed Deputy Director General.                                       |
|      | Jul: Leatherhead Conference merges news and current affairs.                                   |
|      | Sep: BBC Policy and Planning Unit established. Downing Street Seminar on Broadcasting Policy.   |
|      | Nov: Michael Grade leaves the BBC for Channel Four.                                             |
|      | Dec: Newsnight schedule row exposes splits in BBC management.                                  |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Jan: Series of anti-BBC editorials in The Times</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb: BBC1 ratings boosted by Eastenders and Wogan.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Mar: Peacock Committee set up to investigate BBC finance.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jun: Michael Checkland becomes Deputy Director General.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jul: Real Lives crisis. Decline in annual income from licence fee begins downward slide</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apr: Peacock Report published.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Oct: Marmaduke Hussey becomes Chairman of the BBC. Maggie's Militant Tendency libel settlement.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Jan: First annual See For Yourself programme</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apr: Paul Fox replaces Bill cotton as Managing Director (TV).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apr: The Next Five Years Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov: Broadcasting White Paper. Introduction of &quot;The Next 5 years Strategy&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Jan: The Late Show starts</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feb: Murdoch launches Sky TV. (Advent of Cable and Satellite TV)</td>
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<td>Jul: BBC pay dispute</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Feb: Will Wyatt replaces Paul Fox as Managing Director (TV).</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Apr: Greg Dyke advises Governors to 'hack' at staff numbers. Kenneth Baker renews Hussey's contract as BBC Chairman.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>May: ITV franchise auction.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Jul: Michael Checkland sacked as Director General</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Citizens Charter</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Nov: Birt resources committee announces &quot;Producer Choice&quot;.</td>
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<td>Dec: Checkland knighted</td>
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<td>1992</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Jan: Funding the Future Committee (John Phillips)</td>
<td>• Jan: Director General takes over as Director General</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Mar: Sliding into Slump edition of Panorama pulled.</td>
<td>• Feb: Independent on Sunday reveals Director General's freelance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: General Election. Tories back with working majority. Joint BBC-Sky deal over Premier League football. BBC annual accounts reveal 'missing millions'</td>
<td>status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Checkland announces 24-hour rolling news service plan.</td>
<td>• Checkland announces 24-hour rolling news service plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: Resources Studies for Network Television</td>
<td>• Mar: Eldorado scrapped.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: &quot;Producer Choice&quot; - The pilot</td>
<td>• Apr: &quot;Producer Choice&quot; officially starts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aug: Michael Grade attacks 'pseudo-Leninist' management of BBC during Edinburgh TV Festival.</td>
<td>• Apr Attitude Survey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Oct: Checkland makes &quot;Fuzzy Monsters&quot; attack on Hussey.</td>
<td>• Apr Market testing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Checkland announces his is standing down as Director General in December.</td>
<td>• Jul: Mark Tully says the BBC is gripped by a 'climate of fear'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Launch of &quot;Producer Choice&quot;</td>
<td>• &quot;Producer Choice&quot; in situ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Extending Choice in situ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Jul: Evaluation of &quot;Producer Choice&quot;</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Sept: Progress Report to the Department of National Heritage</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1994</th>
<th>1995</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: Touche Ross Report (level of licence fee)</td>
<td>• Apr: Programme Strategy Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: Attitude Survey</td>
<td>• Apr: Corporate Restructuring Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Apr: Extending Choice in the Digital Age</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Apr: Royal Charter Renewal</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Apr: Corporate Restructuring BBC announced</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Apr: Resources Limited Company created</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Adapted from BBC archival data 1998
APPENDIX F

LETTER TO PARTICIPANTS

Dear X,

Subject: Permission to seek your co-operation in a DBA Research project.

I am currently pursuing a Doctorate in Business Administrator at Henley Management College and have decided to conduct my field studies at the BBC.

Therefore I would be very grateful if you would kindly agree to assist me in the process of my research project, by agreeing to be one of my research participants.

The purpose of the project is to study the Organisational change process in the BBC, since the introduction of "Producer Choice" in April 1993-1997, in order to develop a theory of an empirically based approach to understanding organisational change from a multi-stake holders prospective.

Your role.

If you do agree to assist me, will be to act as volunteer interviewee where I will seek your personal views about your issues and concerns about the change process in the BBC, and how it may have affected you over the years.

Process of Data Collection.

The interview will be on a one-to-one basis between yourself and myself and will be very confidential once, you have given me your comments. I will then do a summary of it and replay it back to you for your comments to ensure that your views are not misrepresented by me. The only other commitment I would require of you is to be prepared to give your comments on an interim report which will be prepared as a result of the data collected from you and others.

Confidentiality.

Throughout the entire project I would undertake to guarantee total confidentiality on what ever information you have disclosed to me.
Opt out clause.

I would like to state that your contribution is purely voluntary and therefore, you should feel free to discontinue participating in the research if you are unhappy with me, or the process.

Sign to grant approval.

There is a space provided in this letter for you to sign and return a copy of the letter to me if you agree to participate in the research.

My Address.

BBC Elstree Centre
Room 518 Production & Broadcast Training.

Telephone Number.
0181 228 7207 (Direct Line)
Ext. (87207)

How the Information will be used.

The data collected from the interviews will result in the compilation of a case report, which will be submitted for my Doctorate in Business Administration at Henley Management College.

However, all those who have participated in the research will be given the opportunity to critique it before its final submission to Henley, to ensure that it is a true reflection of their views.

The Benefits to you.

You will be granted the unique opportunity to participate in an exciting project which is unprecedented in the history of the BBC.
APPENDIX G

CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH PROJECT

NAME                Eversley Felix
BBC Elstree Centre
Room N518

PHONE               0181 228 7207 (Direct Line)
Or Ext. 87207

TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT (D.B.A)

Development of an empirically based understanding of organisational change process in the BBC from pluralistic multi-lens perspective of its stakeholders.

SIGNATURE: I have given my consent to participate in the research project

Signature________________________________________

Address________________________________________

Phone No_______________________________________
APPENDIX H

RESEARCH CONTRACT

Name of Sponsor Organisation: The BBC

Name of Client Bob Nelson

Entity to be Studied: Organisational change process in the BBC from April 1993 - 1997

Purpose of Research:

The purpose of the research is to study the process of organisational change in the BBC from a multi lens perspective of the stakeholders.

Outcome of Research

To develop a theory of an empirically based multi-lens perspective which is accessible to operational managers.

Signature of approval: ____________________________
APPENDIX I

Formal Letter to Head of Organisational Consulting and Management Development, Bob Nelson

Dear Bob,

Subject: Permission to conduct Research on Organisational process in the BBC.

As you already know I am currently studying for my DBA at Henley Management College, which you have kindly agreed to sponsor.

Therefore, the purpose of this letter is to seek your kind permission to allow me to conduct my research project on “Organisational change processes in the BBC from the period 1993-1997.

I hope that you will agree to my request and I would like this opportunity to reassure you that I will abide by all the rules and protocol of issues relating to non-disclosures of BCC’s confidential and sensitive information.

In addition I would also undertake to submit a draft of the research project to you for your comments before final submission to Henley Management College.

I am looking forward to hearing from you soon. In the meantime, if you have any queries please do not hesitate to contact me on my extension at Elstree (87207).

I have enclosed a formal contract for you to sign if you are willing to grant the approval.

Yours sincerely,

Eversley Felix
### Appendix J: Detailed Research Plan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 1</td>
<td>Contracting</td>
<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- obtain funding for the research</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- signing a formal contract with BBC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 2</td>
<td>Literature Review and discussion of initial research idea with Supervisor</td>
<td>1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 3</td>
<td>Submission of final research design</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 4</td>
<td>Organising research design plan</td>
<td>17/12/97</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This involves drafting some 'broad' research questions to be asked during the one-to-one semi structured interviews.</td>
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<td>- drafting of pro-forma and covering letter to send out to participants</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- permission to participate in the research, both BBC as an organisation and prospective respondents etc</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 5</td>
<td>Identifying Stake holders</td>
<td>06/01/98</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- this involves identifying prospective respondents to participate in the one-to-one interview respondents chosen on purposeful sampling basis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Writing 100 letters and e-mail to prospective respondents and 45 follow-up phone call. (see appendix G and H) Patton (1990), Pettigrew et al (1990)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 6</td>
<td>Respondent replies</td>
<td>07/01/98</td>
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<td>- This involves confirmation of dates for interviews and drafting an interview schedule. Table (10)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Drafting of a few broad questions for the one-to-one interviews.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Step 7</td>
<td>Pilot</td>
<td>07-09/01/98</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Testing the feasibility of the research questions and ironing out testing problems involving to colleagues.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- individual interviews (10) lasted an average of 2 ½ hours each</td>
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<td>- minor refinements of the questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 8</td>
<td>Conduction of one-to-one interviews semi-structured and non directive</td>
<td>Planned for 20/01/98 but done June &amp; July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- a total of 40 one-to-one interviews were held during June July 1998 each lasted 2 hours</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- about 30 broad questions and a few warm up questions were used</td>
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<td></td>
<td>- the interviews were tape recorded (tapes subsequently destroyed) or returned to respondents on request</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- out of the 40 interviews only 1 was discarded because it was incomprehensible</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Out of 60 requests only 40 agreed to participate in the interview.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 9</td>
<td>Initial data analysis</td>
<td>July-Aug 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the 40 interviews were transcribed and a preliminary analysis was done to get an overall impression of the various perceptions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 10</td>
<td>Follow-up Questionnaire</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- follow-up questionnaire was designed with 42 items, based on some of the data from the one-to-one semi-structured interviews</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Out of 60 prospective respondents, only 20 replied (out of that 20, I was lost in</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

333
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Step 11</th>
<th>Collating transcribing and analysing the data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Step 12</td>
<td>Joint constructions of data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- the data from the one-to-one interviews were further analysed in tandem with the one from the follow-up questionnaire to identify common themes and joint constructions of the respondents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>on going July 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 13</td>
<td>A focus Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- This focus group was conducted amongst 15 middle managers from the Religious Department in Manchester. The purpose was to use the data obtained from the one-to-one interviews and the follow-up questionnaire, to test their perceptions against what seemed to be emerging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 14</td>
<td>Transcription and analysis group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- The data from the focus was transcribed and further analysed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 15</td>
<td>Introduction to the NUDIST programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- attend training course and later purchased the programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Using NUDIST as a tool for analysis research data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Inputting the data from the one-to-one interviews, follow-up questionnaire and focus group. further data analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-Dec 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 16</td>
<td>Writing draft case report and member checking process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- draft report was made from the one-to-one interviews, follow up questionnaire and focus group and copies sent to 10 respondents from the one-to-one interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 from the follow-up questionnaire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- 5 from the focus group for feedback</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov-Dec 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 17</td>
<td>Writing up second draft case report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- draft to supervisor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jan 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 18</td>
<td>Peer review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- D.B.A presentation to peer group and supervisor</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 19</td>
<td>Third draft report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- review of the integration of chapters 2,3,6 and 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 20</td>
<td>Final case report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Step 21</td>
<td>Completion of thesis</td>
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<td></td>
<td>March 1999</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Appendix K

Strictly Confidential

Follow-up Questionnaire (42 Questions)

Name: Job Title:

Directorate: Location:

How long have you been employed by the BBC?

Instructions:

Following our recent interview regarding my research project, I would be very grateful if you could kindly take about thirty minutes to answer this follow-up questionnaire for me.

The Purpose:

Is to ensure that in writing up the final report of my findings, it represents a true reflection of your individual opinion. It also gives me another opportunity to cross check my interview opinion. It also gives me another opportunity to cross check my interview notes with you and to make the necessary corrections where necessary.

(1) How would you describe the following:

(a) The BBC as an organisation?
(b) The BBC's culture?
(c) Morale in the BBC?
(d) Morale in your work unit?
(e) The management style?
(f) The Director General's style of leadership?

(2) What are some of the problems facing the BBC today?

(3) How would you describe your experience of the change process in the BBC on the following rating scale below?

(a) small scale 1 2 3 4 5 large scale
(b) pace of change slow 1 2 3 4 5 fast
(c) planned 1 2 3 4 5 unplanned
(d) organised 1 2 3 4 5 messy
(e) evolutionary 1 2 3 4 5 revolutionary

(4) Please comment in the following statement below:
“Organisational change is a phenomenon which could be planned and managed in a relatively predictable manner of the appropriate measures are adopted and deployed in an organisation.”

(5) What are the main triggers for the change in the BBC?

(6) How did the Board of Management respond to these triggers for change both in the external environment and internally?

(7) Who were the key initiators of change?

(8) How would you describe their level of awareness in relation to the pressures for change in the external environment?

(9) What were the key specific corporate and strategic actions adopted by the Board of Management, both internally and externally in preparation for the introduction of the planned programme of change?

(10) What was the rationale for the Board of Management in adopting these corporate initiatives?

(11) What was the Board of Management stated corporate objectives in introducing the programme of change?

(12) What strategy did the Board of Management adopt in introducing the programme of change?

(13) How was the strategy communicated to the work force?

(14) In formulating the strategy, how much collaboration, involvement and participation were the staff allowed in the process of influencing the change policy?

(15) To what degree does the change strategy adopted by the Board of Management remain the same? Or, if it changed, please give your views about the reasons for the change.

(16) To what degree were the strategic initiatives co-ordinated and linked to the local initiatives at your work unit level?

(17) How effective was the strategy in delivering the desired change?

(18) What are your views about involving the staff in the influencing and shaping the policy on strategic change in the BBC?

(19) How significant is it to represent the various views of the diverse interests of the multiple groups in the work force?

(20) What is your observation of the general attitude of the managers to the change in the BBC?

(21) How do the managers feel about the change?

(22) What has been the impact of the change on the managers?

(23) What is the general attitude of the rest of the staff to the change?
(24) How do the staff feel about the change?
(25) How have they responded to the change?
(26) To what degree has the staff embraced the change?
(27) To what degree has the managers embraced to the change?
(28) What has been the impact of the change on the staff?
(29) How was the staff prepared for the launching of the change in the BBC?
(30) How equipped are you to deal with the new requirements of your job in this new changed environment?
(31) How did the Leadership agenda evolve over time during the period 1993-1998?
(32) What aspect of the change do you like most? (Please explain your answer)
(33) What aspects of the change you liked least? (Please explain your answer).
(34) To what degree have the stated objectives of the change programme been achieved?
(35) What is the key evidence to support your answer?
(36) What were the unintended consequences of the changed programme?
(37) What are the most significant changes that were introduced by the BBC during the period 1993-1998?
38. Describe the impact on your life today?
(39) Describe how you felt about the change of process when first began in the early 1990's.
(40) How do you feel about the change now? (Please explain your answers)
(41) What is your assessment of the future of the BBC?
(42) Is there anything else you think that I should know about the change, but have not addressed above? (If yes, please elaborate)
| 6.2.1 | Outcomes/Negative Consequences/low morale |
| 6.2.2 | Outcomes/Negative Consequences/lack of respect of staff abilities |
| 6.3  | Outcomes/Intended Consequences |
| 9    | Other Multiple Stakeholders |
| 10   | Summary of Respondent |
| 11   | Cumulative Summary |
| 12   | Respondents |
| 12.1 | Respondents/ |
| 12.2 | Respondents/ |
| 12.3 | Respondents/ |
| 12.4 | Respondents/ |
| 12.5 | Respondents/ |
| 12.6 | Respondents/ |
| 12.7 | Respondents/ |
| 12.8 | Respondents/ |
| 12.9 | Respondents/ |
| 12.10| Respondents/ |
| 12.11| Respondents/ |
| 12.12| Respondents/ |
| 12.13| Respondents/ |
| 12.14| Respondents/ |
| 12.15| Respondents/ |
| 12.16| Respondents/ |
| 12.17| Respondents/ |
| 12.18| Respondents/ |
| 12.19| Respondents/ |
| 12.20| Respondents/ |
| 12.21| Respondents/ |
| 12.22| Respondents/ |
| 12.23| Respondents/ |
| 12.24| Respondents/ |
| 12.25| Respondents/ |
| 12.26| Respondents/ |
| 12.27| Respondents/ |
| 12.28| Respondents/ |
| 12.29| Respondents/ |
| 12.30| Respondents/ |
| 12.31| Respondents/ |
| 12.32| Respondents/ |
| 12.33| Respondents/ |
| 12.34| Respondents/ |
| 12.35| Respondents/ |
| 12.36| Respondents/ |
| 12.37| Respondents/ |
| 12.38| Respondents/ |
| 12.39| Respondents/ |
| 13   | Doc Types |
| 13.1 | Doc Types/One to Ones |
| 13.2 | Doc Types/Questionnaires |
| 13.3 | Doc Types/Focus Group |
| 14   | Questionnaire questions |
| 14.1 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1a - Org description |
| 14.2 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1b - Culture description |
| 14.3 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1c - BBC Morale |
| 14.4 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1d - Morale in work unit |
| 14.5 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1e - The Management Style |
| 14.6 | Questionnaire questions/Q.1f - The DG's leadership style |
| 14.7 | Questionnaire questions/Q.2 - Problems facing BBC today |
| 14.8 | Questionnaire questions/Q.4 - Possibility to predict and manage change |
| 14.9 | Questionnaire questions/Q.5 - Triggers for change in 1993 |
| 14.10| Questionnaire questions/Q.6 - How did BOM respond to triggers |
| 14.11| Questionnaire questions/Q.7 - Key initiators of the change |
| 14.12| Questionnaire questions/Q.8 - Their level of awareness of the pressures for change |
| 14.13| Questionnaire questions/Q.9 - Key actions adopted by BOM |
| 14.14| Questionnaire questions/Q.10 - Rationale of BOM to adopt Programme of Change |
| 14.15| Questionnaire questions/Q.11 - BOM's corporate Objective in P of C |
| 14.16| Questionnaire questions/Q.12 - Strategy BOM adopted |
| 14.17| Questionnaire questions/Q.13 - Means to communicate strategy to staff |
| 14.18| Questionnaire questions/Q.14 - Staff involvement in shaping change |
| 14.19| Questionnaire questions/Q.15 - extent to which initial strategy followed |
| 14.20| Questionnaire questions/Q.16 - degree strategic initiatives linked to local initiatives |
| 14.21| Questionnaire questions/Q.17 - effectiveness of strategy |
| 14.22| Questionnaire questions/Q.18 - views on staff Involvement in shaping strategic change |
| 14.23| Questionnaire questions/Q.19 - Why should or should not staff be involved |
| 14.24| Questionnaire questions/Q.20 - attitude of your line managers to the change |
Questionnaire questions/Q.21 - degree to which your managers have embraced change
Questionnaire questions/Q.22 - impact of change on these managers
Questionnaire questions/Q.23 - attitudes of peers to change
Questionnaire questions/Q.24 - how responded to change
Questionnaire questions/Q.25 - degree peers embraced change
Questionnaire questions/Q.26 - impact of change on peers
Questionnaire questions/Q.27 - Peers prepared for launch of P of C
Questionnaire questions/Q.28 - personally equipped to deal with new requirements in job
Questionnaire questions/Q.29 - how has your professional life changed
Questionnaire questions/Q.30 - What aspect of change you like the most
Questionnaire questions/Q.31 - aspects of change you like least
Questionnaire questions/Q.32 - degree to which objectives of change has been achieved
Questionnaire questions/Q.33 - Key evidence to support answer to Q32
Questionnaire questions/Q.34 - Unintended consequences of change
Questionnaire questions/Q.35 - Most imp corporate changes introduced
Questionnaire questions/Q.36 - impact of changes on life today
Questionnaire questions/Q.37 - How felt when changes started to affect you
Questionnaire questions/Q.38 - How feel about change now
Questionnaire questions/Q.39 - future of the BBC
Questionnaire questions/Q.40 - Anything else?

Description of BBC

/new idea
/Style
/Style/Senior Management's style
/Style/Senior Management's style/Poor communication of senior managers
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior Management good at communicating
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior management autocratic
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior management more professional and business like
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior management lacks credibility
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior management lack of feedback
/Style/Senior Management's style/Senior management indecisive
/Style/Director General's style
/Style/Director General's style/DG's negative impact on talent
/Style/Director General's style/DG is a Visionary and an Entrepreneur
/Style/Director General's style/DG is a good communicator
/Style/Director General's style/Director General Autocratic and Non communicative

/Threat
/Threat/Competition from multi-channels
/Threat/Licence fee debate
/Threat/Technological revolution
/Threat/Political
/Department
/Reasons for Morale
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures/feel overworked
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures/constant pressure to cut back year on year
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures/staff constantly being asked to do more and more with fewer resources
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures/having to learn new skills
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Work pressures/people feel inadequate to cope
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Specific Policy Initiatives
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Specific Policy Initiatives/outsourcing of Resources Ltd
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Specific Policy Initiatives/the split between Production and Broadcast
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Specific Policy Initiatives/the Internal Market
("Producer Choice")
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Managerial actions
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Managerial actions/sacking of many staff
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Managerial actions/Redundancy
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/continual change
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/uncertainties
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/quicker turn around of people
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/lack of teamwork and socialising
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/lack of job security
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/frequent management changes
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/poorly paid
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/jobs becoming less satisfying
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/Fatalistic acceptance
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Psychological aspects/Different perspective now
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management
/Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/lack of respect of staff abilities
(20 1 9 6) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/senior managers not communicative
(20 1 9 8) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/lack of support from experienced staff
(20 1 9 13) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/the way managers treat their staff
(20 1 9 15) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/very autocratic management style
(20 1 9 16) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/superficial consultation of workforce
(20 1 9 18) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/because of total managerial insensitivity
(20 1 9 30) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/we felt rudderless
(20 1 9 31) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/staff unsure of how to work under the new system
(20 1 9 33) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/programmer makes feel unsupported
(20 1 9 37) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Style of management/Management doesn't care anymore
(20 1 117) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/people like eto whinge
(20 1 259) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/staff, s lack of identity with Directorate
(20 1 32) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/teams feel isolated
(20 1 34) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/people feel isolated and exposed
(20 1 40) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for Low Morale/Coming into the real world
(20 2) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale
(20 2 1) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/External factor
(20 2 1 16) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/External factor/Devolution factor
(20 2 2) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful
(20 2 2 1) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/vibrant and expanding department
(20 2 2 2) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/Great opportunities
(20 2 2 5) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/Like working on my programme
(20 2 2 6) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/ lots of commissions
(20 2 2 14) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/feel good factor
(20 2 2 15) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/High audience figures
(20 2 2 16) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/New staff new perspective
(20 2 2 17) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/Contented with work environment
(20 2 2 18) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Being successful/Broadcast in the driving seat
(20 2 4) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership
(20 2 4 2) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/good management
(20 2 4 3) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/Dynamic leadership
(20 2 4 8) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/Former Head of Science Department fantastic and pioneering
(20 2 4 9) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/New Head of Science Department great and gives feedback
(20 2 4 10) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/people given opportunity to do what they want
(20 2 4 13) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Style of leadership/manager keeps staff abreast of change and reasons for it
(20 2 7) /Reasons for Morale/Reasons for High Morale/Good career structure
(20 3) /Reasons for Morale/ok morale
(20 4) /Reasons for Morale/NAME ME193
(21) /Morale
(21 1) /Morale/Low
(21 2) /Morale/OK
(21 3) /Morale/High
(22) /Acceptance of change
(22 1) /Acceptance of change/Enthusiastically embrace change
(22 2) /Acceptance of change/Just accept reluctantly
(22 3) /Acceptance of change/Don't accept the change
(23) /Types of personal values
(23 1) /Types of personal values/Left back and relaxed atmosphere
(23 2) /Types of personal values/Consistency
(23 3) /Types of personal values/Career vs family orientation
(23 4) /Types of personal values/Job satisfaction and pay
(23 5) /Types of personal values/Openness accountability and fairness
(24) /Personal values over time
(24 1) /personal values over time/past
(24 1 1) /personal values over time/past/Career oriented
(24 1 2) /personal values over time/past/Paternalistic organisation with job for life
(24 1 3) /personal values over time/past/Passionate believer in public Service Broadcasting
(24 1 4) /personal values over time/past/motto to educate, entertain and inform
(24 1 5) /personal values over time/past/Openness and accountability
(24 1 6) /personal values over time/past/Staff recognition
(24 2) /personal values over time/present
(24 2 1) /personal values over time/present/Family oriented
personal values over time/present/Want stress free job and easy life
personal values over time/present/Value for money
personal values over time/present/world wide reputation for excellence
personal values over time/present/Motto to educate, entertain and inform
personal values over time/present/Openness and accountability
personal values over time/present/Job satisfaction and pay

Awareness of External threats
Awareness of External threats/Aware
Awareness of External threats/Not aware
Reasons for reaction to change
Reasons for reaction to change/Exciting and necessary
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for reluctantly accepting the change
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for reluctantly accepting the change/exhausted by too much change
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for reluctantly accepting the change/inevitable
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for reluctantly accepting the change/Fear of the future state
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for reluctantly accepting the change/question the method of implementation
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for not accepting the change
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for not accepting the change/Cynicism and disillusionment
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for not accepting the change/some people don't like change
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for not accepting the change/different priorities as I get older
Reasons for reaction to change/reasons for not accepting the change/Lack of understanding of bigger picture

Types of consequences
Types of consequences/Positive consequences
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/Efficiency measures
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/Efficiency measures/sacking poor performers
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/Efficiency measures/cost savings
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/BBC's future security
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/more professional managers
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/enjoys consistency
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/flexible ways of working
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/performance management
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/better communication
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/greater accountability and openness
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/more focus and direction
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/excellent management in Science Dept
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/freedom of choice
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/freedom of choice/enthusiastic about change
Types of consequences/Positive consequences/multi-skilling
Types of consequences/Negative consequences
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/resistance to continual change
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/staff turnover and redundancy
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/loss of commitment
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/future uncertainties
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/lack of job security
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/low morale
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/no career prospects
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/feeling stressed
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/family vs career orientation
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/lack of team spirit
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/destruction of the family
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/fear of criticising policy
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/fear of risk taking
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/Psychological impact/dissillusionment
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions/lack of staff recognition
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions/poor managerial communication
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions/fragmentation of the BBC
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions/staff resentment due to lack of involvement
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/managerial actions/DG not trusted
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/all activities cost driven
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/loss of creative talent and knowledge base
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/headcount still high
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/press leaks
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/work pressures
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/de-skilling
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/only interested in the small picture
Types of consequences/Negative consequences/decline in programme quality
Silver Stuff
Gold Dust
Matrix Node.  
(1) Index Searches/jean's perception of change  
Matrix Node.  
(2) Index Searches/white city's perception of change  
Matrix Node.  
(3) Index Searches/index search  
Matrix Node.  
(4) Index Searches/index search194  
Matrix Node.  
(5) Index Searches/index search196  
Matrix Node.  
(6) Index Searches/index search195  
Matrix Node.  
(7) Index Searches/index search197  
Matrix Node.  
(8) Index Searches/index search198  
Matrix Node.  
(9) Index Searches/by questionnaires  
Matrix Node.  
(10) Index Searches/morale by directorates  
Matrix Node.  
(11) Index Searches/index search201  
Matrix Node.  
(12) Index Searches/rc on ma  
Matrix Node.  
(13) Index Searches/index search203  
Matrix Node.  
(14) Index Searches/lowl morale by directorates  
Matrix Node.  
(15) Index Searches/lowl morale by dept  
Matrix Node.  
(16) Index Searches/lowl morale by job position  
Matrix Node.  
(17) Index Searches/index search216  
Matrix Node.  
(18) Index Searches/index search217  
Matrix Node.  
(19) Index Searches/lowl morale by dept2  
Matrix Node.  
(20) Index Searches/lowl morale by job position2  
Matrix Node.  
(21) Index Searches/lowl morale by job position3  
Matrix Node.  
(22) Index Searches/high morale by job position  
Matrix Node.  
(23) Index Searches/high morale by science  
Matrix Node.  
(24) Index Searches/high morale by depts  
Matrix Node.  
(25) Index Searches/lowl morale by dept3  
Matrix Node.  
(26) Index Searches/index search240  
Matrix Node.  
(27) Index Searches/science jr managers  
Matrix Node.  
(28) Index Searches/science sr managers  
Matrix Node.  
(29) Index Searches/jr sci managers by low morale  
Matrix Node.  
(30) Index Searches/sr sci managers by low morale  
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