Political culture

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Introduction

Studies of political culture contend that democracy is as much a product of institutions, i.e. the formal supply-side processes in place, as it is of the predispositions and orientations of the citizenry, i.e. the informal or cultural demand-side processes at play. Such theories argue that democratic stability within a given country depends largely on its culture. Countries with high levels of a civic culture (Inglehart 1988) are associated with democratic stability and economic affluence because their cultural orientations are in line with the values of liberal democratic institutions. On the contrary, instability and extremism are more likely in countries with low levels of a civic culture, where parochial and pre-modern orientations have crystallised and often prevail, causing tensions with the values and institutions of liberal democracy.

The key point raised in the literature with regards to the Greek case is that because Western institutions were superimposed upon traditional loyalties and communal values during the creation of the modern Greek state, Greek political culture has been characterized by a tension between on the one hand modern institutions and the participant values these have instilled, and on the other hand the traditional/ parochial values of the past which often prevail. This is understood in the literature as the 'cultural dualism' thesis (Diamandouros 1994), which distinguishes between Greece's 'Westernising' and 'underdog' traditions. The 'traditional', 'parochial' or 'underdog' orientations of Greek political culture include the personalized character of social relations, irrational distributional forms of regulating social production, collective as opposed to individualistic moral standards, and a hierarchy of social bonds from family, to kin, to village, region and Genos (Tsoukalas 1991:14). In other words, Greece exhibits low levels of a civic culture. The prevalence of traditionalist/ parochial orientations has led to the emergence of an underdeveloped civil society, the persistence of ethnic nationalism defined by religion, political polarization, populism, clientelistic networks and partitocracy- all features of what we might term an illiberal democracy (Pappas 2013), susceptible to instability and extremism, especially at times of crisis when the system is particularly vulnerable.

This chapter examines Greece's political culture post-1974. Specifically it applies the broader literature on political culture to the Greek case, focusing on Greece's cultural dualism. Drawing on Putnam (1993), we discuss Greek political culture with reference to four dimensions, including types of engagement, citizenship and political equality, solidarity and the politics of consensus, and finally social structures of co-operation. Our aim is to explain the ways in which the participant and parochial elements of Greek political culture in each dimension have interacted, with the latter prevailing and shaping Greek politics post-1974. While the system proved surprisingly resilient during the post-dictatorship era, the 2008 Eurozone crisis exposed its inherent tensions and systemic weaknesses, revealing its propensity for instability, extremism, and illiberalism. At the same time, however, the fragmentation of the party system and the entry of few new personnel and progressive forces have

also facilitated the possibility for some reforms in the areas of human rights, minority policies and foreign policy. This suggests that political culture has also evolved, illustrating that, while as the literature argues, political cultures shape democratic institutions and to a great extent determine their stability, at the same time institutions also shape political cultures.

Political culture: types and patterns

A nation's democratic model depends on both the formal institutions of democracy, for example elections, political parties, parliament and government, and the particular type of political culture that is responsible for sustaining it. Political culture refers to citizens' orientations towards the political system and their attitudes towards its processes. Orientations can be cognitive, affective and/ or evaluational, i.e. based on citizens' knowledge of the system, their feelings about the system, and their judgments towards the system (Almond and Verba 1963: 14-15). Therefore political culture, i.e. the norms, belief systems and codes of personal relations within a given polity, are fundamental to our understanding of both how institutions function, and under what circumstances they are likely to succeed or fail (Almond and Verba 1963: 5).

The literature distinguishes between different types of political culture. The latter is often understood as a dialectic process, which develops and transforms over time, while simultaneously retaining elements from the past. Therefore, in modern democratic societies, political culture is mixed, consisting of both modern and pre-modern elements. The greater the prevalence of modern characteristics, the more civic the culture is, and as such the more likely it is to be associated with democratic stability and economic development (Inglehart 1988; Putnam 1993). This can be evidenced through levels of personal life satisfaction, political satisfaction, interpersonal trust and support for the existing social order (Inglehart 1998). In other words, this literature, which is part of the broader modernization theory literature, associates political culture with the performance of democratic institutions through a mechanism that takes into account the Protestant Reformation, industrialisation, secularization, the development of modern nationalism and other modernization processes associated with the West.

Almond and Verba (1963: 17-19) examine the combinations between three major types of political culture: parochial, subject and participant. The term 'parochial' describes the political culture of tribal societies and autonomous local communities. The term 'subject' refers to political culture in societies characterized by a passive relationship between the citizens and the system. Finally, the term 'participant' is used to describe the political culture of a society in which the citizenry is active both in terms of the input and output aspects of the political system. These types combine to produce the following three patterns of political culture: parochial-subject; subject-participant; and parochial-participant. Modern democratic societies presuppose a level of participation in the democratic system. Therefore the structural norms of democracy presuppose that such societies will by definition have participant orientations in their political cultures. They also retain, however, parochial and/ or subject orientations from the past. The 'civic culture' is therefore mixed: the more prevalent the participant orientation, the more civic the culture, and democratic stability will be more likely (Almond and Verba 1963: 31). Extending this theory,

Putnam (1993) and Inglehart (1988) both conceptualise political culture as a combination of different orientations and link the civic culture to institutional capacity and economic development.

Greece's cultural dualism

So far, we have established from the literature that different cultural orientations have different economic and political consequences. High levels of a civic culture are more likely to be associated with stable and enduring democratic institutions. As noted above, scholars tend to juxtapose Western to other societies in which pre-modern orientations prevail and clash sharply with modern institutions. This cultural dualism, which sees political culture as a dialectic and a balance between modern and pre-modern parochial or traditional orientations, can be applied to the Greek case.

Greek political culture tends to be characterised by a tension between traditionalist and modern orientations (Tsoukalas 1991; Diamantouros 1994; Stavrakakis 2002). On the one hand, Greece's 'Westernising' or 'modernizing' culture is secular and influenced by the Enlightenment; on the other hand its 'underdog' culture stresses tradition and is largely influenced by the country's Ottoman and Byzantine pasts. Part of the reason for the tensions between different orientations within Greek political culture is the limited exposure to modernizing processes that took place in the West including the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and industrialization which promoted rationalization of thought, structural differentiation, and the emergence of liberal ideas and institutions (e.g. Pollis 1987). This explains why there is an obvious contradiction between liberal democratic institutions and Greek mores and norms: the construction of the modern Greek state was accompanied by the introduction of Western institutions which were to an extent incompatible with local structures (Tsoukalas 1991; Diamandouros 1994: 8; Stavrakakis 2002).

Therefore Greece can be categorised in accordance toAlmond and Verba's (1963) parochial-participatory model. This model mixes the participant orientations associated with rational institutions and the parochial political orientations prevalent in Greece's pre-modern political culture. Such models are prone to instability and authoritarianism because of their inherent contradictions and resulting weaknesses. In other words, they lack the horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation, solidarity, trust and tolerance and strong civic associations that scholars expect will lead to democratic stability.

Despite these apparent contradictions, however, the Greek political system proved particularly resilient post-1974 (Pappas 2013). What is paradoxical about the Greek case is not that the system collapsed as a result of the 2008 Eurozone crisis (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013), but rather that it survived for that long despite its weak political foundations. The democratic system consolidated after 1974 was strong enough to see the country's membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1981 ahead of other Southern European countries, including Spain and Portugal; its accession into the Eurozone in 2001; as well as a period of economic boom during the 2000s. This system was characterized by liberal and pluralist democratic institutions (Pappas 2013) as well as a stable two party system that produced strong majority governments. During this period, the centre-right New

Democracy (ND) and the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) alternated in government, never gaining less than 83 per cent of the seats in parliament combined until 2009. As a result very few small parties gained parliamentary representation during that time- notably the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which enjoyed parliamentary representation in most Greek parliaments of the post-dictatorship era after its legalization.

However, the eruption of the Eurozonecrisis in 2008 challenged the Greek system fundamentally, altering the dynamics of party competition. The strong majority governments of the post-1974 era became substituted by coalition governments within a framework of an emerging division between those forces that supported and those that rejected external financial assistance in the form of a bailout and intervention in the form of structural reforms. PASOK imploded, giving way to the rise of the previously marginalised Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) and anti-establishment parties, including the Golden Dawn and Independent Greeks (ANEL).

To what extent is this political instability, resulting from the crisis, linked to the inherent contradictions within Greek political culture? And how was the political system sustained prior to the crisis despite these contradictions? In this chapter, we proceed to address these questions by drawing on Putnam's (1993) dimensions of civic political culture, include types of engagement, citizenship and political equality, solidarity and the politics of consensus, and social structures of co-operation.

Types of engagement

Societal engagement refers to public interest in politics and overall participation in public affairs and the political process. Civic forms of engagement require a high degree of participation, usually linked with institutional trust and political satisfaction (Putnam 1993: 87). Countries in which civic forms of engagement are prevalent tend to exhibit high levels of public interest and a strong civil society. The Greek case constitutes a paradox in that despite high levels of public interest in politics (Charalambis and Demertzis 1993), civil society tends to be weak and underdeveloped.

Greek citizens tend to have a positive attitude towards politics. This has much to do with the heritage of classical Greece and the Renaissance which have instilled the belief that Greeks are the founders of democracy (Pollis: 1987: 593). Public interest in political affairs is high, as indicated in Eurobarometer surveys (Charalambis and Demertzis 1993). Greek citizens participate in political discussions, have close affiliation to particular political parties, attend political rallies and participate in the electoral process. Turnout has been historically high in Greece -partly a product of compulsory voting. From the end of the 1970s until the mid-1990s turnout was consistently over 80 per cent. From 1996 to 2009 it ranged between 70 per cent and 76 per cent. The relaxing of electoral rules in recent years as well as the disenfranchisement of various social groups as a result of the crisis have meant that turnout has dropped somewhat in recent elections. In 2012 and 2015 turnout had dropped to 62 per cent to 63 per cent. This figure, however, is well over turnout in many other European democracies.

It is, therefore, paradoxical that civil society in Greece is weak at all levels: i.e. in terms of structure, impact and membership. There is a wider sentiment of distrust towards this type of organisations (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli 2006) and no formal procedure for consulting them. Civil society expanded after the fall of the military dictatorship, partly because of the strengthening of democratic institutions and partly because of EU accession. However, civil society organisations remain mostly information based. Their prime objective is to disseminate information, carry out research and encourage debate on various issues. They do not have a strong role in service delivery and have little lobbying power (Sotiropoulos and Karamagioli 2006), unless they are connected to a political party. This is what Mouzelis and Pagoulatos (2002: 6) term "partitocracy": i.e. 'the logic of political partisanship and party clientelism [which] permeated the whole of society and undermined the specific logic of all institutional subsystems'. This entails Greece, civil society has been to a great extent overridden by strong partisanship and that the most powerful pressure groups are insider ones, strongly associated with political parties, such as labour organisations or trade unions.

Citizenship and political (in)equality

In modern communities, citizens are equal, bound together by horizontal relations of reciprocity. Modern societies entail equal rights and obligations for all. The greater the resonance of the idea of political equality, the higher the levels of a civic culture (Putnam 1993: 87). On the contrary, pre-modern societies are characterized by vertical relations, i.e. a hierarchy of authority. In Greece, pre-modern vertical hierarchies have persisted, permeating Greece's modern political culture. Partly to do with the absence of Enlightenment and limited industrialization, the concept of citizenship is affected first by an ethnic as opposed to civic form of nationalism; second the resilience of traditional-parochial orientations, such as religion; and third the absence of the concept of inalienable rights.

Unlike in most Western European countries that underwent industrialisation and developed a civic type of nationalism, the official ideology of nationalism in Greece is in line with the traditional 19th century core nationalist doctrine: i.e. based on the idea of secession from a larger political unit in a designated ethnic homeland seeking to set up a new political independent ethno-nation. The quest for autonomy is premised on two pillars: the Greek nation is unique with its individuality, history and destiny and thus should be allowed to rule itself, i.e. the Kantian idea of the ethic of determination; and the Greek nation is superior because its history and destiny are that of a higher civilization. Greek nationalism has stagnated on these pillars and continues to be premised on a culture of confrontation and defiance. Therefore, by retaining its parochial orientations, Greece developed an ethnic type of nationalism. This is characterised by an emphasis on a community of birth and native culture, organic membership and ascriptive criteria of inclusion in the nation, including blood, creed and language. The defining features of Greek national identity are language and religion (Mavrogordatos 2003) understood as identity markers, which have existed throughout the longue durée. They provide ideological justification for exclusion from the Greek nation of everyone who does not share these characteristics on ethnic grounds, i.e. those not born Greek Orthodox to Greek Orthodox parents and who are not native Greek speakers. As such Greek nationalism may best be characterised as 'ethno-exclusionary': based on ethnic identity criteria and excluding anyone who does

not meet these criteria from membership of the Greek nation. Unlike Protestantism, which contributed to the emergence of the civic culture (Inglehart 1988), Orthodoxy therefore contributed to the persistence of parochial orientations, entrenching the traditional ethic of Greece's cultural heritage.

At the heart of this nationalism is an acceptance of authoritarian values. For example, Greek nationalism accepts the supremacy of authoritarian non-pluralist institutions such as the Greek Orthodox Church, whose power is institutionalised by the granting of special status (e.g. see Chrysoloras 2004; Halikiopoulou 2010). All other religions are discriminated against. Certain authoritarian values, such as violence, punishment and the establishment of a particular order, are acceptable as long as they promote the non-negotiable homogeneity of the Greek nation. In addition, the ideals, symbols and heroes of Greek nationalism are rarely associated with democratic or moderate ideas. They tend to emphasise valour, justified hatred, anomie (Psychogios 2013), and the necessity of sacrifice (Fragoudaki 2013). Such symbolic figures or events are commemorated on a regular basis, and these commemorations are institutionalised as compulsory in schools and other state institutions, and tend to exclude non-ethnic Greeks.

The development and consolidation of this form of nationalism has impacted on the ways in which the concepts of citizenship and human rights have developed in Greece. Consistent with Greece's parochial cultural orientations, the emphasis on the collective nature of the 'organic whole' (Pollis 1987) in ethnic Greek nationalism has undermined the role of the individual, including inalienable rights. The state functions as the organic embodiment of the Greek nation, meaning that nationalism overrides all other political allegiances, including left and right (Kalyvas and Marantzidis 2002; Pollis 1987). Both right and left are united by the nationalist culture of resistance (Psychogios 2013), which can be translated as resistance against pluralism, individual autonomy and democratic rule when these are seen as a threat to national sovereignty and unity.

Solidarity and the politics of consensus

Communities in which citizens are active participants are characterized by a degree of mutual trust and relationships of consensus. The higher the levels of civic culture is, the greater the levels of tolerance and consensus are expected to be (Putnam 1993: 88-89). Greek society is characterized by conflict lines and a simultaneous absence of robust mechanisms that are able to forge a consensus. Social relations and politics have been largely governed by polarization. These conflict lines include left versus right, and the people versus the elites.

Left-right divisions are deeply embedded, partly a legacy of the Greek civil war and partly the product of Greece's electoral system, which has produced a two party system and strong majority governments for decades, reinforcing the adversarial nature of Greek politics. This has served to consolidate a political culture of confrontation, which was reinforced by the military junta and permeated the post-dictatorship era. Post-1974, left and right became associated with specific political parties. This became expressed through Greece's strong partisanship, or as termed above, partitocracy, translating into inadequate mechanisms of cooperation for the efficient provision of public services and policy implementation.

The second conflict line, i.e. the people versus the elites, may be understood as populism, which is not a new feature of Greek politics just associated with the 2008 Eurozone crisis. For example, PASOK's 1980s expansionary policies were pursued and justified as being in the interests of the underprivileged (Lyritzis 2005: 249). In this framework populism became associated with the underdog culture, i.e. the losers of modernisation (Diamandouros 1994; Stavrakakis 2002). The people versus the elite distinction is at the core of Greece's cultural dualism as often the elites and their 'collaborators' are framed by political parties as hegemons and appeal to the fact that 'they belong to the 'people' or the 'non privileged' (Lyritzis 1987: 671).

Social structures of cooperation

Social structures of co-operation refer to the formal and informal ways in which members of a society interact. Civic structures of co-operation are associated with democratic stability (Putnam 1993). In Greece, however, structures of co-operation tend to be dominated by personalized relationships, which has entailed the entrenchment and consolidation of a clientelistic system (Tsoukalas 1991; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011).

At the heart of Greek political culture is thus the structural issue of political clientelism, i.e. a system based on corruption, cronyism and patronage networks. Although changing in nature, scope and intensity over the years, clientelism is a historically embedded feature of Greek political culture. It has been a constant and pervasive feature of the evolution of the Greek political system dating since the pre-industrial 19th century Greek state. The post-dictatorial era became characterised by over-centralised mass' clientelism, i.e. political organisation along the lines of mass parties, a move to mass politics, the penetration by party officers of the periphery and the concentration of power at the top levels. Local elites became powerless unless attached to the party leader (allowing the latter to assume unprecedented power). This created a window of opportunity to decompose the clientele, yet party leaders were unwilling to undermine these structures. For instance despite being a new party, PASOK 'not only relied heavily on old patronage networks, but also built new ones' (Pappas 2003: 316-317). Interestingly, PASOK did not attach itself to a specific social class, despite professing radical socialism in its founding manifesto, instead it appealed to the under-privileged in an 'all-embracive' way (Lyritzis 1984: 111; Featherstone 1990).

Due to these embedded clientelistic networks, ideological and/or class divisions have become linked to the capacity and willingness of the party to provide patronage (Pollis 1987; Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis 2011). In the absence of a fully functioning and structured civil society, 'winning elections and controlling the state provide the winners with the ability to distribute immediate benefits in the form of employment, favours and access; it allows the large scale but particularistic distribution of "spoils". Broad policy concerns, although present, are distinctly secondary' (Legg and Roberts 1997: 131). Essentially this two-way rent-seeking process characterises the relationship between voters and parties, the latter using the state to provide 'rents'.

Democratic Illiberalism

Our analysis of the various dimensions of Greek political culture so far indicates that civic features tend to be underdeveloped. Instead the parochial features are predominant. These include vertical hierarchies of social relations, irrational distributional forms and an emphasis on the organic whole. In other words, each pillar of Greek political culture stands in antithesis to the key tenets of liberalism including 'liberty, rationality, individuality, progress, sociability, the general interest, and limited and accountable power' (Freeden 2015: 15). As a result, the Greek may be described as a case of democratic illiberalism: on the one hand there is participation and interest in politics; on the other hand, liberal democratic institutions are weak and the political culture is underpinned by an 'organic worldview' which supports the 'whole group' (Pollis 1987) as opposed to the individual or social sub-units. This results in support for illiberal forms of politics, which transcend ideology. These include populism and ethnic nationalism, an opposition to individualism and individual rights, as well as disapproval for institutional mechanisms of consensus both internally and externally.

During the post-1974 era we may observe a number of instances of democratic illiberalism exemplifying the points made above. For example, the same rights and obligations that apply to Greek citizens do not extend to religious minorities, indicating the absence of the concept of inalienable rights for all in socially inclusive politics. In practice the special status of the Greek Orthodox Church guarantees a set of privileges for the clergy, while at the same time discriminates against non-Orthodox minorities. For example, there is no official place of worship for Muslims in Greece. While permission for the construction of a Mosque was finally granted in 2006, construction has not yet began as of the time of writing (Halikiopoulou 2010). Similar types of discrimination have been noted in the past in relation to Jehova's witnesses who have had to serve prison sentences on numerous occasions for failing to carry out military service. Finally there is the issue of the cremation of the dead. While this was legalized in 2006 it was done so with very tight provisions: only if the dead had formally declared his/ her wish to be cremated and had waved their right to a Greek Orthodox funeral. The State has also not created the structures to allow cremation to take place on Greek ground. As of 2018 there are no crematories in Greece, and relatives must instead transport the dead abroad in order to be cremated.

The Greek identity crisis of May 2000 is another example illustrating the embeddedness of the illiberal orientations of Greek political culture. This example merges Greek nationalism and religion. The Greek identity crisis commenced in 2000 following a reform initiative on behalf of the Greek government to eliminate the religion field from Greek identity cards. The Greek Church opposed the reform organising mass rallies in Athens and Thessaloniki. During the Athens rally, the then Archibishop of Athens and all of Greece, Christodoulos, finished his speech by raising the Greek flag of independence and with his back to the Greek parliament proclaimed 'let the laws sleep' (Halikiopoulou 2010). This example is important because it shows how a parochial institution and its leader showed obvious contempt for liberal democratic institutions and were applauded and supported by large numbers of the public.

More recently, the events that unfolded outside the Hytirio theatre in Athens in 2012 also reveal the extent to which intolerance in terms of religious pluralism, freedom of

speech and the acceptance of minority views, underpins Greek political culture. Protesters objecting to the premier of Terrence McNally's play Corpus Christi were condemning the play's moral agenda as 'blasphemous' because its portrayal of Christ and the apostles as homosexuals. What is revealing about this case in terms of political culture is the joint protest of members of the Church with members of the public and the Golden Dawn. What was at stake was not whether the moral message of the play was blasphemous; it was the issue of the acceptance of the rights of others to hold beliefs that one may disagree with and exposed the absence of respect for pluralist ideals and individual rights.

The difficulty to introduce educational reforms may also be understood through the prism of Greece's political culture. Education is the formal means through which nationalism is reproduced and disseminated, thus perpetuating political culture from generation to generation (Gellner 1983). This is particularly true of highly centralized education systems where both the curriculum and the content of textbooks are determined by the state. Greek history textbooks draw heavily on the dividing line between 'us' and the 'other'. They portray the Greek nation as an organic entity that has existed since time immemorial bound on the basis of blood, kinship, religion and descent, and which is constantly under threat by various hostile external forces. A series of reforms regarding the content of a primary school history textbook introduced in 2006 became contested on nationalistic grounds from across the political spectrum. The textbook, which offered a revisionist version of Greek history removing obvious ethnic nationalist references, was finally withdrawn (Halikiopoulou 2010).

Instances of political illiberalism are also manifested in Greece's uncompromising foreign policy and the popular explosion of nationalism that some foreign policy initiatives have triggered, provoking confrontation with neighbouring countries. A good example is the 'Macedonian' question. The dissolution of Yugoslavia created the emergence of newly developed independent states. Greece at the time vetoed the ability of the state currently known as Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), to adopt the name 'Macedonia' blocking its NATO entry and EU accession. This was because the name Macedonia is also the name of a region in northern Greece where the country's second largest city, Thessaloniki, is situated. Justification for this veto was made on ethnic nationalist lines, that the adoption of such a name on behalf of the neighbouring country would result in its appropriation of the Greek language, history and heritage, and could be an irredentist move on their behalf. This led to the collapse of the ND Mitsotakis' government (1990-1993) after then foreign minister Antonis Samaras, who was unwilling to compromise on this question, resigned creating a new party. This move was widely supported by the public who opposed the adoption of the Macedonia name fervently participating in mass demonstrations with slogans such as 'Macedonia is Greek', 'Μολών Λαβέ' alluding to the story of Leonidas and the 300, and 'One can not be a Macedonian without being Greek' and waiving banners depicting pictures of Alexander the Great. Similar nationalist reactions were revoked in 1996 when a war almost erupted between Greece and Turkey over a rock in the Aegean Sea known as 'Imia'. The difficulty in achieving consensus as well as the strong nationalist sentiment among the Greek public serve again to illustrate the illiberal elements in Greek political culture.

Greek political culture in the context of crisis

Parochial- participant societies tend to be politically unstable (Almond and Verba 1963) and are prone to authoritarianism and extremism. This means that they are particularly susceptible to crises, given that the latter challenge the foundations of political systems when those are weak. The effect of the 2008 Eurozone crisis on Greece was severe. Beyond a merely economic crisis, this crisis had important political and ideological dimensions, translating into an overall crisis of democratic representation. It exposed Greece's severe issues of governability and limited ability of the state to mediate the effects of economic malaise and deliver on its social contract obligations (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2018). The crisis served to further reveal the prevalence of the parochial orientations of Greek political culture by fuelling Greece's ethnic nationalism, exposing the weaknesses of its civil society, and revealing how deeply embedded but at the same time detrimental clientelistic networks were in Greek society. This section will briefly examine some of these instances.

The most straightforward effect of the political crisis was the high levels of electoral volatility, which resulted in the break up of the party system and its transformation from bipolarity to multipolarity. The inability of a single party to gain a strong majority has challenged the existing system and its majoritarian nature, by creating the need to forge consensus through coalition governments. It has also elevated previously marginal extreme and anti-establishment parties to positions of strength.

One good example is the Golden Dawn, which received support from over 400,000 Greek citizens during the May and June 2012 elections, gaining 21 and 18 parliamentary seats out of 300 respectively. The party sustained its electoral presence in subsequent national and EP elections, and at the time of writing continues to have solid support of approximately 7% despite its key members undergoing trial of maintaining a criminal organization. The Golden Dawn is an extreme right party, which publicly rejects procedural democracy. Its ideology is highly nationalistic, emphasising the superiority of the Greek nation and the ethnic markers of Greek identity including race, blood and creed. The Golden Dawn links nationalism with its anti-establishment and populist politics by portraying the Greek nation as pure and virtuous and under threat by domineering foreign powers and collaborationist internal elites who serve foreign interests, including Germany, the European Union, the United States and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). It pledges to 'destroy' the old 'rotten system' which it associates with stagnation and corruption.

Greek political culture and the official ideology of Greek nationalism contain elements that are consistent to some of the values put forward by the Golden Dawn. In other words, because of its traditionalist orientation and emphasis on defiance, resistance and the ultimate value of national self-determination for the homogenous and organically defined Greek nation, Greek nationalism has provided a cultural opportunity for the Golden Dawn.

While the Golden Dawn seized cultural opportunities related to Greek nationalism, SYRIZA seized cultural opportunities related to populism. SYRIZA, a formerly marginalised political party on the radical left of the spectrum, marked its electoral

breakthrough in 2012 reaching second place. In January 2015, the party further expanded its support, and formed a coalition government with far right ANEL. While these two parties came from the opposite ends of the political spectrum, what united them was their anti-elite and anti-establishment narrative consistent with the populist elements of Greek political culture as discussed above. SYRIZA offered an alternative vision for Greece premised on national pride, defiance and an antagonism against the status quo. The party linked the dichotomy between 'us', i.e. the pure people and 'them', i.e. the corrupt elite to a blame-shifting narrative that associated these corrupt elites with domestic politicians and their external collaborators (Vasilopoulou et al. 2014).

Conclusion

In this chapter we have analysed Greek political culture with reference to the literature on the civic culture and the cultural dualism thesis. Specifically, we focused on various dimensions of political culture offered by Putnam (1993) and examined the ways in which participant and parochial orientations interact in each dimension. We understand this interaction within the framework of democratic illiberalism, i.e. an inconsistency between on the one hand interest in democracy, but on the other support for illiberal forms of politics premised on a collective organic worldview and opposition to individualism. Finally, we have briefly examined Greek political culture within the context of crisis, illustrating how some of its parochial orientations have shaped post-crisis Greek politics.

This analysis is based on the modernisation literature that expects political culture to have an effect on institutional performance. However, there is endogeneity in the relationship between political culture and institutions. While on the one hand indeed political culture plays a role in the extent to which liberal democratic institutions can function, on the other hand the endurance of these institutions also shapes political culture which is not a static, but rather a dynamic process. SYRIZA was elected on a populist platform, and brought radical politics to the fore. At the same time, certain policies aimed at protecting minority rights and reaching consensus have been introduced during its office. The legalisation of same-sex civil partnerships was approved in 2015 with a strong majority. In 2018 the SYRIZA-ANEL government forged a deal on the Macedonian question. This suggests that while traditionalist orientations in Greek political culture are indeed durable, they are also fluid and themselves influenced by long-standing democratic institutions.

At times of external shock, upheaval and crisis, civic cultures are also vulnerable to extremism. For example, some of the far right parties that have enjoyed parliamentary representation in their domestic arenas in Europe, including the French Front National, the Dutch Party for Freedom and the United Kingdom Independent Party, have all increased their support in countries whose political cultures have high levels of civic orientations. The increased relevance of these parties is linked to the manner in which they employ civic values in their discourse. They present culture as a value issue-ideological rather than biological. Cultural justifications of exclusion increasingly focus on purported threats posed by those who do not share 'our' liberal democratic values. The justification is that such cultures are intolerant and inherently antithetical to democracy. Therefore 'we' exclude people not because they are different, but because they constitute a real danger to the stability and security of our society

(Halikiopoulou et al. 2013). This entails that civic values often do not shield from extremism; rather they make our societies more vulnerable to extremism by disguising it.

This suggests that that further research should place the Greek case in a comparative framework examining cases with similar cultures but different political outcomes, or similar outcomes but different levels of civic culture. While Portugal, Greece and Spain share a history of polarisation and authoritarianism, only Greece has developed right-wing extremism in the form of the Golden Dawn. While Greece and Cyprus share many similarities in their political cultures, the Golden Dawn's sister party National Popular Front (ELAM) remains marginal in the Cypriot party system. While many countries of the West are fundamentally different from Greece in that they have high levels of civic culture, they have nonetheless developed radical politics, which not only persist but have also permeated mainstream ground. The answer to these questions might go beyond political culture to understand the effect of a range of other supply and demand side dynamics.

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