

*When economic and cultural interests align: the anti- immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe*

Article

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**When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe**

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Abstract:	<p>This article contests the view that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis and against the economic grievance thesis. We argue that far right party success depends on the ability to mobilise a coalition of interests between their core supporters, i.e. voters with cultural grievances over immigration and the, often, larger group of voters with economic grievances over immigration. Using individual level data from 8 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), our empirical analysis shows that while cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, those who dislike the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms. Taken together, our findings suggest that economic grievances over immigration remain pivotal within the context of the transnational cleavage.</p>

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**When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions  
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Far right party success depends largely on mobilising grievances over immigration (Golder 2003; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Rooduijn et al 2017). This is particularly relevant within the context of an emerging transnational cleavage at the core of which lies a value conflict between those who support and those who reject multi-culturalism, cosmopolitanism and globalization (Hooghe and Marks 2017). Theoretically, the importance of cultural values in shaping voting behaviour within the context of this cleavage, and empirically the strong association of cultural concerns over immigration and far right party support at the individual level have led to an emerging consensus in the literature that the increasing success of far right parties may be best understood as a ‘cultural backlash’ (Inglehart and Norris 2016), i.e. a reaction to the perceived cultural threats posed by immigration.

Scholars recognise that there are theoretical reasons to expect the material aspects of immigration scepticism to also matter even within the context of a transnational cleavage. However, most empirical studies tend to support the cultural explanation. In terms of anti-immigration attitudes, findings regarding the labour market competition hypothesis are highly contested (Malhotra et. al 2013; Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin and Sides 2008; Sniderman et al 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014). In terms of far right party support, economic explanations are often dismissed or understood as secondary (Lubbers and Güveli 2007; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2016) given the greater predictive power of cultural concerns over immigration at the individual level.

This article contests the view that immigration is a predominantly cultural issue and that the strong positive correlation between anti-immigration attitudes and far right party success

necessarily and by default constitutes evidence in support of the cultural grievance thesis. We suggest that insufficient attention has been paid both to the predictive power of socio-tropic economic concerns over immigration, and to the important distinction between galvanising a core constituency on the one hand, and mobilizing more broadly beyond this core constituency on the other. We posit and test a twofold argument using data on immigration concerns and the far right vote from 8 rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS) across 19 countries.

Our findings from multilevel mixed effects logistic regressions, cross-tabulations, scatter plots and simulations indicate that, first, both cultural and economic concerns over immigration increase the likelihood of voting for a far right party. Second, while cultural concerns are a *stronger predictor* of far right party voting behaviour in a statistical sense, *this does not automatically mean that they matter more* for far right party success in substantive terms. What determines far right party success is the ability to mobilise a coalition of interests between core voters, i.e. those primarily concerned with the cultural impact of immigration, and as large a subset as possible of peripheral voters, i.e. the often numerically larger group of voters who are primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration, as well as those who do not have concerns about immigration. This coalition is necessary for far right parties to extend their mobilisation capacity beyond their core support base and thus make significant electoral gains.

This article proceeds as follows. First, we review the literature on immigration-related grievances and far right party support. Second, we present our argument, focusing on why mobilising a coalition of voters with different types of immigration-related concerns is key to understanding far right party support. Third, we discuss our data and methods and proceed to test our argument empirically. The article concludes with some of the broader implications of our argument and directions for future research.

### **Immigration and ‘the cultural backlash’**

The growing popularity of the far right is often linked to voters’ concerns over immigration (Rydgren 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Arzheimer 2009; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Rooduijn et al 2017). Studies find that immigration has a positive effect on far right parties, often irrespective of other factors (Golder 2003). Voters are either affected by actual immigrant numbers, or by negative perceptions about immigrants, or both (Stockemer 2016). Far right parties, which ‘own’ the immigration issue (Van der Brug and Fennema 2007; Van Spanje 2010) and share a common emphasis on nationalism (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015) or nativism (Mudde 2007), sovereignty and policies that promote a ‘national preference’ are well placed to exploit immigration-related grievances and generate greater demand.

The question of immigration is particularly relevant within the context of an emerging transnational cleavage whose focal point is ‘the defence of national political, social and economic ways of life against external actors’ (Hooghe and Marks 2017: 2). The increasing salience of the immigration issue may be partly understood by this development, which has altered in-group and out-group dynamics. The transnational cleavage divides voters who hold cosmopolitan values from those who hold nationalist ones and can be best understood as a value conflict between voters who support and voters who reject multi-culturalism, globalization, as well as social and ethnic diversity. It is the result of rapid and profound value change in post-industrial societies (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

Because at the core of the transnational cleavage is a cultural – or value – conflict, scholars emphasize the importance of the cultural dimension of competition with immigrants in driving far right party success. The main proposition of the cultural grievance thesis is the perceived incompatibility between native and immigrant behavioural norms and cultural values (Golder 2016: 485). In other words, the argument here is that what drives far right

party support is a fear that immigrants erode the national culture and traditional ways of life, thus threatening the value consensus upon which social norms are based. This cultural threat exacerbates prejudices against immigrants, and prompts voters to opt for parties whose main agendas are centred on limiting immigration. According to this view, far right party support may be best understood as ‘a cultural backlash’: i.e. a reaction to value change by those who reject universalistic values and place emphasis on national identity and fear the erosion of their cultural values (Inglehart and Norris 2016).

A large body of empirical research finds support for the cultural grievance hypothesis at the individual level (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Lubbers and Güveli 2007). This complements findings that pervasive cultural concerns are an underlying source of opposition to immigration and that culture is more important than economic advantage in evoking anti-immigration sentiments (e.g. Chandler and Tsai 2001; Citrin and Sides 2008; Sniderman et al 2004; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Evidence includes post-material voting trends determined by factors such as age and education, the endorsement of authoritarian values, mistrust in political institutions and general resentment towards out-groups (Inglehart and Norris 2016). In addition, scholars emphasise the association between cultural concerns, nationalistic attitudes (Lubbers and Coenders 2017), euroscepticism (Van Elsas et. al 2016) and class (Oesch (2008)). As part of this broader trend towards cultural-oriented explanations of far right party support, immigration scepticism tends to often be identified as a cultural issue (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Kaufmann 2017).

*Labour market competition and economic grievances*

Immigration, however, is a multi-faceted issue (Mudde 2012; Lucassen Lubbers 2012; Malhotra et al 2013; Rydgren 2008). Indeed more recent scholarship stresses that the culture versus economy debate is a false dichotomy (e.g. Gidron and Hall 2017; Adler and Ansell 2020), and that both dimensions matter, often shaping each other (Burns and Gimpel 2000). There are reasons to expect that competition with immigrants will likely be shaped not only by cultural but also by material interests. Indeed, the Labour Market Competition hypothesis suggests that prejudices against immigrants have objective economic foundations (Polavieja 2016; Hellwig and Kweon 2016; Dancygier and Donnelly 2013; Malhotra et. al 2013; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001). Concerns might be either ego-tropic or socio-tropic, meaning that either those pessimistic about their personal economic situation and/or those pessimistic about the impact of immigration on the nation's economy as a whole, are more likely to have negative attitudes towards some migrant/ minority groups (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Burns and Gimpel 2000).

We might expect this to hold even in the context of the new transnational cleavage mainly prevalent in post-industrial societies. The decline of traditional cleavages does not necessarily imply that social and economic divisions are politically irrelevant, as new cleavages are 'strongly shaped by the political legacy of traditional cleavages' (Kriesi 1998: 165-167). While indeed comprehensive welfare states protect minimal standards of living (Inglehart and Norris 2016; Vlandas and Halikiopoulou 2018), relative deprivation and inequality still affect voters (Adler and Ansell 2020; Colantone and Stanig 2018; Engler and Weisstanner 2020), and position in the labour market continues to have an impact on voting behaviour (Swank and Betz 2003; Swank and Betz 2018; Rovny and Rovny 2017; Kitchelt 2018).

A close association between labour-market competition and negative views on immigration is more likely when a labour market threat is present (Malhotra et. al 2013: 392). Social groups that have a higher degree of exposure to labour-market competition are more likely to have an interest in limiting immigration because ‘an increase in the supply of immigrant workers is likely to lower their wages and/or to increase job insecurity’ (Polavieja 2016:396). These may include – but are not confined to- the lower social strata. Which social group will be affected depends on country, individual occupational source, employment sector, and skill level (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). Skilled individuals are more likely to favour immigration in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants (and oppose it otherwise), ‘because in this case immigration reduces the supply of skilled relative to unskilled labour and raises the skilled wage’ (Mayda 2006:510). Individuals employed in growing sectors are more likely to support immigration than those employed in shrinking sectors (Dancygier and Donnelly 2013). Less-skilled workers are more likely to prefer limiting immigrant inflows (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). There is also a policy effect as national protection policies may reduce hostility towards immigration (Artiles and Meardi 2014).

All this suggests we should treat immigration as a complex issue, and expect reasons other than xenophobic or racist attitudes including economic grievances (Rydgren 2008) to affect people’s attitudes towards immigration and the way they vote. To account for this, research has increasingly distinguished between the different sets of threats- mainly cultural and economic- posed by immigration, and their impact on anti-immigration attitudes (Sniderman et. al 2004; Malhotra et. al 2013) and far right party support (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Sniderman et al 2004; Rydgren 2008).

The majority of studies, however, that consider, and juxtapose, both the economic and cultural dimensions of anti-immigration attitudes and far right party support find greater

support for the cultural grievance thesis and tend to agree that, although both dimensions matter, the economy matters much less than culture. These conclusions are based predominantly- but not exclusively- on the strong predictive power of cultural variables at the individual level (Lubbers and Güveli 2007; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; for a review of studies explaining attitudes on immigration see Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

### **Why mobilising an anti-immigrant voter coalition is key to understanding far right party success**

#### *Immigration is not just a cultural issue*

This article contests the view that immigration is predominantly a cultural issue and that the stronger predictive power of cultural concerns over immigration *necessarily* implies that culture is always more important than the economy in driving far right party success. We argue instead that both cultural and economic concerns matter, albeit in different ways. Our argument responds to recent calls in the literature to refine and better explain the economic anxiety thesis instead of disregarding it (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018). We do so by paying more attention to voters' socio-tropic economic concerns over immigration and to the size and coalition potential of voter groups with both cultural and economic concerns over immigration.

Specifically, our argument unfolds into two separate claims. First, while cultural concerns over immigration are indeed a stronger predictor of voting for the far right than economic concerns, the latter also have predictive power that is not negligible. This is particularly true of socio-tropic concerns: people's views about the impact of immigration on the economy motivate them to express opposition to immigration on economic grounds. While, however, scholars agree that socio-tropic drivers of anti-immigration attitudes 'can be economic as

well' (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014:230) and that pessimism about the national economy is likely to predict restrictive immigration attitudes (Citrin et al 1997; Kinder & Kiewiet 1981; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014), this is often de-emphasised and under-theorized in cultural arguments about far right party support.

Second, we make the case that in order to understand a party's electoral success we need to consider not just the predictive power of certain attitudes but also the ways in which they are incorporated into politics. This points to the crucial distinction between receiving support from a core constituency and being able to mobilise more broadly. A party is more likely to have a large electoral potential if 'a substantial proportion of the voters agree with its political program' (Van der Brug et al 2005: 563). It must therefore broaden its support beyond its secure voting base in order to be electorally successful (e.g. Tilley and Evans 2017). This entails mobilizing a coalition of interests between different social classes or groups with different preferences. In sum, the *size* of, and coalition potential between, groups play a key role in explaining successful electoral performance.

#### *Core and peripheral far right voters*

Far right parties share a common emphasis on nationalism, or nativism, in their programmatic agendas (Hainsworth 2008; Mudde 2007). They compete along the national identity axis (Ellinas 2013) and centre their political programmes on a purported conflict between in-groups and out-groups, postulating that the in-group must in all circumstances be prioritised at the expense of the out-group. Their signature is to propose nationalist solutions to all socio-economic problems (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).

The broad umbrella of voters with nationalist concerns (Lubbers and Coenders 2017) is a key far right party target group because these voters are more likely to identify with far right positions and the issues they deem salient. Immigration is central: far right parties have

ownership of the immigration issue (e.g. Van Spaghe 2010), because the latter speaks to the debate about entitlement to national membership, and as such is directly linked to nationalism (Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2018). Voters with nationalist concerns relating to immigration, therefore, could significantly increase the electoral fortunes of far right parties given the rise in the salience of this issue within the context of the transnational cleavage (Hooghe and Marks 2017).

Nationalism, understood as the 'attainment and maintenance of autonomy, unity and identity of a nation' (Breuilly 2005: 16–17), however, is multi-dimensional. Its different components include the ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic (Halikiopoulou et al 2012). Opposition to immigration can be linked to one, all, or some- in the form of a combination- of these components. Voters are likely to have different party preferences depending on the source of their grievance and the extent to which they identify with the proposed party's nationalist platform. This suggests a distinction between core and peripheral voters, which we elaborate on below.

Traditionally far right parties have been associated with ethnic nationalism and xenophobia (Halikiopoulou et al 2012; Rydgren 2008). Core far right voters (we term these voters 'the culturalists') are more likely to be primarily concerned with the cultural threat posed by immigration, and to identify with all elements of nationalism and, by extension, the entire far right party platform. Because their support of the far right is principled, and more specifically linked to a principled form of xenophobia (Rydgren 2008), they see far right parties as their natural home. Peripheral voters, on the other hand, identify only partially with this platform. As such, their support is more contingent. This includes groups primarily concerned with the economic impact of immigration (we term these voters 'the materialists'). These voters are likely to support the prioritization of the in-group on economic grounds but do not necessarily identify with the other nationalist elements of far right agendas, including the ethnic and

cultural. Because their concerns are related to a weaker form of immigration scepticism (Rydgren 2008) and their out-group attitudes are not principled, they may be catered for by a number of other parties and their affinity with the far right is less strong.

The implication of this distinction between core and peripheral voter groups is as follows. While the culturalists are core supporters and hence more likely to vote for the far right, it does not follow that they are automatically more important. To be successful, far right parties can, and often do, draw on a subset of an often larger peripheral electoral group composed of materialists, whose preferences may be more likely to include other parties addressing their economic concerns about immigration. Using European Social Survey data of 19 European countries (see data section for more details), Figure 1 compares the distribution of economic and cultural concerns over immigration. It is clear from this figure that there are more respondents with economic concerns than with cultural concerns.

--- Figure 1 about here ---

The ability to mobilise as large a subset of materialists determines far right party success. Sniderman *et al's* (2004:36) distinction between galvanising a core constituency and mobilizing more broadly is crucial for our point: 'politically [it] makes all the difference as it enlarges the portion of the public in support of these parties and/or the policies they advocate'. This mobilisation can be brought about by situational triggers, which exacerbate voters' socio-tropic economic concerns over immigration. This group of voters - the 'materialists' - may not be *the core* constituency of far right parties, but it is still highly likely to support far right parties because, as we have argued above, economic concerns over immigration may matter even if they are weaker predictors of voting for the far right than cultural concerns. As a result, it is precisely materialist voters (and/ or voters without

immigration concerns) who need to be mobilised by far right parties and in many ways determine their broader electoral success of such parties.

Why might we expect some far right parties to be better able to mobilise materialists more than others? Supply-side literature has emphasised the shift from predominantly ethnic (or nativist) nationalist narratives, which draw on ascriptive criteria, to more civic narratives, which draw on ideological rationalisations of national belonging (Halikiopoulou et al 2013). This shift in turn allows these parties to extend their appeal to a broad range of immigration sceptics (Rydgren 2008). Part of this changing narrative is an explicit move away from market liberal positions (Kitschelt and McGann 1995) to the adoption of welfare chauvinism (De Lange 2007; Ivaldi 2015; De Koster et al 2013; Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015; Afonso and Rennwald 2017), which draws on economic nationalism, thus speaking directly to those voters with material insecurities feeding concerns over immigration.

#### *The importance of group size*

Our point regarding the importance of the size of a given group is best illustrated with a simple hypothetical example, displayed graphically in figure 2. Suppose the electorate is composed of 110 voters and all are concerned about immigration, but 10 feel culturally insecure about immigration (the culturalists), while the remaining 100 feel economically insecure about immigration (the materialists). Suppose further that in the last election, 5 out of 10 people in the culturalist camp voted for the far right so that they have a 50% probability of voting for the far right. By contrast in the materialist camp, 10 out of 100 voted for the far right so that they have a 10% probability of voting for the far right. Thus, in this example, a culturalist is *ceteris paribus* five times as likely as a materialist to vote for the far right, yet the materialists are much more important to the success of far right parties than the culturalists.

The materialist group determines far right party success because of its numerical majority despite the fact that individual concerns about immigration's cultural impact have a stronger effect on individual far right party support than do concerns about its economic impact. Therefore, while it may well be that the core of support for far right parties objects to immigration on cultural grounds, it is the more economically oriented concerns that are especially influential in allowing these parties to expand beyond that core – and indeed those without immigration concerns. In other words, in order to increase their electoral chances, far right parties must mobilise immigration-related grievances beyond culture. In appendix 4, we demonstrate using a larger sample of hypothetical data that it is indeed possible for the characteristic associated with a much smaller group of far right supporters to have a larger effect on far right voting.

--- Figure 2 about here ---

The point of this hypothetical example is to show that stronger predictive power in a statistical sense does not necessarily equate to substantive importance in a theoretical and empirical sense. This explains why we cannot infer from the stronger predictive power of individual cultural concerns over voting for far right parties that they necessarily matter *more* for far right party success at the national level in substantive terms. The assumption that the predictive power of a variable at the individual level equals substantive importance at the national level suffers from an atomistic- or individualistic- fallacy, which consists of “formulating inferences at a higher level based on analyses performed at a lower level” (Hox, 2010: 3)<sup>1</sup>. Generalising from the individual to the aggregate level is inappropriate because ‘relationships among variables that hold at one level do not necessarily hold at another level of the hierarchy’ (Croon and Veldhoven 2007: 45). The attempt to make such inferences

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<sup>1</sup> Drawing national level conclusion from individual level results is potentially as problematic as inferring individual level dynamics from national level results (i.e. an ecological fallacy), but has been so far neglected in the literature on far right voting.

overlooks the composition dimension- or in other words the size of the group that shares this particular concern and how widespread this concern actually is among the electorate. Thus, while some variables may be stronger predictors, this does not automatically tell us what matters more in the sense of accounting for this party's electoral success.

## **Research design**

### *Data*

In order to examine how and to what extent far right party success depends on mobilising grievances over the cultural and economic impact of immigration, we combine eight waves<sup>2</sup> of the European Social Survey (ESS), which has been used by previous research on both immigration attitudes and far right support (see e.g. Citrin and Sides 2008; Ivarsflaten 2008; Rydgren 2008; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Inglehart and Norris 2016).

We adopt the terminology 'far right' in accordance to Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), and examine all parties that propose nationalist solutions to a variety of socio-economic problems (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015), compete along the national identity axis (Ellinas 2011) and 'own' the immigration issue (Van Spagne 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012). Our analysis includes 31 parties in 19 European countries. In each country-wave, respondents were asked which political party they voted for in the last national election. Our dependent variable measures far right party support and is binary: it is coded 1 if the respondent voted for a far right party and 0 if the respondent voted for another party. The countries, parties, ESS round in which they included, and relevant sources corroborating our classification are listed in appendix 1.

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<sup>2</sup> The data was accessed in November 2019 and consists of the following 8 waves: 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016.

Our independent variables include questions that ask respondents whether they think their country's cultural life is undermined (0) or enriched (10) by immigrants (henceforth 'cultural concerns about immigration') and whether they think immigration is bad (0) or good (10) for their country's economy (henceforth 'economic concerns about immigration'). In each case, we reverse the scale so that higher values indicate greater concern.

These two variables are partly correlated (0.62) and as such, one may contend they should be treated as a single variable. However, recent studies have treated the two as separate, assessing the extent to which each type of threat affects attitudes and voters' propensity to vote for the far right and showing that the two sets of threats 'independently affect prejudice' (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012: 548; see also Sniderman et al 2004). For instance, Lucassen and Lubbers (2012) use data from the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the ESS round to juxtapose cultural and economic threats over immigration and far right party support in 11 European countries. Similarly, using data from the 1<sup>st</sup> round of the ESS, but focusing on 6 European countries, Rydgren (2008: 738) also differentiates between racists, xenophobes and immigration sceptics arguing these dimensions 'overlap asymmetrically'. In addition, Lubbers and Güveli (2007) juxtapose cultural ethnic and economic concerns over immigration and their impact on voting for LPF using the Dutch sample of the ESS. Finally, also focusing on the Netherlands and using a series of experiments, Sniderman *et al* (2004: 35) contrast the importance of considerations of national identity and economic advantage in 'evoking exclusionary reactions to immigration minorities'. These studies point to the importance of conducting further research that distinguishes cultural from economic threats (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012: 576) by using larger samples and including more cases. Following this literature, we also treat the two variables as separate but also run a variety of tests paying close attention to the extent to which they differ and overlap.

Our controls include age, gender, education (in years), occupation<sup>3</sup> and source of income<sup>4</sup>. We also control for level of income. While waves 4 to 8 use the standard 10-income decile classification, the first three waves of the ESS rely on a 12-category variable. We therefore create two separate variables: the first is coded 1 if the respondent is in the bottom 50% of categories (bottom 5 deciles in one case and bottom 6 categories in second case) and 0 otherwise; the second variable is coded 1 if the respondent is in the bottom 10% for the decile variable and in bottom 2 categories for the 12 categories variable. Finally, we control for partisanship, Euroscepticism and trust in institutions. An 11-point left-right self-placement scale is used to capture the ideological location of the respondents. To account for Euroscepticism we include a trust in European parliament variable (0-complete trust at all to 10-no trust at all trust). There are several variables asking respondents about their levels of trust. We use ‘trust in national parliament’ but show results are the same if we use different forms of trust such as trust in legal system, politicians and political parties, and we have also tried alternative measures of trust (see table A3.2 in appendix). All summary statistics are shown in table A2.1 in appendix.

### *Method*

Our methodological approach is as follows. First, our aim is to investigate whether and how different immigration concerns affect the probability of voting for the far right. Using multilevel mixed-effects logistic regressions, we examine whether cultural and economic individual concerns about immigration have an effect on voting for the far right and which of

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<sup>3</sup> The ESS allows us to capture the following occupations: manager, professional, technician, clerical, service, agriculture, craft, operator, and elementary

<sup>4</sup> We capture (1) Wages or salaries; (2) Income from self-employment (excluding farming); (3) Income from farming; (4) Pensions; (5) Unemployment/redundancy benefit; (6) Any other social benefits or grants; (7) Income from investments, savings, etc; and (8) Income from other sources.

these two concerns has stronger predictive power. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave.

Second, we need to ascertain the share of respondents that have each type of concern and vote for far right parties. This speaks to our point about the size of voter groups with different concerns over immigration. A series of tabulations reveals that there are more individuals with economic than with cultural concerns over immigration and that those who are concerned about the impact of immigration on the economy are more important to the far right in numerical terms than those concerned with its impact on culture.

Third, we examine the implications of our argument at the national level. We focus on the cross-national variation in far right party support by plotting the share of materialists and culturalists that vote for the far right against the overall percentage of the far right electorate. More formally, we also test whether the impact of being a culturalist or a materialist on the probability of voting for the far right at the individual level has a bearing on far right party support at the national level. In a first step, we run a series of logistic regression analyses for each country-wave in our sample<sup>5</sup>. In a second step, we extract the country-wave coefficients for the two variables capturing economic and cultural concerns over immigration, respectively, and we then regress national level share of far right party support as the dependent variable on these two coefficients as two independent variables. This allows us to assess whether the individual level predictive power of concerns correlates with national level success.

Finally, we run a series of simple simulations to evaluate the extent to which artificially varying the distribution of economic and cultural concerns in a given country would result in a different electoral score for the far right. We run a series of logistic regression analyses for

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<sup>5</sup> Each logistic regression controls for the same variables as our multi-level analysis carried out above.

each country in our sample. Using the coefficients from these regressions, we calculate individual predicted probabilities for different distributions of economic and cultural concerns: everyone scores 0, everyone scores the true distribution of concerns, and everyone scores 10. We then predict country level far right party support for all possible combinations of these three levels of economic and cultural concerns (i.e.  $3 \times 3 = 9$  scenarios).

### **Results: the impact of immigration concerns on far right party success in Europe**

#### *The predictive power of economic and cultural concerns*

Table 1 reports the coefficients for our key independent variables<sup>6</sup>. In column 1, we can see that both economic and cultural concerns have a positive and statistically significant association with the probability of voting for the far right. Cultural concerns seem to have stronger predictive power, as we will confirm later by calculating predicted probabilities for different scenarios in a second step. There is a positive and significant association between being male and voting for the far right, while older individuals appear less likely to support the far right. By contrast, being in the bottom of the income distribution has no statistically significant association (column 1)<sup>7</sup>. The subsequent columns include additional controls stepwise and our results concerning the impact of economic and cultural concerns are stable. Having higher education is negatively associated with support for the far right. These results are consistent with literature that identifies the typical far right voter as a young male, with a low level of education (Lubbers & Scheepers 2002, Arzheimer 2009, Lucassen & Lubbers 2012; Golder 2016).

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<sup>6</sup> The average marginal effects of economic and cultural concerns over immigration are show in Table A3.1b in appendix.

<sup>7</sup> Note however that in column 8 when we use a different proxy for having low income we find that the coefficient becomes statistically significant and positive.

We find mixed evidence regarding source of income. Being self-employed and receiving a pension are both negatively associated with voting for the far right. The statistical significance of receiving ‘other (non-unemployment/non-pension benefits) social benefits’ is not stable across specifications. We also find a positive and significant association between being unemployed and voting for the far right in all specifications. In terms of occupation, the highly skilled professionals have the strongest negative association with the probability of voting for the far right, while workers in skill-specific craft occupations and low skilled workers employed as operators (both occupations capturing core parts of the manufacturing sector) are most likely to vote for far right. Right-leaning individuals are associated with higher support for the far right, while trust in national and European institutions is negatively associated with support for the far right (columns 7 and 8).

In order to assess which variable has the largest effect on the probability of voting for the far right, we calculate the difference in the predicted probability when taking the maximum versus the minimum value of each independent variable (see column 9, table 1). The largest effects on the predicted probabilities can be observed for the following variables: left-right scale; cultural concerns over immigration; economic concerns over immigration; education and trust. Next, with respect to occupations, craft, operator and service occupations have the highest effect on predicted probabilities. Being male, unemployed, or a clerical worker also have a sizeable effect (above 1 percentage point higher predicted probabilities). By contrast, the magnitude of the effect of different income sources such as pensions or self-employment is lower (under 1 percentage difference) and similarly for certain occupations (agriculture and professionals).

--- Table 1 about here--

We carry out a number of robustness checks. The results are the same for economic and cultural concerns over immigration when including the borderline Law and Justice (PiS) in the analysis (see appendix 5). We also reproduce our results with alternative measures of trust (table A3.2 in appendix). Next, we change the operationalisation of our key independent variables. We rerun the results of column 8 in table 1 using a binary version of our initial variables measuring cultural and economic concerns over immigration. Our binary economic concerns over immigration variable is coded 1 if the respondents choose a response above 5 to the question of whether immigration is good or bad for the country's economy, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the binary cultural concerns over immigration variable is coded 1 if respondents choose a response above 5 to the question of whether immigration is good or bad for the country's culture, and 0 otherwise.

Cross-tabulating these two variables reveals that 55.6% of respondents have neither economic nor cultural concerns, 8.2% have cultural but not economic concerns, 15.2% have economic but not cultural concerns, and 20% have both types of concerns over immigration (table A3.6 in appendix). The results in table A3.3.a in the appendix confirm that being a culturalist has greater predictive power than being in a materialist. To address potential criticisms about treating economic and cultural concerns as two separate variables we add an interaction term and the results are the same (see table A3.4 in the appendix). We also reproduce these results using binned variables for economic and cultural concerns: the stronger effect of cultural concerns over immigration is confirmed using this different operationalization (see table A3.5.b).

Using the same model as in column 8 in table 1, we can predict the probability of voting for the far right for individuals with different levels of economic and cultural concerns over immigration. As figure 3 shows, having cultural concerns has a stronger effect on the

predicted probability of voting for the far right, but economic concerns also matter, especially among those with cultural concerns. Even among those with no cultural concerns, an individual with strong economic concerns would be more than twice as likely as an individual with no economic concerns at all to vote for the far right. These results indicate that overall cultural concerns over immigration are a stronger predictor of far right party support, but that economic concerns also matter.

We check the robustness of these results as well. First, as above, the findings are similar when including PiS in the analysis (see figure A5.1 in appendix). Second, we reproduce figure 3 while including an interaction term between economic and cultural concerns over immigration (see Figure A3.2 in appendix). The results are similar but the impact of economic concerns is now stronger among those with very low cultural concerns and weaker among those with very high cultural concerns. Third, we recalculate and plot the predicted probability using the two binary versions of cultural and economic concerns and then using the two 'strict' version of concerns discussed above: both cultural and economic concerns increase the likelihood of supporting a far right party (figures A3.3 and A3.4 in appendix). Overall, our findings suggest that both economic and cultural concerns have a statistically significant positive effect on the probability of voting for the far right, while the predictive power of cultural concerns is stronger.

--- Figure 3 about here---

#### *Extending support beyond the core far right constituency*

Recall figure 1, which displays the tabulations for economic and cultural concerns over immigration. We can see that at every point of the scale the share of those with economic concerns is greater than for those with cultural concerns. If we use a cut-off point of 5 for

each type of concern, we can observe that nearly 57% of our sample scores under the cut-off point for both economic and cultural concerns; 8.2% are culturalists but not materialists, 15% are materialists but not culturalists and nearly 20% are above this cut-off point for both economic and cultural concerns (table A3.6 in appendix). This indicates that the primacy of culture as an explanation of anti-immigration attitudes is not as straightforward as suggested in the literature: even if the predictive power of cultural concerns is greater, there are more people with economic concerns than people with cultural concerns about immigration. In other words, while culturalists are more likely to vote for the far right, materialists are a numerically larger group.

Figure 4 offers a graphical illustration of the number of voters and non-voters for the far right for different levels of economic and cultural concerns. While the share of far right voters for those with cultural concerns is higher (top panel) than the share of these voters among those with economic concerns (bottom panel), there are many more people with economic concerns and as a result they remain more important to the far right. For instance, in this example there are 4,182 respondents with economic concerns above 5 who voted for far right compared to 3,925 respondents with cultural concerns above 5 who voted for far right (table A2.3 in appendix).

In figure 5 we plot the distribution of respondents with different types of concerns (just economic, just cultural, both and neither types of concerns) for each country's far right electorate. In a range of countries, those with pure economic concerns are more numerous among the far right electorate than those with pure cultural concerns. In addition, those with pure economic concerns when added to those without any types of concerns are more numerous in many countries than those with both economic and cultural concerns (and the latter picture is even starker if a higher cut-off point of 7 is used to identify concerns – see Figure A2.9 in appendix). Consequently, if we remove respondents with pure economic

concerns from far right electorate, this results in many countries in a much lower electoral score than if we remove those with pure cultural concerns (see figure A2.10 in appendix).

--- Figures 4 and 5 about here---

#### *Cross-national variation in far right party support and immigration concerns*

Thus far, we have argued that both economic and cultural concerns matter for far right party success: having these concerns increases the probability of voting for the far right. In addition, these concerns matter in different ways. While cultural concerns have a stronger predictive power, there are often more people with economic concerns and this group is therefore important for far right party success in numerical terms.

What do these results mean for the cross-national variation in far right party support? If economic concerns were of no or of secondary importance to far right party success, then the share of materialists who vote for the far right should have little bearing on the total share of the far right vote at the national level. However, the evidence is not consistent with this expectation. The bottom panel of Figure 6 plots the *country average* percentage of far right party votes against the percentage of respondents with economic concerns. The fit appears strong: countries with high average far right party support tend to exhibit substantial support for those parties from materialists (the correlation is above 0.9 with  $p\text{-value} < 0.001$  and  $R\text{-squared}$  of 0.931). If we plot instead the *country average* percentage of far right party votes against the percentage of respondents with cultural concerns, a similar picture and the correlation remains strong but the  $R\text{-squared}$  is a lower 0.870 (see top panel of figure 6).

---Figure 6 about here---

Next, we investigate the extent to which the strong predictive power of cultural concerns over immigration at the individual level necessarily translates into higher far right party support at

the national level. In other words, is it the case that countries where culturalists are very likely to vote for the far right have particularly high levels of far right party support? To answer this question we create a new dataset with three variables. The dependent variable is the average far right party vote in a given country-wave. Two independent variables capture the predictive power of each type of concern - cultural and economic - over immigration on voting for the far right at the individual level. These two variables are created by extracting the coefficients from a series of logistic regressions for each and every country-wave in our original sample.

The results suggest that there is no statistically significant correlation between the predictive power of cultural concerns on the individual probability of voting for a far right party in a given country-wave and national level far right party votes in that country-wave. By contrast, the predictive power of economic concerns on the individual probability of voting for a far right party in a given country-wave is significantly and positively correlated with the country-wave average far right party vote (see table 2). In sum, countries where culturalists are highly likely to vote for the far right, as captured by higher coefficients, do not necessarily exhibit high far right party support. This constitutes further evidence that the predictive power of individual level cultural concerns is not enough to explain a party's electoral success.

---Table 2 about here---

### *Simulations*

Finally, using a series of country level logistic regressions we simulate different scenarios to assess precisely how the predicted country level far right party support varies depending on the distribution of respondents with 0, actual, or 10 on the scale of economic versus cultural concerns over immigration. This is shown in Figure 7 (for country specific graphs see figure A4.1 in appendix). To illustrate, the square sign for Austria indicates that predicted support is highest when both economic and cultural concerns are set at 10 for every single respondent in

that country, and lowest when these are set at 0. The key piece of information here is to compare the predicted support for the actual distribution of both types of concerns to what happens to this prediction when either cultural or economic concerns are set at their maximum versus minimum values.

Setting economic concerns for everyone at 0, results in lower predicted national support than doing the same for cultural concerns in four countries: Sweden, Norway, the Netherlands and Bulgaria. In a number of countries, setting cultural concerns at 0 result in lower predicted national support than doing the same for economic concerns (but only by less than 1%): Greece, France, Finland, Denmark, and Belgium. In the remaining cases, setting all respondents to have 0 cultural concerns results in larger falls in support than doing the same for economic concerns (the largest differences are seen in Switzerland, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia). Setting each type of concern to their maximum values reveals that in three countries economic concerns play a larger role (Norway, Netherlands, and Bulgaria), in six countries results in a bigger role for cultural concerns but by less than 2%, and in the remaining cases setting cultural concerns to their maximum values results in a higher score by more than 2% (see table A4.4 for specific numbers).

--- Figure 7 about here ---

In sum, having individual cultural concerns over immigration has a strong impact on voting for far right parties, but economic concerns also increase support for the far right and there are more people with economic than cultural concerns, both in the broader population and among many successful far right parties' electorate. In many – but not all – cases an electorate that has maximum cultural concerns over immigration would *in principle* yield the maximum support for far right parties. But this is not always the case and the predictive power of economic concerns at the individual level are correlated with national level support, while

this is not the case for cultural concerns. Thus, mobilising those with economic concerns over immigration is always important to far right party success and in many cases the driving force of their success.

## Conclusion

This article suggests that studies focusing on the anti-immigration drivers of far right party support should pay more attention both to voters' socio-tropic economic concerns as well as the important distinction between mobilising a core constituency on the one hand, and the ability to extend support beyond this core constituency on the other. In a nutshell, our argument is that while cultural concerns over immigration may be a stronger predictor of far right party voting, this does not mean that culture necessarily and always matters *more* for far right party success than the economy. This is because, first, as shown in our analysis of 8 waves of ESS data between 2002 and 2016, concerns about the impact of immigration on the country's economy as a whole are statistically significant and have a strong positive association with voting for the far right.

Second, those who dislike the impact of immigration on the economy are important to the far right in numerical terms as they allow these parties to extend their support beyond their secure voting base. These findings confirm that the far right parties that are more likely to be electorally successful are those able to mobilise a 'winning anti-immigrant coalition' which consists of both the vast majority of the few core supporters who care strongly about the cultural impact of immigration and a subset of the numerically larger group of voters who care strongly about the economic impact of immigration.

This article makes several contributions by challenging a key assumption, which is increasingly becoming consensus in the literature, that culture predominantly drives support for the far right within the context of an emerging transnational cleavage.

First, by presenting an empirical reassessment of theories that examine the relationship between different concerns over immigration and success of far right parties using 8 waves of ESS survey data, we show how and why economic considerations over the impact of immigration also drive far right party success. Existing literature in the field has repeatedly stressed the need for further research that nuances the role of economic anxiety (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2018), distinguishes between the perceived economic and cultural threats posed by immigration and their effect on far right support (Lucassen and Lubbers 2012: 549) and identifies ‘how, when and why’ socio-tropic concerns matter (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014: 225). This article addresses this gap in the literature, and in doing so it brings the economy back in the debate on far right voting within the context of the transnational cleavage.

Second, we point to an important methodological problem arising from inferring what ‘causes’ a cross-national level phenomenon using individual level findings. While the ecological fallacy has been front and centre of the recent drive to use more individual voting data rather than national electoral results, little attention to date has been paid to the reverse risk of the individualistic, or atomistic, fallacy. In this article, we advocate for paying closer attention to descriptive information such as the size and composition of different far right voter groups. We also illustrate the kinds of tests and simulations that researchers can carry out to explore complex multilevel interactions and assess the severity of the atomistic fallacy.

Our article also opens avenues for future research. First, it could form the basis of future research aiming at more targeted examinations of the role of other (including non-

immigration related) economic drivers of far right party support. As our article suggests that identifying the probability of voting for the far right at the individual level is not in itself sufficient in establishing the causes of far right party success, future research could test these conclusions by focusing more closely on the specific mechanisms that link voting preferences to far right party success. For example, the adoption of a targeted sampling strategy (see Malhotra et. al 2013) might identify trends not prevalent among the general population, and hence not visible in surveys such as the ESS.

Second, another important issue raised in our article is the multi-faceted character of the immigration issue and the extent to which this multi-dimensionality suggests that immigration should not be treated as merely a cultural variable in theories of far right party support. This point has been previously raised (Rydgren 2008), and more work is needed, extending beyond the economy-culture dichotomy and examining more dimensions of anti-immigration attitudes. For instance, this could include the extent to which voters are concerned about the impact of immigration on their personal safety, because of increased crime levels and/ or terrorism; and on the provision of public goods, i.e. deteriorating public services. A related point is that of data availability: the research community would benefit from new or extended surveys that include more elaborate questions on the cultural and security threat dimensions of anti-immigration attitudes. This will allow us to more adequately measure and operationalize anti-immigration attitudes in a manner that captures all the threat dimensions that trigger them.

Third, demand-side insights emphasised here can be linked to supply, both in terms of far right party strategies and in terms of other parties such as the centre-right that also draw on the increasing salience of immigration. Indeed, our article has briefly discussed some conclusions from recent literature, which show that far right parties focus increasingly on social welfare (Afonso and Renwald 2017; Röth et al 2018; Afonso and Papadopoulos 2015;

Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2019), in order to appeal to those voters with economic concerns, thus complementing our findings. The field would benefit significantly from more mixed methods approaches that focus on the complementarity between demand and supply-side dynamics and the ways in which multiple and overlapping societal grievances are targeted by far right parties.

Overall, our findings have significant policy implications. If we are right then the economic dimension of far right party support is often underestimated. In order to address the success of these parties, policy-makers need to pay attention not only to policies related to national identity and cultural values, but also to the underlying economic insecurities that trigger those anti-immigration sentiments, which in turn often translate in voting for the far right.

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Figure 1: Distribution of respondents with cultural (panel above) and economic (panel below) concerns over immigration





Figure 2: Hypothetical example illustrating the importance of group size


**110**  
NUMBER OF PEOPLE  
IN ELECTORATE  
ECONOMICALLY INSECURE  
**10%** of economically insecure vote for the  
far right



CULTURALLY INSECURE  
**50%** of culturally insecure vote for  
the far right

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Figure 3: Predicted probability of voting for the far right for different combinations of economic and cultural concerns over immigration



Note: the predicted probabilities were calculated using the coefficients from column 8 in table 1.

Figure 4: Number of far right and non-far right voters with different levels of cultural (panel above) and economic (panel below) concerns






Figure 5: Distribution of concerns among far right voters (cut-off point of 5)




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Figure 6: Percentage of far right voters among the total population versus among voters with immigration concerns



Note: a cut-off point of 5 is used to identify who has concerns.

Figure 7: Simulations of predicted country level far right party support for different hypothetical distributions of economic and cultural concerns



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Table 1: Economic and cultural concerns over immigration and far right voting

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Economic concerns over immigration	0.175***	0.162***	0.164***	0.163***	0.152***	0.120***	0.114***	0.114***	3.61
Cultural concerns over immigration	0.235***	0.222***	0.192***	0.192***	0.188***	0.161***	0.153***	0.153***	5.3
Male	0.480***	0.482***	0.429***	0.432***	0.390***	0.435***	0.403***	0.409***	1.35
Age	-0.011***	-0.016***	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-4.4
Bottom income dummy	0.064	-0.025	0.056	0.008	-0.026	-0.056	-0.062		
Lower half of income dummy								0.101***	0.33
Education (in years)		-0.070***	-0.075***	-0.075***	-0.043***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.037***	-4.716
<i>Reference category: wages</i>									
Self-employed				-0.236***	-0.181***	-0.202***	-0.211***	-0.213***	-0.66
Pensions				-0.099**	-0.097**	-0.095**	-0.082*	-0.117***	-0.38
Unemployed				0.400***	0.396***	0.366***	0.393***	0.328***	1.23
Other social benefits				0.241***	0.216***	0.187**	0.193**	0.130	0.45
Investments				-0.268	-0.223	-0.217	-0.205	-0.210	-0.64
Other sources				-0.334**	-0.309*	-0.285*	-0.239	-0.294*	-0.88
Placement on left-right scale			0.242***	0.245***	0.254***	0.272***	0.272***	0.273***	9.237
<i>Reference category: manager</i>									
Professional					-0.215***	-0.204***	-0.191***	-0.193***	-0.6
Technician					0.157***	0.154***	0.184***	0.178***	0.62
Clerical					0.329***	0.325***	0.358***	0.347***	1.29
Service					0.568***	0.541***	0.547***	0.530***	2.05
Agriculture					0.266***	0.283***	0.259***	0.226**	0.82
Craft					0.638***	0.587***	0.624***	0.605***	2.4
Operator					0.667***	0.603***	0.622***	0.603***	2.44
Elementary					0.546***	0.492***	0.511***	0.482***	1.88
Trust in National Parliament						-0.188***	-0.140***	-0.139***	-4.47
Trust in European Parliament							-0.097***	-0.097***	-3.01
Constant	-5.155***	-3.920***	-5.033***	-5.061***	-5.848***	-4.900***	-4.562***	-4.624***	
Observations	124,046	123,674	119,680	117,971	113,175	112,730	106,950	106,950	
Number of groups	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	122	
Log likelihood	-24658	-24385	-22731	-22642	-21570	-21048	-19864	-19860	
Wald Chi2	5043	5234	6103	6125	6132	6690	6474	6478	
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	

Note: this table presents the results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . Column 9 reports the % change in the predicted probability when the independent variable is set at its maximum value minus when it is set at its minimum value, holding all other independent variables at their mean value.

*Table 2: Individual level coefficients and far right party success at the country-wave level*

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable composed of country-wave logistic regression coefficient of economic concerns	0.0797***		0.0857***
Variable composed of country-wave logistic regression coefficient of cultural concerns		0.0153	0.0381
Constant	0.07384***	0.07916***	0.06752***
Observations	108	108	108
R-squared	0.05	0.00	0.05

*Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . This regression is run using a country-wave level dataset. The dependent variable is the country-wave average far right party success. The two independent variables are coefficients from the respective country-wave logistic regression of individual far right party votes on economic and cultural concerns, with a series of individual level controls. Thus, each coefficient captures the size of the impact of an individual having economic and cultural concerns, respectively, on the probability of voting for the far right in that specific country-wave.*

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## Appendix

### When economic and cultural interests align: the anti-immigration voter coalitions driving far right party success in Europe

*Last updated 14<sup>th</sup> March 2020*

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## Appendix 1. Party classification

We adopt the term ‘far right’ in accordance with Lucassen and Lubbers (2012). As we similarly distinguish between perceived cultural and economic concerns over immigration and the extent to which they impact on support for such parties, we deem it appropriate to adopt similar terminology. We define ‘far right’ parties as parties that propose nationalist solutions to a variety of socio-economic problems (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015), compete along the national identity axis (Ellinas 2011) and ‘own’ the immigration issue (Van Spagne 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012).

We examine a total of 31 parties in our empirical analysis (see table A1.1). Because our sample of countries is larger than that of Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), who focus on 11 countries and use data only from the first round of the ESS (2002-2003), we extend their list using a similar classification as that offered in other articles that use larger samples (e.g. Immerzeel et al 2015; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016) and examine more recent ESS waves (e.g. Rooduijn and Burgoon 2018). We exclude the N-VA and Fidesz from our analysis as none of these sources code these parties as ‘far right’. We consider PiS as a borderline case given that the literature is divided on this party: Immerzeel and et al (2015) code it as Conservative whereas Harrison and Bruter (2011), Pankowski and Kormak (2013) and Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2016) code it as ‘far right’. Results that include PiS are presented in appendix 5.

Table A1.1: List of far right parties

Country	Far Right Party	Borderline Far Right Party	ESS Wave	Source
<b>Austria</b>	Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)		R1, R2, R3 and R7, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Austria</b>	Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)		R3 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Belgium (Flanders)</b>	Flemish Interest (VB)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Belgium (Wallonia)</b>	Front National Belge (FNb)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Bulgaria</b>	National Union Attack (ATAKA)		R3, R4, R5 and R6	Immerzeel et al 2015
<b>Denmark</b>	Danish People's Party (DF)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Finland</b>	True Finns (PS)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>France</b>	Front National (FN)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>France</b>	Mouvement National Republicain (MNR)		R1, R2, R3	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Germany</b>	National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)		R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Germany</b>	The Republicans (REP)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Germany</b>	Alternative for Germany (AfD)		R8	Halikiopoulou 2018
<b>Greece</b>	Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)		R2, R4 and R5	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Greece</b>	Golden Dawn (GD)		R5	Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016
<b>Hungary</b>	Movement for a better		R1, R2, R3,	Immerzeel et. Al 2015;

	Hungary (Jobbik)		R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Italy</b>	Northern League (LN)		R1, R2 and R6, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Italy</b>	Allianza Nazionale (AN)		R1 and R2	Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Italy</b>	Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT)		R1 and R2	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012
<b>Lithuania</b>	Order and Justice Party (TT)		R5, R6 and R7, R8	Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016
<b>Netherlands</b>	List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)		R1, R2, R3 and R4	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Netherlands</b>	Party for Freedom (PVV)		R5, R6 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Norway</b>	Progress Party (FrP)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Poland</b>		Law and Justice Party (Pis)	R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7, R8	Pankowski, 2010; Harrison and Bruter 2011; Pankowski and Kormak 2013; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2016
<b>Poland</b>	Congress of the New Right (KPN)		R6 and R7, R8	Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Poland</b>	League of Polish Families (LPR)		R1, R2, R3, R4 and R5	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Slovakia</b>	Slovak National Party (SNS)		R3, R4 and R5	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Slovenia</b>	Slovenian National Party (SNS)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Sweden</b>	Sweden Democrats (SD)		R5, R6 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Switzerland</b>	Swiss People's Party (SVP)		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>Switzerland</b>	Swiss Democrats		R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6 and R7	Lucassen and Lubbers 2012; Immerzeel et al 2015
<b>United Kingdom</b>	United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)		R3 and R7, R8	Immerzeel et. Al 2015; Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
<b>United</b>	British National Party		R3	Immerzeel et. Al 2015;

<b>Kingdom</b>	(BNP)			Rooduijn and Burgoon 2017
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## Appendix 2. Descriptive information

Table A2.1: Summary statistics

<b>Description</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Standard deviation</b>	<b>Minimum</b>	<b>Maximum</b>	<b>Number observations</b>
Far right vote	0.066635	0.249389	0	1	151948
Economic concerns over immigration	5.068976	2.41297	0	10	233126
Cultural concerns over immigration	4.317209	2.504216	0	10	233606
Strict economic concerns over immigration (i.e. economic concerns but not cultural concerns), based on a cut-off point of 5	0.163006	0.369372	0	1	228311
Strict cultural concerns over immigration (i.e. cultural concerns but not economic concerns), based on a cut-off point of 5	0.075932	0.264889	0	1	228311
Economic <i>and</i> cultural concerns, based on a cut-off point of 5	0.19745	0.398076	0	1	228311
Male respondent	0.470589	0.499135	0	1	242581
Age	48.17545	18.51791	13	123	241941
Bottom income decile	0.083542	0.2767	0	1	192622
Bottom half of income distribution	0.509807	0.499905	0	1	192622
Education	12.51584	3.857022	0	56	240878
Left-right scale	5.100996	2.167993	0	10	215335
<i>Source of income (wage is reference category)</i>					
Wage	0.588947	0.492026	0	1	236860
Self employed	0.070324	0.255693	0	1	236860
Pension	0.268551	0.443207	0	1	236860
Unemployed	0.018429	0.134496	0	1	236860
Other social benefits	0.027746	0.164246	0	1	236860
Investments	0.005184	0.071817	0	1	236860
Other sources	0.011627	0.107201	0	1	236860
<i>Occupation (Managers is reference category)</i>					
Manager	0.086858	0.281628	0	1	219381
Professionals	0.154266	0.361204	0	1	219381
Technicians	0.161049	0.367577	0	1	219381
Clerks	0.102096	0.302776	0	1	219381
Service	0.15742	0.364197	0	1	219381
Agriculture	0.034324	0.18206	0	1	219381
Craft	0.119659	0.324564	0	1	219381
Operators	0.079072	0.269852	0	1	219381
Elementary	0.105255	0.306883	0	1	219381
Trust in national parliament	4.593119	2.557438	0	10	237406
Trust in European parliament	4.472181	2.420747	0	10	220693

Table A2.2: Correlation

	Male	Age	Bottom income decile	Bottom half of income distribution	Education	Left right scale	Wage	Self-employed	Pension
<b>Male</b>	1	-0.001554177	-0.04395506	-0.059767137	-0.005024546	0.050851907	0.001695689	0.046825088	-0.02465
<b>Age</b>	-0.001554177	1	0.058321152	0.160426254	-0.256666671	0.041622853	-0.534312716	-0.055329658	0.681151
<b>Bottom income decile</b>	-0.04395506	0.058321152	1	0.28205157	-0.125621978	-0.032680531	-0.206558914	-0.014551358	0.10871
<b>Bottom half of income distribution</b>	-0.059767137	0.160426254	0.28205157	1	-0.273607503	-0.0424057	-0.309438712	-0.050338208	0.263628
<b>Education</b>	-0.005024546	-0.256666671	-0.125621978	-0.273607503	1	-0.046243881	0.237174731	0.033265851	-0.26921
<b>Left-right scale</b>	0.050851907	0.041622853	-0.032680531	-0.0424057	-0.046243881	1	-0.03631141	0.053793154	0.030768
<b>Wage</b>	0.001695689	-0.534312716	-0.206558914	-0.309438712	0.237174731	-0.03631141	1	-0.329349462	-0.73917
<b>Self-employed</b>	0.046825088	-0.055329658	-0.014551358	-0.050338208	0.033265851	0.053793154	-0.329349462	1	-0.15495
<b>Pension</b>	-0.024653346	0.681151036	0.108710235	0.263627633	-0.269212011	0.030767751	-0.739168226	-0.154945548	1
<b>Unemployment benefits</b>	0.012767548	-0.04616647	0.139902929	0.118164953	-0.021931631	-0.034673562	-0.173583456	-0.036386823	-0.08166
<b>Other social benefits</b>	-0.020402168	-0.061857098	0.176682698	0.136383599	-0.029361007	-0.027085576	-0.201289865	-0.042194682	-0.0947
<b>Investments</b>	0.015263921	0.031898122	0.009596782	-0.012355475	0.017759243	0.028618253	-0.09338185	-0.019574843	-0.04393
<b>Other sources</b>	-0.005478352	-0.075587622	0.100355126	0.062851619	0.014178204	-0.012793453	-0.12038241	-0.025234741	-0.05664
<b>Manager</b>	0.115409488	0.059706198	-0.044046589	-0.111824712	0.108213194	0.065295221	-0.033795838	0.086977017	0.004828
<b>Professionals</b>	-0.03258563	-0.01867431	-0.072519282	-0.167169333	0.413130809	-0.043735202	0.078826935	0.000160907	-0.05703
<b>Technicians</b>	-0.043812381	-0.022542183	-0.057372945	-0.089195026	0.097059988	-0.003683666	0.068832076	-0.030478504	-0.03753
<b>Clerks</b>	-0.149648944	0.004835527	-0.018504063	0.013095725	-0.037105025	-0.003898032	0.003961907	-0.040815628	0.015578
<b>Service</b>	-0.187920892	-0.088537356	0.039395859	0.072062173	-0.101856755	-0.012668035	0.009680437	-0.018391686	-0.02893
<b>Agriculture</b>	0.049270952	0.067954583	0.062322577	0.082559315	-0.136368752	0.054543232	-0.133045416	0.17863038	0.052513
<b>Craft</b>	0.246152243	0.009966991	0.017609586	0.081211864	-0.162726653	0.004418023	-0.020161303	-0.006846865	0.023647
<b>Operators</b>	0.14271737	0.040280731	0.026944096	0.076739834	-0.162154933	-0.007082818	-0.019576844	-0.040075624	0.040178
<b>Elementary</b>	-0.062093763	0.010099419	0.107888757	0.143059725	-0.212967636	-0.015285024	-0.058705971	-0.045264179	0.046184
<b>Trust in parliament</b>	0.047506304	-0.032413959	-0.104413849	-0.169415568	0.161737321	0.070668061	0.06963178	-0.001513065	-0.05872
<b>Trust in European parliament</b>	-0.042213294	-0.109156207	-0.040003385	-0.083620463	0.109094451	0.032394747	0.068395907	0.002120255	-0.0651

	<b>Unemployment benefits</b>	<b>Social benefits</b>	<b>Investments</b>	<b>Other sources</b>	<b>Manager</b>	<b>Professionals</b>	<b>Technicians</b>	<b>Clerks</b>	<b>Service</b>
<b>Male</b>	0.012767548	-0.020402168	0.015263921	-0.005478352	0.115409488	-0.03258563	-0.043812381	-0.149648944	-0.18792
<b>Age</b>	-0.04616647	-0.061857098	0.031898122	-0.075587622	0.059706198	-0.01867431	-0.022542183	0.004835527	-0.08854
<b>Bottom income decile</b>	0.139902929	0.176682698	0.009596782	0.100355126	-0.044046589	-0.072519282	-0.057372945	-0.018504063	0.039396
<b>Bottom half of income distribution</b>	0.118164953	0.136383599	-0.012355475	0.062851619	-0.111824712	-0.167169333	-0.089195026	0.013095725	0.072062
<b>Education</b>	-0.021931631	-0.029361007	0.017759243	0.014178204	0.108213194	0.413130809	0.097059988	-0.037105025	-0.10186
<b>Left-right scale</b>	-0.034673562	-0.027085576	0.028618253	-0.012793453	0.065295221	-0.043735202	-0.003683666	-0.003898032	-0.01267
<b>Wage</b>	-0.173583456	-0.201289865	-0.09338185	-0.12038241	-0.033795838	0.078826935	0.068832076	0.003961907	0.00968
<b>Self-employed</b>	-0.036386823	-0.042194682	-0.019574843	-0.025234741	0.086977017	0.000160907	-0.030478504	-0.040815628	-0.01839
<b>Pension</b>	-0.081663967	-0.094698708	-0.043932368	-0.056635035	0.00482754	-0.057025568	-0.037534901	0.01557841	-0.02893
<b>Unemployment benefits</b>	1	-0.022238685	-0.01031691	-0.013299956	-0.026691029	-0.034288719	-0.021955364	-0.00259852	0.016798
<b>Other social benefits</b>	-0.022238685	1	-0.011963637	-0.01542282	-0.027481012	-0.039457392	-0.026563735	0.00319464	0.040124
<b>Investments</b>	-0.01031691	-0.011963637	1	-0.007154913	0.037423719	0.001989039	-0.001900584	-0.001580631	-0.00521
<b>Other sources</b>	-0.013299956	-0.01542282	-0.007154913	1	-0.012911656	-0.011491285	-0.011800319	0.005828314	0.032784
<b>Manager</b>	-0.026691029	-0.027481012	0.037423719	-0.012911656	1	-0.149102889	-0.149388773	-0.108431265	-0.13586
<b>Professionals</b>	-0.034288719	-0.039457392	0.001989039	-0.011491285	-0.149102889	1	-0.211048698	-0.153186059	-0.19193
<b>Technicians</b>	-0.021955364	-0.026563735	-0.001900584	-0.011800319	-0.149388773	-0.211048698	1	-0.153479772	-0.1923
<b>Clerks</b>	-0.00259852	0.00319464	-0.001580631	0.005828314	-0.108431265	-0.153186059	-0.153479772	1	-0.13958
<b>Service</b>	0.016798056	0.040123813	-0.00521172	0.032783861	-0.135855547	-0.19192966	-0.192297659	-0.13957594	1
<b>Agriculture</b>	-0.002840435	-0.009268888	0.004446261	-0.005240812	-0.056735733	-0.080153296	-0.080306979	-0.058289436	-0.07303
<b>Craft</b>	0.015676963	0.001709439	-0.008301438	-0.01032651	-0.117089057	-0.165417338	-0.165734503	-0.120295531	-0.15072
<b>Operators</b>	0.018153513	0.00539034	-0.012005761	-0.007180573	-0.09244953	-0.130607894	-0.130858316	-0.094981253	-0.119
<b>Elementary</b>	0.051966689	0.06189104	-0.012904157	0.018702147	-0.100559314	-0.142064976	-0.142337365	-0.103313123	-0.12944
<b>Trust in parliament</b>	-0.04403692	-0.02115806	0.014391637	0.0029725	0.044845604	0.133555192	0.047152064	-0.005480607	-0.03042
<b>Trust in European parliament</b>	-0.031439497	-0.010902001	-0.003097336	0.011360836	0.017180732	0.081869775	0.020175294	0.002084439	-0.00536

	<b>Agriculture</b>	<b>Craft</b>	<b>Operators</b>	<b>Elementary</b>	<b>Trust in parliament</b>	<b>Trust in European parliament</b>
<b>Male</b>	0.049270952	0.246152243	0.14271737	-0.062093763	0.047506304	-0.042213294
<b>Age</b>	0.067954583	0.009966991	0.040280731	0.010099419	-0.032413959	-0.109156207
<b>Bottom income decile</b>	0.062322577	0.017609586	0.026944096	0.107888757	-0.104413849	-0.040003385
<b>Bottom half of income distribution</b>	0.082559315	0.081211864	0.076739834	0.143059725	-0.169415568	-0.083620463
<b>Education</b>	-0.136368752	-0.162726653	-0.162154933	-0.212967636	0.161737321	0.109094451
<b>Left-right scale</b>	0.054543232	0.004418023	-0.007082818	-0.015285024	0.070668061	0.032394747
<b>Wage</b>	-0.133045416	-0.020161303	-0.019576844	-0.058705971	0.06963178	0.068395907
<b>Self-employed</b>	0.17863038	-0.006846865	-0.040075624	-0.045264179	-0.001513065	0.002120255
<b>Pension</b>	0.05251256	0.023647119	0.040178141	0.046184398	-0.058723379	-0.065101218
<b>Unemployment benefits</b>	-0.002840435	0.015676963	0.018153513	0.051966689	-0.04403692	-0.031439497
<b>Other social benefits</b>	-0.009268888	0.001709439	0.00539034	0.06189104	-0.02115806	-0.010902001
<b>Investments</b>	0.004446261	-0.008301438	-0.012005761	-0.012904157	0.014391637	-0.003097336
<b>Other sources</b>	-0.005240812	-0.01032651	-0.007180573	0.018702147	0.0029725	0.011360836
<b>Manager</b>	-0.056735733	-0.117089057	-0.09244953	-0.100559314	0.044845604	0.017180732
<b>Professionals</b>	-0.080153296	-0.165417338	-0.130607894	-0.142064976	0.133555192	0.081869775
<b>Technicians</b>	-0.080306979	-0.165734503	-0.130858316	-0.142337365	0.047152064	0.020175294
<b>Clerks</b>	-0.058289436	-0.120295531	-0.094981253	-0.103313123	-0.005480607	0.002084439
<b>Service</b>	-0.073031917	-0.150720507	-0.119003777	-0.129442932	-0.030421544	-0.005359406
<b>Agriculture</b>	1	-0.062943608	-0.049698128	-0.054057708	-0.01235562	-0.017212991
<b>Craft</b>	-0.062943608	1	-0.102565116	-0.111562252	-0.068932808	-0.048539504
<b>Operators</b>	-0.049698128	-0.102565116	1	-0.088085753	-0.079148034	-0.052933788
<b>Elementary</b>	-0.054057708	-0.111562252	-0.088085753	1	-0.08607948	-0.035851131
<b>Trust in parliament</b>	-0.01235562	-0.068932808	-0.079148034	-0.08607948	1	0.520312072
<b>Trust in European parliament</b>	-0.017212991	-0.048539504	-0.052933788	-0.035851131	0.520312072	1

Figure A2.1: Distribution of cultural concerns




Figure A2.2: Distribution of economic concerns






Figure A2.4: Percentage of far right voters in the entire electorate and among those with economic concerns





Figure A2.5: Percentage of far right voters in the entire electorate versus percentage of far right voters with economic concerns (left hand side) and percentage of far right voters with cultural concerns (right hand side)




Figure A2.6: Number of far right and non-far right voters with different levels of cultural concerns




Figure A2.7: Number of far right and non-far right voters with different levels of economic concerns




Table A2.3. Far right voters with economic and cultural concerns

<b>Economic concerns over immigration</b>	<b>Did not vote for far right</b>	<b>Voted for far right</b>
0	4,353	86
1	4,112	88
2	15,341	309
3	19,781	444
4	17,603	497
5	34,539	1,590
6	12,649	758
7	12,398	995
8	8,709	843
9	4,522	535
10	6,372	1,051
<b>Cultural concerns over immigration</b>	<b>Did not vote for far right</b>	<b>Voted for far right</b>
0	9244.145	124.3178
1	8200.76	111.2039
2	22216.06	431.5777
3	23570.52	619.6374
4	16377.33	581.1398
5	26111.18	1423.463
6	10368.34	738.9172
7	9595.537	846.3265
8	6817.179	852.3091
9	3514.269	502.4339
10	4661.552	985.8045

Figure A2.8. Distribution of concerns among far right voters (cut-off point of 5)




Figure A2.9. Distribution of concerns among far right voters (cut-off point of 7)




Figure A2.10. Percentage of far right voters overall when manipulating the numbers of voters with different immigration concerns (cut-off point of 5)





Figure A2.11. Percentage of far right voters overall when manipulating the numbers of voters with different immigration concerns (cut-off point of 7)



Appendix 3. Main regression tables – without PiS (starts on next page)

For Peer Review

Table A3.1.a. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table – baseline without PiS

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Economic concerns over immigration	0.175***	0.162***	0.164***	0.163***	0.152***	0.120***	0.114***	0.114***	0.220***
Cultural concerns over immigration	0.235***	0.222***	0.192***	0.192***	0.188***	0.161***	0.153***	0.153***	0.272***
Interaction between economic and cultural concerns									-0.020***
Male	0.480***	0.482***	0.429***	0.432***	0.390***	0.435***	0.403***	0.409***	0.411***
Age	-0.011***	-0.016***	-0.017***	-0.015***	-0.012***	-0.013***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***
Bottom income dummy	0.064	-0.025	0.056	0.008	-0.026	-0.056	-0.062		
Lower half of income dummy								0.101***	0.104***
Education (in years)		-0.070***	-0.075***	-0.075***	-0.043***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.037***	-0.035***
<i>Reference category: wages</i>									
Self-employed				-0.236***	-0.181***	-0.202***	-0.211***	-0.213***	-0.218***
Pensions				-0.099**	-0.097**	-0.095**	-0.082*	-0.117***	-0.117***
Unemployed				0.400***	0.396***	0.366***	0.393***	0.328***	0.329***
Other social benefits				0.241***	0.216***	0.187**	0.193**	0.130	0.141
Investments				-0.268	-0.223	-0.217	-0.205	-0.210	-0.215
Other sources				-0.334**	-0.309*	-0.285*	-0.239	-0.294*	-0.286*
Placement on left-right scale			0.242***	0.245***	0.254***	0.272***	0.272***	0.273***	0.271***
<i>Reference category: manager</i>									
Professional					-0.215***	-0.204***	-0.191***	-0.193***	-0.187***
Technician					0.157***	0.154***	0.184***	0.178***	0.169***
Clerical					0.329***	0.325***	0.358***	0.347***	0.335***
Service					0.568***	0.541***	0.547***	0.530***	0.521***
Agriculture					0.266***	0.283***	0.259***	0.226**	0.209**
Craft					0.638***	0.587***	0.624***	0.605***	0.588***
Operator					0.667***	0.603***	0.622***	0.603***	0.592***
Elementary					0.546***	0.492***	0.511***	0.482***	0.470***
Trust in National Parliament						-0.188***	-0.140***	-0.139***	-0.139***
Trust in European Parliament							-0.097***	-0.097***	-0.097***
Constant	-5.155***	-3.920***	-5.033***	-5.061***	-5.848***	-4.900***	-4.562***	-4.624***	-5.198***
Observations	124,046	123,674	119,680	117,971	113,175	112,730	106,950	106,950	106,950
Number of groups	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	122	122
Log likelihood	-24658	-24385	-22731	-22642	-21570	-21048	-19864	-19860	-19818
Wald Chi2	5043	5234	6103	6125	6132	6690	6474	6478	6360
Prob > chi2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Note: this table presents the results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A3.1.b. Average marginal effects for key variables of column 8 in table A3.1.a

Economic concerns over immigration	0.00212*** (0.000381)
Cultural concerns over immigration	0.00286*** (0.000496)
Observations	106,950

Note: this table presents the average marginal effects for key variables of column 8 in table A3.1.a which was carried out using a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure A3.1. Predicted probabilities using column 8 of table A3.1.a





Figure A3.2. Predicted probabilities using column 9 of table A3.1.a



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Table A3.2. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table – baseline without PiS – different proxies for trust

Column	1	2	3	4	5
Economic concerns over immigration	0.114***	0.117***	0.125***	0.117***	0.122***
Cultural concerns over immigration	0.153***	0.157***	0.161***	0.158***	0.162***
Trust in National Parliament	-0.140***				
Trust in the legal system		-0.088***			
Trust in the police			-0.038***		
Trust in politicians				-0.124***	
Trust in political parties					-0.092***
Trust in European Parliament	-0.097***	-0.130***	-0.153***	-0.102***	-0.122***
Male	0.403***	0.380***	0.357***	0.364***	0.374***
Age	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.014***
Bottom income dummy	-0.062	-0.059	-0.051	-0.051	-0.050
Education (in years)	-0.038***	-0.039***	-0.041***	-0.041***	-0.043***
<i>Reference category: wages</i>					
Self employed	-0.211***	-0.221***	-0.216***	-0.205***	-0.231***
Pension	-0.082*	-0.091**	-0.075*	-0.075*	-0.093**
Unemployed	0.393***	0.396***	0.396***	0.384***	0.383***
Social benefits	0.193**	0.198**	0.200**	0.197**	0.198**
Investments	-0.205	-0.195	-0.212	-0.197	-0.176
Other sources	-0.239	-0.251	-0.251	-0.246	-0.253
Placement on left-right scale	0.272***	0.265***	0.264***	0.269***	0.258***
<i>Reference category: manager</i>					
Professional	-0.191***	-0.187***	-0.196***	-0.197***	-0.156**
Technician	0.184***	0.185***	0.187***	0.182***	0.207***
Clerical	0.358***	0.360***	0.364***	0.358***	0.379***
Service	0.547***	0.554***	0.568***	0.561***	0.599***
Agriculture	0.259***	0.264***	0.256***	0.281***	0.291***
Craft	0.624***	0.644***	0.657***	0.649***	0.687***
Operator	0.622***	0.641***	0.650***	0.646***	0.654***
Elementary	0.511***	0.541***	0.544***	0.534***	0.561***
Constant	-4.562***	-4.531***	-4.676***	-4.696***	-4.580***
Observations	106,950	106,821	107,002	106,972	94,321
Number of groups	122	122	122	122	108
Log likelihood	-19864	-19946	-20039	-19929	-17949

Note: this table presents the results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

**Table A3.3.a. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table – binary concern variables without PiS**

Binary materialist (coded 1 if economic concerns over immigration > 5)	0.523***
Binary culturalist (coded 1 if cultural concerns over immigration > 5)	0.591***
Male	0.405***
Age	-0.014***
Lower half of income dummy	0.110***
Education (in years)	-0.043***
Placement on left-right scale	0.286***
<i>Reference category: wages</i>	
Self-employed	-0.203***
Pensions	-0.107**
Unemployed	0.361***
Other social benefits	0.124
Investments	-0.218
Other sources	-0.302*
<i>Reference category: manager</i>	
Professional	-0.203***
Technician	0.197***
Clerical	0.373***
Service	0.562***
Agriculture	0.270***
Craft	0.650***
Operator	0.649***
Elementary	0.530***
Trust in National Parliament	-0.150***
Trust in European Parliament	-0.112***
Constant	-3.608***
Observations	106,950
Number of groups	122
Log likelihood	-20067
Wald Chi2	6294
Prob > chi2	0


*Note: this table presents the results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .*

**Table A3.3.b. Average marginal effects of key variables in Table A3.3.a**

Binary materialist (coded 1 if economic concerns over immigration > 5)	0.0102*** (0.00179)
Binary materialist (coded 1 if cultural concerns over immigration > 5)	0.0115*** (0.00201)
Observations	106,950

*Note: this table presents the average marginal effects for key variables of table A3.3.a which was carried out using a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .*

Figure A3.3. Predicted probabilities using table A3.3.a



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
Table A3.4. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table – binary concern variables with interaction term, without PiS

Binary materialist	0.663***
Binary culturalist	0.786***
Binary materialist * Binary culturalist	-0.352***
Age respondent	-0.013***
Low income dummy	0.113***
Education in years	-0.042***
Left-right scale	0.285***
<i>Source of income (ref: wages)</i>	
Self-employed	-0.204***
Pension	-0.109**
Unemployment benefits	0.361***
Other social benefits	0.125
Investments	-0.222
Other sources	-0.306*
<i>Occupation (ref: managers)</i>	
Professionals	-0.199***
Technicians	0.195***
Clerks	0.370***
Service	0.562***
Agriculture	0.266***
Craft	0.644***
Operators	0.647***
Elementary	0.526***
Trust in parliament	-0.150***
Trust in European parliament	-0.112***
Constant	-3.655***
	0.614***
Observations	106,950
Number of groups	122
Log likelihood	-20050
Wald Chi2	6280
Prob > chi2	0

Note: The table presents results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave.

\*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure A3.4. Predicted probabilities using table A3.4



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Table A3.5.a. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table – binning concerns into four dummy variables - without PiS

<i>Economic concerns over immigration (reference category is dummy variable equal to 1 if economic concerns equal to 0 or 1 – see notes for coding)</i>	
Economic concerns dummy variable 1	-0.058
Economic concerns dummy variable 2	0.336***
Economic concerns dummy variable 3	0.673***
Economic concerns dummy variable 4	0.765***
<i>Cultural concerns over immigration (reference category is dummy variable equal to 1 if cultural concerns equal to 0 or 1 – see notes for coding)</i>	
Cultural concerns dummy variable 1	0.367***
Cultural concerns dummy variable 2	0.851***
Cultural concerns dummy variable 3	1.191***
Cultural concerns dummy variable 4	1.352***
Male	0.414***
Age	-0.014***
Lower half of income dummy	0.102***
Education (in years)	-0.037***
Placement on left-right scale	0.275***
<i>Reference category: wages</i>	
Self-employed	-0.217***
Pensions	-0.115***
Unemployed	0.326***
Other social benefits	0.129
Investments	-0.209
Other sources	-0.291*
<i>Reference category: manager</i>	
Professional	-0.193***
Technician	0.172***
Clerical	0.342***
Service	0.527***
Agriculture	0.217**
Craft	0.601***
Operator	0.604***
Elementary	0.480***
Trust in national parliament	-0.143***
Trust in European Parliament	-0.101***
Constant	-4.379***
Observations	106,950
Number of groups	122
Log likelihood	-19875
Wald Chi2	6367
Prob > Chi2	0

Note: each type of concerns is 'binned' into five dichotomous variables: dummy variable 1 is 0/1; 2 is 2/3, 3 is 4/5/6, 4 is 7/8 and 5 is 9/10. The table presents results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Table A3.5.b. Average marginal effects of key variables in Table A3.5.a

<i>Economic concerns over immigration (reference category is dummy variable equal to 1 if economic concerns equal to 0 or 1)</i>	
Economic concerns dummy variable 1	-0.000783 (0.00132)
Economic concerns dummy variable 2	0.00552*** (0.00162)
Economic concerns dummy variable 3	0.0132*** (0.00269)
Economic concerns dummy variable 4	0.0157*** (0.00321)
<i>Cultural concerns over immigration (reference category is dummy variable equal to 1 if cultural concerns equal to 0 or 1 – see notes for coding)</i>	
Cultural concerns dummy variable 1	0.00442*** (0.00110)
Cultural concerns dummy variable 2	0.0132*** (0.00238)
Cultural concerns dummy variable 3	0.0224*** (0.00394)
Cultural concerns dummy variable 4	0.0278*** (0.00502)
Observations	106,950

*Note: this table presents the average marginal effects for key variables of table A3.5.a which was carried out using a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data; the standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .*

Table A3.6: Distribution of materialists and culturalists using binary variables

Binary materialist	Binary culturalist	
	No (0)	Yes (1)
No (0)	129,335 (56.65%)	18,718 (8.2%)
Yes (1)	34,693 (15.20%)	45,562 (19.96%)

Note: Post-stratification design and population weights applied. The binary materialist variable is coded 1 if the respondents choose a response strictly above 5 to the question with regards to the economic impact of immigration, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, the binary culturalist variable is coded 1 if the respondents choose a response strictly above 5 to the question with regards to the cultural impact of immigration, and 0 otherwise.

Table A3.7: Distribution of far right voters among strict materialists and strict culturalists

Strict materialists	Vote for far right		Strict culturalists	Vote for far right	
	No (0)	Yes (1)		No (0)	Yes (1)
No (0)	118,174 (95.2%)	5,969 (4.8%)	No (0)	127,292 (95.3%)	6,209 (4.7%)
Yes (1)	19,933 (94.6%)	1,133 (5.4%)	Yes (1)	10,815 (92.4%)	894 (7.6%)

Note: post-stratification, design and population weights applied. Although being a strict culturalist, as opposed to a non-strict culturalist, results in a larger increase in the predicted probability of voting for the far right than being a strict materialist, as opposed to a non-strict materialist, the number of far right voters that are strict materialists is greater than the number of far right voters that are strict culturalists.

Table A3.8. Relationship between individual level coefficients and votes for far right parties at the country-wave level

Column	(1)	(2)	(3)
Variable is composed of the country-wave logistic regression specific coefficient of economic concerns	0.07972***		0.08572***
Variable is composed of the country-wave logistic regression specific coefficient of cultural concerns		0.01528	0.03806
Constant	0.07384***	0.07916***	0.06752***
Observations	108	108	108
R-squared	0.05	0.00	0.05

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ . This regression is run using a country-wave level dataset. The dependent variable is the country-wave average far right party success. The two independent variables are coefficients from the respective country-wave logistic regression of individual far right party votes on economic and cultural concerns, with a series of individual level controls. Thus, each coefficient captures the size of the impact of having economic and cultural concerns, respectively, on the probability of voting for the far right in that specific country-wave.

## Appendix 4. Simulations

Table A4.1. A hypothetical far right electorate with anti-immigration concerns

<b>Far right</b>			<b>Economic concerns</b>			<b>Cultural concerns</b>	
	<b>Actual</b>	<b>percentage</b>		<b>Actual</b>	<b>percentage</b>	<b>Actual</b>	<b>percentage</b>
No	170	85%	No	100	50%	180	90%
Yes	30	15%	Yes	100	50%	20	10%

Table A4.2. A hypothetical far right electorate: tabulation of far right voters and anti-immigration concerns

	<b>Economic concerns</b>		<b>Cultural concerns</b>	
<b>Far right</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>	<b>Yes</b>
<b>No</b>	90 (45%)	80 (40%)	160 (80%)	10 (5%)
<b>Yes</b>	10 (5%)	20 (10%)	20 (10%)	10 (5%)

Table A4.3. A hypothetical far right electorate: regression results


```
. reg farright econ cult
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	200
Model	4.5	2	2.25	F(2, 197)	=	21.11
Residual	21	197	.106598985	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Total	25.5	199	.128140704	R-squared	=	0.1765
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1681
				Root MSE	=	.32649

farright	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P> t	[95% Conf. Interval]	
econinsec	.2	.0489742	4.08	0.000	.1034189	.2965811
cultinsec	.5	.0816237	6.13	0.000	.3390315	.6609685
_cons	4.44e-16	.0365033	0.00	1.000	-.0719873	.0719873

Figure A4.1: Simulations of predicted country level far right party support for different hypothetical distributions of economic and cultural concerns by country



Note: black line represents actual far right party votes in the country.

Table A4.4. Estimates from country specific regressions

Country	vright	econXcultX	econXcult0	econXcult10	econ0cultX	econ0cult0	econ0cult10	econ10cultX	econ10cult0	econ10cult10
SK	4.69%	3.65%	3.28%	4.14%	6.33%	5.68%	7.10%	2.22%	1.98%	2.51%
SI	3.13%	3.43%	2.53%	4.65%	3.94%	2.90%	5.30%	3.10%	2.27%	4.18%
SE	2.40%	2.91%	0.72%	11.56%	0.63%	0.17%	3.50%	7.00%	2.32%	30.60%
PL	2.81%	2.97%	1.35%	8.67%	4.72%	2.10%	12.62%	1.94%	0.82%	5.57%
NO	14.45%	14.65%	8.75%	23.23%	8.52%	4.68%	14.64%	23.26%	15.14%	35.63%
NL	7.64%	7.90%	5.70%	11.13%	3.02%	2.10%	4.53%	15.00%	11.36%	21.00%
LT	9.93%	10.66%	9.37%	11.96%	11.37%	10.01%	12.74%	9.97%	8.76%	11.20%
IT	7.98%	8.46%	5.97%	11.35%	8.87%	6.27%	11.86%	8.11%	5.70%	10.88%
HU	5.99%	8.03%	4.62%	12.48%	8.38%	4.83%	12.97%	7.86%	4.51%	12.21%
GR	2.36%	2.20%	0.88%	3.04%	1.30%	0.51%	1.87%	2.65%	1.10%	3.76%
GB	2.03%	2.27%	1.12%	3.50%	2.22%	1.09%	3.42%	2.30%	1.13%	3.55%
FR	7.92%	8.64%	3.03%	15.28%	3.57%	1.17%	7.16%	13.00%	5.16%	24.20%
FI	6.96%	8.04%	5.36%	15.85%	5.49%	3.60%	11.50%	10.93%	7.54%	21.27%
DK	9.19%	8.99%	3.67%	17.93%	4.57%	1.75%	10.19%	13.55%	6.17%	27.36%
DE	2.23%	2.90%	1.13%	6.17%	2.33%	0.90%	5.11%	3.35%	1.34%	7.25%
CH	22.09%	20.90%	11.29%	38.20%	14.81%	7.34%	29.53%	30.41%	18.23%	51.99%
BG	5.48%	4.44%	4.38%	4.52%	3.68%	3.62%	3.74%	5.37%	5.30%	5.46%
BE	6.20%	6.34%	3.11%	11.44%	3.73%	1.76%	7.14%	8.44%	4.34%	15.46%
AT	10.93%	12.90%	5.28%	21.34%	6.55%	2.31%	11.85%	19.66%	8.89%	32.95%

*Note: X captures keeping the distribution of values for that particular independent variable at its true value. For instance, econXcultX means that the distribution of values for economic and cultural concerns are kept as in the original true data. By contrast, econ0cult10 means that all economic concerns for all individuals are set at 0, whereas all cultural concerns for all individuals are kept at 10. The percentage show then capture the predicted national level support by aggregating all individual predicted probabilities given the coefficients and the distribution of values within the data.*

## Appendix 5. Results including PiS

Table A5.1. Economic concerns and far right voters – with PiS

Economic concerns	Far right voters and non-voters				
	0	1	SUM	0	1
0	4219	222	4441	95.0%	5.0%
1	4000	201	4201	95.2%	4.8%
2	14932	719	15650	95.4%	4.6%
3	19337	889	20226	95.6%	4.4%
4	17142	959	18101	94.7%	5.3%
5	33518	2613	36130	92.8%	7.2%
6	12279	1128	13408	91.6%	8.4%
7	11977	1417	13394	89.4%	10.6%
8	8404	1149	9553	88.0%	12.0%
9	4314	743	5057	85.3%	14.7%
10	6131	1293	7424	82.6%	17.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	136252	11333	147585		

Table A5.2. Cultural concerns and far right voters – with PiS


Cultural concerns	Far right voters and non-voters				
	0	1	SUM	0	1
0	8975	393	9368	95.8%	4.2%
1	7996	316	8312	96.2%	3.8%
2	21586	1062	22648	95.3%	4.7%
3	22914	1276	24190	94.7%	5.3%
4	15892	1067	16958	93.7%	6.3%
5	25167	2367	27535	91.4%	8.6%
6	10069	1038	11107	90.7%	9.3%
7	9348	1093	10442	89.5%	10.5%
8	6601	1069	7669	86.1%	13.9%
9	3427	590	4017	85.3%	14.7%
10	4572	1075	5647	81.0%	19.0%
<b>TOTAL</b>	136548	11346	147894		

Table A5.3. Multilevel random intercept logistic regression table –with PiS

Column	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
Economic concerns over immigration	0.162***	0.149***	0.153***	0.153***	0.144***	0.117***	0.111***	0.110***	0.184***
Cultural concerns over immigration	0.222***	0.208***	0.178***	0.179***	0.176***	0.152***	0.144***	0.143***	0.228***
Economic concerns * Cultural concerns									-0.014***
Male	0.423***	0.422***	0.371***	0.374***	0.328***	0.365***	0.334***	0.343***	0.344***
Age	-0.009***	-0.014***	-0.014***	-0.013***	-0.010***	-0.010***	-0.011***	-0.011***	-0.011***
Bottom income dummy	0.034	-0.062	0.000	-0.053	-0.078	-0.106*	-0.115**		
Lower half of income dummy								0.124***	0.125***
Education (in years)		-0.071***	-0.077***	-0.076***	-0.043***	-0.038***	-0.038***	-0.036***	-0.035***
Placement on left-right scale			0.272***	0.274***	0.282***	0.299***	0.298***	0.299***	0.299***
<i>Reference category: wages</i>									
Self-employed				-0.222***	-0.175***	-0.196***	-0.203***	-0.206***	-0.208***
Pensions				-0.094**	-0.097**	-0.097**	-0.080*	-0.123***	-0.123***
Unemployed				0.452***	0.436***	0.405***	0.428***	0.336***	0.338***
Other social benefits				0.274***	0.253***	0.227***	0.237***	0.150*	0.157*
Investments				-0.229	-0.212	-0.203	-0.184	-0.195	-0.197
Other sources				-0.267*	-0.257*	-0.239	-0.213	-0.289*	-0.287*
<i>Reference category: manager</i>									
Professional					-0.205***	-0.193***	-0.182***	-0.186***	-0.183***
Technician					0.146***	0.147***	0.172***	0.164***	0.158***
Clerical					0.283***	0.285***	0.314***	0.299***	0.292***
Service					0.536***	0.513***	0.520***	0.497***	0.492***
Agriculture					0.279***	0.305***	0.284***	0.239***	0.226***
Craft					0.613***	0.571***	0.610***	0.585***	0.574***
Operator					0.639***	0.584***	0.610***	0.586***	0.580***
Elementary					0.525***	0.476***	0.498***	0.461***	0.454***
Trust in National Parliament						-0.175***	-0.124***	-0.122***	-0.123***
Trust in European Parliament							-0.106***	-0.105***	-0.106***
Constant	-4.902***	-3.639***	-4.925***	-4.961***	-5.763***	-4.902***	-4.539***	-4.618***	-5.004***
Observations	124,046	123,674	119,680	117,971	113,175	112,730	106,950	106,950	106,950
Number of groups	123	123	123	122	122	122	122	122	122
Log likelihood	-27479	-27173	-25006	-24841	-23684	-23153	-21776	-21769	-21743
Wald Chi2	4931	5176	6551	6558	6587	7139	6934	6939	6854

Note: The table presents results from a multilevel mixed-effects logistic regression taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data. The standard errors are robust and clustered by country-wave. \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*  $p < 0.1$ .

Figure A5.1: Predicted probabilities using column 8 of table A5.3



Review