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Derivative deprivation and the wrong of abortion

Stratton-Lake, P. (2020) Derivative deprivation and the wrong of abortion. Bioethics. ISSN 1467-8519 (In Press)

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Abstract/Summary

In this paper I defend the future of value account of the wrong of abortion against an objection by S. Brill. I argue that the fact that an organism has experiences derivatively does not entail that it can only be deprived of them in a morally neutral sense. So long as it genuinely has those experiences, it does not matter what the underlying metaphysics is, it may still be wrong to deprive an organism of those experiences. Furthermore, the suggestion that such deprivation could not be wrong has various implausible consequences, so should be rejected.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:93420
Publisher:Wiley

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