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Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union

Chortareas, G. and Mavrodimitrakis, C. ORCID: (2017) Strategic fiscal policies and leadership in a monetary union. European Journal of Political Economy, 47. pp. 133-147. ISSN 0176-2680

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.04.003


We consider the strategic interactions between fiscal and monetary policies in a monetary union when a fiscal authority enjoys a strategic advantage. In particular, we depart from the standard literature on strategic interactions in monetary unions in that we solve a three-stage game, where the two national fiscal authorities do not play simultaneously. We find that there is always an incentive for the leader fiscal authority to play a three-stage game, which leaves the other fiscal authority worse off under demand shocks. This choice leads to more (less) volatile union-wide fiscal stance for demand (supply) shocks compared to the standard narrow-coordination case. This volatility is positively related to demand shocks' asymmetries.

Item Type:Article
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
ID Code:100309

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