Accessibility navigation


Should philosophical reflection on ethics do without moral concepts?

Hooker, B. (2022) Should philosophical reflection on ethics do without moral concepts? Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 16. ISSN 1572-8447

[img]
Preview
Text (Open access) - Published Version
· Available under License Creative Commons Attribution.
· Please see our End User Agreement before downloading.

645kB

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s10677-022-10303-x

Abstract/Summary

Roger Crisp, in his book Reasons and Goodness, argues in favour of de-moralizing our philosophical reflection on ethics. This paper begins by explaining what ‘de-moralizing’ means. Then the paper assesses Crisp’s argument for de-moralizing and puts forward arguments against de-moralizing.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:106612
Publisher:Springer

Downloads

Downloads per month over past year

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation