



School of Agriculture, Policy and Development

Department of International Development

Contradictions in the Political Economy of Large-Scale Land Investments and Human Rights

Discourse in Tanzania

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou

**Supervisors:**

**First:** Dr Andrew Ainslie, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading

**Second:** Prof Rosa Freedman, School of Law, University of Reading

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## List of Acronyms

<b>AFDB</b>	African Development Bank
<b>ASDP</b>	Agriculture Sector Development Programme
<b>ASDS</b>	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy
<b>BHRT</b>	Business and Human Rights Tanzania
<b>BRN</b>	Big Results Now
<b>CCM</b>	Chama cha Mapinduzi
<b>CESCR</b>	Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
<b>CFTC</b>	Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation
<b>CHRAGG</b>	Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance
<b>CSO</b>	Civil Society Organisation
<b>CSRP</b>	Civil Society Reform Programme
<b>CTI</b>	Confederation of Tanzania Industries
<b>ERP</b>	Economic Recovery Programme
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>FAO</b>	Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
<b>FDI</b>	Foreign Investments
<b>FGD</b>	Focus Group Discussions
<b>FIAS</b>	Food Insecurity Access Scale
<b>FTLRP</b>	Fast Track Land Reform Programme
<b>GC</b>	General Comment
<b>GDP</b>	Gross Domestic Product
<b>GOT</b>	Government of Tanzania
<b>HFIAS</b>	Household Food Insecurity Access Scale
<b>ICESCR</b>	International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
<b>ICCPR</b>	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
<b>IFAD</b>	International Fund for Agricultural Development
<b>IMF</b>	International Monetary Fund
<b>IPC</b>	Investment Promotion Centre
<b>JICA</b>	Japanese International Cooperation Agency
<b>LCA</b>	Latent Class Analysis
<b>LGC</b>	Local Government Council
<b>LHRC</b>	Legal and Human Rights Centre
<b>LSLI</b>	Large-Scale Land Investments
<b>MNC</b>	Multinational Companies
<b>MP</b>	Member of Parliament
<b>MVIWATA</b>	Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania
<b>NBC</b>	National Bank of Commerce
<b>NGO</b>	Non-governmental Organisation
<b>OAU</b>	Organisation of African Unity
<b>RDA</b>	Ruvuma Development Association
<b>SAGCOT</b>	Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania
<b>SAP</b>	Structural Adjustment Programme, 33
<b>SLF</b>	Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
<b>SOE</b>	State Owned Enterprises
<b>SPILL</b>	Strategic Plan for Implementation of Land Laws

<b>TADB</b>	Tanzania Agriculture Development Bank
<b>TANCOFF</b>	Tanzania National Committee of Family Farming

**LIST OF ACRONYMS**

<b>TCCIA</b>	Tanzania Chambers of Commerce Industry and Agriculture
<b>TDV</b>	Tanzanian Development Vision
<b>TIC</b>	Tanzania Investment Centre
<b>TISCO</b>	Tanzania Industrial Studies and Consulting Organisation
<b>TNC</b>	Transnational Corporations
<b>TPSF</b>	Tanzania Private Sector Foundation
<b>UDSM</b>	University of Dar es Salaam
<b>UN</b>	United Nations
<b>USAID</b>	United States Agency for International Development
<b>VAT</b>	Value Added Tax
<b>VEO</b>	Village Executive Officer
<b>WTO</b>	World Trade Organisation

## Declaration

I, Atenchong Talleh Nkobou, confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

## Declaration of contribution

I, Atenchong Talleh Nkobou, declare that the following percentage contributions were made to my PhD thesis as a collection of papers:

<b>Chapter Five</b>	<i>Agrarian Political Economies: Large-Scale Land Investments and Domestic Political Alignments in Tanzania</i>	
<b>Contributors</b>	<b>Statement of contribution</b>	
Atenchong Talleh Nkobou (80%)	Conceptualised and designed the study; Carried out the study and data collection; performed the analysis; wrote the first draft of the manuscript.	
Prof Chris Maina Peter (20%)	Reviewed initial versions of the manuscripts, and ensured that the narrative reflected the local context, especially where language and cultural interpretations were needed.	
<b>Chapter Six</b>	<i>'Developmental Nationalism?' Political Trust and The Politics of Large-Scale Land Investment in Magufuli's Tanzania</i>	
<b>Contributors</b>	<b>Statement of contribution</b>	
Atenchong Talleh Nkobou (80%)	Conceptualised and designed the study; Carried out the study and data collection; performed the analysis; wrote the first draft of the manuscript.	
Dr Andrew Ainslie (20%)	Helped design the study and secure research ethics clearance; provided feedback on fieldwork/data collection strategies; made comments, reviewed, and restructured initial and subsequent (reworking based on reviewers' comments) versions of the manuscript.	
<b>Chapter Seven</b>	<i>Broken promises: A rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania</i>	
<b>Contributors</b>	<b>Statement of contribution</b>	
Atenchong Talleh Nkobou (70%)	Conceptualised and designed the study; Carried out the study and data collection; performed the analysis; wrote the first draft of the manuscript.	
Dr Andrew Ainslie (10%)	Provided comments and reviewed initial versions of the manuscript.	
Dr Stefanie Lemke (20%)	Contributed to the conceptual and methodological approach to the study. Provided comments and reviewed initial versions of the manuscript. Dr Lemke was my M.Sc. Supervisor.	

<b>PhD Supervisor</b>		
I can confirm the contributions made to Atenchong Nkobou's PhD thesis as a collection of papers. I am happy with how the contributions have been allocated and defined.		
Name: Dr Andrew Ainslie	Signature: ___	Date: <u>15.02.2021</u>

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## Abstract

This study combines a historical, legal and policy analysis of large-scale land investments (LSLIs) to provide a critical engagement with LSLIs in Tanzania. The research presents new perspectives on an issue that has generated significant policy and scholarly debates in recent times. Arguably, LSLI policies in Africa rely on neoclassical approaches to development such as the promotion of growth corridors and leave insufficient room for observing non-economic [or political] processes of change. It goes beyond alarmist approaches to LSLI research, such as those cited in media and NGO reports in the wake of the ‘global land rush (2007-2012)’, by using a human-rights based political economy approach. Through an in-depth case study in the Ruvuma region of Tanzania, the study examines the contradictions in the political economy of LSLIs and human rights discourse in Tanzania. Contradictions are understood here as the differences between the promises expressed by LSLI policies and the everyday realities of agrarian societies in which LSLI schemes are embedded. Indeed, the tensions between the political economy of land investments and human rights are reminiscent of the tensions between market and society described over 75 years ago by Karl Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’. These tensions create opportunities for reflecting on cultural, social, and political relations within agrarian societies. The use of a case study approach as a research strategy allowed for various data sources and research methods, including participant observation, focus group discussions (FGDs), key informant interviews, and surveys as a part of the investigation. I undertook a pilot visit to Tanzania from the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2017. Fieldwork was carried out from May to September 2018. By unpacking the historical, legal and policy dynamics of LSLIs in Tanzania, this research contributes to understanding the political shifts and contestations inherent in ‘modernist’ versions of agricultural land investments in rural Tanzania, i.e., contemporary debates about LSLIs as contingent on history and pre-existing social formations. The research explores three research questions (**RQs**), i.e., **RQ1**: How does

economic nationalism, defined as ‘practices to create, bolster and protect national economies in the context of world markets’, and LSLIs influence domestic political alignment within agrarian political economies? **RQ2:** How did ‘developmental nationalism’, a variant of economic nationalism, contribute to or undermine political trust and the politics of LSLIs in Magufuli’s Tanzania<sup>1</sup>? **RQ3:** What are the food (in)security experiences of individuals within households in LSLI-affected communities in rural Tanzania today? **RQ1** and **RQ2** explore the support for Economic nationalism under the Magufuli regime (2015-2021). Magufuli’s approach to economic development and investment was a restorationist form of developmental nationalism, which purported to make Tanzania great again. Economic nationalism encapsulates these variants of ‘nationalism’ linked to the state’s involvement in regulating and intervening in markets. It is viewed here as a political reaction to the uneven and combined development of capitalism. It emphasises the ‘national’ in economic nationalism as a crucial economic orientation of a state in restructuring its identity at a particular conjuncture. The nationalist turn of President Magufuli’s government was grounded in a selective history that swept him to power. By looking closely at the politics of land investments at the village level in Tanzania, the study highlights the extent to which local community members, a majority of whom are smallholder farmers, were in fact (*dis*)empowered by this wave of nationalism. Magufuli’s supporters heralded his approach to investment policies and regulations as an attempt to redefine Tanzania’s relationship with investors.

Under the Magufuli regime, there seemed to be a contradictory relationship between Tanzania’s striving to attract investors and the president’s authoritarian impulses, which his supporters viewed as those of a ‘strong leader’. These contradictions present an opportunity to

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<sup>1</sup>This research was conducted prior to the demise of President John P. Magufuli in March 2021. With his departure, it will be interesting to study if any changes are introduced in the orientation of the SAGCOT and investment policy in Tanzania.

re-examine the LSLI discourse in Tanzania and understand the emergence of a new wave of nationalism. While this study acknowledges the authoritarian turn of Magufuli and the dwindling of civic and media spaces in Tanzania, it agrees with Paget (2020) that Magufuli succeeded in justifying his authoritarianism as a form of liberation which sought to make ‘Tanzania great again’. Hence **RQ1** and **RQ2** contribute to the growing literature on the complex politics of LSLIs by presenting the political contestations in both case-study communities. **RQ1** is unique in its exploration of the labour dynamics within rural households, which contributes to an understanding of the nascent worker-peasant alliance against capitalist landed investments. **RQ2** is distinct in its use of a Latent Class Analysis (LCA), which categorises research participants into different groups of individuals based on their trust in the president, the ruling party (CCM), the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and their support for LSLIs. Political trust is defined as an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government based on people’s normative expectations. The use of an in-depth case study approach facilitates a context-dependent analysis for measuring political trust. **RQ3** provides insights into the material impact of LSLIs in these agrarian communities and how the state of Tanzania may conform to or derogate from its duty in relation to the provisions within the relevant international human rights regimes that it is signatory to. The right to adequate food is used as the human right of interest and deviates from a needs-based perspective to an entitlement-based perspective of food security. The sustainable livelihood framework is used here to facilitate the assessment of livelihood strategies and outcomes in the two case study communities. Livelihood outcomes are evidenced by individuals’ food insecurity experiences within rural households and measured using the USAID standardised household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS). Findings from the analysis show that in the case of these two villages, the human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency, and empowerment are severely undermined. This overall situation is due to inadequate monitoring

and evaluation of LSLI processes and low levels of commitment on the part of institutions in Tanzania to monitor the promises made by investors. In concluding, the study argues that LSLIs deserve closer academic attention, not least for their remarkable popularity and their spread. But given that no LSLI occurs in a socio-political vacuum, also for the increased interest in the recognition to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of local communities, the majority of whom are small-holder farmers in ‘developing’ countries. Following the demise of president Magufuli in March 2021, it is relevant for future research to study the direction of investment policy and design in Tanzania. Certainly, the potential longer-term absence of the ‘strong leader’ element displayed by President Magufuli will have consequences for the orientation of Tanzania’s approach to both investors and ordinary citizens.

# 1 Chapter One: Introduction

This study presents new perspectives on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) in Tanzania using a human-rights based political economy approach. The approach used in this study combines a historical, legal and policy analysis of LSLIs. It provides a rounded view on an issue that has generated significant policy and scholarly debates in recent times (Edelman et al. 2013, Oya 2013b, Zoomers and Kaag 2014). As the name suggests, political economy focuses on the intersections of politics and economics. Through such an analysis, I seek to examine how political power and its associated political processes shape economic outcomes, influence the location of economic activity and ultimately, also the distribution of the costs and benefits of these activities on society (Oatley 2015). Political economy explores how economic forces, production and trade influence political action and contestation and the relationship of all of these with the law and the government (Crane and Amawi 2013). I critically examine power relationships between the state, non-state actors and society in determining LSLI schemes. My approach to this research is primarily to explore the tensions between political and business elites and rural communities impacted by LSLI schemes and how, somewhat paradoxically, President John P. Magufuli co-opted rural communities using LSLIs as a vehicle to increase political support (Paget 2020a, b).

The origins and dynamics of contemporary debates about LSLIs are grounded in history, long-standing land tenure patterns and pre-existing social formations (Alden-Wily 2011b, Edelman et al. 2013). This study considers ‘*Contemporary LSLIs*’ as land deals and associated policies of the post-2007/2008 financial crisis era, specifically those entered into after 2009. Understanding the history of political, legal and economic reforms within local political economies, including the countries interaction with the rest of the world, permits both a

profound analysis of contemporary LSLIs (Edelman et al. 2013). For example, Ngoitiko et al. (2010) and Nelson et al. (2012) regard the competition for land by both foreign and domestic investors in Tanzania as a symptom of political and economic changes, which led to the liberalisation of the Tanzania economy in the post-socialist era (the period 1967-1984). Ngoitiko et al. (2010) argue that the economic and political reforms under the Structural Adjustment programme (SAP) in the 1980s gave rise to an unprecedented period of 'land-grabbing' in Tanzania. Alden-Wily (2011a) further argues that vestiges of colonial law are to blame for the disposition of land in Africa under contemporary LSLIs.

Since the global land rush which ensued after the 2007/2008 financial crises, policy analysis and academic research on LSLIs have been marked by explicit and implicit differences over the causes, character, mechanisms, meanings, trajectory and implications of LSLIs (Edelman et al. 2013, 1518). More specifically, the period between 2007 and 2012 was marked by a great deal of scholarly and political debates around LSLIs and has been referred to as the 'land grab literature rush', the 'making sense period' or the 'hype' period on LSLI research (Edelman et al. 2013, Oya 2013b, Zoomers and Kaag 2014). The alarmist representation of the impact of LSLIs in the media, NGO reports and some scholarly articles during the 'making sense period' has been questioned by authors like Oya (2013b), Edelman (2013) and Locher and Sulle (2014) on the reliability of the data used to represent the 'facts' in communities impacted by LSLIs. Additionally, data can be reliable but the interpretation and deployment of these 'facts' can be questionable i.e., not placed in context or ignores/overlooks negative consequences. For example, Edelman (2013) questions the 'epistemology of land grabbing data' towards Chinese investors in Africa.

This study gets beneath the bonnet of the ‘hype’ and the ‘literature rush’ by presenting a more balanced, considered, and in-depth case study on the contradictions in the political economy of LSLIs and human rights discourse in Tanzania. The term ‘*contradictions*’ is used in the context of the post-Frankfurt school of critical theory (Held 1980, 183 & 186). It is understood here as the differences between the promises expressed by LSLIs policies on the one hand and the everyday realities of agrarian societies in which these investment schemes are embedded on the other hand. This study argues that it is essential to locate debates about contemporary LSLIs in their historical and legal context. It is vital to uncover their rootedness in human – political and economic – interests, and devise novel approaches to understanding the drivers and outcomes of socio-economic change in developing countries (Oya 2013b). As already mentioned, scholars like Edelman et al. (2013), Oya (2013b) and Locher and Sulle (2014) have challenged many of the approaches such as those in media and NGO reports used in documenting land acquisition and transfer processes in the wake of the 2007/2008 crisis. To these critical scholars, studies during the ‘literature rush period’ have resulted in a simplistic appreciation of the full consequences of the upsurge of LSLIs in many African countries (Edelman et al. 2013, 1517). While these authors question the approaches used in examining land investments in African countries, they all agree that there was a renewed interest in land investments following the 2007/2008 crises.

Policymakers often present LSLIs as a means to improve investments in agriculture, increase Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), food security, farmer’s incomes, technology transfer, and job creation (Bergius et al. 2018, World Bank 2017). For example, in October 2001, the government of Tanzania launched the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), which declared land in Tanzania untapped and underutilised (Kazungu and Cheyo 2014). Still operational today under the ASDS II, the objective of the ASDS is to create an enabling and

conducive environment for improving profitability in the agrarian sector as the basis for improved farm income and rural poverty reduction (URT 2015). In fact, following the 2007/2008 crisis, the government of Tanzania launched the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) as part of the ASDS and as a means to stimulate economic development by attracting multi-national companies to invest in agriculture (Bergius et al. 2018, SAGCOT 2011). The SAGCOT provided a platform to galvanise global investors, multi-national companies, state bureaucrats and politicians in ‘a grand modernist vision for the transformation of agriculture’ (Sulle 2020, 333). In this sense, the SAGCOT is envisaged by the government of Tanzania as a means to stimulate economic development – given the overall structure of the economy - by attracting multi-national companies to invest in agriculture (Bergius et al. 2018, SAGCOT 2011).

The tensions between the political economy of land investments and human rights are reminiscent of the tensions between ‘market’ and ‘society’, described over 75 years ago by Karl Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double movement’<sup>2</sup>. At the centre of Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ is the duality of the law, i.e., both as an enabler of the commodification of land and labour and as a recourse mechanism for citizens to ensure accountability and justice (Silver and Arrighi 2003, Cotula 2013b). Within contemporary LSLI research, Cotula (2013b, 1607) uses Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ to examine how shifts in the political economy of land investments and the growing interests in human rights create opportunities for reflecting cultural, social, and political relations and tensions within agrarian societies. Additionally, Cotula et al., (2009) publication, i.e., ‘*Land grab or development opportunity? Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa*’ highlights this duality within contemporary LSLI debates.

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<sup>2</sup> In his book *The Great Transformation*, the economic historian Karl Polanyi (1944) argued that states are not only a tool of the dominant class, but have a fundamental role to establish and maintain the framework within which market activity takes place, and to provide social protection to society from the inevitable ‘destruction’ wrought by market forces (Lim 2014).

Indeed, governments in land ‘abundant’ countries mobilise their formal ownership of land within national law to legitimise LSLIs and promote growth corridors or ‘agricultural modernisation’. Similarly, private investors (domestic and foreign) maximise national law and the legal protections provided by international investment law to acquire land and shelter themselves from adverse public actions and contestations (Ferrando 2014, Jayne et al. 2016).

On the other hand, there have been calls for protecting local communities against these land investments deals, which encroach on their customary and human rights (Alden-Wily 2012, Narula 2006, German et al. 2013, Kanosue 2015). Proponents advocate for improved accountability and transparency in designing and implementing LSLI schemes (De Schutter 2011b, Claeys and Vanloqueren 2013). In other words, rural communities should be better involved in land investment policy design and implementation (De Schutter 2009a, 2011b). For this reason, international and civil society organisations (CSOs) have contributed to these debates by proposing actions in the form of voluntary guidelines, which primarily focus on improving the governance of land tenure and agricultural policy in general (see Seufert 2013). For example, following the increased interest in land after the 2007/2008 crisis, the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forest in the Context of National Food Security* was endorsed by the UN Committee of World Food Security in May 2012 (FAO 2012).

The contributions of CSOs to the contestation of land expropriation in African countries has been widely documented (Chome et al. 2020, Sulle 2020, Twomey et al. 2015). Civil society organisations like *Via Campesina*, the German Catholic Bishop’s Organisation for Development Cooperation (MISEREOR) and a host of others like the national farmer’s organisations *Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania* (MVIWATA), have contributed to the peasant resistance against the displacement of rural communities by LSLIs and against

the destruction of their livelihoods and cultures (also see Bernstein and Oya 2014, 14). Local communities and their global alliances, including non-governmental and civil society organisations, resort to national law and human right bodies to slow down or renegotiate these LSLI deals and schemes (Polack et al. 2013).

It is the ‘double movement’ between the use of the law for the commodification of land and the protection of agrarian societies from the excesses of market forces that frame the relationship between law and social change in Polanyi’s work (Cotula 2013b, 1609). While Polanyi’s work has been critiqued for being Eurocentric, there is consensus that markets are rarely devoid of social relations, and culture and politics are essential components of market processes (Cangiani 2011, Cotula 2013b, Hodgson 2017). To Polanyi, land and labour cannot be treated purely as commodities without causing widespread social transformation (Cotula 2013b, 1609). Summarily, the law constitutes both the mechanism for enabling land deals *and* an object for political contestations against land deals (Edelman et al. 2013, 1524).

Yet, the lack of ‘political tools’ such as specific accountability regulations within investments contracts (Fernandez and Schwarze 2013, 1225) reflects the deficiencies to hold investors and multinational institutions accountable for failing to fulfil their promises (Bélaïr 2018) and for depriving local communities of their social and economic rights (Zirulnick 2015). Indeed, Bélaïr (2018, 379) mentions the limited capacity within the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) to monitor and ensure that investment promises are implemented and fulfilled.

It is, therefore, not surprising that agrarian movements and so-called ‘progressive’ scholars put human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights, as an essential element in the governance of LSLIs (Edelman et al. 2013, 1524, De Schutter 2011b). I use the human rights lens to introduce an obligatory level of state responsibility, which helps restrain the interference

of state and other non-state actors from interfering in the spheres of private and personal rights (Vogt et al. 2016). The spectrum between the commodification of land and labour and human rights as a source of political contestation is a matter of degree more than a dichotomy. This is because the law can both facilitate and restrain the commodification of land and labour (Cotula 2013b, 1609). This forms the basis for integrating human rights into an agrarian political economy analysis of land investments and commodification.

Empirical evidence for the study relies on an in-depth case study of two rural communities within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). By using two purposively selected case studies, a point which I elaborate further in Chapter Three, I can make a systematic study of the multiple dimensions introduced by LSLIs within these rural settings. The real-life situations of the case studies facilitates the nuanced exploration of the complex issues related to the political economy of LSLIs (Flyvbjerg 2006, 223).

With the ascent to the presidency of John Magufuli, there was some expectation that the SAGCOT (re)-oriented its focus on small farmers by placing importance on out-grower schemes and capacity improvement in local communities (Sulle 2020, Chome et al. 2020). To Paget (2020b, 8), Magufuli presented himself as a hero against the bureaucratic and business middle class, which he portrayed as against ‘the poor and downtrodden section of society’. A senior SAGCOT secretariat officer is quoted by Sulle (2020, 345) as stating that ‘unlike the [Kikwete] regime, [Magufuli’s] leadership [was] pro smallholder’, leading to the emboldening of political contestations against LSLIs in rural communities. These nuances and shifts within LSLI/SAGCOT present an opportunity for scholars and policy analysts to re-engage with the agrarian questions of capital and labour to understand how the commercialisation of agriculture through growth corridors may affect society’s preferences for specific economic policy

interventions. So, instead of dismissing the investment approaches under President Magufuli as pure ‘reactionary populism’, it is, perhaps, essential to ask how we got here and how the failure of neoclassical policy interventions contributed to the rise in support for interventionist policies within rural settings.

Debates around LSLIs were essential elements in Magufuli’s presidential campaign (Schlimmer 2018). In part, increasing levels of disenfranchisement of smallholder farmers played a significant role in the support for Magufuli, whose legitimacy rested on active involvement in ‘deals making’ and social claims used by authoritarian governments to ‘shape markets’ for legitimacy-enhancing purposes (Paget 2020a). The use of various data and analytical tools in this research, such as trust in government surveys, key informant interviews and a latent class analysis (LCA), helps to demonstrate that the discursive element within policy and pronouncements on LSLIs can be used to enhance political support and make claims for economic policies, including economic nationalism in Tanzania. The next section of this Introduction presents an overview of literature on LSLIs, the research gaps and contributions of this study to contemporary debates about LSLIs.

### **1.1 What is the state of LSLI research? Research gap and contribution:**

The onset and impact of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis resulted in unstable and fragile markets and the collapse of financial banking institutions, which affected all sectors of the global economy (Mapulanga-Hulston 2009, 306). The 2007/2008 crisis proved that a sub-prime mortgage market and an increase in oil prices in the US (Nazlioglu et al. 2013), policy decisions on biofuels in Europe (Sinkala and Johnson 2012, German and Schoneveld 2012), and adverse weather in major grain-producing countries like Australia, could all contribute to a spike in food prices in a wide range of countries with varying levels of economic exposure

and vulnerability. Affected countries include Tanzania, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Tunisia, Haiti, Indonesia, and Senegal (German 2015, Rosegrant 2008). The 2007/2008 crisis also showed how interdependent and globalised market and political systems have become in recent decades.

Following the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 'interdependences' within markets were demonstrable in the price sensitivity of national product markets, the (further) rise of agile transnational corporations, and global capital mobility and accumulation, which also challenged the autonomy of states to pursue their national economic strategies (Berazneva and Lee 2013, Lin 2008). The 2007/2008 crisis contributed to an increase in the demand for land by foreign governments and multinational corporations to meet the growing demand for food and resource supply to their home countries and, in other cases, local investors who acquired land for speculative reasons (Cotula 2013a, McMichael 2013, Jayne et al. 2016). As discussed earlier, the acquisition of land in many African countries contributed to a flurry of media and NGO reports in what has been characterised by authors like Carlos Oya as the 'land grab literature rush' (Oya 2013b).

However, research on LSLIs remains highly contested due to a lack of sound and accurate data (Edelman 2013, Oya 2013b, Locher and Sulle 2014). The lack of reliable data in LSLI research is partly due to the reluctance of governments and investors to reveal detailed information on land-based investments (Cotula 2011), the varied nature and definitions of LSLIs (Anseeuw 2013), the lack of rigour in research methodologies (Edelman 2013, Oya 2013b, Locher and Sulle 2014), and the risk involved in researching such a politically charged phenomenon (also see Talleh Nkobou 2020, Cramer et al. 2015). These challenges and limitations in conducting LSLI research can lead to what Edelman (2013) and (Oya 2013b) describe as 'killer facts', by

which Oya means ‘the extent to which data reflects realities... is questionable’ (Oya 2013b, 505). Further, evidence on the contributions of LSLI to local communities whose livelihoods and food security are at stake is said to remain limited (Scoones et al. 2013). Especially among marginalised groups like women and the elderly are largely invisible in this literature, with data on the gendered impacts of land deals mostly lacking (Behrman et al. 2012, Daley and Pallas 2014).

Oya (2013a, 1536), for one, has called for a more critical approach to investigating the contradictions and ambiguities within debates around LSLIs in developing countries. Other authors like Edelman (2013) and Sulle (2020) argue that research on LSLIs and the commercialisation of agriculture often leave insufficient room for the observation of political processes of change within rural agrarian political economies. The over-reliance on economic models often fails to meet its stated objectives in parts of the world where ‘extra institutional’ social transactions significantly impact political and economic outcomes (Khan 1995, Khan 2017). In other words, neoclassical approaches to LSLIs model institutional behaviour as rational (Morrow 1994), with little regard for understanding the layered politics of social differentiation within agrarian political economies (Greco 2015).

Indeed, the increase in food prices, which followed the 2007/2008 financial crisis, resulted in a spike in violent riots in African countries like Ethiopia, Madagascar, Cameroon, Tunisia, Egypt, Senegal, Mozambique and Burkina Faso (Berazneva and Lee 2013). The financial crisis reaffirmed the ‘the extent to which food markets [have] become highly interdependent, and the inability of national governments to deal with dramatic surges in food prices adequately’ (Berazneva and Lee 2013, 25). Such complex and often asymmetric interdependences (Nye and Keohane 1971) between states and international actors create new economic connections

and power configurations in the global system. Here, the economic and political interconnectedness within which parties depend on each other (interdependence), but where one party is much more dependent than the other (asymmetry) does not only have economic consequences but increasingly noticeable political effects as well (Crane and Amawi 2013).

The extent of political contestations against contemporary LSLIs in Africa can be exemplified using the case between the South Korean logistics company Daewoo and the Malagasy government. In the wake of the 2007/2008 crisis, Daewoo negotiated a deal with the government of Madagascar, which would see the company acquire over 1.3 million hectares of land intended for the production of maize for export to South Korea (Andrianirina et al. 2011). The terms of the negotiation between Daewoo and the Malagasy government were leaked by the *Financial Times* in November 2008 and contributed to the overthrow of the Ravalomanana government in March 2009 (see Vinciguerra 2011). This case provides a particularly graphic example that vividly demonstrates the concept and potential political dimensions introduced by LSLIs.

In an investigation into micro-political contestations within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor (SAGCOT) of Tanzania, specifically the Kilombero Plantation Limited, Sulle (2020, 336) shows how the Magufuli government has put a stop to land investments for failing to fulfil their contractual obligations. In another politically contentious land transaction in Tanzania, the redistribution of land by the Magufuli government in the Tanga district has been extensively reported in local media<sup>3</sup> (also see Sulle 2017, 13). Arguably, neoclassical approaches to LSLIs interpret their outcomes as linear processes which can be ‘triggered by moving the right

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<sup>3</sup> The Citizen of August 2017 reported the Magufuli ordered the ‘repossession of 14,000 acres [of land] in Tanga. See The Citizen (2017) Magufili orders repossession of 14,000 acres in Tanga. <https://www.thecitizen.co.tz/tanzania/news/magufuli-orders-repossession-of-14-000-acres-in-tanga-2599046> accessed 20.09.2021.

economic pieces' (Dannenbergh et al. 2018, 138) but they fail to appreciate the politics of social differentiation and contestation within agrarian political economies (Schlimmer 2018, Sulle 2020).

Like in the Daewoo and other cases within the SAGCOT, these transactions often happen while local communities remain uninformed. In most cases, 'no one [in the local community] can express an opinion' (Vinciguerra 2011, 5). Consequently, LSLIs deserve close academic attention, not least for the remarkable spread of their popularity but for the increased and corresponding interest in the recognition to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of local communities, the majority of whom are smallholder farmers in developing countries (Cotula 2012, Davis et al. 2015, German 2015, Teklemariam et al. 2016, Alden-Wily 2011a, Twomey et al. 2015).

These debates and questions around LSLIs are most often grounded in a broader history in the sense that they are intimately bound up with historical ideas about inequality, social (*in*)justice and the political struggles informed by the contemporary political and economic reforms in most developing countries (Edelman et al. 2013, Bernstein 2004). By unpacking the historical, legal and policy dynamics of LSLIs in Tanzania, this research contributes to understanding the political shifts and contestations against 'modernist' versions of agricultural land investments in rural Tanzania, i.e., it sees contemporary debates about LSLIs as contingent on history and pre-existing social formations.

Applying a human rights lens to the political economy of LSLIs highlights the recognition that states have obligations and that LSLIs 'should under no circumstances trump the right human obligations of the states concerned' (De Schutter 2009b, 33). Neoclassical expectations and

approaches to LSLIs (see Chapter 2.3) must be investigated to arrive at a critical understanding of the actors that constitute such a framework (Gale 1998, 257, Ruggie 2008). The critical approach used in this study is to understand what happens within agrarian societies in which these investment schemes are embedded. The next part of this Introduction chapter presents the main research questions of the thesis, a guide to how the questions are answered, and where this has been achieved within the study.

## **1.2 Theoretical framing, Research questions and structure**

This thesis is presented as a collection of papers, and it is centred around three main research questions (**RQs**). Each research question is addressed as a results chapter, which is presented in the form of a paper to contribute to an in-depth understanding of LSLIs and ultimately contribute to the empirical evidence on the contradictions in the political economy of LSLIs in Tanzania. The thesis is comprised of eight chapters with three result chapters dedicated to the research questions. The result chapters are linked with the other chapters to form a comprehensive overview of the political economy of LSLIs in Tanzania. First, I start by discussing the research questions, and then I discuss the content and structure of the other chapters that make up the thesis. The main research questions are:

**RQ1:** How does economic nationalism and LSLI influence domestic political alignment within rural political economies in Tanzania?

**RQ2:** How did ‘developmental nationalism’ contribute to or undermine political trust and the politics of LSLIs in Magufuli’s Tanzania?

**RQ3:** What are the food (in)security experiences of individuals within households in LSLI-affected communities in rural Tanzania today?

The study relies on an in-depth case-study research approach, including intensive fieldwork in two purposively selected rural communities in the Ruvuma region of Tanzania. As I elaborate in Chapter Three, these cases have been chosen because they are well-known cases of LSLIs, and they are suitable cases to examining the embeddedness of contemporary LSLIs in rural communities. Other pragmatic reasons, elaborated in Chapter Three, also explain why I chose them as cases for this research. To understand the complex politics of LSLIs, and mitigate against the errors of oversimplification expressed by Edelman et al. (2013) and Oya (2013b), a case-study approach is necessary. Answers to the research questions (**RQs**) are achieved through continued proximity to everyday realities in the case-study communities and feedback from those in the case-study communities.

Through **RQ1** and **RQ2**, I explore the support for various forms of ‘nationalism’ under the Magufuli regime (Lange and Kinyondo 2016, Paget 2020a, Poncian 2019). Paget (2020a, 1240) terms Magufuli’s approach as ‘restorationist developmental nationalism’, which purported to ‘make Tanzania great again’. Several authors have documented variants of nationalism as a challenge to the failures of economic liberalism in Tanzania – including ‘resource nationalism’ within the extractive industry (Jacob and Pedersen 2018, Lange and Kinyondo 2016, Poncian 2019). Poncian (2019) provides evidence on the use of ‘resource nationalism’ by the Magufuli government to galvanise political support as he did during the 2015 presidential elections. By studying the politics of land investments at the village level in Tanzania, I highlight the extent to which local community members, a majority of whom are smallholder farmers, were emboldened by the wave of nationalism under Magufuli. LSLIs provides a window into questions about representation, accountability, and governmental legitimacy in Tanzania (Nelson et al. 2012).

For example, in the run-up to the 2015 general elections, political commentators suggested that Magufuli and others politicised LSLI rhetoric as a ‘discursive tool’ to garner votes and lash out against corruption and the legitimacy of foreign investors getting involved in the national economy (Schlimmer 2018, 94). Additionally, while the Magufuli government adopted industrialisation as its central policy, several contradictions emerged from its efforts to design and reform its relationship with investors. In an article published in *The Citizen* newspaper on the 25th of May 2018, the cabinet approved an Investment Blueprint that set the stage for a raft of amendments to laws and regulations governing business conduct in Tanzania. The aim of the Investment Blueprint, according to Mr Charles Mwijage<sup>4</sup>, the then Minister for Industry, Trade and Investment, ‘[was] to improve the country’s business [or investment] environment and attract more investors’. At the same time, the passing of *The Natural Wealth and Resources (Permanent Sovereignty) Act (PSA)* in July 2017 restricted the use of international arbitration commissions for the settlement of investment disputes (*Article 11*). This is a move which many, including Pedersen et al. (2020, 1212), have described as ‘resource nationalism’.

Additionally, several investors such as the Swedish firm Eco-Energy saw their land titles revoked and handed back to smallholder farmers. In October 2018, the Government of Tanzania gave the Dutch government a notice of intent to terminate its Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) with the Netherlands. According to an article by *The EastAfrican*, on the 29<sup>th</sup> of September 2018, ‘The BIT signing [between Tanzania and the Netherlands] in 2001 was opposed by civil society in both Tanzania and the Netherlands as biased towards the Dutch and not people-centred’. Magufuli’s supporters heralded these reforms to investment policy and regulations as attempts to redefine Tanzania’s relationship with (foreign) investors. Under the Magufuli regime, there seemed to be a contradictory relationship between Tanzania’s striving

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<sup>4</sup>He was eventually sacked by the president in November 2018 because of a row in the cashew nut sector.

to attract investors and the president's authoritarian impulses, which his supporters view as those of a strong leader (Paget 2020b). These contradictions present an opportunity to re-examine the LSLI discourse and outcomes in Tanzania and deepen our understanding of the emergence of a new wave of nationalism in Tanzania.

Economic nationalism encapsulates these variants of 'nationalism' linked to the state's involvement in market making (Pryke 2012). It is viewed here as a political reaction to the uneven and combined development of capitalism (Smith 2013). In a 1998 article by George T. Crane, '*Economic Nationalism: Bringing the Nation Back in*' Crane (1998, 56), emphasises the 'national' in economic nationalism as a crucial economic orientation of a state in the restructuring of its identity at a particular conjuncture'. Magufuli's version of economic nationalism was about 'tacking back control' and intervening in all sectors of the economy, including the renegotiation of LSLI deals. As stated in the Five Year Development Plan 2016/2017 – 2020/2020 (URT 2016, 3), Magufuli aimed to renegotiate Tanzania's relationship with investors by introducing a 'business unusual approach' that involved far more direct involvement of the state in the market.

Consequently, **RQ1** and **RQ2** examine the support for these 'political reactions', especially in rural (case study) communities where ordinary citizens are arguably less concerned about their civic space being squeezed but are interested in the material consequences of LSLIs on their livelihoods. While this study acknowledges the authoritarian turn of Magufuli and the dwindling of civic and media spaces in Tanzania (*The Economist* 2018, Fouéré 2011), it agrees with Paget (2020a, 1241) that Magufuli succeeded in justifying his 'authoritarianism' as a form of liberation which sought to make 'Tanzania great again'. President Magufuli's government focused more on an industrialisation agenda characterised by a strong state presence in all

sectors of the economy (URT 2016). For example, in 2019, Magufuli transferred the investment portfolio from the Ministry of Industry and Trade to the Prime Minister's Office (PMO). He has also created a new Land Investment Unit (LIU) under the purview of the Ministry of Lands, a decision motivated by the President's efforts to remedy inefficiencies in Tanzania Investment Centre's (TIC) (Bélair, 2018, p. 379). Therefore, both research questions investigate the level of support for LSLI within rural communities and political contestations which may result from these investment schemes. Sulle (2020, 347) for one, regards the SAGCOT as 'a political construct that is subject to broader political circumstances' at the local, national and international level. Hence **RQ1** and **RQ2** contribute to the growing literature on the complex politics of LSLIs by presenting the political contestations in both case-study communities in the Ruvuma region of Tanzania.

**RQ1** - How does economic nationalism and LSLI influence domestic political alignment within local political economies in Tanzania? – This research question is unique in its exploration of the labour dynamics within rural households. The labour dynamics within rural households challenge the easy differentiation of labour into workers associated with farm and non-farm activities (Bernstein 2004, 211). The nuances of labour arrangements within rural households blur such pervasive distinctions in the differences between the interests of farmworkers and non-farm workers, the social logic of labour transition systems and the livelihood strategies adopted within rural households (Bernstein 2004, 211). The labour dynamics may contribute to what Amin (2017, 154) refers to as a 'worker-peasant alliance' against capitalist landed investments.

**RQ2** - How did 'developmental nationalism' contribute to or undermine political trust and the politics of LSLIs in Magufuli's Tanzania? - This research question is distinct in its use of a

Latent Class Analysis (LCA). The LCA is used to categorise research participants in both case-study communities into different groups of individuals based on their trust in the president, the ruling party (CCM), the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and their support for LSLIs. Political trust is a critical concept in approaching **RQ2**. Political trust is defined as an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government based on people's normative expectations (Schneider 2017). The use of an in-depth case study approach facilitates a context-dependent analysis for measuring political trust. This means that by using communities within the same regional and socio-cultural context, the study minimises measurement errors that may occur when such studies are done across cultural, agro-ecology and regime settings (Schneider 2017). The measurement of political trust within LSLI research is further explained and examined in Chapter Six.

In summary, both **RQ1** and **RQ2** use the LSLI discourse to focus on the political and economic orientation to investments in land and the wider economy under the Magufuli government. Magufuli's election in November 2015 and re-election in 2020 was built on the mantra of anti-corruption and a drive for greater industrialisation (URT 2016), with land being a significant factor during his presidential campaign (Schlimmer 2018). To most smallholder farmers in these rural communities, Magufuli's approach towards investments was viewed as a solution to broken promises of 'grand modernist' versions of land investments. A response to both research questions elucidates the link between the rise in 'nationalism' and the limitations of neoliberal policies introduced in the 1980s as an alternative to Tanzania's socialist regime (Mwapachu 2005, Shivji 1991). It argues that three major factors contribute to the legitimisation of the LSLI discourse in Tanzania as a vehicle to increase political competition. These factors are:

1. The increasing levels of distrust in the political class by the ordinary citizens of Tanzania due to high levels of corruption and broken promises within LSLIs.
2. The perceived ‘foreignisation of spaces’ linked to the increasing impact of land deals and the power asymmetries between promoters of LSLIs and rural communities.
3. The disenfranchisement and marginalisation of rural communities, particularly smallholder farmers, due to the constituent structures and processes of the capitalist-oriented economy.

Building on the work of scholars like Paget (2020a), Sulle (2020) and Fouéré (2011), the research illustrates that these factors must be considered when analysing the success or otherwise of contemporary LSLIs given the dynamic political climate in Tanzania.

In exploring **RQ3** , i.e., what are the food (in)security experiences of individuals within households in LSLI-affected communities in rural Tanzania today? - I provide insights into the factors that have placed these agrarian communities in a vulnerable position within the neoliberal world order and how the state of Tanzania may conform to or derogate from its duty in relation to the provisions within the broader international human rights regimes (Mapulanga-Hulston 2009, 308). I use the right to adequate food as the human right of interest and deviate from a needs-based perspective to an entitlement-based perspective of food security. The Sustainable Livelihood Framework is used here to facilitate the assessment of livelihood strategies and outcomes in the two case study communities. Livelihood outcomes are evidenced by individuals' food insecurity experiences within rural households and measured using the standardised household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS) (Coates et al. 2007). These instruments and how they apply to the study are further explained in Chapter Seven.

The limitations of LSLIs for failing to fulfil their contractual promises and obligations and the lack of political tools such as adequate accountability and transparency requirements within investments contracts call for an investigation into the material impact on rural communities and an evaluation of the principles of accountability, transparency, empowerment and participation during policy design and implementation. As stated in earlier sections of this Introduction chapter, the role of the state is to establish and maintain the framework within which market activity takes place and provide social protection to society from the possible excesses of market forces (Gill 1995, Silver and Arrighi 2003). Correspondingly, UN frameworks such as the international human rights regime introduce obligatory levels of state responsibility within countries (Jacob 2010, Nickel 2007, Wisborg 2013). Human rights instruments help restrain the actions/activities of state and other non-state actors from overweening interference in the spheres of private and personal rights (Vogt et al. 2016). These human rights instruments also define conditions for the state to help develop individuals towards the progressive realisation of their rights (Mapulanga-Hulston 2002).

For example, Article 11<sup>5</sup> of the International Covenant for Economic Social and Cultural Rights strengthens provisions for member states to recognise everyone's right to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food. According to the provisions of the Covenant, member states must undertake individually and through international cooperation measures specific to implement programmes needed to:

1. improve methods of production, conservation, and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles

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<sup>5</sup> The FAO had a decisive influence in the drafting of Art 11(2). It was the express suggestion of the then FAO director-general when addressing the third Committee of the General Assembly in 1963 that the limited reference in Art 25 of the universal declaration to the right of food was significantly expanded upon in the Covenant. Alston, P. 'the United Nations' specialised Agencies and implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights' (1979) 18 *Col J Transnational L* 79, 89.

of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilisation of natural resources.

2. Take into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting countries to ensure an equitable distribution of food supplies in relation to needs.

Through the food insecurity experiences of individuals within the case study communities, **RQ3** explores the material realities of selected community members. By introducing a human rights lens into the political economy analysis, I argue that access to land in Tanzania is a precondition for realising the right to adequate food and thus a requirement for achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security.

In 2009, following the shortages of food and subsequent political upheavals in many African countries, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Adequate Food, De Schutter (2009b), identified and recommended plausible policies focused on the linkages between land ownership, food security, sustainable development and the right to food (Miggiano et al. 2010). Human rights form part of the political economy. It is a quintessential part of the cut and thrust of mobilising coalitions around new ideas and ways of speaking (back) to ‘power’. For this reason, a political economy approach is essential because it builds on the study of the exercise of power and the prevailing conditions under which agents use such power (Silver and Arrighi 2003). Human Rights is politics (see Freedman 2014). It is, therefore, necessary to understand how both concepts, i.e., political economy and human rights, can be studied as complementary paradigms to investigate the embeddedness of economic activities in agrarian societies.

Human rights define conditions, transforming structures and processes for the state to help develop individuals to their full potential (Mapulanga-Hulston 2002). Within the international

human rights regime, these state obligations, known as the tripartite obligations, include the duties to respect, protect and provide (fulfil) the rights of society members. In summary, human rights are a tool to lobby for effective political change. Therefore, the approach proposed in this study advocates for the recognition of citizens as human right holders and the promotion of state compliance with international human right standards (Barling et al., 2002).

In principle, there are at least five major actors within the international investment framework (Sheffer 2010, 484, Cotula 2013b). These actors include (1) **Host states**: this is the country which receives the foreign direct investment (FDI). Like Tanzania, in this case, it is the country in which the investment is operationalised. (2) **Home states**: this is the ‘parent country’ of the investor, the country in which the investor or investment company can claim rights as a corporate citizen. (3) **Investor**: the person or entity who invests. It is typically a non-state actor who is entitled as a corporate citizen. (4) **Ordinary citizens**: person(s) or entities impacted by the investment activities, usually citizens of the host country. They are also groups such as civil society organisations who can act on behalf of persons affected by the investment. (5) **Recourse mechanisms** - this is a legally designated entity to settle investment disputes between actors.

This complex arrangement within the investment framework highlights three critical and intertwined elements or domains suggested by May (1996) and Stopford et al. (1991). The bargaining among states for influence, competition among firms for the market, and the specific bargaining between states and firms for the use of wealth-producing resources, i.e., state-state, firm-firm and state-firm (May 1996). An element that is left out in May’s complex arrangement is the bargaining with civil society and ordinary citizens. The introduction of rural

communities and ordinary citizens makes the arrangements more complex and intertwined (see Figure 1).

Since there is a high probability for food insecurities to worsen within the context of global economic shocks like the 2007/2008 financial crisis, states must be proactive in designing, adopting and implementing policies that enhance and not violate people's right to adequate food (Eide 1999). In all situations, the increase in food prices directly affects food security, and governments are expected to address the increasing aggregate demand for (especially staple) food commodities within their constituencies (Mustapha and Culas 2013). Such weaknesses in the integration of markets and financial institutions produce a *vulnerability context* for impacted citizens and demonstrate the need for policies and institutions to mitigate and regulate the excesses of market forces (Van Esterik 1999). Giannone et al. (2011) have shown that the resilience of an economy in the face of such global economic shocks depends on the strength of institutions such as the rule of law, governance effectiveness and democratic principles of participation and accountability.

That said, the political component of the framework presented in Figure 1, including the *labour continuum*, compradorialism, and questions of political contestation, are examined in Chapters Five and Six. The rights-based livelihood framework, which integrates the human rights principles, and the food insecurity experiences of household individuals is elaborated in Chapter 7. This framework forms a sub-set of the overall conceptual framing of the study as presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1 Comprehensive approach to the political economy of large-scale land investments and human rights discourse

In Chapter Two, I pay particular attention to the history of political, economic, and legal reforms about land registration and transfers in Tanzania, the unfolding of the neoliberal orthodoxy on which present-day governance rests and which contains within itself several contradictions. In this sense, I examine social institutions, political structures and activities/relationships for the values they set forth as standards and ideas. Such a critical epistemological approach helps promote greater awareness about societal contradictions and may contribute to an objective improvement in human existence (Held 1980).

Chapter Three sets out the research design, methodology and explains the various data collection methods and techniques used in the study. It also highlights the importance and limitations of case-study approaches to contribute to a greater understanding of LSLIs. The Methods chapter links with Chapter Four which also underlines the researcher's positionality and the 'difficulty, breadth and depth' of conducting LSLI research. Chapter 4 has been published in the journal *Area* as Talleh Nkobou, Atenchong (2020). "The Trepidations of a PhD Researcher – Who Are You and Why Are You Here?" *Area* 53 (2): 257-263. <https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12672>.

As stated earlier, Chapters 5, 6 and 7 are the results chapters and address the main research objectives as outlined in the Introduction chapter. Chapter 5 is co-authored with Prof Chris Maina Peter and is being considered for resubmission in *Journal of Southern African Studies*. Chapter 6 is co-authored with Dr Andrew Ainslie and has been published in the *Journal of East African Studies* (see Talleh Nkobou, Atenchong & A. Ainslie (2021) 'Developmental Nationalism?' Political Trust and the politics of large-scale land investment in Magufuli's Tanzania, *Journal of East African Studies* 15 (3): 378-399. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1951944>). Chapter 7 is co-authored with Dr Andrew

Ainslie and Prof Stefanie Lemke and has been published in *Food Security* see Talleh Nkoubou et al. (2021) Broken Promises: A Rights-Based Analysis of Marginalised Livelihoods and Food Insecurity Experiences in Large-Scale Land Investments in Rural Tanzania, *Food Security* <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-021-01195-3>. Chapter 8 is the concluding chapter. What follows in the next chapter is a comprehensive literature review that presents Tanzania's history of land law and reform from colonial times to the present, concentrating on policies adopted by successive governments in relation to land registration and transfer.

## 2 Chapter Two: Literature Review

### 2.1 The legal position of land registration and transfer in Tanzania: Historical context

In examining the legal position of land registration and transfer in Tanzania, this section highlights the importance of historical analysis in contemporary LSLIs research. Reading today's large-scale land acquisition processes with an understanding of history permits both a more profound analysis of its origins, dynamics and an appreciation of the specificities that may characterise contemporary debates around LSLIs (Edelman et al. 2013, 1521). In carrying out a historical review of the '*vulnerable status of common property rights in Sub-Saharan Africa*', Alden-Wily (2011a, 740) demonstrates that the law is, among other factors, the 'most efficacious' enabler of 'involuntary' dispossession in many rural economies. National legal frameworks allow governments to take land, often held under indigenous or customary regimes, as the state's property (Alden-Wily 2011a). Additionally, structural and power imbalances often introduced and nearly always exacerbated by colonial history provide a setting for the political and economic choices which enable the marginalisation and disregard of customary land rights in many African countries, including Tanzania (Havnevik and Isinika 2010).

The central argument of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate that the government continued over time to tighten up on land laws and ensured that expropriation by the state was facilitated. Hence, to understand the current state of LSLIs in Tanzania is to know how far the country has come. What has been the mindset of successive waves of political leadership? What is the nature of the governance system in relation to the evolution of land tenure? How have social groups and formations responded to these changes or reforms over time? How have these changes have been financed?

Before colonial rule, land in several African countries like Tanzania was under customary tenure systems, governed by tribal laws and tribe elders, including chiefs, who resolved land disputes through customary mechanisms (Lugoe 2008). For example, land ownership in pre-colonial Tanzania was based on non-written tradition and relied on beliefs and codes passed down through generations (Odgaard 2005, 248). Colson (1971, 194) provides examples of such codes in his analysis of *'The impact of the colonial period on the definition of land rights'* in East Africa. Some include: (1) every man has the right to land for cultivation to provide for his family and dependents, and (2) The right to everything that one created, i.e., homes and developed agricultural land. These codes (rights) were passed down or inherited.

Indeed, pre-colonial African communities had established significant meanings to the value, functions and uses of land as sources of 'power', 'wealth' and cultural identity (Shipton and Goheen 1992, 307). For example, hunting communities like the Hadzabe, Sandawe and Mang'ati tribes of Tanzania, mainly of the central Rift Valley, were classless societies with a community mode of production and land ownership (Mundeme 2002, Alden-Wily 2011a). Other landownership systems akin to feudal systems existed within certain ethnic groups in the West Lake Region of Tanzania. An example that has been extensively documented is the *Nyarubanja* feudal systems in the Haya village in Kagera with landlords (*abatwazi*) and serfs (*adatwarwa*) (Itandala 1986, Reining 1962).

In general, these customary practices were limited to members of a specific community, including immigrants who adopted their ways of life and excluding members who had abandoned such ways (Anderson 2008, 436). As discussed in later sections of this chapter, these land tenure systems in Tanzania were formally abolished in 1968 under the post-colonial *Customary Leasehold (Enfranchisement) Act of 1968* (See Table 3). With the beginning of

colonial rule in 1884, local individuals and communities who accessed land under customary laws were dispossessed of their land in favour of commercial farm estates or plantations (Myenzi 2005). For example, during German colonial rule (1884 -1919), land ownership was transferred from the purview of native ownership to the German colonial administration (Perras 2004). The following section discusses these changes in land tenure under early colonial rule.

### **2.1.1 Colonial land registration and transfer in Tanzania, 1884 - 1961.**

The arrival of the German settlers in 1884/5 introduced Western forms of land legislation in Tanzania with the enacting of the *Imperial Land Ordinance of 1895* (Emel et al. 2011, Iliffe 1969). Authors like the Alden-Wily (2011b), Okoth-Ogendo (1999) and Colson (1971) argue that the earliest form of large-scale land dispossession in Tanzania was carried out by the colonial administration, which completely ignored the rights of the native people who occupied traditional land under customary laws and practice. The *Imperial Land Ordinance of 1895* guided the acquisition and distribution of lands in all German East Africa, covering present-day Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania, and part of Mozambique (Sabea 2008). Table 1 is a breakdown of some significant pieces of legislation introduced by the Germans to regulate land administration and management. The introduction of these laws converted all land into ‘crown land’ vested in the German empire (Chidzero 1961). Colonial authorities considered all land without ‘documentary proof’ of ownership as ownerless (Okoth-Ogendo 1999, 2). Unimproved or uncultivated land like forest/woodlands, along with water bodies like rivers, lakes and streams, were deemed ‘unowned’ (Alden-Wily 2011a, 741). Declaring land as ‘unowned’ and ‘unimproved’ suited the objectives of the imperial regime, which was to capture land for large-scale plantations and the exploitation of timber and extractive resources such as gold (Alden-Wily 2011a, Larsson 2006). The German Empire became the default owner of all land in Tanzania (Giblin 1998, Alden-Wily 2003).

In the same way, land transfers and transactions were made following German law (Larsson 2006). The requirement to prove land ownership through documentary evidence favoured mainly white settlers who could easily get grants from the German administration (James 1971). The ease of land acquisition by German settlers was evident in the amount of land owned by German settlers by the end of the German colonial rule. By 1919, over 526,091 ha of land on the coast of Tanzania and in the northern highlands were in the hands of German settlers (Rwegasira 2012). German settlers held freehold titles through purchase or leasehold granted by the empire for a period of 21 years. In 1903, the Germans had established a *Land Registration Ordinance* (see Table 1) as a legislative guide to developing a registry system under which land titles were registered and documents issued to landowners (Rwegasira 2012, 53). Native landowners had customary land rights considered by the Germans as inferior (not having documentary evidence) and thus not fit to be registered as owners in the registry (Rwegasira 2012).

*Table 1 Timeline of significant land tenure reform under German colonial rule*

<b>Date</b>	<b>Land law</b>	<b>Implication</b>
1895	Imperial Land Ordinance of 1895	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The German Empire became the default owner of all land that was not occupied in German East Africa (Giblin 1998, Alden-Wily 2003).</li> <li>• The Ordinance Act guided the acquisition and distribution of lands in all German East Africa (see Sabea 2008).</li> </ul>
1903	Land Registration Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Developed a registry system under which land title was registered and documents issued to landowners (Rwegasira 2012, 53).</li> </ul>
1904	Forest Ordinance Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It initiated the conversion of three-quarters of a million hectares of Crown land into forest reserves. No settling, farming, grazing, or other unauthorised use was allowed. Motives for the declaration of forest reserves were primarily environmental (see Sunseri 2003).</li> </ul>

Following the defeat of the Germans in World War I (1914-1918), Tanzania became a British mandated territory (1919-1961). The mandate resulted from the *Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919*, which also saw the creation of the League of Nations and the dispossession of Germany

of her colonies<sup>6</sup> (Conrad 2011, 187). Immediately after receiving the mandate, the British enacted the *Tanganyika Order in Council of 1920* (hereafter, the Order in Council), which allowed for the introduction of British law, *the British Foreign Jurisdiction Act of 1890*, into Tanzania – then Tanganyika (Rwegasira 2012, 55). The Order in Council established the office of Governor, who had all legislative power and the Executive Council, whose function was to advise the Governor. The Order in Council also vested all land under the control of the Queen (Rwegasira 2012). Article 8 (4) of the Order in Council empowered the Governor to act on behalf of her Majesty in granting freeholds or leasehold. Article 8 (1) of the Order in Council declared that ‘all rights in relation to “public lands” shall be vested in and may be exercised by the Governor’. Article 2 defined public land as:

‘...all land in the Territory which are subject to the control of [the Crown] by virtue of any treaty, conviction, or agreement, or [the Crown’s] Protectorate, and all public lands which have been acquired for the public service or otherwise howsoever.’

Fimbo (1973, 217) describes the definition of ‘public land’ as ‘ambiguous and able to cause a certain vagueness’. Fimbo questions if the scope of the definition of public land also included land purchased from the *Custodian of Enemy property*<sup>7</sup>. All land, farms, plantation, and movable or immovable properties under German ownership were vested in the *Custodian of Enemy property’s* office in 1917 by the *Enemy Property (Vesting) Proclamation 1917* (No. 5 of 1917). According to Richter (1996), the definition of public land was made more explicit in the *Land Ordinance Act of 1923*. Section 23 of the *Land Ordinance Act of 1923* (hereafter Land Ordinance) completely abolished German law and practice on public land, even though the

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<sup>6</sup> Section I, Art. 119 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles), 1919 – ‘Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions.’

<sup>7</sup> The Office of the Custodian of Public Property oversaw the liquidation of movable or immovable property owned by ‘enemy subjects or cooperation’. The liquidation of enemy property was also legitimised by article 297, 120 and 257 which ensured the relinquishing of any German property to the administrator of the occupied German East Africa. Almost 1,100 farms and plots were identified as belonging to enemy subjects – See Richter (1996).

British administration maintained all land titles obtained under German rule. Section 2 of the 1923 Land Ordinance expanded the definition of public land as,

‘The whole of the lands of the territory, whether occupied or unoccupied, on the date of the commencement of this ordinance and hereby declared all land to be public.’

Of note is the fact that the British colonial government was under the obligation of the *Covenant of the League of Nations*, Art. 23 (b), ‘to undertake to secure just treatment of the natives of the territories under their control’. Accordingly, the preamble<sup>8</sup> of the 1923 Land Ordinance indicated that ‘native customs concerning the use and occupation of land should as far as possible be preserved’ (Rwegasira 2012, 56). Also, Section 6 of the 1923 Land Ordinance declared that the Governor ‘in respect of any land should have regard for the native laws and customs existing in the district in which such land is situated’. Section 6 also granted the Governor the authority ‘to grant rights of occupancy to native and non-natives.’ Section 5 of the 1923 Land Ordinance elaborates on the nature of a ‘right of occupancy’ as:

‘A title to the use and occupation of land shall be termed a “right of occupancy”, and the grantee thereof shall be termed the occupier.’

Under the customary land tenure systems, land is vested in a group such as a village, tribe, clan, or community. A village elder (formally chief) administers land on behalf of the group (Myenzi 2005).

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<sup>8</sup> Preamble of the Land Ordinance Act, 1923 (No.3 of 1923) ‘WHEREAS it is expedient that the existing customary rights of the natives of the Tanganyika Territory to use and enjoy the land of the Territory and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves their families and their posterity should be assured protected and preserved; AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the existing natives customs with regard to the use and occupation of land should as far as possible be preserved; AND WHEREAS it is expedient that the rights and obligations of the Government in regard to the whole of the lands within the Territory and also the rights and obligations of cultivators or other persons claiming to have an interest in such lands should be defined by law. BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Tanganyika Territory as follows: -

However, these provisions did not ensure the protection of land held under customary laws and practice from colonial interests and dispossession (Alden-Wily 2003). Several reports of the alienation of native land by the British have been documented (Alden-Wily 2012, Okoth-Ogendo 1999). The blatant alienation of native land for plantations and the exploitation of minerals was acknowledged and condemned by the Permanent Mandate of the Commission of the League of Nation, which eventually led to the amendment of the 1923 Land Ordinance Act and statutory recognition of customary rights in 1928 (Rwegasira 2012, 57). The modification of Section 5 of the 1923 Ordinance Act redefined the rights of occupancy to include natives and communities lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native laws and customs.

‘Right of Occupancy means a title to the use and occupation of land and includes the title of a native or a native community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom. “Occupier” means the holder of a right of occupancy and includes native or a native community lawfully using or occupying land in accordance with native law and custom’.

However, Rwegasira (2012) highlights two limitations of this definition. Firstly, it excluded the right of ownership and focused on the ‘use and occupation of land’. Thus, the amendment marked the introduction of the rights of occupancy or deemed right of occupancy for native and native communities. Secondly, it was invoked by the court of law to deny land to those who could not prove that they were natives<sup>9</sup>. Richter (1996) adds that the redefinition of the rights of occupancy did not deter Europeans from dispossessing natives of their land or the expansion of commercial farming on the lands of native communities. An example of such alienation of land occurred during the implementation of the Groundnut scheme (1947 -1951), with over

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<sup>9</sup> *NAFCO v Mulbadaw Village Council and Others [1985]*. The Court of Appeal hesitated to recognise the title of some customary holders when it found that they had not proved to be natives. Quoted in Rwegasira (2012).

three million acres of land earmarked to cultivate groundnuts (Hogendorn and Scott 1981, Rizzo 2006). The British colonial government envisaged that the groundnut scheme would help to ease the shortage of edible fats and oils caused by the Second World War (1939-1945) (Coulson 1977, 75). The food crises introduced by WWII led to growing demands for land to increase food and resource supply to Britain and global markets (Rizzo 2006).

Additionally, as discussed earlier, Section 2 and 3 of the 1923 Land Ordinance declared all land as public land and all public land under the control of the colonial Governor. Shivji (2006, 11) condemns the 1923 Land Ordinance as a ‘masterpiece of British legal *draftsmanship*, which expropriated all land in Tanganyika in two sections’, i.e., Section 2 and 3 of the 1923 Land Ordinance Act. The introduction of the ‘right of occupancy’ and ‘public land’ into statutory law raised more questions about the standings of customary law and practice in litigation. For example, whether customary rights of occupancy enjoyed the same status as a granted right of occupancy under statutory law – the 1923 Land Ordinance Act. Richter (1996) adds that there was a lack of understanding of the provisions protecting customary rights in practice. Some of these questions were later clarified in case law *Muhena Bin Said Vs Registrar of Title (1948)*<sup>10</sup>.

The case of *Muhena Bin Said vs Registrar of Title* introduced the notion of ‘permissive occupation’, which implied that the land remained public and the Governor only permitted natives to occupy it, not possess or own it (Rwegasira 2012, 60). Therefore, the customary right of occupancy was (is) inferior to granted rights of occupancy by interpretation of the law. The

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<sup>10</sup> *Muhena Bin Said Vs Registrar of Title (1948)* – The appellant had inherited land from an Arab prior to German colonial rule. He made a claim of the land to registrar as a fee simple (a permanent and absolute tenure in land with freedom to dispose it at will). His fee simple request was accepted in 1931 by the Registrar of Titles. However, in 1947 he then applied for registration required in section 5 of the Land Ordinance Act. The registration was then rejected. Unsatisfied, the appellant brought the matter in court against the Registrar. The determinants of the matter were (1) If the appellant could claim possession over the land and (2) if Islamic law (customary law) could be applied to confer rights of occupancy which could pass for a fee simple. The court’s ruling was: (1) Arabs were given land by the chief and hence he was granted tenure recognised by customary law which had no concept of freehold. Secondly, the appellant failed to prove adverse possession of the land for the period of 30 years prior to 1923 and finally the occupation by the appellant is a permissive occupation enjoyed by all inhabitants and could be revoked. The Case as reported in Rwegasira (2012).

recognition of rights of occupancy under customary laws did not equate to the protection of customary land rights in the court of law (Rwegasira 2012). Not surprisingly, several laws were further enacted to limit the effectiveness of customary rights (see Tables 2 and 3).

In 1950, changes to the 1923 Ordinance Land Act No.3 recognised a dual tenure system, i.e., (1) Deemed right of occupancy, which was under customary law (permissive occupation) and (2) Granted right of occupancy, which was statutory. Granted rights of occupancy were more protected than customary rights. The colonial administration regarded customary rights as a threat to development, and the East Africa Royal Commission (1955) argued for the individualization of land ownership as opposed to community land rights. Table 2 is a breakdown of significant changes to land tenure under British colonial rule. Between 1921 and 1946, the British colonial Authority of Tanganyika passed a total of 11 essential ordinances, some of which are still relevant to the interpretation of contemporary land laws in Tanzania (Richter 1996, 55)

*Table 2 Timeline of significant land tenure reform under British colonial rule*

Year	Law	Implications
1919	League of Nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Britain receives the mandate to extend colonial administration to Tanganyika (Conrad 2011).</li> <li>• Germany is dispossessed of all colonies.</li> </ul>
1920	Tanganyika Order in Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• It provided for the reception of English law in the Tanganyika.</li> </ul>
1921	Registration of Documents Ordinance (No. 10 of 1921)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All land documents dating back to the German colonial era must be registered.</li> </ul>
	1923	Repealed and replaced by the Registration of Document Ordinance (No. 14 of 1923) All other documents regarded landed property became compulsory Amended – 1926 (No. 5 1926), 1932 (No.11 of 1932), 1939 (No. 38 of 1939), 1941 (No. 33 of 1941).
1921	Land Survey Ordinance (No. 10 of 1921)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• For the survey of land by survey officers.</li> </ul>

Year	Law	Implications	
1923	Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>As expressed in section 2 (1),<sup>11</sup> the purpose was to apply English law of property and conveyancing to the Territory (Cole and Denison 1964, 212).</li> <li>Declared all land, whether occupied or unoccupied, to be public land (Section 2).</li> <li>All public land was put under the control of the Governor (section 3).</li> </ul>	
	- 1924; 1926; 1929; 1930; 1935;		Amended several times
	Amended in 1928		- The amendments gave customary titles statutory recognition. - Birth of customary (deemed) rights of occupancy
	Amended in 1950		- Amendment was done as a result of the Meru land case before the United Nations (see Wright 1966) - No land under native Authority could be alienated without consulting the said native Authority <sup>12</sup>
1923	Land (law of property and conveyancing) Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Prohibited natives from appropriating land to non-natives without the state authority's expressed permission or consent (See Sawyerr 1969).</li> <li>English way of land conveyance established in Tanzania (Section 2).</li> </ul>	
1928	1923 Land Ordinance Act N° 2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Redefine and regulated land in accordance with the provisions made by the <i>British Mandate of East Africa (1922)</i>.</li> </ul>	
1923	Town and Country Planning Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It divided Dar es Salaam into three zones based on race.</li> </ul>	
	Repealed and replaced and in 1956		- it is now called the Town and Country Planning Act [Cap. 355]
1923	Land Registry Ordinance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It provided for the registration of titles to land in Tanganyika. Substituted the <i>Registration of Document Ordinance, 1921</i>.</li> </ul>	
	1925 (No. 2 Of 1925); 1926 (No. 15 of 1926); 1935 (No. 6 of 1935); 1939 (No. 6 of 1939) and 1949		

<sup>11</sup> Section 2 (1), *Land (Law of Property and Conveyancing) Ordinance, 1923* [Cap. 114] 'subject to the provisions of this ordinance, the law relating to real and personal property, mortgagor and mortgagee, landlord and tenant, and trusts and trustee in force in England on the first day of January, 1922, shall apply to real and personal property, mortgages, leases and tenancies, and trusts and trustee in (Tanganyika) and the English law and practice of conveyancing in force in England on the day aforesaid shall be in force in (Tanganyika) (Cole and Denison 1964).

<sup>12</sup> 'No African communities settled on the land should be moved to other areas unless a clear expression of their collective consent has been obtained' Quote from the Trustee Council of the United Nations cited in Rwegasira (2012).

Year	Law	Implications
1926	Land Acquisition Ordinance (No. 13 of 1926)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Empowered the Governor to acquire land for 'public purpose'. Section 3 states that the Governor can 'acquire any land required by the Governor for any purpose for an estate in fee simple or a term of years'</li> <li>No Compensation for 'unoccupied land' (section 12). 'Under the Land Acquisition Ordinance, compensation is not payable for land that is considered vacant or unused' (Lusugga 2006, 466).</li> <li>Definition of 'public purpose' provided for in section 2.</li> </ul>
	Amended 1931 (No.54 of 1931); 1937 (No.5 of 1937); 1943 (No.21 of 1943)	
1926	Tanganyika (Legislative Council) Order in Council	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Established the Legislative Council in Tanganyika.</li> <li>Ended the legislative power of the Governor established by the 1920 Tanganyika Order in Council.</li> </ul>
1928	Land Surveyors Ordinance (No. 17 of 1928)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>It provided for the registration and licensing of land surveyors.</li> </ul>
	Amended 1940 (No. 14 of 1940)	
1941	Land (Rent and Mortgage Interest Restriction) Ordinance (No. 26 of 1941)	
	Amended: 1942 (No. 16 of 1942); 1945 (No. 23 of 1945); 1946 (No. 22 of 1946)	
1948	Land Regulations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Laid down statutory control, especially on the disposition of interests in land – for e.g., regulation 3(1) prohibited the dispossession of holders of granted rights of occupancy to dispose of land if the dispossession was not in writing and approved by the Governor.</li> </ul>
	Amended in 1960	
1953	Government Circular No.4 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Amendment of 1923 Land Ordinance Act N° 3</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Anticipated the recommendations made by the East African Royal Commission (1956) to initiate individual landholdings among Africans.</li> <li>It established that all urban land should be exempted from customary tenure. All Africans should obey the same laws in the territory in respect of land occupation, same as any member of another race.</li> <li>It provided Africans within town boundaries to be compensated by the District Commissioner for the loss of rights to their land.</li> <li>Interpreted the 1950 amendment of the land ordinance by clarifying that consultation with native Authority meant 'consultation' and not 'consent'.</li> </ul>
1956	Report of East Africa Royal Commission	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Saw customary tenure as a threat to development and therefore recommended for individualization of land ownership (see East African Royal Commission 1956).</li> </ul>

### **2.1.2 Postcolonial land registration and transfer in Tanzania 1961 - 1999.**

From the previous section, it is evident that understanding contemporary LSLIs and the political contestations that result therefrom requires an appreciation of history and acknowledging that ‘the spaces in which land [transactions] are taking place have been created and shaped by longstanding patterns [and frequent changes] of land tenure and use’ (Edelman et al. 2013, 1531). Alden-Wily (2011a, 733) makes this point by arguing that ‘since the establishment of independent states [in Africa], national land laws have been structured to make [dispossession] possible, by denying that customary rights are fundamental property rights, deserving of protection’. While the restructuring of land tenure by the colonial administrations has been documented in the previous section, in this section I critically assess land ownership, transfer, and registration in Tanzania after independence in 1961.

Understanding the legal standings and processes of change in Tanzania’s land laws are vital for understanding the ‘vulnerable status’ of customary (or village) land (Alden-Wily 2011a). For one thing, the early restructuring of land law after independence came with the *Land Acquisition Act n<sup>o</sup> 47 of 1967*, which repealed and replaced the 1923 Land Ordinance Act and entrusted land powers in the president (Shivji 1998). Veit argues that ‘[t]he independent government of Tanzania simply replaced the word ‘*Governor*’ with ‘*President*’ and inherited the provisions that centralised authority in the executive branch’ (Veit 2010, 3). In this sense, the President can acquire any land for any public purpose, with some provisions for compensation (Alden-Wily 2003).

The newly independent state enacted several legislative changes to land tenure under Julius K. Nyerere’s presidency. A summary of some of these changes is presented in Table 3. The most ambitious was the villagisation settlement schemes that started in 1963 (Briggs 1979, Hydén

1975, Lorgen 1999). The villagisation settlement scheme was based on ideals of socialism, self-reliance, equality, and the intention to transform villages into commodity producing units through ‘modernised agriculture’ (Bryceson 1980, Twomey et al. 2015, Coulson 1977). According to Bryceson (1982, 552), the first settlement schemes were launched in 1963 under the Village Settlement Agency. Nyerere envisaged the development of the newly independent state by developing village units (Hydén 1980) and providing productive infrastructure to selected villages to promote ‘development take-off’ (Bryceson 1982, 552). Cliffe and Cunningham (1972, 173) estimated that by the end of 1963, about 1,000 settlements had been spontaneously initiated by natives who were inspired by the ‘ideology of African Socialism’.

Following the official proclamation of the state’s intention to pursue ‘nation-building along socialist lines’, in the *Arusha Declaration of 1967* and Nyerere’s (1967) essay on ‘*Socialism and Rural Development*’, *ujamaa* (familyhood – African socialism) was declared as the ‘basis for agriculture development’ in Tanzania (Bryceson 1982, 553). By 1973, over 80% of the rural population had been relocated to 5,528 villages (Veit 2010, 4). Bryceson (1982, 554) adds that by 1979, there were 6,044 villages recorded under the settlement scheme. (Coulson 1977, 90) provides a detailed account of the government efforts, including the various development approaches and policies that legitimised the use of force to ensure the success of *ujamaa* villages. Some policy and legislative instruments that legitimised coercive techniques for implementing *ujamaa* were the *Presidential Circular N° 1 of 1969*, and the *Rural Lands (Planning and Utilization) Act N° 14 of 1973*. By 1973, ‘the president declared living in villages as compulsory’ (URT 1994, 42). Section 4 of the *Rural Land Planning and Utilization Act* gave the president ‘unrestricted discretionary powers to declare any part of Tanzania as a specified area’. ‘Specified areas’ were placed under the control of the Minister responsible for regional

administration to control any land use in the 'specified area' from buildings through farming to mining and gardening (URT 1994, 43).

Further, in 1975, the *Village and Ujamaa Village Act* was promulgated to facilitate the registration of villages and the easy disbursement of development credit (Bryceson 1982, Shivji 2002). The *Village and Ujamaa Village Act of 1975* set the stage for the village administration structure extant in Tanzania today. Notably, the Village Assembly (VA) composed of all village residents 18 years and above. The VA elects the Village Council, which is composed of 25 members. The elected Village Council (VC) is the village government's executive arm, vested with powers to plan and coordinate activities necessary for the village's economic and social development. The VC is accountable to the VA (Shivji 2002, 37).

However, due to the challenges faced by the villagization programme, mainly for its top-bottom and coercive approach, i.e., the transfer/relocation of citizens to villages against their will (Palmer 1999, Bryceson 1982), the disregard for customary tenure systems, and the alienation of large portions of customary land (Veit 2010, 4), there was a need for changes to approaches towards land reform in Tanzania. For example, by June 1991, out of 8,471 registered village settlements, 1,836 (22%) had been surveyed for village land titles, 1,303 (15%) village land title certificates prepared, and only 183 (2%) of the land certificates had been registered (URT 1994, 46). The challenges in land management and administration led to the creation of a Presidential Commission in 1991 headed by Issa G. Shivji. The objective of the Presidential Commission was to come up with recommendations for better approaches to land reforms and tenure (URT 1994).

Consequently, the Shivji-led Presidential Commission, which conducted an 18 months long study, found significant problems with the Villagisation programme, village land titling regarding ‘rights of occupancy’ and the levels of discretionary powers held by public officials and institutions to ‘revoke’ village land (URT 1994, 51-57). Between 1995 and 2009, the government instituted several land laws and policies, exemplified in the first *National Land Policy of 1995*, which was amended in 1997. Authors like Veit (2010) and Manji (2006) have argued that contrary to the Shivji-led Presidential Commission report, the *National Land Policy of 1995* ‘was developed with limited public participation and did not incorporate any of the recommendations from the Presidential commission’ (Veit 2010, 4). The 1995 National Land Policy led to the enactment of the *Land Act N<sup>o</sup>.4 of 1999* and the *Village Land Act N<sup>o</sup>.5 of 1999*. Both land laws came into force in May 2001 (Okoth-Ogendo 1999).

The 1999 Land Act and the 1999 Village Land Act categorise land into three types (Alden-Wily 2003): (1) Village land, which is managed and administered by the village council which, as noted above, is elected by the village assembly. (2) Reserved land is land set aside for various protection purposes, including forest and wildlife conservation, marine parks, and public recreation. Such reserved land is under the management and administration of sectoral government agencies. (3) General land refers to land that is neither village land nor reserved land. General land is regulated under the Land Act of 1999 and supervised by the Ministry of Lands. While accurate data on the specific amounts of village land, general and reserved land are lacking, experts estimate that village land accounts for approximately seventy per cent of land in Tanzania (Veit 2010). Reserved lands about twenty-eight per cent and general land about two per cent (German et al. 2011).

Additionally, Section 11 (7) of the 1999 Land Act allows the government to overrule any land decision taken by local authorities like the village council. The ‘political centralisation of land management in Tanzania’ reinforces debates about the vulnerable status of village land during land negotiation processes (Bélair 2018, 373). Summarily, although Tanzania’s land laws provide for the recognition of customary rights (German et al. 2011), the status of customary land tenure remains vulnerable, and control mechanisms are ineffective in mitigating the excesses of state power over village land (Okoth-Ogendo 1999, 7). This critical review of the shifting legal position of land transfer and registration in Tanzania, justifies the view put forward by Alden-Wily (2011a, 740) of the ‘law as a key enabling factor to dispossession and tenure security’ in African countries, including Tanzania. Tanzania’s impressive land reforms and laws (Table 3) still allow for pervasive large-scale land deals to encroach on local customary rights, marginalise rural farmers and pastoralists and prevent them from having adequate access to productive resources such as water, food and other natural resources (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, Nelson 2012). Table 3 is a representation of significant changes to land legislation in Tanzania from 1963-1999.

Table 3 Summary of significant changes to the law after independence (summarised from Veit 2010)

Year	Law	Implications
1963	The Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act of 1963	Converted 'freehold' titles covering less than one per cent of land to 99-year leasehold (with development conditions).
1963	The Right of Occupancy (Development Conditions) Act of 1963.	Obligated lessees to pay rent
1965	The Rural Farmland (Acquisition and Regrant) Act of 1965.	Empowered government to acquire 'undeveloped' private land and transfer it to 'people who would occupy and develop it'. Veit (2010, 3) argues that land was transferred to state enterprises, parastatals, and cooperatives in practice.
1967	The Arusha Declaration 1967	Proclaimed the state's intention to pursue national building along socialist lines.
1968	The Customary Leaseholds (Enfranchisement) Act of 1968	Abolished feudal land tenure systems (e.g., the <i>Nyarubanja</i> , which was practised in the Kagera region)
1969	The Government Leaseholds (Conversion to Rights of Occupancy) Act of 1969	Converted all leaseholds to rights of occupancy under government leaseholds.
1969	Presidential Circular N° 1 of 1969	Ordered government departments to give preference to the new villages in their investment budgets. A Regional Development Fund was created, putting one million shillings a year for Regional Commissioner to be spent on small projects (Coulson 1977).
1975	The Village and <i>Ujamma</i> Village Act 1975	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Registered villages with 250 or more household units as a corporate body to facilitate accession to credit.</li> <li>Stipulated the form of village organisation and structure. This formed the basis for the current <i>Local Government (District Authorities) Act N° 7 of 1982</i>.</li> </ul>
1982	Local Government (District Authorities) Act N° 7 of 1982	Repealed the Village and <i>Ujamaa</i> Villages Act of 1975
1991	Presidential Commission	Provided recommendations for major land reforms in Tanzania (which were largely ignored)
1992	Local Government Laws (Amendment) Act N° 7 of 1992	Made the post of village chairman elective following the constitutional recognition of the multiparty system.
1995	National Land Policy (amended in 1997)	Led to the enactment of the Land Act N°4 of 1999 and the Village Land Act N° 5 of 1999.

In the following sub-section of this literature review, the study presents a clear overview and explanation of how state led LSLIs happen in Tanzania. It starts by providing a historical review of the investment environment and how investment policy and design contributes to government orientation towards LSLIs in the first place. In many Sub-Saharan Africa countries, because much of the land is (ultimately) owned and controlled by the state, smallholder farmers' rights under customary tenure systems are not adequately secured (Abebe 2012, 878). Despite much talk about 'vacant' and 'underutilised' land in these agrarian settings, LSLIs almost

invariably lead to competition and conflict over land use (Fortin and Richardson 2013, Anseeuw et al. 2012). This is because all land in Tanzania *already has* ‘users’ whether they use its resources (such as grazing resources) on a continuous basis, or seasonally/lightly or indeed only during extreme events, such as droughts. The reality is that the rights of smallholders and local communities utilizing pieces of land, which may not be formally recognised as theirs, for many generations are compromised and, in some cases, sacrificed for what public officials regard as ‘public purpose’ (Rahmato 2011).

## **2.2 Taking the large-scale land investment debate further: Understanding the investment environment in Tanzania**

This section builds on the previous section by critically engaging in an extensive review of literature to examine Tanzania’s investment environment and how political contestations between actors affect the evolution of investment policies in Tanzania. The section discusses the history of investment reforms based on moments of intense change that structured new divisions of power and political and economic changes within Tanzania’s business environment. It sheds light on leadership, ideology, and the evolution of the Government of Tanzania’s developmental ambitions over time. In doing so, the relationship between investors, public institutions and ordinary citizens is considered as the social foundation upon which policy choices regarding LSLIs are negotiated, supported, or disputed. This literature review places these social transactions within the context of global capitalism while allowing for a much richer understanding of the economy by drawing insights from various theories of economic change (Behuria et al. 2017, 524).

Unlike the neoclassical economic frameworks that rely on markets as largely unproblematic units of analysis i.e., uncomplicated by social institutions, political interference and more

recently, behavioural quirks, the approach applied in examining Tanzania's political economy is a function of the widely recognised prominence of everyday social transactions within policy circles (Khan 2017, Bernstein 2004). Transactions refer to 'social interaction' between institutions and actors (Khan 2017, 638). These transactions could occur outside 'formal' institutional settings or within the constraints of legal and policy instruments. This perspective argues that history, context and the agency of actors are essential in understanding these transactions within local political economies and their relations with the factors of production in a given economic setting (Coulson 2013). Within such a political economy approach, particular emphasis is placed on the social context in which these transactions are embedded (Khan 2017, 638).

Political power and the resulting policies and strategies can impact economic growth, a deviation from 'the narrow empiricism that characterises much of economics and development economics' (Coulson 2019, 13). For example, the apparent political stability in Tanzania after the introduction of neoliberal policies in the 1980s has been described by Gray (2013, 194) as a 'legacy of the centralisation of political power within the ruling political party, mainly by ring-fencing investment incentives in favour of influential business actors at the commanding heights of the Tanzanian economy'. Understanding the evolution of the investment environment in Tanzania hinges on the assumption that contemporary debates about land investments are rooted in history (Behuria et al. 2017, 512). In other words, to what extent do actors (i.e., the State, private sector or ordinary citizens) support or influence investment policies and regulations which protect local communities and ensure that these communities benefit from LSLIs? In fact, in economic terms, the ambitions of the SAGCOT, mentioned in the previous section (also see SAGCOT 2011) should be beneficial to the state, investors and ordinary citizens in rural communities, or at least not involve significant disbenefits for any of

these parties. However, in most cases in Tanzania (see Nelson et al. 2012, Sulle 2020), ‘LSLI cannot be regarded as ethically correct in practice as the insignificant improvements and human rights violations for local populations contradict principles of distributive justice’ within LSLI schemes (Fernandez and Schwarze 2013, 1223).

In a post-structuralist age, critical political economy approaches are needed to understand the organisation of political and economic institutions more thoroughly in Tanzania. Such a political economy approach needs to look at the history of the country and its political institutions and explore how public and private sector organisations have mobilised, won, and lost contests for influence/power in the past. In effect, there is a need for an approach to LSLIs which considers how institutional arrangements such as investment laws emerge and how history and agency contribute to the distribution of power and rent among powerful social groups in Tanzania (Coulson 2019). This sub-section provides an insight into the investment environment in Tanzania and how this contributes to contemporary debates around LSLIs. For periodisation, the literature review starts from the post-independence socialist era (1961-1985) to the introduction of neoliberal policies (1985 – 1995), and the aftermath of the 2007/2008 financial crisis (2009-2015).

### **2.2.1 Socialism and post-independent Tanzania: The state enterprise (1961 – 1985)**

In the years after independence, the economy of Tanzania followed an interdependent capitalist economic system left by the British in 1961 (Bigsten and Danielsson 1999). In other words, Great Britain was still the primary export destination with a share of nearly 36% of the total exports, followed by the USA and West Germany with a share of 8.0% and 10% respectively, with India (5%), and the Netherlands (6%) as other export countries (Biersteker 1986). The bulk of exports consisted of unprocessed or semi-processed raw materials, including (in order

of importance) sisal, coffee, cotton, minerals (diamonds, gold, tin, and salt), cashew nuts, and cloves (Coulson 2013). Exploring the political economy of Tanzania within the context of global capital accumulation, as suggested by Cotula (2013b) and Coulson (2019), allows for a clear understanding of ‘how classes within an economic system [linked in globalised markets] hold power, the discretions they have, and how exploitation may occur’ (Coulson 2019, 13).

To Nyerere, the newly independent economy was typically colonial and depended on subsistence production and the production of primary commodities for export. After independence, the Nyerere government promoted a ‘transformation approach’ with the World Bank’s support, favouring large-scale agriculture, often with irrigation schemes (Van Arkadie 2019, 85). Citizens were encouraged to occupy ‘virgin land’ through settlements schemes – such as the villagisation scheme (Coulson 2019, 14). The Three-Year Development Plan from 1961 to 1963 identified agriculture, the establishment of secondary schools, and road construction as the main sectors of public interest and investment (Maro 1990). For Nyerere, economic progress and dissociation from the Britain’s capitalist economic structure depended on an ideology of hard work, freedom, and self-reliance (*kujitegemea*) (Fatton 1985, Lal 2012). In 1962, Nyerere experimented with a ‘self-help scheme’, resulting in the haphazard expansion of infrastructure all over the country (Bjerk 2015, 109). People began to build schools, dispensaries, roads, and other hard infrastructure on their own initiative. The ambition to mobilise all Tanzanians for development was at the centre of independence rhetoric, intending to create an industrial base upon which Tanzania could become a predominantly self-sustaining economy (Bryceson 1980, 547).

The ambition to build a Tanzania-centred economy resulted in the emergence of the cooperative movements in 1962, in part to take the place of Asian and Arabs who had acted as intermediaries

under colonial rule (Aminzade 2003). Hundreds of cooperatives and unions joined to form the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika in 1962. According to Burke (1964, 209), in 1963, there were more than 800 societies with membership exceeding 300,000. Colonial restrictions to certain industrial activities reserved for British firms were removed (Mbilinyi 1986). By the end of 1963, the relationship between the Nyerere government and the British government had turned sour. The first Five-year Development Plan (1963-1968), drafted under the guidance of the new Ministry of Development Planning, specified the scope of planned public investment (Morse 1964), and Nyerere started pursuing his '*Africanization*'<sup>13</sup> agenda against any form of imperialism on the continent (Nyerere, 1972). This was exemplified in Nyerere's stand against the British presence in the south of Africa (Rhodesia) and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique (Chachage and Cassam 2010).

Additionally, in 1963, Nyerere accepted an invitation to host in Dar es Salaam the Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), a central arm of the struggle for independence in Africa (Ishemo 2000). Power struggles in the military ranks between Tanzanian soldiers and the British command of the King's Africa Rifles<sup>14</sup> in Tanzania compounded Tanzania and Britain's frictional relationship (Lupogo 2001). Another example of Nyerere's disagreements with Western nations was expressed in 1964 when Nyerere accepted the opening of the East German consulate in Dar es Salaam. The East German consulate in Dar

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<sup>13</sup> The *Africanisation* agenda was grounded on the ideas of anti-colonialist doctrine within indigenous African communities. This gained recognition in the 1960s and was based on anti-European and pro-African ideologies. The protagonist for change in the management of African state affairs began to mobilise African communities against colonial regimes. According to Nyerere (1987), it was in the struggle to break the grip of colonialism that Africans learned the need for unity. The colonial administration had created a society which was fundamentally opposed to the nature of being African (Nyerere, 1972). Being African rejects the individualistic philosophy of the West (Rosberg & Friedland, 1964). Based on this conviction, African socialists like Nyerere and others like Senghor of Senegal clamoured for an independent state 'under a modernised and altered system of the pre-colonial African way of life', with qualities of African communalism in an egalitarian and socialist order (Fattou, 1985, p. 2).

<sup>14</sup> The King's African Rifles (KAR) was a multi-battalion British colonial regiment raised from Britain's various possessions in East Africa from 1902 until independence in the 1960s (see Lupogo 2001).

es Salaam resulted in the termination of financial support from West Germany, a decision justified by the '*Hallstein doctrine*'<sup>15</sup> (Lowenkopf 1967).

Evidently, the first three years after independence had not favoured the newly independent nation's economic ambitions, and trade relationships with the UK, (West) Germany and Portugal had all been compromised. Financial hardship was further exacerbated by severe drought from 1962 -1963 (Ruthenberg 2013). Nevertheless, foreign investments remained protected under the *Foreign Investment (Promotion) act of 1963*, which did not include provisions for protecting local businesses and investors<sup>16</sup> (Rugumamu 1988). With the creation of the Cooperative Union of Tanganyika in 1962, cooperatives expanded into wholesale, retail and import businesses (Nindi 1977). The expansion of cooperative movements into trade incentivised the shift of Tanzanian-Asian capitalists into industry (Coulson 1982), which resulted in the strong presence of Tanzanian-Asians in the manufacturing sector. Most of the factories inherited from the colonial regime were in the hands of an Asian minority (Coulson 2019, 14). Examples include Asian owned Sunguratex and Kilitex textile firms, Kioo Limited, a glass bottle manufacturing firm, and ALAF (Aluminium Africa Ltd) for aluminium products (Gray 2013).

Local investors, mainly Tanzanian-Asians (with strong networks to global markets), benefited extensively from import-substituting industrialisation primarily because of state subsidies and favourable tariffs on manufactured imports (Gray 2013, 188). Taxes were often set based on discussions between investors and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry rather than through a comprehensive industrial strategy (Rweyemamu 1966). This association of newly established

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<sup>15</sup> The *Hallstein doctrine* was key foreign policy of West Germany which forbade any third world country from having diplomatic relations with East Germany (Kuhne and Von Plate 1980)

<sup>16</sup> Perhaps, the absence of provision within the 1963 Investment Act to protect local businesses fell in line with the ambitions of Nyerere to discourage 'possessive individualism'.

private sector actors and state elites influenced political and economic decisions in several public institutions like the Ministry of Cooperatives and Community Development (Burke 1964, 210). In a process that was to be repeated in many other newly independent countries, the ruling class in Tanzania and owners of large companies in the West now colluded with the ‘educated elite’ and ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ who were ‘recruited into political leadership, the civil service or other parts of public administration’ (Coulson 2019, 14). In remarking on this phenomenon, Shivji (1991, 81) refers to these ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ as ‘compradors intellectuals’.

The outcome was increased bureaucracy and clientelism (Chazan et al. 1999), which was exemplified in replacing local organisations with the National Development Corporation (NDC) in 1965 (Packard 1972). The newly formed NDC had a more socialist defined objective to build up public enterprises and establish public partnerships with private businesses (Nyerere 1972). The NDC’s task was to ensure that industrial development adhered to national interests, notably import-substitution (Rweyemamu 1966, Mramba and Mwansasu 1972). However, faced with severe challenges such as the absence of adequate supervision, lack of proper planning and coordination within industry and the manufacturing sector (Saul 1975), corrupt and profit-driven elites began exploiting small-scale producers, and local monopolies started to emerge (Gray 2013). For example, Coulson (2019, 14) discusses the realisation in 1966 that the settlement scheme – a community development approach - would not be a viable alternative for Tanzania’s industrialisation plans. Gray (2013) argues that the private sector continued to exist despite the government implementing socialist policies and regulatory reforms against ‘possessive individualism’ introduced by the 1967 Arusha Declaration (Jackson 1979, 219).

Following the *Arusha Declaration of 1967*, the government adopted an interventionist approach through stringent price controls to pursue public sector-led development (Muganda 2004). The Arusha Declaration was designed to ensure continuous engagement between the ruling elite and lower sections of society and the nationalisation of ‘large-scale means of production’ (Coulson 2019, 15). Because of the lack of an indigenously owned industrial sector, almost all the industrial firms were owned by Tanzanian-Asians (Gray 2013). Hence, previous managers, mainly Tanzanian-Asians, remained managers of the newly nationalised industries (Gray 2013). These new social and economic contexts introduced new and cemented existing social networks, which were more potent than the reach of formal institutions (Chazan et al. 1999, 101). For example, Waters (1992) demonstrates that the need to obtain state permits for price-controlled items pushed market goods into an economy created by linkages along political party lines.

Additionally, industrial progress was predominantly based on consumer goods (Rweyemamu 1966, Mramba and Mwansasu 1972) and assembly-type activities like the bicycle factory, which imported parts from India (Coulson 1982, Mwapachu 2005). The agriculture sector was severely impacted by climatic and economic shocks i.e., droughts in 1962/3 and 1973 and economic crisis of 1974 respectively, lack of expertise and the poor implementation of successive five-year development plans (Chachage and Cassam 2010, Van Arkadie 2019). Coulson (2019, 18) argues that the 1969-74 Second Five Year Development Plan set out to implement the policies in the Arusha Declaration with ‘little discussion of how it might be coordinated or funded’. The plan reinforced the state’s controlling role and consolidated the power of the bureaucratic elite. Major export-oriented crops like sisal saw a decline in production due to the shifts in the commodity export market (Van Arkadie 2019, 63). For example, the introduction of synthetic fibre as a replacement from the natural fibre from sisal

negatively impacted export revenue (Kamuzora 2010, Chachage and Cassam 2010, 94). Other agricultural commodities like cotton, coffee and tea, which depended on traditional export markets, saw a downturn in export revenue because of Nyerere's ambitions to realign trade relations with new partners such as China, Korea and Russia (Moshi and Mtui 2008, Van Arkadie 2019). Further, the 'forced villagisation of 1969-1970 had an adverse impact on agriculture' (Coulson 2019, 15) because of its top-down approach and consequent resistance from local communities (Bryceson 1982).

On another front, previously strong labour unions, which had emerged from the independence struggle, and their demands for better working conditions, had been weakened by the reorganisation of trade unionism in 1964 to form the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (Coulson 1982, 1979). The National Union of Tanganyika Workers played an essential role in disciplining the workforce, especially in restraining demands for higher wages and promoting positive work attitudes (Morse 1964). Nyerere also introduced legislation to prevent, regulate and settle labour disputes. Examples include (1) *The Trade Unions Ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 51 of 1962*; (2) *the Civil Service (Negotiating Machinery) Act, No. 52 of 1962*; and (3) *the Trade Disputes (Settlement) Act, No. 43 of 1962*. Together, these regulatory instruments considerably restricted the trade unions' power to demand favourable working conditions (Jackson 1979, 226). By and large, the focus on industrial policies, state-led capital investments, the disciplining of labour and direct subsidies, all contributed to productivity growth in the industrial sector until 1973 (Gray 2013).

However, the 1973 drought in Tanzania (Briggs 1979), the 1974 global oil crisis (Boesen et al. 1986), and the synchronous impact of poor governance structures and policies (Bryceson 1982, Lorgen 1999), contributed to a decline in domestic food production and export revenue. Lofchie

(1976, 452) regards the magnitude of the collapse in domestic food production in 1973 as signalling an ‘imminent peril of widespread famine’. State control of imports further exacerbated the shortages of many essential items (Coulson 2019). By 1974, the industrial sector began to show signs of poor economic performance, though mainly due to a decrease in export revenue caused by the 1973 oil crisis (Gray 2013, 189). In light of these challenges, Nyerere resorted to the diversification of the economy into crops for the domestic and regional markets like maize, rice, wheat, beans and groundnuts (URT 1967, Van Arkadie 2019).

The ambition to diversify economic activities became the primary objective of the 1975 *villagisation* scheme, the first major large-scale land acquisition and resettlement scheme in post-independence Tanzania (Bryceson 1999). In 1975, *the Village and Ujamaa Village Act*<sup>17</sup> was promulgated, which registered villages with over 250 household units as corporate bodies to facilitate the organisation of villages as production units under village development plans. Villages in Tanzania were conceived of as units of development rather than units of devolved governance or democratic practice (Shivji 2002, 37). By 1979, through the state's coercive devices, the *villagisation* programme developed across the country (Bryceson 1980).

For one thing, while the extension of state control following colonial rule was meant to transfer power to workers and peasants, in reality, economic control was increasingly vested in an expanding group of party, bureaucratic and management officials (Shivji 1976, Coulson 2019). As already argued, the top-down approach used in implementing the *villagisation* scheme introduced a significant legitimacy crisis for the ruling party. The use of force became a not uncommon practice connected with the sense of urgency to implement the *villagization*

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<sup>17</sup> The 1975 Village and *Ujamaa* Village Act introduced the first major change in land management since the 1923 land ordinance act which was inherited from British colonial rule. See (Richter 1996) Section 2 and 3 of the 1923 Land Ordinance converted all land into public land and placed all public land under the control of the colonial Governor (Alden-Wily 2012). The 1923 Land Ordinance Act was a ‘master piece of British legal *draftmanship*, which expropriated all land of Tanganyika in two sections’ see Shivji (2006, 11)

programme (Briggs 1979, Lorgen 1999). Regional, district party and government officials acting under pressure from the state's ambitions for 'modernisation', resorted to force in the face of peasant resistance to the villagization process (Bryceson 1982, 654). Peter (1997, 114) quotes President Nyerere's honesty, when he acknowledged in retrospect that 'the government was prepared to take the risk of locking up innocent people to prevent harm to the state'.

Additionally, the increasing dominance of Tanzanian-Asians in policy and business circles and their strong influence over the ruling political party created animosity within parliament (Gray 2013). Several Tanzanian elites, such as Wilfred R. Mwakitwange, began advocating for the 'indigenisation of the economy' (Aminzade 2000, 2003). Mwakitwange was eventually expelled from the ruling party in 1968 because of his racially motivated stands on the economy and later established the Popular National Party (PONA) (Heilman and Lucas 1997, 161). According to Hewitt (1999, 389), advocates for the indigenisation of the economy, like Mwakitwange, began mobilising ordinary Tanzanians by arguing for deliberate investment strategies which empowered indigenous (African) people and against industrial policies which largely favoured Tanzanian-Asians (also see Aminzade 2013). This debate gained popularity among ordinary Tanzanians, which meant that political relations between the ruling party and Tanzanian-Asian investors became difficult (Gray 2013). Additionally, external factors such as the 1979 war with Uganda (Matata 2016) and pressures from proponents of the neoliberal orthodoxy (Gibbon 1995, Hewitt 1999) began pushing for economic and political reforms, which hampered the capacity of the government to pursue its socialist ambitions.

By 1979, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) highlighted the problems in the balance of payment and proposed austerity cuts, including the devaluation of the Tanzanian shillings (Coulson 2019). Soon thereafter, the 1975 Villagisation Act was replaced by the *Local*

*Government (district authority) Act of 1982* (Kauzeni et al. 1993, 26). The *Local Government (district authority) Act of 1982* was enacted to ‘make better provisions for, and to consolidate laws relating to local government and to provide for other matters connected with the organisation of local government in Mainland Tanzania’<sup>18</sup> (Local Government (district authority) Act of 1982).

The 1980s became a defining moment for the involvement of multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the IMF in African economies, exemplified by the introduction of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) and neo-liberalism as a solution to the economic ills of the socialist regime in Tanzania (Mwapachu 2005, 167). The political and neoliberal economic reforms in Tanzania in the 1980s had a lot to do with the pressure in the form of economic advice, loans and grants from multilateral donors like the World Bank and the IMF (Shivji 1991, 93). As will be demonstrated in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, and as argued by Nelson et al. (2012) and Ngoitiko et al. (2010), the liberalisation of the economy contributed to the steady increase in competition for land in Tanzania.

### **2.2.2 Introduction of neoliberalism and multiparty politics (1985 – 1995)**

Following the failures of his political and economic ambitions under socialism, Nyerere resigned in 1985 (Mwapachu 2005). Tanzania witnessed a shift towards a more open market economic structure. President Ali Hassan Mwinyi adjusted his developmental ambitions to the conditionalities of foreign financiers, including the IMF and the World Bank (Coulson 2013, Mapunda 2008). In all, the economic and political reforms in the 1980s brought around three fundamental changes in Tanzania (1) The devaluation of the shilling (Loxley 1989), (2)

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<sup>18</sup> It should be noted that Zanzibar is a semi-autonomous territory of the United Republic of Tanzania. This thesis is concerned with Mainland Tanzania. Authors like Bierwagen and Peter (1989) and Cameron (2019) have dealt with the complexities of the legal and political arrangements in the Union.

Changes in the political structure - introduced by the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration and multi-partyism (Cameron 2019), (3) Changes in the regulatory framework, including investment and private property laws (Mapunda 2008).

Mwinyi undertook to open the economy for foreign and local investment. For example, the 1986 Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was introduced to encourage private sector engagement in agriculture and reduce state interference in the market (Bagachwa 1991). As part of the ERP, the government privatised publicly owned institutions that were mainly acquired by the Tanzanian business elite (Kaiser 1996, 232). Laws enacted to establish public enterprises and regulate the conduct of economic activity in Tanzania were repealed and replaced (Mapunda 2008). For example, the *Regulation of Trade Act* that confined import and domestic trade to the state-owned enterprise, the Board of Internal Trade, was repealed (Mwapachu 2005, 93).

The Tanzania Legal Task Force, charged with carrying out the legal reforms, was headed by the former Attorney General of Tanzania, Mark Bomani (Mapunda 2008). One of its consultancy reports written by the British lawyer and professor, Patrick McAuslan, asserted that the legal and regulatory framework with which commercial activity was conducted in Tanzania was inadequate for the needs of 'modern business' (Mwapachu 2005, 93). The apparent meaning of 'modern business' in McAuslan's report was the link to the neoliberal approach introduced by the IMF and the World Bank and of course, by the legions of private sector interests operating in Tanzania and across Africa. It may also be noted here that following the land reforms in the 1990s, McAuslan's recommendations which favoured the IMF and the World Bank's business-friendly approach, were selected over those of the Shivji led

Presidential Commission of 1991, which favoured local land governance at village level (Manji 2006).

The focus on neoliberal ideals over the decentralised approach to land governance proposed by Shivji may have contributed to his 1991 paper on *The democracy debate in Africa: Tanzania*, a critic of the undemocratic way neoliberal reforms, had been adopted and implemented (Shivji 1991). In summary, the change from a socialist economy to a neoliberal economy, an economy which according to Mwapachu (2005), undermined the social role of the state, i.e., in respect of protections for the rights of the poor and vulnerable and the rule of law more generally, spurred the need for changes in legislation. The task to prepare new legislation for investments was entrusted to three institutions (Peter and Mwakaje 2004, 11). These were the Ministry of Finance, Economic Affairs and Planning, the Tanzania Industrial Studies and Consulting Organisation (TISCO)<sup>19</sup>, and the Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation, London. The production of a full-fledged investment law depended on a discussion report titled '*The promotion of Private Investment in Tanzania*' prepared by the Technical Assistance Group of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) in 1987. Tanzania's government was now 'ready' to welcome private investors, evident in enacting the *National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1990* and the *Zanzibar Declaration of 1991*, which overhauled the restrictions on owning businesses and private property introduced by the *Arusha Declaration of 1967*.

The new *Investment Act of 1990* further introduced the Investment Promotion Centre (IPC) in July 1990 and provisions prescribing application procedures, investment incentives, dispute settlements, and foreign currency transfer (Peter and Mwakaje 2004). In 1991, subsidies

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<sup>19</sup> TISCO was a business consultancy firm which lobbied for a favour investment environment in Tanzania – by the time this research was conducted, TISCO had closed its doors.

provided to farmers for agricultural inputs such as fertilisers and seeds were suspended. The removal of government subsidies in 1991 badly affected local food production and rural development as farmers depended heavily on these inputs (Mbonile 1995). Like the ERP and the removal of state subsidies, these developmental programmes led to unfair competition for smallholder farmers and infant industries in Tanzania from imported foodstuffs (Meertens 2000, 337). Coulson (2019, 16) argues that cuts in government spending threatened the achievements of the Nyerere administration, i.e., health points in almost every village, water supplies and a near-comprehensive primary education. Increasing levels of inequality began to emerge within the private sector mainly because of the absence of a viable local industry and the dismissal of public servants from the public service (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996, 303).

On a political front, advocates for economic reforms on racial grounds like Mwakitwange were prohibited from mobilizing supporters based on race (or ethnicity or religion) (Aminzade 2013). However, indigenization debates remained a dominant issue within the newly established multiparty electoral system (Aminzade 2003, Nagar 1996). For example, other proponents like Rev. Christopher Mtikila of the Democratic Party denounced Indians and Arabs as thieves and looters of the country's wealth (*gabacholis*) and claimed that 161 Tanzanian-Asians ran the economy at the expense of indigenous Africans or the downtrodden people (*mkombozi wa walahoi*) as he called them (Aminzade 2003, 52). The Democratic Party (DP) was later banned from contesting elections and disbanded as an official political party because of its strong racial biases. The party, however, became very popular among Tanzanians because of its support for indigenisation and nationalism. The party's leader, Rev Christopher Mtikila, was nicknamed 'Hitler', and he also supported Idi Amin's decision to expel Asians from Uganda (see Aminzade 2000, 2003).

Because of the increasing popularity of the indigenisation debates among ordinary Tanzanians, ruling political party elites like Idi Simba, leader of the Confederation of Tanzania Industries (CTI), began substituting the indigenisation rhetoric as a struggle against foreign interference. Here, proponents for indigenisation (like Idi Simba) transformed the debates into a struggle based on territory. In other words, indigenisation was extended to questions between citizens (*wananchi*) and foreigners and sought to protect the nation's economy and culture from the threat of foreign domination (Aminzade 2000, 44). The political elites, especially those who advocated for indigenisation against foreign interference, viewed the IMF's political and financial influence as intrusive (Picard and Garrity 1994). However, the ruling elite continued to maintain its relationship with the industrial ownership structure created under the socialist period (Gray 2013). The meaning of the term *indigenous* (*uzawa*) shifted from a racially charged designator of the boundary between Tanzanian-Asians and African Tanzanians to a term used to designate the boundary between foreigners and citizens (Aminzade 2000, 46).

All the while, the IMF and the World Bank continued to subject economic reforms in Tanzania to close supervision, which led to the constriction of domestic space for exercising policy sovereignty (Mwapachu 2005, 135, Therkildsen 2000, 64). Loxley (1989) provides a detailed account of the 'dispute' between the IMF and 'powerful groups' of the Tanzanian economy in the 1980s. The private sector was marred by conflicts within the political elites, leading to a lack of coalition in local private sector actors' voices and increased clientelism and corruption within political and business circles (Mwapachu 2005). Several authors have highlighted the lack of convergence around implementing the economic and political reforms introduced by the IMF and the World Bank (Shivji 1991, Doriye 1992, Hewitt 1999). These conflicts also meant that the government and ruling party was weak and vulnerable to a growing and stronger private-sector faction. It was in the interest of the ruling party, *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM),

to secure its survival by co-opting the influence of powerful social and business actors (Andreoni 2017).

### **2.2.3 Implementation of the neoliberal orthodoxy (1995-2005)**

In 1995, President Benjamin Mkapa became president with approval from a still influential Nyerere (Mwapachu 2005). President Mkapa took over the leadership of the ruling party - *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), with the goal of overseeing the transition of the country into a multiparty democratic state (Bujra 2010, Havnevik and Isinika 2010). The change to multiparty politics in 1995 was dominated by advocates for neoliberal policies, specifically to encourage foreign investments in all sectors of the economy (Nyirabu 2002). The new market-led approach to industrial development was set out in the *Sustainable Industries Development Policy 1996 to 2020* (Gray 2013, 191). Correspondingly, the private sector became increasingly entangled with the personal interests of the ruling elite (Nelson et al. 2012). For one thing, Andreoni (2017, 19) argues that ‘with the transition to a multiparty democracy in 1995, corruption became a major driver of change and resulted in factional conflicts within the ruling coalition and its lower level factions’.

Additionally, the Structural Adjustment Programmes proposed by the IMF and the World Bank introduced austerity measures in public spending (Bryceson 1999, Coulson 2013). Arguably, the ruling elite failed to build effective state institutions to oversee the realisation of its broad-based developmental objectives (Andreoni 2017, Coulson 2019). The economic reform ‘was hurting the poor with adverse political consequences especially on the part of the ruling political party that was gearing up for its first multiparty general elections in 1995’ (Mwapachu 2005, 135).

With the introduction of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1994 and its stand against protectionism, the 1990 Investment Promotion and Protection Act became redundant and this reality formed the basis for enacting the 1997 Investment Act (Peter and Mwakaje 2004, 12). New investment laws were introduced through the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act, which opened the country to investments in any sector if the requisite capital threshold of USD 100,000 for local investors and USD 300,000<sup>20</sup> for foreign investors was met. The new 1997 Investment Act abolished the protection of local industries or the ring-fencing of investment sectors for local investors. In the mining sector, institutional requirements for local content became weaker through the *Mining Act of 1998* (Lange and Kinyondo 2016).

The introduction of the *Mining Act of 1998*, promoted by the World Bank, was considered very attractive to foreign investors (Campbell and Bhatia 1998). Lange and Kinyondo (2016, 1097) report that four large scale gold mines were established during the first four years following the implementation of the new legislation. The new 1998 mining regulations undermined the importance of protecting local communities and focused on the macro-economic benefits aligned with inviting foreign mining companies into Tanzania. Investments in the mining sector became very controversial mainly because local people were displaced by mining activities and complained of unfair treatment (Lange 2011). Additionally, companies had been granted lucrative VAT and duty exemptions which negatively affected revenue buoyancy (Lange 2011).

The banking sector remained in public ownership until its privatisation in 1999/2000, a significant decision of President Mkapa (Mwapachu 2005). The resistance mounted by Nyerere to privatising the banking sector was defeated after his demise in 1999. To Nyerere, who was still influential until he died in 1999, banks such as the National Bank of Commerce (NBC)

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<sup>20</sup> The threshold amount for foreign investors has been increased to \$500,000 for foreign investors under the Magufuli administration.

were ‘the people’s bank’ (Mwapachu 2005, 396). Mwapachu (2005, 396) argues that ‘it was the perception among the majority of Tanzanians that state-owned enterprises were the people’s assets (*Mali ya Umma*)’. Those associated with owning state enterprises were derogatorily referred to as ‘bloodsuckers’- deemed *capitalist exploiters* (Brennan 2012). There was a surge in the number of public policies and strategies to attract foreign investments. Therkildsen (2000, 62) satirically referred to this surge as ‘*projectitis*’, with over 2,000 development projects listed by the World Bank (1994, 194). The privatisation also gave rise to an unprecedented expansion of LSLIs in Tanzania (Nelson et al. 2012, Ngoitiko et al. 2010).

To conciliate advocates for indigenisation, the businessman and vocal advocate Idi Simba was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry (Aminzade 2013). After his appointment, opposition party parliamentarians joined ‘CCM backbenchers to support the *National Employment Promotion Service Act of 1999*’, which introduced measures designed to require foreign investors to enter into business partnerships with Tanzanian citizens (Aminzade 2013, 298). Several sector development plans were published with financial support and strategic influence from donors. For example, the *Tanzania Development Vision 2025* was launched in 1999 to transform Tanzania’s ‘low productivity agricultural economy to a semi-industrialised one, led by modernised...agricultural activities’ (URT 1999, 2). Other essential pieces of legislation introduced were the *Village Land Act of 1999* and the *Land Act of 1999* – both pieces of legislation have been discussed in the previous section.

Again, the absence of robust regulatory and oversight institutions in Tanzania allowed corrupt politicians and institutions to engage in rent-seeking with devastating consequences for the economy (Cooksey 2017, 4). The lack of an effective institutional and regulatory framework in the wake of market-led investments affected the functioning of state institutions such as the Tanzania Revenue Authority, which became plagued with high levels of corruption (Fjeldstad

2003). For example, the falsification of VAT receipts to the tune of 34 billion shillings (USD 32 million) per annum by 2003 and increasing cases of tax exemption of approximately 414 billion (USD 454 million) in 2001, contributed to significant losses in tax revenue by the government (Osoro 1995, Mwapachu 2005).

The political settlement during this period was characterised by a weak regulatory framework that failed to protect local communities, exemplified in the 1998 Mining and 1997 Investment Act, and with the strong incentive to attract foreign investments. For this reason that Mwapachu (2005, 94) argues that ‘the central problem that features predominantly in Tanzania lies with the institutional capacities of regulatory bodies charged with the task of law enforcement’. There was also a surge in capital flight through tax evasion and avoidance, corruption and clientelism (Fjeldstad 2003).

#### **2.2.4 Legitimacy crisis of the neoliberal orthodoxy (2005 -2015)**

By 2005, when Jakaya Kikwete became president, the contradictions between the ideas and actions of the ruling class and the lived experiences of common Tanzanians had become profound. For example, a review of the Tanzanian Development Vision (TDV) 2025 by Mashindano et al. (2011) showed that economic growth did not correlate with poverty reduction, gender equality and improved livelihood levels for ordinary Tanzanians. Authors of the TDV review report attributed this mismatch in economic growth and poverty to high dependency levels. Over 70% of the population is below 30 years, there is significant unemployment, as well as a lack of technical and scientific capacity needed by industry (Mashindano et al. 2011). There was a need for the government to allocate appropriate resources for accelerated sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

Coupled with the effect of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the outcome was an increase in LSLIs and development projects, which according to Kelsall (2018), became populist vehicles for promises made during election campaigns. An example is the *ad hoc* implementation of the SAGCOT scheme in 2010. The SAGCOT initiative was seeded by YARA, a Norwegian petrochemical company at the World Economic Forum in 2009. In an interview conducted as part of this research, a researcher on the SACGOT had this to say:

It was an open invitation with an eye on Mozambique and Tanzania. It then went to the *World Economic Forum* [to garner support from other home states and TNCs], *then they went to Beira, Mozambique. In fact, in Beira, they were given a place to erect a fertilizer plant, but once they got to that place and did the environmental impact assessment, they found that the site was a water catchment, [so] they could not do it! They flew up to Dar es Salaam and met with president Kikwete - and everything was fine [sic]. In fact, YARA came at the right time because, in 2009, the private sector engineered the Kilomo Kwanza - the idea was that agriculture needs a lot of investment* – Key informant, Researcher on the SACGOT interviewed in Dar es Salaam, 17.05.2018.

Kaarhus (2018) provides details on the development of the SACGOT and the disadvantaged position of communities in Beira, Mozambique who were impacted by the decision by YARA to transfer its operations to Tanzania.

Another outcome of the TDV review was the Big Results Now (BRN) programme, launched in 2013 and aimed at improving the provision of public services. However, the BRN was criticised for prioritising short-term gains over longer-term sustainability (Janus and Keijzer 2015). In a relatively recent report of the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (URT 2015), the GoT

acknowledges that the focus on large commercial farms had made little contribution to the reduction of poverty in Tanzania. Indeed, increasing levels of corruption and the imminent disintegration of the ruling political party, due to in-fighting between political party elites in the run-up to the 2015 elections (Fouéré 2008, Cooksey 2017), paved the way for the ascent of President John P. Magufuli, who would advocate for change, and disrupt the business as usual approach in Tanzania (Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016).

These contradictions present an opportunity to re-examine the implications of LSLI discourse in Tanzania using historical and current cases as sources of political capital. Such an approach provides context and a greater understanding of how policy choices are disrupted or emerge. For example, the histories and machinations of particular firms, multinational corporations, and business individuals may at different junctures, be critical in determining political and economic outcomes within the economy (Behuria et al. 2017, Gray 2013). It is essential in this case to look at ownership structures, the history of agrarian transformation, and political party elites, friends, and ethnic engagements. Arguably then, current debates around land expropriation and investments merely reproduce and extend ongoing debates that form part of Tanzania's history (Schlimmer 2018, 84). This history of land investments in agriculture supports the claim by Sulle (2020, 337) that 'the SAGCOT did not start from scratch, but builds on existing projects'. This history unfolds as we begin to understand the land acquisition process in the case study communities in this research. The following section turns to contemporary LSLI debates using the SAGCOT as a starting point.

### **2.3 Policies adopted by governments in relation to agriculture, especially after 2009**

The economy of Tanzania remains heavily dependent on rain-fed agriculture (Mongi et al. 2010). As of 2018, over a quarter of Tanzania's gross domestic product (GDP) came from the

agrarian sector, providing 85% of exports and employing 67% of the workforce, while 45% of GDP contribution came from manufacturing, mining and the service industry, which employed about 32% of the population (World Bank 2019). However, in recent years, Tanzania's agriculture has been affected by repeated climatic and economic shocks, resulting in sustained low crop yields and food insecurity at both household and national levels (Henry et al. 2019, Thornton et al. 2019). All this in spite of Tanzania having had an average GDP growth rate of 6% between 2010 and 2015, compared to the sub-Saharan Africa GDP growth rate average of 2.98% over the same period (World Bank 2019).

In addition, Tanzania's population growth is one of the fastest in the world, at a rate of over 2.7% per year (Agwanda and Amani 2014), with implications for many facets of planning and economic management as well as food security (Mashindano et al. 2011, 14). According to Van Arkadie (2019, 71), 'the urban population in Tanzania was estimated at 16.9 million in 2015, growing from 528,508 in 1960'. These pressures push governments in countries like Tanzania to justify the implementation of large-scale agricultural schemes in the 'public interest' (Alden-Wily 2012), with the ambition to achieve the goals of state action such as food security and socio-economic improvements in their citizen's welfare (World Bank 2017). In fact, over the past decade, the Tanzanian government, through concerned ministries like the Ministry for Industry, Trade and Investment, and institutions like the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF), have encouraged LSLIs as a means to increase foreign direct investments (FDI), farmers' income, technology transfer, and job creation (Lange 2011, World Bank 2017, Bergius et al. 2018). The significance of agriculture in state revenue and employment legitimise the government's regard for export-oriented agriculture in crops such as coffee, tea, sugar cane and sisal as a development opportunity (SAGCOT 2011).

By attracting investors, including multinational companies (MNC), state-owned enterprises (SOE) and sovereign wealth funds (SWF), LSLIs are regarded as a means to accumulate capital through the acquisition of ‘cheaply’ available land and labour (Blache 2018, Cotula and Vermeulen 2009, Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). As demonstrated in the previous sections, state policies such as LSLIs are outcomes of either state-centred or society centred approaches (or both) to development (Crane and Amawi 2013, 30). A balance of forces comprising of state actors and other interest groups determine the orientation of policies such as LSLIs, arbitrated by the power of capital and labour (Bernstein 2004, Borrás Jr and Franco 2012). Take, for example, the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy (ASDS), which was launched by the Government of Tanzania (GoT) in October 2001 to create an enabling and conducive environment for ‘improving profitability’ in the agrarian sector, as the basis for improved farm income and rural poverty reduction (URT 2001). As part of the ASDS, an Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) was jointly prepared by the GoT, the World Bank, USAID, UK Aid and other donors who ‘agreed to contribute funds for proposals’ within the ASDP from 2006-2013 (Coulson 2019). The majority of the funds for the ASDP, over eighty per cent, was envisaged for the rehabilitation of irrigation schemes (Therkildsen 2011), without any evaluation studies on what had caused them to fail (Coulson 2019, 21).

Additionally, Coulson et al. (2018, 63) highlight that the problem with the (top-down) implementation of large-scale irrigation schemes in Africa is the lack of a farmer-centred approach that includes the voices of existing groups of farmers at the start of project design and implementation. According to Coulson et al. (2018, 63), integrating farmers from the beginning of such a project would enforce the ‘fair sharing of water and maintenance of the [irrigation] systems’. To Therkildsen (2011, 6), the failures in the implementation of the ASDP, which was predominantly irrigation focused, was a consequence of the focus of the ruling elite on ‘the

political goal of winning elections and maintaining coalitions’ than on achieving the economic goals set out by the ASDP. Yet, other grand style investment schemes were implemented or initiated with little regard for the failures in past interventions (Andreoni 2017).

More significantly, within the strategic framework of the ASDS (see Figure 2), on the 3rd of August 2009, President Kikwete launched the *Kilimo Kwanza* – Agriculture First strategy as a national resolve to accelerate agricultural transformation in Tanzania by ‘providing incentives to attract more agricultural investors’ (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, 15). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), Irish Aid and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) were the main donors in the first phase of the ASDS which ran from 2006 to 2013 (Coulson 2019). These partnerships resulted in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) in 2010 (Bergius et al. 2018, Sulle 2020).




Figure 2 SAGCOT within Tanzania’s developmental and agricultural strategic framework

### 2.3.1 The Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

Growth corridors have been used as regional policy instruments for economic development worldwide (Chome et al. 2020, Dannenberg et al. 2018, Nijbroek and Andelman 2015). Adding to the SAGCOT, other examples of growth corridors include the Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Development Corridor in Zambia (Foulds 2014) and the Dry Corridor in Guatemala (Sain et al. 2017). The rationale behind growth corridors is based on Hirschman's (1958) theory of unbalanced growth, which assumes that due to a low level of capital endowment and decision-making ability in an economy, development processes can be initiated in sectors with the potential to induce growth (Dannenberg et al. 2018, 136).

Launched in May 2010 by President Jakaya Kikwete under the *Kilimo Kwanza* strategy (see *Figure 2*), the SAGCOT partnership aims to facilitate the development of clusters of profitable agricultural businesses (see *Figure 3*) within the Southern Highlands of Tanzania (SAGCOT 2010). The SAGCOT partnership is implemented by an operational support system, the SAGCOT Centre Ltd, established as a limited company by guarantee in 2011 (SAGCOT 2010).





Figure 3 Illustration of an agricultural cluster and a value chain envisaged by the SAGCOT partnership scheme (SAGCOT 2011, 8)

The SAGCOT covers approximately one-third of mainland Tanzania (see *Figure 4*) and extends north and south of the central rail, road and power ‘backbone’ that runs from Dar es Salaam to the northern areas of Zambia and Malawi (Bergius et al. 2018, Steffens et al. 2019). The SAGCOT encompasses Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Njombe, Rukwa & Katavi (SAGCOT 2010).



*Figure 4 SAGCOT cluster areas and regions for development. Source: (Sikira and Kahaigili 2017, 110)*

Primarily driven by the private sector (see *Figure 5*), the SAGCOT was expected at its outset to produce 680,000 tonnes of field crops (maize, tea, soya and wheat), 630,000 tonnes of rice, 4.4 million tonnes of sugar case, 3,500 tonnes of red meat and 32,000 tonnes of high-value fruits by 2030 (SAGCOT 2011, Mbunda 2016, 282).

Initiatives like the SAGCOT fall within Tanzania’s 2025 Development Vision (TDV) and National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (*Mkukuta*) (see Figure 2) that is designed to transform Tanzania into an emerging economy by 2025 (MAFAP 2013). Other strategies for implementing TDV 2025 include The Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) framework and successive five-year development plans. In a FAO analysis of food and agricultural policies in Africa, the authors described the SAGCOT ‘as an opportunity for aligning public investment with policies aimed at increasing agricultural output and productivity while reducing hunger and poverty (Angelucci et al. 2013, 135).



Figure 5 Strategic public-private partnership within the SAGCOT

When viewed in the context of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, which led to an increase in agricultural commodity prices (Rapsomanikis 2009), the acquisition of land through the SAGCOT presents more continuity than change from the past dispossession of land for LSLIs (Alden-Wily 2011b). Arguably, the emergence of LSLIs as a response to specific policies and market failures is not new (Deininger and Byerlee 2012, 1). Historically, land acquisition is

often related to speculative markets, resource supply constraints, carbon trading businesses, and increasing regard for land as financial assets (Nazlioglu et al. 2013). The global crisis of 2007/2008 merely contributed to the increased pace of LSLIs, with some cash-rich, food-importing countries seeing the acquisition of farmland in developing countries as a means to guarantee food security for their populations (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, 5).

Although the SAGCOT claims extensive benefits to Tanzania's smallholder farmers, Mbunda (2016, 282) observed that policymakers did not sufficiently integrate small-scale farmers in the conception, designing and implementation stages of the SAGCOT. Others like Schiavoni et al. (2018), Sulle (2020) and Twomey et al. (2015) have reported incidences of deprivation from human rights and discriminatory decision-making processes during the implementation of the SAGCOT. Kaarhus (2018) provides a detailed account of the development of the SAGCOT and the Norwegian petrochemical company YARA International's role in promoting commercial agriculture as a growth model in East Africa. An important question that arises is how growth corridors shape factor markets in agrarian political economies? And what are the political implications of these schemes on domestic political alignments and support for government development priorities?

To understand the political implications of the SAGCOT, Sulle (2020, 347), for one, calls for the regard of the SAGCOT as 'a political construct that is subject to broader political circumstances' at the local, national and international level. Table 4 is a tabulated categorisation of stakeholders involved in the SAGCOT. Table 4 also highlights the 'political construct' of the SAGCOT, which involves local, national, and international players. According to Therkildsen (2011, 6), 'such political considerations influence how state authorities and local governments' enforcement capacity are used'. Edelman et al. (2013, 1522) underscore the

importance of taking the dynamics of agrarian change and global capital accumulation as a key to research on LSLIs. Such a broad agrarian political economy framework critically examines the dynamics of production, and how power, property and labour are politically contested and transformed over time' (Edelman et al. 2013, 1522).

For example, Sulle (2020, 333) uses the Kilombero sugar investment within the SAGCOT to demonstrate how local political elites welcome large-scale initiatives because they 'create rent-seeking opportunities through lease agreements'. The ideological notion about 'modernising agriculture' through growth corridors motivates the ruling elite to push for these investment policies and treat rural community members as only marginally competent political agents (Schneider 2006).

Table 4 Categorisation of stakeholders involved in the SAGCOT investment schemes, relying on Cotula et al. (2009).

Political Economy Level	Name of partner (Kind of Partnership) (Function in SAGCOT)			
Macro-level	Ireland (Gov-to-Gov) (ECM) (IP)	Norway (Gov-to-Gov) (IP)	USA (Gov-to-Gov) (ECM)	
	Norfund (SWF) (IP)	Standard Bank (SWF) (IP)		
	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (ECM) (TNC) (S.F.P)	United States Agency for International Development (ECM) (TNC) (S.F.P)	The World Economic Forum (TNC) (S.F.P) (IP)	Food and Agriculture Organisation (TNC) (S.F.P) (IP)
	Unilever (ECM) (P)	Yara International (IP) (P)	Diageo (IP) (P)	DuPont (IP) (P)
	General Mills (IP) P	Monsanto (IP) (P)	SAB Miller (IP) (P)	Syngenta (IP) (P)
National Level	Government of Tanzania (ECM)	Norwegian Embassy – Tanzania (Gov-to-Gov) (IP)	Irish Embassy –Tanzania (Gov-to-Gov) (ECM)	
	Confederation of Tanzanian Industries (SOE) (ECM)	Tanzania Sugarcane Growers Association (SOE) (ECM)	Agricultural Council of Tanzania (SOE) (ECM)	
	National Microfinance Bank (SWF) (IP)			
	Logistics Consulting Group (TT) (P)	Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (SOE) (TT)	Tanzania Agricultural Partnership (TT) (P)	
	AgDevCo (TT) (P)	Prorustica (TT) (P)		
	Tanzania Investment Centre (checks financial viability of LSLI)	Ministry of Agriculture (Agricultural Viability)	Ministry of Land and Housing Development (Land registration)	Ministry of Environment (Environmental impact assessment)
Local-level	District Commissioner (government-appointed)	Village Council (elected by village community)	Village Assembly (all village adults)	

**\*LEGEND**

NATURE OF PARTNERSHIP AND FUNCTION	
<b>GOV-TO-GOV</b>	Government to government partnership
<b>SWF</b>	Sovereign wealth fund
<b>SOE</b>	State-Owned Enterprise
<b>IP</b>	Investment partner
<b>P</b>	Private partnership
<b>S.F. P</b>	Support framework partner
<b>TT</b>	Technical Team

The expansion of economic development and trade, typified here by the invitation of multinational companies within the SAGCOT and the increase in LSLIs following the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009), should, in a neoclassical sense, benefit sectors that are better endowed with a production factor relative to their trading partners (Goldstein and Gulotty 2019, Le Goff and Singh 2013). However, they fail to appreciate the

politics of social differentiation within agrarian political economies and the role of micro-politics, which may contribute to resistance against these investment schemes (Schlimmer 2018). As Sulle (2020) argues, the resultant processes of social differentiation within rural political economies mean that the simple grand vision of commercialisation through growth corridors must be adapted to specific local settings.

Tanzania's land transfer processes allow for recourse and grievances to be channelled to the appropriate government authority (Section 5 of the *Land Act of 1999*). For example, every investor must address the village assembly to respond to villagers' concerns regarding any LSLI process. If the Village Assembly approves and recommends the transfer, the commissioner of Lands forwards the approval to the president, who signs off on the transfer to general land. After the president's approval, another 14 days is provided to allow any aggrieved party to lodge complaints before the final transfer. The identified land is then vested in the Tanzanian Investment Cooperation (TIC) (Section 20 of the *Land Act of 1999*), which issues a derivative right of occupancy to foreign-owned investments or a granted right of occupancy to a Tanzanian-owned enterprise.

Land to be designated for investment purposes... shall be identified, gazetted, and allocated to the Tanzania Investment Centre, which shall create derivative rights to the investor(s) – Section 20 (2) of the Land Act of 1999

The TIC also has a 'land bank', which in theory allocates land to an appropriate investor. Section 15 of the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997 (No7) stipulates that:

The (Tanzanian Investment) Centre shall, in liaison with relevant Ministries and other authorities [see Table 4], determine investment opportunities available in the country and the modalities of accessing them.

The definition of ‘modalities’ is not clear and may lead to uncertainty or misinterpretation. Bélair (2018, 378) also demonstrates that the TIC’s land bank is incomplete, and in practice, investors first identify the land they wish to acquire, then ‘use the TIC to formalise their access to the identified land’. Such uncertainties and the absence of adequate procedures may lead to abuse of power. For this very reason, Bélair (2018, 377) describes the land transfer process in Tanzania as ‘political’, with ‘several investors [including local investors] acquiring important pieces of land through their political networks’.

The reliance on neoclassical assumptions that treat markets in Africa as unproblematic units of analysis fails to bring out the political implications of these land deals (Bernstein 2004). These political contestations can change priorities between regimes and impact the design and orientation of growth corridors. For example, the ASDS-II now acknowledges that a strategic focus on large commercial farms in the past has had ‘little impact on poverty reduction’ in Tanzania – and efforts must be made to address these challenges (URT 2015). There is an expectation on the part of national policymakers that the SAGCOT has now oriented its focus towards small farmers by placing an importance on out-grower schemes and capacity improvement in local communities (Sulle 2020, Chome et al. 2020).

## **2.4 Land Rights Embedded in Agrarian Societies: Human Rights as a Tool/Resource for Recourse**

Tanzania is often described by land reform scholars as a country with the most progressive land tenure reforms in Africa (Nelson 2012), mainly for the inclusion of gender parity in ownership of communal land (Tsikata 2001) and the guarantee of community participation in the land transfer processes (Shivji 1998). For example, Section 6 (a) of *the Village Land Act of 1999* allows the Village Councils (VC) to transfer village land below 250 ha with consultation and approval from the Village Assembly (VA) during village meetings provisioned in Section 103 (3) of *the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982*. Additionally, Section 6 (b) of *the Village Land Act of 1999* guides the transfer of more than 250 hectares (as with most LSLIs), which the Minister must approve after considering any recommendations made by the VA through the VC. The Minister re-categorises the identified village land to general land after valuating or considering the recommendations from the VA (German et al. 2011).

However, in practice, customary rights are frequently ignored, and rural communalities dispossessed of their land with little or no consultation during LSLI processes (Nelson et al. 2012, Sulle 2020, Anseeuw et al. 2012). For example, in a study conducted by Bélair (2018, 380) in the Rufiji district of Tanzania, although the Village Assembly opposed the land transfer to investors, ‘the land transfer was nonetheless approved and completed’ by state officials. The exclusion of village members from these land transfer processes creates contestations and contributes to reconfiguring social and political relations within rural communities (Sulle 2017, 2020). In many cases, the dynamics of political contestations against LSLIs undermine the investors’ capacity to become operational in rural settings (Bélair 2018, Sulle 2020).

Barume (2017, 63) describes the conflicts between the Maasai Indigenous communities in Liliondo and the Tanzanian government over ‘over ancestral community land granted to foreign safari and hunting companies’. After several ‘urgent appeals’ from the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights<sup>21</sup> and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous People, underlining allegations of ‘burned houses, arbitrary arrest, rape and even killings’<sup>22</sup>, the investment contract was halted by the Magufuli administration in 2017 (Ngoitiko et al. 2010, Barume 2017). Similar examples have been documented by Sulle (2020) during land transfer processes in Kagera and Kilombero.

In summary, large-scale land deals are giving ground to large businesses, which undermine the land rights of local communities (Cotula 2013b, 1610), and overall, the contributions of LSLIs to rural development and poverty reduction in countries like Tanzania remain questionable (Diao et al. 2018, Pritchard et al. 2017, 42). The question posed by Cotula et al. (2009) ‘*Land grab or development opportunity?: Agricultural investment and international land deals in Africa*’, reaffirms the tension between ‘markets’ and ‘society’ and introduces the moral and legal consequences of these LSLIs, which are encroaching on the rights of local communities (German et al. 2013, Kanosue 2015, Alden-Wily 2012).

Like the case studies presented here, LSLIs in Tanzania have been linked to the lack of transparency, unfulfilled promises, corruption and intimidation of village community members (Mbilinyi 2012a, West and Haug 2017, Ngoitiko et al. 2010). According to observations made

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<sup>21</sup> “Urgent Appeal to the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, 2011,” African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, <http://www.achpr.org/sessions/49th/ intersession-activity-reports/indigenous-populations/>

<sup>22</sup> A/HRC/15/37/Add.1, “Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and fundamental freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya,” Human Rights Council, fifteenth Session (September 15, 2010).

by the Committee on Economic, social and Cultural Rights in the third periodic review report in 2012 (CESCR 2012)<sup>23</sup>, the Committee expressed concern that:

‘Several vulnerable communities, including pastoralist and hunter-gatherer communities, have been forcibly evicted from their traditional lands for large-scale farming, the creation of game reserves and expansion of national parks, mining, construction of military barracks, tourism and commercial game hunting. The Committee [was] concerned that these practices have resulted in a critical reduction in their access to land and natural resources, particularly threatening their livelihoods and their right to food.’

The absence of adequate legal and institutional mechanisms have contributed to the negative impacts of LSLIs on the human rights of local communities (Abebe 2012, 878). The focus of the Tanzanian government on the ‘public purpose’ and macroeconomic benefits, rather than on long-term socio-economic reforms to enhance the productive resources and livelihoods of smallholder farmers, calls for better protection of rural communities from the excesses of these LSLI schemes. Additionally, the absence of a robust civil society to counter the negative consequences of LSLIs and ensure accountable governance systems further weakens rural communities' rights in Tanzania (Maillard-Ardenti 2012).

Public institutions such as the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) have been criticised for the lack of follow-up on the promises made by investors, which in the case of TIC has been attributed to the lack of capacity to perform monitoring and evaluation exercises in investment

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<sup>23</sup> CESCR. 2012. Concluding observations on the initial to third reports of the United Republic of Tanzania, adopted by the Committee at its forty-ninth session (12–30 November 2012). Translated by Translator. Number of. Rome, Italy: Economic and Social Council. Accessed 30.03.2021.

communities (Bélaïr 2018, 379). As discussed in earlier chapters, land laws in Tanzania are still very centralized and rely on colonial land management and administration (Alden-Wily 2003, Shivji 1998). In fact, the President has unilateral powers to revoke and convert village land into general land in the ‘public interest’ (Alden-Wily 2012):

‘...[w]here the President is minded to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved land for public interest, he may direct the Minister to proceed in accordance with the provisions... for the purpose of public interest’  
(The Village Land Act, 1999, pp. Part III, Section 4 (1),(2))

Evidently, as Cotula (2013b, 1611) argues, there is a need for ‘some form of regulation to ensure that land deals do not cause widespread dispossession’ and encroachment on customary land rights. The realignment of the law to protect agrarian communities from the excesses of market forces reintroduces another dimension of the land investment debate. A human rights-based approach puts human rights principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment and the rule of law (PANTHER principles) at the centre of government and business strategies and engagements (Ruggie 2008, FAO 2005). It seeks to ensure that citizens’ political and social rights are embedded in political and social policy (Gready and Ensor 2005). This approach advocates for recognising citizens as holders of rights and promoting state compliance with international human rights standards (Kanosue 2015, Barling et al. 2002).

For example, in 2009, the Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate food, Oliver De Schutter (2009a), identified and recommended plausible policies focusing on the linkages between land tenure, food security, sustainable development and the right to food. There is a strong link between the effectiveness of land tenure regimes, food security, sustainable development, and the right to food (see Miggiano et al. 2010, Kothari 2006). Like De Schutter (2009a), promoters

of this paradigm advocate for a human rights-based approach to LSLIs, which considers fundamental human rights and aspects of participation, accountability, and transparency (De Schutter 2011b, Mapulanga-Hulston 2009). Human right instruments oblige states and non-state actors like transnational corporations (TNC) and investors (domestic and foreign) to refrain from interfering in the spheres of private and personal rights (Vogt et al. 2016). Human rights define conditions for the state to help develop individuals to their full potential (Mapulanga-Hulston 2009).

In the context of contemporary LSLIs, Golay and Biglino (2013) and Narula (2013) provide a comprehensive analysis of the responses of different human right actors to the political recognition of the rights to food at the international level and call for mainstreaming human rights considerations in the analyses of land transactions. The use of a human rights lens in understanding LSLIs rests on the premise that ‘individuals and communities, right holders, are entitled to a set of rights and procedural safeguards that cannot be forfeited in the context of LSLI schemes’ (Edelman et al. 2013, 1524). A rights-based perspective to LSLIs thus entails a distinct regard for the political economy of land transactions (Golay and Biglino 2013, 1631). It proposes strategies ‘to secure and strengthen the entitlement of individuals and groups to land as a productive and right-fulfilling asset’ (Narula 2013, 127). In this sense, a rights-based approach hinges on recognising that states have obligations and that LSLIs ‘should under no circumstances trump the human rights obligations of the states concerned’ (De Schutter 2009b, 33).

International organisations such as the United Nations have contributed to these debates by proposing voluntary guidelines, focusing on the proper governance of land tenure and agricultural policy in general (Seufert 2013). For example, the *Voluntary Guidelines on the*

*Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forest in the Context of National Food Security* was endorsed by the UN Committee of World Food Security in May 2012. Additionally, the PANTHER principles, which are used as an analytical tool in this research, are part of the FAO's (2005) *Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security*. From a human rights perspective, access to land is closely linked to the protection of indigenous cultures and ways of life, and of fundamental human rights including the right to food, and the right to property (Cotula 2013b, 1617). Additionally, although the right to adequate food is not explicitly mentioned in Tanzania's constitution, it is implicit in *Article 9*. The constitution upholds the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, protects 'human dignity and other human rights', which are 'respected and cherished...' as fundamental principles and directives of state policy.

Like all UN member states under Customary International Law, Tanzania is bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and is a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 1966). At the regional level, Tanzania is a member (joined on 25 April 1963) of the African Union (previously the OAU) (AU 2019) and is a signatory to the African Banjul Charter (ratified in 1984). These international agreements require the United Republic of Tanzania to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of the people of Tanzania, including the right to adequate food.

The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) affirmed a broad range of human rights, including economic, social, and cultural rights, as '...a common standard of achievement for all people and all nations...' <sup>24</sup>. *Article 25* of the UDHR provides that:

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<sup>24</sup>UN General Assembly, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, 10 December 1948, 217 A (III), available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b3712c.html> [accessed 21 October 2016]

Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of [his/herself] and of [his/her] family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age, or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond [his/her] control.

These rights became legally enforceable with the introduction of the International Covenants on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1966, forming the international bill of rights (Ssenyonjo and Baderin 2016). *Article 11* of the ICESCR recognises ‘the right to everyone to an adequate standard of living for [his/herself] and [his/her] family, including adequate food...and the continuous improvement of living conditions...as well as the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger’.

Moreover, General Comments of the Committees of both Covenants, i.e., ICESCR and the ICCPR, define core minimum obligations for member states and core entitlements to individuals and groups (De Schutter 2014). For example, General Comment 3 para.10, of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) ‘...is of the view that a minimum core obligation is needed to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every state party’<sup>25</sup>. *Article 11* of the ICESCR and General Comment 12 of the CESCR, which focuses on the right to adequate food, form the basis of this thesis. Also of thematic importance within large-scale land investments are the following General Comments. General Comment 21 (2009), *para.* 48-54<sup>26</sup>, General

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<sup>25</sup>UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties' Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1 of the Covenant)*, 14 December 1990, E/1991/23, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838e10.html> [accessed 19 October 2016]

<sup>26</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General comment no. 21, Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1a of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), 21 December 2009, E/C.12/GC/21, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ed35bae2.html> [accessed 19 October 2016]

Comment 18 (2006), *para. 22*<sup>27</sup>, General Comment 16 (2006), *para. 43*<sup>28</sup>, General Comment 14 (2000), <sup>29</sup>*para. 33*<sup>30</sup>, and General Comment 13 (1999), *para 46*<sup>31</sup>.

Summarily, the CESCR established through several General Comments three levels of state responsibility towards the full realisation of economic, cultural, and social rights, i.e., ‘... the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil. The **obligation to fulfil** contains obligations to facilitate, provide and promote the rights within the Covenant. The obligation to fulfil requires States to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional and other measures towards the full realisation of the right...’. The **obligation to respect** requires States to refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right in the Covenant. The **obligation to protect** requires States to take measures that prevent third parties from interfering in the rights enshrined in the Covenant.

As mentioned in the Introduction, the right to adequate food is the human right of interest in this study. General Comment 12<sup>32</sup> of the Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR 1999) defines the right to *adequate* food as: ‘...when every man, woman and child alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’. In the CESCR General Comment No. 12 on the right to adequate food, *paragraph 12* of the General Comment refers to the availability of food as ‘the

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<sup>27</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work* (Art. 6 of the Covenant), 6 February 2006, E/C.12/GC/18, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4415453b4.html> [accessed 19 October 2016]

<sup>28</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 16: The Equal Right of Men and Women to the Enjoyment of All Economic, Social and Cultural Rights* (Art. 3 of the Covenant), 11 August 2005, E/C.12/2005/4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/43f3067ae.html> [accessed 19 October 2016].

<sup>30</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health* (Art. 12 of the Covenant), 11 August 2000, E/C.12/2000/4, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838d0.html> [accessed 19 October 2016]

<sup>31</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 13: The Right to Education* (Art. 13 of the Covenant), 8 December 1999, E/C.12/1999/10, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c22.html> [accessed 19 October 2016]

<sup>32</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food*, 12 May 1999, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html> [accessed 07 March 2020]

possibilities either for feeding oneself directly from productive land or other natural resources...’. In *paragraph 13* of the General Comment, accessibility to food is defined as any acquisition pattern or entitlement through which people procure their food...’. Of importance are ‘...indigenous population groups whose access to their ancestral lands may be threatened...’ *Paragraph 26* of the General Comment adds that strategies to provide access to food as including ‘...guarantees of full and equal access to economic resources, particularly for women, including the right to inheritance and the ownership of land and other property...’

By introducing a rights-based perspective, this research demonstrates the complementarity of rights-based approaches to the political economy of LSLIs in agrarian societies. As Table 5 illustrates, using a human rights lens to analyse the embeddedness of land transactions in society is a matter of degree, not of dichotomies (Cotula 2013b).

Table 5 Using a rights-based lens to ensure compliance in the political economy of land transactions (I have formulated the summary in Table 5 to reflect the texts cited in this research).

Area of Interest	Rights-Base Lens/Perspective	Political Economy of Land Transactions
Processes of development	<p>Integrates human rights into plans and processes of development.</p> <p>Brings with it human rights principles of participation, equality and non-discrimination, and accountability both in development processes and as a fundamental goal of development itself.</p> <p>All stakeholders should have access to the process of and benefits of development (access is inclusive).</p>	<p>Brings out the power dynamics between actors in plans and processes of development.</p> <p>Bring out the concept of bargaining power as a process of formulating policy, and winners and loser as an outcome of policy.</p> <p>Access to the process of and benefits of development depends on factors endowment (access is exclusive).</p>
Focus on Actors	<p>Seeks to regulate relationships between state and non-state actors, including citizens, through the notion of duty-bearers and rights-holders.</p> <p>Considers their corresponding duties, rights, and sets of abilities to meet obligations and claim rights as the target of development.</p> <p>The needs of actors become entitlements (in legal terms).</p> <p>Actors make entitlement claims through courts or legal procedures.</p> <p>State policies focus on the most vulnerable group.</p>	<p>Brings out the differences between actors as winners and losers.</p> <p>It considers the power of actors in terms of factor endowments and sets the ability of capital and labour to determine policy outcomes</p> <p>The needs of actors become demands (in political terms).</p> <p>Actors make demands through economic sanctions or elections.</p> <p>State policies focus on the most powerful group.</p>
Participation	<p>Participation is fundamental, and all persons are entitled to participate to the maximum of their potential.</p>	<p>Participation is exclusive and depends on the ability or capacity to wield the power of capital or labour.</p>
Equality	<p>All stakeholders are equal by the fact that they are human beings.</p> <p>Equality and non-discrimination are fundamental in human rights frameworks</p>	<p>Not all actors are equal by the fact that they have different factor endowments as capital and labour.</p> <p>Inequality between labour and capital is fundamental in political economy analysis.</p>
Empowerment	<p>Empowerment means people’s ability to exercise their influence or claim their rights is improved, and people have control over the means necessary to control their own life.</p>	<p>Empowerment means the ability for actors to use their factor endowment is improved, and people take control of the means necessary to control their interest.</p>
Accountability	<p>The state should establish safeguard mechanisms (and give) special attention to address issues of discrimination, inequality, and vulnerability.</p> <p>Within the human rights framework, there is an explicit focus on accountability of the duty-bearer towards the rights-holder.</p> <p>The state must be responsible for adherence to human rights standards as well as being answerable to the law and policy – If it fails to do so, there are mechanisms for rights-holder to seek and obtain redress</p>	<p>The state should safeguard the strongest sector or factor (capital or labour) and protect sector or factor interests. The state is required to respond to a society based on the potential of their factor endowment and capacity to pressure the state or on the state’s need for capital or labour.</p> <p>Within A PEA, there is a focus on accountability of the state towards the stronger sector or factor.</p> <p>The state must be responsible for adherence to factors of production as well as be answerable to its electorates; if it fails to do so, it should be elected out of government.</p>

Such a rights based political economy approach, including an in-depth case study in two rural communities within the SAGCOT, is useful as it interrogates the actors and processes involved in large-scale land deals (Barkin 2003, Denscombe 2004).

As Morgenthau (1948, 178) notes, ‘people are inherently moral, as well as political animals. All political acts have ethical significance’. Additionally, in order not to get completely lost in actors and factors of production, the rights-based political economy approach used in this study builds on analytical models which focus on the exercise of power, ways in which agents use such power, and ways of talking back to power (Silver and Arrighi 2003). It is, therefore, in the interest of this study to complement the moral parsimony of political economy analysis with the prowess of ethics, legality and morality in a human rights-based approach (Narula 2013). Applying a human right lens sets a standard against which institutions and socio-political relations ‘ought to be’ measured (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 916). The next chapter advances further the argument in favour of the case-study approach used in this research, including questions of bias and how they are addressed to improve the quality of the entire research process. An in-depth case study offers the chance of studying the subject matter in sufficient detail to focus on relationships and processes, and unravel the complexities of a given situation (Denscombe 2004, 31).

### 3 Chapter Three: Research Methods

In earlier sections of this thesis, it became evident how widespread LSLIs and their influence on the broader Tanzanian political economy have become in the last decade. Ngoitiko et al. (2010) and Barume (2017) examine political contestations between the Maasai community, the Tanzanian government and private investors, introduced by the transfer of community land to foreign safari and hunting companies in Liliondo. Sulle (2020) provides insight into the politics of LSLIs in Kilombero, and Bélair (2018) examines the role of the TIC using LSLIs in the Rufiji region as an example. Schlimmer (2018) presents a comprehensive review of '*land as politicised rhetoric during the 2015 elections in Tanzania*'. Arguably, these authors highlight the broader 'political' implications of LSLIs in Tanzania using 'spatially' or 'temporarily' bounded cases to explore the more general phenomenon of LSLIs in Tanzania.

Sulle (2020), for example, uses the spatially bounded Kilombero Plantation Limited case to explore the 'micro-politics' of 'land rights and agro-commercialisation in the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT)'. Bélair (2018) studied the spatially bounded unit in the Rufiji region to assess the role of the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as the 'state broker' in land transfer processes in Tanzania. Ngoitiko et al. (2010) also made use of a spatially bounded case to demonstrate how local communities were beginning to mobilise resources and capabilities against the expropriation of their land within the LSLI context, taking the Maasai community in Liliondo as a case study. Schlimmer (2018) adds another dimension to the case study approach by introducing a temporarily bounded case in exploring land as politicised rhetoric in the 2015 elections. Reviewing these cases in the literature review section of this thesis illustrates the broader dynamics of the politics and history of LSLIs in Tanzania, which may not be appreciated if their corresponding authors did not intensively study these individual cases. Arguably, LSLI research may be strengthened – a critical balance in respect

of the benefits and disbenefits of LSLIs established - by executing a more significant number of thorough case studies (Flyvbjerg 2006, Oya 2013b).

This section provides a working definition of a case study approach in this research. It examines the vitality and limitations in LSLI research and how the case-study itself was carried out to improve the entire research process. There is considerable literature on whether the case study approach is a 'method' or a 'strategy' within social science research (Verschuren 2003, Amerson 2011, Gerring 2004, Yin 1981, Zainal 2007). Denscombe (2004, 33) argues that any impression that case study research is a method for collecting data is wrong. To Denscombe, case study research is a matter of research strategy, not research methods. Verschuren (2003, 128) adds that case study research is a way of doing research, rather than the reductionist view as 'the study of a single case'. A 'case' may vary across research objectives, spatial and temporal boundaries, with varying implications on the research design (Gerring 2004). For example, in discussing the significance of 'new-generation growth corridors and their integration in global value chains in the Global South', Dannenberg et al. (2018) use the SAGCOT and the Walvis Bay-Ndola-Lubumbashi Development Corridor in Zambia as case studies in a cross-sectional analysis. Steffens et al. (2019) take the SAGCOT as their starting point to discuss the '*new generation of growth corridors as drivers of development in Africa*'.

Additionally, to investigate the contradictions in 'development as exploitation' during the German colonial period in Tanzania, Koponen (1995) uses the temporal boundary between 1884-1914 in a retrospective analysis of German colonial policies in Tanzania. James Scott (2008) uses the small village of 'Sedaka' to illustrate the everyday forms of peasant resistance in Malaysia's paddy rice sector by performing a synchronic or snapshot description of the day-to-day realities in Sedaka between 1967-1979. The regard of a case study as a strategy

accommodates the point made by Hammersley (1992, 185) that a case study ‘should be determined by the [judgement of the researcher] and of the resulting gains and losses in light of the particular goals and circumstances of the research, including the resources available’. In this sense, the researcher’s *positionality* matters in selecting cases and in the validity and quality of the entire research process (Ganga and Scott 2006, Hammersley 1992).

Hence, while the case study approach is extensively labelled as a ‘research method’ (Zainal 2007, Amerson 2011), this research recognises it as a research strategy (Yin 1981, Gerring 2004, Denscombe 2004), which allows the researcher to use ‘a variety of sources and research methods as a part of the investigation’ (Denscombe 2004, 31). This mixed-method approach within case study research ensures data validity through cross-checking and triangulation (Jick 1979, Flick 2004). In the context of LSLI research, Oya (2013a, 1536) adds that effective triangulation and probing are crucial in understanding the complexities and nuances of LSLI research. For example, for an initial analysis of secondary data, this research draws on academic literature, policy documents, civil society and media reports, and internal project documents regarding LSLIs in Tanzania. Documents such as letters between villagers and government officials, minutes of village meetings and land use maps were obtained from village members. The documents were also used as prompts during focus group discussions (FGDs). Primary data was collected through key informant interviews, FGDs, and household surveys. As Denscombe (2004, 31) argues, ‘the case study approach can be combined with participant observation and informal interviews, including questionnaires to provide information on a particular point of interest’.

Therefore, a case study approach is defined here as an in-depth investigation of a purposively selected case, using several data collection methods to understand a larger class of cases

(Gerring 2004, 342). The cases purposively selected for this study are spatially located in the Ruvuma region and fall within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania. Ruvuma is one of the thirty-one regions in Tanzania and is located in the Southern Highlands, bordering on Malawi and Mozambique. The villages (or cases) have been anonymised, and pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of households and research participants (sub-cases). However, anyone who is familiar with the area would be able to identify both villages quite quickly. This puts more pressure on the researcher in respect of what s/he can reveal and attribute to individuals in the area and to ensure that the principles of anonymity and confidentiality are respected as part of research ethics (see Table 9). What follows is a detailed description of why and how these cases were selected for this research.

### **3.1 Case selection**

Like other social science research, which focuses on questions of power, relationships and processes of change in society, to understand how power shapes LSLIs and social transformation within agrarian societies, in-depth case study research is necessary (Oya 2013b, Locher and Sulle 2014). A good case study provides granular data on the relationships and processes under investigation (Denscombe 2004). However, there is always a trade-off in selecting case studies as a research strategy (Hammersley 1992). Hammersley (1992, 186) demonstrates this by arguing that ‘the choice of a case study involves buying greater detail and accuracy of information about particular cases at the cost of making effective generalisation to a larger population of cases’. Yet, case studies are essential in developing social science research (Verschuren 2003), especially in the ‘force of examples’ for deductive reasoning (Flyvbjerg 2006, 228). The trade-off between an in-depth understanding of a particular phenomenon through a specific case and making effective generalisation to a larger population is relative to the relationship between resource demands and resource availability (Hammersley

1992). For example, the smaller the resources, i.e., time, financial or human, available to carry out a particular study, the more likely the researcher foregoes a general population survey in favour of selecting a case study. Importantly, a case study's generalisability can be improved by a strategic selection of cases (Flyvbjerg 2006, 229), which mitigates the degree of trade-off and resource constraints in investigating the broader significance of a phenomenon.

A good case study requires the researcher to defend the suitability of a case for the research (Denscombe 2004, 33). There are several reasons for case selection in case study research (Yin 1981, Verschuren 2003, Flyvbjerg 2006, Denscombe 2004). This section focuses on the case selection strategies for this research. Broadly speaking, the reasons for case selection can be categorised into three main themes: (a) suitability, (b) pragmatic reasons and (c) no real choice or alternative (Denscombe 2004, Flyvbjerg 2006). The selection of a case where there is no other alternative for the researcher usually falls within the context of commissioned research with 'no real choices [for the researcher] in selecting the cases' (Denscombe 2004, 35). Sampson (2004, 387) give examples of the absence of choice in case selection in the 'context of contract research'. However, for this research, I had the freedom to choose my cases, including the scope and objectives of my PhD research. For example, to identify suitable cases for this research, I started the process of applying for the appropriate research permits and make initial contact with host institutions and persons, I undertook a pilot visit to Tanzania from the 3<sup>rd</sup> – 23<sup>rd</sup> of December 2017.

Pilot or preliminary visits are essential for reflecting on 'research validity, approaches in data collection, ethics, foreshadowing research problems and questions and the researcher health and safety' (Sampson 2004, 384). During the pilot visit for this research, I interviewed key informants (see below) to 'well-known cases' of LSLIs associated with political contestations

against land expropriation or investment processes in Tanzania. Flyvbjerg (2006, 229) defines ‘well-known cases’ as ‘critical cases’ that have ‘strategic importance to the general phenomenon under investigation. Thomas (2013, 152) defines them as ‘well-known examples’ of the phenomenon under study. I interviewed a researcher who worked with the NGO Farm Radio International about the Kagera sugar plantation case; I interviewed Sulle (2020) on the Kilombero case. I made trips to Arusha and Ruvuma, where I discussed with other key informants about LSLI in schemes in these spatially defined territories. In total, seven key informants, i.e., two academics in investment and human right law at the University of Dar es Salaam, four community-based activists, and the CEO of a farmer-based organisation, were consulted during this pilot visit. The pilot visit allowed me to identify a critical case *vis-à-vis* budgetary constraints, re-evaluate the research's purpose and scope, and adequately contextualise the research questions. All this was documented carefully and discussed in full with my supervisors.

Pilot studies of this sort have been used within social science research to re-define research questions, collect background information on the phenomenon under investigation, and adapt the research approach and design (Sampson 2004, 387). After appreciating the logistical challenges, the financial demands, and the security risk of doing fieldwork in four different regions of Tanzania as initially conceived, I decided that fieldwork would be done in two villages in the Ruvuma region. Therefore, the latitude in choosing my cases eliminates option (c) as a reason for case selection and leaves reasons (a) and (b) as plausible explanations for my case selection.

While there may be some advantages of ‘getting into the field’ as a ‘stranger’ without any pilot visit, i.e., the researcher can be ‘objective’ and ‘distant’ from the case under investigation, there

is a trade-off of understanding things in greater depth (Sampson 2004, 387). To Sampson (2004, 392), ‘some kind of pilot study is deeply advantageous to qualitative inquiry in all forms’. Madison (2011, 29) suggests that researchers should have a basic understanding of the field – the general history, meanings, practices, institutions, and believes that constitute it – before they plunge full force into the actual field research. In July 2014, I had previously visited Village 1 in the Ruvuma region for two weeks as part of research conducted for my M.Sc. dissertation<sup>33</sup>. These prior visits to Village 1 in the Ruvuma region proved valuable in carrying LSLI research, ‘where context specificity is essential’ (Oya 2013a, 1535).

Instrumental for community entry was access to the communities through the farmers’ network MVIWATA. MVIWATA is a national farmer’s network with regional offices in Ruvuma, Dodoma, and other regions of Tanzania. Their close association with land certification issues (certificates of occupancies) and smallholder agriculture contributed to selecting them as a point of entry for field research. Additionally, their partnership with international NGOs like MISEREOR, the German Catholic Bishop’s Organisation for Development Cooperation, was instrumental in setting the stage for my first visit to Tanzania in 2014. In fact, a MISEROR sponsored research on LSLI’s in Ruvuma (see Twomey et al. 2015) partly informed the selection of the region as the area of field research during my M.Sc. Additionally, as is illustrated in Chapter 4, local partnerships were essential in ensuring my safety and navigating tensions with powerful gatekeepers in the research community. For example, support from a trusted activist academic who is a university lecturer in the area was extremely useful in that

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33 The M.Sc. thesis (unpublished) was entitled *the impact of large-scale land acquisition on the right to adequate food of small-scale farmers in Tanzania*, the limited time spent in the field (two weeks) during that study and small sample size in Village 1 (25 households), uncovered a host of interesting issues, and justified the need for a much broader and in-depth study, as presented here.

some law enforcement agents in the research area were once his students and held him in high regard.

My engagements with local communities in the Ruvuma region influenced my decision to select Village 1 and 2 as the cases for this research. I established relationships of trust, facilitated community entry (also see Zinn 1979) and engaged in more sensitive issues around livelihoods, food security and empowerment as addressed by this research. The Ruvuma region became a ‘well-known case’ to me and a ‘critical case’ concerning the political contestations against LSLIs within SAGCOT (as revealed in the results chapters). Village 1 is close to a functioning 1,999 ha agribusiness, while Village 2 is close to a failed investment project of about 20,000ha. The farms belong to foreign and local private investors, respectively.

In summary, both villages in the Ruvuma region were suitable cases to the broader debates on the politics of LSLIs, and ‘well-known cases’ given my prior (albeit limited) knowledge of the research area. However, prior knowledge and partnerships were also potentially detrimental to my research experience as they exposed me to further scrutiny by powerful social actors in the community and questions about who was funding my research (Talleh Nkobou 2020). Fieldwork was carried out in the Ruvuma region from May to September 2018. Research permits and ethical clearance were obtained from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH)<sup>34</sup> and the University of Reading’s School of Agriculture, Policy and Development Research Ethics Committee<sup>35</sup>. I now turn to a brief description of the case study locations.

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<sup>34</sup> Ref No.2018 – 348-NA-2018-06

<sup>35</sup> Ref: 00739\_14.05.2018

## 3.2 Area of study

### 3.2.1 The Ruvuma Region

The Ruvuma region is situated in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. It borders the Republic of Mozambique to the south, Malawi, and Lake Nyasa to the west, Njombe and Morogoro Regions to the north, and Mtwara Region to the east. The Ruvuma region covers approximately 63,968 square kilometres and is divided into five rural districts and three town councils. Figure 6 is a map showing the rural districts in the Ruvuma region. Administrative units within regions are divided into rural districts. The districts are Mbinga, Nyasa, Namtumbo, Songea and Tunduru. The town councils include Mbinga, Tunduru and Songea Municipal. The Ruvuma River is the primary source of water in this region. Agriculture accounts for a significant part of the region's economy, providing over 90% of regional production and employment. Agriculture is predominantly carried out by smallholders, typically cultivating about 2–5 acres (Sarris et al. 2006, Seki and Maly 1993). This research was conducted in the Songea district.




Figure 6 Administrative Units in the Ruvuma Region Source: (PFP 2016)

At the time I conducted fieldwork, in 2018, Songea Rural had thirty-nine (39) wards, of which three (3) were held by the opposition party *Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo*

(CHADEMA), and the rest were of the ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM). Each district is divided into administrative wards. Each political party nominates a candidate for each ward and candidates for ‘women seats,’ i.e., with twenty-five per cent of all council seats to be elected as district councillors. On average, each ward is comprised of 2-3 villages. Ruvuma has a total of 124 villages. The elected councillors constitute a Local Government Council (LGC), which is comprised of elected ward leaders, member of parliament (MP), the district executive director/officer and the district commissioner (DC) (Art. 35(1) Local Government Act 1982).

Additionally, each ward has a ward development committee which includes chairpersons of all village councils within the ward (Section 6 (b) the Local Government Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act, 1999. These development committees are, at least theoretically, concerned with development projects, including LSLIs in rural communities. The balance of power in Songea Rural is reflective of the historical dominance of the ruling political party nationwide. This observation is seconded by Lange (2008, 1127), who adds that ‘none of the opposition parties has managed to challenge CCM’s popularity’ since independence. The political dynamics at the local level influence how state authorities and local governments’ governance and implementation capacity are used (Therkildsen 2011, Peter and Shivji 2000). This makes the Ruvuma region a suitable case for examining the history and evolution of investment policies from a local political economy perspective.

Additionally, Ruvuma’s strategic position in the history of villages as commodity-producing units under the villagisation scheme (Mann 2017) provides a unique dynamic and opportunity to combine historical, legal and policy analysis of contemporary LSLI debates. In fact, before the 1967 Arusha declaration that established *Ujamaa*, the Ruvuma region pioneered Nyerere’s version of cooperative development under the villagisation scheme in the 1970s (Coulson 1984). As an alternative to the harsh working conditions experienced under British colonial

rule, youths like Ntimbanjayo Millinga, who later became leader of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) Youth League in Peramiho (one of Ruvuma's ward), took to the countryside of Ruvuma to implement their version of cooperative development (Huizer 1973, Schneider 2004). Millinga, together with Ralph Ibbott (1966)<sup>36</sup>, later formed the Ruvuma Development Association (RDA), and in 1965, Millinga became a Member of the Tanzanian Parliament (Mann 2017). Mann (2017) and Ibbott (2014) provide a detailed account of how the RDA influenced the *Ujamaa* policies under the Nyerere regime and also its influence on contemporary development discourse in the region.

The RDA was eventually disbanded in 1969, ostensibly to limit the powers of an association whose independence and self-assured leadership posed a challenge to the state's authority on approaches to community development (Schneider 2014, 49, Melchiorre 2016, 124). Hence, the present-day animosity between local communities and the developmental ambition of the state is not new. A detailed review of the history of the villagisation scheme has been presented in Chapter two. Examining these histories and practices is crucial in explaining the history of political contention between local bureaucratic elite and agrarian communities (Schneider 2014, 167).

Hence the case-study approach applied here seeks to combine both a historical/retrospective analysis and a spatially bounded in-depth understanding of the politics of LSLIs in the community. According to Gerring (2004, 344), a combination of both temporal and 'within unit variation' is the most common genre of case study analysis. The villages selected as cases within the Ruvuma region, i.e., Village 1 and Village 2 (see *Figure 7*), form part of the

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<sup>36</sup> Ralph Ibbott worked on co-operative farms with black Africans in apartheid Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) before moving to Tanzania where the possibilities of continuing his passion for co-operative farming with rural communities were more supported by the state.

community of discourse and provide valuable insight into the histories and politics of LSLIs. It remains unclear to this researcher if both villages were *Ujamaa* villages. Peramiho district is about 20kms away from Village 1. However, the presence of LSLIs in both villages and within the geographical boundaries of the SAGCOT provide valuable context and grounding within contemporary debates about LSLIs.

Demographic data from Village Executive Officers (VEO) in both villages are presented in Table 5. According to the 2018 demographic data obtained from the VEOs in both villages (see Table 6), there are 428 households in Village 1, with a total of 1,954 inhabitants (991 male and 963 female inhabitants). Village 2 consists of 821 households and 3,612 inhabitants (1,793 male and 1,819 female inhabitants).

*Table 6 Population distribution of both Village 1 and Village 2*

<b>Village</b>	<b>Vitongoji (hamlets)</b>	<b>Number of households</b>	<b>Males</b>	<b>Females</b>	<b>Total population</b>
Village 1	7	428	991	963	1,954
Village 2	12	821	1,793	1,819	3,612





Figure 7 Land use map of Village 1 and 2 including distribution of household survey by hamlet

### 3.3 Sampling procedure

As previously discussed in the definition of a case study approach, one of the ‘strengths of a case study approach is that it allows the researcher to use various sources and methods during investigation’ (Denscombe 2004, 31). Gerring (2004, 343) adds that case study approaches are unique in their reliance on covariation and their attempt to illuminate features of a broader set of units. Covariation is how two or more variables correlate or affect each other (Gerring 2004, Denscombe 2004). For example, in this study, I seek to investigate how the politics of LSLIs affect domestic political alignment (**RQ1**), how LSLIs contribute to the support of nationalism in Magufuli’s Tanzania (**RQ2**)? And finally, what is the food insecurity experience of individuals in LSLI communities (**RQ3**)? Identifying variables that can answer these questions requires multiple sources of data and systematic sampling techniques.

Having identified the cases, i.e., Village 1 and 2, I used a two-stage sampling technique to identify respondents. Ghaljaie et al. (2017) argue that sampling is done in two general ways, i.e., nonprobability and probability sampling. In nonprobability sampling, the researcher or the community members influence the selection of samples. Here, not everyone has an equal chance of being selected. For example, in the first stage of sampling, I selected key informants based on a snowball technique. Snowballing is a purposive data collection method in which identified research participants ‘recruit future’ participants among their peers and acquaintances (Ghaljaie et al. 2017, 2). For this research, the primary contact person, a law professor at the University of Dar es Salaam, was contacted via e-mail in April 2017. He was selected based on an internet search for experts on investments and human rights at the University of Dar es Salaam. He also subsequently agreed to kindly act as the institutional host for the researcher. Additionally, representatives from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSO) were purposively selected based on my previous visits

in 2014 and the pilot visit and recommendations from other NGOs like MVIWATA, MISEROER and the Danish Institute of Human Rights. These NGOs also carry out several community-based activities on land rights in Tanzania and may be seen as ‘pro-community’ and thus not necessarily supportive of the wider LSLI and SAGCOT agenda.

In the second stage of sampling, I used a probability sampling approach. Here, the researcher’s opinion or community members do not significantly influence the selection of samples (Ghaljaie et al. 2017). For example, 187 households were systematically selected by relying on the stratification of villages into hamlets (*vitongoji*). In Tanzania, rural areas are divided into hamlets, while urban areas are made up of *mitaa* (streets). Village 1 and Village 2 have seven and twelve hamlets, respectively (Table 7). Not all 12 hamlets in Village 2 were surveyed because of the abrupt termination of the researcher’s permit in the local community. Using this fact as the basis of my sampling technique, I was able to carry out household surveys and use a structure questionnaire on a representative percentage of the population in both villages (Ghaljaie et al. 2017).

Additionally, all adults above 18 years of age in these households (n= 374) were selected for survey interviews within the stratified hamlets in both villages. Each interviewee was given an anonymised code to represent the *kitongoji*<sup>37</sup> (Dx), household number (HHx), and a four-digit random integer. For example, an interviewee code was as follows: D1HH11234. Reasons for the abrupt termination of the researcher’s permit are explained in Chapter 4, also see Talleh Nkobou (2020). Through the use of appropriate sampling techniques and systematically arriving at a representative sample, case studies seek to represent a population of cases *vis-à-vis* the phenomenon under investigation (Gerring 2004, 344). There are different methods to

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<sup>37</sup> Sing. for *Vitongoji*

collect required data, including interviews, focus groups, notes, reports, observations, all of these leading to various data types (Ghaljaie et al. 2017). In the next section, I discuss the different types of data and instruments used in collecting them.

*Table 7 Sample size distribution of both Village 1 and Village 2*

<b>Village</b>	<b>Vitongoji</b>	<b>Number of households</b>	<b>Me (males)</b>	<b>Ke (Female)</b>	<b>Total population</b>
Village 17		112	87	109	196
Village 28		75	86	92	148
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>173</b>	<b>201</b>	<b>374</b>

### 3.4 Data type and instruments

#### 3.4.1 Qualitative data:

##### Key informant interviews:

Key informant interviews can be used to gain access to ‘privileged information’ from key players involved in the phenomenon under investigation (Denscombe 2004, 165). Authors like Lokot (2021) have questioned the privileged position given to ‘key’ informants in social science research compared to the information obtained from ‘ordinary’ people. To Lokot (2021, 1), their ‘expert status’ may lead to unhelpful assumptions that key informants ‘understand and represent their community’, especially in situations where ‘power-holders’ benefit when they participate in the key informant interviews. The conflicts regarding who is ‘key’ to understanding a phenomenon under investigation can be reflected in the researcher’s interactions with powerful gatekeepers in the case study community. For example, while carrying out fieldwork in Village 1, I was questioned by the manager of the investment company, who argued that he was in the best position to ‘point me towards the right individuals for my interviews’ (Encounter with the management team of the investment company in Village 1, 25<sup>th</sup> July 2018). Cramer et al. (2015) also experienced similar challenges while conducting fieldwork in Ethiopia.

It is essential that the researcher stays alive to these conflicts, tensions and power imbalances and applies alternative methods such as focus group discussions, surveys, and interviews with ‘ordinary’ people to validate information obtained through key informant interviews (Lokot 2021). So, to gain ‘key’ information and a holistic understanding of land ownership and acquisition processes in the case-study communities and the politics of LSLIs in general, I conducted unstructured interviews with a total of 18 key informants. Key informants were sampled from various stakeholder groups in both villages and Dar es Salaam between December 2017 and September 2018 (see Table 8). Interviews were held with officials from the private sector (Tanzania Private Sector Foundation); Civil Society Organisations (Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) Tanzania), Business and Human Rights Tanzania, Activists, Tanganyika Law Society, Tanzania Farmers Network (MVIWATA), and Tanzania National Committee of Family Farming (TANCOFF); Public institutions such as the Commission of Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) Tanzania; academics such as University of Dar es Salaam staff, Saint Augustin University Staff and three independent consultants working in the LSLI sector. Key informants also contributed to the translation, adaptation, and validation of the household food insecurity access scale (HFIAS), which was used to explore individuals' food insecurity experiences (and provide answers to **RQ3**). The HFIAS is revisited in detail in Chapter 7.

*Table 8 Distribution of prominent community members and key informants consulted during this study*

Stakeholder group	Number interviewed (n)		
	Male	Female	Total
Farmers based organisation	3	N/A	3
Academia	3	N/A	3
Civil Society Organisations	3	1	4
State Government representative	1	1	2
Local Government representative	4	2	6
Total	14	4	18

It should be noted that, of the 18 key informants, only four were women. This reflects a striking gender imbalance in the academic sector and the farmers-based organisation. This also reflects

the low representation of women in the public sphere in the context of land rights in Tanzania and again highlights the limitations of relying solely on key informant interviews (Duncan and Haule 2014, Lokot 2021).

#### Focus Group Discussions (FGD):

FGDs can validate (or contradict) the information and mitigate the power imbalances introduced by key informant interviews (Lokot 2021). FGD participants were selected from each hamlet in both villages by the village chairperson (male) and with support from two male village guides. The selection of participants across hamlets introduces some level of probabilistic sampling (Ghaljaie et al. 2017). In other words, a strict set of selection criteria was given to the village chairperson to minimise selection bias as much as possible. For example, both male and female participants had to be selected from each hamlet, allowing for fairness and equal sex and geographical representation across the village. Where possible, an elder with sound knowledge of the village history was preferred. Care was, however, taken throughout to ensure that women were selected to participate. For example, in Village 1, fourteen participants were equally split into two groups - seven males and seven females (details about the need for equal representation across age and gender are highlighted in Chapter 7). FGDs were organised with the same participants for three consecutive Saturdays, with each daily session lasting an average of two hours. In Village 2, fourteen participants were selected. The focus group discussion in Village 2 was limited to one session with both male and female participants grouped because of the abrupt termination of the researcher's research permit (see chapter four. Also, see Talleh Nkobou 2020).

Focus groups were instrumental in exploring participants' perspectives of the history of the LSLIs, and the roles played by key actors or officials. Participants also explored questions relating to recourse mechanisms, i.e., where they may go when they need help on food security

issues or a perceived abuse of their rights. They also explored the gendered implications of LSLIs in the community. FGDs were conducted in Swahili with the help of a paid facilitator and translator. Translators and local partners are valuable in settings where the researcher has limited knowledge in the language and cues in the ‘world’ of research participants (Leck 2014, Temple and Edwards 2002). The FGDs were also audio-recorded, and the recordings transcribed by the facilitator and a second translator, working with the researcher, to avoid missing any nuances in the data. Confidentiality and anonymity were respected throughout this process. Locally recruited field assistants were familiar with the community’s language and culture and acted as rapporteurs during the FGDs. The guide to and protocols of the FGDs can be found in the Appendices at the end of this thesis.

### **3.4.2 Quantitative data**

Quantitative data e.g., age, income level, and land ownership status were collected using a structured household questionnaire. An online survey tool, *Qualtrics*, was used to capture responses in *Village 1*. However, in *Village 2*, the questionnaire was transferred to a different survey tool, *LimeSurvey*, which allowed the questionnaire to be administered offline. This change reduced the time and cost of administering the survey questionnaires in a context where both the electricity supply and internet connectivity were intermittent.

#### Structured Household Survey Questionnaire:

Household surveys were conducted using a probabilistic sampling technique (Ghaljaie et al. 2017). i.e., each village member had an equal chance of being contacted for household interviews. Households were systematically sampled based on the geographical stratification of villages into hamlets. One hundred and twelve households in *Village 1* and seventy-five households in *Village 2* were surveyed. The survey questionnaires were administered with the help of two research assistants (one male and one female). An average of ten households was

surveyed per hamlet (See *Figure 7*). Each dot in *Figure 7* represents a household, and the different colours represent the various hamlets. Apart from the typical demographic data (age, gender, relationship to household ‘head’, etc), household surveys were also useful in gathering data on trust in government and individual food insecurity experience. Data collection techniques for the standard ‘trust in government’ question used in this study are further explained in Chapter 6. Data on individual food insecurity experience at the household level is presented and analysed in Chapter 7.

All the questions were translated from English into Swahili to minimise the inconsistencies which may occur when questions are translated individually and in an *ad hoc* fashion. Where possible, both male and female adults in a household were interviewed. Interviews lasted for an average of 45 minutes. Male and female adults were interviewed separately by the male and female research assistant, respectively. Doing so minimised potential unequal gender dynamics between interviewer and interviewee and possible power dynamics between household members, e.g., husband and wife, enabling both female and male to offer their opinions relatively free of such dynamics.

A total of 374 interviewees (n=374) responded to the survey in both villages. Adults above 18 years were selected to reflect the minimum age required to belong to the village assembly (as per the *Village Land Act of 1999*) and in line with the imperative to address voluntary, prior, and informed consent issues. For this research and its specific interest in human rights principles, individual responses were used to analyse village members' perceptions of investment policy, trust in government, and their experiences of food insecurity. These aspects of the data are presented and discussed in Chapters 5, 6 & 7, respectively.

### **3.5 Data analysis**

Two methods were used to analyse the data. Qualitative data was analysed using NVivo 10. Data was initially categorised through boldening and colouring of text and fieldnotes, and ultimately by grouping data around similar themes in the researcher's written notes before the NVivo software was used to enhance the categorisation process further. Following Creswell and Poth (2018), the categorisation of the data through the development of emerging themes, patterns and concepts formed the basis of analysing the qualitative data. Household questionnaires were quantitatively analysed using the statistical software package R. Quantitative data from the data collection tools Qualtrics and Limesurvey were automatically pre-coded, and their values easily recorded in R. A number of the questions were open-ended. Their values had to be captured by categorizing the open-ended responses into similar codes and themes before they were captured in R. Quantitative data were used in the Latent Class Analysis to provide answers to **RQ2** and measure the food insecurity experiences of individuals as a response to **RQ3**. Qualitative data was also used for demographic descriptions and characterisation of household interviewees.

### **3.6 Limitations and Biases in case-study research approach**

As stated in the introductory section of this method chapter, there are always trade-offs in selecting case studies as a research strategy (Hammersley 1992). The choice of a case study typically comes at the cost of making effective generalisation to a larger population of cases (Hammersley 1992, 186). Denscombe (2004, 36) argues that by opting for a case study approach, the researcher is likely to confront scepticism about how far it is reasonable to generalise from the findings of one case. To this point, Flyvbjerg (2006) suggest that while case studies may be an in-depth study of a specific case, it is also an example for a broader class of cases. 'The extent to which finding from the case study can be generalised to other

examples depends on how far the case study example is similar to other cases (Denscombe 2004, 36). So, in line with the studies presented by Sulle (2020), Bélair (2018) and Ngoitiko et al. (2010), the cases presented here demonstrate *examples* of the political contestations against LSLIs in African agrarian-based economies. The specificities in the spatial and temporal boundaries of the cases present unique insights into LSLI investment debates.

Additionally, as suggested earlier, case-study research relies on the judgement and *positionality* of the researcher for case selection. This has led to debates about subjectivity vs objectivity (Flyvbjerg 2006). Case study-based research is often understood to have a bias toward verification, i.e., ‘as a tendency to confirm the researcher’s preconceived notions’ (Flyvbjerg 2006, 334). I was faced with this challenge when questioned by powerful gatekeepers in the research community. It was assumed that a German NGO had sent me to investigate human rights violations on the investment in Village 1. In the next section, I discuss how it has become more difficult for researchers to present themselves as objective. The subjective bias of case study research exposes the researcher to various risks, as discussed in the next chapter of this thesis. Flyvbjerg (2006, 236) argues that ‘verification bias’ questions also apply to other research approaches and is not limited to the case-study approach. In-depth observations made possible by the case study approach is a prerequisite for an advanced understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Verschuren 2003, Gerring 2004, Flyvbjerg 2006).

It is also for the sensitivities and ‘varification bias’ in LSLI research that they are often perceived to be politically contentious, which can lead to multiple levels of conflict between the researcher and powerful gatekeepers in case study communities and critiques of the interpretations offered (Cramer et al. 2015, Talleh Nkobou 2020). Questions about ‘verification bias’ also highlight the importance of triangulation of findings and keeping an open mind in

respect of different ways to set up the research questions, design the study, analyse the data and ultimately to interpret the data you have collected. Some of my experiences of this are illustrated in Chapter Four.

### **3.7 Ethical considerations**

This section uses a tabulated format to illustrate the ethical considerations used in this research. The researcher had to submit for approval two Research Ethics applications to two institutions, i.e., the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the University of Reading's School of Agriculture, Policy and Development Research Ethics Committee. Table 9 highlights approaches and considerations in dealing with human data (e.g., confidentiality and anonymity as part of the data handling process), working with children (which does not form part of this research), and obtaining research clearance documents.

Table 9 Ethical considerations and actions taken

Ethical concern	Action Taken
Human Data	Voluntary consent was obtained by explaining my intentions to each participant, why I selected the village and the participant, and how their personal information will be anonymized and used. The contact details of my supervisors, local host and contact institutions in Tanzania were also provided for participants to decide to opt-out of the research before December 2019. My raw data was shredded in December 2019. Anonymised data was encrypted and saved in a secure password-protected datasheet while the personal information of research participants was stored in a separate, password-protected 'keyed' file.
Working with children	Children were not consulted or interviewed during the entire research process. Strict sampling criteria were applied to limit the age of research participants to 18 years. This age limit was selected to reflect the age prescribed in the 1999 Village Land Act and section 55 of the Local Government (District Authorities) Act 1982, which describes the village assembly as every village member above 18. The legal age of consent in Tanzania is 18 years.
Informed consent	In situations where participants were unable to read, including those with no education, some primary education or informal training (equal to about 89% of research participants), an information sheet was read out to them. They were given a chance to ask questions. The participants were requested to accept or deny consent, thereby demonstrating their approval for the research. In cases where respondents were worried about signing the consent form due to this study's sensitive nature, participants were informed that they could withdraw from the process should they feel insecure. They were assured that their personal information would be anonymised during data analysis and presentation. Additionally, data storage and protection were rigorously followed and respected using GDPR guidelines recommended by the Research Ethics Committee of the School of Agriculture, Policy and Development at the University of Reading.
Research clearance from Tanzania	Before commencing research in Tanzania, a research permit must be obtained from the Tanzania Commission for Science and Technology (COSTECH). Additional legal documents and letters secured from local authorities as introductory letters, work and resident permits that were required before the research could proceed, have all been listed in the Appendix section of this thesis.
Ethical Clearance documents and procedures for the University of Reading	The University of Reading is committed to its staff and students conducting ethical research. The research followed all the recommendations of the Research Ethics Committee of the School of Agriculture, Policy and Development at the University of Reading.

In summary, the research applied here relies on a case-study strategy which allows for the use of various research methods and data collection techniques. It also allows for the use of pilot visits for case selection and familiarity of the case study. In the next chapter, I discuss the political nature of LSLI research, by highlighting the *positionality* of the researcher. As argued earlier, while there may be advantages of getting into the field as a stranger, the politics of LSLI research requires researchers to be sensitive to the environment of the research. It also

requires research techniques which immerse the researcher in day-to-day reflections about the significance of their research activities on the community of the researched and the researcher. For example, what happens when research runs up against various cultural, racial, gendered, and institutional obstructions?

These questions on the researcher's *positionality* bring to the fore potential conceptual errors, which may arise when the researcher uses 'value judgements and ideas of rationality from one particular tradition to prove why other traditions or other concepts of rationality are unreasonable or unworthy' (Madison 2011). While authors like Flyvbjerg (2006) have termed this as 'verification bias', Minnich (1986) calls it a conceptual '*circularity error*' meaning that knowledge from a single domain has the potential to foreclose alternative possibilities for ordering and reordering authoritative regimes of truth. In order to avoid these 'verification biases', 'availability bias' (i.e., the tendency to pick the explanation that is readily available and agrees with your own preconceptions) and 'circularity errors', the researcher needs to be open to self critique and alive to the dangers of carrying out politically contentious research. A particular danger here is the researcher consciously or less consciously 'picking sides' in contentious/conflict situations where there appear to be 'winners' and 'losers', sometimes along the lines of powerful, outsiders and elites 'versus' ordinary villagers. I discuss these reflections in the next chapter, including reflections on interactions as a non-native researcher conducting field research.

## 4 Chapter Four: Positionality - The Trepidations of a PhD Researcher – Who Are You and Why Are You Here?

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou

School of Agriculture, Policy and Development<sup>38</sup>,

Email: [atenchongtallehnbou@reading.ac.uk](mailto:atenchongtallehnbou@reading.ac.uk)

### 4.1 Abstract

This chapter contributes to research risks that have a predominant focus on Western researchers in the global South. First, the paper examines how my African identity fits into a Western discourse of being a researcher and their intersections with my other personalities as I world-travel. ‘World-travelling’ is about the plurality of selves and an opening for self-construction. Second, the paper elaborates on violence and intimidation in the field and how researchers may succeed or fail in negotiating such risks. As a non-native researcher in a UK-based University, I acknowledge my plurality of selves and the skills needed to navigate these social worlds.

**KEYWORDS:** Fieldwork, PhD researcher, positionality, violence, world-travelling

### 4.2 Introduction

This chapter discusses my *positionality* and reflections as a researcher carrying out LSLI research in a country where I am not a native. The positionality of the researcher can affect the

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entire research experience, and social scientists are rightly being increasingly more reflexive about their research experiences. In carrying out doctoral field research in the Rufiji district, Bélair (2019, 6-8) describes her experience as ‘challenging because land issues are very politically contentious in the increasingly authoritarian context that prevails in Tanzania’. Chiswell and Wheeler (2016) reflect on how the particularities of farmer interviews pose unique and challenging prospects for young inexperienced female researchers. De Silva and Gandhi (2018) reflect on how social networks and relations between researchers and their parents could help gain access during field research. Menga (2020, 13) discusses how researchers ‘discipline themselves and normalise self-policing behaviours and practices that can influence and limit knowledge production processes.’ And the risks are not to be taken lightly: Scholars at Risk (SAR 2019, 60) documented 324 verified attacks on researchers in 56 countries from September 2018 to August 2019. While much research on risks in fieldwork emphasises gender and the negotiation of gender-based safe spaces (Miller 2014, Sampson and Thomas 2003), there is limited research on how race and nationality shape risks during field research.

This chapter makes two key contributions to existing work that predominantly focuses on the experiences of Western researchers in the global South. First, it examines how my African identity fits into the Western discourse of being a researcher and the intersections with my other ‘personalities’ uncovered by what Lugones (1987) refers to as ‘world-travelling’. Lugones (1987, 10) defines ‘world’ as a social construction of society, and ‘world-travelling’ is about the plurality of selves and an opening for self-construction. It refers to both movements between context and the sense of belonging to more than one world simultaneously (Anderson, 2014, p. 640). In immersing myself in the case-study communities, I carry several personalities that may impact my interactions with powerful gatekeepers, community members and local partners. It became evident during these interactions that my

African identity extends beyond borders and encompasses the meaning of being part of a people ‘who know what it signifies when race and [nationality] are used to determine who is human and who sub-human’ (Mbeki 2005, 17). Second, the chapter elaborates on violence and intimidation in the field and how researchers may succeed or fail in negotiating such risks. I illustrate how researchers can be put in harm’s way due to arrogant perceptions from ‘other’ researchers and observers, the deployment of stereotypes, and complex relationships with research partners.

These risks are not limited to non-native or foreign researchers as researchers can be constructed and perceived as outsiders in various ways. For example, in 2016, three researchers from the Arusha-based Selian Agricultural Research Institute (SERI) were killed in Dodoma, Tanzania, during field research. An article from The Citizen newspaper of October 5, 2016, tied their death to ‘utterances by a local politician’ who instructed members of Chamwino Districts in Dodoma to ‘deal hard and have no mercy with any stranger not familiar with them’. According to the report, these researchers were labelled by villagers as ‘blood hunters’. The label was later debunked by the Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Livestock Development and Fisheries as a ‘misguided conviction’. Although these researchers were Tanzanians, their ‘outsider’ status was defined by the utterances made by the local politician. They had become outsiders because members of the Chamwino District were ‘not familiar with them’. Their status as outsiders was a threat to the status quo and a security risk to the researchers who were eventually murdered. This brings to light more complexities associated with the concept of insiderness. It supports Haniff (1985), who argues that insiderness is a difficult concept to define. To Haniff (1985, 112), ‘insider may be more detriment than an outsider and a native more foreign than a foreigner’.

Another account by Cramer et al. (2015), involved experienced researchers who had undergone extensive training in research methodology and ethical research protocols. Their account resulted from fieldwork on a horticultural investment within the project on Fairtrade, Employment and Poverty Reduction in Ethiopia and Uganda (FTEPR) (Cramer et al. 2014). After a series of heated and confrontational encounters between local agents in Ethiopia and the six researchers, i.e., three from the UK and three from Ethiopia in the research team, ‘the officials took the Ethiopian researchers into town to the police station and confiscated their identity papers’ (Cramer et al. 2015, 149). Why did they not take the UK researchers to the police station? Could it be for fear of the power asymmetry between Ethiopia and the UK? Alternatively, were the female Ethiopian researchers just easy targets? Cramer et al. (2015) do not give a comprehensive reflection on the dynamics of race and nationality between the two groups of researchers. However, concerned about the wellbeing of the Ethiopian researchers who had been taken to the police station, the UK researchers accompanied them to the police station where they were told, ‘you do not know our culture. In our culture, you cannot come and stay here [at the police station]; you must go out.’ (Cramer et al. 2015, 149). Could the complexities of cultural values in Ethiopia place female Ethiopian researchers in a more precarious position? Were the UK researchers excused based on the assumption that they did not understand certain cultural norms? These questions and reflections are vital to consider in understanding how one’s positionality as a researcher may shape one’s research experiences and those of his/her collaborators (Noblit 2004).

Taking this a step further, understanding one’s positionality as a researcher is integral to adopting research strategies and approaches, including the choice of epistemic concepts and interpretations. As a Western-educated doctoral researcher, there is pressure to respect disciplinary boundaries and methodological protocols/rigidity, which confirms the critique

made by Jordan and Yeomans that typically '[Western] researchers are too concerned with reproducing the field strategies inscribed within their academic canon and too little in exploring alternative epistemological standpoints' (1995, 393). In the field, the African researcher is faced with expectations of being 'African' and with the ethical concerns of Connell, who argues that 'Southern forms of knowledge do not exist simply to be showcased' (2014, 219).

So, the approach I adopt in this research is critical approach which Geuss (1981) describes as providing a guide for human action. It is inherently emancipatory, has a cognitive content, is self-conscious, and self-critical. In other words, the task for the critical approach I chose to adopt in this research is to interrogate opposites between promises within LSLIs and the everyday realities of smallholder farmers in rural communities, and discern the outlines of what could become a more rational state of affairs within LSLIs. Such a critical approach to research on LSLIs could promote greater awareness about societal 'contradictions' and lead to improvements in human existence (Held 1980). Within such an epistemological construct, I had the freedom to use a framework that critiques the political economy of investments in Tanzania. It is critical in the sense that it is reflective, through a human rights lens, and gives agents a kind of knowledge productive of emancipation, and makes demands for their rights (Geuss 1981, 3).

However, as I have elaborated in Chapter Three, researchers must have a basic understanding of the field before plunging into field research (Madison 2011). During my research journey, I adjusted my positionality to reflect various worlds and circumstances as a UK-based doctoral researcher of African descent and as a necessary part of everyday life. During field research, I was intimidated, accused of spying and of teaching research participants how to riot. A search warrant was issued for my residence, part of my research data was confiscated, and my

possessions were mishandled. Finally, my research permit was revoked because a powerful social actor did not like the direction my research was taking.

In exploring my positionality, I use fieldnotes and recordings made during my journey from first-year doctoral student to ‘battle-scarred’ field researcher. The chapter is structured as follows. First, I contextualise the meaning of ‘world-travelling’ as a valuable tool for foregrounding the experiences of ‘minoritised’ people within a Western-dominated discourse of being a researcher and within the political context of LSLI research. Second, I focus on the privileges of researchers as ‘arrogant perceivers’ and how I navigated these new worlds, especially when they are constructed in ways that the researcher does not understand. I conclude by advocating approaches that improve doctoral researchers’ responsive capacity in accessing the everchanging and at times dangerous world of being a social science researcher.

### **4.3 World-travelling and the politics of LSLI research**

As stated by several authors, LSLI research is politically contentious (Bélair 2019, Talleh Nkobou 2020). Like politics, LSLI research is associated with activities aimed at improving someone’s status or increasing their power and agency within society. For example, as stated in the Introduction, this research examines LSLI discourse in Tanzania and argues that decades of neoliberal reforms have led to the disillusionment of the citizenry and, according to Amin (2017, 154), the systematic exclusion of an agrarian workforce from a capitalist-oriented economy. This research, therefore, ‘takes a clear position in intervening on hegemonic practices and services’ (Madison 2011, 7). Researchers are never neutral or detached from the phenomena they are observing, even if they think they are (Emerson et al. 2011, 3).

Additionally, using a human right lens interrogates relationships, power dynamics and introduces legally enforceable state obligations within LSLI transactions (De Schutter 2009a,

Narula 2005). My research examines LSLI discourse in Tanzania and argues that decades of neoliberal reforms have led to the disillusionment of the citizenry. In Tanzania, the term 'investment environment' seems to be used as an abstraction or bubble, an 'abstract community' (borrowed from James 1996), an ideological construction of domains for the pursuit of economic growth within which investors are expected to operate aloof to socio-political realities of rural communities. Speaking in Dar es Salaam during a two-day Tanzania-Israel Business and Investment Forum in April 2018, Israeli Minister of Justice Ms Ayelet Shaked said:

'Investors are like birds; they always stay up a tree which is stable - and has fruits. This is what Tanzania is like today; there are areas with big potential for investments and has stable political stability' -The Citizen 4th May 2018.

This analogy cannot be more befitting of the nature and relationship between Tanzania and the swarm of investors. Those at the bottom of the proverbial tree are a majority of Tanzanian citizens who are poor, vulnerable and less likely to benefit from the high hanging fruits produced by the so-called favourable 'investment environment'. As already mentioned in Chapter Two, Gray (2013, 194) describes Tanzania's political stability as a 'legacy of the centralisation of political power within the ruling political party.' Hence, examining the embeddedness of these transactions, including land investment in society, introduces political contestations and contradictions within the investment environment.

I sought in consequence to explore the contradictions within the political economy of LSLIs, the performances and effects, and the aspirational objectives of the SAGCOT. Such contradictions result from the actual rift between citizens' social reality, as small-scale farmers, and the values postulated by the SAGCOT. While such research is relevant as it interrogates power and knowledge relations, it exposes the researcher to various risks and arrogant

perceptions. By examining ‘what is’ and establishing ‘what ought to be,’ researchers must take responsibility for their thoughts and actions as they travel into the world of the researched.

The actions of the researcher and the inherently political nature of LSLI research have the potential to distort established social and material arrangements in which the distribution of power is at stake. At best, the researcher is invading various ‘worlds’ ridden with interests (Madison 2011, 63), and researchers must develop self-reflective approaches to alleviate the complexities of these other worlds (Beoku-Betts 1994, Menga 2020). Such responsibility comes with questions about ethics and research design that needs to accommodate likelihoods of misguided interpretations rather than assuming friction-free access to other ‘worlds’ via supportive gatekeepers (Cramer et al. 2015, 154). The capacity to respond to these ‘worlds’ is vital to the researcher's success and safety. To Lugones (1987, 17), world-travelling is ‘playfulness.’ It is a wilful ‘openness to being a fool’ and the skilfulness of navigating social worlds. Put differently, world-travelling rejects ‘static notions of identity while acknowledging that differences shape people’s experiences in negotiating social worlds’ (Anderson 2014, 639). As a non-native researcher, conducting research in a country other than my country of origin often attracted much curiosity from colleagues and local authorities in my area of fieldwork. The curiosity did not seem to come from genuine interests in my research, but more from an angle of bafflement, seemingly surprised that I am doing fieldwork in a country where I am not a native. Being a Cameroonian, studying at a UK-based university and carrying out field research in Tanzania comes with both challenges and opportunities.

There are consequences when the researcher world-travels (Madison 2011, 123), and there may be ‘worlds’ that construct the researcher in ways that he/she does not understand (Lugones 1987, 10). World-travelling warrants code shifting, which becomes a skill of mobility and necessity (Lugones 1987). It offers a productive contrast to the dominant representation of non-

native researchers as ‘different’ within a Western construct of the researcher’s world (Anderson 2014, Hull 2004). That is, it presents ‘minoritised people’ as skilful in navigating different cultural codes and norms and facilitates attention to both dominant and resistant discourses and people’s agency in relation to them (Anderson 2014, 639).

In fact, Anderson (2014, 637) argues for new ways of thinking where educational policies privilege cultural differences as a primary analytical tool and assume that ‘international [research] students’ are necessarily different to ‘local [research] students.’ In this world, the non-native researcher acquires flexibility in shifting from the ‘mainstream’ construction where they are constructed as ‘outsiders’ to other constructions of life where they are more or less ‘at home.’ They are ‘world travellers’ as a matter of necessity and survival. Feeling ‘at ease’ in a world can be dangerous, as it tends to reduce our willingness to perceive other ways of being in the world (Anderson et al. 2017, Lugones 1987). The following section highlights the privileges of researchers as arrogant perceivers.

#### **4.4 Researchers as ‘arrogant perceivers’: The Privileges of Researchers**

As a non-native doctoral researcher from an (economically and geo-politically) weak state, I am conscious of the balance of power among states and how my country may remain neutral and incompetent in providing security to its citizens [abroad] (Kassab 2015, 2). To Kassab (2015), in the global balance of power, the behaviour of weak states can be defined in three folds: remaining neutral, bandwagoning, and appeasing in relation to great powers and their balancing behaviour. My Cameroonian and African identity makes me conscious of arrogant perceptions as I navigate the researcher’s ‘world’. The feeling of being an ‘outsider’ researcher is reinforced when faced with questions that are often loaded with euphemistic undertones in European cities. As Selasi (2014) brilliantly articulates, the question ‘where are you from?’ or

‘where are you *really* from?’ is a code for ‘why are you here’ ‘and [when] do you plan to leave/return home’? Arguably, Western researchers are hardly ever asked these questions when ‘the field’ has become a synonym for the South and a testing ground for Western ideas.

These sensitivities can be heightened throughout the entire research journey. For example, the sensitivities in the differentiation of researchers are more heightened when there is a nationwide rise in anti-immigration rhetoric and sentiments in the UK - exemplified in political rhetoric that scapegoat overseas students as a means to meet immigration targets. In 2016, like many international students in the UK, I was concerned by the Home Secretary’s decision to ‘crackdown on overseas students as part of the drive to reduce net migration’ (Travis and Weale 2016). The assumptions of international students’ difference reveal colonial views (also see Anderson 2014), with consequences for African researchers who are positioned as the African Other. For example, in July 2019, a British newspaper headline stated that ‘African [researchers are] twice as likely to be refused UK visas’ (Bulman 2019). At this point, ‘belonging’ became an essential component of my research journey. Appropriation, mimicry, and identifying role models became tools for fitting into the research community.

In this ‘world’, there was a failure to identify with Western researchers who often expect that being a ‘researcher’ grants you unfettered access or a diplomatic fallout if they were attacked or arrested in a country where they are not a native. For example, in November 2018, the British media was highly concerned with the case of ‘Matthew Hedges: British academic jailed for allegedly spying in the UAE’ (Nazia and Patrick 2018). Hedges, a PhD student from Durham University, was accused of ‘spying for a foreign country, [and] jeopardising the security of the state’. In a more tragic case in 2016, Giulio Regeni, a Cambridge PhD student from Italy, was killed in Egypt while conducting fieldwork (see Kirchgassner and Ruth 2016).

Giulio was allegedly involved in ‘sensitive research for an Italian newspaper into labour unions in Egypt and using a pseudonym’.

It is particularly worrisome to assume that such attacks on researchers are often not anticipated. In Hedges case, it was reported that ‘few in the UK’s Foreign Office expected Matthew to be given a life sentence for trying to carry out academic research into the UAE’s security politics’ (Nazia and Patrick 2018). In Giulio’s case, commentators in Italy expressed shock at the treatment of Giulio ‘given the diplomatic fallout that may occur if an Italian researcher were attacked in Egypt’ (Kirchgaessner and Ruth 2016). It is the reaction to the attacks on researchers, especially Western researchers, that highlights the privileges of researchers as ‘arrogant perceivers’. While Matthew and Giulio’s case may be tangential to my Tanzania experience, it illustrates some level of entitlement among Western researchers, which I may have struggled to relate to as a non-Western PhD researcher. Indeed, respect for European researchers conducting their research in the South, comes from historical and colonial realities (Jordan and Yeomans 1995). I now turn to my field experience as a non-native researcher.

#### **4.5 Risks in the field as a non-native/non-Western researcher**

Accessing the ‘world’ of the researched primarily entails code shifting and learning the different roles and norms and then choosing to play by those roles or not. It involves having different personalities or characters; or using language and space in different ways (Anderson 2014, 640). For example, in carrying out a pilot visit, which I discuss in Chapter Three, I adapted my research approach and design by focusing on cases that are well known and familiar to me (Sampson 2004, 387). By travelling into the world of the Other, the researcher seeks to gain the trust and understanding of the Other (Lugones 1987). While doing household surveys in the case study communities, my Africanness was valuable in establishing trust as they

referred to me as '*ndugu yangu*' (relative). This insiderness increased the chances of gaining access to certain privileged information among village members. I was invited for meals, social events and participated in household activities as part of the community. I felt at home. In this world, I felt a sense of 'fit' because I was humanly bonded and was at ease with the norms of the researched.

However, identity is fluid and ambiguous. The researcher may find a particular identity as 'rightfully existing there' and 'rightfully out of place or uncomfortable' at the same time (Noble 2005). In the case study communities, my insider status was also of concern to the local elites and the investor, who would prefer that privileged knowledge about the relationship between the investor and the community remained concealed. I was labelled as an 'intruder', especially among some local authorities who consciously protected the investor's interests. In the world of these local elites, my non-native status, not my Africanness, was a marker on my identity. My journal notes express the tense moment when I was labelled as an intruder and interrogated in the DC's office.

“[The man from the DC's office] started with an opening remark, explaining why we were in the seminar room. Then [the manager of the investment company] took the floor...he started by addressing me as a 'gentleman'. He then told me I had been sent to spy on them, and I am an 'intruder' in the community. I ensured that I never spoke while he made his point and that he had my full attention. He sounded angry and disappointed that I had been granted all the necessary research permits and authorisation letters from the local authorities [at this point, he was looking angrily at the man from the DC's office]. (Journal notes 25.07.2018)

In a well-argued paper, Labaree (2002) elaborately describes a personal account of the hidden dilemmas of entering the field, which involved the negotiation of 'positional spaces'. To Labaree, whether as an insider or outsider, researchers must constantly reflect on their positionality and their research implications. Whether or not researchers are independent of sponsors and governments, they often struggle to convince observers of their intellectual independence (Cramer et al. 2015). The political nature of LSLI research makes it difficult to argue that researchers are free of 'conflicts of interest' to conduct objective research. To the local elites, I was foreign and had been sponsored to investigate the investors' activities in the local community. My activities in the community thereafter were under greater scrutiny.

I received a call from a public official who requested my presence at the local district office. He sounded ominous. As Hull (2004) argues, skilfulness is needed to negotiate unfamiliar worlds, and appearance is the first piece of information available to others in face-to-face interactions (Naumann et al. 2009). It can powerfully influence the perceiver's subsequent behaviour. I needed to morph into the world of a sophisticated researcher. In a study conducted by Borkenau and Liebler (1995) on the relationship between observable attributes and personality, they found that dressing is a valid indicator of the degree of conscientiousness. Indeed, Western ideas gain credibility as universal ideas because we, as African researchers, have learned and applied them so well at home (Haniff 1985, 112). To look assertive and confident may reduce the chances of physical confrontation and intimidation. However, these codes must be contextualised. The danger is that observers may misconstrue assertiveness as being arrogant and provocative.

Tanzania is a society where there is a high degree of acceptance that people are unequal and where the respect for authority is salient (Hofstede et al. 1991). Other expressive channels of

appearance, such as eye contact, knowing when to talk, body language such as handshakes and gestures, are used by observers as information to make judgements about people and social situations (Naumann et al. 2009). What researchers refer to as ‘the field’ is a social unit with normative standards and values. To Lugones (1987, 12), ‘knowing the norms that are to be followed’ in a ‘world’ is essential for being at ease in that ‘world’. Researchers must appreciate when it is appropriate to code shift and when it is not (Madison 2011, 123). In other words, the onus is on the researcher to properly understand mannerisms, cultural cues and strive to avoid being perceived as arrogant or confrontational, although being humble and naïve is usually acceptable.

During the meeting with the man from the DC’s office and the investment company’s management team, I expressed the stereotypical mannerisms of an African. I was submissive, humble and did not challenge authority. As I navigate these worlds, I take along the various intersections of my personalities, and I can materialise these personalities at the same time. As an African, I can say ‘I am humble’ and as a researcher from a UK-based institution, ‘I am assertive’. I was humble; I listened and talked only when asked a question. Although I was referred to as ‘gentleman’, presumably from my approach during the meeting, the meeting became heated as we progressed into explaining my research objectives. A police officer remarked that ‘by questioning village members about their perceptions on investments in the area, I was introducing ideas which may cause them to riot’. Indeed, some local elites were fearful of a conscious group of affected citizens whose change in political preferences may lead to more demands for accountability and inclusion in LSLI design and implementation. At this point, I was accused of being a spy and disturbing the peace of the country. My legality as a researcher was now under scrutiny by the police.

#### 4.6 Importance of good 'local' partnerships

As discussed in Chapter Three, my choice of the case study communities was informed by the local partnerships I had established since 2014. Social connectedness is crucial in facilitating a sense of belonging or comfort in an unfamiliar 'world' (Anderson 2014, 644, Lugones 1987). De Silva and Gandhi (2018) provide an account of using 'parents' as agents to gain access to research sites in their 'native' country. Researchers often resort to local partnerships, translators and research assistants to compensate for their lack of knowledge in the language and cues in the 'world' of the researched (Leck 2014, Temple and Edwards 2002). Although I carried out a pilot visit and had taken a month-long course in Swahili, my understanding of the language, cultural cues, and undertones were different from those of a 'native'. To compensate for my inability to communicate freely (Lugones 1987), I worked closely with two research assistants (male and female) from the community and with support from a trusted activist who is also a university lecturer in the area. His role as an activist is appreciated in the village, and his years of experience as a lecturer also meant that some law enforcement agents were once his students. While at the police station, my relationship with him eased the tension with police officers. The police were interested in my 'legitimacy' and that I met the legal requirements for researching in Tanzania.

The subtlety and sophistication of any research approach do not imply 'that physical risks to the researcher would not arise from the interaction between research and local political economies' (Cramer et al. 2015, 155). Obtaining all formal research clearances and introductory letters does not guarantee an incident free research journey, and locally dominant individuals and organisations can restrict access in various ways (Cramer et al. 2015, 147). Legality involves institutional 'box-ticking' requirements, with relatively less contact with the researched. In fact, because I had every document, research clearances and permits (17 in total)

required for me to research in Tanzania, this police officer remarked that ‘I was too organised to be a simple student. I was a spy’! To this police officer, I was too meticulous and different from the stereotypical construct of African PhD researchers who are often perceived as incapable of gaining credible access to social domains left for the ‘sophisticated’ researcher. In this ‘new world’, my Africanness was foreign. I was too organised and deviated from their expectations of an African doctoral researcher. My access to the world of the researched was impeded by the ‘arrogant perceptions’ of this powerful actor, and at worst, my life was at risk.

There would be no diplomatic fallout if this African/non-native PhD researcher were attacked. In this world, I cannot be too comfortable. The closest diplomatic service of my country to Tanzania is in Ethiopia. Concerned about my safety, my university was going to inform the British High Commission in Dar es Salaam that I was in impending danger. Again, as a Western-based institution, my university assumed that the diplomatic power of the British High Commission would potentially make my accusers worried about a diplomatic fallout if I were attacked or mistreated. As per the protocol, my silence after 6 pm or the use of a ‘safe word’ to my supervisors would ‘trigger the cavalry’, and I would be whisked out of a remote village, 582 miles away from Dar es Salaam. In fact, I could be dead before any help arrived!

While legality deals with conforming to the law, access deals with issues of familiarity, trust, and consent (Beoku-Betts 1994), which entails a good deal of empathy and temporarily suspending judgments regarding the Other (Bartky 1998, 388). Although my university has a duty of care, I was aware that I am not British, and the British High Commission may have no diplomatic responsibility for my safety. As a PhD researcher from a weak African State, one comes to the realisation and confusion as both having and not having the protection of their

UK institution. I became animated by both ‘worlds’: a non-native PhD researcher and a student from a UK institution. The simultaneous enactment of both ‘worlds’ can be confusing if one is not on one’s guard’ (Lugones 1987, 11). It was better to remain insignificant, open to being a fool, give respect where it's due and use my local partners and networks to ease the tensions.

Negotiating the field ‘requires a hypersensitivity of one’s own previous knowledge assumptions and the positional space one occupies’ during research (Labaree 2002, 110). It is very much a part of trickery and foolery (Lugones 1987, 13). My relationship with the ‘local’ university lecturer was instrumental in ensuring my safety. In fact, because he was known in the community, I was set on bail and entrusted in his care until the police investigations were over. However, I eventually received a letter from the District Commissioner’s office, terminating my research permit in the area. I abruptly ended my research activities in Ruvuma and moved to Dar es Salaam where I stayed for a few weeks before returning to the UK.

In hindsight, it is significant that my research assistants were never threatened. They were natives, young and were perceived as having had no ‘power’ to challenge social domains of power in the community. What happened to me was a display of local politics and how powerful social agents could impede access into the ‘world’ of the researched. I was foreign, and as a researcher, I can document, challenge, and disseminate contravening practices and norms between the investor and village members. As an African PhD student, I can be intimidated, and there would be no diplomatic fallout. To these powerful social actors, terminating my research activities would reduce my chances of gaining full access. Although such encounters may constrain research and shape findings, they may also reveal the local political economy in sharper contrast (Cramer et al. 2015, 147).

## 4.7 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that like other social science research associated with interrogating relations, power dynamics and agency within society, LSLI investment research can be politically contentious. Researchers must take the impact of their positionality on the entire research process more seriously. Understanding the research environment through pilot visits, studying the language, cultural cues, and building 'good' local partnerships can be valuable to the success of the research and the researcher's safety. Each researcher should endeavour to understand and reflect as many 'sides' and positions to every situation and argument encountered as possible. Additionally, researchers are not a homogenous group, and the world of the researcher is a non-static social construction ridden with power struggles. A non-native researcher may fail in their attempt to world-travel if they are not open to self-construction. Constrained as an outsider in a Western dominated domain of social science research and left alone by a weak state which may remain neutral when they are at risk, researchers, mainly from the South, must be skilful in navigating the researcher's world.

For researchers who are interested in crossing national and racial boundaries, a Western construction of field research may be costly and even deadly. The arrogant perceptions from 'some' Western researchers and observers of non-Western researchers as not 'sophisticated' enough to be independent can be detrimental to their research experience. Mimicry, appropriation, and code shifting are tools for mobility, and non-native researchers must be open to these realities. Good local partnerships are essential in ensuring safety. What is vital is for doctoral researchers and universities to take hindrances and the nuances of being a researcher as part of research and partake in active pursuance of the goal of improving PhD researchers' responsive capacity. There are always chances for arrogant perceptions, and threats posed by the inherently political nature of LSLI research.

# 5 Chapter Five: Political contestations: Large-Scale Land Investments and Domestic Political Alignments in rural Tanzania<sup>39</sup>

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou<sup>a</sup> and Prof. Chris Maina Peter<sup>b</sup>

<sup>a</sup> *School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, Email: [atenchongtallehnikobou@reading.ac.uk](mailto:atenchongtallehnikobou@reading.ac.uk);*

<sup>b</sup> *University of Dar es Salaam, School of Law, Email: [peter1404@gmail.com](mailto:peter1404@gmail.com)*

## 5.1 Abstract

Large-scale land investment (LSLI) policies in Africa often leave insufficient room for the observation of non-economic [notably political] processes of change. In this Chapter, the study relies on a theoretical model to re-examine the relationship between the majority of affected citizens and political elements introduced by the LSLI discourse in Tanzania. The chapter makes two key contributions to the literature. Firstly, it deconstructs the simplistic modernist justification for growth corridors and their consequences on domestic political alignment at the village level. Second, it presents an analysis of the labour dynamics within rural households, which challenges the easy differentiation of labour into categories of workers associated with farm and non-farm activities and how these labour dynamics within households may contribute to contestations against capitalist, landed investments and support for economic nationalism.

**Keywords:** Livelihood, Labour continuum, Political alignment, Tanzania, LSLI

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## 5.2 Introduction

In 1941, Wolfgang Stolper and Paul Samuelson showed that the expansion of trade and commerce, benefits countries that are better endowed with a production factor relative to their trading partners (Goldstein and Gulotty 2019, Le Goff and Singh 2013). Following what became known as the *Stolper-Samuelson theorem*, Rogowski (2000) provides a powerful tool for explaining how economic policies may impact domestic political alignment. In this sense, political alignment is the support of economic policy or ideology based on its relation to specific factors of production, i.e., land, capital and labour (Rogowski 2000). For example, based on the model, at least theoretically, countries that are land-scarce and capital-poor, with labour being an abundant resource, would support policy choices that encourage market expansion to absorb more labour. In contrast, capitalists, i.e. holders of the scarce resource-capital - would advocate for protection to avoid competition from foreign capital and boost their economic [and political] influence as monopolies or oligopolies (also see Rogowski 2000, 321).

However, like several neoclassical approaches to economic growth, Rogowski's model, fails to appreciate the politics of social differentiation within agrarian political economies. This chapter examines the relationship between the rural communities and political elements introduced by the LSLI discourse in Tanzania. The chapter provides a response to **RQ1**. That is, how does economic nationalism, in its political sense, influence domestic political alignment within agrarian political economies in Tanzania? While there has been extensive research on the socioeconomic impact of LSLIs (Herrmann 2017, Twomey et al. 2015), there is little emphasis on the political implications of land deals in rural communities. More recently, authors like Schlimmer (2018), Sulle (2020) and Bélair (2018) are beginning to highlight the 'micro politics' of LSLIs in Tanzania. The results presented here aim to make two key

contributions to a study of the politics of LSLIs. Firstly, it deconstructs the simplistic modernist justification of growth corridors and their consequences on domestic political alignment at the village level. Second, it presents an analysis of the labour dynamics within rural households, which challenges the easy differentiation of labour into categories of workers associated with farm and non-farm activities (Bernstein 2004, 211), and how these labour dynamics within households may contribute to contestations against capitalist landed investments and, in the process, provide support for economic nationalism

Economic nationalism is viewed here as ‘a facet of nationalism’ in the context of global trade and investments (De Bolle and Zettelmeyer 2019, 4). This view of economic nationalism emphasises the ‘nationalist content’ of state policy and highlights the anti-liberal approach to markets motivated by nationalist thought (Crane 1998). It deviates from the more limited view held by economists of nationalism as ‘preferential treatment’ to the domestic industry or targeted subsidies to domestic firms in their competition with foreign firms (De Bolle and Zettelmeyer 2019). Crane (1998, 56), for example, views economic nationalism as a ‘crucial economic orientation of a state in the restructuring of its identity’. Economic nationalism consists of ‘practices to create, bolster and protect national economies in the context of world trade’ (Pryke 2012, 281). By way of example, as stated in the Five Year Development Plan 2016/2017 – 2020/2020 (URT 2016, 3), President John Pombe Magufuli aimed to renegotiate Tanzania’s relationship with investors by introducing a ‘business unusual approach’ that involves direct participation of the state in the market. However, Magufuli’s ‘business unusual’ approach (as described in URT 2016, 3), in part, contributed to a decrease in FDI net flow from 3.57% in 2015 to 1.4% in 2018 (World Bank 2019).

This is because Magufuli's nationalist and populist impulses irked domestic investors/capitalists within the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation (TPSF) and foreign investors led by the IMF, who described Magufuli's approach as undermining economic growth with 'unpredictable and interventionist' policies (Ng'wanakilala 2019). For its part, the Magufuli government was directly involved in deal making and pledged 'to deal with the land ownership of investors by reclaiming the grabbed land rights of his supporters' (Schlimmer 2018, 93). Arguably, the active involvement of the Magufuli government in deal making strengthened his ability to achieve specific social outcomes for legitimacy enhancing purposes (Paget 2017, 2020a) and a push for a change in the orientation of the SAGCOT toward smallholder farmers. It is his political orientation towards smallholder farmers that galvanised support for his presidency in rural areas.

In most cases, nationalist governments 'shape markets' for legitimacy enhancing purposes and appeal to populist nationalist sentiments (Pickel 2003, 404, Wilson 2015). Magufuli's leadership and policy stance was pro-smallholder, something which led to the emboldening of political contestations against LSLIs in rural communities (Sulle 2020, 345). Political regimes that advocate for economic policies against neoliberal approaches to investment can co-opt the majority of voters within the '*labour continuum*' (a term which is elaborated later in the chapter). Such regimes can use discursive elements within the LSLI debate to advance or defend their political interests (Schlimmer 2018). The popularity and longevity of a government may depend on perceptions about its ability to protect the majority of rural workers and smallholder farmers from market forces within the agrarian political economy. In other words, such legitimacy hinges on the degree of trust which society places on the promises made by the government and rests ultimately on voters' perceptions about how the government aligns with various factors of production - land, capital and labour (Rogowski 2000, 321).

The chapter draws on a mixed-method approach, including an extensive review of academic literature, civil society and media reports, legal documents, and village minutes. Primary data was collected through an in-depth case study approach as discussed in Chapter Three. A pilot visit was conducted in December 2017. Eighteen unstructured key informant interviews and 374 survey questionnaires, within 187 systematically selected household, were administered in both villages between March 2018 and September 2018. An average of two adults above 18 years was interviewed per household in both case study communities. In most cases, the household head and his/her partner were interviewed separately.

Focus Group Discussions (FGD) were also conducted with fourteen participants in each village. Male and female FGD participants were selected from each village hamlet, allowing for fairness and equal gender and geographical representation across the village. Where possible, an elder with sound knowledge of the village history was specifically recruited for the FGD. FGDs helped explore participants' perspectives about LSLIs in their communities and perceptions about President Magufuli's policy interventions and leadership.

In Village 1, the FDG was organised for three consecutive Saturdays with the same participants; the FGD in Village 2 was limited to one session of 2hrs with both male and female participants together because of the abrupt termination of my research permit. Details of my confrontations with powerful gatekeepers, which led to the termination of my research permit, have been published elsewhere (see Talleh Nkobou 2020) and discussed in Chapter Four. Names of individuals and villages have been replaced and anonymised because of the politically sensitive nature of this research. It is also important to note that this research does not attempt to generalise its finding or evaluate the potential, country-wide successes, or failures of interventionist policies under the Magufuli government. Instead, it provides

evidence and analysis to understand why there was support for interventionist policies in specific rural areas of Tanzania affected by LSLIs under the Magufuli government. The next section deconstructs the neoclassical approach to growth corridors and shows that these policy interventions can lead to different forms of political contestations within the rural communities.

### **5.3 The neoclassical approach to growth corridors and domestic political alignment**

As discussed earlier, growth corridors have been used worldwide as regional policy instruments for economic development (Chome et al. 2020, Dannenberg et al. 2018, Nijbroek and Andelman 2015). The rationale behind growth corridors is based on Hirschman's (1958) theory of unbalanced growth, which assumes that due to a low level of capital endowment and decision-making ability in an economy, development processes can be initiated in sectors with the potential to induce growth (Dannenberg et al. 2018, 136). With expansions of economic growth through growth corridors, it is expected that various factors of production will be affected differently (Samuelson 1948, Rogowski 2000). An important question that arises is how growth corridors shape factor markets in agrarian political economies? And what are the political implications of these schemes on domestic political alignments and support for government development priorities?

Rogowski (2000) provides a neoclassical explanation of how commercialisation of economic relations influences domestic political alignment. The expansion of economic development and commercialisation - typified here by the invitation of multinational companies to invest in the SAGCOT and the increase in LSLIs following the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Cotula and Vermeulen 2009) - should, in a neoclassical sense, benefit sectors that are better endowed with a production factor relative to their trading partners (Goldstein and Gulotty 2019, Le Goff and Singh 2013). Rogowski (2000) shows that sectors with a higher factor endowment would

support policy choices that encourage market expansion. In contrast, holders of scarce resources would advocate for protection to avoid competition from their trading partners and boost their economic and political influence as monopolies or oligopolies (also see Rogowski 2000, 321). For example, based on this model, it is expected that smallholder farmers and rural workers would advocate for the expansion of the agricultural sector through growth corridors.

Rogowski's model (see Table 10) allows us to theoretically place economies into four possible quadrants depending on whether the economy is advanced or least advanced and whether the economy has a high or low land-labour ratio (Rogowski 2000). Going by Rogowski's model, capital and landowners in Tanzania ought to advocate for protectionist policies, while the abundant factor – labour ought to advocate for less regulation. Neoclassical approaches to economic development and growth interpret the outcomes of growth corridors as linear processes which can be 'triggered by moving the right economic pieces' (Dannenberg et al. 2018, 138). For example, neoclassical approaches to agrarian transformation, like the SAGCOT, is associated with the vertical and horizontal transition of farm labour<sup>40</sup>, with farmers remaining in farm production becoming capital-intensive and commercialised (Jayne et al. 2018, Timmer 2008). In fact, the commercialisation of agriculture has become a principal pillar in policy discourse that purports to provide more diverse farm and non-farm opportunities for the rural populations in Africa (IFAD 2016, Jayne et al. 2018).

However, the expected benefits of a labour transition from these policy interventions, exemplified in the expansion of growth corridors and LSLIs (see Bergius et al. 2018,

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<sup>40</sup> By horizontal transitions it is meant the movement out of agriculture for 'better' employment or job opportunities. Dorward et al. (2009, 243), references this as 'stepping out', whereby existing activities are engaged in to accumulate assets which in time can then provide a base for moving into different activities that have initial investment requirements leading to higher and/or more stable returns. Vertical transition is staying within the same livelihood activities in agriculture. Again, Dorward et al. (2009, 242), refers to this as 'hanging in', whereby assets are held and activities are engaged in to maintain livelihood levels, often in the face of adverse socio-economic circumstances. It can also involve Dorward's 'stepping up', whereby current activities are engaged in, with investments in assets to expand these activities, and increase production and income to improve livelihoods (an example might be the accumulation of productive dairy livestock).

Dannenberg et al. 2018) have, to date, not been realised by the majority of rural workers and smallholder farmers (Borras Jr and Franco 2012). In the first place, these schemes often rely on analytical assumptions which treat markets in Africa as a general and unproblematic category of analysis – specifically land and labour markets (Bernstein and Oya 2014, 7). They leave ‘insufficient room for the observation of non-economic [or political] processes of change’ within rural agrarian political economies (Bryceson 2002, 3). They fail to appreciate the politics of social differentiation within agrarian political economies and the micro-politics, which may contribute to resistance against these investment schemes (Schlimmer 2018). As Sulle (2020) argues, the resultant social differentiation processes within rural political economies mean that growth corridors should ideally be adapted to specific local settings.

In an agrarian political economy like Tanzania (as illustrated in Figure 8), where the majority of land users are smallholders, a worker-peasant alliance may emerge to contribute to the ‘peasant resistance’ against capitalist investments. This was exemplified in the contributions (mainly financial contributions) made by landowners and farm labourers towards the struggle to gain back village land that had been acquired by the investor in Village 1. Such resistance is also expressed through political alignment and support for economic policy choices against ‘capitalist’ investors (Paget 2020a, b). Political alignment is mainly influenced by the concrete lived experiences of rural workers and smallholder farmers, rather than a theoretical construct of a modernist world (Sulle 2020, Dannenberg et al. 2018).

The pervasive distinction between farm and non-farm workers, often presented by neoclassical approaches to LSLIs, are blurred by the nuances in the difference between the interests of both social categories (Bernstein and Oya 2014, Bernstein 2004). Certainly, the social logic of labour transition systems and the livelihood strategies adopted within rural households

challenges the easy categorisation of livelihood strategies adopted within these households as solely farm and non-farm activities (Bernstein 2004, 211). The worker-peasant alliance, exemplified in the labour continuum within rural households (see below and presented in Chapter 6), can be co-opted by politicians to increase popular support for nationalist policies using discursive elements within the LSLI debate.

As demonstrated in the factor endowment discussion below, Tanzania is in fact *land-scarce* because of the vulnerable status of customary land, the increase in land conflict, and the de facto proportion of land categories, i.e., village land, reserve, and general land. Secondly, Tanzania is *capital scarce*, evidenced in its least developed country status and the need for FDI for development programmes and projects. Here, rather than advocate for their protection, domestic capital or compradors aligns with foreign capital – in a process known as *compradorialism* - in support of commercialisation through growth corridors or LSLIs. Finally, only labour is abundant, as explained using the *labour continuum* and ‘worker-peasant alliance’ proposition. This theoretical framing places Tanzania in the bottom right-hand cell of the factor model in *Table 10*.

*Table 10 Factor endowment model following Rogowski (2000)*

	Land – Labour Ratio	
	High	Low
Advanced Economy	<b>ABUNDANT:</b> Capital Land  <b>SCARCE:</b> Labour	<b>ABUNDANT:</b> Capital labour  <b>SCARCE:</b> land
least Advanced Economy	<b>ABUNDANT:</b> Land  <b>SCARCE:</b> Capital Labour	<b>ABUNDANT:</b> Labour  <b>SCARCE:</b> Capital land

Indeed, the commercialisation of land and labour is now embedded in agrarian societies (Cotula 2013b), resulting in various forms of social transformation and contestations. Understanding the factor endowments within agrarian societies facilitates an understanding of this social transformation and political realignments. What follows is an explanation of factor endowments in agrarian communities and the land investment debate, as it pertains to Tanzania and the SAGCOT.

### **5.3.1 Factor endowment in agrarian communities and land investment debate**

#### The supposed abundance of land and the labour continuum within rural households

Agricultural transformation and commercialisation are often associated with the emergence of non-farm related activities from a subsistence-based agri-food system (Timmer 2008, 280). For example, the SAGCOT is expected to produce 680,000 tonnes of field crops (maize, tea, soya and wheat), 630,000 tonnes of rice, 4.4 million tonnes of sugar case, 3,500 tonnes of red meat and 32,000 tonnes of high-value fruits by 2030 (SAGCOT 2011, Mbunda 2016, 282). To do so, the SAGCOT aims to facilitate the development of clusters of profitable agricultural businesses, with a variety of non-farm activities, including logistics, banking, and marketing (see *Figure 3*). The diversification of rural livelihoods and the combination of agricultural and non-agricultural activities within rural households outlined by the SAGCOT, have been extensively documented and challenged in Africa (Bryceson 2002, 17, Bernstein and Oya 2014, Dorward et al. 2009). These ‘multiplex livelihoods’, characterised by the transition of small-scale land users and agrarian workers to non-agriculture related activities within rural households, denote the interplay of social, political, cultural and economic dynamics that are said to involve the wholesale recasting of labour markets in rural Africa (Bryceson 2002, 2).

Bryceson (2002, 6) defines non-agricultural related activities as ‘any work that does not directly involve plant or animal husbandry’. Authors like Diao et al. (2018, 852) have pondered why a substantial part of households in Tanzania involved in non-agricultural related activities remain below the poverty line contrary to the assumption that ‘households with non-agricultural enterprises are less likely to be poor’. According to Jayne et al. (2018, 783), there appears to be a relatively low correlation between agricultural growth and poverty reduction in Tanzania, mainly due to the absence of technical skills needed for economic expansion and growth.

The resurgence of LSLI schemes in the wake of the 2007/2008 financial crisis contributed to ‘multiplex livelihoods’ within rural households, evidenced by the increase in agribusinesses in rural communities and the diversification of employment opportunities along the agricultural value chain (Jayne et al. 2018, 780, De Schutter 2011b). However, the nuances in the distinction between the interests of farmworkers and non-farm workers in rural households challenge the easy differentiation of labour in Tanzania into categories of workers associated with farm and non-farm activities. Smallholder agriculture remains the backbone of rural life, and it is usually considered the prime source of economic security and self-identity in rural communities (Diao et al. 2018, Pritchard et al. 2017, 42). In rural households, the traditional distinction between waged workers and farmers is more nuanced (Bernstein and Oya 2014, 18), resulting in what is referred to in this chapter as a ‘labour continuum’. This labour continuum is a continuous sequence of labour activities in which adjacent labour concerns and interests are not perceptibly different from each other. However, the margins of the labour continuum are quite distinct. In the case study communities presented here, this *labour continuum* results from the lack of technical skills needed for these grand modernist policy interventions depicted by the SAGCOT.

Table 11 is a demographic representation of those who make an income exclusively from small-farming activities and non-farming activities in both case study communities. Non-farming activities in the communities include primary school teachers, petty trading, construction of mud shacks and the brewing for sale of the local beer (*wanzuki*). The labour dynamics in Table 11 are represented across age, gender, educational level, and land ownership status. In both villages, 91% of research participants exclusively earn a living from smallholder farming activities. However, only 19% of respondents are landholders. It was observed that there are challenges to land ownership in these communities, and access to land is mainly through rents from the few landholders in the communities.

These capital-intensive investments such as the SAGCOT are taking place alongside smallholder farmers and in the context of an acute lack of land and technical skills needed by the capital intensive agriculture in Tanzania (Amin 2017, Ngoitiko et al. 2010). As a result, individuals in rural communities cannot gain meaningful, long-term employment or improve their farming activities from these land investments (Sulle 2020). For example, the management team in the large-scale farm in Village 1 is composed of mainly foreign workers, with few Tanzanian nationals working in entry-level positions. Migrant workers from neighbouring villages primarily do manual labour in the plantation-style farm in Village 1. Most research participants, who are indigenous members in Village 1, have refused to work on the investor's farms as a form of resistance against their land being 'grabbed'. 'Working on the investor's farm is humiliating. It is like accepting that we rightfully gave him the land. The poison of our grabbed land is still in our hearts' (FDG participant 14.07.2018).

The implemented LSLI in Village 1 contributes to more non-farming activities than in Village 2, where the investment has been abandoned since 2010. Only 6% of respondents in Village 2 mentioned a non-farming activity as a livelihood source. The lack of activity in the LSLI in Village 2 contributes to the low level of workers in both communities. Of the 374 respondents, 33 (9%) work on the LSLI in Village 1. In Village 1, most of the jobs in the LSLI are seasonal and include harvesting, planting, and clearing. In Village 2, community members have been barred from trespassing on the piece of land and feel betrayed by local government officials and the investor. Failed promises made within the context of grand style investments like those in Villages 1 and 2 often undermine local livelihoods (Amin 2017). The investor was described in *Village 2* as 'just a cunning man', who took advantage of 'our illiteracy. None of his promises was fulfilled!' A village member explained that '[the investor] gave us many promises [*sic*]. First, he promised to bring a tractor which will help village members to get rid of poverty. Secondly, he promised to repair our school and bring textbooks. Then he promised that he would construct a village dispensary, he also promised to bring a telecommunication tower [none of which has materialised].'

In their report on *Human Rights and Business in Tanzania*, Wazambi et al. (2017, 10) cautioned that care 'must be taken not to forsake labour rights in the business sector in favour of boosting investments'. For their part, Diao et al. (2018, 844) demonstrate that high education levels and technical training are needed to acquire better non-farming jobs. Research elsewhere indicates that labour in the real world (as opposed to neoclassical predictions) may not be as mobile (Davis and Mishra 2006, Le Goff and Singh 2013, 2). There are too many barriers to a smooth labour transition for workers, including poor education. The low levels of education in both Village 1 & 2 also explain the inability of community members to gain meaningful employment within these investment schemes or to step out into other non-farm related activities.

With the inability to transition to better non-farm opportunities, a loose coalition of farmers and workers within rural households can increase their political influence by rallying behind a leader whose developmental ambitions purports to work in favour of the poor (Sulle 2020). ‘We have a good case in Morogoro, where the village community impacted by the sugar plantation made some contributions amongst themselves and went to the Minister in Dodoma to lay complaints about the Kilombero Plantation Ltd (KPL). They went to the minister, who decided to visit the village to listen to their complaint properly’ (Key informant, Ruvuma, 13.12.2017). In Village 1, FDG participants discussed a failed attempt to send representatives to the Minister of Lands to reclaim their land after village-level remedies had been exhausted – due to what they perceived as a corrupt relationship between local administrators and the investor. The interactions between small farmers and rural workers within rural households, in which adjacent labour activities, concerns and interests are not perceptibly different from each other, contribute to a worker-peasant alliance and resistance against capitalist forms of agriculture, which undermine their interests.

Such hostility towards industrialised and commercialised agriculture extends to dissatisfaction with capturing extensive land areas for large-scale export production of food and biofuels (Bernstein and Oya 2014, 13). Rural communities are beginning to actively demand that their land rights be protected (Ngoitiko et al. 2010, 273). This characterisation of labour within rural households in Tanzania brings in more nuances to the neoclassical prediction of agricultural commercialisation via growth corridors (Sulle 2020, Dannenberg et al. 2018, Greco 2015). In agrarian political economies, the majority of the land users are smallholder farmers, who also perform non-farm related activities or work as labourers on LSLIs (Bernstein and Oya 2014). Nevertheless, smallholder agriculture remains the backbone of rural life, and it is usually

considered the prime source of economic security and self-identity in rural communities (Diao et al. 2018, Pritchard et al. 2017, 42).

*Table 11 representation of 'multiplex livelihoods' and labour dynamics in Villages 1&2*

	<b>Additional income from Non-Farming Activity (%)</b>	<b>Income exclusively from Farming activity (%)</b>	<b>Total (n=374)</b>
<b>Age group</b>			
18 - 29	8%	92%	75
30 - 49	9%	91%	184
50 – 69	9%	91%	91
70 and above	12%	88%	24
<b>Education level</b>			
None	0%	100%	15
Informal	14%	86%	14
Primary Education	9%	91%	306
Secondary Education	11%	89%	39
<b>Sex</b>			
Male	9%	91%	174
Female	9%	92%	200
<b>Landowner</b>			
Yes	7%	93%	71
No	9%	91%	303
<b>Work on LSLI</b>			
Yes	21%	79%	33
No	6%	94%	341
<b>Village</b>			
Village 1	12%	88%	196
Village 2	6%	94%	178
<b>Total</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>91%</b>	<b>374</b>

Smallholder farmers and non-farm workers within rural households may act in concert – e.g., donating towards community efforts to claim village land and expand their political influence. These actions contribute to the ‘peasant resistance’ against capitalist forms of agriculture, which undermine interests of smallholder farmers and workers in rural communities (Pritchard et al. 2017, 43). As mentioned earlier, 68% of Tanzania's workforce is engaged in farming, and an estimated 83% of all households with landholdings are owner-operated/family farms both

in rural and urban areas (FAO 2018). Additionally, over 80% of the smaller proportion of the workforce who are engaged in non-farm related activities, are employed as waste collectors, domestic workers and similar unregistered and low-paid work (Diao et al. 2018, Black 2015). For example, casual work like harvesting, clearing, and spraying in the large-scale coffee is done by workers who are registered daily with no contract or job security. During household interviews, it was observed that community members resorted to other activities like vegetable gardening, sweet potatoes farming, moulding of mud bricks, and brewing local beer. One of the village guards for this research was dismissed from the large-scale coffee farm for using the toilet outside the allotted break time. He engages in vegetable gardening and bread making as a livelihood strategy. The labour continuum evidenced in rural households share similar challenges around the protection of workers, maintaining high-quality working conditions, and facilitating a labour transition to better job opportunities in and out of agriculture. After characterising the nature of labour within rural households in Tanzania, what follows is an examination of land and capital in Tanzania as essential elements for understanding domestic political alignment within agrarian societies.

#### Is there an abundance of land as proposed by LSLIs?

As discussed in Chapter Two, land laws in Tanzania remain highly centralised, and rhetoric around the availability of ‘vacant’ and ‘abundant’ land has been used to justify land dispossession in Tanzania. The presumption that land is vacant and in abundance spurs the interests of capital-intensive investments in Tanzania (Giovannetti and Ticci 2016, 736). Alden-Wily (2011a, 740) takes the view that the ‘law [is] a key enabling factor to dispossession and tenure security’ in African countries, including Tanzania. According to Section 11 (7) of the 1999 Land Act, the government has the right to overrule any land decision taken by local authorities like the Village Council (Sundet 2005). Indeed, the juridical content of customary

land tenure in Tanzania remains vulnerable, and mechanisms for protecting rural communities against the excesses of market forces remain ineffective (Okoth-Ogendo 1999, Alden-Wily 2012).

These observations by Okoth-Ogendo (1999, 7) and Alden-Wily (2012), and those discussed in Chapter Two, undermine the progressive character of land law in Tanzania. Although Tanzania's land laws protect customary land, underwrite gender parity in ownership (Looloitai 2014, Nelson 2012) and guarantee community participation in the identification of 'free' land (Shivji 1998), it still allows for pervasive land deals which encroach on local customary rights (Alden-Wily 2011a). The encroachment of land deals on community land rights has material consequences, i.e., access to productive resources such as water, food and other natural resources (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, Nelson 2012), which directly undermine food production and thus inform political choices at the village level. The impact of these land deals on the food security experiences of community members have been documented in Chapter 7 (also see Talleh Nkobou et al. 2021).

While it may be challenging to accurately measure the amount of acquired land within the LSLI deals, as highlighted in Edelman's (2013) 'messy hectares' thesis, perceptions about land availability continue to play a significant role in political competition against LSLIs (Alden-Wily 2012, 736, Schlimmer 2018). Accurate data on the specific amounts of land categories in Tanzania are lacking. However, experts estimate that village land accounts for approximately 70% of land in Tanzania (Veit 2010). Reserved (forest land) land is about 28%, and general (public) land constitutes about 2% (German et al. 2011). Civil society organisations like Business and Human Right Tanzania (BHRT) have refuted the notion of 'abundant' and 'free' land in Tanzania. In an interview, the representative of BHRT argued that 'Tanzania

does not have vacant land, and what may be claimed as vacant [or free] land [by State officials] is in fact, forest, or reserve land' (Key informant interview, BHRT, 08.06.2018). According to the BHRT representative, 'village communities often challenge any person who claims that land is free and vacant'.

Hence, the debate about land availability in Tanzania is a debate about land size and debates about legal access to land and protection of customary land tenure. Whether land is an abundant or a scarce resource, the vulnerable status of customary land contributes to the dispossession of village land in Tanzania (Alden-Wily 2011b). So, going by the limited amount of land defined as 'public' land in the expert literature, the vulnerable status of village land within legislative provisions, and the increase in land conflicts following the LSLI rush after the 2007/2008 financial crisis (Shao 2008, Ngoitiko et al. 2010), this thesis takes the view that Tanzania is in fact land scarce. Arguably, this is not a result of high concentrations of people per area of land, but a function of the insecurity of land tenure and the fragility of livelihoods that are centred on the exploitation of such insecure land.

The previous government of President Jakaya Kikwete was open to investors and a modernist approach to agricultural transformation, part of which was an orientation of the SAGCOT towards large agribusinesses. A key informant highlighted that '[Magufuli] is taking back lots of land from investors. For example, in January 2016, Magufuli ordered the seizure of [five estates]' in Tanga (Key informant, interviewed in Dar es Salaam, 18.12.2017). The redistribution of land by the Magufuli government in the Tanga district was extensively reported in local media (also see Sulle 2017, 13). An expert researcher on the SAGCOT argued that Magufuli has downplayed and largely reversed the enthusiasm for agribusinesses brought in by the SAGCOT. In fact, the scheme was marred by high levels of corruption, distrust, and

expropriation of land from local communities (Key informant, interviewed in Dar es Salaam, 17.05.2018). What follows is a critical analysis of the nature and role of domestic and foreign capital in the politics of LSLIs in Tanzania's agrarian political economy.

### Compradorialism: domestic and foreign capital within LSLIs

The nature of capital contributes to the conceptual understanding of LSLIs in Tanzania. Political rhetoric in Tanzania is characterised by the link between the vested interests of the political elite and foreign capital expansion (Nelson et al. 2012, 4) and what Zoomers (2010) refers to as the 'foreignisation of space'. This link has also been described in Chapter Two. For example, to Aminzade (2013, 298), the National Employment Promotion Service Act of 1999 introduced measures designed to require foreign investors to enter into business partnerships with Tanzanian citizens. Such provisions are also provided in the Village Land Act, 1999 (Act No. 5 of 1999), which allows for 'joint venture[s]' between the villagers and the investor through the Village Council.

Domestic capital takes advantage of the weak enforceability of regulatory mechanisms to act in concert with foreign investors through what Shivji (1991) describes as 'compradorialism' (also illustrated in *Figure 8*). Compradorialism depicts economic activities involving intermediaries in the host country who serve the interests of 'foreign capital' in exchange for personal benefits (Shivji 1991). Nelson et al. (2012, 4) have reported cases of compradorialism by linking the private interests of the domestic political elite with the expansion of foreign investors in Tanzania.

For one thing, the link between domestic and foreign capital is not new in Tanzania: authors like Aminzade (2013), Doriye (1992), and Shivji (1991) highlight the emergence of class

conflicts between indigenous communities, Asian businessmen, and the political elite - disparagingly referred to as 'bloodsuckers'- deemed to be capitalist exploiters in Tanzania (Brennan 2012, 90, Schlimmer 2018). These debates and how they contribute to political trust are further explored in Chapter 6 (also see Talleh Nkobou and Ainslie 2021). While these discursive elements are not new, they are elements to foster political competition and persuade the electorate to support various forms of economic policy in Tanzania (Schlimmer 2018). Distrust in the political class and perceptions about favours to (and from) foreign investors who possess capital for investment and development, and the subsequent disenfranchisement of rural workers and smallholder farmers from a capitalist-oriented economy and have galvanised support for economic nationalism which purports to 'fight for the poor' (Shivji 2019, Paget 2020b).

Shivji (1991) has long been critical of the 'undemocratic' way neo-liberal changes were implemented in the post-socialist era in Tanzania. He lucidly makes his arguments in the paper *The Democratic Debate in Africa: Tanzania* (Shivji 1991, 80). According to Shivji (1991, 80), those who supported the reforms towards a market economy in the 1980s were 'comprador' intellectuals. In Shivji's (1991, 80) words, 'so long as economic reforms remain imprisoned within the four walls of neoliberalism, the debate has not begun – it may be a diversion but not a debate'. Shivji's primary contention was that the economic and political reform process in the 1980s had been co-opted by a political elite including 'comprador intellectuals' for self-enrichment. This point has been elaborated on in Chapter Two. To Shivji, the political process of the neoliberal reform was not legitimate as it did not consider the core democratic values of equality and public participation of the majority of affected citizens in Tanzania, a process which Shivji himself used during the inquiry into land matters through the Presidential Commission for land reform (see URT 1994). The introduction of neoliberal reforms over 20

years ago saw the penetration of international capital into remote rural areas, carrying several challenges and producing a legitimacy and a socio-economic and environmental crisis (Poncian 2019, 79, Therkildsen 2000, 63).

The very idea that land is in the hands of ‘land grabbers’ or ‘capitalist exploiters’ evokes old debates about capital, the ‘foreignisation of space’ (Zoomers 2010) and ‘indigenisation’ in Tanzania (Aminzade 2013). As explained in Chapter 2.2, indigenisation draws a boundary between citizens (*wananchi*) and foreigners and seeks to protect the nation’s economy and culture from the threat of foreign domination (Aminzade 2000, 44). Additionally, the high levels of corruption (*rushwa*) under the *laissez-faire* period, specifically under the Kikwete era, contributed to deep distrust in the ruling political class (Must 2018, Vavrus 2005). In the absence of adequate regulatory mechanisms, the contradictions between the developmental ambitions expressed within LSLIs and the deprived material reality experienced by the majority of rural workers and smallholder farmers, have prepared the ground for a widespread, popular opposition to LSLIs.

These effects can be exemplified by the number of high-profile corruption scandals that plagued the private sector, including the Escrow scandal (Nyang’oro 2016), the Bank of Tanzania extension scandal, and the Richmond scandal (Fouéré 2008). These scandals robbed the taxpayer in Tanzania of over 229 million USD (Cooksey 2017) and resulted in a high level of distrust in the political elite on the part of ordinary citizens and the profound disillusionment of rural communities from the promised benefits of LSLIs. To Cooksey (2017, 4), the absence of robust regulatory and oversight institutions in Tanzania allowed corrupt politicians and institutions to engage in rent-seeking for over 20 years, with devastating consequences for the economy.

Priorities aimed at bolstering economic development and investments, like the SAGCOT, serve as a vehicle for the local political elites to pursue these development agenda and treat rural community members as marginally competent political agents (Schneider 2006). Local political elites welcome large-scale initiatives because they create rent-seeking opportunities through lease agreements and via the accumulating of land (Sulle 2020, 333). In Village 1, with the launch of the SAGCOT and the arrival of the investor in 2011, local government officials became increasingly involved in facilitating the acquisition of land for investors. The dynamic in Village 2 adds to perceptions about compradorialism. In Village 2, it was alleged that a Tanzanian investor visited the village with a 'white man'. After several visits by the Tanzanian investor and his foreign business partner, they collected and transported soil in 25 kg bags for transportation to Morogoro (Key informant interview, Village 2, 04.08.2018). Village members believe that the soil samples were transported to laboratories for testing.

It was the belief among research participants that President Magufuli's promises to return the grabbed land of local communities from investors was a source of hope for their struggles to reclaim their land. To many, 'Magufuli [was] a different cup of tea. Magufuli [was] trying to correct the cancer [of corruption] in this country' (Key informant interviewed in Dar es Salaam, 11.09.2018). Another key informant added that 'Magufuli's relationship with the investors [was] not the best. Especially agricultural investors. He [Magufuli] amended the Land Act by reducing the length of a land lease from 99 years to 33 years. Small-scale farmers [were] happy with the land law changes. They [were] praising Magufuli. I do not think there is a single small farmer who [would have denied] voting for Magufuli again' (Key informant, interviewed, 18.12.2017). This resonance was evident in the election campaigns of President Magufuli (Schlimmer 2018, 93). Distrust in the local political class and perceptions about favours to (and from) investors who possess capital for investment and development adds to the political

contestation against land investments (Sulle 2020, Schlimmer 2018). It was suggested by FGD participants in Village 1 that the investor had bribed local political elites to facilitate the land acquisition process. According to Babu Kujua, a key informant in Village 1, ‘upon the arrival of the investor, local government officials repainted their houses, had new motorcycles, and some were even offered new corn mills. They also got supervisory positions in the investor’s farm’ (Interview with Babu Kujua, Key informant, 19.07.2018).

Magufuli’s election in November 2015 and re-election in 2020 was built on the mantra of anti-corruption and a drive for greater industrialisation (URT 2016), with land being a significant factor during his presidential campaign (Schlimmer 2018). To the majority of smallholder farmers in rural communities, Magufuli’s approach towards investments was viewed as a solution to broken promises and what Amin (2017, 154) describes as the systematic exclusion of an agrarian workforce from a capitalist-oriented economy. Indeed, Bélair (2018, 379) mentions the limited capacity within the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) to monitor and ensure that investment promises are implemented and fulfilled. In 2016, Magufuli ‘sacked’ the TIC Executive Director, who had reportedly been promised a salary outside the established government remuneration structure (The Citizen 2016). Magufuli also created a new Land Investment Unit (LIU) under the purview of the Ministry of Lands, a decision motivated by the president’s efforts to remedy inefficiencies in Tanzania Investment Centre’s (TIC) (Bélair, 2018, p. 379).

As one informant in Dar es Salaam reported,

When a leader [Magufuli] comes as a sovereign state and rejects things that are not consonant with the sovereignty of the state, he must correct them. It

is not an abuse of office. Correct those things so that Tanzania's natural resources are exploited to help Tanzanians [not foreigners] (Key informant, Interviewed in Dar es Salaam, 11.09.2018).

Magufuli swept to power in November 2015 – following his reputation as Minister of Works (2010-2015), which earned him the nickname ‘The Bulldozer’ – for his ability to get things done and his strong stance against corruption. By focusing on making the government ‘perform’ for the people, Magufuli raised public expectations of a ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM), that had stagnated for over 20 years (Cheeseman 2018). The public display of Magufuli's opposition against capitalist elites (see below) was a means to galvanise political support (Jacob and Pedersen 2018, Shivji 2019). It was common to see or hear Magufuli reprimanding government and business officials in public for failing to fulfil their duties. For example, during the launch of the second phase of the Agricultural Sector Development Programme (ASDP) in 2018, President Magufuli publicly questioned why the president of the Tanzania Agriculture Development Bank (TADB) was still in post. His frustration stemmed from the fact that money intended for small-scale farmers, Shs 186.5 billion (\$80.3 million), was loaned by the TADB to borrowers such as investment banks and other financial institutions who were not involved in agriculture-related activities.

However weak the material or economic evidence of these claims, they find resonance in society by linking LSLI to concerns about employment, protection of workers, poverty, food security and land distribution (Das and Grant 2014, Bernstein 2004). In fact, in his first years in office, a newspaper headline proclaimed that ‘*Magufuli seized idle land from investors to return to poor farmers*’ (The Citizen 2017). In doing so, Magufuli appealed to the majority of the electorate, i.e., rural workers and small scale farmers (Paget 2020b), most of whom live in

rural areas. His supporters was this move as a bold and pragmatic move on a corrupt political and business elite (The Citizen 2018). Unsurprisingly, debates about land expropriation, joblessness, food security, and indigenous communities' rights (Anseeuw 2013, McMichael 2013) are essential discursive elements to shift political opinion and increase political support in agrarian political economies (Schlimmer 2018). Indeed, to Schlimmer (2018, 84), the re-emergence of the indigenisation debates in the 2015 general elections merely extended and reproduced ongoing debates over land that can be traced back to the introduction of neoliberal reforms in the 1980s.




Figure 8 Factor endowment model and the politicisation of large-scale land investment in Tanzania (Source: Author's 2020)

## 5.4 Conclusion

Growth corridors are regional policy instruments for promoting economic development, which assumes that due to a low level of capital endowment and decision-making ability in an economy, development processes can be initiated in sectors with the potential to induce growth. Exemplified here by the SAGCOT, the support for LSLI on the part of agrarian communities is not automatic but rather depends on necessary complementary policies such as the protection of workers' rights, improvement of governance mechanisms, maintenance of high-quality working conditions and the facilitation of a labour transition to better farm and non-farm activities. In fact, like several LSLIs in Africa, the orientation to LSLIs by the SAGCOT fails to accommodate the challenges within agrarian political economies such as elite capture, co-optation and conflicts of interests, capacity constraints and cross-accountability, and deficiencies in legal institutions. The reliance on economic assumptions that treat markets in Africa as unproblematic units of analysis fails to bring out the political implications of these land deals. This chapter has demonstrated that the assumption that the abundant factor of production, labour, in this case, would advocate for the expansion of commercialisation leading to greater trade, produces opposite results where regulations and governance mechanisms are weak.

The orientation of the Magufuli government towards economic nationalism, 'a facet of nationalism', emphasized the 'nationalist content' of state policy and highlighted an anti-liberal approach to markets. The labour dynamics within rural households can act in concert to contribute to a worker-peasant alliance against capitalist land investments. The labour continuum within rural households supports the interventionist policies proposed by the Magufuli government for three main reasons. First, the lack of 'political tools' within

investments contracts reflects the deficiencies to hold foreign investors and multinational institutions accountable for failing to fulfil their promises and depriving local communities of their land rights. Second, the perceived lineage between comprador elites and foreign investors contributes to perceptions about the foreignisation of spaces and capitalist exploitation. Elite capture, co-optation and conflicts of interests, and lack of cross-accountability within the investment environment all lead to high distrust and disillusionment against LSLIs.

Third, the history of land law reforms, including the vestiges of colonial land laws, has contributed to the vulnerable status of customary land. The debate about land availability in Tanzania is not just a debate about land size or population density, but also about legal access to land and the protection of customary land tenure. By considering these, the results presented in this chapter demonstrate that the increasing levels of inequality and years of disenfranchisement of the majority of agrarian workers played a significant role in the growing support for Magufuli, whose legitimacy rested on populist rhetoric and social claims, devices often used by authoritarian governments to ‘shape markets’ for legitimacy-enhancing purposes. Using key informant interviews from various stakeholders, the results presented here show that politicians can use the discursive elements and promise that LSLIs hold to enhance political support and make claims for economic policies, including the fight for the poor against their perceived capitalist exploiters. These nuances within LSLI in Tanzania present an opportunity for scholars and political commentators to re-engage with the agrarian questions of capital and labour to understand how forms of trade expansion, globalisation, and the commercialisation of agriculture via LSLI schemes may affect ‘domestic political alignment’ and society’s preference for specific economic policies and interventions.

The support for LSLI in rural communities is not automatic but rather depends on necessary complementary policies such as the protection of workers' rights, improvement of governance mechanisms, maintenance of high-quality working conditions and the facilitation of a labour transition to better farm and non-farm activities. The LSLIs in Village 1 and 2 indicate various forms of political contestation against LSLIs within agrarian political economies. The reliance on neoclassical assumptions that treat markets in Africa as unproblematic units of analysis fails to bring out the political implications of these land deals. These political contestations result in a change of priorities between regimes and impact the design and orientation of growth corridors. For example, the ASDS-II now acknowledges that a strategic focus on large commercial farms in the past has had 'little impact on poverty reduction' in Tanzania – and efforts must be made to address these challenges (URT 2015). There is an expectation that the SAGCOT has now oriented its focus towards smallholder farmers by placing an importance on out grower schemes and capacity improvement in local communities (Sulle 2020, Chome et al. 2020). This chapter examined how domestic political alignment can be impacted by elements within LSLI discourse in Tanzania. The next Chapter extends these debates by using political trust as a latent variable for political support to demonstrate how LSLIs can support developmental nationalism in Tanzania.

## 6 Chapter Six: ‘Developmental Nationalism?’ Political Trust and the Politics of Large-Scale Land Investment in Magufuli’s Tanzania<sup>41</sup>

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou<sup>a</sup> and Andrew Ainslie<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, email:

[atenchongtallehnbou@reading.ac.uk](mailto:atenchongtallehnbou@reading.ac.uk)

### 6.1 Abstract

Research on LSLIs can provide useful insights into the support for developmental nationalism in Tanzania today. Paget defines this developmental nationalism as ‘a creative variant of liberation’, which purports to make ‘Tanzania great again’. The nationalist turn of President Magufuli was grounded in a populist political ideology and the selective use of the past that swept him to power. However, there is limited research on how political practice around land investments contributes to trust and support for public institutions. The results presented in this chapter make two key contributions to scholarship on the political economy of LSLIs. First, the chapter uses household data to demonstrate the levels of trust between the ‘new’ developmental ambitions of President Magufuli and ‘old order’ *laissez-faire* institutions such as the TIC. Second, it examines the politics of LSLIs, the failures in design and implementation, and the rise in support for ‘developmental nationalism’ in two rural communities in the

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Ruvuma region of Tanzania. Political trust is a key concept in this chapter and is defined as ‘an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government, based on people’s normative expectations.’

**Keywords:** Tanzania, land investments, developmental nationalism, Magufuli, political trust

## 6.2 Introduction

As demonstrated in the previous chapters, LSLIs are unquestionably political, particularly within state-centred land tenure regimes in Africa (Bélair 2018, Boone 2019, Schlimmer 2018). Schlimmer (2018) demonstrates how the ‘land grab’ discourse became a talking point during the 2015 presidential elections in Tanzania. Similarly, for Zimbabwe, Cliffe et al. (2011) explain how Zimbabwe's subsequent political and economic contexts were shaped by the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) in the early 2000s. In Madagascar, the sale of 1.3 million hectares of land to a South Korean company led to the overthrow of the Ravalomanana government in March 2009 (Andrianirina et al. 2011, Vinciguerra 2011). In countries where land laws are centralised and vested in the President as trustee (see Chapter Two on the legal position of land registration and transfer in Tanzania), the direct involvement of government agents in land allocation and dispute resolution fosters the politicisation of LSLIs (Boone 2019, Sulle 2020).

However, there is limited research on how political practice around land investments contributes to changes in the trust and support for public institutions in rural settings. This chapter makes two key contributions to research on the politics of LSLIs. First, the chapter uses household data to demonstrate differences in the levels of trust between the ‘new’

developmental ambitions of President Magufuli and 'old order' *laissez-faire* institutions such as the TIC. Political trust is defined as 'an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government based on people's normative expectations' (Schneider 2017, 964). Here, a latent class analysis (LCA) is used to group research participants into various classes based on their trust in the President, the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC), in the ruling political party *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) and their support for LSLIs. A McNemar's dependent Z-test is then used to determine if there is a significant difference between the classes identified in the LCA. For analytical purposes, the TIC is posited in the chapter as representing 'old order' *laissez-faire* institutions that advocate for a neoliberal and open economy favouring LSLIs (Bélair 2018, Mwapachu 2005). Second, it examines the messy politics of LSLIs, the failures in design and implementation, and the subsequent rise in support for 'developmental nationalism' in two rural communities in the Ruvuma region of Tanzania.

Paget describes 'developmental nationalism' as 'a creative variant of liberation', which purports to make 'Tanzania great again' (Paget 2020a, 2). 'Developmental nationalism' is versatile and mutable and legitimised President Magufuli's authoritarian rule in the eyes of his supporters (Paget 2020a, 6). Developmental nationalism formed part of Magufuli's practices to create, bolster and protect Tanzania in the context of world trade (Pryke 2012, 281). Its nationalist content was defined by the purported 'liberation' from an 'old order' *laissez-faire* economy and purported link to compradorialism between domestic and foreign business (see Chapter Five). Paget identifies this 'liberation' as a form of progressive restorationist ideology under Magufuli's regime, which break away from an 'old order' *laissez-faire* economy that is said to have disenfranchised the majority of rural workers and smallholder farmers for over 20 years (Paget 2020a, 2).

Considering the analytical challenges in measuring political trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2005, Hutchison and Johnson 2011), this research accepts certain analytical assumptions and does not generalise its findings. These analytical assumptions are explained in the next section. Using two rural communities, one where a LSLI project has been implemented and another where the investment project has not been implemented over 10 years after the acquisition of land, the research provides valuable insights into the politics of LSLIs in rural communities in Tanzania. Like Paget, the chapter argues that as the insurgent leader of CCM, President John P. Magufuli instrumentalised ‘developmental nationalism’ as a political tool to increase political support among rural communities, who were already disillusioned by unfulfilled promises within LSLI schemes (Paget 2020a).

The nationalist turn of Magufuli was grounded in recognisable political ideology and the selective deployment of the rhetoric of the past. For one, an article in *The Economist* (2017) describes Magufuli’s leadership style as having ‘a whiff of African Socialism’. Cheeseman (2018) argues that Magufuli’s leadership did not represent an actual break with the past but can instead be understood in the context of the country’s return to a more statist economic approach, last experienced under Nyerere. In justifying his decisions, Magufuli drew on the revered legacy of Nyerere, which leads some authors to qualify his approach as post-socialism (Fouéré 2011). This authoritarian style was manifested by the President, who publicly attacks foreign and local private investors as corrupt and succeeded in presenting himself as fighting for the poor against corrupt business and political elites (Cooksey 2017, Nyang’oro 2016). To Paget (2020b, 8), Magufuli presented himself as the ‘leader of the downtrodden’.

The high levels of distrust in political institutions, which were evident in the run-up to the 2015 elections (Paget 2017, 2020a, 2019), demonstrated the extent to which ordinary citizens

perceive public institutions like the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as working in favour of powerful and corrupt investors against local community members (Schlimmer 2018). Institutions like the TIC have encouraged LSLIs as a means to increase foreign direct investments (FDI), farmers' incomes, technology transfer, and job creation (Bergius et al. 2018, Bélair 2018). However, local community members, disillusioned by the broken promises of these LSLIs (Zoomers 2010, Twomey et al. 2015), expressed a kind of nostalgia for a past that could only be brought back by a restorationist form of 'developmental nationalism' as expressed by Magufuli (Paget 2020a).

The negative impacts of LSLIs on the rights of local communities (Engström and Hajdu 2019, Mousseau and Mittal 2011), and the absence of adequate political tools oriented towards holding investors accountable for the promises made to local people (Fernandez and Schwarze 2013), place public institutions and citizens in a constant struggle for political legitimacy and support (Schlimmer 2018, Sulle 2020, Zoomers 2010). Magufuli introduced a 'business unusual' approach to investments which was supposedly aimed at correcting the shortfalls in Tanzania's relationship with investors through a form of 'developmental nationalism' (URT 2016, Paget 2020a), that gained widespread public support. The following section elaborates on the data collection and analytical techniques used in measuring 'political trust' as a latent variable<sup>42</sup> for political support.

### **6.3 Measuring 'political trust' as a latent variable for political support**

Challenges abound in measuring 'political trust' as a latent variable for government support within social science research (Kanji and Nevitte 2002, Hutchison and Johnson 2011, Schneider

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<sup>42</sup> Latent variables are proxy variables. In other words, these variables are not observed but are rather inferred from other variables that are observed. Here, trust in government variables are used to observe 'political support'.

2017). In studying the trends in ‘political trust’ within new and stable democracies, Catterberg and Moreno (2005, 34) define political trust as ‘citizen’s confidence in political institutions’. Political trust is an evaluative orientation based on an individual’s normative expectations. In other words, political trust is a highly subjective and normative concept (Schneider 2017, 964). What constitutes a trustworthy institution is likely to differ among citizens within different cultural and governance regime contexts (Catterberg and Moreno 2005, Hutchison and Johnson 2011, Schneider 2017, Suh et al. 2012).

Hence, this research adopts an in-depth and context-specific case study approach because of the subjective and normative character of political trust. Like James Scott (2008), this study assumes that the members of the sample community are embroiled in the same everyday realities, and their divergent experiences and interests form part of the same community of discourse and practice. A case-study approach to research allows for context-specific measurements and analysis of the phenomenon under investigation (Gerring 2004, Flyvbjerg 2006). Political trust analysis within the same regional and socio-cultural context minimises measurement errors, which may occur when such studies are done across cultural and regime settings (Schneider 2017).

For these reasons, the research focuses on two rural communities in the same local administrative region - the Ruvuma region. In doing so, the study mitigates context-specific (mis)interpretations in determining political trust. Researching within the same context is valuable in understanding local dynamics and carrying out research ‘where context specificity is essential’ (Oya 2013b, 513). Village 1 is 50 miles away from Village 2 and falls within the same ethnolinguistic, cultural, and political-economic context. As described in Chapter Three, both villages are located within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania

(SAGCOT), a public-private partnership scheme launched in May 2010 by then-President Jakaya Kikwete (SAGCOT 2011, Mbunda 2016).

### **6.3.1 Data collection**

As described in Chapter Three, different techniques were used to collect data on the perceptions of local community members. Summarily, this analysis relies on key informant interviews and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Additionally, a standard 'trust in government' survey questionnaire was translated into Swahili and administered to individuals in both communities. In total, 374 interviewees, with an average of three adults per household, responded to the survey questionnaire. The questionnaires were administered with the help of two research assistants (one male and one female) in both villages. Questions were translated beforehand from English to Swahili to minimise inconsistencies which can occur when questions are translated independently by interviewers. By providing the exact definition of 'political trust' to the respondents, we ensured that a common understanding of political trust was shared across our sample.

### **6.3.2 Political trust variables**

The trust variables and how they were coded for analysis are presented in Table 12. These standard 'trust in government' variables have been used in other studies on political trust (Hutchison and Johnson 2011, Suh et al. 2012). The 'support LSLIs' variable is used to link LSLIs and public institutions. Authors like Suh et al. (2012) have used a LCA approach to good effect in the context of South Korea to classify individuals based on their trust in public and non-public (or private) institutions.

Table 12 Trust in government variable used for latent class analysis

Nº	Variable	Likert scale for all variables	Coding for LCA for all variables
1	Trust in the President	1 = a great deal, 2= a lot, 3 = a moderate amount, 4 = a little, 5 = none at all, -9 = prefer not to say	If response < 3, code as 1 = Trust. Otherwise, code as 0 = do not trust
2	Trust in the ruling party (CCM)		
3	Trust in opposition parties		
4	Support LSLIs		
5	Trust in TIC		

The rigorous data collection techniques presented in Chapter Three helped mitigate measurement errors in the political trust analysis and develop an understanding of LSLI schemes in the case study communities. The following section presents demographic data relating to the survey respondents and the results of the LCA.

#### 6.4 Trust in institutions as a result of perceptions around LSLI

This section presents the evaluative perception of research participants towards government institutions and the President. Table 13 presents a demographic distribution of survey respondents. The mean age of the research respondents was 44.7 years. Out of the 374 survey respondents, 200 were male, and 174 were female. Most (306 out of 374 or 82%) of the survey respondents had primary school level of education –, with 15 having no education. Research participants have been categorised based on their trust in government using the LCA in Table 14. The best fit model to classify respondents based on their responses to the ‘trust in government’ survey was selected using approaches suggested by Vrieze (2012), Porcu and Giambona (2017) and Suh et al. (2012). Several models were examined in *R* using a different number of classes to categorise survey respondents. The analysis showed that survey respondents could best be categorised into three classes. The statistical software also generates the conditional item response probabilities per variable and the estimated class population share for each category (see Table 14). The item response probabilities show the difference in response patterns for each variable between the classes (Porcu and Giambona 2017, 144).

Table 13 Description of interviewees by age, gender, and educational level

**Age in years**

**(44.7±14.2)**

<i>n</i>	374
<i>Mean</i>	44.7
<i>Standard Deviation</i>	14.2
<i>Minimum</i>	18
<i>Maximum</i>	85

**Gender**

<i>n</i>	374
<i>Male</i>	174
<i>Female</i>	200

**Educational Level**

<i>n</i>	374
<i>No education</i>	15
<i>Primary level education</i>	306
<i>Secondary level education and above</i>	39
<i>Only informal training or apprenticeship</i>	14

Table 14 Conditional item response probability by outcome variable for each class

Class	President		CCM		Opposition party		TIC		Support LSLI		Estimate class population share	The calculated size of Class 1 (n)
	Trust	Do not trust	Trust	Do not trust	Trust	Do not trust	Trust	Do not trust	Yes	No		
Class 1	0.96	0.04	0.94	0.06	0.66	0.34	0.97	0.03	0.64	0.36	0.31	115
Class 2	0.99	0.01	0.97	0.03	0.35	0.65	0.00	1.00	0.09	0.91	0.44	164
Class 3	0.40	0.60	0.16	0.84	0.09	0.91	0.03	0.97	0.22	0.78	0.25	94

\*Number of observations (*n*): 374; number of estimated parameters: 17; residual degrees of freedom: 14

The calculated size of the class (in Table 14) ( $n_i$ ) = Estimate class population \* the total number of observations ( $n$ ), where  $i$  is the class number.

From *Table 14*, the various classes were defined as follows:

**Class 1:** Class 1 respondents have a neutral tendency towards LSLIs and the President, and the TIC. Some 31% of respondents fall in Class 1. Individuals in Class 1 are 96% likely to trust the President, 94% likely to trust CCM, 66% likely to trust opposition parties, 97% likely to trust the TIC and 64% likely to support LSLIs in the community.

**Class 2:** Individuals in Class 2 are less likely to support LSLI in the community (9%). This class makes up 44% of the sample population and are 99% likely to trust the President, 97% likely to trust CCM, 35% likely to trust opposition parties, and 0% likely to trust the TIC.

**Class 3:** Individuals in Class 3 tend to distrust any public institution and LSLIs. Class 3 makes up 25% of the sample and are 40% likely to trust the President, 16% likely to trust CCM, 9% likely to trust opposition parties, 3% likely to trust TIC and 22% likely to support LSLIs in the community.

#### **6.4.1 Difference between classes**

A McNemar's Z-test (Lachenbruch 2014) was then used to determine the statistical difference between Class 1, where participants are likely to support LSLIs and participants in Classes 2 and 3, who are less likely to support LSLIs. In doing so, we set the hypothesis for the differences in classes.

Firstly, by inferring from data, the proportion of those who do not support LSLI in the community (Class 2 and 3) is greater than the proportion of those who support LSLIs (Class 1). That is, only 31% of respondents are likely to support LSLIs in the community. Therefore, we set the null hypothesis to test whether those who support LSLI in the rural community (i.e., Class 1) is statistically different to those who do not support LSLIs in the rural community (i.e., Class 2 and 3). There, we execute two hypotheses tests.

**Hypothesis test 1:**

$$\text{McNemar's } Z \text{ score} = (n_2 - n_1) / \sqrt{(n_2 + n_1)}$$

*Table 14 Hypothesis test 1*

	Hypothesis	Z score	One-tailed Z-Critical at 95% CI	Interpretation
1.	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub></b>: Class 1 ≥ Class 2</p> <p><b>H<sub>a</sub></b>: Class 1 &lt; Class 2</p>	-1.66	-1.64	<p>Z. score falls within the rejection zone. We reject the null hypothesis and instead accept our original claim that those who support LSLI in Class 1 is always less than those who do not support LSLI in Class 2.</p>

**Hypothesis test 2:**

$$\text{McNemar's } Z \text{ score} = (n_3 - n_1) / \sqrt{(n_3 + n_1)}$$

*Table 15 Hypothesis test 2*

2.	<p><b>H<sub>0</sub></b>: Class 1 ≥ Class 3</p> <p><b>H<sub>a</sub></b>: Class 1 &lt; Class 3</p>	1.53	-1.64	<p>Z. score falls within the acceptance zone. We accept the null hypothesis and conclude that the proportion of those who support LSLI, Class 1, is not always less than those in Class 3.</p>
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Given that Class 1 is greater than or equal to Class 3 but always less than Class 2, it can be concluded that the population proportion in Class 2, which is the highest proportion of our sample, do not support LSLIs but support the President. This, therefore, supports the claim that despite the promises made by the proponents of LSLI schemes, community members are disillusioned by the broken promises and would support a president who purports to fight against institutions such as the TIC, which is linked to these LSLI deals and schemes. Community members are more likely to support the President, whose approach to investments has elements of developmental nationalism and expresses himself as the leader of the downtrodden (Paget 2020b). On the other hand, community members are not likely to support LSLIs or trust the TIC, represented here as an ‘old order’ *laissez-faire* institution. The following section sets out a rationale for the politics of LSLIs and how it may contribute to the support of ‘developmental nationalism’ under Magufuli in rural Tanzania.

### **6.5 How local politics becomes entangled in the politics of large-scale land investments**

This section presents empirical work on how local political economies become entangled in the politics of LSLIs and highlights how the paternalistic perception of the state officials as being ‘responsible for, but not to, citizens’ creates animosity between public institutions and local community members (Schneider 2006, 108). The section highlights how changes to investment and land laws to increase private sector engagement, and broken promises within LSLIs, can contribute to distrust for old order *laissez-faire* institutions. For periodisation, the section focuses on discourse from the late 1980s, when the first half of the land in Village 1 was acquired. This was a period which coincided with the introduction of neoliberal economic policies in Tanzania. This history of land investments in Village 1 supports the claim that ‘the SAGCOT did not start from scratch, but builds on existing projects’ (Sulle 2020, 337).

The section also highlights the formation of the Tanzania Investment Centre following the enactment of the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act and the broken promises and adverse outcomes which were to accompany LSLIs under the Kikwete regime (2005-2015). The introduction of the TIC and the legal standing of the 1997 Tanzania Investment Act has been discussed in Chapter Two. Understanding how and why people act in politics and why there is support in these local communities for the turn to ‘developmental nationalism’ suggests that history be viewed from the standpoint of its agents (Schneider 2006).

The acquisition of the 1,999ha piece of land in Village 1 happened in two phases (see Figure 7 of village maps). The acquisition of the first half of the piece of land, 404ha, occurred in 1984 when Tanzania was transitioning from being a socialist regime to a neoliberal political economy (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996, Gibbon 1995, Coulson 2013). The second half, 1,595ha, was acquired in 2011 when the Kikwete administration launched the SAGCOT scheme (Sulle 2020). The 20,000ha piece of land in Village 2, was acquired in 2010, also after the launch of the SAGCOT scheme. These periods were marked by an active invitation to and support for private investors in agriculture in Tanzania (Nelson et al. 2012).

For one thing, Nelson et al. (2012, 1) regard the increase in the competition for land by foreign and local investors in Tanzania as an outcome of broader political and economic changes, leading to the liberalisation of the Tanzanian economy in the 1980s. Ngoitiko et al. (2010, 273) argue that the reforms in the 1980s gave rise to an unprecedented period of ‘land-grabbing’ in Tanzania. These debates, including those of the 2015 electoral campaign, are thus not new. The re-emergence of the land discourse in the 2015 general elections merely extends and reproduces ongoing debates over land and investments in Tanzania (Schlimmer 2018).

### **6.5.1 Political competition and the introduction of neo-liberal policies**

The ‘shift to an open market economy in the 1980s meant that Tanzania now had a government which supported private investments’ (Interview, former secretary-general of Tanzania Chambers of Commerce Industry and Agriculture (TCCIA), 31.08.2018). ‘To obtain structural adjustment loans’, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985-1995) adjusted the developmental ambitions of Tanzania to the conditionalities of foreign financiers, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (Mapunda 2008). As mentioned in Chapter 2.2.1, these conditions included; (1) The devaluation of the Tanzanian shilling (Loxley 1989), (2) changes in the political structure, introduced by the 1991 Zanzibar Declaration and multipartyism (Coulson 2013), and (3) changes in the investment regulatory framework, including investment and private property laws (Mapunda 2008).

By 1991, state subsidies provided to farmers were suspended under the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) (Mbonile 1995). Introduced in 1986, the ERP encouraged private sector engagement in agriculture and reduced state ‘interference’ in the market (Bagachwa 1991). As part of the ERP, the Civil Society Reform Programme (CSR) of 1991 -1998 was implemented in 1993 (Mapunda 2008), followed some years later by the Public Service Reform Program Phase One (PSRP I: 2000–2007), and its continuation, PSRP II 2008–2012 (Issa 2010, 474). Publicly owned enterprises were privatised and acquired mainly by the business elite (Kaiser 1996, 232). These economic and political changes led to widespread redundancies in the public service, increasing inequality between the business elite and poorer, rural sections of society (Engberg-Pedersen et al. 1996, 337).

Consequently, political debates about the expansion of the economy became entangled in what Aminzade refers to as the ‘indigenisation debates’ (Aminzade 2003, 52). These debates have

been addressed in Chapters Two and Five. For example, in the mid-1990s, opposition party leaders like Rev. Christopher Mtikila of the Democratic Party described Tanzanians of Asian and Arab origin as thieves and looters of the country's wealth (*gabacholis*), at the expense of indigenous Africans or the downtrodden people (*mkombozi wa walahoi*) (Aminzade 2003, 2013). The economically better-endowed Tanzanians, mainly of Asian origin, were seen as better able to acquire assets while the impoverished majority (African) nationals became further economically marginalised in their ancestral land (Mwapachu 2005, 170).

It is argued that Tanzanians of Asian origin became the new proprietors of many state-owned enterprises. Being economically better off, they were able to acquire significant private assets in the wake of economic liberalisation. These debates became political capital and were not only limited to race (Aminzade 2003). In a seemingly strategic move, ruling political party leaders like Idi Simba began substituting the indigenisation rhetoric with language that signified rather a struggle against foreign interference (Key informant, University of Dar es Salaam, 28.08.2018). Here, indigenisation rhetoric distinguished between citizens and foreigners. The indigenisation rhetoric became a populist tool to gain political support by advocating for the protection of the nation's economy and culture from the threat of foreign domination (Aminzade 2003).

The rising inequality in the country legitimised the indigenisation debates (Mwapachu 2005). It remained one of the dominant issues within the newly established multiparty electoral system (Aminzade 2003, Nagar 1996). Mwenye Busara (not his real name), a 70-year-old key informant in Village 1, remembers the socio-political changes during this period. Mr Merali, of Asian origin, benefited from the newly liberalised economy in the 1980s and was able to acquire the piece of land in this Ruvuma village. Mwenye Busara and a group of the village elders

acquiesced to the transfer of 404ha of land to Mr Merali in 1984. ‘We were young when our land was taken. I was 36 years old. He told us that he would bring jobs and develop our village’ (Interview, Mwenye Busara, Key informant, Village 1, 02.07.2018). It should be apparent that the local interpretations of the history of these political and economic changes are fundamental in understanding and evaluating the political impact of contemporary debates in rural communities. The following section discusses this history and the changes to investment and land laws to increase private sector engagement.

### **6.5.2 Changes to investment and land laws for increased private sector engagement**

Following Cotula (2013b), I have shown how governments mobilise their formal ownership of land within national law to legitimise LSLIs and to promote growth corridors or ‘agricultural modernisation’. Private investors (domestic and foreign) maximise national law and the legal protection provided by international investment law to acquire land and shelter themselves from adverse public actions and contestations (Ferrando 2014, Jayne et al. 2016). The legal reforms that followed the failures of the socialist regime in Tanzania, as discussed in Chapter Two, confirm the law's position as an enabler of the disposition of customary land in Tanzania (also see Alden-Wily 2003, 2011a).

For example, the Local Government Reform Act of 1998, which was introduced to decentralise decision-making processes within government, failed to materialise into a veritable devolution of power due to political and institutional constraints (Kessy and McCourt 2010). Significantly though, changes to land laws in 1999, which introduced the oversight mechanism needing the consent of the village assembly, i.e., all village adults above eighteen years, for any transfer of land to a potential investor, nevertheless left the administration of village land transactions under district authorities (Alden-Wily 2003). In principle, the 1999 Village Land Act of

Tanzania provides for the separation of power between the Village Assembly, and the Village Council, as the basis for village-level governance (Peter and Shivji 2000). However, local elites, including government officials, continued to perceived village community members as the objects of development and recipients of orders from the top rather than equal partners in decision-making processes (Shivji 2002, 37).

Indeed, by 1993, following the failures of the socialist regime and the introduction of the economic and political reforms in Tanzania in the late 1980s, there was a need for legal and institutional reforms to ‘facilitate an enabling environment for enhanced private sector participation’ in Tanzania (Mapunda 2008, 102). The Mwinzi government announced the establishment of the Legal Sector Task Force led by Mark Bomani. Bomani argued that ‘market-oriented economic reforms could not be implemented in the absence of a “sophisticated”, legal or regulatory framework capable of meeting the exacting challenges of a “modern” market economy (Bomani 1996, 1). The Bomani report justified the redundancy of the 1990 Investment Promotion and Protection Act and formed the basis for the 1997 Investment Act (Peter and Mwakaje 2004, 11). It should be recalled that the 1990 Investment Promotion Act had provisions for the protection of local industries. It should also be recalled that the introduction of World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules in 1994 challenged the justification of preferential treatment or ‘ring fencing’ within national investment regimes (Peter 1991). This meant that with the introduction of WTO rules, it became increasingly untenable to justify preferential treatment to local firms and businesses as part of national economic policy and strategy.

The new 1997 Tanzania Investment Act introduced the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) as a ‘one-stop-shop’ to facilitate the acquisition of land and investment certificates for investors

(Bélair 2018). These legislative and institutional changes opened all sectors of the economy for investments. The new 1997 Investment Act abolished the protection of local industries or the ring-fencing of investment sectors for local citizens as in the 1990 Investment Promotion and Protection Act. According to an expert in investment and human rights law at the University of Dar es Salaam, 'the best investment law this country [Tanzania] has ever had, and which gave locals a fair opportunity for investments, was the 1990 Investment Promotion Act. Surprisingly, Tanzanians spearheaded the change of the law...they were just a group of comprador guys' (Key informant, University of Dar es Salaam interviewed 28.08.2018).

To appease advocates calling for the indigenisation of the economy, vocal proponent and businessman, Idi Simba, was appointed Minister of Commerce and Industry in 1999 (Interview, lecturer, University of Dar es Salaam, 28.08.2018). After his appointment, opposition party parliamentarians joined 'CCM backbenchers to support the National Employment Promotion Service Act of 1999', which introduced measures designed to require foreign investors to enter into business partnerships with Tanzanian citizens (Aminzade 2013, 298). This encouraged the link between foreign investors and local businesses, in what authors like Shivji have described as compradorialism (Shivji 1991). To others like Zoomers and Nelson et al., the interest in land investments was a consequence of 'the liberalisation of land markets, which became a significant policy goal in the 1990s and furthered the commodification of land and other natural resources in Tanzania (Nelson et al. 2012, Zoomers 2010).

The absence of robust regulatory and oversight institutions allowed corrupt politicians and institutions to engage in rent-seeking with devastating consequences for the economy (Mwapachu 2005). The land reforms in 1999 were criticised as 'being too focussed on enhancing economic growth' to enhance the productivity and profitability of the agricultural

sector, as stated in the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy of 2001 (Pedersen 2010, 12). With the transition to multiparty democracy in 1995, increased opportunities for corruption and self-enrichment by state officials became a significant driver of change in Tanzania (Andreoni 2017). Continued inefficiencies in institutional and regulatory frameworks in the wake of market-led investments affected the functioning of state institutions. The implementation of the land law reforms remained problematic because of the inadequate resources and capacity at the local and national level, including the Ministry of Lands (Odgaard 2002). The increase in tax exemption cases of approximately US\$178 million by 2001 contributed to losses in tax revenue by the government (Osoro 1995) and the falsification of VAT receipts at the Tanzania Revenue Authority to the tune of US\$15 million per annum by 2003 (Fjeldstad 2003).

By 2005, when Kikwete became President, the contradictions between the ideas and actions of the ruling class and the lived experiences of common Tanzanians had become profound (The Monitor 2015). For instance, the 2005 Strategic Plan for Implementation of Land Laws (SPILL), criticised pastoralists and smallholder farmers for not contributing to agricultural productivity and economic growth (Pedersen 2010). Many investment projects had failed to materialise into profitable economic opportunities for smallholder farmers (Nelson et al. 2012). In the case study community, the land which Mr Merali acquired in *Village 1* remained vacant till 2011. ‘We accept that we gave the land to Merali. We gave [it to] him because he promised to bring jobs and develop our village. So, we did not go to that land since it was no longer our land’ (FGD participant, Village 1, 14.07.2018). The increasing poverty levels demanded that the government allocate appropriate resources for accelerated sustainable and inclusive economic growth. The outcome was an increase in LSLI schemes and a focus on the commercialisation of agriculture, which, according to Kelsall, became populist vehicles for promises during election campaigns (Andreoni 2017, Kelsall 2018).

### 6.5.3 Broken promises

The focus on LSLIs under President Kikwete's administration, the global land rush after the 2007/2008 food crisis (Anseeuw et al. 2012, German 2015), and weak legal and institutional processes all contributed to the vulnerable status of customary land in Tanzania (Alden-Wily 2011a, 733). By 2009, an estimated four million hectares of land was requested from the Tanzanian government, through the TIC, with about 640,000ha having been formally allocated to investors (Nelson et al. 2012, 10). Land transfer processes remain 'political', and rural communities frequently dispossessed of land, with the 'public interest' used as a justification for land expropriation (Bélair 2018, Gebremichael 2016). Land laws in Tanzania remain highly centralised, such that the President can acquire any land for any public purpose (Chirayath et al. 2006, Veit 2010, Alden-Wily 2003).

In August 2009, President Kikwete launched the *Kilimo Kwanza* – 'Agriculture First' strategy as a national resolve to accelerate agriculture transformation in Tanzania by 'providing incentives to attract more agricultural investors' (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, 15). The *Kilimo Kwanza* strategy was Kikwete's plan for promoting commercialised agriculture (Pedersen 2010, 12). As part of the *Kilimo Kwanza*, the SAGCOT was launched in May 2010 (SAGCOT 2011). The SAGCOT encompasses the regions of Dar es Salaam, Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, Ruvuma, Njombe, Rukwa & Katavi, and is supported by the G8's (now G7) New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition Strategy (Steffens et al. 2019). Transnational corporations (TNCs) like Yara, Monsanto, Bayer Crop Science, Syngenta, Unilever, the World Bank, and the US Feed the Future strongly support the initiative (SAGCOT 2011).

While the interest of most governments in developing countries is to attract much-needed capital through FDI, the benefits of the commercialisation of agriculture remain debatable in

these counties, and institutional performance can influence support for such policy interventions in the short and longer term (Diao et al. 2018, Newfarmer and Sztajerowska 2012). The launch of the SAGCOT introduced the second phase of the land acquisition in *Village 1*, only this time, without the knowledge and consent of village members. ‘We were shocked when we received a letter<sup>43</sup> from the village executive officer (VEO), restricting us from accessing the land on the left side of the road’ (FGD participant, *Village 1*, 14.07.2018). The son of the now-deceased Merali returned to the village in 2011 to claim his father’s land (404 ha), including an additional 1,595ha of land on the left-hand side of the road (see Figure 7).

It came as a surprise to Mwenye Busara and his fellow village members that this investor now claimed an additional 1,595ha.

*When the current investor came, we were grown up. We witnessed a massive conflict between the investor and us [sic]. Of course, as villagers, we did not offer our consent [to the 1,595ha], but we had to give [it] up because all of our efforts yielded no results. We struggled by writing several letters to the authorities to bring back our land, especially the land on the left side of the road. The poison of our grabbed land is still in our hearts (FGD participant, *Village 1*, 14.07.2018).*

It is not uncommon to witness land rights infringements in the transfer of land title deeds from one investor to another in Tanzania (Greco 2015). Similar inconsistencies in the size of land transfers between investors were reported in the Kupunga village. There, villagers accepted the transfer of 5,500ha of land to the National Agriculture and Food Corporation (NAFCO); however, in 1995, the NAFCO offered a land title deed of 7,370 ha to the Kapunda Rice Project

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<sup>43</sup> Ref.No.LVC/Land. Dated 17/10/2011 – Reference number of letter from VEO.

Limited, leading to land disputes between the village community and Kapuna Rice Project Ltd (Sulle 2017, 6). Similarly, the land in Village 2 was acquired in 2010, and village members have since been barred from accessing the land, which also functioned as their cemetery. Indeed, several LSLI deals in Tanzania have been reported as showing a disregard for the broader interests and concerns of village members in favour of investors who possessed capital for investment and development (Ngoitiko et al. 2010). A research participant described the investor in *Village 2* as ‘just a cunning man. That is why he got the land. They took advantage of our illiteracy. None of his promises was fulfilled!’ FGD participants said the only useful thing for them when the land was transferred were the ‘promises he made to us’ (FGD, Village 2, 04.08.2018).

As Sulle (2020, 341) suggests, the contestation by local communities of the expansion of land sales in Tanzania needs to be located in an understanding of the broader political economy. In many cases, as in Village 1 and 2, contestations over access to land are often spurred by an investment and development agenda, which undermines rural communities’ control over their land and other productive resources (Lund and Boone 2013, 2). The return of Veit (not his real name) in 2011 and the arrival of investors in Village 2 followed the launch of the SAGCOT in May 2010 (SAGCOT 2011). As Schneider notes, ‘the focus on the commercialisation of agriculture serves as a vehicle for local political elites to pursue a *developmentalist* agenda and see themselves as empowered to rule for the good of society and treat village communities as marginally competent political agents (Schneider 2006, 107). The political imagination of the state elite is often expressed in deeply paternalistic and hierarchical terms, with their ‘knowledge’ and ‘modern’ agency placed alongside the ‘ignorance’ and ‘backwardness’ of village members (Schneider 2006, 109).

Local political elites welcome large-scale initiatives because they create both genuine economic opportunities as well as rent-seeking opportunities (Sulle 2020, 333). As a result, rural communities like Village 1 and 2 become political hotspots to boost popular support for public policies towards poverty reduction and income generation through the commercialisation of agriculture. This may explain the visit of President Kikwete to Village 1 in 2014. He raised the expectations of community members by saying that he had directed government institutions to increase the pace of poverty reduction in the country, which could be done through investments such as the newly established coffee farm in the village (The Citizen 2014). While conducting field research in *Village 1*, the first author overheard a local police officer remark that 'village members have a low IQ', and that his research was introducing ideas that could cause them to riot against the investor and the government (an encounter between a regional police officer and first author, 01.08. 2018). There is indeed a general perception that LSLIs are often linked to a corrupt political elite and foreign investors at the expense of disadvantaged local communities (Schlimmer 2018). The general increase in land conflicts between investors and local communities disenfranchises local communities and excludes them from the 'benefits' of LSLI in various parts of Tanzania (Ngoitiko et al. 2010).

Additionally, the dire food insecurity experiences of research participants in Village 1 and 2, as documented in Chapter 7, contribute to the disillusionment of rural communities around the benefits of these LSLIs. For example, when Mwenye Busara was interviewed, he was weaving a basket from raffia-like twines, which he planned to exchange for 4kg of maize per basket, maize being the staple in Ruvuma. Over 90% of research participants from the household survey in Village 1 and 2 described maize-based stiff porridge (*ugali*) as the staple in the region. *Ugali* is usually accompanied by vegetables and if available, also fish. Halfway into the interview, Busara requested some food from one of the research assistants. Busara was hungry,

and his daughter and carer, with whom he lives in a tiny mud shack, had left for work on the investor's farm without preparing a meal for him. In general, over 47% of interviewees reported experiences of being severely food insecure (see Chapter 7). Also, see Talleh Nkobou et al. (2021). This example illustrates the socio-economic situation in Village 1, where many of its members are labourers in what is now a large agribusiness which was first touted for its capacity to bring employment and development to the local area, among other 'benefits'.

During the FGDs in Village 1, community members seemed to have given up on the struggles to defend their land. 'This is a massive investment, and you cannot fight it with the money from begging [sic]. For our chairman to go to town to follow up [these issues], he has to borrow the transport fare from various shop-owners within the village' (FGD participant, Village 1, 21.07.2018). The failures of investment and economic policies to bring about a positive change for rural people in Tanzania legitimises their support for the nationalist turn in Tanzania today. During this research, it became clear that village members associated anything to do with investments as the failures of the TIC, which explains the low level of trust in 'old order' *laissez faire* institutions vis-à-vis Magufuli's new 'developmental nationalism' approach. To the majority of interviewees in village communities, Magufuli's actions were viewed as a possible solution to the systematic exclusion of smallholders from a capitalist-oriented economy.

Additionally, President Magufuli's election came against the background of a political climate marred by high-level corruption scandals and distrust in the public institutions in Tanzania (Cooksey 2017). The private interests of state elites became entangled with elite capture and patronage-based politics in Tanzania (Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016). For example, Pelizzon and Bekenova provide detailed accounts of some of the highest profile scandals, including the

Richmond scandal, the Bank of Tanzania's (BoT) External Payment of Arrears (EPA) scandal, Escrow scandal, and the BoT's twin tower inflation scandal (Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016).

These events, in part, paved the way for the ascent to the top job of the then Minister of Works (from 2010 to 2015), John P. Magufuli, who had gained a reputation as a 'no-nonsense' Minister, an approach which earned him the nickname 'The Bulldozer'. Magufuli's first years in office as President were dedicated to building political support by introducing popular social policies such as free education for children between the age of 8 and 12 and improved health service provision for the poor (Asim et al. 2019). He also focused on improving the public service and curbing corruption while consolidating power at the helm of a weakened ruling political party (Andreoni 2017, Kelsall 2018).

His supporters heralded this approach to investment policy and regulations as attempts to redefine and rebalance Tanzania's uneven relationship with investors. The pragmatism of President Magufuli's fight against corruption and his purported anti-establishment agenda propelled him to the head of a nation and a ruling political party (CCM) that needed fundamental changes in structure - principles, values and institutions, - an image undoubtedly different from the bluster that accompanied the neoliberal reforms introduced in the late 1980s (Andreoni 2017, Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016). In a recently published report on the Agriculture Sector Development Strategy of Tanzania, the government of Tanzania acknowledged that the focus on establishing large commercial farms made little contribution to the reduction of poverty (URT 2015). Indeed, increasing levels of corruption and the seemingly imminent disintegration of the ruling political party in the run-up to the 2015 elections paved the way for President Magufuli, who would advocate for change, and disrupt the business-as-usual approach in Tanzania (Fouéré 2008, Cooksey 2017, Pelizzo and Bekenova 2016).

## 6.6 Conclusions

The involvement of state agents in land transactions can transform land investments into a tool for politicians to garner political support. These land transactions contribute to questions about legitimacy and government representation within local political economies. Additionally, the vulnerable position of customary land within state-centred land tenure regimes pit local communities against local government officials who continue to regard them as incompetent political agents. The negative impacts of LSLIs on the rights of local communities, and the absence of adequate political tools oriented towards holding investors accountable for the promises made to local people, place public institutions and citizens in a constant struggle for political legitimacy and support.

While political trust is a highly normative and subjective concept, the use of a case study approach minimises measurement errors that may occur when measuring political trust across cultural and regime settings. From the LCA performed in this study, it became evident that there is a difference in support for the president and 'old order' *laissez-faire* institutions. Results show that 31% of rural community members are likely to support LSLIs in these rural communities. While the research does not examine the successes and failures of developmental nationalism under President Magufuli, it shows that rural communities impacted by LSLIs were likely to support a 'developmental nationalism' approach to investments in Tanzania. Such support or trust is dependent on people's normative expectations towards public institutions linked to LSLIs. For years, local communities have been disillusioned by the promises made within these investment schemes, which are often presented as a means to increase FDI, farmers' incomes, technology transfer, and job creation. The negative impacts of LSLIs on the rights of local communities and the absence of adequate political tools, which are oriented to

holding investors accountable for the outcomes promised to local people, underpin the popular support for the 'developmental nationalist' turn in Tanzania today.

To local communities impacted by LSLIs, Magufuli's actions were viewed as a solution to the systematic exclusion of an agrarian workforce from an increasingly capitalist-oriented economy. Having made his calculations on where to build his support base, Magufuli instrumentalised this variant form of 'developmental nationalism' as a political tool to increase political support among rural communities. His 'developmental nationalism' was versatile and mutable and has legitimised his authoritarian rule in the eyes of his supporters as a fight for the poor against a corrupt political and business elite. Further research is needed to understand how the material consequences of this turn towards developmental nationalism will impact trust in public institutions in the long run, particularly if Magufuli's efforts ultimately fail to deliver livelihood benefits to the marginalised masses of people in Tanzania.

# 7 Broken promises: A rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania<sup>44</sup>

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou<sup>a</sup> and Stefanie Lemke<sup>b</sup>, and Andrew Ainslie<sup>a</sup>

<sup>a</sup> School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, e-mail:

[atenchongtallehnikobou@reading.ac.uk](mailto:atenchongtallehnikobou@reading.ac.uk);

<sup>b</sup> Centre for Agroecology, Water and Resilience (CAWR), Coventry University, [e-mail: ac0447@coventry.ac.uk](mailto:ac0447@coventry.ac.uk)

and Dep. Societal Transition and Agriculture, University of Hohenheim

## 7.1 Abstract

Proponents of large-scale land investments (LSLI) still promote them as a development opportunity, which can lead, among other benefits, to job creation and enhanced food security for local communities. However, there is increasing evidence that these investments often deprive affected communities of their access to land, with multiple negative impacts on livelihoods, food security, and the environment. This chapter contributes empirical data on LSLI in two villages in the Ruvuma region, Tanzania, years after the acquisition of village land that lies within the Southern African Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). The chapter introduces an innovative framework that integrates a rights-based approach with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) to explore smallholders' livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity. Findings show that

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<sup>44</sup> This paper is co-authored with Dr Andrew Ainslie and Dr Stefanie Lemke. The paper was submitted to the *Food Security Journal* for the first phase of peer review on the 26.12.2020. The paper has been published as Talleh Nkobou, A., Ainslie, A. & Lemke, S. Broken promises: a rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania. *Food Sec.* (2021). <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12571-021-01195-3>. Dr Lemke contributed to conceptualising the study and methodological approach applied in this research. She was the first author's M.Sc. thesis supervisor in 2014/2015 at the University of Hohenheim, Germany. Data collection and analysis were performed by the first author, with reviews from Stefanie Lemke and Andrew Ainslie.

the human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency, and empowerment are severely undermined. This is largely due to inadequate monitoring and evaluation of LSLI processes and low levels of commitment on the part of institutions in Tanzania to monitor the promises made by investors. Also, the inadequacy in monitoring and evaluation demonstrates an accountability deficit on duty-bearers within LSLIs, and a lack of capacity of affected community members to claim their rights. Individual food insecurity experienced in the two communities correlates, among other characteristics, with lack of land ownership, employment and income-generating activities. The rights-based livelihoods framework applied in this chapter emphasises that access to land in Tanzania is a precondition for realising the right to adequate food and thus a requirement for achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security.

**Keywords:** Right to food, Food Insecurity Access Scale, large-scale land investments, livelihoods analysis, Tanzania, SAGCOT

## **7.2 Introduction**

This chapter takes up the question posed by **RQ3** - what are the food insecurity experiences of individuals within households in the case study communities? The chapter provides insights into the policy and institutional factors that have placed these agrarian communities in a vulnerable position within the neoliberal canon. It also examines how the state of Tanzania may conform to or derogate from its duty within the international human rights regimes to which it is a signatory (Mapulanga-Hulston 2009, 308). In the period following the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, there has emerged evidence of a 'global land grab' (TNI 2013) and consequent to it, a growing body of research on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) in Sub-Saharan Africa

(SSA). This literature is largely critical of the impact of LSLIs on livelihoods and food security (Alamirew et al. 2015, Cotula 2012). For example, in a cross country analysis of the impact of ‘transnational land acquisitions on local food security and dietary diversity’, Müller et al. (2021, 5) found that land deals in SSA have contributed to food insecurity by shifting production away from local staples and decreasing dietary diversity among households in the region. Critics who cite a mounting number of case-studies, argue that the economic and speculative value of land in these countries are prioritised to the detriment of the rights of local communities including other social and cultural rights attached to land (Davis et al. 2015, Von Braun 1995). For example, Bues and Theesfeld (2012) report that local communities in Ethiopia were denied their rights to water in favour of a floriculture investment because of the investor’s influence on the local government. Alamirew et al. (2015) and Yengoh and Armah (2015), examining the impact of LSLIs on food security and employment in Ethiopia and Sierra Leone respectively, show that employment opportunities associated with these investments are both temporary and marginal and that there is a decline in affected households’ food consumption, attributable to LSLI.

The issues can be more serious than this: Borras Jr et al. (2013, 175) state that there is a ‘blurring of governance boundaries between sectors of food, energy, climate change mitigation strategies and commercial complexes’, all posing significant governance challenges in the regulating of LSLIs. Significantly, the law itself, including international human rights law, has been criticised as an enabler of the commodification of land and labour, exacerbating the global order’s ‘poverty, dispossession and exploitation’ (Cotula 2020, 475) and increasing the vulnerable status of customarily held land in many African countries (Alden-Wily 2011a, Chadwick 2019). Indeed, governments routinely mobilise their formal ownership of land within national law to legitimise LSLIs and promote growth corridors or agricultural modernisation (Cotula 2013b,

Chadwick 2019), while private investors (domestic and foreign) maximise national law and the legal protections provided by international investment law to acquire land and shield themselves from adverse public (re)actions and legal contestations (Ferrando 2014, Jayne et al. 2016).

Consequently, the weaknesses in global markets and financial institutions, further exposed by the 2007/2008 financial crisis and subsequent land rush and food security risks in many African countries, have variously produced and deepened a *vulnerability context* for ordinary citizens. This has in turn demonstrated the need for policies and institutions to mitigate and regulate the excesses of market forces (Sama 2016, Schiavoni et al. 2018). It is for this reason that in 2009, the former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to adequate food, De Schutter (2009b), identified and recommended plausible policies focused on the linkages between land ownership, food security, sustainable development and the right to food (see Miggiano et al. 2010, Kothari 2006). Indeed, authoritative voices like De Schutter (2011a, 505), have argued that '[g]overnments have obligations that they cannot simply ignore in the name of attracting capital' and actively advocated for rights-based approaches to LSLIs, which we use in framing this paper.

Research on and the impact of LSLIs remain highly contested due in part to the lack of accurate data (Edelman 2013, Oya 2013b, Locher and Sulle 2014), and due also to opposing views of different actors (Diao et al. 2018). On the one hand, advocates for LSLIs, such as government ministries, multi-national corporations and institutions such as the World Bank argue that these investments are a development opportunity and can boost much needed foreign direct investment (FDI), increase export revenue, and can lead to food security, technology transfer and job creation for local communities in developing countries (SAGCOT 2011, Steffens et al. 2019, World Bank 2017). In fact, as discussed in the preceding chapters, following the

2007/2008 crisis, the government of Tanzania and its partners launched the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) as part of the Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) and as a means to stimulate economic development by attracting multi-national companies to invest in agriculture (Bergius et al. 2018, SAGCOT 2011). The SAGCOT provides a platform to galvanise global investors, multi-national companies, state bureaucrats and politicians in a grand modernist vision for the transformation of agriculture (Sulle 2020, 333). The International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank, the African Development Bank (AfDB), the European Union (EU), Irish Aid and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) were the main donors in the ASDS (SAGCOT 2011). These partnerships underwrote the launch of the SAGCOT in 2010 (Bergius et al. 2018, Sulle 2020). Kaarhus (2018) provides a detailed account of the development of the SAGCOT and the role of the Norwegian petrochemical company YARA International in promoting commercial agriculture as a growth model in East Africa.

In this sense, the SAGCOT is envisaged by the government of Tanzania as a means to stimulate economic development by attracting multi-national companies to invest in agriculture (Bergius et al. 2018, SAGCOT 2011). There is no doubt that these large-scale land deals cannot avoid a certain degree of enmeshment in local dynamics and micro politics over who has the right to dispose of land, who is consulted and who benefits from sales or transfers of land within rural households and communities (Sulle 2020). For example, political contestations around land investments in Tanzania can be traced back to the 1970s and 1980s following the state-led villagisation programme (Nelson et al. 2012, Bryceson 1980). Bryceson (1980, 557) describes the villagisation programme as a failed top-down experiment in which the state became the coordinator in the formation of villages as commodity-producing units. Arguably, current debates around land dispossession and investments serve in part to reproduce and extend

ongoing debates that form part of Tanzania's agrarian history (Schlimmer 2018, 84). This complex history of political contestations in relation to land investments in Tanzania supports the claim by Sulle (2020, 337) that the SAGCOT did not start with a *tabula rasa*, but builds on existing state-led agricultural investments and local machinations around land.

LSLIs have been challenged for depriving local communities of their access to land, causing environmental degradation, and leading to human rights violations (Baumgartner et al. 2015, Kanosue 2015, Schiavoni et al. 2018). This affects those people most severely who are already marginalised, worsening existing structural inequalities. Women, who often depend on marginal land for supplementing food supplies for their households, especially certain categories such as widows and single women with children, but also the elderly in general as well as the youth, are included here. Proponents of human rights advocate for improved accountability and transparency in designing and implementing LSLI schemes. In other words, rural communities should be better involved in land investment policy design and implementation (De Schutter 2009a, 2011b). For this reason, civil society organisations have contributed to these debates by proposing actions in the form of voluntary guidelines, which primarily focus on improving the governance of land tenure and agricultural policy in general (see Seufert 2013). For example, following the increasing interest in land after the 2007/2008 crisis, the *Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security* were endorsed by the UN Committee of World Food Security in May 2012 (FAO 2012). Civil society organisations like *Vía Campesina*, the German Catholic Bishop's Organisation for Development Cooperation (MISEREOR) and a host of others like the national farmer's organisations *Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima Tanzania* (MVIWATA), have contributed to the peasant resistance against the displacement of

rural communities by LSLIs and against the destruction of their livelihoods and cultures (Bernstein and Oya 2014, Sulle 2020). .

As already mentioned, the lack of sound data on LSLI is exacerbated by (i) the reluctance of governments and investors to reveal information on land-based investments which are controversially deemed to be proprietary and confidential (Cotula 2011), (ii) the varied nature and definitions of LSLIs (Anseeuw 2013), (iii) the lack of rigour in research methodologies (Edelman 2013, Oya 2013b, Locher and Sulle 2014), and (iv) the risks involved in researching such a politically charged phenomenon (Cramer et al. 2015, Talleh Nkobou 2020). These challenges and limitations can lead to what Oya (2013b) describes as ‘killer facts’ within LSLI research, or, stated differently, ‘the extent to which data reflects realities ... is questionable’ (Oya 2013b, 505). Further, Scoones et al. (2013) argue for the need for more research on the impact of LSLI on local communities whose livelihoods and food security are at stake. Socially marginalised groups, among others, women and the elderly, are most affected, with data on the gendered impacts of land deals largely lacking (Behrman et al. 2012, Daley and Pallas 2014).

While this is not the first study to call for, or to integrate, human rights with the Sustainable Livelihoods framework (SLF) (see Carney 2003, Lemke and Bellows 2016), this study uniquely combines the SLF with the human rights (PANTHER) principles. PANTHER stands for Participation, Accountability, Non-discrimination, Transparency, Human Dignity, Empowerment, and Rule of Law (FAO 2005), as will be elaborated in the following section.

The Chapter has three objectives. First, in addressing conceptual and methodological challenges in LSLI research, this paper sets out to provide a new perspective and approach to research on LSLI. It does so by developing an innovative rights-based livelihoods framework. The chapter draws on the right to adequate food, moving away from a needs-based to an entitlement-based

perspective of food security. The SLF is used to facilitate the assessment of livelihood strategies and outcomes in the two case study communities. Second, within this broader framework, the research applies the Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) (see Coates et al. 2007) to explore the food insecurity experience of individuals as a livelihood outcome in the context of LSLI within these case study communities. The objective is not to perform a ‘before’ and ‘after’ evaluation of the food insecurity experiences in the community, an option which was not available for this research. Such an approach will require more data, time, and resources as we have highlighted in the challenges of conducted research in Chapter 3. This research, however, juxtapose a cross-sectional perspective of individuals’ food insecurity experiences within these communities against promises made in investment contracts and policies. This provides valuable new empirical data, given that in Tanzania data on the link between LSLI and individual food insecurity experience has thus far been lacking. Third, the research sheds light on whether the human rights principles of accountability, transparency, participation and empowerment were adhered to in the context of the LSLIs observed here, and especially how relevant local government institutions and land management structures affect livelihood strategies in these communities.

In making these contributions, this research emphasises the imperative of bringing greater nuance to the complexities of LSLI as a global phenomenon, which affects local actors and communities in a wide range of ways. The research recognises, however, the inherent difficulties and yet the necessity of doing so via in-depth, localised and on-the-ground research into this often controversial and polarising area of enquiry, which can place researchers themselves at risk of their personal safety (see Talleh Nkobou 2020). The next section introduces the rights-based livelihoods framework, which integrates the human rights-based

PANTHER principles and the SLF, placing the elements of the framework in the context of LSLIs in the two case study communities observed here.

### **7.3 A rights-based livelihoods framework**

In the debates on LSLI schemes, a rights-based perspective has increasingly been called for, both within policy and academic research (Claeys and Vanloqueren 2013, Grajales 2015, Busscher et al. 2019). As argued by Scoones (2009, 181), sustainable livelihood approaches have been criticised for the ‘lack of engagement with processes of economic globalisation’, ‘lack of attention to power and politics’ and its focus on local level livelihoods in isolation (also see Lemke and Bellows 2016). The rights-based livelihoods framework applied in this research focuses on *both* the overarching context and conditions for the development of livelihood strategies *and* the resulting livelihood outcomes, such as food security. This human rights-based approach complements the SLF by introducing broader political economy debates and structures of accountability for a more nuanced understanding of LSLIs across different scales from the local, through the regional to the global level (Narula 2013).

To do so, the research draws on the widely accepted 1996 World Food Summit definition of food security as the physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food, at all times, to meet dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 1996). However, this research extends this definition by moving from a needs-based to a rights-based approach, which includes aspects of dignity, acknowledgement of rights, transparency, accountability, and empowerment (Mechlem 2004), as is reflected in the definition of the right to adequate food (see below). A rights-based approach introduces legally enforceable state obligations within LSLI transactions (De Schutter 2009a, Narula 2005). Here, ordinary citizens are rights holders, and national governments and other local institutions are the primary duty

bearers, with multiple public and private sector actors also being recognised as duty bearers (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004).

General comment (GC) 12<sup>45</sup> of the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR 1999) defines the right to *adequate* food as: ‘...when every man, woman and child alone or in community with others, have physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’. In GC 12, para. 7-13, the term **adequacy** is particularly significant for the right to food since it serves to underline **availability** (dietary and sustainable), **accessibility** (economic and physical), and **acceptability** (consumer and cultural) of food. For its part, a rights-based approach entails focusing on those who are most vulnerable, understanding what causes the vulnerability and changing conditions to improve the situation (Chilton and Rose 2009).

This means that, as a signatory to the 1966 International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), other international treaties such as the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CDC), and in line with General Comment (GC) 12 of the CESCR (1999), the Government of Tanzania has the following legally enforceable obligations: (1) to *respect* the right to food, meaning that it should not interfere with people’s access to resources necessary for their livelihoods. (2) To *protect* against non-state actors (individuals or enterprises) from interfering with the access to productive resources of individuals. (3) To *fulfil*, requiring states to adopt appropriate legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial, promotional, and other measures towards the full realisation of the right to food (GC 12, 1999),

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<sup>45</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), *General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food*, 12 May 1999, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html> [accessed 07 March 2020]

*para 15*<sup>46</sup>). The fulfil dimension includes the sub-dimensions to *facilitate*, where states should proactively strengthen people's access to and use of resources and services, and to *provide* goods and services to those, who for emergency or non-emergency reasons outside their control, are unable to obtain them (for example, food assistance).

Noteworthy, however, is Article 2 of the ICESCR, which obliges states to take steps 'individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation of rights recognised by the covenant'. Moreover, 'progressive realisation' cannot be treated as a licence to remain passive, and GC 3 of the CESCR (1999) clearly defines the minimum core obligation of states (De Schutter 2014, 562). In line with these normative contents, LSLIs and associated policies should be implemented in a way that progressively realises the right to adequate food for ordinary citizens (Narula 2006, 2013).

As stated earlier, this research applies the PANTHER principles, which form part of the FAO's (2005) *Voluntary Guidelines to support the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security* (Right to Food Guidelines). Along with legally enforceable treaties such as the ICESCR, voluntary instruments such as the Right to Food Guidelines ensure that citizens' political and social rights are embedded in political and social policy (Gready and Ensor 2005). Authors like Das and Grant (2014) and Mohr et al. (2016) have used the PANTHER principles to assess the progressive realisation of the right to adequate food at the national and sub-national level. In line with Yeshanew (2014, 4), this research argues that these principles should govern decision-making, implementation and monitoring processes within LSLIs in countries like Tanzania. While this research acknowledges that the PANTHER

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<sup>46</sup> UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), General Comment No. 12: The Right to Adequate Food (Art. 11 of the Covenant), 12 May 1999, available at <http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538838c11.html> [accessed 07 March 2020]

principles are indivisible, for the purpose of this study, particular attention is given to the following four principles as experienced by individuals in the two case study communities, which in the context of this research are understood as follows: (also see Figure 9):

- (1) **Participation** means ensuring the free, informed, and full involvement of all segments of the population, including marginalised groups such as women, the elderly, and the youth, in decision-making processes at all stages of LSLIs. This also involves engaging in meaningful consultations with relevant state and non-state actors, including impacted citizens and civil society groups.
- (2) **Transparency** means adopting a clear and context-sensitive strategy for communication with citizens and other stakeholders impacted by LSLIs. This entails freely sharing information about the duties and responsibilities of different actors, rights, and entitlements of affected citizens, and maintaining a two-way communication between investment-related actors and impacted communities.
- (3) **Accountability** refers to duty bearers having to ensure that monitoring and reporting mechanisms, that are inclusive and context-sensitive, are put in place within LSLI schemes. Such tools should contribute to continued learning about and improvements to the LSLI scheme. Accessible and confidential grievance and recourse mechanisms, including pathways for timely responses to complaints of impacted citizens, should be a critical part of the governance system within LSLIs.
- (4) **Empowerment** of marginalised and affected citizens should play a primary role and should be provided to build resilient livelihoods. Local governments and other authorities are expected to be supported in implementing their duties to respect, protect and fulfil the right to adequate food, and building the capacity of affected citizens to claim their rights. Programmes and policies that promote LSLI should design and implement inclusive and participatory capacity-building strategies, including improving capabilities to absorb shocks and stressors and to adapt to new livelihood strategies, e.g., the protection of workers, and raising awareness of the distribution of rights and responsibilities within LSLIs.


### 7.3.1 The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF)

Developed as an intervention planning tool in development programmes (Chambers and Conway 1992, Solesbury 2003), the SLF has been developed further and adapted to various contexts, allowing for the assessments of the vulnerability and capability of households' assets or resources to cope with shocks and to develop livelihood strategies based on available resources (Morse et al. 2009, Scoones 2009). Scoones (2009, 186) in a critical review of the SLF calls for a livelihood approach which 'looks simultaneously at both structure and agency and the diverse micro- and macro-political processes that define opportunities and constraints'. In the context of our research on LSLI and applying a rights-based approach, the elements of the SLF are understood as follows:

- (1) The *vulnerability context* consists of two components: external stresses and shocks people are exposed to, such as climatic and weather events, but also market shocks such as experienced during the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent increased global demand for land (Deininger et al. 2011). The vulnerability context also refers to internal stresses and shocks, which are mainly determined by the capability of individuals to cope with the loss of productive resources such as land, as well as to internal dynamics and power relations among diverse actors within communities. This includes the (*in*)ability of individuals to cope with shocks and stresses depending on the human, physical, natural, social, financial and political resources ('assets') available to them. Access to these resources largely determines people's capacity to diversify their livelihoods and, in line with a rights-based perspective, to hold state and non-state actors accountable for the violation of their rights.
- (2) *Transforming structures and processes* refer to institutions, policies and regulations that impact the choices that individuals make about using their productive resources, and the types and amount of assets or resources they have entitlements to (Messer and Townsley 2003, 4). This component of the SLF focuses on the role played by institutions and processes, such as the rule of law, in the realisation of people's right to adequate food in rural and urban settings.

- (3) **Livelihood strategies** denote the range of activities and choices that people undertake or make to achieve certain livelihood outcomes. In the context observed here, such goals include the choice to work on large-scale farms, or to secure alternative pieces of land for farming. The capability to maintain, uphold and develop livelihood strategies can be a means to achieve alternative livelihood outcomes (Hall et al. 2015, Scoones 2009).
- (4) **Livelihood outcomes** are the goals to which people individually and collectively aspire as a result of pursuing their livelihood strategies, for example, food and nutrition security, increased income and wellbeing (Scoones 2009, Messer and Townsley 2003). Here, we are specifically concerned with the food insecurity experience of individuals as one of the livelihood outcomes in the context of LSLIs.

Figure 9 illustrates how all elements of the rights-based livelihoods framework are inter-linked, highlighting those aspects in red that are most relevant in the case studies observed here.



\*Adapted from DFID 2001 and SDC 2007

Figure 9 Conceptual framework integrating a human rights-based approach with the Sustainable Livelihoods framework in the context of large-scale land investment in the two case study communities

### **7.3.2 Case Study location**

As described in Chapter 3, fieldwork was carried out in the Ruvuma region, Tanzania, during a three-week pilot study in December 2017 and the from May to September during 2018. This prior knowledge, familiarity, and existing relationship with MVIWATA (name in full and very short description here) helped facilitate community entry, establish rapport and relationships of trust, and allowed for engagement in more sensitive discussions related to livelihoods, food security, and the right to food as discussed in this chapter (also see Chapter Three).

Ruvuma is located within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), an area earmarked for developing agribusiness partnerships (SAGCOT 2011). Ruvuma has five districts, with the regional capital being the municipality of Songea. Two villages (Village 1 and 2) were selected and were anonymised, along with the names of research participants, to protect their identity. The Ruvuma River is the primary source of water in this region. Agriculture is predominantly carried out by smallholders, typically cultivating about 2–5 acres of land, and accounts for over 90% of regional food production and employment. In both villages, the village government is co-led by a chairman elected by the village assembly and a government-appointed Village Executive Officer (VEO). According to 2018 demographic data obtained from the VEO in both villages, there are 428 households in Village 1, with 1,954 inhabitants (991 male and 963 female inhabitants). Village 2 is appreciably larger and consists of 821 households and a total population of 3,612 inhabitants (1,793 male and 1,819 female inhabitants).

A detailed account of the LSLI process in the two case study communities has been provided in Chapter Six. For this reason, only a summary of the history of the LSLIs is set out here. In the first case study (Village 1), the origin of the LSLI dates to 1984 when it is claimed by

research participants that a group of male village members acting on behalf of the village agreed to the transfer of 404ha of village land to an investor<sup>47</sup>. At the time, land could be transferred by the village government, who negotiated the transaction, and provided land to anyone<sup>48</sup>. However, under the 1999 Village Land Act, a village council is tasked with making recommendations on any land transfer. The village council is then supposed to submit a proposal to the village general assembly for approval. The same village members who had agreed to the transfer of land in 1984, some of whom were key informants in this research, were shocked when the son of the deceased investor suddenly claimed an additional 1,595ha in 2011. The total land he claimed thus constituted an area of just under 2,000ha, and controversially, local government officials supported his claim. Several attempts by village members to contest the acquisition of this additional land failed, among others holding village assembly meetings, involving local law firms, and writing letters to the respective district officials involved. During these contestations, some village members were intimidated by the district commissioner, village executive officer and police, and even jailed. In 2018, while village members seem to have accepted that their land was taken, they continue to accuse local government officials of favouring the investor, to the detriment of their rights.

In the second case study (Village 2), community members agreed to the very substantial transfer of 20,000 ha of land to a local investor in 2010. The investor promised to provide farming equipment and tractors, a telecommunication tower, employment opportunities, schools, and a dispensary. However, village members expressed frustration that they were tricked by a ‘cunning investor’ who gave them 2000Tsh (U.S. \$0.86) each for their ‘voices to be silenced’

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<sup>47</sup> The investor was a Tanzanian of Indian origin, who lived in Songea (capital of Ruvuma, Tanzania) at the time. This reality has informed what is widely referred to as *indigenisation* debates in Tanzania (among others, see Aminzade 2003, Mwapachu 2005), which need not concern us here.

<sup>48</sup> It is important to understand these transactions within the context of changing legal, political and economic reforms in Tanzania. Firstly, in 1984, land laws in Tanzania permitted village governments to transfer land to interested individuals without the involvement of the village assembly. Subsequent changes in 1992 and 1999 introduced the oversight mechanism of the village assembly which must give its consent for any transfer of land to a potential investor (for more see Larsson 2006).

(female FGD participant, Village 2, 04.08.2018). Controversially, village members have been barred from accessing this piece of land, which has not been developed since 2010, contradicting the promises made by the investor at the time of acquisition. In both case study communities, members reported abuse of power by local government representatives and the consistent disregard of their interests and rights.

## **7.4 Materials and Methods**

### **7.4.1 Data collection**

As mentioned in Chapter Three, the research relies on both qualitative and quantitative research approaches. The chapter draws on published academic literature, policy documents, civil society and media reports, and community documents such as letters and village meeting minutes regarding the land deal in the two communities. A two-stage sampling technique was used. First, two villages were purposively selected because of the presence of LSLIs in the communities (as described above). Second, 187 households were selected using census data and a random number generator, including an average of ten households per hamlet in each village (see Table 7). All adults above 18 years of age in the sampled households were interviewed (n= 374) using a structured questionnaire. Questionnaires typically took 45mins to administer to each person. This study holds that experiences regarding food security of each individual within a household must be considered, as certain voices may be marginalised when only household heads are consulted, as is still a common approach when conducting household surveys. Techniques for administering the questionnaire have been described in Chapter Three.

### **7.4.2 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)**

Again, the selection of participants for the FGDs has been documented in Chapter Three. FGD participants were selected from each hamlet, with input from the village chairperson. Each

hamlet was represented by one male and one female participant to allow for a fair representation of male and female participants. Selected participants were preferably in the older generation and with sound knowledge of the village history. To encourage the participation of women, FGDs were separated into male and female groups. In Village 1, fourteen participants were split into two equal groups - seven men and seven women. Each FDG lasted about two hours. The FGD in Village 2 was limited to one session with both male and female participants because of the sudden termination of the first author's research permit (see Chapter Three). Focus groups were valuable for exploring the perceptions of village members regarding institutions related to land investments; the role played by key actors, e.g., government officials in land investments; human rights and recourse mechanisms, e.g., the support provided by the government in case of the violations of rights; and the gendered implications of the LSLIs.

#### **7.4.3 Key informant interviews:**

Key informants (n=18) were selected from various sectors, mainly using snowball sampling (see Table 8) in the selected villages and urban areas in Ruvuma and Dar es Salaam. Initial e-mail contact with an expert in investment and human rights law at the University of Dar es Salaam (who also acted as the institutional host for the first author) was established through a purposeful internet search. Key informant interviews followed a loose 'schedule of questions' but were primarily (and deliberately) unstructured. Interviews lasted for approximately one hour. Key informant interviews were especially helpful in gaining an in-depth understanding of the land acquisition process in the case study communities and the politics of LSLI in Tanzania more generally.

#### **7.4.4 Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)**

In line with Coates et al. (2007), De Cock et al. (2013), and Vogenthaler et al. (2013), this research uses the food insecurity access score (FIAS) from the HFIAS (explained later in this

sub-section) as a measure for individual food insecurity experience. Vogenthaler et al. (2013) use the FIAS at an individual level, while De Cock et al. (2013) use the FIAS to measure food insecurity at the household level. By using the FIAS, the study assigns individuals along a continuum from food secure to severely food insecure (see Table 18) over four weeks during the dry season (also see Vogenthaler et al. 2013, 1689).

Key informants also contributed to the design, adaptation, and validation of the HFIAS survey instrument. For example, during the development phase of the HFIAS questionnaire, a standardised protocol developed by USAID (Coates et al. 2007) was used to operationalise and translate the questionnaire into the local *lingua franca* (Kiswahili) with the help of key informants. Translation into Swahili minimised inconsistencies, which may occur when questions are translated in an *ad hoc* manner during interviews. Additionally, to avoid inconsistencies raised during the piloting phase, three generic questions in the ‘insufficient food intake’ domain of the standard HFIAS questionnaire were excluded while maintaining all three domains, as demonstrated in Table 17. Each item was asked with a recall period of four weeks.

Knueppel et al. (2010, 365) also found inconsistencies in the validation of the HFIAS in rural Tanzania, concluding that there were challenges in separating items in the HFIAS due to ‘the overall high level of food insecurity in the population’. Leyna et al. (2008) document similar challenges with food insecurity measures in rural Tanzania.

Table 16 The HFIAS occurrence questions adapted to this study, based on (Coates et al. 2007)

Item domain (Adequacy)	Item domain question (recall period of four weeks)
Anxiety and uncertainty about household food supply (Accessibility)	Did you ever worry that your household would not have enough food?
Insufficient quality - includes a variety of the type of food and food preferences (Acceptability)	Were you or any household member unable to eat certain kinds of foods you preferred due to lack of resources? Did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to lack of resources? Did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?

Insufficient food intake and its physical consequences (Availability)	Was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of a lack of resources to get food? Did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?
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It should be noted that, of the 18 key informants, only four were women (see Table 8). There is a striking gender imbalance in the farmers-based organisations and, for that matter, in academia. This gender imbalance reflects the low representation of women in the public sphere in the context of land rights more generally in Tanzania (also see Duncan and Haule 2014).

## 7.5 Data Analysis

### 7.5.1 Measuring Food insecurity experience

The FIAS is calculated as the sum of the product of the item response ( $x_i$ ) and the frequency-of-occurrence response ( $f_i$ ) across all item domains from the HFIAS for each individual in Table 11 (Coates et al. 2007). If an item response was 'yes' (coded as 1), the frequency of occurrence question was asked (often = 3, sometimes = 2, rarely = 1). Based on these responses, the food insecurity access score (FIAS) was calculated using the following formula (1):

$$FIAS = \sum_{i=1}^6(x_i f_i) \quad (1)$$

If the individual response to all six frequency-of-occurrence questions was 'often', coded as 3, then the maximum FIAS is 18. If the individual responded 'no' to the item domain questions, frequency-of-occurrence questions were skipped and subsequently coded as 0 – with a total minimum FIAS of 0. The responses on individual food insecurity experiences were then coded and categorised into four levels using a description in Table 18. Fitawek et al. (2020) use the same food security categories to explore the effect of LSLIs on household food security in Madagascar. The results were also disaggregated by gender, age, and education to investigate the prevalence of food insecurity in these categories (*see* Table 18).

Table 17 Levels of individual food insecurity access prevalence status adapted from (Coates et al. 2007)

Individual food insecurity access prevalence status (FIAS)	Description
Food secure (FIAS < 2)	Individuals expressed no concerns about running out of food and did not have to cut back on the quantity of food. However, some individuals in this category worry about dietary diversity because of the socio-economic realities in these communities.
Mildly food insecure (FIAS < 5)	Individuals expressed concerns about not having enough food sometimes or often, and/or were unable to eat preferred foods, and/or eat a more monotonous diet than desired and/or some foods considered undesirable, but only rarely. However, to fit into this category, the individuals did not express cutting back on quantity nor experience any of the most severe conditions of food insecurity, i.e., running out of food or going to bed hungry.
Moderately food insecure (FIAS < 6)	Respondents indicated incidences in which households sacrificed quality more frequently by eating a monotonous diet or undesirable foods sometimes or often and/or started to cut back on quantity by reducing the size of meals or number of meals, rarely or sometimes. However, to fit into this category, the individuals did not experience any of the most severe conditions.
Severely food insecure: (FIAS ≥ 6)	Respondents described households as cutting back on meal size or on number of meals often and/or having experiences of some of the most severe conditions, i.e., running out of food or going to bed hungry in any instance during the four weeks. In other words, any individual that experienced one of these three conditions even once in the last four weeks (30 days) were considered severely food insecure.

\* These categories can indicate tendencies or broad categories but are more nuanced in reality, as we describe in more detail when presenting the results.

### 7.5.2 Variables associated with Food insecurity experience

As mentioned earlier, the FIAS was used as our dependent variable. The study used a backward stepwise Akaike information criterion (AIC) approach to select associated variables linked to individual food insecurity experience (Yamashita et al. 2007). The model with the lowest AIC was selected. Results from the regression analysis are included in Table 20. Variables associated with food insecurity include sex, income, level of education, land ownership status, livelihood strategy, amount of daily income spent on food. Authors like Smith et al. (2017), Wambogo et al. (2018) and De Cock et al. (2013) have documented these variables as determinants of food insecurity. The variables also capture the vulnerability characteristics of individuals in Village 1 and 2.

Qualitative data from focus group discussions, key informant interviews and observations were used to gain insights into the principles of participation, accountability, non-discrimination, transparency, human dignity, empowerment, the rule of law. These and other rights-based livelihoods framework components were categorised by identifying emerging themes and concepts using the qualitative software Nvivo (Creswell and Poth 2018). The following section presents and discusses the results.

## **7.6 Results and discussions**

### **7.6.1 Socio-demographic and economic characteristics**

On average, a household in Village 1 and 2 comprises five members with a standard deviation (S.D.) of 4. The average age of interviewees (n=374) was 44.7 (SD 14.2). Interviewees generally fell between the age range of 40 – 50 years (48%). The vast majority (85%) of interviewees described their household as male headed. The daily income of interviewees was estimated by 82% of respondents themselves as below the daily minimum wage of 3,815.50 Shillings (US\$1.65). Concerning education, 82% of interviewees had primary level education, 4% had no education, 10% had attended secondary school, and 4% had received apprenticeship (e.g., masonry). The low level of education was skewed towards female interviewees, explained by customary practices which continue to discriminate against women in Tanzania (Duncan and Haule 2014). Since the LSLI, the average size of arable landholdings of those interviewees who owned land (19%) in both Village 1 and 2 was reduced to 2-3 acres.

### **7.6.2 Food insecurity access score as part of livelihood outcomes**

Years after the LSLIs in Village 1 & 2, village members experience high levels of food insecurity. The distribution of the food insecurity access scale across gender, age and education is represented in Table 19. Based on calculations of the FIAS, 47% of interviewees were severely food insecure, 16% moderately food insecure, 4% mildly food insecure, and 33% were food secure. Even for those in the ‘food secure’ category, some respondents expressed that they are sometimes worried about not always having the full diversity of foods. So, in the research context, a strict application of the definition of the right to food would result in over 90% of individuals being categorised as food insecure along the FIAS continuum, given that no individual should experience any form of food insecurity (G.C. 12 of the CESCR 1999).

Considering the dire socio-economic realities in Village 1 and 2, this research categorised those individuals as food secure who stated that they never ran out of food and did not have to cut back on the quantity of food (see Table 19). The study argues that this minimalist categorisation shows that food security categories have to be regarded with a degree of caution, especially in contexts where communities experience high levels of food insecurity (Saint-Ville et al. 2019, Knueppel et al. 2010).

Table 18 Weighted sample distribution of food insecurity in Villages 1 and 2

		n	Food Secure	Mildly Food Insecure	Moderately Food Insecure	Severely food insecure
Sex	Female	200	31%	6%	16%	48%
	Male	174	34%	3%	16%	47%
Age group	18-29	75	41%	4%	20%	35%
	30-49	184	32%	4%	13%	51%
	50-69	91	27%	5%	16%	51%
	70 and above	24	29%	4%	21%	46%
Level of education	Secondary education	39	47%	4%	14%	14%
	Informal Education/Apprenticeship	14	29%	7%	7%	57%
	Primary education	306	30%	5%	16%	49%
	No education	15	19%	0%	6%	75%
<b>Total</b>		<b>374</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>16%</b>	<b>47%</b>

n= 374

### 7.6.3 Determinants of individual food insecurity experience

Because the regression analysis performed in this study focuses on the individual level experiences, national-level variables such as global economic shocks, and other variables that may explain food (*in*)security such as climatic condition or seasonality, soil profile, GDP, and economic development profile of the country (Baumgartner et al. 2015, Müller et al. 2021) were not included in the regression model. This explains the low R-square value of 17%. The R-square value means that the variables of choice (see Table 20) explain 17% variability in the food insecurity experience of individuals. However, this limitation in explaining the variation in individual food insecurity is compensated by triangulating via a qualitative analysis within the rights-based livelihoods framework. Understanding individual's food insecurity

experiences like other studies on human behaviour and preferences inherently have a greater amount of unexplainable variations (Miles 2005). Yet, the significant coefficients for the variables associated with food insecurity in this study such as land and employment still represent the mean change in the FIAS when holding other predictor variables in the model constant. The low R-square value justifies the need for a mixed research approach in LSLI research which can explain other macro level variables that impact individual food insecurity experiences and livelihoods.

So, in further explaining the variation in individual food insecurity, the study compensates by triangulating via a qualitative analysis within the rights-based livelihoods framework. The framework clarifies the obligations of states at the national level and the role of local institutions as part of transforming structures and processes, as well as other components of the SLF, such as external stresses and shocks. Table 20 presents the results from the regression analysis. The coefficients of each variable are of importance here and show how various variables affect the FIAS (the measure of food insecurity experience) of individuals within the two communities. The results in Table 20 are explained along with the qualitative analysis in the next section.

#### **7.6.4 A rights-based perspective of food insecurity experienced in the context of LSLI**

##### External vulnerabilities and shocks

The pressures of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the rapid rise in food/cereal prices in 2008/09 and the focus of E.U. policies on biofuels all encouraged multinational corporations and foreign governments to seek cheaper land in countries like Tanzania (Cotula et al. 2008, Giovannetti and Ticci 2016). Additionally, national policies and programmes such as the SAGCOT partnership, which was launched as part of Tanzania's Agricultural Sector Development Strategy (ASDS) in 2010, created additional incentives for investors to engage in the commercialisation of agriculture in Tanzania (URT 2015). These external drivers created

shocks that impacted local communities in various ways (Nelson et al. 2012, Ngoitiko et al. 2010). According to research participants, land conflicts spiked in the time since 2010 – following the launch of SAGCOT and interest on the part of outside investors in land in their communities.

What this demonstrates is how ‘so-called’ external variables could link with ‘local’ policy implications to accentuate violations of the right to food for smallholder farmers. Additionally, the link between local investors and foreign capital adds to a more nuanced representation of investments in Tanzania's history (Ngoitiko et al. 2010, Nelson et al. 2012). Within these LSLI schemes, there is a clear focus on the part of the Tanzanian government on promoting export-oriented agribusiness rather than adopting long-term economic policies and programmes to enhance the productive capacity and livelihoods of smallholder farmers. For example, the visit in July 2014 by the researcher to *Village 1* unexpectedly coincided with a visit to the village by the then President of Tanzania, Jakaya M. Kikwete. The President praised the implementation of the large-scale farm, which would ‘improve government’s efforts in alleviating poverty’ (see *The Citizen*, 22.07.2014).

More recently, there is recognition by the government of Tanzania that the focus on large-scale ‘commercial agricultural has had little impact on poverty reduction and efforts must be made to address these challenges’ (URT 2015, 42). And indeed, researchers such as Mbunda (2013) observe that policymakers did not sufficiently integrate small-scale farmers into the conception, design and implementation of the SAGCOT initiative (also see Bergius et al. 2018). Consequently, there have been regular and worrying reports on the abuse of human rights, such as the right to adequate food, and discriminatory decisions and policy-making processes during the implementation of LSLI schemes in Tanzania (Mousseau and Mittal 2011, Twomey et al. 2015). According to interviewees, the LSLI processes in Village 1 & 2 was done in favour of

the investors with support from local government officials, and several promises made by the investors have remained unfulfilled.

Similarly, other LSLIs in Tanzania have consistently been linked to a lack of transparency, unfulfilled promises, corruption, and intimidation of village community members (Mbilinyi 2012b, West and Haug 2017, Ngoitiko et al. 2010). The absence of adequate legal and institutional mechanisms within the LSLI landscape in Tanzania has contributed to the negative impacts on human rights in local communities (Abebe 2012, 878). Control mechanisms regarding LSLIs are often ineffective and transactional procedures inconclusive (Okoth-Ogendo 1999, 7, Bélair 2018).

#### Enhancing livelihood opportunities: promises and reality

The government of Tanzania describes LSLIs as a development opportunity that will allow them to increase employment opportunities, enable technology transfer, and lead to income generation and infrastructure development in rural areas (SAGCOT 2011). However, in both Village 1 and 2, only 8% of the 374 research participants had gained employment from the LSLIs. The low rate of employment can partly be explained by the fact that in Village 2, the investment scheme has not yet been implemented. Workers on the large-scale farm in Village 1 are mainly commuting workers from neighbouring villages. Some travel daily, and others rent temporary huts from residents and share food and water with their landlords.

Job opportunities are often seasonal, and workers are employed informally, on a day-to-day basis, without formal contracts that could provide economic and social security. A representative of the civil society organisation, Business and Human Rights Tanzania,

explained that investors often rely on *intermediaries* (known locally as *middlemen*<sup>49</sup>) to provide the labour on the farms. Investors exploit weaknesses in the labour laws, by ensuring that workers are not employed for the statutory period of more than six days per month or a six-months-probation period<sup>50</sup>, which would automatically qualify workers to receive several employment benefits, such as an employment contract and a fair representation in the case of unfair termination of the contract. Hence, intermediaries and the investor/manager of the scheme resort to a day-to-day registration system for their workers in the LSLI community in Village 1.

Additionally, the lack of access to land increases concerns and anxiety about not having enough access to food within both villages, as is expressed in the following statement of a male research participant:

[Before the arrival of the LSLI], I cultivated 10 acres. Now, I cultivate five acres because I was robbed of my land. Now I harvest 50 bags [of maize] while I used to harvest 200 bags. I've reduced the number of kids I used to live with [sic]. Two went to another village; one went to work in the garage in town. He does not want to work on the farm anymore! - Male FGD participant Village 1, 07.07.2018

The long working hours on the LSLI farm in Village 1, ten hrs per day (07:00 – 17:00), and the lack of adequate food that can be consumed during working hours partly explain why those working on the large-scale farm experience a high level of food insecurity (FIAS of 2.60), compared to those who do not work on the farm (see Table 20). The lack of adequate time to

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<sup>49</sup> The term *middlemen* is used locally to refer to contractors, or agents who source for labourers to work on the large-scale farms.

<sup>50</sup> Art 14-15 of Employment and Labour Relations Act 2004 - Tanzanian Labour Law requires that workers should be provided with written employment contracts at the start of employment except those who work less than six days in a month for an employer. Article 35 - a worker with less than six months of employment may not bring an unfair termination claim against the employer.

produce one's own food also explains why community members involved in other income-generating activities have a higher food insecurity experience. However, from Table 6, 18% of interviewees who earn above the minimum daily wage of 3,815.50 Shillings (\$1.65) have a lower FIAS of 2.28 than those who earn below the minimum daily wage (82%). Results in Table 20 also show that a one per cent increase of income spent towards food reduced the FIAS by 1.54.

Participants in focus groups and key informant interviews volunteered that working conditions on the large-scale farm are not favourable for workers' health and wellbeing. For example, workers who are tasked with spraying insecticides complained about the lack of protective gear, and consequently that workers experienced burning eyes and sore hands from repeated exposure to harmful chemicals. Further, there were reports of sexual abuse by female FGD participants who stated that to gain employment, farm supervisors, who are mostly men, ask for sexual favours.

When women go to work, male supervisors ask them for sex. If they reject [these requests], they do not get the job. If you do not have sex with them, you are not employed. So many people come here from far away to find jobs on the large farm. Some women have to agree to give sex bribes because that is the only choice to secure a job. – (Female FGD participant, Village 1, 21.07.2018)

When a local government representative in Songea was asked about unfair employment conditions and violation of workers' rights in the LSLI scheme, he responded that 'village members always complain because they are lazy and are always expecting handouts from the government' (Interview, 24.07.2018). Such reasoning fits well with ideas that present welfare policies as 'paternalistic' and people attitudes as lacking entrepreneurial spirit. It highlights the

regard of government officials as being responsible ‘for’ and not ‘to’ citizens (Schneider 2003). As a response to complaints about sexual exploitation in Village 1, the investor organised sex education campaigns and distributed free condoms to farm workers, which was seen by the investor as part of the solution.

Table 19 FIAS and associated food insecurity variables

<b>Linear Regression</b>						
<i>Dependent variable</i>		FIAS				
<i>Independent variables</i>		Household total, Education primary (=1), Education secondary (=1), Land before Investments (=1), Work on LSLI (=1), Other income-generating activities, L.N. (Daily income), Daily income_>3,815.50 (=1), L.N. (income spent on food), Any land conflict since LSLI (=1), Places to seek for help (=1)				
<i>N</i>		374				
<b>Regression Statistics</b>						
<i>R</i>		0.42	<b>R-Squared</b>		<b>0.17</b>	
<i>Akaike inf. criterion (AIC)</i>		5.78	<i>AICc</i>		5.78	
<b>ANOVA</b>						
	<i>d.f.</i>	<i>SS</i>	<i>MS</i>	<i>F</i>	<i>p-value</i>	
<i>Regression</i>	11	1,382.59	125.69	6.85	1.64E-10	
<i>Residual</i>	362	6,637.99	18.34			
<i>Total</i>	373	8,020.59				
	<i>Coefficients</i>	<i>StdErr</i>	<i>LCL</i>	<i>UCL</i>	<i>t Stat</i>	<i>p-value</i>
Intercept	0.27	8.15	-15.75	16.29	0.03	0.97365
Household total	0.10	0.06	-0.02	0.21	1.67	0.09596
Primary Education	-2.24	0.87	-3.94	-0.54	-2.59	0.01007**
Secondary Education	-4.27	1.08	-6.39	-2.14	-3.95	0.00009**
Land before Investment	1.95	0.67	0.63	3.26	2.92	0.00374**
Work on LSLI	2.60	0.87	0.90	4.31	3.01	0.00280**
Other income-generating activities	2.83	0.80	1.26	4.40	3.55	0.00044**
LN (Daily income)	1.72	0.78	0.19	3.25	2.21	0.02746*
Daily income >3,815.50	-2.28	0.89	-4.02	-0.53	-2.56	0.01083*
LN (income spent on food)	-1.54	0.57	-2.67	-0.41	-2.69	0.00749**
Any land conflict since LSLI	1.98	0.58	0.84	3.12	3.43	0.00068**
Places to seek for help	0.74	0.44	-0.13	1.60	1.67	0.09572
<i>T (5%)</i>	1.97					
<i>LCL - Lower limit of the 95% confidence interval</i>						
<i>UCL - Upper limit of the 95% confidence interval</i>						

\*0.05 significant level, \*\*0.01 significant level

## 7.6.5 Institutionalising the PANTHER principles

### Transparency

Research participants argued that there is a lack of transparency regarding the acquisition process surrounding the LSLIs in the two villages. For example, while members in Village 1 acquiesced to the transfer of 404.ha of land to the investor in 1984, there were no subsequent consultations before the transfer of the additional 1,595ha in 2011. A letter<sup>51</sup> from the D.C.'s office showed that the 1,595ha piece of land was registered with an ownership certificate in the investor's name in 1987. However, the authenticity of this document could not be determined. FGD participants and key informants denied agreeing to the transfer of this parcel of village land in 1987.

These debates must, of course, be situated within the broader history of Tanzania's complicated and constantly evolving land reform process. For example, oversight mechanisms for the transfer of village land at the local government level were only introduced after land reforms in 1992 and 1999 (Alden-Wily 2003, Shivji 2002). In other words, the village assembly (V.A.), comprised of all adults living in the village above eighteen years of age, is the supervisory organ, while the elected Village Council<sup>52</sup> should act as an executive body accountable to the V.A. (Shivji 2002, 37). If the village assembly approves and recommends the transfer, the land commissioner forwards the approval to the President, who signs off on the transfer of the village

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<sup>51</sup> Ref: No. AB.81/223/02/95 letter to *Village 1* from the District Commissioner's office addressing dispute between village members and large-scale investor.

<sup>52</sup> In Tanzania, village leaders (except for the village executive officer, VEO, who is appointed by the government) are elected by the village residents or village assembly every five years. This ensures that these leaders are accountable to the village assembly (Kesale 2017, 5). Hence, the village government reports to the village assembly and village members, in theory, have the power to hire and fire village government. However, this oversight mechanism can be abused by VEOs who might regard themselves as more powerful than the village government – as is experienced in the case of *Village 1*, where the VEO was described by key informants as 'more influential than the village chairman' when the land was transferred to the investor in 2011.

land to private ownership. After the President's approval, 14 days are provided to allow any aggrieved party to lodge complaints before the final transfer is made.

Tanzania's has one of the most progressive legal structures relating to land tenure in Africa, including gender parity in communal land tenure (Nelson et al. 2012, Looloitai 2014). However, while the country's land laws have provisions to protect customary rights (German et al. 2011) and the power to enact and give concrete expression to these, land laws in Tanzania are, in fact, still very centralised (Alden-Wily 2003, Shivji 1998). Indeed, the President has unilateral powers to revoke and convert village land into public land in the 'public interest' (Alden-Wily 2012, 755):

*'...[w]here the President is minded to transfer any area of village land to general or reserved land for the public interest. He may direct the Minister to proceed according to the provisions for the purpose of public interest' -*

The Village Land Act, 1999, pp. Part III, Section 4 (1),(2).

In Village 1, the village assembly was not a party to the land transfer process. Expressing their discontent with the land acquisition process, FGD participants highlighted that:

*We have sent several letters to the district commissioner's office, ward secretaries, regional officers, but we have received no reply. The Prime Minister came to this farm in 2018, but we did not get the chance to talk to him. In 2014, President Kikwete came here; no one was allowed to speak. These politicians only come here to speak to the investor and about coffee farming. They do not listen to the challenges we face from this investment. –*  
FGD participant in Village 1, 07.07.2018.

The land conflict increases anxiety and concerns over food availability among village members. This very likely explains why those involved in land conflicts have a higher FIAS of 1.98 relative to those not involved in land conflicts (see Table 20).

### Empowerment

While LSLI schemes claim to contribute to the broader local economy, interviewees argue that they do not expect any benefits from the investments, as is reflected in the following statement:

‘We do not have any information [from the district] about the income generated from the coffee farm. We don’t benefit from the company! Last year, [we know] the company paid [some money] to the district, but where is our village share? (Male FGD participant, Village 1, 21.07.2018).

It is the case, however, that the influx of migrant workers provides benefits to residents in Village 1 who resort to alternative sources of income, such as renting out accommodation facilities. Further, there is high production and consumption of a local brew (*wanzuki*), commonly consumed during social gatherings in the evenings. Additionally, some women sell sweet potatoes along the main road, while several young men are engaged in moulding mud bricks to construct houses in the village. It was clear, however, that there is no strategy or programme by local government officials to provide alternative livelihood strategies to build resilient livelihoods within these communities. Instead, local government officials refer to village members as being ‘lazy and expecting government handouts’. On the part of the investor, apart from distributing condoms, we did not observe any inclusive programmes that might foster capacity-building to help village communities curb the negative impacts stemming from the LSLI.

In terms of local infrastructure, village members had expected changes in infrastructure and public services in their villages due to LSLIs. Research participants in Village 1 placed particular importance on road traffic signs, arguing that: ‘the lack of road signs is proof that we are not important. We fear that there are plans by the investor to expand his landholding. We even think there are plans to remove us from this village!’ – (Male key informant, *Village 1*, interviewed 10.07.2018). Members in this village perceive this as a sign of neglect on the part of government authorities.

And indeed, in 2017, the investor had a dispensary built in Village 1. At the time of this study, village members started advocating for the construction of school infrastructure. The investor promised to provide financial support for purchasing building materials, which cannot be sourced locally, such as roofing material, cement, and paint, while the local community committed to providing labour, bricks, and other locally sourced building materials. This ‘patron-client’ type relationship leaves one to wonder what the role of the government is in the provision of these services?

Educational levels in the community remain low, and there is a need for education provision both for adults and the youth. The results in Table 20 show that those with primary education are more food secure, with a lower FIAS of 2.24, relative to those with no education, and those with secondary level education have a lower FIAS of 4.27 compared to those with no education. Women remain highly disadvantaged, exemplified by the sexual harassment experienced by them and higher levels of food insecurity, as shown in Table 20. Further, women are not represented in positions of authority, as observed by the limited number of women who were key informants during this research.

In Village 2, FGD participants highlighted that none of the investor's promises had been fulfilled. We also observed a lack of empowerment within the LSLI process and among different actors and institutions in the affected communities. For example, legal institutions concerned about the welfare of the local community have had to close because of the lack of financial resources needed for land dispute resolution.

### Accountability

According to information gathered from the FGDs in Village 1 and 2, village members made efforts to address the lack of accountability and transparency in LSLI processes. They repeatedly consulted with Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), the media and lawyers to facilitate and support these efforts:

Although we have not succeeded to get back our land, journalists have helped us understand our rights to some extent. We found out about human rights by listening to the radio. Rights should be fought for. If you fight, you can get it. We have tried by going to lawyers. A local radio station came here and asked questions, what did you do after losing your land? Which problems did you go through? Then they aired the interviews and our stories over the radio!

(key informant interview with the Chairman of Village 1 07.07.2018)

To ensure accountability, the functions and tasks of local government institutions need to be clearly defined, regularly reviewed, and institutional provisions made for adequate monitoring and dispute resolution mechanisms. In the case studies observed here, there is a perception among village members that the state is not willing to take measures that will prevent third parties from interfering in the productive resources of local communities and institute appropriate legislative, administrative, or judicial measures to ensure fair access to these

resources in local communities. The following quote from a FGD participant provides a good indication of the broader perceptions of village members:

Unfortunately, the government has not addressed this issue... I am convinced that the whole government knows about the land problems in this community. Because getting our land involved the regional and district commissioner's offices, our complaints are known from the district level to the ministerial level. These people [public officials] have just decided to support the investor by staying quiet about our problems! – Key informant in Village 2, 04.08.2018.

When respondents in both Village 1 and 2 were asked if they are aware of official channels via which they could lay land-related complaints, 73.5% responded 'no', while only 26.5% were aware of some of the procedures, as described by FGD participants:

When there are land conflicts between village members, they normally bring them to the chairperson or VEO. If it is complicated, the conflict is forwarded to Village land committee, and if the Village committee fails, we forward it to the Ward land committee. - FGD participant in Village 1, 07.07.2018.

These findings correspond with Fernandez and Schwarze (2013), who argue that there are typically no tools within land investment schemes to hold investors accountable for not fulfilling their promises within investment contracts. Additionally, the financial cost of defending the rights of local communities is high, and lawyers are not willing to invest their efforts in land disputes – given that the villagers will struggle to pay their fees. In an interview with a representative from the Tanganyika Law Society, he explained that investigating conflicts around land is expensive, time-consuming and that there is a lack of legal capacity and resources in Tanzania to dedicate to rural communities. Thus, in most cases, land conflicts are

investigated on a *pro bono* basis. According to the same representative from the Tanganyika Law Society, many civil society groups are more interested in tackling issues such as domestic violence, which can attract funding from the donor community and are less resource-consuming and intractable than land dispute resolution. These factors impact civil society interests in the continuous monitoring of LSLI deals.

Public institutions such as the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) have been criticised for the lack of follow-up on the promises made by investors regarding broader economic development, which in the case of TIC has been attributed to both the lack of capacity and of the will to perform monitoring and evaluation exercises in investment communities (Bélair 2018, 379). The near-absence of a robust civil society to counter the negative consequences of LSLIs and ensure accountable systems of governance further weakens the rights of local communities in Tanzania (Maillard-Ardenti 2012, 19). This often means, in effect, that those in authority can ignore the efforts made by local communities to defend their rights of access to productive resources.

### Participation

FGD participants were asked to share their perceptions of participation in the LSLI process. They generally defined participation as follows: ‘When the majority agree, it has to be done. If few are involved and many excluded, that is not participation’ (Focus group, Village 1, 17.07.2018). Another participant defined participation as [it is] ‘like eating together. In any discussion, I should be allowed to speak and be listened to, and what I say should be considered when taking any decision’ (Focus group, 17.07.2018). These perceptions and understandings reflect the concept of participation as applied in the rights-based livelihoods framework applied in this research (see Section 7.3.1).

Additionally, during the Prime Minister's visit to Village 1 in 2018, the village chairman raised concerns about the lack of transparency and involvement of village members with regards to the revenue from the farm.

‘During an audience with the Prime Minister, before I finished [expressing our concerns], the microphone was taken. When we ask about the proceeds from the investor, we are silenced or told to go and read the documents [related to proceeds from the farm at the district office]. When we ask for the documents [from the district commissioner], we don’t get them’. (Interview with chairman of Village 1 07.07.2018).

These quotes illustrate that village members seek to engage with public officials concerned with LSLIs, but local government officials often disregard their concerns.

## **7.7 Conclusion**

By adopting an innovative rights-based livelihoods approach which integrates the human rights PANTHER principles and the Sustainable Livelihoods framework (SLF), this research reflects recent calls to go beyond a needs-based perspective on food security. This approach highlights the right to food as a human right, which empowers individuals to make claims when their right to food is violated, as can be the case in the event of LSLIs. A rights-based analysis emphasises that land in rural Tanzania and elsewhere is not only a key resource for agricultural production, but a precondition for the realisation of the right to adequate food and thus a requirement for achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security. This perspective, and our approach to the issues, further enhances the critical need to understand individual experiences by giving a voice to marginalised groups in society. The rights-based livelihoods framework applied complements the limitations identified in using the SLF. It allows for a holistic understanding

of the roles of various actors involved in the context of LSLI and enriches our understanding of the livelihood strategies of and outcomes for rights holders affected by these investments.

The study further highlights that rights-based approaches aren't only reactive (i.e., kicking in when people's rights have been violated) but they need to infuse rural development policies and investment agreements during their formulation and ensure that processes of free, prior, and informed consent and human rights-impact assessment are carried out. Prior studies on LSLI in Tanzania have focused on food insecurity at the level of the household, without extending this to examine individual food (in)security experiences of members *within* these households. The anxiety levels and the experience regarding food security of each adult individual within a household must be considered, as certain voices may be marginalised when only (male) household heads are consulted. Whilst this research has focused on individuals over the age of 18years, it is arguable that future studies should cast the analytical net even wider to also include the experiences of children with households. Tellingly though, it is very much the case that information relating to livelihood strategies of individual household members could be missed or may receive little attention if such an analysis is performed without a gendered interpretation of LSLIs.

The vulnerability of ordinary citizens in the case study communities is exacerbated by the lack of monitoring and evaluation of LSLI processes, and the lack of capacity and commitment of institutions in Tanzania to follow-up on the promises made by investors. This demonstrates a lack of accountability on the part of duty-bearers within the entire LSLI institutional landscape. Additionally, low educational levels and limited access to information on the part of community members restrict their ability to claim their rights. There is a lack of trust and incentives on the part of community members to work within LSLI, as they perceive the land acquisition process

to be fundamentally unfair. In fact, citizens who are impacted by LSLI should be able to participate fully and play a primary role in building resilient livelihoods within the remit of these LSLI schemes.

There remains a pressing need, therefore, to understand the capability of the poor and frequently marginalised groups in dealing with external shocks and stresses as the starting point of any intervention. It is equally important to place a context-specific, case-study-based analysis as presented here, within the broader context of cumulative macroeconomic effects and their impact at the local level. The overall and longer-term contribution of LSLIs to rural development and poverty reduction in countries like Tanzania remains questionable, given the poor integration of the concerns of local communities and the absence of mechanisms to ensure that investors keep their contractual obligations. Progressive coalitions within and beyond national states must devise policies and institutions that empower individuals and civil society actors to make demands on their governments to respect, protect and fulfil their obligations regarding the right to food. They should also be nudged to ensure the accountability and transparency of government agents and other decision-making bodies and processes in implementing such policies.

## 8 Chapter Eight: Conclusions

### 8.1 Epistemic reflections and a multidimensional approach to LSLI research

This research deals with two sometimes contradictory academic paradigms and theories. In the academic world, or at least during my research experience, human rights and political economy paradigms are often perceived as conflicting and epistemologically irreconcilable. Epistemologically, social scientists are prone to think within their academic spheres, generating abstract concepts that reflect reality with *ceteris paribus* assumptions (other things being equal). Of course, in their attempt to join an ‘epistemic community’ of like-minded scholars, studying similar questions and publishing in the same stable of journals, researchers may undermine the introduction of divergent views and other realities or epistemological interpretation of the phenomenon they are studying or trying to understand.

By positing that political economy and human right concepts are contradictory and epistemologically irreconcilable, researchers admit that policymakers can pick and choose the rules of the game depending on how those rules align with their policy agenda. However, as Susan Strange (2002) beautifully puts it in *States, Firms and Diplomacy*, it is more and more difficult for governments to ring-fence a policy so that implementing it does not directly conflict with, or perhaps negate, some other policy.

Justifiably, compartmentalising or departmentalising social science research or academic disciplines helps study political, economic, and social challenges in greater detail. Yet, this should not negate daily realities and decision-making processes in everyday life. States or governments grapple with political and economic decisions every day. They are also required to write periodic reviews or reports as part of their obligations to human right bodies and their membership in international human right treaties. Governments will not get votes because they

are maintaining human rights principles while the socio-economic situation in their country is in peril. Likewise, economic development is not expected to be done at the expense of the rights of citizens or the environment. Governments are expected to simultaneously grapple with these choices, while academics and researchers make decisions about what to study and how to interpret their findings mainly along disciplinary lines.

In conducting this research, it also became evident that neoclassical approaches to development in Africa, specifically in Tanzania, fail to accommodate political elements introduced by these policy interventions. The combination of a historical, legal and policy analysis of LSLIs in this research acknowledges the need for an interdisciplinary lens in studying phenomena such as LSLIs. Such a holistic approach provides a rounded view on how political processes shape economic outcomes, influence the location of economic activity and the distribution of the costs and benefits of these activities across all sectors of society. The balance of power, institutions and agency are common elements in political economy theory and human rights-based approaches. Human rights approaches and attempts to keep states to account using these approaches, form part of the political economy – the cut and thrust of mobilising coalitions around new ideas and ways of talking (back) to power.

Summarily, land and labour cannot be treated purely as commodities. This is because history shows that shifts in their interrelations cause widespread social transformations. The embeddedness of policy and economic interventions in society calls for a more critical and holistic review of development studies and research. Here, LSLI research must be grounded in local settings, but with an appreciation of global capital accumulation and mobility. Within contemporary LSLI research, shifts in the political economy of land investments and the growing interest in human rights create tensions that reflect cultural, social, and political

relations in agrarian societies. There is a need to understand how both concepts can be studied as complementary paradigms to understand their strengths and weaknesses in determining state policy and actual outcomes in affected people's lives.

## **8.2 Research findings and arguments**

The results presented in this study relied on an in-depth case study of two rural communities within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). By using two purposively selected case studies, the research was able to examine the multiple dimensions introduced by LSLIs within rural settings. In this sense, with the closeness of the researcher to the case studies and everyday realities of the rural communities, the research developed a nuanced view of the situation 'on the ground' and undertook an exploration of the complex issues related to the political economy of LSLIs. The study showed that a political economy approach is highly apposite because it builds on an analysis of the exercise of power and the prevailing conditions under which agents construe and contest such power. The study argues that political economy and human rights may be deployed as complementary paradigms with their respective strengths and weaknesses in determining state policy and policy outcomes.

The use of a case study approach as a research strategy allowed the researcher to apply various sources and research methods, including participant observation, FGDs, key informant interviews, and surveys as a part of the investigation. This mixed-method approach within case study research ensures data validity through cross-checking and triangulation. Case studies are essential in developing social science research, especially in using examples for deductive reasoning. However, the trade-off between a generalised understanding of the phenomenon under investigation, in this case, LSLIs and exploring the most pertinent issues via a specific case, is dependent on resource demand and availability. Therefore, a case study's

generalisability can be improved by a strategic selection of cases, which mitigates the degree of trade-off and resource constraints in investigating the broader significance of LSLIs.

I justify the selection of cases for this research based on suitability and pragmatic reasons. Conversely, the freedom to choose cases within a case-study approach eliminated a third justification for case selection, i.e., where research has been commissioned, and there is no real choice or alternative. This research was done in the context of a PhD and not a commissioned study and I had the freedom to choose my cases, including the scope and objectives of my PhD research. For suitability, both cases were 'well-known cases' of LSLI with elements of political contestation in rural Tanzania. While there may be some advantages of getting into the field as a stranger without any pilot visit, i.e., the researcher can be 'objective' and 'distant' from the case under investigation, there is a trade-off of understanding the case in greater depth. Arguably, prior knowledge and pilot visits are necessary to better understand the general history, meanings, practices, institutions, and beliefs that constitute the case before the researcher plunges headlong into actual field research. In undertaking this research, I had prior knowledge of the area, established networks, and organised a pilot visit to the case study location. My visits to the case study location in July 2014 and a pilot visit in December 2017 established relationships of trust, facilitated community entry, and permitted an engagement with more sensitive issues around livelihoods, food security and empowerment. In this sense, the Ruvuma region became a 'well-known case' to me and a 'critical case' concerning the political contestations in relation to LSLIs within SAGCOT.

For pragmatic reasons, after appreciating the logistical challenges, the financial demands, and the security risk of doing fieldwork in four different regions of Tanzania as was initially conceived, I decided that fieldwork would be done in the Ruvuma region. However, prior

knowledge and partnerships were also potentially detrimental to my research experience as they exposed me to further scrutiny by powerful gatekeepers in the community. Notwithstanding the importance of conducting LSLI research, researching such politically charged subjects can expose researchers to various risks. Although such encounters may influence the direction of research and data collection elements, it can be used as substantive evidence from the field as it reveals the local political economy and the various interests being (sometimes violently) contested at this level, in sharper contrast. Researchers and research institutions must comprehensively account for and incorporate such encounters and their fall-out as part of the overall research endeavour.

Evidently, during Magufuli's term in office, Tanzania was at a crossroads in redefining its relationship with the private sector, including in relation to LSLIs. This involved a change in the economic orientation of the state and a reorientation of LSLI policies towards smallholder farmers. As stated in the five-year development plan 2015/2016-2020/2021, Magufuli's government aimed to do so by strengthening dialogue mechanisms with the private sector and other stakeholders, given the fact that some of the reforms were likely to trigger resistance from these quarters. Paget (2020a) terms Magufuli's approach as 'restorationist developmental nationalism', which purported to 'make Tanzania great again'. By providing answers to **RQ1** and **RQ2**, it became evident that Magufuli succeeded in emphasising the 'national' in economic nationalism as a crucial economic orientation of Tanzania in the restructuring its stance after the failures and perceived compradorialism during the *laissez-faire* period, especially under the Kikwete administration (2005-2015). What is certain is that the Tanzanian government was seeking ways to renegotiate its relationship with the private sector and re-establish public trust in institutions that were marred by high levels of corruption scandals in the recent past. So, instead of dismissing the economic reforms under the Magufuli administration as pure

reactionary populism, this research demonstrates that Magufuli's version of economic nationalism was about 'taking back control' and seeking to intervene in all sectors of the economy.

In re-engaging with the rural political economy of Tanzania, the study demonstrates that the economic ambitions of the Magufuli government was a consequence of and a response to a history of injustice, inequality, and the failure of investment policy reforms to materialise into tangible benefits for most Tanzanians. While the government has made constant efforts to improve the business environment of Tanzania, the absence of adequate regulatory and institutional frameworks has encouraged various forms of rent-seeking and undermined the potential benefits of these reforms to most Tanzanians. Additionally, policies and programmes designed to encourage LSLIs placed customary land in a vulnerable position within the global context of LSLIs.

The labour dynamics within rural households challenge the easy differentiation of labour into workers variously associated with farm and non-farm activities described by neoclassical approaches to LSLIs. The nuances of labour arrangements within rural households blur such pervasive distinctions between the interests of farmworkers and non-farm workers. The social logic of labour transition systems and the livelihood strategies adopted within rural households contribute instead to a worker-peasant resistance against capitalist landed investment in rural Tanzania. A disenfranchised worker-peasant alliance within rural households – the *labour continuum* – lends its supports to interventionist policies and various forms of economic nationalism in Magufuli's Tanzania. These contradictions within public-private relations in Tanzania present a new opportunity for scholars and political commentators, and development experts to re-engage with the agrarian questions of capital and labour and understand how forms

of trade expansion or globalisation may have unintended consequences for ‘domestic political alignment’.

The wholesale failures in LSLI investment schemes, evidenced in the case studies presented here and those of authors like Sulle (2020), Bélair (2018) and Ngoitiko et al. (2010), to meet the promises within investment contracts and the normative expectations of ordinary citizens contributed to the support of Magufuli’s economic approaches. In purporting to fight for the poor against corrupt political and business elites, Magufuli mobilised support from affected citizens, a clear majority of whom constitute the *labour continuum*. The capability of local communities, especially smallholder farmers, to protect themselves from the negative impacts of LSLIs in countries like Tanzania is often minimal. It is exacerbated by the asymmetric power dynamics between the various actors involved in land negotiation processes. As demonstrated in the case-study communities, there is often little, or no involvement of local communities in the negotiation and implementation of large-scale land deals, and the power asymmetries within local and global political economies can influence the degree to which local land users can be excluded or engaged within LSLI processes.

The innovative rights-based approach applied to this research facilitated an analysis of smallholders’ livelihoods and food insecurity experiences within the context of LSLIs. Findings show that state actors derogated from their human rights obligations, including the principles of participation, accountability, transparency and the empowerment of institutions and local community members. This is underpinned by inadequate monitoring and evaluation of LSLI processes and low levels of commitment on the part of institutions in Tanzania to monitor the promises made by investors. Additionally, the individual food insecurity experiences of impacted citizens in both case study communities correlates, among other characteristics, with

the competition for land, employment, and income-generating activities. In arguing for a comprehensive approach to LSLI research, including a rights-based analysis, this thesis has shown that land is not only a resource for agricultural production but a precondition for the realisation of the right to adequate food and other social and cultural rights.

The application of a human rights-based framework to LSLIs shifts the debate from a needs-based to an entitlement-based perspective of food security. Such an approach further enhances understanding of individual experiences by giving a voice to often marginalised groups and individuals in society for whom land has diverse socio-cultural functions. The rights-based framework used in this study shows that it is vital for researchers and development actors and those involved in policy intervention to have a holistic understanding of the roles of various actors involved in the context of LSLI, as well as livelihood strategies of and outcomes for rights holders affected by these investments.

### **8.3 Areas for further research:**

This research was conducted before the sudden demise of President Magufuli in March 2021. While the study has contributed to understanding the popular support for variants of economic nationalism in Tanzania under the Magufuli regime, more research is needed to explore how the stifling of democratic freedoms such as the limits placed on the activities of civil society organisations in Tanzania may have contributed to the lack in respect of human rights principles in LSLIs and the state officials who challenge the rights of investors. Further, it is questionable if the current political dispensation in Tanzania, with its different balance of power between competing forces in the country will continue to pursue Magufuli's developmental ambitions.

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# Appendix

## SCREENSHOOT OF PUBLISHED CHAPTERS

**Chapter 4:** Talleh Nkobou, A. (2020). "The Trepidations of a PhD Researcher – Who Are You and Why Are You Here?" *Area* 53 (2): 257-263. <https://doi.org/10.1111/area.12672>.

REGULAR PAPER



## The trepidations of a PhD researcher – Who are you and why are you here?

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou 

School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, Reading, UK

### Correspondence

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou Email: [atenchongtallehnbkou@pgr.reading.ac.uk](mailto:atenchongtallehnbkou@pgr.reading.ac.uk)

This paper contributes to research that has a predominant focus on Western researchers in the global South. First, the paper examines how my African identity fits into a Western discourse of being a researcher and their intersections with my other personalities as I world-travel. “World-travelling” is about the plurality of selves and an opening for self-construction. Second, the paper elaborates on violence and intimidation in the field and how researchers may succeed or fail in negotiating such risks. As a non-native researcher in a UK-based University, I acknowledge my plurality of selves and the skills needed to navigate these social worlds.

### KEYWORDS

fieldwork, PhD researcher, positionality, violence, world-traveling

## 1 | INTRODUCTION

The positionality of the researcher can affect the entire research experience and social scientists are being more reflexive about their research experiences. Chiswell and Wheeler (2016) reflect on how the particularities of farmer interviews pose

**Chapter 6:** Talleh Nkobou, A. & A. Ainslie 2021 'Developmental Nationalism?' Political Trust and the politics of large-scale land investment in Magufuli's Tanzania, *Journal of East African Studies* 15 (3): 378-399. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2021.1951944>

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## 'Developmental nationalism?' Political trust and the politics of large-scale land investment in Magufuli's Tanzania

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou and Andrew Ainslie

School of Agriculture, Policy & Development, University of Reading, Reading, UK

### ABSTRACT

Research on large-scale land investments (LSLIs) can provide valuable insights into the support for developmental nationalism in Tanzania today. 'Developmental nationalism' is 'a creative variant of liberation', which purports to make Tanzania great again'. The nationalist turn of late President Magufuli was grounded in political ideology and the selective history of the past that swept him to power. However, there is limited research on how political practice around land investments contribute to trust and support for public institutions. This paper makes two key contributions to scholarship on the political economy of LSLIs. First, we examine the messy politics of LSLIs, the failures in design and implementation, and the rise in local support for developmental nationalism in two rural settings in Tanzania. Second, using Latent Class Analysis (LCA), we identify distinct groups of individuals based on their trust in the President, the ruling party (CCM), the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) and support for LSLIs. We define political trust as 'an evaluative orientation towards an institution or government, based on people's normative expectations'.

### ARTICLE HISTORY

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### KEYWORDS

Tanzania; land investments;  
developmental nationalism;  
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Food Security  
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ORIGINAL PAPER



### Broken promises: a rights-based analysis of marginalised livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity in large-scale land investments in Tanzania

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou<sup>1</sup> · Andrew Ainslie<sup>1</sup> · Stefanie Lemke<sup>2,3</sup>

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#### Abstract

Proponents of large-scale land investments (LSLI) still promote them as a development opportunity, which can lead, among other benefits, to job creation and enhanced food security for local communities. However, there is increasing evidence that these investments often deprive affected communities of their access to land, with multiple negative impacts on livelihoods, food security and on the environment. This paper relies on empirical data to present an analysis of LSLI and food (in)security – crucially at the level of individuals in two villages in the Ruvuma region, Tanzania, over 10 years after the acquisition of village land within the Southern African Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT). We introduce an innovative framework that permits an integration of a rights-based approach with the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework to explore smallholders' livelihoods and experiences of food insecurity. Our paper demonstrates how this integration, along with attention we have given to the FAO's PANTHER principles, adds the missing yet crucial dimension of accountability on the part of national governments as duty bearers. Our findings show that in the case of these two villages, the human rights principles of participation, accountability, transparency and empowerment are severely undermined, with women bearing the brunt in all these domains. This overall state of affairs is, we argue, due to inadequate monitoring and evaluation of LSLI processes themselves and low levels of commitment on the part of institutions in Tanzania to monitor the promises made by investors. This in turn demonstrates an accountability deficit on the part of duty-bearers within LSLIs, and limited capacity of affected community members to claim their rights. Individual food insecurity experience in the two communities correlates, among other characteristics, with lack of land ownership, employment and income-generating activities. The rights-based livelihoods framework applied in this study points to serious deficiencies in the LSLI model as presently endorsed in SAGCOT, and emphasises the fact that access to land in Tanzania is a precondition for the realisation of the right to adequate food and thus a critical requirement for achieving and maintaining food and nutrition security. We conclude by arguing that progressive coalitions within and beyond national states must devise policies and institutions that empower individuals and civil society actors to make demands on their governments to respect, protect and fulfil their obligations regarding the legally enforceable right to food.

**Keywords** Right to food · Food insecurity access scale · Large-scale land investments · Livelihoods analysis · Tanzania · SAGCOT

**HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF LARGE-SCALE LAND INVESTMENTS AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO ADEQUATE FOOD**

Start of Block: Default Question Block



Q1 Interview date \${date://CurrentDate/d%2Fm%2FY}

---

Q1 Tarehe ya mahojiano \${date://CurrentDate/d%2Fm%2FY}

---

Q2

**Consent**

Dear

**letter**

Sir/Madam,

I am Atenchong Talleh, a PhD candidate in the School of Agriculture, Policy and Development at the University of Reading in the United Kingdom. As part of my studies, I am carrying out research to understand land ownership and land transfers and how these affect people's human rights and their ability to feed themselves in this part of Tanzania.

This information sheet is intended to explain my research and to ask for your consent to participate in my research. The interview is to record your perspective towards large-scale land investments schemes and human rights in Tanzania. I have selected this community because of the presence of the large-scale land investment in this area. Your household has been chosen at random for this research by using a map of the community to select households to interview.

My research is supervised by Dr Andrew Ainslie and Prof Rosa Freedman, of the University of Reading. I am working with support from the University of Dar es Salaam and the Tanzania National Committee for Family Farming (TANCOFF). The interview would take place at a location where you feel comfortable and will last for a maximum of two hours. Depending on your consent and approval, this interview will be audio recorded and will be used solely for this research. Your participation in this research will be voluntary, and I will treat any information you provide confidentially. This means that all the information I collect will be kept anonymously so that no one will be able to work out who has said what to me since no-one's name will be attached to the information provided.

If you have any comments or questions about this research, please feel free to contact my supervisor, Dr Andrew Ainslie by telephone +44 (0) 118 378 8157 or by email a.m.ainslie@reading.ac.uk. If you feel uncomfortable with any particular questions, you can indicate that you do not wish to answer them. If you are unwilling to continue with the interview, you are free to opt out at any time. All the information you have provided to that point will then be destroyed. You are also free to opt out of this research by contacting me before the 30th of September 2018, after which I will start processing the data. You do not have to provide any reasons for wanting to opt out of the research. If you need further information about my research, please let me know.

This research project has been reviewed according to the procedures specified by the School of Agriculture, Policy and Development's Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct. By participating in this survey, you are acknowledging that you understand the terms and conditions of participation in this study and that you consent to these terms. For additional information regarding this research, including access to the research findings, please do not hesitate to contact me or my research supervisor. Many thanks in advance for your consideration.

Regards,

Atenchong Talleh Nkobou,  
PhD Candidate, School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading  
atenchongtallehnkobou@pgr.reading.ac.uk Mobile:  
Skype: tallehatchong

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q2

(1)

(2)

Skip To: End of Survey If Consent letter Dear Sir/Madam, I am Atenchong Talleh, a PhD candidate in the School of Agricult... = No

Q3 Household Name

---

Q3 Jina ya kaya

---



Q4 Interviewee ID

Name (1) \_\_\_\_\_

Interviewee ID (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q4 Utambulisho

Jina (1) \_\_\_\_\_

Kitambulisho (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q5 What will you say is your age range?

Less than 18 (1)

18 - 29 (2)

30 - 49 (3)

50 - 69 (4)

70 and above (5)

Q5 Umri wako ni kati ya miaka mingapi?

chini ya 18 (1)

18 - 29 (2)

30 - 49 (3)

50 - 69 (4)

70 na zaidi (5)

Skip To: End of Survey If What will you say is your age range? = Less than 1

Display This Question:

If What will you say is your age range? = 18 - 29

Q6 You said you are  $\{Q5/ChoiceDescription/2\}$  years old. How old are you now? are you...

Less than 29 years old (1)

29 years old (2)

Q6 Umesema una wastani wa umri kati ya  $\{Q5/ChoiceDescription/2\}$  Je una miaka mingapi?

Chini ya Umri wa miaka 29 (1)

Miaka 29 (2)

Q7 Gender of the interviewee

Male (1)

Female (2)

Other/Prefer not to say (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q7 Jinsia ya Mhojiwa

Me (1)

Ke (2)

Other/Prefer not to say (3) \_\_\_\_\_



Q8 How many people live in your household including children?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q8 Je ni watu wangapi wanaishi kwenye kaya yako ukijumulisha watoto?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q9 How many members of your household are above the age of 18?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q9 Je wanakaya wangapi wana umri zaidi ya miaka 18 ?

\_\_\_\_\_



Q10 Who would you say is the head of your household (HH)?

Wife (1)

Husband (2)

Son (3)

Daughter (4)

Grandmother (5)

Grandfather (6)

Stepmother (7)

Stepfather (8)

Other please specify (9) \_\_\_\_\_

Q10 Je ni nani mkuu wa kaya?

- Mke (1)
- Mume (2)
- Kijana (3)
- Binti (4)
- Bibi (5)
- Babu (6)
- Mama wa kambo (7)
- Baba wa Kambo (8)
- Wengine.... Taja (9) \_\_\_\_\_



Q11 How many years of education have you completed?

- Two years of pre -primary education (1)
- Standard I-VII (2)
- 1- 4 years of secondary ordinary level education (Form 1- 4) (3)
- 1 - 2 years of advanced level education (Form 5 and 6) (4)
- 1- 4 years of University education (5)
- Some informal training (7) \_\_\_\_\_
- Other, please specify (8) \_\_\_\_\_

Q11 Je umemaliza miaka mingapi katika elimu?

- Miaka miwili ya elimu ya awali (1)
- Elimu ya Msingi (2)
- Elimu ya sekondari (3)
- Elimu ya Kidato cha sita (4)
- Elimu ya chuo kikuu (5)
- Mafunzo Rasmi (7) \_\_\_\_\_
- Elimu nyingine, Taja (8) \_\_\_\_\_



Q12 What is your relationship status?

- Married (1)
- Single (2)
- Divorced (3)
- Widow (4)
- Widower (5)
- In a relationship, other please specify (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Q12 Hali ya ndoa

- Umeo/umeolewa (1)
- Hujaolewa (2)
- Umeachika (3)
- Mjane (4)
- Mgane (5)
- Nipo kwenyemahusiano, Tafadhali elezea (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Q13 Do you consider yourself as part of the village assembly?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)
- Maybe (3)

Q13 Je wewe ni miongoni mwa washiriki wa mkutano mkuu wa kijiji?

- Ndiyo (1)
- Hapana (2)
- Labda (3)

Q14 Why do you say  $\{Q13/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$  to being part of the village assembly?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q14 Kwanini unasema ni miongoni mwa washiriki wa mkutano mkuu wa Kijiji?  $\{Q13/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



Q15 Have you attended a village assembly meeting during the past year?

- Yes (1)
- No. Why not? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q15 Je umewahi kuhudhuria mkutano wa kijiji katika kipindi cha mwaka mmoja uliopita  
 Ndiyo (1)  
 Hapana, Kwanini Hapana (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q16 If Have you attended a village assembly meeting during the past year?(No. Why not?) Is Not Empty

Q16 How often have you attended a village assembly meeting during the past year?  
 Rarely (once or twice in the past year) (1)  
 Sometimes (three to four times in the past year) (2)  
 Often (more than 4 times in the past year) (3)  
 I Don't know (4)

Q16 Je ni marangapi umeshiriki katika mkutano wa kijiji kwa kipindi cha mwaka mmoja uliopita?  
 Marachache (mara moja au mara mbili kwa mwaka uliopita) (1)  
 wakati mwingine (mara tatu mpaka mara nne kwa mwaka uliopita) (2)  
 Mara nyingi (zaidi ya mare nne katika kikipindi cha mwaka uliopita) (3)  
 Sijua (4)

Q17 I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are an official leader, an active member, an inactive member, or not a member, or not a member

	official leader (1)	an active member (2)	an inactive member (3)	not a member (4)	Don't Know [DNR] (5)
Local village government (9)					
Political party (1)					
Religious group (2)					
Woman's group (3)					
Men's group (4)					
Youth group (5)					
Workers/trade union (6)					
Extended family meeting group (7)					
NGO or CBO (8)					

Q17 Nitakusomea orodha ya makundi ambayo watu hujiunga ua hushiriki . Kwa kila mojawapo, nieleze kama wewe ni kiongozi rasmi, mwanachama hai, mwanachama mfu au siyo mwanachama.

	Kiongozi Rasmi (1)	Mwanachama Hai (2)	Mwanachama Mfu (3)	Siyo Mwanachama (4)	Sifahamu (5)
Serikali ya Kijiji (9)					
Chama cha Siasa (1)					
Kikundi cha Kidini (2)					
Kikundi cha Wanawake (3)					
Kikundi cha Wanaume (4)					
Kikundi cha Vijana (5)					
Chama cha Wafanya Kazi (6)					
Kikundi cha Kifamilia (7)					

Azaki/Asasi (8)

Q18 Does the group deal with land-related issues in the community?

Yes (1)

No (2)

I don't know (3)

Q18 Does the group deal with land-related issues in the community? Je, Kikundi chenu kinajihusisha na masuala ya ardhi katika jamii?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Sifahamu (3)



Q19 Please describe some of the activities of the group?

---

---

Q19 Tafadhari elezea shughuli za kikundi

---

---



Q20 Have you got together with others in the community to discuss land-related issues in the past year?

Yes (1)

No. Why not? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q20 Je umewahi kukutana na wenzako kujadili masuala ya ardhi kwa mwaka uliopita?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana. Kwa nini? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q23 If Have you got together with others in the community to discuss land-related issues in the past year?(No. Why not?) Is Not Empty

Q21 How often have you got together with others in the community to discuss land-related issues in the past year?

Rarely (once or twice in the past year) (1)

Sometimes (three to four times in the past year) (2)

Often (more than 4 times in the past four weeks) (3)

I Don't know (4)

Q21 Ni kwa kiasi gani umekutana na wenzako kujadili masuala yahasuyo Ardhi kwa mwaka uliopita?

Mara Chache (Mara moja au mara mbili kwa mwaka) (1)

Mara kadhaa (Mara tatu mpaka nne ndani ya mwaka mmoja) (2)

Mara kadhaa (Zaidi ya mara nne ndani ya mwaka mmoja) (3)

Sijui (4)

Display This Question:

If Have you got together with others in the community to discuss land-related issues in the past year? = Yes



Q22 What did you talk about when you got together with others in the community to discuss land-related issues in the past year?

---

---

---

Q22 Mlizungumzia nini mlipokutana na wenzako kujadili masuala yahasuyo Ardhi kwa mwaka mmoja uliopita?

---

---

---

Q23 How often have you contacted any of the following persons about any land-related complaints or to give them your views on land problems in the community?

	Never (1)	Only once (2)	A few times (2-3 times) (3)	Often 5 or more times (4)	Don't know (5)
A local government councilor (1)					

A Member of Parliament (2)

An official of a government agency (3)

A political party official (4)

Traditional Leaders (5)

Religious leaders (6)

NGO or CBO (7)

Researcher (8)

Q23 Ni mara ngapi umewasiliana na watu wafuatao kuhusu masuala ya Ardhi

	Kamwe (1)	Mara Moja (2)	Mara chache (Mara 2 mpaka 3) (3)	Zaidi ya mara 5 (4)	Sifahamu (5)
Diwani (1)					
Na Mbunge (2)					
Afisa wa Serikali (3)					
Afisa kutoka chama siasa (4)					
Viongozi wa Kijamii (5)					
Viongozi wa Dini (6)					
Asasi/Azaki (7)					
Mtafiti (8)					

Q24 Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens when they are dissatisfied. For each of these, please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things since the arrival of the investor.

	Never (1)	Only once (2)	A few times (2-3 times) (3)	Often 5 or more times (4)	Don't know (5)
Joined others in your community to request action from the government (1)					
Contacted the media, like calling a radio program or writing a letter to a newspaper (2)					
Contacted a government official to ask for help or make a complaint (3)					
Refused to pay a tax or fee to the government (4)					
Participated in a demonstration or protest march (5)					

Q24 Ifuatayo ni orodha ya hatua ambazo wakati mwingine huwa zinachukuliwa na watu pale wanapokuwa hawajaridhika. Kwa kila moja kati ya hatua zifuatazo, hebu niambie, kama wewe mwenyewe, umeishawahi jambo lolote kati ya haya tangu kuja kwa mwekezaji.

	Kamwe (1)	Mara moja tu (2)	Mara chache sana (Mara 2 mpaka 3) (3)	Zaidi ya mara tano (4)	Sifahamu (5)
Kuungana na wenzangu kuitaka serikali kuchukua hatua (1)					
Kuwasiliana na vyombo vya habari kwa njia kama ya kupiga simu au kuandika barua kwenye gazeti (2)					
Tuliwasiliana na afisa wa serikali kuomba msaada au kuulalamikia (3)					
Tulikataa kulipa kodi au tozo nyingine kwa serikali (4)					
Kushiriki kwenye maandamano na migomo (5)					

Q25

#### Large-scale Land Acquisition Process

Q25

#### Hatua za uporaji wa kiwango kikubwa cha ardhi

Q26 Are you aware that this community offered a piece of land to an investor in 1984?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q26 Unafahamu kama jamii hii ilimpatia mwekezaji kiasi cha Ardhi mwaka 1984?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q28 If Are you aware that this community offered a piece of land to an investor in 1984? = No

Q27 Who do you think was the investor to whom land was given in 1984?

Q27 Unadhani alikuwa ni mwekezaji yupi alipewa Ardhi mwaka 1984

Q28 Are you aware that an additional piece of land was taken from the community in 2011?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q28 Unafahamu kama Ardhi ya upande mwingine wa barabara ilichukuliwa kutoka kwa jamii mwaka 2011?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Q29 Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q29 Je, Ardhi ilichukuliwa kwa ajili ya kilimo kikubwa?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q33 If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = No

Q30 Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q30 Ulikuwa na Ardhi kabla ya kuja kwa mwekezaji?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)



Q31 What year was the land taken from you?

---

Q31 Ardhi yako ilichukuliwa mwaka gani?

---



Q32 What was the size of the land taken from you (in acres)?

---

Q32 Je, kiasi cha Ardhi yako kilichochukuliwa kilikuwa na ukubwa gani (ekari ngapi?)

---

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q33 When did you acquire the land you owned before the arrival of the investor (dd/mm/yyyy)?

---

Q33 Ardhi hiyo uliyokuwa ukimilika kabla ya kuja kwa mwekezaji uliipata lini (taja tarehe, mwezi na mwaka)?

---

Q34 Who do you think was the investor to whom land was given?

---

Q34 Unadhani Ardhi hiyo alipewa mwekezaji yupi?

---

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

Q35 What type of tenure did you have on the piece of land you owned before the arrival of the investor?

Titled deed (1)

Rent contract (2)

Community or family arrangement (3)

I had no proof of ownership (4)

Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q35 Ni aina gani ya umiliki ulikuwa nayo kabala ya kuja kwa mwekezaji?

Hati (1)

Mkataba (2)

Urithi (3)

Sikuwa na uthibitisho wa umiliki (4)

Aina nyinge, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q36 How did you acquire the land you owned before the arrival of the investor?

Purchased (1)

Inherited (2)

Rented (3)

By the village Council (4)

Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q36 Uliipataje Ardhi hiyo kabla ya kuja kwa mwekezaji?

- Nilinunua (1)
- Nilirithi (2)
- Nilikodi (3)
- Nilipewa na serikali ya kijiji (4)
- Sehemu nyingine, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

Q37 What was the size of the piece of land you owned (in acres) before the arrival of the investor?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q37

\_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q38 What did you use the land for?

- Real estate/ to build a house (1)
- Crop Production (2)
- Livestock Production (3)
- Leased out (4)
- Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q38 Ardhi yako uliitumia kwa shughuli gani?

- Kwa ajili ya makazi (1)
- Kilimo (2)
- Ufugaji (3)
- Kukodisha (4)
- Matumizi mengine, yataje (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q39 If What did you use the land for? = Crop Production

Skip To: Q40 If What did you use the land for? = Livestock Production

Skip To: Q41 If What did you use the land for? = Real estate/ to build a house

Skip To: Q41 If What did you use the land for? = Leased out

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

And What did you use the land for? = Crop Production

Q39 What type of crops did you cultivate on the land?

- Maize (1)
- Sorghum (2)
- Millet (3)
- Rice (4)
- Beans (5)
- Cassava (6)
- Potatoes (7)
- Banana (8)
- Plantains (9)
- Coffee (10)
- Oil seed (sun flower) (11)
- Tomatoes/Onion (12)
- I did not grow crops (13)

Q39 Ni aina gani ya mazao ulilima katika Ardhi yako

- Mahindi (1)
- Ulezi (2)
- Mtama (3)
- Mpunga (4)
- Maharage (5)
- Mhogo (6)
- Viazi (7)
- Ndizi (8)
- Migomba (9)
- Kahawa (10)
- Arizeti (11)
- Vitunguu (12)
- Sikupanda zao lolote (13)

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes  
And What did you use the land for? = Livestock Production



Q40 What type of livestock did you keep?

- Cattle (1)
- Goats (2)
- Pigs (3)
- Fowls (4)
- Ducks (5)
- Fish ponds (6)
- Rabbits (7)
- Pigeons (8)
- I did not keep livestock (9)
- Other, please specify (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q40 Ulifuga nini?

- Ng'ombe (1)
- Mbuzi (2)
- Nguruwe (3)
- Ndege (4)
- Bada (5)
- Samaki (6)
- Sungua (7)
- Nguruwe (8)
- Sikufanya ufugaji (9)
- Kingine? Taja (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q41 Who determined how the land was used in your household (HH)?

- Wife (1)
- Husband (2)
- Son (3)
- Daughter (4)
- Grandmother (5)
- Grandfather (6)
- Stepmother (7)
- Stepfather (8)
- Other please specify (9) \_\_\_\_\_

Q41 Nani alikuwa na maamuzi juu ya Ardhi katika kaya yenu?

- Mama (1)
- Baba (2)
- Kijana (3)
- Binti (4)
- Bibi (5)
- Babu (6)
- Mama wa kufikia (7)
- Baba wa kufikia (8)
- Mwingine, mtaje (9) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

Q42 Was there any discussion with you on what the land will be used for at the time?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q42 Je, kulikwa na majadiliano yoyte kuhusu matumizi ya Ardhi kwa wakati huo?

- Ndiyo (1)
- Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

Q43 Did you understand what the land was intended for at the time?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q43 Je, ulifahamu Ardhi ilikuwa ya nini kwa kipindi hicho?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q44 What value would you place on that piece of land that was given to the investor?

---

Q44 Ni thamani gani unaweza kuipatia Ardhi yako kabla haijachukuliwa na mwekezaji?

---

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

Q45 Did you or any member of your household willingly give the land that was taken from you?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q45 Hivi kuna mwanafamilia yeyote au wewe mwenyewe aliyekuwa tayari tayari kutoa Ardhi yenu uliyochukuliwa?  
Ndiyo, (1)  
Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q46 What did the person do or say to make you give-up your piece of land?

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---

Q46 Mtu huyo alifanya nini au aliwaambia nini mpaka mkaamua kutoa Ardhi yenu?

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Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes



Q47 How did you know that the land will be used for investment purposes?

Meetings with village council members (1)

Meeting with district commissioner (2)

From newspapers (3)

From a friend (4)

Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q47 Ulijuaje kama Ardhi hiyo ingetumika kwa ajili ya uwekezaji

Kupitia mkutano wa wajumbe wa halmashauri ya Kijiji? (1)

Kupitia Mkutano na Mkuu wa Wilaya (2)

Kupitia magazeti (3)

Kupitia Rafiki yangu (4)

Njia nyingine, itaje (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q48 Was there any village assembly meeting before the land in the community was given to the investor?

yes (1)

No (2)

I don't know (3)

Q48 Je, kulikuwa na mkutano wa Kijiji kabla hamjaitoa ardhi yenu kwa mwekezaji?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Sifahamu (3)

Q49 Did you attend any village assembly meeting before the land in the community was given to the investor?

Yes (1)

No (2)

**Q49 Je, ulishiriki mkutano huo wa Kijiji kabla mwekezaji hajapewa Ardhi?**

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q55 If Did you attend any village assembly meeting before the land in the community was given to the inv... = No



**Q50 Who were those presiding over the village assembly meeting?**

The Ward Officer (1)  
The District Commissioner (2)  
The Investor (3)  
Policies officers (4)  
The Parliamentarian (5)  
Other, please specify (7) \_\_\_\_\_  
I don't know (6)

**Q50 Nani aliongoza mkutano huo wa kijiji?**

Afisa Tarafa (1)  
Mkuu wa Wilaya (2)  
Mwekezaji (3)  
Maafisa wa polisi (4)  
Mbunge (5)  
Mwingine, Mtaje (7) \_\_\_\_\_  
Sifahamu (6)

**Q51 Were you able to freely share your ideas and point of view during the meeting?**

Yes (1)  
No (2)

**Q51 Je, ulikuwa huru kuchangia mawazo na mtazamo wako wakati wa mkutano**

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

**Q52 Did you feel threatened at any point during the meetings?**

Yes (1)  
No (2)

**Q52 Je, wakati wa mkutano kuliwa kuwa na vitisho vyovyote kwako?**

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

**Q53 From which of these people did you perceive any threat during the meeting?**

The Ward Officer (1)  
The District Commissioner (2)  
The Investor (3)  
Policies officers (4)  
The Parliamentarian (5)  
Other please specify (7) \_\_\_\_\_  
I don't know (6)

**Q53 Kati ya wafuatao, Unadhani ni nani alikuwa tishio?**

Afisa Tarafa (1)  
Mkuu wa Wilaya (2)  
Mwekezaji (3)  
Maafisa wa polisi (4)  
Mbunge (5)  
Sifahamu (7) \_\_\_\_\_  
Mwingine, Mtaje (6)



**Q54 What do you think should have been done differently during the meeting?**

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---

**Q54 Unadhani ni kitu gani kingefanywa tofauti wakati wa mkutano?**

---

---

Display This Question:

If Did you own any piece of land before the arrival of the investor? = Yes

And Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q55 Were you given an opportunity to say 'NO' to your land being taken away for investment purposes?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q55 Je, ulipewa nafasi ya kusema HAPANA kwa Ardhi yenu kuchukuliwa kwa ajili ya uwekezaji?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes



Q56 How would you describe what made you give your land away?

Family decision taker (1)

Village council member (2)

District commissioner (3)

Government official (4)

Investor (5)

Other, please specify (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Q56 Unaweza kuelezea kilichopelekea Ardhi yenu kuchukuliwa?

Mfanya maamuzi kutoka kwenye familia (1)

Mjumbe wa Halmashauri ya Kijiji (2)

Mkuu wa Wilaya (3)

Afisa kutoka serikalini (4)

Mwekezaji (5)

Mwingine, mtaje (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes



Q57 What did the person do or say to make you give-up your piece of land?

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Q57 Mtu huyo alisema nini au alifanya nini mpaka mkakubali kutoa Ardhi yenu?

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---

Page Break

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q58 Did you receive any other form of compensation?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q58 Mlipata Fidia yoyote?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q66 If Did you receive any other form of compensation? = No

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes



Q59 How much would you value the compensation you were given? If you were compensated financially, how much was it?

---

Q59 Unaitaminishaje Fidia uliyopewa? Kama ungepewa Fidia ya fedha, ingekuwa sawa na kiasi gani?

---

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes



Q60 What kind of compensation did you receive?

Financial compensation (1)

An alternative piece of land (2)

Employment (3)

Food (4)

Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q60 Ni aina gani ya Fidia ulipata?

Fedha (1)

Ardhi mbadala (2)

Ajjira (3)

Chakula (4)

Kingne, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q61 Were you satisfied with the compensation you received?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q61 Uliridhika na Fidia uliyopata?

Nidyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q62 Were you able to directly negotiate the terms of the compensation?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q62 Ulipata nafasi ya kujadili kuhusu Fidia?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes



Q63 How did you use the compensation you received?

I got a new piece of land (1)

Used for family expenses (school, health and food) (2)

Saved the money (3)

Built a house (4)

I invested the money into a new business activity (5)

Other, please specify (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Q63 Uliitumiaje Fidia uliyopata?

Nilinunua Ardhi nyingine (1)

Kwa matumizi ya kifamilia (kama vile shule, afya na chakula) (2)

Niliweka akiba (3)

Nilijenga nyumba (4)

Niliwekeza katika biashara (5)

Mengineyo, taja (6) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q64 With whom in your HH did you decide on how to use the compensation?

Alone (1)

Wife (2)

Husband (3)

Son (4)  
Daughter (5)  
Grandmother (6)  
Grandfather (7)  
Stepmother (8)  
Stepfather (9)  
Other please specify (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q64 Mliamua na nani HH kutumia Fidia?

Mwenyewe (1)  
Mke (2)  
Mume (3)  
Kijana (4)  
Binti (5)  
Bibi (6)  
Babu (7)  
Mama wa kambo (8)  
Baba wa Kambo (9)  
Wengine.... Taja (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Display This Question:

If Was land taken from you for the large-scale farm? = Yes

Q65 To what extent do you agree that the compensation process was transparent

Strongly agree (1)  
Agree (2)  
Somewhat agree (3)  
Neither agree nor disagree (4)  
Somewhat disagree (5)  
Disagree (6)  
Strongly disagree (7)

Q65 Ni kwa kiasi gani unakubali kwamba utaratibu wa Fidia ulikuwa wazi

Nakubali kabisa (1)  
Nakubali (2)  
Kwa kiasi flani nakubali (3)  
Sikubali wala sikatai (4)  
Kwa kiasi Fulani sikubali (5)  
Sikubali (6)  
Sikubali kabisa (7)

Q66 Are you aware of a notice from the district commissioner that was circulated in 2011 to restrict activity on the land after it was given to the investor?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q66 Unalifahamu agizo kutoka kwa Mkuu wa Wilaya lililosambazwa mwaka 2011 kuzuia matumizi yoyote katika Ardhi ile baada ya kuchukuliwa na mwekezaji?

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q67 Are you aware that a counter letter was written by community members to challenge the restriction notice in 2011?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q67 Unafahamu kama jamii iliandika barua kupinga zuio hilo mwaka 2011

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q68 Are you aware that community members made attempts to file a case at NOLA in 2011?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q68 Unafahamu kama wananchi walijaribu kushitaki Kupitia NOLA mwaka 2011

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q69 Are you aware of any letter that was addressed to the district commissioner in 2012 explaining your grievances about the large-scale farm?

Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q69 Unaifahamu Barua iliyoandikwa kwenda kwa Mkuu wa Wilaya mwaka 2011 ikielezea malalamiko yenu kuhusu shamba?

Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Page Break

Q70 Do you work in the large-scale farm?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q70 Unafanya kazi katika shamba la mwekezaji?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q82 If Do you work in the large-scale farm? = No



Q71 How do did you gain employment in the coffee farm?  
Through a middleman or employment agent (1)  
Through a friend (2)  
Directly from the investment company (3)  
Through a family member (4)  
Through a community-based group (5)  
Through an NGO (6)  
Other, please specify (7) \_\_\_\_\_

Q71 Ulipataje ajira katika shamba la mwekezaji?  
Kupitia mawakala wa ajira (1)  
Kupitia rafiki (2)  
Kupitia kampuni yenyewe (3)  
Kupitia ndugu (4)  
Kupitia azaki (5)  
Kupitia asasi (6)  
Njia nyingine, taja (7) \_\_\_\_\_



Q72 How often do you go to work on the coffee farm?  
Every working day including weekends (1)  
Every working day excluding weekends (2)  
Occasionally (when I need extra money) (3)  
Other, please specify (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Q72 Ni mara ngani unakwenda kufanya kazi katika shamba la kahawa  
Kila siku pamoja na siku za juma (1)  
Siku za kazi tu ikiondoa siku za juma (2)  
Mara chache (pale ninapohitaji pesa) (3)  
Nyingine, Taja (4) \_\_\_\_\_



Q73 What is the nature of your work contract?  
Temporary contract (signed) (1)  
Permanent contract (signed) (2)  
Just by filling in a daily work register (3)  
Other, please specify (4) \_\_\_\_\_

Q73 Mkataba wako ni wa aina gani?  
Mkataba wa muda (1)  
Mkataba wa kudumu (2)  
Kwa kujaza mahudhurio ya siku (3)  
Aina nyingine? Taja (4) \_\_\_\_\_



Q74 What kind of job do you do on the coffee farm?  
Weeding/ Clearing (1)  
Picking coffee (2)  
Security (3)

Watering (4)  
Planting (5)  
Driver (6)  
Supervisor (7)  
Other, please specify (8) \_\_\_\_\_

Q74 Unafanya kazi gani katika shamba la kahawa  
Palizi (1)  
Kuvuna kahawa (2)  
Ulinzi (3)  
Umwagiliaji (4)  
Kupanda (5)  
Udereva (6)  
Usimamizi (7)  
Nyingine, taja (8) \_\_\_\_\_



Q75 What would you say is your daily wage on the farm?  
less than 3,815.50 TSH (1)  
More than 3,816.50 TSH (2)  
Please specify how much (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q75 Unaweza kusema ujira wako ni kiasi gani kwa siku?  
Chini ya 3,815.50 TZS (1)  
Zaidi ya 3,816.50 TZS (2)  
Tafadhali, taja kiwango (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q76 Do you think you need protective gear for your job work at the farm?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q76 Unadhani unahitaji vifaa vya kazi unapokuwa shambani?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q77 Are you provided with any protective gear for your job work at the farm?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q77 Je. Unapewa vifaa vya kazi unapokuwa shambani?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q78 Are you provided with toilet facilities at your job site?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q78 Shambani kuna huduma ya choo?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q79 Do males and females use separate toilet facilities?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q79 Je. Wanaume na wanawake wanatumia vyoo tofauti?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q80 Have you ever suffered from any illness as a result of the working conditions in the farm?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q80 Umeishawahi kuugua kwa sababu ya kufanaya kazi kwenye shamba la muwekezaji?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Q81 Are you paid for days you are off due to sickness or injuries sustained from the farm?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q81 Huwa unalipwa kwa siku ambazo hujaenda kazini kwa sababu ya kuugua au kuumia ukiwa kazini?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Display This Question:

If Do you work in the large-scale farm? = No

Q82 Why do you not work on the coffee farm?

---

Q82 Kwa nini haufanyi kazi kwenye shamba la muwekezaji?

---



Q83 Are there any other contractual benefits you gain from the farm?

Yes, Please specify (1) \_\_\_\_\_

No (2)

Q83 Je. Kuna stahiki nyingine unapata kutoka kwenye shamba la muwekezaji?

Ndiyo, taja (1) \_\_\_\_\_

Hapana (2)

Q84 Do you have any other income generating activity?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q84 Unavyanzo vingine vya mapato?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q87 If Do you have any other income generating activity? = No



Q85 How would you describe this other activity?

Local Shopkeeper (1)

Sell own farm produce in the market (2)

Work in other peoples farms (3)

Masonry (4)

I own a corn milling business (5)

Teacher (6)

I work in the local religious center (7)

Employed in the main town (8)

Work in a neighboring village (9)

Other, please specify (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q85 Unazungumziaje shughuli zifuatazo?

Muza duka (1)

Biashara ya kuuza mazao kutoka shambani kwako (2)

Kufanya vibarua katika mashamba ya watu wengine (3)

Fundi Mjenzi (4)

Namiliki mashine ya kusaga (5)

Mwalimu (6)

Nafanya kazi kituo cha kidini (7)

Nimeajiriwa mjini (8)

Nafanya kazi kwenye vijiji vya jirani (9)

Nyingine, taja (10) \_\_\_\_\_



Q86 What would you say is your daily income from this other activity?

less than 3,815.50 TSH (1)

More than 3,815.50 TSH (2)

Please, specify how much (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q86

Chini ya 3,815.50 TZS (1)

Zaidi ya 3,816.50 TZS (2)

Tafadhali, taja kiwango (3) \_\_\_\_\_



Q87 Since the arrival of the investor, have you been able to own or occupy another piece of land in the village?

Yes (1)

No, why not? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q87 Tangu kuja kwa mwekezaji, umeweza kupata Ardhi kijijini hapa?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana, kwa nini? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q96 If Since the arrival of the investor, have you been able to own or occupy another piece of land in t...(No. why not?) Is Not Empty



Q88 When did you own or occupy this piece of land (dd/mm/yyyy)?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q88 Ni lini ulimiliki au kupata Ardhi hii? (Taja, tarehe, mwezi na mwaka)

\_\_\_\_\_



Q89 Do you still own this piece of land?

Yes (1)

No, why not? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q89 Bado unamiliki hiki kipande cha Ardhi?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana, Kwa nini? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q96 If Do you still own this piece of land?(No, why not?) Is Not Empty



Q90 What is the size of land you currently own?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q90 Ni kiasi gani cha Ardhi unamiliki

\_\_\_\_\_

Q91 What is the land used for?

Real estate/ to build a house (46)

Crop Production (47)

Livestock Production (48)

Leased out (49)

Other, please specify (50) \_\_\_\_\_

Q91 Yapi ni matumizi ya Ardhi?

Makazi/ujenzi (46)

Kilimo (47)

Ufugaji (48)

Kupangisha (49)

Nyingine, taja (50) \_\_\_\_\_



Q92 Who determines how the land is used in HH?

Alone (1)

Wife (2)

Husband (3)

Son (4)

Daughter (5)

Grandmother (6)

Grandfather (7)

Stepmother (8)

Stepfather (9)

Other please specify (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q92 Nani hupanga matumizi ya Ardhi katika HH

- Mimi (1)
- Mke (2)
- Mume (3)
- Kijana (4)
- Binti (5)
- Bibi (6)
- Babu (7)
- Mama wa kambo (8)
- Baba wa Kambo (9)
- Wengine.... Taja (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q93 What type of crops do you cultivate on the land?

- Maize (1)
- Sorghum (2)
- Millet (3)
- Rice (4)
- Beans (5)
- Cassava (6)
- Potatoes (7)
- Banana (8)
- Plantains (9)
- Coffee (10)
- Oil seed (sun flower) (11)
- Tomatoes/Onion (12)
- I did not grow crops (13)
- Other, please specify (14) \_\_\_\_\_

Q93 Unalima mazao gani

- Mahindi (1)
- Ulezi (2)
- Mtama (3)
- Mpunga (4)
- Maharage (5)
- Mhogo (6)
- Viazi (7)
- Ndizi (8)
- Migomba (9)
- Kahawa (10)
- Arizeti (11)
- Vitunguu (12)
- Sikupanda zao lolote (13)
- Sehemu nyingine, taja (14) \_\_\_\_\_

Q94 What type of livestock do you keep?

- Cattle (1)
- Goats (2)
- Pigs (3)
- Fowls (4)
- Ducks (5)
- Fish ponds (6)
- Rabbits (7)
- Pigeons (8)
- I did not keep livestock (9)
- Other, please specify (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q94 Unafuga nini?

- Ng'ombe (1)
- Mbuzi (2)
- Nguruwe (3)
- Ndege (4)
- Bada (5)
- Samaki (6)
- Sungua (7)
- Nguruwe (8)
- Sikufanya ufugaji (9)
- Kingine? Taja (10) \_\_\_\_\_

Q95 What type of tenure do you have?

- Titled (1)
- Rent contract (2)
- Community or family arrangement (3)
- I had no proof of ownership (4)
- Other please specify (6)

Q95 Ni aina gani ya umiliki wa Ardhi yako

Hati (1)

Mkataba (2)

Urithi (3)

Sikuwa na uthibitisho wa umiliki (4)

Aina nyinge, taja (6)

Q96 Would you sell your land to the investor if you had the chance?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q96 Je, ungeweza kuuza Ardhi yako kwa mwekezaji?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

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Q97 Why would you say '{Q96/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' if you have a chance to sell your land to the investor?

---

Q97 Kwa nini '{Q96/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' kama ukipata nafasi ya kuuza shamba lako kwa mwekezaji?

---

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Q98 Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) Generic Questions

Each of the questions is asked with a recall period of four weeks (30 days). The respondent is first asked an occurrence question – that is, whether the condition in the question happened at all in the past four weeks (yes or no). If the respondent answers “yes” to an occurrence question, a frequency-of-occurrence question is asked to determine whether the condition happened rarely (once or twice), sometimes (three to ten times) or often (more than ten times) in the past four weeks.

Q99 In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q99 Kwa kipindi cha majuma manne yaliyopita, iliwahi kutokea ukahofia upungufu wa chakula katika familia yako?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q101 If In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food? = No

Q100 How often did you worry that your household would not have enough food?

Rarely (once or twice in the four weeks) (1)

Sometimes (three to four times in the four weeks) (2)

Often (more than 4 times in the four weeks) (3)

I Don't know (4)

Q100 Ni kwa kiasi gani umekuwa na wasiwasi kwa kaya yako kukosa chakula?

Mara chache (Mara moja, mara mbili katika kipindi cha majuma manne) (1)

Wakati mwingine (Mara tatu mara nne kwa majuma manne) (2)

Mara kwa mara (Zaidi ya mara nne kwa kioindi cha majuma manne) (3)

Sifahamu (4)

Q101 In the past four weeks, were you not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q101 Kwa kipindi cha majuma manne yaliyopita, imewahi kutokea ukashindwa kula chakula ulichokipenda kwa kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q103 If In the past four weeks, were you not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a l... = No

Q102 How often were you not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources?

Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) (1)

Sometimes (three to four times in the past four weeks) (2)

Often (more than 4 times in the past four weeks) (3)

I Don't know (4)

Q102 Ni Kwa kipindi gani imewahi kutokea ukashindwa kula chakula ulichokipenda kwa kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali?  
Mara chache (Mara moja, mara mbili katika kipindi cha majuma manne) (1)  
Wakati mwingine (Mara tatu mara nne kwa majuma manne) (2)  
Mara kwa mara (Zaidi ya mara nne kwa kipindi cha majuma manne) (3)  
Sifahamu (4)

Q103 In the past four weeks, did you have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q103 Kwa kipindi cha wiki nne zilizopita umekuwa ukila pungufu kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali za uzalishaji?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q105 If In the past four weeks, did you have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources? = No

Q104 How often did you have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources?  
Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) (1)  
Sometimes (three to four times in the past four weeks) (2)  
Often (more than 4 times in the past past four weeks) (3)  
I Don't know (4)

Q104 Ni kwa kiasi gani umekuwa ukila chakula pungufu kwa sababu ya uhaba wa rasilimali za uzalishaji?  
Mara chache (mara moja au mbili kwa majuma manne yaliyopita) (1)  
Wakati mwingine (Mara tatu mpaka nne kwa wiki nne zilizopita) (2)  
Mara nyingi (Zaidi ya mara 4 kwa kipindi cha wiki nne zilizopita) (3)  
Sifahamu (4)

Q105 In the past four weeks, did you have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q105 Kwa kipindi cha wiki nne zilizopita umejikuta ukila chakula ambacho hukipendi kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali za kuzalisha aina ya chakula?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q107 If In the past four weeks, did you have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because... = No

Q106 How often did you have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  
Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) (1)  
Sometimes (three to four times in the past four weeks) (2)  
Often (more than 4 times in the past past year) (3)  
I Don't know (4)

Q106 Ni kwa kiasi gani umejikuta ukila chakula ambacho hukupenda kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali za kukusaidia kukipata?  
Mara chache (Mara moja, mara mbili katika kipindi cha majuma manne) (1)  
Wakati mwingine (Mara tatu mara nne kwa majuma manne) (2)  
Mara kwa mara (Zaidi ya mara nne kwa kioindi cha majuma manne) (3)  
Sifahamu (4)

Q107 In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q107 Kwa wiki nne zilizopita, iliwahi kutokea kukawa hakuna chakula kabisa katika kayo yake kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali za upatikanaji wa chakula?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q109 If In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of la... = No

Q108 How often was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food?  
Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) (1)  
Sometimes (three to four times in the past year) (2)  
Often (more than 4 times in the past year) (3)  
I Don't know (4)

Q108 Ni kwa kiasi gani iliwahi kutokea kukawa hakuna chakula kabisa katika kaya yako kwa sababu ya ukosefu wa rasilimali za upatikanaji wa chakula?  
Mara chache (Mara moja, mara mbili katika kipindi cha majuma manne) (1)

Wakati mwingine (Mara tatu mara nne kwa majuma manne) (2)  
Mara kwa mara (Zaidi ya mara nne kwa kioindi cha majuma manne) (3)  
Sifahamu (4)

Q109 In the past four weeks, did you go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q109 Kwa kipindi cha wiki nne zilizopita imewahi kutokea ukalala njaa kwa sababu ya kukosa chakula?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q111 If In the past four weeks, did you go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food? = No

Q110 How often did you go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food?  
Rarely (once or twice in the past year) (1)  
Sometimes (three to four times in the past year) (2)  
Often (more than 4 times in the past year) (3)  
I Don't know (4)

Q110 Ni mara ngapi umewahi kulala njaa kwa sababu ya kukosa chakula?  
(1)  
(2)  
(3)  
(4)



Q111 What is your main source of food?  
Own production from farm (1)  
Local market and shop (2)  
Donation from community members (3)  
Government Food bank (4)  
Other please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q111 Nini chanzo chako kikuu cha chakula?  
Unazalisha mwenyewe (1)  
Sokoni/dukani (2)  
Msaada kutoka kwa jamii (3)  
Serikali (4)  
Sehemu nyingine, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q112 Would you say the food you eat reflects your cultural preferences?  
Yes (2)  
No (3)  
I don't know (4)

Q112 Unaweza kusema chakula unachokula kinaendana na utamaduni wako?  
Ndiyo (2)  
Hapana (3)  
Sifahamu (4)

Q113 Why do you say '{Q112/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' when asked if the food you eat reflects your cultural preferences?

\_\_\_\_\_

Q113 Kwa nini unasema '{Q112/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' ulipoulizwa kwamba chakula unachokula kinaendana na utamaduni wako?

\_\_\_\_\_



Q114 How would you describe a culturally prepared meal  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q114 Unaweza kuelezea chakula kilichoandaliwa kulingana na utamaduni?

---

Q115 Would you generally consume coffee in this community?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q115 Je, mnatumia kahawa katika jamii hii?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)



Q116 In your opinion, what is the use of coffee in this community?

---

Q116 Kwa mawazo yako, nini matumizi ya kahawa katika jamii hii?

---

Q117 What would you say is your daily income?

less than 3,815.50 TSH (1)

More than 3,816.50 TSH (2)

Please specify how much (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q117 Je, upi ni ujira wako kwa siku?

Chini ya 3,815.50 TZS (1)

Zaidi ya 3,816.50 TZS (2)

Tafadhali, taja kiwango (3) \_\_\_\_\_

Q118 On average, how much of your daily income is spent on food?

A great deal (Above 3000TSH) (1)

A lot (Between 2001 TSH - 3000TSH) (2)

A moderate amount (1001 TSH - 2000 TSH) (3)

A little (Less than 1000 TSH) (4)

None at all (5)

Q118 Kwa wastani ni kiasi gani ya kipato unatumia kwa ajili ya chakula

Kwa kiasi kikubwa sana (Zaidi ya 3000 TZS) (1)

Kiasi kikubwa (Between 2001 TSH - 3000TSH) (2)

Kiasi cha kawaida (1001-2000 TZS) (3)

Kidogo tu (chini ya 1000 TZS) (4)

Hakuna kabisa (5)



Q119 On what would you say the rest of your income is used?

Health (1)

Children school fees (2)

Savings for a future project, (3)

Social activities (e.g drinking) (4)

Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q119 Kiasi kingine cha mapato kinatumika kwa

Afya (1)

Ada za watoto (2)

Akiba (3)

Matumizi ya kijamii (kama kunywa pombe) (4)

Matumizi mengine, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_



Q120 What is your primary source of water for cooking and drinking?

Groundwater (e.g. springs, wells) (1)

Precipitation (e.g. rain) (2)

Surface water (e.g rivers, streams) (3)

Water supply network (tap water) (4)  
Other, please specify (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q120 Ni ni chanzo cha kwanza cha maji ya kunywa na kupikia  
Maji ya ardhi (mf. chemichemi na visima) (1)  
Mchevuko (mf. mvua) (2)  
Yanatirika (e.g mito, mikondo) (3)  
Mtandao wa maji (Mabomba) (4)  
Kngine, taja (5) \_\_\_\_\_

Q121 How would you say the large-scale farm has affected the food situation in your household?  
Deteriorated (1)  
Not changed (2)  
Improved (3)  
I can't tell (4)

Q121 Unawezaje kusema kwamba uwekezaji mkubwa katika kilimo umeathiri hali ya chakula katika kaya yako?  
Imevurga kabisa (1)  
Hujabadilika (2)  
Umeboreka (3)  
Siwezi kusema (4)

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Q122 Why did you say the large-scale farm has '{Q121/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' the food situation in your household?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q122 Kwa nini unasema uwekezaji mkubwa Kupitia kilimo ume '{Q121/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' hali ya chakula katika kaya yako?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q123 Are there any other reasons besides the arrival of the coffee farm that can explain your food situation?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q123 Je, kuna sababu nyingine Zaidi ya shamba la kahawa inayoweza kuelezea hali ya chakula?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q125 If Are there any other reasons besides the arrival of the coffee farm that can explain your food sit... = No

Q124 What other reasons would you say has contributed to your food situation?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

Q124 Ni sababu zipi nyingine zimechangia katika hali ya chakula?  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

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Q125  
Land-related Conflicts and Recourse Mechanisms

Q125  
Land-related Conflicts and Recourse Mechanisms

Q126 Have you ever had any land-related conflict since the investor arrived?  
Yes (1)  
No (2)

Q126 Umeishawahi kuwa na mgogoro wowote kuhusu masuala ya Ardhi tangu kuja kwa muwekezaji?  
Ndiyo (1)  
Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q133 If Have you ever had any land-related conflict since the investor arrived? = No

Q127 With whom did you have the land-related conflict?

Another village member (19)

A family member (20)

A lawyer (21)

Someone from another village (22)

At the arbitration commission (23)

NGO/Community based organisation (24)

The Ward Officer (25)

The District Commissioner (26)

The Investor (27)

Polices officers (28)

The Parliamentarian (29)

Other, please specify (31) \_\_\_\_\_

I don't know (30)

Q127 Ulijikuta katika mgogoro huo wa Ardhi na nani?

(19)

(20)

(21)

(22)

(23)

(24)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

(29)

(31) \_\_\_\_\_

(30)

Q128 Can you please describe the problem?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

Q128 Unaweza kuelezea tatizo?

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_



Q129 Did you take the complaint to any authority?

Yes (1)

No. Why not? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Q129 Je, ulishitaki kwa mamlaka yoyote?

Ndiyo (1)

Hana, Kwa nini? (2) \_\_\_\_\_

Skip To: Q133 If Did you take the complaint to any authority? = No. Why not?

Q130 To whom did you lay the complaint?

Another village member (1)

A family member (2)

A lawyer (3)

Someone from another village (4)

At the arbitration commission (5)

NGO/Community based organisation (6)

The Ward Officer (7)

The District Commissioner (8)

The Investor (9)

Polices officers (10)

The Parliamentarian (11)

Other, please specify (13) \_\_\_\_\_

I don't know (12)

Q130 Ulikwenda kushitaki kwa nani?

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

- (8)
- (9)
- (10)
- (11)
- (13) \_\_\_\_\_
- (12)



Q131 How did you lay the complaint?

---



---

Q131 Kwa namna gani ulishitaji?

---



---



Q132 What did the persons to whom you laid your complaint say or do?

---



---

Q132 Je, mtu uliyekwenda kushitaki alisemaje au alifanya nini?

---



---

Q133 Are you aware of any official channel to make a land-related complaint?

- Yes (1)
- No (2)

Q133 Je Unafahamu Njia maalumu unayoweza kutumia kupeleka malalamiko yako kuhusu migogoro inayohusiana na ardhi

- Ndiyo (1)
- Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q135 If Are you aware of any official channel to make a land-related complaint? = No



Q134 What are the official channels to make a land-related complaint?

---

Q134 Zipi ni Njia rasmi za kufikisha malalamiko yahasuyo migogoro ya ardhi

---

Page Break

Q135

Perception about large-scale land investment

Q135

Mtazamo kuhusu uwekezaji mkubawa katika kilimo

Q136 To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements about large-scale land investments?

	Strongly agree (1)	Agree (2)	Somewhat agree and disagree (3)	Disagree (4)	Strongly disagree (5)
It can lead to the transfer of new farming skills? (1)					
It can lead to an increase in income (2)					

It can lead to an increase in food supply (3)

It can lead to an increase in health (4)

It can lead to an increase in water supply (5)

It can lead to an increase in employment opportunities (6)

I cant lead to an increase in inward migration (7)

It can lead to an increase in business activities (8)

It can lead to an increase in outward migration (9)

Q136 Ni kwa kiasi gani unakubaliana au kutokubaliana na kauli zifuatazo kukuhi uwekezaji mkubwa katika ardhi

	Nakubalina kabisa (1)	Nakubali (2)	Kawaida tu (3)	Sikubali (4)	Sikubali kabisa (5)
Unaweza kupelekea utaalamu mpya katika kilimo (1)					
Unaweza kuongeza kipato (2)					
Unaweza kuongeza chakula (3)					
Unaweza kuongeza afya (4)					
Unaweza kuongeza upatikanaji wa maji (5)					
Unaweza kuongeza ajira (6)					
Unaweza kuongeza wahamiaji/wageni (7)					
Unaweza kuongeza shughuli za biashara (8)					
Unaweza kuongeza watu kuondoka vijijini (9)					

Q137 Are you in support of the large-scale farm in your community?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q137 Je. Unaunga mkono uwekezaji mkubwa Kupitia kilimo?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Q138 What is the reason for your saying '{Q137/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' when asked if you support the large-scale farm in your community?

---



---

Q138 Nini sababu ya wewe kusema '{Q137/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' ulivyoulizwa kama unaunga mkono uwekezaji mkubwa katika ardhi?

---



---

Q139 How likely is it that you could get the following information from government or other public institutions, or haven't you heard enough to say?

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Neither likely nor unlikely (3)	Moderately unlikely (4)	Extremely unlikely (5)
If you went to the local council's lands office - to find out who owns a piece of land in your community. (1)					
If you went to the local council's lands office - to find out how to make a land-related complaint (2)					
If you went to the local council office to find out about the district/city/town development plan and budgets. (3)					
If you went to the local council office - to find out how to register your land or get a land title in your community. (4)					

Q139 Na kwa namna gani Unaweza kupata taarifa zifuatazo kutoka serikalini au katika taasisi nyingine za umma, au hauna cha kuzungumza?

	Uwezekano mkubwa (1)	Uwezekano wa kawaida (2)	Kawaida tu (3)	Hakuna uwezekano (4)	Hakuna Uwezekano kabisa (5)
nani anamiliki Ardhi katika jamii yenu (1)					
Kama ulikwenda kwenye ofisi ya Ardhi kutafuta kutafuta namna ya kulalamikia mgogoro wa ardhi (2)					
Kama ulikwenda kwenye ofisi ya Ardhi kutafuta mipango ya maendeleo na bajeti za Wilaya/jiji/mji (3)					
Kama ulikwenda kwenye ofisi ya Ardhi kutafuta namna ya kusajili					

Ardhi yako na  
kupata hati (4)

Q140 How much do you trust each of the following?

	A great deal (1)	A lot (2)	A moderate amount (3)	A little (4)	None at all (5)	I don't know (6)
The President (1)						
Parliament (2)						
The National Electoral Commission (NEC) (3)						
Your Local Government Council (4)						
The Ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (5)						
Opposition Political Parties (6)						
The Police (7)						
The Army (8)						
Courts of law (9)						
Judges and Magistrates (10)						
Traditional leaders (11)						
The Tanzania Investment Center (12)						
Religious leaders (13)						
NGOs (14)						
Researchers (15)						

Q140 Ni kwa kiasi gani unawaamini wafuatao?

	Kwa kikubwa sana (1)	Kwa kikubwa (2)	Kiasi Kawaida (3)	Kidogo (4)	Hakuna kabisa (5)	Sifahamu (6)
Rais (1)						
Mbunge (2)						
MNEC (3)						
Halmashauri ya wilaya (4)						
Chama tawala (5)						
Vyama vya siasa (6)						
Polisi (7)						
Jeshi (8)						

Mahakama (9)  
 Majaji na mahakimu (10)  
 Viongozi wa kijamii (11)  
 Kituo cha Uwekezaji Tanzania (12)  
 Viongozi wa dini (13)  
 Asasi (14)  
 Watafiti? (15)

Q141 How likely are the following people do you think are involved in corruption, or haven't you heard enough about them to say?

	Extremely likely (1)	Moderately likely (2)	Slightly likely (3)	Neither likely nor unlikely (4)	Slightly unlikely (5)	Moderately unlikely (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)	I don't know (8)
It can lead to the transfer new farming skills? (15)								
It can lead to an increase in income (16)								
It can lead to an increase in food supply (17)								
It can lead to an increase in health (18)								
It can lead to an increase in water supply (19)								
It can lead to an increase in employment opportunities (20)								
I cant lead to an increase in inward migration (21)								
It can lead to an increase in business activities (22)								
It can lead to an increase in outward migration (23)								

Q141 Ni kwa kiasi gani unafikiri watu hawa wanahusika katika rushwa au hujasikia vya kutosha kuhusu wao?

	Extremely likely (1)	Uwezekano mkubwa (2)	Uwezekano wa kawaida (3)	Kawaida tu (4)	Hakuna uwezekano (5)	Hakuna Uwezekano kabisa (6)	Extremely unlikely (7)	I don't know (8)
(15)								
(16)								
(17)								
(18)								
(19)								
(20)								
(21)								
(22)								
(23)								

Page Break

Q142

Community understanding of Human Rights and Support Network

Q142

Uelewa wa wanakijiji kuhusu Haki za Binadamu na Mtandao wa Msaada

Q143 Have you ever heard of the term 'human rights'?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q143 Umeisha sikia neon, "Haki za Binadamu"

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Q145 What does 'human rights' mean to you?

---

Q145 'Hazi za binadamu' zina maana gani kwako?

---

Q144 From whom did you hear about human rights?

A government official (3)

A government official (4)

Journalist/Newspaper (6)

Another village member (7)

A family member (8)

A lawyer (9)

Someone from another village (10)

At the arbitration commission (11)

NGO/Community based organisation (12)

The Ward Officer (13)

The District Commissioner (14)

The Investor (15)

Polices officers (16)

The Parliamentarian (17)

Other, please specify (19)

I don't know (18)

Q144 Umesikia kutoka kwa nini?

(3)

(4)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

- (10)
- (11)
- (12)
- (13)
- (14)
- (15)
- (16)
- (17)
- (19)
- (18)

Q146 Can you give examples of such rights?

---

Q146 Unaweza kutoa mfano wa 'haki za binadamu'?

---

Q147 Do you think everybody has the same 'human rights'?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q147 Unadhani kila mtu ana 'haki sawa'?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)



Q148 Why did you say '{Q147/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' to everybody having the same human rights? Can you explain using a story that has affected you recently?

---

Q148 Kwa nini unasema '{Q147/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' ana hali sawa? Unaweza kuelezea kwa kuhutumia habari iliyokugusa hivi karibuni?

---

Q149 How do you think human rights can be protected?

---

Q149 Unafikiri ni vipi haki za binadamu ninaweza kulindwa?

---

Q150 Do you think there is a human right to food?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q150 Unadhani kuna haki za binadamu kwenye chakula?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q154 If Do you think there is a human right to food? = No



Q151 Why did you say '{Q150/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' when asked if there is a right to food?

---

Q151 Kwa nini unasema '{Q150/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices}' ulipoulizwa kama kuna haki sawa katika chakula?

---

Q152 What can be done to achieve this right?

---

Q152 Nini kinaweza kufanyika ili haki hizi zipatikane?

---

Q153 How do you think another persons actions can stop you from enjoying your right to food?

---

Q153 Unadhani ni kwa namna gani matendo ya watu wengine yanaweza kukuzuia kufurahia haki yako ya chakula?

---

Q154 What do you do in a situation where you are not able feed yourself or meet your dietary needs?

---

Q154 What do you do in a situation where you are not able feed yourself or meet your dietary needs?

---

Q155 Are there places where you can go a seek for help?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q155 Kuna Sehemu Unaweza kwenda kuomba masaada?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Skip To: Q157 If Are there places where you can go a seek for help? = No

Q156 Where do you go when you need to be helped to meet your food needs?

---

Q156 Huwa unakwenda wapi inapotokea unahitaji Msaada wa chakula?

---

Q157 Do you think the government has an obligation towards your food needs?

Yes (1)

No (2)

Q157 Unadhani serikali inawajibika katika masuala ya chakula?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Page Break

Q158 Why did you say  $\{Q157/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$ ' when asked if the government has an obligation towards your food needs?

---

Q158 Kwa nini unasema  $\{Q157/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$ ' ulipoulizwa kama serikali inawajibika katika masuala ya chakula

---

Q159 What in your opinion, should the government do in situations where you are not able to feed yourself?

---

Q159 Kwa mawazo yako unafikiri serikali inatakuwa kufanya katika mazingira ambayo huwezi kujilisha?

---

Q160 Do you think there is a connection between access to or owning land and food?

Yes (1)

No (2)

I don't know (3)

Q160 Unadhani kuna uhusiano kati ya upatikanaji wa au umiliki wa Ardhi na chakula?

Ndiyo (1)

Hapana (2)

Sifahamu (3)

Page Break

Q161 Can you explain why you said ' $\{Q160/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$ ' when asked if you think there is a connection between access to or owning land and food?

---

---

Q161 Unaweza kuelezea kwa nini unasema ' $\{Q160/ChoiceGroup/SelectedChoices\}$ ' ulivyoulizwa kuna uhusiano kati ya upatikanaji wa au umiliki wa Ardhi na chakula?

---



Q162 What do you think are the changes in the community since the land was given to the investor?

---

Q162 Unadhani ni mabadiliko gani yametokea katika jamii tangu mwekezaji alipopewa ardhi?

---



Q163 What have you done to cope with the changes in the community since the arrival of the investor? Please, can you share an experience that demonstrates some of these challenges?

---

Q163 Je, umefanya nini ili kwenda na mabadiliko hayo tangu kuja kwa mwekezaji? Tafadhali, Unaweza kutupa uzoefu unaonyesha mabadiliko haya?

---

**End of Block: Default Question Block**

## FOCUS GROUP: PLANNING FORM

<b>Project name:</b>	Political Economy of Large-Scale land investments in the South –West of Tanzania and the Human Right to Adequate Food
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<b>Facilitator:</b>	
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<b>Assistant:</b>	
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<b>Details:</b> What communities will be involved in the FGD? How many people will be in each group? Will women and men be separate? Any other specifics about the make-up of the groups?
--

What criteria will be used to select these members? Consultations with local NGO representative; Notes should be made about the biases of the NGO; Make an initial visit to the local community to observe community setting and make initial contact with community members; What about randomly selecting members from the community? These questions should be discussed during meetings with Denis and Frank.

Examples of potential FGD participants include: Government officials, academics, prominent community members, or other knowledgeable individuals familiar with the conditions and experiences of household conditions (access) in the areas

- It should be explained to the key informants that they are being consulted to ensure that the questionnaire is understandable in their community.
- The consent letter should also be read to the participants: They should also be given the option to participate or not and should be informed that they can choose to leave or refuse to answer a question at any time.

ID of participant	Name of participant	Gender (6 Male/6 Female)	Signature	Notes

<b>Fieldwork date start:</b>	
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<b>Aim (1) for focus group:</b> What do I want to learn from the FGD? Large-scale investment timeline – Participants will be separated according to gender groups Women and men will be separated
---

Probing questions	Notes
Can you tell me how the land in the village was acquired by the investor? – Use dates where possible. Who were those involved and how were they involved? What was your role as community members?	Definition of keywords: Facilitator should ask the informants who they consider is the investor. What or who do they understand in the <b>investor</b> ?
What meetings/consultations took place and what was your impression about the meetings? How many meetings took place? When, where and who was present?	
In your own words, how would you describe participation? – What are the keywords or elements which make you feel confident that you have fully participated in an exercise?	Definition of keyword: What does participation mean to the participants?
Did you actively participate in these meetings? How did you participate? What contributions did you make during the meetings? Did you understand the purpose of the meetings?	

What do you think was the purpose of the meetings? What in your opinion should have been done differently?	
Did you receive any information about the kinds of investment that was going to take place? Did any official explain what was going to happen to the acquired land? What did they say? What was your impression about the planned investments?	What <b>kinds of investments</b> do the participants know about? Who are the <b>officials</b> they expect this information to come from?
In 2009, some land was distributed by the village council to some Village members – do you know of any person who was given land by the village council in 2009?	Who are those in the <b>village council</b> ? Participants should be able to describe members of the village council not by name but by their official title and responsibility.
Do you know any council members who were among those who distributed land in 2009? Who were they? What position did they have in the community?	
Why do you think the land was taken back from the village members?	
Was any alternative land given to the village members? If yes, where was the land located? Did you like the land? If No, why? What did community members think about this?	
Was there any forum to lay complaints?	
What kinds of complaints did you have? How did you deal with the complaints?	The participants should be able to describe their understanding of a <b>complaint</b> . What kinds of complaint frequently comes up in the community?
Were you able to meet any authority to talk about your problems? Which authority did you meet? If 'no', why not? What do you think could have been done differently?	
What was the role of NGOs in the process? What did religious groups or institutions do?	Participants should be able to describe their understanding of what NGOs are and the role they expect NGOs to play. They should list the main NGOs they have engaged.
What do you think has been the contribution of researchers in this issue? Do you think they have made any contributions? What contributions do you think they can make?	
What is the attitude of the current government toward these investments? Do you think the government is supportive of you as a community? Why do you think so?	
Do you think the government is supportive of the investor? Why do you think so?	The facilitator should probe the participants on their knowledge/perception of governments role in large-scale investments. What do they expect from the government?
How will you compare the current government and the previous one?	
Do you think anything has changed? Can you give an example of what you think has changed? What will you like to be done differently?	

Aim (2) for focus group:  
What do I want to learn from the FGD? Land Investment Actor Mapping

**Probing questions**

**Notes**

Who are the government and community level players in land-related matters in the community? What (are) were their roles during the large-scale land negotiation process?	Participants should be able to describe or list players that are important in land-related issues in the community. Participants should also describe the role they played in the land acquisition process.
Who were the main decision makers? Who made the decisions?	Participants should be involved in ranking the players according to their status, starting from the most influential to the list influential. They should also describe how these players relate to each other or treat each other. This can be done on a flat surface using sticker notes or other items that can help represent the various players.
What is the relationship between these actors? Government workers? Party members? Religious members? Friends? Superior colleague? Subordinate colleague? The main is to know how the actors are connected in professional and political life.	What is the relationship between these actors? Government workers? Party members? Religious members? Friends? Superior colleague? Subordinate colleague? The main is to know how the actors are connected in professional and political life.
How did you feel about the process? - likes and dislikes	Participants should be probed on their likes and dislikes about the acquisition process.
How should it have been better? What was the role of the investor and what was their perception about the investment?	
Can such investment be improved?	Participants should be probed on their opinions on how such investments could have been improved.
What about the investor? – What role did he play?	
Was there any legal advice given to you? Was there a lawyer?	Participants should be probed on their opinion about using lawyers. Who is a lawyer to them and what do they think about lawyers. Participants should be asked if they will have been happy with legal advice.
Have you contacted a lawyer regarding any land related issues since the land investment deal?	
Do you know of the law regarding large-scale investments? Can you tell when anyone does anything that is unlawful?	Do you know of the law regarding large-scale investments? Can you tell when anyone does anything that is unlawful?
What do you feel about the current government's approach to large-scale investments?	
Was the police involved and any stage? How and when?	
What about parliamentarians? Were they involved? What is their role in the community? What do you think about them? Did they play any role during the land acquisition?	
What is the role of religious leaders or groups in the community? Are they involved in land-related matters?	
What about the local government members what are/were their role?	
What about NGOs? Can you name some of the NGOs that you have come in contact with regarding any land related matter?	
What do you do when having a land dispute/concern?	
Who do you contact when you have concerns about land?	
What about lawyers or the arbitration commission?	

<p>Are there any community groups or structures that you have formed within which you deal with land-related issues? You have certainly had many researchers in the community to investigate on land-related matters. Since 2011 how many researchers do you think have visited the community? What do you think has been their role or the impact so far?</p>	<p>Participants should talk about mechanisms they have resorted to deal with the situations. Have they formed any committees? Who are the committee members? Are women involved? Who brought up the idea of a committee?</p>
<p>What are the roles of adult women? What are the roles of adult men? What are the roles of male and female children below the age of 18? What are the roles of male and female children above the age of 18?</p>	
<p>In your opinion, what has been the role of journalists, the media and other support services in the community? Please, can you share examples of how journalists have been involved in land issues</p>	

**Aim (3) for focus group:**

What do I want to learn from the FGD? Network mapping

Probing Question	Notes
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**Aim (4) for focus group:**

What do I want to learn from the FGD? Human Rights and the right to adequate food in the community

Probing questions	Notes
Have you ever heard of the term 'human rights'? Where and how did you hear about it?	
What does 'human rights' mean to you? Can you use keywords to define what you think are human rights? Can you give examples of such rights?	
How you think everybody has the same 'human rights'? Why do you think so? Can you explain using a story that has affected you recently? How do you think human rights can be protected?	
Do you think there is a human right to food? Why do you think so? What can be done to achieve this right? What can be done to hinder you from having this right?	
Do you think the government has an obligation towards your dietary needs? Why? What should the government do in situations where you are not able to meet your dietary needs?	
What do you think is the connection between land and food? Do you have any experiences to share that will demonstrate this connection?	
What do you think are the changes in the community since the land was given to the investor? What have you done to cope with these changes? Have you been successful? Why and how? Please, can you share an experience that demonstrates some of these challenges?	
What are the kind foods you eat in the community? Please, can you name the foods you eat during a meal? What are the main sources of protein? Fish or meat?	<p>By "kinds of foods" we mean foods that people generally eat in the community. Considered "preferred foods" in this culture.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• What are some examples of foods that secure food people eat that food-insecure people cannot afford to eat?</li> </ul>
What will describe as a balanced diet in the community? How will you describe a complete meal? What are the components of a complete meal? Use the local language to describe these meals – keywords will be helpful.	
What are the main activities of community members as a source of livelihood? What do they do to get food, money or to support their daily needs?	
What are the main economic activities in the community? Would you say the village contributes to the economy in the region? What do you think is their contribution? If not, why not? What do you think could have been different?	
How will you describe someone or a child who is malnourished? Are there cases of malnourishment in the village? What are the local names to describe such a person or child? Are there circumstances like that in the village? Do you think the land problem has contributed to this?	
What do you do in a situation where you are not able to feed yourself or meet your dietary needs?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• By "not able to feed yourself" we mean not having the money or the ability to grow or trade for the food.</li> <li>• How do people here usually talk about a "not being able to feed themselves"?</li> </ul>
What do you understand by "a limited variety of foods"? We want to mean an undesired monotonous diet for an extended period of days. What are examples of what an undesirable monotonous diet	

might be? What types of foods are included in a diverse diet in this culture?	
Are there places where you can go a seek for help? What do you think can be done differently to reduce incidences of malnutrition in the community?	