University of Reading

How effective is the Climate Justice Movement in sub-Saharan Africa?

PhD in International Development

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Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all materials from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Zainab Ojone Aliyu

Abstract

Climate change (CC) remains one of the most pressing challenges globally and particularly for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) which lies in the frontline of the catastrophic impacts of CC. Yet, global progress towards urgent, ambitious, and equitable climate action (CA) remains slow. And while this holds devastating consequences for the people of SSA, and thus places the burden of demanding urgent and just climate action on them, it is also the case that only very limited research has been conducted until now on the Climate Justice movement (CJM) in SSA. Using the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) as a case study and drawing on 42 key informant interviews and over 150 hours of participant observation carried out over 16 months (August 2018 to December, 2019) at six different study sites, this thesis investigates the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA in their demand for climate justice (CJ). Specifically, it analyses 1) the Movement's effectiveness in three domains: (a) Institutional and Governance strengthening, (b) Public awareness, engagement and mobilisation and (c) Policy influence; and 2) the factors or structural conditions) that inhibit their effectiveness.

Building on the extant studies and literatures on CJ, social movements and organisational effectiveness, this thesis develops an analytical framework that underpins the analysis and understanding of the CJM's effectiveness. It argues that PACJA is moderately effective in its progress towards achieving its CJ objectives in the three categories that were analysed. It identifies four overlapping factors that currently limit the effectiveness of the Movement: 1) managing complex institutional dynamics, 2) underdeveloped mechanisms, strategies and tactics, 3) limited technical, financial, and political resources, and 4) a complex external socio-political environment. Thus, to be effective, the CJM must (i) harmonise and align their CJ framings and narratives in ways that connect and inspire the public for increased participation in the CC governance processes at different levels, (ii) identify and solidify a coherent set of strategies and tactics, (iii) explore more localised fundraising opportunities and, (iv) build enabling socio-political conditions that will support mass mobilisation for urgent climate actions in SSA.

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Dedication

“We have a responsibility to protect the rights of generations, of all species, that cannot speak for themselves today. The global challenge of climate change requires that we ask no less of our leaders, or ourselves”.

Wangari Maathai

I dedicate this thesis to all people of sub-Saharan Africa who are struggling with the negative impacts of climate change. You are the inspiration behind my research and the drive for my future aspirations. I hope that this thesis will contribute to bringing climate justice closer to you.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACCER	Africa Climate Change and Environment Reporting
ACLI	Africa Climate Legislation Initiative
ACSEA	African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access
ACW	Africa Climate Week
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGN	African Group of Negotiators
AMCEN	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment
AMCOW	African Ministerial Conference on Water
AREI	African Renewable Energy Initiative
AC	Advisory Committee
ACT!	Act Change Transform
AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
BAU	Business as Usual
CA	Climate Action
CAHOSSOC	Conference of the African Heads of State and Government on Climate Change
CBD	Convention on Biological Diversity
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CBDRRC	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capacities
CC	Climate Change
CCDA	Climate Change and Development in Africa
CEB	Continental Executive Board
CEC	Continental Executive Commission
CF	Climate Finance
CGC	Continental Governing Council
CIS	Climate Information Services
CJ	Climate Justice
CJM	Climate Justice Movement
COP	Conference of Parties
CSDevNet	Climate and Sustainable Development Network of Nigeria
CSOs	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Cooperate Social Responsibilities

DCC	Directorate of Climate Change
DFID	Department for International Development
EAC	Ethics and Arbitration Committee
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ED	Executive Director
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund
EJ	Environmental Justice
FAC	Finance and Administration Committee
FBO	Faith Based Organisation
FCPF	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility
FES	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
FMEnv	Federal Ministry of Environment Nigeria
FP	Focal Point
GA	General Assembly
GC	General Council
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GEF	Green Environment Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gas
HBS	Heinrich Boll Stiftung
HR	Human Resource
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IGS	Institutional and Governance Strengthening
IIN	Indigenous Information Network
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development
INDC	Intended Nationally Determined Contribution
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
KIE	Kenya Industrial Estate
KII	Key Informant Interview/Interviewee
KNCCAP	Kenyan National Climate Change Action Plan
KP	Kyoto Protocol
KPCG	Kenyan Platform for Climate Governance
LRI	Legal Response International
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding

NCAP	National Climate Action Plan
NDC	Nationally Determined Contributions
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NESREA	Nigerian Environmental Standards and Regulatory Enforcement Agency
NET	National Environmental Tribunal
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NP	National Platforms
NPO	Non-Profit Organisation
OCA	Organisational Capacity Assessment
PA	Paris Agreement
PACJA	Pan African Climate and Environmental Justice Alliance
PAMACC	Pan African Media Alliance on Climate Change
PAP	Pan African Parliament
PAEM	Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation
PEN	Poverty Eradication Network
PI	Policy Influence
PPP	Polluters Pay Principle
RCC	Recruitment and Credentials Committee
REC	Regional Economic Integration Bodies
REDD	Reduction of Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
RM	Resource Mobilisation
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SD	Sustainable Development
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
TAAFA	The ACCER Awards Finalist Academy
TFN	The Funding Network
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPAC	Technical and Policy Affairs Committee
TWG	Technical Working Group
UN	United Nations
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNEP	United Nations Environmental Programme

UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
WB	World Bank
WED	World Environment Day
WRI	World Resources Institute

Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Research Context and Justification

Climate change (CC) is one of the most pressing global challenges, with particularly significant impacts anticipated for Africa. Whereas the continent contributes little to the total greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere, it is most affected by the detrimental impacts of CC (Okereke, 2010; IPCC, 2007; Roberts and Parks, 2009). Consequently, many scholars including Okereke and Coventry (2016), Baptise and Rhiney (2016) and Barret (2013a) have warned that without timely and strategic interventions, multiple stressors like poverty, poor infrastructure, climate refugees, will severely limit the adaptive capacity of the continent, aggravate the current socio-economic incapacities, and threaten sustainable development for the African population as a whole.

Despite these warnings, global progress towards urgent, ambitious, and equitable climate action appears to be moving at a snail's pace (Brunnee and Streck, 2013). This is in part because the international CC negotiations and governance processes have been fraught with contestations over who should act on and/or bears the cost of the detrimental impacts of CC and the remediation thereof (Heede, 2014; Gardiner, 2010; Caney, 2005b). These arguments range from issues of causal attribution and historical responsibility, to capacity to pay and of whose bears the brunt of CC impacts (Roberts and Parks, 2007; Shue, 1999). The governments of 'Highly Industrialised countries (HICs) which are the most significant contributors to CC are for the most part reluctant to take responsibility for the costs and burdens (Allen, 2015; Foran and Widick, 2013). The failure of the Kyoto protocol and the political power of leading economies, for example, the US to either join or withdraw from global CC agreements like the landmark Paris Climate Agreement, provides enough evidence that the actions of these powerful actors are stalling significant climate action (CA) at the global level, which is to the detriment of Africa and its constituent states.

The recent onset of the COVID 19 pandemic and the ensuing global lockdown, although it has provided a glimpse into the future where there is far less CO_2 emitting air travel, for instance, also serves as a CC threat multiplier, exacerbating the drivers of vulnerability on the continent, particularly poverty, inequality, conflicts, weak infrastructure, and amenities including health facilities, and a deep mistrust between governments and their citizens. For example, in Nigeria, the government faced difficulties in maintaining security for its population of over 200 million people when it made the decision to implement a phased lockdown in the country on March 30th, 2020 to curb the spread of the coronavirus. The restriction on movement affected the livelihoods of a greater number of the population who are mostly dependent on the informal sector (Narula, 2020), and thus, cannot work from home and/or earn a living, nor do they have savings to rely on during this time of economic upheaval. This reality is coupled with the lack of social security have exposed these populations to hunger and starvation and increased their socio-economic vulnerability.

The adverse effects of this - as shown in the various news platforms in the country - was a significant spike in the rates of criminal offences including petty theft, home invasions, vandalism etc. across the country. Many of these informal sector workers were believed to have engaged in these criminal activities to ensure their survival and that of their dependants. The breakdown was to such an extent that the security agencies in the country were overwhelmed with the situation, such that the citizens were left on their own to implement spontaneous safety measures.

The Nigerian government and several well-meaning individuals tried to intervene by providing palliatives for the poorer and most vulnerable populations (Eranga, 2020). Their efforts were however hindered by several issues including chaotic distribution, political hijacking and massive looting due to the widespread corruption and poor distribution and tracking system in the country (Guardian News, October 2020, Eranga, 2020). Consequently, the onus fell on the middle class to pool together resources and distribute them among the poorer populations in their communities in exchange for their own security and well-being. In addition, the mature male occupants in each household took turns to patrol their streets and estates, particularly at night, to keep hoodlums away. This is perhaps a foretaste of the climate-induced social and economic breakdown that may be in prospect if the global climate emergency is not prioritised to a much greater extent.

However, there is a silver lining for climate action beyond the pandemic. The pandemic has helped to draw attention to the importance and urgency of addressing CC by highlighting the nexus between CC and the drivers of vulnerability, for example, poverty and food insecurity as well as the impacts (i.e., insecurity, conflicts, displacement, migration, and climate refugees) on the population. Old prejudices die hard though: the recent global easing of the lockdown has seen harsh migration policies being directed at many countries in Africa. For example, only one African country, Rwanda, was included in the "safe travel corridor" list of countries that was released by the EU as of December 17, 2020. This is although countries in Africa have significantly fewer confirmed cases of COVID 19 than many of the countries that were included in that list. This shows the importance of mobilising homegrown solutions to addressing CC, as relying on countries in the Global North to provide finance, technology or even to open their borders to people from the Global South as climate refugees, poses a risk for the African continent.

Now more than ever, the burden of demanding climate justice (CJ), and advancing the discussions around, for example, internal financing for building resilience, rests on the shoulders of Africans, who are increasingly the unfortunate victims in the frontline of the catastrophic impacts of CC. Subsequently, it is important for CJ scholars to urgently address the fundamental question of how Africans including the government, individuals and organisations can utilise a right-based discourse to enhance their leverage, strengthen their voices, share responsibilities and work to speed up global climate action.

1.2 Literature review

Past studies have shown that the governments of many developing countries including most countries in SSA are ill-equipped to take meaningful, urgent, and coordinated policy action to address climate impacts and injustice both at the national and global levels (Saraswat and Kamar, 2016; Chatterton *et al*, 2013; Fisher, 2012; Roberts and Parks, 2009). They argue that this is because of a prevalent weakness in the governance systems across SSA, in addition to the limited socio-economic capacity, and weak political clout on the international scene. Similarly, many citizens of SSA countries are reportedly doubtful of their governments' efforts and sincerity to address the inequalities of CC and promote CJ for their poorest and

most vulnerable populations (Evans, 2010). This, along with the stalling of climate action at the global level, is resulting in an increase in a new set of actors i.e., climate justice (CJ) advocates, grassroots NGOs and CSOs who are lending their voices and support to open new spaces for participatory political action and that demand CJ from the governments and decision-makers (Eriksen et al, 2021; Jamieson, 2010).

For instance, in SSA, CJ advocates (e.g., Nnimmo Bassey, the late Wangari Maathai) and grassroots movements (e.g., Environmental Rights Action (ERA), Pan Africa Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), African Youth Climate Change Initiative (AYCCI) and GroundWork) have drawn and continue to draw public attention to local struggles of indigenous and other affected people (Tokar, 2013; Foran and Widick, 2013; Bond, 2011). Their growing understanding of the political nature of climate negotiations, and the importance of joint efforts in raising their voices, profiles, and opportunities to influence the processes at the national, regional, and international levels (Heinrich Böll Stiftung, 2014), have propelled them to take their CJ advocacy beyond individual boundaries and national borders by forging alliances and networks. They use their immersion in national politics and their legitimacy at the grassroots level, along with access via their cross-country alliances, to contest climate injustices in discussions and negotiations on CC and sustainable development, and to compel the "more powerful" actors to pursue meaningful climate action for Africa (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Tokar, 2013).

In line with this shift, current scholarship on climate action is increasingly looking beyond the government to these new set of actors i.e., individuals and organisations, for example, La Via Campesina, Climate Justice Alliance etc., that are mobilising around issues of CC and CJ and the need to protect their human and environmental rights (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Mckenzie et al, 2014; Tokar, 2013). This scholarship has attempted to increase knowledge of how these mobilising actors (i.e., movements) have originated and evolved, understand how they frame CJ in their discourses, discharge their roles, and evaluate their significance in CC governance processes at various levels. Accordingly, they have often portrayed these new actors i.e., the wider climate justice movement, in discourses as an avenue to strengthening institutions' capacity and fill in for failures in governance systems (Saraswat and Kamar, 2016; Chatterton *et al*, 2013). While research on these actors is still relatively young, often

fragmented and provides little information on their capacity to competently capture and manage underlying CJ challenges and operate at different scales, evidence from the small number of existing studies indicates that their efforts to deliver CJ are limited by several factors like the use of weak and underdeveloped mechanisms and processes (Newell et al, 2011).

Quite noticeably, research on these CJ actors or movements in the African context is lagging in the literature (Okereke and Coventry, 2016). Available literature on the CJM in Africa has mostly been conducted by Patrick Bond, focused extensively on South Africa, and made little reference to SSA. A few other studies on CJ in Africa and the UNFCCC negotiations have been conducted by scholars including Mwenda and Beer (2016), Death (2014) and Okereke (2010). Even fewer studies among these contributions on CJ in Africa has been conducted on SSA as a whole (Newell et al, 2020). While these scholars agree that certain key actors have enhanced the continent's voice and participation in the CC dialogue processes at different tiers of governance, they also acknowledge that they face limitations like other CJ actors in the Global South. These limitations including weak institutional and organising capacity, limited financial resources, weak framing narratives, limited political power and the use of weak and underdeveloped mechanisms have all prevented them from forming a strong, popular, and effective CJM on the continent (Newell et al, 2020; Mwenda and Beer, 2016; Death, 2014 and Okereke, 2010).

For example, in 2014, Death observed that the climate movement in Africa, though plural and diverse, lack a strong centre and unified CJ framing that was capable of mobilising people in contentious action that challenges political elites under the CJ banner. He argued that their failure to adequately link their understanding of climate science and the impacts of CC, for example, water scarcity, desertification, droughts and flood, etc., to other socio-economic, ecological and cultural issues like food security, loss of livelihoods, biodiversity loss and poverty, was responsible for the perceived lack of public interest, weak government-led climate actions, and limited scholarly interest in the CJ movement(s) in Africa (Death, 2014). In contrast, other scholars including Okereke (2010) have linked the weakness in Africa's CJM's impact to the complex interdependency and mostly overreliance on the more powerful developed countries for finance, technology and capacity transfer, globalisation, and democratic peace, among other reasons.

In any case, each study has indicated that Africa's movements for CJ must urgently strengthen their climate advocacy to temper the worst effects of CC, while simultaneously securing the best possible outcomes for the continent and its regions. However, there is limited theoretical evidence to support the above claims since none of these publications sought to wholly and systematically unravel why these actors (i.e., the CJM) have failed to deliver CJ for the poor and vulnerable populations in African countries. Additionally, until now, no work has investigated the roles (i.e., CJ objectives), capacities and/or limitations of African continental CJMs themselves and their impacts that are and will be critical going forward. This is the gap in the literature which this research written up in this thesis was designed to address.

1.3 Research Objectives

This thesis aims to investigate the effectiveness of the Climate Justice Movement (CJM) in SSA in driving the CJ agenda. To do this, the thesis first highlights in the literature review chapter the CJ demands (or corresponding objectives) of the CJM globally and then specifically those of a case study movement in SSA. The Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) was selected as the case study for this research. PACJA is an Alliance of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Faith-based Organisations (FBOs), Community-based Organisations (CBOs), Farmer, Trust, Foundations and Pastoralist Groups from diverse regions across Africa. This alliance was purposefully selected as an ideal case for this investigation due to its geographical immersion in grassroots activism in SSA. It was also selected because of its inherent claim that its core mandate is to promote all of Africa's interests from a position of equity and fairness with regards to development and equity-driven solutions in international CC conferences and related process.

In the ensuing chapters, the thesis will conduct a critical and granular investigation into the current efforts and capacities of the PACJA towards achieving specific CJ objectives from when it was established in 2008 until December 2019. These include:

a. Institutional and governance strengthening of the CC governance processes across scales (i.e., global, regional, national, and sub-national)

b. Enhancing public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation for CJ and
c. Influencing CC policy processes i.e., from agenda setting to policy evaluation and revisions, to prevent climate injustices from continuing unchecked into the future.

Finally, and with an emphasis on the CJ objectives of PACJA, the thesis will seek to identify, analyse and explain the structural and contingent reasons for gaps, tensions, and limitations, if any, that may be causing the movement to lag or appear to lag in the demand for urgent and ambitious climate action despite the current and impending detrimental impacts of CC on most of the population in SSA.

Based on the above objectives, this thesis will attempt to answer the following research questions:

1. To what extent has PACJA been able – over a period of 11 years (2008-2019) to achieve each of the three CJ objectives listed below:
    - Institutional and Governance Strengthening
    - Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilization
    - Policy Influence

2. What factors (if any) have limited the effectiveness of the CJM towards achieving each of the above listed CJ objectives? (*This will also include an analysis of the compromises and 'paths not taken' that were entailed in the movement's institutional/organisational development trajectory*).

The above questions will be addressed by conducting a critical review of the broad literature on climate justice, social movements, and organisational effectiveness. The purpose of this review is to identify and theorise the key concepts to be analysed. Important concepts analysed in this thesis include climate justice, mass mobilisation, engagement, representation and participation, capacity building (technical, financial, socio-political), governance and resource mobilisation as well as factors such as material and intellectual resources, access to policy processes, political economy etc. that shape the effectiveness or otherwise of a movement. The thesis draws upon primary data collected between October 2018 and

December 2019, literature reviews (both academic and organisation unpublished, internal organisational documents); key informant interviews (KIIs); and participant observation (including of conferences, meetings, workshops, as well as day-to-day office routines and processes.).

1.4 Research Significance

The findings of this study are highly relevant to both the academic and CSOs communities. This study will broadly contribute to the growing scholarship on global environmental and climate change politics, social movements, sustainability governance and pro-poor development. Specifically, it will contribute to the literature on climate justice by following the suggestion of Patrick Bond in his book on *Politics of Climate Justice* (2012) that future research should investigate what gaps exist in CJMs and constituencies, the emerging CJ narratives, and which alliances are effective in moving CJ demands forward. Accordingly, this research fills a significant gap in this field of study by identifying PACJA as a movement that is attempting to move Africa's CJ demands forward and demonstrated a range of capacities and limitations in their CJ advocacy. Also, the geographical focus of this research on the CJMs in SSA, with insights from Kenya and Nigeria, makes a substantial contribution to the almost non-existent literature on CJ and CJM in the region.

Like the more theoretical claims of Bond and Galvin (2018), Claeys and Pugley (2017) and Dany (2014), the empirical data collected and analysed in this research demonstrates that partnerships, strong organisational and institutional frameworks, consistent CJ framing and narratives, and sufficient capacity (technical, financial, human, and socio-political) are necessary preconditions for ensuring the success of the CJM. More specifically, this research supports the findings of Death (2014) that Africa's CJMs, including PACJA lack a unified CJ framing. It also lends credence to Okereke's claim that the weakness in Africa's demand for CJ is due to dependency on the more powerful actors for resources and a need to maintain democratic peace among other interest groups (Okereke, 2018).

However, contrary to the theoretical expectations of scholars like Bond and Galvin (2018) and Kirchherr (2018) that further institutionalising movements would allow for higher

integration, influence and legitimacy, the findings of this research shows that such institutionalisation can aggravate existing structural issues like unequal power (i.e., leadership, access to decision making), exclusion and even further marginalisation of some voices and constituencies. Additionally, it recognises that there are instances where the availability of financial resources, for example the funding for the REDD+ project (see Chapter 5), is considered to have placed limitations on PACJA's effectiveness.

Empirically, this research generated a nuanced understanding into the best practices of the movement i.e., partnerships and collaborations. The study identified collective social justice framings around human rights and issues of access, deployment of strategic CJ mechanisms that target the root causes of climate injustice (i.e., 'supply side policy' – Newell et al, 2020) for example, the advocacy against the construction of the Lamu power plant project in Kenya, and bottom-up processes like the Peoples' Caravan used in COP 17 (held in Durban, South Africa), as enabling conditions where CJ concerns formed the basis of for social mobilisations that cut across regional, class, ethnic and gender divides. In doing so, these actions validated the claims of Newell et al (2020) that adopting collective justice framings would support more proactive and widespread engagement from both the government and the citizens, act to significantly address root causes of CC injustices, and make CJ advocacy more focused and effective. Alternatively, it revealed insights into regional and national-level challenges like the 'hijacking' of the participatory process by some of the more powerful actors involved, limited evidence of knowledge integration, underdeveloped mechanisms/strategies (in terms of CJ framings and narratives, strategies of engagement, etc), poor accountability, etc., all of which limits the opportunities for strengthening and deepening democracy for CJ. In addition, the research focus on SSA has provided important insights into how a highly differentiated region and the myriad of experiences its peoples, can have unique effects on the development and effectiveness of a continent-wide movement.

Overall, this research has significant potential to contribute to policy design that will help redress climate injustices in Africa through the CJM. It has demonstrated the relevance of the CJM as a key actor in the global CC governance and negotiation processes. Moreover, it has identified some of the gaps and tensions facing the movement, and their implications on the CJ agenda. Thus, this research provides fresh insights – both in theory and practice, into the capacities and limitations of CJMs in Africa. Finally, the knowledge gained from this

research can be scaled up by movement actors to advance the CJ debates and improve the effectiveness of CJMs globally, and particularly in collaboration with partners in Africa.

1.5 Structure and sequence of chapters

This thesis is organized into eight (8) chapters as follows:

This chapter (i.e., **Chapter 1**) describes the background to and objectives of this study.

Chapter 2: provides a comprehensive and critical review of the literature on CJMs globally, and more narrowly on Africa. It includes a discussion of the concept of CJ, the emergence and evolution of the CJM and the significant role(s) of the movement in CC governance. The chapter concludes by providing highlights of current theoretical gaps in the literature and directions for future research, several of which this thesis responds to.

Chapter 3: describes the core concepts relevant to the CJ agenda and mass mobilisation. Contemporary, critical social movement and organisational theories were analysed to understand the core 'ingredients' of social mobilisation and effectiveness and to identify and operationalise the assessment of these concepts. The critical social movement theory allowed the research to apply important aspects from framing, political opportunity and resource mobilisation theories as criteria used to examine the movement's effectiveness in line with the research objective listed in Section 1.3 of this chapter. Organisational theory helped in prioritizing and analysing important criteria like the movement's internal organisation and management structure and the implication on its capacity to effect social change. The chapter then concludes with a synopsis of the conceptual framework underpinning this research. Key concepts described in this chapter include institutional and governance strengthening (IGS), public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM), and policy influence (PI).

Chapter 4: describes the methodology employed in this research. It includes a brief overview of the philosophical orientation, research design, methods and ethical considerations employed for data collection. The chapter also describes the methods used for data analysis,

validation of findings and provides a consideration of the limitations encountered in conducting this research.

Chapter 5: presents the findings on PACJA's efforts at institutional and governance strengthening and what factors are inhibiting progress towards this CJ objective. The first part of the chapter analyses and discusses this objective and the activities and/or strategies employed by the Alliance for it. The chapter focuses on three components of IGS which are: 1) PACJA's internal governance, 2) resource mobilisation and 3) institutional learning. Each component was explored in detail consistent with the research findings to critically reflect on the effectiveness of the movement in relation to this CJ objective. Subsequently, the chapter identified and analysed factors including internal conflicts, power imbalances, and limited diversification of sources of funds, i.e., dependency on donor funds, and the implications that these have on the movement's agenda and agility.

Chapter 6: critically analyses and discusses PACJA's efforts and the challenges it faces in engaging, mobilising and organising different actor groups in favor of its CJ agenda. The analysis covers the period between the movement's establishment in 2008 up until December 2019. It examines the following components of PACJA activities: CJ framings and narratives, the public engagement and mobilisation strategies, PAEM activities, and the nature of their participation at CC events for indicators of their effectiveness. Evidence of PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM found in this study include its broad membership and partnerships, wider participation in the CC governance processes in Africa, and globally and the implementation of knowledge and capacity projects/programmes. The chapter highlights several gaps and tensions including the inconsistent CJ framings and narratives, and limited communications and research activities of PACJA. These gaps were found to be closely associated with factors such as unevenness in managing limited financial resources and underdeveloped engagement mechanisms and tactics Accordingly, the chapter argues for a more radical collective action (i.e., social justice) framing and narrative of CJ, focused and targeted media communications, and an increase in purposeful research.

Chapter 7: focuses on exploring PACJA's policy influence in different phases of the policy process (i.e., agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, and revision) and across different scales (i.e., local, national, regional, and international). It analyses

PACJA's access to the relevant policymakers, engagement in the policy processes at different levels, nature of engagement including how they exercise leverage to gain influence in the policy process, and the outcomes of their labours. The chapter argues that although PACJA's engagements with other policymakers suggest possible influence in the policy process, their actual influence is limited by interacting factors such as their limited political power, knowledge-policy integration and poor tracking or accountability mechanisms.

Chapter 8: concludes the thesis by providing a summary on how each of the discussion and analysis chapters, i.e. 4, 5 and 6 have addressed the research questions and how it links to the overall research objectives stated in Section 1.3 above. The chapter discusses the broader significance of this research and the key contributions it has made to the scholarly fields of climate justice movement, CC governance and politics and pro-poor development. Finally, it concludes by providing recommendations for avenues for future research.

1.6 Conclusion

This research began with an interest in exploring why there is a gap in the literature on the CJM in sub-Saharan Africa. Considering the widespread knowledge of the burden of CC impacts on the continent, it remained unclear why SSA and its CJM are lagging behind in terms of research analysis and prominence in the literature on CJ. This led the researcher to develop two hypotheses. One, this was due to the absence of research and scholarly literature on CJ in the region. Two, SSA is yet to build a visible and powerful movement that has the capacity to challenge existing powerful actors and begin to address – or at least shine a spotlight on - the underlying causes of climate injustice. Subsequently, a critical literature review revealed that indeed only very limited research had been conducted on CJMs in SSA. While it also revealed the presence of several CJMs in SSA, there was limited evidence of previous attempts to investigate the capacity and/or progress towards delivering meaningful CJ for the poorest and most vulnerable populations on the continent. This is a gap in the literature which this research intends to address.

To do this, the study will adopt the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) as the movement case for this research. It will examine the capacities of, and progress made by

PACJA to deliver CJ for the continent. This examination will cover three main aspects of the Alliance CJ objectives: institutional and governance strengthening, public engagement and mobilisation and policy influence. It will utilise examples from the movement's activities in two countries i.e., Kenya and Nigeria representing two of the core regions, East and West Africa, in SSA. The analysis will occur at different levels including platform, national, regional, and global, and cover the period between its establishment in 2008 up to December 2019.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Debates on CC have moved beyond analysing and discussing its causes and effects from a purely environmental science perspective and framings like "tipping points", "planetary boundaries" etc., to include ethical, political and development dimensions of the challenge or phenomenon, for example, climate justice (Bulkeley, 2019). This is a result of a growing body of knowledge among scholars that multiple perspectives (not simply scientific ones) and framings are needed to address the inherent, complex interdependencies and difficulties with defining and addressing the CC challenge (O'Neill et al, 2010). Accordingly, scholarly interests and literature on the subject have extended into various social science disciplines like sociology, politics, economics, human geography, and development studies to open up spaces of inquiry into what constitutes CC and proffer possible solutions from social, cultural, ethical and political perspectives.

For example, sociologists and political scientists researching CC have concentrated their efforts into understanding the social causes and impacts, environmentalism, inequality, conflicts, structure and agency, and the potential for mass mobilisation for climate action (Bhatasara, 2015; Zehr, 2015). These scholars have analysed how social entities – i.e., actors and institutions respond to CC with regards to behaviours, cultures, attitudes, and ideology (Bulkeley, 2019) and in line with the dominant approaches and narratives in their respective disciplines. Similarly, scholars of development studies, for example, Doulton and Brown (2009) and Schipper and Pelling (2006) have paid attention to understanding the impacts of CC on global development. Specifically, their works have evaluated the role of key actors, significant events, media, and broader socio-political factors like globalisation, and industrialisation on CC and development.

Geography plays a key role in enhancing our (academic and societal) understanding of CC. To emphasise this point, in her last address as the president of the Royal Geographical Society, Professor Judith Rees pointed out that the importance of geography cannot be ignored in determining the feasibility of CC policies, resource allocations and distributions,

cost of action and/or inaction and perceptions of CC risks and impacts (Rees, 2015). So far, human geographers have been exploring the relationship between CC and issues relating to space, scale, power, and identity through case studies (Bulkeley, 2019; O'Brien and Leichenko, 2019). More specifically, their studies have critically investigated and increased understanding of CC perceptions, risks, and vulnerability; CC and conflicts; actors and/or responses to CC at different levels e.g., individual, institutions, and collective; resources; power and CC governance (Okereke, 2018; Arnall et al, 2014; Geoghegan and Leyson, 2012).

Despite the laudable efforts from these social science disciplines, evidence from the literature suggest that an inter- and transdisciplinary approach to research on CC is needed for better integration and understanding of the different dimensions i.e., political, cultural, social, ethical etc. of the challenge. For example, scholars like Bulkeley (2019) and O'Brien and Leichenko (2019) advocate for more critical engagement with CC by social scientists across different disciplines to provide fresh insights into understanding, defining and also addressing the challenge. They argue that because each discipline has its unique approach to framings and vocabularies, interpretations and perspectives of realities, a purposeful integration of various disciplinary approaches would allow for a deeper analysis and understanding of the CC issue and/or possible solutions. Though difficult to achieve, this multidisciplinary approach to understanding CC has been attempted by scholars including Giuseppe, Hilary and Alex in their book on '*Climate and Culture: Multidisciplinary Perspectives of Knowing, Being and Doing in a Climate Change World*' (Feola et al, 2019).

Following from the above, this research will adopt an inter and multi-disciplinary approach to research design, methods, and analysis that will transcend existing disciplinary boundaries to include aspects from sociology and human geography. Moreover, since the main objective of this study is to investigate the current efforts and progress of the CJM in SSA towards achieving CJ for their poorest and most vulnerable populations, this approach will open up spaces for conducting more critical investigations and analyses in future. Subsequently, this chapter provides a critical review of the CJ and CJM literature. The review includes an expanse of literature from various social science disciplines including human geography, sociology, international development, and politics and philosophy. This is necessary to

adequately situate this research within the broader social science scholarly literature on CJ and allow for deeper analysis and multiple perspectives on the research topic.

The review is organised thematically to ensure that concepts relevant to the research topic and objectives, for example, the issue - CJ, the actor - CJMs, place – sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), and scale – national, regional, and international etc. are clearly highlighted and subjected to critical analysis. It begins with a review of the literature on CC and the underlying elements of justice and injustice. Next, the chapter explores different scholarly views on CJ, the demands, framings, and narratives along with the complexities and controversies in their interpretations. Attention is paid to issues around leadership and responsibility for CC, the burdens of CC impacts and capacities to address the challenge. Then, it presents an overview of the history and evolution of the CJM globally, and then specifically on the movement in Africa. Various perspectives with specific examples on the role of the movement, their significance and challenges from different scholars drawn from the civil society organisations (CSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and Transnational organisations within the CJMs are highlighted and analysed. The chapter concludes by indicating the weaknesses and gaps in the existing literature and establishing the research niche, i.e., of which the thesis is a significant contribution.

2.2 Climate Change and the underlying elements of injustice

Climate change and its injustices were first introduced and discussed in scholarly literature in the early 1990s. Among its early proponents was Henry Shue, a professor of politics and international relations, who wrote extensively on justice in international CC negotiations, for example, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during this decade. Some of his seminal works include "*Subsistence and Luxury Emissions*" in 1993, "*Equity in International Agreements on Climate Change*" in 1994 and "*Environmental Change and the Varieties of Justice*" in 1996. Although these works recognised CC as a human right issue that is affecting livelihoods, generations, natural resources etc., it was his work on "*Global Environmental Change and Inequality*" in 1999 that increased the prominence of equity in CC governance among other social science researchers. According to Shue, equity lies at the heart of the CC challenge. Therefore, efforts to address CC must be

first address global inequality (Shue, 1999). He argues that since CC was the direct result of the industrial activities of the rich, developed countries which would prefer that the poor developing countries avoid taking the same development pathway, it is only fair that any collaboration between them be done on equitable terms with due consideration being accorded to the economic development of the poor countries along with environmental preservation (Shue, 1999).

Subsequently, Shue established that three principles (i.e., the principles of equity) that should be adopted to address the inequality imposed by CC. Firstly, '*the greater the contribution to the problem, the higher the burden of responsibility*'. This means that those who have caused the problem, should bear the cost of addressing it. In this case, since CC has been and continues to be caused by the activities of the developed countries, they should bear the greater burden in terms of climate action. The rationale behind this principle is to reduce or take proper account of the unfair advantage of development and accompanying wealth possessed by the developed countries. The second principle of equity states that '*the greater the ability to pay, the more the contribution to the endeavour'.* Shue justifies this principle by arguing that it be imposed to prevent the poorer, developing countries from becoming worse off because of the unfair additional burden of dealing with CC. In line with this justification, Shue established the third and last principle of equity which states that '*provisions should be made to guarantee an adequate minimum standard of living for all people without jeopardising the capacity of the wealthier populations*' (Shue, 1999). Subsequently, the poorest and most vulnerable populations should not be made to share in the burden of CC unless adequate provisions have been made to elevate them to and/or prevent them from falling below the guaranteed minimum standard of living.

While Shue makes a strong case for equity and justice in addressing the climate crisis, his arguments were founded on normative philosophy or ethics which works well in abstract but may be impossible to achieve in practice given the global distribution of poor and the complexity of human behaviour and subjectivity. Since then, other prominent social scientists researching on CC, for example, Simon Caney, Stephen Gardiner, Catriona McKinnon, Naomi Klein, Uma Kothari, Timmons Robert, Bradley Parks, and Chukwumerije Okereke have seized on Shue's philosophical foundation with supporting and counterarguments to

further inquiry into equity and justice in addressing the climate crises to create a new field of study known as climate justice (CJ).

For example, Caney has conducted extensive research on the inequality engendered by CC from an ethical dimension and using an integrationist approach to investigate CC in conjunction with normative issues like capacity, development, and human rights (Caney, 2014; 2005). Like Shue, Caney approaches climate injustice from the perspective of burden-sharing and harm avoidance i.e., in terms of cause, capacity and effect (Caney, 2005). However, he argues that the discussions on climate inequality have focused unduly on the issue of burden sharing to the detriment of the injustice of climate impacts (i.e., imposing harm) which is of paramount importance in addressing the CC challenge (Caney, 2005). Caney suggests that the perspective of burden sharing for climate equity is incomplete and fraught with many controversies, for instance, who should bear the responsibility for CC – is it the corporations, institutions or individuals, or countries like Shue suggests. Subsequently, Caney establishes that focusing on the injustice of climate impacts and harm avoidance will ensure the adoption of significant climate actions beyond mere mitigation measures, for example, (enforced and enforceable) emissions reduction, to avert further, dangerous CC (Caney, 2014). Stephen Gardiner also investigates CC from an ethical dimension (2004, 2006). Not only does he support the argument that those who have contributed to the problem should shoulder the responsibility of addressing it, but he also argues that the implementation of the core precautionary principles, i.e., harm avoidance would serve to avert the ecological crisis (Gardiner, 2004).

In contrast, Timmons Roberts and Bradley Parks adopt an empirical approach to their research on CC and its role in exacerbating underlying inequalities (2006, 2008 and 2009). Using key examples from developing countries including Honduras, Mozambique, and Tuvalu, they observed that factors like colonial history and the global distribution of socio-economic power increase climate injustice (Parks and Roberts, 2006). This helped to clearly and persuasively situate climate injustice within the broader context of global inequalities and international political economy. Subsequently, they argue that three aspects, i.e., identifying which countries are primarily responsible for CC and inequalities (responsibility), which will suffer the most impacts (vulnerability), and which will bear the largest cost of addressing the challenge (mitigation), are key to overcoming the injustices of CC (Parks and Roberts, 2006).

In a significant turn in scholarship, Chukwumerije Okereke investigates climate injustice in the international governance regime and provides unique perspectives on global north-south equity in terms of distributive and procedural justice. That is, how the benefits and burdens of CC should be distributed between the Global north and south, along with deficits and opportunities for greater democracy and participation in international CC negotiations and processes (Okereke, 2011). For example, he observes that the central challenge to addressing CC and its multiple inequalities is the failure of the relevant regimes, i.e., the United Nations to move beyond abstraction and provide practical solutions on how the benefits and burdens of CC should be distributed between the Global north and south (Okereke, 2011; 2010). More so, since the prospective benefits and burdens are now extensively mapped in the literature, particularly those published regularly by the IPCC and discussed in the academic spheres, the multi-lateral negotiations like the UNFCCC COPs and the worlds of NGOs and CBOs and the private sector.

In the next section, this review explores the main complexities and controversies around climate justice at the level of the international governance regime. Attention is paid to the issue of leadership in addressing and averting dangerous CC.

2.3 Climate justice as a contested concept

Generally, global literature on CJ has focused on developing different accounts or narratives of climate injustices and concepts of justice including responsibility, vulnerability, and capability for CJ (Bulkeley, 2019; Okereke, 2018; Shue,1999). Whereas this growing literature has raised or attempted to address three fundamental justice questions including: who is responsible for causing CC, who is most affected by the impacts of CC and who should bear the responsibility for climate action, they have remained subjects of significant controversies in the international CC negotiation processes and national level political developments. The most significant of these controversies have been on the issue of the distribution of the costs of CC (Gardiner, 2004). So much so that it has stirred disagreements between the high- and low-income countries and stalled significant global climate action (Heede, 2014). These contestations are explored in more detail below.

2.3.1 ***Who is responsible for causing CC?***

The origins of CC have long been attributed to the nineteenth century industrialisation which saw the emergence of coal powered engines that resulted in increased emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), including carbon dioxide, water vapour and methane into the atmosphere (IPCC, 2007). These GHGs when present in significant quantities are the main cause of the warming atmosphere and lead to other sequences of events, for example, sea level rise, collectively known as CC. The link between CC and industrialisation has been further established by the increasing availability of climatic and scientific evidence on the burning of fossil fuel to power economic growth (IPCC 2014, Stern, 2006). Accordingly, CJ scholars including Shue (1999), Parks and Roberts (2008) and Gardiner (2004) have long attributed the responsibility for CC to the industrialised (or HICs) like the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Russia who have achieved development by, among other things, burning fossil fuels. However, this position has been met with several contestations from them.

Firstly, they have rejected responsibility for causing CC on the basis that they were unaware of the effects of their industrialisation activities on both humans and the environment (Heede 2014; Singer 2004; Jamieson 2010). Secondly, they argue that responsibility for CC should be assigned at the level of business and individuals as opposed to countries since most of the GHGs emissions can be traced to energy producing entities and the lifestyle choices of wealthy individuals (Heede, 2014, Broome, 2012). Thirdly, they claim that the present-day CC is due to the emission of the past generations and cannot be laid at the door of present-day citizens of these countries (Caney, 2005). And lastly, countries like the United States argue that the responsibility for CC should also be assigned to countries like China who although cannot be charged with historical emissions are now a major player and polluter of GHGs.

In response, strident voices from the LICs have countered each of the arguments raised by the HICs. They maintain that scientific evidence of CC has been available dating as far back as over three decades ago and as such HICs cannot claim to be ignorant of the impacts of their activities (Singer, 2004). Also, scholars argue that assigning CC responsibility to countries held more prospects since it is the countries rather than entities and individuals that are

recognised as parties to international laws and agreements (Shue, 1999). On the issue of the time lag effect of CC and assigning responsibility to the present generation in developed countries, Caney (2005) aptly summarises the response from different scholars including Shue (1999) and Neumayer (2000) by stating that since this generation is reaping the benefits of the industrial activities of the past generation, it is therefore complicit. And lastly, the argument of punishing current emitter like China is ultimately flawed since HICs have reached an economic cul-de-sac (economic stagnation) and also an environmental one (biodiversity crashes, and CC-induced disasters like the annual wildfires in California). These contestations over which actor(s) is responsible for CC are stalling global progress in determining how to overcome this challenge. More so since scholars of climate ethics demand that those who are responsible for CC should shoulder the burdens (direct and opportunity costs) of finding solutions to the problem (Roser and Seidel, 2017; Parks and Robert, 2008 and Caney, 2005).

2.3.2 Who is most affected by the impacts of CC?

Another significant justice issue in the global literature on CJ is on who is firstly and mostly affected by the detrimental impacts of CC. Many researchers on CC have predicted that poorer populations in the LICs will bear the brunt of CC (Adger, 2013; Goodman, 2009; IPCC, 2007). For example, in 2007, the intergovernmental panel on CC (IPCC) stated that poor populations in LICs across Africa, Asia and Latin America are already suffering the impacts of CC. They reported that these populations were recording significant deaths and loss of livelihoods due to CC related events like flooding, droughts and wildfires. Likewise, developing countries, particularly those in Africa, have been classified as being extremely vulnerable to CC (Maplecroft, 2013).

In the same vein, in 2015, the University of Notre Dame highlighted in their Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN) of 181 UN-recognised countries' vulnerability to and readiness for climate disruption that LICs were more vulnerable to CC. The report listed countries in Africa including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic, Eritrea, Chad, and Somalia as the 5 most vulnerable countries to CC (Chen et al, 2015). This is because their high dependence on the environment (natural resources) for different

ecosystem services including food and (ecosystem) regulatory purposes increases the climate vulnerability of these populations (Rockström et al, 2009).

To illustrate, Abate (2010) observed that CC has already altered the physical climatic elements like rainfall patterns, biodiversity and carbon cycle with devastating consequences for agriculture, which is the economic mainstay of SSA. As a result, the region is experiencing food insecurity, water scarcity, increases in resource conflicts, higher mortality, and population migration, all of which threaten their economic and social 'progress'. Additionally, their vulnerability to CC increases with stressors such as poverty, underdevelopment, limited technical knowledge and capacity embedded in other socio-ecological factors, for example, weak governance, inequality, and geographical sensitivity to severe and unpredictable shifts in climate. Without timely and adequate intervention, CC would aggravate current socio-economic challenges and threaten Africa's progress towards sustainable development (Okereke and Coventry 2016; Baptise and Rhiney 2016; Barrett 2013).

Consequently, scholars like Parks and Roberts (2008) and Douglas *et al* (2008) argue against the injustice of uneven climate impacts. They observe that despite having contributed the least to CC, LICs including most of SSA remain the unfortunate victims and are most at risks from CC. Thus, the continuation of this situation defies a fundamental principle of justice i.e., harm avoidance. Accordingly, they argue that these populations must not be compelled to share equal responsibility to address CC which they have not created in the first place but are already suffering from the impacts (Parks and Roberts, 2008; Douglas et al, 2008). Rather, they propose that they should be compensated for the "ecologically unequal exchange" and "ecological debt" that is owed to them (Roberts and Parks, 2009).

However, this position has been challenged by others who claim that the issue of vulnerability and impact is irrelevant to addressing CC due to its complex and ubiquitous nature (Caney, 2005). Also, there is the counter argument that vulnerability to CC is mostly felt at the individual level and is mostly dependent on socio-economic status. This means that even within wealthy developed countries, the low-income households would still be vulnerable to the impacts of CC (Puaschunder, 2020). Hence, it is inadequate to assign CC vulnerability at the country level as plans to enhance resilience and address climate impacts

will fail to include the poorer populations in the HIC countries (Gardiner, 2010). Such views should not be allowed to detract from the CC-induced misery unleased in LICs. Considering that the idea of the injustice of climate impacts has both influenced and shaped global discussions and negotiations on CJ with notable scholars like Okereke who has previously acted as an advisor to the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) at the UNFCCC COPs. For the developing countries, it has accorded them strong moral leverage to demand accountability from their developed counterparts in the negotiation process. In contrast, because the developed countries are not yet experiencing the brunt of CC, they are still perceived to be stalling progress towards urgent, ambitious, and equitable climate action (Goodman, 2009). This caused the third fundamental question of justice, who should bear the responsibility (cost) of CC, to be raised and addressed by scholars in the CJ field (Gardiner, 2010; Goodman, 2009).

2.3.3 Who should bear the responsibility (cost) for mitigating CC?

Many CJ scholars including Moss (2018), Jamieson (2010) and Shue (1999) agree that based on global principles of justice, for example, the “polluter pays principle”, those responsible for causing CC should take the first and most significant actions including bearing the financial cost to address the problem. Subsequently, they argue that the wealthier developed countries like the US, UK and most part of Europe which attained this status through industrialisation (see Section 2.2.1) should bear the burden and cost of addressing CC which is a notable externality of the industrial activities of their corporations and factories. Also, this will reduce the burden on the LICs who are already struggling with the impacts of CC and other socio-economic challenges and allow them to build their adaptive capacity without jeopardising their opportunity to overcome poverty and vulnerability along the lines of the SDGs. While this proposition has moved centre-stage in the literature and discussions on global CC governance, the actual process of distributing the burdens and costs of CC has met with several controversies and practical implications.

For instance, in 1997, parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) signed the Kyoto Protocol to foster justice and cooperation in a global effort to reduce GHGs emissions and avert dangerous human induced CC. The Protocol

which recognised the historical responsibility for CC, differing socio-economic capacities and a shared responsibility to address CC, placed a higher binding target on the developed countries i.e., so-called "Annex I countries" to reduce their emissions more quickly and significantly (Bortscheller, 2010; Gardiner, 2010; Parks and Roberts, 2008). However, developed countries like Canada and the United States (US) soon rejected this protocol on the grounds that it was "both backward looking" and "impractical" (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Heede, 2014. Brunnee and Streck, 2013). They argued that the protocol was backward looking since the dominant emitters of GHGs in the past are not the same ones in the present day. Accordingly, they highlighted the inadequacy of (only) using historical emissions as a criterion to assign the costs for addressing CC as it overlooks and accords no binding commitments to the dominant emitter of GHGs today, that is, China.

On the issue of assigning the costs of CC based on differing responsibilities, the developed countries again vetoed this criterion by arguing that such differentiation constitutes a hindrance to them (a taxation by another name) and offers undue economic advantage to developing countries. They claimed that because of the strong links between industrialisation, CC, and economic growth, restricting the amount of GHGs they can emit and placing the financial burden of CC adaptation in the developing countries on them will have negative impacts on their economic growth (Heede, 2014; Rajamani, 2000; Stern, 2006). In addition, they claim that shouldering the cost of addressing CC, including technology transfer to the developing countries, would make these developing countries dependent on and feel entitled to their resources (Rajamani, 2000).

In response, many CJ scholars including Neumayer (2000), Rajamani (2000) and Agarwal *et al* (2002) made compelling arguments against dismissing historical emissions as a criterion for apportioning responsibility to address CC in the interest of the disadvantaged, poorer developing countries, and the future generations. They argue that if the amount of GHGs to be emitted is assigned a limit and distributed evenly among all countries, it will be clear that the developed countries would have already emitted their share of the cumulative emissions. Therefore, it is only fair for the developed countries to allow the developing countries some flexibility in terms of emissions reduction to reach their own limits (Shue, 1999).

On the criterion of differing responsibilities under the UNFCCC principle of *Common but Differentiated Responsibilities* (CBDR), CJ scholars argued that it was necessary to allow fairness and balance in commitments towards addressing CC (Roberts and Parks, 2009; Shue, 1999). This is because developing countries who have emitted lesser amounts of GHGs into the atmosphere are already being adversely affected by the impacts of CC. Subsequently, they are both saddled with the burden of adapting to the impacts of CC and balancing their need to achieve socio-economic growth and development in a sustainable manner (Okereke, 2010).

As each group (i.e., developed and developing countries) seek to protect their individual interests and needs, the rationale behind the principle of CBDR declines. On the one hand, the wealthier and more powerful developed countries are still stalling, unwilling to fulfil their responsibility of bearing the cost of the mitigation and adaptation efforts, particularly in the developing countries. The developing countries, on the other hand, have continued to reject more obligations to mitigate CC, based on their need for development and a growing mistrust for the developed countries (Okereke, 2010). Subsequently, these positions are reflected in the global agreements on CC that have been negotiated and implemented. While the more powerful countries like the United States favour more actions that involves mitigation, for example, the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) etc., proponents from Nigeria and Kenya argue that significant climate actions from these populations should be more concerned with actions that involves building their resilience and capacities to adapt to cope with the impacts of CC (Okereke, 2010; Goodman, 2009; Singer, 2004).

The limited convergence on climate responsibilities have resulted in stalling significant climate action as commitments and targets fall well below and behind the amounts required to avert dangerous ('catastrophic') climate change (Brunnee and Streck 2013; Goodman, 2009). While the Kyoto Protocol and the principle of CBDRRC have played a significant role in creating an equitable process to address CC at the international regime by recognising that the developed countries should bear the cost of CC and the developing countries are most vulnerable groups, it has failed to deliver climate justice for the latter group due to the "distributional contestations" (Okereke and Coventry, 2016; Brunnee and Streck, 2013). This according to Abate (2010) and Pettit (2004), is an infringement on the human rights of the

vulnerable groups in developing countries i.e., is a clear example of climate (in)justice. Therefore, it is imperative that global efforts to address CC be conducted in an urgent, equitable and practical manner – at a number of scales and levels simultaneously - to deliver CJ.

The 2015 landmark Paris Agreement is the most significant global effort to deliver urgent and just solutions to CC in recent times. According to the agreement, countries make voluntary pledges towards (i.e., nationally determined contributions - NDCs) climate action and emissions reduction which will be reviewed periodically. While this strategy of "voluntary pledge" appears to have overcome the crippling challenge of distributing the costs of CC between the developed and developing countries, scholars like Falkner (2016) and Okereke and Coventry (2016) are wary that its success is dependent on how climate actors, particularly those in developing countries can mobilise international and domestic pressure to support its implementation. More so, since elements of the Paris Agreement, for example, "naming and shaming", essentially relies on the third sector i.e., the NGOs and civil society organisations to scrutinise government efforts and pressure them into action in line with their NDCs (Falkner, 2016).

Remarkably, this is not the first time that scholars are assigning the agency for achieving CJ to non-state actors. In 2004, Pettit stated that the CJMs, though still in its infancy, has the potential to influence the scope and boundaries of CC policy debates as well as change the dynamics of global CC politics. Five years later, Goodman also argued that "social movements" are best suited to generate new ideas and possibility for CJ. He explained that the nature and urgency of the CC problem is such that it requires cataclysmic changes to society. Since social movements, for example, the anti-colonial movement, has in past defeated powerful structural forces on a global scale, they are on 'the right side of history' (Goodman, 2009).

The jury is still out on whether these non-state actors have the power and capacity to carry out this important assignment. Particularly in developing countries where many of them face several challenges including limited funds, run the risk of government repression due to weak democracy and other socio-economic issues. Subsequently, Falkner (2016) and Quinn-Thibodeau and Wu (2016) advocate for providing a 'safe operating space' for the non-state

actors if the Paris Agreement is to succeed in its goal of driving global cooperation to avert dangerous CC for the poorest and most vulnerable populations. The next section provides a brief review of these non-state actors in CC governance. This includes a description of the history and evolution of the climate movement and climate justice movement globally, and then specifically in Africa. It also examines various scholarly and critical perspectives of the CJM including its roles, significance, and challenges.

2.4 The Emergence and Evolution of the Climate Justice Movement

2.4.1 The Emergence of the Climate Justice Movement

Perspectives on the origin and history of the climate justice movement (CJM) can be broadly classified into two: the environmental justice movement (EJM) and the global justice movement, either topically or geographically. Several scholars including Quinn-Thibodeau and Wu (2016), Schlosberg and Collins (2014) and Tokar (2013) have argued that the CJM has its roots in the broader EJM. For example, Schlosberg and Collins (2014) believe that the CJM originated from the 1982 protest of the illegal disposal of polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) in a poor African American community in Warren County, North Carolina, United States. They argued that this event, which saw environmentalists, civil right activists and black political leaders collaborating with the affected communities to protest against the distribution of environmental harms in minority communities, spurred the onset of an EJM. This resulted in an increase in scholarly interest in understanding the links between race, poverty, and vulnerability to environmental harms (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014). As the knowledge of these linkages become widespread, the EJM began to extend beyond merely resisting the environmental harms to include demands for equity and social justice (Agyeman and Evans, 2004; Warriner et al, 2001). This resulted into the entry of new actors like the indigenous land rights movements and other social and economic groups into the broad movement. Soon, the demands of EJMs expanded to include concerns on CC, instances of environmental racism, and issues of procedural justice i.e., climate justice issues (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014).

Similarly, Tokar (2013) linked the origin of the CJM to the EJM. According to him, the concept of CJ was first introduced into mainstream media in a 1999 report titled "*Greenhouse Gangsters vs. Climate Justice*" written by the Corporate Watch group in the United States. He observed that this report, which exposed the role of Oil/fossil fuel sector Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in facilitating CC and stalling climate action and highlighted several conceptualisations of CJ, was authored by active participants in the US EJM, which began in the 1980s. Following this report, Tokar noted that in 2002, environmental NGOs and movements including the Friends of the Earth International and World Rainforest Movements joined Corpwatch and others to develop the Bali principles of climate justice. Since then, representatives from the EJM and other social movement groups like the indigenous peoples' organisations have converged under the banner of a "climate justice framework" to demand CJ for communities across the global that are, or feel themselves to be, disproportionately affected by CC (Tokar, 2013).

Alternatively, other scholars, particularly those from Europe argue that the CJM has emerged from and built upon the more recent and wider global justice and anti-capitalist movement of the late 1990s and early 2000s (Russell, 2015; Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Goodman, 2009). Having observed that traditional environmental framings and narratives abouts CC, for example, the melting of sea ice and ice-caps, increased droughts, loss of biodiversity, health related issues, land loss to rising sea levels etc. and that the proposed solutions including carbon markets, held little hope of addressing the complexities and inequalities of CC, advocates began to unite, for example, under the banner of the European Climate Justice Action Network (CJA) to discuss the underlying inequalities of CC and demand for CJ. This included rejecting neoliberal markets and recognising justice issues such as the exclusion of a global majority from decision making and an undermining of capabilities. And in doing so, they have clearly demonstrated that the fight for climate justice is a fight for social justice (Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010).

Despite the above conflicts, these scholars agree that the CJM is the uniting of diverse ideologies from the EJ, anti-capitalist, global justice, indigenous peoples', and land-based movements to address climate inequalities, market failures and power imbalances (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014; Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Goodman, 2009). For

instance, much of the discourses and tactics of the CJM were adopted from the EJM. However, the CJM has extended beyond using environmental framing to include social dimensions of the injustices such as inclusion and self-sovereignty (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014; Goodman, 2009 and Dorsey, 2007). Also, while the CJM is like the anti-capitalist movement in its rejection of the use of elite-friendly market-based solutions to address CC, they differ in the sense that the former demands for the repayment of "ecological debt" to the unfortunate victims of CC (Dorsey, 2007). Again, the CJM supports the ideology of the land based and indigenous peoples' movements that CC is a looming disaster because of unsustainable production and consumption patterns.

2.4.2 The Evolution of the Climate Justice Movement

Since its emergence, the climate justice movement (CJM), which is a network of transnational CSOs, NGOs, grassroot organisations and individuals uniting and advocating for urgent and equitable solutions to CC, has been constantly evolving, particularly around significant conferences and events, for example, the Kyoto Protocol of 1997, the 2002 United Nations World Summit on Sustainable Development in Bali and the 2004 Durban Climate Justice Summit. The withdrawal of Canada and the refusal of the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 2001 spurred the first significant international movement for CJ (Tokar, 2013). By 2002, the movement gained momentum and entered the international scene as the International Climate Justice Network (Schlossberg and Collins, 2014). Climate justice activists organised under this umbrella at the sidelines of the Bali Summit to develop and articulate the 27 principles of CJ (Tokar, 2013; Aygeman and Evans, 2004). The principles, which were adapted from the EJ principles, prioritised ecological debt and stronger participation of the victims of CC in the negotiations at the multilateral level. By 2004, the movement's demand had evolved to include the rejection of emissions trading as a viable solution to CC (Tokar, 2013; Dorsey, 2007). Subsequently, representatives of the movement at the Durban summit in South Africa articulated this demand and produced "The Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading" (Bond, 2012).

The production of this document marked a significant turning point for the CJM. It served as a foundational document which underpinned the formation of organised networks or

movements for climate justice, for example, the Climate Justice Now! (CJN) which was formed at the thirteenth session of the UNFCCC Conference of Parties (COP 13) in Bali, Indonesia in 2007 (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018). The CJN network was a fusion of radical, grassroots environmental and global justice and justice groups seeking to draw attention to the underlying injustices of CC (Bond, 2011). Also, the Durban Declaration on Carbon Trading supported a shift from climate strategies that support commodifying CC to those that focused on addressing the underlying roots causes like drastically reducing the consumption of fossil fuels (Bond and Dorsey, 2010).

Since then, the CJM has proliferated and gained center stage at international CC events to include other groups like the Climate Justice Action Network, Klimaforum, Climate Justice Alliance and the Indigenous Peoples' groups in Copenhagen in 2009 and at the World's People's Movement for Climate Change and Rights of Mother Earth in Cochabamba, Bolivia. By December 2010, more environmental groups like 350.org, Greenpeace and Grassroots Global Justice and Movement Generation and peasant groups like *La Via Campesina* also endorsed and joined the CJM during the UNFCCC COP 16 in Cancun, Mexico (Bond, 2011).

The CJM, which until now has mostly been funded by NGOs in HICs, has continued to enjoy rapid expansion and proliferation across the globe. More organisations and groups have joined and are still joining the global CJM through informal networks and/or partnerships around the annual UNFCCC events where they share information, perspectives, and strategies to advance the CJ agenda (Tokar, 2013). The implication of this rapid and constant expansion of the CJM is an increase in the diversity of perspectives on CJ and its demands, given that different actors hold diverging views and constructs of the phenomenon. This ranges from global to local outlook and constructs, and demands such as emissions reductions, repayment of climate debt, decommissioning the carbon markets, strategies to end supply-side 'pipelines' (i.e., fossil fuels) and so on. The differences that have emerged were mostly due to divides along geographical or ideological lines which have often presented challenges for the movement (Bond, 2011). The next section will offer a critical review of some of the different perspectives and divergent CJ demands within the movement. It will examine the tensions present in the different CJ conceptualisations and demands and highlight some of the current efforts to overcome this challenge.

2.5 Common Articulations of CJ Demands and their implications for the Climate Justice Movement (CJM)

The primary objective of the CJMs is to create mass political mobilisations to demand climate justice for the populations that are and will be disproportionately impacted by CC despite being least responsible for it (Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Roberts and Parks, 2009). However, several scholars including Newell *et al* (2020) have observed that while the CJMs have mostly been successful in conceptualising the various dimensions of climate injustices, they still struggle to articulate their CJ demands in ways that truly capture the sources, effects, and solutions to CC in a just and practical way. They indicate that this failure of the CJM to clearly articulate its CJ demands may be due to several reasons including the ubiquitous nature of the challenge, the asymmetry in impacts, differing ideological orientations and multifaceted perspectives due to the diversity of actors in the movement and the use of weak and underdeveloped mechanisms. This has resulted in an array of CJ demands, some of which appear to be inconsistent and in conflict with the movements' primary objective (Bond and Dorsey, 2010). These inconsistencies and conflicts in CJ demands are most noticeable along structural, institutional, and ideological divides. Yet, without clear and practicable CJ demands, current efforts of the CJM will remain futile to the detriment of many, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA (Newell et al, 2020).

Until now, common articulations of CJ within the movement range from the global outlook such as emissions reduction, repayment of climate debt, decommissioning of the carbon market and voluntary pledges around the UNFCCC negotiations, to national and grassroots conceptualisations like the implementation of laws and regulations, innovations and 'just transitions and campaigns which target the supply side, for example, mining of fossil fuels. At the global level, CC is articulated as a phenomenon that requires joint and coordinated efforts to address. Accordingly, the mainstream global CC process, for example, the UNFCCC COP negotiations conceptualise CJ using global principles of justice such as polluters pay principle (PPP), beneficiary pays principles (BPP), harm avoidance and the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capacities (CBDRRC). Subsequently, global CJMs and transnational organisations use this approach to

articulate their CJ demands. These include (1) significant GHG emissions cuts by the developed countries by 2020, (2) payment of ecological debts owed by the developed countries to the developing countries, (3) decommissioning of the carbon market, (4) significant investment in the renewable energy and technology to aid transition to a zero-carbon economy and (5) procedural justice for vulnerable groups at CC negotiations (Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Roberts and Parks, 2009; Hornborg and Martinez-Alier, 2013).

While the above conceptualisations and CJ demands have been successful in highlighting the core issues of climate injustices, stirring a feeling of unity, and inspiring collective action which is a key prerequisite for movement building (Biermann and Kalfagianni, 2020; Roberts and Pelling, 2019), the processes of contextualizing them have been fraught with several complexities and ideologies that are controversial to movement building (Bond and Dorsey, 2010). Examples of these controversies include GHG emissions budget sharing, South-North justice, the right to development and the use of carbon market, for example, REDD (a detailed examination of these issues is provided in Section 2.3 of this chapter). These coupled with the uneven balance of power between the global North and South, the top-down approach of global CJ demands, and the rise of the neoliberals and capitalists within the CJM (Bond and Dorsey, 2010) present difficulties for arriving at common set of ideologies, narratives, strategies, and tactics, all of which are necessary for mass mobilisation and movement building. Therefore, adopting global conceptualisations of CJ is insufficient for the movements' objective as it can create a counterproductive outcome which reinforces the burden of addressing and articulating opposition to CC on the poorer and more vulnerable populations in developing countries that it seeks to address.

To illustrate further, Schlosberg and Collins (2014), Baer (2011) and Bond and Dorsey (2010) observed that the CJ demands of global or transnational movements, particularly those from the developed countries across America, Europe, and Australia centres on CC mitigation via GHG emissions reduction and the use of market strategies like CDM and REDD. However, the conceptualisation of CJ demands differs slightly at the national and sub-national levels. For instance, while grassroots environmental and social justice movements in the poor and vulnerable communities in developing countries like the Philippines, Bolivia and Fiji Islands recognise these demands as valid, their demands are mostly focused on social issues like resources mobilisation for adaptation, decommissioning

of the carbon market to allow for self-sovereignty, place and land-based rights, political liberation, and rights to development (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016). This is because they explicitly articulate CJ as the rejection of failed government policies and failed market-based solutions to address the negative impacts of CC and advocating for the rights of the poor and marginalised groups (Bond, 2014).

Again, the CJ demands of grassroots movements across sub-Saharan Africa takes a slightly different turn. Here, there is a deeper critique and focus on ecological exploitation, food sovereignty and issues of gender equity (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014; Bond, 2011). As a result, these localised movements tend to focus their CJ demands on specific issues, actors, and communities. For example, the Ogoni peoples' protest to stop Shell's fossil fuel mining activities in the Niger Delta region in Nigeria. These localised articulations of CJ have significant potential to highlight the injustice and urgency of addressing the problem, and frequently offer practical and easier solutions to the problem (Benford, 2005 cited in Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018; Bond and Dorsey, 2010). However, the limitations of this approach for the CJM are that it creates spatial boundaries and moral distances which can serve to hinder mass social mobilisation in support of the agenda (McDonald et al, 2015). The Ogoni struggles against Shell are left to the Ogoni themselves. This is because those who are far away or shielded from the impacts and injustices of CC can afford to delay urgent climate (Goodman, 2009). Also, the narrow focus on single targets and issues allows for only limited integration with the broader CJ demands at the international scale (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016). The implication of this is that it further excludes the already marginalised groups within the broader movement space (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018).

The different perspectives of CJ demands are also due to the differences in the scale of negotiations, socio-economic capacity, and vulnerability to the impacts of CC of these actor groups. As a result, issues of social justices though present, are often downplayed in the global articulation of CJ demands (Bond, 2011). If this movement is to transcend interests and grip of the global elite in the CC negotiations, and mobilise political will for urgent climate action in a just, unifying, and practical manner, a critical first step for them would be to renegotiate their shared CJ demands to reflect the underlying injustices at different scales.

To do this, Newell et al (2020) suggests articulating CJ as the disruption of political relations and shifting decision-making processes which support and reproduce climate injustices. Subsequently, global movements' CJ demands must centre around improving participation by all constituencies in the CC negotiations and governance processes, accessing climate finance to enhance their economic power, building resilience, and implementing effective policies to mitigate current climate injustices and avoid future harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations. This will ensure that climate actions do not further impoverish and marginalise the poor but rather serves to improve their conditions, prioritise their needs and recognise them as legitimate partners in the CC governance processes (Kashwan et al, 2020).

2.6 Actors in the Climate Justice Movement

The global CJM include a wide range of actors such as transnational advocacy networks (TAN), major environmental NGOs, CSO, Faith-based alliances, and grassroot organisations. These organisations (or actors) work in partnership with CJ advocates, national government, grassroots communities etc. to elevate the profiles of climate victims and united them with other more powerful actors in the CC governance space to drive the CJ agenda (Bortscheller, 2010). Examples include organisations like CAN International, 350.org and *La Via Campesina*, that all partner with grassroots communities.

Climate Action Network (CAN International) is the first, largest and perhaps best-known climate-focused global civil society in the CJM (Bond and Dorsey, 2010). The network originated from the global North in 1989 with nodes in the US and Europe. CAN International began joint organising around the United Nations' Climate Conference in the early 1990s (Duwe, 2001). Since then, the network has gained prominence and recognition for its significant role in organising and sustaining a global climate movement. Today, CAN is home to over 1,500 organisations from across 130 countries globally. Members of the network share common values and interests in promoting environmental justice, sustainable development and addressing CC, and are guided by a set of rules or terms of engagement (Rietig, 2016; Duwe, 2001). The network is decentralised and organised into several working groups including Adaptation; Mitigation; Loss and Damage etc.; and into regional nodes to explore its strength and enable effective coordination and formalisation of its large

membership (Rietig, 2016). Its main coordination tools include an electronic mailing system, newsletters and infrequent face-to-face meetings at its own events and other international CC gatherings.

CAN International is targeted at promoting individual and governmental actions on CC via information exchange and coordinated advocacy activities especially at the UNFCCC COP negotiations. Their activities include lobbying of delegates, criticising government decisions, actions, and inactions to either change their negotiating positions or increase ambitions and suggesting recommendations for climate action (Rietig, 2016). Common strategies adopted by the network include media campaigns, regular news updates via its newsletters ECO and VOICE, websites, press briefings, and symbolic tactics like the “Fossil of the Day” award.

CAN International has shown pioneering leadership in organising the global CJM and more specifically for its role in influencing the Kyoto Protocol. Also, the network remains the only global NGO that enjoys unrestricted access to the UN facilities and the UNFCCC negotiations (CAN-International, 2014). However, like any network, it has also encountered several setbacks, such as conflicting demands, strategies, distribution of funds etc. in driving the CJ agenda due to the diversity of organisational membership in terms of scope, size, and regional representation. The most noticeable challenge which CAN has had to survive over the years was the fallout of some major environmental groups like FOEI from CAN in Copenhagen due to the network’s support for carbon trading (see CAN-International, 2014 and Holz, 2012 for detailed accounts of this issue).

Another prominent actor within the global CJM is 350.org. This alliance or network was founded in 2007 in the United States by American activist, Bill McKibben (Gunningham, 2018). Its membership largely comprises of students and youths working collaboratively to inspire for urgent climate action. Unlike CAN-International which although actively engage in CJ does not lay claim to it as one of its core activities, 350.org takes CJ to be its foundational philosophy for mass mobilisation for collective climate action. The networks’ core strategy includes linking climate activists with other actors i.e., academia, grassroots organisations, and affected communities, globally to exert pressure on governments and transnational corporations to divest from fossil fuels mining and consumption. It is known to be in the forefront of using online tools to promote and coordinate campaigns, grassroots

organising and mass mobilisations for climate actions. For example, in 2009, 350.org organised and coordinated a global online event, titled the "International Day of Climate Action". The event which saw over 400,000 take to the streets and over 2,000 non-violent direct actions organized globally was deemed successful by international media like CNN as it raised global awareness of the impacts of CC and the dangers of the current climate inaction (Jacobs, 2016). Other notable actor organisations within the CJM include FOEI, Third World Network, Extinction Rebellion, Indigenous Peoples' Network and Peasant organisations like *La Via Campesina*.

So much for the descriptive retelling of the unfolding CJM story, to engage more critically with the movement it is worth noting firstly that overall, many of the significant actors in the global CJM seem to have originated from the global North and then diffused into the global South in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. This is perhaps due to the dominant presence of actors from these global North at the international CC negotiations. Yet, Saraswat and Kumar (2016) argue, for the CJM to achieve its agenda of protecting the interests of the most vulnerable populations from impending harms, actors from the global South who are mostly at the forefront of the negative impacts of CC must take the reins to ensure that their demands are prioritised in the final goals of the movement. In response to this, there are now several CJ actors who, although originating from the global South, have gained international visibility and legitimacy at the international scene, at least as reflected in the academic and popular literature. These actors who are mostly working at the local scale are using their engagements and/or collaborations with other actors from the global North in the broader movement to push their agenda and gain international visibility. Examples include Asia's Third World Network, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

Despite the presence and grassroots efforts of CJ actors from across Africa in driving the CJ agenda for the CJM, scholars including de Waal et al (2015), Bond (2012) and Okereke, 2010) suggest that this group of actors is lagging in its visibility and influence at the international scene. They argue that the absence or limited visibility of this group at the international scene is particularly worrisome given that they often represent (or claim to represent) the poorest and most vulnerable populations who are in the forefront of the detrimental impacts of CC. It was this conspicuous absence of a predominant African CJ civil

society on the international climate scene, that led to the establishment of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA).

The Pan African Climate Justice Alliance

PACJA is an Alliance of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), Faith-based Organisation (FBOs), Community-based Organisations (CBOs), Farmer, Trust, Foundations and Pastoralist Groups from diverse regions across Africa. The Alliance was formally constituted in June 2008 following a workshop organised by Oxfam International and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for African CSOs and NGOs at the sidelines of 12th African Ministerial Conference on the Environment in Johannesburg, South Africa, and subsequent meetings. A unique feature of this Organisation is not only the apt inclusion of climate justice in its name but it's clear declaration of CJ as central to its overall agenda. That is, its core mandate of promoting Africa's interest from a position of equity and fairness with regards to development and equity solutions in international CC conferences and related process.

Since its establishment, PACJA has gained international visibility and recognition among key climate actors both regionally and globally (Mwenda and Beer, 2016). Today, the Alliance boasts of a broad membership, listing more than 1000 organisations and networks from across 45 countries on the continent. Core strategies adopted by PACJA include advocacy, capacity building, formation of strategic alliances and partnerships etc. The Alliance enjoys partnerships with key climate actors from other parts of the Global South (i.e., South America) and the Global North (i.e., Europe, North America etc.). Its presence as a unified African CJM is a laudable step towards ensuring procedural justice[1] and enhancing the presence and (ostensibly) common interests of African countries in the global CC governance processes (Kaup and Casey, 2016).

[1] Procedural justice – The perceived fairness of the procedure used to arrive at outcomes (Naumann and Bennett, 2000).

The next sections of this chapter will critically examine literature on the role and significance of the CJMs, their successes and challenges. Following that, it will highlight and discuss current theoretical issues around the CJM, and specifically on the movement in SSA. By so doing, it seeks to demonstrate the links and relevance to this study to the broader movement and field of study, i.e., climate justice (CJ).

2.7 The role and significance of the climate justice movements (CJMs)

As already noted, the CJMs are increasingly recognised as important actors in the CC governance processes (Roger et al, 2017). These actors take on different roles in the CC governance processes including acting as a platform to mobilise a wide variety of individual actors and give international visibility to issues of climate injustice and the communities at the grassroots, providing information for deliberation, exchange and dialogue, shaping the nature and terms of CC debates and negotiation i.e., influencing policies and outcomes and monitoring implementation and compliance with international CC agreements (Roger *et al* 2017; Bulkeley et al, 2012; Yanacopulos 2005; Kecks and Sikkink 1998). In addition, their ongoing expansion, transnational outlook, and interconnectivity of environmental and social justice issues, appears to grant them both access and legitimacy to influence the CC governance processes at national, regional, and international levels (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Bulkeley et al, 2012). Overall, Goodman (2009) argues that the greatest significance of the CJM is their capacity to mobilise actors across the global North-South divide.

In line with the above, many scholars agree that the movement has recorded several successes for its CJ agenda across scales. For instance, Bond (2011) noted that the CJMs at UNFCCC COP 15 in Copenhagen were successful in linking the local struggles of the affected populations to the interests of the more powerful actors in the international arena. He particularly commended the movement's strategy of using a simple yet "catchy" slogan, "Leave the Oil in the Soil", to publicise their CJ demand of decommissioning the 'neoliberal[2]' carbon market. Similarly, Tokar (2013) noted that the CJ movement

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[2] Neoliberal – used here to mean individual economic freedom or liberty

organisations, including FOEI and NGOs like CorpWatch, have successfully leveraged their med[3]ia influence to stir public interest and create awareness on a broad array of climate (in)justice issues. Also, citing the example of the 2014 People's Climate March, Young (2015) argued that the CJMs have been successful in using local narratives of personal experiences of climate impacts to place the most vulnerable populations at the center of CC agreements and mobilising people across the globe to demand urgent climate action. Additionally, Hicks and Fabricant (2016) observed that the impact of the Bolivian CJM on the global community from their efforts in organising around climate injustices at the national level and conveying these issues to an international audience.

In a similar vein, another significant impact of the CJM has been in their use of radical strategies such as protests and demonstrations to block climate-destructive projects and practices. For instance, 350.org, a CJ movement organisation is known for using its mass mobilisation to protest climate inaction and the decommissioning of the fossil fuel industry. In 2010, the 350.org organised and coordinated an International Day of Climate action. The objective of the event was to hold leaders (i.e., government) accountable for making more just decisions about CC. The evidence of its success was the substantial number of events that were held concurrently in over 188 countries globally. Also, in 2015, this organisation staged a protest that influenced the decision of Barack Obama, who was the president of the United States at the time to reject the construction of the Keystone XL (tar sands pipeline) due to its climate impacts (Tokar, 2013). Through these actions, the CJM have been able to increase their influence on the more powerful actors and help to articulate and then prioritise the demands of the more vulnerable populations for urgent climate action at CC negotiation processes (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Young, 2015). While the CJMs offer hope for a new form of CC governance and a just and safe world for all (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Bond, 2011), they struggle with several challenges which if not adequately managed, will hinder their capacity to deliver CJ to the poorer and most vulnerable populations (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018). Section 2.8 below will examine some of the challenges facing the CJMs and the efforts, if any, undertaken to overcome them.

2.8 Challenges of the Climate Justice Movements (CJM)

Pluralistic CJ articulations and demands, diverging issues and targets, inconsistent strategies, ineffective coordination, overarching power divides between the global North-South, and other structural issues along economic, racial, and cultural divides (Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Juris, 2013, Bond, 2011) are some of the key challenges of the global CJMs. Because of the atomistic nature of the movement, that is, the presence of diverse and multiple individual organisations (or actors), they are inevitably confronted with pluralistic concerns and demands, with many actors working at smaller scales and/or specific issues (Bond, 2011). These different actors are often fixated on advocating single CJ issues like food sovereignty, energy security, water availability, gender equity and so with little or no interest nor capacity to expand their scope (Mwenda and Beer, 2016; Bond, 2015). Consequently, there is limited opportunity for the active integration of these individual CJ issues to support the movements' development of a stronger shared narrative and CJ demands.

Another challenge facing the CJM is the overarching power divide between the actors from the developed and developing countries in the movement. Mostly, the CJ actors from the developed countries are the funders of the movements' activities, providing them with financial resources, visibility and even access to the international scene. As a result, they tend to exert more influence in the internal processes of the movement including the decision of which actor(s), activities, and events to fund, publicise and address. While they may share common CJ ideologies and goals, there is the argument that their understanding of the urgency and solution of the issue will differ significantly seeing as they are not on the frontline of the devastating effects of CC (Goodman, 2009). Subsequently, they may choose to support, fund, and implement activities that are to the detriment of their partners from the global South.

A suitable example is the Climate Action Network (CAN) International and its support for the carbon market. CAN is believed to be the first global climate movement that united in controversial fashion, major environmental NGOs, CSOs, for example, FOEI, Greenpeace and grassroots organisations with the global managerial class. However, in Kyoto in 1997, the elite organisation publicly declared incremental emissions reductions and carbon trading

and related offsets as its core CJ strategy. This strategy conflicted with the interests of some of the movement's members. Subsequently, many grassroots organisations, particularly those from and/or working in developing countries in Africa broke away from the network. This caused a rift, albeit small in the momentum of the CJM (Bond and Dorsey, 2012). In contrast, the actors from the developing countries are sometimes unwittingly yet frequently reduced to subordinates because of their dependence on their developed counterparts to provide the resources (Bond, 2015; Goodman, 2009). Accordingly, they find themselves agreeing to implement projects that reinforce the current power dynamics to avoiding losing their access to resources and the international area should their counterparts from the developed countries choose to exit the movement (Aboussai and Trent, 2016).

The uniting of diverse groups of CJ actors from across the global North and South raises a new array of internal structural challenges, for example, exclusion and marginalisation, for the movement. Organisations from the global North tend to have more funds and capacity to actively engage in networking and other activities within the movement. As a result, they gain stronger identification with the movement. This increases their influence and recognition as the more powerful organisations within the movement. In the process, they may end up dominating the internal processes and pushing forward their demands. In response, the voices of the weaker organisations from the global South may become or remain marginalised and excluded from the internal decision-making process (Evans, 2017). Given that organisations (or actor groups) which already struggle with limited funds and institutional capacity join the CJM voluntarily and without the guarantee of financial compensation in exchange for their participation, they are then forced to pursue and maximise their self-interest and/or individual goals, all to the detriment of the shared movement goal(s) (Duwe, 2001).

Moreover, the presence of different socio-cultural practices in the CJM often results in internal conflicts and inconsistencies which if not carefully managed can lead to tensions, movement fragmentation and possibly decline (Bond, 2015; Ossewaarde et al, 2008). For instance, Magrath (2010) observed that there is still limited understanding of the causes and impacts of CC in SSA, arguing that a substantial number of the population in SSA still perceive CC impacts like desertification, droughts, and crop failure as naturally occurring 'acts of God'. Therefore, these actors though working on addressing CJ issues like poverty, environmental degradation, water scarcity etc. are yet to adequately establish how these

issues link to CC and the global CJ narrative (Bond, 2015; Magrath, 2010). Not only does this highlight a likely reason for the current gap in the CJ narratives from SSA, but it also lends credence to the earlier scholarship of Singer (2004) which claimed that most countries in SSA have not organised any demonstration or civil disobedience to demand accountability for CJ from the developed countries because of the limited integration of CC impacts in this region and the broader CJ frames.

The movement is also challenged by the deep distrust between the global North-South which is occasionally present in the interactions between the CJ actors from the different regions. Due of the history of oppression and colonialism between them, actors from the global South tend to express caution in their commitment and association with those from the global North. This limits the extent to which the CJM can establish sufficient common ground that will spur the movement for collective actions (Pettit, 2004).

Overall, there are still arguments about the capability of the global CJM to exert the desired pressure on the global CC governance processes. While many scholars agree that the CJM is an emerging global force for climate action, they warn that it is at present too weak to effect the desired societal change (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018; Okereke, 2010; Pettit, 2004). This is particularly true of the movement in SSA which is reliant on actors from the developed countries for finance, technology, knowledge, and capacity transfer. Their overreliance on the developed countries is limiting the extent of their influence and leverage, thus, constituting a stumbling block for them in the international CC arena. As time runs out on CC, these CJ actors from SSA must seek urgent ways to strengthen their capacity and gain the necessary leverage to speed up global climate action.

Considering the above findings, many scholars have recommended that the CJM will need to take deliberate measures to strengthen its capacity to effectively engage with other climate actors and drive the CJ agenda (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018; Okereke, 2010, Roberts and Parks, 2006; Pettit, 2004). Pettit (2004) and Okereke (2010) have suggested that the CJMs can strengthen their capacity to deliver CJ by building skills in direct political participation, for example, lobbying and negotiations skills. Both authors argue that it is critical for the CJM to learn the art of diplomacy since CC negotiations are at a point where it requires global cooperation to progress. Alternatively, Tormos and Garcia-Lopez (2018) and Roberts

and Parks (2006) indicated that forging strategic alliances and stronger coordination can help the CJM achieve continuity and enhanced political influence across different actor groups in the CC governance process.

To this aim, there has been an increase in scholarly interest in investigating the roles and capacities of the CJMs and/or actors to pursue CJ for their constituencies (Roger et al, 2017; Russell, 2015; Lecy et al, 2012, Bond 2012). However, only limited attention has been paid to understanding the practical implications of the movements' activities in pursuing CJ on behalf of the poorest populations who are most vulnerable to CC impacts (Bond, 2012; Dorsey and Bond, 2010), despite the purpose of the CJ agenda being to better the lot of those that are most affected by the impacts of CC and prevent them from further harm. As CC impacts continues at an unprecedented rate, there is an urgent need to bridge this gap as fast as possible.

2.9 Theoretical Gaps in the literature

So far, past research on CJMs have attempted to increase knowledge on how the movement has originated and evolved, and how its constituent actors conceptualise and frame their CJ narratives and demands. The literature has also considered their significance and challenges at different levels. These studies have indicated that although the CJM is deeply rooted in the EJ movement, it is now a merger of different movements and ideologies including the global justice, anti-capitalist, and the indigenous peoples' movements (Schlosberg and Collins, 2014; Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Goodman, 2009). Also, these studies have identified and critically examined the different conceptualisations and demands of the CJMs including the reduction in GHGs emissions, repayment of ecological debts, decommissioning of the carbon markets and enhanced participation of the marginalised populations in the decision-making process, among others.

The academic literature has grown to investigate the roles and significance of the CJM in pursuing the CJ agenda. The core roles and significance of the movement according to the literature include creating public awareness and engagement on CC and CJ issues; mobilising the public for urgent climate actions like resilience and capacity building; strengthening CC

institutions and governance practices; and the formulation and implementation of effective CC policies to address CC and its negative impacts (Roger et al, 2017; Bond, 2012; Yanacopulos, 2005). There are a growing number of studies that have attempted to assess the successes and challenges of the CJMs across multiples levels (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018; Newell, 2008; Covey, 1995). These studies and others including Idemudia (2017), Rietig (2016) and Pache and Santos (2010) identified and examined the different strategies and tactics employed by different CJMs in various roles and capacities to further the CJ agenda.

However, most of the evidence provided in the literature has been from the CJMs that have originated outside of SSA. There is limited reference to empirical studies on the CJMs in SSA despite now-widespread understanding of the implications of CC and its underlying injustices on this region. Moreover, there is limited evidence of any research being conducted solely to investigate how the CJMs in SSA have responded to the different CJ conceptualisations and demands, how they are executing their roles as key actors in the CC governance processes at different levels, and their impacts on the CJ agenda which ultimately provides a measure of their effectiveness.

Thus, it is increasingly clear that there are significant gaps in knowledge production on the global CJMs and the reliability of existing information on the movement in SSA. This thesis will attempt to fill this gap by investigating how African CJMs like PACJA are increasing public awareness and mobilising the masses while at the same time, engaging and lobbying with key political actors to gain their confidence, trust and loyalty of both to implement climate policies and safeguards that places the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable populations at its centre.

2.10 Conclusion

This chapter has provided a theoretical and rich contextual background for this thesis. It started with an introduction into the notion of climate justice by reviewing several literatures that are relevant for demonstrating the links between CC and its underlying elements of injustice. It highlighted three core elements of CC injustice: responsibility, impacts and cost

of mitigation. Firstly, although CC presents a global challenge today, it is due to the activities of developed countries, and certain of these countries more than others. Secondly, those who are least responsible for CC i.e., the developing countries are suffering the greatest impacts of the CC challenge. And lastly, those who are least responsible for causing CC are having to bear the cost of addressing the challenge.

The chapter went on to discuss the theoretical development of different conceptualisations and demands of CJ including reductions of GHGs emissions, decommissioning of the global carbon market, repayment of ecological debts by the developed countries to the developing countries, transfer of knowledge, capacity, and technology from the developed countries to the developing countries and the inclusion of marginalised groups into the discussions and negotiations on CC. It highlighted that the contestations in the CJ demands were mostly between the developed and developing countries and around issues of how the burden and cost for addressing CC should be distributed. In addition, it emphasised that the limited convergence on these critical issues is responsible for the current stalling and/or inaction to address CC at the global level. This discussion steered the review towards the literature that have identified the CJM as an emerging force for driving urgent climate action and advancing the CJ agenda.

The chapter then examined different scholarly perspectives on the emergence and evolution of the CJM as a global force to overcome the current political impasse in global climate action. While some literature suggested that the movement has deep roots in the EJ movement, others established that it had links to the global justice movement, with these movements not always sharing overlapping priorities and concerns. Nevertheless, there is widespread consensus that the CJM is the uniting of diverse ideologies and demands from the EJ, anti-capitalist, global justice, indigenous peoples', and land-based movements to address climate inequalities, market failures and global power imbalances. As a result, the CJM includes a wide array of actors such as the transnational advocacy networks (TAN), major environmental NGOs, CSOs, Faith-based alliances, and grassroot organisations. A brief yet critical description of some of the major actors for example, CAN International was also included in this chapter. The review then went on to provide an overview of the roles, significance, and challenges of the global movement. Emphasis was paid to examining the challenges facing the CJMs, for example, pluralistic demands, uneven balance of power and

distrust, and how they impact on the movements' capacity to deliver CJ for the poorest and most vulnerable populations. Thus, leading to a final discussion on the significance of this study.

The purpose of this chapter has been to establish (i) CJ as a highly contested concept and (ii) the fact that the CJM not as a single entity, but as a dynamic, fluid and socially constructed alliance of people and organisations with overlapping interests. This conceptualisation will provide the necessary background for the analyses and discussions on the CJ articulations and demands, capacities and impacts of the movement in SSA in ensuing chapters. Needless to say, there is now a burgeoning literature on CJ and movement actors in addition to the ones that have been reviewed and discussed here (for example, Newell et al, 2020; Puaschunder, 2020; Almeida, 2019; Gunningham, 2018; Saunders, 2013; Betsill and Correll, 2008). While the scope of this chapter has prevented a detailed discussion of all of these works, they provide necessary insights that will be used where appropriate to develop the conceptual and analytical framework, and to evaluate, compare and validate some the findings of this study. For instance, the recent study by Newell et al (2020) provides useful insights into how CJ might be conceptualised to secure the best possible outcomes for the movement in the long term. These include recognising the importance of building the capacity of local and civil society groups to engage in meaningful discussions on climate finance; how organisations funding these can be used to address structural drivers of climate vulnerability; and finally, for ensuring that the poorer groups to not bear the burden of transitioning to a zero-carbon economy as important components of CJ. Also, it suggests entry points for analysing the effectiveness of the CJM, for example, climate justice initiatives, engagement activities, alliance building etc.

The next chapter sets out the conceptual and analytical framework underpinning this research. Here, the thesis will draw upon main themes from several theoretical fields including social movement and organisational effectiveness. This will pave way for a following chapter (Chapter Three) that will set out the methodological approach to research design, data collection and analysis.

Chapter Three: Contextualising Climate Justice, key criteria, and Indicators of Effectiveness

3.1 Introduction

Studies on the Climate Justice Movement (CJM), though relatively new, have paid the most attention to understanding the movements' history and development, composition, and significance (Scholsberg and Collins, 2014; Tokar, 2013; Bond and Dorsey, 2010; Pettit, 2004). While these studies have often highlighted the capacities, successes, and challenges of the CJMs, there are grounds to believe that the extent to which individual movements within the global CJMs have been effective, or not, in progressing CJ has not been systematically analysed to date. This is certainly the case for the CJMs in SSA. Perhaps this is because of several reasons such as the presence of diverse actors which has resulted into pluralistic and sometimes conflicting articulations and demands of CJ in the CJM (Bond and Dorsey, 2010). The practical implication of this is that the differences in place, issues and identity (languages, cultural 'styles' of interaction, etc) may limit the chances of arriving at a consensus on their "effectiveness".

Another reason for the limited investigations into the extent of effectiveness of the CJMs is the broad, fluid and often ambiguous nature of the CJ demands that are being pursued by these actors. Because the ubiquitous nature of the CC challenge demands the inclusion of a wide array of actors to address the problem, the CJMs mostly adopt broad framings for their CJ objectives in an attempt to attract wider public support for their agenda (Scott, 2014). This makes deciding on specific, measurable, and time-bound objectives an uphill or even impossible task for the movement. Yet, without clear goals, it will be difficult to measure the extent to which they have achieved their aims (Dyke and Amos, 2017; Cameron and Whetten, 2013).

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, scholars are reluctant to conduct studies that measure the extent of effectiveness of the CJM due to the understanding that evidence of movements' effectiveness are often time bound, not clearly visible, and may overlap with other factors,

i.e., the attribution of 'successes' to specific drivers or factors may be difficult to do with any level of certitude (Ashraf, 2012). Since movements are established with specific aims, many of them do not exist for prolonged periods. It is either they survive the pressure, achieve their aims, and decline or they do not survive the competition, are starved of funds and decline, albeit prematurely (Krause, 2014; Wadongo and Abdel-Kader, 2014; Saunders, 2013). Yet because the foundational philosophy and CJ objectives of the CJMs are intent on effecting social change to existing societal systems, indicators of their progress may occur incrementally and over prolonged periods. This may make it difficult to give an accurate measure of the extent of their effectiveness over the short term (Smith and Fetner, 2010).

However, the growing recognition of the CJM as an emerging force in CC governance (Okereke and Coventry, 2016: Falkner, 2016; Pettit, 2004) and the current demand for a power shift from the global North to the South to foster ambitious and transformative CJ (Newell et al, 2020; Goodman, 2009), highlights both the significance and urgency of conducting investigations into the extent of effectiveness of the movement in SSA. Scholars including Dyke and Amos (2017), Cameron and Quinn (2006) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) advocate for a "process-oriented" structural perspective to measuring movements' effectiveness. Since the core activities of the movement revolves around mobilising and retaining support to influence outcomes in favour of their agenda, these authors argue that their effectiveness can be measured from evaluating activities (and outputs) that they undertake to achieve these objectives.

While this approach overcomes some of the challenges of the functional approach to measuring effectiveness, for example, the lack of or limited availability of evidence in the short-term, the indicators of effectiveness are highly subjective and open to different interpretations (Tsui, 1990). To illustrate, two movement organisations, A and B, are established to drive the CJ agenda in support of the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA. After a year of their establishment, Organisation A has 10 funders and 20 partners while Organisation B has 5 funders and 10 partners. Without additional information and adequate contextualisation, Organisation A could easily be perceived as being more effective. However, when additional information like the amount of funding provided by the funders, the scope of projects or activities, running costs, priority needs vs the implemented activities etc., it may change initial perceptions of effectiveness. Therefore, it is important that efforts

to measure movements' effectiveness using the 'process-oriented structural approach' should include adequate contexts such as the external environment i.e., socio-political space, economic capacities etc. to increase understanding and objectivity.

Overall, the literature on social movements (and alliances) paid closer attention to analysing effectiveness from the efficacy of the process rather than the outcome. By drawing attention to the process, social movement scholars (for example, Escobar, 2018; Han and Barnett-Loro, 2018; Diani, 2013; Covey, 1995), highlight the importance of understanding the complexities and realities of influencing the desired long term and large-scale societal change (i.e., behaviour, policy, cultural norms, and attitude). This includes understanding the role that important preconditions like ***identity*** *(i.e., race, class, gender etc.*) (Escobar, 2018; Han and Barnett-Loro, 2018), ***frames*** (Hornsey *et al*, 2006; Nissen, 2004; Covey, 1995), and ***power dynamics*** (Han and Barnett-Loro, 2018) play in shaping movements interactions and outcomes. ***Resources, organisational forms, and management*** were also identified as necessary preconditions for movement's effectiveness (Escobar, 2018; Han and Barnett-Loro, 2018; Caiani, 2014; Diani, 2013). Consequently, a significant process in this research is to articulate CJ in practicable terms that captures and addresses the different dimensions of climate injustices and rooted within the context of SSA. This will enable a clearer understanding of what indicators will be used to provide adequate measures of the movements' effectiveness in pursuing CJ concerns and actions.

Drawing on insights from relevant fields of studies including development, geography, sociology, and management studies, this chapter provides a detailed conceptualisation of CJ in SSA, and set out key metrics and indicators of the movements' effectiveness. The chapter begins by articulating CJ based on different accounts of climate injustices from the region (drawing on the existing literature). The purpose of this is to enable the identification of key CJ demands and/or actions of the movements' in SSA. Ideally, these demands will inform the CJ objectives of the movements in SSA. Next, the chapter provides detailed discussions of the following demands: provision and access to climate finance, resilience and capacity building, fair and equitable participations in the CC governance processes at multiple levels, and the implementation of equitable and effective CC policies as the most relevant CJ demands of the movement as the criteria for measuring the effectiveness of the movement in

this study. Specifically, the literature on NGOs, CSOs, transnational advocacy networks and other actors (or organisations) that occur within the domain of social movements will provide insights on the above listed criteria and guide the discussion into suitable indicators of effectiveness for the CJM. For example, the type, number and frequency of 'resilience capacity building' initiatives, engagement activities etc. and how they contribute to mitigation of climate injustice and avoidance of future harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA. Finally, this chapter concludes with the elaboration of an analytical framework that underpinned the data collection and the analysis pursued in my data chapters. Attention will be paid to examining the gains, trade-offs, and losses inherent in various, case-study activities and actions of the movement.

3.2 Contextualising Climate Justice for SSA

The geographical variability across SSA makes the region highly vulnerable to the impacts of CC (Keohane, 2019; Bond, 2013). As a result, reports of a changing climate such as changes in temperature and rainfall patterns have become consistent and more strident across the region. The implications of these changes include an increase in health-related issues like heat exhaustion, malaria and diarrhea from heavy rainfall and flood events etc.; low agricultural productivity from drought or heavy rains; prolonged water shortages, loss of livelihood and increased starvation; climate refugees; environmental degradation from cutting down trees for fuel and exacerbated poverty (Bond, 2013; Magrath, 2010). As CC continues, the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA, comprising mostly of farmers and pastoralists whose livelihoods are directly impacted because of their direct reliance on land-based resources, women because of their primary role in ensuring food, water and energy security, and children who will suffer more climate-related health issues and will thus will struggle to adapt to an overheating continent (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Barclay Derman, 2013).

Low awareness and knowledge of CC, its impacts and solutions, poverty, weak governance systems, overreliance on environmental resources and limited participation of the vulnerable groups in CC governance, have been identified as some of the factors responsible for the low

adaptive capacity across SSA (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Barclay Derman 2013; Bond, 2013; Magrath, 2010). While there is now widespread knowledge that CC is occurring, most of the population in SSA are still unaware of the causes, the role of the developed countries and current global debates on CJ (Magrath, 2010). As a result, to adapt to the changing climate, these populations are adopting short-term coping mechanisms like planting different types of crops all year round due to the unpredictable weather patterns and walking longer distances to collect water to cope with the CC. In fact, more costly but sustainable strategies like irrigated farming technologies, use of improved seedlings, construction of large crop storage and processing facilities, building seawalls and other ameliorative actions are required at the very least to reduce their growing vulnerability to CC.

Although the many current actions across Africa to adapt to CC are necessary and commendable, they are insufficient for adapting to the scope of the CC impacts or indeed addressing the underlying roots causes of CC. Moreover, scholars like Keohane (2019), Saraswat and Kumar (2016) and Magrath (2010) argue that, because of their limited capacity, insignificant role in causing CC and need for socio-economic development, these populations should not be left to adapt to the impacts without sufficient help. Thus, suggesting that the extent to which SSA can sufficiently adapt to CC is dependent on the developed, industrialised countries reducing their emissions both significantly and urgently.

Similarly, Bond (2013) argues that Africa's capacity to adapt to CC is dependent on the Global North paying for the cost of adaptation, mitigation, and the continent's right to sustainable development because of their role in CC. However, he observes that the lack of political will and weak accountability of the African governments. He notes that aside from the current contestation between the Global North and South over the payment of climate debt in the form of climate finance (see Section 2.3.3 of Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion), it remains highly likely that the African governments who are mostly corrupt will hijack the funds, if provided, to the detriment of the victims of CC. Using the example of the late Ethiopian dictator, Meles Zenawi, who is said to have betrayed Africans by supporting the Copenhagen Accord in exchange for a side deal, Bond argued that African governments were unreliable and not to be trusted. In addition, the colonial history of extraction across SSA and its implications, for example, political distrust and maximising self-interest, weak and

underfinanced governance structures, degraded environment, and dilapidated infrastructure, all contribute to weaken the institutional capacity of the region (Parks and Roberts, 2006).

Given the imbalance in power and capacity, many CJ scholars agree that CJ actions by, for and across SSA should focus on enhancing the capacity of the populations to cope with climate variability and shocks to avoid further impoverishment (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Bond, 2013; Magrath, 2010, Parks and Roberts, 2006). This includes making adaptation their priority CJ demand; investing in small scale farmers and mechanisms of social protection; implementing climate policies that address the adaptation capacity needs of the people; demand for climate finance from developed countries to cover the cost of these actions and binding emission cuts in developed countries; and finally, increasing the participation of vulnerable groups in the decision-making process.

One of the ways through which these can be achieved is by increasing the knowledge and awareness of the populations on CC causes, impacts and solutions. Armed with new information, this population can demand their governments act on CC by implementing the appropriate policies and then hold them to account. This will allow the population of SSA to advocate and support climate friendly policies that prioritise their adaptation needs and not merely perceptions of what the government and or donors think these needs are, and consequently hindering their capacity to adapt. Also, it will increase interest and accountability of the African public in CC governance.

Aside from knowledge enhancement, Magrath (2010) suggested that the adaptive capacity of SSA can be improved by implementing climate-smart sustainable programmes/projects. For example, investing in agriculture and rural development. Since women and livelihoods in Africa are mostly at the center of the impacts of CC and development, that is according to several accounts of women's direct involvement in farming, fetching wood for fuel, etc. (Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Magrath, 2010), priority must be given to programmes and projects that are linked to livelihoods and which emphasise women's rights, access, and participation in the governance process (Barclay Derman, 2013). Actions on climate adaptation should also emphasis grassroots research and development to find better and improved ways of coping with CC. For example, conducting investigations into the

prevailing conditions and climate variabilities across SSA, the physiological, psychological and longer-term effects of CC on societies and well-being, managing a just transition to a low carbon economy pathway and the role of social movements in supporting or hindering adaptation and CJ for the vulnerable groups.

In addition to the above, CJ would include pursuing mitigative actions to prevent SSA from experiencing the impending impacts of catastrophic CC and further impoverishment. Examples would include organising campaigns against CC from the source such as contesting the construction of mega-dams in Ethiopia and DRC, coal power plants in Kenya, oil extraction in Nigeria and pushing for the creation of climate/'green' jobs in South Africa, to mention a few examples. Also, access and participation of the vulnerable groups in the CC governance processes at multiple scales must be pursued in earnest. This will provide an incremental first step to influencing global CC decisions and outcomes. Through their participation, these vulnerable groups will gain the opportunity to disrupt the default, hegemonic political relations to one that leads to improvements in equity and CC outcomes (Keohane, 2019).

The above discussion has opened several analytical frames for understanding what CJ could mean in practice. Grounded in the knowledge of the climate injustices across SSA, this study conceptualises CJ as the disruption of processes that support or reproduces climate injustices. This includes taking actions to improve participation of the vulnerable groups across SSA in international CC negotiations and governance processes, create new and strengthen existing access climate finance deals to enhance their economic power, build their capacity to adapt to the impacts of CC, and implement effective policies to mitigate current climate injustices and avoid future harm (Keohane, 2019; Okereke, 2018, 2010; Saraswat and Kumar, 2016; Bond, 2013; Magrath, 2010). Therefore, analysing the actions of CJM in SSA in line with these CJ objectives will provide the analytical framework for measuring their effectiveness.

In the next section, this thesis will identify and discuss three (3) objectives of the CJM in SSA that will act as the criteria for investigating the extent of their effectiveness in progressing the CJ agenda in this study. The discussion will include several scholarly perspectives on how the CJM can adopt and maximise various activities to advance the CJ objectives. These perspectives will be drawn from literature on NGOs, CSOs, Transnational

advocacy networks (TANs), Social Movements and organisational effectiveness. The discussion will highlight data sources and relevant indicators i.e., actions and outcomes of effectiveness.

3.3 Criteria of Effectiveness

Following from the discussion above, this thesis will investigate the activities of the CJM in SSA around three main CJ objectives for indicators of their effectiveness. They are: 1) Institutional and governance strengthening, 2) Public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation; and 3) Policy influence. Below is a discussion on how each of these objectives serves as a criterion of effectiveness and their respective indicators.

3.3.1 Institutional and Governance Strengthening

According to social movement literature, strong institutions[4] are necessary to open up spaces for participation in political processes and bring about the desired transformational change for CJ (Oloo and Omondi, 2017; Bader, 2007; Gottschalk and Schmidt, 2004). Therefore, the extent to which the CJM in SSA can effectively demand CJ is dependent on their institutional strength. Yet many scholars including Tormas and Garcia-Lopez (2018), Bond (2012) and Pettit (2004) argue that the CJMs - particularly those originating from the Global South - are still relatively too weak to effect the desired change that they demand. While they were clear in highlighting the weaknesses of these movements, for example, limited resource availability, weak capacity, underdeveloped mechanisms etc and suggesting strategies like partnership, capacity development etc. for addressing this gap, they were mostly silent on what constitutes a strong movement. So, what is a strong institution?

Bader (2007) defines a strong institution as one which can absorb changes due to external factors. That is, changes in the social, economic, legal and/or political conditions of the environment in which they exist and operate. Similarly, Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004) and

4 Institutions are the rules of the game of a society, or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints (political, economic and social) that structure human interaction (North, 1990 pp. 3).

Barret et al (2001) refer to institutions as strong if they can demonstrate stability, self-autonomy, and continuing performance i.e., sustainability, when exposed to shocks. Notably, the shocks can either be internal, for example, the entry and exit of employees, partners, loss of a founder etc., or external like the introduction of new government legislation or changes to existing ones. While these definitions provide a basis for understanding what classifies as a strong institution, it is important to note that these scholars have used a resilience perspective in their definitions.

Oloo and Omondi (2017) take a slightly different turn and use the adaptive capacity approach in their definition. They define strong institutions as institutions having high capacity, social capital and access to knowledge and information for sustainability. That is, institutions that go beyond merely adapting to shocks to taking advantage of them as opportunities. Aligning with this definition, this thesis defines strong institutions as those that are continually stabilising and reproducing themselves to carry out their primary functions while ensuring accountability and legitimacy. That is, institutions that are constantly seeking to identify and review their existing capacities, threats and opportunities for continuous learning and improvement in line with their set objectives, such that they exist over an extended period of time.

There are several advantages to being perceived as a strong institution for the CJM in SSA. For instance, a purportedly strong movement institution will attract more partnerships and funding from likeminded organisations. According to Suh (2011), policymakers are more likely to engage with movements as collaborative partners if they consider such movements strong enough to disrupt the norm. Also, Keck and Sikkink (1999) observes that international donors are more likely to fund movements that they perceive to be strong to increase their own legitimacy and reputation. By aligning with strong movements, these funders are also increasing their public perception and politicise their organisational goals and activities (Pache and Santos, 2010; Ossenwaarde et al, 2008). Additionally, the CJM in SSA would benefit from the political clout of having elites on its board, strategic partnerships, and reputable funding organisations to avoid backlash and extend its political space of influence across domestic and international scales. Consequently, for the CJM in SSA to achieve its set CJ objectives and be effective, it must ensure that it is perceived as a strong institution.

Indicators of Effectiveness in Institutional and Governance Strengthening

There are many components that make up a strong institution. They include governance, resource mobilisation and enhancement, institutional learning, operations and compliance, effective communications etc. However, following from the above definition of a strong institution, this thesis recognises 1) Governance, 2) Resource mobilisation and 3) Institutional learning as the three most critical components for analysing the institutional and governance strengthen of the CJM in SSA. Each of these components and their indicators of effectiveness will be explored in more detail below.

1. Governance (or Coordination)

Governance is crucial for the CJM due to the diversity of individual interests, priorities, power, and the capacities of different actor groups that are working collaboratively towards a shared agenda. Particularly, it ensures that the dense exchanges of information and resources among actors trying to reaffirm their identities, build solidarity and organise for CJ, translate into meaningful participation and outcomes for the movement's agenda (Diani et al, 2018; Haug, 2013). Effective governance also ensures that conflicts are minimised, differing interests and perspectives are accommodated and consolidated actions are taken in favour of the movement's goal. Therefore, the extent to which a movement can demonstrate effective governance will provide an indicator of its effectiveness more generally (Lecy et al, 2012).

Biermann (2006) defines governance as a process which cuts across all stages and procedures, from decision-making to implementation across different levels including subnational, national, international, and transnational. Likewise, many scholars like Bulkeley *et al* (2012), Hufty (2011), and Kooiman (2003) define governance as a process or strategy used to manage resources and integrate actors (i.e., CSOs, NGOs etc.) working on issues that involve public participation or mass collective action (such as CC and SD) to ensure active participation, while upholding civic virtues. For this thesis, governance will refer to how the CJM in SSA integrates and coordinates its actors (or members), mobilises, and manages its resources towards the realisation of its goals.

The level of organisation of a movement is increasingly used as an indicator of effectiveness among scholars (Amenta, 2014; Lecy et al, 2012; Leopkey and Parent, 2012; and Suh, 2011). They agree that the higher the level of organisation and coordination, the higher the level integration, recognition, and access movement actors have to different sources of knowledge and/or power, and thus, the higher the movement's chances to achieve its objectives. For example, the elites (or technical experts) possessing advanced knowledge and relational capacity can harness this clout to engage with the policymakers on behalf of the movement while remaining in contact with the grassroots. On the other hand, CBOs and other grassroots NGOs/CSOs can utilise their "people power" to advance the visibility, sphere of influence and legitimacy of the movement (Bond and Galvin, 2019; Schroeder, 2010; Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

This view of analysing a movement's effectiveness seems to be gaining prominence to such an extent that some scholars now claim that organisational strength provides a more accurate measure of movements' effectiveness that public engagement and mobilisation (Oloo and Omodi, 2017; Haug, 2013). They argue that although public engagement and mobilisation seeks to inspire and motivate for collective action, the organisational structure and coordination provides the basis for creating order and sustaining interactions among the movement actors and allies.

As the membership grows, the need arises to adopt a more corporate structure to maintain better coordination of policies and activities within the CJM (Juris 2007; Keck and Sikkink 1998). However, formalisation within transnational movements often possess and reproduce governance issues, for example, power imbalances, exclusion, and bureaucracy, which they challenge and work to overcome (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Covey 1995). Actors with "powerful" functional roles and more resources tend to impose their authority and dominate decision-making processes within the organisation (Pache and Santos 2010; Juris 2007; Covey 1995). To address this challenge, many transnational CJMs have organised into regional hubs or distinct nodes/units, each of these responsible for its own governance and procedures. Since climate impact is felt differently across regional and national borders, it may be more rewarding to organise along similar regional and socio-political class (Norgaard 2011; Tokar, 2013).

However, Ossenwaarde *et al* (2008) noted that such organising has resulted in selective interventions with minimal impacts and internal struggles over resources. Many of these organisations unwittingly focus their attention and resources on addressing the demands that align with the interest of those at the secretariat to the disadvantage of other constituencies. This distance between the secretariat and regional or local constituencies of many organisations can cause a disconnect between the grassroots affected populations and the organisation's leadership. Also, since movements consist of actors with unequal distributions of knowledge and socio-economic capacity and operating at different scales i.e., from more localised grassroots to transnational towards the same agenda (Escobar, 2018), effective governance and coordination movements serves to overcome these structural issues and promote equal or at least reasonable access to political decision making (See Pache and Santos, 2010; Ossenwaarde *et al* 2008; Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002; Keck and Sikkink 1999).

Therefore, indicators of effective governance will be obtained from analysing the movement's organisational structure and procedure, including policies, procedures etc, leadership and coordination i.e., representation, participation, inclusiveness etc. in the movement's activities and decision-making process, and transparency and accountability. Evidence of an organisational organogram, constitution, terms of engagement etc. would suggest that the movement is taking steps to overcome challenges of leadership and exclusion that are common to many social movements (Robinson and Schroeder, 2017; Cameron and Quinn, 2006). It will also indicate some level of transparency and accountability, since this information is available to promote equitable participation, trust, empowerment and to minimise any abuse of power and neglect of duties by movement actors (McGee, 2013). These are all taken as indications of effectiveness.

2. Resource mobilisation

John McCarthy, Mayer Zald and Charles Tilly, were among the first social movement scholars to link resource mobilisation to movements' effectiveness. They argued that before any movement can successfully mobilise to resist and/or demand societal change, it must first be able to identify and mobilise resources that it needs to achieve its goal(s) (McCarthy and

Zald, 1977; Tilly, 1978). Years later, other scholars including McCarthy (2013), Diani (2000) and Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) agree that a movement is effective to the extent to which it can continuously mobilise resources to ensure its growth and survival in a competitive environment. More so, since the extent of coordination, type and number of activities a movement can implement is dependent on the number of resources that it can mobilise, the more resources that a movement can mobilise, the stronger their institutional and governance capacities are likely to be, although the relationship is one of 'necessary but not sufficient'. (Goodwin et al, 2000).

Resources refer to the range of assets required for planning, mobilising, and organising a CJM. It includes and is not limited to finance, social, political, technological, and people (Saunders, 2013; Smith and Fetner, 2013). Scholars still debate over which forms of resources are more important for institutional and governance strengthening. For example, Godwin et al, (2000) argue that financial resource is most important for building a strong CJM. They stressed that without the money needed for planning, mobilising, and organising movement activities, movements are likely to fail.

Conversely, other scholars like Kirchherr (2018), Andrews (2014) and Fitzgerald and Rodger (2000) argue that while the availability of financial resources has its merits, it is not necessarily the most important resources for determining a movement's success. They observed that in some instances, the availability of finances can be counterproductive for a movement's effectiveness. Especially in situations where these monies came from international funders or aid organisations with misaligned priorities and strategies and/or stringent reporting and accounting agreements. Thereby concluding that beyond a minimum threshold, the types of conditionalities tied to the finances have more implications on the movements' effectiveness than the availability of financial resources (Kirchherr, 2018; Fitzgerald and Rodger, 2000).

For instance, a donor organisation may have funds allocated to a capacity training programme on CC for local communities in Nigeria in support of its climate adaptation objective. However, the communities in question may already be dealing with severe impacts of CC like water scarcity, health related issues etc. As a result, their priority adaptation needs will be

addressing the water scarcity and providing free and affordable health care. However, because of the scarcity of donor funds and the need to continue functioning, local CSOs within the CJM may find that they realign their CJ demands so that they can attract the donor's interest and potential benefit from the funding despite the mismatch in priorities.

Going a step further, Andrews (2014) and Fitzgerald and Rodgers (2000) highlighted that the lack of financial resources may in fact be the determinant success factor for some movement organisations. They argue that funders possessed latent power over movements, and during interactions they can unwittingly influence movements' effectiveness by restricting their activities and political range. Similarly, Kirchherr (2018) and Rohlinger (2002) argue that financial resources are largely irrelevant for movement success, particularly in developing countries that relied heavily on volunteerism and community driven participatory approaches. This highlights the possibility that human and social resources are more important for institutional and governance strengthening of the CJM in SSA.

Socio-political resources in terms of organisational structure, human capital, technological and media attention all need to be drawn upon and taken advantage of by CJ movements. The diversity of actors within a movement creates an avenue for some resources to be drawn internally from different actor groups within the movement. For example, a movement would rely on experts within the group to provide technical knowledge and capacity that would inform and support their agenda. Also, it would rely on the presence of the grassroot communities and constituencies to gain legitimacy, politicise the agenda and for mass mobilisation. Nonetheless, other forms of resources would still need to be mobilised from external sources. For instance, in a bid to avoid backlash and state repression, movements would need to attract the presence of elites or grab media attention to 'mainstream' their agenda.

While resources are important for movement mobilising and organising, the way it is mobilised has implications for the movement's effectiveness. Several factors have effects on how the CJM mobilises and allocates resources. For example, Rohlinger (2002) observes that the organisational structure plays a key role in determining whether a movement can attract elite organisations and draw upon external resources. Also, Franks and Cleaver (2007) noted

that the process of resource mobilisation and allocation in turn affects the choice of campaign mechanisms to be adopted and the character of the movement. Movements that organise their resources internally had the flexibility of determining which intervention strategies and tactics that they wished to adopt. In situations where movements seek for external resources from donors and/or funder, they are restricted as they must ensure that their strategies are not in conflict with those of their donors (Fitzgerald and Rodgers, 2000).

Regardless of whether resources are being mobilised internally or externally, it can be used as an instrument to gain power and control. For instance, actors within the CJM that provide financial resources and political opportunities would implicitly possess more decision-making power over other actors who might be providing only time or legitimacy via their participation (Zeitoun and Allan, 2008). Their capability as an "agent" of change translates into political capital or clout for them (Franks and Cleaver, 2007). They may gain profound influence on the campaign mechanisms and programmes run by the CJM. Subsequently, this generative power can replicate prevailing issues of structural inequality and power imbalances in the societies (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004) that the movement originally seeks to address.

This thesis will analyse how the movement has identified which resources are needed, how they are accessed, mobilised, and distributed, and the implications including tensions and trade-offs on the institutional and governance capacity of the CJM. Evidence of effective resources mobilisation will include funding streams, joint implementation of CJ projects/programmes, a resource mobilisation strategy, evidence of its implementation and team, See Table 1 below for a summary of these indicators.

3. Institutional learning (IL)

This thesis refers to institutional learning as the deliberate effort of the CJM to obtain information, analyse it and use the findings from this process to implement changes that improves their activities and strengthen their capacities in general. Usually, it is focused on understanding how procedures, norms i.e., culture, behaviours, attitudes etc., and strategies impact on set objectives and whether there is need for changes to be initiated (Horton and

Mackay, 2003). That is, evaluating theories (i.e., policies, plans, strategies etc.) in actions to increase effectiveness (Bloch and Borges, 2002). Similarly, many scholars (e.g., Watts et al, 2007; Horton and Mackay, 2003; Hassink and Lagendijk, 2001) have observed that an organisation is strong to the extent that it can learn and change in response to the lessons learned. They thus, argue that IL is a critical component of movement effectiveness (Whatley, 2013; Edwards, 1997).

Institutional learning is important to a movement for several reasons including enhancing transparency and accountability (Madon, 1999), identifying weaknesses and opportunities for growth, long-term stability, relevance, and effectiveness over time (Watts et al, 2007; Bloch and Borges, 2002). Similarly, Hassink and Lagendijk (2001) observed that institutional learning typically increases the movement's profile, donors' interests, and international competitiveness. However, they noted that for it to occur, certain conditions like learning leaders, transparency, shared responsibility, collective capacity, and purpose versus action-relevance must be fulfilled.

Given the benefits to be gained, there are several claims that many movements do not demonstrate institutional learning or see the need to (Whatley, 2014; Watts et al, 2007). Thus, casting doubt over their organisational strengthen and effectiveness. A first claim is the limited availability of funds to conduct monitoring and evaluations and implement changes as most of the funding available to CJ movements are linked to specific project/programme delivery. Hence, additional funds spent for the purpose of learning is seen as a luxury (Whatley, 2014). A second claim is that research has paid little attention to evaluating institutional learning in movements (Bloch and Borges, 2002). A third claim is that the loss of institutional memory from the high entry and exit of actors in the movements undermines institutional learning (Horton and Mackay, 2003). Lastly, there is the claim that because of the link between past projects/programme impact assessment and success in funding applications, movements are more focused on documenting their success at the expense of learning from their mistakes (Bloch and Borges, 2002).

Due to the urgency and complexity of CC impacts across SSA, the CJM must demonstrate institutional learning to boost public confidence in their capacity as a key driver for CJ under the current Paris Agreement. While there are several entry points to investigating institutional

learning, this thesis will focus on the organisational and programme level. Since Bloch and Borges (2002) defined learning as identifying and correcting mistakes, evidence of IL will include changes in plans, procedures, norms, and strategies. Subsequently, the analysis would include an investigation of the organisational and leadership structure since inception.

The investigation will cover approaches to planning, decision-making, training, pilot initiatives, monitoring and evaluation, and data management. The aim is to provide insights into the governance capacities and changes undertaken by the CJM. Because a key CJ demand of the CJM is to increase public participation in the CC governance process and raise the voices of the most vulnerable populations to CC across SSA, it is important to investigate how the CJM addresses issues of governance and leadership in their daily functioning. The analysis will also include an investigation of the programme and projects of the CJM in relation to their CJ demands and the external environment. The purpose of this is to identify whether these programmes and projects have been sufficient in meeting the CJ objectives of the movement. If not, what changes (if any) have been implemented to address the gaps. Evidence of institutional learning will include changes in organisational and management structure, changes in strategies, monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning plans, activities, and reports, e.g., advocacy and projects monitoring, monitoring, evaluation, research and learning (MERL) personnel etc. A summary of these indicators is presented in Table 1 below.

Table 1: Indicators of Institutional and Governance Strengthening

S/N	Component	Indicators
1	Governance	1. Formalisation e.g., Institutional policies and constitution, presence of a board with clear roles, responsibilities, and deliverable etc. 2. Decentralisation e.g., working groups, regional nodes etc. to cater to the diverse interest of movement actors, manage power imbalances, increase participation etc. 3. Organisational philosophy, advocacy strategy, theory of change and strategic plan etc. to direct and coordinate actions towards shared movement objective(s)
2	Resource mobilisation	4. Evidence of a resource mobilisation strategy/plan 5. Resource mobilisation team/personnel in place 6. Documentation of funding mobilised over specified periods, 7. Diversification of resource mobilisation funds and activities 8. Evidence of clear linkage between resource mobilisation and movement's strategic plan
3	Institutional learning	9. Changes in organisational and management structure, strategies etc. 10. Documentation and data management including quality and utilisation, 11. Monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning plans, activities, and reports, e.g., advocacy and projects monitoring, 12. MERL personnel

The next section of this chapter will examine PACJA's second CJ objective of enhancing public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM) of Africans to demand urgent and equitable climate actions. Using social movement literature, it will highlight key components of PAEM to draw out relevant indicators that will be used to measure its effectiveness in this study.

3.3.2 Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation (PAEM)

Increasingly, the CJMs are concerned with how they can create public awareness on CC and its underlying injustices, connect on a deeper level and inspire collective action towards CJ (Roger et al, 2017; Bulkeley et al, 2012; Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and rightly so. This is because CJM in its broad terms refers to a movement to politicise issues of CC and its unequal impacts and provide adequate solutions (Claeys and Pugley, 2017). Moreover, since many scholars including Tormos and Garcia-Lopez (2018), Falkner (2016) and Goodman (2009) all advocate that large scale collective actions are required to address the "wicked" CC

problem, the more actors that the CJM in SSA can attract to participate in and support their activities i.e., meetings, rallies, sign petitions, protest etc., the more visibility they enjoy and the higher their likelihood of achieving their CJ agenda of increasing the participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC governance and related processes (Bond and Galvin, 2019; Schroeder, 2010; Kecks and Sikkink, 1999). Subsequently, how the CJM creates awareness, engages, and mobilises the public has practical implications for their effectiveness.

This thesis defines awareness creation as the process of making information about a topic or an issue available in the public domain with the purpose of influencing perceptions, attitudes, and actions in favour of an agenda. Its potential to incite public interest on an issue makes it an important first step towards engagement and mobilisation for collective action (Goodman, 2009). By creating public awareness on CC and climate injustices, the CJM would be addressing the current gap in public understanding of CC and its linkages to inequality, poverty, and other socio-economic issues across SSA that have been previously highlighted in the literature (Goodman, 2009; Pettit, 2004). Also, through this learning process, the CJM can incite and sustain interest in the issues to such an extent that it results in incremental actions that will address CC, its impacts and prevent further injustices from occurring i.e., engagement and mobilisation (Masuda et al, 2008; Poliakoff and Web, 2007).

Therefore, this study understands the CJM's objective of PAEM as the activities undertaken by the movement to create and increase awareness of CC and CJ issues with the sole intention of shaping public understanding, perceptions, and action towards the realisation of CJ for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA. Whereas the term "public" has been commonly used in the literature to denote the "general public" or "mini-publics", for example, communities, state, market etc. (Felt and Fochler, 2010; Marres, 2005), here, it is used to refer to the CSOs, NGOs, government, local communities, and other actor groups, specifically those that are currently outside the "inner core" of the movement.

Components and Indicators of public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation effectiveness

Typically, public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM) do not occur in isolation but through exchanges i.e., information, legitimacy, leverage etc. (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). That is, on the one hand, the CJM provides information on CC and CJ issues to the public

that may otherwise have evaded them. On the other hand, the public looks up to them as sources of information and an important link to the CC political process, thus increasing their legitimacy. Therefore, for PAEM to be deemed highly effective, the interactions between the movement and the public must highlight positive outcomes for both groups, for example, mutual learnings; increased ownership of issues motivated by shared values; new and sustained partnerships and collaborations; strengthened capacities and empowerment in addition to evidence of their interactions.

But how does this occur in practice? The CJM uses different activities, strategies, and tactics for PAEM. For instance, they use activities like media communications, face-to-face events i.e., conferences, workshops and meetings, the production and distribution of IEC (Information, Education and Communication) materials, rallies, etc to create and negotiate access to the public, share relevant information and engage in other forms of knowledge generation and transfer (Bauer and Jensen, 2011; Brulle, 2010; Masuda et al, 2008). Because the main purpose of their PAEM is mass mobilisation and agitate for CJ, Bond (2018), Claeys and Pugley, (2017) and Keck and Sikkink (1999) argue that they must implement strategies such as developing and applying cognitive frames to achieve this objective. That is, the CJM must gather, organise, and distribute information, knowledge and experiences on CC and CJ in a way that it influences broader public understanding and ownership in support of climate just actions. More so, since several factors like public concerns, capabilities and socio-political realities are known to have implications for the extent to which the public engage with an issue and mobilise for action (Foran, 2015; Barret, 2013; Whitmarsh et al, 2011). For example, access to resources i.e., technology can act as routes to only selective recruitment of wealthier and more powerful groups and the exclusion of the poorer and more vulnerable groups from the movement i.e., women, older populations, and youths (Diani et al, 2018; Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017).

Also, culture can positively or negatively impact on public engagement and mobilisation for CJ (Kirchherr, 2018; Zoogah et al, 2015). It can be positively manipulated to draw similarities and create social cohesion for societal change. Through local community-based groups and faith-based groups, movement actors can create, mainstream, and sustain their

agendas by deploying cultural narratives, arts, music, and poetry to draw and maintain support from the communities (Kirchherr, 2018).

In contrast, culture can also create distinctions which may prevent the effective engagement and mobilisation of some key movement actor groups in many aspects of movement's activities. For instance, globally, and in many places in sub-Saharan Africa, dominant cultural practices do not provide room for women to actively participate in political activities (Beckwith, 2000; Banaszak, 1996). Women are only allowed to play key roles within the confines of their homes and with the consent of a "mature" close male relative such as their husbands, fathers, or brothers. Also, within dominant cultures in sub-Saharan Africa, the youth are discouraged from participation in political activities as such sensitive affairs are mostly proscribed by age (Theogene, 2018). For instance, in Nigeria, it is perceived as unacceptable for the youth to challenge the wisdom of the elders, who in most cases hold leadership positions and are the targets of collective action. The youth are morally subjugated to the whims of the elders and are less likely to challenge their authority (Theogene, 2018) both out of an inherent desire to abide to widely accepted cultural norms and conventions and fear of negative consequences of contesting them (Polletta, 2008). Therefore, the extent to which the CJM can develop and apply cognitive frames to their PE communications and outreach is dependent on the extent of their understanding of the external conditions within which they exist and seek to influence.

The PAEM activities and tactics that the CJM choses to adopt is also dependent on the scope and target of their campaign. For instance, in the case of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA), the movement specified that its PAEM goal is to mobilise and empower African CSOs to ensure that CC does not negatively impact on or further impoverish the poorest and most vulnerable people in Africa. The movement's PAEM objective, though clearly targeting the African CSOs, cuts across several strata, sectors, cultures, and societies. Thus, highlighting a broad and diverse array of actors or 'mini publics' with which they must share information, persuade, and collaborate with to demand CC adaptation, mitigation, and accountability from those responsible for the problem. While PACJA may choose to use media communication and public events to maximise their communications and outreach, it is important that they identify shared values or issues in common to overcome the challenges

inherent in the diversity of organisations and the societies in which they exist and enhance their mobilisation capacity.

Following from the above analysis of PAEM in different literature, this thesis has identified three components to measure the movement's effectiveness. They are: 1) Collective ownership, 2) Partnerships and Collaborations and 3) Knowledge and Capacity Development. Each of these components and their relevant indicators are discussed in more details below.

1. Collective ownership

Many scholars of social movements agree that a strong sense of ownership or belonging increases public engagement and participation for the socio-ecological transformation that CJ demands (Jugert et al, 2016; Bamberg et al, 2015; Diani, 2013). They argue that individual actors are more likely to engage in movements without the need for incentives if they feel a strong sense of identity and collective efficacy. Yet, the PAEM objective of the CJM is to engage a broad array of actors, with different political and ideological orientations, uneven distribution of knowledge and socio-economic capacity. Therefore, the CJM is faced with the challenge of looking beyond these individual differences to identify and highlight similarities or "commons" among the target actor groups, to increase ownership and quality of participation in the movement's activities (Escobar, 2018; Fournier, 2013).

Bond and Galvin (2019) and Bollier (2016) refer to 'commoning' as a political strategy or ideology for connecting the dots between movement actors, their shared features and struggles, and demonstrate how individual actions link to collective action and solidarity. They argue that if properly done, it creates a safe space for the public to unite, deliberate on their struggles and arrive at solutions that places their needs at the centre. That is, promoting a decentralised bottom-up approach to the governance processes. However, the process of identifying and communicating shared similarities in CJ issues and the need to engage in the broader political struggle i.e., the CJM, remains one of the most difficult tasks for the movement to achieve (Escobar, 2018; Euler, 2018; Foran et al, 2017; Stekelenburg and Klandermans, 2017). It requires skilful manipulations of strategies, spaces, and structures (Escobar, 2018; Euler, 2018). Since the similarities between the actors in the CJM in SSA

comes from several notions including social identity, shared histories and common future, sovereignty and mutual trust, the movement can and must build on these notions to establish commonalities among a diverse group of actors.

For instance, Milan (2015) and Diani (2011) argue that movements can increase ownership by identifying the motivations and self-interest of individual actor groups and locating it in socially recognisable categories like race, place, nation-state, communities etc. with a sense of collective agency. This involves using all three components: diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational, of a collective action frame to politicise an agenda (Bond and Galvin, 2019; Snow, 2007; Benford and Snow, 2000). The diagnostic which comprises of the climate injustices, the prognostic which contains information on the solution to the challenge including actors and action plans, and the motivational which inspires for collective action.

Also, scholars like Rietig (2016) and Scott (2014) observe that the CJM can increase movement ownership by adopting collaborative strategies such as partnerships, lobbying and negotiations, workshops, etc. This is because these strategies are believed to increase cooperation, build trust, and create open and honest lines of communications among actors for long-term engagement. In addition, mutual trust among actors is believed to have positive implications for movement ownership (Bond, 2015). It has the potential to overcome the challenge of competing, self-promoting interests and increase the chances of articulating the CJ demands in one voice. Subsequently, this thesis will seek evidence of ownership (or lack of) from the movement's collective action framing, mutual trust among actors in the movement, inclusiveness in the movement's activities and decision-making processes.

2. Partnerships and Collaborations

Partnerships and collaborations have also been identified from the literature review as an indicator of social movement effectiveness. This is because many scholars including Oloo and Omondi (2017), Diani (2011) and Suh (2011) observe that partnerships and collaborations increases a movements capacity i.e., technical, social, financial, and political for large scale transformational change. Through partnerships and collaborations, individual actor groups within the movement can draw on the social capital of their partners to gain legitimacy, increase funders interest and minimise the cost of their participation. By creating

alliances beyond national and geographical boundaries, class and social stratifications, movements can generate a greater pool of resources, enhance legitimacy, and embed a sense of ownership among wider groups of participants.

Also, movements can successfully mainstream their agenda into public discourse and increase their chances of influencing policy outcomes by harnessing opportunities for collaboration and political alignment (Bennett, 2005; Carty, 2002; Diani, 2000). For example, a core CJ demand of the CJM is implementing climate friendly policies that places the poorest and most vulnerable populations at the centre. However, the mandate for formulating and implementing policies lies with the state or government. Therefore, a strategy for the CJM to achieve its desired policy objective will be to engage this actor as partners. Through this process, the movement can persuade or pressurise the government to formulate the necessary policies while they collaborate with them to ensure its implementation.

Additional effects of partnerships and collaborations for CJM in SSA include proliferation of their agenda, wider engagement in the political processes, an increase in movements' activities and higher likelihood for achieving success. For example, having partners from the more powerful international NGOs in the developed countries and constantly interacting with them, can help to raise the profile, ambition, and opportunities i.e., access to the political processes, funds, prestige of the CJM. Also, their partnerships with the local communities or the grassroots organisations can help proliferate their agenda at local levels and increase trust and movement ownership at this level. To illustrate further, a grassroot movement in sub-Saharan Africa, Environmental Right Action (ERA) Nigeria, was able to gain the attention, and subsequently, the allegiance of an influential International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO), Friends of the Earth International (FoEI) through media proliferation that was born out of globalisation. Through this strategic partnership, ERA gained access to a greater pool of resources, enhanced credibility as an activist group in the fight for Environmental Justice (EJ) and increased their legitimacy and ownership among the Nigerian public.

However, forging and maintaining partnerships and collaborations is costly, requires some form of exchange or incentives and has bearings on the outcomes of the movements' agenda (Bob, 2002; Keck and Sikkink, 1999). As a result, individual actors forge partnerships or

jointly collaborate with movements only if their perceive that there is a greater incentive (i.e., rewards) in it for them in terms of their interests, organisational missions, and campaigns. These incentives could either be tangible i.e., sharing information, accessing funds, public spaces etc. or intangible i.e., visibility, influence, and so forth (Andrews, 2014). Occasionally, these exchanges are unevenly distributed and have implications for a movements' legitimacy and accountability.

For instance, as noted in the previous section, actors within the CJM that provide financial resources and political opportunities would unconsciously possess more decision-making power over other actors providing only time or legitimacy via their participation (Zeitoun and Allan, 2008). Their capability as an "agent of change" translates into some sort of political clout for them (Franks and Cleaver, 2007). They may gain profound influence over the campaign mechanism and programmes run by the CJM. Subsequently, this generative power replicates prevailing issues of structural inequality and power imbalances in the societies (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004; Cress and Snow, 1996) that the movement originally seeks to address.

Therefore, the onus is on the CJM to be strategic in its approach to partnerships and clear on the benefits that they offer to these partners to retain their support and vice versa. This thesis will analyse whether (or not) the CJM in SSA has been successful in attracting and retaining partnerships and collaborations and harnessing the strengths inherent in it to further its PAEM objective, as well as the trade-offs that occur.

3. Knowledge and Capacity Development

Knowledge refers to an organised body of information, skills and competencies of a subject that is acquired either through education or experience. It varies from one person or actor to another depending on the amount of information each person has, individual experiences, interpretations, and responses (Buuren, 2009). While capacity is understood as the ability of persons, organisations, and institutions to perform their functions and deal with a problem or challenge (Steiner, 2010; Smith and Kulynych, 2002). Knowledge is theory oriented and focuses on the "what' while capacity is more encompassing and action oriented. Although essential for institutional and governance strengthening, knowledge and capacity

development have more practical implications for public participation in the CC governance processes.

For example, scholars agree that evidence of movements' effectiveness in PAEM is demonstrated in the positive changes in public knowledge and capacity (Gustafsson et el, 2020). This is because they believe that the intended outcome of PAEM is to influence public understanding of issues and solutions towards a specific outcome. By providing them with information, the public can enhance their participation in CC governance by taking informed decisions, demanding accountability, and supporting the implementation of climate just policies (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2004). This is particularly important for the CJM in SSA since many scholars including Bond (2015), Okereke (2010) and Singer (2004) have identified gaps in CC knowledge and capacity as being responsible for the current limited CJ mobilisation and demands from the region. As a result, they argue that PAEM offer a means to empower the public through knowledge and capacity development for large scale mobilisation and for the transformational change that CJ demands. More so, since many of the PAEM of movements, for examples, conferences, seminars and the like allow participants access to other actors and opportunities like media attention, partnerships, political spaces, etc.

However, many scholars have criticised the PAEM activities of the broader CJM as mostly top-down and elite driven (Bond, 2015). That is, the movements have been mostly concerned with enhancing the publics' technical knowledge of CC causes and individual narratives of CC impacts with little attention being paid to integration of these issues with the broader CJ struggles. For example, scholars like Diani et al (2018), Kirchherr (2018) and Rohlinger (2002) argue that developing the social, economic, and political capacity across SSA is more crucial for the CJM as this will inevitably result in enhanced technical capacity. They reason that although individual actors may wish to participate in a movement's PAEM activities, they may refrain from doing so if they perceive that the cost of their participation, for example, time, unpaid labour, loss of social security etc., is too high and in conflict with their need for survival. Conversely, they may be more likely to participate if guaranteed some form of incentives, for example, compensation for their time, access to political events, grant-writing opportunities etc.

Similarly, Bennett et al (2018) and Garret (2006) argue that the tools used by movements for PAEM create limited opportunity for engagement and capacity enhancement. For example, they observe that information and communication technology (ICT) like the internet, websites, emails, social media have been identified by movements as a disruptive tool for mobilising and organising for collective action. While they acknowledge the many advantages presented by the ICT, e.g., significant reduction in cost of face-face participation, fast and improved access to information, expanded space for engagement, they reason that these ICT platforms are not readily available to all, particularly the poorest and most vulnerable populations across SSA. In cases where they are available, limited computer literacy and intermittent power supply may limit the extent of accessibility and benefits that would otherwise have been derived from it. As a result, information proliferated through these channels may not be accessible to significant numbers or the target population (Bennett, 2005). Therefore, limiting participation in and impacts of a movement's PAEM activities conducted through this medium.

If the CJM is serious about engaging and mobilising for CJ, it must ensure that its PAEM activities identify and attempt to addresses current CC knowledge and capacity gaps across SSA. Subsequently, this thesis will analyse what capacities the CJM in SSA has built and their implications, if any. The analysis will include an examination of the movement's strategy and activities for knowledge and capacity development, and whether there are additional capacity gaps that needs to be addressed. Data sources for the various indicators shall be obtained organisationally and interpersonally. Organisationally from organisational documents i.e., strategic plan, reports, publications, and communication channels i.e., websites, social media pages. Interpersonally, through participant observation of their activities, and via interviews and informal discussions with other participants in movements' PAEM activities.

While the indicators of the movement's effectiveness in PAEM can be described quantitatively for example, using the number of people attending in their events and/or public meeting, the size and growth of their membership, number of visits, likes and comments on their social media pages etc., in many cases, quantitative indicators are not representative of effectiveness (Neserini and Bucchi, 2011). For example, the quality of participation in events, i.e., whether learning or other forms of exchange have occurred cannot be demonstrated in

qualitative terms. Consequently, this thesis shall use both quantitative and qualitative indicators to provide a balanced analysis of the extent of the CJM's effectiveness in PAEM. See Table 2 below for a summary on the indicators and their manifestation in practice.

Table 2: Indicators of Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation

S/N	Component	Indicators
1	Collective ownership	1. Shared CJ framings and narratives i.e., advocacy messaging and collective action framing etc. 2. Inclusiveness – diversity and representation of stakeholder groups in the movement, trust 3. Existence and implementation of a holistic engagement strategy
2	Collaborations and Partnerships	4. Number and types of collaborations and partnerships including new and sustained, including signed agreements or memoranda of understanding etc. 5. Wider engagement in relevant CC governance processes 6. Joint projects/programmes implementations
3	Knowledge and Capacity Development	7. Number and types of public awareness and engagement events, activities, including TV and radio appearances, print, social media etc. 8. Open access to information and movement's activities e.g., using social media pages, providing links to help desk etc. 9. Implementation of capacity development and mobilisation programmes e.g., provision of funds to attend events, training, research, Targeted activities for specific groups etc.

Having discussed the second CJ objective, relevant components and indicators of effectiveness, the final section of this chapter will critically examine PACJA's third CJ objective i.e., policy influence. This will include an account of how policy influence has been constructed in the literature, how it is defined in this study, its key components, and practical indicators.

3.3.3 Policy Influence (PI)

Policy influence (PI) is increasingly recognised as a core function of social movements, especially the CJM (Piggot, 2018). This is because the ubiquitous nature of CC and the political landscape of the global CC governance processes (i.e., democratic global cooperation) makes policy the most preferred mechanism for addressing CC (Brass, 2012a). As a result, the CJMs must gain significant influence in the CC policy processes if they are to achieve their CJ objectives. But how is "influence" defined? Nye Jr (2004) broadly defines influence as the exercise of power. More narrowly, Tallberg et al (2018) defines PI as the political outcomes that occur because of the actions of an actor. Although these definitions provide a background for understanding PI, they are limited by their failure to include the processes and conditions under which power can be exercised. This is because of the fluid nature of power i.e., the link between where power lies, and the conditions like time, resources etc. needed to alter the normal cause of actions (Lowery, 2013; Nelson, 2000). For instance, many scholars including Rietig (2010) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) observe that power in lies with different actors in the policy process. Usually, this power is linked to an actor's resource mobilisation capacity (i.e., funds, information etc.), legitimacy etc. Therefore, how these actors mobilise and exercise their power (i.e., funds, information, legitimacy) to gain leverage on a policy issue is a measure of their influence.

Following from the above, Betsill and Corell (2001) defines PI as the "*intentional transmission of information*" by an actor with the sole aim of altering political outcomes. In their definition, they linked power in the policy process to capacity of an actor (in this case, International Non-Governmental Organisations - INGOs) to mobilise information, and the exercise of power over how this information is transmitted. However, this definition of PI is inadequate because of its limited focus on information despite movements being known for their capacity to mobilise funds to support project and programme implementation. Moreover, the impacts of information on PI are not always visible in the short-term. This is because the political complexities and existing realities of the CJM require consistent interactions over prolonged periods before it is reflected in policy outcomes (Hans and Barnett-Loro, 2018; Hornsey et al, 2006; Borgatti et al, 2002). Therefore, there is need to recognise the different types of power that movements have in the policy process, how they

are exercised and the changes that in the policy process or outcomes that occur as a result (Tallberg et al, 2018; Brass, 2012: Covey, 1995). Subsequently, this thesis defines PI as the extent to which the CJM can leverage its power to strengthen the capacities and participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC policy process, alter, formulate, and support the implementation of climate just policies. The section below will highlight and discuss three key components and their relevant indicators of effectiveness.

Components and Indicators of Policy Influence

Andrews (2001) observes that despite the increasing knowledge of significance of movements in the CC policy processes and participants' concerns regarding the efficacy of movements, their influence has remained understudied. For the most part, scholars have studied movements' PI in terms of policy outcomes (Tsutsui and Shin, 2008; Giugni, 1999). This is based on the premise that policy outcomes encompass the long-term goal of many movements and are easy to measure (Andrews, 2001). However, more recently, scholars have begun to include other phenomena encountered (for example, access to and participation in the policy arena i.e., sites where policies are negotiated and leverage i.e., power) in the process of creating these outcomes, in their analysis of PI (Amenta et al, 2010).

For instance, Tallberg et al (2018) and Mahoney (2007) argue that PI is dependent on the extent of access that a movement has to the CC policy processes. This is because a movement's access to the policy arena is not always open and participation in the processes can be mostly informal. In some instances, access to the policy arena is limited. This may be because the state actors, having the jurisdiction of policymaking, wish to use the policy arena to retain their control over the evermore blurred lines of the roles of the state and the Third Sector (Brass, 2012). Or they may do so due to other factors such as limited availability of resources to effectively coordinate public engagement. Therefore, they (i.e., Tallberg et al, 2018; Mahoney, 2007) argue that the more access that a movement has to the policy actors and arena, the greater the likelihood that it will influence the process and outcomes in support of its agenda, Thus, highlighting "access" to the CC policy processes as the most significant indicator of PI.

However, other scholars like Dany (2014) and Giugni and Passy (1998) have observed that access does not automatically translate into policy influence for movements, since the power to formulate and implement policies ultimately lies with the government. Therefore, the CJM would need to derive ways to persuade the government to formulate and implement climate just policies. To do this, scholars like Kirgis (2014) and Keck and Sikkink, (1999) maintain that the CJM must possess leverage. That is, material benefits that the CJM possess and which are wanted or needed by the government to satisfy its interest(s) or deliver on its mandate. This leverage can be exercised in several ways including commitments from partnerships or collaborations (i.e., positive), or protest and demonstrations (i.e., negative) (Kirgis, 2014). Nevertheless, the extent of leverage that the CJM can exert on the policy process is dependent on several factors including the value to the government, their needs and/or interest alignments, strategies etc.

Considering the above, this thesis recognises: 1) access to and participation in the policy process, 2) leverage and 3) policy outcomes as the three most important components of policy influence. Each of these components will be discussed in more detail below to highlight relevant indicators of a movement's policy influence.

1. <u>Access to and participation in the policy process</u>

Increasingly, scholars have observed that PI is significantly dependent on other phenomena like the nature of access to the policy process, procedural constraints from institutionalised participation etc. (Dany, 2014; Brass, 2012). For example, Brass (2012) observed that closed government systems are less likely to have opportunities for movements to engage in the governance processes to develop inclusive policies. Even in situations where movements stage protests and demonstrations as means to engage the state, there is no guarantee that their concerns will be taken into consideration or result in any policy change (Giugni and Passy, 1998). Mahoney (2007) also noted that because of the limited pressure for accountability in states that have weak democratic structures and processes the governments are less responsive to the demands from the civil society. In fact, these civil societies may face repression by the state as a backlash of their activities (Obi, 2005).

However, Dany (2014) also argues that movements still face structural challenges even in open democratic processes. Mostly, the invitations extended to movements to join CC policy dialogue and related processes often include set agenda, agreed procedures for participation, pre-assigned roles etc. which creates a situation of "exclusion via inclusion". Like at the UNFCCC COPs where although climate movements, NGOs and CSOs are invited to participate, their participation is restricted by their observer status and indirect engagements, e.g., lobbying government officials, organising seminars and presentations, staging protests etc. at the conference sites.

Also, since the policy mandate lies with the government, movements' participation in the process is mostly informal and limited in scope as they may only be invited to engage in dialogues over minor or side issues that have little relevance to the overall policy process (Guigni and Passy, 1998). Additionally, their participation may be hindered by the high turnover of actors and employees. This is because most actors in movements are volunteers who are unable to fully engage in policy process due to other conflicting demands on their time. The implication of this is that the movements are either underrepresented at these discussions or lose track of the process (due to the frequent change in members' representatives) and their influence is thereby affected. Consequently, access to and participation of the movements in the CC policy process has implications for their influence.

This thesis will analyse the access in terms of agenda setting, direct or indirect, of the CJM to policymakers and sites (meetings, conferences, consultation events etc.) and their roles in the policy process to provide information on their potential, whether high, moderate, or low to achieve PI. Indicators of access and participation in the CC policy process will include agenda setting in the form of research initiatives, media campaigns, policy briefs, etc., evidence of the CJMs engagements, partnerships, and collaboration with the government on CC policies at different levels.

2. Leverage

Following from the above, other scholars have observed that PI is significantly dependent on other phenomena like leverage and/or the extent of exchanges that take place during policy processes (Tallberg et al, 2018; Nelson, 2010; Mahoney, 2007). Thus, indicating its relevance

to assessing PI. This is in line with the earlier claims of Giuigni (2007) that movements' impact on policy is dependent on the amount of leverage that it can mobilise. Kirgis (2014) defines leverage as power rooted in consequences. That is, power based upon an actor's ability to confer material benefits or impose material costs on another. Usually, leverage is prominent during interactions as it increases the chances of agreement being reached on one's terms. Also, because it is not static, it can be transferred from an actor to its counterpart at different phases in the policy interactions or negotiations. Examples may include resources, visibility, legitimacy etc.

Leverage is often unevenly distributed among actors (Andrews, 2014). As a result, actors having more leverage tend to gain stronger influence in the policy process (Kirgis, 2014; Zeitoun and Allan, 2008). For example, many movements possess a potential for high resource mobilisation due to their broad membership (Mahoney, 2007). Also, the presence of grassroots communities and constituencies grants them a certain degree of legitimacy in the policy arena. In contrast, governments who are the key policymakers, typically have limited resources to formulate and implement key and effective CC policies, particularly those in developing countries which are already struggling with the cost of addressing socio-economic challenges. Subsequently, they can benefit from the resource mobilisation potential of movements by partnering with them to support the policy process (Amenta et al, 2010).

Movements can use the funds available to them and their broad membership to support the policy process by incurring some of the cost of public participation, thereby strengthening local capacities on CC policies through awareness and trainings. (Brass, 2012; Godwin et al, 2000). In turn, they can use their resources mobilisation capacity as leverage to persuade the government and influence their policy decisions in support of their agenda (Fyall, 2016; Amenta et al, 2010; Franks and Cleaver, 2007). Nevertheless, governments' mandate as the key policymakers grants them higher leverage in the CC policy negotiation process.

In some instances, an actor i.e., movements, may possess more than on type of leverage (e.g., resources, legitimacy, political allies etc.) which can be used to gain influence in the policy process. As a result, many scholars including Cunningham, et al (2017), Idemudia (2017) and Kaup and Casey (2016) argue that it is important for such an actor to identify which leverage is most important to serve their agenda at different points in time. For instance, at the policy

formulation stage where the finer details of negotiations are being discussed, movements can use their capacity for mobilising information to gain an insider position as a resources hub to influence the processes (Idemudia, 2017). Especially since policies are founded based on the amount of information available to policymakers, they can provide them with expert knowledge and evidence from their grassroots constituencies to influence the decisions (Cunningham et al, 2017; Kaup and Casey, 2016). Alternatively, if the goal of the movement is to occupy and challenge for policy change, they can use their visibility and legitimacy gained from their mass proliferation and grassroots representation to stage mass demonstrations, protests, naming and shaming etc. to politicise their agenda and influence the outcomes.

However, making these linkages is not always an easy feat for movements to achieve. This is because their ability to exercise leverage is dependent on several factors including the value of the leverage, levels of knowledge, education and awareness of movement actors, strategy, existing governance system and other structural factors within which a movement operates (Bond, 2018; Claeys and Pugley, 2017; Bullard and Mullard, 2012). For example, Grossmann (2012) argues that information can only be used as leverage to influence policy depending on the time and issue under consideration. This is because for information to be used to gain political clout in the policy dialogue process, it must be shared with the policy makers in advance and clearly demonstrate how a CC issue links to other aspects of the society i.e., political, social, and economic, which also compete for their attention (Chen et al, 2013).

Also, movements may or may not gain influence in the policy process depending on the value of the leverage and external socio-political conditions (Amenta et al, 2010). For instance, oil remains the economic mainstay in Nigeria. Being a developing country, the government's priority is focused on maximising its oil production activities to generate more revenue to address its development challenges. Regardless of the amount of grassroots evidence of negative oil impacts that the CJM can leverage, it is highly likely that policy demands like "stop fossil fuel use" will be met with stronger resistance by the government. Such campaigns may even be considered 'dead in the water' by the political and comprador classes. However, if the CJM can strategically transmit technical information on the consequences of transition versus non-transition, they may potentially succeed in altering beliefs and subsequently, decisions (Chen, et al, 2013).

In line with the above, many scholars have highlighted that the process or strategy for exerting leverage is equally as important (Idemudia, 2017; Mahoney, 2007). For instance, Idemudia (2017) argues that movements that seek entry into the policy arena using collaborative strategies are more likely to gain influence in the process than if they adopt antagonistic approaches. He noted that this is because collaborative strategies like partnerships, lobbying, establishing joint meetings and training tends to enhance cooperation and build trust among actors. Thus, enhancing the reputational legitimacy of the movement as an important actor in the policy process (Mahoney, 2007; Miller, 1994).

In turn, collaborative strategies allow movements to sustain their access to the policy actors and arenas since long-term engagement is needed for them to achieve their policy objective(s) (Amenta et al, 2010; Giugni and Passy, 1998). Occasionally, during interactions in the policy process, movements find themselves in positions where they must scale down their policy demands and align with other more powerful actors (i.e., the government) (Brass, 2012). While this flexibility and willingness to compromise can offer a movement opportunity for future wins and longer-term influence, if not adequately managed, it can also pose difficulties for them (Andrews, 2001). For instance, they may face co-optation and the risk of losing their reputation, especially among their grassroots constituencies who may perceive them as selling out because of their flexibility and blurring lines of accountability (Hudson, 2001; Evans, 2010; Edwards and Hulmes, 1995). Since legitimacy enhances their influence, the absence of it would also limit their influence and thus their effectiveness (Fyall, 2016; Cameron and Quinn, 2006).

The ideal scenario will be for movements to maintain a balance and determine which strategy is best depending on individual context without losing sight of their policy agenda. Subsequently, their influence in policy can be determined from the presence of leverage(s), the movement's ability to identify and satisfy a need/interest(s) of the government, and the strategy used by the movement to exercise this leverage at different stages in the policy process. Practical indicators of leverage will include evidence of the CJM's use of material and non-violent (i.e., moral and intellectual) tactics to influence the CC policy process.

3. Policy Outcomes

This thesis defines policy outcomes as the outcomes that occur because of a movement's participation, either directly or indirectly, in the CC policy processes. These outcomes can either be positive, negative, intended, or unintended (Andrews, 2001). Examples of policy outcomes include new policy enactments and/or changes to existing ones, court orders, altering administrative rule/actions, policy implementation, etc. Policy outcomes are commonly used by scholars as indicators of movements' effectiveness in driving political change (Mahoney, 2007). However, scholars like Amenta et al (2010), Tsutsui and Shin (2008) and Diani (1997) have highlighted problems with attributing policy outcomes to movements' activities.

For instance, they argue that while movements' actions may have contributed significantly to policy outcomes, there may be other explanations or factors responsible for the outcome. Also, Amenta et al (2010) argue that policy outcomes are outside the direct influence of movements, and as such cannot be attributed to them. However, they reasoned that in situations where a movement has specific political goals like the banning of Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs), alcohol etc., it can be used to indicate PI. A notable example of attributable policy outcomes is the current campaign to ban GMO products in Nigeria that is being spearheaded by the Health of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF). In addition to this, HOMEF is also pushing for reforms in the national food security and safety policies to include stronger information disclosure and government accountability. Until now, there is no policy targeted at GMOs neither is there another organisation known to be driving this specific goal despite the numerous agenda on food security in the country. Perchance the policymakers enact a new regulation prohibiting the use of GMO products in Nigeria, the policy win can be credited to HOMEF since it matches their campaign goal. This policy outcome can create additional policy wins for the NGO such as access to the policy table from presenting themselves as a relevant player (or interest group) in the food sector policy arena (Mahoney, 2007).

Consequently, this thesis will focus on identifying only those policy outcomes, intended and unintended, that have evident links to the movement's actions, specifically in the last decade.

The evidence will be obtained from analysing the movements interactions in the policy arena and with the policy actors, strategies, and contexts i.e., agenda setting, political opportunities etc (see Table 3 below).

Table 3: Indicators of Policy Influence

S/N	Components	Indicators
1	Access and participation	1. Agenda setting in the form of research initiatives, media campaigns, policy briefs, etc. 2. Participation in the CC policy process including nature of access to the policy actors and arena i.e., observer, consultation, or joint partnerships and collaboration with the government on CC policies at different levels,
2	Leverage	3. Evidence of the CJM's use of material tactics i.e., information, finance etc. 4. Moral (non-violent) tactics i.e., protest events, public opinions,
3	Policy outcomes	5. Policy enactments and/or changes to existing ones, 6. Altering administrative rule/actions, court orders, 7. Joint policy implementation e.g., Paris Agreement, CC budget etc.

So far, this chapter has examined the constructs of the three CJ objectives (or effectiveness criteria) 1) institutional and governance strengthening (IGS), 2) public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM) and 3) policy influence of the CJM in SSA. It has examined three key components of each criterion to highlight a total of 28 relevant practical indicators of effectiveness: 12 of IGS, 9 of PAEM and 7 indicators of PI for this study. These criteria, components and their relevant indicators are summarised in Table 4 below which will serve as the analytical framework for this study.

Table 4: Framework for analysing the Effectiveness of the Climate Justice Movement (CJM) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

Effectiveness Criteria	Proposed by Authors	Components	Indicators
Institutional and Governance Strengthening (IGS)	Robinson and Schroeder (2017), Oloo and Omondi (2017), Amenta (2014), Lecy et al (2012), Leopkey and Parent (2012), Haug (2013), Suh (2011), Pache and Santos (2010), Ossenwaarde et al (2008), Bader (2007), Watts et al (2007), Gottschalk and Schmidt (2004), Horton and Mackay (2003), Kecks and Sikkink (1999)	Internal governance	1. Formalization e.g., Institutional policies and constitution, presence of a board with clear roles, responsibilities, and deliverable etc. 2. Decentralisation e.g., working groups, regional nodes etc. to cater to the diverse interest of movement actors, manage power imbalance, increase participation etc. 3. Organisational philosophy, advocacy strategy, theory of change and strategic plan etc. to direct and coordinate actions towards shared movement objective(s)
		Resource mobilisation	4. Evidence of a resource mobilisation strategy/plan 5. Resource mobilisation team/personnel in place 6. Documentation of funding mobilised over specified periods, 7. Diversification of resource mobilisation funds and activities 8. Evidence of clear linkage between resource mobilisation and movement's strategic plan
		Institutional learning	9. Changes in organisational and management structure, strategies etc. 10. Documentation and data management including quality and utilisation, 11. Monitoring, evaluation, reporting and learning plans, activities, and reports, e.g., advocacy and projects monitoring, 12. MERL personnel
Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation (PAEM)	Bond and Galvin (2019), Tormos and Garcia-Lopez (2018), Oloo and Omondi (2017), Roger et al (2017), Falkner (2016), Jugert et al (2016), Bamberg et al (2015), Bulkeley et al (2012), Diani (2013), Neresini and Bucchi (2011), Goodman (2009),	Ownership	13. Shared CJ framings and narratives i.e., advocacy messaging and collective action framing etc. 14. Inclusiveness – diversity and representation of stakeholder groups in the movement, trust 15. Existence and implementation of a holistic engagement strategy
		Collaborations & Partnerships	16. Number and types of collaborations and partnerships including new and sustained, including signed agreements or memoranda of understanding etc. 17. Wider engagement in relevant CC governance processes 18. Joint projects/programmes implementations

Effectiveness Criteria	Proposed by Authors	Components	Indicators
	Buuren (2009), Kecks and Sikkink (1998)	Knowledge & Capacity Development	19. Number and types of public awareness and engagement events, activities, including TV and radio appearances, print, social media etc. 20. Open access to information and movement's activities e.g., using social media pages, providing links to help desk etc. 21. Implementation of capacity development and mobilisation programmes e.g., provision of funds to attend events, training, research, Targeted activities for specific groups etc.
Policy Influence (PI)	Piggot (2018), Tallberg (2018), Dany (2014), Kirgis (2014), Amenta et al (2010), Tsutsui and Shin (2008), Idemudia (2007), Mahoney (2007), Chen et al (2013), Andrews (2001), Betsill and Corell (2001), Guigni (1998), Kecks and Sikkink (1998)	Access & participation	22. Agenda setting in the form of research initiatives, media campaigns, policy briefs, etc. 23. Participation in the CC policy process including nature of access to the policy actors and arena i.e., observer, consultation, or joint partnerships and collaboration with the government on CC policies at different levels,
		Leverage	24. Evidence of the CJM's use of material tactics i.e., political allies. 25. Moral (non-violent) tactics i.e., protest events, public opinions, etc.
		Policy outcomes	26. Policy enactments and/or changes to existing ones, 27. Altering administrative rule/actions, court orders, 28. Joint policy implementation e.g., Paris Agreement, CC budget etc.

3.4 Summary

This chapter has provided the analytical framework for this thesis. It began by providing the different contexts of climate injustices including geographical variability, structural issues, for example, weak adaptive capacity, poverty, power imbalance in the global sphere etc. and justification for conceptualising CJ for SSA as the disruption of processes that support or reproduces climate injustices. It highlighted four key CJ demands for the CJM: 1) improved participation of the vulnerable groups across SSA in CC negotiations and governance processes, 2) the creation of new and strengthening of existing access to climate finance for SSA, 3) capacity development for the poorest and most vulnerable populations across SSA to enable them to adapt to the impacts of CC, and 4) the implementation of effective policies to mitigate current climate injustices and avoid future harm.

Following from the above and further review of the literature on social movement and organisational effectiveness, the chapter went on to identify three main criteria to be used to evaluate the effectiveness of the CJM. They include: 1) Institutional and governance strengthening (IGS), 2) Public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM); and 3) Policy influence (PI). Next, the chapter examined each of these criteria of effectiveness and further divided them into three respective components. This was necessary to highlight diverse scholarly perspectives and tensions inherent in each criterion, open the scope of analysis and allow for easier identification of the relevant indicators of effectiveness. Overall, the chapter identified 12 indicators of IGS, 9 indicators of PAEM and 7 indicators of PI.

Examples of indicators of IGS include evidence of a valid registration, institutional policies, constitution, resource mobilisation strategy and MERL (see Table 3.1). For PAEM, indicators of effectiveness include evidence of an engagement strategy and its implementation, members inclusiveness, extensive and strategic partnerships and collaborations and implementation of capacity development programmes (see Table 3.2). While the indicators of movement's PI include agenda setting, inclusion in policy dialogues, policy enactments and/or changes to existing ones etc. (see Table 3.3)

While the chapter has identified a total of 28 indicators of effectiveness to be used for this study, it recognises that there are other indicators that have not been included. This is because it is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide an exhaustive list of all the indicators of effectiveness and concurrently conduct a thorough investigation of them. Also, since the purpose of this chapter is to establish the analytical framework for this thesis, it has sought to identify only those indicators that it considers to be most practicable and relevant in line with the key CJ demands across SSA. These indicators were then summarised into an analytical framework in Table 3.4 that would underpin this research.

The next chapter will discuss the research epistemology, design, methods, and ethical considerations that were used in this study. The discussion will include details on the procedures used in validating, analysing, and interpreting the data and limitations associated with the processes.

Chapter Four: Research Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the research epistemology, design, methods, and ethical considerations employed in this study. The chapter begins with an overview of the research epistemology and design, linking the research questions to the process of data collection, and how the data will be used to make inferences (King et. al., 1994). Next, it provides a detailed account of the research methods and procedures that were adopted to address the research questions. The methods include a case study, document analysis, key informant (in-depth) interviews and participant observation. The chapter goes on to describe how the data collected for this research were validated, analysed, and interpreted. Finally, it concludes with a summary of the ethical considerations and research limitations associated with the research design, data collection methods, analysis, and interpretations.

4.2 Research Epistemology

In any research, establishing the ontological and epistemological base is the starting point for collecting reliable data. Ontology refers to the nature of reality or nature of the object (or entity) under investigation while epistemology is our knowledge of reality including the sources and limits of such knowledge (Silverman, 2006; Krauss, 2005). Since social movements are known for their unique role in identifying and highlighting issues and demanding changes to existing socio-political system, their ontological position is premised on the idea of alternative world devoid of the existing reality (Chester, 2012). Accordingly, this research is underpinned by a realist ontological position since it is investigating the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA to demand urgent and ambitious actions to address the injustices of CC on the poorest and most vulnerable populations in the region.

In terms of the epistemology, this research is positioned within the interpretivist/constructivist framework. This is because social movements like the CJM are known for their role as both objects and co-producers of knowledge (Chester, 2012). Also, this research recognises that effectiveness is contextually bound and mediated by several interacting factors including the existing socio-political structure, resources, time, and space etc. (as outlined in Section 3.2 of Chapter 3). As such, the presence of a variety of actors in the CJM, bounded to a specific place (i.e., SSA) (Neuman, 2000) and interacting in open, contingent, and unpredictable ways means that individual experiences or accounts will vary according to the extent of their interactions and consciousness of the interacting factors or phenomena (Harre, 2009; Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Therefore, this research must seek to adequately capture and understand the standpoints of CJM and research participants relative to the historical, social, and cultural context within which the movement is situated (Scotland, 2012).

Many social movement scholars including Chester (2012) argue that such understandings can only be achieved from close interactions between the researcher and the movement since knowledge, meanings and interpretations of realities are constructed, ascribed, and transmitted through human interactions. As a result, they mostly advocate for participatory engagements such as ethnography, participant action research etc. (Chester, 2012; Cohen et al, 2000). However, these methods are problematic for this study for several reasons.

Firstly, the CJM in sub-Saharan Africa is not a single entity but a movement made up of smaller movements and organisations that is continually expanding and changing in response to a changing world. Secondly, engaging too closely with the object under investigation, in this case the CJM, can negatively impact on the striving for objectivity on the part of the researcher and compromise the research objectives (Chester, 2012). More so, since the role of the researcher includes critiquing, resisting, revising, and confirming/questioning the concepts and knowledge of the movement where necessary (Demmer and Hummel, 2017). Lastly, many movements, both globally and in SSA do not have databases or archives documenting the profiles of participants, movement processes (i.e., activities, histories, learnings, changes etc.) and outcomes (della Porta, 2014). In cases where records, databases or archives exist, the process of archiving, sourcing, and interpreting these documents is influenced by professional/individual idiosyncrasies and

biases, both on the part of the researcher and the movement participants, which may or may not be known to the researcher and/or research participant (Barros et al, 2019; Krauss, 2005). For example, why and how these archives were produced and curated, existing rules of law at the time it was curated, personal interests, standpoints of the curator or researcher etc. Therefore, it is important for this research to utilise an appropriate methodology, that is one that takes cognisance of the empirical challenges and tries to account for them. This will ensure that only data that reflect the deliberate perspectives and experiences of the research participants and on movement's activities are collected and studied.

Accordingly, suitable methodologies associated with this research epistemology (i.e., constructivist/interpretive) allow for providing detailed qualitative accounts or narratives on an individual case or phenomenon. Also, they allow for a wide range of qualitative methods like document analysis, life histories, open-ended interviews, focus groups, informal discussions, and participant observations to be used for data collection (Creswell, 2003; Silverman, 2006). In turn, these methods will allow the researcher to get close enough to the CJM and research participants (Creswell, 2009) to be able to gain relevant insights and in-depth understanding of their CJ objectives, activities, strategies, histories, influence etc., that are needed to adequately address the research questions. Furthermore, they enhance the opportunity for triangulation i.e., collecting, and validating (i.e., cross checking and confidently drawing conclusions) data from multiple perspectives to reduce limits and biases inherent in a single method and ensure the reliability and transferability of the research process and findings (Ayoub et al, 2014; Scotland, 2012; Denzin and Lincoln, 2011).

Reliability is the consistency in results/findings from a study repeated over several attempts by different researchers (Hayashi Jr et al, 2019). Social science research frequently has low reliability in that it is virtually impossible for two different researchers to study the same phenomena in the same way and end up with consistent findings. Similarly, transferability, which is when the findings can be transferred to other context, tends to be low in such research, especially case-study based research. It is the validity that is highest in such research, i.e., the confidence to assert that your research design has allowed you to 'measure' concepts that are well-founded and corresponding to what you set out to measure/analyse. (Rose and Johnson,

2020). Subsequently, this research will adopt the case study methodology to data collection and analysis. The justification for choosing this methodology is provided in Section 4.3.2 below.

4. 3 Research Design

4.3.1 Research questions

The overarching research question for this thesis is: "*How effective is the climate justice movement in sub-Saharan Africa"?* Accordingly, this thesis is focused on investigating the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA in relations to the key CJ objectives of the region. This includes improving participation in the CC negotiations and governance processes, accessing climate finance to enhance their economic power, building resilience, and implementing effective policies to mitigate current climate injustices and avoid future harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations. However, for the purpose of clarity and empirical analysis, this research has grouped these CJ objectives into three main core activities: 1) Institutional and governance strengthening, 2) Public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation, and 3) Policy influence. Also, since the CJM exists and operates within the external environment, coupled with the fact that effectiveness as a concept is contextually bound, it is important to investigate what factor(s), if any, has implication on the movement's effectiveness.

Subsequently, the overarching research question is sub-divided into two:

1. How effective is the CJM in SSA in a) Institutional and governance strengthening, b) Public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation, and c) Policy influence?
2. What factors (or structural conditions) inhibit the effectiveness of the CJM?

4.3.2 Research Methodology

A case study methodology is identified as suitable for this thesis. Public mobilisation, for one thing, can act as a guiding concept for data collection and analysis in this research because of the widespread knowledge that movements are founded on the philosophy of collective action. As

such, understanding what the CJM in SSA does to mass mobilise, for example, their awareness and engagement practices, will provide empirical data for this analysis. Moreover, since empirical data like the media movement actors use to engage, the main target audience and the core messages being passed, are all rooted in specific social contexts which in turn affect the way a concept like mobilisation is understood and interpreted.

Also, the nature of the overarching research question: 'How effective is the CJM in SSA?' emphasises the exploratory nature of the research to include details and descriptions of the extent of the effectiveness of the movement and the driving or inhibiting factors (Corbin and Strauss, 1990; Saunders et al, 2009; Yin, 2003; Gillham, 2000). Moreover, case study-based research allows for comprehensive descriptions and direct interpretations of issues, events, experiences, and interactions of a phenomenon within an empirical reality (King et al, 1994). Additionally, the case study methodology is well suited for this study given the limited time frame for this research including fieldwork, thesis writing and submission. Consequently, this thesis has adopted the case study methodology to data collection and analysis.

In the next section, this thesis will discuss the selection of the CJM as the case study for this research. The discussion will include the criteria used for the selection and a brief profile of the CJ movement.

4.3.2.1 <u>Selection of case study</u>

A purposive sampling technique was used to identify existing CJMs in SSA (Bryman, 2012). This involved asking questions that related to identifying people and movements that are engaged in the CJ 'space' in Africa, and particularly in SSA due to this research focus on the region (Palys, 2008). Informal discussions with associates within the researcher's academic and professional network helped identify vibrant CJMs in SSA. They included Friends of the Earth International (FoEI), 350.org, Climate Action Now International (CAN), Environmental Rights Action, Greenbelt movement, and the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) among others (*A brief profile of these movements has been provided in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2 of this thesis*). This was followed up with desk-based research to obtain information on their respective

histories, objectives, activities, outreach, representation, and significance in SSA. Key criteria used in the selection of a suitable case study movement in this research included international visibility, geographical location, grassroots activism, deep immersion in political economy, longevity, and influence (see Table 5.).

Table 5: Summary of Attributes used in the selection of a CJM for intensive study

Attributes	FOEI	CAN-I	350.org	ERA	GBM	PACJA
CJ objective	• Energy justice i.e., increase access. • GHGs emissions reductions • Advocacy campaign for alternative energy sources	• Loss &Damages • Debt cancellation • Holding developed countries accountable under the Paris Agreement • Just transition from fossil fuels • Grassroots mobilisation & empowerment	• Divestment from fossil fuel • Just transition to renewable energy	• Energy justice i.e., increase access. • GHGs emissions reductions • Advocacy campaign for alternative energy sources	• Capacity building • Public awareness & engagement • Implementation of CC programmes e.g., REDD+	• Institutional & governance strengthening • Public engagement & mobilisation • Policy influence • Holding government accountable • Research, Knowledge & Development
International visibility	• Largest grassroots environmental network in the world	• Largest climate network globally	• Organised the largest event on CC in the world – International Day of Climate action	• Sophie prize for excellence and courage in the struggle for EJ (1998) • Court cases with Shell in the Niger-Delta region in Nigeria	• Global Alliance Partner of the Earthshot prize • Over 50 regional & international partnerships	• Largest Pan African alliance on climate justice • Over 100 international donors & partners
Headquarters	Netherlands	Germany	United States	Nigeria	Kenya	Kenya

Attributes	FOEI	CAN-I	350.org	ERA	GBM	PACJA
Grassroots activism	• Grassroots energy access • Food sovereignty • Human rights and gender equality • School of sustainability	• Grassroots mobilisation and empowerment	• Opposing coal plants and mega pipeline	• Local struggles against oil companies • Impacts on oil on the people and the environment	• Community Empowerment and Education Programme (CEE) • Gender equality and equity at the grassroots	• Community empowerment via climate-smart farming techniques • Grassroot mobilisation for participation in CC governance process • Opposing fossil fuel projects
Transnationalism	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Longevity (yrs)	>40	>30	>10	>15	>40	>10
Influence in Africa	• Focal points in 13 African countries	• Focal points in 6 African countries	• Focal points in 5 countries in Africa	Nigeria	Kenya	• Focal points in over 45 countries in Africa

Generally, the six (6) CJMs listed in table 5 above specify advocating for CJ on behalf of the most vulnerable and affected population, including the people of SSA, as one of their core objectives. Accordingly, they all appear to have grassroots representation across Africa regardless of their founding geographical sites. Whereas some like FOEI and CANI are international movements with outreach in sub-Saharan Africa, others like ERA and GBM are grassroots movements operating at sub-national and national levels with limited interactions with other parts of sub-Saharan Africa. PACJA is the only movement that clearly identifies as being deeply rooted in SSA, a key criterion for this research. This is criterion was based on the argument of scholars like Okereke and Coventry (2016), Saraswat and Kumar (2016) and Goodman (2009) that to achieve CJ the efforts and campaigns for CJ, though connected to the global CJ agenda, must be driven by those who are in the frontline of the impacts of CC.

PACJA stands out from the other CJMs as the most suited case for addressing the research question for the following reasons. Firstly, the inclusion of 'Pan Africa' in its name draws attention to the continental identity. Secondly, PACJA's membership which is solely comprised of African CSOs with a higher number of its members drawn from across SSA highlights its deep immersion in Africa. Thirdly, within a decade of its establishment, PACJA has gained international visibility and recognition as a key climate actor in the CC governance processes both regionally and globally as evidenced from its apparently unique ability to unite a diverse set of actors from across Africa and partners from the global North regardless of cultural, national, and political boundaries (Mwenda and Beer, 2016).

Although many scholars including Yin (2013) and King, et al (1994) have highlighted the importance of using multiple cases when conducting empirical research to compare and draw adequate inferences (or make generalisations), this research maintains that such comparison are contextually viable only in situations where these cases share certain similarities, in terms of their scope of influence, geographical location and context. (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Accordingly, there is no justifiably comparable movement to PACJA, in terms of scope of operations, representation and geographical context. Other movements identified were either international movements with outreach in SSA or grassroots movements operating at sub-national and national levels with limited interactions with other parts of SSA. Rather than compromise on the research credibility, PACJA was used as the single case in this research. The focus on this movement allowed for multiple in-depths observations and explanations of its *modus operandi* within a real-world context (Yin, 2013; Chester, 2012;

Corbin and Strauss, 1990). Additionally, its transnational character offers many potential levels of observations (i.e., national, regional, and continental) and different units of analysis (individual, organisational and institutional) for this research.

4.4 Data collection scope and procedure

The scope of data collection for this research includes investigating PACJA's CJ objectives, activities, and processes at different scales i.e., regional, national, and international from its establishment in 2008 until August 2019. A total of six (6) different study sites including PACJA's secretariat, two national platforms: Kenyan Platform on Climate Governance (KPCG) and the Climate and Sustainable Development Network (CSDEVNET), Nigeria, the 7th conference on climate change and development in Africa (CCDA), Nairobi-Kenya and the 24th UNFCCC COP in Katowice, Poland, as well as the movement's social media platforms were used as sources of data at different points in this research. These sites provided information and insights into PACJA's activities and interactions at the regional and international level. Visits to the study sites were conducted between August 2018 and April 2019. The earlier years of PACJA's organisational development were studied using available Annual Reports, other documents and by conducting interviews with key actors.

The first study site visited and studied was PACJA's secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya in August 2018, for three weeks. This is because the secretariat is the coordinating arm of the movement and as such, serves as a base for collecting background information, for e.g., its history, organisation and management structure, memberships, strategic plan at the organisational level. However, because of the specific research interest in SSA, there was also need for investigations be conducted on the movement's activities at the sub-regional level. Subsequently, two study sites in SSA, Kenya and Nigeria, were used to represent comparable study locations of the movement's activities at this level. These sites were purposively selected from among the 45 countries in Africa were PACJA operates. Criteria for their selection included their reputation and visibility in SSA, access to key data sources, as well as the researcher's personal experience and knowledge of the study sites and social reality.

For example, Kenya was selected because it is home to PACJA's secretariat which is a central study site in this research. Also, many of the movement's regional and international partners, for example, the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Oxfam International, CARE International, and others such as the CGIAR centres, and activities at the continental level and regional CC governance processes, are mostly domiciled and hosted in Nairobi. Nigeria was selected as a second study site based on the researcher's knowledge of and social ties in the country which are useful for overcoming everyday challenges (i.e., access, trust etc.) with data collection. Their national platforms, the Kenyan Platform on Climate Governance (KPCG) and the Climate and Sustainable Development Network (CSDEVNET), Nigeria, each acted as key data sources for analysing and understanding PACJA's activities and engagements at the national and sub-national levels. They provided valuable information on both the similarities and differences in national contexts within SSA, and the implications that these may have on the effectiveness of the movement at the continental level (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2013).

In addition to these two study sites, PACJA's social media platforms (i.e., website, Facebook, Twitter and specifically WhatsApp group), the five day-long CCDA event in Nairobi-Kenya and the two weeks' engagement at UNFCCC COP 24 in Katowice-Poland, all provided sites for observing PACJA's engagement at the regional and international levels. Figure 1 below provides a summary of the research approach including the data points and methods used in this research.



Figure 1: Summary of approach and used in this research.

4.4.1 Deployment of Research Methods

Different methods, e.g., document analysis, interviews, participant observation and online platforms were used in this research to ensure that the different indicators and the extent of PACJA's effectiveness in institutional and governance strengthening, public awareness, engagement and mobilisation and policy influence were identified and analysed (Mattoni, 2014). For example, document analysis (i.e., both organisational documents including, strategic plans, annual reports, policy briefs etc. and also the online and other media content) which was conducted during the visit to PACJA's secretariat, was undertaken to collect background information on the movement including their history, procedures and policies, and activities.

The secretariat in Nairobi houses the movement's library, which is a small office comprising of two tables, four chairs, and two bookshelves which is used to store their books, research, and some organisational materials. Although the books and documents were neatly organised on the bookshelves, there was no proper filing system in place nor a designated librarian. The library also doubled as an office for two of their programme assistants and two interns, at the time of the visit. These factors combined to make accessing and retrieving information from the library somewhat difficult. As a result, the researcher had to resort to requesting information from the employee who was assigned by the MD of PACJA to support the researcher or directly from the relevant staff member (either the originator or custodian of the document), depending on the context. Although some documents, for example, the stakeholder engagement plan, organisational capacity assessment report, and the SIDA programme/project reports were either missing or not made available to the researcher despite several requests, overall, this approach proved to be reasonably effective and time efficient.

Other methods deployed in this research included conducting participant observation and a number of interviews. These methods were used to gain insights into and in-depth understanding of PACJA's activities and collect reliable data as they allowed for closer interactions between the researcher and the movement actors and key stakeholders including government actors. They also provided access to engagement sites like meetings and other activities organised, coordinated, or attended by the movement (Saunders et al, 2009).

Participant observation conducted for this research included participating in the movement's activities like the regional CCDA event, national platform meetings, thematic working groups discussions, side meetings and daily briefings at the UNFCCC COP 24 in Poland, WhatsApp group discussions and similar. This allowed the researcher to observe at close range the strategies of engagement employed by the movement at different levels, the issues and focus of these meetings and conferences, the existing tensions, and gaps in the perspectives of movement participants and other key stakeholders and their practices. It also allowed for a growing understanding of the interaction of culture, geographical context, and study sites with their activities and processes. It offered the opportunity to verify or obtain additional information from the document reviews, thereby contributing to the triangulation of the data collected. Additionally, created access for the researcher to establish contact with potential key informants for follow-up interviews for the research.

Key informant interviews (KII) as a research tool was deployed as an important method for data collection in this research. It was used to collect detailed descriptions and/or follow-up information of specific events, perspectives, issues, and concerns around any of the sensitising concepts under investigation (Mattoni, 2014). A total of 41 interviews were conducted for this study. These informants included two co-founders, employees, members, and partners of PACJA depending on their positions in the movement and its constituent organisations. These interviews were either conducted in person at the engagement sites or virtually via skype, zoom or whatsApp. The interviews ranged from 30mins to 3hrs, with an average of 2hrs for in-person and 1 hour for virtual interviews. The list with the names and affiliations of all the interviewees in this research is provided in a separate document and can be made available on request. In the analysis that follows, names have been anonymised, except where it would not make sense to do so, as the individual occupying a particular position in the organisation is widely known. That has inevitably led the researcher to tread carefully at times, as sensitivities have had to be taken into account at various points in the analysis presented here, given that reality.

Overall, the data collection process and activities for this research spanned 24 months, from January 2018 to December 2019. A summary of these activities and timeline is provided in Table 6 below. The procedures associated with each of these methods is discussed in further detail in the proceeding section.

Table 6: Summary of Primary Data Collection Activities and Timeline

Research activities	Timeline
1) *Site visits to PACJA's secretariat and national platforms in Nairobi, Kenya (2 weeks), and Ibadan, Nigeria (2 weeks)* • Participant observation in Alliance thematic working group meetings and youth forum • Review of organisational documents (i.e., 35 documents including constitution, strategic plan, annual reports, project briefs for the period 2011 to August 2018) • Semi-structured interviews with ED and employees of the Alliance (no. of KII =9) • Informal discussions with other movement members (n=7)	August 2018 (4 weeks)
2) *CCDA VII Conference in Nairobi- Kenya* • Participant observation in conference presentations, discussions, seminar and ACCER award night (n=5, with each activity having between 50-500 participants) • Document reviews (i.e., pamphlets, presentation slides, conference papers) • Semi-structured interviews with key participants (n=2)	October 2018 (*5 days*)
3) *UNFCCC COP in Katowice - Poland* • Participant observation in preparatory meetings, thematic working group meetings and meetings with stakeholders including the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) and other NGOs (n=7 meetings, 15-35 participants per meeting) • Document reviews including position papers and press releases • Semi-structured interviews with key participants in the movement (n =8)	December 2018 (*10 Days*)
4) *In-person interviews with CSDevNet members and external stakeholders including government and other NGOs in Nigeria (n=7)*	April 2019 (*10 Days*)
5) *Email exchanges, Skype, and WhatsApp interviews with key research informants including representatives from AfDB, AMCEN, Kenyan Government, alliance members and AU (n=14)*	May to August 2019 (*Interviews lasted an average of 1hr*)

4.5 Data Collection Processes

4.5.1 Document Reviews

Documents from both secondary and primary sources were critically reviewed on an ongoing basis throughout the study to collect data and provide supporting evidence with which to triangulate the findings from primary data collected during interviews and PO (Bowen, 2009). Academic texts and mainstream media, specifically those relating to CJ and CC negotiations, social movements, civil societies and organisational effectiveness formed the basis of the secondary sources used in this research. The review of secondary documents was the first step undertaken for data collection in this study. The purpose of this step was to

understand the current arguments, tensions, and gaps in the literature on the CJM globally and then more narrowly in SSA, *from the perspectives of the actors directly involved*, particularly around their CJ demands, successes, and limitations, and situate this thesis within existing scholarship on CJ and social movements.

The literature search was conducted thematically using the main concepts i.e., climate justice, social movements, effectiveness etc. in this thesis (*These concepts have been discussed extensively in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis*). The University of Reading (UoR) search engine "Summon" was used for the initial search to find relevant databases, articles, and documents for this research. Databases used included JSTOR, Wiley Online Library, ScienceDirect, SCOPUS and Taylor and Francis. Occasionally, "Google Scholar" was used in conducting arbitrary searches and to measure an article's citations. Keywords such as "climate justice", "climate justice movements", "Africa", "effectiveness", "social movement", "mobilisation", institutional capacity" and "policy influence" were used. Although the search threw up hundreds of papers at a time, limits such as the year of publication (usually from 2005 but sometimes dating far back into the 90s), discipline (i.e., Geography, Development Studies, Environmental science, Sociology, and Management), peer-review, location (both study and authors) and publication type (i.e., journal, thesis, or magazine articles) were used to refine it. The university's Enterprise catalogue was used to find books stored in the University library. Occasionally, the inter-library loan system was used to gain access to books that were not available in the UoR library. Media sources included websites and publications of SMOs, government, donors and partners. Mostly qualitative data that were relevant to the research objectives and sensitising concepts, and had verifiable sources for triangulation, were collected. Overall, the secondary sources were useful for gaining a more holistic understanding of the movement in sub-Saharan Africa, the political climate, conditions that may affect their effectiveness, and how these actors respond to these conditions to drive their agenda (Bell et al, 2014; Corbin and Strauss, 1990).

Contrarily, primary sources included PACJA's organisational documents, as mentioned above, including the movement's constitution, strategic plan, theory of change, annual reports, project briefs, flyers, and other communiques. These documents were obtained directly from the movement's representatives either during field visits, via emails, or were harvested from their social media pages i.e., websites, Facebook, Twitter etc. Again, these documents were reviewed thematically using relevant sub-concepts i.e., CJ objectives,

organisational structure, public awareness, and engagement, etc. The aim of this review was to gain an authentic, relevant, and in-depth understanding of PACJA in terms of their mission, objectives, structure, history and growth, and activities including details of past and upcoming events, initiatives, partnerships and programmes. In addition to providing this contextual information, specific documents like their strategic plan and annual reports helped the researcher to identify major actors and/or partners (or implementers) in the movement as potential key informants to approach for follow-up interviews (Bowen, 2009). The next section provides a detailed description of the second data collection method, participant observation, that was used in this study.

4.5.2 Participant Observation

Balsiger and Lambelet (2014) suggested that it is through participating in movements that an activist scholar can fully comprehend how the movements organise, the strategies employed and the gaps between theory/planning and practice. Therefore, beyond the document reviews, it was necessary to follow up the investigation with observations of the movement in practice to generate and record first-hand insights. Participant observation entailed participating in the movement's activities to allow for direct observation of the movement to collect fine grained data on organisational styles, actions, and interactions. Through participant observation, informal yet accurate information and insights around planning, decision-making and strategising were generated. Also, the experience gained from participating in the movement aids understanding of and familiarity with the specific context of the movement including the local cultural milieu and institutional culture and practices of the sets of individuals currently and (in some instances) previously in the movement (Balsiger and Lambelet, 2014). In addition, it allows the researcher to identify and address changes/issues to be pursued by obtaining primary data via other methods, for example, interviews, and set the context for follow-up discussions where necessary.

Participant observation conducted for this study included visiting PACJA's secretariat and attending PACJA's engagements with other stakeholders in the CC governance processes at national, regional (i.e., CCDA VII) and global levels (e.g., the UNFCCC COP 24). A discussion on the observations conducted on the movement at different levels in this study is presented below.

4.5.2.1 Observing PACJA at the Secretariat level

Based on the works of many scholars, including Escobar (2018), Han and Barnett-Loro (2018) and Diani (2013) who have demonstrated the link between 'organising' and 'movement effectiveness', this thesis identified 'organising' as one of the pre-established activities of PACJA to be examined in this research (see Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3). As a result, the movement's secretariat which is the coordinating arm of PACJA, provided a suitable site and starting point for this investigation. To this end, a formal letter of introduction and request to participate in this research was sent by the researcher to the Executive Director of PACJA in April 2018 via the email: info@pacja.org. The letter included information on the purpose of the research, significance, supervisory team, purpose of the visit, proposed time of visit and other ethical considerations (*This letter is available in a separate appendix folder not included in this thesis*).

Following an initial lack of response, a reminder was sent three weeks later. Again, after a few weeks, there was still no response from the email. This led the researcher to proactively request the goodwill of a professional connection on LinkedIn and a former employee of PACJA, Dr Samuel Ogallah, to facilitate access to the Executive Director. This strategy proved to be very useful as access was immediately initiated and granted upon his intervention. Accordingly, a direct line of communication was established between the researcher, the executive director, and the administrative team via a series of email exchanges between June and July 2018. A formal letter accepting to participate in and host the researcher was signed and sent by the Administrative and Human Resources officer to the researcher (*Also available in the appendix folder*). This letter was then included as a supporting document in both the researcher's application for research ethics clearance from the University and for the Kenyan visa application process. Subsequently, in August 2018, a three week-long research visit was undertaken to PACJA's secretariat in Nairobi.

The visit provided an avenue for the researcher to establish a close interaction and gain the acceptance and trust of the employees, members, and other movement stakeholders for subsequent stages of data collection for this research (Chester, 2012). An observation template, as proposed by Balsiger and Lambelet (2014) was used for this visit. The template included space to record observations of aspects of organising, coordinating, decision-making

and other day-to-day aspects of the movement such as internal communication and reporting, that were not publicly available.

4.5.2.2 *Observing PACJA at the National level via the Kenya Platform for Climate Governance (KPCG)*

KPCG, the national designated platform for Kenya brings together multiple CSOs and small CSO networks working to address the impacts of CC in Kenya. They do so by tackling the challenge of uncoordinated and ineffective CSOs participation in CC governance in the country. The platform is coordinated by PACJA's secretariat and the activities of the platform are funded under the "Angaza" project which is funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) through Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI). Members of the platform are organised into five thematic working groups including Adaptation, Mitigation, Gender, Youth and Marginalised, Climate Finance and Technology transfer, Knowledge Management and capacity building.

Participant observation was undertaken by the researcher while attending the bi-weekly meetings of two thematic working group: Adaptation and Mitigation, that were hosted by KPCG in August 2018. Key observations noted by the researcher were mostly around the internal dynamics, members interactions, leadership vs ownerships and capacity of the members of the working groups. For instance, while the platform claims to include members from across Kenya, the researcher found that most of the participants at the meetings were from CSOs within or closely bordering Nairobi. This highlighted the limited representation and possible exclusion of CSOs located outside Nairobi. Also, these meetings and the working groups in general were facilitated by the Angaza project coordinator from PACJA's secretariat. While the working groups and meetings appeared to be well coordinated, there seem to be an over-reliance on the secretariat (i.e., facilitator) to provide leadership for the various groups. For example, participants at the meetings always looked to the facilitator to endorse their decisions, and workplans and basically drive their engagement. Nevertheless, the research successfully used these meetings to establish rapport with four members for informal discussions and follow-up interviews to understand their perceptions of their roles within the group, their motivations, expectations, and concerns.

4.5.2.3 Observing PACJA at the CCDA VII Conference in Nairobi

The researcher attended the five day-long CCDA VII conference in Nairobi -Kenya in October 2018. The CCDA conference is an annual event organised under the auspices of the Climate for Development in Africa (ClimDev-Africa) Programme. This programme brings together stakeholders from across the African continent, and offered an opportunity for the researcher to better understand PACJA's engagement with its broader membership and other regional actors including the African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Development Bank (AfDB). The conference theme for 2018 was "Supporting the Implementation of the Paris Agreement in Africa: From Policies to Action".

The number of partners and vast attendance of delegates in conference was ostensibly evidence of PACJA's (*a co-organizer of the event*) success in attracting and retaining significant support from key actors including the government and non-state actors across Africa. Also evident from this conference was the limited amount of research on the local impacts of CC and the limited understanding on the part of delegates of the inextricable link between CC and other sectors of the economy. This was observed from the disagreement among stakeholders at the conference over Africa's CJ priority and strategies.

4.5.2.4 Observing PACJA at the UNFCCC Conference

The 24th UNFCCC Conference of Parties which was held in Katowice, Poland in December 2018, provided a suitable site to observe PACJA at the global CC negotiations arena. At least 30 employees and members from PACJA were either fully or partly funded by the movement to attend this conference. The researcher was registered as an observer with one of PACJA's member CSOs and thus able to participate at the conference. Thanks to this arrangement, the researcher was able participate fully in the day-to-day activities of the movement. This included attending the daily meetings that were convened by PACJA, some of the side events that were organised by the movement and its partners, open plenary sessions as well as meetings with other stakeholders, for example, the influential and important African Group of Negotiators (AGN).

The endless formal and informal discussions at these events were mostly centred around the ongoing processes and outcomes of the negotiations. Movement documents such as the CSOs

demands for the COP, daily press releases, leaflets and other communiques were collected from these meetings and events (Philipps, 2012). Although this event allowed the researcher to gain insights and deeper understanding of the UNFCCC COP processes and negotiations, the main benefit was that it allowed the researcher to observe the interactions of the movement at the international scale at close range and from an insider perspective. Close attention was paid to observing their communications, advocacy, and lobbying efforts, including points of convergence and divergence, power dynamics etc. Subsequently, seven interviews were conducted at the conference venue with key informants from PACJA's broad membership to discuss concerns, successes, challenges, and the way forward for the movement in progressing its CJ agenda. Contacts were also established with other key actors in the movement for potential follow-up interviews later due to time constraints and clashing schedules at the conference.

Overall, participant observation as a data collection tool offered several benefits to this research. For instance, it offered emotional and relational experiences on the part of the researcher that furthered the understanding of and insights into the processes of interactions that occur both within and external to the alliance. In addition, taking detailed fieldnotes, which is a significant aspect of this method (Goffman, 2002), allowed for greater reflexivity for the researcher during the data analysis (Birks et al,2008; Charmaz, 2006; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Moreover, participant observation provided opportunities for the researcher to establish connections and build trust with the movement's actors, functioning and interacting at different levels for follow-up discussions and/or interviews to either clarify or validate some of findings from the events and activities. In turn, this allowed the research to overcome challenges such as issue of access (i.e., short notice or invitation to attend the movement's activities, visa constraints/requirements, etc.), the high cost and frequencies of travel to PACJA's different advocacy sites across Africa, and even globally.

4.5.3 Key informant Interviews

Although document reviews provided the background to understanding PACJA and participant observation was the avenue to observe the movement in practice, key informant interviews were used to collect more specific information and varied perceptions on different aspects of the movement including motivations, internal dynamics, strategies, successes,

challenges, and institutional changes over time. This is following on from the argument of della Porta (2014) that interviews constitute the most important data collection tool in movement studies. According to her, they enable the collection of specific primary data and generate empirical data about the research context and phenomenon under investigation. Similarly, Blee (2013) argues that interviews are significant in social movement studies for their unique role in bringing human agency (i.e., social context, perspectives, and experiences) to the centre of the analysis. Furthermore, they provide an opportunity to triangulate the findings from the previous methods to give accurate meanings and interpretations to practices and experiences (Mattoni, 2014).

But, of course, interviews as a research method present interviewee with an opportunity to cast themselves, their motivations and their actions in the best possible light. It provides them with an opportunity to 'post-rationalise' events and decisions made previously and can assist them in 'aligning' their interpretations of such events in less contradictory ways than may perhaps represent the reality of the situation. Subsequently, in-depth key informant interviews, suitably 'triangulated' with all the other methods of data collection, provided the final method for data collection that was used in this study. The procedure for selecting and conducting these interviews is discussed in the proceeding sections below.

4.5.3.1 *Selecting Interviewees.*

The first set of informants identified for this research were selected based on their unique knowledge of, relevance i.e., experience, leadership etc. and participation in PACJA. As such, they included the executive director (ED) who also doubles as the spokesperson for the alliance, the chair of the technical and political affairs committee. Interviews were conducted with the programme managers and officers, the administrative manager, the communications, knowledge management and transfer officer and the programme evaluation officer. The interviews (n=9) with this set of key informants were conducted at the PACJA's secretariat in August 2018. From there, the selection of other key informants in this research was done using the snowball sampling technique (Geddes et al, 2018; Kirccherr and Charles, 2018; Bernard, 2011). This means that the first set of interviewees helped to identify and recruit other participants in this research. This was done mostly by introducing the researcher to other key informants including platform members across SSA, either physically at CC events

such as the CCDA VII in Nairobi-Kenya and UNFCCC COP 21 in Katowice-Poland, or virtually via emails or phone contacts.

The snowball sampling techniques was purposely and effectively applied in this research for the following reasons. Firstly, although the research topic was aimed at critically investigating the CJM, the perception of a shared African identity between the researcher and the movement significantly reduced the risk level and increased trust between the researcher and the key movement participants in the research (Geddes et al, 2018). Secondly, the snowball sampling technique helped the researcher identify and recruit the most informed and active participants in the movement. Because PACJA consists of organisational memberships, the leaders of these individual organisations were often the ones invited to represent their organisations and participate in the movement's activities. Thus, making it easier for participants to identify one another. Thirdly, the collective characteristics and/or strong networking of individual actors within the movement required harnessing of existing social ties or connections to gain access to them (Kirccherr and Charles, 2018).

Following from the first set of interviews conducted at PACJA's secretariat, a further ten face-to-face interviews were conducted with members of PACJA during the CCDA VII conference in Nairobi-Kenya in October 2018 (i.e., 2 interviews) and UNFCCC COP 24 in Katowice in December 2018 (i.e., 8 interviews). The selection of these interviewees was purposively done to include representatives from different regions across SSA (i.e., East, West, South Africa) to account for contextualisation, triangulation, and representation. However, particular attention was paid to recruiting and interviewing members from two national platforms: KPCG in Kenya (n=4) and CSDEVNET in Nigeria (n=4) because of their selection as sub-cases in this research. Other face-to-face interviews were conducted with members of the CSDEVET platform in Nigeria during a research visit to Nigeria in April 2019. In cases where face-to-face access was difficult, online Skype and WhatsApp interviews were used to engage with these key informants from the movement's memberships as well as from state and regional partners.

The interviews offered the researcher valuable perspectives on PACJA and helped to address some of the questions that arose from the document reviews and participant observation. Furthermore, the interviewees helped to identify other potential interviewees whose insights and role in the CC governance processes were relevant to addressing the research objectives

though external to or not directly involved in the movement (della Porta, 2014). This included the national government, regional actors (such as the African Union Commission (AUC), African Development Bank (AfDB), African group of Negotiators (AGN), African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) etc.), partner NGOs (such as Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), Health of Mother Earth Foundation (HOMEF)) and media outlets like Pan African Media and Climate Change (PAMACC).

To illustrate further, the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kenya) was selected as a key institution to focus on because of their work and position as the national focal point in Kenya on any issue, meetings, or agreement on CC. In addition to this, all key informants that were selected from this group held middle to senior level positions in their organisations. For instance, the group included as a senior policy officer in the AUC, the secretariat of AMCEN, a regional principal officer in AfDB and the Director, Department of CC in the Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv).

Access to these actors were mostly established through informal engagement at meetings and conferences where the researcher was present as a participant observer. However, conducting face-to-face interviews was difficult owing to their busy schedule and frequent travels. Subsequently, e-channels such as Skype, and WhatsApp calls were used for the interviews. Occasionally, as in the case of the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment (FMEnv), the researcher had to seek permission directly from the Minister of Environment to allow employees to participate in the research as representatives of the Ministry. This was presumably because of the sensitive nature of the position that they occupy in the institution. In any case, an official letter of invitation and request to participate in the research addressed to the Nigerian Minster of Environment was sent to the FMEnv in February 2019 (*available in a separate appendix folder*).

4.5.3.2 Conducting the Interviews

An interview protocol was prepared from document reviews, the emerging analytical framework of the study and participant observation to guide the process of interaction and line of inquiries during the interviews (Bryman, 2012b). The protocol made use of open-ended questions to allow for in-depth discussions and the collection of data on the personal perspectives and experiences of the interviewee (Kvale, 1996). However, it was continually

modified to reflect themes most relevant to the informant and to follow up with emerging leads or hypotheses from previous interviews.

Typically, interviewees were informed about the research, key themes in the research, why they have been selected to participate in the research and other relevant information prior to the interview. The interviews begin with basic information exchange to build rapport, set the context for the discussion, and situate the interviewee within the research (della Porta, 2014). Next, the interviewees are asked basic questions around their educational and professional background. Then, the interviews move on to ask more difficult questions on important themes and/or personal experiences that are relevant to the research objectives. The questions broadly centred around perceptions of CJ, general and specific movement activities (i.e., coordination, events, programmes, interactions), engagement (i.e., roles, frequency, representation etc.), experience (i.e., working for or collaborating with PACJA), challenges and self-evaluation of effectiveness. Occasionally, prompts were used to clarify understanding, redirect the discussions, or solicit for more information about an issue or event. This including using questions and phrases like "Can you give me an example?", "Do you mean to say that", "In your experience,", "I have heard contrary opinions on this", "I noted that" and "I am very interested in".

A total of 41 interviews including 26 face-to-face, 8 via skype, 6 via whatsapp and 1 email exchange were conducted for this research. The researcher deems this number of interviews to be sufficient for this research since other methods of data collection (as discussed above) were also employed (Mattoni, 2014; Ravasi and Canato, 2013). All the interviews were conducted in English. The length of the interviews varied between 30 minutes and 3 hours. This was dependent on the time availability and verbosity of the interviewee. A dictaphone and notepads were used during the interview process as a means of noting particularly relevant concepts. The dictaphone was checked to be working prior to the start of each interview. Of the 41 interviews conducted, 38 were recorded. These recordings were fully transcribed by the researcher (transcript available on request). Notes taken during the interview were mostly around follow-up questions on issues that demanded further clarification or requests for the interviewees to provide supporting documents or evidence that would aid the analytical process (Hancock and Allgozzine, 2006). The interviews typically concluded with an opportunity for the interviewee to ask any question(s) or make statements that s/he deem relevant to the discussion but may not have had the chance to air

during the interview, and a final statement by the interviewer on the possibility of a follow-up interview if necessary. Also, permissions were sought from research participants to take photographs during meetings and after interviews.

4.6 Ethical considerations

4.6.1 Prior to fieldwork

This research was conducted in line with the University of Reading (UoR) Research Ethics Procedures for data collection in research involving human subjects. A risk assessment form and research ethics application including amendments to existing ethical clearance were completed and submitted to the SAGES Research Ethics Committee for approval prior to embarking on any research visit for data collection (this document is available in a separate appendix document). The central aim of obtaining this approval was to ensure that the participants in the research are offered protection from any harm and exposure owing to their participation, primarily by their being in a position to give their free, prior and informed consent to participate in the study (Babbie, 2015; Marshall and Rossman, 2014).

Consequently, several precautionary measures were taken to avert and minimise these risks. For instance, to address the first category of risk (i.e., the risks associated with participating in this research), an official letter of request was sent to PACJA and the FMEnv informing them of the research, the relevance of their participation to the research objectives and requesting their approval and support in conducting the research. These applications were both followed up internally on behalf of the researcher by a past employee of PACJA and a current employee of the FMEnv, who are acquaintances of the researcher. Once the letters of approval were received from both organisations, an application for ethical review was made to the Research Ethics Committee at the UoR for approval to conduct the research visits. The ethics application contained information on the details of the proposed study, scheduled activity guide, proposed informant groups and sample of interview protocol (available in a separate appendix document). Ethics clearance was granted by the Chair of the School of Archaeology, Geography and Environmental Sciences (SAGES) Research Ethics Committee via an email notification[5].

5 The researcher was a member of the Department of Human Geography in the School of Archaeology, Geography and Environmental Sciences at the time of the field visits.

4.6.2 During fieldwork

Safety measures were adopted at the research sites included downloading maps for local travel, organising prearranged taxis including airport pick-ups and drop off to the chosen hotel, taking the recommended immunisations against prevalent local diseases, moving around with the campus card for identification and a communication device (mobile phone). Also, the researcher capitalised on the additional support provided by host organisation in the form of an internal key contact person to enhance integration and overall research experience while also maintaining daily communication with family, and intermittently with her doctoral supervisor regarding research activities and progress.

Although most interactions were conducted within offices or other venues of formal engagements, there were a few occasions that were interviews and informal discussions were conducted over lunch and/or in less formal settings. This was done to gain trust and build better rapport with some of the key participants in the research depending on the unique informant(s) characteristics and the situation. Nevertheless, special attention was paid to ensuring that the conduct of the researcher and the interactions of the researcher with the research participants were formal including the clothing, language, style, and tone of communication during the investigation (Kumar, 2019).

For the interviews which demanded a closer and somewhat "probing" interaction (della Porta, 2014), a participant information sheet was prepared and shared in advance with each participant, either directly or via email. This sheet contained information on purpose of the interview, the duration, confidentiality, data storage and protection (including audio files), and disclosure agreements (Kumar, 2019; Oliver, 2010) (available in separate appendix document). Next, interviewees were either asked to sign the consent form (or give a verbal consent in cases where interviews were conducted virtually) should they wish to proceed with the interview (DePoy and Gitlin, 2015). A section in the consent form allowed interviewees to determine whether they wished to speak anonymously or disclose their identity. While most of the interviewees requested anonymity, a few stated that they were happy to be directly quoted. However, based on the request for anonymity by the majority, this research will use pseudonyms to refer to all interviewees. All participants consented to having their

interviews recorded and for their responses to be used in the thesis and subsequent publications. Interview transcripts were sent to interviewees who wished to review and make edits to their statements prior to the start of data analysis. This measure was deemed necessary to avoid the disclosure of politically sensitive information and to ensure the validity of the information provided and it is the researcher's opinion that neither the integrity of the data nor the analysis has been compromised as a result (Bell, 2014).

4.7 Data Analysis

Balsiger and Lambelet (2014) refers to data analysis as the process by which a researcher logically sorts all materials collected throughout the research into a coherent narrative. That is, the process of giving structure and meaning to data within a specific research context (Huberman and Miles, 2002; O'Leary, 2004). Data analysis for this research was conducted immediately the data was collected at each phase in the data collection process (Silverman, 2010) to allow for flexibility in refining the process of collecting additional evidence (Mattoni, 2014). A systematic approach of coding and categorization was used for the analysis. A discussion of the analysis of the data deriving from each method used in the research is presented below.

4.7.1 Document Analysis

Document analysis involved a reflective and iterative process of reviewing documents, both organisational or secondary, to identify data relating to the main concepts or emerging themes in this research. This process can be subdivided into two categories namely content and thematic analysis. The process of collecting excerpts, quotations or sections from these documents and organising them around the core concepts (such as mobilisation, policy influence, organisational capacity etc.) of the research is known as content analysis (Bowen, 2009; Bryman, 2012a). Whereas thematic analysis involved the process of recognising patterns and emerging themes within the data to form categories (Bowen, 2009; Charmaz, 2006). Both content and thematic analyses were used throughout. However, the application of these techniques differed depending on the phase in the research.

At the outset, content analysis was used to gain in-depth understanding of the research context, create rich descriptions of the movement (i.e., PACJA) and its related activities, and identify insights relating to the research problem (for example, identify potential interview questions and observation template). However, as the research progressed, it was used as a means of triangulation to ensure the validity of data collected. For instance, interviews and participant observation involved the participation of the researcher. Since many scholars including della Porta (2014) have argued that the researcher "brings" her/himself to the field and thus is not separate from the research process, it was important to attempt to triangulate the findings from these methods (i.e., interviews and participant observations) with PACJA documents which were prepared without the intervention of the researcher, with a view to reducing the introduction of bias i.e., confirmation or anchoring bias (Cohen et al, 2013).

4.7.2 Participant Observation

Following the suggestions of Balsiger and Lambelet (2014), data from participant observation were recorded in fieldnotes and transferred into a personal computer at the end of each day. The notes included descriptive information on the day's events, venue(s), participants in events or activities including representation, age and gender, discussions, personal interactions, highlights, and more subtle details like the tone, language, dominant voice(s) or persons, tensions and power interplays as observed by the researcher. These notes were then coded to organise observations along the sensitising concepts (i.e., mobilisation. policy influence etc.) and themes (i.e., organisation, strategy, frames etc.) in this research.

The data generated by participant observation offered compelling narratives of the perspectives from engaging with the movement in practice. However, because participant observation – like all qualitative research - inevitably involves subjectivity on the part of the researcher, triangulation with document reviews and interviews was important to ensure that observations were adequately contextualised. Likewise, the process of coding fieldnotes allowed the researcher to reflect on issues around positionality and relationships with actors in the movement as well as key informants, and how this may have influenced the observations and thus the credibility of the data.

4.7.2 Interviews

Data collected from interviews were recorded using a dictaphone and fully transcribed by the researcher using the software "oTranscribe" *(www.otranscribe.com)*. The transcripts were shared with all interviewees (n=7) who requested to see them when filling in their consent form, for clarification and to ensure the accuracy of the statements in them. Three of these interviewees requested that certain information shared during their interview to give context to the interviewee should not be referenced to in the thesis or publications therefrom. Handwritten notes taken during the interviews were transferred to a personal computer. The transcribed interviews and fieldwork notes were labelled and uploaded into NVivo (version 12), a software package that was used for the data analysis.

The first stage of the analysis involved reading and re-reading through each transcript and memo to identify and index key words, phrases and sections that relate to the research objectives (Bryman, 2012b). This process of indexing is referred to as inductive coding. Codes were assigned to indexed texts in the transcripts and memos to allow for easy retrieval. A total of 72 labels were obtained during this stage. The second stage was more elaborate and focused on organising the initial codes into broader categories or concepts. It established links or relationships between codes identified in the first stage to form broader codes or categories (Corbin and Strauss, 1990). A total of 27 categories including public awareness, participation, capacity building, resources and influence emerged from the entire process. However, there were some codes for example, emotions, that did not fit into any of the ensuing categories (della Porta, 2014). Thus, a final round of coding was undertaken using both an inductive and deductive process to look for other emergent themes and/or categories that would prove useful for elaborating interpretations of the research findings and possibly support the development of new concepts/theories.

The analysis generated both small and large chunks of information, useful quotes and meanings which were summarised into an MS Excel document as descriptive data ready to be interpreted. However, the high level of subjectivity inherent in interviews as a means of knowledge creation made it necessary to look beyond individual social constructions and interpretations of reality and also for the researcher to be alert to the subjective impulses in the data derived from interviews (Van Dijk, 2011). As a result, document analysis was utilised in addition to interviews to better interpret the data (Cohen et al, 2013). Some of the

information generated from the interviews were cross-referenced with different sources, both primary and secondary, to produce a coherent storyline and holistic interpretation of the research findings.

4.8 Research Limitations and Reflections

The limitations identified in this research are like those that are associated with conducting all qualitative research. They include issues around the researcher's positionality, the research approach and associated methods, and the confidentiality and protection of the research participants. This thesis refers to a researcher's positionality as the identity and worldview of the researcher at the point where s/he enters the field (Burawoy, 2009). However, because identity and worldviews are fluid and affected by several factors including prior knowledge and/or perspectives on the research topic, racial/ethnic identity, nationality, gender etc., scholars like Widerhold (2015) have observed that researchers mostly enter the field/research with multiple positionalities which are often interchanged at different points during the research depending on the unique context. These all influence, in sometimes unknowable ways, the research design, data collection and analysis process (DeWalt and DeWalt, 2010).

For instance, the researcher entered the field identifying as a young (i.e., age), female (i.e., gender), Muslim (i.e., religion), black African (i.e., race), Nigerian (i.e., nationality), and an academic (i.e., career). These different identities were negotiated by the researcher throughout the research. However, the researcher tried to remain reflexive of the impact that her different identities had on the data collection process and final research outcomes. For instance, during the research design for the data collection, the researcher particularly highlighted her African identity to gain entry/access into PACJA and build trust with the movement's actors. Once access was granted into the movement and trust established, the dominant identity changed to that of a researcher to maintain objectivity and ensure that the research objectives are achieved. Although different identities were mostly explored to maximise their potentials and benefits to achieving the research objectives, occasionally they acted as barriers to the process.

For instance, during interviews, it was frequently assumed by interviewees that the research identity meant that the researcher had mainly theoretical knowledge and no practical

understanding of the realities of CSOs and the CC governance processes in Africa. This narrative was pursued specifically by some interviewees apparently to avoid answering difficult questions particularly around issues of transparency and accountability. One way the researcher managed to address the challenge was to include mentions of the researcher's professional experience in the CC and environmental sector in SSA.

The limitations of the interpretive framework of this research include the high level of subjectivity and thus limited room for generalisations which have already been identified by many scholars including El Hussein *et al* (2014) and Huberman and Mile (2014). Also, scholars like Huberman and Miles (2014) may argue that the use of PACJA as a single case, and the two sub-cases, KPCG and CSDevNet leaves little room for generalisations and transferability of the research findings. This is unquestionably the nature of much interpretive social science research.

However, the researcher does not consider it to be a limitation since the choice of this case and sub-cases was deliberate and took into account several factors including their scope and political immersion in Africa (Yin, 1994). Moreover, employing additional or comparative cases like CAN International or 350.org would not have allowed for sound comparability as the origin and geographical focus of these movements extend beyond a single continent. Subsequently, to minimise the difficulty with measuring PACJA's effectiveness considering the lack of a benchmark or comparative case, the researcher developed an effectiveness framework to be used in this study (as set out in Table 3.4 in Chapter 3).

Although the researcher tried to maintain an "outsider" position during data collection, it was impossible to be completely removed from the process. Conducting participant observation and interviews required the researcher to negotiate an "insider" position to gain access to movement, its members and employees (Mattoni, 2014). In the process, the researcher had to engage closely with the research subjects to build rapport and gain a level of trust. Within a short time, the researcher was able to build the required trust and gained access to significant information and discussions, whether formal or informal. During analysis, the researcher was confronted with the dilemma of disclosing certain information and maintaining confidentiality. To ensure anonymity and confidentially and reduce the risk of disclosing sensitive information in the thesis, the researcher employed the use of pseudonyms and

shared the transcripts with interviewees who indicated at the start of the interviews that they wanted to review these.

Other limitations in this research include the inability of the researcher to access some organisational documents which according to some interviewees contained relevant information and/or evidence due to the poor archiving system in PACJA at the time of the study (see Section 4.4.1 above). Thus, some of the data provided by interviewees in this research could not be verified. Furthermore, the limited time and funding allocated for this research also restricted the researcher's opportunity to undertake more extended participant observation and engagement with the movement in practice which may have further enriched the analysis. However, the use of these different methods minimised these limitations on the overall quality of the research output (Creswell, 2007). The researcher attended several short courses on research methods and data analysis to reduce subjectivity during data interpretation and was conscious of the lessons imparted when doing so. Finally, the research findings were presented to experts (including supervisors and participants in academic workshops and conferences) for scrutiny and peer review.

4.9 Summary

This chapter has described the methodology and methods used in this thesis. It began with an explanation of the research epistemology. It also discussed the interpretivist/constructivist epistemological framework and the qualitative, case study methodology which allowed for an in-depth and contextualised investigation of the effectiveness of the particular instance of CJM in SSA, i.e., PACJA.

Next, the chapter offered a detailed description of the scope and different data collection methods and procedures that were used. The scope of data collection for this research included investigating PACJA's CJ objectives, activities, and processes at different scales i.e., regional, national, and international from its establishment in 2008 until August 2019. Different methods, for example, document analysis, participant observation and key informant interviews were used in this research to ensure that the different indicators, nature and extent of PACJA's effectiveness in Institutional and governance strengthening, public awareness, engagement and mobilisation and Policy influence were identified and analysed.

The entire data collection process and activities for this research spanned over 17 months, from August 2018 to December 2019. A summary of these activities and timeline has been provided in Table 4.2 above. The procedures used to analyse the data from each method have also been described.

The chapter went on to include information on the ethical considerations that were employed to ensure that the identities and rights of the participants in this research were protected and the quality of data is guaranteed. For instance, this research was conducted in line with the University of Reading (UoR) Research Ethics Procedures for data collection in research involving human subjects.

Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations in this study and measures that were taken to address them. Subsequently, the chapter has asserted that although studying a continent-wide/transnational movement was always going to be a challenging undertaking, the research design adopted here produced a credible research effort and generated several valuable, even unique, and detailed insights into the research question and the nature of the movement under study.

The next chapter will offer a discussion on the findings and interpretation of the extent of PACJA's effectiveness in relations to their CJ objective of institutional and governance strengthening. The discussion will draw on the indicators of effectiveness that have been identified in Table 3.1 in Chapter 3.

Chapter Five: PACJA's Effectiveness in Institutional and Climate Change Governance Strengthening in sub-Saharan Africa

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents a critical analysis of PACJA's effectiveness in institutional and CC governance strengthening (IGS) of African CSOs, NGOs, CBOs etc. in line with its climate justice (CJ) objective to strengthen the capacity and improve the participation of the vulnerable groups across SSA in CC negotiations and governance processes. Using the indicators drawn in Table 3.1., it examines evidence of PACJA's effectiveness including the significant growth in membership from only 63 in 2010 to over 1,000 organisations by 2019, changes to its organisational structure, leadership, and processes i.e., new, and revised constitutions, policies, procedures and programmes. It also examines the strategic formation of extensive partnerships and collaborations to accommodate its growing membership and the external, dynamic context in which it operates. The analysis includes a close study of PACJA's institutional capacity development efforts including resource mobilisation, and monitoring, evaluation, research, and learning (MERL) activities.

5.2 Indicators of PACJA's Effectiveness in IGS

This section critically examines PACJA's effectiveness based on the three criteria of IGS: 1) Governance, 2) Resource mobilisation and 3) Institutional learning and their respective indicators, that were identified and set out in Chapter 3.

5.2.1 <u>Internal Governance</u>

Following from the definition of internal governance as 'the process by which PACJA integrates and coordinates its members, mobilises, and manages resources towards the realization of its goal(s)' in Section 3.3.1 of chapter 3, evidence of PACJA's effective governance will include 1) formalisation due to the need to integrate and coordinate its broad and diverse membership, increase transparency and accountability, 2) a decentralised governance structure to address governance issues like power imbalance, capacity and

exclusion from the decision-making process, 3) organisational philosophy, plans/strategies to direct and organise the individual actions of their members towards the movement's objectives (see Table 3.1). Subsequently, this section will critically examine the data on PACJA's organisational structure, operating procedures, and management philosophy for evidence of effectiveness in IGS since they form the bases for creating order, sustaining interactions, mobilising, and managing its resources. The data analysed here were obtained from the review of PACJA's internal documents and interviews conducted with the ED/spokesperson, seven full-time employees, two board members and two coordinators, each representing the sub-cases i.e., KPCG and CSDevNet.

1) Formalisation

This study found that PACJA is officially registered in Nairobi as a civil society organisation under Kenyan national law. The significance of this for IGS is that the Movement is recognised as a legal entity. Accordingly, it can enter into agreements, partnerships, etc. with other legal entities including donors and state actors (Assenova and Sorenson, 2017). This has the benefit of further enhancing their institutional capacity.

The organisational document review indicates that the operations and interactions of PACJA are governed by a constitution which was drafted and approved by the members. The constitution provides clear information on the roles and responsibilities of the movement board, governing councils, members registration etc. including the minimum criteria required to be appointed to the CGC. For instance, PACJA's governance structure in 2019 consisted of a General Council (GC), a Continental Governing Council (CGC), a Continental Executive Board (CEB), five sub-Committees and the Secretariat (PACJA Constitution Revised, 2017). The GC is the *supreme policy and decision-making* organ for PACJA. It consists of three (3) delegates from PACJA's designated national platform representing one (1) adult male, one (1) adult female and one (1) representative from the marginalised groups; one (1) delegate each from PACJA's designated initiatives like PAMACC, ACSEA; associate and honorary members. The CGC is the *oversight* body for PACJA. As such, it comprises of the Executive Director (ED) and representatives from PACJA's broad memberships, initiatives etc. to increase representation, transparency, and accountability. Members of the CGC are assigned individual roles like chair, vice-chair, treasurer, and chair of standing committees. In

addition, the CGC has a collective responsibility to enter into agreements on behalf of the Movement.

The Continental Executive Board (CEB) is the *management* body of PACJA. Members of the CEB are elected by the CGC. The CEB include the Chairpersons of the CGC, Chairpersons of the Standing committees, two members representing the special interest group and the ED of PACJA. The CEB convenes three time a year to discuss matters arising and to make decisions for the Alliance. The Board is responsible for developing the agenda of the CGC and mobilising resources. To ensure fairness and equal opportunity in the movement, members of the CGC and CEB are appointed for a maximum of two terms of three years each.

In addition to the CGC and CEB, PACJA has five standing committees. They include: 1) the Technical and Policy Affairs Committee (TPAC), 2) Ethics and Arbitration Committee (EAC), 3) Recruitment and Credentials Committee (RCC), 4) Finance and Administration Committee (FAC) and 5) Advisory Committee (AC). The roles and activities of these standing committees are assigned and overseen by the CGC. For instance, the RCC is responsible for recruiting the ED and presenting the candidate to the CEB for approval. This committee is also responsible for verifying and endorsing prospective members to the CEB upon application and subject to 1) set criteria, for example proof of organisation's registration, verified physical office etc., alignment with CJ goals etc., 2) approval by the CEC and 3) payment of initial subscription fees[6].

The Secretariat is responsible for implementing policies, programmes, decisions, and day-to-day activities of the CJM as approved and directed by the CEB, CGC and GC (PACJA Constitution 2017, p. 17). It is structured along functional roles like Administration and finance, programmes, communications, and partnerships etc. The secretariat had 19 full-time paid employees and a part-time ED, as of December 2019. See Figure 2 below for an overview of PACJA's governance structure.

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6 Although included in the constitution, the payment of a membership fee was not in effect at the time of this study.



Figure 2: Organogram of PACJA as of December 2019 (Source: PACJA, 2019)

However, discussions with interviewees revealed a gap in the actual implementation of this constitution. For instance, several interviewees observed that there is no clear procedure in practice on how PACJA verifies and selects the members of the CGC (KII 24 and KII 28). In addition to this, there was also evidence to suggest that the selection of PACJA's board members did not follow the laid down process of being elected during the Movement's General Assembly (GA) which holds every three years at a time and place as appointed by the CGC as stated in its constitution. For example, a board member was approached at one of the UNFCCC COP events to join the movement and subsequently appointed a member of the board by the top leadership (KII 24). This blatant disregard for the constitution highlights the lack of fairness and transparency in PACJA's internal governance process and thus creates distrust between the members and the movement's leadership (KII 24 and KII 28).

Another gap highlighted by several interviewees in this study is the overlap in the line of responsibilities and/or influence as a member of PACJA and their autonomy as an individual

organisation. To illustrate, the ED of a member organisation noted that "*the leadership of PACJA occasionally encroach on its members' autonomy and attempts to dominate all the CC initiatives, events, and processes across Africa*" (KII 24). Still commenting on the issue, s/he revealed that PACJA's broad visibility was hindering the visibility of its member organisations at the individual level which is detrimental to their survival in the highly competitive and ever shrinking funding space of CSOs. Similarly, a co-ordinator of one of the thematic working groups for the KPCG platform noted that there is a conflict within the roles and responsibilities between the secretariat and the KPCG platform. S/he claimed that the platform's working engagement with the secretariat is not clearly defined (KII 28). So much so that the activities and decisions of KPCG are being facilitated by PACJA. "*Our independence is a bit compromised, and our voices and concerns are not being taken onboard. We are sometimes left feeling like employees of PACJA rather than an independent arm of the movement"*, this interviewee said.

Following up with these observations, the researcher asked whether these members have tried to draw the attention of PACJA's leadership to this issue. In response, KII 24 argued that "*whenever you try to resist PACJA's influence, the leaders become antagonistic and resort to intimidating or sidelining you from the movement's activities"*. S/he argued further that "*you know when someone is sitting at the top of a network and he uses his position to get funding, he believes that he has to teleguide what you do and that is what is happening [here]. If you are against them, you are removed from everything that they do"*.

While these arguments seem valid, this study recognises that they may be biased due to individual interests and/or expectations prior to joining the movement. For example, in a counter-argument, the Administrative and HR officer of PACJA explains, "*there has always been that thing about what are we benefitting. Some understand their membership to mean participating in all meetings, ability to influence the board or benefiting from a grant directly. In the absence of this, they do not find the time to attend or to value of their membership. It has been difficult to satisfy all these people"* (KII 7). Again, in PACJA's defence, one of its programme officers noted that the movement's perceived influence on the KPCG platform is because the current activity of the platform is funded by the Angaza project which already has predesigned areas of intervention, activities, and expected outcomes. S/he argues that as a result, "*there are things that cannot be funded under the project. There are limits and we must look at activities that fall within these limits*" (KII 10).

Clearly, this conflict in decision-making power, roles and responsibilities comes about because PACJA's leadership is focused on protecting the shared goals of what is effectively a continent-wide umbrella movement over individual members' interests/goal. Nevertheless, it raises the possibility of a lack of transparency and bureaucracy in PACJA's internal governing processes. Also, it suggests, contrary to the claims of Cameron and Quinn (2006) and Keck and Sikkink (1998), who argue that higher level of formalisation and coordination results in increased movement's effectiveness, that in fact it leads to internal conflicts, fragmentation and weakening of the movement, to the detriment of their CJ agenda.

2) Decentralisation

Against the most common inclination of organisations to bureaucratise and centralise decision-making and power over time, another indicator of effective internal governance for this study is decentralisation i.e., the organisation into regional nodes, working groups etc. This is because prior studies including Escobar (2018) and Azani (2009) have demonstrated that decentralisation allow for better alignment, integration, and coordination of a diverse group of spatially disparate actors as in the case of PACJA. Also, these studies have shown that decentralisation is useful for addressing challenges like representation and geographical isolation.

The findings of this study reveal that PACJA, like many social movements, adopts a network tie approach (i.e., secretariat to country level nodes/platforms/focal points) to association and coordination. Its broad membership interactions and activities are coordinated by the secretariat in Nairobi via the designated national platforms (NPs) and focal points in 45 countries across Africa where their membership resides. This allows the movement to maintain effective coordination, maximise resource efficiency and minimise structural issues like unequal capacity, different geographical attributions of climate impacts and CJ priorities, differing local socio-political context etc. of its broad and diverse membership. For instance, if the ED or a member of PACJA wishes to share information with other members of the CJM, that person sends it to the secretariat rather than engaging individually with its over 1,000 member organisations. The secretariat then sends the message to all or specific national platforms or focal points depending on the targeted audience. These national platforms or focal points are then responsible for sharing the information locally.

The organisation of PACJA into platforms and focal points is strategic and indicates effectiveness in IGS for several reasons. Firstly, it allows the movement to gain legal access into different African countries. This is because these platforms or focal points which act as host or affiliate organisations for PACJA are typically founded, registered, and run locally. Secondly, it allows PACJA to minimise conflicts around interests, priorities, representation and the like that are commonly associated with broad and diverse memberships, since individual platforms and focal points have the responsibility of identifying their CJ priorities. The implication of this is an increase in members' ownership of the movement, but at the potential cost of a clear and shared set of messages. Thirdly, it enhances the coordination of PACJA's efforts in lobbying for CC initiatives at the national level across SSA (PACJA Annual Report, 2014). Therefore, the findings support the idea of Oloo and Omondi (2017) and Stumer and Simon (2004) that a decentralised governance system can be an effective strategy for coordinating movements with broad membership like PACJA.

However, it is important to note from this study that decentralisation results in several trade-offs for PACJA. For instance, with the secretariat necessarily acting as the hub, this structure created distance in the interactions between PACJA's members from different platforms or hubs. According to a number of participants in the research, their interactions with members from other platforms is unhelpfully limited to quarterly virtual meetings and participation at bilateral and side meetings around regional and global CC negotiations and processes. As one of the coordinators from the KPCG platform noted, "*…in the long run, we have ended up with independent platforms. We need better integration among members so that it does not look like these platforms have become silos of their own*' (KII 28).

Also, the cultural and language differences across the different platforms is believed to have effect on members' interactions at the regional level. According to the Administrative and HR officer of PACJA, there is still some level of distrust in the movement as it is yet to find a common ground where the members understand each other fully. Similarly, one of PACJA's programme officers noted that the difference in culture also creates internal conflicts around strategy. S/he argued that "*members from platforms across West Africa tend to favour non-violent direct approaches over acts of lobbying and diplomacy, which are the preferred choice for members from East Africa*" (KII 6).

Moreover, this study found that decentralisation resulted in the unequal allocation of donors' funds within the movement. Somewhat controversially, over half of the funds raised by PACJA supported the implementation of projects/programmes in only one country, namely Kenya. When asked to comment on this observation, the ED of PACJA stated that this was mostly because of the '*donors' preference*'. He argued that these donors were more inclined to support projects in places where they have offices and staff due to the ease of access and an established understanding of the CSOs' capacity and the socio-political environment. While this argument is valid, this study recognises a significant gap since countries with a higher presence of donors like Kenya do not necessarily host the poorest and most vulnerable populations to CC in SSA. Thus, the extent of engagement and intervention on the part of PACJA on these populations is limited.

Another issue with decentralisation is the potential cost of a fragmented or disjointed CJ strategy and the resultant possible exclusion of members from the movement. This is because the different platforms and focal points in PACJA have different priority CJ issues and governance systems. For instance, depending on the geographical location, the priority CA varies for the different members within PACJA. While members from Nigeria considered CC governance their priority CA strategy, members from Cote d'Ivoire chose energy finance.

Also, the unique socio-political context of each group signifies differences in their membership needs, capacities, and perspectives of CJ politics, irrespective of their shared commitment to an over-arching CJ agenda (Leroy and Arts 2006). Until recently, some African countries, for example, Cote D'Ivoire, did not allow the registration of CSOs whereas in Kenya, the government is obligated under the Public Participation Act of 2018 to engage CSOs in discussions on public policy including the national CC dialogues, to enhance and promote public participation in the governance processes in Kenya (KII 29). Additionally, there are countries, particularly in central Africa, where CC is yet to gain momentum as a priority issue (KII 7).

The implication of this is a gap in the extent of PACJA's engagement in different countries across the continent. The more established platforms seem to enjoy more status and agency in the movements, leading to the side-lining of the smaller and less established platforms in the movement. This outcome is contrary to that of Escobar (2018) who found that decentralisation helped to limit challenges associated with integration.

3) Organisational philosophy, strategies and plans.

Evidence of an organisational philosophy, advocacy strategies and plans are indicators of PACJA's effectiveness in IGS because of their value in offering direction and coordinating the actions of the members towards their shared CJ demands (as outlined in Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3). Accordingly, this study set out to investigate whether PACJA has solidified a coherent organisational philosophy, strategies and tactics for their CJ advocacy. From the analysis of the data obtained from organisational document reviews, participant observation and interviews with the movement actors, the findings broadly support the claims of Newell et al (2020) and Bond (2012) that the CJM in SSA is yet to solidify a coherent philosophy, or set of strategies and tactics. This is because one, and perhaps the most significant finding is that although PACJA has documented its organisational philosophies, strategic plan, theories of change etc., evidence of a shared interpretation and implementation on the part of its membership is still lacking.

To illustrate, PACJA's documented organisational philosophy include transparency, accountability, volunteerism, inclusiveness, fairness and justice, gender responsiveness, participatory democracy, and professionalism. However, when interviewees from PACJA's membership were asked about the organisation's philosophy, a majority of the responses alluded that some of these values were not being incorporated in practice. The most significant views among these interviewees were that issues related to inclusiveness, quality of participation (in terms of professionalism and fairness) and gender responsiveness are not sufficiently prominent in the movement.

For example, several interviewees including a coordinator of the KPCG platform and a director of a CBO noted that there is limited evidence of PACJA's engagement at the grassroots. They argued that even though the poorest and most vulnerable populations across Africa constitute 'the grassroots', PACJA's public engagement and mobilisation activities appear to be mostly conducted in the conference rooms in the cities. Only on rare occasions, for example during sensitisation activities, are these engagements hosted in local communities and rural villages which host the grassroots NGOs and many of the most vulnerable populations.

While PACJA may have are several reasons for this, for example, to increase their visibility and encourage the participation of the more powerful state actors which will in turn increase their access to the CC negotiation arenas and processes (KII 5), the implication of this is that these populations, particularly the women and youth who often lack the opportunity and means to travel to attend these events, find themselves left out of these important discussions, further reinforcing climate injustices experienced by these populations (KII 27). This in turn further precludes other members like KII 27 from actively engaging in PACJA since they perceive the movement's stated CJ objective to advance the conditions of the most vulnerable population in Africa is not being pursed sincerely. Also, the general expectation among PACJA's members was that they will be actively engaged in the movement's activities. This is despite the understanding that it is highly unlikely for the movement to engage all its members equally in its activities, including attending national dialogues and the UNFCCC COPs. Subsequently, several interviewees felt that they were being excluded from the movement, even though PACJA benefited from their membership.

Other interviewees alluded to the issue of professionalism and quality of members' participation in the movement. For instance, there is evident disparity in the capacity of PACJA's members in terms of understanding CC concepts and the like. As one interviewee put it "*PACJA is not effectively utilising the skills and expertise that is available to them internally"* (KII 24). A possible explanation offered by one interviewee for this is that because of the rigidity of time and the lack of compensation given, the highly qualified members are mostly unavailable as active participants in the movement (KII 10). Moreover, because the movement relies on the goodwill of its members, it is unrealistic to expect that it will completely address this internal gap in capacity given the constant influx and exit of members (KII 5).

Commenting on the issue of gender responsiveness, an interviewee from PACJA's board said that "*African women organisations in CSOs networks on CC in Africa is not strong. Even within PACJA, they are not giving women a strong voice on CC, yet it wants to coordinate them*". According to this interviewee, the perception of women within PACJA is still poor. To support this claim, this interviewee recalled that:

> "*I was at a side event in Poznan, Poland when I first learnt about PACJA. They had a stand and were trying to do a press release. I thought it was a*

> *good Pan African organisation which deserved all the support. I introduced myself as a lawyer and offered to help them with it.* ***They said so women can be very serious like this****. That was how I was invited to join the board".* (KII 24)

Continuing with the conversation, this interviewee highlighted that until now, there is no Pan African organisation that is focused solely on harnessing the voices of African women. She concluded that the current CJ efforts in this regard are being amplified by international NGOs (KII 24).

However, a further line of questioning on these issues with representatives from PACJA's management revealed that although these issues are recognised as important, they are not considered as priorities for PACJA now. The topmost priority for the movement, according to its employees is to enhance public awareness, engagement and mass mobilisation for CJ. Nonetheless, they pointed out that PACJA was making internal efforts to address these gaps.

For example, PACJA, through the implementation of the SIDA project was building the capacity of its members – including women - to improve the quality of their engagements in the CC governance processes. Also, the movement is addressing the issue of inclusion by ensuring that different groups (both thematic and regional) are represented in its engagements, the governing board, and executive councils (KII, 10). Commenting on the issue of gender responsiveness, the Administrative and HR officer, who identifies as a female, noted that the movement took it very seriously, especially in their recruitment of paid employees. This information was verified from the male to female employee ratio at the secretariat during August 2018. The same interviewee noted that the selection of representatives at events was done on merit and depending on availability (KII 7).

Overall, the analysis of PACJA's internal governance system has revealed that the movement has taken several significant steps including formalisation via its constitution and accompanying institutional organogram, decentralisation to national platforms and the development of formal institutional policies and procedures to enhance its capacity. However, the study finds that there are implementation gaps in its internal governance that need to be addressed. The most significant of which are the stronger integration of its many

members, policy implementation and the development of clear and robust philosophical principles and approaches.

5.2.2 <u>Resource Mobilisation</u>

Drawing from the analytical framework in Table 3.5 of Chapter three, a second component of PACJA's effectiveness in IGS is resource mobilisation. Again, since the organisational structure, procedures and philosophies form the basis for mobilising and managing its resources, they provided most of the information on PACJA's efforts in resources mobilisation. This information was examined, scaled-up and validated against additional data obtained during participant observation and interviewees with key informants at the movement's secretariat. From the literature review, the following indicators of effectiveness in resources mobilisation were identified a) the existence of a resource mobilisation strategy/plan, b) a dedicated resource mobilisation team/personnel, c) documentation of funding mobilised over specified periods, d) diversification of resource mobilisation funds and activities and e) evidence of clear linkages between resource mobilisation and movement's strategic plan. A detailed examination and discussion of the findings are presented below.

1. <u>Limited evidence of a resource mobilisation (RM) strategy</u>

PACJA understands the importance of RM to its institutional and governance strengthening objective. This observation was drawn from the RM strategy outline on page 37 its strategic report for 2016-2020. In this outline, PACJA indicates that it intends to develop and implement of a RM strategy that will include securing dedicated personnel to support its implementation, developing an efficient funding lead and contact management system, the development and alignment of CC action plans/programmes with those of donor countries and fundraising activities. However, the findings from this study suggest that there was no evidence of a formal, developed and fully constituted strategy. More so, this document was not available to the researcher as part of the organisational documents that were reviewed for this study despite several follow-up requests for it.

Despite this absence of a documented RM strategy, PACJA appears to have identified key resources (i.e., financial and social-political) needed for IGS and developed some RM procedures in place going by its success in mobilising different forms of resources both internally and externally and at different levels for their activities (see below). For instance, when interviewees from PACJA's management team were asked to comment on the RM strategy of the movement, the general response alluded to fundraising and the importance of forging strategic partnerships to overcome the movement's challenge of limited funds as keys for building a strong movement. Thus, supporting the argument of previous scholars like Godwin et al (2020), they indicated that finance is the most important resource to PACJA.

To illustrate, a senior manager in PACJA noted that the strength and sustainability of PACJA is tied to its finances. According to this interviewee, "*we want to expand our activities in the coming years, but we need fund[s]. The constraints of finances cannot be understated. It is part of our job responsibility as senior managers to support the board to identify how we can raise funds, opportunities, partnerships, etc." (*KII 4). Also commenting on RM, the administrative and HR officer in PACJA stated that one of the strategies that the movement is looking at is to develop its own funding because "*finance is where we struggle more as it is quite difficult to obtain. We have people aligning [with PACJA's goals] based on the violations they see, their identity as Africans etc. But the money flowing to CSOs in shrinking because of other emerging issues globally"*. Likewise, the ED of PACJA, Dr Mithika Mwenda, agreed that financial resources was key to the movement's effectiveness in IGS. According to him, "*we need funds to advance our CJ goal. We want to provide support and influence the government and we require funds to do this*".

It can be deduced from the interview excerpts in the above paragraph that the limited funds available to PACJA limiting implications on its effectiveness in IGS. For example, the limited budget allocated by their partners/donors for administrative cost means that they are unable to retain staff except on short-term contracts. Consequently, the movement ends up with a high turnover of employees who if engaged on a long-term basis, could take the organisation to another level. Also, the reliance on donor funds limits the extent to which PACJA can grow or the leeway of independence in terms of how funding sources can be developed, according one of its senior programme officers.

Another finding of this study is that PACJA has been effective in mobilising socio-political resources. The movement considers forging and sustaining vibrant partnerships to be a core RM strategy towards achieving its CJ mandate (PACJA's Strategic Plan 2015-2020). Accordingly, PACJA uses its network structure to draw on socio-political resources internally by exploring its vast membership to create ties and linkages for growth, partnerships, and collaboration across the continent and beyond. This has resulted in its extensive number of partnerships and collaboration i.e., over 1,000 partners and donors globally, as indicated on its website.

2. A dedicated resource mobilisation team/personnel

PACJA did not have dedicated personnel responsible for RM at the time of the field visits and data collection for this study. This is because the CJM does not have enough funds to cover the cost of engaging dedicated RM personnel, according to the Administrative and HR Officer of PACJA. However, to mitigate this gap, RM (i.e., funds, opportunities, partnerships etc.) is included as a core responsibility of the board and the senior management team (KII 7). To validate this claim, when a senior programmes manager of PACJA was asked about this issue, s/he said that "*PACJA does not have resource mobilisation personnel because it does not have the finances to engage full-time personnel. So, we all have that responsibility. Besides, if you look at how our team is structured, we have sub-sectors and their experts. When a funding call comes in, it's easier for us to co-opt a team from these sub-sectors specifically for that purpose"* (KII 4).

While there is nothing unusual about PACJA not having a dedicated RM team, the absence still has several implications for the movement's objective of IGS. Firstly, and probably most importantly, the lack of a dedicated RM personnel is that it creates a reactive culture to RM. The implication of this is that it increases the risk of the movement engaging in activities that have little or no impact in advancing their CJ agenda, because they have to accept funding for activities that may be outside of this agenda, simply to survive. Secondly, assigning the role of RM to the already overstretched responsibilities of the management team reduces the quality of their performance in their primary roles. Thirdly, it increases the chance of conflicts of interest. Since members of PACJA's board and management team comprise of representatives from different national platforms and focal points, there is invariably a conflict between mobilising for PACJA or for their individual platforms or organisations.

Lastly, there is a lack of harmonisation in RM across the Alliance and lingering questions about what constitutes a fair allocation of these resources among its member organisations.

3. Documentation of funding mobilised over specified period.

PACJA appears to have been successful in mobilising resources going by the significant number of its programmes/projects and partnerships. However, this study did not find any evidence of well-preserved documentation of the movement's funding from its inception through to the present time. Rather, information on its funding is has to be gleaned from disparate sources, including on their websites, in annual reports, and other organisational documents. The most probable explanation for this is the lack of a dedicated RM /team to harmonise and record the individual resource mobilisation efforts of the management team. Nevertheless, PACJA has been effective in its fundraising efforts and a summary of the Alliance's most significant fund mobilisation efforts in the last five years, including the funders, amount, CC issues etc. is presented in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Summary of PACJA's most significant Resource Mobilisation Efforts in the Last Five Year

	Project Title	Funders	Objective	Scope	Duration	Amount	Activities	Achievements
1	Deepening engagement of African CSOs for effective implementation of NDCs	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)	• To strengthen African CSOs engagement in the implementation of PA through enhancing the capacity of NPs, and particularly the 8 priority chapters to engage their governments in the implementation of the PA and SDGs • To facilitate selected national chapters to participate and contribute CC dialogue processes with a view to holding governments accountable on their commitment to NDCs and other	Regional – Includes eight countries: 1. Botswana 2. Cote d'Ivoire 3. Gabon 4. Ethiopia 5. Nigeria 6. Kenya 7. Tanzania 8. Zambia	Aug. 2016 to Dec. 2019	Not disclosed	• Identification of RECs • Organisational Capacity Assessment of the 8 DNPs. • Meetings, Training and Capacity Building e.g., Project management • Lobbying • Knowledge sharing/exchanges • Programme implementation	• Increased CSOs participation in national and regional CC processes • Increased coherence regional in implementing the NDCs, SDGs and PA. • Better coordination of the Alliance via its DNPs • Harmonised data collection and analysis of African perspectives and government responses to CC

	Project Title	Funders	Objective	Scope	Duration	Amount	Activities	Achievements
			provisions of PA as well as strengthen the governance structure of PACJA and national chapters to effectively deliver on their mandate. • To broaden citizen awareness on PA through robust media engagement					
2	Building the capacity of African Civil Society and Local Communities on REDD+	The Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) though World Bank	• To strengthen the knowledge of targeted southern CSOs and LCs of REDD+ Readiness at the national level • To promote knowledge exchange at the regional level	Continental – 18 FCPF eligible countries	April 2016-Dec 2019	Initial USD 1,156,440 plus additional funding of USD 800,000	• Training • Workshops • Development and dissemination of existing and new REDD+ educational materials • Environmental and social safeguard monitoring • Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and reporting, • Preparation of work plans • Financial audits	• Increased knowledge of CSOs and local communities on REDD+ • Strengthened institutional capacity of the sub-grantees on REDD+ • Established linkages and coordination for information sharing/exchange among the 18 eligible countries.
3	Angaza: Strengthening Civil Society Advocacy for	DFID through Development Associates Inc.	• To catalyse and facilitate CS and broader citizen	Kenya -Nairobi	Sept 2017 – July 2019	GBP 339, 278	• Constitution of TWGs • Review of national CC laws and	• The establishment of the Momentum committee alongside five (5) TWGs and their TORs

	Project Title	Funders	Objective	Scope	Duration	Amount	Activities	Achievements
	Improved Climate Change Governance in Kenya		participation in the implementation of the NCCA, 2016, review of the NCCAP (2018-2022), Implementation of the NDCs and Influence the NCC. • To track and monitor CF to ensure National Budget allocated for CC and other CF streams meet the needs of the most vulnerable communities at the frontline of CC impacts; and • To solidify gains achieved in the coordination of diverse groups aimed at consolidating a unified CS voice in national CC				policies, NDCs implementation, • Consultations for the development of national CC strategies, policies and frameworks	• Convening bi-monthly TWGs and monthly Momentum committee meetings • increased members capacity in CC governance process at the national and county levels • The launch of five county KPCG chapters and • New partnership with the Kenya Industrial Institute to support monitoring and climate proofing of innovations

	Project Title	Funders	Objective	Scope	Duration	Amount	Activities	Achievements
			policy dialogues and interventions.					
4	Strengthening the capacity of pastoralists organisations to engage in CC processes at national and regional levels.	Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa (OSIEA)	• To build strong linkages and partnerships between pastoralist organisations and broader CS lobby groups working in the area of CC at national, regional and international levels.	Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania	Jan 2017 – May 2019	USD 180,678	• Training/workshops on food security and CC in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania • Exchange learning for Pastoralist organisations on CC initiatives at national and regional levels • Participation of pastoralist's organisations in agricultural/livestock related climate policy processes at national and regional levels • Produced and disseminated policy briefs, statements, factsheets targeting key policy makers at the national and regional levels. • Facilitated PAMACC to disseminate media stories on CC, food security and pastoralism. • Organized sensitization forums for Pastoralist's	• Increased engagement of pastoralist CSOs and coalitions on CC policy advocacy issues at national level in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. • Highlighted the important role of pastoralist CSOs in CC processes where they can inform processes and decision making. • Strengthened capacity of pastoralist CSs to engage in CC processes. • Created linkages among pastoralist CSOs and other CSOs at the country level. • Pastoralist organisations have built common understanding of the various issues in pastoralism and CC as demonstrated by the various messages developed. • Secured the involvement of pastoralist CSOs in CC processes for instance in the annual UNFCCC country level COP engagement.

	Project Title	Funders	Objective	Scope	Duration	Amount	Activities	Achievements
							organisations on the UNFCCC-COP processes • Participation of Pastoralists organisations in UNFCCC-COP processes at national and international level • Engagement of pastoralists organisations in climate related processes at the international level	
5	Community resilience and CC adaptation	Trocaire	To promote the resilience of vulnerable communities to the impact of shocks and stresses related to CC	Kenya – Kitui, Tharaka Nithi Embu	2017-2019	Not disclosed	• Workshop • Distribution of cook stoves • Distribution of tree seedlings	• Awareness creation • Emissions reduction • Forest conservation • Healthy cooking • Reducing pollution • Time saving

4. Diversification of RM funds and activities

PACJA has solely depended on the goodwill of its donors and the strength of its relationships with these donors since its inception in 2008 to keep it functioning. Most of its funds come from international NGOs, CSOs and government agencies including SIDA, Oxfam International, UK Aid, German Watch, World Bank etc. This funding structure has been found in this study to have significant implications for how PACJA conducts its activities and the extent of its influence in the CC governance processes. For example, because donor funds are mostly assigned to specific projects in Africa, PACJA is constrained to implement project or programmes that align with their donors' mandates to fulfil the funding requirement and retain its functioning and visibility whether or not its addresses the priority CJ demands of their constituencies. To illustrate further, one of PACJA's programme officer noted that the movement sometimes have activities that it wants to implement but cannot be funder under a donors' mandate. "*When this happens, we must look at activities that we can implement that align within the limits provided by these donors before these funds are released*" (KII 10).

Another interviewee, when asked why PACJA is yet to address the capacity gap in its national platforms and focal points that were identified from its organisational capacity assessment (OCA) and reported in its Strategic Plan 2016-2020, inferred that it was due to its current fund mobilisation structure. To quote directly, s/he said that "*I can assure you nowhere do they provide money for you to build networks. Remember this money is coming from the West. So, you are building networks that would go and cause problems for them. And that's a challenge of the CSOs in Africa*" (KII 4). Commenting on the same issue, the ED of PACJA began by acknowledging the challenge with the movement's current funding structure and highlighting the need to relook at how they can get finances from the global North without restrictive conditionalities. He stated that:

> "*PACJA's current resource mobilisation strategy is a well-crafted one to fit into the current political space otherwise we would be starved. We are not in the north which like Oxfam has over 450,000 members who contribute to them even if it is only $5, it is quite a lot of money. The same can be said for Action Aid, FOEI. Independently they can act. But for us in Africa, we need resources. So, when you become antagonistic, you starve and die and fail to achieve your agenda. So, it's about establishing that very complex relationship*".

He explained further using the example of the World Bank's FCPF REDD+ programme.

> *"I know many southern organisations and global movements are strongly opposed to the concept of REDD, but we did not look at it in the Northern perspective, we embraced it because we know that REDD is a big policy issue for Africa, especially countries in the Congo Basin, where forestry is the source of their livelihood. REDD is a key policy issue for 18 African countries so should we keep off? We decided as an organisation that we are not going to follow the Northern narrative that REDD is the way they defined it. Rather than keeping away, we go there and oppose it that this is not right and that is our position. I know we differed with some northern organisations, but they do not define our policy options and advocacy options. We do. When we went there, we realised that there is a capacity building programme for African CSOs supported by FCPF and we are now beneficiaries".* (KII 2)

While the ED's argument of PACJA's support for the REDD+ project appears credible in terms of its impacts in strengthening the individual capacities of its members and constituencies, this study recognises some trade-offs with it. For instance, his response signifies the movement's tendency to retrofit its objective to gain access to the limited donor funds in a highly competitive CSO space. The implication of this is that it weakens the negotiating power of the movement in favour of the donors and/or wealthier actors in the CC governance process. This in turn reinforces the inequitable power relations which is a root cause of climate injustices that the movement seeks to address.

Another implication of PACJA's lack of diversification of income streams highlighted in this study is the imbalance in resource distribution in relations to the CJ priorities of the region. According to the findings, many of the funds provided by PACJA's international partners and donors appear to target intellectual capacity building activities in the form of seminars, trainings, and workshops (see Table 5.1) rather than upskilling (i.e., via programming, online tools and platforms) in a way that they can actually tackle 'technical' challenges. Thus, creating an evident gap in the funding of hardware projects such as long-term financing schemes for farmers, rural solar-powered electrification schemes, water management projects, and the like. that can enhance the socio-economic capacity and CC resilience of the poor and vulnerable populations in SSA (Magrath, 2010).

When questioned about this issue, the ED of PACJA responded that this misalignment in the CC priorities versus the donors' interests was because "*the international donors were comfortable providing money for projects where their researchers and people come to do research and studies in Africa and thus provide them jobs and the money again goes back to their economies*".

Further to the above, there were clear indications - and as the quotation above indicates, also a clear understanding within PACJA - to suggest that some of these donors perceive PACJA as a tool to either implement their own agenda or to gain some form of legitimacy for their work in SSA or both. For instance, the ED of PACJA noted that PACJA is often approached by international donors/partners in need of an African perspective when they do not want to be seen directly engaging with the national government, perhaps due to the existing, questionable governance system or socio-political context of the country. The existing bureaucracy within the process of accessing WB, GCF and other climate related funds was highlighted as an additional challenge for PACJA and their relationship with their financial partners. This is the case even though many of these funds have ostensibly been established to respond to the adaptation and CJ needs of these vulnerable populations. Access to and distribution of these funds are still significantly controlled by the donors themselves (KII 2).

Despite the above limitations, there was no evidence from this study to indicate that the movement is making efforts to diversify its RM funds, despite the claims by several interviewees that donors' funds are continually shrinking in response to other emerging issues (KII 2, KII 4 and KII7). A possible reason for this lag according to an interviewee from PACJA is because the movement is registered as a not-for-profit organisation, and thus, is restricted in the ways by which it can fundraise (KII 6). This argument is rather weak as past studies like Achamkulangare (2014) have shown other ways, including partnering with private sector, that CSOs can diversify their funding streams from non-traditional donor sectors. Again, this highlights the need for a dedicated /team who will constantly seek to explore, identify, and pursue opportunities for RM for PACJA.

Clearly, the findings from this study are in line with those of previous studies like Goodwin et al (2000) which showed that the greater availability of monies and other forms of resources will mean that the movements like PACJA are more likely to implement their objectives and expand the range of their activities. Also, it supports the assertion by Zeitoun and Allan

(2008) and Fitzgerald and Rodger (2000) that the ***source*** of the funding is equally as important as the ***availability*** with regards to its implications on the extent and limits of a movement's interventions.

5. Evidence of linkages between PACJA's resource mobilisation activities and its strategic plan

There is evidence of clear linkages between PACJA's RM strategy and its strategic plan. For example, PACJA has launched several initiatives through its partnerships to pool together and harness other forms of socio-political resources. These include:

1. Pan African Media Alliance on Climate Change (PAMACC),
2. Africa Climate Change and Environment Reporting (ACCER) award,
3. The ACCER Awards Finalist Academy (TAAFA)
4. Africa Climate Legislation Initiative (ACLI) and
5. Africa Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access (ACSEA).

Having recognised the key role of media in shaping CC politics (KII 2), PACJA played a significant role in the formation of the Pan African Media Alliance on Climate Change (PAMACC) in 2013. PAMACC is an independent consortium of media practitioners across Africa that report on environmental and CC issues, both in Africa and globally (KII 40). The Alliance aims to motivate journalists to engage in and improve their reporting on environmental and CC issues in Africa and globally (KII 4, KII 5 and KII 6). Between 2013 and 2016, PAMACC mostly used print media to pool diverse perspectives on CC and CJ issues across Africa, increase awareness and engagement with these issues and mainstream the CJ agenda into the public domain. However, in 2016, PACJA supported PAMACC in the design, maintenance, and update of its own website (www.pamacc.org) to strengthen and increase its visibility and outreach (PACJA Annual Report, 2016). Today, PAMACC uses multiple media platforms including individual blogs, portals, and websites to report on CC issues ranging from the grassroots to the international level and engage with its audiences across Africa (http://pamaccafrica.blogspot.co.ke/).

By harnessing its relationship with PAMACC, PACJA draws upon various perspectives across Africa and mainstreams the CJ agenda into the public domain to increase awareness and engagement with the issues (KII 2). The movement has contributed to IGS by increasing the reporting and coverage of African narratives on CC through its provision of financial support to journalists under PAMACC to facilitate their participation at regional and international CC events like the CCDA, AMCEN and UNFCCC COPs (KII 40). At the CCDA VII event in Nairobi in 2018, the ED who doubles as the spokesperson of PACJA, reported that the existence of PAMACC has both increased awareness of CC in Africa and beyond and served as a catalyst for greater participation and influence in policy outcomes across Africa. Regional organisations like UNECA, AfDB and the African Ministerial Conference on Water (AMCOW) now rely on the over 100 journalists from major media networks under the auspices of PAMACC to report their activities throughout the year (PACJA Annual Report 2017).

To sustain this relationship and encourage journalists to continually report on CC and the environment, PACJA established the biennial Africa Climate Change and Environment Reporting (ACCER) award in 2013 (www.pacja.org). The ACCER awards publicly recognise and reward outstanding journalists for their contributions to advancing the CJ discourses in Africa. It covers different categories namely: Print, Radio, Television, Photojournalism and Online. The ACCER awards are supported by some of PACJA's partners including UNECA. The awards ceremony is usually held on the side-lines of the regional CC events like the CCDA to increase its visibility and make it more attractive to partners. The award includes cash prizes, trophies, a certificate of excellence and an all-expenses paid trip for the overall winner to participate in the UNFCCC COP later in the year. It is currently one of the most popular and prestigious competitions for African journalists (PACJA Annual Report, 2017).

The ACCER awards were taken to new heights in June 2014 when PACJA launched the inaugural ACCER Awards Finalist Academy (TAAFA) to train journalists on environmental policies, global standpoints, African narratives and contexts and essential skills in CC reporting (PACJA Annual report, 2014). Participants at the TAAFA are shortlisted through the ACCER awards process. In addition, PACJA occasionally partners with PAMACC to conduct media workshops on the side-lines of key CC events, for example, at the Africa Climate Week 2019 in Accra (KII 35).

Since policy influence is one of the core CJ objectives of the movement, it is imperative for it to harness political resources and support for their activities. Consequently, in 2015, PACJA strategically established a partnership with parliamentarians from across Africa under the Africa Climate Legislation Initiative (ACLI) by a resolution of the Second African Parliamentarians Summit on Climate Policy which held in Kenya (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). ACLI links CSOs in Africa to the policy makers and the policy making processes, promotes the exchange of ideas, and fosters collective learning that would influence the design and implementation of national CC laws and policies. As a result, PACJA has succeeded in 1) Sensitizing parliamentarians to the key provisions of the PA and the NDCs as well as bridging gaps in policy and practice, and 2) Developing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Pan African Parliament (PAP) for long-term collaboration in driving climate policy processes and legislation in Africa, as evidenced from their joint events during COP 23 (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). Through this platform, the movement continues to engage with African policy makers to promote the exchange of ideas and collective learning that would influence the design and implementation of national CC laws and policies.

Further to the above initiatives, PACJA has strengthened its governance capacity by hosting the African Coalition for Sustainable Energy and Access (ACSEA). ACSEA is an alliance of CSOs, private sector, academia and research institutions engaging in work on access to clean, reliable, affordable, and sustainable energy across the African continent (www.acsea54.org/). Through the ACSEA, PACJA seeks to influence national governments as well as strategic regional development bodies such as the AfDB to prioritise policies that will secure investment in the sustainable energy sector as well as improving access to energy by the energy poor communities, among other mandates (KII 2). PACJA is also a member of the consortium of the alliance in the Green Climate Fund (GCF) working on energy issues in Africa (KII 6).

PACJA has leveraged on its status as the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) CSO representative in Africa to work closely with African Ministers of Environment and ensure that climate realities are captured in their national plans and policies (KII 4). Accordingly, the movement is increasingly being factored into many regional dialogues on CC and justice by key regional actors, including at the African Development Bank (AfDB), African Union Commission (AUC) and the African Group of Negotiators (AGN) at the continental level (KII 35 and KII 41). Occasionally, these actors' partner with

PACJA to implement thematic specific CJ programmes or initiatives. For example, AUC, UNECA and AfDB (i.e., AUC-UNECA-AfDB) partners with PACJA to implement the Clim-Dev-Africa programme, which includes the annual Climate Change and Development Africa (CCDA) Conference.

At the national level, PACJA, through its NPs, is collaborating with the national and sub-national governments in planning and implementing CC laws and policies. For example, several interviewees from PACJA's national platforms, KPCG and CSDevNet, mentioned that the movement frequently receives invitation from both the Kenyan and Nigerian governments to jointly organise CC events including pre- and post COP workshops and dialogues sessions, implementing CC awareness programmes at the sub-national and grassroots levels (KII 16 and KII 31). They use their participation at these events to provide governments with information and recommendations that are occasionally included in the final policy outcomes (KII 31). Because movement activities involve a lot of organising and coordinating of efforts (Lecy et al, 2012), the movement has had to engage several full-time paid employees to oversee its activities at the secretariat.

In line with is goal of capacity development, PACJA is partnering with other international CSOs and NGOs from the global North and South to implement projects and programmes that are targeted at developing and strengthening its capacities. For instance, a senior programme manager at PACJA disclosed that the movement has a working agreement with several institutions including the Methodist Church of Africa which provides it with additional technical capacity when needed in the form of volunteers from its Global Fellowship Mission (KII 5). These volunteers are mostly skilled professionals who possess a minimum of a BSc qualification and whose interests closely align with PACJA's work.

PACJA also partnered with SIDA on a project with the specific aim of strengthening the capacity of African CSOs in the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Furthermore, PACJA benefits from its partnership with the World Bank Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) under the REDD+ programme to build local capacities of CSOs in 10 countries across Africa, for meaningful engagement in the REDD+ processes. Other projects/programmes being implemented by PACJA in collaboration with their strategic partners include: The Pastoralist project funded by Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa (OSIEA), Improving CSOs' readiness for the

GCF project funded by the German Government, Project for Advancing Climate Transparency, funded by the European Union (EU) in partnership with the World Resource Institute (WRI) and Community Resilience and Climate Change Adaptation in Semi-Arid Lands funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) through Trocaire. Additional information on these projects including the timelines, funding amount etc, is provided in Table 5.1 above.

Perhaps, the most compelling evidence of PACJA's clear linkage of its resource mobilisation to its strategic plan was drawn from the overall positive response from both its employees and members. Most of the responses to the self-evaluating question on whether they think PACJA is effective indicated that it is and pointed to its past successes in implementing several programmes in line with the CJ agenda. Several interviewees noted that PACJA is now being approached by organisations wishing to fund/support some of its activities. For instance, one of PACJA's programme officers commented that "*Partners are now approaching us rather than us approaching them with funding to support what we are doing. They want to associate themselves with a successful organisation which has networks across Africa*" (KII 5). This finding is consistent with those of McCarthy's who found that a movement's institutional strength is large dependent on its capacity to mobilise and retain resources to implement its objectives and expand its range of activities (McCarthy, 2013).

In summary, it is clear that PACJA's resource mobilisation efforts are considerable, although some significant gaps still exist. Financial resource distribution appears to be one of those. The most significant indicator of PACJA's effectiveness in resource mobilisation are the clear linkages between its socio-political resource mobilisation activities and its strategic plan. This finding is consistent with those of Masuda et al (2008) who found that social-political resources are especially significant for IGS.

5.2.3 Institutional Learning (IL)

Prior studies have noted that a movement is strong to the extent in which it can demonstrate growth, stability and dynamism while retaining support for its core values (Dyke and Amos, 2017; Cameron and Quinn, 2006). Therefore, changes over time in an organisation's structure, functions, coordination, and resource mobilisation strategy often indicate that an

organisation is focused on continual learning and improvement, a key component of effectiveness in IGS. Based on this understanding, this study examined primary data obtained from the review of organisational documents and KIIs for the indicators of IL listed in the analytical framework in Chapter Three. These include changes in organisational and governance structure, documentation and data management, evidence of MERL activities and reports, and a dedicated MERL personnel. A critical examination of these indicators is presented here.

1. Evidence of changes to PACJA's Organisational and Governance Structure

PACJA is continually changing its organisational and governance structure to reflect its changing dynamics (i.e., in terms of size, external environment etc.) and ensure better coordination. For example, a noted earlier, the movement began in 2008 as a loose network of only a handful of CSOs that was governed by a five-member Steering Committee. However, by 2010, PACJA had experienced rapid growth in its membership to include 63 member organisations and remarkable proliferation into over 12 countries across Africa (KII 3, a co-founder of PACJA). In response to this expansion and its accompanying growth in visibility, PACJA modified its governance structure to become more institutionalised, create order and lines of authority (i.e., in terms of leadership and decision-making) and to sustain and deepen interactions with and between its members and allies. It established a General Assembly (GA), a Continental Executive Committee and an autonomous Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya (PACJA Annual Report 2011).

The Secretariat acts as the coordinating arm of the movement to implement the decisions and policies of the GA and the CEC. It is also responsible for coordinating exchanges (i.e., information and resources) and interactions among the movement actors and ensuring that it translates all of these into meaningful participation for the movement's agenda. The board and members of PACJA were working solely on a voluntary basis until 2011 when PACJA, through the Secretariat, engaged a total of nine paid employees to assist in supporting roles with the development and implementation of reports, policies and programmes, as well as manage the day-to-day functioning. This included two full-time employees, one part-time (engaged 1 day per week), one contract workers and one intern (PACJA Annual Report 2011). The cost of engaging these employees was factored into the PACJA's programmes

that were funded by their donors. Functional roles covered by these paid employees include finance and administration, human resources, and programme/project management.

By 2013, PACJA had again changed its governance structure to include the General Assembly (GA) as the supreme body, the Continental Executive Committee (CEC), and the Secretariat with three departments: Finance and Administration, Programme Communication, and Advocacy. Other changes implemented here included categorising its membership into three – Full members, Associates and Honorary members and developing the first draft of its constitution. The finalised version of this constitution was later ratified and adopted at the General Assembly in 2015 (PACJA Annual Report 2013).

The continued rapid growth and expansion of PACJA, both in terms of its visibility and its membership, created new challenges including inevitable imbalances in knowledge, cultural capital and socio-economic capacity of its growing membership. This meant that maintaining effective coordination among its diverse membership (who are operating at different scales i.e., national, sub-national and grassroots) and maximising its resource efficiency, would present a key challenge (PACJA Annual Report 2014). Also, the differences in geographical location meant that specialised coordinating efforts were needed to manage the different priorities or preferred CA for its broad membership so as to allow for better alignment and integration of its ambitious agenda.

To illustrate these tensions, this study uses examples of two distinct grassroots organisations, a fishing CBO in Nigeria and a peasant organisation in Kenya, which are both members of PACJA. The CC experience of fishing community from the northern part of Nigeria (for e.g., Maiduguri) includes significant drying up of Lake Chad. As a result, CA action for this population could mean building their capacities around sustainable fishing and perhaps aquaculture and/or helping them to develop alternate livelihoods. All of these are complex and multi-dimensional undertakings that PACJA would be hard-pressed to support. Alternatively, the dominant CC impact of a smallholder farmers' organisation in Kenya (e.g., Kitui) is the decline in farm outputs arising from unreliable or reduced rainfall. Priority CAs for this group would likely include a focus on sustainable farming practices that will improve farm outputs and secure their livelihoods. Yet, both groups need to feel that their voices are being heard and their concerns (or needs) met within PACJA. The comment below illustrates that this perspective is well understood by the PACJA's team at the secretariat.

> "*You are looking at a movement comprising of people from across Africa. It becomes a challenge to operationalise. It needs much support beyond having it as just a structure where people come together. You need to be strong enough to address structural issues before it becomes a challenge. We are trying to address that with the new constitution and structures which provides for targeted support through the Secretariat*" (KII 6).

Consequently, based on its growing experience in relation to the diverse needs of its membership, in 2014 PACJA again revised its organisational structure and established national platforms (NPs) and country focal points (FP) to minimise the challenge of conflicting CJ interests and CA priorities. The movement now has NPs or FPs in 48 countries across the continent (PACJA Statement on African Civil Society Position for COP 25, 2019). This is an important finding for this study because previous studies like Bond and Galvin (2019), Bollier (2016) and Diani (2011) have recommended creating nodes around regional, cultural, or other forms of social categorisation to increase representation and participation in the broader movement, something that, by opting for NPs, PACJA has decided against.

In March 2015, PACJA held a GA in Cairo where its members reviewed the draft 2013 constitution and recommended that it should be amended to reflect the organisation's growth and changing circumstances. In October 2017, the movement officially changed its name from the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance to the Pan African Climate and "Environmental" Justice Alliance as agreed by the 2015 General Assembly. They agreed that the inclusion of "environmental" in the name was necessary to reflect the growing mandate of the movement, which is "*seeking to conduct interventions across the environment sector*" (PACJA Strategic Plan 2016-2020 p. 10). The acronym "PACJA", however, remained unchanged.

Evidently, these changes made to PACJA's governance structure over the years are indicative of its effort to implement procedures that not only better integrate their members but also ensure the active participation of their members towards the realisation of the long-term transformational changes which they seek. Nevertheless, the findings from this study suggests that most of these changes occur in response to perceived needs rather than because of longer-term sustainability planning, i.e., they are responsive or reactive rather than

proactive, creating the impression that as an organisation, PACJA continues to sail through uncharted waters, without a clear model of what it might become or achieve. This could be seen in contradictory ways: on the one hand, it makes the Alliance more agile and able to respond to changes in the overall environment, including crucially, the needs of its members. On the other hand, it can make its evolution seem haphazard and ad hoc, with the institutional arrangements always on the back foot, having to respond to members' demands for change.

2. Limited evidence of documentation and data management

Documentation and data management was included as an indicator of IL in this study due to their critical roles in sustaining institutional history and 'memory' and providing a record of growth and changes in the organisation. Accordingly, this study sought to examine PACJA's organisational documents and archives for evidence of any changes in their activities from when it was established in 2008 until December 2019. The findings, however, suggest that although the movement has generated a lot of data, it does not have a proper archival system in place (as discussed in Section 4.4.1 in Chapter 4). The movement's documents are held by either by the ED, their originators or authors, or the document users. As a result, there were noticeable gaps in the employees' knowledge of the movements' history, practices and strategies, since most of those interviewed for this research claimed to have no knowledge of PACJA's practices, strategies and past projects and were quick to refer the researcher to the ED, and/or other past employees for such information. This corroborates the claims of della Porta (2014) that many movements, both globally and in SSA, do not have databases or archives documenting the profiles of participants, movement processes (i.e., activities, histories, learnings, changes etc.) and outcomes, which can be problematic.

In contrast to this situation, there were several mentions and links to different documents to suggest that some of the data generated by the movement were in fact being used concretely to support their IGS. For instance, while the OCA report was unavailable to the researcher at the time of the visit, the Strategic Plan 2016-2020 indicated that it focused on implementing several measures to address some of the gaps that had apparently been identified in the report. Nevertheless, because of the poor documentation practice, this study could not demonstrate the extent to which PACJA is utilising the data it generates from both its internal and external activities for IGS.

3. <u>Limited evidence of MERL activities and reports</u>

PACJA's accountability agreement between the CEB, Secretariat and its membership as documented in its Strategic Plan 2016-2020 includes a commitment to 'constant monitoring, evaluation and reporting to its donors, partners, and its members' as a way of measuring its achievements and making operational adjustments, as necessary. However, this study found that while the movement has demonstrated commitment to conducting regular stocktake or evaluation reporting activities as evidenced from its annual reporting since 2011, there was limited evidence to suggest that it engages in adequate monitoring and evaluation activities that could serve to question and reflect on the appropriateness of their activities in line with their CJ objectives, for the purpose of iterative learning. For example, PACJA has received several recommendations from their members and partners including Diakonia, Oxfam and SIDA requesting that it undertake better monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of its activities (PACJA Annual Report, 2016). These recommendations suggest that conducting adequate MERL activities is not the norm in the movement.

Also, PACJA stated in its Strategic Plan 2016-2020 that one of its core activities is to ensure that African governments efficiently implement Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and the SDGs in line with their CJ agenda. To do this, the movement noted that it would develop compliance scorecards, toolkits, and periodic reports to track the various governments' progress towards this complex goal. However, evidence from the reviews of organisational documents and interviews show that it is yet to develop a comprehensive compliance toolkit and/or periodic reports that measure the extent of policy implementation at the national, sub-regional and regional level. As of December 2019, none of PACJA's NPs or FPs has developed a tool for tracking the implementation of the NDCs or compliance with other environmental and CC laws and policies. Rather, they have channelled most of their efforts into coordinating dialogues with the government around climate finance and the implementation of the NDCs (KII 2, KII 16, KII 25).

Although these dialogues are necessary to define actionable interventions and support the implementation of the Paris Agreement, it is only through constant MERL, via the use of compliance toolkits, that PACJA can track the governments' progress in implementing the NDCs and validate the effectiveness of existing environmental and CC laws and policies. This has led several interviewees to describe PACJA's engagement with national

governments as an "*unholy alliance*" and as "*sleeping in the same bed*" (KII 24 and KII 28). As a result, it appears that contrary to their claims to be CJ advocates for the poor and vulnerable in Africa, their legitimacy lies more with the powerful actors i.e., government, donors and the like. It is fair to say, therefore, that PACJA is falling short in its critical work as a "watchdog' and its CJ objective of ensuring that new and existing CC laws and policies are pro-poor.

Furthermore, the evidence from this study indicates that most of PACJA's projects that are being implemented on behalf of the vulnerable local communities were ineffective and failed to achieve their objectives of safeguarding human rights and promoting 'pro-poor development[7]' for the most vulnerable people in Africa (PACJA Strategic Plan 2016-2020). For example, the ED of PACJA claimed that the movement embraced the FCPF REDD+ programme because of its implications for vulnerable communities in Africa, for example, the Congo Basin, that are dependent on this programme for their livelihoods. However, a critical examination of the REDD+ programme revealed that it has little or no impact in addressing the climate vulnerability of these populations. For instance, most of the activities are focused on awareness raising with no attention paid to achieving a 'just transition' as illustrated from the comment below.

> "*We tried to talk to them about the long-term implications of cutting trees vs the short-term benefit. And they ask, if you tell me to stop cutting trees, and I am not getting anything from my farm, where do you expect me to get food from? In as much as we try to bring local solutions for adaptation and mitigation, sometimes they expect solutions to the problems of survival that they currently face. There is need for alternatives. That is another challenge". (KII 5).*

Clearly, the romanticising of this initiative as a crucial step for the movement's CJ advocacy by the ED of PACJA suggests the movement's avoidance of or a distraction from addressing the complex systemic issues of fighting climate injustices, in this case the uneven distribution and redistribution of the burdens and benefits of CC. Also, the continued support for this initiative demonstrates the failure of the movement to question the appropriateness its

[7] Pro-poor development – i.e., development processes that directly targets and positively transforms the livelihoods of the poor communities

activities, their impacts and to learn from this. In turn, it suggests that PACJA is falling short when it comes to conducting research to identify the most significant CJ issues for the poorest and most vulnerable populations of SSA.

Commenting on the issue, several interviewees in this study highlighted the limited MERL activities as a core weakness of PACJA (KII 9 and KII 42). They noted that the movement does not conduct sufficient evaluations of its projects and programmes and even of its network and members. A common explanation given by the interviewees for this evident gap is the limited funding available to the movement vis-à-vis the hight cost involved in conducting research and evaluations. Another reason suggested by one of its senior programme managers is that they want to avoid profiling and putting labels on their member organisations and platforms (KII 2). More so since their membership is voluntary and without any compensation or benefits accrued to them (KII 9). Therefore, the furthest PACJA has gone in evaluating its members was when it conducted the Organisational Capacity Assessment (OCA) or baseline evaluation of the eight NP platforms prior to the implementation of the SIDA project in 2010 (KII 4). The OCA evaluated the NPs in terms of their functions, governance structure, project management, activities etc. The only reason that this evaluation was conducted was because it was included as the first phase of project implementation in the project proposal (KII 9). Nevertheless, it is important to note that the OCA provided PACJA with information on the strength and weaknesses of the eight NPs which were then integrated into the design for the next phase of the project, according to PACJA's senior programme manager. This claim was validated by the several references to the OCA in PACJA's Strategic Plan 2016-2020, thus highlighting the importance of MERL for IGS.

In general, the findings from this study are consistent with past studies which have demonstrated that without these evaluations, movements like PACJA cannot determine the extent of their impacts, gaps and unwanted outcomes and learn from these in advancing their CJ agenda (Tallberg *et al*, 2018; Nelson, 2000). Accordingly, conducting sufficient MERL will provide opportunities for input and learning. Ideally, members from the weaker or less active platforms can benefit from the reporting on the more active and functional platforms through conscious engagement for knowledge sharing and information. This will in turn strengthen the institutional and governance capacity, project and programme design, implementation, and outcomes of the CJM.

4. A dedicated internal MERL personnel

PACJA had an MERL personnel at the time of data collection for this study. However, an interview with this person revealed that s/he was appointed as the first MERL staff member for PACJA in 2007, following series of recommendations from the movement partners and its inclusion as a requirement to access donor funds. When asked to comment on the issue, PACJA's Administrative and HR officer stated that although the movement understands the importance of having internal MERL personnel to track the implementation of projects and programmes, and ensure that they are on track with regards to their objectives, requirements, and expiration date, for the longest time it did not have enough resources to engage one. S/he however noted that PACJA is now entering into discussions with its donors on the need to provide additional funding (so-called 'core funding') that will cover the cost of M&E (KII 7).

Upon further investigation, this study found that despite having a staff member dedicated to MERL, evidence of evaluation and learning within the movement remained limited. This finding may be explained by the fact that the MERL staff member claimed to be facing challenges with integrating M&E into PACJA's organisational culture due to its novelty. S/he stated that "*M&E is new to PACJA. I am introducing a new culture and it takes time for people to accept that*" (KII 9). Explaining further, s/he disclosed that the most difficult aspect of this challenge was the lack of support from the top management to adequately purse the implementation of M&E activities in the organisation. As a result, most of the MERL activities in PACJA are tailored towards monitoring its project and programme implementation with little attention being paid to conducting evaluations of its completed projects and organisational efficiencies.

Contrary to expectations, this finding suggests that engaging a dedicated MERL staff member will not necessarily result in enhanced IL for the movement. While this is unexpected, it is not surprising, seeing as it will be rather difficult for an internal MERL staff member to remain objective due to potential conflict of interests. Overall, the strongest evidence of IL was seen in the changes that occurred in PACJA's organisational structure since it was established in 2008.

5.3 Conclusion

This chapter has critically examined the extent of PACJA's effectiveness in institutional and governance strengthening (IGS) in line with the Alliance's objective to strengthen the capacities of African CSOs and enhance public participation in CC governance. This was necessary for the following reasons. Firstly, the structure and management practices of an organisation have implications for the extent to which it can achieve its set objectives (Woodland and Hutton, 2012). Secondly, identifying and reviewing the existing capacities, weaknesses and opportunities within its operations would allow PACJA to improve its functional and ethical performance by a) providing opportunities for learning and improvement, b) improving its capacity to attract both funders and partners and c) enhancing its transparency and legitimacy in CC governance.

Drawing on the relevant literature, the chapter devised a list of key criteria to measure the effectiveness in IGS of an Alliance/umbrella organisation like PACJA. They include: 1) PACJA's membership, organisational and governance structure, 2) resource mobilisation activities and 3) institutional learning efforts. It has examined notable examples of PACJA's project work and organisational workings, specifically the SIDA and the FCPF REDD+ projects, and initiatives to shed light and reflect critically on the characteristics, structural dynamics and processes that typically shape the evolution of Alliance-type CSOs, such as PACJA.

Significant indicators of PACJA's effectiveness in IGS include 1) the rapid growth in its membership and visibility: initially from only a handful of CSOs representing all sub-regions in Africa in 2008 to having over 1,000 members in 48 countries across Africa by December 2019, 2) the development and reviews of its internal governance structure and processes i.e. from being loosely governed by a five-member steering committee in 2008 to becoming more formally institutionalised with a Secretariat, CEB and CGC which constitutes 5 standing committees and the Designated National Platforms (DNPs), 3) the formation of many partnerships and joint collaborations like the joint partnership between PACJA and the AUC, UNECA and AfDB (i.e. AUC-UNECA-AfDB) to implement the Clim-Dev-Africa programme and with SIDA to implement the project 'Deepening engagement of African CSOs for effective implementation of nationally determined contributions (NDCs) and 4) the

establishment of new and/or strengthening of existing CC initiatives including PAMACC, ACLI and ACSEA. However, there were also gaps identified in the indicators of effectiveness in IGS. This includes limited evidence of organisational policies being implemented, e.g., the constitution, the diversification of fund mobilisation, and the Alliance's MERL activities. These gaps were found to create difficulties for the movement including internal conflicts, disjointed CJ strategies and inequitable power relations. All of these acts to limit the institutional and governance capacity of PACJA.

Overall, this chapter has demonstrated in line with past literature like Bond (2012) that to be effective in IGS, movements like PACJA must identify and solidify a coherent philosophy, backing up this rationale for its work with coherent and aligned sets of strategies, mobilisation and tactics in support of its agenda. This will allow it to sufficiently manage the expectations of its broad membership and donors in line with its CJ agenda. This study supports the growing body of research including McCarthy (2013) and Godwin et al (2000) that assert that a movement's institutional strength is large dependent on its capacity to mobilise and retain resources to implement its objectives and expand its range of activities. Lastly, it highlights the importance of implementing adequate quality management system i.e., documentation, MERL etc. for IGS.

The next chapter of this thesis will examine PACJA's effectiveness in public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation.

Chapter Six: PACJA's Effectiveness in Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation

6. 1 Introduction

This chapter critically analyses the data collected on PACJA's effectiveness in public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM). It argues that although PACJA is effective in creating public awareness on climate change (CC), sustaining engagements, and mobilizing for climate action, there are still several tensions and gaps in its PAEM activities. The analysis here focuses on evaluating two main domains: 1) PACJA's activities undertaken to increase public interest in and support for CC and environmental issues in Africa at the national, sub-regional, regional, and international levels, and 2) the nature of their engagements for indicators of effectiveness in PAEM from the following components i.e., collective ownership, collaboration and capacity development and mobilisation as highlighted in Table 3.2 in Chapter Three of this thesis.

Major PAEM activities analysed here include CC awareness and media campaigns, capacity building programmes, research, and the development of partnerships. Particular attention is paid to examining issues such as alignment of CJ priorities and interventions (i.e., framing and narratives), power dynamics (i.e., the shifting and balancing of power at different phases during engagement), exchanges (i.e., information, legitimacy, funds etc.), and outcomes (i.e., actions and/or reactions) from the interactions between PACJA and other CC actors. This is because the nature of engagement between PACJA and the target audience at any time is dependent on several factors including the uniqueness of each target group in terms of their interests, motivation, capacity, and role in the CC governance process. The analysis and discussion combine insights from multiple fields of social movement theories including frame analysis, resource mobilisation and political process (Saunders, 2013; Smith and Fetner, 2009; Polletta and Jasper 2001).

The analysis indicates that PACJA is effective in its public awareness and engagement based on the significant number of engagement activities i.e., seminars, conferences, meetings, workshops, negotiations on CC and environment that it hosts, co-hosts and/or is invited, the

numbers and diversity of CC actors present at these events, and the extensive number partnerships and collaborations that it enjoys i.e., over 1,000 partners globally, according to the information available on its website. PACJA's increased and positive media coverage and capacity development initiatives were also identified and analysed as evidence of its effectiveness in PAEM. However, factors like limited financial resources and underdeveloped engagement strategies were found to be responsible for the gaps/tensions i.e., inconsistent CJ framings and narratives, poor research and documentation practices and limited social media engagements that were found in the movement's PAEM activities.

6.2 Indicators of PACJA's Effectiveness in PAEM

PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM was determined by analysing its core activities i.e., CC awareness creation and advocacy campaigns, partnerships and collaboration, CC knowledge and capacity development, and research and publications for indicators of 1) collective ownership, 2) partnership and collaborations and 3) capacity development. This is because these activities are the tools through which PACJA can achieve its objective of creating awareness, motivating, and sustaining interest and support for urgent CA and CJ for SSA. The evidence of PACJA's effectiveness or gaps in its PAEM are critically examined and discussed below under these various components.

6.2.1 Collective ownership

The significance of collective ownership for a movement's effectiveness in PAEM has been established in Chapter Three, Section 3.3.2 of this thesis. Accordingly, indicators of collective ownership in the CJM include a) a shared CJ framing and narrative evident from their CJ messaging (i.e., collective action framing), b) inclusiveness in terms of diversity and representation of target CJ actors, and c) the existence and implementation of a holistic engagement strategy. The evidence for and against these indicators is critically examined and discussed here.

1) <u>Inconsistent CJ framings and narratives</u>

Several questions including "what does CJ mean for sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)?", "what are the CJ action priorities and strategies?", and "what is the role of PACJA within the CC governance space?" were posed to the employees and members of PACJA to determine whether there is a shared construction and interpretation of CJ goals and actions within the movement. These questions also generated additional insights into how employees and members of PACJA perceive and represent themselves within the movement, what CJ framings and narratives are emphasised, downplayed and/or overlooked, how (if any) connections and linkages were made to CC, and what implications these factors held for mobilisation. The findings indicate that there is a widely shared, common understanding of CJ goals and objectives within PACJA. This is based on the general responses of the interviewees that CJ for SSA means building the resilience and adaptive capacity of the population to adapt of the impacts of CC, increasing the availability of and access to climate finance, providing alternate livelihoods for the populations that are dependent on coal, oil, and forest products for their survival, and scaling up climate ambitions i.e., emissions reduction targets in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of the developed countries in the context of the Paris Agreement. Other less common responses included fair and meaningful participation in the CC governance and related processes, gender equity, rejection of market-based principles and scientific solutions like geoengineering, the use of GMOs etc.

However, there is a less commonly shared interpretation within the movement of what CJ means in practice and how to achieve it, going by the responses to the question on the CJ action priorities and strategies. For example, interviewees from PACJA's Secretariat mostly interpreted CJ as a sub-set of EJ. Accordingly, they framed CC as an environmental problem and prioritised CJ actions that centred around environmental preservations like forest conservation, tree-planting, emissions reduction and the like. They argue that this interpretation holds more practicality and likelihood of CJ being perceived as a tangible concern, and thus increases the likelihood of ensuring discussion and mobilisation (KII 2, KII 14 and KII 15). For instance, the ED of PACJA disclosed from his personal experience in CJ advocacy that interpreting CJ outside of the EJ framework, for example, using the social justice perspective that clearly depicts victimhood and reparation for climate debt, would

mean facing a lot of obstacles and resistance from the more powerful political actors, particularly those from the developed countries. Specifically, he stated that:

> "[S]*ome actors, potential allies, are very uncomfortable with the social dimension of CJ because you know what it requires is reparation, restorative and (re)distributive justice. There is the issue of the underlying cause of the problem, who is responsible and who is bearing the brunt. The fear of accepting that responsibility which they have completely refused to accept. So, I think that is the sensitivity*" (KII 2).

He also observed that many African governments have adopted the EJ frame in tackling CJ at the national and international levels. Accordingly, aligning their CJ advocacy with the EJ frame held more potential for public engagement with their CJ agenda (KII 2). As if to buttress this observation, the pictorial illustrations on the Nigerian pavilion at the UNFCCC COP 24 in Poland i.e., desertification and the drying up of Lake Chad (see Fig 3) solely portrayed CC and CJ issues affecting the country as environmental issues. By doing so, they justified the claim of the ED of PACJA that interpreting CJ and prioritising climate actions from an EJ perspective, is likely to increase their effectiveness in engaging and mobilising actors, specifically the government and international actors.

Figure 3: Nigerian Pavilion at the UNFCCC COP 24 in Poland, showing the core CC issues affecting the country (Source: Aliyu, 2021)

Discussions with other interviewees revealed that framing CJ as a subset of EJ with passive references to the historical responsibility of CC within their narratives, was a deliberate attempt by PACJA's leaders to gain the support of and align with powerful political actors at the national, regional, and global scales. In doing so, they wished to position themselves as capable actors, as opposed to being perceived as the unfortunate victims. For instance, one of PACJA's senior programme managers argued that this strategy was fitting "*since international agreements have moved beyond the Kyoto Protocol based on the polluters pay principle of historical responsibility to the Paris Agreement of shared responsibilities and opportunities to contribute to the CC solutions (i.e., Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capacities)"* (KII 4). A further implication of this observation is that, by overlooking the social injustices of historical responsibility and impacts, PACJA has diplomatically sidestepped "anger" as the groundswell emotion for mobilisation as suggested by Kleres and Wettergren (2017) and has instead adopted positive emotions of hope, opportunities, and collaboration as the organising ideas for the movement.

Similarly, a coordinator from the Nigerian Platform of the movement, CSDevNet observed that:

> "*We (i.e., Africans) already see ourselves as vulnerable people and not believing that our resources are enough to achieve our aim. We need to look deeply on how we can work together and solve the problem internally because the developed countries will not continue to give us money. We need to look inward and use our resources to generate that money for ourselves to make it work"* (KII 25).

In contrast, interviewees from grassroots CSOs, NGOs and locally based organisations within PACJA interpreted CJ from a social justice perspective in terms of survival, alternative livelihoods, gender equity, etc. (KII 24, KII 27 and KII 28). They argue that while they recognise the significant links between environmental degradation, CC and climate injustice, its interpretation as an EJ concern holds little opportunity for effective engagement and mobilisation at the sub-national and grassroots levels where the socio-economic impacts of CC are greatest. For example, one of these interviewees reported that because PACJA's programme and project officers interpret CC impacts for the vulnerable communities in terms of droughts, desertification, poor agricultural yields etc., these populations understand urgent and priority climate actions to include reforestation, shifting cultivation and new and improved agricultural practices (KII 27). However, the implication of this is that it creates negative emotions and feelings of frustration and helplessness which in turn has limiting impacts on PACJA's effectiveness in mobilising these populations. This observation was validated from the narrations of several interviewees including the ED and a programme officer with PACJA. The ED of PACJA stated that "*the movement is at the basic level of awareness creation. As a result, most of our PAEM activities at the grassroots [involve] trying to relate CC impacts to the livelihood efforts of these populations i.e., the farmers and pastoralists. But you find that most of them do not appreciate this*". Similarly, the programme officer narrated that:

> *"When we visited Kitui county which is one of the counties that is really affected by CC in Kenya, we tried to talk to them about the long-term implications of cutting trees (i.e., deforestation) vs the short-term benefit (note that this county faces prolonged drought, and they depend on charcoal production for their livelihood because crops do not really grow well). They*

> *asked, if you tell me to stop cutting trees, and I am not getting anything from my farm, where do you expect me to get food from?…Inasmuch as we try to bring solutions to these environmental issues, sometimes they expect solutions to the problems of survival that they currently face. That is another challenge we face".* (KII 5)

From the excerpts above, it can be deduced that communicating CJ priorities and actions from an EJ perspective without due consideration of the social dimensions of the problem i.e., limited alternative livelihoods, poverty exacerbation etc., limits the extent of engagement and mobilisation for climate action at the grassroots. The struggle for survival and the burden of moral responsibility and environmental stewardship creates emotional conflicts for these poor and vulnerable populations which degenerates into feelings of helplessness and frustration which have negative effects on PACJA's CJ mobilisation agenda. This observation supports the hypothesis of scholars like Wlodaraczyk et al (2017) that movements are generally more effective in PAEM if they can generate positive emotions like hope through engagement among the target populations.

These findings indicate that PACJA is yet to effectively harmonise and homogenise a common set of CJ framings and narratives. This provides an explanation as to why there was considerable ambiguity and differing interpretations within the movement on SSA's CJ demands and whether the movement was meeting their expectations or not. For instance, members of PACJA interviewed for this study spoke about Africa's CJ demands in general terms of capacity building, fair and meaningful participation, gender equity, local innovative solutions, and climate. However, when asked to clarify what these demands would look like in practice, for capacity building, gender equity etc., a range of responses was elicited. Some related capacity building to mean technical capacity in the form of trainings, workshops and the like (KII 11 and KII 30) while others pointed out that it goes beyond that to include social and financial capacity (KII 14 and KII 27). Responding to the question on Africa's CJ demand for capacity building, a former senior project manager with PACJA pointed out that:

> "*[T]he biggest problem we have is that we have approached capacity from workshops. We want to organise and attend workshops and say that we are building capacity. That is not capacity building. For Africa to move, we need to move away from that mentality. But that is also the mentality of our*

donors from the west. They think that the capacity that we need is to come into workshops and tell us about gender and technology transfer, that is not capacity. The capacity that we want in Africa is technological capacity, how do we adopt new technologies and where are those technologies for us to adopt for CC adaptation. The narrative on capacity building needs to change" (KII 14).

The excerpt above illustrates that the CJM in SSA is yet to solidify their CJ narratives to maximise their impact in PAEM. As a result, they face limitations in their outreach and mobilisation activities, much of which unwittingly contributes to further exclude already marginalised group i.e., women and grassroots communities which they seek to engage and speak for.

2) Inclusiveness and representation

PACJA has been effective in attracting a diverse range of actors. This is visible from its extensive membership which include representatives from CSOs, NGOs, FBOs and CBOs across SSA. These members shared similar ideologies and experiences on CJ which serves as the defining factor for them joining the movement. According to the findings, PACJA's leadership strive to accentuate the similarities and the unity of purpose among their members by promoting trust and democratisation through a constitution. They also do so bystrengthening internal governance process, inclusion via the formation of national platforms and focal points, and representation via thematic working groups such as gender and marginalised groups etc. (as discussed in Chapter Five, Section 5.2). For instance, many of PACJA's members interviewed for this study were found to share a similar ideology and motivations. These members generally considered themselves to be advocates, drawing from comments such as "I was a community activist", I campaigned against" etc that were made during the interviews. As a result, they were quite passionate about their inclusion and roles in the movement. This finding broadly supports the work of scholars like Milan (2015) and Diani (2011) who have linked increased movement ownership to overlapping individual motivations and self-interests.

However, a critical examination of the data revealed that there are still gaps with regards to representation and inclusion in the movement. For instance, a review of their membership list

revealed that most of its member organisations are from West and East Africa. This is perhaps because the prevailing national politics in these regions allows for the formation and registration of CSOs, which is a prerequisite requirement for joining PACJA, unlike many countries in North and Central Africa that do not have the same favourable political conditions (KII 7). The reality is that these regions are less represented in the movement.

Another significant example of the limited representation of some actors within PACJA is that while the movement claims to advance the CJ narrative of gender equity as documented on page 42 of their Strategic Plan for 2016-2020, the findings from the interviews suggest otherwise. The physical representation of members of the grassroots and women at PACJA's events were also found to be below par, with the average ratio of men to women present in these events being 4:1. Follow-up questioning on this gap with the ED and coordinators of the NPs revealed that factors such as money to cover the cost of travel to attend these meetings, culture, conflicting responsibilities, for e.g., childcare, homemaking etc. were responsible for it (KII 2, KII 26 and KII 27). Also, there appears to be a tension in the understanding of "gender equity" among the actors in the movement. Some interviewees, including PACJA's Administrative and HR officer, claimed that the inclusion of women in the movement either as employees, members and/or as part of the core management team indicates its success in driving the gender equity narrative (KII 2, KII 7). However, discussions with some members of PACJA revealed otherwise.

For example, a female leader in PACJA claimed that "*PACJA has not been very successful in giving women a strong voice and space in the internal governance process*" (KII 24). Likewise, two other female members of PACJA disclosed that they felt that they were mostly being engaged, and particularly on issues and positions relating to CC and gender, simply because they are women and not necessarily because of their competence i.e., expertise or skills (KII 23 and KII 24). Nevertheless, these interviewees were quick to point out that they were content with the current "gender inclusion" that was being promoted by PACJA. They believed that inclusion is a first step towards gender equity and fair and meaningful participation and were optimistic that eventually it will gain them more buy-in and less resistance from the men. As KII 23 noted, "*the current African reality does not advocate for gender equality. We advocate for gender inclusiveness because of issues of culture and religion. If you push too much for gender equality, you will not get the men to buy into some of your programmes and that is not the kind of response we want*".

The issue of distrust ranked highly among the factors that had resulted in the limited inclusion of some actor groups within PACJA, although this was not immediately visible because of the unity of purpose. In-depth interviews with members of the movement revealed that there is still distrust among different actor groups that are represented in the movement, notwithstanding their shared CJ objectives. There were several remarks by interviewees to indicate that members were not treated equally or engaged in a fair and transparent manner. For instance, a coordinator of one of the KPCG's thematic working group observed that the need for more transparency in how PACJA internal processes worked. Using the example of the UNFCCC COPs, s/he stated that "*there are no clear criteria for the selection of participants. I have observed that priority is given to the secretariat while other members of the platform must lobby for the few slots. It is so protracted to the point that you do not even want it*" (KII 28).

Also, some actors especially the employees at the secretariat and representatives from the larger CSOs and NGOs perceived themselves to be empowered persons and others from the grassroots communities as "helpless" or "vulnerable". For example, when asked to identify the important actor groups within PACJA, there were constant references to like-minded CSOs. Local communities were left out of this conversation and only referred to when speaking about CC vulnerability. This indicated a clear distinction among actors in the movement in terms of their socio-political status. The implication of this is that these actor groups can became excluded from participating actively in the movement even though they are part of the CJ struggle. The next section will examine data for evidence of a holistic engagement strategy and its implication for PACJA's PAEM objective.

3) The existence and implementation of a holistic engagement strategy

The findings from this study indicate that PACJA has adopted a combination of constructive (i.e., collaborative) and critical (i.e., confrontational) approaches as its engagement strategy for PAEM. The constructive approaches adopted by the movement include awareness creation and advocacy campaigns, partnerships and collaborations, knowledge and capacity development while the critical tactics include litigation, walk-outs and demonstrations. Generally, the interviewees in this study observed that collaboration formed the core of PACJA's engagement strategy with only occasional use of confrontational tactics. A common view amongst the interviewees was that because PACJA understands its lack of decision-

making power at the policy level in the CC governance process, it largely depends on using constructive tactics for engaging and mobilising African CSOs and other CC actors, including the governments for CJ and participating in CC governance in SSA.

For instance, the ED of PACJA stated that because the movement is working in a context where it must remain constructive to advance its goals, it adopts a collaborative approach. He explained further that "*we (i.e., PACJA) want to provide support and influence the government for this narrative that we are advancing. It is a very well-crafted strategy to fit us in the current world otherwise we are going to be starved*". Also, a senior programme manager in PACJA argued that because collaboration underpins the foundational philosophy of PACJA, it forms the core of the movement's engagement strategy. According to her, "*the movement was founded to unite African CSOs voices on CC and draw attention to the climate injustices of those at the frontline of the impacts because of the negotiating power in numbers. As a result, collaboration forms the core of PACJA's engagement strategy*" (KII 4). Likewise, a representative from AfDB noted that the movement "*is using its network and access to raise new conversations on CC and environmental issues at the continental level.*" He explained further that "*PACJA is interfacing and opening the eyes of the government(s) to areas that have not been considered. They are really knocking on the door and putting everybody on their toes*" (KII 34).

Notable examples of PACJA's collaborative PAEM strategy include the Trans-African Caravan of Hope (2011), The Lamu Power Coal Campaign (2019), Annual Pre and Post UNFCCC COPs workshops and meetings, as well as the Production and Dissemination of IEC Materials and media engagements. The 2011 Trans-African Caravan of Hope campaign remains one of the most significant PAEM activities of the movement to date, in terms of media coverage and public participation. This singular activity organised by PACJA mobilised a diverse group of over 300 participants from countries across Eastern and Southern Africa (including Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Malawi, Botswana, and South Africa) to converge at COP 17 in Durban, South Africa. This made it the largest CSO delegation ever to attend a UNFCCC Conference (PACJA Annual Report, 2011).

Several factors contributed to the success of this event in mobilising and sustaining public engagement for CC participation at the COP in Durban. For instance, PACJA benefitted from

the wide media coverage of the event both locally in Africa (e.g., the Nation Media group, All Africa.Com, Africa-Oped) and internationally (e.g., CNN, Voice of America, and the BBC) (PACJA Annual Report, 2011). Also, the creative mobilisation of youth and culture by the CJM at this event was effective in drawing the attention of otherwise marginalised CC actors like the youth, women, local and grassroots communities to their CJ agenda. According to two employees from PACJA, "*the caravan*[8] *used music as an instrument to draw awareness. We worked hand in hand with artists. These people wore their traditional regalia during this campaign. We supported various people from different cultures, to participate and tell the stories of how CC has affected their way of life."* (KII 5 and KII 6).

As a result of this, more Africans, particularly the youth, women and smallholder farmers were inspired to tell their CC stories and participate in the CC governance process either by joining the caravan or signing the African People Petition. In fact, a coordinator of one of the NPs revealed that it was through this activity that s/he became aware of and involved in the Alliance. S/he recalled that "*there was an opportunity [offered] by PACJA to join the TransAfrican Caravan in 2011. It set off from Burundi through Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana to SA were COP 17 was being held. I joined the caravan from Tanzania. That trip made me more aware of CC issues and that was how I joined PACJA"* (KII 15). This event was clearly successful in mobilising actors from the CSOs and local/grassroots communities. The extensive media attention and signing of the African People's Petition by over 1 million Africans also helped to draw the attention of African leaders/policymakers to the significance of the event and the need to work together to deliver a CC agreement that reflects the African realities (PACJA Annual Report, 2011).

At the continental policy development level, PACJA attends meetings and private consultations with regional actors like AMCEN, AUC, AfDB and AGN as part of its PAEM. For instance, the AMCEN coordinator disclosed that "*PACJA is invited biennially to meetings with the regional governments under AMCEN to discuss CC goals and [our] agenda including relevant frameworks to support the implementation of CC adaptation and mitigation measures (e.g., the Strengthening and implementation of the NDCs), fund mobilisation, priority issues (or sectors)*." (KII 35). Also, the ED of PACJA revealed that

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8 Several buses were used to convey people as the caravan travelled to the UNFCCC COP venue in Durban.

after harvesting lots of information from its mass membership prior to and during the COPs, it analyses the data and shares the findings with the AGN as its way of providing input into their work at the UNFCCC COP negotiations (KII 2). Accordingly, PACJA's representatives at these events use these opportunities to discuss the governments' agenda and CSO's positions on behalf of the continent of Africa. By doing so, they indirectly influence Africa's negotiating position as well as the process and outcome of the global climate negotiations.

At the national level, for example, in Kenya and Nigeria, PACJA has and continues to design and implement many PAEM activities either alone or in partnership with the national government. These include the National Pre- and Post-UNFCCC COP Consultative Dialogues, Climate Week of Action, and other national CC awareness and advocacy campaigns. These engagements with the national government of Kenya and Nigeria are conducted via the NPs to reflect the CC and environmental priorities of the host country in line with other factors like culture, resources, and unique socio-economic context. Also, it ensures that PACJA maximises its outreach and effectiveness in mobilising support for their overall agenda. For instance, in 2013-2014, CSDevNet (i.e., the Nigerian NP) together with other CSOs like Global Rights, organised national campaigns against the proposed coal mining project in Okobo, Kogi state, Nigeria. The platform identified that there was no evidence that an initial public consultation or a comprehensive EIA was conducted for the proposed project, as required by law. Additionally, they were able to link several deaths in the community to the ongoing mining activities. The CSOs homed in on these issues to drive their campaign. As a result, the mining license for the project was not renewed at the end of the first phase in 2016. At the time this campaign happened in Nigeria, coal mining was not considered a CC priority in Kenya. It was not until 2017-2019 that it became a CC priority in the country. At the same time, the CC priority of PACJA-Nigeria was bringing a stop to the agreement between Nigeria and Iran on generating electricity from nuclear energy i.e., nuclear energy plants which will be developed in Akwa-Ibom and Kogi states in the country. This goes to show PACJA's conscientiousness as the CC advocacy campaigns in these countries are dependent on the unique climate concern at a given point in time and PACJA's capacity to respond in time.

In addition, PACJA under its NPs jointly organises Pre-COP meetings, seminars, and workshops with national governments across Africa where they present the CSOs' position papers and contribute to the development of the country's agenda for the UNFCCC COP, and

that of the African Group more broadly. Post-COP, PACJA again organises national consultative workshops and dialogues with the government and other CC actors where they discuss the outcome of the negotiations and strategies to 'domesticate' the agreements reached, including the formulation of national CC policies and relevant frameworks in line with their national priorities. For example, PACJA-Kenya worked with the Kenyan government for the realisation of the Kenyan CC Act of 2016 and other policies on CC (KII 2 and KII 10).

Further to the above, PACJA frequently conducts its PAEM activities in virtual spaces i.e., via media engagements, for example, the conventional print media (i.e., magazines, communiques, hand-outs and flyers, posters, banners, policy briefs, and research publications) and digital/electronic media channels (i.e., TV, radio, newsletter etc. and social media - e.g., website, Facebook, twitter, and Instagram). This allows the movement to generate and disseminate information and data in a cost-effective way and to different stakeholder groups, according to PACJA's internal communications officer. For example, the ED of PACJA, Dr Mithika Mwenda, has a significant media profile and is a regular guest on the national TV (i.e., KTV) and local radio stations in Kenya discussing environmental, CC and CJ issues at the national and regional level (KII 5).

PACJA also uses social media to highlight its work and increase its visibility in communicating key positions on various issues around CC and CJ. The movement has a functional, user-friendly and accessible website (www.pacja.org) which is constantly updated and managed by the Secretariat in Kenya. The site is designed to be accessible via mobile phones and desktops. PACJA's website provides information on its mission statement, membership and organisational structure, partnerships, and initiatives, news and events, publications, and vacancies (www.pacja.org). Moreover, it provides links to its other social media platforms including Facebook, Twitter, Google plus, LinkedIn and YouTube used to advance the PAEM goals of the Alliance.

From the above analysis, it is patently clear that PACJA has been effective in using collaboration to advance it PAEM objective. The findings have also demonstrated that the movement has successfully positioned itself as a significant knowledge broker in the CC governance process in Africa which has contributed to its growing influence as a key actor in the CC processes and decisions at the policy level. However, other findings from this study

highlight several limitations with PACJA's PAEM strategy. The most significant of the limitations highlighted is that PACJA's PAEM efforts culminate at the level of awareness creation and engagement with far fewer impacts on mobilisation. For instance, a coordinator of the CSDevNet platform observed that "*most of our effort as an alliance has mostly been at the level of awareness creation and advocacy. Why? Because I have not seen a tangible success story that replicates into actions on the ground. The sustainability of our advocacy is to see the local communities approving, accepting, and taking ownership of the CJ agenda. I have not seen that happening yet*" (KII 24).

Another significant finding is that PACJA seems to have assigned priority to their PAEM efforts at higher levels (national, regional, and international) judging by its focus on partnerships and collaboration with the more powerful stakeholders, for example, the government. Subsequently, it has been less successful in creating strong linkages and ownership (via case studies, research and evidence-based policy recommendations) and scaling up ideas and interventions to address the impacts of CC in SSA. While it may be that their uneven focus on engagement over mobilisation accounts for their limited capacity and power in the decision process, other evidence from this study indicates otherwise. For instance, the findings indicates that despite the recommendation of scholars like Felt and Fochler (2008) for movements to conduct PAEM at the grassroots using a bottom-up approach to maximise their effectiveness, the movement conducts many of its PAEM activities in a top-down manner. This includes hiring consultants to deliver technical lectures and talks within the confines of hotels as part of their capacity building programmes (KII 27 and KII 28). The implication of this is that many of these vulnerable populations including small-scale farmers, women and youth are excluded from these activities because they cannot bear the cost of their participation i.e., transport costs and the conflicting demands on their time. Also, because of the technical nature of these events, only limited knowledge and capacity are transferred to these populations who do not understand much of the arcane CC concepts and terminology. Thus, the extent of mobilisation for their CJ agenda remains limited. To illustrate, a coordinator of one of the TWGs in KPCG observed that:

> *"I have to be honest with you. I thought the issue of taking this discussion to the people at the grassroots to the community would be a main part of the discussions, but to me it remains a very big challenge within PACJA. The thematic WG took it upon themselves to be going to the suburb counties in*

> *Kenya. We went to the grassroots and were sensitising the community because we know that there is a lot of knowledge gap and awareness were lacking. The CSOs should be the bridge between these people and the govt but let me say we have not executed our role properly or we have failed in our role at some point. However, it can be addressed through a minimum change in advocacy strategy and awareness creation blueprint and very targeted sensitisation"* (KII 28).

It is evident from the above argument that despite the good intentions of PACJA and its members, they still face several barriers i.e., socio-political class and uneven power relations that limit their effectiveness in PAEM of the grassroots. The implication of this for their CJ agenda is that these populations who are most affected by CC remain under-represented in the governance process. This in turn increases the existing climate inequalities and exacerbate the impacts of CC on them.

PACJA's use of confrontational tactics was also highlighted by several interviewees as having negative impacts for its PAEM. One interviewee representing the AGN observed that their engagements with the movement have mostly centred around information generation and activism. S/he recalled that "w*hen the AGN meets with PACJA either at the COPs or even the AGN technical meetings, it is always about what we (i.e., the AGN) are doing or would do. They always have lots of questions. It is not about supporting us but more about crosschecking that we are doing our jobs correctly* (KII 18). This view was supported by another interviewee, an assistant director from the Kenyan CC directorate, who claimed that although PACJA was effective in awareness creation and engaging different stakeholders to attend various CC meetings and events, their approach to mobilising these stakeholders for sustained interests and support of their CJ agenda leaves much to be desired. When probed further, s/he explained that:

> *"There is this notion that as a civil society organisation you have to keep the government in check, you have to oppose whatever the government says and so on. I am trying to make them understand that they can help in the processes instead of opposing the processes. They can bring in their good ideas to what we are doing so that we can move forward instead of allowing us to do what they don't want then they oppose us and take us to court"* (KII 29).

While the use of these more critical, confrontational tactics by PACJA is necessary to retain their position as "watchdogs", by drawing attention to their demands and holding the government accountable, according to the ED, the implication is that it creates a tense environment where the targets of these campaigns are less willing to work with the movement. For instance, an assistant director from the Kenyan CC directorate observed that PACJA's action of suing the government has caused a strain in the relationship between the movement and the top officials in the Ministry. S/he explained that:

> *"[E]mployees of the Ministry were instructed not to work with the movement for over a year which hampered significant progress on CC governance in the country, for example, the CC council has been unable to sit for three years because of the pending case between PACJA and the Kenyan Government. I only wish that they could have used an opportunity that they have to sort that out by simply withdrawing the case and allowing us to work freely without friction. We have achieved a lot through collaboration"* (KII 29).

This finding is contrary to the claims of scholars like Idemudia (2017) and Scott (2014) who suggested that confrontational tactics have a higher impact that collaborative tactics. One explanation for this might be the weak democracy in the country. The national politics in Kenya and past military regime in many parts of SSA, for example, Nigeria, has left many of the political leaders still acting as autocrats by tactically frustrating collaborative efforts or democratic progress. This indicates that the choice of engagement strategy for PACJA and its members is dependent on the external political environment within which they exist.

In summary, the above analysis of the findings indicates the existence and implementation of a holistic engagement strategy by PACJA albeit with a few limitations. Also, the analysis revealed that the movement has been deliberate in its efforts to promote inclusion and fair representation of different actor groups. However, it found that there are still significant gaps in its current CJ framings and narrative and in level of inclusion that are limiting collective ownership and impacting on its PAEM efforts.

6.2.2 Partnerships and Collaboration

Another component of PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM highlighted in the analytical framework in Chapter Three is partnerships and collaboration. This follows from the observations of several scholars including Oloo and Omondi (2017), Diani (2011) and Bauer and Jensen (2011), who have demonstrated a strong link between forging strategic partnerships and collaborations and a movement's effectiveness. Also, many interviewees including the ED of PACJA, alluded to the fact that the movement's extensive partnerships and collaboration are a key determinant of its effectiveness. Accordingly, this section will examine PACJA's partnerships and collaboration for indicators of effectiveness in PAEM including proliferation of their agenda, wider engagement in the CC governance processes and increase in movements activities i.e., joint project and programme implementation.

1) Proliferation of PACJA's CJ agenda

"*PACJA understands that it is crucial to forge networks and partnerships to strengthen its advocacy at various levels and contribute to the discourse and decisions on CC*", said one of its project officers. This position was also indicated on page 1 of its Strategic Plan 2016-2020. This is understandable considering that its overall objective is to unite CJ actors across Africa in a way that they derive mutual benefit from one another and in so doing, strengthen their collective capacities to demand CJ for all Africans. Consequently, the movement is constantly seeking avenues to expand its membership, partnerships, and collaborations into different spaces i.e., government, CSOs, academic and research institutes and across multiple levels i.e., local, regional, and global to contribute to and influence CC governance processes at different levels.

For example, PACJA has increased its presence and membership across Africa through the establishment and partnership with local organisations that act as focal points for the movement in 45 countries across Africa. Through their activities with the focal points (which is usually a registered network), PACJA creates awareness of their CJ mandate and subsequently attracts smaller and grassroot organisations across Africa to join the movement. In addition, it draws upon these various platforms within its network to create ties and linkages as well as expand its outreach and grassroots mobilisation for its CJ agenda.

Reflecting on how he joined PACJA, the project coordinator for CSDevNet i.e., PACJA's designated focal point in Nigeria, stated that his first encounter with the movement was the tree planting advocacy campaign which they held in partnership with CSDevNet. He recalled that:

> "*I saw pictures online of their activities including planting trees with high school students. From there I developed an interest in their work. I had to find out where their office was located and registered my interest…That was how I became a volunteer as an undergraduate. When I went back to school, several people approached me to say that they had seen my pictures online. So, I started motivating my colleagues"* (KII 32).

Other evidence of proliferation of PACJA's CJ agenda because of its partnerships and collaboration is the increased media coverage of the movement's activities. PACJA gained the attentin of African journalists through its support for the establishment of PAMACC, ACCER and TAAFA and frequent collaborations with media houses like KTV Kenya, Fahamu, Kiss FM Nigeria etc. The movement occasionally organises media training and support these journalists to attend key CC meetings like the UNFCCC COPs, CCDA and AMCEN to build their CC knowledge and capacity to report on the negotiations. In turn, these journalists help to promote PACJA's CJ agenda by increasing coverage of their activities across Africa, and globally (PACJA 2015 Annual Report). This enhances the movement's PAEM objective. To illustrate, one interviewee, who was a coordinator for the Tanzanian NP, FORUM CC, stated that he joined PACJA because of the positive media coverage of its 2011 TransAfrican Caravan of Hope Campaign. *"I saw the news about the opportunity to join PACJA's TransAfrican Caravan to COP17 in South Africa. And because I was interested in CC, I joined the caravan from Tanzania. That trip made me more aware of CC issues and I thought that the focal point in Tanzania, Forum CC, was a good platform as a national network to engage with and that was how I joined"* (KII 15).

Further to the above, this study also found that PACJA's CJ agenda has proliferated to the grassroots across SSA through its collaboration with local TV and radio stations which air their agenda and activities. The ED of the movement, Dr Mithika Mwenda, is often invited as a guest onto the national TV stations in Kenya to speak on CC and CJ issues in Africa, and particularly in Kenya, as reported by PACJA's Internal Communications Officer. Occasionally, these TV and radio programmes are aired in the local languages to increase understanding and engagement with CC related issues. For example, the coordinator of

CSDevNet (i.e., PACJA-Nigeria) highlighted that a core achievement of the organisation PAEM effort was the creation of an hour weekly programme on CC in one of the major local languages (i.e., Hausa) in the country. S/he explained further that facilitating this programme in the local language was necessary "*because that is what the people can easily digest*" (KII 12).

Another indicator of PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM was the extensive number of partnerships and collaboration i.e., over 1,000 organisations both in Africa and globally, including new and sustained ones that the movement has (*as extensively discussed in Chapter Five*). As a result, PACJA is being factored into many discussions on CC and CJ on the continent. To the extent that the movement now attracts wide audiences including the academic community from across the globe. The comment below from one of PACJA's senior programme managers illustrates this claim.

> "*PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM can be measured from the numbers of partnerships and collaboration that it enjoys".* According to this interviewee*, PACJA has working agreements with more than 10 institutions globally. We had a student coming from the US to do her internship with us. She found out about PACJA through reading on CJ in Africa. This demonstrates our growing international visibility and reputation,*" (KII 4).

However, this study did not find any evidence of PACJA's growing reputation nor any partnerships in the private sector. When asked to comment on this gap, a common view among the interviewees was that there was limited understanding of how to explore a working relationship with this actor group. This is exemplified in the comment below.

> *"…for the private sector being for profit and us being a not for profit, we are yet to understand our languages. It is a conversation that we are still trying to sell. What is in it for them. We had some engagement with an organisation, and they do not consider advocacy a priority for them. They want to see the benefit in it for them. But I think with engagement we are going to get them to slowly buy into the whole thing and get to understand how to approach these discussions. We are working towards it*" (Administrative and HR officer, PACJA).

Together, the findings in this study indicate that PACJA is effective in propagating its CJ agenda among different actor groups and across different levels. Also, the findings confirm the strong relationship between forging strategic partnerships and collaboration and a movement's effectiveness in PAEM, that have been previously reported in the literature. In the next section, the evidence of PACJA's wider engagement in relevant CC governance processes, and subsequently, effectiveness in PAEM owing to its partnerships and collaboration will be examined.

2) Wider engagement in relevant CC governance processes

This study found that PACJA, through its strategic partnerships and collaborations, has gained the attention of other key political actors in the CC governance processes in Africa and globally. Their ability to mobilise and coordinate African CSOs for CC and CJ as evidenced by their broad membership has earned them the goodwill of many key players in the CC sector in Africa and globally. As a result, the movement receives invitations for partnerships and collaborations from the international community as well as regional and national governments in Africa. For example, one interviewee who is a senior policy officer with the AUC disclosed during the interview that "*the AUC noticed the impact and validity of PACJA and its constituencies to the CC discourse because of their partnership with the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC). As a result, PACJA now receives frequent invitations from the AUC to participate in and jointly organise some of their events, like the 2018 African Environment Day which was held in Luanda, Angola in March of the same year*" (KII 41).

Also, PACJA's partnerships with international organisations like SIDA, Oxfam International and the WB FCPF has provided it with significant resources that have contributed to enhancing their capacities for effective PAEM for CC governance in Africa (*as has been discussed extensively in Chapter 5 and summarised in table 5.2*). In fact, some members of PACJA claimed that "the movement has strategically positioned itself to be the recipient of the largest single funding among all African CSOs on the continent". They argued that the movement's partnerships with international organisations have enhanced their visibility and reputation at the international scene (KII 24 and KII 25). This has strategically positioned them to attract more funding and gained them recognition among regional and national

governments as deserving of a seat at the negotiation tables, meetings and other forms of dialogues and collaborations on CC. Subsequently, PACJA participates in several governmental process like the African Union Summit, African Policy Dialogue on CC Meeting, High Level Dialogue on Sustainable Energy and Energy Access in Africa, African Parliamentary Roundtable on Climate Policy and Legislation Parliamentarians from across Africa under the Africa Climate Legislation Initiative (ACLI) and the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN) (PACJA Annual Report, 2017).

For instance, PACJA partners with the AMCEN secretariat and UNEP to jointly organise and participate in the biennial CSOs pre-AMCEN meeting to discuss the AMCEN agenda and suggestions to be shared with the Ministers (KII 35). Their attendance at these events allows them the opportunity to mix freely, acquire and share state of the art knowledge and real-life context to the decision makers, and lobby government officials to design favourable policies and programmes, financing, and implementation mechanisms for Africa in relation to the UNFCCC Paris Agreement and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. These engagements thus allow PACJA to influence crucial CC governance processes and outcomes. See Table 8 below for a summary of their activities and key achievements at these events.

Another significant finding of this study is that PACJA regularly participates and has an impact in many international CC events, including the UNFCCC COPs and related processes. Furthermore, because of its status as an accredited CSO observer organisation, PACJA participates in all the GCF Board meetings that make critical decisions with regards to the governance and the funding process of the Fund, as disclosed by the ED. Again, their participation at these international events indicates effectiveness for their PAEM objective since it allows them to understand the workings of the international CC processes with a view to influencing the process in favour of their CJ agenda.

Table 8: Summary of some of PACJA's Key PAEM activities between 2011 and 2019

Date	Theme	Location	Role	Achievement
11-15 Nov., 2019	17th Ordinary Session of the AMCEN	Durban, South Africa	Participant	• Partnered with several organisations like UNEP Africa, SNV etc. to convene side events. • PACJA led a session on the General Stock Taking on Previous AMCEN Decisions and Briefing on Global Forums and Conferences • Published a joint communique with Oxfam
10-12 Oct., 2019	Seventh Climate Change and Development Conference in Africa (CCDA VII)	Nairobi, Kenya	Co-organiser	• PACJA supported over 300 participants including their members and partners to attend this event. • The event helped PACJA establish linkages between the various sectors and actors involved in CC governance. • TAAFA and ACCER awards were hosted on the side-lines of this event
17-19 Jul., 2019	Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) REDD+ Regional Capacity Building Workshop	Nairobi, Kenya	Co-organiser	• PACJA supported 60 participants from its employees and membership in the 18 countries across Africa where this programme was being implemented to this event. • This event provided participants from PACJA with information, knowledge, and awareness to enhance their understanding of REDD+
1-3 Mar., 2017	African Parliamentary Roundtable on Climate Policy and Legislation	South Africa	Co-organiser	• PACJA signed an MOU with PAP for long term collaboration, and to support parliamentarians across Africa in driving climate policy processes and legislation on the continent
1-2 Feb., 2017	Media Training for African Journalist	Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	Organiser	• Supported 33 journalists from Africa to participate in the training. • Enhanced technical reporting skills of journalists who participated in this training
15-18 Oct., 2013	African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN)	Gaborone, Botswana	Participant	• Out of the 71 participants who participated in the Pre AMCEN CSOs consultative workshop, PACJA supported 37 to participate in the AMCEN sessions. • Issued press statements and talking points during the sessions. • Presented the African CSOs CC demands including post 2015 agenda to the Ministers and President of Botswana • African Environment Ministers incorporated the African Civil Society Position in their final statement of the conference

Date	Theme	Location	Role	Achievement
24-28 Jun., 2013	Fourth Meeting of the Green Climate Fund Board	Songdo, Korea	Participant	• As African CSOs representative at the GCF, PACJA brought the African community perspective to bear on the decision-making process by • Blocking the expanded private sector role in the allocation of CF from the fund • Compelling the GCF Board to publicly circulate its documents, reports, and decisions to promote accountability and transparency
9 Nov – 11 Dec, 2011	The Trans-African Caravan of hope	Across East and Southern Africa	Organiser	• PACJA was the largest CSO group at COP 17 negotiations supporting around 300 participants including small holder farmers, youth, women etc. • Organised rallies on key climate demands like CF, emission cuts etc. • Delivered the African people's petition to President Jacob Zuma
20–26 Nov., 2011	PACJA week of Action	Across Africa	Organiser	• Solidified the African voice by ensuring that the "African People's Petition", the common demands for African civil society to their leaders, was signed by more than one million people

At the national level, PACJA is proactive in their engagements in national debates and processes on CC, environment, and SD. They have sought to be included in forums, workshops, roundtable discussions, and independently organise many CC events and activities with the government where they discuss and determine CC implementation plans in line with the unique national socio-economic circumstances and CC priorities. Examples include the pre and post COP stakeholder consultation workshops, and roundtable engagements between CSOs and key government ministries including the Ministry of Environment, Ministry of Agriculture etc. drawn from organisational document reviews, such as annual reports and interviews.

Also, in collaboration with the African government and their funders, PACJA frequently conducts PAEM activities i.e., awareness creation and advocacy campaigns, and capacity building training and programmes that target key public actors i.e., local CSOs, researchers, private sectors, and other interested individuals. Key thematic issues highlighted in their awareness campaigns include CC Adaptation, Natural Resource Management and Forest Conservation, Food and Energy Security etc. Usually, these events are staged around significant UN days or global and local campaigns such as World Environment Day, World Biodiversity Day, The Big Shift Campaigns, Tree-Planting Campaign, and PACJA Week of Action. For instance, because coal mining was a critical issue in Kenya in 2018/19, the Kenyan chapter conducted much of its PAEM during the PACJA Week of Action around raising awareness and calling for diversification from fossil fuels during its week of Action. In doing so, they contributed to PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM specifically, and its overall CJ agenda more broadly (PACJA Annual Report, 2017).

In view of the above, it can be inferred that PACJA has been effective in using its partnerships and collaborations to increase its participation in the CC governance process and achieve progress towards its CJ objective of PAEM. Since PACJA's mandate is to support the most vulnerable populations towards the realisation of CJ, their engagement by the government at the grassroot level is evidence of their meaningful participation in governance (KII 16, KII 22 and KII 27). Moreover, the inclusion and representation of PACJA in these processes,

notwithstanding reservations about the quality of their participation, is a first step towards sustained influence.

3) Joint project and programme implementation

This study found that PACJA frequently collaborates and partners with a wide spectrum of CC and CJ actors beyond the African civil societies and grassroots organisations to jointly implement CC projects and/or programmes that will accelerate climate action for the continent. They include actors from government institutions (i.e., sub-national, national, and regional level), international NGOs and CSOs, private businesses, and academic and research institutions. For instance, several interviewees from PACJA and from national governments of Kenya and Nigeria revealed that they collaborate on various CC thematic issues including energy, food security, air pollution etc. (KII 2, KII 11, KII 16 and KII 29).

The partnership between PACJA and the national government is believed to be crucial for the following reasons. The limited political influence of the movement in CC negotiations (see Section 7.2.3 in Chapter 7 for details), according to the ED of PACJA, demands that they form strategic partnerships with the government who are the key decision makers to gain influence in the CC governance process. Also, the government recognises that CSOs like PACJA enjoy public trust and are often more effective at communicating the government's policies at the sub-national and grassroots levels and conversely at providing information about the issues at grassroots to the government (KII 16 - Director of CC from the FMEnv Nigeria). Additionally, since national governments across Africa are already saddled with addressing complex socio-economic challenges with their limited financial resources, they (i.e., the government) welcome the additional resources provided from their partnership with CSOs like PACJA to support the implementation of CC projects and programmes on condition that this activity overlaps with their agenda (KII 6). As a result, both actors collaborate to jointly implement campaigns and initiatives that reflect the local reality, actively promote environmental and climate stewardship, and support the realisation of the countries' NDCs in line with the global 2015 Paris Agreement.

For instance, a representative from the Kenyan Directorate of CC acknowledged the ongoing partnership between PACJA and the government on CC particularly at the grassroot level. S/he stated that "*the government is collaborating well with PACJA to ensure that we have, for instance, people who do planning and budgeting at the counties [who are] trained to be able to appreciate the CC challenge and how to go about addressing the challenge*" (KII 29). Likewise, PACJA's ED revealed that the movement was instrumental in domesticating international CC agreements under the Kenyan National Climate Change Action Plan (KCCAP). Because members of KPCG mostly work at the grassroots levels, they were able to feedback information about these populations to the government and input into the process of deciding what effort and support would enhance their resilience and adaptation to CC. Through this process, PACJA ensured that the KCCAP reflected the local reality in Kenya as they see it while maintaining the aim of realising the goal of the CC decisions made at the global level i.e., PA (KII 2). Other examples of jointly implemented programmes between PACJA and the national governments in Kenya and Nigeria include tree planting campaigns, production, and distribution of charcoal briquettes and clean cook stoves etc.

Furthermore, this study found that PACJA enjoys partnerships with many international CSOs and NGOs such as German Watch, SIDA, Oxfam, UK Aid, CARE International, WRI etc. These partners provide funding for the movement to support the implementation of programmes and projects on environment, CC, and Sustainable Development. For example, PACJA is the winner of the African renewable energy initiative (AREI), which is a $10bn project supported by the G7 (KII 34). The movement is also the recipient of a substantial amount (undisclosed) from Swedish International Development Agency to strengthen African CSOs' capacity and engagement in the implementation of PA and the SDGs as well as strengthen PACJA's governance structure (KII 4). The project lasted for 40 months, i.e., from August 2016 to December 2019 and spanned eight countries in Africa including Botswana, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Kenya, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. These countries were selected based on their closeness to the regional economic communities (RECs) such as the AU, ECOWAS and SADC in Africa and global politics, and the expectation that they will effectively lobby these institutions for harmonised and significant CA across Africa (PACJA Annual Report, 2016). Also, the UK's DFID through DAI

funded PACJA's Angaza project which aimed to strengthen CSOs advocacy for improved CC governance in Kenya (*A summary of some of these funded projects was presented inTable 5.2 in Chapter 5*). Through these projects, PACJA has extended their influence and strengthening their capacity to engage effectively in the national, regional, and global discussions on CC and CJ.

For example, through the SIDA project, PACJA (via CSDevNet) contributed various inputs into the UNFCCC COP 21/INDC dialogue from participating in the ECOWAS 'Road to Paris' dialogue to the Regional CF workshops for the implementing entities of the Adaptation Fund and the GCF (PACJA Annual Plan, 2015). Key outcomes of their participation at these events include increased coherence at regional level in implementing the NDCs, SDGs and PA, better coordination of the movement via its DNPs and harmonised data collection and analysis of African perspectives and government responses to CC (KII 3).

Having examined PACJA's partnerships and collaboration for indicators of effectiveness, the findings indicates that the movement has been effective in harnessing these relationships and engagements to advance its CJ objectives of PAEM for enhanced participation in the CC governance processes across different scales. Nevertheless, this study also found that tensions exist with regards to the nature of their engagements in these partnerships, specifically with the government. For instance, according to some interviewees (KII 27, KII 22 and KII 25), PACJA's participation in national CC and environmental processes appeared to be merely symbolic and instrumental. They reasoned that despite the claims of cooperation with the CSOs from the government, 90% of the time it is the CSOs that write to the government asking to be included in the CC governance processes. The resulting implication is that the movement is not always fully aware of the complexities involved and is thus often simply carried along in the CC governance processes.

The general impression created by the interviews with staff of the FMEnv and CSDevNet (i.e., the Nigerian national platform) that they (i.e., CSDevNet) were mostly invited to review draft position papers, generate data, assist with community awareness and sensitisation, and discuss the implementation of the NDCs (KII 19, KII 21, KII 23, KII 30), further validates this claim. As

one of the interviewees reported "*our engagement with the government have not moved beyond meetings, meetings and meetings*. "*Rarely do we find our positions or recommendations reflected in the final policy outcomes*" (KII 30). A similar trend was observed in KPCG (Kenya) where interviewees from the platform accused the Kenyan government of engaging the CSOs merely out of the legal obligation to fulfil the Public Participation Act of 2018 (KII 27, KII 29). This could be expected however, considering that the government is responsible for deciding on the country's environmental and CJ agenda and drafting the relevant policies and legislations in line with it. Regardless, this is an important finding which is consistent with those of Newell et al (2011) who found that governments' engagement of CSOs is often to legitimate their own choices and 'rubber-stamp' their decisions rather than engage in genuine dialogue.

Further investigation revealed a difference in the extent of engagement of these platforms and their respective governments. For CSDevNet, there was no evidence of advanced preparations ahead of these engagements or a strong desire to influence the outcomes of these processes. Staff at the FMEnv who were interviewed for this research stated that the Ministry do not receive policy briefs on specific CC and environmental issues from CSDevNet in advance of these engagements. They claimed that on the contrary, many of the communications they receive are either soliciting support or critiquing the government's policies, actions, or inactions (KII 23, KII 16, KII 22).

By contrast, there was evidence of policy briefs and recommendations generated by the KPCG to the Kenyan Government at both national and sub-national levels. For example, in 2018, PACJA in partnership with Act! drafted a policy brief on the climate proofing county integrated development plan (CIDP) in Turkana County. Perhaps the differences in the engagement of these platforms with the government relate to several factors including the prevalent socio-political context in the country, knowledge and capacity on CC, resource availability etc. As one of the interviewees from CSDevNet observed, the slow and bureaucratic nature of the political processes in Nigeria prevented the network from proposing or recommending policies to the government (KII 25). This, coupled with the government's perception of the limited capacity of experts in the movement that can develop adequate policy recommendations and contribute

effectively to national CC dialogues in critical areas such as finance, science, technology, law, and policy, further prevents them from engaging the movement as equals. As an assistant director at the FMEnv point out, "*these CSOs including CSDevNet come to us to support them and their activities because they do not have the right capacity, both financial and technical, to do what they want to do*" (KII 22). The abiding issues here are those of the movement carving out a separate identity and having recognised expertise to contribute, *and having* a robust and critical relationship with government whilst maintaining a fundamental and sustained reservoir of trust and partnership.

The next section examines the data on PACJA's PAEM activities for indicators of effectiveness in knowledge and capacity development for institutional strengthening and improved participation of the vulnerable populations across SSA in CC governance processes. These indicators include the frequency and types of public awareness and engagement activities, 'open accesses' to the movement's activities and the implementation of capacity development and mobilisation activities.

6.2.3 Knowledge and capacity development

This area was selected as the final component for analysing PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM because of the understanding that the large-scale mobilisation and transformation for CJ that movement's like PACJA seek is only possible when there is significant public knowledge of CC and its impacts, the capacity to act on it, and ultimately, to make positive changes where necessary (Gustafsson et al, 2020; Steiner, 2010 and Buuren, 2009). Therefore, this section will examine PACJA's activities in generating and sharing information on CC, impacts and CJ to build public knowledge and capacity for enhanced participation in the CC governance processes by holding government accountable whilst also supporting the demand for and implementation of climate just policies.

1) Number and types of public awareness and engagement activities

This study found that PACJA has an extensive and commendable record of organising, co-organising and participating in public awareness and engagement activities on CC and CJ across Africa. In fact, it has consistently organised about three activities per month over the period under investigation (PACJA's Annual reports, 2011-2017). These include organising closed-door events either solely or jointly with their partners or the government like workshops, roundtable discussions and seminars on CC and SD, or open events such as media campaigns e.g., sponsoring TV programmes and commercials, tree planting campaigns, print publications, social media etc, school clubs, PACJA's Week of Action, press conferences, side events etc. (*A list of PACJA's PAEM activities from 2011 to December 2019 is available in a separate appendix document*). While PACJA's open-door and media PAEM activities occur all year round, their closed-door engagements with governments usually peaks around key CC events such as CCDA, AMCEN meetings and the UNFCCC processes. The movement uses these events as a medium to share information and increase public awareness on CC and CJ in Africa, and globally. For example, in August 2018, PACJA organised a youth engagement workshop at Ngong Hills Hotel in Nairobi. The one-day event, which was attended by over 50 youth drawn from different youth groups and organisations, sought to increase young people's awareness of CC and to create avenues for their active involvement in the CC governance processes in the country. As such, it involved PACJA presenting brief lectures on the key CC priorities in the country, their roles as youth, their mission as a movement organisation and spaces for youth engagements, both in the movement and the CC process in Kenya.

Another example of PACJA's public awareness activities is the PACJA's Week of Action that is held in November yearly. Via its NPs and focal points across Africa, PACJA uses this one week-long event to conduct public awareness campaigns on key CC and CJ priorities in the respective host countries, and the continent to increase engagement and mobilisation ahead of the UNFCCC COPs (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). Additionally, PACJA uses social media platforms like its organisational website, Facebook, and Twitter pages to conduct its public awareness activities, which include sharing information about internal or external CC and CJ events, publications i.e.,

articles, research publications and policy briefs, and to interact with likeminded individuals and organisations locally, regionally, and globally (see Figure 4 below). Notable examples of PACJA's awareness and engagement with government were examined and discussed in Section 6.2.2 above.



Figure 4: Screenshot of CSDevNet using its Twitter page to share CC event at COP 25

Further examination of the data revealed that consultative workshops and dialogue sessions were the most frequent activities used for PAEM, with the government being the main target audience of PACJA. A possible explanation for this may be because the movement's CJ objective is to transform the current political structures in the CC governance processes to create avenues for increased participation of the poorest and most vulnerable populations in the dialogues. However, the implication of this is less evidence of public awareness activities that target the public and civic audiences. For instance, a critical review of PACJA's website and social media pages showed that the content of these online communications or posts were often complex and

did not provide useful information, for example, on self-efficacy that would arouse the interest and motivation of less-educated public audiences (see Figure 5). While the post mentions PACJA's PAEM activity targeting the youths in Nairobi, it did not offer any background into the COP or on the importance of youth participation in the CC governance process in Africa.



Figure 5: Screenshots showing similar posts shared on PACJA's Facebook and Twitter pages

Also, there was limited evidence to show that the messages were specifically curated to increase engagement with and among their followers judging by the fact that the same messages are being shared across all their social media pages without due consideration of the unique needs and dynamism of the different platforms (see Figure 5 above). Neither does the movement include the use of memes, gifs, emojis and emoticons which have been found by Wolny (2016) and Waters and Jamal (2011) to increase engagement (i.e., to garner more likes and retweets) on

Twitter because of the playful spin, personality, and emotions they add to posts. This is despite the claims of several scholars that social media, when used effectively e.g., paying attention to messaging, uses of engagement tactics like competitions, polls, online discussions i.e., Twitter chats etc., holds significant potential for awareness creation and mass mobilisation (Thelen et al, 2018; Agostino and Arnaboldi, 2016; Saxton and Waters, 2014). This is especially the case in this era of globalisation, almost instant global communication and exploiting of virtual spaces for broader political engagement (Keating and Melis, 2017; Stilgoe et al, 2014). In addition, there were no follow up tweets on the outcome of the meeting and neither did they provide any information on how other youth might become engaged in the process.

While this research did not determine the number of views per post on each of the social media platforms, the engagement and impacts seem low judging by the number of followers, comments, likes and retweets. For example, as of December 2019, PACJA had mobilised only 6,750 and 4,631 followers on their official Facebook and Twitter (@PACJA1) pages respectively since they joined the social media platforms in 2012. This is quite low when compared with La Via Campesina which has gained over 40,000 and 20,000 followers on its Facebook and Twitter pages since 2010. For PACJA, the highest number of likes and retweets generated by a single post on Twitter was only 23 and 8, respectively. Further analysis of the comment sections revealed the absence of a facilitator or moderator from PACJA who is responsible for monitoring and responding to the comments generated by the audience. Also, most of the information provided on the movement's PAEM activities (i.e., events page) is redundant (see Figure 6) and the links to their publications, are broken. While the website provides a platform for signing up for its newsletters, several attempts to do this over the course of a year, between August 2018 and December 2019, proved futile. This study also revealed that PACJA is yet to exploit Instagram for PAEM despite the perceived benefits such as visibility, branding, relatability, and trust that can be gained from using the platform to share photos and videos of their events and activities (Cotter, 2019). In addition, there was no evidence to suggest that PACJA uses social media analytics to measure the extent of its media outreach, so as to better understand their audience and improve on their PAEM.

Figure 6: Webpage showing an outdated PACJA event as of December 2019 (Source: PACJA, 2019)

Since knowledge and capacity development occur when the relevant information is easily accessed, understood, and interpreted correctly by the target audience(s), the next section will investigate public access to PACJA's PAEM activities and how the information on CC and CJ are generated and shared through these activities.

2) Accessibility to the movement's activities and information on CC and CJ

Accessibility to information on CC and CJ has been found to overcome barriers to public engagement and mobilisation for climate action (Ado et al, 2019; Simoes et al, 2017). It is thus important to get a better sense of PACJA's efforts to create easy access to their PAEM and information on CC and CJ. Following from the analysis, this study found that the movement is

increasingly recognised for its role as a knowledge and relationship broker, for open and consolidated CA across Africa, and globally. The findings from this study indicate that PACJA has made significant strides in creating ready access (i.e., making information accessible, and user friendly) to CC knowledge and information on the continent via research and publication, social media engagements and consistently funding some of its members, including representatives from the grassroots i.e., pastoralist community, to attend the annual UNFCCC COP and other regional CC meetings like the CCDA, Africa Climate Week and UNECA.

For instance, PACJA engages in research, and the development (commissioning and publication) of discussion papers, policy briefs and other information, education, and communication (IEC) materials like posters, brochure, and factsheets, either independently or in collaboration with their partners to achieve its PAEM goals. It uses this medium to generate and communicate complex CC issues in simplified formats and create linkages to the African realities in a way that aids the understanding of other CSOs, researchers and students who in turn will work to mainstream this information and resources into the public domain and informs policies at various levels (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). Examples of the resulting publications from some of PACJA's research activities include '*Transforming Energy for a Clean and Sustainable Future in Africa, Towards Implementation: The 2017 Adaptation Watch Report'* and '*Walking the talk: Reflections on NDC's Implementation in five African Countries*' (date of publication?). These publications have been increasing steadily over the years and numbered over 30 as of December 2019. They are available for download in pdf formats on PACJA's website (https://www.pacja.org/pacja-impact/publications) and in hard copies at the offices of the movement's Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya.

This study also found that PACJA has focused aggressively on developing the social and political capacity of its members and the local communities, as well as creating access to CC actors and the policy area through several of its PAEM activities (see Section 6.2.2). For instance, a journalist from PAMACC that was interviewed for this research commented that "*PACJA is good to have as an ally or partner because of their resource mobilisation potential"*. S/he explained further that "*associating with the movement grants you access to places and*

people that would have been impossible; and sometimes they even guide you to invaluable sources of information" (KII 40). Simultaneously, PACJA catalyses CC knowledge and transfers information from the grassroots communities across Africa to the national and international processes and vice versa. The movement, through its NPs galvanises these different voices from across Africa to the international level such as the UNFCCC COPs. Here they organise side events and press conferences to share this information and connect the voices of the most vulnerable populations to the powerful policymakers. In turn, PACJA designs several of its awareness and advocacy campaigns with an explicit view to simplify and explain how these agreements affect those at the local level.

However, this study found several barriers to PACJA's public awareness and capacity building activities. Firstly, the research productivity and outreach activities of the movement are still considerably low seeing as most of the research outputs are linked to their joint project and programme implementation. As a result, the research focus, and subsequent findings are mostly determined by and shared with their project partners or funders. This is accentuated because the PAEM interests of many of these funding partners do not include conducting nor disseminating research in SSA (KII 4). Commenting on the subject, more than half of the interviewees from PACJA agreed that the number and frequency of research studies conducted by the movement was still minimal. To illustrate, a former senior programmes officer with PACJA highlighted the issue of the prevailing weak ties between PACJA, the government and the academic and research institutes across SSA as having a limiting impact on the public awareness activities of the movement. S/he argued that the poor research culture in SSA was limiting the production and availability of evidence-based data that will serve as reference when telling the African climate stories at the international level and to support PACJA's CJ advocacy agenda. S/he stated that:

> *"We don't do enough research. We talk about how CC has contributed to socio-economic issues. But that link or evidence we are talking about, has any university or government institution tried to do research on the link between CC related hazards and those kinds of damage that occur from CC related impacts? Are they really from CC related impacts or other issues? Three weeks ago, I organised a regional dialogue in Nairobi on CC conflicts in the Horn of Africa, and we are trying to interrogate the links between CC and conflicts. We ended*

up without establishing that link because we could not find a case study that tried to link CC and conflicts. We must interrogate those links. You talk about loss and damage and we are not sharing the cases. We want that case from Nigeria that talks about losing lives, property, agricultural produce due to CC. It must be evident that CC would have more impact on some of these issues at the African level" (KII 14).

Likewise, during the CCDA VII conference in Nairobi in 2018, participants at a panel session to discuss the implementation of the NDCs in Africa, suggested that some of PACJA's advocacy did not appear to have been well researched or suitable for the African context. They argued that because most of the existing research on CC in SSA has been conducted by researchers linked to international agencies and institutions, it was limiting the extent to which the movement was creating awareness and motivating for collective action both in Africa, and globally.

When probed further on the likely reasons for this gap, these interviewees linked the low research productivity of the movement to the cost implications associated with conducting research, such as maintaining a dedicated research team within PACJA, undertaking data collection which may include conducting costly and extensive fieldwork in rural areas, time spent analysing the data, writing the reports, and disseminating the research findings. Hence, they pleaded for stronger partnerships and collaborations between PACJA and African universities and research institutions which has remained poorly developed, so as to ensure that the movement's advocacy efforts are evidence-based and with clear linkages between local causes, CC impacts and hazards, and other related challenges.

Further to the above, the findings also highlighted that whereas movements like PACJA generate a lot of data on CC and CJ from their project implementation efforts, only a summary of such information is made available in the public domain via their website and/social media pages. Additional information usually requires an email request (usually the least productive approach as a response is not guaranteed), attendance at their programmes and events or physical visitation to the offices of the movement's Secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. Even then, the desired information is not readily available due to the poor archival system as discussed in the previous

chapter. Also, most of the PAEM activities of PACJA appears to be conducted in a top-down approach using seminars and workshop and technical terminologies with little attention paid to using more appropriate public engagement strategies like simpler messaging and relevant media such as TV, radio, and social media. This has the effect of limiting public understanding and engagement with the topic.

Having examined wider, public access to PACJA's PAEM activities, the next section will present the findings on the movement's efforts at capacity development and mobilisation for urgent and collective climate action.

3) <u>Implementation of capacity development and mobilisation programmes</u>

This study found that PACJA organises and facilitates several CC knowledge and capacity development programmes including training courses, workshops and seminars for both its broader membership, partners and even for governments. For instance, at the 2019 Africa Climate Week in Ghana, PACJA organised free-to-attend training and seminars for over 400 persons, drawn from their members and partners (KII 34). The training events and seminars centred around breaking down complex CC information, laws, and policies into easily understandable texts for increased engagement and implementation. Subsequently, PACJA was able to enhance the capacity of the participants at these events in relation to thematic issues such as climate finance, and to share ideas and information as well as spark new conversations about commitments versus action (KII 34).

PACJA has also implemented many capacity-building projects and programmes with their partners. For example, in partnership with SIDA, the movement implemented a capacity development programme that focused on strengthening the capacity of African CSOs to participate meaningfully and effectively in the CC governance process. PACJA in collaboration with the WB implemented the FCPF programme to build the capacity of African CSOs on REDD+ preparedness and knowledge exchange at the national and regional level. Participants from the CSOs and local communities at these REDD+ training events reported an increase in

their knowledge on REDD+ following their participation. Through this project, PACJA provided funds to its members to organise capacity building activities. The regional exchange also helped to establish stronger linkages and coordination for information sharing/exchange among their members in the 18 countries that were beneficiaries of this project (PACJA Annual Report 2017). Additionally, PACJA implemented the PACJA-OSIEA pastoralist project which focused on strengthening the engagement of pastoralist CSOs in national and regional climate processes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. The project supported the representatives of three pastoralist organisations to attend the UNFCCC COP 23 in 2017 and served as a stepping stone for PACJA to join the "Voice for Change Project", a five-year project funded by SNV on strengthening pastoralist resilience through improved capacity for CC policy advocacy in Kenya (PACJA Annual Report 2017). A summary of these projects including their key achievements has already been presented in Table 5.2 in Chapter 5.

Based on information available in its annual reports, PACJA also supports between 35 to 50 of its members to attend the annual UNFCCC COP event every year since it was established in 2008, except in 2011 when it supported over 300 participants including small-holder farmers, youth, women etc., to COP 17 using the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope. Additionally, it offers funding to many of its members to attend other national and regional CC events like the AMCEN sessions and the CCDA. As indicated earlier, the criteria and process of selection of members that receive such funding is unclear. In theory at least, their presence at these CC events opens spaces and creates opportunities for PACJA to engage in and influence the CC governance processes and outcomes in favour of Africa and the most vulnerable populations which they represent. PACJA has also helped to convene several governmental processes including ACLI, AREI, PAP, AMCEN meetings etc. (see Table 6.1).

This study found that PACJA implements several capacity developments projects at the grassroots level to provide practical skills and support to the vulnerable populations to help them adapt to the impacts of CC (KII 5 and KII 6). This includes organising and facilitating training on sustainable land practices, charcoal harvesting, and integrated water resource management. For instance, in Kenya, KPCG works with a consortium of farmers to form CC lobby groups that

are run essentially by the farmers at the grassroots. Subsequently, this group which comprises of a county committee, secretary and treasurer meets independently with the County government, the directors of environment and CC, directors of revenue, etc to discuss improved farming practices including "what kind of seeds the government is procuring for the farmers", "what type of agroecological practices they want the county to use" and "whether or not new or existing policies are detrimental to them in terms of CC adaptation and resilience" (KII 27). PACJA uses these fledgling programmes to achieve their objective of enhancing the capacities of these actors to contribute meaning fully and effectively to the CC governance processes. As of one of its members put it, "*we (i.e., PACJA) cannot forever be champions of talking about CJ on behalf of the local communities and vulnerable populations. Therefore, we need to build their capacity so that they can rise and talk about CJ on their own and get their government to listen to their stories*" (KII 13).

Other findings from this study indicate that PACJA's engagements with the local communities go beyond technical capacity building to include the occasional provision of financial and social resources. This is because although this actor group are the custodians of certain indigenous knowledge that are crucial for implementing CA at the local level, they often lack the financial means to attend these engagement and capacity training workshops. As a result, PACJA occasionally provides stipends to facilitate their attendance at some of these events and support programme implementation at the grassroots (KII 3, KII 5, KII 25 and KII 27). By participating in these events, they are presented with an opportunity to close the gap between them and the political actors and lobby them to implement policies that responsive to their CJ needs. Therefore, PACJA enhances the social mobilisation capacity (i.e., increase in number and self-determination) of the grassroots learning, empowerment, and CA in support of its CJ agenda. This is evidenced from the implementation of the PACJA-OSIEA pastoralist project, including an increase in the engagement of pastoralist CSOs and coalitions on CC policy advocacy issues at national level in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania and the increase in the number of pastoralists from SSA that attend the annual COP event (KII 6).

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter has critically analysed PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM using three components: collective ownership, partnerships and collaboration, and knowledge and capacity development. By examining all the evidence it was able to collect, it has demonstrated that PACJA is effective in its PAEM objective even while recognising the limited nature of the movement's underdeveloped public engagement strategy. The movement's effectiveness was demonstrated by its extensive PAEM activities, partnerships and collaboration, and its increasing recognition among key CC actors i.e., the policymakers as a useful organ in mobilising African CSOs and the voices of the poorest and most vulnerable populations on CC issues to the regional, national, and global levels. One of the most striking pieces of evidence of PACJA's effective PAEM activities found in the study was the *TransAfrican Caravan of Hope Campaign*. This campaign attracted significant media coverage in Africa, and globally and mobilised over 300 participants, including small-holder farmers, youths, and women from across 10 countries in Eastern and Southern Africa to attend the UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban, South Africa. The free logistics i.e., transport, feeding and accommodation offered by PACJA to these participants helped to address resources inequalities that often act as barriers to participation at the COPs. Subsequently, this initiative made PACJA the largest CSO group at the COP. Other evidence of PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM was seen from the movement's wider engagement in the CC governance process in Africa, for example, at the AMCEN meetings, pre and post COP workshops, and in joint implementation of programmes and projects like the domestication of the Kenyan National Climate Change Action Plan (KCCAP) and the distribution of clean cook stoves in Nigeria.

The chapter has also highlighted and discussed several gaps and tensions in PACJA's efforts towards its PAEM objectives. The most significant limitations to emerge from this study are (a) the limited research and (b) the underdeveloped media engagement strategy. These were evident from the movement's inconsistent CJ framings and narrative, extensive focus on engaging the more power political actors i.e., regional, and national governments (see Table 6.1) and limited social media engagement activities. The implication for PACJA's PAEM agenda is that it has restricted the extent to which the movement can create strong (downward) linkages to people at

the grassroots and greater ownership on their part on the one hand, and limited PACJA's capacity to scale up ideas and interventions for CJ in SSA on the other hand.

A significant theoretical contribution of this chapter is that PACJA's extensive focus in engaging and mobilising the more powerful political actors is an unavoidable outcome of the African context in which PACJA operates. This provides a deeper insight into the strong link between resources and participation in the whole domain of CC governance. The more resources i.e., financial, socio-political etc. available to an actor group, the stronger the quality and the more sustained can be their participation in the governance processes over time. This corroborates the earlier findings of Lecy et al (2012) that the extent and quality of engagement and participation in CC events and dialogue significantly relies on the resource capacity of each of the various stakeholder groups. Alongside that, PACJA's limited used of social media and other media such as TVs, radio etc. and engagement tactics like plays, dramas, arts, poetry and even celebrities provide strong empirical confirmation that the CJM in SSA is yet solidify its PAEM strategies in a way that is pertinent its people.

Overall, the findings in this chapter confirm the claims of scholars like Tormos and Garcia-Lopez (2018), Bond (2015) and Okereke (2010) that the CJM in developing countries, in this case SSA struggle with challenges such as their inconsistent CJ framings and underdeveloped mechanisms which serve to limit their capacity to deliver on their CJ objective of increased participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC governance processes. Clearly, for a continent-wide movement like PACJA, these challenges are multiplied several times over.

The next chapter of this thesis will critically analyse PACJA's effectiveness in policy influence. This is in line with the movement's CJ objective of influencing the formulation and implementation of climate just policies. Evidence of PACJA's effectiveness in policy influence will be obtained from analysing their activities in three areas: 1) access to and participation in the policy process, 2) evidence of leverage and 3) policy outcomes.

Chapter Seven: Analysing PACJA's Climate Policy Influence in sub-Saharan Africa

7.1. Introduction

Policy influence (PI) is the third and final CJ objective of the CJMs in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) that is under critical investigation in this thesis. PI is defined here as the extent to which the CJM can leverage its power to strengthen the capacities and participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC policy process, alter, formulate, and support the implementation climate just policies. Accordingly, this chapter will critically analyse the data collected from multiple sources including document analysis (organisational texts, academic literature, and policy documents) and key informant interviews (KII) relating to PACJA's activities and nature of engagement in the CC policy processes. It will do so to determine the extent of its influence in the formulation and implementation of climate just policies in SSA. That is, an examination of the movement's activities and leverage in agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation, and revisions of policy. Drawing from the analytical framework developed in Chapter Three, the analysis will focus on three components of PI 1) access to and participation in the policy arena, 2) leverage and 3) policy outcomes. Foci of the chapter include evidence of PACJA's strategic policy campaigns i.e., media campaigns, policy briefs etc., participation in the CC policy processes, leverage or tactics of influence and policy outcomes including court/administrative orders.

The analysis indicates that PACJA is highly effective in its access to and participation in the policy arena in SSA. This is because of the movement's reputation as a knowledge and relationship broker due to their vast knowledge and experience of CC, expansive and immersed membership at the grassroots across SSA and extensive partnerships with strong Northern organisations. The indicators of PI and limiting factors are analysed and discussed in detail below.

7.2 Indicators of PACJA's Effectiveness in Policy Influence

This section will critically analyse PACJA's influence in the CC policy process in SSA from three components: 1) access to and participation in the CC policy arena, 2) leverage and 3) policy outcomes. It will identify and critically evaluate a small number of indicators of PI as well as the factors acting to limit PACJA's impacts in this regard.

7.2.1 Access to and Participation in the Policy Arena

This was identified as a first component of PI based on the understanding of the important link between participation and procedural justice in the CC governance processes. Because PACJA lack the political mandate to make decisions and/or enter into agreements on behalf of countries, their PI is limited to their interactions, either directly or indirectly, with the policymakers including the intergovernmental, regional, and national governments in the policy arena and processes (Kirchherr, 2018; Feinberg et al, 2017). Subsequently, this section will analyse and discuss indicators of PACJA's access and participation in the policy arena. Agenda setting is the first indicator that will be examined. This is because scholars including Mahoney (2007) and Weaver (2007) have provided significant evidence to suggest that agenda setting by movements like PACJA is a significant first step in gaining access to the policy arena and policymakers and ultimately to participating in the CC policy processes.

1) Agenda Setting

The findings indicate that PACJA has been strategic in its agenda setting efforts to gain access to the policy makers and the policy arena. The movement has successfully organised several media campaigns to create awareness of CC challenges and to influence perspectives and political agendas in different countries in SSA. A prominent example of this is the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope organised by PACJA in 2011. As indicated earlier, the movement used this caravan which travelled from Burundi and across seven other countries in Eastern and Southern Africa

and conveyed over 300 participants to the UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban, South Africa to draw public, media and political attention to the significant CC event and the African peoples' CJ agenda. Consequently, they gained access to the policy arena and policymakers where they presented the African People's petition to the South African President, Jacob Zuma who was chairing the meeting (PACJA Annual Report, 2011). Another notable and more recent example of PACJA's effort in agenda setting using media campaigns is drawn from the movement's 2019 campaign against the construction of the Lamu Coal Project (*which is supported by the Kenyan Government and other organisations like the AfDB*). This campaign led a Kenya court ruling that the project be temporarily halted, and a new Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) be conducted in the interim (KII 40).

Other examples of PACJA's efforts in agenda setting were seen from the movement's activities like partnerships and collaborations, research initiatives, and the like. PACJA in collaboration with its partners like UKAid, Irish Aid, Trocaire, etc. regularly conducts research and/or implements projects around environment and CC issues across Africa. The outcomes of these activities usually include the establishment of national and/or sector-based (i.e., thematic) environmental and CC initiatives, the production of policy briefs, research papers and other outputs. Occasionally, these outputs are incorporated into their policy advocacy work across Africa to support the enactment of new agreements, laws, legislation and court rulings. To illustrate, in 2017/18, PACJA together with its partners, Trocaire and Irish Aid conducted a research project on "Mainstreaming CC into Kenya's development budgets, projects, plans and programmes towards a climate resilient low carbon development pathway." The findings from this project supported the formulation of Kitui County CC Policy Framework, which was presented to the Country's Minister of Environment, the Honourable John Makau at the County's Executive Committee (CEC) Consultation workshop in May 2018 (Kitui County Government, 2018). Since then, no formal assessment has been conducted by PACJA to evaluate whether this policy framework is being implemented and if it is, to what extent.

PACJA has also organised a minimum of 10 many consultative forums, and roundtable discussions on environment and CC each year, and invited key CC policy actors across Africa to

participate in these events. The events are usually held in different capital cities across Africa, for example, Nairobi, Abuja, Johannesburg and Addis Ababa. They used these events to raise awareness of their work/research initiatives and outputs and CJ demands and/or positions. As one of PACJA's project officer noted that "*to influence policy, you must get through to the policymakers. You must bring them closer to you and make them understand the CC challenge and why they need to pass a certain law or policy. Over prolonged periods, these issues become engraved in the consciousness of these political actors in favour of the movement's agenda*" (KII 5). This view was also shared by the ED of PACJA who noted that "*to influence the government for this CJ narrative that we are advancing, we (i.e., PACJA) must present itself as a civil society partner deserving of a seat at the negotiation table*". This strategy, according to several interviewees has been useful for the movement in creating access to the policy arena as strategic partners and stakeholders. For example, the Regional Officer, responsible for CC and Green Growth, AfDB, observed that PACJA has earned a place at the negotiation table as a key stakeholder in the African CC policy process due to its strategic positioning as a diplomatic group. He stated that:

> *"If you ask about the bank's (i.e., AfDB) partnership with PACJA, it evolved from non-existence to what it is today i.e., partnership where we are almost two equals on the table. We do not have an official MoU but there have been times when we have been invited to their meetings and there have been times when we have co-organised meetings. For example, this year (i.e., 2019) during the One Planet Summit, we had a major event, a whole day event on energy transition which was jointly organised by the AUC, AfDB and PACJA. And it was a very successful event. We came out with a communique and I will be honest with you the president of AfDB referred to that conversation. As we speak, our engagement is now on refining ideas of interest. We were sitting together trying to talk through things and bringing perspectives to realities; and not on the other side of the aisle trying to argue.*" (KII 34).

Despite this evidence of PACJA's effectiveness in policy agenda setting, this study found that the prevailing socio-political system across Africa and the movement's limited communication strategies were limiting the extent of its influence. For example, one of the coordinators of the

CSDevNet platform argued that "*the prolonged and bureaucratic bottlenecks in the political process in Nigeria were found to limit the movement's policy advocacy*". According to this interviewee, "*the political subsystem across Africa is such that everyone is careful of their actions to avoid backlash from the government. Before you can influence anything, politics is the way forward because if you do not join politics, you cannot influence policies*" (KII 25).

Also, the extent to which the CJM can publicly advocate for CC policies is often hindered by the existing policies in the countries. For instance, the 2009 Ethiopian proclamation restricts the active engagement of NGOs and CSOs in policy agenda setting and formulation in that country. In Nigeria, the current value of tax imposed on importing solar panels (which have positive implications for GHG mitigation and promoting energy security), is very high and in sharp contrast to the existing government policy of providing fossil fuel subsidies (KII 17). Coupled with the current policy around individual/private electricity generation in Nigeria, this further discourages policy advocacy for (private) renewable energy generation and transmission and the design of new CC policies such as a carbon tax. According to the policy, excess electricity generated above the 10MW threshold must be given to the government who then decides how much they are willing to pay for it. This leeway granted to the government to determine the price of the electricity disincentivises individuals/private sector from investing in the power sector for fear of running at a loss (KII 12). Yet, this study did not find evidence of any advocacy campaign (i.e., policy evaluation) from PACJA that targets addressing this important area.

Another factor identified from this study that was hindering PACJA's effectiveness in policy agenda setting was its limited public engagement strategy, especially framing of the key issues. This is because although the CJM understands the clear link between CC and economic development, there is evidence that it is yet to solidify a coherent narrative that underscores their CJ agenda and public interest in economic growth and development. For example, a coordinator from CSDevNet observed that "*the movement is still lagging in interpreting scientific findings on CC and CJ, providing key information, summaries, and positive coverage to the public*". He argues that the messages in most of their public communications are not clearly articulated with facts and figures and neither do they show clear links between CC and the broader development

struggles like hunger, health, energy, and security (KII 25). When one of PACJA's co-founders was asked to comment on this perceived gap, he argued that this was because until recently, the movement's works and achievements had focused mainly on the international CC negotiation processes, specifically the UNFCCC (KII 3). Nevertheless, the outcome of this is a lack of public interest in understanding CC and advocating CJ. To explain further, this interviewee used the illustration of two young climate activists, Greta Thunberg from Sweden, and Adenike Oladosu from Nigeria. He observed that:

> "*When Greta started the Friday Climate Strike, many climate organisations and the European media were very quick to jump on it and project it in a positive way as a key climate action. Within a few weeks, Greta was recognised and invited to speak at various events, received several awards etc. Yet PACJA and the African media have done little to promote Adenike who has been championing a similar advocacy in Nigeria. They do not find the story interesting or controversial enough. It was not until the international community recognised her effort and carried her story that you see our media sharing this information."* (KII 25)

A similar view was shared by another interviewee from PACJA who observed that the movement is not strategic in how it links CC to the different sectors. S/he noted that:

> "[*O*]*ne important thing I have seen as a gap in PACJA's work is that they are impractical about CJ issues. Impractical in the sense that if you look at the way international CSOs do their publications and write about issues, they are more systemic and focused about what they want. If you look at PACJA, they do a lot of publications that are not well researched at times. When I see some of our press releases at the UNFCCC, I feel so bad because they do not address anything….and I have said this to them severally"*. (KII 24)

In addition, this study found that PACJA still struggles with deciding on the best strategy to adopt in its engagement with the government for policy advocacy. The reason being that although the complex nature of the CC challenge demands collective and diplomatic engagements with the government, as a movement-based organisation, PACJA understands the

importance of critical advocacy and not getting into a "very cosy" relationship with the government that it leaves no room for alternative spaces (KII 5 and KII 28). Whereas some members of PACJA are concerned that the movement's deployment of collaborative tactics in their engagement with governments increases the chances of co-option, which is detrimental to their CJ agenda (KII 24 and KII 28), others from the government argue that the activism strategy of the movement ultimately hinders their access to the policy making arena (KII 29 and KII 33). This is by no means a unique problem: scholars like Kirgis (2014) have identified that balancing both collaborative and activist tactics and actions is necessary for movements who want to increase their PI.

The next section will move on to analyse the data for evidence of PACJA's participation in the CC policy process in SSA.

2) PACJA's Participation in the CC policy process in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

The findings here indicate that PACJA participates to varying degrees in CC policy process across different levels in SSA. The movement participates in the policy process in different capacities, either as a 'key stakeholder' in the consultation process (i.e., sharing information with the government and other actors), an observer (i.e., to monitor and comment on the process but not actively participate in it) and joint implementation partner (i.e., an active participant having equal ownership of the process). For instance, at the African continental level, PACJA enjoys a strong though 'informal working relationship'[9] with the African Union Commission (AUC), which is the highest intergovernmental and policy-making organisation at this level. To the extent that a senior policy officer in the AUC stated that PACJA is one of the few movements to which the commission provides access the political space and gives them the necessary political backing. According to them:

[9] They have no official status, but by being useful allies, they are included in the process.

"[T]he AU noticed the impact and the validity of PACJA's constituency to the CC discourse and the importance of the work that they do through their partnership with the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC). They have reached the grassroots, a level that we at the AUC cannot reach. As a result, we (i.e., AU) also jointly organise events together, like the 2019 Africa Environment Day in Luanda Angola. PACJA invited and sponsored several participants from the SA region. A substantial outcome of that was the idea to create an African Women Environment Platform kind of thing for advocacy with the aim of empowering women in the aspect of natural resources. Also, we convene the ministerial meeting and then their (i.e., PACJA) expectation of course is for us to present for the endorsement of those various ministerial bodies some of the outcomes of the conferences and meetings that PACJA and partners are organising all over the continent" (KII 41).

Subsequently, PACJA participates as an observer at the summit of the heads of states and government. Through the AUC, the movement was able to push for the establishment of the committee of heads of states and government on CC (CAHOSSCC), as stated by the ED of PACJA. The CAHOSCC in partnerships with other African organisations like the AGN and AMCEN work to coordinate and articulate a common position on CC for Africa and advance it at the international scene like the UNFCCC COP negotiations.

Since 2014, PACJA has also participated regularly in the pre-AMCEN African CSOs Workshop, Stakeholders Consultative meetings and AMCEN extra-Ordinary sessions. The movement is responsible for coordinating African CSOs and identifying participants for these events (KII 35). At these events, PACJA and other African CSOs deliberate on the AMCEN agenda, which includes issues related to CC, and come up with their CJ demands, proposals, and suggestions, according to the AMCEN coordinator. They noted that:

"Their views and suggestions are taken into consideration by the experts when developing the key messages and decisions to be shared with the Ministers. They do not just finish their session and then take off; they are still there until the end of the conference, so they have that opportunity to engage with the Ministers as well. Therefore, I can say that they have been effective in influencing the policy

agenda at the continental level because of their engagements here and, they have been very active in engaging other regional leaders from the AUC, AfDB, UNECA and the RECs" (KII 35).

Furthermore, PACJA, in collaboration with the the Pan African Parliament (PAP), established the African Climate Legislative Initiative (ACLI). Through ACLI, PACJA has been able to share ideas and learnings on CC that will promote the resilience of the local communities and ensure that the parliamentarians who are the decision-makers are duly informed of the grassroots realities when formulating CC laws and policies (PACJA Annual report, 2014). In addition, the movement's status as an accredited 'African CSO observer organisation' to the GCF process grants it access to participate in all GCF board meetings and workshops and to contribute to the fund's governance process. A significant contribution of PACJA at the GCF policy process was creating direct access to the FCPF capacity building funds for southern CSOs. According to the ED of PACJA, the World Bank FCPF capacity building programme for southern CSOs was being managed by an intermediary organisation, the US Environmental Defense Fund. However, when PACJA started participating in the GCF meetings as an observer, they observed this injustice and opposed it which led to it being dismantled. As a result, African CSOs can now access the money without an intermediary (KII 2).

At the national level, PACJA frequently receives invitations from national governments to attend CC policy dialogue or consultative forums (KII 16 and 31). For example, in January 2019, PACJA announced on their website that the Kenyan platform of the Alliance had been appointed to participate in a high level technical consultative advisory committee to formulate the Water, Environment, Energy and Natural Resources (WEENR) Policy for Kiambu County. Here, they enjoyed access to the policymakers and an avenue to influence policy by providing useful and practical information on CC to these actors. The workshop developed and collated inputs that are expected to be included in the county's CC policy. Other examples of PACJA's engagement with the government in the CC policy process across Africa were discussed extensively in Section 6.2.2 in Chapter 6.

The above analysis clearly indicates that PACJA has been effective in PI based on its evident participation in the CC policy process in various contexts across Africa. However, scholars like Tallberg et al (2018), Nelson (2010) and Mahoney (2007) have observed that movements participation in the policy process, though significant, is not a single measure of PI. This is because the quality of movements participation and the outcomes typically varies from being active partners driving real impacts on the ground i.e., policy reforms to passive observers with little or no influence in the process. Subsequently, the next section of this chapter will analyse the quality of PACJA's participation (or leverage) in the CC policy process in SSA.

7.2.2 Leverage

Following from the definition of PI used here as the extent to which the CJM can leverage its power to strengthen the capacities and participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC policy process, alter, formulate, and support the implementation climate just policies, this section will analyse PACJA's participation in the CC policy process for evidence of this influence. Example of these evidence will include the use of material leverage such as information, training and finance and 'moral leverage' like protests, public opinions, legitimacy etc.

1) Material Leverage

This study found that PACJA uses material leverage like information, finance and political allies to influence the CC policy process in SSA. For example, in 2017, PACJA jointly organised a side event with the African Climate Policy Centre (ACPC-ECA) during the 28th African AU summit in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. At this event, the movement drew from its expansive knowledge and experience on CC and CJ to drive the discussions with these policymakers in favour or their agenda, according to PACJA's 2017 Annual Report. They provided practical information on CC on the continent to the policymakers, exchanged and deliberated upon ideas including highlighting policy deficits and suggestions to address some of the environmental and CC challenges on the continent. A notable outcome of this engagement

involving PACJA was a policy recommendation to the 28th Summit of African Leaders on how to advance conversations on low-carbon, climate resilient, green development trajectories under the NDCs (PACJA Annual Report, 2017).

Also, several interviewees observed the important role of PACJA in providing information to the decision makers. For instance, the director of CC at the FMEnv Nigeria observed that CSOs like PACJA are key stakeholders in the CC policy process in the country. He stated that "*they are closest to the grassroots and provide the ministry with key information of the CC impacts as well as their CC interventions (or initiatives) at this level*" (KII 16). This view was also shared by a senior policy officer in the AUC who observed that PACJA had extensive knowledge of CC impacts at the grassroots which is not readily available to them (KII 41). This recognition of PACJA as a knowledge broker has earned them significant leverage as key actors in the CC policy process across Africa (KII 16, KII 35 and KII 41). For example, the representative from the AUC stated that PACJA is invited to collaborate with the Commission in all the CC events and processes that requires CSO participation (KII 41). Likewise, the regional principal officer, CC, and Green Growth (GG), AfDB observed that PACJA "*is really knocking on the door and putting everyone on their toes*". S/he noted that it was the movement that first began talking about some of the commitments that were yet to be fulfilled by the developed countries, for example, energy access. "*Today, because of the PACJA's effort, the African Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), a $10 billion project supported by the G7, was established to overcome the issue of energy access for African communities"* (KII 34). S/he went on to applaud the movement's contribution to the AGN work.

> "PACJA *provides the state-of-the-art knowledge and real-life situation as context to the AGN who are the direct negotiators. And in a governance framework, that is the most important role that non-state actors can play in influencing the global climate agenda. We take interest in the work that they do, and I think at the bank we have been able to support their work and facilitate that interaction. The more that you can PACJA into the policy space… the more they have a better picture, and the more they can make a better presentation of where we are"* (KII 34).

However, subsequent discussion with a member of the AGN technical team revealed that all is not necessarily as it appears. Commenting on PACJA's engagement with the AGN, this interviewee who had been with the AGN for over five years at the time of the interview stated that the interactions between both parties have mostly been limited to the roundtable discussions and/or interview briefings with the AGN chair (KII 18). S/he reasoned that "*Perhaps this is because of PACJA's overriding concern to enhance their political outreach. However, I think that the lack of tactical engagement with the technical team of the AGN, who directly engages in the negotiation processes on various thematic issues limits policy influence at the international level*". This is a valid observation considering that the AGN technical team enjoy more influence from their constant engagement in the negotiations and role as the negotiators on behalf of the continent, unlike the chair who is only appointed for specified periods.

The study also found that PACJA uses its reputation as a knowledge broker to gain influence in the CC policy process at the national level. For instance, two coordinators of the KPCG platform who were interviewed for this research noted that the PACJA, through the NP has contributed to national policy formulation in Kenya. The first coordinated stated that:

> "[*W]e (i.e., KPCG) were the first CSO in Kenya to initiate the discussion on the CC framework with the government*. *We took our inputs to the national Treasury and they were happy that we were proactive enough to want to influence the country's CC framework. We have also been engaged by the Kenyan Government in the formulation of national policies like the AFA i.e., the Agricultural Food Policy on CC and its impacts on farming and food production* (KII 27).

Likewise, the second coordinator recalled that:

> *"[W]hen the Kenyan government wanted to produce the revised version of the NCCAP II, they called a joint meeting for CSOs to make input into the process. To ensure that people understand CC and that the action plans are correctly implemented, we try to simplify these emerging CC policies and legislations into*

IEC materials, particularly those that are targeting ensuring urgent climate actions. These materials are then consumed by the locals, CSOs and the government. We also present them at conferences, meetings etc. Our input was included in the plan. So, I can say that we have contributed to policy formulation." (KII 28).

A similar observation was seen in the movement's use of information to gain PI in Nigeria. A coordinator and representative from CSDevNet who disclosed that prior to developing a CC policy, the FMEnv invites representatives from the CSOs, often led by CSDevNet, to appraise the documents before passing it on to the relevant parties (i.e., legislators) for adoption (KII 25). S/he stated that:

"*Our engagement with the government has been in the issue of all the ratification that they say they are going to be doing. One of the things that CSDevNet pushed was to make sure that in every conversation, every meeting, every drafting of programmes they need to bring in CSOs. I was very opportune to be part of the team that the FMEnv invited to appraise the third national communication strategy that was sent to the UNFCCC. Also, we have been able to engage the government when it comes to the CC bill*" (KII 25).

Another, similar observation of PACJA's influence in policy design and formulation was seen in relation to Nigeria. The Director of CC at the Nigerian FMEnv. verified this claim when he disclosed that the Ministry involves CSDevNet, the Nigerian platform of the PACJA in the CC policy process in the country including "the development of national documents, consultation in preparing position papers before we set out for international negotiations like the annual UNFCCC COP". He said that *"CSDevNet attends our events and gives us their own perspectives and positions which we assess. If it is in line, then we integrate it into the government position to further strengthen it*" (KII 16). Other interviewees including the Green Bond Desk Officer (GBDO) and the NDC/MRV (i.e., monitoring, reporting and verification of GHGs) national desk officer at the Department of CC, FMEnv also supported this claim. According to the GBDO who at that time of the interview in 2019 had spent over 12 years at the Ministry, "*the FMEnv.*

engages with CSDevNet in policy design and formulation. When we (i.e., FMEnv) have a policy draft and we want to do a review, we try as much as possible to set up a platform where we can work together. They support us by providing some of the data that we used in developing the national CC action plan and the NDCs" (KII 21). Speaking on the implementation of the Paris Agreement, the national desk officer for the NDC and the MRV (i.e., monitoring, reporting and verification) of GHG emissions in Nigeria commented on the active involvement of the Nigerian CSOs, including CSDevNet in the drafting of the country's INDCs. S/he recalled that during the process in 2015, CSDevNet was invited to participate in a workshop with the government and other stakeholders. "*They made their inputs and verified the draft INDCs before onward submission. It was [a] good event. There were positives, and the documents reflected what they were expecting"* (KII 19).

Contrary to the above positive indicators, this study also found evidence that shows that PACJA is not maximising its use of information as a leverage to gain PI. For example, in an interview with a senior policy officer from the AUC, they noted that the AUC engages with PACJA in the policy process because it is one of the few CSOs known to the Commission to be working at the grassroots levels. However, when this interviewee was asked to describe the process of information exchange between the Commission and PACJA on CC policies implementation at this level, for example, the forest conservation policy and the impacts on livelihoods, s/he noted that there was a "*bit of weakness*" (KII 41). S/he went further to explain that:

> "*In areas like that, the communication is not that very good. I know that they are doing a lot but many times these things are not communicated to us. I must say that they are more pre-occupied with sharing these with partners that are providing them with funds. They are their primary targets in terms of information. We do not very often get all that information from them. I think that there is a gap there. They need to work a bit more on that in terms of the linkages with the AU so that we can do more advocacy*" (KII 41)

Also, there was the claim that PACJA was not strategic in the way it obtains and deploys information in their engagements in the CC governance process to gain PI. A chair of one of

PACJA's steering committees noted that the movement is yet to implement a clear-cut procedure for deciding which member(s) attends policy dialogues and how they engage with policy actors during the process (KII 24). To validate this claim, s/he recalled that s/he was asked by the management to attend a stakeholder meeting on behalf of PACJA simply because s/he was the only member available at the meeting venue at the time. However, during the meeting, this interviewee recognised that s/he had limited capacity to proactively engage in the discussions. S/he narrated that:

> "*I was like a novice at that meeting. They (i.e., other stakeholders) were talking and trying to develop proposals for the Paris rulebook. They were so professional about it, looking at different aspects and sections of the rulebook. It took me time to catch up and I did because I have been in the system. For me it was an eye opener. I thought that an organisation like PACJA that is really serious about CC and CJ should have sent someone to be following this discussion*" (KII 24).

While the reason for this is not clear, it may be due to the unavailability of a more qualified representative or the limited financial capacity of the movement to cover the cost of sending other representatives to attend this event. Nevertheless, it highlights occasional gaps in the quality of PACJA's participation at these events and their capacity for influence. This gap was highlighted by other interviewees from PACJA. For instance, one of the coordinators from KPCG noted that members of PACJA find themselves responding to the government's agenda as opposed to pushing their own agenda when they attend CC policy events. According to this interviewee:

> *"[T]heir engagement with the government in policy dialogues is rather weak and in need of strengthening. I say that because we are often given very minimum time for preparation. We attend without having well thought out how we were going to respond to some of the issues and maybe give govt alternative positions for negotiations…we do not have our own agenda when we were attending these meetings. As a result, our impact in PI is limited to the extent of their participation as determined by the government"* (KII 28).

When probed further on what steps had been taken by PACJA to address this evident gap, s/he responded that *"I have challenged them (i.e., other members of PACJA). I told them that in policy advocacy, you must be deliberate and proactive. You have to know those alternatives that you must push to the table and what it is that you want to gain from that position".* Overall, this evidence backs up the claims of scholars like Claeys and Pugley (2017) and Bullard and Mullard (2012) that exercising leverage is dependent on the level of knowledge and awareness of the movement actor and their assigned role, among other factors.

Other evidence of PACJA's use of material leverage to gain PI found in this study was its provision of financial support to both the government and CSO representatives across Africa. PACJA receives funding from its international partners like SIDA, DFID, Trocaire, UK Aid, German Watch etc., to support its CJ objectives of IGS, PAEM, and PI. From these funds, the movement supports African governments by jointly organising CC policy events and/or implementing these policies at the national and sub-national levels. For example, the Kenyan Charcoal bill of 2014 was formulated to address the negative impacts of CC. However, the implementation processes presented several challenges for the Kenyan government like providing alternative means of livelihoods to the forest dependent communities. PACJA, through the community resilience and CC adaptation project funded by Trocaire, supported the Kenyan government by providing capacity development support to the communities that were dependent on these trees for their livelihoods to limit the impacts and enable a just transition (KII 5 and KII 27). This included organising workshops on forest conservation, new farming techniques and making briquettes, and the distribution of clean cook stoves and tree seedlings. As one of the coordinators of the KPCG platform stated*:*

> *"Our organisation stepped in to support women groups and youth by providing them with drought resistant crops that can withstand harsh environmental conditions and mills to process these crops. Also, we offered them trainings in new farming practices and provide funds for them to start SMEs. For example, we taught them how to make briquettes using fallen leaves from the trees. They sell some and use them for cooking. We bought them some machines to make the*

briquettes. We also used the county government to provide scholarships in education and other forms of support so that their lives would go on" (KII 27).

PACJA provides financial support to CSO representatives across Africa to participate in several CC policy dialogues including the UNFCCC COPs and intercessional meetings, the GCF processes, African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), Climate Change and Development Conference in Africa (CCDA), National Consultative Forum on CC and the Environment, among others. In 2018, this researcher observed how PACJA funded either fully or partially over 200 members and partners from the various countries across all regions in Africa to attend the CCDA VII event that took place between October 10 to 12, in Nairobi, Kenya. In doing so, the movement created an avenue for these CSO representatives to dialogue with other stakeholders including representatives from national and regional governments as well as the research and academic communities on policies and actions for effective implementation of the Paris Agreement for resilient economies in Africa. Also, in 2017, PACJA supported 38 of its members to attend the 23rd session of the UNFCCC that was convened in Bonn, Germany between November 6th, and 17th (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). These representative members participated as observers in several side events/activities including regular briefings with the AGN. These avenues allowed them the opportunity to both track proceedings and contribute their expertise albeit indirectly to inform decisions and various processes at the COP. Key results from their participation at these events include increased recognition and influence of CSOs in CC governance, and enhanced linkages between the policymakers and grassroots communities (PACJA Annual Report, 2017).

Although the above findings indicate that the extent of PACJA's engagement in the CC policy process and resulting influence is dependent on the availability of funds, this observation was particularly salient from the interview with the project officer from CSDevNet who disclosed that because of their lean financial resources, the platform has been unable to advance the discussion with ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) on revising its environmental policy document which is now obsolete. When probed further, S/he explained that:

"*When we initiated the discussion with ECOWAS on the need to revise their current environmental policy, we were informed that any attempt to engage them (i.e., ECOWAS) outside of their routine engagements with the CSOs would require us to invite and cover the cost of the representatives from all 15 ECOWAS countries to attend the discussion at the HQ in Abuja-Nigeria. We do not have the capacity to do so right away but it is something that we are working on as we speak*" (KII 32).

A possible explanation for this is that many African governments, particularly those is SSA lack sufficient resources to allocate to addressing CC issues given the conflicting priorities of socio-economic development. As a result, they rely on additional support from the private sector and the CSOs to drive the CC agenda. Yet in most cases, these CSOs also rely on the goodwill of their donors to support their participation in the CC governance process. The resulting implication is a reduced policy engagement between the CSOs like PACJA and the various African governments. The next section will analyse and discuss the moral leverage used by PACJA to increase their influence in the CC policy process in SSA.

2) <u>Moral Leverage</u>

The two most significant pieces of evidence of PACJA's use of moral leverage for PI found in this study were the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope and the public demonstrations against the Lamu coal power project in Kenya. PACJA used the media attention generated by the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope to draw public attention including the African policymakers to the significance of the UNFCCC COP 17 event in Durban, South Africa. The movement mobilised over a million Africans to sign the African People's petition which it then presented to President Jacob Zuma as its key CJ demands (PACJA Annual Report, 2011). Also, PACJA was actively involved in the campaign against the development of a coal power plant in Lamu-Kenya, based on the reports of several interviewees. The movement was part of the CSOs who sued the Kenyan government over the project (KII 40). They followed up the case by organising peaceful demonstrations in Lamu, sending frequent updates and information on the project, as well as on the outcome that they expect to see, to reporters across Kenya, according to a

journalist with KTV Kenya and a member of PAMACC. In the end, the court ruled in their favour (KII 41). Speaking on the issue, a representative from the government commended PACJA's efforts in stalling the Lamu Coal Project. S/he noted that:

> "*[P]art of the advocacy work is that as a government you have made a commitment to achieve certain % mitigation goals by 2030. Doing coal was not going to help that. You can give them that credit that in our system you need a bit of check and balances. We need someone who can tell you no, this is not what you said that you were going to do. It is worth commending that they can interface and open the eyes of the government to areas, in this case, the climate impacts of the project, that have not been considered or were assigned lesser significance*" (KII 34).

Other examples of PACJA's exercise of moral leverage to gain PI found in this study include CSDevNet's public campaign against the mining activity in Nigeria and PACJA taking the Kenyan government to court over a lack of transparency in its selection of a CSO representative for the Kenyan CC Council. In 2013-2014, CSDevNet (i.e., the Nigerian NP) together with other CSOs like Global Rights, organised national campaigns against the proposed coal mining project in Okobo, Kogi state, Nigeria. The platform identified that there was no evidence that an initial public consultation nor comprehensive EIA was conducted for the proposed project according to the law. Additionally, they were able to link several deaths in the community to the ongoing mining activities. The CSOs homed in on these issues to drive their campaign. As a result, the mining license for the project was not renewed at the end of the first phase in 2016 (KII 12). Narrating on the pending court case between PACJA and the Kenyan government, KII 5 stated that:

> "*[I]n 2016/17, a process was initiated in Kenya to select CSOs representative for the Kenyan CC council. The CSOs in Kenya met and devised a methodology for the selection process. Along the line, some CSOs that were selected pulled out from the process and we realised that two different CSOs groups had been forwarded to the government of which one of them was selected. However, we (i.e., PACJA) felt that the selection process had been compromised and as such it did not reflect the choice of the group. So, we sued them*".

Whereas PACJA's exercise of moral leverage appears to have increased their PI, interviewees from the government argue that it creates a tense atmosphere which jeopardises any opportunity for effective engagements between them (KII 29 and KII 33). For instance, the regional officer, CC, and GG, AfDB stated that "*while I understand that the world of CSOs are driven on activism. With CC, we are dealing with a complex problem that no one has a complete solution for. So, activism doesn't help here*". Similarly, an assistant director from the Directorate of CC, Kenya noted that "*rather than [them] opposing the process, I am trying to make PACJA understand that they can help".* He then emphasised the importance of CSOs like PACJA providing the government with relevant inputs in the form of discussions and dialogue rather than using non-violent moral tactics like demonstrations and litigation to force its hand.

> *"You find PACJA wanting to oppose whatever we say because of the prevalent notion that as a CSO you have to keep fighting the government to keep them in check. They can bring in their good ideas to what we are doing so that we can move forward instead of allowing us to do what they do not want then they oppose us. They mostly work at the grassroots, are closer to and enjoy the trust of the communities. They can and should provide the government with more accurate information on the communities... We can refine ideas rather than disagreeing*" (KII 29).

Overall, this study found that PACJA exercises more material than moral leverage to increase its influence in the CC policy process in SSA, despite the stronger PI of the latter than the former. Perhaps, this is because of the movement's formal recognition of collaboration as a core strategy for its climate advocacy (PACJA Strategic Plan, 2016-2020). A second reason may well be their recognition of the weak governance system within which the movement operates. The gaps, tensions and trade-offs found here include underdeveloped lobbying/negotiation skills, conflicts over which leverage is most effective in which contexts, and the risk of disengagement (or loss of legitimacy) of other actors in the CC policy process. The next section will analyse the final component of PI: policy outcomes.

7.2.3 Policy Outcomes

This is the third and final component of PI to be analysed for this study. The analysis will focus on highlighting policy outcomes that occur because of PACJA's actions, either directly or indirectly in the CC policy processes in SSA. The data used for the analysis is drawn from multiple sources including the review of PACJA's organisational documents, secondary documents like news platforms, and key informant interviews. Indicators of effectiveness will include the enactment of new CC laws, policies, or legislation and the revision of existing ones, court orders or administrative rules, and policy implementations.

1) Enactment of new CC laws, policies, or legislations and/or revisions

PACJA's actions have resulted in the formulation of bills, recommendations and briefs leading to the enactment of CC policies in Africa, and especially in Kenya, according to the findings from this study (see Table 7.1). For instance, in 2014, the Kenyan platform of the Alliance, KPCG, proposed the country's charcoal bill to address the problem of significant and deleterious cutting down of trees in Kitui County (KII 27). This action started a series of processes leading up to the formulation of a CC law in the country prohibiting the cutting down of trees. In addition, the movement is responsible for producing the simplified version of the National Climate Change Act, 2016 as part of their contribution to the formulation of CC policies, plans and programmes in the country among others (KII 5 and KII 6). Other policy outcomes arising from PACJA's activities at the continental level include the production of policy material such as: '*Are they really financing CC in Africa'* (2010); '*REDD and Redlines in Africa'* (2010); '*Carbon Trading in Africa'* (2013) and '*Pro-poor climate finance: Is there a role for Private Finance in the Green Climate Fund*?' (2013). Table 9 below provides a summary of PACJA's policy recommendations, working briefs etc. targeting different sectors of the economy i.e., energy, agriculture, and security that are affected by CC in the last five years.

Table 9: Summary of Policy Documents from PACJA's activities in the last five years

Policy Document	Year	Region/Country	Issue	Partners
CC Conflicts and Migration in the Horn of Africa – A regional dialogue synthesis report	2019	Horn of Africa	CC, Conflicts, and Migration	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES)
Climate Finance (CF) Thematic Working Group Case study	2019	Kenya – Taita Taveta	CF Governance in Kenya	CARE Kenya
The Transition to Low-Carbon Climate-Resilient Green Economic Development in Kenya – A Survey on the Level of Preparedness in the SMEs Sector	2019	Kenya	CC risk assessment (for SMEs)	Kenya Industrial Estate Limited (KIE) UK Aid Trocaire Deepening Democracy Programme
Assessing EbA Integration into Policies in Tharaka Nithi County as a Major Response to CC	2018	Kenya - Tharaka Nithi County	CC Adaptation	Trocaire, Irish Aid
Participation of Civil society Organisations in REDD+, Processes in Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, and Cameroon	2018	Cote d'Ivoire, Mozambique, and Cameroon	Deforestation and forest degradation	FCPF
Integrating Ecosystem based adaptation approaches in National policies and plans	2018	Kenya	National CC Adaptation plans and policies	Trocaire, Irish Aid
Assessing EbA Integration into Kitui County Policies as a major response to CC	2018	Kenya - Kitui County	CC Adaptation	Trocaire, Irish Aid
Mainstreaming CC into Development	2018	Kenya	CC and Development	Act Change Transform (ACT!)
Policy Brief on Climate Proofing CIDP in Turkana County	2018	Kenya – Turkana County	CC Adaptation and Development	Act Change Transform (ACT!)
CC Policy Recommendation for Kitui county	2018	Kenya – Kitui county	National CC laws and policy	Trocaire, UK aid
Mainstreaming Ecosystem-Based Adaptation in Climate and Development Planning for Embu County	2018	Kenya – Embu county	CC Adaptation and Development	Trocaire, Irish Aid
Strengthening Institutional Governance for Mainstreaming NDCs Implementation in Kenya	2018	Kenya	Mainstreaming Kenya's NDCs into sectors of the economy at national and county level.	Act Change Transform (ACT!)
CC law for the people – A simplified	2018	Kenya	National CC	UK Aid, DDP

Policy Document	Year	Region/Country	Issue	Partners
version of the CC Act, 2016			Law	
Science, Economics and Politics of CC – A guide for policymakers in Cameroon	2018	Cameroon	Implementation of the Paris Agreement	Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS), Cameroon Climate Change Working Group (CCCWG) Bioresources Development and Conservation Programme - Cameroon (BDCP-C).
Bottom-up Climate Legislation in Cameroon	2018	Cameroon	National CC Law and policies	The Funding Network (TFN), the Climate Development Knowledge Network (CDKN), ACLI, Legal Response International (LRI), Cameroon Climate Change Working Group (CCCWG)
Kenyan National CC Action Plan NCCAP (2013-2017) – Review and Recommendations from civil society	2018	Kenya	National CC plans	DDP, UK aid
Africa Renewable Energy Initiative for Africa: Africa Civil Society Organisations Perspective.	2017	Africa	Clean energy	CAN, German Watch, Brot fur die Welt, Reseauclimt Development
Transforming Energy for a Clean and Sustainable Future in Africa, Discussion Paper	2015	Africa	Clean Energy in Africa	*Did not specify

Investigations into the reasons for the significant number of policy outcomes in Kenya compared to other countries in SSA revealed that the imbalance was because of the prevailing socio-political context in the host countries. For instance, the ED of PACJA explained that the movement's PI in terms of outcomes was higher in Kenya because of the country's political climate. He argued that the political structure in Kenya is favourable to the presence of international donors who fund most of the movement's activities. And these donors who are

based in Kenya, for example, Trocaire, prefer to support PACJA's activities here (KII 2). Again, this highlights the link between financial resources.

Another perspective to the argument on the political structure shared by a coordinator from CSDevNet is that the bureaucratic process and bottlenecks in the policy process in Nigeria hinders the extent of their PI. He narrated that the CC bill proposed by CSDevNet in partnership with the FMEnv and other CSOs to the government over two years ago is still "lying" in the national House of Assembly. "*Our leaders have refused to act on it. There is no transparency and accountability in the governance process in Nigeria*" (KII 25). This is a sharp contrast from the policy process in Kenya which enshrines public participation in the governance processes such that government must invite different stakeholders to participate in the CC governance process in a responsible manner as provided for under Article 1 of the constitution (Constitution of Kenya, 2010).

However, a zonal coordinator of CSDevNet argues that the inaction of the Nigerian policymakers and their inability to engage effectively in CC policy dialogues is due to the limited understanding of CC, its impacts, and opportunities and how it links to other sectors of the economy. S/he referred to the public statement made by the country's senate president in the first quarter of 2019 that "*Nigeria should not accept the entry of electric cars into the country because of its status as a fuel producing nation*" (KII 31). And concluded that such a mindset made it difficult to engage these actors on CC policies. In addition, this research found that CSOs' observer status or lack of decision-making power in the CC policy process was hindering PACJA's effectiveness in PI. As a result, their participation in these processes is mostly indirect and conducted from the sidelines. In effect, their efforts are mostly reactive in the sense that they spend a significant part of their resources responding to the agendas set by other actors, particularly the government rather than pushing for climate just policies that place the most affected and vulnerable populations at their center. Overall, these arguments lend credence to the claims of Bond (2010) and Amenta et al (2010) that movements' PI is largely shaped by and dependent on the external socio-political conditions in which they operate. Furthermore, the findings are consistent with those observed in previous studies by Kirchherr (2018) and Feinberg

et al (2017) that movements' dependence on state actors to make decisions and/or enter into political agreements ultimately restricts their PI. This section will now move on to consider policy implementation as another indicator of policy outcomes and influence.

2) Policy Implementation

This study found that PACJA is heavily invested in supporting the implementation of environmental and CC policies in SSA. The findings revealed that PACJA partners with different African governments in various capacities to implement climate policies including awareness creation and sensitisation at the sub-national and grassroots levels, capacity building, provision of incentives etc. For example, a senior government official in the department of CC in the FMEnv. Nigeria revealed that Department's engagement with CSDevNet is mostly always on policy implementation, particularly at the grassroots (KII 21). Going a step further, the assistant director, education, training and awareness, department of CC, FMEnv Nigeria explained that the reason is because CSOs like CSDevNet are key stakeholders in driving government policies at the grassroots because they are closer to these constituencies. He then narrated the partnership between the government and CSDevNet in climate policy implementation, using the example of the renewable energy bill.

> "*The Ministry collaborated with CSOs and NGOs in Nigeria under the umbrella of the CSDevNet platform to sensitise the public on the use of renewable energy sources like solar energy, hydro and other clean energy. They also assisted the Ministry in distributing clean stoves to the local dwellers*" (KII 22).

This view was again reiterated in a subsequent interview with an assistant director, CC, and finance in the CC Directorate in Kenya. S/he stated that the Ministry partners with PACJA to implement climate policies at the grassroots mostly because PACJA works closely with these populations and enjoys their trust. S/he narrated that:

> “*[T]he Ministry faces several challenges in getting resources to the grassroots to execute their role in coordinating and implementing the NDCs and CC Acts. As a result, we collaborate with PACJA to ensure that those involved in the planning and implementation at the grassroots are trained to appreciate the CC challenge and how to implement the action plans. We are also partnering with them to come up with ways of engendering; that is, making the actual actions on the ground gender responsive”* (KII 29).

On the side of the CSOs, one of PACJA’s project officers noted that a core activity of the movement is ensuring that CC decisions made at the global level are domesticated and implemented at the national and sub-national levels and mainstreamed into various processes and the different sectors of the economy (KII 5).

PACJA also provides funds and other incentives to support the implementation of climate policies. For instance, one of the coordinators of PACJA’s KPCG platform noted that the public participation law in Kenya mandates that the public be adequately involved in the policy process in the country. However, the Kenyan government like most in SSA struggles with limited funds and capacity to facilitate public engagement and participation. As a result, PACJA often supports the government to conduct its public engagement and participation activities in the CC policy since it aligns with its CJ objectives of improving the participation of the vulnerable population in the CC governance process. S/he recalled that:

> “*[W]hen the county government announced their plan to formulate a CC and energy policy for Majia, Machakos and Kitui, we (i.e., KPCG) went into these counties to inform them. We educated them on how the policy would affect them in terms of CC, impacts on livelihoods and so on. We asked them to come and give their views on how they want the policy to be implemented. We provided support to them in the form of funds for public participation, bringing the media on board and coming up with IEC material or pamphlets to educate them about the impact of the policy, what it is about, and what it requires. And when the county government called for a day of participation, we selected some people who are better educated from the groups to step out and give their contributions and engage the county government*” (KII 27).

The movement also acts as watchdogs to drive public compliance and regular monitoring of the governments' implementation of climate policies. A recent example was when the Kenyan government opted to construct the country's first ever coal-powered plant in Lamu. PACJA and other CSOs like Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, 350 Africa and Natural Resource Alliance of Kenya organised the "deCOALanise" campaign against the construction of the coal mine. They argued that the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was insufficient, especially the component of public engagement which was mechanical and a far cry from the country's public engagement law which states that it should be meaningful (KII 2). In addition, they argued that it was a deviation from Kenya's NDC commitments to be powered 100% by green energy by 2020 and reduce its GHGs emissions by 30% by 2030 (KII 34). This led the National Environmental Tribunal to rule that the construction be halted and a thorough ESIA conducted (KII 40).

Despite the above evidence of PACJA's influence in policy implementation, this study also found that its effectiveness here, is hindered by its limited policy analysis, monitoring and evaluation activities. For example, PACJA supports the implementation of green climate policies and programmes like the REDD+. While the REDD+ initiative itself is commendable as it seeks to address rampant deforestation and presents significant opportunities to upgrade to a low carbon development pathway as argued by scholars like Roberts and Parks (2009), the findings from this research support the claims of Okereke (2010) that its implementation in SSA potentially limits long term economic growth and development and fuels continued dependency. This is because its implementation is top-down and involves trade-offs between climate and environmental conservation and aggravating underlying economic and social impacts on the poorest and most vulnerable populations, some of which depend on forests for their livelihood. PACJA like many proponents of REDD+ appears to have approached the initiative from a purely CC perspective of forests as a carbon sink while minimising the other numerous ecosystem services (for example, food, cultural, regulating services) it provides. However, considering the high dependency of the poor and vulnerable populations in SSA on forest-based resources for their livelihoods, the implementation of such policies will require giving up traditional forms of jobs and livelihoods (i.e., farming, logging, hunting etc.), having limited access to inheritance such as lands, heritage (traditional/worship) sites and so on. Such actions will increase the

vulnerability of these groups and exacerbate socio-political tensions as illustrated in the interview excerpt below.

> *"When we visited Kitui county which is one of the counties that is really affected by CC in Kenya, we tried to talk to them about the long-term implications of cutting trees (i.e., deforestation) vs the short-term benefit (Note that this county faces prolonged drought, and they depend on charcoal production for their livelihood because crops do not really grow well). They asked, if you tell me to stop cutting trees, and I am not getting anything from my farm, where do you expect me to get food from…Inasmuch as we try to bring solutions to these environmental issues, sometimes they expect solutions to the problems of survival that they currently face. That is another challenge we face".* (Project Officer, PACJA - KII 5)

It can be deduced from the above that PACJA did not conduct a critical analysis and evaluation of this policy and its implications from a pro-poor centred justice perspective before supporting its implementation. Consequently, these populations are left to still bear the brunt for implementing climate policies to address CC. The countereffect of this is that it further impoverishes the already poor populations, increases their vulnerability to CC and fails to address poverty, which is not only a multiplier of climate injustice and a key aspect of its CJ mandate to promote pro-poor development. This highlights a major drawback in PACJA's efforts to address established inequitable power relations that drives vulnerability, and more importantly perhaps, to grapple with the inevitable trade-offs that characterise these complex policy decisions.

3) Court or administrative rules

This is the final indicator of policy outcome identified for this study. This study found that PACJA through its participation in the CC governance processes, has occasionally been successful in disrupting unjust processes and overturning decision in favour of its CJ agenda. For example, at the global level, PACJA opposed the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) use of the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) as an intermediary for Southern countries to access the

WB's FCPF funds. This led the GCF to remove the EDF as an intermediary and establish a new rule that allows countries from the global South to directly access this fund (KII 2). In addition, the movement through its alliance with northern organisations pushed for the establishment of the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI), an African led mitigative action, endorsed by the AUC and CAHOSCC and supported by the G7 with $10 billion to accelerate and scale up renewable energy access for African communities (KII 2 and KII 34).

At the regional level, PACJA was successful in convincing Parliamentarians from across Africa to establish a partnership with African CSOs. This partnership was established under the umbrella of the Africa Climate Legislation Initiative (ACLI), by a resolution made by the Second African Parliamentarians Summit on Climate Policy in Kenya (PACJA Annual Report, 2017). Subsequently, PACJA has contributed to the development of model laws for the implementation of the ACLI (KII 2). Also, there was evidence to indicate that the movement has influenced a few court or administrative rulings in favour of its CJ agenda at the national and sub-national levels in SSA. For instance, in 2018, PACJA took the Kenyan government to court over discrepancies in the selection of CSOs representative for the country's CC council. This led the court to rule that the Kenya CC council meetings be adjourned until a decision was reached (KII 2 and KII 29). Similarly, on the 26th of June 2019, Kenya's National Environmental Tribunal revoked the licence granted to Amu Power to build an estimated $2 billion coal power plant in Lamu following massive public protest from PACJA and other CSOs in the country (KII 41). In Nigeria, the movement's campaign against the proposed coal mining project in Okobo, Kogi state in 2014 led the FMEnv to mark the mining license for non-renewal at the end of the first phase in 2016 (KII 12). These policy outcomes though few in number occurred because of PACJA's exercise of moral leverage on the policymakers using different tactics including lobbying and demonstrations, indicating that moral leverage, if utilised well, holds significant opportunities for movements to maximise their influence in the policy process.

Further analysis of PACJA's activities in the CC policy processes in SSA revealed only limited evidence of the movement's leverage on moral standing. This may be because of its insufficient monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of these policies, according to the findings. For

instance, PACJA had stated on page 27 of its Strategic plan 2016-2020 that it will develop tools to measure and compile periodic reports to show the extent of environmental and CC policy implementation (or lack thereof) at the national, sub-regional and regional level and hold governments accountable for their obligations. However, there was only limited evidence to suggest that these tools have been developed and the process being implemented. For example, this research did not find any evidence that the national platforms i.e., KPCG and CSDevNet, have a register or database of the CC and environmental laws including concerned agencies, actions, instruments, and funding allocated to CC of their host countries. As a result, some actors within PACJA lacked basic knowledge of these CC laws and policies, their requirements, and relevant instruments. This in turn reduces their capacity to exercise moral leverage by holding the government and relevant actors accountable for adequate policy implementation.

One example of PACJA's limited grip on this important area relates to the commemoration of the 2019 World Environmental Day (WED) celebrate, when the UN declared the theme for the year as "Beat Air Pollution" to spread awareness on air pollution. This day, June 3, 2019, was marked in Nigeria by many CSOs, including CSDevNet, which organised a public awareness and engagement event in Abuja. This event attracted stakeholders from the CSOs, academia and the government. At the event, a stakeholder issued a call to the Nigerian Government to formulate a policy to address air pollution in the country. This view was reiterated by CSDevNet's representative at the event while equally urging the public to take action (EnvironNews, 2019). This was surprising because this policy, the National Air Quality Standards, already exists in this instance. A more appropriate call would have targeted the National Environmental Standard Regulation and Enforcement Agency (NESREA) which is the responsible agency to ensure strict implementation and compliance to this law.

Figure 7: A cross section of stakeholders present at an event organized by CSDevNet to mark the 2019 World Environment Day (Source: EnivorNews, 2019)

Also, the findings did not show any evidence of policy analysis or evaluation (i.e., whether the policy resulted in the intended outcomes or not and should be revised) conducted by PACJA, both at the NPs and Alliance levels. Neither was there any published report tracking CF commitments and funds disbursement to implement CC and environmental policies and programmes at these levels. Follow-up interviews with members of PACJA revealed that these actors are aware of this gap in their activities and its implications for their PI. Commenting on the gap, a coordinator for KPCG said that:

> "*Kenya is superb in developing the best policies and blueprints globally. Implementation always presents a big challenge for the country because of the disconnect between the government who are the policymakers and the communities at the grassroots who are the implementers of these policies. Although we (i.e., KPCG and PACJA) have tried to bridge this gap between policy formulation and implementation in the country vis-à-vis government versus community engagement and published a simplified version of the CC Act, 2016. We have not executed our role properly or let me say that we have failed at some point. We need to really wake up and grab this space and give an*

> *impact. We must walk the talk as we need tangible actions to influence policy*" (KII 28).

A zonal coordinator of CSDevNet also agreed that there have been some lapses in the efforts of the movement in this aspect. S/he stated that the "*platform has had to compromise on several aspects like conducting persistent checks and monitoring in their role as watchdogs to maintain a cordial working relationship with the government"* while also acknowledging that there are still a few things that can be done (KII 31). S/he explained further that:

> *"We can engage in more liberal discussions with the government to have an understanding, and when we notice that there is gas flaring, we should be able to ask why. We can advise them on what is needed, the action, timescale, and budget. These are some of the practical things that we can do at this level"* (KII 31).

Other interviewees from PACJA linked the movement's limited efforts in tracking the implementation of CC policies and conducting policy analysis and evaluations to the high cost vis-à-vis their limited financial resources. They argue that such activities are not accounted for in their funders' budget allocations to PACJA (KII 9, 24 and KII 41).

This examination of PACJA's PI efforts found gaps in its policy analysis and monitoring activities and concludes that this coupled with the external socio-political context in many parts of SSA limits the impact of its CJ objective of PI.

7.3 Conclusion

This chapter has critically analysed PACJA''s effectiveness in PI from three components namely: 1) access and participation in the policy process, 2) leverage, and 3) policy outcome(s).

This analysis was crucial for addressing the overall research question of “How effective is the CJM in SSA” because of its CJ demand of the formulation and implementation of climate just policies that will mitigate current climate injustice and avoid further harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA. The analysis has highlighted specific indicators of PACJA’s effectiveness in PI including organising public campaigns like the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope to create access to the policymakers at the regional and national levels; participation in policy formulation process like the AMCEN meetings, pre- and post-COP workshops etc., and the implementation of CC policies in line with global CC agreements like the Paris Agreement and the NDCs. It also focused attention onthe provision of resources i.e., financial, technical, and socio-political to strengthen the institutional and governance capacity for CJ in SSA and allow for the improved participation of the vulnerable populations in the CC policy process. Other indicators of PACJA’s effectiveness in PI highlighted in this chapter include the support for the enactment of new agreement, laws, and legislations like the Kenya Climate Change Action Plan (KCCAP); production of policy briefs, research papers or outputs summarised in Table 7.1; and court rulings like the NET ruling to halt the construction of the Lamu coal power plant and to force the conducting of a thorough ESIA.

Subsequently, this chapter concludes that PACJA is largely effective, given its institutional constraints, in using its leverage as a knowledge broker and advocacy organisation and deploying the international visibility arising from its partnerships with Northern organisations like SIDA, Oxfam etc. to attract public attention, create access to the policy makers and policy arena and push their CJ agenda so that it is reflected in the CC and environmental policies across SSA. However, it also highlights that despite this display of effectiveness in PI, the movement still faces challenges. These include: 1) limited political clout in the policy process owing to its status as a non-state actor (i.e., lack of decision-making power or direct influence), 2) insufficient technical capacity and crucially 3) weak accountability (or lobbying) mechanisms evident from its insufficient analysis, monitoring and evaluation of CC policies and processes.

Having now analysed, over the course of three consecutive chapters of this thesis, all three criteria, namely 1) Institutional and Governance Strengthening (IGS), 2) Public Awareness

Engagement and mobilisation (PAEM) and 3) Policy influence (PI) for measuring PACJA's effectiveness in advancing its CJ objectives, the next chapter, i.e., chapter eight will synthesis the main findings and demonstrate they have addressed the research objectives highlighted in Section 1.3 in Chapter One. It will reflect on the significance of this study and its contributions to the theoretical fields of climate justice and social movement studies, and the CC governance processes in practice. The chapter, and thesis will conclude with a reflection on the entire research process to note some limitations of the study and, finally, to propose suggestions for future research.

Chapter Eight: Conclusion

8.1 Introduction

This chapter synthesises different elements and key findings of this study which was designed to investigate: 1) the effectiveness of the climate justice movement (CJM) in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) based on three criteria such as a) institutional and governance strengthening (IGS), b) public awareness, engagement, and mobilisation (PAEM), and c) policy influence (PI); and 2) the factors that limits is. This study was both important and timely because despite the widespread sense of climate injustice on the part of most of the populations in SSA and the important role of the CJM in demanding climate justice (CJ) for them, research is lagging around investigating the effectiveness of such movements and what factors and conditions may be hindering their efforts. Accordingly, this chapter will summarise the key findings on the effectiveness of the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA) using the three criteria to understand how CJMs in SSA are executing their roles as key actors in the CC governance processes and in their demands for CJ for all and especially for the poorest and most vulnerable populations on the African continent. It will demonstrate the theoretical and empirical contributions of this study and highlight areas for future research.

The findings from this empirical study indicate that PACJA though moderately effective in IGS for CJ still faces challenges with its weak campaign strategies i.e., in linking its CJ demands in a way that it connects with the wider public, and its limited power in CC governance processes. Also, the study found that PACJA is most effective in improving public participation in the CC governance process in Africa. This was drawn from several lines of evidence including its extensive partnerships, collaboration, and engagement with key policymakers like the AUC, AMCEN and national governments in the CC policy process. The most significant of PACJA's PAEM activities found in this study was the 2014 TransAfrican Caravan of Hope Campaign set a high bar in attracting mass media coverage in Africa, and globally and mobilised over 300 participants, including small-holder farmers, youths, and women from across 10 countries in

Eastern and Southern Africa to attend the UNFCCC COP 17 in Durban, South Africa. Furthermore, this study found that PACJA is effective in using its leverage as a knowledge broker and its positioning as a powerful advocacy organisation with strong international allies, to create and sustain access to the policy arena. Through this avenue, the CJM has also enjoyed increased access to climate finance and the policymakers on the continent.

However, the study revealed that the PACJA is lagging in its efforts to use lobbying and advocacy to dismantle the current political decision-making structures that drive climate injustices and further impoverish and marginalise the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA. Possible factors or conditions responsible for this gap that were examined in this study include the prevailing external socio-political conditions (notably weak state governance processes) and underdeveloped lobbying mechanisms. An unsurprising yet very important finding in this study is the strong correlation between resource mobilisation and the movements' effectiveness in their role as CJ advocates. Resource mobilisation was highlighted as an overarching limitation in all three criteria of the movement's effectiveness that were analysed for this study. However, the priority resource need varied with each criterion of effectiveness. For instance, IGS identified socio-political and financial resources, PAEM identified technical and financial resources and PI identified technical and socio-political resources as having the most implication on effectiveness.

The extent to which the findings on the CJMs in SSA presented here can be generalised is limited in part because this study has focused on investigating only one such movement, namely PACJA. Nevertheless, several lessons on the effectiveness of the CJM in IGS, PAEM and PI can be drawn. For instance, this study has firmly established that the choice of engagement strategy is dependent on a thorough and ongoing assessment of the (changing) external political environment within which the movement finds itself. It has also provided deeper insight into the strong link between resources and participation in the CC governance. The more resources i.e., financial, socio-political etc. available to an actor group, the more consistent and potentially stronger the quality of their participation in the governance process.

Overall, while scholars like Patrick Bond have published important findings on the CJM in Africa and especially on South Africa, little was known before now on the CJ movement in SSA. This research has sought to close that gap by providing insights into this little studied yet important group within the global CJ movement. It concludes that the CJM in SSA though vibrant and remarkably resilient, is still challenged by several factors including managing complex institutional dynamics, limited capacity, underdeveloped mechanism, and external socio-political conditions.

8.2 Summary of Key Findings

This thesis has investigated the effectiveness of PACJA, the primary CJM in SSA. It began by conducting an extensive and in-depth literature review to identify the key CJ demands of CJMs. These include: 1) improving participation in the CC negotiations and governance processes, 2) accessing climate finance to enhance their economic power, 3) building the adaptive capacity and resilience of the affected populations, and 4) implementing effective policies to mitigate current climate injustices and avoid future harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations. A close analysis of the literatures on social movements and organisational studies revealed practical components and activities for measuring effectiveness such as organisational and coordination, partnerships, and collaboration, capacity development and policy outcomes, in line with these core CJ demands. On the strength of the review of these relevant literatures, three criteria were identified as key to understanding the effectiveness of the CJM under investigation. These three criteria were: Institutional and Governance Strengthening (IGS), Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation (PAEM) and Policy Influence (PI).

The focus on IGS provided the avenue for analysing the movement's effectiveness in their CJ agenda of improving participation in the CC governance processes. Measuring PACJA's effectiveness in PAEM allowed for an evaluation of PACJA's progress in improving public capacity to engage in CC governance. This is because growing public awareness of CC causes and impacts will increase participation in the governance processes including awareness of and access to new and existing climate finance which will in turn increase their adaptive capacity and

resilience to CC. The third criterion of PI provided the opportunity to measure the CJM's progress in achieving the CJ demand of implementing pro-poor and climate justice policies that place the needs of the poorest and most vulnerable populations at its centre, both in formulation and implementation.

In seeking to identify a relevant CJM in SSA that would act as the case study for an in-depth investigation of the movement's effectiveness in achieving its CJ demands, six CJMs were identified and reviewed. This included Friends of the Earth International (FOEI), Climate Action Network International (CAN-I), 350 dot org, Environmental Right Action (ERA), the Greenbelt Movement (GBM) and the Pan African Climate Justice Alliance (PACJA). Criteria like geographical location, grassroots activism, deep immersion in Africa political economy, international visibility at CC governance and related processes, e.g., the UNFCCC and longevity were used for the final selection process. PACJA was subsequently selected as the most suitable case for this study due to it having the strongest alignment with these criteria among the movements, and a series of research engagements and instruments were used to study the movement at close quarters in two localities.

In recapping the substantive findings of the study, these will now be summarised in three sections as below.

8.2.1 Effectiveness in Institutional and Governance Strengthening

This study set out to examine critically the effectiveness of the CJM in strengthening the institutional and CC governance processes across scales i.e., global, regional, national, and sub-national. It has examined critically the case study movement i.e., PACJA's activities in organizing and building the capacities of African CSOs, creating strategic partnerships with powerful actors like the government and northern allies and disrupting political processes that supports or reproduces inequalities in the CC decision-making process. PACJA has been successful in organising over 1,000 African CSOs to engage in CJ advocacy for the poorest and

most vulnerable populations on the continent under the umbrella of a Pan African Alliance for Climate Justice and Sustainable Development. Through this structure, the movement established national platforms and focal points to create linkages in their activities at the global and regional level with the national and sub-national levels and vice versa. Also, PACJA has established strategic partnerships with powerful Northern organisations like SIDA, Oxfam International etc. and collaborates regularly with national and regional governments including the AUC, AMCEN, AGN, ACLI etc. It leverages on its partnerships with the international organisations, for example, its partnership with SIDA to strengthen the capacity of African CSOs in the implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and its collaborations with the government as avenues to strengthen governance for CC by exchanging ideas and fostering collective learning with these policymakers.

However, the research found PACJA's effectiveness in IGS to be limited by several factors like managing the complex internal dynamics of its broad memberships and partnerships, limited funds for implementing capacity building programmes/activities, and insufficient monitoring, evaluation, research, and learning (MERL) activities. For instance, this research found evidence to suggest that there is limited transparency and inclusion in the internal governance and decision-making process in the movement. Thus, indicating that PACJA is running a process that can create fragmentations, inequalities, and marginalisation if not adequately managed. Also, in spite of PACJA's understanding of the importance of financial resources to its goal of IGS, there was limited evidence from this study to indicate that the movement is making efforts to diversify its fundraising from its current strategy of relying solely on donors. The implications of this on its CJ objective of IGS are the loss of institutional memory due to the low staff retention, limited impacts of their capacity building activities due to poor linkages between priority needs and donors' interest and overdependence on donor-derived monies. Moreover, there was limited evidence from this study to suggest that PACJA engages in adequate MERL activities that evaluates the appropriateness of their actions, strategies, tactics etc., for the purpose of iterative learning and in line with their objective of IGS. Accordingly, this study found that many of PACJA's activities in IGS were failing to achieve the desired impacts of improving public

participation in the CC governance processes, holding governments accountable and safeguarding human rights and pro-poor development for the most vulnerable people in Africa.

For instance, PACJA has emphasised collaborations with the government as its main strategy of IGS. While this strategy has its merits, this study has found the limited use of moral tactics like monitoring and compliance toolkits to track the governments' progress in implementing the NDCs /or validate the effectiveness of existing environmental and CC laws and policies is leading to co-optation and blurring the lines of legitimacy. As a result, PACJA is lagging in its critical role as a "watchdog' and its CJ objective of ensuring that new and existing CC laws and policies are pro-poor. If not adequately managed, the movement may ultimately lose its legitimacy as CJ advocates for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA.

8.2.2 Effectiveness in Public Awareness, Engagement and Mobilisation

The second sub-objective of this study was to examine PACJA's effectiveness in creating public awareness on CJ and its underlying injustices in a way that that inspires and motivates for collective and urgent climate action. This study has shown that PACJA is largely effective in its public awareness and engagement activities based on several indicators like the significant number of engagement activities i.e., seminars, conferences, meetings, workshops, negotiations on CC and environment that it hosts, co-hosts or is invited to, the numbers and diversity of CC actors present at these events, and the extensive number partnerships and collaborations that it enjoys i.e., over 1,000 partners globally. The movement has attracted a diverse range of actors including representatives from CSOs, NGOs, FBOs, CBOs etc. across SSA through the establishment and/or partnership with local organisations that act as focal points for the movement in 45 countries across Africa. Also, it has leveraged its broad membership to increase its visibility and public engagement by organising regional campaigns on CC like the TransAfrican Caravan of Hope (2011), the PACJA week of action, and national CC campaigns like the Lamu Coal Power Campaign (2019). Additionally, PACJA engages with regional and national governments like AMCEN, AUC and the AGN at CC dialogue events. Here, they leverage their role as knowledge brokers to inspire and mobilise these policymakers in support of

their CJ agenda. Furthermore, PACJA partnerships with international organisations like SIDA, Oxfam etc. have enhanced their visibility and reputation on the international scene and increased their access to funds to implement their PAEM activities. Subsequently, they frequently collaborate with a wide spectrum of CC and CJ actors beyond the African civil societies and grassroots organisations to jointly implement CC projects and programmes that will accelerate climate action for the continent. A notable example of this is PACJA's partnership with SIDA to implement a capacity development programme that focused on strengthening the capacity of African CSOs to participate meaningfully and effectively in the CC governance processes in Africa, and globally.

However, this study found several gaps in PACJA's PAEM activities. They include the inconsistent CJ framings and narratives and poor media engagement strategy. While there is a shared understanding of CJ goals and objectives within PACJA and other climate actors in SSA, the findings indicate that there are differing perspectives on how it can be operationalised. in an especially telling example of this, interviewees from PACJA's secretariat mostly interpreted CJ as a sub-set of EJ. Accordingly, they framed CC as an environmental problem and prioritized CJ actions that centred around environmental preservations like forest conservations, tree-planting, emissions reduction etc. They argue that this interpretation holds more practical utility and thus the likelihood for CJ to be perceived as a tangible concern, and thus increases the likelihood for ensuing discussion and mobilisation. Conversely, other interviewees, particularly those from grassroots CSOs, NGOs and local based organisations within PACJA interpreted CJ from a social justice perspective in terms of survival, alternative livelihoods, gender equity, etc. According to this group, operationalising CJ as an environmental problem holds little opportunity for effective engagement and mobilisation at the sub-national and grassroots levels where the dependence on environmental resources is highest. This implication of this is that PACJA faces limitations in their outreach and mobilisation activities at the grassroots. A further implication of this is that it reinforces climate injustices that excludes these vulnerable populations from the CC governance process and aggravates their socio-economic conditions that they seek to protect.

Although the study found that PACJA uses social media for its PAEM activities, a critical examination of its social media pages revealed gaps in the manner it is being used. For instance, the content of its online communications or posts were often complex, ambiguous, and lacking in useful information. Also, there was limited evidence to show that the messages were specifically curated to increase engagement with and among their followers judging by the fact that the same messages are being shared across all their social media pages without due consideration of the uniqueness and dynamism of the different platforms. As a result, they fail to adequately stimulate the interest of the target audience judging by the low number of followers, comments, likes and retweets on its social media pages. Furthermore, the findings also highlighted that whereas PACJA generates a lot of data on CC and CJ from their programmes, only a summary of such information is made available in the public domain via their website and social media pages. Additional information usually requires an email request (usually the least productive approach as a response is not guaranteed), attendance at their programme events or physical visitation to the movement's secretariat in Nairobi, Kenya. The implication of this is that it creates barriers in public access and engagement with this information, and thus, hinders mobilisation.

Overall, the findings highlight that PACJA's PAEM efforts mostly culminate at the level of awareness creation and engagement with little impacts on mobilisation, particularly at the grassroots because of its focus in mobilising the more powerful actors i.e., the government.

8.2.3 Effectiveness in Policy Influence

The third sub-objective of this study was to measure and assess the effectiveness of the CJM in its CJ objective of influencing the formulation and implementation of climate policies to mitigate climate injustice and prevent future harms to the poorest and most vulnerable populations in Africa. The study has demonstrated that although the movement is highly effective in creating access to policy makers and participating in the policy arena, it is not nearly as effective in how it exercises its leverage to gain influence in the policy process. For example, that PACJA has been strategic in using several media campaigns like the Lamu coal power project in Kenya, to

create awareness and salience on CC challenges and influence perspectives and political agendas in different countries in SSA (*These have been discussed extensively in Chapters Six and Seven*). Also, because of their role as knowledge brokers, the movement has organised and participated in many consultative forums, and roundtable discussions on environment and CC across Africa, like the pre-AMCEN African CSOs workshops, African heads of state summits and the pre- and post- COPs conferences or dialogue sessions. Through these events, they have gained access to the policymakers and raised political awareness of their work/research initiatives and outputs and CJ demands and/or positions. Consequently, these actions have resulted in the formulation of bills, recommendations and briefs leading to the enactment of CC policies and administrative rules in Africa.

However, the findings indicate that PACJA has not been strategic in how it exercises its leverage to gain influence in the CC policy process in SSA. While the CJM understands the linkages between CC and socio-economic development, there was also evidence to suggest that it is yet to solidify a coherent narrative that underscores their CJ agenda and government's interest in economic growth and sustainable development. Also, this research did not find any evidence that the two national platforms i.e., KPCG and CSDevNet have a register or database of the CC and environmental laws including concerned agencies, actions, instruments, and funding allocated to CC of their host countries. As a result, some actors within PACJA lacked basic knowledge of these CC laws and policies, their requirements, and relevant instruments. This in turn affected their capacity to exercise moral leverage and hold the government and relevant actors accountable for any inadequacies in policy implementation. Additionally, PACJA is yet to devise and implement a clear-cut procedure that will ensure that only the most qualified members represent the movement at policy dialogues and the best strategy to employ. For instance, at the time of the data collection for this study, members are randomly asked to attend a stakeholder meeting on behalf of PACJA simply because of their proximity or availability at the time. Their technical capacity to engage effectively at such meetings is not taken into consideration. As a result, their engagement with the government and PI is in need of strengthening.

The external socio-political environment was also found to have implications on PACJA's effectiveness in PI in this study. For instance, PACJA demonstrated more PI in countries like Kenya that operated a more open and democratic governance system which encourages public participation in the governance processes. Also, the movement's lack of decision-making power in the policy process restricted its influence to lobbying and negotiating with the policymakers i.e., indirect influence. As a result, PACJA's PI was mostly limited to responding to the government's agenda as opposed to inducing the implementation of climate just policies. The implication of this is that many of the climate policies across SSA are still formulated and implemented via a top-down process with little attention being paid to addressing the injustices and livelihood challenges at the grassroots. This further impoverishes the already poor populations, increases their vulnerability to CC and fails to address poverty, which is not only a root cause of climate injustice but also a key aspect of PACJA's CJ mandate to promote pro-poor development.

Having summarised and synthesised the findings on the first research question of measuring the extent of PACJA's effectiveness based on the above three criteria, the section below will demonstrate how this study has addressed the second research objective of what factors are hindering or limiting the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA.

8.3.4 Factors that limits the Effectiveness of the CJM in SSA

The second aim of this study was to determine what factors are limiting the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA. This was important because although scholars of the global CJMs have argued that the movements struggle with several challenges like pluralistic CJ framings and narratives, underdeveloped mechanisms, power imbalance etc. which if not adequately managed will hinder their effectiveness in achieving their CJ demands (Tormos and Garcia-Lopez, 2018; Hicks and Fabricant, 2016; Juris, 2013, Bond, 2011), no study has specifically sought to determine which factors have implication on the effectiveness on the CJM in SSA. This study has identified: 1)

managing complex institutional dynamics i.e., power imbalance, interest vs needs alignment; 2) underdeveloped mechanism, or strategies i.e., issues framing, engagement or lobbying; 3) limited resources i.e., technical, financial, and political, and 4) external socio-political environment as the four main factors that inhibit the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA.

1) Managing complex institutional dynamics

This study found that managing the complex institutional dynamics i.e., its broad and diverse members, engagements with the other CC actors like the government, funders, international partners etc., had significant impacts on PACJA's effectiveness particularly in IGS. For instance, the diversity of PACJA's memberships in terms of CC knowledge, geography, priority issues, expectations etc. occasionally resulted in internal tensions that created mistrust, lack of ownership and disengagement. An illustrative example of this internal was highlighted in the interviews with members of PACJA including the ED. According to him, the disjuncture in CJ perspectives and members expectations is one of the most pressing challenge facing the CJM. He narrated that when PACJA signified interest in the FCPF project funded by the World Bank, some of their members kicked against it because they believe that the REDD+ initiative is in opposition to their CJ mandate. Also, they claimed that because the initiative is driven by the developed countries, it accords less power to developing countries in deciding how it was implemented. However, he argued that other members like himself believed that the initiative was a welcome development and a form of repayment of the climate debt owed to Africa. This group maintained that since the project design solely targeted capacity building activities on REDD+, it was not necessarily against PACJA's CJ mandate. Moreover, it would allow them (i.e., PACJA) the opportunity to enhance their knowledge and capacity on REDD+ to make the best decisions around projects that are implementing the initiative in the future. The final decision of the management of PACJA to join the REDD+ project created internal conflicts as some of its members felt marginalised from the decision-making process and thus, began to doubt the sincerity of the movement in its fight for CJ (KII 2).

PACJA also faces ongoing challenges with managing its dynamic engagements with its donors or funders, particularly those from the high-income economies. The need for funds has often led the movement to realign some of its activities to meet with the donor's requirements. As a result, PACJA occasionally implements programmes that do not align with the priorities of their host communities or long-term strategies of the country. For instance, although adaptation and sustainable development actions remain the priority CC intervention for most parts of SSA, the strife competition for funding pushes the movement to give priority to supporting mitigation actions in line with the interests of their international donors. The implication of this is that it weakens the negotiating power of the movement in favour of the donors and/or wealthier actors in the CC governance process. This in turn reinforces the inequitable power relations which is a root cause of climate injustices that the movement seeks to address.

2) Underdeveloped mechanisms

The use of underdeveloped mechanisms or strategies was another factor that was found in this study to hinder PACJA's effectiveness in achieving CJ. For instance, this study found that the movement is yet to gain PI because it has not been intentional about how it identifies and exercises its leverage in the CC policy processes. Particularly, this study found that PACJA was lagging in how it uses moral leverage to improve its influence in the policy process. On paper, the movement has demonstrated a commitment to hold government accountable for fairness and justice in the CC governance process, but the limited MERL activities by PACJA suggests otherwise. This study also found that PACJA does not conduct internal evaluation of its activities or networks (KII 9 and KII 42), and that without evaluations, they are unable to see the gaps and/or extent of the impacts of their programmes at the national and sub-national level.

Furthermore, this study found that PACJA's use of social media strategy for its PAEM objective is still underdeveloped. For instance, the movement's social media communication mostly involves a one-way informational messaging that leaves little or no room for active engagement. there was minimal evidence on the use of effective social media engagement strategies like

competitions (e.g., essays, quizzes, poetry, arts, and crafts etc.), webinars, polls, online discussions, and interviews (e.g., twitter chats), all of which have been identified as having positive impacts on the engagement and mobilisation (Thelen, Robinson and Yue, 2018; Agostino and Arnaboldi, 2016; Saxton and Waters, 2014). Furthermore, the results from the critical review of PACJA's website showed that some of the information provided is redundant and the links broken.

The poor research and documentation practices of the PACJA was also highlighted as limiting the movements effectiveness in its CJ advocacy. According to the interviewees, this was limiting the production and availability of evidence-based data that will serve as reference when telling the African climate stories at the international level and to support PACJA's CJ advocacy agenda. They argued that this gap is also responsible for the perceived weakness in the movement's efforts in drawing linkages between CC causes, impacts and solution from the global to the grassroots and across all sectors of the economy i.e., energy, agriculture, transportation, construction etc.

3) <u>Limited resources</u>

PACJA effectiveness was found to be hindered by its limited resource availability i.e., financial, technical, and political. For instance, the limited technical knowledge of the movement actors limited its effectiveness in its role as knowledge brokers. Although many of PACJA's members are interested in and conversant with the term CC and CJ interventions, their capacity to adequately engage with it, i.e., what it means, its causes and solutions in practical terms is still limited.

The limited financial capacity of PACJA was seen to hamper its overall effectiveness both in its workings and structure. PACJA is solely dependent on the goodwill of private and public donors to keep it functioning. However, the funding for CSOs and movements like PACJA has been shrinking over time due to the spontaneous growth in the number of NPOs compared to the

number of available donors, the amount of funds that they can provide, and other emerging development issues such as conflicts, mass migration, etc. This lack of reliable funding streams/income has constrained PACJA to mostly implement projects or programmes that are in line with their donors' mandate and to fulfil the funding requirements, as evidenced in this study. Also, because many of PACJA's financial partners are international CSOs and NGOs from the developed countries, it creates underlying tensions in their relationships or engagements which limit their mobilisation agenda. While the tensions between PACJA and their partners were not visible at first because of their shared purpose, further analysis of the funder-recipient relationship revealed an unequal balance of power in their engagements. This includes a restriction on the leeway of independence in terms of the type of activities which can be implemented.

Other implications of the limited financial capacity of PACJA were evident around issues of staff retention and sustainability. Since donor funds to PACJA are accessed in the form of implementation of programmes or projects, the Secretariat employs staff on a short-term contract basis to support the implementation. When these projects end or are not renewed or scaled up by the donors, their contracts are not renewed as PACJA cannot itself carry the ongoing cost of their salaries. This is regardless of their significant role or contributions made to PACJA over time. The constant turnover of staff from the PACJA was found in this study to limits its effectiveness in several ways. These include the loss of institutional memory, reduced efficiency and productivity, additional costs incurred from recurrent induction and training.

4) External socio-political environment

The external socio-political environment was found to have implications for PACJA's effectiveness at the national and sub-national level. These were because of conditions like the national political climate, social security, culture, technology. For example, the findings highlighted that a possible reason for PACJA's stronger PI in Kenya compared to Nigeria was because of the greater presence of funders in Kenya and in line with their requirements and those

of the Kenyan government for the inclusion of civil societies in the governance process. Also, since achieving economic growth and development remains the priority of the government in SSA, CC appears to have gained more attention as a priority issue in Kenya than Nigeria due to environmental resources i.e., agriculture and pastoralist being the mainstay of its economy. Efforts to mainstream CC in Nigeria, which is dependent on oil for its revenue, are still at its earliest stage.

The dominant narrative among the movement actors in this study was that the political environment across SSA do not support the use of direct forms of engagement but rather relies on lobbying and diplomacy. Several reasons including subjection because of many years of military regime distrust, and lack of social security was highlighted as possible explanations. Yet, the findings suggest that direct strategies hold more opportunities for the movement to achieve its CJ objectives.

The study also found that PACJA's effectiveness is hindered by the political climate at the international level which is heavily laden with problems of national interest, economic globalisation, trade and commerce, and other politics of exploitation. Consequently, while addressing CC and its underlying injustices is a priority concern for SSA, it is not necessarily considered a priority for the international community who have the capacity to adapt to the impacts. Other issues like insecurity and the COVID 19 pandemic may be assigned a higher priority than fighting CC. This is detrimental to the efforts of the CJMs since it is developed countries who are the major providers of climate finance.

Additionally, evidence was found in this study to suggest that PACJA is yet to balance the multifaceted challenge of accountability and legitimacy. The movement has demonstrated its need to be accountable and play by the international rules of accounting for disbursed funds, networking and lobbying the global elite institutions, there is gap in how it engages with those from below i.e., grassroots communities and members and funnel these interactions "upwards' by empowering and giving voice to these continent-wide important stakeholders.

Overall, the very ambitious, continent-wide reach of PACJA means that it has had to endure serious structural challenges: 1) the tension between the Anglophone and Francophone countries, the tension between maintaining a fierce independence and critique of African governments, 2) 'the West' and elite international institutions and 3) the tension between ensuring that it maintains its relationships and access to the elite powerful stakeholder and the negotiation tables, and trust of the 'communities' that it claims to represent, to keep lines of communication, trust, and alliances at the personal and institutional level alive and thriving.

8.4 Contributions to knowledge

8.4.1 Theoretical Contributions

This study has made several contributions to the literature. Firstly, this study bridges the gap in the literature on the CJM in SSA. It has contributed to the broad literature on CJ by addressing a research call by Professor Patrick Bond for scholars of CJMs to investigate what gaps exists in CJMs and constituencies, and which alliances are moving CJ demands forward. More narrowly, the geographical focus of this study on the CJMs in SSA, with insights from Kenya and Nigeria, has contributed to the almost non-existent literature on CJ and CJM in the region. Also, the systematic analysis of the extent to which an individual movement i.e., PACJA has been effective in progressing the CJ demands of the global CJMs has added to a growing body of literature on social movement effectiveness, especially in SSA. Furthermore, the multi-sited nature of this study strengthens the triangulation and thus validity of the findings.

Secondly, the development of an analytical framework that was used in this study will help other researchers in the design of social movement effectiveness measurement tools. It has devised a list of practical indicators of movements' effectiveness in IGS, PAEM and PI. These include membership size, representation, and organisation structure; the extent of resource mobilisation activities including funds diversification and strategic partnerships; evidence of and capacity

development i.e., increase in the numbers, size, and funding of programme implementation with time, etc.; evidence of strategic use of material and moral leverage and policy outcome.

Thirdly, this study has enhanced our understanding of the CJM in the CC governance processes globally, and in SSA. For instance, the study has argued that the CJM in SSA is most effective in its CJ objective of PAEM. Also, it has shown that of all the different forms of resources i.e., financial, political, human, etc., socio-political resources have the most significant implications on movement's effectiveness in IGS particularly in developing countries with weak governance systems. In addition to this, it has argued in support of Bond (2015) that to be effective in IGS, movements like PACJA must identify and solidify a coherent set of strategies (e.g., fund mobilisation etc.) tactics (e.g., integrating etc.), and philosophy in support of its agenda. This will allow it to manage the expectations of its broad membership and donors in line with its CJ agenda. In terms of PAEM, PACJA's extensive focus in engaging and mobilising the more powerful political actors highlighted in this study has provided deeper insight into the strong link between resources and participation in the CC governance. The more resources i.e., financial, socio-political etc. available to an actor group, the stronger the quality of their participation in the governance process is likely to be. This corroborates the earlier findings of Lecy et al (2012) that the extent and quality of engagement and participation in CC events and dialogue significantly relies on the resource capacity of each stakeholder groups. However, contrary to claims of Tallberg et al (2018) and Mahoney (2007) that the more access a movement has to the policy actors and arena, the higher their PI in favour of their agenda, the findings from this study indicates otherwise. Consequently, this thesis has argued in support of scholars like Dany (2014) and Guigni and Passy (1998) that what a movement does with this access has more significance on its PI.

Fourthly and lastly, this study has provided additional evidence that resources, power dynamics, strategies and external socio-political environments are factors that can either enhance or inhibit a movement's effectiveness in achieving its CJ demands. It has argued that the limitations in the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA is mostly tied to its dependence on external actors, for example, international NGOs for funds, and limited decision-making power.

8.3.2 Empirical Contributions

This is the first study that has evaluated the effectiveness of the CJM in SSA. The study has provided empirical evidence that has enhanced our understandings of the CJ demands, roles, and effectiveness of the CJM in SSA. It has identified best practices of the movement including alliance building, formalisation, and decentralisation for IGS; the formation of strategic partnerships and collaboration for PAEM; and the use of material and moral leverage to gain PI. Furthermore, this study has provided evidence that the CJM in Africa is yet to effectively harmonise and homogenise a common set of CJ framings and narratives in a way that connects and inspires the vulnerable populations at the grassroots for increased participation in the CC governance processes at different levels. Also, with respect to the argument on collective action framing and movement's effectiveness, this study has provided additional evidence that positive emotions like hope, opportunities etc. among the target populations have a higher mobilisation effect than negative emotions like deprivation and anger.

The limited used of social media and other media such as TVs, radios etc. and engagement tactics like plays, dramas, arts, poetry and even celebrities by PACJA provide strong empirical confirmation that the CJM in SSA is yet solidify its PAEM strategies in a way that is pertinent to its efforts to mobilise people. Furthermore, this study has firmly established that the choice of engagement strategy is dependent on the external political environment within which the movement exist. Finally, this study has demonstrated that some of the CJ initiatives, for example, the WB FCPF REDD+ project, being implemented by PACJA are failing to address the root cause(s) of climate injustice, mostly because of insufficient engagement with what constitutes CJ, and to integrate an understanding of the inevitable trade-offs that exist between CJ and pro-poor development discourses like a just transition that define what success would mean in practice.

8.4 Suggestions for future research

This research has clearly shown that the CJM in SSA plays a crucial role in driving the demand for CJ for the poorest and most vulnerable populations in Africa. As demands for urgent climate actions continue to accelerate, particularly in a post Covid-19 world, more research needs to be conducted into understanding how these CJMs like PACJA can improve on their current strategies to deliver CJ for the continent. Subsequently, future research is needed to investigate how each of the factors that have been identified in this study can be addressed to enhance the capacity of the CJM. Also, future research should investigate enabling conditions for mass mobilisation for urgent climate actions in SSA. This will allow African CJMs to learn and adapt accordingly in their mobilising efforts for CJ in a manner that aligns with the socio-economic and political context within which they exist.

The focus of this research on the CJMs in SSA has provided important insights on how a place and its people have unique effects and experiences on a movement. More so, since Newell *et al* (2020) suggested that only one item of research among the many available literature on CJ had a geographical focus on SSA. Future studies that focus on CJ and CJMs in SSA can examine what strategy or combination of strategies would provide the best results in a SSA context to overcome marginalisation. Attention should be paid to investigating the social impacts of current mitigation and adaptation strategies to ensure that the advocacy of the CJMs do not reinforce the climate injustices they seek to address. In addition, more participatory methods of research that involves closer interactions with the movements and populations in the frontline of CC should be employed. This will ensure that the efforts of the CJMs translates into actual CJ for these populations. Finally, since this study highlighted a significant gap in PACJA's engagement or partnerships with the private sectors in SSA, future research should investigate this gap and highlight opportunities and barriers to the partnerships between the CJM and the private sector and its implications for the CJ agenda.

8.5 Conclusion

In general, the findings presented here indicate that PACJA has recorded several successes in increasing the participation of the poorest and most vulnerable populations in SSA in the CC governance processes and access to climate finance to support adaptation. But this study found that they still face challenges with mass mobilisation, particularly at the grassroots, and inducing the formulation and implementation of policies that dismantles the current political structures and addresses the root causes of climate injustices.

Much of this work suggests that the CJM in SSA is still relatively weak in its efforts to exert the desired pressure on the CC governance processes that will address the current climate injustice and spur urgent and collective action to prevent catastrophic CC and avoid further harm to the poorest and most vulnerable populations in the region. As CC impacts continue at an unprecedented rate, there is an urgent need to bridge this gap as fast as possible.

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