What is Manga?
Reading Representation and Culture

Doctor of Philosophy

Department of English Literature

Natthavimol Wangsittikul

May 2023

Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Natthavimol Wangsittikul

Acknowledgments

First of all, I would like to express my sincere thanks to my supervisor, Professor Karín Lesnik-Oberstein, whose insightful words and wise perspective have helped me push myself forward with my thesis and encouraged me to fulfill other aspects of my life. Your confidence in me really makes me feel confident in myself. And for that, I am truly grateful.

I am also indebted to the University of Reading for allowing me to change my mode of study so that I can go back and be with my family during my tough time. In fact, my whole family would like to thank you.

I also would like to thank my fellow Ph.D. friends, Grace and Linda. My environment has changed greatly since I flew back to Thailand, but your kind words and gestures always remind me that I am not doing this alone.

To all my friends in Algorhythm Project, LSK, and HathamGang, thank you all for your late-night gaming and podcasting. It really helped me feel connected to the outside world during the pandemic. Living so far away, I feel at home with you guys.

Thanks to my friend, Plearn. Although you have moved to another city and have so many things going on with your life, I know you will always have my back.

My gratitude also goes to my friends in TalonBoon, especially Dr. Pornchadatorn, who encourages me and makes me realize that my grief also has its purpose. My world has been a lot bigger since then.

I want to thank my mom and my sister for your help and understanding, even though we were so busy with many changes during my time as a student. You gave your all to make this possible for me. I cannot express enough how fortunate I am to have you in my life.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this thesis to my loving father. I could never do this without his unconditional support, even in his passing.

This is for you, Dad.

Abstract

This is an interdisciplinary thesis that explores the questions and claims surrounding manga. It will engage in several issues by asking *how* and *why* the arguments are constructed the way they are, using psychoanalysis and the approach from, for example, Jacques Derrida (1995), Jacqueline Rose (1998), and Saito Tamaki (2011).

I begin the first section by investigating the 'term' of manga and its usage which could be known differently depending on the positions and the translation. This idea leads to the process of the translation and how the idea of originality is constructed through the framing of history and time — James Clifford's (1988) idea of 'culture collecting'. That is, history would have to rely on the retrospective perspective to identify and recognize the frame as history, which is required to understand manga. Chapter 2 discusses the constitution of manga's readers, known as 'otaku', in relation to 'culture collecting' and the construction of *self*. I read that the investment of the otaku involves culture and the relationship with the objects of interest. But they are not just objects, for they have other meanings and could represent something else. The next chapter further investigates the idea of framing a culture, and how it requires the perspective of sameness and difference to form a cultural code. In Chapter 4, I will continue to explore women's representations and images, especially how cuteness is being thought of in manga in relation to the notion of culture, for there is an idea that images of women could reflect their position in Japanese society. Nevertheless, all the imagery and representation would have to hinge on the idea of seeing and a gaze on the body, which I am going to do a close reading in Chapter 5, using Michel Foucault's *The History of Sexuality* (1978) as a base of my argument. In the last chapter, I am going to read the images in manga and the relationship between different spaces — fantasy and reality — to further investigate the effect of the 'images', as claimed, on readers.

Hence, my thesis will discuss how the system of culture is constructed by retrospective perspective of repetitions and oppositions, and how, in every chapter, it always returns to the same process the way it does.

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Introduction

Manga *is* manga.

Or I could say that manga *is* มังงะ.

Or I could say that manga is หนังสือการ์ตูน.

Or I could say that manga is *not* a graphic novel[1].

But that might not be the case for others, as 'some say that manga is a part of, or born of, contemporary Japanese popular culture, while others regard it as part of, or an extension of, traditional Japanese culture'. [2]

So, manga could be many things. *Still*, what they are would have to be constructed by the *saying* and the *thinking* about it — or 'as' something else. And that should be the case, for if there is already an idea of what manga *is*, then manga cannot be *just* manga. Or at least it could not be from the *beginning*.

But, *maybe*, this is not about asking or thinking about *what* the manga is, but rather the things or the claims surrounding manga, or if it leads to something else altogether. Since if it could be a 'part of', then this 'manga' would have to be constructed by something which is not only outside of it but *with* it. How so? Because whatever 'manga' is a 'part of', that 'part' would have to be *doubled*. This doubleness allows the 'manga' to be 'manga' and be a 'part of' something else. And although this could be *it*, 'manga' can also be 'regard[ed]' as a 'part of […] traditional Japanese culture'.

Indeed, if this is *what* and *how* I am going to read, then my choice of text is not a historical overview or survey, and I will not base my reading on one specific practice. Instead, this will be an interdisciplinary thesis that draws on many areas of interest, for example, anthropology, philosophy, and gender. As such, my reading is going to be engaged in several issues by asking

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[1] I am reading this implication from Waterstones website ("Graphic Novels & Manga Books," Waterstones Booksellers Limited, https://www.waterstones.com/category/graphic-novels-manga.) that catagorizes 'Graphic Novels & Manga' together as a section.

[2] Shige Suzuki and Ronald Stewart, *Manga: A Critical Guide*, 1 ed., Bloomsbury Comics Studies (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023).

why the questions return to the way they do and what the stakes in the claims are. And to do that, I will read in perspective, using many approaches from many theorists, such as Jacques Derrida, Jacqueline Rose, Marilyn Strathern, and Sigmund Freud.

In addition, this is not going to be a reading *on* manga, as that would already set up *what* manga is. Instead, I would like to read the claims around manga, looking at its construction and how it is understood and viewed in various fields.

Now, I might want to begin with *this*.

Or have I already begun?

I could use the statement from Derrida: 'Let us not begin at the beginning, nor even at the archive. But rather at the word "archive"—and with the archive of so familiar a word.'[3] So, I am going to begin with the *word* 'manga', according to Power in *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka and the Creation of Post-World War* II:

> As the terms manga and anime started to become a part of the English language vocabulary, their meanings also departed from the original Japanese definition.[4]

And,

> It is impossible—and unnecessary—to "correct" the usage of the term "manga" outside Japan to refer to all things comics, as it does in the Japanese language. Perhaps we should accept the term MANGA, written in Roman alphabets [...], as a new word that carries a set of meanings specific to our historical and cultural contexts.[5]

So, the claim is about 'manga and anime', the working of the 'terms' concerning 'their meanings', and the becoming and the departure. The becoming of the 'terms manga and anime' would have to be from the position in which they are not *yet* a 'part of the English language vocabulary', but elsewhere. Why *elsewhere*? It would have to do with what constitutes the

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[3] Jacques Derrida and Eric Prenowitz, "Archive Fever: A Freudian Impression," *Diacritics* 25, no. 2 (1995): 9.

[4] Natsu Onoda Power, *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka and the Creation of Post-World War II Manga*, Great Comics Artists Series (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 2009), 6.

[5] *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka and the Creation of Post-World War II Manga*, 11.

'terms', for it cannot 'become' something else without already being known as something. The 'terms' would also have to exceed itself as it is set up to 'become' a 'part of English vocabulary'. Still, that is limited to the 'terms'; the 'terms' are separable from 'manga' and 'anime' and known from the perspective outside of them.

Nevertheless, the position at the start affects 'their meanings'; 'their meanings also departed from the original Japanese definition'. So, this becoming would have to be something of a continuation. A *process*? And the limit of this becoming would have to be the 'English language vocabulary' as it 'start[s]' to 'become a part of'. Following this reading, since the notion of the 'terms' could be thought of as something changeable, this produces a possibility that the 'terms manga and anime' could 'become' a 'part' of something else. And I think that although there is this expectation of the 'terms' to 'become' *something*, in any sense, the 'terms manga and anime' still cannot be known only as a 'part of' *something* — the becoming would always gesture to the split.

But I also think about the 'meanings' as 'their meanings also departed from the original Japanese definition'. Despite its construction, known as a separate being from the 'terms manga and anime', this could not happen without the start to 'become' of the 'terms manga and anime' as it is what comes after — a product of rethinking around the 'terms' — '*also*'.

If the 'meanings' belong to the 'terms manga and anime' and are separated from the 'terms', then the departure would only be about the 'meanings' and not the 'terms'. If so, whether 'the terms manga and anime started to become a part of English vocabulary' or 'their meanings also departed from the original Japanese definition', 'manga' and 'anime' would always remain as such. And even if that might be the case, the position of 'meanings' is already moved, 'departed', from the 'original Japanese definition'. And wherever it is, the 'meanings' are no longer known as the 'original', as the originality in this perspective would only be situated as the 'Japanese definition', which can be traced back within this 'Japanese definition'. As such, although there is a replacement of the 'meanings' outside of the 'original', the 'meanings' would

still be 'their[s]' and known as the 'meanings'. The 'depart[ing]', somehow, does not affect the relationship between the 'terms' and what is known to be 'their[s]'.

But there might be something more about 'manga' and its relationship with the 'meanings':

> It is impossible—and unnecessary—to "correct" the usage of the term "manga" outside Japan to refer to all things comics, as it does in the Japanese language. Perhaps we should accept the term MANGA, written in Roman alphabets [...], as a new word that carries a set of meanings specific to our historical and cultural contexts.

There are more than 'manga' in the sense that there are also '"manga"' and 'MANGA'. The difference would be about their positions, as they are not 'becom[ing] a part of the English language'; '"manga"' is both 'outside Japan' and 'in the Japanese language' while 'MANGA' is still out there, not a 'new word', but 'as' a possibility, according to 'we'.

But I am more interested in the claim around '"manga"', as although the 'term' is claimed to be 'the' — the specific 'term', the 'term "manga"' is both 'outside Japan' and 'in the Japanese language', reading from the outside of 'outside Japan' and 'Japanese language' to be able to claim as such. So, the term '"manga"' is being repeated — *doubled*? It is known to do different things depending on the position(s).

What about the difference? The *positions*? That would have to come from the implication that there is a correction 'outside Japan' even though it is 'impossible' and 'unnecessary'. 'It is impossible—and unnecessary—to "correct" the usage of the term' can be so only if the correction has already happened and there is already an idea of what the '"correct"' is. And if what is outside of the 'Japanese language', regarding the 'usage of '"manga"', can be '"correct[ed]"', then this correction would have to rely on the difference between what '"manga"' does 'outside Japan' and 'in the Japanese language', as the 'correct' 'usage' can be known as 'correct' only if there is another 'usage' for it to claim the difference. And thus, I can read that there is a connection between what constitutes '"manga"' and the 'Japanese language'.

Nevertheless, suppose the term '"manga"' can be thought 'outside Japan' without 'Japanese language'. In that case, the 'Japanese language' is not necessarily contained by what is thought to be 'outside Japan'. The correction only extends to what is known to be 'outside Japan' and does not affect the usage of the 'term'. But there is also a knowledge of what the '"manga"' does, which is to 'refer to all things comics' in the 'Japanese language'. So, '"manga"' is known to be '"manga"', but its 'term' would be about 'all things comics'. That is, '"manga"' cannot be known only 'as "manga"'; there is always something more to it, as what it *is* is also about what it *does* — to refer to something else outside of it.

If 'it is impossible—and unnecessary—to "correct" the usage of the term "manga" outside Japan to refer to all things comics, as it does in the Japanese language', then the idea of 'all things comics' is something that has to be referred to within the 'Japanese language' despite there being 'all things comics'. So, '"manga"' is not 'comics' and 'comics' is not '"manga"'. But I think that if '"manga"' can 'refer to all things comics' then the notion of '"manga"' would have to be more than 'comics', as it also encompasses 'all things comics'. The 'things' would have to be separated from 'comics', still, these 'things' would be 'comics', but it can be 'all', apart from itself. That is, to be 'comics' is a lack in itself, at least in this perspective, and it needs 'all things' to fulfill it. As such, if this is known to be what is to be '"correct"', then the 'usage of the term "manga" outside Japan' can be anything else besides to 'refer' to 'all things comics'. '[A]ll things comics' can be seen as a whole.

But what is at stake here is how 'we', known as multiple, is not in agreement, as there is what 'we should accept'. That is, the accepting of the 'term MANGA' can only be known as a possibility to 'we', or 'perhaps', one of the better possibilities for what 'we should accept' as it also rests upon the notion of 'our historical and cultural contexts'. What is 'our[s]' is separable from 'we' and needs to be claimed as 'our[s]' to make this 'accept[ing]' possible for 'we'. In addition, even though this argument would be from the position of seeing the different 'usage[s]' of the term "manga"', regardless of its being claimed to be 'impossible' and 'necessary' to '"correct"', there is an investment in the idea of what is happening 'outside Japan'.

This might be about the '[p]erhaps' and 'we should accept', for this would have to be the production of thinking that the correction is 'impossible' and 'unnecessary', which would only be limited to 'we'. I can read this as the justification of 'we' in 'accept[ing] the term MANGA, written in Roman alphabets' 'as a new word'. But that would also come from the notion that whether or not the 'usage' of the term is '"correct"', the 'term' must 'carries a set of meanings'. And since what is '"correct"' cannot be known without the construction of 'Japanese language', then the 'term MANGA', even if it 'carries a set of meanings specific to our historical and cultural contexts', would still be related to the 'Japanese language'. In other words, although the idea of the 'set of meanings' is to be 'carri[ed]' by the term 'MANGA [...] as a new word', the 'new word' would have to be the production of the idea that it is already the *word* to be claimed 'as a new word'. So, 'MANGA' is not a 'new word', but it *could* be, according to 'we', once 'we' 'accept'. But this would be precisely the 'MANGA' that is 'written in Roman alphabets', and it does not include 'MANGA' that is 'written' in any other way.

But then, what does it do to 'accept' the 'term MANGA'? For if there is a claim to this 'term', would not this imply that there is *already* the 'term MANGA' within this formulation?

So, the notion of 'accept[ing] the term MANGA' here is not about its position, as it is *already* known by 'we' — and is already out there — waiting for 'we' to 'accept', but I read that it is about the agreement of 'we' in seeing the 'term MANGA' as a 'new word'. Therefore, if there is something that is to be claimed 'as a new word', then this 'new' would have to be built upon what the *word* is not, as what is seen to be 'new' would have to be different, making it another. Then again, the 'new' might also be because the 'term "manga"' that is being used 'outside Japan' does not 'refer to all things comics' 'as it does in the Japanese language'. If so, then to be constructed as a 'new word', it would have to rely on the 'set of meanings' and not the other way around. That is, for 'we', the 'term MANGA' is not fixed in what it does — to 'carr[y]' the 'set of meanings' — which can potentially affect what it *is*.

So, from the reading, 'MANGA' would have to be about what it *could* do while '"manga"' would be about what it *does*. And what 'we' 'should' do — 'accept' the 'term

MANGA, written in Roman alphabets [...] as a new word' — is to make the difference *different*. That is, 'MANGA' as a 'new word' would break down the doubleness of '"manga"'; to be a 'new word' that 'carries a set of meanings specific to our historical and cultural contexts'. However, as I have read, this can only be seen as a possibility — the *justification*. 'MANGA' is *not* a 'new word', for 'we' has not 'accept[ed]' it. But there is a potential, as 'MANGA' is already there. That is to say, the being of 'MANGA' as a 'new word' would rely on the agreement of 'we'. And since 'we' could not see themselves as such, the 'new word' would have to rest on the perspective outside of 'we'.

And although I could read the difference and the shift of positions between the claims surrounding 'manga', '"manga"', and 'MANGA', for whatever they are, their notions would have to be built from the 'usage' — 'refer[ing] to all things comics' 'as it does in the Japanese language'.

Might there be manga only in *this* 'usage'?

'Manga is a completely different type of reading experience. To start at the beginning, go to the end!'

Authentic manga is read the traditional Japanese way—from right to left, exactly the opposite of how American books are read. It's easy to follow: just go to the other end of the book, and read each page—and each panel—from right side to left side, starting at the top right. Now you're experiencing manga as it was meant to be.[6]

So, there are different 'reading[s]'. Here, '[m]anga' is constructed by the 'type of reading experience' through the difference of seeing it with the other 'type of reading experience'. So, if the '[m]anga' cannot be known without the other 'type of reading experience', then to be able to claim what it is, there is already a pre-knowledge of what the 'type of reading experience' is. Also, as '[m]anga is a completely different type', the completeness could only be within the frame of difference. And I could read that there have to be other 'type[s]' that would not be 'completely different' since the completeness itself is known to be other to the *difference*.

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[6] Hitoshi Iwaaki, *Parasyte*, trans. Andrew Cunningham (New York: Del Rey, 2007).

So, manga is known for its 'usage' and the 'reading experience'. The shared notion within these formulations would be that they both claim to see 'manga' as something that cannot be known as itself, only as itself. That is to say, manga has to be constructed with its functionality — having something outside act on it, as there are the 'refer[ing]' and the 'reading'. And I also think that since '[m]anga' is different from other 'type[s] of reading experience', then what is known to be 'reading experience' of '[m]anga' would have to have a sameness with other types of 'reading experience' as it is also a 'reading experience', despite the differences.

But what is 'reading experience'? Also, as it is the 'reading experience', the 'reading' is not 'experience' but can be a part of 'experience'. As such, I think about '[m]anga' and 'reading experience' with the following claim: 'to start at the beginning, go to the end'. 'To start', a position is already in place at the 'beginning'. That is, 'to start' does not necessarily have to be at the 'beginning'. The act of starting 'at the beginning' here, though, is being conditioned, which is to 'go to the end'. But where is the 'beginning'? As this is only the 'to start at the beginning', I could say that the starting is not at the 'start', but it would be to 'go to the end'. The 'beginning', therefore, is also not, in a sense, the beginning. And by claiming 'go to the end', this perspective is not at 'the end' and thus constitutes the distance between the 'beginning' and the 'end'. And even though there is a requirement to 'go to the end' to 'start at the beginning', there is still a need to 'start at the beginning' to 'go to the end'. The 'end' is always after the 'beginning', as there cannot be 'go[ing] to the end' without the 'start at the beginning'.

And so I read that the 'reading experience' of 'manga' here would have to be about the *position* — the 'start'.

If 'manga' is constructed by its 'reading experience', then '[a]uthentic manga' is different as it is to be 'read the traditional Japanese way'. As such, 'manga' here is something that can be added up from what is already there. But I also think that the authenticity, outside of 'manga', could have something to do with the 'traditional Japanese way' since what is known to be 'manga' has already been claimed. So, this *authenticness* could be read, but it is the '[a]uthentic manga' which is to be 'read the traditional Japanese way' and not the other. Following this, I can read

that although '[a]uthentic manga' and 'manga' are constructed differently, I think both still have something to do with the idea of 'read[ing]'.

But if, in this case, the 'read[ing]' is separable from 'manga' and as the authenticity might hinge on the 'way' that it is 'read', which has to come from the outside, there is then the idea of the shared 'read[ing]' in the 'way'. That is, the concept of authenticity cannot be sustained without the 'way' of reading, as it would require a certain 'way' of reading.

There is a 'way' to 'read' authentic 'manga' — the 'traditional Japanese way' — 'from right to left, exactly the opposite of how American books are read'. The 'way' consists of 'right' and 'left' — from one position to another. It is thus from the perspective that is not of 'left' and 'right' but at the position that can recognize both. So, I can read that this is about the direction that is 'exactly opposite of how American books are read'. The claim, in a sense, produces two 'how[s]' within its opposition: 'how American books are read', and how '[a]uthentic manga is read'. If 'how' '[a]uthentic manga' is 'read' situated at the opposition of 'how American books are read', then '[a]uthentic manga' is again being constituted by its difference in its 'reading'.

Could I read this as a *pattern*? Although there is a construction of 'manga', what it is cannot be known without the supplements from what it is not — what is already recognized as the 'opposite'. There are different difficulties in the 'way' to 'follow'. This level of easiness, though, would also rest upon the idea of 'how American books are read', for, as the text claims, it is 'exactly the opposite' of the 'traditional Japanese way'. So, this exactness would encompass all of its opposition, which makes the 'opposite' in itself cannot be included in its entirety.

The 'way' that can be 'follow[ed]', so there must be, as I read, a repetition, for if there is something to be 'follow[ed]', there must be, then, the expectation of another to 'follow' the way. According to this, the 'way' is thus not limited to 'it'; it can be shared, and the 'follow[ing]' would be the same, but it is different in the 'way'. The 'way', that is, to 'go to the other end of the book' could only be so if it is not at the 'other end' and there is already the 'end'. As such, the 'end(s)' would be multiple, and even though there is more than one end, as it is claimed to be the 'end',

they cannot be seen as the same, for there is the 'other'. And those 'end[s]' could only be within the frame of the 'book' and not one of the 'American books'.

'[J]ust go to the other end of the book, and read each page—and each panel–from right side to left side'. I cannot help but think again about another 'read[ing]' here, for this 'read[ing]' is different from other reading(s) because it can only be within the 'follow[ing]'. As such, could I then read this as a 'read[ing]' within the 'read[ing]'?

That it would have to be already at the 'other end of the book' to 'read each page' and 'each panel' would imply that it cannot be *before* that. That is, there can be a 'read[ing]', but not the 'read each page' and 'each panel' because, according to the way, there is the sequence of this 'following', for there is, indeed, already the 'way' and the tracing back of 'it', the way is fixed, and it is not interchangeable. The 'page' and 'panel' cannot differentiate by themselves without the position because it is to be read 'from right side to left side'. That is, it would have to be about framing the 'page' and the 'panel', as there is multiple 'page[s]' and 'panel[s]' in this 'book'. The reading does not necessarily have to be in that 'way'.

But it has to be this 'way' for 'you' to be 'experiencing manga as it was meant to be', and it has to be in the time situated in '[n]ow'. But where is the '[n]ow' in here? Whatever 'you' is 'experiencing' does not come from 'you' since this would have to rely on what 'it was meant to be' — outside of 'you'. But if what 'you' experienced is something that 'was meant to be', 'manga' cannot be thought of as itself since 'it' can also be 'experienced' in other ways. That is also because what the 'manga' *is* and 'it' are two different things, but can be framed together within their sameness and difference: 'as'. In other words, what it 'was meant to be' needs to be outside 'it' for 'it' to be 'it'. So, in a sense, outside of 'now', 'you' must have already experienced what 'it was [not] meant to be', for there being something *else* that 'it was meant to be'.

Still, what 'it was meant to be' has to go through 'you' to be claimed as such. There is still a question, though: if what 'you are experiencing' depends on the follow[ing]', then might I also say that the experience could be shared since the 'way' could be 'follow[ed]' and it is not limited to 'you'?

The being of 'it', as 'manga', is constructed by what 'you are experiencing'. Although being 'you' is a problem in itself, this could not have been the case if 'you' already knew what 'it was meant to be'. '[A]s it was meant to be' is constituted by the lack of 'you'.

And so, I think this might be about the experience of reading manga — the start, the position, and the investment that comes with it.

Nevertheless,

> [a]nother cultural issue that arises in writing a book on Japanese comics is the reading order. [...] Most often, publishers have "flipped" and "rearranged" the images selectively, so that some of the panels preserve the original orientation. They have also replaced the Japanese sound effects with their English equivalents. While this translation process allows the readers to enjoy the work without having to constantly struggle with cultural differences, it compromises the artists' original works.[7]

So, whether or not there is a 'writing a book on Japanese comics', 'reading order' is still known to be a 'cultural issue', but the arising here has to do with the 'writing a book on Japanese comics'. That is to say, 'writing a book on Japanese comics' would somehow bring the 'cultural issue' into this formulation. I could read that this 'reading order' can only be an 'issue' if there is already another 'reading order'. Indeed, 'reading' would have to be about the 'cultural issue' one way or another. That is, the 'reading order' is not something that is known to be universal, for there is a separate 'order', which is outside of the 'reading', but somehow depends on the notion of the 'cultural issue', or rather 'cultural issue[s]', as this is the 'another'. Hence, there must be another one before this.

I also think that all these 'issue[s]' might have something to do with the 'translation' as a 'process', for although it 'allows the readers to enjoy the work without having to constantly struggle with cultural differences', 'it compromises the artists' original works.' But I am thinking about the 'translation process' *here* because if it can compromise the 'original works', something might be lost during the 'process'. But what do they lose? What comes out through the 'translation

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[7] Power, *God of Comics: Osamu Tezuka and the Creation of Post-World War II Manga*, xiii.

process', even though it has to be different from the 'artists' original works', would still be known as the 'works'. So, perhaps, it is the originality here that is being lost. And that might be what is at stake, for the originality of the artists would have to be part of the 'works', and the ownership of the 'works' itself has to be claimed from the outside of the artists. What should be the limit of this originality? If it is separated from the 'works', then there should be a frame of difference between *what* has been through the translation process and what is *not*.

Yet, I think the originality might be more about 'publishers' who '"flipped" and "rearranged" the images selectively', 'so that some of the panels preserve the original orientation' because this flip and rearranging of the 'images' would have to rely on 'publishers'. That is, there must be already the knowledge of *what* or *which* to 'preserve', what is it to make of the 'original orientation', because 'images' are not the 'panels', and because 'selectively' — 'some of the panels' — not all of them are to be '"flipped" and "rearranged"'. Again, this would be about the position of the 'images' and the repeat, the *rethink* of the arrangement of the original frame, and the order of 'images'. Still, this is not always the case, as it is '[m]ost often'; therefore, the arising of the 'cultural issue' would not happen outside of '[m]ost often'.

However, the limit of the originality, or the frame, might also have something to do with the 'translation process' since it 'compromises the artists' original works'. That is, the 'original' would be constructed from the thinking that there is *something*, somehow, which is in the same frame with the 'original', but still different, so it cannot be, then, the 'original'. To be the 'original' then, the perspective would have to exceed itself because there is already then not the original; the one identified *with* the 'original' to *not* be the 'original' and after the 'original'.

The *process*? I am again thinking about the 'meaning' and the departing of the originality. It might be that if what is lost in the 'translation process' is something that 'compromises the 'artists' original works', the loss in this originality that is seen as the 'cultural issue' would have something to do with the 'meaning' itself.

Again, the translation *process* is to flip and rearrange the 'images' and replace the 'Japanese sound effects' with 'their English equivalents'. Interestingly, 'images' could be

'"flipped" and "rearranged"', but 'Japanese sound effects' would need to be 'replaced' even though they are all within the 'translation process'. So, if 'images' and 'sound effects' are related to the 'reading order', then I could also read that both are constructed through the 'reading' on them. Nonetheless, 'Japanese sound effects' could be 'replaced' with 'their English equivalents' only if 'their English equivalents' exist. It might also be because 'English' would rely upon 'Japanese sound effects', so there is a comparison between two frames — 'Japanese' and 'English' — and these frames could not be the same. What is being 'replaced' thus could not be the same; it is different, but still 'equivalents'.

However, 'equivalents' could be a problem here. Indeed, it is seen as a 'cultural issue' because what 'they have also replaced' the 'Japanese sound effects' with is 'their English equivalents', that is, the ownership of 'they', the 'publishers' is only with their 'English equivalents'. There cannot be 'sound effects' outside of 'their' to be 'equivalents', for that is all they have.

To replace and rearrange? These would have to be about redoing what has already been done — putting what is *theirs* into what is not — which I could read as a 'translation process'. And this might be what the compromise is about.

But there might be more than 'this translation process', or perhaps, from this formulation, there could be a 'translation process that 'allows the readers to enjoy the work without having to constantly struggle with cultural differences' without compromising the 'artists' original work'. But why 'this process' and '[m]ost often'? That might be because it is 'this translation process', the specific one, would have to come from the perspective that the 'readers' cannot 'enjoy the work without having to constantly struggle with cultural differences' since it is 'this translation process [that] allows the readers to enjoy the work'. That is to say, if readers' enjoyment is hinged upon the 'translation process' done by 'publishers', then it cannot be that 'publishers' do not know the 'readers'. And if there is a cultural issue with the 'reading order', then what is at stake here would be that there should be, or *must* be, a guarantee in the 'readers' that they, at least, do not have 'cultural differences' within themselves.

They also have to know about the 'struggle', for this is what the 'readers' have to deal with, particularly the constant 'struggle'. Thus, the struggle constructs the 'readers' in its loss and the enjoyment of the 'readers', for I could not say that the struggle happens once. There seems to be a repetition between enjoyment and cultural differences. That is, 'without having to constantly struggle', there would not be an issue with the 'translation process'.

But I think I can find more 'way[s] to follow' in *Parasyte*.

> Japanese is a tricky language for most Westerners, and translation is often more an art than a science. For your edification and reading pleasure, here are notes on some of the places where we could have gone in a different direction or where a Japanese cultural reference is used.[8]

The 'translation' here could be both 'an art' and 'a science'. This comparison could set up the idea of 'art' and 'science' here as an opposition. And what *it* is could depend on the repetition of it. That is, if this 'translation' is 'often more an art than a science', then there must be more than one 'translation' that has already happened. Could it be about the trickiness of the 'language'? Since the idea that 'translation' is 'often more an art than a science', then what has been an issue here — the tricky language — could be about how it is 'more' of 'an art' than 'a science'. There is a concern with the idea of 'art' that could be problematic.

Suppose the 'notes' has something to do with 'your edification and reading pleasure', then I can also say that there must also be a relationship between 'your edification and reading pleasure' and 'we' as well because it is to do with the choice of 'we'. There is a knowledge of a 'different direction' that 'we could have gone'. So, from this implication, there are different choices for 'we' here. So, although 'we' is not limited by this, there is still a frame in which 'we could have gone'. There is also an idea that 'reading pleasure' could be *affected* by these 'notes' since it is *for* 'your edification and reading pleasure'. And I would say '*affected*' because 'reading pleasure' would have to be there already and not *from* these 'notes'. The 'notes' cannot be 'for' something if it is not already there in the first place.

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[8] Iwaaki, *Parasyte*, 273.

Also, if 'some of the places' are where 'we could have gone in a different direction', then other 'places' must not be up to 'we'.

Am I looking at the 'places' now? It might not be the case because 'your edification and reading pleasure' is not about 'some of the places' and a 'Japanese cultural reference' but rather about the 'notes'.

But I could read a problem here, of the idea that there are 'some of the places where a Japanese cultural reference is used'. Would not that exclude all other places in this case? That out of these 'places', outside of these 'notes', there is no 'Japanese cultural reference'? Or it could be that it is not the 'places' that 'cultural reference' is 'used' by 'we'. *Still*, if a 'Japanese cultural reference' is something that can be 'used', then it cannot invoke itself as such in a way that 'your edification and reading pleasure' is not affected. That is to say, there is indeed a relationship between the 'reading pleasure' and the knowledge of 'Japanese cultural reference', but there is a problem with the access, which requires something other than themselves to operate here.

And this is still in the *process*.

Perhaps I could read these 'notes' as something outside this translation. And if there could be more to this 'translation process' from the perspective, there is always a lack in the translation itself. The 'notes' thus could not fill the gap — it could offer more, but not all.

Can it, though, be *all*? *Complete*? If there are different 'different directions' to take in the 'translation process', then instead of seeing the gap between the translation and the original, what could be the *excess* here should be the translation itself. With that said, I think here, in this case, there should be a translation frame. But if there is a *limitation*, then what is it?

Chapter 1: Reading Manga and Translation

But many of my ideas depend on the 'translation process'. So, I am going to read further what Derrida has already said about the translation or what he has already *thought* on the questions about the translation:

> The question, What is a relevant translation? Would return to the question, What is translation? or, What should a translation be? And the question, What should a translation be? implies, as if synonymously, What should the best possible translation be?[9]

I might have asked the same questions, but since the 'translation' could be *more* than the translation itself, then what *it* is cannot be known by knowing the 'translation' *as such* because if there is a question regarding what it 'should be', then what it can be are not *set*, or what it *is* could be thought of as something else other than itself.

Can I read this as a 'translation process'?

I think I might because there is knowledge beyond the translation itself, which could be framed as a 'process'. And although the 'best possible translation' can only be thought of through the implication, in this perspective, there should still be the 'best possible translation'.

Following by some answers:

> A relevant translation would therefore be, quite simply, a "good" translation, a translation that does what one expects of it, in short, a version that performs its mission, honors its debt and does its job or its duty while inscribing in the receiving language the most *relevant* equivalent for an original, the language that is *the most* right, appropriate, pertinent, adequate, opportune, pointed, univocal, idiomatic, and so on. [10]

The perspective would have to think beyond what the 'translation' is because there is the idea that a 'relevant translation' is different from a '"good" translation'. Although it can be one another, it is still in the frame of 'quite simply', so the 'relevant translation' could potentially be

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[9] Jacques Derrida and Lawrence Venuti, "What Is a "Relevant" Translation?," *Critical Inquiry* 27, no. 2 (2001): 182.
[10] "What Is a "Relevant" Translation?," 177.

other than a '"good" translation' depending on how it is viewed differently. And there are others, for a '"good translation"' is also a 'translation that does what one expects of it'.

Would this '"good" translation' only hinge on 'one' as it is what 'one expects of it'? If that is the case, then 'one' must know what it is supposed to do, or the 'translation' must have already happened. But I am curious about the relationship between 'one' and 'translation' since it is the 'translation' that 'does' what 'one expects of'. Or maybe, the 'translation' does not necessarily depend on 'one', but as I read, it is a '"good" translation', specifically, that does so. The '"good"' in the quotation marks must have been from *elsewhere* and might be in the same frame as the '"correct"' and the '"manga"'. '[I]n short', there are different 'version[s]' for the 'translation' to 'perform its mission, honors its debt and does its job or its duty'. So, it is also about the 'perform[ing]' that somehow still needs the idea of being seen or 'read', one way or another.

Could this be about 'one'?

I would say it *is* because this is what one 'expects of it'.

So, 'one' must know what it *could* be before the translation does. Or at least, there must be a knowledge of what 'its mission' is. That is to say, 'one' must know 'the most *relevant* equivalent for an original, the language that is *the most* right […]'. But there might be a stake in the idea that there is '*the most* right' language, for there is a scale of 'right', and it could only depend on the perspective of 'one' — that there is the 'equivalent for an original'. As such, 'language' could be 'equivalent'? Still, I can read that even if several 'version[s]' can 'perform [their] mission', the translation cannot escape the frame of 'original[ity]'.

Still,

> [i]t is impossible to decide the source language to which, for example, the word "relevante" answers *[relive]*, a word that I leave within quotation marks for now. Nor the language to which it belongs at the moment when I use it, in the syntagms or the phrases where I move to reinscribe it. Does this word speak one and the same language, in one

and the same language? At the same time, we don't even know if it is really one word, a single word with a single meaning, or if […] it constitutes more than one word *in* one.[11]

If there is a knowledge that '[i]t is impossible', the decid[ing] would have already occurred. The decision is thus constructed through the absence of itself. I am thinking about the investment of the 'source language', for if that is something to be decided, then it could also be a choice, the choosing, that is to be determined externally. The 'word "relevante"' is established as the 'word' that 'I leave within quotation marks for now'. So, can I say that the notion of the 'word' is also about *time*? And how can it not be so since there is the 'language […] which it belongs at the moment when I use'. The impossibility would be in the deciding, but in this formulation, there would have to be the idea that there must be the 'language to which it belongs'. So, '"relevante"' belongs to the 'language'? If so, then, it is *not* the 'language' because the 'language' is what it belongs to. And if it 'belongs at the moment when I use it', then there is also the '"relevante"' outside of that 'moment' as well. Indeed, there must be a correlation between time and the tracing back to the 'source language', including the use of 'it'.

The construction of '"relevante"' does not only depend on *time* but also the use of 'I', from 'I' perspective.

'Does this word speak one and the same language, in one and the same language?' The question could only be asked on the ground that this 'word' is about the 'speaking' within the system of 'language'; that what is thought to be 'language' must be more than 'one'. *Yet*, 'we don't even know if it is really one word'. As such, what 'we' know relies on 'I' because this *choice* is operated on the system of language, although there is still the question regarding the 'source language', it is, nevertheless, the 'language' as the same. And although 'it is impossible to decide the source language to which […] the word "relevante" answers' '[n]or the language to which it belongs at the moment when I use it', there is no problem for 'I' to 'use it'.

If 'we don't even know if it is really one word', 'we' would have to know that it could be more than one already. '[O]ne word' is constructed to be a 'single word with a single meaning'.

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[11] "What Is a "Relevant" Translation?," 176.

So in a sense, 'one word' requires an excess, that 'one word' cannot be only 'one word' *as such*, for the 'word' also comes with the 'meaning'. That is to say, a 'single word' is not limited to a 'single meaning'; it could be multiple. Not only that but 'we' also 'don't even know' if 'it constitutes more than one word *in* one'. I could thus read that there is a shift of the perspective on this 'word', for if 'it' can be more than 'one word *in* one', then there must be a 'word' '*in*' a 'word'.

I am thinking back to the question of the '"good" translation' and a 'version that performs its mission, honors its debt and does its job or its duty while inscribing in the receiving language the most *relevant* equivalent for an original'. As such, I want to think about the *process*, the working between the system of language, according to Bell and Candlin,

It is apparent, and has been for a very long time indeed, that the ideal of total equivalence is a chimera. Languages are different from each other; they are different in form having distinct codes and rules regulating the construction of grammatical stretches of language and these forms have different meanings.

To shift from one language to another is, by definition, to alter the forms. Further, the contrasting forms convey meanings which cannot but fail to coincide totally; there is no absolute synonymy between words in the same language, so why should anyone be surprised to discover a lack of synonymy between languages? Something is always 'lost' (or, might one suggest, 'gained'?) in the process and translators can find themselves being accused of reproducing only part of the original and so 'betraying' the author's intentions.[12]

So, the 'ideal of total equivalence' is something that has to be *seen*, and it can be seen with the idea of 'time'. And if the 'idea of total equivalence is a chimera', then the 'chimera' would have to be constructed from the perspective on the 'apparent', which also requires more than *one thing* to be 'equivalence'. Interestingly, the 'equivalence' can also be 'total', so there is a scale to which the 'equivalence' can be. That is to say, the 'equivalence' itself works *with* the frame upon other frames, which could be counted in 'total'. So, this 'chimera' concerns this

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[12] Roger T. Bell and Christopher Candlin, *Translation and Translating: Theory and Practice*, Applied Linguistics and Language Study (London: Longman, 1991), 6.

totality rather than only the 'equivalence'. The construction of 'languages' would have been from these frames, which I could read as 'form'. The 'form' has distinct 'codes and rules regulating the construction of grammatical stretches of language'. Therefore, I could say that the difference between languages would be with the 'form', with the 'codes', or with the 'rules', all known to be the 'languages'.

If 'to shift from one language to another is, by definition, to alter the form', then although the 'language' is not the 'form', there is a correlation between the two. I think the issue here is not about the 'shift' of the 'language' but rather about what is being 'altered' in the *process* because the 'shift from one language to another' is already known. Still, there is 'by definition', which implies that there could be other claims other than 'by definition' that could be said about the 'shift' of the 'language'. So, the 'forms' can be 'alter[ed]'. *Yet*, if the 'form' which is 'alter[ed]' would still be known to be the 'form' after the alteration, then there must be more than the 'form' itself to be constituted as the 'form'. Here, I think that the alteration, or the 'shift', comes with the doubleness, for if there is the 'contrast' between 'one language' and the 'another', then the 'another' would have to be *something else* outside of 'one language'. That is, there must already be more than *one* language in this formulation. It already departs from what is known to be 'one language' to 'another'.

Also, the difference would have to come from the alteration. That is to say, something must have been lost in the *process*, and this loss could be framed as the 'contrast'. But I think the 'total equivalence' being claimed here is not about the 'forms' or the 'languages' as such, but rather about the 'meanings' that are 'convey[ed]' which 'cannot but fail to coincide totally'. I could read that if they 'fail' to 'coincide totally', there must be an attempt here to make it 'coincide totally'. Again, the totality seems to be problematic in this perspective.

Indeed, '[s]omething is always 'lost' (or, might one suggest, 'gained'?) in the process'. So, *what* is lost from the 'shift' of 'one language to another' might be the 'meanings' which 'cannot but fail to coincide totally'. The frame of the contrast would be the '"lost"' and '"gained"'. But again, if 'meanings' can be '"lost"' or '"gained"' in the 'process', there should be a fixed

'meaning', of 'something' that could be collected and recognized to be *as such* but with the supplement, since, as 'one suggests', it could be 'gained' as well.

Still, 'something is '"lost"' or '"gained"' in the 'process' is different from 'reproducing' something else altogether. And all of this would have to rest on the idea that there is a *core* in the word, which does not change, that there is a fixed meaning, but there is something outside of that which can be added and reduced without losing itself so it could be known to be the same.

If 'something is always "lost" or "gained"', can I say this is also a part of the 'process'? Or it is, indeed, the *process*.

'Something is always "lost" or "gained"' differs from 'reproducing' because it is what the 'translators' are 'accused of'. This accusation is also constructed to be about the finding of the 'translator', something that they 'can find'. *Yet*, what they 'find' is not the accusation itself, but rather 'themselves' that is 'being accused of'. So, there is a split of the 'translators' here. Could I read this a version of themselves? If the 'translators' can 'find themselves', then 'themselves' would have to be outside the translators. Moreover, if it is for 'translators' to 'find', then there must *already* be 'themselves' out there that are already being accused of for the 'translators' to 'find'.

It is very interesting how the accusation is being set up here. This is about 'themselves', which reproduce only 'part of the original', and this act of 'reproducing only part of the original' is an issue that betrays the 'author's intention'. So, the perspective on the accusation would have to know already what the author's intentions *are* to be able to claim so. But I am more curious about the difference between the idea of the 'original' and the 'author's intentions', for if they are indeed different, and they are different because they are known to be *as such*, then how are they set up in relation to one another?

If the accusation is about 'reproducing only part of the original', then I could read here that 'reproducing' here is not an issue. It is the 'only part of the original' which is problematic. As such, the translation *process* could be about 'reproducing' something out of something. The act of 'reproducing' itself would imply that the production is already in place, which I read as the

'original' because the problem with the 'reproducing' is that 'only part of the original' is being kept.

'[O]nly part of the original'?

I cannot help but think that if it is being reproduced, then it is already in itself not the 'original'. So then, if some part of the 'original' or all of the 'original' can be 'reproduced', it is still not the 'original' because it is already *something else*. But can the reproduction contain all 'part of the original' then? According to the perspective, the answer is no, for '[s]omething is always "lost"'. As such, the idea of betraying the 'author's intentions' would only be possible if the condition of the accusation is met.

And so, I would like to think again about these 'cultural differences' because there is the production of choices between 'readers' enjoyment' and the 'artists' original works'. That is to say, one cannot be without another. The 'culture differences' would imply that there is more than one culture in this formulation. Both are not the same, but they are still within the frame of what constitutes the notion of 'culture'. I could read that there being 'cultural issues' might be because what is known to be contained in 'Japanese comics' — 'images' and 'sound effects' — is not *ours*. If that is the case, then the 'publishers', although claiming the 'English' to be 'their[s]', also know the Japanese culture. As such, the ownership here does not necessarily limit the knowledge of the 'culture'.

Hence, the 'reading' of 'manga', then, could not only be about the 'readers', rather, the 'reading experience' and the *position* which constructs the idea of 'manga' would have to rely upon the 'publishers'.

But 'manga' is not only *that*, for I am thinking back again on the notion that there is the '"correct"' usage of the term '"manga"' to 'refer to all things comics'. Since 'manga' is something that can be referred to outside of itself — to be known by something else externally, I think it would be interesting to think more about the 'comics', for there is 'all things comics', as Barker has also thought about in *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics*:

Just studying comics, I discovered how painfully ignorant I was of their history. I also realized, as I began to understand that history, how many of the critics who have made 'devastating' attacks on them, themselves betray gross ignorance.[13]

I could read that this is about 'study comics' — something that happens *after* 'studying comics'. And I would read this as a frame of what is also about 'I', which would also be the connection between 'I' and the study of 'comics'. What 'I discovered' is 'how painfully ignorant I was of their history', and this could only be the case through the shift of the positions of 'I'(s). For the discovery to happen, there must be a set up of the perspective that sees 'I' that 'discovered' that also sees another 'I' that was 'ignorant'. But this would also depend on the study of 'comics', since by doing so, there is a production of the difference between what is known by 'I' that 'discovered' and the other 'I' that was 'ignorant'. And if what 'I discovered' is 'how painfully ignorant I was of their history', then the study of 'comics' would have to be about the 'history', or rather 'their history', the 'history' which is claimed to be 'their[s]', but from the perspective outside of 'their'.

Might I say this is the history of 'history'? The history — the tracing of the difference between the perspective on the perspective on the seeing of 'I' on another 'I' and the perspective on the perspective on 'I'.

There is also a realisation, and it would 'also' already have been in place 'as I began to understand that history' and 'how many of the critics who have made "devastating" attacks on them'. Because this is 'I' that 'realised' 'as I began to understand', I could read that this understanding seems to be about the *process* — the continuation of the understanding — the *becoming*[14].

Again, 'also', 'I' could 'realise' because this can happen only after the discovery of 'how painfully ignorant I was of their history'. As such, to *realise* cannot be said to be the same as to discover, at least for 'I'. That is, within this realisation, there is another shift of 'I' — seeing the

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[13] Martin Barker, *Comics: Ideology, Power and the Critics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989), 5.
[14] My reading on '[a]s the terms manga and anime started to become a part of the English language vocabulary […]' in the first chapter.

difference in another position and rethinking back again in its loss — the perspective on another perspective on 'I'.

And although the realization and the discovery are two different things, both share in their construction the way they rely on recalling the position of the study of 'comics' of 'I's, and frame what has come after — 'history'. And it is 'that history' that I 'began to understand', so I could say that within this formulation, within the realisation, there could be other histories for 'I' as well, but the understanding of 'I' cannot go further than 'that history', what 'I' sees as 'their history'.

And it is the *understanding* because it could be a 'process'. And this 'understanding'[15] of 'manga' would have to rely on the idea that the 'MANGA' is already known. It is only about the 'understanding' of it.

So, in this next section, I will read the claims about 'manga' and how 'history' and the 'translation' has to do with 'understanding' it.

(Figure 1)[16]

According to McCloud, this 'UNDERSTANDING' of 'MANGA' is outside of 'I' as they are in different frames. But does it have something to do with 'history'? I could say it *does* because

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[15] Scott McCloud, *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 215.
[16] *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 215.

this is about perspective on the perspective of 'I' and the perspective of 'I' on the 'JAPANESE COMICS' or '"MANGA"'. The issue, though, would be how 'UNDERSTANDING MANGA' in this case requires this *history*. The recalling of the position of 'I' in '1982' is thus being framed in this 'UNDERSTANDING' of 'MANGA'.

But '"MANGA"' could also be known, according to 'I', as 'JAPANESE COMICS'. I read 'OR' as something which formulates 'JAPANESE COMICS' and '"MANGA"' as something which 'I' finds interchangeable. Nevertheless, 'JAPANESE COMICS' are still not '"MANGA"'. So, there is 'MANGA' and is being understood here, and the '"MANGA"' which 'I' became 'OBSESSED WITH READING'. *Still*, the question is: what does it do? This is to do with how the 'MANGA' is not *yet* in this 'UNDERSTANDING' since it is being put in another frame. That is to say, this formulation is to do with the perspective on 'I' on this 'JAPANESE COMICS' and '"MANGA"' and what is being recalled from the *position* in another position — the history of 'I' which could not be claimed from the perspective of 'I'.

From this passage, I am also interested in the idea of the 'READING' and the translation, for although 'I DIDN'T KNOW A WORD OF JAPANESE', 'I' could read. Somehow, the translation is constructed here as something needed for 'I'. That is to say, there is an expectation for these 'JAPANESE COMICS' to be 'TRANSLATED'. That is, despite being thought of as 'FUNNY', not knowing the 'WORD' does not affect the ability to read. But if the 'WORD' does not have to be known for 'I' to be able to 'READ', then does *knowing* the 'WORD' contribute to something else other than 'READING'? I think it does, although that would have to be somewhere outside this 'FUNNY THING'. And it could be that there is more than the 'WORD' in 'JAPANESE COMICS' that 'I' could 'READ'.

In a way, since this is being framed in 'UNDERSTANDING MANGA', although this is about 'I' not knowing a 'WORD OF JAPANESE', it is still about the 'UNDERSTANDING' of it.

(Figure 2)[17]

'UNDERSTANDING MANGA' is also about the 'READER', for this is how 'I' claims to study 'MY OWN REACTIONS AS A READER'. So, 'I' is not a 'READER', but 'I' could act as one. This study of 'I' would have to rest on the idea that 'I' is outside of 'MY OWN REACTIONS' and that 'I' could somehow *see* them. But how could 'I' invest in this 'MY OWN REACTIONS' as a reader? Not only so, 'I' would have to see the split of *itself*, since this is claimed to be the 'REACTIONS AS A READER'. As such, 'I', according to the perspective on 'I' of 'I', could be seen as other things other than 'I'. That is, 'I' would have to see itself other than itself.

And 'MANGA' is to do with 'JAPANESE SOCIETY', for its 'ROLE' could be 'LOOKED INTO' in 'JAPANESE SOCIETY'. I think the issue here is that there is no question regarding the 'MANGA'S ROLE' in 'JAPANESE SOCIETY', for if this is about 'I' that 'LOOKED INTO' it, then 'I' would have to know that it is already *there*. That is to say, it is rather about what 'I NOTICED' *as* 'I LOOKED INTO' it. This noticing, again, could only rely on the looking back of 'I', which *sees* what 'I' sees in relation to other than itself. In other words, there must be multiple 'I(s)' in this formulation for the perspective to claim the perspective on 'I'.

What have 'I NOTICED'? Whatever it is, it has to be there in the first place, for this noticing of 'I' would have to be conditioned by studying and looking into 'MANGA'S ROLE'. That is, this 'COMMON THEME' would have to be known by 'I' even outside — prior — to this looking for 'I' to be able to notice it. And, indeed, it *should* be before this noticing because the

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[17] *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 217.

'COMMON THEME' itself would already require multiple 'THEME[S]' to be 'COMMON'. In a sense, this 'THEME' could be found outside 'MANGA'S ROLE' as well.

There are 'THESE TECHNIQUES', but 'THESE TECHNIQUES' might not be 'DEPLOYED TOWARD A SINGLE PURPOSE' since this is being claimed as the possibility. *Yet*, even if this is a possibility, then there should be a 'PURPOSE' in doing so. That is to say, there is an investment in this *intention*, or by 'STUDIED MY OWN REACTIONS' and 'LOOKED INTO MANGA'S ROLE', 'I' could *see* the 'PURPOSE' of 'THESE TECHNIQUES'. In other words, what 'I NOTICED' should be about the repetition, or even duplication, because a recognized 'THEME' could be seen *inside* and *outside* of 'MANGA'.

But I could read this as a *process*. Indeed, it rests on the idea that 'I' would have to accumulate knowledge to be able to 'UNDERSTAND MANGA', and what is surrounding 'MANGA' that has been *gathered* would have to come from the perspective which has to rely on the perspective of 'I'.

I could read more on the history of 'history'. Or the 'way to see it' as claimed by Clifford:

> To see ethnography as a form of culture collecting (not, of course the *only* way to see it) highlights the ways that diverse experiences and facts are selected, gathered, detached from their original temporal occasions, and given enduring value in a new arrangement.[18]

If 'ethnography' could be 'see[n]' as a 'form of culture collecting', then 'ethnography' is not a 'form' or 'culture collecting'. Instead, this is about the perspective on seeing 'ethnography', and how it could be seen as other to itself, and there are 'others' because this is 'not' the *'only* way to see it'. Not the '*only* way to see it'. The italic might be because there is another frame on seeing the 'ethnography', and it could not be '*only*' without other 'way[s]' to see it. There must *already* be other ways to 'see ethnography' besides as a 'form of culture collecting'. As such, 'ethnography' here is all about the appearance — only from the 'see[ing]' of 'it'.

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[18] James Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988), 231.

So, there is an investment in this seeing since it is not the 'ethnography' that 'highlights the ways that diverse experiences and facts are selected [...]', but it is the case when it is seen as a 'form of culture collecting'. But again, something must have been taken away from 'ethnography' because although to be seen as a 'form of culture collecting' can 'highlights the ways [...], nevertheless, it is still 'ethnography', yet, the lack of 'ethnography' is only in its *appearance*, as I have read, it is limited to the seeing.

And it is indeed about the appearance, as it 'highlights the ways that diverse experiences and facts are selected, gathered, detached from their original temporal occasions, and given enduring value in a new arrangement'. So, I could read that if this is only about the seeing, then seeing 'ethnography as a form of culture collecting' itself does not affect the 'ways that diverse experiences and facts are selected [...]', as the 'ways' are already thought to be there (or with a 'form of culture collecting').

To 'see' 'as a form' would only affect the seeing on the 'ways' here. The 'see[ing]' is all that is offered. I might have to repeat this.

So, what is at stake here is that all this would have to rely on the 'see[ing]' — to make the connection between ethnography and 'culture collecting' — and also because 'diverse experiences and facts' are not enough as such. The 'diverse experiences' and 'facts', though two different things, could be 'selected, gathered, [and] detached from their original temporal occasions'. Indeed, if those can be 'selected' and 'gathered', then there must be a repetition within the formulation, as they are 'detached from their original temporal occasions'.

This makes me reconsider the 'translation process' and how it might compromise the 'work'. In this case, the movement here which 'diverse experiences' and 'facts' are 'detached from their original temporal occasions' and 'given enduring value in a new arrangement' could be thought of as the *process*: the idea that something has to be taken out of the originality, and 'given' something else back, 'enduring value', the 'value' that has to be outside of itself. As such, from this perspective on 'culture collecting', 'diverse experiences and facts' should have a

'value'. Also, the 'new' has to be built from the 'original', which the 'temporal occasions' are not, somewhere else, not the same, but connected.

There might be a stake in the idea that 'experiences and facts' could be 'given enduring value' even 'in a new arrangement', as they would have to be known to be the same but are already, in itself, *different*.

But this could not only be about the *positions* within the frame of 'original', as this has something to do with the 'temporal occasions' as well. Thus, this is already known to not be permanent, depending on the idea of time.

Still, might this have its position in *time*?

Collecting—at least in the West, where time is generally thought to be linear and irreversible—implies a rescue of phenomena from inevitable historical decay or loss. The collection contains what "deserves" to be kept, remembered, and treasured. [...] Anthropological culture collectors have typically gathered what seems "traditional"— what by definition is opposed to modernity. From a complex historical reality (which includes current ethnographic encounters) they select what gives form, structure, and continuity to a world. What is hybrid or "historical" in an emergent sense has been less commonly collected and presented as a system of authenticity.[19]

'Collecting' does not exist only in the 'West', for 'at least' would also place '[c]ollecting' outside of it. But why the 'West'? Because this is where 'time is generally thought to be linear and irreversible'. That is, there is an implication here that '[c]ollecting' might not have something to do with 'time' at all, or 'at least' the 'time' that is 'linear and irreversible' because if 'in the West' is 'where time is generally thought to be linear and irreversible', then 'time' itself does not necessarily have to be 'linear and irreversible' here, or outside of the 'West'. Therefore, I could say that if 'time' could be thought of differently, then the thinking of 'time' should depend on positions which in turn constitutes the notion of '[c]ollecting' in this perspective. Then could I say there might also be different '[c]ollecting'?

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[19] *The Predicament of Culture*, 231.

And although that might be the case, 'time' is only something that is 'generally thought to be'. As such, what 'time' is would have to rely on what it is being 'thought' of, and 'generally', does not include that 'thought' in its entirety. I could read that 'time' here is subjected to the repetition of 'thought[s]' and is limited *as such*. The thinking of 'time' has to be more than singularity. Also, if 'time' is 'thought to be linear and irreversible', then 'time' would have to do something with the idea of continuation, for to have been known to be 'irreversible', there has to be already *something* that can be traced back, the continuous past, from the position outside of it: 'historical decay or loss'. The notion of history is already there.

Indeed, in this case, there can be no 'historical decay and loss' here if 'time' is not thought to be 'linear and irreversible'. The constitution of '[c]ollecting' can only be so if the notion of 'time' and linearity within the same formulation exists. And since 'historical decay or loss' is 'inevitable', then 'inevitable' is outside the 'historical decay or loss' itself.

The 'historical' would also have to be about this 'time'. That is, something has to be lost or changed in this linearity.

Yet, would that not collapse this *continuation*?

But again, there can be no loss here if there is no continuation of this linearity. Still, if there is a loss, then there must also be a constitution of differences *within* history, the continuation of differences, different positions, known from the perspective outside of it.

The implication of this '[c]ollecting' breaks down the 'inevitable': a 'rescue of phenomena from inevitable historical decay or loss'. And even though '[c]ollecting implies a rescue of phenomena', I could read that 'historical decay or loss' is beyond the '[c]ollecting' itself. And the *process* is shifted, as there is now the '[c]ollection' which 'contains what "deserves"' to be kept, remembered, and treasured'. But where might be the 'diverse experiences and facts' in this? Or I could say that *with* the '[c]ollecting', they are no longer as such, for to be able to 'contain', then 'what "deserves" to be kept, remembered, and treasured' would have to be *within* the 'collection', which can only be claimed from the position outside of the 'collection'.

What might be at stake would be the idea of 'what "deserves"' here because the 'collection' is to be 'kept, remembered, and treasured' even though the '[c]ollecting' is already done: 'selected, gathered, detached,' and 'given enduring value in a new arrangement'. That is, I could read that the deserving might be about what the 'collecting' is and *more* to the '[c]ollecting', as there are not only the 'ways that diverse experiences and fact are selected, gathered', 'detached', but also 'given enduring value in a new arrangement' that has something to do with the 'culture collecting'. '[W]hat "deserves"' would have to be because they have already been through the *process*, therefore, the deserving cannot be only what they *are* — 'diverse experiences and facts' — but something that has been 'given enduring value in a new arrangement'. Or I could say it is the 'value', the 'new arrangement', the framing of the space that allows it to be the 'collection'.

But '[c]ollecting' is not the end of the 'collecting', as 'what "deserves"' have to be 'kept, remembered, and treasured'. The selecting and gathering here — the framing for the 'experiences and facts' — is not enough, for there is an implication that they could also be lost and could be forgotten: need to be 'remembered' and 'treasured'. This notion of sustaining would also hinge upon the idea of 'time', to be 'linear' and 'irreversible'.

The interesting idea here would be the investment in what the perspective sees as deserving and what not, for if 'what "deserves"' depends on the selection, value, or even the framing of itself, 'what "deserves"' must have to be from the position outside of the 'what "deserves"' itself, and have to be outside of the keeping, the remembering, and the treasuring. '[W]hat "deserves"' as such in the 'collection' could not be much about the 'experiences' and 'facts' as the outside of it, for if those cannot sustain itself from 'historical decay or loss', 'what "deserves"' must rely upon the keeping, remembering, and treasuring outside of itself to be *deserving*. And I think the quotation marks of 'what "deserves"' might be about this, the shift of the deserving, and how it requires something external to sustain and constitute itself as such — to be the 'collection'.

Another shift of 'what "deserves"': [a]nthropological culture collectors have typically gathered what seems "traditional"—what by definition is opposed to modernity'. The frame of gathering here is what 'seems "traditional"', therefore, there is a knowledge of what "traditional" is. Nevertheless, it is claimed from the seeing of it and not itself. That is to say, the traditionality of 'what' might not necessarily be as such, for what is to gather would have to rely on the perspective on the 'collectors', outside of 'collectors', in the seemingly. And if the definition is offered here, then 'traditional' is not enough, as there has to be the addition, the 'definition' that is known outside of it. But there is still a problem because 'by definition', '"traditional"' is 'opposed to modernity', so the notion of 'modernity' must have already been known before the '"traditional"'. There can be no '"traditional"' without 'modernity' 'by definition'.

I could read that this is all in the 'complex historical reality', the framing of this 'select[ion]', for that is where 'they' have to take 'from'. Thus, there is *another* shift in 'what "deserves"', as those selected are claimed to 'give form, structure, and continuity to a world'. If those are what they can 'give', then I think 'reality' must also have something to do with a 'world', which can only be separate from each other. '[H]istorical' in this sense would have to also imply the notion of 'time'; the coloration between 'time' and 'reality', which although not the same, cannot be thought of without one another in this perspective, in this frame.

But where might this 'form, structure, and continuity' be *in* this, or even *before* this? If they 'select what gives form, structure, and continuity to the world', then 'they' must also know what 'what' can do *before* the selection occurs. The *process* would have to be even before this selection itself. Furthermore, there must also be something *in* this 'complex historical reality' for them to be able to 'select'. But also, 'what gives form [...]' would have to be separate from the 'reality' itself, as it could be 'select[ed]' from the 'reality'. Still, I could also say that there is no movement here, for this is only the selecting of 'they', thus, 'form, structure, and continuity' are beyond a 'world' as they have to be given to by 'they', who have access to it. It could not be that the deserving has nothing to do with 'they'.

I am still wondering about the position of 'time', but since it is conditioned by the 'West', I am going to read the 'West' further:

Every appropriation of culture, whether by insiders or outsiders, implies a specific temporal position and form of historical narration. Gathering, owning, classifying, and valuing are certainly not restricted to the West; but elsewhere these activities need not be associated with accumulation (rather than redistribution) or with preservation (rather than natural or historical decay). The Western practice of culture collecting has its own local genealogy, enmeshed in distinct European notions of temporality and order.[20]

Here, the 'West' and 'elsewhere' are constituted by their differences through the notion of '[g]athering, owning, classifying, and valuing', which I could also read together as 'activities'. As such, '[g]thering, owning, classifying, and valuing' are different things, but they all share their notions of being in the 'West' and not the 'West'. Not being 'restricted' to the 'West' would imply that there is a restriction in this formulation, that it somehow must have been thought from the perspective on the 'West'. That is to say, the 'West' is a frame, a limit to these 'activities', and only these 'activities' could go beyond that. Interestingly, their *positions*, which are 'certainly not restricted to the West', do not change what they *are*, but rather what they are 'associated with'. But this could be the issue here. They are 'activities', both in the 'West' and 'elsewhere', although what is known *about* them has been changed.

But this '[c]ulture collecting' could also be known without the 'Western practice', as such, the 'collecting' is not only in its repetition but within the 'practice'. Could I see this as the repetition within the repetition? But the 'Western practice' in itself is not 'culture collecting' for it is 'of culture collecting', so I think that if there is 'culture collecting' outside of 'Western practice', then it could not be that 'culture collecting' relies only on the notion of 'Western practice' alone. This particular 'culture collecting' has 'its own local genealogy', therefore, the 'local genealogy' is not *within* the 'culture collecting'. Instead, it is 'own[ed]' by 'culture collecting'. And this ownership would also have something to do with the idea of the position,

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[20] *The Predicament of Culture*, 232.

the locality of the 'culture', including the 'genealogy' of it, which I read here, again, is about the framing of the space and time; the space and time from the perspective on the 'Western practice' as this is what the 'culture collecting' is about. Nevertheless, this 'local genealogy' is 'enmeshed in distinct European notions of temporality and order'. Still, not so enmeshed if the 'distinct European notions of temporality and order' could still be known outside of it. That is to say, the 'temporality and order', even if it is claimed to be 'of' 'European notions', cannot be that they are known to be 'temporality and order' *as such*, for this is claimed to be the 'notions'. What is to be determined as 'temporality and order' is outside 'European'.

But where is the 'culture' in this 'culture collecting' in 'Western practice'? At least, to have 'every appropriation of culture' would have to be within the idea that there are either 'insiders [n]or outsiders'. That is, there cannot be something else *other* than these. This would have to already be an idea that 'culture' is built on the notion that there is already the frame, divided between what is outside and inside. As such, I could say that 'appropriation of culture' cannot only be about a 'specific temporal position and form of historical narration', but it also depends on what constitutes 'insiders' and 'outsiders'. Still, the perspective could not be both 'insiders' or 'outsiders' to be able to claim so.

Yet,

> [i]t is increasingly clear, however, that the concrete activity of representing a culture, subculture, or indeed any coherent domain of collective activity is always strategic and selective. The world's societies are too systematically interconnected to permit any easy isolation of separate or independently functioning systems.[21]

What is 'increasingly clear' here is not the 'concrete activity of representing a culture, subculture, or any coherent domain of collective activity' but that it is 'always strategic and selective'. I think there must be a knowledge that 'the concrete activity of representing a culture, subculture, or indeed any coherent domain of collective activity is always strategic and selective' even before this clearness as it is *already* clear.

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[21] *The Predicament of Culture*, 230-31.

And indeed, there is no issue with the 'concrete activity of representing a culture, subculture, or indeed any coherent domain of collective activity'. The 'culture' and 'subculture' are something that can be represented, so what is *not* a 'culture' and 'subculture' could also be known to be a 'culture' and 'subculture'. This 'concrete activity' thus cannot be a 'culture' and 'subculture', though it could be 'of representing culture' and 'subculture'. Therefore, the idea of the 'concrete activity' here in itself as such cannot be said to be, in this perspective, something prior to a 'culture' and 'subculture'.

Interestingly, what might be at stake could rest upon the idea that there is a need for 'any coherent domain of collective activity', which is not the same as 'the concrete activity of representing a culture [and] subculture'. And how could it be traced, then, to be 'collective'? And there is still a question about 'any coherent domain'. What is this with the 'culture' and the 'activity'? And even 'subculture'? Is it the breakdown of the 'culture' itself?

Still, those 'activities' could not go beyond the 'world' where they are 'too systematically interconnected to permit any easy isolation of separate or independently functioning systems'. If there is already a knowledge of some things to be 'systematically interconnected', then it would have to come from the position that the 'world's societies' can be identified apart from each other for them to be recognized as multiple. There is also the notion of 'systems' at play here. And although 'the 'world's societies are too systematically interconnected to permit any easy isolation of separate or independently functioning systems', there is a possibility that there could be an 'isolation of separate or independently functioning system', as there is the 'isolation' and the 'independently functioning system' which must be outside of the permission in this formulation *already*.

But I am thinking again about the positions of 'societies', 'systems', and 'cultures' within the frame of the 'world'. As 'societies' belong to the 'world' and 'culture' cannot go beyond it, I could say that the 'culture' might not be a part of the 'systems'. Rather, it is the 'societies' which could function *as such*. Indeed, the 'culture' can be known for, but not in itself something that

can be in the 'systems'. Therefore, I could say that 'culture' is to be 'represented' to be in the 'systems', something that has to be deferred and cannot present itself in the 'societies' as *itself*.

In a sense, the issue here is not about how the 'societies' are too 'systematically interconnected to permit any easy isolation of separate or independently functioning systems', for it is already *known* to be so, but it is rather about how there is a stake in the idea of 'activity' of 'representing a culture […] being 'strategic' and 'selective', and that it is 'always' the case.

Might there be, also, a kind of 'system' here?

> The existence of the comic book has done more than just help undermine the primacy of the printed word. Comic books break down, or at least blur boundaries between word texts and picture texts. Reading comic books requires a different type of literacy because on the comic-book page the drawn word and the drawn picture are both images to be read as a single integrated text.[22]

What is beyond the 'help undermin[ing] the primacy of the printed word' of the 'existence' of 'comic book' would have to be 'more', the excess of what it *could do*. '[B]reak[ing] down' or 'blur[ing] boundaries between word texts and picture texts' are not the way to 'help undermine the primacy of the printed word' because comic books can do *more* than just that. 'Comic books break down, or at least blur boundaries between word texts and picture texts' could only be so if there are already the 'boundaries between word texts' and 'picture texts', and there must be a knowledge here of what the 'word' and 'text' are, including its difference, to be able to claim as such, as both 'picture' and 'word' can be a part of the 'texts'.

In a way, I could read the investment in 'breaking down' or 'at least' 'blur boundaries between word texts and picture texts'. But again, I am thinking about the 'boundaries' because if they can be broken down, then they are not something that is permanent, or at least not from this perspective. They are something that can be perceived, as it can be blurred as well. As such, the 'boundaries' also are not the frame of the 'texts', but they would have to be if they could 'break

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[22] Randy Duncan and Matthew J. Smith, *The Power of Comics: History, Form and Culture*, Kindle ed. (New York: Continuum, 2009), xvi.

down' that which are in 'between', the frame *between* the frames of 'word texts' and 'picture texts'. But I am *still* thinking if the breaking down of boundaries would have anything to do with the 'word texts' and 'picture texts', for if they are already known to be different and separate from each other, then the 'boundaries' could be *anything* else besides making it *different*.

Or it might have something to do with 'reading': 'Reading comic books requires a different type of literacy because on the comic-book page the drawn word and the drawn picture are both images to be read as a single integrated text'. Since '[r]eading comic books' 'requires' something else to be *read*, this reading thus not only has to be outside of the comic book itself, but it is also not enough. And if the 'drawn word and the drawn picture' have to be read as a 'single integrated text', then this could be the breaking down of the 'boundaries'. And if this is the case, then the 'break down' of the 'boundaries', even though it is claimed to be done by the 'comic books', cannot be possible without the 'reading' and the knowledge that this has to be the 'boundaries' — that these are the 'drawn word' and the 'drawn picture'. As such, what could be at stake here is that the 'reading' would have to be outside of the 'comic books', the 'drawn word', and the 'drawn picture'. Yet, this 'reading' could construct the idea of a 'comic book' since what it does is to 'break down' or 'at least blur boundaries' — to be read as a 'single integrated text'. That is to say, the 'comic book' is constituted by the 'reading', which requires a specific 'type of literacy' outside of itself to be known as *itself*. Nevertheless, although the 'drawn word' and the 'drawn picture' are different, both share the construction of which they are both 'images to be read as a single integrated text' and could only be on the 'comic-book page', for that is the limit to which they are known as 'comic books'.

As such, to 'break down' the 'boundaries' would be to do with the idea of 'reading', which could make what is known to be multiple 'images' to be known as something singular — 'single integrated text' — through the 'reading'. '*[A]s* a single integrated text' because although they are to be read as such, the 'drawn word' and the 'drawn picture' itself would still be known to be different. This singularity could only be so when there is a reading, the limit of this 'single integrated text'.

I am getting somewhere. So, I would like to think again about the idea of 'culture' and 'history' of the 'system'. For *there* is a system, there is time, and there is the limitation of boundaries of which one cannot be altogether distinguished from *another*, of looking at the *positions* with the idea of 'time'.

Albert Einstein in his Special Theory (Relativity) states that time is not absolute but relative to the position of the observer. In essence the panel (or box) makes that postulate a reality for the comic book reader. The act of paneling or boxing the action not only defines its parameters but establishes the position of the reader in relation to the scene and indicates the duration of the event. Indeed, it 'tells' time. […] The act of framing separates the scenes and acts as a punctuator. Once established and set in sequence the box or panel becomes the criterion by which to judge the illusion of time.[23]

So, according to Einstein, the 'time' has to do with the 'position of the observer'. But I think this could only be possible if there is another perspective on the 'observer', which is in a different position from the 'observer' to know that 'time' is 'relative'. That is to say, the statement would have to rely on the idea that there is more than one position of the observer to be able to claim this 'position'. Although 'time' that is 'not absolute' here would have to be limited to this 'Special Theory', which in turn requires this 'observer'.

But the issue of 'time' here should have something to do with the 'paneling or boxing' of the 'action'. So, the 'action' in the 'comic book' could be contained? There is a tension here in which this formulation implies the excess of the 'action', and in that *action* could define 'its parameters' and 'establishes the position of the reader in relation to the scene'. The question would be: how could the perspective guarantee the position of the observer, or in this case, the 'reader' to be the same to be able to *know* — 'establish' — its relation to the 'scene' and 'indicate the duration of the event'?

If that is the case, then the ability to frame the 'action' should not have much to do with the 'position of the reader', rather, it should be about the 'scene' that is in 'relation' to the 'position

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[23] Will Eisner, *Comics & Sequential Art* (Florida: Poorhouse Press, 1985), 28.

of the reader'. It could also 'indicate the duration of the event'. Indicate to whom? If the answer is the 'reader', then this 'duration of the event' would have to be *there* whether the 'reader' is established. That is, the 'duration of the event', in this formulation, does not rely on the establishment of the 'reader'.

But does it?

I cannot help but think about this relationship between the 'scene' and the 'event', for although both are different, they are to do with the 'position' of the 'reader'. The scene is 'in relation' to the position of the 'reader', but the 'event' is something that could be indicated to the 'reader'. That is to say, this is to be thought of as a *sequence* — the *progress*. So, I could read that if there is a change in this *position* of the 'reader in relation to the scene', there might not be this 'event'? Or could there be a change in this 'duration'?

Nevertheless, the 'position' of the 'reader' would have to be 'established' for the 'duration of the event' to be 'indicated' to the 'reader'.

'Indeed, it "tells" time'.

Indicating the 'duration of the event'? Telling 'time'? So, from this claim, the idea of 'time' cannot be accessed. There is the idea of 'time', *yet*, even in this formulation, from the perspective which could somehow establish the 'position of the reader in relation to the scene', the time is still being alluded to here. But there is more to this 'time'. If 'the act of framing separates the scenes and acts as a punctuator', then the scene is thought of as something as *one* but could be 'sperate[d]'. And if the 'act of framing' could separate the 'scene', then there should be a scene before the 'act of framing'. That is, they cannot happen at the same time. There is also a 'punctuator' although it is not the 'punctuator' *as such* but the 'act of framing' that acts 'as' one.

The 'box' or the 'panel' are to be 'established and set in sequence'. If so, can I say that the separate scenes are not 'in sequence'? Or could I say that the 'scene[s]' are not in 'sequence'? Thus, there is a 'sequence' once the 'box or panel' are 'established and set'.

But the 'sequence' could have to do with the idea of the 'duration of the event'. If so, the 'scene' itself cannot gesture to the notion of 'time'. It requires the 'act of framing', 'boxing', and 'paneling'. Nonetheless, the 'criterion' is still *not* the 'box or panel' since those are what they 'become'. And it is this 'criterion by which to judge the illusion of time'. That is, although there is the notion of 'time' to be said about here, what is being claimed is the 'illusion of time', which has to be 'judged'. So, establishing the 'position' cannot guarantee the 'time' here, despite the idea that 'time' is 'relative to the position of the observer'. *Time* is the 'illusion' in the 'comic book', which relies on 'criterion' to 'judge'. To 'judge illusion of time'? Then the establishment of the 'position of the reader' might not be enough, for 'time' is still not certain in a sense. So, the issue here would be the 'position of the reader' and the 'scene' and how this 'act of paneling or boxing' could establish the relationship between the two.

Could these be the techniques? For this is to do with the 'position of the readers', as McCloud also states:

(Figure 3)[24]

If 'ALL OF THESE TECHNIQUES AMPLIFIED THE SENSE OF READER PARTICIPATION IN MANGA', then there should already be the 'READER PARTICIPATION IN MANGA'. And these techniques do not necessarily have to do with the 'READER

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[24] McCloud, *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 217.

PARTICIPATION' itself, but 'RATHER' the 'SENSE' of it. The question is: should there be, then, the 'READING PARTICIPATION' in 'MANGA'? The claim here constitutes the position of the 'READER' and the 'MANGA' outside each other. But I am curious about what this position *could* do, for this could be more than about the observer. There are the 'OBSERVER' and the 'READER'. The difference between them could be about how the 'OBSERVING' should already be in place, that there is already the determined position of the 'READER' and the 'STORY'. Nevertheless, this position could only hinge on the idea of the 'SENSE', for it has to be within the 'SENSE OF READER PARTICIPATION'. That is, the 'SENSE' is *not* the 'FEELING'. I could say that they operate separately, for this 'FEELING' would require the sense of the 'READER PARTICIPATION'.

But this is not to say that the observer is not without the 'SENSE OF READER PARTICIPATION'. Instead, I think that 'OBSERVING THE STORY FROM AFAR' is something which is also within this 'PARTICIPATION', already, including a 'FEELING OF BEING PART OF THE STORY'. What the 'TECHNIQUES' do — amplifying the 'SENSE OF READER PARTICIPATION' — is to do with both a 'FEELING OF BEING A PART OF THE STORY' and the 'OBSERVING THE STORY FROM AFAR' in a sense that it is the *limit* to one another. That is, within the frame of the 'SENSE', I could read a 'FEELING OF BEING A PART OF THE STORY' as an *excess* to the 'OBSERVING'. Or I could say that the 'FEELING' of 'BEING PART OF THE STORY' is something *more*. But how could it be *more* while being different? Or why invest in a 'FEELING OF BEING PART OF THE STORY'? And it is part of the 'PURPOSE'. Still, that is not to say that the 'READER' could be a 'PART OF THE STORY' since it is only a 'FEELING'. But how could the perspective guarantee that these techniques can affect a 'FEELING' of *another*, or even claim to know the 'FEELING' of the 'READER'? There is a stake in this.

Hence, this is to do with the idea of the relationship and the position between the 'reader' and the 'story'. Might I say that the closer to the 'story', the better? Although, as it claims, the *position* does not change, only the 'sense' and the 'feeling'.

And this is pretty much about the panel and the box.

It is not possible for a reader to passively receive meaning from a comic book. Even comprehending what each picture represents and what each word means requires some effort, and moving beyond image comprehension to understanding the panel as a whole and how it fits into the overall narrative requires comic book readers to make inferences about the functions of images and the relationships between images.[25]

What I found interesting here is the idea of 'meaning' *in* the 'comic book' and that 'meaning' could be transferred to the 'reader', the receiver. What could be a problem is that although there is the 'meaning' that the 'reader' could 'receive', it is only possible with the condition of being *not* 'passively'. I could read here a lack in the 'reader' itself. And if the 'reader' 'requires some effort' to understand 'the panel as a whole and how it fits into the overall narrative', then I think there is *already* a set up of the 'narrative' that the 'reader' could 'understand'.

Still, even though it is 'not possible', I could say that the receiving though must have already occurred, for there is the knowledge of what is needed for the 'reader' to receive the 'meaning'. Yet, receiving the 'meaning' might not be enough, for there is still the need to comprehend 'what each picture represents and what each word means'. As such, even if there is no 'understanding' of what 'the 'picture represent[s]' or what the 'word means', there is still a knowledge that the 'picture' must 'represents' *something* and the 'word' — 'each word' — have a meaning. And that what it does is to 'represent' or 'mean' *anything* else besides itself, outside of itself.

Here, the idea is not about the understanding of 'the panel' but the 'panel as a whole', which has to 'fit into the overall narrative'. If those would have to fit the 'overall narrative', then, as I have already mentioned, there must already be the *known* narrative before understanding the 'panel as a whole' and 'how it fits into the overall narrative'. This understanding thus cannot be done only by the 'readers', as 'comic book readers' are required to 'make inferences about the

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[25] Duncan and Smith, *The Power of Comics: History, Form and Culture*, 168.

functions of images and the relationship between images'. As such, I could say that this could be another *system* or a 'function' of the 'images' — something that the 'readers' need outside of the 'comic book', not only to *read* but to understand the 'image' and 'comprehend' what 'each picture represents'.

I also could read another frame within the frame of 'each picture' and 'each word'. For there is *already* something that is known to be more to it, even though what is to be *more* is yet to be known, as that would require the 'readers to make inferences […] and the relationships between images'. There is a deferral to what it could *be*. In addition, another frame would be the idea that 'each picture' and 'each word', once it is known, is yet to be what the 'readers' require to know, for they would have to need more than 'each picture' and 'each word' to understand the 'panel' and how it 'fits into overall narrative'.

Could there be a gap between the set up of the 'panel' and the ability of the 'reader' which the 'reader' has to 'judge' the 'illusion of time'? The relativity of time could thus rely on the reader's ability to 'judge' or *see* the 'criterion' despite the reader's understanding of the 'scene'.

Therefore, I could say that what must be known for the readers here is not the 'overall narrative', for that might have *already* been in place. Instead, it is to 'know what each picture represents and what each word means', and then understand the 'relationships between images'. That is to say, this would be about the idea that there *must* be the 'relationships between images' and the 'function of images' even though there is still no understanding of it. At least, the 'comic book' cannot be about one picture, for it would require multiple 'images' to constitute the idea of 'relationships'. Nevertheless, the notion of 'comprehending' what 'each picture represents' would have to be in the formulation, for there is still *something* 'moving beyond' that.

Chapter 2: Reading Manga's Reader

'[R]eader'? '[A]udience'?

If what has been constructed in the 'comics' relies on the idea of 'reader' and 'audience', then I would like to think more about the relationship between those ideas. And Galbraith has some thoughts on the 'reader'. For, '[i]n the literature on manga and anime in North America, examples abound of referring to manga/anime fans in general, if not also viewers/readers, as "otaku."'[26]

First of all, what I am dealing with now is in the 'literature'. Not only so, but it is being framed by the area — 'North America'. And if the perspective could invoke the 'examples' from the 'literature', then there must be multiple 'manga/anime fans' already for the perspective to work with. That is, the 'referring' would have already happened. Nonetheless, if these 'examples' are about the 'manga/anime fans in general', then there should be more to these 'manga/anime fans', or at least they are *not* '"otaku"' for that is what they are being referred to 'in general'. But this has to be worked in limitation, for the referring can only be in the 'literature on manga and anime in North America'.

More to these 'manga/anime fans in general'? Because there are also 'views' and 'readers' in this limitation. '[I]f not also'? So, the 'viewers/readers' are the addition in this case although they are still being thought of as a condition in relation to the '"otaku"'.

But if 'manga/anime fans' are different from the '"otaku"', then what can be said more about this '"otaku"'? And what is the frame of the " " of the '"otaku"'?

Galbraith continues:

I have decided to keep "otaku" in scare quotes and draw attention to it as a label, which is to be interrogated in context rather than taken for granted at large. More concretely, I present "otaku" as a label that is applied in response to the imagined excesses and

[26] Patrick W. Galbraith, Otaku and the Struggle for Imagination in Japan, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2019). 5.

perversions of "male" fans of manga and anime, namely an attraction to and affection for cute girl characters.[27]

The quotation marks are to do with the 'label', but what 'draw[s]' attention is not the quote itself but the "'otaku'" in the quote. And if that is the case, they would have to work together. The "'otaku'" could be known as another — a 'label'. Yet, this is the 'attention', as such, what it is known to be *could be* more than a 'label'. That is to say, the 'otaku' itself could be *another*. There is the 'otaku' and what the otaku *could* be at the same time. As such, I could read the split in this "'otaku'".

The 'label' is also something that 'I' decide, so what it *is* relies on the perspective on 'I'. Why so? Because this is to be 'interrogated in context rather than taken for granted at large'. Therefore, the construction of this 'label', according to 'I', could allow this interrogation in 'context'. From this formulation, I can read the inability of 'otaku' itself to be seen as 'otaku'.

So, there is the 'otaku' and the "'otaku'" which is 'present[ed]' as a label that is applied in response to the imagined excesses and perversions of "'male' fans of manga and anime'. That is, since this is the 'label' that is in 'response' to the 'imagined excesses and perversions of "male" fans of manga and anime', then the "'otaku'" would have to be constituted by 'I', relying on the 'imagined excesses and perversions of "male" fans of manga and anime'. Nevertheless, the "'otaku'" could be 'label', but it could be another if this is what 'I' present[s]. So, could I read this as the 'looking'? That should be more about *this* "'otaku'" outside of the 'label'? But whatever it is, "'otaku'" is not 'excesses and perversions of "male" fans of manga and anime' because it is only something that is 'imagined'. And there could be *more* to it, for there should already be the "'male' fans of manga and anime' in this claim.

But might these 'scare quotes' be the *system*?

If the 'scare quotes' are about framing this idea, then this "male" could also be about the labeling. So, there should also be the "'male'" that is being 'interrogated in context', in other words, there is also a split in this "'male'". And these "'male' fans of manga and anime' could

[27] *Otaku and the Struggle for Imagination in Japan.* 6.

be *known* as another, 'namely an attraction to and affection for cute girl characters.' So, the idea of 'excesses and perversions' could have to do with 'attraction' and 'affection' for 'cute girl characters.'

But what about the 'otaku' in another context? Or outside of this 'context'?

Otaku, which translates to the English term 'nerd', was a slang term used by amateur manga artists and fans themselves in the 1980s to describe 'weirdoes' (*henjin*).[28]

For Kinsella, '[o]taku' is about the translation. So, through the translation process, '[o]taku' could be associated with the 'English term "nerd"'. And if it is about the translation, then, assuming from my previous read, the 'term' has already lost something. In any case, what 'otaku' *is* is still not the 'nerd' because it is but the 'term' that has been brought into the formulation here. That is to say, if '[o]taku is something that can be translated to another 'term', then it would have to be outside of the 'English term' and the '"nerd"'. So, '[o]taku' could be known in many 'term[s]' depending on the translation and how it is 'used'. Although this use is limited, it is only used by 'amateur manga artists and fans' and in the '1980s' to 'describe "weirdoes" (*henjin*)'.

But I stand by my previous reading, as the translation would have to be about framing what has already been known to the perspective, for there could be no '[o]taku' in this case ('translate[d] to the English term "nerd"' if there is no 'nerd' in the formulation). But what it has been 'translated' to is different from what it has been 'used', as 'otaku' is being used to 'describe "weirdoes" (*henjin*)'. So, '"weirdoes"' and '"nerds"' are different, and both are connected to the 'otaku' in different frames. So there is a connection that has been made between two frames through the gap.

In addition, Parker also claims that 'Tamaki has become well-known for offering a defense of the otaku, using some Lacanian concepts to characterize them.'[29] So, the 'otaku' could

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[28] Sharon Kinsella, *Adult Manga: Culture and Power in Contemporary Japanese Society*, Consumasian Book Series (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2000).

[29] Saito Tamaki, *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, trans. J. Keith Vincent and Dawn Lawson (Minneapolis, London: Univeristy of Minnesota Press, 2011), 62.

be characterized? And if Tamaki is to defend the 'otaku', what is being defended against? To quote Parker on this:

> The term became more widespread after the arrest in 1989 of a young man for serial murder and cannibalism; his collection of otaku comics and videos drew attention to 'otaku culture' as a problem.[30]

The otaku itself is not the issue here, nor the 'term' of it. Instead, the notions associated with those things become the issue, at least according to this formulation. 'The term become more widespread after the arrest in 1989 of a young man for serial murder and cannibalism'. And maybe this is how the system of culture is constructed, for the word — the 'term' itself is still the same — how the position and time shape what is to do with the 'term' has changed the perspective on the 'term'.

But how his 'collection of otaku comics and videos drew attention to "otaku culture" as a problem'? And how is the connection being constructed between the 'otaku collection' and the 'young man'? Could I think of this as the frame of identity? Or maybe I should look at the idea of 'collection', starting with what Walter says in *Illuminations*.

> Every passion borders on the chaotic, but the collector's passion borders on the chaos of memories. More than that: the chance, the fate, that suffuse the past before my eyes are conspicuously present in the accustomed confusion of these books. For what else is this collection but a disorder to which habit has accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as order?[31]

'[P]assion is not the 'chaotic', for there is a frame in which can be known to separate the two. This would be about the position and the limit of the 'passion'. If '[e]very passion borders on the chaotic', 'but' would put 'collector's passion' outside of 'every passion', so 'every' could not be 'every' *as such*. 'Every' could also be about repetition, for the multiplicity of the 'passion'

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[30] Ian Parker, *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 62.
[31] Benjamin Walter, *Illuminations*, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 60.

is to be known as the *same*. Nevertheless, if 'collector's passion' is different from 'every passion', then the ownership here would have to be able to *shift* the construction of 'passion'.

'[M]emories'? The next question would be: whose 'memories' are these? It could be the 'collector's' or outside of it. Nevertheless, I could say that 'memories' here are something to do with 'chaos', even though it is outside. So, the idea would have to hinge on the relationship between what is *known* to be outside, as this is a reading on the positions of 'passion' and 'memories'. 'More than that' could be about 'memories', that there is an excess of what is known to be *already* within the frame because what has been transferred would have to be 'before my eyes'. That is to say, this is something to do with *time,* that there is a *process* 'that suffuse[s] the past before my eyes are conspicuously present in the accustomed confusion of these books'.

Why am I thinking back on *time* again? That would be because there is already the set up of what is to be the 'past'; the 'past', which has to rely on 'my eyes' to be known as such. But I think that it could also be the other way around, that the 'past' itself does not hinge on 'my eyes', for that is the 'past' that 'are conspicuously present in the accustomed confusion of these books', so there must be more to it, those that are not before 'my eyes'. Therefore, 'my eyes' could also be another frame, for if what is to be 'present[ed] in […] these books' to be 'before my eyes', then there can be nothing else to be said to be in 'these books', as it is the 'accustomed confusion of these books'.

The *seeing* seems to be what matters here, for '[m]ore than that', the 'chance', the 'fate' is 'present[ed]'. It is not about what they *are*, but what is being 'present[ed]'. 'For what else is this collection but a disorder to which habit has accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as order?'

'[A]ppear as the order?' So there is a question. But what is already known here would be that 'it' is *not* in 'order', for that is only the possibility of being so. The appearance thus is different from what *it is*. 'For what else is this collection [..] that it can appear as order?' This asking is the asking for *more*, beyond what is known to be the limit of the frame of the 'collection'. So, there is a construction that relies on the ground that there is a limit to which the appearance could shift.

That is, I could read the split in this 'collection', for although this is a specific 'collection', being known from the outside to be claimed so, accommodating 'itself' could not be possible without 'it' thinking towards 'itself' to claim *as such*.

But does it? For if there is a question regarding what is beyond 'this collection', then, as I read, there has to be a set up of what 'this collection' is *already*: 'a disorder to which habit has accommodated itself to such an extent that it can appear as order[.]' So, what this 'collection' is *is* not the 'collection'. It could be about the deferral, the layering of knowing what it is by looking outside of it.

> Some sort of "gathering" around the self and the group—the assemblage of a material "world," the marking-off of a subjective domain that is not "other"—is probably universal. All such collections embody hierarchies of value, exclusions, rule-governed territories of the self. But the notion that this gathering involves the accumulation of possessions, the idea that identity is a kind of wealth (of objects, knowledge, memories, experience), is surely universal. The individualistic accumulation of Melanesian "big men" is not possessive in Macpherson's sense, for in Melanesia one accumulates not to hold objects as private goods but to give them away, to redistribute. In the west, however, collecting has long been a strategy for the deployment of a possessive self, culture, and authenticity.[32]

The 'self' differs from the 'group', but they share a common constitution regarding the position(s), for there would have to be *some* ground for the '"gathering"' to be 'around'. And there is something to think about this '"gathering"', for although I could read that this is not a specific one — '[s]ome sort of' — there is a frame to this; 'the assemblage of a material "world," the marking-off of a subjective domain that is not "other"'. But the '"world"', though, could not be the '"world"' as such because the quotation marks would have to put this '"world"' in the same frame with the '"gathering"' and the '"other"'.

Could I read the 'assemblage of a material "world"' and the 'marking-off of a subjective domain that is not "other"' as 'some sort of "gathering" around the self and the group'? Since this

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[32] Clifford, *The Predicament of Culture*, 218.

is 'some sort of', and the '"gathering"' is not the 'assemblage of a material "world"' and the 'marking-off of a subjective domain', then the 'assemblage of a material "world"' and the 'marking-off' would have to be within the frame *of* the "gathering" around the self and the group'. There are indeed multiple layers to this idea of the '"gathering"'.

But I am still interested in the idea of the 'marking-off of a subjective domain that is not '"other"'. For this to happen, the '"other"' would have to be known before the 'marking-off'. That is to say, the identification of what the '"other"' is and what is not is already occurred. There must be a division of the division to make another *division* — to mark-off of a subjective domain.

Again with the 'material'. So, there is a 'material' that is 'reality' and the 'material' that is a part of the '"world"'. I think the difference could be about the position of *what* is being gathered 'around'. '[T]he marking-off of a subjective domain that is not "other"', so the '"other"' here would have to rely on the 'self and the group'. The universality here, then, if not only the possibility, would have to be about the '"gathering"' as well as the 'self and the group'. And if this '"gathering"' is probably universal, then it is *not* universal as such.

Also, there could be a problem here, for if there are '[a]ll such collections', then there must be collections outside of '[a]ll', 'such collections' would already imply another. But again, it is 'probably universal'. *And* that, itself, is not 'universal'. 'All such collections embody hierarchies of value, exclusions, rule-governed territories of the self', so 'hierarchies of value, exclusions, rule-governed territories of the self' would have to be outside the 'collections'. That is to say, this embodiment only occurs when there is this '"gathering"'.

'[R]ule-governed territories of the self'? Then the 'self' would have to contain, somehow, the idea of space, of the divisions *of* the 'self', for there are multiple 'territories' of the 'self'. Still, this is only about the embodiment of the 'collections'. 'But the notion that this gathering involves the accumulation of possessions, the idea that identity is a kind of wealth […] is surely universal'; however, 'surely' the universality here could not be universal *as such* if there is one that rests in the sureness and that there is a frame of what is 'universal'. So, the '"gathering"' itself is not the 'accumulation of possessions' since that is what it 'involves' with. But it could also be only 'this

gathering', for it is produced from the idea that there *must* be other 'gathering' as well, though I could say that it might not 'surely' be 'universal'.

What this 'gathering involves', though, is about the 'idea' but not the identity itself. And if the 'idea of identity is a kind of wealth' that could be accumulated, then the 'identity' is something that is outside of the self. 'The individualistic accumulation of Melanesian "big men" is not possessive in Macpherson's sense'. So, the perspective would have to be outside of 'Melanesian' and 'Macpherson', but there is a knowledge of what 'Macpherson's sense' of 'possessive' is. That is, the 'possessive' is shifted to be about 'sense', so it could be another, rather, it is about the accumulation. If, in Melanesia, 'one accumulates not to hold objects as private goods but to give them away, to redistribute', then the idea of what accumulation would have to depend on *where* it happens. That is, the 'accumulation' could be both to 'hold objects as private goods' and to 'give them away' — to 'redistribute', but what it *is* would require the idea of framing to make it *so*.

But I am curious about the *position* of it, for I could read that this is not the meaning but something *in* the 'sense'. This should be about the deferral even — that the 'accumulation' could be something else — *in* the 'sense'.

So, 'in Macpherson's sense', 'accumulation' is to 'hold objects as private goods', which is 'possessive'. That is, 'accumulation' is about the constitution of the 'objects' and their relationship surrounding it. If it is to 'hold objects as private goods', then the 'objects' would still be known to be the 'objects'. It is the *holding* that makes it 'as' 'private goods'. If this is the claim to the 'private goods', then here, the 'goods' is not 'private', but they can be one by holding it 'as' one. Moreover, the 'objects' could also be 'give[n] away' to 'redistribute'. But to be able to 'give them away', the 'objects' would have to already be *owned* for it to be 'give[n] away'. That is to say, the notion of 'accumulation' in the 'sense' is about the movement of the 'objects' and how it is being established in their *function* regarding their position.

The shift of the *position*, but not in the 'sense': 'collecting has long been a strategy for the deployment of a possessive self, culture, and authenticity'. As such, 'collecting' is now a

'strategy', and has 'long been so' in the 'west'. So, a 'possessive self, culture, and authenticity' cannot be operated independently. There could also be other 'strateg[ies]' out there, though they might not be used in the 'west'. If that is the case, then, the idea of 'possessive self, culture, and authenticity' could also be outside of the 'West', only it might not be thought of *with* the 'collecting' to be a 'strategy'.

In a *sense*, the issue would be how the 'objects' are being held 'as', which could be thought of as another. But that would require the idea that the possession has to be owned.

> For a collector's attitude toward his possessions stems from an owner's feeling of responsibility toward his property. Thus it is, in the highest sense, the attitude of an heir, and the most distinguished trait of a collection will always be its transmissibility. You should know that in saying this I fully realize that my discussion of the mental climate of collecting will confirm many of you in your conviction that his passion is behind the times, in your distrust of the collector type. Nothing is further from my mind that to shake either your conviction or your distrust. But one thing should be noted: the phenomenon of collecting loses its meaning as it loses its personal owner. Even though public collections may be less objectionable socially and more useful academically than private collections, the objects het their due only in the latter.[33]

A 'collector's attitude' and the 'feeling of responsibility' is not the same, but there is a correlation between the two: one 'stems from' the other. That is, the 'owner's feeling of responsibility toward his property' would have to *be* known since the 'collector's attitude' can only be possible if there is an 'owner's feeling'. So, here it is not so much about the responsibility as such but about an 'owner's feeling' toward his 'property'. That is to say, this is to do with the ownership of the relationship between the objects and the 'owner's feeling'. As such, I could say the construction of the 'collect's attitude' would have to also rely on the 'feeling' of the 'owner' — the 'feeling' which, in turn, is claimed from the outside of the 'owner'.

I am also interested in the shift of perspective on the 'collector's attitude' and the 'owner's feeling'. If, as I read above, it is the 'collector' that came after the 'owner', then the idea of

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[33] Walter, *Illuminations*, 67.

'collector' would have to be working in the frame of the 'owner' albeit its difference. And if the 'collector' 'stems from' the 'owner's feeling', then where *would* the 'collector's attitude' be in this formulation?

In the 'highest sense'? So this would also be about the same and the difference of the 'most distinguished trait of a collection'. That is, the 'collection' is to be known by its 'trait', which 'will always be its transmissibility'. But I think that if the 'most distinguished trait' of the 'collection' 'will always be its transmissibility', then the 'transmissibility' is not naturally within the 'collection'. If it 'will always be', then the 'trait' could be disrupted. But this thinking — *my* thinking — would have to be operated with the idea that the 'transmissibility' *is* the 'trait' and not the 'collection'. So to say, 'will always be' in itself implies that what is to be expected is *not* already of the 'trait' and is not part of the 'collection'.

Nevertheless, this is about knowing 'you' — something that 'you should know'. But this knowledge is also about the realization of 'I'. 'I fully realize'? So 'I' would have to know that there might be some realization outside this 'fully'. That is, this realization could be about the excess in itself; *this* realization could not be accounted for as a whole because the realization *as such* is not complete.

And this is to do with 'your conviction'; somehow, the 'discussion' of 'I' would 'confirm many of you in your conviction'. So to say, 'your conviction' could be confirmed? Or should I say it requires something else to be a conviction? Then from this implication, 'your conviction' could be affected by another. But I should say again that this is the *realization* of 'I', and it could be only so *in* this 'saying'. That is, the realization would have to rely on this 'saying' as well, not as the condition, because this realization might already be outside of this 'saying' but might not be something that 'you should know'. Moreover, 'I' would have to know that there is 'your conviction' before claiming so. Still, the confirmation might not *yet* happen, for it 'will confirm many of you in your conviction'. '[M]any of you'? If there are multiple you(s) in this formulation, I would like to think that there might be a stake in this claim; of the idea that 'many of you' would share the same 'conviction' — 'his passion is behind the times, in your distrust of the collector

type'. And if '[n]othing is further from my mind that to shake either your conviction or your distrust', then 'your conviction or your distrust' could be shaken. So, this realization would be to do with conviction and distrust. These things would have to be known, and because of that, they could be affected by 'I'.

And this is pretty much to do with 'I', for this is about the saying of 'I' and the realization of 'I' *in* it. 'But one thing should be noted', therefore, there is another saying about this in addition to the 'saying' in which there is the realization of 'I'. '[T]he phenomenon of collecting loses its meaning as it loses its personal power', so what to be lost is not the 'collecting', but the 'phenomenon' of it. That is to say, to be able to 'lose' the meaning, the 'phenomenon of collecting' would have to have the 'meaning', and indeed, it would have to be the case since it is 'its meaning'. So, the 'meaning' is outside of the phenomenon. And if it can be lost, then the 'phenomenon' itself does not necessarily require the 'meaning' at all to be the 'phenomenon of collecting'.

But I also think about the *position* of this 'meaning', for I could say that losing the 'meaning' would have to be about the construction of this 'meaning' as well. For, even if the 'phenomenon of collecting loses its meaning', then what it loses could be about the ownership and not the 'meaning' as such — the 'meaning' could be somewhere else in the frame of the 'collection' still.

So, the 'meaning' is to do with the idea of 'personal owner', that losing one thing could be about another, but they do not necessarily come together. In other words, one is a condition to another.

But 'personal owner'? There seems to be a sense that the ownership might not be enough in this case. It should also require the idea of personalness. As such, could it be then, that the notion of the 'owner' could be multiple? It could be about the space and how this 'personal' is perceived from outside the 'owner' be 'personal'.

So, I could say that the 'meaning' is also about personalness in this perspective.

From this, I could read that collecting is not only about the idea of 'ownership' and the 'meaning' that comes with it but rather the idea of privacy and personalness, of something that concerns the self or the grouping of the self which would require the idea of another to frame the *space*, to consider what is *theirs*. Yet, there are stakes in these ideas and claims because although it is to do with *their* space, it is claimed from the outside. The frame of space could only be constructed from the seeing of another. Therefore, the possession could not be about ownership and privacy *as such*. Instead, it is about framing from the perspective of the *self* on the others on itself and the *return* of it to make it so.

To suffice or bring *back* what I have read, the relations of the 'young man' and the 'otaku' rely on the perspective of the construction of the perspective on the idea of 'collections' and the '"otaku comics"'. Interestingly, what is seen as a 'problem' is not the 'otaku comics and video', which is 'his collection', rather, it is the '"otaku culture"'.

But is '"otaku culture"' the 'problem'? I could *not* say that because this is only about the 'young man' incident that draws 'attention' to the '"otaku culture" as the problem'. I might have seen this before, the formulation of constructing the 'attention' to something as *something* else. So to say, '"otaku culture"' is *not* a 'problem', but it could be seen as one. This 'attention' is being drawn under the condition of the 'young man' and his association with his 'collection of otaku comics and videos'. That is to say, this has to rely on the perspective that claims to know 'comics and videos' to be 'otaku' and the relationships between 'otaku comics and videos' and the 'otaku culture'. And the 'culture' because what has happened with the 'young man' and his 'collection' has constructed his identity and the 'self'.

Whatever the otaku *is*, it is being constructed and used in different ways. But I cannot help but think back on the idea of what has been discussed about the perspective on the perspective of the otaku, something which Tamaki argues at length in *Beautiful Fighting Girl*.

As such, in this section, I am going to read several claims and the question surrounding the 'otaku'.

Given the topic of this book[,] we cannot avoid a detailed inquiry into the nature of the otaku. They are, after all, the largest consumers of the beautiful fighting girls. What are the otaku thinking? What do they want and how do they get it? Are we right to speak of a "psychopathology of the otaku"? Or is that a bogus question? Or rather, don't we know the answer already?[34]

Although there is something to be done by 'we', 'we' is somehow subject to the 'topic of this book'. '[W]e cannot avoid a detailed inquiry into the nature of the otaku' because 'we' already know that there is the 'nature of the otaku' and that the 'nature' and the 'otaku' are separated. But the relationship between the 'topic of this book' and 'we' has to be 'given'. The asking, the 'inquiry', itself already puts what to be questioned in its place, that itself is already known to be *as such*. I think this is not about 'inquiry' but a 'detailed inquiry into the nature of the otaku' that 'we cannot avoid'. Interestingly, there is an investment in the specificity of this 'inquiry' since the frame of the 'detail' would have something to do with the 'topic' and the 'nature of the otaku'. Rather, these two are not being *questioned*.

I am thus interested in what 'we' *already* know.

The perspective knows what the 'otaku' is thinking — that there might be a way to know what they are thinking. But what they think should have been different from what 'they want' and what they want is outside of themselves, which requires them to 'get it'. Also, if the question is about 'how' they get it, would this not already happen? For there is a way that 'they get it' already in this formulation. 'Are we right to speak of a "psychopathology of the otaku?"' 'Or rather, don't we know the answer already?' If what 'we' know 'already' is the 'answer', the answer that 'we know' might not be the 'answer' as such (and if 'already' would have to already be in place). The question is not about the 'answer'; it is the knowledge of 'we' that is being questioned. And although there is these 'question[s]' that are being 'question[ed]', I could still read a frame of what to be 'question[ed]'. With these 'question[s]', there is already, to the extent, the return of what to be 'question[ed]'.

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[34] Tamaki, *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 9.

But if, in turn, there is the idea that 'we' 'already' know the 'answer', then this 'answer' is not permanent. At least, it is something that can be lost by 'we'. The relationship between the 'answer' and 'we' must be maintained and reminded.

Saito also has more to say about the otaku, which, possibly, might have something to do with the 'nature of the otaku':

> First, I want to say a few things about the particular challenges involved in speaking about the otaku. Otaku culture is by all accounts still in a state of immaturity (if one can expect "maturity" from it in the first place). Because it is still coming into being, one runs into fundamental difficulties in trying to view it in its entirety. For this reason, we have only a limited number of ways to discuss it. One way is to establish oneself as an otaku and speak as a complete insider, which is to say in a strategically uncritical manner (this is the stance taken by Okada Toshio).[35]

This is not the 'inquiry' as such, for this is about the 'speaking'. I could read that what the 'otaku' *is* is not the issue, for 'I', the 'challenges' only involve when there is a 'speaking' about it. Otaku itself can also be a part of 'culture', and it cannot be another, for this would already put '[o]taku' outside of it. Also, being in a 'state of immaturity' would imply that its 'state' could go beyond that, that is, 'if one can expect "maturity" from it in the first place'. So, although there is a condition in which the '"maturity"' comes into question, the 'state' of the 'otaku' would have to exceed itself already to be *more* than that. 'If one can expect "maturity" from it in the first place' does not affect the 'state' of it in any way. If 'it is still coming into being', then I could read that the 'state' of 'immaturity' is not *yet* the 'being'. And because it is in this state, 'one runs into fundamental difficulties in trying to view it in its entirety'. As such, there is an investment in *seeing* in 'its entirety'. I could not say that 'one' cannot 'view it in its entirety', only that there are 'fundamental difficulties' in order to do so. That is, to be able to know that there are 'difficulties' in this 'trying to view' or even that there is the 'entirety', there must be already knowledge of what the 'entirety' *is.* The viewing must have already occurred to be able to claim *as such*.

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[35] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 10.

And if 'one' can potentially 'view it in its entirety', then it could also be viewed differently. This would also imply that even though it can be viewed differently (*not* in its 'entirety'), it would still be known as the same. But how would 'one' be able to 'view'? *And* why would 'one' want to 'view it in its entirety'? It might be because the 'view[ing]' of its 'entirety' would have something to do with how it can be 'discussed'. That is to say, there must be a relationship between what can be seen and what can be spoken for. '[W]e have only a limited number of ways to discuss it'. The concern here would be that there are 'ways' for 'we' to 'discuss' about 'otaku', but it is limited. This limitation is to be thought of as an issue. Since with this implication, the limitation would gesture to what beyond this limitation — there could be *more* than this.

But there is a stake in this, for if there is 'speaking' about the 'otaku' being framed by the 'view' on it, then I could say that all of this would have to rely on the *seeing* of 'one'. And 'we', resulting from this *seeing*, is thus framed.

Another 'appropriation of culture'? I could not help but think back again on Clifford's claim: '[e]very appropriation of culture, whether by insiders or outsiders, implies a specific temporal position and form of historical narration'. So, if there is '[o]ne way' to 'establish oneself as an otaku and speak as a complete insider', 'oneself' must be *anything* besides an 'otaku' and a 'complete insider'. What I find interesting is the idea that being able to 'speak' would have to rely on the speaker's position. It might have — *would have* — been 'temporal', for if 'one' can establish 'oneself', there must be a changing in this *position*, in this frame. This 'speaking' is thus a 'strategically uncritical manner', a 'stance taken by Okada Toshio'. Indeed, this position would have to already been *taken*, for this could be 'one' of the 'limited ways' to 'discuss' about the 'otaku', the already *known* 'challenges'. As such, as I have read, even though the notion of 'speaking' would have to hinge on the 'position', this position is still being 'establish[ed]' by 'oneself'. That is, I could also say that this would be about the 'choice'.

Alternatively, one can choose to take oneself out of the equation altogether and face the otaku with an attitude of revulsion and rejection. These two approaches may seem quite

at odds, but in fact they are both versions of self- love and often amount to confessions of a kind of otakuphilia. When speaking of the otaku, it is crucial to begin by recognizing that these are the only two approaches currently available to us.[36]

An 'outsider'? Indeed, '[a]lternatively' would have to be about the choice, for 'one can choose to take oneself out of the equation altogether and face the otaku with an attitude of revulsion and rejection'. But this might be a problem, for if 'one' 'choose[s] to take oneself out the equation altogether', 'one' *must* have already known itself to be in the 'equation' despite the choice.

How to, though, take 'oneself' out of the 'equation altogether'? If 'one' must be out of the 'equation', there would have to have *still* to be this 'equation' and 'oneself' in the formulation.

In a sense, I could also say that there might be a frame in this 'equation', 'altogether', as there has to be more to this 'otaku', perhaps a coloration between the 'view' of it and the 'speaking' about it. Because if 'and' is about what to come *after*, then 'oneself' might potentially be in this 'equation' again, but 'with an attitude of revulsion and rejection'.

There are 'challenges involved in speaking about the otaku', and it is 'crucial to begin by recognizing that there are the only two approaches currently available to us'. So, according to this, there should be a sequence in 'speaking about otaku'. Thus, the 'recognizing' would have to be outside of the 'speaking', and it does not necessarily come together, for it is 'crucial to begin' — the recognizing would only be after the beginning. But I think the concern here would be that there should be recognition and *should be* because it is not a requirement. That there are 'two approaches currently available to us' is framed with this 'recognizing'. And the 'us' would have to know this, the frame of the recognition, for there is a claim of what to do, to 'speak about', and what is 'available'. As such, '[w]hen speaking about the otaku' would have to have already happened, for the 'speaking' is not limited by the 'recognizing'.

But are these 'approaches' really the 'only two' available? Indeed, if 'two approaches' are framed by this 'recognizing', then the perspective knows that outside of this recognizing, there

[36] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 10.

would have to be more than these 'two' that *could* be 'available to us'. So, if these 'two' approaches' are 'currently available to us', then the availability would have something to do with *time* and the idea of recognition. The 'approaches' here are not permanent to 'us'. The correlation between 'us' and 'two approache[s]' could be shifted or removed.

I want to go back again to Clifford: '[e]very appropriation of culture, whether by insiders or outsiders, implies a specific temporal position and form of historical narration'. For there is something I am curious about, and that is the notion of the 'form of historical narration': Whose narration is this? I think there might be a stake in the idea of knowing the 'historical narration' and the implication of it because I think this would have to do something with *time*, a tracing back — of knowing this 'historical narration' as it is.

Maybe I am going back *again* to the beginning, the history of it, perhaps the 'form of historical narration', and where 'we must begin',

Theories of Otaku
First[,] we must begin with a definition of the otaku.
This definition is not all that exciting. It is a provisional description of the kind of person that this book calls an otaku. But if possible[,] I hope it is a description that helps clarify the territory of the otaku community.

The word otaku, which has now spread around the globe, is remarkable for the variety of meanings it has. Let us first briefly review the all-too-famous process by which the term was coined and gained currency. As we do so, it is worth noting that the very fact that we are able to trace the word's roots with such precision is itself a reflection of the particularities of the contemporary media environment.[37]

So, should I not begin at the 'beginning'?[38] Or maybe *another* beginning? But at least it is not 'first' since 'we' need to 'begin' (as 'must' would have to make this a requirement). As such, there is a concern with *what* to 'begin' here. I could say, though, that this is *another* beginning, framed with the 'Theories of Otaku'. That is, the 'otaku' would have to already be seen as something that can be explained, of what the 'otaku' is can be known from elsewhere. So,

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[37] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 11.
[38] My reading, *again*, with Derrida's claim: 'Let us not begin at the beginning'.

I think that these 'theories' have to be outside of the 'otaku', but they cannot be thought of *without* the 'otaku' as such, for they are something that comes *after* to be understood in the frame. Nevertheless, it is outside of the frame.

It begins *with* the 'definition of the otaku', so what the 'otaku' is in itself is not in itself enough for 'we'. That is, to begin about the 'otaku', 'we' need more than the 'otaku', something outside of the 'otaku'. The 'definition' though is different from 'theories'. I could say it could be a part of it, for the 'definition' is indeed *within* the frame. Thus, the 'definition' of the 'otaku' could be the 'kind of person' which 'we' is not, but that would have to be what 'this book calls'. As such, what the 'otaku' *is* is outside of the 'book'. The 'kind of person' itself is not an 'otaku' to the 'book' because it is what is being 'call[ed]'. The 'definition' would also have to differ from the 'description' of the 'otaku'. But this *also* would have to be about the positioning of the 'otaku', which must be there because it is to help 'clarify the territory', as there is the construction of the 'territory' of the 'otaku community' *already*. The 'description' can affect the *seeing* somehow — to make it more transparent. So, this is *another* framing of the position of the 'otaku', not what the 'otaku' *is*.

Because I am now thinking about the 'word', 'which has now spread around the globe'. If the 'word otaku' can be repeated, 'spread around the globe', then it has to be more than *one*. The multiple of this 'word' is in the 'meanings', which I can read as something separate from the 'word' itself, though there is a connection between the two. Might I go back *again* to the 'term "manga"', for there is a template here about how the 'word' is used, depending on the position of it — the 'globe'. But this might have to do with the ability to be repeated, for although the 'meanings' are different, they are still known as the 'word otaku'. That is to say, to be able to know them as multiple, there cannot be only one position in this formulation. 'We' would have to see the 'term' in different positions to claim as such, for as I have read, the notion of 'meanings' here is about the *position* and *on* the position.

This could go back again to the notion of 'culture', for although the 'word otaku' is not the 'culture', both share the *process*, depending on the positions, to be known *as such*; in its multiple, do not change what they *are*, but what they are 'associated with'.

Nevertheless, 'it is worth noting that the very fact that we are able to trace the word's roots with such precision is itself a reflection of the particularities of the contemporary media environment.' Might this be the 'historical narration'? This is the claim that the 'word' could be 'trac[ed]' back, something that 'we' can although only 'as we do so'. Something that is known to be *before* the 'word otaku'. The 'noting' would have to be about the 'doing' but outside of it. Additionally, this 'trac[ing]' back would have to do with the idea that 'time' must have already been in place in relation to the positions. Interestingly, 'we' in this case would have to also know what the 'word's roots' are, for there is a recognition of the originality of the 'roots' 'with such precision'. So I could say that the 'trac[ing]' would have already occurred. Still, there is somehow an issue here, for if 'we' claim to know what the 'word's roots' are, the 'word's roots' *as such*, then it could also be that the *position* of the 'word's roots' would have to be known before the 'trac[ing]' even. And this 'very fact' reflects the 'particularities of the contemporary media environment'. So, there is no rethinking of the 'contemporary media environment' as that would have to be included in this 'fact'.

How does this reflect, though? This would have to do something with *time*, for this is the 'contemporary media environment' and the 'reflection of the particularities'. Yet, there might be more about this 'contemporary media environment' than in the reflection, more than the 'very fact' 'itself'. If the ability to 'trace the word's roots' could reflect the idea of the 'contemporary media', then the tracing would have to occur within the frame of this 'contemporary' as well. So, I could say that, in turn, the notion of the 'contemporar[ity]' allows 'we' to 'trace the word's roots with such precision' within the 'environment'.

Yet, what is the 'word's roots' entail? Or even the limit of it? For the tracing must include the knowledge of what is to be the 'roots' already.

Saito also adds:

Nakamori, who originally came up with the term, seems to have had his own prejudicial stance toward the unique personality of the anime fan, but he never got around to providing a strict definition of otaku.[39]

Nevertheless,

[w]hile they have a vagueness that eludes definition, they have also had a decisive impact on our language. This is why I do not believe that a perfect definition of the otaku is possible. But the abstractions and descriptions that I am going to attempt here do, I hope, go some way toward clarifying our picture of the otaku. This is all that I am aiming for.[40]

Another perspective on the 'original[ity]'. And this might be the answer to my previous question that the 'word's root' could be about the originality and 'Nakamori' who 'came up with the term'; the tracing back of the claim of the originality. But despite the claim that 'Nakamori' 'came up with the term', the originality still needs to come from outside 'Nakamori'. Even so, I could say that there is not only an investment in the idea of 'who came up with the term' but also the position of 'Nakamori' — 'his own prejudicial stance toward the unique personality of the anime fan'. Still, there could be a stake here on the 'seem[ingly]' of 'Nakamori', for this would have to rest on the appearance, as this is also about how 'he never got around to providing a strict definition of otaku'. That is, if 'Nakamori' has something to do with the originality and would have something to do with the *position* as such, then the 'definition of the otaku' could not be thought of without 'Nakamori'. But this is not to say that there is no 'definition' at all, for there is the possibility to be so, even beyond 'Nakamori' who is claimed to be the original; there is already the 'strict definition of otaku', only 'he never got around' to provide *one*.

I would say *one* because the idea of 'vagueness' (another *seeing*), 'that eludes definition,' would have to be about 'they', the multiplicity. If 'they' also had a 'decisive impact on our language', then 'they' here is thought to be 'outside' 'our language'. As such, 'I do not believe that a perfect definition of the otaku is possible', but still, as I have read, there *could* be a

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[39] Tamaki, *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 12.
[40] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 13.

'definition', even in the belief of 'I': the 'perfect definition' is 'possible', but only in the lack of itself, in the believing.

Outside of the 'perfect definition' is constituted by what would be known as the 'abstractions' and 'descriptions'. Yet, although there is already a knowledge of what they are, they are not *yet* 'here', as this is what 'I' claim to be 'going' to 'do'. And I could also say that this is not still set, 'I' is not certain about the 'abstractions and descriptions', for this is only an 'attempt' to 'do'. '[H]ere, the 'abstractions and descriptions' are different from the 'picture', since, according to the perspective on 'I', it could 'clarify' 'our picture of the otaku'. 'Otaku' thus would have to be both outside of 'abstractions', 'descriptions', and the 'picture'. Even so, it cannot go beyond 'here'.

'I' that 'hope' that they could 'go some way toward clarifying our picture of the otaku' would have to come *after* the 'attempt'. As such, what 'I', 'here', could do is in 'some way' *affect* 'our picture of the otaku'. That is to say, if there is an already known 'picture of the otaku' for the 'abstractions and descriptions' to 'clarify', 'I' would have to have already accessed the seeing of 'our' to be able to claim as such. So, there is a setup of the shift of 'I' on the 'picture of the otaku', which is something that can be shared but within the specified position: 'here'.

If the 'abstractions' and 'descriptions' could potentially have something to do with the 'picture of the otaku', then I could not say that 'definition' or even 'our language' does not have anything to do with 'our' seeing. And why not? Because of 'I(s)', there is a relationship that puts all of them in the same frame.

But *why*, again, that although 'I do not believe that a perfect definition of the otaku is possible', 'I' would still 'hope' to clarify 'our picture of the otaku'. Could there be a transition? Or a transfer of some sort, of the 'way toward', that would somehow put what is known to be 'vagueness' as something that could *affect* what is 'our[s]'.

But I also wonder where this 'clarify[ing]' 'picture of the otaku' might be. If the perspective has already claimed the difference between *what* to clarify, then that would have

already occurred. 'I', though, 'hope' that they could *do*, as such, there must be a doubleness in this 'I', which already knows what it could *be* and the one that 'hope[s]' that it could do.

And what about the 'picture of the otaku' in different spaces?

> While "otaku" is often used in America to mean anime/manga fan, without strong positive or negative connotations, some fans use it in a stronger sense, either using "otaku" as a label of sorts for the media, art, genres, and characters they like or as a pejorative, in the same way it has been used by some parties in Japan. When "otaku" is used pejoratively in the United States, we see a close duplication of stereotypes used to describe otaku in Japan, where some describe otaku as being some combination of socially deficient, unhealthily obsessive, concerned with childish things, and unconcerned about hygiene.[41]

What the '"otaku"' *is* is constructed by how it is 'used'. The term '"otaku"' thus is not about the '"otaku"' and cannot be known only as '"otaku"', for it carries a meaning which is outside of itself. And since '"otaku"' is known through its use, then there cannot be only '"otaku"' in the formulation. That is to say, there must also be the user. Or *users*? Because there is also the repetition in this use — it is 'often used'. Hence, it is possible that there is a use outside of this 'often'.

The thinking around '"otaku"' also requires the idea of space, of the position in which it is 'used' (it 'is often used in America'), which implies that it might be 'used' to 'mean' something else apart from 'anime/manga fan' elsewhere. Also, from the claim, '"otaku"' can be 'used' 'without strong positive or negative connotations', so using the 'term' comes *with* 'connotations', and there is a level to which the 'connotations' is measured. It is constituted to be between 'positive' and 'negative'. It is 'used', though, 'without strong positive or negative connotations', as such, I could not say that there are no 'positive or negative connotations' in using '"otaku"' in America, only that it might not be 'strong'. The using of '"otaku"' here could be different, not only different in the sense that it is *already* different in repetition, but because even in 'America',

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[41] Mizuko Itō, Daisuke Okabe, and Izumi Tsuji, *Fandom Unbound: Otaku Culture in a Connected World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), 92.

'fans' are using '"otaku"' with different 'connotations' and use it 'as a label of sorts for the media, art, genres, and characters'. So, although '"otaku"' could be 'used' 'as a label', it is still *not* a label since it is to 'use' 'as'. The 'media, art, genres, and characters' are also different. Nevertheless, they all share its constitution as something 'they like'. But if it is being 'used' 'as a label', what about the 'meaning'? Does it come with the meaning of '"otaku"'? Or could it be with '"otaku"' itself since, according to the previous section, there is the idea that the single word does not necessarily carry only a single meaning?

Or '"otaku"' could be 'used' to 'mean' something and 'as' something else altogether. The 'stronger sense' is constructed to be 'as a label' and 'as a pejorative' — a way. That is to say, these are something with 'strong' 'connotations'. But I am interested in the comparison between the use of '"otaku" in 'America' and in 'Japan'. For there are indeed two frames that coincide: the use of '"otaku"' in a stronger sense. Similar to the idea of 'manga' in the first chapter, if there are differences in which the '"otaku"' is 'used', then the word '"otaku"' would have to carry more than one meaning. Or indeed, it could also be the doubleness in this '"otaku"', which I could not say are the *same*. Still, using '"otaku"' as a 'label' and 'pejorative' has been 'used' by some parties in Japan, so it could not be that the construction of '"otaku"' *only* relies on the position of where they are being 'used'; it also relies on the users as well. And there must be '"otaku"' being 'used' outside of 'America' and 'Japan', but that is not the concern here.

Considering the implications that the notion of '"otaku"' requires the users, it might also raise another issue: if there are connotations with '"otaku"', then would these 'positive or negative connotations', which cannot happen altogether, depend on the users?

Since '"otaku"' is used differently, the perspective would have to claim the knowledge of the use of the 'anime/manga fan' and 'some fans', including the 'connotations' that come with it. That is to say, if the '"otaku"', although different, is being used *as such* as the same, then I could say that it is the *use* of the '"otaku"' that *invokes* its (or might I say their?) difference — the connotations.

'[U]sing "otaku" as a label of sorts for the media, art, genres, and characters they like or as a pejorative, in the same way, it has been used by some parties in Japan'. There is a division between the 'anime/manga fan[s]' in 'America' and 'Japan' and another division between 'some fans' and outside of it. '[W]e' can 'see' something from it, although only *when* '"otaku"' is being 'used' 'pejoratively in the United States'. And if 'we see a close duplication of stereotypes used to describe otaku in Japan', then what 'we see' is not the 'stereotypes' itself, only the 'close duplication' of it. That is to say, the perspective would have to *have already* the knowledge of what the 'stereotypes used to describe otaku in Japan' is in order to recognize this 'duplication'.

And there is a division indeed, for I am thinking about how the 'stereotypes' that 'we see' is a 'close duplication of stereotypes […] in Japan'. That is, 'we' must also know the relationship between the '"otaku"' and 'Japan', for there is a sense of originality 'in Japan'. Again, what 'we see' can only be possible only if there are already these 'stereotypes' in 'Japan'.

Then can I read about this 'duplication' as an inability to *transfer*? What is being transferred would be the 'duplication' and not the 'stereotypes' itself.

Parker also says something about this:

There is also an uncanny repetition of the transmission of cultural forms into Japan from neighboring states; now it is South Korea that has been in the forefront of building online otaku communities, with even some consequences for political processes, and these developments are now being replicated in Japan.[42]

Could there be a 'repetition' if there is a 'transmission'? If that is the case, then the 'cultural forms' are something that can be transmitted, and it is this 'transmission' that is being repeated itself. So, the 'forms' could be transmitted to another frame. From this, I could say that there is indeed the implication of the notion that these frames could contain *something*, and the *things* that are being contained in one frame could only be 'duplicated', transmitted, and 'replicated', but it is still not the original, for there is thus the difference in itself from the point of which it is known to be the 'source'.

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[42] Parker, *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious*, 63.

Here, the 'online otaku communities' are built in 'South Korea'. And these 'developments' — 'with even some consequences for political process' — are 'now being replicated in Japan'. This would only be possible if both 'Japanese' and 'South Korea' share the same notion of 'political processes' and the knowledge of the 'online otaku communities'; they have to work within the same system for the 'developments' to be 'replicated'. As such, this replication would have to be built on the same setup to happen elsewhere, outside the frame.

In addition, the 'duplication' in the 'United States' would have to be operated *with* the same base in 'Japan': 'where some describe otaku as being some combination of socially deficient, unhealthily obsessive concerned with childish things, and unconcerned about hygiene.' Still, this is only 'when "otaku" is 'used pejoratively in the United States'. As such, there is a tension here in which the seeing of 'we' could be limited to the 'United States' because 'we' can 'see a close duplication' when '"otaku" is used' in the 'United States'. Nevertheless, to recognize this 'close duplication', 'we' would have to 'see' the 'stereotypes used to describe otaku in Japan'. That is, there must also be a tracing back of the idea that if this is the 'duplication', then there should already be where it is *duplicated* from. So, 'we' would have to be outside of the 'United Sates' and 'Japan' to claim so. I s*till* read this as *not* the 'definition' of the 'otaku', as this is a claim to what the 'otaku' is described *as*. So, since this is a 'close duplication', I could say that *what* 'we see' could be anything besides 'being some combination of socially deficient […] and unconcerned about hygiene'.

Following the discussion on Japanese and American:

"Socially deficient" may mean different things for Japanese versus American stereotypes of otaku, however, Japanese otaku are sometimes depicted as hopeless introverts who are seeking escape from the world so they can secretly indulge in their shameful hobbies, whereas American otaku (when "otaku" is used by some fans to mean the worst of fandom) are more often depicted as loud, obnoxious, and brazenly outgoing about their

hobbies, interests, and fetishes—so much so that they are seen as invading the comfort zone and personal space of others.[43]

And that should be the case, for "[s]ocially deficient" may mean different things for Japanese versus American otaku stereotypes. The quotation marks are to do with *what* should be the double; however, it is known to be the same. That is, there is '"[s]ocially deficient"' for 'Japanese' and 'American' 'stereotypes', but I read this as the 'word(s)' that have multiple meanings, even though it is only the possibility — it 'may'. Again, even though it claims to be a possibility, it would have to be based on the idea that '"socially deficient"' could mean 'different things' in different frames and places. Therefore, I could read several deferrals in this formulation.

The '"otaku"' is different from the 'otaku', for this '" "' is to do with the shift of the construction. The '"otaku"' would be about the 'using' of it. As I read above, it is known through its use, while I could read the 'otaku' would be about the description.

Interestingly, the idea of 'otaku' and how it is 'depicted' is formulated by comparing the 'otaku' in different countries — 'Japanese' and 'American'. 'Japanese otaku are sometimes depicted as hopeless introverts who are seeking escape from the world so they can secretly indulge in their shameful hobbies'. As such, what the 'otaku' *is* is not the concern here, for they could be something else altogether, yet the thinking would be about the depiction, something that is not of itself — 'as' *something*. So, there should be knowledge of what it *is* already to be able to claim what it is not. And since it is 'depicted as hopeless introverts', then 'Japanese otaku' is thus not *as such*. If the 'otaku' is 'seeking escape from the world', I could read that on the perspective on the perspective on the 'otaku' there is the idea that the 'otaku' could 'escape from the world'. However, escaping from the 'world' by 'hopeless introverts' might not happen since this is the seeking, the *attempt* to do so. This 'seeking' is needed because it is a condition. From this implication, I could say that they might be unable to 'indulge in their shameful hobbies' if 'introverts' do not seek 'escape'. As such, secrecy has something with shamefulness and, in turn, has to do with the world. That is to say, the secrecy here would have to be about the relationship

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[43] Itō, Okabe, and Tsuji, *Fandom Unbound: Otaku Culture in a Connected World*, 92.

between 'they' and the 'world'. If they are 'seeking to escape from the world', then in the perspective, 'they' have to be *in* this 'world'. And by escaping from it, there must be a position outside the 'world' they could be. Whether it is successful or not, there must already be an idea of what could be outside of it.

It would be the shift of perspective, for this shamefulness would be about 'they'. Yet, *not* so secret if indulging in 'their shameful hobbies' is known from the outside. '[T]hey' would have to know that their 'hobbies' are 'shameful' because this is what 'they are seeking'.

Again, this is all the depiction, and it is not the 'Japanese otaku'.

So, I could say that this could be the depiction and also could not, including the depiction of 'American otaku'. The use of '"otaku"' is framed by time — 'when', but this use is also added with another layer with what it *could* mean. As such, the construction of '"otaku"' requires both 'some fans' and the perspective outside of it to know what they mean. So, when '"otaku"' is used by 'some fans', it could also mean something else as well. And if '"otaku"' is 'used' to 'mean the worst of fandom', then it could not be the 'worst of fandom'.

I could read that being 'loud, obnoxious, and brazenly outgoing about their hobbies, interests, and fetishes' is thought to be different from being 'introverts' since being 'introverts' is the depiction of the 'Japanese otaku' which is not the same as the 'American otaku'. Thus, being known as 'American otaku' and 'Japanese otaku' is not the only idea of *difference* here.

The question would be: do the different depictions of 'American' and 'Japanese otaku' relies on the various positions? If that is the case, then claiming that they are 'American otaku' and 'Japanese otaku' *would* have to make them different already.

Still, this is only the depiction. So, another question might be, *who* depicts this? And if this is the depiction known to be 'more often', then there must be more than one depiction.

Being 'loud, obnoxious and brazenly outgoing about their hobbies, interests, and fetishes' somehow has its limit. For 'so much so' that 'they are seen as invading the comfort zone and personal space of others'. So, the 'comfort zone and personal space of others' can be seen from outside the 'others'. If 'they are seen as invading', then this might not happen at all. The seeing

of this could only come from outside of 'they' — the 'depiction' of the 'otaku' — and the 'others' to be able to claim as such. Again, not so 'comfort' and 'personal' if another could see this, although that is not the issue here. Rather, the issue would be the limit of it, that being 'loud, obnoxious, and brazenly outgoing about their hobbies, interests, and fetishes' could invade the 'comfort zone and personal space of others'. In a sense, I could say that there is a degree to be 'loud, obnoxious, and brazenly outgoing about their hobbies, interests, and fetishes', but this is constituted by its relationship with 'others' or the 'comfort zone and personal space of others'.

Hence, even though 'Japanese otaku' and 'American otaku' are different, they are both shared their depiction through their relationship with others regarding their 'hobbies'.

Might this be 'our picture of the otaku'? I should say it *could* be, for this depiction would have to rely on the repetition of it. That there must be other depictions outside of 'sometimes' but still outside of both 'American otaku' and 'Japanese otaku'. And if 'this is all that I am aiming for', then there might be a stake in this, about knowing that there is a 'definition of the otaku', but whatever it is, 'I' does not think of the 'otaku' *as such*, for that already happens, that 'I do not believe that a perfect definition of the otaku is possible'. That is to say, what I am about to read would be about the 'otaku', not the 'definition', but the 'abstractions and descriptions'.

> The term *maniac* referred originally to the kind of person who is obsessed with something that yields no practical advantage. But compared with the otaku, the objects of maniacs can look quite concrete (not practical perhaps, but concrete). Looking back at the list of objects, we can see that those preferred by maniacs, such as audio equipment, stamps, antiques, and insect collections, are certainly for amusement and serve no practical function. But compared with those of the otaku, the objects of the maniac do have a concrete materiality. By concrete materiality I mean simply that one can pick them up in one's hands and that they can be measured.[44]

I can read yet again the 'term', which I think could be a system of thinking around the idea of what it is, for these ('otaku' and '*maniac*') cannot be thought about except being deferred. The idea of the 'term' shifts the notion of '*maniac*' to something that is not of itself, for it is not

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[44] Tamaki, *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 18.

'*maniac*' that is being thought of here — it is the 'term'. There is something 'original' about this 'term', so there is already more than the 'term' than what is being thought of there. Still, I could say that it is not the 'kind of person who is obsessed with something that yields no practical advantage', for that could only be in the frame of the original and beyond the 'term'. The perspective then shifts to the difference of seeing both the 'otaku' and the 'term' as the same. That is, to read on the 'abstractions and descriptions' of the 'otaku' would have to have something to do with the 'term'.

The 'look' of 'quite concrete' here would have to depend on the idea of 'otaku', or the 'objects of the otaku', so this could be a stake here, that in order to read *more* of the 'otaku', there is a need to *look.* Still, this look cannot escape the frame of the 'otaku' itself. So, although there is a claim to not knowing the 'perfect definition' of 'otaku', the idea of the 'otaku' has to be *there*, at least not the 'perfect' one. That is to say, the attempt here would require knowledge of the 'otaku' to know about what is around the 'otaku'.

I can also read another *looking*, but this is the 'looking back at the list of objects': 'audio equipment, stamps, antiques, and insect collections'. Since 'we' have to 'see' as the same, 'we' have to share the 'see[ing]'. And if this 'see[ing]' is conditioned by the 'looking back', then the 'see[ing]' could only be in this frame. As such, I could say that if 'we' all 'see' 'audio equipment, stamps, antiques, and insect collections' as something that is 'for amusement and serve no practical function', the idea of 'amusement' and 'practical function' would have to also be within the frame of that 'see[ing]'. So, there is no other seeing outside this 'see[ing]', only within the 'looking back'. But the 'see[ing]' is something that 'we' 'can' do, whereas the 'looking back' is quite different in the sense that there is another frame that limits the 'looking', which is the 'list of the objects'. The knowing of this 'list' then would have to be before the 'looking'. Also, there should be a repetition of the 'looking(s)', for that is already *behind*: the 'looking back'. Therefore, this would be the perspective of another looking on this 'looking' to be able to claim as such.

Might this be about the 'attempt' of 'I'? The 'see[ing]' and the 'looking' here could be working in the frame of the 'hope' toward 'clarifying our picture of the otaku'. Still, I could not

say that these are *only* the objects 'of' the 'maniac', for these are the things that 'are preferred'. So, there is a difference between being 'of' and 'those' being 'preferred': the ownership that comes from others.

But where might *these* be in the formulation? It could be about the comparison, for 'compar[ing] with those 'of' the 'otaku', the 'objects of the maniac do have a concrete materiality.' As such, the idea of the 'objects' of the 'otaku' and the 'maniac' are being set as the opposition. The comparison could only occur because there is a 'mean[ing]' from 'I'. So, what 'I' say about 'concrete materiality' counts for what 'I' 'mean'. If that is the case, then 'concrete materiality' is not that 'one can pick them up in one's hands and that they can be measured' because it is only the 'mean[ing]'.

I would like to read further about 'concrete materiality' here. According to 'I', 'one' is not '*maniac*', for they are constituted in a different frame, outside 'I'. Also, if 'one' can 'pick them up in one's hands', then the 'hands' would have to belong to 'one', but not necessarily the measuring here: only they can be 'measured'. The question would be: measure *with* what? Or *by* what? If they can be 'measured', then the quality of being able to be picked up by 'one's hands' is not included in the measurement. That is, 'they' would have to hinge on the difference and sameness with something else outside them. The 'mean' thus cannot be limited to 'I' — there is a possibility that the measurement could go beyond that.

Also, there has to be a split in the 'concrete materiality' here, for if it is what 'I mean', then there is already the implication that there is another one outside of 'I'. That is to say, the construction of the 'term' here *cannot* escape the perspective on the perspective of 'I'.

I want to go back again and think of 'I' here with the 'term *maniac*' in the sense that if the 'abstractions and the descriptions' of the 'otaku' are being constructed by the 'term', in which also being framed by 'I', then the 'otaku' here would have something to do with the 'mean[ing]' of 'I' as well. Therefore, 'I' would have to be other than '*maniac*' and the 'otaku' to be able to claim so.

Yet, if the 'term *maniac*' is being used 'originally', then there is already an implication of the 'term' outside of this *originality*. But I could not help but think about the investment in the originality of the 'term *maniac*', for if it is to be *something* of the original, then what is thought to be outside cannot be included in this 'term'. Still, if the referring here has already shifted from the original as claimed, then the knowledge of the originality here would construct the split of the 'term' — not the '*maniac*' itself.

I am *still* reading the 'material':

> Otakus are lacking in this orientation toward the material and the practical. They know that the objects of their attachment have no material reality, that their vast knowledge has no use for other people in the world, and that this useless knowledge may even […] be viewed with contempt and suspicion. And knowing all of that, they still enjoy the game of performing for each other their passion.[45]

There must be more to these 'otakus' in 'this orientation toward the material and the practical', for what is known to be them as they are *is* already 'lacking'. But this is only the 'lacking' in 'this orientation', so the 'lacking' here does not affect the construction of being known as the 'otaku'. It instead only shifts the frame of the 'otaku' in terms of the 'material and the practical'.

Might I say there could be several 'orientation[s]' to this 'otaku'? Or this could be another 'abstractions and descriptions' of 'I', for although this is about the 'otaku', I can read that the issue here has something to do with what 'they know' *with* the 'objects'. And I would say *with* because this is about the 'objects of their attachment', something that is set up outside of themselves, which is already known by both 'they' and the perspective on it. So, the knowing of 'they' can be known from another, including the relationship between 'their knowledge' with 'other people'.

The 'knowledge'? I can read the several shifts of the 'know[ing]'. There is the knowing 'that the objects of their attachment have no material reality', that 'their vast knowledge has no

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[45] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 19.

use for other people in the world', and that 'this useless knowledge may even […] be viewed with contempt and suspicion'. The knowledge of the *knowing* that there is knowledge, and *not* only one type of knowledge but also the 'vast knowledge' and the 'useless knowledge' — the shift of 'knowledge(s)'.

But there is a stake in this — the *knowing*: that 'they' all 'know' the 'material reality', that they would share the knowledge of this 'reality', and that the 'material reality' would also apply to the 'use for other people in the world'.

Still, '[t]hey know' can only be so, or this 'knowledge' could be possible, if 'they' all share 'objects' of 'their attachment'. As such, the 'objects' are not the 'material reality', as that is *what* they lack, 'have no material reality', but the 'objects of their attachment' would have to be claimed by another to know what 'they' do not *have*.

I am also interested in the investment of the 'knowledge' of the 'otaku' *towards* 'other people in the world', for whether 'other people' 'know' about 'their knowledge' or not, this is a relationship that hinges on the idea that 'their knowledge' somehow has the 'use' for 'other people in the world', even in its loss. That is, 'their knowledge' here would have to be limited to the 'objects of their attachment'. The question would be: if there is 'no use' for 'their knowledge', then I could say that the 'lacking […] toward the material and the practical' might have something to do with the 'useless knowledge'.

But what would 'other people in the world' know? It might have nothing to do with this at all; nevertheless, 'this useless knowledge may even […] be viewed with contempt and suspicion'. If this 'knowledge' can be 'viewed' from the outside, then *perhaps* this knowledge might be 'viewed' by 'other people'? Even so, 'they know' that 'this useless knowledge' can be 'viewed' from another, but not from 'they', for 'they know'. Interestingly, as such, *what* is not 'they' would have to be 'viewed' but not known.

There might be an issue with the idea of being able to 'view' this 'useless knowledge', which is different from the 'know[ing]'. '[M]ay even' because the 'view[ing]' would have to

occur already and with 'contempt and suspicion' but not necessarily always the case. So, how much, though, would the seeing of knowledge be able to count for?

This could be it — 'the abstractions and descriptions' — the idea that the 'otaku' is constituted through the lack of knowledge in relationship with 'other people in the world'. If that is the case, being the 'otaku' would require a relationship with 'other people'; however, the idea of 'otaku' has to be 'viewed', not as the 'otaku' *as such,* but what they 'know'.

Another shift of 'knowing' — 'knowing' of the 'knowing' of 'their knowledge'; 'they still enjoy the game of performing for each other their passion'. '[K]nowing all of that' would be about what *comes* after, that the enjoyment of the 'game' could have something to do with being 'viewed with contempt and suspicion'. '[S]till' would require the continuation of something that could be broken down, which would have to be a collective, for their 'enjoy[ment]' would have to be for 'each other'. Although I could not say there is a division, I could read the split of 'they' here — 'for each other their passion'; 'they' could be 'each other'.

And what about the 'game of performing […] their passion'? The 'of' would set the 'performing' to be the 'game', therefore, their 'passion' would have to also be a part of the 'game'. Although it is a 'game', 'passion' can be 'performed', thus, 'their passion' is something that could be seen from another.

Chapter 3: Reading Manga and Representation

As I have read in the previous chapter, the 'collections' could be both 'public' and 'private', and both share the sameness in being 'collections'; however, although they are 'objectionable socially' and 'useful academically', there are certain degrees in which both can be measured and compared. As such, being 'public' and 'private' have something to do with the social and academic. And indeed they are, for the framing of this would have to rely on *one*. Nevertheless, the 'objects get their due only in the latter'. This is where the difference takes place. So, I could say that it is not the 'private collections' that 'get their due' as such, but it is the 'objects'. The shift is about the 'objects' that are 'in' the 'private collections'. That is, the 'private collections' would be to do with framing the frame in which the 'objects', thought to be inside, are being operated instead. But I am still thinking about the question: where is the *meaning*?

Hall has some answers.

It is by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them — how we represent them — that we *give them meaning*. In part, we give objects, people and events meaning by the frameworks of interpretation which we bring to them. In part, we give things meaning by how we use them, or integrate them into our everyday practices. It is our use of a pile of bricks and mortar which makes it a 'house'; and what we feel, think or say about it that makes a 'house' a 'home'. In part, we give things meaning by how we *represent* them — the words we use about them, the stories we tell about them, the images of them we produce, the emotions we associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we place on them.[46]

Not so much about where the 'meaning' is but rather about *how* it is brought into the formulation. '[W]e' and 'them' are the main issues here because it is 'we' that 'give them a meaning'. So, this is about the relationship between 'we' and 'them'. This cannot be about the '*meaning*' only, or it *should* not be since it is 'how we represent them' that 'we *give them a*

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[46] Stuart Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices* (London: Sage Publications in association with the Open University, 1997), 3.

meaning'. That is to say, there seems to be a process for 'we' to be able to '*give them a meaning*'. Indeed, '[i]t is by our use of things, and what we say, think and feel about them', so using, saying, thinking, and feeling are not the same, but all could be done to 'things'. And these actions are being framed by 'how we represent them'. So there are ways for 'we' to 'represent'? As such, it is not the 'represent' that gives '*them*' the '*meaning*', instead, it is the *way* that 'we represent them' that 'we *give them a meaning*'.

If 'we' can 'give them a meaning', then does that imply that 'them' does not have 'meaning' in the first place? Or does it have 'meaning' but not the one we 'give'? Does *this* 'meaning' shift anything?

'In part', so not all of *this* is included here; 'we give objects, people and events meaning by the frameworks of interpretation which we bring to them'. Here the 'meaning' is shifted to be about the 'frameworks of interpretation'. That is, these 'frameworks of interpretation' would have to come from *elsewhere* because this is what we 'bring to them'. I would read this as another step to the *process* for 'we' to '*give them a meaning*'. As such, 'interpretation' is not the 'representation' or the 'meaning'. So, 'things' are *still* 'things', and 'how we represent them' does not shift what it is. It is rather what we 'say, think, and feel about them' that 'give them a meaning'. If that is the case, then I could say that it is not 'we' that 'give them a meaning' *as such* because it is, as claimed, about how 'we say, think and feel about them'.

Yet, 'we' *do* 'give things meaning by how we use them', though this would be another 'part' of it. So, the 'things' would have to be used? And if it depends on 'how we use them', then 'them' can be used differently. The 'things' here are framed from the perspective outside of 'things' and 'we', so this is still to do with the relationship between the two. And if 'we give things meaning by how we use them', then the giving of the meaning would have to come after the use. The 'meaning' is also about how we 'integrate them into our everyday life'. '[O]r' would put these as choices —one way or another. *How* do we 'integrate them into our everyday practices'? This implies that the 'things' are not necessarily in 'our everyday practices', or they could be, but *they* are not being *integrated*. And it is also to do with the 'everyday' as well. So,

this integration also requires the idea of frequency, the *repetition* of the system of relations between 'we' and the 'things'.

So, 'what we feel, think or say about it makes a "house" a "home"'. The quotation marks could be about the framing of the process, that the 'pile of bricks and mortar' makes a '"house"', but a 'home' could only be a '"home"' because of 'we' and nothing else. I could also read that a '"house"' and a '"home"' share the sameness and differences in their relationship with 'we'. That is to say, the '"house"' is about the use of 'we', 'our use', but a '"home"' is something that 'we' do *about* 'it'. This *aboutness* gestures to the idea of 'meaning', that it could shift, not the 'thing' itself, but something outside of it, something in addition to it, which could be known from the outside. Since this is an addition, the 'meaning' could then not be *this* 'meaning' without the 'things'. That is, a '"home"' is a '"home"' because this *addition* would shift what it is to something else. In a sense, then, a '"home"' cannot be a '"home"' without a '"house"' because *it* is what makes a '"home"'.

> In part, we give things meaning by how we *represent* them — the words we use about them, the stories we tell about them, the images of them we produce, the emotions we associate with them, the ways we classify and conceptualize them, the values we place on them.[47]

Another 'part'? But there is more to say *about* the *aboutness* — 'the words we use about them, the stories we tell about them'. So, 'we' would have to know that 'them' could be 'stories', and the telling about 'them' would have to already occur before the representation. Or maybe at the same time? Because this is *about* the representation, or rather, 'how we *represent* them'.

This does not have to do with the thing itself. This aboutness would essentially pull it further away from what the 'thing' is — another layer of it; it is the 'words', the 'stories', and the 'images' produced by 'we' in relation to 'them'. How further? It would be the idea of the perspective on 'we' on the use of the 'things' and turn back to the split of 'we' again because this

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[47] *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, 3.

is what 'we' 'think' about them. There has to be 'we' that are to do *with* 'them' and 'we' that *know* 'them'.

If the representation is about the 'images of them we produce', then what 'we produce' could not possibly be 'them' as such, for this is only what 'we' produce. The 'images' are thus constructed by the perspective on the perspective on 'we', for it is known to be 'images' that are produced from 'we' — from outside of 'we'.

I think it is very interesting — the idea that the representation could be *from* different ways. With that said, it could be the 'words', the 'stories', the 'images', the 'emotions', the classification, and the conceptualization', including the 'value'. *Still*, these are constructed by 'we', that 'place' on 'things'. So these are not the 'things' but 'we' perceived the 'things' with the *addition* that 'we' make outside of the 'things'. From this, I could read that the constitution of the 'meaning' and 'things' would have to rely on 'we'. So to make this possible, these multiple 'we' would have to be in agreement, and there cannot be any disruption within themselves at all. Could it be the 'gathering' of some 'group'? Or the 'code', as Hall suggests,

> [m]embers of the same culture must share sets of concepts, images, and ideas which enable them to think and feel about the world, and thus to interpret the world, in roughly similar ways. They must share, broadly speaking, the same 'cultural codes'. In this sense, thinking and feeling are themselves 'systems of representation', in which our concepts, images and emotions 'stand for' or represent, in our mental life, things which are or may be 'out there' in the world. Similarly, in order to *communicate* these meanings to other people, the participants to any meaningful exchange must also be able to use the same linguistic codes — they must, in a very broad sense, 'speak the same language'. […] We mean 'language' here in a much wider sense. Our partners must speak enough of the same language to be able to 'translate' what 'you' say into what 'I' understand […]. [48]

If '[m]embers of the same culture must share sets of concepts, images, and ideas which enable them to think and feel about the world, and thus to interpret the world, in roughly similar ways', then the 'world' for the 'members' would have to heavily rely on the idea of 'culture'

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[48] *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, 4.

because this is what 'enable them to think and feel about the world'. As such, if this is to be what 'they think or feel about the world', then the 'world' could not possibly be *as such*. In this perspective, it is not about what the 'world' *is* for the 'members' but what they 'think and feel' about it. And so, to interpret the 'world', there is a need to 'think and feel' about the 'world' — to 'interpret', to 'feel', and to 'think' about the 'world' are all different. But one would have to come before another.

'[I]nterpret the world'? I could not help but think that if the 'world' needs to be 'interpret[ed]', could it not be accessed or known as such? And if so, then what to 'think and feel' about the world is not fixed or set. And even though that might be the case, the 'members' would require 'sets of concepts' that need to be 'shared'. That is to say, it is also possible for the 'members of the same culture' to *not* share 'sets of concepts'. The issue here would be that this frame of sameness — or the 'culture' — would have to set up some 'concepts, images, and ideas' even though that is not necessarily the case. The frame of 'culture' could be disrupted, and it is not set in its entirety. This would only 'enable them' to 'interpret the world' in 'roughly similar ways'. So, the perspective would have to *already* have the knowledge of the multiple 'ways' to interpret the 'world' to be able to *claim* so to recognize the similarities and differences. So to say, the interpretation would have to already have happened, and from outside the 'world' and the 'members'.

But I am curious as to why there is an investment in these 'similar ways' to 'interpret' the 'world'. For this is *not only* about the 'world', but how they 'think' and 'feel' about the 'world' in a 'similar way'.

'They must share, broadly speaking, the same 'cultural codes'. 'They' would have to be outside of the 'world' and the 'cultural codes' to be able to 'share' them. The notion of 'culture codes' is constructed to be the 'speaking', so this is the 'speaking' which 'they must share'. So, this *investment* might be about the 'cultural codes'. As Hall puts it, this is also 'to *communicate* these meanings to other people'. Thus, I could say that this is about the 'relationship' on several

levels, between the 'members' and the 'world', leading to the relationship between 'we' and 'other people'.

Again, with the 'thinking and feeling', it is shifted from the *aboutness*, for it could be 'systems of representation'. *Yet*, it is 'themselves', so it could not be 'thinking and feeling' as such, and it should be more about the 'thinking and feeling' because it is also about 'our concepts, images, and emotions which 'stand for' or represent […] things which are or maybe 'out there' in the world'. Accordingly, '"stand for"' is different from 'represent' and cannot be one another. But I am thinking about these quotation marks, for it could be another framing which would put '"stand for"', '"cultural codes"', and '"systems of representation"' outside of 'represent[ation]'.

As I have discussed, the notion of 'our concepts, images, and emotions' is again being constructed as multiple. That is to say, these 'systems of representation' *would* have to be operated within the '"group"', that it would have to rely on the 'members', which, as claimed, 'must share sets of concepts, images and ideas'. The stake would be about the 'concepts', 'images', 'ideas', and 'emotions' which would have to be *known* from outside of 'our', and that this relationship of 'our' and the 'world' is to do with the *repetition* — a 'system' — which not only have to share the *same* sameness and differences but all of these operations cannot be disrupted *as such*.

Furthermore, the 'world' is not the world but must be the 'world' that is 'in our mental life'. And if the 'world' is in 'mental life', then this '"stand[ing] for"' and the representation would have to be, *somehow*, operated in this same frame. By 'mental life', I am *thinking* that this 'thinking and feeling' are constituted to be about 'mental'; nevertheless, this is also a part of 'life', that is, there could be other 'life' which might have to do with the 'world', but it is not to do with these 'systems of representation'.

The 'things which are or maybe 'out there' in the world'. So, in this perspective, *what is* in the 'world' is not confirmed, as it may be '"out there"'. Still, 'things' are already in this formulation despite its claim to the possibility of being 'in the world'. And if that is the case, then the 'things' 'in the world' would have to be '"out there"', away from the perspective. There must be a frame, or a division of sorts, separating the two. But there could be a tension here in the idea

of the position of 'we' and the 'world', for this is about the 'things' which are '"out there"' in the 'world' despite *this* 'world' also being in 'our mental life'. From this, there should be another split of 'we' and 'our', which would set up the perspective on 'we' and *another* set of 'we' on the 'our' again in the 'mental life'. In other words, there are several shifts of 'we' and 'our' in this perspective.

Yet, even if there are these 'cultural codes' to speak of, 'they' cannot guarantee communication. So, there should be multiple groups of 'people' — as there are 'other people' in the formulation — and these 'meanings' could be 'exchanged' between them. This 'exchange', as I read, is framed as communication, so these two are not the same thing.

If there is *something* to do '[i]n order to communicate', the communication thus cannot happen by itself, it needs a condition, which is the 'participants' who can 'use the same linguistic codes'. But who are *these* 'participants'? I could say they *might* be the '[m]embers', 'they', or 'other people'. But whoever might that be, there is a shift of the position and *what* they are, that is, they would have to be put in the same frame to participate in this 'meaningful exchange'. From this implication, it is possible that not all 'exchange' requires 'linguistic codes'; it would apply only to the 'meaningful' one. Nonetheless, I can read an issue regarding this meaningfulness, for this would have to be claimed from outside 'participants'.

The 'participants' must also be able to 'use the same linguistic codes', so not all can use them. To use the 'same linguistic codes' requires *skills* that must be acquired, and not just any 'linguistic codes', but it has to be the 'same'. Therefore, the 'linguistic codes' would have to be *known* by the 'participants', and there would have to be a *split* within themselves — the 'participants', for there is a comparison of seeing the sameness and differences to be able to know that they 'use the same linguistic codes'.

Indeed, the 'linguistic codes' and the 'language' are different. Not only do they differentiate themselves as such, but I could read that the 'linguistic codes' are to be used while the 'language' is to be spoken. '[I]n a very broad sense'? So speaking the 'same language' is in

the frame of the 'linguistic codes'. Indeed, there are multiple codes, and speaking the 'same language' might be one of them.

And '"language"' could 'mean' different things. The quotation marks could be about how the word '"language"' is not fixed, that this is not about the 'language' that comes with the 'meaning', but the 'meaning' that is outside of it, that is to be claimed by 'we'. So, 'here', 'we' would have to know the 'language', not only in a 'much wider sense' but also in other senses. That is to say, the meaning is to do with 'senses' and the *position*.

'We' are not the 'partners', for this is about the meaning of 'we' and what is 'our[s]'. The 'partners must speak enough of the same language to be able to 'translate' what 'you' say into what 'I' understand'. That is, the 'same language' could not be counted in total; there is a certain degree in which the 'same' could be to the *point* of being the translation which, in a sense, is constructed to be something in which '"you"' could '"say"' and '"I"' understand.

So, speaking the 'same language' is not about translation as such. Instead, the translation is about speaking 'enough of the same language'. In a way, the speaking of '[o]ur partners' is to do with the comparison, of seeing that gap of the difference between language, and determining the scale which can be 'enough' for the understanding of the '"I"'. Thus, the translation here would have to be working under the condition of 'our partners'; 'to be able to 'translate' what 'you' say into what 'I' understand'. That is, '[o]ur partners' would have something to do with the saying of '"you"' and the understanding of '"I"'. And if that is the case, then the 'translation' is to do with the understanding, and if this is to do with the understanding of '"I"', which is to be operated from the outside of '"I"', then the understanding of '"I"' would have to be *known* from another.

There is a relationship between the 'say[ing]' and 'understanding', but this relationship would have to be working within the 'cultural codes', which requires the 'system' that needs to be shared and known to be the same within the group from the outside perspective.

And this 'system' would extend to the idea of 'reading', for

[t]hey must also be able to read visual images in roughly similar ways. They must be familiar with broadly the same ways of producing sounds to make what they would both recognize' as 'music'. They must all interpret body language and facial expressions in broadly similar ways. And they must know how to translate their feelings and ideas into these various languages. Meaning is a dialogue — always only partially understood, always an unequal exchange.[49]

If reading 'visual images in roughly similar ways' is something that 'they' must be able to do, then the reading here is something that requires, again, skills and learning. That is, it is not something that can happen naturally. In this case, 'visual images' are constructed as something that could be 'read', and there are 'ways' to read them. The 'way' to read, therefore, has to be known by them, but those 'ways' do not have to be the same, they have to be 'roughly similar' for them. But to know they are similar, the perspective would have to know all of the 'ways' to make the comparison.

In addition, the sense of understanding the 'exchange' by looking at the sameness and the differences seems to be thought of in many areas, including the frame of the 'limit'. For example, in *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword:*

Anthropologists had shown over and over in their studies of primitive people how valuable such cultural comparisons can be. A tribe may share ninety percent of its formal observance with its neighbors and yet it may have revamped them to fit a way of life and a set of values which it does not share with any surrounding peoples. In the process it may have had to reject some fundamental arrangements which, however small in proportion of the whole, turn its future course of development in a unique direction. Nothing is more helpful to an anthropologist than to study contrasts he finds between people who, on the whole share many traits.[50]

Although what is shown *is* in their 'studies', it is the '[a]nthropologists who 'had shown over and over' 'how valuable such cultural comparisons can be'. And if there is a knowledge of

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[49] *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, 4.
[50] Ruth Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture* (London: Secker & Warburg, 1947), 8-9.

the 'cultural comparisons', then I could say that, from the perspective, the anthropologists would have to claim to know that there must be multiple cultures within 'primitive people' that they study, and in repeat, for there are multiple 'studies' that they concern here.

'[I]n their studies', a 'tribe may share ninety percent of its formal observance with its neighbors'. So, for a perspective on a 'tribe', there is a recognition of the *position*, of the 'observance' that could see itself in relation to 'its neighbors'. Nonetheless, this claim would have to come from the perspective on the tribe, which claims the perspective of the tribe on 'its neighbor' and turn back to itself to see what they 'share'. And what they share here might not be the whole issue here, rather, it is how much they 'share' — ninety percent — because 'yet' would set up a contrast of the idea that although there is so much level of sameness, 'it may have revamped them to fit a way of life […] which it does not share with any surrounding people'.

But why would it be so? Also, could its 'formal observance' be compared in percent?

Indeed, it can, at least in this perspective, though it does not guarantee that 'its formal observance' could set up a 'way of life and a set of values'. Despite the link between the two, one does not necessarily lead to the other. There is no confirmation here, even though there is *already* the idea, which this notion could be based upon, that a tribe would 'share' a 'way of life and a set of values' with 'surrounding people'.

Why? Because, in the 'process', 'it may have had to reject some fundamental arrangements'. So, as I have read, if the 'fundamental arrangements' could be 'reject[ed]', then it would have to already be *set up*, and this rejection would then 'turn its future course of development into a unique direction'. That is to say, what a 'tribe' shares might not be a share *as such*, as it could be about the transferring or duplicating of sorts, for this is the 'arrangements', and there is a 'process' for it. So this is not something that can happen as it is since it requires choice and decision-making to 'reject' it 'however small in proportion of the whole'. And this 'small in proportion of the whole' *would* matter, for it could 'turn its future course of development in a unique direction'. If this rejection could 'turn its future course […] in a unique direction',

then I could say that, 'in the process', *all* 'fundamental arrangements' could be everything else but 'unique'.

So if this 'process' has to do with the 'way of life and a set of values', the 'fundamental arrangements' that come with it would have to be out there already, waiting for 'it' to 'reject' some of them. Those 'fundamental arrangements' would have to be 'share[d]' while those rejected would develop into a 'unique direction'.

Could this be the ten percent that has been left out? If this is the case, the whole argument would have to be built on their similarities. The comparison would be to see the differences in those gaps of how the 'future course of development' leads. And whatever that might be, this 'unique direction' would have to be known without the limit. On the other hand, the limitation here is to do with the framing of what they could share and what not, for even if there is a scale to these 'fundamental arrangements', it is interesting to think that what the 'tribe' can 'fit' into a 'way of life and set of values' could be measured. The tension would be how to compare these 'set[s] of values' without breaking down a 'way of life' itself.

Nevertheless, to an 'anthropologist', '[n]othing is more helpful' than to 'study contrast he finds between peoples who on the whole share many traits'. That is, the perspective would have to be outside both 'people' and an 'anthropologist'. And even though it is about the 'contrasts' that an 'anthropologist' between 'people', the perspective on the 'anthropologist' would have to know already that there are contrasts to be *found* — the 'contrasts' which 'he finds between people who on the whole share many traits'. As such, this formulation would have to be the thinking on the idea of that sameness as I read earlier. Nonetheless, if this is about the 'contrasts' between people who 'on the whole share many traits', then this is about seeing the differences in the sameness. The 'share' *could* be 'share' because there are already the 'differences' to be seen.

In a way, this idea would have to be about the perspective on the 'anthropologists' on the 'tribe'. Indeed, it has to be about the position, the areas, the surroundings, and how to frame what is considered 'it' and 'its neighbors'. The framing here though is not constructed from 'it' *itself*,

but from outside of 'it', and what to be seen as 'it' and 'its neighbor' would have to come from another.

This sets up the frame of this grouping, and the division could be thought of as an issue, which an 'anthropologist' is also aware of:

> Anthropologists also have had to accustom themselves to maximum differences between their own culture and another and their techniques have to be sharpened for this particular problem. They know from experience that there are great differences in the situations which men in different cultures have to meet and in the way in which different tribes and nations define the meanings of these situations.[51]

The 'maximum differences between their own culture and another' do not come naturally to 'anthropologists' because they have had to 'accustom themselves'. Or I could say that this limitation might be about the 'maximum differences' and *not* just 'differences'. It is something they must do to make an effort, a skill of some sort.

The issue would be: if this is about accustoming themselves to 'maximum differences', then the idea of the 'maximum differences' would have to be already established. The 'differences' then would have to be considered a scale as such, but what about the 'maximum' of these 'differences'? If there is a scale like this, then what to be 'maximum' would have to be on *another* scale? So, I could say that the 'maximum differences' would be about knowing *all* the 'differences' that could be with 'another'. That is, this is the comparison between the scale of difference and 'another' scale of difference.

This is, then, about knowing 'their own culture' and 'another' 'culture', and there is still something to be done about it. If they have to 'accustom themselves', then what they are 'accustomed to' would have to be from their perspective. '[T]heir own culture' and 'another'? The anthropologists would have to be in agreement and identify themselves and what belongs to them — 'their own culture' — to be able to see what is to be 'another'.

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[51] *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, 9.

These 'maximum differences' is thought of as a 'problem'. The particularness of this implies that there could be another 'problem' in this, but 'their techniques' would be about this. Again, this is to do with 'their techniques', and this is something that has to be 'sharpened', so, as I have read, these things are outside of 'anthropologists'. But I think that if it is that they 'have had to accustom themselves to' and 'their techniques have to be sharpened', then this is about knowing that there *could* be 'themselves' that are more 'accustom[ed]' to this idea, that it could be *better*. And indeed it could be *better* because this gestures to how to deal with a 'particular problem'.

If they 'know from experience that there are great differences in the situations', then I could say that these 'great differences' could be known elsewhere. This perspective would put '[t]hey' outside of 'men in different cultures'. That is, to be able to claim so, the 'anthropologists' would have to be positioned outside of these 'men'. So, there is a tension here in which, although 'they' are claimed from outside of those 'men', the '[a]nthropologists' still know that 'their own culture' is different from 'another'. As such, in this formulation, there seem to be multiple layers of 'difference'; 'they' that see the differences between 'men in different cultures', and 'they' that see the 'differences' between 'themselves' and 'another'. 'They' are *not* part of 'men in different cultures'. There always has to be the other others.

But 'culture' has something to do with 'situations' because these are what 'different tribes and nations' all have in common; these are the *things* that they 'have to meet'. If this is something they have to meet, then the perspective would have to claim the knowledge of what they 'meet' to be able to identify the differences and how the 'meanings' are 'defined' in the 'tribes'. That is to say, there is already the idea that 'these situations' must have 'meanings' in the *first place*. But this 'meanings' does not come with the 'situations', it must have been 'defined' by outside of the 'situations' — by the 'tribes' and 'nations'. So, 'tribes' and 'nations' are not the same thing, but they share the constitution in which they both are constructed by the framing that has to do with 'culture'. That is to say, this would have to rely on the idea that 'culture' is *already* in relation to the 'meanings'.

So, even though the 'situations' have 'different' 'meanings', the 'situations' are *still* 'situations', and the 'meanings', albert their differences, would *still* be constructed as 'meanings'. So, the deferral here would be about the 'way' in which 'different tribes and nations define the meanings of these situations.' So, this is not about the definition of the 'meanings' *as such*, rather, it is about the 'way' that they 'define' the 'meanings'. But are these 'tribes' and 'nations' see the 'situations' as the same? For this is being claimed from the perspective outside of both 'tribes' and 'nations', so it could not be said that, in this formulation, the 'tribes' and 'nations' define 'these situations' because these are 'situations'. This *could* only be 'situations' because, from the perspective of '[a]nthropologists', these are 'situations' to all 'men in cultures'.

And I cannot help but think about the different *situation* here — about the scientist.

> All its textual strategies — its method — depended on a prior and critical disjunction of language and the world. It made visual perception unmediated by concepts the origin of knowledge about the world, and it made language the means by which that knowledge appeared in descriptions. Science depended, in other words, on the descriptive adequacy of language as a representation of the world, but in order to move from individual percept to agreed-upon perception, it also needed a language of communicative adequacy that could enable consensus in the community of scientists.[52]

If the 'textual strategies' and 'its method' 'depended on a prior and critical disjunction of language and the world', then the 'language' and the 'world' would have to be separated. These multiple 'strategies' here could be 'textual', and this 'all' would frame this framing of what it has — *all* of it. There should also be the idea, the framing, of the 'language' and the 'world' to construct this 'critical disjunction', which would then construct 'its textual strategies'. And this could be 'textual strategies' because this is to do with the 'language' — the relationship between the 'language' and the 'world'. But it cannot be only about the 'language' as such because 'it made visual perceptions unmediated by concepts the origin of knowledge about the world'. So, there *is* the 'origin of knowledge about the world', which is to do with the 'visual perception'. I

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[52] James Clifford and George E. Marcus, *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 123.

could read that there should be an investment in this 'perception' — the 'visual' one, so there is another 'perception' that could be about this 'world', but this 'visual perception' is about the originality of it.

And 'by concepts'? So there should be more about this to be said. And 'it [also] made language the means by which that knowledge appeared in the descriptions'. If the 'knowledge' about the 'world' could be 'made' into something, then this 'knowledge' about the 'world' should be outside the 'language' itself. The 'language' here is not a mean, but it could be made into one by it. And with the 'language', this 'knowledge' of the 'world' could appear in 'descriptions'. Therefore, if 'knowledge about the world' requires 'language' to appear in 'descriptions', how does 'knowledge of the world' operate without the 'means'? The appearance of it, indeed, should have something to do with the 'visual' of it. But if it does not appear in 'descriptions', could the knowledge be 'appeared' in another way? Or, if it does not rely on appearance, how could this 'knowledge' be *known*?

Or *why* the appearance and the 'descriptions'? This might be about how science depends on the 'descriptive adequacy of language as a representation of the world'. So, the 'world' is not the 'language' itself, but the 'descriptive adequacy of language' could be thought of 'as a representation of the world'. If that is the case then, the perspective should have the 'knowledge' of the 'world' to be able to know what the 'world' *is* and what it represents. From this formulation, I could read that what the 'science' relies on here is not the 'world' itself but the 'representation' of the 'world'. And not only that, there should be, for 'science', an investment in this 'textual strategies' — 'its method' — the 'language', to get to this 'representation'.

But ultimately, the issue of this would be how the perspective on the perspective knows that what it knows is the 'individual' perception, and what it needs, or what it requires, is the multiple perceptions that would have to be in agreement. What is at stake here could *be* how to know that these are agreed-upon perceptions without it being its perception. The perspective would have to know *all* the perceptions in this frame to be able to claim so. The agreement,

therefore, should have to come from the seeing of sameness and differences in those perceptions to construct the agreement.

And how could those 'perceptions' be agreed-upon from the perspective of this 'individual'? This would have to also rely on the 'language', but this is the 'communicative adequacy' of 'language'. That is to say, it needs a 'language' to 'enable consensus in the community of scientists'. As such, I could now read the frame of the 'perceptions' — the 'community of scientists'. And if the 'language of communicative adequacy' is needed enough to 'enable consensus in the community of scientists', then I could read that the 'consensus' here is what 'science' wants to achieve in the 'community'.

Nonetheless, despite the claims of Hall's 'code' or the 'community of scientist',

> discourses on painting are perhaps destined to reproduce the limit which constitutes them, whatever they do and whatever they say: there is for them an inside and an outside of the work as soon as there is work. A series of oppositions comes in the train of this one, which, incidentally, is not necessarily primary (for it belongs to a system whose edging itself reintroduces the problem).[53]

The constitution of 'discourses on painting', thus, would have to rely on themselves even though there is a possibility of *them* to be so as they are 'perhaps destined' to be. If this is the case, then the formulation would have to operate on the repetition of *themselves*, the difference in themselves, which could shift the 'limit which constitutes them'. Another repetition I could read here is how 'there is for them an inside and an outside of the work as soon as there is work. And this should be the system, perhaps, which could only be *thought* so through the series of 'repetitions'. And not only the repetitions, for '[a] series of oppositions [also] comes in the train of this one'. This series of 'oppositions' and 'repetitions' thus should parallel each other through another 'repetition'. But, as claimed, it 'is not necessarily primary (for it belongs to a system whose edging itself reintroduces the problem)'.

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[53] Jacques Derrida, The Truth in Painting, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020).

Therefore, in the next chapter, I would like to take this formulation from Derrida to think further about how this *limit* plays its role in reading and claiming in another *system*.

Chapter 4: Reading Women in Manga and the World

In this section, I would like to continue thinking about the limit in the *system* but this time with the notion of 'image' and how to understand it — comprehend what the 'picture represents' in the 'comic book'.

It is something that Smith and Duncan have also thought about:

In recognizing and paying attention to the differences in representations of male and female bodies, we can conclude that the focus on male bodies in comics emphasizes the power of their physique, whereas the focus on female bodies in comics is meant to titillate the presumed male reader, as well as privilege his interests as consumer and audience.[54]

Indeed, 'recognizing' and 'paying attention' would have to be different. I could also say there is a sequence in which they cannot be interchangeable, for 'we can' would formulate this 'recognizing and paying attention' as a condition in which 'we' need to achieve to 'conclude'. That is to say, there can be no conclusion without 'we' recognizing and 'paying attention' to the 'differences'. But I think there could be a stake here in this claim, as there would have to be the notion that there are already the 'differences' that 'we' can recognize — waiting to be recognized — even though 'we' might not have recognized, for 'we can conclude' would conclude outside of 'we'. 'we' thus would have to operate with the idea that there *must* be differences in the 'representations of male and female bodies' and also have a knowledge of the 'representations' in order to constitute the differences. As such, this 'we' would have to be in the same position to 'conclude', recognize, and pay attention as the same. The issue is not about the 'representations' of 'male and female bodies' but whether 'we' could recognize and pay attention.

Is there another *function* here? Interestingly, as claimed, the attention is not paid by 'we' to the 'male and female bodies' but rather the 'representations' of them. Nevertheless, the conclusion that has been made is thus about the 'focus' on 'male' and 'female bodies' and not the

[54] Matthew J. Smith and Randy Duncan, *Critical Approaches to Comics: Theories and Methods* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 237.

'representations'. In that case, even though the 'representations' cannot be the 'male and female bodies' themselves, there must be, in a sense, a coloration or a connection between the two. Then again, even in its difference, being claimed to be the 'representations' would have to imply already that there is indeed the connection between what it 'represents'.

But I think *this* connection might have something to do with the idea that the 'recognizing and paying attention' of 'we' is working in a different frame from the conclusion. The recognition is something that 'we' *works* with the 'representation', and because of that, 'we can conclude'. The conclusion would then now move to not the 'representations' themselves but to what they represent. That is, recognizing and paying attention could not be on the 'male and female bodies' *as such* in the 'comics'. There is a limitation in what the 'recognizing' and 'paying attention' of 'we' could *do*.

Also, the conclusion that the 'focus on male bodies in comics emphasizes the power of their physique' would have come from the idea that there are already 'male bodies' in the 'comics'. Yet, these 'male and female bodies' would still be *known* through the 'focus'.

Indeed, if what is claimed here cannot be out of the 'focus', then I could read a split here. If a 'focus' is claimed, then there must be an implication of something that is *out of* 'focus', as there can be no 'focus' without something being constituted outside of 'focus'.

But I think that if the 'differences' is the issue here, then there must be multiple 'focus[es]' in this formulation to work with, as there has to be a 'focus on male bodies' and 'focus on female bodies'. The reading, then, must be from the outside of both 'focus[es]' to be able to claim as such. The 'differences' is about what the 'focus[es]' could do — what it 'meant' to do'. For the 'male bodies', the focus would 'emphasizes the power of their physique', the 'physique' that belongs to 'male bodies', thus, 'physique' and 'bodies' are not the same. The 'focus on female bodies' though is constituted to be different from 'the focus on male bodies' in that there is a *mean* to it; '[it] is meant to titillate the presumed male reader, as well as privilege his interests as consumer and audience'. So, there is already a *setup* of what the 'focus on female bodies' could do to the 'reader', a purpose, perhaps, which could *affect* the 'presumed male reader', a specified

'reader', a 'male'. As such, constructing the 'focus on female bodies' in 'comics' requires the 'presumed male reader', something *outside* of it.

But there is still a question: where might this 'focus on female bodies' *be* exactly? For if the conclusion can only be in terms of 'recognizing and paying attention to the differences in representations of male and female bodies', then this knowledge of what the 'focus on male' and 'female bodies' could do would have to be outside of both the 'reader' and 'we'. That is to say, this 'focus' would have to be claimed by 'we'. Nevertheless, 'we', at the same time, imply that it is there whether 'we' recognize the 'differences in representation' or not. As such, this is about *seeing* and constituting what is there and, in turn, being able to trace back what is *already* there.

Then again, since the conclusion is claimed by 'we' — 'we can conclude' — then the 'comics' and the 'presumed male reader' would have to rest on the perspective on 'we', still including 'his interests as consumer and audience'.

I am also wondering about the 'presumed male reader'. Since the 'focus on female bodies in comics is meant to titillate the presumed male reader', then for this 'focus', by 'we', there is a purpose in which the question of its being comes into play. And as I read above, if the 'presumed male reader' is required in constructing the 'focus on female bodies in comics', then I could say that the 'presumed male reader' cannot be a part of 'we'. Nevertheless, the 'presumed male reader' can be more than that, as they can also be *known* as the 'consumer' and the 'audience'. However, the difference would be that the 'presumed male reader' is someone whose focus' is meant to 'titillate', while the 'consumer' and the 'audience' are known for their 'interests'.

And, if, according to 'we', the 'male reader' is meant to 'titillate', then within the construction of the 'female bodies in comics', there must be the knowledge of both the 'male reader' and what the 'focus' could do to this 'presumed male reader' in the formulation.

But where might all of this be? 'In recognizing and paying attention to the differences' cannot be without knowing what is to be recognized. As such, there is no rethinking of what is to be questioned. I could think of this as an excess of what could happen. Then again, if the excess is what they all have, then what *is* the excess to its *excess*?

I might need to invest in this, perhaps, to think in terms of 'recognizing and paying attention to the differences in representations of male and female bodies' if I want to pursue this further, assuming that this condition would extend outside of 'we'.

Now, I would like to continue thinking about major issues in the system of manga and the code of communication: *what* and *how* it is 'represented' to the 'reader' and whether it could be *transferred* at all, and in this case, I am going to look at the 'imagery' which Parker claims to become 'dominant' in the 'otaku-subculture' — '"*moe*" imagery'.

According to Yiu and Chan,

> The catchword *kawaii*, understood as "cute" in English (although this is not a sufficient synonym), succinctly captures the visual operation that precedes the consumption of exotic gazes.[55]

I am, *yet again*, looking at the system of the translation. The '*kawaii*', like 'manga' and 'otaku', is constructed as something else; '*kawaii*' is the 'catchword'. So, '*kawaii*' is not a 'catchword' since it could be claimed outside of it. The relationship of the '"cute"' of 'kawaii' can only be so if there is already the knowledge of English and '"cute"', and the construction of the '*kawaii*', in this case, would have to rely on another language. To put it simply, '*kawaii*' is not English. It has to be worked in a different frame. Nevertheless, there is an overlap of the connection, which is to be 'understood as'. So 'kawaii' is not '"cute"', and in turn '"cute"' is not '*kawaii*'. And I read that the differences in the framing, the *italics* and the *quotation marks* might have something to do with *this* system.

Why the system of translation? I should think that the understanding is not the only framing of the two frames. Still, there is also the working of the 'synonym' as well.[56] So there is a comparison between the two, which would have to rest on the notion that there is the knowing of these two frames to be able to *compare* them at the same time.

[55] Wai-hung Yiu and Alex Ching-shing Chan, ""Kawaii" and "Moe" — Gazes, Geeks (Otaku), and Glocalization of Beautiful Girls (Bishōjo) in Hong Kong Youth Culture," *Positions: Asia Critique* 21, no. 4 (2013): 856.
[56] I am reading this with Derrida's claim in "What Is a "Relevant" Translation?".

But the issue with this claim could be that this is not the 'sufficient synonym' because there should already be the idea of the 'sufficient synonym'. But what is it, then? If *this* is not the 'sufficient synonym', then I should be thinking about the multiple 'synonym[s]'. And 'although' this is not a 'sufficient synonym', the understanding of the 'catchword *kawaii*' is still constructed with '"cute" in English'. That is to say, this understanding does not guarantee sufficiency. But if this is to be 'understood', then this 'sufficient' is not to do with the understanding of '*kawaii*'.

But in this sense, the perspective would have to know already what the 'sufficient synonym' is. Still, since this is to do with the understanding of '*kawaii*' and how there is more 'sufficient synonym', then could I say that น่ารัก is the 'sufficient synonym'? Might this be another 'synonym' which is not 'sufficient'? Although I could be wrong, that is to do with the different frames and systems.

Also, 'the original Japanese term *kawaii* pairs with *moe* and includes *shojo* (teenage girl) erotic visuals.'[57] So there is a condition to this 'erotic visuals', for this has to come with the 'original Japanese term *kawaii*'. Despite the claim that there should be more to offer, the 'original Japanese term kawaii' is being constructed here. If this is about its relationship with 'moe' and 'shojo', then the 'kawaii', outside the 'original Japanese term', should not fall into this condition. There is a requirement for the frame of originality, not the other *kawaii*.

And now, 'moe':

> *Moe* […] is used to describe specific consumables, which here are images of desired body fragments originated from manga. *Moe* is more or less the equivalent of the English word *desired*, or *desirables*. It originally means "budding" and is literally translated as "flaring and glaring desires" or "prosecuted by undulated excitement and desire, setting oneself in flames," because the word *burning* has the same pronunciation in Japanese.[58]

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[57] Yiu and Chan, ""Kawaii" and "Moe" — Gazes, Geeks (Otaku), and Glocalization of Beautiful Girls (Bishōjo) in Hong Kong Youth Culture," 856.
[58] ""Kawaii" and "Moe" — Gazes, Geeks (Otaku), and Glocalization of Beautiful Girls (Bishōjo) in Hong Kong Youth Culture," 857.

'Moe', in this perspective, is about the usage: 'to describe specific consumables', which 'here are images of desired body fragments originated from manga'. If it is about the description of the consumables, then '*[m]oe*' should rely on this 'manga'. *Yet*, at the same time, if this 'originated from manga', it should already depart from 'manga', as it is known to be '*moe*'.

The 'images of desired body fragments' are the issue here because although this is to be known as the 'images', the 'body' would still be recognized as such. And the 'desired'? The question *would* be, by whom? And another question *could* be, how? In this perspective, it is the 'body fragments' that are being 'desired'. Even as the 'fragments', the 'body' would still be known as the 'body'.

And that is the investment in this notion of '[m]oe', that there is a known 'body' in the frame of the 'images' to be said about and recognized (for if there are the 'body fragments' of the 'images', then there should be this 'fragments' outside of these 'images' as well).

How about the origin of the origins? Or the 'images of desired body fragments' that are not from 'manga'. The perspective would have to claim from the different frames within a frame, for those 'consumables' could be more than the 'images of desired body fragments'. Quite 'specific' indeed if '*moe*' is not the 'images' itself but the term used to 'describe' them.

Another system (or systems) of translation, for I could read the frame within a frame. And from the claim, I could read that 'equivalent', 'mean[ing]', 'translat[ing]', and 'hav[ing] the same pronunciation' are all different. Nonetheless, some things are always lost here: there is always a deferral to one another.

Since '"cute" in English' is being 'understood' and 'succinctly captures the visual operation that precedes the consumption of exotic gazes', then I would like to read the idea of 'cute' in relation to 'manga' and how it is being constructed with the notion of 'gazes'. As such, in the following sections, I am going to do a close reading on what Lent has to say about 'cute' in *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*.

'Cute' has been in the domain of the girl child subculture for decades. At first, it described the girls themselves in the traditional sense of those who would inspire compassion, and

then, later, it became an exclusive term used by girls in order to express certain acceptable or favourable qualities among themselves. If something is 'cute,' then it is good.[59]

So, in this perspective, the notion of 'cute' could be known through its *position* and time. And if this is about how 'cute' has been in the 'domain of the girl child subculture', then 'cute' could also be outside of this 'domain' as well. The issue would be how the construction of 'cute' is being shifted in *time*. 'At first' (so there is the idea of the beginning) 'cute' is being constructed as a description; however, it could be changed. So, what 'cute' *is* is not set, as it would have to rely on how it is 'used'. Still, it is not 'cute' as such that is being 'used', as I read, it is the 'term'.

If 'cute' 'described the girls themselves in the traditional sense', then there should be a split in these 'girls'. That is to say, there are the 'girls' and the perspective on the 'girl' on 'themselves'. '[I]t described the girls themselves' could only be so if the 'girls' know 'themselves' in the 'traditional sense of those who would inspire compassion'. And there is another split: 'of those who inspire compassion'. So although this is about the 'girls' 'themselves', their description, 'in the traditional sense', and the claim of 'themselves' would have to come from outside.

Additionally, if the 'term' is 'used by girls', then although the 'term' is being used, the 'cute' *itself* is still in the 'domain' of the 'girl child subculture'. Using the 'word' then does not affect using the 'term' even though I could read a relationship between the two. The 'term' is the 'exclusive term', but not so 'exclusive' by the 'girls' if it is known from outside. They used it to 'express certain acceptable or favorable qualities among themselves', so this would have to be operated within the group, that is, the 'girls' would have to already recognize 'themselves' and see the 'acceptable or favorable qualities' within them as the same. The 'acceptable or favorable qualities' would also have to be according to the 'girls'. And since this is to 'express certain […] qualities', these 'qualities' are something to be 'expressed', and they can be 'expressed' by using other 'terms' outside these 'qualities'.

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[59] John A. Lent, *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy* (Bowling Green: Bowling Green State University Popular Press, 1999), 98.

But 'cute' and 'term' are *not* 'qualities'. They are being 'used' to express something else. But as the text claims, They are indeed to do with the idea of *goodness*; 'if something is 'cute', then it is good'. This is a deferral and a lack in itself. 'Cute' could not *only* be cute, as there is also the goodness that comes with it.

Thus,

> Girls are supposed to be 'cute,' and during the early, male-dominant stage of the Japanese comics-industry, females were often stereotyped as merely ornamental characters. However, with a rapid evolution of long story comics for girls written by women, the traditional notion of *kawaii* was given a specific set of stylistic features and patterns, and the character depictions began to evolve.[60]

'Girls' are *not* 'cute' because it is what they 'supposed to be'. And even then, 'cute' is already in this formulation prior to the 'girls'. Could this gesture to something more? As I have read, there is already a correlation between 'cute' and goodness. And if 'girls' are supposed to be '"cute"', then, from the implication, I could say that there is a requirement for girls to be associated with the 'good', although within a frame, *it* is still the case.

In the 'Japanese comic-industry', there is also a stage — the 'male-dominant stage'. I read this 'male-dominant' as the type of the 'stage' of the 'Japanese comics-industry'. So in a way, the 'Japanese comics-industry' could be seen in different 'stage[s]', and the perspective would have to know them. In this stage, though, 'females were often stereotyped as merely ornamental characters'. That is, 'females' are not 'ornamental characters' because they were 'stereotyped' as such. But this is not always the case because it is claimed to be 'often'. And being 'merely ornamental characters' could be constituted as a stereotype. So, this could go back to the idea of the *system* and the representation. Thus, the stereotype could be about the construction of 'female' and something which they are not, which would have to be known outside of the 'female'.

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[60] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 94.

What breaks down the 'stage' is the 'rapid evolution of long story comics for girls written by women'. So, there are 'females' as 'ornamental characters', the 'women' that write 'comics' and the 'girls'. They are different but inherently relate to one another. Though I am interested in the idea of writing 'comics' specifically for 'girls', for this would have to be about 'girls', but it is the writing itself is constructed from outside of 'girls'. This writing, therefore, is claimed to be for the 'girls', which would have to be from the perspective on the perspective of the 'women'. Also, if there are 'comics' for 'girls', then there should be 'comics' for others as well. Nonetheless, this 'evolution of long story comics' by 'women' affects this 'stage'. The 'rapid evolution' of comics written by 'women'? I cannot help but think how the idea of gender — 'women' — plays a role in the 'Japanese comics-industry'. That is, being 'women' does *matter* to the stereotypes of 'female' in 'comics'. The gender of the writer does matter.

The change would be about the 'traditional notion of *kawaii*', so the notion of 'kawaii', in a sense, is already known. It would have to be more than the 'traditional notion' in this formulation because it is the 'traditional notion' *with* something else — it was 'given a specific set of stylistic features and patterns'. So, the construction of the 'traditional notion of *kawaii*' is constituted by what it lacks; what it has does not include this 'specific set of stylistic features and patterns'. And if this is a 'specific set of stylistic features and patterns', then I could say that the 'traditional notion' *should* also have a set of 'stylistic features and patterns', but not a 'specific' one that was 'given'. That is to say, the 'rapid evolution' could be about the change of 'features and patterns', but it could not be changed by *itself* — it has to be 'given' and by the 'women'. 'And the character depictions began to evolve'. As such, the 'depictions' are the 'stylistic features and patterns' that must be 'given'.

Then, could I say that the *kawaii* could be about the 'depictions' here? And if the 'traditional notion of *kawaii*', 'given a specific set of stylistic features', has changed, would it be something else?

But I could say that the 'stage of the Japanese comics-industry' is to do with the 'characters depictions'. Gender is also an issue here, for there are 'males' and 'females' in this

formulation, and I could read the idea of *opposition*, although this opposition is the relationship between *outside* and *in* the comics — the characters. That is, the 'stage' dominated by males would gesture to less important female characters in comics, and the change in this 'notion of *kawaii*' could be possible through women writers.

Also,

> […] at least in the fantasy world of manga, the concept of the ideal woman is redefined and, in turn, influences younger generation of girls. On the other hand, the Japanese vision of the "cute" female provides a strategic guideline of a girl child to benefit in a grossly imperfect world dominated by grown-up boys, but it also deludes her into believing the relative importance of being "cute".[61]

The 'concept of the ideal woman' could already be defined even prior to the 'fantasy world of manga', for if this is to do with the redefining, then the defining would have to have already happened. 'At least', in the 'fantasy world of manga'. So, there are multiple worlds of 'manga', and redefining the 'concept' could also happen outside of it. That is, it does not limit to this 'fantasy world', so I could read, from this implication, that there must already be this redefining somewhere else as well, in the 'world of manga'.

The 'concept of the ideal woman'? So, there has to be the 'ideal woman', although this is not what it concerns, for this is to do with the 'concept' of it. And this 'redefined' concept thus 'influences younger generation of girls'. So 'manga' itself cannot 'influence', but it is the 'concept' of it *in* the 'manga' that could affect 'younger generation of girls' — a specific generation, therefore, not all 'girls' could be affected by it.

However, is there really a change in this redefin[ing]? Although it is being 'redefined', the concept of the ideal woman does not *change*. The rethinking about the 'concepts' does not shift the 'idea woman'. It would still be known as the 'concept' *as such*, and the 'ideal woman' would still be working in this operation. There is no question regarding the frame of the 'ideal woman' here.

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[61] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 121.

Could this redefining have to do with the 'younger generation' here? If so, then this *system* and the process here would have to rely on the notion of time. And if this is the redefining, then the question would be: by who? It could be by the 'women' or others, but it is not from the 'younger generation of girls'.

Following this, the quotation marks of the '"cute"' here could be about how it is being framed as a 'concept' and not the 'term' or the word as such, that is, it is to do with the 'Japanese vision' of the '"cute" female'. Hence, this could be about the seeing, the image, which is different from the '"cute" female', for if this is the 'vision', then it could only be claimed from the knowledge that this is not what the cute *is*. That is, the '"cute"' is framed within the notion of 'Japanese', and it is different in *other* 'vision[s]'. And this 'provides a strategic guideline for a girl child to benefit in a grossly imperfect world dominated by grown-up boys'. So, there is a 'guideline' to 'benefit' in the 'world'? It is the 'world' that is 'imperfect' and 'dominated by grown-up boys'. That is, this world would have to be outside the 'fantasy world', but somehow, there is *something* to be transferred here; the 'concept' and the 'vision'. Indeed, although there is a *division* of the frames between the two 'world[s]', one could affect another.

I could read here, again, the idea of the oppositions— 'boys' and 'girls', and 'child' and 'grown-up', and while the 'child' is to do with the 'girls', the 'grown-up' is to do with 'boys'.

The 'vision' also 'deludes' the 'girl child' into believing the relative importance of being "cute"'. So, in a sense, the 'relative importance of being "cute"' is not *important*? Or could I say it is not *important* as much as the 'vision' led 'her' to 'believe'. I am curious, though, how does the importance operate in this formulation? That is, if, from the implication, the 'girl child' 'believe[s]' the importance of being '"cute"', then the perspective would have to know both the 'vision' and the 'girl child', including the 'importance' of being '"cute"' outside of the 'girl child' at the same time.

Or even the discerning question: how does it delude 'her'?

The latter issue can become very problematic, especially in light of the women's movements, for the traditional concept of "helplessness that inspires compassion" is not

yet far gone from the notion of "cute". After all, only women have to pretend to be flawed or incompetent in order to be accepted as part of social groupings. A beautiful, competent woman is allowed to be outstanding so long as she is "cute," whereas a beautiful, competent man is outstanding without putting any extra effort into appearing otherwise. Thus, matters that are conventionally viewed as trivial or insignificant, such as the notion of "cuteness," often contain deeper, important clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society.[62]

This delusion is thought to be an 'issue' and a 'problematic' one. It 'can become'? So it might not necessarily be 'problematic' as such. It is about the becoming of one. Nonetheless, it would still be an issue *regardless*. Thus, there is a knowledge of what it could be even though that process has not yet happened. However, would it not *imply* that that has already happened?

It could also be outside of 'especially', but there is one 'in light of women's movements'. That is, the 'women's movements' would have to rely on the belief of the 'girl child', and thus, I could read that it should correlate with the 'Japanese vision of "cute"' as well. And indeed it should be because the 'traditional concept of "helplessness that inspires compassion" is not yet far gone from the notion of "cute"'. So, the concern here thus is not about the 'concept' as such, rather, it is about the position of the 'concept' in *relation* to the 'notion of "cute"'. Both have to be different and separate. But could they be together? If the 'concept' is not 'yet far gone', then it has to already moved from the 'notion' of '"cute"'. The problem would be that it does not 'yet far gone'. So, the distance between the position matters. But how far gone would the 'traditional concept' be for this not to be a problem? The perspective should know this already, for it is 'yet', that is, the point of position would have to be *set*, waiting for the 'concept' to move from the 'notion of "cute"'.

But the 'notion of "cute"' should still be, within this sense of distance, to do with the traditional concept of "helplessness that inspires compassion"'.

The problem, 'especially in light of women's movements', is about *not* being the same: 'only women have to pretend to be flawed or incompetent in order to be accepted as part of social

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[62] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 121.

groupings'. 'Only women'. So, others that are not 'women' would have to be already thought of, and the perspective would have to be outside all of it. In a way, if 'only women have to pretend to be flawed or incompetent', then 'women' could not be *so*, for it is only the pretending. The concern for the perspective on the perspective of 'women' is to do with the 'social groupings'. That is to say, these 'women' is known to be not part of the 'social groupings', and to be accepted, pretending is the condition that they have to do.

Being 'beautiful', 'competent', and 'cute' are not the same thing, but the 'woman' can be all of them. But to be outstanding' is something that a 'woman' cannot decide; she has to be 'allowed' to be. So, what they *could* be is under the condition, 'as long as she is "cute"'. As such, in a way, 'she' is thus subject to the 'Japanese vision' — of what they could be and where they are in the 'social groupings'. '[S]he' is not subject to the 'cute' *as such* but the 'vision' and 'concept' that comes with it instead.

On the other hand, a 'beautiful, competent man is outstanding without putting any extra effort into appearing otherwise'. So, there is a comparison between a 'woman' and a 'man', who although share a constitution of being able to be 'beautiful', 'competent', and 'outstanding', one is working within the condition. At the same time, the other does not have to 'put any extra effort into appearing otherwise'. So, I could read that pretending here could be about 'extra effort'. Again, to appear as something else would imply that a perspective on the 'man' would have to know the appearance of himself for him to 'appear' as something else that is not himself. That is, there has to be a split for both a 'man' and a 'woman'. Although the 'man' does not have to 'put in any extra effort', there should be the idea of 'extra effort' that the 'man' can do. Thus, the 'man' could be constructed by the lack of appearance.

But the appearance of himself? I think there might be an implication that this split of the 'man' that knows the 'appearance' would have to rely on something outside of the 'man' *himself*. Does this extend to others' visions as well? And it *could* be so because this would still work in the frame of 'Japanese vision'. That is to say, since this comparison is about the 'woman' and her

condition under the concept of '"cute"', then a 'man' whose differences rely on *not* having to be '"cute"', then I could say *this* lack of concept thus makes this an 'issue'.

Whether the 'man' know of this or not, the 'woman' would have to know of this 'vision' of the 'concept' and the agreement on it.

'[M]atters that are conventionally viewed as trivial or insignificant' are not 'trivial or insignificant' because this is only a view of them. Also, if these 'trivial or insignificant' are not the same but outside of the 'matters', then the 'matters' could also be 'viewed' as something else as well. This viewing thus is not fixed, yet it is framed here to be conventional, so it could also be another. Still, it is this conventional view that has to do with the 'notion of cuteness'. '[S]uch as the notion of "cuteness"'? So, more could be said about the 'matters'. That is to say, the 'notion of "cuteness" is one of the 'matters' here. These 'often contain deeper, important clues to beliefs and attitudes of cultures and society'. So, the 'clues' could be 'contain[ed]' in the 'matters', but not all the time, that is, this is not always the case.

Nonetheless, in these 'often', I could read that the claim does not deny that there are 'clues' in the 'matters', only that these are the 'deeper' and 'important clues'. That is to say, there could be 'clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society' in the 'matters that are conventionally viewed. The issue here could be about the 'conventional view', which would affect seeing the inside of the 'matters'.

In the case of the 'notion of "cuteness"', it should be, thus, 'conventionally viewed' as 'trivial or significant' since it is one of the 'matters'. The question would be: does it contain the 'deeper' and 'important clues'? Is it in the 'often'?

It could be. And if that is so, it should 'contain deeper and important clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society'. Yet, another question would be: 'deeper' and 'important' compared to what? I read that 'deeper' and 'important' both are to do with the comparison. *So*, it could be 'deeper' and 'important' compared to how it is being 'conventionally viewed'? Then this should be about the idea that 'trivial' or 'significant' could be thought of as opposed to 'deeper' and 'important'. And with this formulation, the perspective would have to guarantee the

absolute 'view' on the 'matters', that these are the 'matters' *as such*, and not how it is 'viewed' 'conventionally', or 'viewed' at all on the 'matters'.

The 'matters' are about the 'clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society'. So, the 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society' are something that cannot be *known* as such. The tension would be about how there are 'clues' to access the notion of them, however, there is already the idea of 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society' in the formulation. What the perspective claims not to know implies that they are already out there to be known.

The 'clues'? Then there could be other 'clues'. But these 'clues' are not the same in that they are different in the scales. Some 'clues' are 'important' and 'deeper' than others. But these are all 'clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society'. How do these scales, though, relate to 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society'? What are the stakes in this?

It could be how the 'matters' *should* not be 'conventionally viewed', for it could affect seeing the 'clues to beliefs and attitudes of culture and society'. That is to say, to access to 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society', 'matters' *matter*.

Nonetheless, these are 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society' — some things 'of' 'culture and society' — so they are neither 'culture and society'. And if this '"cute"' is to be known from the perspective of 'Japanese vision', then the 'vision' itself would have to be *within* the 'beliefs and attitudes'.

In addition,

> […] the shift of "cute" features in Japanese comic books illustrates the changes in the Japanese mental outlook, preferring commonality over perfection for the sake of mass consumption. In this value system, the notion of cuteness generates and maintains gender stereotypes, although they have gone through a great contextual and formal evolution in the past several decades. The repetitive formula of 'cute' action heroines indicates that 'cute' women are desirable and that being 'cute' is advantages to women who, in reality, do not possess equal ground in the male-dominant culture.[63]

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[63] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 120.

The '"cute" features' are not fixed, and although there is a change in the 'features', all of them would still be known to be '"cute"'. And according to the previous argument, it is also about the *position* of the 'concept' and the idea of the *time,* which would differentiate the *cute* from one another. Cute could be in many places, but in 'Japanese comic books' as the 'features', it 'illustrates the changes in the Japanese mental outlook'. So the changes in cute 'features' in 'comic books' and the 'Japanese mental outlook' work in parallel. That is to say, the relationship between the two would rely on the working of the *effect*; when one changes, so does the other. Yet, the 'changes' in the 'Japanese mental outlook' is something that is illustrated. And if that is the case, the 'Japanese mental outlook' would have to rely on the 'shift' in 'Japanese comic books'. That is, the 'changes in the Japanese mental outlook' are not the 'changes' as such but the illustration made by the 'shift' of 'features' in 'Japanese comic books' — it is being operated within the frame of this 'shift'.

So, the 'preferring commonality over perfection for the sake of mass consumption' is constructed as the 'Japanese mental outlook'. And if this is the case, the 'mental outlook' before the 'changes' could be anything but 'preferring commonality over perfection'. That is, it has to know what the 'perfect' 'features' are and that there is already one to be able to 'shift' the preference here. Also, this perspective would have to invest in 'mass consumption' because this is the purpose of this 'preferring'. The 'outlook' thus would have to hinge on its perspective on seeing the 'mass consumption' at the same time, for this is what the 'commonality' is about, that there should be the sameness and difference of the 'mass'. The 'mass' thus would have to be worked on the same framing *system*, which would still be, as I read, in the 'outlook'.

And it is the 'system' because the text continues: '[i]n this value system, the notion of cuteness generates and maintains gender stereotypes, although they have gone through a great contextual and formal evolution in the past several decades'. So, I can see the shift of the position of the 'notion of cuteness' in 'this value system'.

Yet, I still think that although the 'notion of cuteness' is in the 'value system', it would still be in the frame of 'mental outlook still' since this is being illustrated. If, in this 'value system',

the notion of 'cuteness generates and maintains gender serotypes', then 'gender stereotypes' must be 'maintain[ed]'. That is, it could be lost in time. But this does not necessarily imply that 'gender stereotypes' could only come from the 'notion of cuteness', as it is being framed in 'this value system', therefore, the 'cuteness' is not limited to being in this 'system'.

The condition of going through a 'great contextual and formal evolution in the past several decades' does not affect this 'value system', and the 'notion of cuteness' is still 'generat[ing] and maintain[ing] gender stereotypes'. The claim would have to be built on the idea that the 'evolution' *should* have broken down this maintenance or disrupted the relationship between the 'notion of cuteness' and 'gender stereotypes'. But it does not happen, at least in the 'past several decades'. In a sense, I could argue that *that* itself is the 'system', that there could be 'changes' in 'outlook', but the notion of 'cuteness' would 'maintains gender stereotypes'.

Still, this is in the 'past several decades', so if the 'notion' should *rely* on time, then the perspective should already frame the time, which in turn implies that it *could* be outside of 'past several decades' but is still, nevertheless, in the said frame.

There is a 'formula' for the 'heroine' in 'Japanese comic books'. I am reading this to be *in* the 'Japanese comic books' because I could read that this is to do with the 'system'. This 'formula' could be 'repetitive', and this 'repetitiveness' is thus thought of to be an issue here, for it 'indicates that 'cute' women are desirable and that being 'cute' is advantages to women'. This indication thus has to depend on the idea of repetition.

But there might be something more with the idea of the '"cute" action heroines'. *Why* the investment in the 'action heroines'? There should be other characters besides 'heroines' in these 'comic books', and 'cute' is not fixed to the 'action heroines' since it is outside them. Still, the 'heroines' would have to have some relationships with the 'women', for they are what they 'indicate'.

Not only that, but I could read that being a 'heroine' also has to do with being 'desirable' and 'advantages to women'. But if that is the case, *where* are the 'women'? They could be in the 'Japanese mental outlook, and they can also be in 'reality'. That is to say, there should be 'women'

outside of this 'reality' as well. But in 'reality', they 'do not possess equal ground in the male-dominant culture'. The lack is the problem for the 'women' here, for the 'equal ground' is something they 'do not possess'.

Moreover,

> [t]his particular formula implicitly leaves a message that being 'cute' is a virtue and, in an oddly paradoxical way, strength. However, cuteness in this instance is not in direct opposition of ugliness or neatness. It is clear by the characteristics of the heroine's nemesis, that cuteness in the girls' comics convention battles against 'beauty,' that is, perfection and maturity. [...] Masubushi argues that physical beauty is a fatefully determined state of perfection, unlike the states indicated by such expressions as *kirei* (pretty, neat), *suteki* (dashing), or *kakko ii* (cool, good-looking). These categories, he argues, can be achieved by personal efforts of self-improvement [...]. In other words, even conventionally 'ugly' or 'plain' persons, as many girls' comic heroines are supposed to be, can make themselves 'cute' by working hard at it.[64]

Indeed, there could be other 'formula[s]', but this one 'leaves a message', so the idea that 'being 'cute' is a virtue' and a 'strength' would have to be framed as a 'message'. And if being '"cute"' is thought to be an 'oddly' paradox to the 'strength', then both notions are set to be in opposition. I read that the idea of cute is being constructed here by its opposition and *what* is not the opposition; 'cuteness' in this 'instance' is not 'direct opposition of ugliness or neatness'. The 'direct opposition'? Then there should be the 'opposition' that is not 'direct'. Then, could the 'strength' be the 'opposition' but not the direct one?

Nevertheless, the 'direct opposition' could be constituted by the 'characteristics of the heroine's nemesis'. It concerns the 'heroine' and what belongs to her. But this would have to be about 'cuteness' in 'this instance', that is, the framing has to rely on another *framing* of the system.

The 'characteristics of the heroine's nemesis' are being constructed by the notion that 'cuteness in the girls' comics convention battles against 'beauty', that is, perfection and maturity'. This 'cuteness' is thus different from other 'cuteness' since this is in the 'girls' comics' and this

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[64] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 107.

is set to be 'against' something else. So, the setting of this 'direct opposition' would have to be constituted by the *known* 'nemesis', and the 'characteristics' that come with this opposition are, therefore, another 'opposition'. The 'opposition' thus would have to rest on *what* determines the 'heroine's nemesis' in the first place. That is, I could say that this is the working of the system within the 'system'. However, if it does not recognize the relationship between the 'characteristics' and the character itself, it is impossible to know that the 'nemesis' is to do with 'beauty' and the 'heroines' with 'cuteness'. The 'beauty' is *not* the 'perfection' and 'maturity', but it could be, in this frame, the construction of 'beauty' in 'girls' comics'.

But there is another shift of 'beauty' here, for Masubushi, 'physical beauty' is one of the states, while '*kirei* (pretty, neat), *suteki* (dashing), or *kakko ii* (cool, good-looking) are 'expressions'. So, 'beauty' is about the physicality already 'determined', as the state. That is, it could not be changed otherwise because it is thought to be *perfection*. The tension would be that if this results from the determination, it is not the 'state'. '[F]atefully determined'? So this knowledge of the determination would have to come from the perspective on the determination outside of itself.

The '*kirei*', '*suteki*', and '*kakko ii*' require the framing of *others*; 'pretty, neat', 'dashing', 'cool, gool-looking'. The italics could be about how its construction is a lack in itself, that is, the working within these brackets is something they must be *deferred* to. And these are, as I read above, 'expressions', yet together, they are 'categories'. And these 'categories' can be 'achieved by personal efforts of self-improvement'.

Is it achieved by *whom*? But whoever that might be, this must be done by the 'self' since it is 'personal efforts of self-improvement' and cannot be in other states besides these 'states'. That is, what it 'can' achieved is by no means the 'expressions', instead, it is the 'states' that are 'indicated' by those 'expressions'.

The *issue* would be that there is the 'self-improvement' that it can achieve. If 'beauty' is different from 'kirei', 'suteki', and 'kakko ii' by not being able to be 'achieved by personal effort', then whether or not there is 'physical beauty', there has to be already the *state* in which could be

indicated by 'kirei', 'suteki', and 'kakko ii', and *another* state that is not. And whoever that *might* be, there should be the known self that could be improved to the *point* of achieving that 'state'. Moreover, it could not be the 'state of perfection' if it could be improved. That is, I could say that the 'state of perfection' here might be about something that cannot be changed, the inability to achieve something because there is nothing to be improved from, and there is no knowledge of the achievement.

'In other words', this would have to be about what has been said; 'even conventionally 'ugly' or 'plain' persons […] can make themselves 'cute' by working hard at it'. So, those who could achieve by 'personal efforts of self-improvement' here are the 'persons'. That is, these 'persons' cannot be 'heroines' because these are what they could be thought 'as', therefore, they cannot be in the 'state of perfection' since they 'can make themselves "cute"'.

But are 'heroines' in girls' comics 'ugly' or 'plain'? For these are what they are 'supposed' to be. That is to say, they could be different and be anything but 'ugly' or 'plain'.

Or they could be ugly or plain, but not the 'conventionally' one, as the 'persons' are. The quotation marks would be about how these are being set up in the different frame, a shift in perspective from the perspective on it, which would, in turn, implies another ugly and plain person in the formulation that are not 'supposed to be' in 'girls' comic'.

Still, if 'conventionally 'ugly' or 'plain' persons […] can make themselves 'cute' by working hard at it', then they would have to know, and in *agreement*, in this ugliness and plainness of 'themselves' and also have to knowledge of 'themselves' that are '"cute"' as well. That is to say, there is a division between 'persons' and 'themselves' for the 'persons' to be able to 'make themselves' 'cute' and know that this is *possible*. So the idea of '"cute"' has to be, in the same frame that I read ugliness and plainness, thought as the same in this perspective. That is, they would have to agree with this '"cute"' and what they could be, that the '"cute"' they 'can make themselves' into *is* this '"cute"'.

But being '"cute"' is not an easy task for the 'persons', for they have to work hard at it. So not only the idea of '"cute"' is something that is outside of 'themselves', but to achieve that would require effort. But *how*?

Interestingly,

'[…] even a 'beautiful' woman can become 'cute' if she develops fuzzy, likable flaws in her character, to remove the threat that her very presence poses to the general public.'[65]

So, as I read above, the idea of 'cute' is being seen in opposition to the idea of 'beauty', but a '"beautiful" woman can become "cute" if she develops fuzzy, likable flaws in her character'. Although there is a setup of this opposition, one can 'become' the other. Therefore, the state of beauty is not permanent. Being in the 'state of perfection', 'fatefully determined', can also be changed. But I am wondering, in this opposition between 'cuteness' and 'beauty', for even though they are thought to be so, a '"beautiful" woman can become "cute"', then would not that put 'cute' in another frame from 'beauty'?

Nonetheless, I could read that 'cute' is being operated in the frame of the scale. For the beautiful woman, her becoming cute would have to rely on her 'character', that is, it is working in a condition. So, from the outside perspective, what she is would have to correlate with the 'woman' or persons' perspective on themselves to be able to 'make themselves' 'cute'. The stake would be in this extent of the agreement, that *what* the 'persons' 'make themselves' to be and what the perspective on them are the same.

'[F]uzzy and likable flaws are not the 'character' because this is what is supposed to be *in* it. In other words, what the woman *is* and can *become* is to do with 'her character' and what is in it. The 'flaws' here are constructed to be something that has to be 'developed' in this perspective and could be 'likable'. The question would be: from *whose* perspective is this? This 'likable' would have to do with the 'general public', which is not the 'woman' herself, for if she should develop 'fuzzy' and 'likable flaws', it would have to be for 'remov[ing] the threat that her

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[65] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 120.

very presence poses to the general public'. That is to say, it could be possible only if the 'woman' *knows* what her 'presence' *is* to be able to remove the 'threat' that poses to the 'general public', for this is *what* she has to do by herself.

If her 'presence' poses a 'threat' to the 'general public', then I could say that being 'beautiful' is about her 'presence', which is thought to be a problem. To push this further, I think that *if* 'beauty' is to do with the 'state of perfection', and to become 'cute' is to develop 'likable flaws', then considering this, there is an idea that being *perfect* is a 'threat' to the 'general public'.

Yet, as I read above, not all the flaws are acceptable, it has to be 'likable'. So, this has to be something about the *liking* of the 'public' and not the other way around. The issue, then, could be about the relationships between the 'woman' and the 'general public' regarding her 'presence' and how it could *affect* the 'public' from the perspective outside of both 'woman' and the 'public' to be able to claim so.

And indeed, as Lent further adds: 'by far the most outstanding feature of cuteness is its complete lack of anything observably threatening'.[66] So, there are several features of 'cuteness', and their differences are to do with how 'outstanding' they are since there is the 'most outstanding one'. And 'by far', there is a tracing of the past — setting up of the possible *timeline* — that this relationship between this 'feature' and 'cuteness' could rely on this frame of time.

If the 'feature' is the 'complete lack of anything observably threatening', then I could say that 'cuteness' involves observing what it appears to be to others. Its construction is known through its 'complete lack of anything observably threatening', so, in turn, this should be about what it *has* and how this lack is in relation to *what* is known to be 'threatening'. The tension would be how this 'threatening' is only to do with what it is *observed* to be, so it is already a gesture to the idea that there could be something 'threatening' outside of it. Still, the lack is only about the 'observably threatening' one. 'Its complete lack of anything'? The lack should be more than a lack because this 'complete' would only account for the 'complete' here. But how to see the lack in this perspective? It would have to rely on the idea that there should already be

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[66] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 94.

something to know that something is absent. As such, the perspective would have to claim the seeing of the 'public' in one frame with 'its complete lack' *with* the frame that poses a threat at once.

But there should be more than the *absence* correlating with the idea of 'cute'.

> [I]n 1991 there was a national craze for the 100 year old twin sisters, Kin and Gin, who made frequent appearances in talk shows on Television […]. They were described by young and older people alike as both kawaii (cute) and kawaiso (pitiful). The case of Kin-san and Gin-san illustrates that, although cute was principally about childishness, a sense of weakness and disability — which is a part of childishness — was a very important constituent of the cute aesthetic. In fact cute and pitiful were often the same thing.[67]

The idea of 'kawaii (cute) and kawaiso (pitiful)' is constructed as the description, which is claimed to be from 'young and older people alike', therefore, I could say that 'Kin' and 'Gin' are *not* both 'kawaii (cute) and kawaiso (pitiful)'. It is only the description from the perspective outside of them. That is to say, the concern here is not *how* the 'twin sisters' are being described by 'people', rather, it is about how the relationship between the idea of 'kawaii' and 'kawaiso' is constituted in this 'case' since by setting up this notion, 'cute and pitiful were often the same thing' despite their differences.

'[P]rincipally', 'cute' is about the 'childishness', and since a 'sense of weakness and disability' is a 'part of childishness', it is a 'very important constituent of the cute aesthetic'. So, the 'sense of weakness and disability' is not the same as 'cute', through this formulation of relationship, 'cute' is thus being thought with the idea of 'pitiful'. To push this formulation further, I could read that it is a 'sense of weakness and disability' that is associated with the 'kawaiso (pitiful)' here. In a way, if this is the case, the constitution of 'cute aesthetic' could be *seen* from the 'outside'.

A 'sense of weakness and disability' would have to be about the *absence*, knowing there should be *more* to it — the lack of self. And by reading 'kawaiso (pitiful)' with this 'weakness

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[67] Lise Skov and Brian Moeran, *Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan*, Consumasian Book Series (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 236.

and disability', 'kawaiso (pitiful)' thus would have to be constructed by the idea of multiple *positions*, of seeing another with the knowledge that there is a difference, the lack of another. In a way, I could say that there must be multiple positions, for there should be the perspective that would *know* that difference, knowing the absence. This comparison, then, would have to come from the other. That is to say, the 'weakness and disability', including the absence here, would have to be constructed from outside the 'disability' and the other.

The repetition of 'cute' and 'pitiful' establishes the formulation of the relationship between 'cute' and 'pitiful'. As claimed, if they 'were often the same thing', then this would have to be about how its being is able to shift. The question would be: *how*? In a way, it could be that what it *is* does not change. It could be that the 'same thing' could be about the 'meaning' of 'cute'. It could be that it depends on *what* the 'part' of it is. I could say it is about what is invoked in the 'cute' *here*.

But this would have to be in that 'often'. That is, there should be both 'cute' and 'pitiful' in the formulation within the frame. And even in that frame in which 'cute' and 'pitiful' are the 'same thing', they are, 'in fact', not the 'same'. However, these ideas would have to be framed in the notion of 'Japanese vision'. But I could not help but think again about the *divisions* and how the 'world of manga' has anything to do with 'reality'. If there is an idea of seeing those frames *at all*, then there should be a frame that would put those frames together to be in the same frame.

Thus, the *link* would be how the 'woman' *is* being indicated by 'heroines'. I could say this is a deferral. I could say this is about the duplication and the transfer between frames: the relationship between the 'cute' and 'women' in 'girls' comics' is to do with 'cute' and 'women' in 'reality'.

In addition, for Skov, 'cute' and the child has a close relationship with each other.

The idea underlying cute was that young people who had passed through childhood and entered adult life had been forced to cover up their real selves and hide their emotions under a layer of artifice. But the original childlike innocence of each individual, rather than disappearing forever, was still present in some naive individuals and could be glimpsed occasionally in the gestures, expressions and attitudes of almost any kind of

person. Cute childlike behaviour was considered genuine and pure — implying that the experiences and social relations acquired after maturation were considered to form a false, shallow, external layer. The logic of this assumption is quite coherent, although ironically cute is in fact extremely artificial and stylised. Cute is the particular style derived from adults (and children) pretending to be childlike.[68]

So, 'cute' is not what it seems, for there is the 'underlying cute'. That is, there is a 'cute' to be known and another 'cute' which is also known but requires the known 'cute' to be known. The 'cute' is to do with 'young people', however, they are 'young people' in different positions: 'childhood' and 'adult life'. I could read this as the moving of the *positions* as this is claimed to be the 'young people' that 'passed through childhood', so 'childhood' is a stage that 'young people' could pass through. Similarly, I read 'adult life' as the stage which 'young people' can 'enter'. That is to say, even though 'young people' pass through these 'stages', they would still be known as 'young people'.

There is a system here of sorts, for to be 'forced to cover up their real selves', those 'selves' would have to be known from outside of them even if they are 'covered up'. That is, this covering up does not *affect* the seeing of the perspective on their 'real selves'. For this to happen, there should be, thus, their 'real selves', which do not change. There are more than the selves that are constituted to be 'their[s]' here; the 'real selves' and the 'selves' are as such. The covering up is not up to 'young people', yet it depends on outside of themselves under the condition of entering the 'adult life'.

But 'emotions' are different, and they are not the 'selves'. That is, their 'emotions' would be 'under a layer of artifice'. This 'artifice' would have to come from 'young people', but its construction would have to come from another. And it is interesting that although the 'emotions' could be hidden, like the 'selves', the 'emotions' are still under a 'layer'. But even if it is hidden, it is known not to be 'real' to the outside.

After all,

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[68] *Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan*, 240.

the original childlike innocence of each individual, rather than disappearing forever, was still present in some naive individuals and could be glimpsed occasionally in the gestures, expressions and attitudes of almost any kind of person.

So, the 'original childlike innocence' *could* disappear. The question of this originality would have to be based on this tracing back of the innocence that could remain from the past, implying that it could be gone as well — 'disappearing forever'. So, I could read the investment in this originality of 'childlike innocence'. Why the 'original'? Or *what* is the 'original'? Could it be that 'childlike innocence' is something that could be made new? If there is already the 'original', then what is not the original should be about the repetition or the new one. Or it could be about the 'childlike innocence', so I can say that this 'innocence' is not a child but rather *like* a child. So, this child would have to be outside of the 'innocence'. The *child* and 'innocence' are not the same.

And the 'original childlike innocence' is to do with the 'individual', so although they are different depending on the 'individual', the 'childlike innocence' is something that they share to be the same, from the perspective outside of it.

Still, I could read that this might also have something to do with the idea of 'forever', for the 'disappearing' here could be otherwise. Could it *come* back? Or I could also say that this is about the appearance of the 'childlike innocence', that is, it could still be there but could not be *seen*.

And it should be about the *seeing* because, as claimed, it could still be 'present in some naive individuals and could be glimpsed occasionally in the gestures, expressions and attitudes'. If this is about what could be 'present', then there is no question regarding its existence — the 'original childlike innocence'.

Interestingly, this 'original childlike innocence' is something that can be seen and 'glimpsed occasionally in the gestures, expressions and attitudes'. That is, although this formulation is about claiming its being from its presence, the perspective would have to know it

is already there to be able to see and recognize this 'original childlike innocence'. As I have read, there is no requestioning of its being — only about its appearance.

The presentation of this 'childlike innocence' depends on the 'individuals'. The 'innocence' is not 'gestures, expressions and attitudes' but could be seen in these things. I am wondering that if these things could be seen from these things, then it should be that 'childlike innocence' is something that is *inside*. That is, it requires certain actions for the outside to be *seen*. These actions do not, though, guarantee to see from the outside, for it could be 'glimpsed occasionally'. That is to say, they would have to be constructed as something that could be repeated. And these actions should rely on the individual as well because it does not apply to 'any kind of person'. So the 'kind of person' matters. What 'kind of person'? The notion of 'person' could be divided into 'kind[s]', and these 'kind[s]' are constructed in relation to the 'childlike innocence'. '[A]lmost any kind of person', so there should be a person who is being excluded here.

Indeed, 'cute' and 'childlike' is not the same because there is a kind of 'cute childlike behaviour'. That is, not all 'childlike behaviour' could be considered 'cute' by the perspective. I could read that this 'behaviour' is thus not from the 'child', for it could only be 'childlike'. But that would also imply that it should already know the child's behavior to recognize this behaviour outside of the 'child'. This behaviour is 'considered genuine and pure', and from this formulation, the notion of 'social relations' is thought to form a 'false, shallow, external layer'. This implication would have to be operated from the idea of the contrast, something in opposition. This might also have to do with the concept of 'selves' in which the state of entering 'adult life' is about something which is not 'real'.

The 'experiences and social relations' is something to be 'acquired', so it has to come from the outside, which is different from the 'self' and the 'innocence', which is thought to be 'inside'. And this acquisition could be made 'after maturation', so this would have to occur under the condition. These 'experiences and social relations', from the perspective, are not 'false or shallow' but it could 'form' a 'false, shallow, external layer'. But if this is the implication, then I

think this 'layer' would have to be already known. In other words, the implication is from the idea that 'childlike behaviour' is considered 'genuine and pure' and *how* this 'external layer' is 'form[ed]'. The problem is thus not so much about the 'layer' here, rather, it is about how it is 'false' and 'shallow'.

Still, 'cute' is 'in fact extremely artificial and stylised'. As the text claimed, if the idea of 'cute' is something to do with the notion of 'childlike' and 'innocence', which is thought to be inside of the 'selves', then 'cute' is thus not both. Moreover, the text claims about the 'underlying cute' so 'cute' should be more than that *already*. The idea of this 'underlying' is then *not* the 'fact', for 'in fact' cute is 'extremely artificial and stylised'. The irony would be how 'cute', thought to be 'real selves', is *not*.

Something is being undermined here. And I think it could be about the formulation of thinking of 'cute' to be, 'in fact', 'artificial and stylised', for this claim would already imply that 'cute' is *not* 'artificial and stylised' in this 'fact'. Therefore, I could read the *irony* in this irony of this 'cute'.

'Cute' is the 'style', which would put this formulation of the cute outside the frame of other *cute*. This 'style' is 'derived from adults (and children) pretending to be childlike'. So, the 'adults' and 'children' would have to know what the 'child' is like. If that is the case, then there should be a split in this 'child', for there is the 'child' who could pretend to be 'childlike'. That is, I could read that what they are *like* in other perspective are not necessarily what they are, but that could again imply that there is indeed the idea of what they are outside of this perspective.

As such, the construction of cute would have to depend on the perspective on the *child*, for 'cute' is something that is 'derived from adults' and 'children' pretending to be 'children', then this 'childlike' would have to already, in itself, different from what the child is *like*. This would have to put the 'adults' and 'children' further away from what the 'child' is like, for they would have to know already that this could *only* be 'childlike' and could only be framed as something that they pretend. In other words, although this is the formulation that has something with the *idea* of the child, the perspective on the perspective with the knowledge that this

derivation is from the perspective that knows that this 'childlike' is not a 'child' would then frame this 'style' further away from the child *itself*.

If the 'childlike innocence was still present in some naïve individuals', then not all 'individual[s] are being presented'. But it could still be there, from this implication. That is, if the perspective knows that there is still 'innocence' in the individual, despite not being presented, then this 'innocence' would have to be *there* before. That is, this would have to rest on the idea that it could be maintained, and there should have no question regarding the relationship between the 'innocence' and the 'child'. What is there would still be *there*, even if it is not seen. The stake would be *how* to claim something to be there without *seeing* that it is there. That is, it would have to rely on the frame of *time*, that there is a knowledge of it being there prior, and that it remains there.

In addition,

> There are important political repercussions which follow from this concept of childhood innocence. Childhood is seen as the place where an older form of culture is preserved (nature or oral tradition), but the effect of this in turn is that this same form of culture is *infantilised*. At this level, children's fiction has a set of long-established links with the colonialism which identified the new world with the infantile state of man. Along the lines of what is almost a semantic slippage, the child is assumed to have some special relation to a world which - in our eyes at least - was only born when we found it.[69]

There is something to of a consequence from this 'concept of childhood innocence'. I could read that it is not about the 'childhood' as such but about the 'concept' of it. And this 'childhood', which is to do with 'innocence', is constructed as something which can be 'seen', so the perspective knows that this should be about the *appearance* and not about what it is. And if the 'childhood' is seen as a place 'where an older form of culture is preserved', then this 'place' should be outside of the 'childhood', and there must be the 'older form of culture' within that 'place' in the first place for the 'place' to be able to preserve.

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[69] Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan: Or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, New Cultural Studies (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994), 50.

'[O]lder form of culture'? So there could be differences in 'form[s]' of 'culture', and these forms thus should be thought of by their differences in *time*. Could I read this as the repetition of the form[s]? Even if there are differences, those would still be known as 'form[s]'. And if there is the 'older' form, then there should already be the *newer* one that follows.

The older form is 'preserved', so the 'form' could be 'preserved', but it should be contained. That is, there is a frame, a limit of sorts, for this preservation to happen. The 'older form of culture' is then further constructed *with* another frame – 'nature or oral tradition'. However, the 'or' should formulate this as an option, that is, it should be *one*. In a way, this 'older form of culture' operates here as a *frame*. So, 'nature' and 'oral tradition' are not the same, but both should share the same constitution as something which could be working as an 'older form of culture'. That is, there should be a relationship between 'nature', 'oral tradition', and the 'old form'; these are some things that are thought to be *prior*. *Some things* already follow. I am still thinking about the consequences: 'the effect of this, in turn, is that this same form of culture is *infantilized*'. There is a shift here, for it is not the 'older form of culture' but the 'same form of culture'. The 'form' is in another frame. And this 'frame' is to do with the infantilized and not the 'older form of culture' as such.

This infantilization, thought of as an effect, could be constructed by the relationship with the 'children's fiction', for it has a 'set of long-established links with the colonialism which identified the new world with the infantile state of man'. So, the establishment of colonialism and the 'children's fiction' is something that could be maintained. And I think that within this long-term relationship, the 'links' between both of them, there should *still* be more than the relationship, as there is a 'set' of links *with* the 'colonialism'. The perspective would have to know both 'children's fiction' and its history of the relationship with 'colonialism' and be able to see them in the same frame to know this establishment and *when* it is being done.

The issue here, or the stake here, would be about how the perspective sees this establishment. As I could read, the 'links' might not be the concern here, for they also require this establishment to set the point of time. There is an investment in this long *term*.

Not only it has to be 'long-established links', but this notion of colonialism — that 'identified the new world with infantile state of man' — would have to *be* there as well.

Why *this* 'colonialism'? I should think that because it is to do with the idea of the 'infantile state', which is to do with the infantilization here. That is, the 'colonialism' *could* identify, but what is to be set as the 'new world' would have to be from the shift of another perspective, for there could not be a 'new world' as such if there is not already the 'world' to begin with. But this 'new world' could be a problem, for the perspective would have to rely on another perspective to know the 'new world' — including the infantile state of man', which the 'colonialism' would then have to depend on.

In other words, the 'colonialism' thus could not escape from the 'gaze', for that is already what the perspective is about — identifying. And this identification can only be from the perspective which sees the 'new world' outside of itself and know that this 'new world' and the 'infantile state of man' are not the same. That is to say, this formulation would have to be operated on the perspective on the perspective outside of the 'new world' and 'infantile state of man' which constructs this identification — the constitution of 'colonialism'.

But what is the link between the 'new world' and the 'infantile state of man'? This 'infantile state of man' would have to come from the perspective outside of the 'man', which implies that the 'state' of the 'man' could be known from the outside. Therefore, there should be multiple 'state[s]' of man. This 'state' does not change what the 'man' is, but these 'state[s]' could *still* gesture to the difference in the 'man'. Yet, this could mean that the 'man' could be different in itself, in the 'state'.

The 'infantile state of man'? The 'infantile' here is to do with what already is *not*. The 'infantile' could be so because it is claimed from the outside. So, the 'state' of 'man' could be 'infantile'. Then I could not say that the 'infantile' is the 'man', rather, it is what 'of' the 'man' that is being so.

'Along the lines of what is almost a semantic slippage', it is *not* a 'semantic slippage'. But there should be a relationship of the frame, a construction of the position of 'what' and the

'semantic slippage' in the 'lines'. And along with these 'lines', the 'child is assumed to have some special relation to a world which — in our eyes at least — was only born when we found it'. So, although there is the formulation of the idea that the 'child' has 'some special relation to a world which […] was only born when we found it', this could only be about the assuming of the 'perspective' on the 'child' — *on* 'our eyes' — at least. It could be in 'our eyes' because 'our eyes' would know this agreement on this assumption and the possibility of this assumption outside of it. There is a sense of limitation here, but since this is the framing of what 'our eyes' could do, the perspective would have to know more than 'our eyes'. So, 'our eyes' could not *only* be about 'our eyes' as such, for 'at least' there should be about, perhaps, the 'eyes' outside of 'our[s]' as well.

A 'world […] was only born when we found it'. But as I read, even if there is the idea of it being born when 'we found it', there is already the knowledge that it is not. This finding would imply that there should be it for 'we' to find and in 'our eyes'. That is to say, whether or not 'we' find it, it does not necessarily has to do with a 'world'. A 'world' could be a *world* because 'we found it'. There is a completeness in this perspective of knowing that the 'world' could be 'born', but this being born also has to do with *what* 'we found'. Am I reading the doubleness here? There seems to be a split in the perspective on the 'world'. As in this implication, although there is an idea of what *is* there, its absoluteness hinges on the perspective which claims itself while not being able to see itself.

Hence, there is, indeed, the idea of 'colonialism' which is to do with children, for even though this 'infantile state of man' and the 'new world' is being constructed by 'colonialism', this formulation would have to be operated under *what* the 'children's fiction' *has*, 'at this level'.

So, there should be a link between the idea of 'innocence' and what can be 'preserved' — something that is 'natural or oral tradition'. But if the concept of 'childhood' is to do with, perhaps, the 'form of culture', then could this 'style' and 'cute' also have to do with it? And if the 'cute' is the 'style' which is 'derived' from the perspective of the 'adults' on this 'childlike', then

why should there be the investment in these 'adults' here? Or rather, what is it to do with the notion of 'young'?

Skov also thinks about this relationship, for in Japan,

> young women — even more than young men — desire to remain free, unmarried and young. Whilst a woman was still a shojo outside the labour market, outside of the family she could enjoy the vacuous freedom of an outsider in society with no distinct obligations or role to play. But when she grew up and got married, the social role of a young woman was possibly more oppressive than that of a young company man.[70]

The issue could be about being 'free' of 'young women' and 'young men', which, in a way, is something that they *already* are, but that could be changed. There is a 'desire' to 'remain free', so I could say that 'young men' and 'young women' could not 'remain free' as such. The freedom is constructed to be 'unmarried and young', so *both* 'unmarried and young' are different from being 'free'. If the 'remain[ing] free' cannot be achieved here, then I could say that, under this formulation, they might not be able to remain 'unmarried' and 'young'.

There is a split in the 'woman', for she can also be known as 'shojo'. But this being is being conditioned: 'she would have to be outside of 'labour market'. 'Whilst a woman was still a shojo' would be about the past, of something that has already shifted. So, could I say that 'shojo' *is* a 'woman', for the 'woman' cannot be a 'woman' without *being* a 'shojo'? However, her being a 'woman' is about her position. And indeed, she 'could enjoy the vacuous freedom of an outside in society with no distinct obligations or role to play'. Freedom is, thus, thought of as something of a *position* and the framing of this position — 'outside the labour market'.

But it might not be enough, for being 'outside the labour market', she could 'enjoy the vacuous freedom' when she is 'outside of the family' and 'with no distinct obligations or role to play'. There is a condition within the condition of being 'outside'. This could be about how 'in society', 'shojo' lose 'freedom' once she *is* inside the 'labour market'. In that case, if she is *inside* the 'labour market', I could read that being 'outside of the family', she could *not* 'enjoy the

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[70] Skov and Moeran, *Women, Media, and Consumption in Japan*, 244.

vacuous freedom'. But does this have to do with the enjoyment? Could this imply that there *is* freedom outside if she is inside the 'labour market', but that is not something she can enjoy? Or could it be that 'freedom' is about enjoyment which is the issue here? If that is the case, the 'freedom' should not be so much of the concern here, rather, it is about the enjoyment of the 'woman' which could be problematic.

There is still more to think about this *position*.

'[O]utside of labour market', she 'could enjoy the vacuous freedom of an outsider in society with no distinct obligations or role to play'. Therefore, the 'labour market' should come with 'obligations or role to play' in 'society'.

How could I read this relationship between the 'labour market' and 'family' and the 'society'? Whether 'shojo' is outside or inside the 'labour market', she could still be 'outside of the family'. If that is the case, then the 'enjoyment' could only be *invoked* once she is 'outside of the family', that is, the position of 'shojo' inside the 'labour market' does not necessarily have to do with the 'family' as such. The 'labour market' allows the *shift* in the relationship between 'shojo' and the space outside of the 'family'. Instead, the 'labour market' is to do with the 'distinct obligations' and 'role to play'.

And it is indeed about the *position*, for the 'shojo', it is about being 'outside' of multiple layers of frames. The perspective would have to be outside of 'woman' and 'shojo', including the 'society', to be able to claim as such.

But I would think this would have to rely on the perspective on the perspective of the 'shojo' as well, for it is 'shojo' who 'enjoy the vacuous freedom of an outsider in society with no distinct obligations or role to play'. That is, if being without 'distinct obligations or role to play' is about 'freedom', then to be able to 'enjoy the vacuous freedom', 'shojo' would also have to know this 'freedom' and these 'obligations' and 'role to play'. She would have to know her *position* as an outsider in 'society'.

'[I]n society'? So this is not the outsider of the 'society' but the 'outsider' within the 'society'. I could read that, perhaps, this 'outsider' might have something to do with the

'obligations' and 'role to play'. That is, 'obligations' and 'role' could be framed in this 'society', and by being 'outside', the 'shojo' is thus not a *part* of them, and these 'obligations' and 'role' do not go anywhere. It is in 'society', waiting for the 'shojo' to be *in* the 'labour market'.

And there is no question regarding the becoming of 'woman': 'when she grew up and got married'. So 'she' would have to be a 'woman' already and 'got married', and by doing so, the 'social role of a young woman was possibly more oppressive than that of a young company man'. Interestingly, although 'she' is already married, it is claimed to be the 'social role of a young woman'. That is to say, being 'married' and growing up is *outside* of being a 'young woman'. Moreover, I could read that this 'social role' is *not* getting married, but by doing so, the 'role' become 'of' the 'young woman'. The 'role' which is already *there* would belong to a 'young woman' if she is grown up and 'married'. That is, if 'young women' and 'young men' would like to remain free, I think that in this perspective, they would have to know of these 'obligations' and 'role[s]' as well, for it is the freedom which they 'desire'. In a way, if this is what they 'desire', they *could* not get it. Perhaps, the idea of remaining 'free' is not being achieved; they are not 'unmarried' and 'young'.

But the 'social role' *is* not the same for a young man and young woman. There is a possibility that the social 'role' of a 'young woman' is more 'oppressive' than the other. So there is a comparison, and I could *not* say that a 'young company man' is not being oppressed by the 'social role' as such. And if this 'social role' could be 'of' a young man and a young woman, then there should be *more* to this 'social role'. So to say, I could think of this 'social role' as the *frame*. And there are things within this frame that could be shared between a young man and a young woman, that is, there are also differences in it as well. And this *possibility* could be about what has already occurred, that it could be 'oppressive', still, it could rely on what inside the frame *is,* which is not fixed in this perspective.

And 'young woman — even more than young men — desire to remain free, unmarried and young' because there is the 'social role' in 'society' which could be 'more oppressive' for the

'young woman' than the 'young man'. The issue thus is about how to *see* this 'social role' and how it is constructed in the 'society' and 'family'.

I would like to read an excerpt from Benedict, which claims the position of the 'woman' in Japan;

> A woman […] wants children not only for her emotional satisfaction in them but because it is only as a mother that she gains status. A childless wife has a most insecure position in the family, and even if she is not discarded she can never look forward to being a mother-in-law and exercising authority over her son's marriage and over her son's wife. Her husband will adopt a son to carry on his line but according to Japanese ideas the childless woman is still the loser. Japanese women are expected to be a good childbearers.[71]

There is a reason for the 'woman' to want 'children'; for her 'emotional satisfaction in them' and to gain 'status'. The children are thus a condition for a 'woman', whether with the 'emotional satisfaction' or her 'status'. If this 'status' is to be gained with 'children', then it is not something that she could gain on her own, there is a requirement of something outside of herself. Still, having 'children' does not guarantee her 'status', that is, she could gain 'only as a mother'. So, the woman is not a 'mother', but she can be one, or could be thought of 'as' one. Therefore, what she 'wants' here might not be the 'children' *as such*, for it is actually the 'status' that the 'woman' wants.

Interestingly, the reason for wanting 'children' results in something belonging to the 'woman'. That is, it is about 'her emotional satisfaction' and her 'status' as a 'mother'. Indeed, this ' status' would have to *already* be in this construction of the 'family' even before she gain[s] it.

And there is a 'wife' which is different from the 'woman', but this would have to come from another perspective in the frame. That is, the 'wife' is constructed with the idea of a husband. A 'wife' here could be 'childless', so there could also be a 'wife' with a 'child'. But by claiming

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[71] Benedict, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, 255-56.

of 'childless wife', I could read that the idea of 'wife' would then be constituted in a lack — she is 'childless'. And with this lack, she would have a 'most insecure position in the family'. So, there are 'position[s]' in a family that 'wife' could be in'. As such, family construction here would have to do with hierarchy. One position is not the same as the *others* in terms of security.

And this security is to do with the family, for 'even if she is not discarded[,] she can never look forward to being a mother-in-law and exercising authority over her son's marriage and over her son's wife'. So, *she* could be 'discarded'. Thus, the position of the family is not something in her power. And if *not* being able to be thought of as a 'mother' to gain 'status' in the family, then I could say that being a 'woman' and a 'wife' in itself is not secure.

And this is not only to do with the idea of 'authority' but also about 'exercising' it. Here, the 'woman' is claimed to be 'mother-in-law', so now her position is shifted again, which would have to come from another perspective. The issue could be how 'she can never look forward to being a mother-in-law'. Even though she does have a child, what she is 'looking forward to' is how she could have another 'authority' in another position of the family — mother-in-law. And this authority is over her 'son's marriage and over her son's wife'. So the authority could only be exercised if she has a 'son' and the son got married because she could then exercise it over 'her son's wife'. So, her 'authority' with the son is only formulated here as a condition; what she requires is *what* she is to do with the son. That is, the 'authority' is constructed to be over someone to be able to exercise. And if this is to do with the exercising of 'authority', then the position of her 'son's wife' would have to be something that could be exercised *over*. That is, there is already a set up of *what* she could exercise her 'authority' over, according to the position in the 'family', and to be able to achieve that, the 'children' is necessary.

But indeed, there could be a problem here, for this is only to do with the 'son'. So what she wants might not be the 'children' but the son? As I read the claim, her 'authority' which she could exercise requires the 'son'. *But* again, it could be for 'her emotional satisfaction'. Nonetheless, what she could get from her son and the others would be different. She can only

gain the 'status' when she has a son to 'look forward to' another position which she would be — 'mother-in-law'.

The constitution of the wife in the family could be doubled. So, there is a woman who could be a 'wife', and then there is a 'son's wife'. And if, as I read above, not being a 'mother' is already in the 'insecure position', then I would agree in this sense that the 'wife' is under the authority of the 'mother-in-law'.

There is another shift of the perspective to be on 'her husband' and what belongs to him — 'his line'. So I should say that even though this is from another perspective and the husband belongs to the 'woman', the 'son' here does not have anything to do with her. What the 'husband' will do is under the condition of a 'childless wife', so perhaps this does not depend on the 'husband', instead, it is about the 'wife'. And according to the perspective on 'her husband', adopting a 'son' is to 'carry on his line', so this is what the 'son' *could* do. The 'line' could be carried by the son, and this line would belong to the 'husband'.

Still, 'according to Japanese ideas the childless woman is still the loser'. So, this is not the perspective of the 'Japanese' but *on* it. And interestingly, what is 'childless' now is shifted, so not only there is a 'childless wife' but also a 'childless woman'. And this shift might have something to do with the frame, for the 'childless wife' would be in the *position* in the 'family' while the 'childless woman' could be outside of that.

'[J]apanese women' are 'expected to be good childbearers', so if this is what they are 'expected' to be, then I could read that what they are *are* not 'good childbearers'. The perspective thus could not be the 'Japanese women', but what they are could be known from the outside.

The tension could be about how it is not so much about the idea of a 'young woman['s]' position, which is thought to be able to 'remain free' by being 'unmarried'. This could be undermined by the shift of the frame here, for it is 'Japanese women' who are expected to be 'good childbearers', so she does not *necessarily* have to be a 'wife' in the 'family' to be 'good childbearers'. Being 'Japanese women' or a 'woman' at all in itself would already be 'expected to be a good childbearers'. What she *should* be is to do with the child, even outside of the family.

Then again, the claim would have to know that this expectation would have to come from outside the 'Japanese women'. And that remains an issue.

And if *what* in 'girls' comics' could 'illustrate' the 'Japanese mental outlook' and contain 'clues' to 'beliefs and attitudes of culture and society', then I am going to read what Ogi has to say about shojo manga[72] in *Women's Manga in Asia and Beyond*:

> Let us trace a historical outline of shojo manga, taking a few examples to explain each decade in turn. First of all, shojo manga became one of the dominant forms of Japanese popular culture in the second half of the twentieth century. At the time, idealized Western feminine images like queens and princesses, including the actual royal families and even those of American presidents such as John F. Kennedy, were a staple of Japanese girls' culture. It was not just a coincidence that the first works of manga and anime specifically aimed at a girl audience and written by renowned male authors presented their heroines as princesses.[73]

So, there is a 'historical outline' of 'shojo manga', which could be traced by 'us'. But if this could be traced, then this outline would have already been known by 'us', and there is a point for the 'us' to trace back. Also, even if this 'historical outline' gestures to the past, I read that this is but the 'historical outline' and not the history itself. But this has already happened, indeed, for this tracing back could be invoked, that is, 'let us', the 'us' would have to know all of this 'historical outline' and be in agreement. But there should still be a split in this 'us', for even if the text claims of 'us', 'us' cannot be all 'us' as such for this to be invoked. There is still a need to be other than 'us' to invoke this 'let us' for it to be possible.

'[E]ach decade' is something that can be explained from this 'historical outline of shojo manga', so there is already the division in time in relation to the idea of shojo manga, that 'each decade' should be different. And indeed, because in the 'second half of the twentieth century',

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[72] I choose to read the term 'shojo manga' according to Okabayashi in *Manga for Dummies* (2007): 'shojo manga is a comic for teenage girls.' Also, in *International perspectives on Shojo and Shojo Manga* (2015) by Toku, the idea of 'girls' in 'girls' manga' is being framed by shojo. So although they are different, I think that reading on both notions in relation to 'manga' or 'comic' thus would still be about its relationship in another frame, that has to do with the 'beliefs and attiude of culture and society.'

[73] Fusami Ogi et al., *Women's Manga in Asia and Beyond: Uniting Different Cultures and Identities* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 96.

shojo manga is 'one of the dominant forms of Japanese popular culture'. But this being is about the becoming of it. So, if shojo manga could become something, then it must have been something else before that. The being of it relies on what it is before and after, for the becoming is already happened. But that change does not in itself affect what it is known for. That is, shojo manga is still shojo manga.

'[S]hojo manga' is a form of 'Japanese popular culture', so in this regard, I could say that there is more than one form of 'Japanese popular culture', but *all* of that would be 'popular culture', that is, there is a frame in which the 'shojo manga' is a part of, and that has to do with *what* constitutes 'Japanese'. I could not, then, assume its position, for 'Japanese' would require a frame of *space*. Nevertheless, this frame would require *others*, which is to do with 'popular culture' and 'manga'.

The becoming is thus about the change. What is the change? I could say it might be about its position or maybe its dominance of 'Japanese popular culture'. But wherever it might be, it would still relate to 'shojo manga' and how it cannot escape the 'form' of 'Japanese popular culture' within the time frame — the 'second half of the twentieth century'. And I read it as *time* because 'at the time',

> idealized Western feminine images like queens and princesses, including the actual royal families and even those of American presidents such as John F. Kennedy, were a staple of Japanese girls' culture.

In the *frame*, the 'stable of Japanese girls' culture' depends on 'Western feminine images'; however, it is not the 'Western feminine images' as such, for this should be the 'idealized' one. But from whose perspective it talks about here? For if this is according to the perspective on the perspective of a 'girl audience', then it would be that 'girl audience' knows what the 'Western feminine images' are to be able to constitute the idealized 'images' of it and that there are the 'idealized' 'images' as such. If that is the case, 'queens and princess' are *not* the 'girl audience', 'Western feminine images', and the 'actual royal families' because it is a claim to what it is 'like'. 'At the time' deals with what is thought to be *real* and what is not. '[Q]ueens

and princesses' thus would be constituted as something that cannot be achieved, unlike the 'actual royal families' and 'American presidents'. The 'actual' would put the 'royal families' in another frame, but *all* would be a 'staple of Japanese girls' culture'.

But could I say these 'idealized Western feminine images like queens and princesses' are 'culture'? I could read this as a gathering of images, a repetition constructed within the idea of the 'Western'. That is to say, this would have to be about the 'culture' which *could* be a 'staple' of another 'culture'.

As such, although it is a *culture*, another culture could be recognized within it. So, there is indeed a division and the doubleness of the culture, which, even though it is a culture, could be a part of another. Thus, there is a *culture* and the double that constitute another culture.

A mix of 'culture'? And that itself *is* the 'culture'. In 'Japanese' culture, writing 'heroines as princesses' is a *pattern* and could be so because it is being seen as repetitive. That is, the perspective would have to know what the heroine and the princess are to recognize those 'heroines' and 'princesses' as the same to construct this relationship. And this *relationship* would have to be operated in the 'works of manga and anime specifically aimed at a girl audience'. If these works could be aimed at a specific 'audience', then the 'renowned male authors' would have to know the 'girl audience'. The question would be: could 'manga and anime' be written and aimed at a specific audience?

Nonetheless, this implies their perspective on this correlation between the 'girl' and the 'heroines'. Indeed, as I read above, if the 'heroine' is to do with the 'girl', then the 'princesses' here should also have something to do with the 'girl'. But do the 'male authors' know this? If 'heroines as princesses' are being 'presented' in 'manga and anime', and it is not a 'coincidence', then this is something that, in this perspective, 'male authors' should know.

But it could be a *coincidence*, although this would have to be worked on the condition that this relationship is *not* established. In a sense, I could read that the issue here would be how the 'Japanese girls' culture' is being constructed. If the 'manga and anime 'aimed at a girl audience' is written by 'male authors', then 'Japanese girls' culture' would have to rely on the

'male authors' in the perspective. Another issue would be the notion of *how* the 'heroines' are being 'presented' *as*. The 'heroines' thus could be anything *but* the 'princesses' because it is only what they are 'presented' as. As such, the 'male authors' would have to know the 'princesses', and in this case, the 'idealized Western feminine images'. Hence, I could say that, from the reading, the 'heroines' are being 'presented' as something of an ideal, of the images which are not claimed from the perspective of the 'girl audience'.

But what about the 'authors' who are not 'male'?

Ogi has something to say about that as well:

> In this respect, it is ironic that shojo manga, written by and for women, created a style erasing masculinity and Japaneseness and replaced them with feminine, beautiful Westernized images. Considering that most of the characters whose hair color was not black but golden were also Japanese, we should note that the manga raised the question of whether this was a rejection of the characters' Japanese/Asian identity. In order for shojo to express their own voices, they had to identify with Europeanized feminine images and erase Asian, patriarchal figures from the picture.[74]

Suppose it is 'ironic' that 'shojo manga' writing 'by and for women' replace 'masculinity and Japnaneseness' with 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images'. In that case, there should already be an idea that 'women' should write the style with 'masculinity and Japaneseness', and replacing that would go against *that* idea. Interestingly, though, 'masculinity and Japaneseness' and 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images' is thought to be a 'style' created by 'shojo manga'. But if 'shojo manga' is about 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images', the replacement would have to come from *elsewhere*. That is, if there is no 'masculinity and Japaneseness' in 'shojo manga', it should be somewhere outside. But where would it be? I could say that it could be 'manga' or in another 'style' or outside of women's writing.

Yet, I still think that, in this formulation, the idea of 'masculinity and Japaneseness' would have to be *there*, for there can be no replacement — 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images' —

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[74] *Women's Manga in Asia and Beyond: Uniting Different Cultures and Identities*, 100.

without 'masculinity and Japaneseness' in the first place. The 'women' here thus would have to know the 'masculinity and Japaneseness', including the 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images', and that one could replace *another*.

But how could the 'images' be 'Westernized'? The 'images' could be about the 'characters', 'whose hair color was not black but golden'. The changing of 'hair color' from 'black' to 'golden' is the 'style' in which even though the color of the 'hair' is changed, the characters would still be known to be 'Japanese'. Therefore, this is to do with the 'Japaneseness' but does not necessarily change how it is known to be 'Japanese' *as such*. The 'Japaneseness' is to do with the 'Japanese', but not *all*. And I would say *all* here because it is not the same. I could say it *could* be a 'part' of it. Then, there should be more to the 'Japanese' characters than just the 'Japaneseness'.

The 'characters' with the 'golden hair' are 'Japanese' but not all of them; those are 'most of the characters'. As I have read, the 'hair color' is to do with the 'Japanese', but it also has to do with 'we' and *how* we 'note': the 'manga raised a question of whether this was a rejection of the characters' Japanese/Asian identity'. Although there is a 'question' regarding the issue, I think there is already an idea in this formulation, even if it is claimed that the 'manga raised the question'. There could not be this 'note' if there is no 'considering' of 'we'. That is, 'we' is the condition of this question here.

If the 'rejection of the characters' Japanese/Asian identity' relies on the 'hair color' of the characters, then the 'Japanese/Asian identity' would have to be outside of the 'Japanese'. The rejection thus cannot be about the 'Japaneseness' but rather about the appearance or the 'images' as this is to do with the 'beautiful Westernized images' as well. As such, the 'identity' would have to be worked with the 'images' as well as the 'replace[ment]' of it.

So, the 'identity' could be 'reject[ed]'? If it can, there is a purpose to it, which is for 'shojo to express their own voices'. This expression operates within the *condition* — 'they had to identify with Europeanized feminine images and erase Asian, patriarchal figures from the picture'. The issue would be about the problem with this ownership, for although the 'voices'

belong to 'shojo', they have to rely on the identification of the 'images' which, according to the perspective on their perspective, are not 'Asian', but something else.

Nonetheless, even though the 'images' that they 'identify' is not 'Japanese' or 'Japaneseness', I would think the 'images' they *have* to 'identify' would still be something *they* 'created'. Therefore, I could say that the concern here is not *how* they had to erase 'masculinity' and 'Japaneseness', but it is about the perspective on the perspective of 'women' and 'shojo' on 'masculinity' and 'Japaneseness' and the 'feminine, beautiful Westernized images'.

It might also have something to do with the 'eras[ing] Asian, patriarchal figures from the picture', for these are thought to be a problem for 'shojo to express their own voices'. But how, though, could a voice be disrupted by the 'picture'? Instead, it could be more about the *question* of the 'identity', for 'in order for shojo to express their own voices', they would have to remove a part of the identity while retaining their identity. And I would say a *part* because the 'images' only shift their identity, but they still do not change what they are — 'Japanese'. That is to say, I could also say that a 'part' would be about the 'images', which is to do with the 'identity', so there could be another identity which is not to do with the 'images'.

Again, this is the *questioning* of the 'question'. So, if this is to rely on the *identifying* of the 'images' and the 'picture', which are different from the 'identity', there should be the construction of the 'images' of the 'characters' and the relationship between them.

In *Girlhood on Disney Channel: Branding, Celebrity, and Femininity*, Morgan has thought about this relationship through 'Dolly's presence in this episode of *Hannah Montana*'[75]:

> Aunt Dolly is not just a character—she is a version of the Dolly Parton persona, embodied by Dolly Parton the person. Her femininity is intrinsically bound both to her working-class Southern identity and to whiteness, which is idealized in blond hair, Western beauty conventions, and class privilege.[76]

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[75] Morgan Genevieve Blue, *Girlhood on Disney Channel: Branding, Celebrity, and Femininity*, Routledge Advances in Television Studies (New York: Routledge, 2017), 78.
[76] *Girlhood on Disney Channel: Branding, Celebrity, and Femininity*, 77-78.

'Dolly' *is* a 'character', but there seem to be different types of 'character'. An d since 'Aunt Dolly is not just a character', there should be more to *this* 'character': 'she is a version of the Dolly Parton persona, embodied by Dolly Parton the person'. 'Dolly Parton' thus should have more than one 'persona[s]', for this is only a 'version' of her. This 'version' is different from other versions since this is 'embodied' by 'Dolly Parton', the 'person'. That is, there are several Dolly Parton(s) here; the 'character', the 'persona', and the 'person'. The difference would be *how* it requires others to constitute themselves. So, there should be an order or the *process* by which the character is constructed. 'Aunt Dolly' should be both the 'character' and the 'version of Dolly Parton persona'. The 'persona' is not the 'person' but could be 'embodied' by one. That is, the perspective would have to know what 'Dolly Parton' the 'person' is and how it is *not* the 'persona'. If this is the 'version' that is 'embodied' by 'Dolly Parton the person', then this 'version' would require 'Dolly Parton the person'. 'Aunt Dolly' is a character that is *more* than a 'character' because it is constructed by 'Dolly Parton the person'. That is to say, '[a]unt Dolly' does not necessarily have to do with the 'Dolly Parton the person'. 'Aunt Dolly' is *not* 'Dolly Parton the person', including the 'character'.

The embodiment is about '[h]er femininity', and this 'femininity' here is constructed to be 'bound' to 'her working-class Southern identity and to whiteness'. The 'femininity' is thus outside of the 'working-class Southern identity' and the 'whiteness'. And these are being 'idealized' — 'blond hair, Western beauty conventions, and class privilege'. If this 'femininity' which belongs to her *is* different from other femininity, then I think that the notion of 'femininity' is not fixed; it should be about the addition, the excess of what the 'femininity' is, relying on whose it *is*. And in this case, what belongs to her is 'bound' to the ideal 'Western beauty conventions and class privilege'. That is to say, '[a]unt Dolly['s]' femininity should be constructed as something from the perspective outside of 'Dolly Parton the person' even if it is claimed to be 'embodied' by 'Dolly Parton the person'. So, the 'character' of '[a]unt Dolly' would also be constructed from the *other*.

But I am curious about the idea of 'her working-class Southern identity' and the 'whiteness' which is 'idealized in blond hair, Western beauty conventions, and class privilege'. I could say that what has been 'idealized' would have to be about the 'images' and the station of the 'character' but not the 'identity' itself. That is, the 'identity' would have to be known *apart* from the images and the position. And with the 'femininity' being 'bound' to both the 'identity' and the 'whiteness', what is thought to be the image of the *ideal* is thus being constructed with the 'femininity'.

Therefore, the 'femininity' of the 'character' is *not* so much about the identity but rather the ideal images that come with it. The issue would be about this ideal, that it should already be known that the 'blond hair, Western beauty conventions, and class privilege' is 'idealized'.

All of this would have to do with the 'images' and what could be *seen*, and the seeing of what is not, with the expectation of it, which, as I read, is to do with the perspective on the seeing on it — the gaze.

Chapter 5: Reading Gaze and the Body

A gaze on the other which appears to give the observer a thrill, enjoyment at seeing something strange which is also kept at a safe distance, forms the basis of psychoanalytic theories of voyeurism, and the analyst expects to find sadistic elements mingled in with such a gaze. Images of picturesque victims in 'underdeveloped' countries fit the bill here, and the role of fantasy becomes evident when these poor people start to act for themselves and break out of the coordinates of the orientalist gaze. Psychoanalytic assumptions then also play a role in our understanding of the way the gaze of the West which sees evil is itself the 'evil', maintaining the conditions of those it holds within it. We are thus able to explore the investments in certain ways of seeing the world and some underlying dynamics in ostensibly neutral scientific descriptions of people different from us.[77]

A 'gaze' on the 'other' would come from the perspective which is not *of* the 'other' and not the 'observer', for this is what 'give[s]' the 'observer a thrill'. That is, a 'thrill' could be 'given', but this giving is only in appearance. The 'thrill' thus would require a 'gaze', the 'observer', and the 'other'. This 'thrill' is not the 'same' as the 'enjoyment', but I could read that this 'enjoyment' is being framed by the 'thrill' — 'enjoyment at seeing something strange which is also kept at a safe distance'. So, this 'enjoyment' would have to rely on the 'seeing' of the 'other'. If I read together, I could read that the 'other' is to do with 'something strange'. That is, the 'other' does not necessarily have to be 'strange', but this might have to do with the 'gaze'. What is, though, 'something strange'? The strangeness of this would have to come from the idea of the difference, of comparing what has been 'seen' by the 'observer'. That is to say, this would have to depend on the perspective on the 'observer' which, at the same time, could see the difference between the 'observer' and the 'other', including the *other* others, for this is to do with what the 'observer' has been seen in relation to the 'other'.

The issue here could be about the position, that is, there should be the seeing which could be 'kept at a safe distance'. And if there is a safe distance that could be 'kept,' then there should

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[77] Parker, *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious*, 95.

be, perhaps at the beginning, *already* in the 'safe distance'. And this construction of 'seeing' should then require the 'distance' to be 'kept'.

The 'safe distance'? I could not help but think that if this is the 'safe distance' that has to be kept, then there is something about seeing which could threaten that 'distance'. The observer thus would have to set up what the 'safe distance' is to be able to keep it. That is, there is a 'safe distance' and the distance which is not *safe*.

But how could this seeing, though, threaten that 'safe distance'? The strangeness is constructed to be something threatening, which is to do with the perspective on the position of a 'gaze' and the 'other'.

Nonetheless, this notion should then be operated from the idea that there is already the idea of 'distance' in this 'seeing'. The 'gaze' as such would have to do with the idea of the position — of knowing where the 'observer' is in relation to the 'other'. And it is this operation, which, as I read, 'forms the basis of psychoanalytic theories of voyeurism'.

But if this is only to do with the 'basis of psychoanalytic theories of voyeurism', then I could say that these 'psychoanalytic theories of voyeurism' should be more than this *already*. This is the 'basis', the part that can be built upon.

If the 'analyst' could expect to find 'sadistic elements mingled in with such a gaze', then the 'sadistic elements' would have to be outside of the 'gaze', and there should be then the process before this finding of the 'analyst' because the 'elements' already 'mingled' in *with* 'such a gaze'. And even though there is the question regarding the 'finding' of the 'analyst', there is *no* question about the 'sadistic elements' being in 'such a gaze'. For if the perspective on the 'analyst' expects to find 'sadistic elements', then the perspective would have to know that they are already in it. The issue would be about the 'finding'.

The 'bill' is about this formulation — the *form* of the process. And the 'images of picturesque victims in 'underdeveloped' countries [which] fit the bill here' could only be because there is an established formulation outside of it and seeing this formulation and these 'images', at the same time, in the same frame.

If there are the '[i]mages of picturesque victims in 'underdeveloped' countries', then the perspective on the 'gaze' could not be of the 'victims in 'underdeveloped' counties'. And if I could see this 'fit' of the formulation, then this would have to be based on the idea of the *transfer* — of finding the relationship and seeing another *relationship* as the same — 'fit[ing] the bill' — which ultimately would have to be about the working of the *system* of the process.

Translation process? I think that something might be lost here, but that is something I would *expect*, for 'something is always lost' in the process. And the 'role of fantasy becomes evident' because this should be the 'fantasy', so there is already the knowledge of this 'role' even before it 'becomes evident'. Still, this becoming evident should be about the appearance of the being from the *seeing*, that is to say, this 'role of fantasy' is known from its appearance — 'when these poor people start to act for themselves and break out of the coordinates of the orientalist gaze'. Indeed, to break out of the 'coordinates of the orientalist gaze', these 'poor people' would have to be in it. Also, starting to act of 'themselves' would have to be framed as something which is *not* fit in the 'coordinates of the orientalist gaze', for this is to do with the 'breaking out' of it. There could be a stake in this *frame*, for it is also constructed outside of these 'poor people', therefore, what is considered 'for themselves' is not from the 'poor people'. As such, whether they are able to break out of the 'coordinates of the orientalist gaze' at all does not necessarily have to do with the 'poor people' — it is about the 'role' and the 'gaze'.

But what are the 'coordinates of the orientalist gaze' here? The 'orientalist gaze', as I read above, would have to be outside of the 'poor people', but these 'coordinates of the orientalist gaze' in itself would already require more than the 'poor people'. That is, the 'coordinates' would gesture to the idea of position(s), and this 'gaze' is constructed with the 'orientalist'. That is, there should be the 'gaze' in this 'orientalist' *already* because the 'orientalist' is about the *gaze*, if I could read. According to Said, in *Orientalism*,

> [i]t will be clear to the reader (and will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow) that by Orientalism I mean several things, all of them, in my opinion, interdependent. The most readily accepted designation for Orientalism is an academic one, and indeed the label still serves in a number of academic institutions. Anyone who

teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient—and this applies whether the person is an anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist—either in its specific or its general aspects, is an Orientalist, and what he or she does is Orientalism.[78]

So, there is an idea that the 'reader' does not know what is going to happen while the perspective on it does. Do I see the *seeing* here? But whatever the reader is seeing now, it is not 'clear', or not as clear as it could be because it 'will become clearer still throughout the many pages that follow'. Thus, the 'pages' are to do with the *becoming* of the 'it'. That is to say, the 'pages', multiple 'pages', are something that can 'follow', and this 'following' is about the appearance in the perspective of the 'reader'. There is a tension of the knowledge of the *seeing* of this 'reader' in relation to what 'I mean', for it is about the 'Orientalism' which depends on 'I'.

But this 'Orientalism' has to 'mean' several things, and I do not mean according to this 'I', but also outside of 'I', for if this *is* about the meaning of 'I', then there should be the meaning outside of 'I' as well. So, 'all of them' could only be this 'all' from the frame of 'I', 'in my opinion'. And there should be more to this 'interdependent' as I read because if this is 'interdependent', then what it is should, perhaps, also be known as '[in]dependent'. And I could say that because there could be outside of 'my opinion'.

Anyway, they should be separated and known to be different, but at the same time, there needs to be a relationship between them to be able to be 'interdependent'.

I could read that '[o]rientalism' is something that has to be 'accepted', and these acceptances (and I would read these as multiples, for there should be more than 'one' that can accept the 'designation') are not to be the same in terms of their readiness.

But how does this acceptance of designation have to do with anything if there is 'Orientalism' in this formulation? That is, the idea of this 'Orientalism' is constructed from the 'designation', but if there is already the 'designation' which is to be 'accepted' for others — outside of an 'academic one' — then this would have to rely on this 'designation' more than the acceptance of it.

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[78] Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Penguin Group, 2003), 2.

Still, I could only say that others accepted this 'designation' although it might not be as readily as the 'academic one', but already accepted nonetheless. The question would be: what is the frame of this acceptance? Who else besides the 'academic one' can accept? 'Orientalism' is not stable. 'Orientalism' is constituted as the 'label', and this could be a 'label' when it 'serves in a number of academic institutions'.

'[S]till serves'? So there is an expectation here for it not to serve. If that is the case, then the idea of accepting does not necessarily guarantee the serving. That is, if it is to do with the serving at all, the designation could be retracted. The using of it in 'academic institutions' does matter. So I could say that regarding the serving and the accepting, although not the same, there should still be a correlation between both notions in this perspective.

Who might be framed here? 'Anyone who teaches, writes about, or researches the Orient'? That is, 'anyone' should, at the least, claim to know *what* the 'Orient' is. The 'Orient' could also be taught, written about, and researched. As such, I could read that even if there is the idea of what the 'Orient' is, what it is, or in the perspective on 'anyone' here, could be more than *that*. From this perspective, it is already known that there should be more to the 'Orient' than what they know to research about it.

There is also a 'person', but this 'person' could also be an 'anthropologist, sociologist, historian, or philologist', including 'Orientalist'. So the 'person' could be several things. Nonetheless, it would have to be about what the 'person' *could be*, so there should be the 'person' *still* in what it is. And there are several 'aspects' to this 'Orient' — 'specific' and 'general'. So, the frame of this 'Orient' would have to be constructed by its relation to another frame in terms of what could be 'general' and 'specific'. This should also be about the sameness and difference of what is outside the 'Orient'. And 'anyone' — or the 'person' — who 'teaches', 'writes about', or 'researches' the 'Orient' would be an 'Orientalist'.

'Anyone' or the 'person' could also be 'he' or 'she', and 'what he or she does is Orientalism'. So, the doing here is different from teaching, writing, and researching. Although I could say this is about framing the 'Orient', 'Orientalism' is about the doing and not the other.

Therefore, this should be about the 'gaze' of those who already know the 'Orient', who already see what the 'Orient' is, establish it, and accept its designation. But this should not be *of* the 'Orientalist', for this is from the perspective *on* the 'Orientalist'. That is to say, the stake would be about how it is being claimed from the gaze in the seeing *in* the 'Orientalist'. And it is with the 'coordinates', therefore, this should also be the framing of the gaze on this *position*, of the relationship — the 'coordinates' in the 'gaze'.

And '[p]sychoanalytic assumptions' are to do with 'our understanding of the way the gaze of the West which sees evil is itself the "evil"'. So if 'our understanding' could be affected from the outside, then what is 'our[s]' would have to see outside as the same. The stake would be: *how* could the perspective on the 'our' on the 'assumptions' be in agreement?

And there is already the 'gaze of the West which sees evil is itself the "evil"'. And these 'psychoanalytic assumptions' do not necessarily *make* this 'understanding'. That is to say, if there is a 'way' that the 'gaze of the West' which sees evil is itself the '"evil"', then there should be more 'way[s]' to understand that the 'gaze of the West'. 'Psychoanalytic assumptions' thus contribute to this 'understanding' — 'our understanding' — so the concern would be about the 'way' rather than the 'gaze' itself. As such, the perspective on 'our understanding' would have to know that this is only the 'understanding of the way'.

The 'gaze of the West which sees evil is itself the "evil"' is claimed from the perspective which is not the 'West'. And if this 'gaze' is specifically 'of' the 'West' then this 'gaze' could belong to another as well, but the difference might be how this also has to do with 'our understanding', and that is the 'gaze' which 'sees evil is itself the "evil"'.

So, there are the 'gaze' and the seeing, and both would have to be different. And indeed, for the 'gaze' could 'give the observer a thrill' while, as I read, the *seeing* could not. I could read that the seeing of the 'evil' itself is not '"evil"' in 'our understanding', rather, it would have to be the 'gaze of the West' that is '"evil"'. And there are already two 'evil[s]' here, for one is the 'evil' and another is in the quotation marks.

And this should have something to do with the frame. The 'evil' without the quotation marks should be framed within the 'gaze of the West' while I read that the other '"evil"' (with the quotation marks) is to do with 'our understanding' and the '[p]sychoanalytic assumptions'.

But if this is to do with the 'evil' with the quotation marks and not in the quotation marks, then there should also be the evil outside both frames. I thus could not say that the 'way' is 'evil' or the seeing of the West is 'evil', but there must be somewhere in 'our understanding'.

If the 'conditions' could be maintained, then *what* is to be maintained is conditioned with the idea of time. This would have to also be about something that requires something external to be *it*. That is, something has to be an excess in these 'conditions'. There are the 'conditions' of those 'it holds within it', then this 'it' should be *something* that others can be 'in'. The holding thus could be a *condition* of the condition. And I could read that because of this 'maintaining', 'we are able to explore the investments in certain ways of seeing the world and some underlying dynamics in ostensibly neutral scientific descriptions of people different from us'.

The ability to 'explore' the 'investments' of 'we' thus relies on what we 'understand' from the seeing of the 'gaze' of another — the 'West'. If that is the case, I could say that these 'investments' should have something to do with how the 'West' construct *what* 'we' see. The stake would be about the reliance on this 'seeing', and how could 'we' *see* its seeing itself?

I could read a lot of 'seeing[s]' here and the investments in them. But *what* are they? These are the 'investments in certain ways of seeing the world'. And if these could be explored, even though it is to be 'explore[d]', there should be the knowledge, at least, that these could be 'explore[d]'. That is, there are already more than the 'investments', in this perspective, to be invested. The 'investments' concern the 'ways of seeing the world'. So, there is more than one way to see the 'world'. That is, if all of these 'ways' could be known, then I could say that the 'world' *is* known to be the 'world' — the only 'world'. But it could be different in its perspective on other perspectives. That is to say, it could *not* see that the 'world' could be known in different 'ways' if this perspective does not know what the 'world' is itself. It should also see the world in one way, and that way is different from others.

The issue, though, is about the exploration of the investments. That is, not all the 'world' are concerned here, for it is only the 'certain ways'.

I could then read the investment in these 'investments', of the 'seeing of the world' in 'certain ways' and 'some underlying dynamics'. So there are dynamics that are *not* 'underlying'. Although this is the 'underlying dynamics', it is also known that there is an 'underlying' one[s]. Even if there is a sense of covering this, the 'dynamics' could still be seen from the perspective. But I think this underlying could be about how it is to be claimed from the perspective on another, for there is already the *seeing* of the seeing of the other. That is to say, this is not the dynamics that could be *seen* by some others, perhaps the 'West'. And by seeing the seeing of others, the perspective could see something which it cannot see, despite the construction of the seeing of others which would have to come from itself.

And indeed, these are the 'dynamics in ostensibly neutral scientific descriptions of people different from us', so there should already be the idea of the appearance and what is constructed to be 'us' and another. There is already a division. But the problem, in this perspective, could be the 'neutral scientific description of people [that] different from us'. Since this is the investment in 'certain ways of seeing the world', then I could read that this description should be one of them. The issue would be *how* it is the 'neutral scientific description', for although this is the 'neutral' one, the idea of 'science' itself is *not* 'neutral'. Furthermore, it is 'ostensibly', that is, something which is problematic in itself, for there is already the idea that something is being deceptive and not what it actually *is* here. That is, there should then be what the 'neutral scientific' could be *thought* of as, but not as it seems. Knowing something that ought to be unknown would then set up a perspective that knows both possibilities in the same frame. And this formulation would have to somehow rely on its perspective on the others — outside of itself — to know of things that could be unknown at the same time. And I think that *this* could be a stake in this perspective.

So there is a 'neutral scientific descriptions of people different from us'. If there are 'neutral scientific descriptions', then there should be other 'descriptions' which are not the

'scientific' ones. And although there is an issue with the way of 'seeing' *this*, there is no question regarding the *difference* of 'people' that are not 'us'.

And there should be a stake in this gaze, the seeing of the stereotype, and how it is being used to construct, in turn, the 'gaze'.

> Within stereotyping, then, we have established a connection between representation, difference and power. However, we need to probe the nature of this *power* more fully. We often think of power in terms of direct physical coercion or constraint. However, we have also spoken, for example, of power *in representation*; power to mark, assign and classify; of *symbolic* power; of *ritualized* expulsion. Power, it seems, has to be understood here, not only in terms of economic exploitation and physical coercion, but also in broader cultural or symbolic terms, including the power to represent someone or something in a certain way within a certain 'regime of representation'. It includes the exercise of *symbolic power* through representational practices. Stereotyping is a key element in this exercise of symbolic violence.[79]

'[W]e have established a connection between representation, difference[,] and power' because 'we' already know these things are different. And if this 'connection' is being 'established' by 'we', then 'within stereotyping', what 'we' *have* is what we 'have established'. The issue here, though, is what 'we' are concerned about — the 'nature of this '*power*'. Although 'we' claim to know this '*power*', what we *know* about it is not all of it. Or I could read that knowing the '*power*' is different from probing it. Or I could also read that knowing about the 'power' is different from knowing the 'nature of this *power* more fully'. The italics could be about how the idea of 'power' is shifted: the '*power*' and the 'nature of this *power*'. Although it is known, what it is being known is only a part of *it*. And this '*power*' in italics is being constructed as something which could be known outside of its perspective — that there is to be said about it more than what it has already known.

Because what 'we often think of power [is] in terms of direct physical coercion or constraint'. So what we know about this 'power' is different from what we 'think' about it. That

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[79] Hall, *Representation: Cultural Representations and Signifying Practices*, 259.

is, if what we 'often' think of as power is only 'in terms of direct physical coercion or constraint', then the perspective on 'we' would have to know already that the 'power' could be thought of in other 'terms' besides 'direct physical coercion or constraint'. And 'we have also spoken, for example, of power *in representation*; power to mark, assign and classify; of *symbolic* power; of *ritualized* expulsion'. So, the 'power in representation' could be spoken about, and if this is only in the example, then 'we' could have also 'spoken' more than *this*.

Power in representation can only be claimed if there is knowledge of the representation. But since this is different from what it *could* represent, this representation here could be thought of as a *system*.

There is more to say about this 'power in representation', for it is further constructed to be a 'power to mark, assign and classify'. So, this power of it could not only be about what it represents but what it could do as well. The 'power to mark, assign and classify' could only come from the notion that authority is at hand. That is to say, in order to 'mark, assign and classify', there is, perhaps, a requirement to have this 'power' although this 'power' would have to come from outside. This marking, assigning, and classifying are thus different, but they would have to share the constitution in which the 'power' is needed.

But *do* they? This requirement of 'power' might be about the 'power in representation', of *'symbolic* power, of *ritualized* expulsion'.

Indeed, I could read the shared constitution in this 'representation', 'symbolic power', and the 'ritualized expulsion'. These would have to come from the system of *repetition*: marking, assigning, classifying, and putting things in place by seeing their relationship. And this would have to rely on the 'power' to do so. But if this is about the authority of this *system*, then could this idea of 'power' correlate with this seeing?

And it might be, for there is 'power to represent someone or something in a certain way within a certain 'regime of representation'. That is, the 'power', in order to operate, has to be 'understood' here. So, I could say that this is to do with the space. This 'power' would have to be different from other power[s]. According to this, it has to be 'understood in terms of economic

exploitation and physical coercion' and in 'broader cultural or symbolic terms'. As such, there are several 'terms' that the 'power' could be 'understood'.

In addition, if the 'power' could be understood in several terms, then it does not necessarily have to be in those 'terms'. That is, this could be about the understanding of it, but not the claim of *where* this 'power' is. And if that is the case, then to be understood in several terms is to do with the perspective on *it*: this would have to rely on what it could be understood as.

And the understanding of this 'power' would also have to come from outside. That is, in this formulation, the perspective on this 'power' should have already known that this understanding does not come with the 'power' itself. What to be known about the power requires an excess of this 'power'. And in this case, the 'power to represent someone or something in a certain way' has to be 'understood' as well.

But if there is a further construction of this understanding, then I could say there are other ways of *understanding* this 'power' — outside of this '"regime of representation"'. That is to say, there are ways to 'represent someone or something', but within that *frame*, certain ways could require 'power'. Could I say that not all representation, then, requires power? Or does all representation require power, but not in a "regime of representation"'?

Yet, even so, I think that this idea of 'representation' itself would already require 'power' to be able to make the 'process'. So, there could be a power to construct this 'representation', and there is also the '*power*' to represent 'someone or something'. There should be multiple 'power[s]' in this formulation.

'It includes the exercise of *symbolic power* through representation practices'. I read this as another shift of 'power'. This 'symbolic power' is constructed as something which needs to be invoked and exercised. *What* needs to be understood 'includes' exercising symbolic power through representational practices'. So, the 'symbolic power' is not included here. Instead, it is the exercising of it that is the issue. This is the exercising through 'representational practices'. And indeed, I could read the repetition in these 'practices', so I would still say that this notion of

representation itself is to do with this repetitiveness. As such, there should already be these 'representational practices' in the formulation before the 'symbolic power' for it to 'exercise' through.

And if this 'stereotyping' is a 'key element in this exercise of symbolic violence', then this 'symbolic violence' would have to be outside of this 'stereotyping'. And the 'key element'? Then there should be more than this 'element' to exercise 'symbolic violence'. The question would be: what about the other 'element'?

'[S]ymbolic violence' should be different from this 'symbolic power', but both could be 'exercised', or rather, both *have* to be 'exercised'. That is to say, invoking them *within* the process requires more than just 'symbolic violence'. But then again, if this is to exercise this 'symbolic violence' and this 'symbolic violence' could only be *there* through the 'practices', then I could say that 'stereotyping' could be a part that constructs this 'symbolic power', or it could be a part of the 'process' to make it possible in a sense that there is *already* this 'symbolic power' to access. Still, not all practices can allow this 'exercise'.

Previously, I have read out Hall's construction and idea of 'power' and 'representation' and how the 'power' could be, in a sense, understood within the system of 'stereotyping'. So, in this section, I would like to continue reading out this 'power' and 'representation', but with the claim surrounding sex and gender, *following* my reading *of* images of a woman in the previous section, *starting* from Foucault's *The History of Sexuality*.

> In Greece, truth and sex were linked, in the form of pedagogy, by the transmission of a precious knowledge from one body to another; sex served as a medium for initiations into learning. For us, it is in the confession that truth and sex are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive expression of an individual secret. But this time it is truth that serves as a medium for sex and its manifestations.[80]

I am thinking about the 'boundaries' here, for the link between 'truth and sex' could not only *be* in 'Greece', rather, the 'form of pedagogy' that constructs this 'truth and sex'. Indeed,

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[80] Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 61.

'truth and sex' cannot be 'pedagogy', according to the perspective, for this is the 'form' which implies another frame of 'pedagogy'. And if this is to do with 'by', then the 'pedagogy' would have to be constituted *by* the idea of 'transmission of precious knowledge from one body to another'. So, the knowledge could be about the 'body'. If this is about the 'knowledge from one body to another', then the 'knowledge' is something that could be contained in the 'body'. And this 'knowledge' could be 'transmitted' as well. But could this be transmitted as such? In some sense, this process makes me think about how the 'translation' and the 'cultural comparison' are constructed in previous chapters. Even though 'knowledge' and 'terms' are different, both could be transferred through the 'boundaries'. Nevertheless, I think this transfer of 'terms' or 'knowledge' should be about the 'duplication' since there is 'precious knowledge' in 'one body' and 'another' now.

Am I reading too much into this? But there is indeed this shared idea of the implied perspective, which has to be outside of both *inside* and *outside*, in this case, the 'bod[ies]', to be able to see this as the 'transmission'.

And there is something to be said about the duplication in terms of the hierarchy, for although there *is* the position from the outside, wherever that might be, this idea of the 'transmission', the 'duplication', or the 'transfer' would still require the source of the movement, where it is 'originated'. This construction of this relationship can only be so when those frames are constructed or are recognized to be so by their *connection*.

And why not the other way around? Because there cannot be a transfer without knowing the 'boundaries' for it to be the 'transfer'.

That is to say, 'us' is not in 'Greece', though the perspective would claim the knowledge of this connection from the perspective on 'us'. 'For us, it is the confession that truth and sex are joined.' *This* connection would have to operate within the condition; 'in the confession'. So both 'sex' and 'truth' should be outside the 'confession' — once 'in', it could be 'joined' through the 'obligatory and exhaustive expression of an individual secret'. Nevertheless, the 'obligatory and exhaustive expression' is not guaranteed.

And,

> [i]t was during the same period—the end of the eighteenth century—and for reasons that will have to be determined, that there emerged a completely new technology of sex; new in that for the most part it escaped the ecclesiastical institution without being truly independent of the thematics of sin. Through pedagogy, medicine, and economics, it made sex not only a secular concern but a concern of the state as well; to be more exact, sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole, and virtually all of its individuals, to place themselves under surveillance.[81]

'[T]echnology of sex' depends on the 'period' of 'time', and there is a reason for it. Although these 'reasons' are not 'determined', they will be. That is to say, even though there is a *question* regarding the reasons, there is no question that there *are* 'reasons'. According to the perspective, the reasons themselves do not rely on this determination. Or at least, this determination does not invoke the 'reasons'. The 'reasons' already presented themselves without it.

Might I say this is the determination of the determination? As claimed in this perspective, the only thing that could be expected is that there 'will be' a determination.

'[T]hat there emerged a completely new technology of sex' could only be possible if there is a known 'technology of sex'. The 'new' here does not include the perspective's construction of the 'new technology of sex'. Rather, the idea of the 'new' presented here, the claim of this 'new technology of sex', would have to be constructed from the frame of 'technology of sex'. That is, the 'new technology of sex' could be anything but the 'technology of sex' since this is already the 'new' one. In other words, the 'new technology of sex' is constructed from what it is *not*, which is from the 'technology of sex'. But there is the connection of being known as the 'technology of sex'. '[C]ompletely' cannot be so 'complete' because this is still claimed as the 'technology of sex'. That is, it does not extend to the idea of 'boundaries'.

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[81] *The History of Sexuality*, 116.

And not so complete since 'for the most part it escaped the ecclesiastical institution without being truly independent of the thematics of sin'. But this *might* be the 'boundaries'. It is still being 'technology of sex' because not all the 'part' 'escaped the ecclesiastical institution without being truly independent of the thematics of sin'. So, there are 'part[s]' to this? That is to say, it is in the 'ecclesiastical institution' has to be with the 'thematics of sin'. And if this 'new', even in 'part', could be outside of 'ecclesiastical institution' while *still* depending on the 'thematics of sin', then there should be a tension in this being both dependent and able to escape the 'ecclesiastical institution'. I could read that there *is* an investment in the connection between this 'new' and the 'thematics of sin', for by claiming that it could escape without 'being truly independent', the perspective implies the scale of this 'independent' — there is a 'truly independent' in this formulation.

'Through pedagogy, medicine' is something new to 'sex', for 'sex' are not a 'concern of the state', but it is 'made' to be. Do the 'pedagogy, medicine, and economics' expand the 'boundaries' of 'sex'? I could *not* say that they are, for 'sex' *is* a 'secular concern', or at least *without* 'pedagogy, medicine, and economics', and not even *in* them, but 'through' them.

But there is another question: Do all of them *together* make 'sex' a 'concern of the state'? Or just one?

Either way, with or without 'pedagogy, medicine, and economics', 'sex' is a 'concern'. *But*, again, 'pedagogy, medicine, and economics' do not make 'sex' a 'concern of the state', it is *through* them that make it so. This is not to say that there is an expansion of the frame of 'sex' as such. Instead, according to the perspective, there is an *addition* of the frame that overlaps together.

'[T]o be more exact', there is more than one way to put this: 'sex became a matter that required the social body as a whole'. Here, I could read the breaking down in this 'social body', for if there is the 'social body as a whole', then it can also not be *as such*. The breaking down of this 'social body' should be about the multiplicity and how to see the limit of this 'social body' and the 'body'.

The 'body', in this sense, is outside of 'social' if there is a 'social body'. Can I read this as a type? Although this is the 'body', this 'body' now is to do with the notion of 'social'. In a way, I could say that what the 'social' does is shift the 'boundaries' of the 'body'. And if the requirement is about the 'social body as a whole', then the thinking of 'state' would have to do with *more* than 'social body'.

There are two 'sex[es]' in this operation; the 'sex' that becomes a 'matter that require[s] the social body as a whole' and the 'sex' that is not a 'matter', or at least, the 'matter' that requires the 'social body as a whole'.

The 'state' is not only about the 'social body' but also has to do with 'its individuality'. That is, breaking down the 'social body' should be about multiplicity. As the 'body' is connected to the 'social', its 'boundaries' could still be recognized. As such, 'pedagogy, medicine, and economics' do not change the construction of the 'body' but a gesture to another frame in relation to it, for there are still 'individuals' in this formulation, although only 'virtually'. So there is the investment in these 'individuals' and not as a 'whole'.

But *why* so? I cannot help but think that this might be the issue with the construction of the 'social body', for although there is no shift in the frame of the 'body', the perspective already gestures to the 'boundaries' of the 'social body'. But there could be a problem with looking back, for although there is a knowledge of the 'social body', the requirement would also claim to its 'individuals'. Nevertheless, this could only be possible if the perspective constructs the 'social body' from the 'body' as the same.

'[V]irtually all of its individuals'? So there is a gap between these 'individuals' and the 'social body as a whole'. That is to say, this 'all' is not 'all' as this is only the 'virtually'.

Another investment and another concern: 'to place themselves under surveillance'. If it requires the 'social body as a whole' to 'place themselves under surveillance', then I could say that this investment might be about how it allows the 'social body' to 'place themselves under surveillance'. Could I read this as the ability to 'place themselves'? That would have to rely on

the perspective on the 'matter' on the perspective on the 'surveillance' to know that it is 'place[d] under surveillance'.

However, even if it is 'sex' that becomes the 'matter', as I read, it is still the 'matter' that is to be 'place[d] under surveillance'. *But*, how, though, to claim from the perspective of the 'matter' 'themselves' to be placed 'under surveillance'? This has to rest on the operation that knows the perspective of the 'surveillance' — the looking of it — then *looks* back to see 'themselves' and 'place themselves under' that perspective. This operation, though, cannot be done by 'individuals', it has to be done 'as a whole'. And if that is the case, then this should also 'require' the agreement in the perspective that could see this 'surveillance' as the same.

For Butler, sex is also something which is to do with the notion of 'time' and requires a system of communication — the 'scientists', the repetition of the agreement on the frame of the *norms*.

> "sex" is an ideal construct that is forcibly materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialize "sex" and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms. That this reiteration is necessary is a sign that materialization is never quite complete, that bodies never quite comply with the norms by which their materialization is impelled.[82]

Here, '"sex"' is being thought of as an 'ideal construct'. This 'ideal' could be about the 'construct which is forcibly materialized through time'. And this 'construct[ion]' should be outside of the '"sex"'. That is, could there be more than this *construction* here? As there should be the '"sex"' and the 'ideal construct' that is outside of it. As such, I read that the quotation marks of '"sex"' here is the 'construct[ion]' of the *sex* itself.

Also, '"sex"' would have to rely on time since what it *is* requires being 'materialized' through 'time'. And it is the 'process whereby regulatory norms materialize "sex" and achieve this materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms'. From this, I cannot help but think about the question: should there be *sex* before this 'process'? Or is this the 'sex' but not the

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[82] Judith Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"* (New York: Routledge, 1993), 2.

'"sex"' as such because 'sex' would have to be repeated? That is to say, there should be several *sexes* in this '"sex"', and I could read the quotation marks as the frame of this 'materialization' which make *sex* '"sex"'. The stability in this *materialization*? Indeed, 'it is not a simple fact or static condition of a body'. The *frame* is not the 'condition' of the 'body', nor the 'fact', but a 'process whereby regulatory norms materialize "sex"'.

Interestingly, '"sex"' is not something that can happen on its own, that is, it requires 'norms', and it has to be *forced*. And in this perspective, since 'this reiteration is necessary' and that is a 'sign that materialization is never quite complete', could I say there is an idea of 'complete' one in this formulation? But if this 'reiteration' is 'necessary' to materialize, then where is the *limit*?[83]

I could read about the power and authority in the 'body' at another *time*:

 The classical age discovered the body as an object and target of power. It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body — to the body that is manipulated, shaped, trained, which obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces.[84]

According to the perspective, the 'body' is not the 'object and target of power', for this is what the 'classical age discovered' it 'as' one. But it knows the 'body', or as far as it knows before it 'discovere[s] the body as object and target of power'. It also knows the 'object and target of power', which would be linked by the discovery of the 'classical age'. That is, the 'body' is *still* the 'body', but now it can be seen as *others*: 'object and target of power'. The formulation also puts the 'body as object and target of power' as something already outside of the 'classical age', waiting for it to discover.

'It is easy enough to find signs of the attention then paid to the body.' The easiness would have to rest upon the idea that working on the 'body' is possible, and 'enough' here should be the limit in which the 'signs' could be found and the 'attention' that could be 'paid to the body'. But there is a condition to the 'body'; this 'body' is to be 'manipulated, shaped, [and] trained'. Thus,

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[83] I read this in a sense that the *limit* is the completion of this materialization.
[84] Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Random House, 1995).

the 'body' could be changed and is to be known as the 'body'. Its form is not fixed, though, if it could be 'shaped', and if it could be 'trained', then there is the idea of the repetition at play here. That is to say, its construction as such could rely on the outside, and this would lead to the *effect* — it 'obeys, responds, becomes skillful and increases its forces'. What it does requires external actions. It is not about what it is but what it can do. *Still*, I think this 'body' should require stability in its frame (and not the limitation) to be 'manipulated, shaped, [and] trained' and become 'skillful and increases its forces'.

Still, according to Butler, '[t]hinking the body as constructed demands a rethinking of the meaning of construction itself.'[85] So although there is a demand, it does not necessarily come together. But how could it? It is already outside of the 'rethinking' itself. And if this is the 'rethinking of the meaning of construction', then I would think that the stake in this claim would be how there is a constructed hierarchy in this thinking.

And presumably another 'rethinking' of the 'construction'?

But,

> [s]uffice it to say that the boundaries of the body are the lived experience of differentiation, where that differentiation is never neutral to the question of gender difference or the heterosexual matrix. [86]

First, I cannot help but think about this idea of 'boundaries'. Is it to do with the *space*? Do these 'boundaries of the body' have to do with framing the 'body' as such? If the 'boundaries' are outside the 'body', then there is no 'body'. *But* there is a 'body'. So, if this is about asking for the *multiple* 'boundaries' in this formulation, then this should be about the space. And if there is a talking about these 'boundaries' *at all*, then I would think that the 'body' could not be known by its 'boundaries', for it is 'of' the 'body'.

Does the 'body' change through *time*? The answer might be no, for although this is to do with the construction and the agreement on the frame of the 'body', the 'body' is the 'body', but

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[85] Butler, *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*, xi.
[86] *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of "Sex"*, 65.

never the same 'body'. And although there are multiple *bodies* in different frames, they are the 'bodies'.

This is thus to do with the instability of the 'boundaries', yet, that *instability* would have to rest upon the stability of the frame of instability. The 'boundaries' do not rely on the 'experience', for they *are* the 'lived experience of differentiation', instead, they rely on the perspective which constructs the 'experience' and the 'differentiation' which 'is never neutral to the question of gender difference or the heterosexual matrix'. If this is 'never neutral to the question', then there is somehow the idea of neutrality through the lack of it. So, there is an investment in this neutrality of the differentiation and the question of gender difference.

And there is something to say more about the construction of the *body* and more disagreement on the 'body':

> The controversy over the meaning of *construction* appears to founder on the conventional philosophical polarity between free will and determinism. As a consequence, one might reasonably suspect that some common linguistic restriction on thought both forms and limits the terms of the debate. Within those terms, "the body" appears as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed or as the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will determine a cultural meaning for itself.[87]

If there is a 'controversy over the meaning of *construction*', then I could say that, in the frame of this 'controversy', the perspective claims to the disagreement on the 'meaning' of it. Nevertheless, despite the *disagreement*, there is an agreement that the 'meaning' is outside of the '*construction*'. And this is about the appearance of the 'controversy', so although the notion of 'controversy' is already constituted here, I could not say it *would* be as such. It relies on the perspective outside of this 'controversy' to construct this 'meaning'. But the 'controversy' also depends on the idea of 'conventional philosophical polarity between free will and determinism'. And since this is the 'controversy' over the 'meaning of *construction*' as claimed, the 'meaning' should have something to do with the idea of 'free will and determinism'. I read that if there is

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[87] *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (New York: Routledge, 1999), 11-12.

'philosophical polarity' that is 'conventional', then it should be the *not* conventional *one* outside of this as well, but it does not necessarily have to do with this 'meaning'[88].

But there are 'terms', and '[w]ithin those terms, "the body" appears as a passive medium on which cultural meanings are inscribed or as the instrument through which an appropriative and interpretive will determines a cultural meaning for itself'. If those 'terms' are being restricted, then this 'body' would have to be worked under the frame within a frame within a frame. The 'controversy' of the 'meaning' can only be the 'controversy' in it being thought under the working of repetitions and oppositions.

It might come down to this, the frame of the repetition, as Nasio states:

> [...] our body repeats indefatigably, from birth to death, the same vital gestures: respiration, consumption, elimination, sleep, etc. Our body repeats, and thanks to the repetition it consolidates itself as a body.[89]

From the previous reading, I could read that repetition always gestures to the differences. But if 'our body repeats indefatigably', then even in its difference, 'our body' would still be known as 'our body'. If so, then there should be the frame of this repetition, that is, what has been working under the *same* limit, would have to be under *that* limit. '[O]ur body' is constructed by the 'repetition', and 'thanks to the repetition, it consolidates itself as a body'. Where might, though, this repetition begin? If 'our body repeats', the 'repetition' would have to rely on the 'body'. This 'repetition' has an effect on the 'body'; it 'consolidates itself'. That is to say, this would have to claim from outside of the body and see the body as the same with the knowledge that this body *is* the same despite its change. And this is 'our body', so this construction of 'body' would have to work in the frame of what is 'our[s]'. The perspective on 'our' would have to see 'our body' in the same frame, as the same, 'from birth to death'.

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[88] Here, I think there is a correlation between the meaning and the system of repetitions and oppositions by Derrida.
[89] Juan-David Nasio, *Psychoanalysis and Repetition: Why Do We Keep Making the Same Mistakes?*, trans. David Pettigrew (New York: State University of New York Press, 2019), 10-11.

But allow me first to advance a general definition of repetition. I propose the following formulation: repetition involves at least two occurrences in which an object **appears**—a first occurrence—, disappears, and then **reappears**—a second occurrence—each time slightly different but always recognized as the same object.[90]

So, there is a 'general definition of repetition', and this 'definition' could be a 'formulation', yet could I read this as a 'definition' as such? For this is only something that 'I propose', and it is only to do with what is thought of as 'general'.

[…] The following formulation: repetition involves at least two occurrences in which an object **appears**—a first occurrence—, disappears, and then **reappears**—a second occurrence—each time slightly different but always recognized as the same object.

The 'two occurrences' are not the 'repetition' as these are what they involve. And since this is claimed to be about 'at least two occurrences', there is a prior knowledge of what could be possible 'occurrences'. That is, more than 'two occurrences' could be involved in this 'formulation'. These 'occurrences' are about the appearance of the 'object', as it could 'appear', 'disappear', and then 'reappear'. I could read these 'occurrences' as a process. A repetition of a repetition? Nevertheless, it would have to work as the system, for there is already a set up of the frame, and it could not go beyond it.

I am still curious about this 'object' and the appearance of it. For there should be a recognition of this object, to know that it is *the* 'object' that '**reappears**'. Indeed, even though 'each time' it is 'slightly different', it is 'always' 'recognized as the same object'. So in itself, this formulation would imply that there could be 'object(s)' and that there should be a *problem* with this recognization. Recognizing the 'same object' here would have to rest on the idea of comparing sameness and difference. Even if it is *different*, it is the same one. And this idea of *difference*, thus, would have to rely on the *seeing* of the perspective. But that might not be all. Rather, this is to do with the limit of the recognition of the 'object'. That is, the 'object' could be

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[90] *Psychoanalysis and Repetition: Why Do We Keep Making the Same Mistakes?*, 10-11.

different, but if it could be known to be the same, then could I say that this might also be about the categorization? The categorization of the 'object' to be the *object*.

In a way, I can also read that this would have to require another perspective outside of the perspective that sees these 'occurrences'. That is, to be able to know that this 'object' is to be recognized as the 'same', the perspective would have to *know* the seeing of the perspective on the object to claim to know that it '**appears**' and '**reappears**'. As I read, since this is about the appearance, it does not necessarily have to do with its existence, for it could always be there. That is to say, this should be about the claim to the seeing of the perspective that *something* could be outside of its seeing, and this could only be so from another perspective outside of it yet still know another perspective as the same.

Indeed,

[t]here is no repetition without you, without your counting, without the conscious enumerator that you are. In order for there to be repetition there must be a human agent; there must be a consciousness that identifies an event, extracts it from the incessant flux of life, and counts all the times where it surfaces.[91]

If 'you' is required for the 'repetition', then 'you' would have to be outside the 'repetition'. The idea of 'repetition' here is being thought of here from its absence. But it is not just 'you' that is required; 'you' would have to come with 'your counting' and 'conscious enumerator'. Those what you 'are' — 'enumerator' and what belongs to your — 'your counting' are both outside of 'you'.

'[F]or there to be repetition[,] there must be a human agent'. So I could say that 'you' *must* be a 'human agent' if it is what requires. Why? Because 'there must be a consciousness that identifies an event, extracts it from the incessant flux of life, and counts all the times where it surfaces'. And if this is needed in the formulation for 'repetition', then I could read this as the *process* that constitutes the 'repetition'. The 'human agent' is required here to complete the process. That is to say, in this frame, there is only a 'human agent' which provides 'consciousness'

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[91] *Psychoanalysis and Repetition: Why Do We Keep Making the Same Mistakes?*, 12.

that can identify an 'event'. This 'event' thus could not be outside of what the 'consciousness' knows. The concern here is thus not about the 'event' as such but *how* it could be recognized and whether it *could* be recognized at all. How to identify if this is not already known to be the 'event' *itself*? The 'repetition', thus, would already require the *repetition* in another frame.

The 'event' is also being 'extract[ed]', which can only be done in a certain way; through a 'human agent'. I read that the identification of a 'human agent', then, from this perspective, should be about framing the 'event' itself, for this is to be extracted from the bigger frame — the 'incessant flux of life'. Then, the 'event' would have to come from 'life'.

The following process is to count all the 'times' where it 'surfaces'. I find it interesting how it is not 'when' it 'surfaces' but 'where it surfaces'. This surfacing should rely on the construction of the *limit*. If this is the surfacing of the 'event' in 'life', and it could be seen and 'extract[ed]' from the incessant flux of 'life', *then* there should be a split in this 'life'. That is, the 'event' could only 'surface' as it is beyond the *limit*, the limit of this 'incessant flux of life'. But where might that be outside of 'life'? Or I could say that outside of the 'incessant flux of life' is 'life' itself. Even then, there should be a split in this life — a division of 'life' in which the limit could be seen from the perspective. Thus, 'where it surfaces' could be about this frame of 'life', the position of the 'event' in relation to 'life'.

Indeed, identifying the 'event' could be only so if it 'surfaces'. This implies that the 'it' does not rely on a 'human agent' to surface. A 'human agent' must 'count all the times where it surfaces'. So the 'event' could surface many 'times'? The problem is how this 'human agent' could know that it is indeed 'all the times where it surfaces' if this should also depend on identifying the 'human agent'. This, though, could only be so if the 'human agent' can guarantee 'all the times where it surfaces'. That is to say, according to the perspective, on the 'human agent', there is no question about this identification when it is known to *be* the 'event' as such. Once the 'event' is identified, this knowledge of a frame of the 'event' can be known 'all the times'. There is not a change in this 'event' in those 'times' — 'all the times' — in this perspective.

This constitution of 'event' also relates to the idea of stability and continuity, the 'counting'. This 'counting all the times it surfaces' would have to be built on the knowledge that it can surface more than *once*. The 'event' thus would have to be constructed with multiplicity *before* the 'counting' itself, for there is framing on this framing of the event, that this framing is to be framed in relation to another frame.

Chapter 6: Reading Reader's Fantasy and Reality

I would like to begin this chapter by considering the idea of 'fantasy', for this is to do with the 'concept' of women and how the idea of representation of women operates within this frame — the 'fantasy world of manga'. And Rose has an idea about this,

> [f]or one line of thinking, the concepts of state and fantasy are more or less antagonists, back to back, facing in opposite directions towards public and private worlds. But fantasy, even on its own psychic terms, is never only inward turning; it always contains a historical reference in so far as it involves, alongside the attempt to arrest the present, a journey through the past.[92]

So, there are many ways of thinking about the 'concepts of state and fantasy'. But the one that Rose's 'concepts of state and fantasy' are 'more or less antagonists, back to back, facing in opposite directions towards public and private world'. So, this is to think about the 'concepts' and not the 'state and fantasy' as such. And it is very interesting in the way that this 'thinking' of the 'concepts' is to do with the directions and the *positions* — 'towards public and private world'. That is to say, there is a *placement*, a knowledge of the space required in the 'concepts'.

This 'line of thinking' is the not in the 'psychic terms', for the perspective should be outside of it by claiming 'its own psychic terms'. So, there is an investment in this 'fantasy' and how its 'psychic terms' relate to this 'turning'. That is, the 'terms' of this 'fantasy', and not only the 'psychic terms', are being thought of with *another*. And there should be more than the 'fantasy' here, for it 'always contains a historical reference in so far as it involves, alongside the attempt to arrest the present, a journey through the past'. That is, 'fantasy' requires the idea of time and looking back on it to construct *history*. I could read the 'fantasy' as something of a frame or a box, which could contain something inside — a 'historical reference'. The perspective on 'it' would also have to know the 'present' as it 'attempt[s]' to 'arrest'. But this is only the 'attempt' of it, so I could say that the 'arrest[ing]' might not be happening. And *that* is a 'journey through

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[92] Jacqueline Rose, *States of Fantasy* (Oxford University Press, 1998).

the past'. So, there is a tension here in which the construction of 'fantasy' requires multiple looking(s) simultaneously.

Moving on to another 'line of thinking':

The making of a reader's personal fantasies, which are individually designed and contrived might then be understood as constituting a different dimension of fantasy—a singular/internal space of difference that is variously elaborated on and repeatedly transformed. This kind of personal fantasy will hereafter be referred to as the second fantasy dimension. It is precisely because of the process of reading, which involves mediation, confrontation, and criticism, that *manga* does not directly become the reader's *own* fantasy, because readers produce their own interpretations as they read and do not necessarily have personal fantasies related to *manga*.[93]

The 'reader's personal fantasies' are 'made'. The making is about individuality, that is, some fantasies are also not 'personal'. But this personalness of the 'reader' could be known outside of the 'reader', including the 'making' of it. And 'making' is different from designing. I could read that if it is 'individually designed', then there should be a known process of this designing which are for the individual. That is to say, the perspective would have to know multiple designs to know that the design *could* be individual.

And 'contrived'?

If these 'fantasies' are 'designed' and 'contrived', it does not happen *naturally*. There is a sense of purpose, of 'making' them depend on the 'individual'. And this making could be 'understood', but this is formulated only to be a possibility. Still, that would already imply that it *could* still be understood as 'constituting a different dimension of fantasy — a singular/internal space of difference'. So 'making' is different from 'constituting'. Perhaps it is to do with the 'fantasies' which is to be made that are not the same as 'constituting a different dimension of fantasy' because it is only the *understanding* of it.

A 'different dimension of fantasy'? Then there should be a dimension of fantasy or a dimension *already*. So this is about the dimension, and the 'fantasy' is 'of' the dimension. That

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[93] Lent, *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 133.

is, the 'fantasy' is to do with the frame. There is always a *limit* to this 'fantasy'. The 'dimension of fantasy' is further constructed as a 'singular/internal space of difference that is variously elaborated on and repeatedly transformed'.

In this *understanding*, there is a 'space', which is thought to be 'singular' and 'internal' of 'difference'. But if this 'space' could be 'elaborated on', then the understanding of it is not fixed. And since it could be 'variously elaborated on', there should be a shared knowledge of this 'space'. Even before this elaboration, there should be an agreement on the perspective on this 'space'. But does this singularity and the internal have to do with the agreement? If so, there should be a seeing of the frame, of seeing this internally or constructing this *seeing* in sameness and difference.

Understanding the making of a 'reader's personal fantasies' requires more than a 'space'. That is to say, if the 'space of difference' is 'repeatedly transformed' but could still be known to be this *space*, then this transformation does not affect what it is. Or, in a sense, I could also say that what is being 'repeatedly transformed' might not be the 'space of difference' itself, but rather what is being transformed is what is *inside* it.

And if the 'personal fantasies' are to be understood with the idea of 'singular/internal space', then I could read that the notion of 'personal' should be constructed with the concept of singularity and internal. Therefore, the 'space' is *known* to be different for the 'individual' from the perspective outside of it to be able to claim so, but this would have to rely on the idea that there is a frame of the 'space' which could be applied to each individual. That is, if the transformation and the elaboration should rely on the individual, then there is no question regarding this agreement of space.

'[R]epeatedly transformed'? Then the transformation here could be repeated, but this repetition would still be in the frame of what constitutes it as the 'space'.

And there should be more than one 'dimension', for 'this kind of personal fantasy will hereafter be referred to as the second fantasy dimension'. This implies a different kind of 'personal fantasy', but this particular kind, 'this kind', could be 'referred to as second fantasy

dimension'. I could read that if this is to be 'referred to' as something else, then it could not be the 'second fantasy dimension' as such, for this can only be known 'as' a referring. But if this is *not* a 'second fantasy dimension', should there be a 'second fantasy dimension' which is not the reference here, somewhere out there? Furthermore, this is about the 'hereafter', so there could be a point to this 'referring'. That is to say, it does not happen in any other way and time — it only happens to 'this kind' and the 'hereafter'.

There is so much to be said about the 'reader' here in relation to the idea of 'fantasy' and 'manga'. That is, the 'reading' here is not 'mediation, confrontation, and criticism' because these are all in the 'process' of 'reading'. And because of this 'process', '*manga*' does not directly become the reader's own fantasy'. This formulation would have to come from the position that 'manga' could become the reader's 'fantasy' and that the 'readers' could have 'fantasy' from reading the '*manga*'. Although the claim of 'directly' would also imply that the 'manga' could become 'reader's own fantasy' though not directly. Still, this idea of 'manga' and the becoming would then set those which are constituted outside of 'manga' in a position that could become the 'reader's own fantasy'. And it should be so, for this is about what the 'manga' could *not* do — the lack of 'manga' itself compared to *what* is outside.

The formulation of this becoming relies on the condition that the 'readers produce their own interpretations as they read and do not necessarily have personal fantasies related to *manga*'. But *how* could it be? As I could read, there is already the idea of 'manga' in the formulation. Even though the 'readers' could 'produce their own interpretations as they read', what they 'produce' is, *still*, the 'interpretation'. And even if this 'interpretation' is not the 'fantasy', in a way, the 'interpretation' comes from the 'reading' of the '*manga*'.

But if that is the case, then what they interpret does not have anything to do with the 'fantasies' and 'does not necessarily' would make this a possibility.

In this perspective, this 'fantasy' should relate to the idea of 'interpretation', but if producing 'their own interpretation' does not make 'manga […] become the reader's own fantasy', then it can be without another.

And there should be something more in the 'process of reading' outside of 'mediation, confrontation, and criticism' because it is about the production of 'their own interpretations' as they 'read'. I could read here the production of 'their own interpretation', framed and limited to a certain action: 'as they read'. And it should be 'their own interpretations'. That is to say, there is already the idea that the 'constitutions' which are produced from '*manga*' are something of 'their own': this ownership could be known and understood from the outside, and this relationship between 'their ownership' would be known as the 'interpretations' as the same.

Indeed, even if 'manga does not directly become the reader's *own* fantasy', I could still read the link between the idea of '*manga*' and 'fantasy' through 'reading'. Thus, the idea would have to rely on this 'reading', how it is read constructed the 'fantasy' and the 'interpretations'. And if this is the reading about '*manga*', then I think that the link might not be only about the 'reading' of '*manga*'. The 'fantasies' could be produced by other things, outside of 'manga', other things that could be *read*. If '*manga* does not directly become the reader's *own* fantasy', then others might can.

And,

> [n]either is *manga* a substitute for reality but rather constitutes part of the reality of contemporary cultural production that readers interact with as a medium of communication. The refusal to consider the work of reading as complex negotiation leads easily to the reductive interpretation of mass media and its consumption as 'escapist'.[94]

'Neither is *manga* a substitute for reality'. So, '*manga*' is not 'reality' and not the 'substituted'. The perspective thus would have to know what 'reality' is to be able to say what it is *not*. But in this formulation, in this lack, there should still be the idea that '*manga*' could *be*, from the implication. And suppose it is not the 'substitute', but 'rather constitutes part of the reality of contemporary cultural production'. In that case, the idea of 'substitute' is constructed as something that cannot be a 'part of'. It should be able to 'constitute' *more* than that. And if it could 'constitutes part of the reality of contemporary cultural production', then this 'reality of

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[94] *Themes and Issues in Asian Cartooning: Cute, Cheap, Mad, and Sexy*, 133.

contemporary cultural production' would have to require the notion of '*manga*' and also other things — to be able to constitute *other* parts.

This 'reality' is the 'reality of contemporary cultural production that readers interact with as a medium of communication', and this is what the 'readers' could 'interact with'. So, the relationship between the 'readers' and the '*manga*' is not about 'reading' but also about interacting. But with the 'interaction', the notion of '*manga*' is shifted, as now, from the perspective on the 'readers', it is thought of as the 'medium of communication'. That is, 'communication' requires something to act as a medium. And I could read here the investment in this 'communication', for this is what the '*manga*' is about for the 'readers'.

I could read that the 'work of reading' is *not* a 'complex negotiation', for the issue here is about considering it as one. And this seems to be a choice of sorts, for it could be refused. However, there is a condition in which if it is *not* being considered to be so, it could lead to the 'reductive interpretation of mass media and its consumption as "escapist"'. Still, if the perspective knows where it could lead, then this refusal would have happened *already*.

I think it is pretty interesting that the 'interpretation' is now being constructed as something that would have to come *after* the considering. So, in a sense, this 'interpretation' is to do with the choice since what it could be is not considered. What it *is* should be outside of consideration.

If the investment here relies on the consequence of *not* considering, then the 'reductive interpretation of mass media and its consumption as "escapist"' should be regarded as problematic. And I think such consideration could be seen as the prevention that disrupts this 'leading'. What it *is* depends on this.

What it leads to is the 'reductive interpretation', so other types of 'interpretation' could happen otherwise. But this 'reductive' should have to do with the idea of '"escapist"'. That is to say, the '"escapist"' should be constructed from the perspective that sees the '"escapist"' outside of the 'consideration' and the 'consumption' as something outside of *itself*. That is to say, the

'reading' is to do with the 'interpretation', but the consideration of this 'reading' — the seeing of this 'reading' — is about *how* the 'interpretation' operates in this formulation.

Suppose the idea of 'reading' could 'lead […] to the reductive interpretation of mass media and its consumption', in that case, 'reading' should also have something to do with both the 'media' and the 'consumption' one way or another. Nonetheless, if this is the 'interpretation', then the perspective would have to imply already that 'its consumption' is not the '"escapist"'. Then, the issue should be on the perspective on the perspective of the 'refusal' that does not 'consider the work of reading' as such.

Do I need to consider something? Or am I considering something about the construction of 'fantasy' and the 'reader': 'This way of talking about fantasy seems to reflect something of a pattern.'[95] And if this is to do with the *pattern*, then this should be about the repetition of the opposition. What has been constituted to be 'fantasy' would have to rely on the notion of reality. Nevertheless, '[as] a literature of "unreality", fantasy has altered in character over the years in accordance with changing notions of what exactly constitutes "reality"'.[96] Even in this *pattern*, the idea of '"reality"' could be changed. I read quotation marks of '"reality"' and '"unreality"' in the same frame, a construction of the frame, as those would have to be operated with the limit, that although there is a change in the constitution of reality, it would still be known as *reality*. And although fantasy is not '"unreality"', it could be known 'as a literature of "unreality"'. That is, what has happened to 'fantasy' correlates with '"reality"'. So, the idea of 'fantasy' has to depend on the idea of '"reality"'. Even then, I could not say that it only has to do with '"reality"' *as such*, rather, it is to do with 'what exactly constitutes "reality"'. Therefore, the construction of this '"reality"' would have to come from outside. Thus, it is *not* reality that has been changed; it is the constitution of it.

And

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[95] Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan: Or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, 64.
[96] Rosemary Jackson, *Fantasy: The Literature of Subversion* (Taylor & Francis, 2008), 3.

Realism in children's writing cannot be opposed to what is 'literary' or truly 'aesthetic', once it is seen that realism does not refer just to the content of what is described, but to a way of presenting it to the reader.[97]

For Rose, there are multiple 'way[s]' of talking about the 'fantasy', but what differentiates this 'way' from the others would be how it could 'reflect something of a pattern'. As I read, it is not the 'fantasy' that reflects here, rather, it is the 'way of talking' about it. The 'pattern' as such could only be when there is a talk about the 'fantasy'. As such, I could say that the notion of 'fantasy' could be known through the 'talking'.

'Realism' could be in 'children's writing', and although it 'cannot be opposed to what is "literary" or truly "aesthetic"', it is already constructed by 'what is "literary" or truly "aesthetic"'. Nonetheless, this construction works under the condition: 'once it is seen that realism does not refer just to the content of what is described, but to a way of presenting it to the reader'. So, this 'realism' could be 'seen'? If this formulation requires the seeing in which 'realism' does not just 'refer to the content', then it could be seen another way. But in this perspective, I could read that 'realism' could 'refer' to the 'content of what is described' and a 'way of presenting it to the reader'. If that is the case, then 'realism' requires the *seeing* and the 'reader' to constitute itself since it needs to be presented and described.

And what about the 'children's writing'?

The writing that is currently being promoted for children is that form of writing which asks its reader to enter into the story and to take its world as real, without questioning how that world has been constituted, or where, or who, it comes from. Even if it is not the intention, it is the effect of writing which presents itself as 'realistic' that the premises on which it has been built go largely unnoticed, because it appears so accurately to reflect the world as it is known to be.[98]

But this 'writing' which is being 'promoted for children' is not promoted *by* 'children'. The perspective would have to have the idea of what is this 'writing' is and how it is constructed

[97] Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan: Or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, 65.
[98] *The Case of Peter Pan: Or the Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, 62.

to be (different from the other writing) 'for children'. The difference, that I read, is the 'form of writing' which 'asks its reader to enter into the story and to take its world as real'. So to say, this 'form of writing' would have to be constructed with its 'reader' *already* in the process to be able to 'asks its reader to enter into the story'.

The 'form of writing'? So whatever it is *is* not the 'writing'. That is, this could only be operated from multiple 'writing[s]'. Its reader would have to be known, including the ability to 'enter into the story' of 'its reader'. *Yet*, as I read, this is only the asking to 'enter the story', so there seems to be a choice of 'its reader' to 'enter' and to 'take its world as real'. As such, the perspective on this 'form' would have to know that the 'story' is not 'real' for it to know that its 'reader' to 'take its world as real'. To take the 'story' as the 'real world' could only be so if the 'story' is not 'real', and what is 'real' could be known from the perspective on 'its readers'.

'[I]ts reader'? So there is an ownership of the relationship of the 'reader' and the 'writing'. This relationship though would have to hinge on the perspective outside of the 'reader' and the perspective on the 'writing' on 'its reader' since it would have to be constructed with the 'reader'. And it knows that the 'reader' would have to 'enter' 'without questioning how that world has been constituted, or where, or who, it comes from'.

But even so, in the perspective, the 'reader' could still know something, that it could come from 'where' and 'who' and that it should have come from the 'constitution'.

I am thinking, though, about the relationship between the 'world' and the 'story'. The 'reader' could enter the 'story', but the 'world' is something that it has to 'take as real'. So, this 'world' should be inside the frame of the 'story'. But where *is* the 'world' exactly? Wherever that might be, it is something that has to be 'constituted' and has to come from *somewhere*.

The stake in this issue would be how the 'reader' should take the 'world as real' without 'questioning' its constitution. But does *this* questioning has anything to do with taking the 'world' as 'real' at all? This should rely on the choice of the 'reader'. If there is the idea of 'questioning' in this question, then I could read that, in this formulation, 'questioning how that world has been constituted' has something to do with 'enter[ing] into the story and tak[ing] its world as real'.

I would like to think back again about this notion of 'real', for as I read, even if there is a question regarding the 'reader' to 'enter into the story and to take its world as real', this would have to rely on the set up that the 'reader' could 'take its world as real'. But this 'real' would have to be 'real' in the perspective on the perspective on the 'reader'. The 'real' thus cannot be 'real' from the perspective of the 'reader' itself.

'Without questioning how that world has been constituted'? So, the question, in this case, is brought to the formulation through the lack. And I could read *that*, in itself, would imply that there should be the questioning of 'how that world has been constituted'. That is, there is a question of *how* the world is 'constituted', yet, this should rely on the idea that the world is to be 'constituted'. So, 'that world' could only come from the constitution and have to come from somewhere or someone.

'[E]ven if it is not the intention' would have to be working in a condition, so I read that it could still be the 'intention': it is the 'effect of writing which presents itself as 'realistic' that the premises on which it has been built go largely unnoticed'. So the perspective knows that the writing itself does not do anything; it is rather the 'effect of the writing' which 'presents itself as ''realistic'''. If it can present 'itself', then this effect must know what it is being presented for. What it is *is* being presented as ''realistic''', so this 'effect of writing' then could not be as such: ''realistic''', for if itself knows that *that* is something that is being presented, then the perspective on it should know that it is not what *it* is.

So this is still to do with the appearance of something that seems ''realistic'''. And I could read that, despite being presented as ''realistic''', the term ''realistic''' itself would imply that what is being framed here is not 'real', for the 'real' is already outside of it.

And due to this presentation, the 'premises on which it has been built go largely unnoticed, because it appears so accurately to reflect the world as it is known to be'. But what is being presented and 'real' would have to be connected. If the 'real' is *already* outside, then this notion of 'real' would have to be still operated in the frame, claiming from the perspective outside of the outside of the frame.

And since I am interested in this 'real' and its relationship with the outside, I would like to go back and think again about 'otaku' and the relationship with the 'fantasy world of manga'. I am going to explore more about this, which, according to Parker and as I have discussed in the previous chapter, there seems to be a shift in 'anime imagery', from 'machine-imagery' towards '*bishojo*' or '"nymphs"'[99]:

> Minakawa Yuku, the author of Kodansha's *Gundam Officials, Limited Edition* guide to one of the best-selling series of robot 'Mobile Suit Gundam' manga, is reported as saying that viewers did not identify with the armoured power of the robots so much as with the security of being in a mother's womb. The robot's armour becomes the body, so being inside is to be in 'a safe place in which you can *interact* with the world'.[100]

I could not say this *is* according to 'Minakawa Yuku' for this is to do with *what* is being 'reported' from 'Minakawa Yuku'. The report says that 'viewers did not identify with armored power of the robots so much as with the security of being in a mother's womb'. And this is not to say that 'viewers did not identify with the armored power of the robots'. *They* 'did', but not so much as they did with the 'security of being in a mother's womb'. So, in this perspective, the identification is constructed with the idea of the *becoming* — the 'robot's armor becomes the body', and because of this, 'being inside it is to be in "a safe place in which you can interact with the world"'. If that is so, it is not so much about the 'power' but the 'security'. And if this is a 'safe place', then this 'safe place' would have to be outside of the 'world', a 'safe place' which is not separate from each other since it allows you to '*interact* with the world', which, as I read, would imply that the 'world' itself is not a 'safe place' or even not 'safe' to '*interact* with the world'. Indeed, this formulation would have to rely on the idea of the position — inside and outside. There needs to be *something* — the body or the armor — that operates as a frame to constitute what is *in* and *out*.

Also,

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[99] Parker, *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious*, 64.
[100] *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious*, 64.

[t]hese figures are part of the now dominant '*moe*' imagery, one definition of which is that it 'expresses a rarefied pseudo-love toward fictitious characters and their related embodiments'. Here there is an emphasis on erotic relationships with the images, the kind of relationships that Saito refers to as evidence of the predilection of otaku to 'take fictional constructs for sex objects'.[101]

These 'figures' would have to be within the frame of '"*moe*" imagery', therefore, those 'figures' *could* not be '"*moe*" imagery'. I read that this 'now' has to do with the shift of the 'dominant' imagery rather than the shift of the 'figures' which are 'part' of the 'imagery'. But I am thinking about the idea of 'dominant' here, for where is a frame of this 'dominant' taking place? And if this is a shift, something else should be *here* before 'now'. And whatever that might be, it could not be '"*moe*" imagery' and not 'these figures'. The '"*moe*" imagery is known by its 'definition' — specifically, 'one definition', so I could not rule out other 'definition[s]', that is, this formulation opens another possibility of *other* constructions outside the claim here. It '"expresses a rarefied pseudo-love toward fictitious characters and their related embodiments"'. This 'definition' concerns what has been expressed: a 'rarefied pseudo-love toward fictitious characters and their related embodiments'. The stake here, thus, would have to be about how the perspective frames the 'pseudo-love' and their 'embodiments', for this has to do with the deferral of it. What has been set as these 'fictitious characters and their related embodiments' has to always be outside these 'characters' themselves.

So, '[h]ere, there is an emphasis on erotic relationships with the images'. And I think what the 'emphasis' does here is that it is *not* to do with other 'relationships', but the 'kind of relationships that Saito refers to as evidence of the predilection of otaku to "take fictional constructs for sex objects"'. And there could be *more* to this 'evidence of the predilection of otaku to "take fictional constructs for sex objects"' outside of Saito because this is something that Saito 'refers to'. That is, it could only be something else. As such, the perspective constructs these 'relationships' through Saito's perspective.

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[101] *Japan in Analysis: Cultures of the Unconscious*, 64.

I could say that for 'otaku to "take fictional constructs for sex objects"' is something that has to be proven as these 'relationships' are thought to be 'evidence'. The 'evidence' of the 'predilection of otaku to "take fictional constructs for sex objects' would have to rely on the perspective that knows what 'otaku' takes. Thus, 'fictional constructs' are not 'sex objects'. The issue of the 'otaku' here is *how* the 'otaku' could take one for another and tends to do so. The problem is not the 'sex object' itself but the relationships constituted by the 'otaku' between the two.

And according to Saito, '[w]hen we perceive reality in an object, we are touching the traces of *jouissance*. Or, to put it differently, not until it is put in an unreachable place does *jouissance* activate *real* desire.'[102] So does that mean perceiving 'reality' does not happen naturally? Additionally, 'touching the traces of *jouissance*' requires the perspective to 'perceive reality'. That is, there is a condition and an action for this 'reality', therefore, I could say that this 'reality in an object' could be missed. And 'not until it is put in an unreachable place does *jouissance* activate *real* desire'. I could read that putting the 'object' would have to depend on 'we', which could happen under the condition that 'we' should see the 'unreachable place'. The issue would be *how* it is 'put' in an 'unreachable place' when it is, as claimed, 'unreachable'. The putting of 'it' should rely on the perspective outside of 'we' — the seeing of the 'unreachable place'.

But I am thinking about the 'until' with the '*real* desire'. That is, '*real* desire' should have already been established, for the perspective *knows* this condition and how the '*jouissance*' could be activated when 'it is put in an unreachable place'. In other words, '*real* desire' would have to be there, waiting for the 'object' to be 'put' for the '*jouissance*' to 'activate'.

And as I have discussed above, 'otaku' could take 'images' for 'sex objects'. And if 'images' are different from 'objects', then there should be more than one frame operated here. So, in the next section, I would like to read more about 'images' and how they are constructed in different 'spaces'.

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[102] Tamaki, *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 167.

The so-called phallic mother is one of the key concepts of psychoanalysis. It literally means a mother with a penis and is sometimes also used to describe a woman who behaves authoritatively. The phallic mother symbolizes a kind of omnipotence and perfection. The tough fighting women in Western media, for example, can all be termed phallic mothers. It is in comparison with these Amazons that I use the term "phallic girls" to refer to the beautiful fighting girls.[103]

So, the 'phallic mother' is something that is 'called', and since it is 'one of the key concepts of psychoanalysis', then there should be multiple concepts of this 'psychoanalysis'. What *it* is could not be known by itself, for there is the construction of the meaning after a 'mother with a penis'. As such, although the text claims that it 'literally means', it could not 'literally means' as such since a 'phallic mother' and a 'mother with a penis' are different, *literally*.

Not only does it have a meaning, but this is also being 'used to describe a woman who behaves authoritatively'. That is to say, the 'phallic mother' itself is being operated in different ways in this formulation. The 'phallic mother' *is* not a 'woman who behaves authoritatively, but it is being 'used to describe', so this using would have to be outside of the 'woman who behaves authoritatively.' But there seems to be a paradox in this, for although the 'woman' is known to behave 'authoritatively', what she *is* being described, 'sometimes', is not herself but what is known to be *not* her, from the perspective outside of the 'woman'. But indeed, if this is used to describe a woman who 'behaves' authoritatively, then I could not say this is about *her* authority, for this authority can be seen in her behaviour; it is not *hers*.

Suppose the 'phallic mother symbolizes a kind of omnipotence and perfection', then the 'omnipotence and perfection' here could not, in itself, be 'omnipotence and perfection' *as such* because there is a 'kind' of them. That is, even if it is being constructed with that idea, there is somehow a lack of this absoluteness. The 'phallic mother' symbolization is also one of the things which set up this 'phallic mother' in another frame. This is not about how it is 'used' to describe but *symbolize* something.

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[103] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 159.

The 'tough fighting women in Western media, for example, can all be termed phallic mothers'. So, the 'phallic mothers' and the 'tough fighting women' are not limited to the 'Western media', but the framing of the 'tough fighting women' to be within 'Western media', those 'women' could be known in different term — 'phallic mothers'. So, these shifts of the term that I read would have to rely on the position and how this framing of the 'term' is being operated within another frame. That is, 'phallic mothers' could be 'phallic mothers', but it is the term of it that makes this 'phallic mothers' more than it is.

Could I read this as an addition to the 'phallic mothers'? But even more so, if these terms hinge on the framing of the frame in this perspective, then who decides these frames? As claimed, it could not be from the 'fighting women' and also not the 'Western media'.

It could be the perspective on 'I': 'It is in comparison with these Amazons that I use the term "phallic girls" to refer to the beautiful fighting girls'. So the 'phallic mothers' are shifted again, for now they are 'these Amazons'. That is to say, the term '"phallic girls"' is something that relies on the comparison of these 'Amazons'. And if this is about constructing the comparison between '"phallic girls"' then there should already the '"phallic girls"' in this formulation.

What 'I' use here is not the '"phallic girls"' *as such* but the term of it to 'refer to the beautiful fighting girls'. So according to 'I', '"phallic girls"' are not 'beautiful fighting girls', what they are being referred to, even though the perspective knows what it is, is something which is not of *itself*.

But if that should be the case, then there should be an investment in this referring, of comparing them to 'these Amazons', for what they *are* is already known. And I read that this might have to do with the 'key concepts' of the idea of a 'phallic mother' and how it is being used to 'describe a woman who behaves authoritatively'. So, this use of "phallic girls"' would also have to do with the idea of this authority through this relationship of the comparison — to see those in the same frame.

But I would think that even if the idea of behaving authoritatively and omnipotence or perfection is to do with the 'beautiful fighting girls', the undermining of seeing this authority of

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seeing their behaviour would *still* be there. These '"phallic girls"', which could also be used to refer to 'beautiful fighting girls', according to 'I', would have to come from the construction of the 'phallic mother' which in turn also from the perspective which is not the 'woman'. Hence, the idea of seeing the authority in this formulation would have to come from another *authority* which then *sees* 'beautiful fighting girls' to 'assign' what it could be known for.

Saito continues:

> The phallic girl's fighting is the inverted mirror reflection of hysterical symptoms in a fictional space, specifically, a visually mediated one. In contrast to actual hysterics, who heighten their phallic value by covering it over with symptoms, the phallic girl openly embodies the phallus and acquires symbolic value through her complete nonexistence. If, as I have argued, Japanese space founds an autonomous space of fiction separated from everyday reality, the beautiful fighting girls who emerge in this space do so already, needless to say, as "beings in a state of lack." They have broken with all actuality and substance.[104]

If the 'phallic girl's fighting' is the 'inverted mirror reflection of hysterical symptoms in a fictional space', there should already be a setup of this 'fictional space' and what is outside of this 'fictional space'. But I think that if this is a 'mirror reflection', does this imply that what is being reflected should be outside the 'fictional space'? If so, this 'mirror reflection' could be operated between the frames. Another frame within the frame? For there should be a frame of what is being reflected here and how the reflection and what is being reflected could be seen at the same time. This perspective, thus, would have to be outside of the 'fictional space' and outside of that space to be able to see all of *this* and the relationship of the reflection.

That is, the 'phallic girl's fighting would have to be about the appearance and what could be seen as it is constructed to be a 'reflection of hysterical symptoms', and 'specifically, a visually mediated one'. But there is something that could be lost, for this is still the 'inverted mirror reflection'.

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[104] *Beautiful Fighting Girl*, 166.

And there is a comparison:

> In contrast to actual hysterics, who heighten their phallic value by covering it over with symptoms, the phallic girl openly embodies the phallus and acquires symbolic value through her complete nonexistence.

If this is about the 'actual hysterics', then there should be 'hysterics' that are not 'actual' here — the 'phallic girls'? The 'actual hysterics' are constructed as those who 'heighten their phallic value by covering it over with symptoms', so the issue here is not about the 'phallic value' and the 'symptoms' because these are what they should already have, that is, it is rather to do with how it is being 'heighten by covering it over with symptoms'. So, 'phallic value' could be covered *over*, leading to high 'phallic value'. I could say that the 'phallic value' could then rely on the 'symptoms'. Unlike the 'actual hysterics', the 'phallic girl openly embodies the phallus and acquires symbolic value through her complete nonexistence'. But how could the 'phallic girl' embody the phallus through her 'complete nonexistence'? Completely?

In a sense, there can be no 'nonexistence' if the 'phallic girl' is already in the formulation. So, I could read that 'her complete nonexistence' could apply to the frame in which she is being thought of. That is, if there is already the 'phallic girl' in a 'fictional space', then her 'complete nonexistence' could be about how she cannot be *outside* of that 'space', even only as the 'inverted mirror reflection'.

And there is something to be said about 'openly embody[ing] the phallus and acquir[ing] symbolic value', for that could only be done under the condition, which, according to the perspective, is the *lack* in itself. If the 'phallic girl' could embody the 'phallus' and 'acquire symbolic value', then there should already be the 'phallus' and the 'symbolic value' somewhere in this frame. Yet, embodying or acquiring would not make the 'phallic girl' the 'phallus' and the 'symbolic value'. They are still different. The 'phallic girl' is thus being constructed *with* the idea of the 'phallus' and the 'symbolic value'.

But that is also operated under *another* condition, for 'I', though, 'have argued', is also working the 'Japanese space' as a possibility: if it 'founds an autonomous space of fiction

separated from everyday reality'. So, if this is to find the 'space of fiction' that separated from 'everyday reality', then in the 'space', the 'fiction' is not thus 'separated from everyday reality'. And there seems to be more than 'reality' here because there is also the 'everyday' one.

Hence, this is about the possibility of the 'space', specifically, 'Japanese space', and how it could find 'an autonomous space of fiction separated from everyday reality'. That is, there should be this 'space' somewhere out there waiting for the 'Japanese space' to find. But this frame should also depend on 'I', 'as I have argued': the 'beautiful fighting girls who emerge in this space do so already […] "beings in a state of lack".

Conclusion

Perhaps, I should go back to the beginning and think about 'manga', but this time, I would like to read about the construction of the 'artist' and how the question returns to the notion of the 'readers', using the same frame and the *system* of Derrida's repetitions and oppositions.

So,

[i]f you're a manga fan who wants to draw comics, then you might start out by learning how to draw in that style, and there are hundreds of books in print offering to teach you how. […] It's a natural first step to imitate your favorite artists and I'm not going to try to talk anyone out of it. But in the long run, I hope you'll consider looking beyond those surface styles to the fundamental ideas and effects that those style have grown to convey[,] and how they compare with a world of other styles. And in manga's case that means finding new ways to personally connect with readers.[105]

The existence of 'you' is being formulated here in a condition: a 'manga fan who wants to draw comics'. So there is already some idea of 'you' in this perspective — ' you' could be a 'manga fan' and 'you' know what the 'comics' is. In addition, it also knows what 'you' could do, for it claims that 'you might start out by learning how to draw in that style, and there are hundreds of books in print offering to teach you how'.

But how could the perspective know this? This might be because there could be a split in this 'you'. That is to say, there might be 'you' who is not a 'manga fan', and then there is 'you' who is a 'manga fan who wants to draw comics'. This condition could only be possible if the perspective already knows 'you', a 'manga fan who wants to draw comics'.

To 'draw comics' would require a 'start', and 'you' could 'start out by learning how to draw in that style'. I could read that this drawing also comes with the 'style', which would have to exist already and be known by 'you': it is 'that style'. The 'style' should also be in the 'books',

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[105] McCloud, *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 223.

and these 'books' could 'teach you how' to 'draw'. So, the 'books' could 'teach'? And it could teach, specifically, 'that style'.

But this could be a 'first step', although not so 'natural' if this needs to be claimed. The first step is to 'imitate your favourite artists'. So 'I' know you have 'favourite artists' and that 'you' could 'imitate'. That is to say, the notion of *learning* here would require an existing 'style'. But this could only be so if there is a construction of *what* the 'style' is and how it would have to come from the outside of the perspective outside of it. It would have to hinge on the perspective on seeing the seeing in order to frame the 'style'. Thus, the idea of learning how to draw, in a sense, should be about seeing the others — the style of others — and understanding that 'style' to 'imitate'. In addition, this imitation is about 'your favorite artists', so the perspective should know that 'you' should already have the 'favorite artists'. That is to say, in this formulation, it is 'natural' for a 'manga fan who wants to draw comics' to have 'favorite artists' and also be able to 'imitate' the style of those 'artists'.

If I can 'try to talk anyone out of it', then that is to say that 'anyone' could also *not* follow this 'first step'. This 'trying' is something in which 'I' know *this* could be the case. Then, there should be a problem with this 'natural first step', for if this is already the 'first step' that, from the perspective, 'anyone' could be out of this frame, then this 'step' could be anything but 'natural'.

'But in a long run, I hope you'll consider looking beyond those surface styles to the fundamental ideas and effects that those styles have grown to convey'. That is, this 'looking' could be conditioned by the idea of 'time'. The 'looking' being claimed in this perspective could be known with the construction of 'time'. So, if 'I' know that 'you' can 'look beyond those surface styles', then 'I' would have to know what that 'style' *is*. Or if this is the specific style, 'that style', then this might be about the construction of *the* 'style', that there is always something 'beyond the surface'. And to see those 'fundamental ideas and effects', there is a need to 'look' — this 'look'.

And indeed, if this is what I hope for 'you' to 'consider', then 'I' should also know the looking of 'you', for 'I' know what could be if 'you' look 'beyond the surface styles' even though the formulation would still gesture to the idea that this 'looking' is up for 'you' to consider.

There is an ability to look 'beyond the surface style', so there is more to the 'styles' than the 'looking'. I think this could be about how the 'looking' is insufficient in this case. There should be a position of knowing where to look. I could assume that if this is about what 'you' could consider looking at, then 'I' should somehow claim to know where to 'look' at. So, interestingly, there is a knowledge of this 'looking' of 'you' even though 'you' do *not* know this 'looking'.

The 'fundamental ideas and effects that those styles have grown to convey'. So, the 'style' could have 'grown'? If that is the case, then the style should be thought of as something which is not fixed, but it could still be known to be the style despite its change. That is to say, what has been changing should be outside of what is constituted to be 'that style'.

The issue here, perhaps, could be about how there are 'ideas and effects that those styles have grown to convey'. So, the 'style' can 'convey'? And I could say that this growth of the 'style' might have something to do with the ability to 'convey'. If the 'style' could 'convey', then there should also be something to 'convey', and the perspective would have to know this, for it could not be claimed as such if what is to be conveyed is not known from the outside.

'[T]hey' would have to be outside of the 'world of other styles' because, in perspective, they could be compared to the 'world of other styles. I could read that the issue might not be about the comparison as such, for there has to be a 'comparison' in a way to be able to see them in the same frame even though it is outside of the 'world', but it is rather about the 'how' it is being compared. And if this is about 'how they compare' by already seeing the comparison, then the looking of 'you', which 'I' 'hope' in this comparison, would have to be already set up in this formulation. I could say that what 'you' might see cannot go beyond what 'I' has hoped from the perspective on 'you'.

And 'in manga's case', this could be about other 'case[s]' as well, although it should not mean the same: 'finding new ways to personally connect with readers'. Might I read this connecting with 'readers' as something which to do with the 'looking', for if looking 'beyond those surface style' thus leads to the 'new ways to personally connect with the readers', then there should be an idea already that 'you' can 'personally connect with the readers'. And it *should* be because if these are the 'new ways', then there *is* a way or the ways to 'personally connect with the readers'. And I could read the 'ways', for there should be the idea of the 'ways' which they already know to know that there could be other 'ways', the 'new ways' it could find. The formulation would imply that there should be more than one way for the perspective to 'connect with the readers'. And this connection could be limited because this is to 'personally connect with readers'. That is to say, there could be a connection that is not *personal*, but the 'style', which could be looked *at* and looked *beyond*, has something to do with what constitutes personalness.

But anyway, there should already be a personal connection with the 'readers'.

I read that the 'personal connect[ion] with readers' could be about framing the link between the artists and the 'readers', for the 'new ways' is being further constructed as to 'not just echoing the ways other artists in other lands connected with theirs'. So to say, the ways that 'other artists' connected could be known by the outside. And there are several framings of 'artists' in this perspective. The artists are known by their position — the 'lands'. That is, the connection not only has something to do with the 'style', but it should be about the position of the 'artists', the 'lands' that the artists are *in*.

There is still a question about these readers, for although they connect with the 'artists', the readers are not being framed with these 'other lands'. Or are they?

'[T]heirs'? Since the 'readers' could belong to the 'artists' and does not include in that framing of position, the idea of the *space* and the 'style' about this connection would only rely on the 'artists'.

But these 'artists' cannot, in a way, escape from the idea of 'readers', for to be able to 'draw', there is a requirement to *know* other 'artists'. They would have to be something *other* than

the 'artists' to *be* 'artists'. And I think that the *other* would have to be the 'reader' since this is about the 'manga fan'. So to say, there is a shift of the position; one could not be without the other, for it would require another to construct itself. I could read this as the *process* of the transition. But this is not to say that this process could be done by itself, as this idea of 'artists' would have to be known prior. In other words, there is a perspective on the perspective on the 'reader' which sees this *process* and knows what the reader has to *read* to 'draw'. So, there is a retrospective perspective on the 'artists' to be 'artists'.

> Not just echoing the ways other artists in other lands connected with theirs. […] But despite their influences, they haven't just been telling stories about Japanese schoolgirls and samurai. Instead[,] these new Japanese-influenced comic artists are veering closer to their readers' lives in the process.[106]

But not only the 'ways' can be known from the outside, it could also be *echoed*. If the 'ways' that 'artists in other lands' are something that could be echoed from the outside, then the idea of the echoing could only be in the formulation that if these 'ways' are being used in other spaces, it is something that is being echoed and not the 'ways' *as such*. So, there is a division of the 'lands' in which the 'ways' to connect to 'readers' are different.

If 'they haven't just been telling stories about Japanese schoolgirls and samurai', then what they do is to tell stories, and these stories could be more than just 'Japanese schoolgirls and samurai'. '[T]hey' thus could not possibly be *one* of the 'Japanese schoolgirls and samurai' since these are what the stories are about. Although 'despite their influences', what 'they' tell, in this perspective, should still have something to do with their 'influences'.

I want to read these 'influences' with the 'echoing' of the 'ways other artists in other lands connected with theirs' for there is a *connection,* or I could say there is already the connection in which the perspective establishes the link between what the 'artists' in 'other lands' and the implied 'artists' that are *other* to 'other lands'. So what has been transferred or *affected* would

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[106] *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 223.

have to be known and identified as 'their[s]'. That is to say, there should be other 'influences' outside of 'their[s]' as well.

And '[i]nstead', 'these new Japanese-influenced comic artists are veering closer to their readers' lives in the process', which could only be possible if the 'artists' knows both their 'readers', including 'their lives', and the position of them. If that is the case, then there must be a division between the 'artists' and the 'readers', but those would have to be within of implication that they are *not* Japanese since they would have to be outside of the 'Japanese' to be 'influenced' *by*. And there *are* different groups of 'Japanese-influenced comic artists' as these are the 'new' ones. The 'new' here could have something to do with what they are 'veering close to' — 'their readers' lives in the process'. If that is the case, then this could be about the change in the 'process'. The artists' styles would have to be about what 'you' could 'imitate' and the knowledge of their 'readers' lives'. And although there is a claim to know 'readers' lives', there is still a need to, in the 'long run', 'connect' with the said 'readers'. So, the connection has to be achieved, and the knowledge does not necessarily lead to the said connection.

But what about *those* 'lives'?

I could read that those 'lives' are somehow constructed as something of a *position*. That it is something that they can veer 'closer to', but if this is about the position as such, then there should be more than the position(s) of the 'readers' lives'. And this has to be in the 'process'. That is to say, the moving, the 'veering' of the 'artists' could only be within this frame. But *doing* is different from 'veering', for what 'they'll do' in the process has not happened *yet*. Or is it? For although this is the claim to what they have not done, what 'they'll do' would have to be set, as I read, within the limit — the 'process';

> And they'll do it using the people they know and understand, the places they can bring to vivid life, the everyday interests and details they can make real for readers, and the emotions and sensations they've know first-hand. And as styles and stories on both sides

of the Pacific Ocean continue to evolve, manga can be seen for what it always has been: another word for comics.[107]

The issue would have to rely on the perspective on 'they', for this is to do with the 'readers' lives', the 'people they know and understand'. So, if this is what the 'readers' lives' are constituted from, then they would have to be from what 'artists' know and 'understand'. That is, I could say there could be a split in these 'readers', for although they are outside of 'they' and 'artists' as claimed, they would have to be from what they 'know and understand'. So, knowing is different from understanding, and those two need to be together for 'they' to 'use'. If what they 'know and understand' is already outside of the 'readers' lives' but 'closer to their readers', then what 'they know and understand' would have to be 'closer to readers' lives' already. And 'lives' are not just the 'people' but also the 'places they can bring to vivid life'. So, the 'places' themselves are not 'vivid' since that is something that 'they can bring'. If this is about what 'they' can and cannot do, then there should be the 'places' that they cannot do as well, but I think that those might be about what 'they' *will* 'use' — closer to their 'readers' lives'.

The 'everyday interests and details they can make real for readers' would also be about what 'they' *can* and *cannot* 'make'. If this is about making 'real for readers', then there should be a question regarding whether the idea of 'real' can be *for* someone or anyone. If this is to be 'real for readers', then the implication would be that while it is 'real' for 'readers', it could also be *not* 'real' for another. And even though this is to 'make [it] real for readers', the perspective at the same time would already imply that those 'everyday interests and details' are not 'real'. The 'real' thus would already depend on the perspective on 'they' and *not* the 'readers' in which they would have to be claimed from the perspective on this 'real'.

Could this be about *assuming* the assumption of *sameness*? The issue would be about making this 'real' and how the 'emotion and sensations' derived from something that 'they've know[n] first-hand'. This sameness is about *their* ability, the known relations between the perspective on 'they' and the perspective of 'they' on the 'readers'.

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[107] *Making Comics: Storytelling Secrets of Comics, Manga and Graphic Novels*, 223.

'And as styles and stories on both sides of the Pacific Ocean continue to evolve', the 'styles and stories' could have been applied to 'both sides of the Pacific Ocean', that is, the perspective would have to construct them 'both sides of the Pacific Ocean' as the same. I can read that these 'styles and stories' that continue to 'evolve' could be read as *repetition*, for although it continues to 'evolve' and change, those 'styles and stories' can still be known to be the 'styles and stories' from 'both sides of Pacific Ocean'. This seeing on the 'manga', thus, would have to rely on this *repetition* and the notion of the opposition, for it requires the continuation and the evolution of them to be seen 'for what it always has been'. If 'manga can be seen for what it always has been', then what it *is* and what it is *seen* would have to be different. It could also be seen differently, but there is the idea of what it is in this perspective — 'another word for comics'.

The question would be what the stake *is* if it is seen as something it is not. And the problem is not about how it is known because if 'manga' is, as claimed, 'another word for comics', then the issue would have to be in its *appearance* — the representation. As such, the construction of 'manga' here is to do with the seeing on it, which relies on the 'styles' and the 'stories' drawn from *others'* styles and stories. The return of the 'styles' would have to hinge on the prior frame, known as 'styles'.

I cannot help but think that all of this could be read as a construction *process* of *culture* and *body,* which requires the history, the repetition, and the opposition to constitute itself while still being known as the same. It also has to rely on the constitution of the limitation itself. Nevertheless, there is always a sense of turning back to see what has been *processed* and identify the system as something of itself but, at the same time, not *itself*. That is, it would have to hinge on deferral and the maintenance of the *system*. The issue, though, is the idea of *self,* for although it is to be known as such, the self itself could be shifted in that *process*. Yet, this constitution would have to come from the perspective outside of it to make a comparison and thus depends on seeing from the outside to make it *as such* — the pattern of the construction.

And thus, I would like to return to the *beginning* of my thesis, but this time I should move to somewhere else, to Derrida's *The Law of Genre*[108], for this might be what all this is about: the framing of the retrospective which then frames the limit and then repeats itself as such.

Indeed, the stake of the question — *what is manga?* — would have to eventually turn back to the *position* and the perspective on it. For it can only be 'another word for comics' if there is already the idea of what 'comics' are in the first place. But this is not to say that this is the *only* answer, for as I have already mentioned, it is about reading the claims surrounding it.

And what am I seeing *now*?

Manga is Manga.

Manga is หนังสือการ์ตูน.

Manga is comics.

[108] Jacques Derrida, "The Law of Genre," *Critical Inquiry* 7, no. 1 (1980).

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