

The University of Reading

**Reading Time and the Time of Reading**

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## **Declaration**

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

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12.07.2023

## Abstract

This thesis questions how time is defined in an interdisciplinary range of texts, from children's literature to literary theory, philosophy, postcolonial theory, cognitive psychology and physics in order to think through a series of problems and issues with what time is claimed to be; specifically, time's connection with children and childhood.

Drawing on Jacques Derrida's (1992) arguments from 'Counterfeit Money', in *Given Time*, I read how time is defined according to different perspectives: time in such thinking is therefore always something other than time, including, crucially, being also always claimed necessarily in retrospect. I work with Jacqueline Rose's (1984) related arguments from *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, concerning claims to know the child always from another perspective, including the child's relations to time. I also draw on critical psychologist Erica Burman's *Deconstructing Developmental Psychology* (1994), and philosopher Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time* (1962), as these different texts enable me to read the differences in ideas of time while also reading the repetition of differences in retrospect. The implications of such arguments are worked through in relation to texts by the children's literature theorist Maria Tatar (1999) and historian Ernst Bloch (1999) on myth and folktale; developmental psychologist Jean Piaget (1969), physicist Carlo Rovelli (2015; 2018), literary critics Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar on author Virginia Woolf (2004), author Jhumpa Lahiri (2004), post-colonial theorist Pheng Cheah (2016) and educator Geoffrey Williams (1999).

These ideas are analysed in order to think through what is at stake in the claims made about time and the ostensible educational intentions or purpose of children's literature to which these notions lead. This means that this thesis is not concerned with the achievement of mastery or knowledge and is formulated as a reading in perspective.

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## I. Introduction:

This thesis reads ‘time in children’s literature’. Initially, I began with reading Maria Tatar’s ‘Introduction’ to *The Classic Fairy Tales* as my focus was on reading ideas of time in myth and folktale in children’s literature. In a similar strain, Ernst Bloch’s pieces entitled ‘The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own in Time’ and ‘From Better Castles in the Sky at the Country Fair and Circus, in *Fairy Tales and Colportage*’, appealed to me the most in terms of the claims that they were making about time. I wrote on these pieces reading the claims that it makes about time and what is invested in those claims. While researching on this topic I came across a few articles in newspapers which were outlining how the physicist Carlo Rovelli intends to change how “we” think about time and how his recent writing on time “will blow your mind”. Thus, I started reading about Rovelli and some of his interviews about his ideas on time. I am reading more about his work and his ideas of time according to physics. More than his theories themselves, it is the use of language in these articles that are of consequential interest to me.

In choosing further texts to read I am not choosing the texts so much on the basis of authority or exemplarity but instead following Derrida’s argument that:

Even supposing that Rousseau's text can be rigorously isolated and articulated within history in general, and then within the history of the sign "supplement," one must still take into consideration many other possibilities. Following the appearances of the word "supplement" and of the corresponding concept or concepts, we traverse a certain path within Rousseau's text. To be sure, this particular path will assure us the economy of a synopsis. But are other paths not possible? And as long as the totality of paths is not effectively exhausted, how shall we justify this one? In Rousseau's text,

after having indicated-by anticipation and as a prelude-the function of the sign "supplement," I now prepare myself to give special privilege, in a manner that some might consider exorbitant, to certain texts like the *Essay on the Origin of Languages* and other fragments on the theory of language and writing. By what right? And why these short texts, published for the most part after the author's death, difficult to classify, of uncertain date and inspiration? To all these questions and within the logic of their system, there is no satisfying response. In a certain measure and in spite of the theoretical precautions that I formulate, my choice is in fact *exorbitant*. (Derrida, 1997, p. 161)

I then started reading and working on some of the texts by Jacqueline Rose. My readings of various other texts have been based on Rose's ideas and writings in some parts. Specifically, to zoom in on questions about language, how language can be read, what does language do and who is it "for". This also affects formulations for this thesis:

The scene of the critical debate is thus a repetition of the scene dramatized in the text. The critical interpretation, in other words, not only elucidates the text but also reproduces it dramatically, unwittingly participates in it. Through its very reading, the text, so to speak, acts itself out. As a reading effect, this inadvertent "acting out" is indeed uncanny: whichever way the reader turns, he can but be turned by the text, he can but perform it by repeating it. (Felman, 2012, p. 101)

Rose's writings also enabled me to think about questions about children's literature such as whether "Children's fiction sets up the child as an outsider... and then aims, unashamedly, to take the child in"? (Rose, 1982, p. 2) While working on the *Alice* texts, I am basing my readings on what Rose calls this "classic for children" and further elaborates that

the child is held in such a place of timelessness “by the act of telling the tale”. Rose’s writing then enables me further to think about who is “telling the tale” and what is that “for”. My reading and writing on Maria Tatar’s piece on fairy tales analyse these questions further. What I find in these readings are claims made about time, but time here is always something other than itself. Time is about always that which is not now. It is about imagining a time which is other to the current time. What are fairy tales and what are myths, what their meanings are, what were once told and where? Therefore, this too is a time other to the time which is now. Through these claims made about things other than time in relation to time, claims are actually being made about adults, children, literature, what is “cultural”, what is “the narrative” and what this “narrative” is “for”.

Reading texts by Freud and Derrida have helped me navigate through some of the ideas that I am working on and particularly helped me look at language and how to read it. I therefore analyse claims made about time through psychological semantics, base my readings on psychoanalysis and Derrida’s method of deconstruction. Hegel and Heidegger are what my ideas of time in philosophy are based on. This is where my thinking of the “now”, disjuncture or seamlessness about time in different texts stem from. This is how I am thinking about time but not in isolation; time then can be read in relation to “Dasein”, the being and consciousness. Time can be read in terms of that which is ontical and that which is ontological.

Writing on Geoffrey Williams’ ‘Children Becoming Readers: Reading and Literacy’, it emerges that through the claims made about time which entails repetition<sup>1</sup> in this case, Williams elaborates how children can become better readers and suggests different “reading

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<sup>1</sup> I also read repetition in chapter IX. Pp. 88-89 in this thesis. C.f.: Rose refers to “the very constitution of the adult as a subject, a process” which is repetitive in itself as it is repeated through the books which the adult “gives to the child”. (Rose, 1984, p. 141) Repetitions, that which is aspirational, a known future, the predictable unpredictability, that which is known to the point that the unknown is also known, are the different parts that constitute the “restrictive ‘determiners’” that I read at play in the Beauvais’ (Beauvais, 2015) writing.



pedagogy” and tools. So, while the “children” might already be reading “stories they like over and over again and then pay(ing) attention to the words” and also discovering “what happens” in these “stories”, this is not enough. For “children” to be considered as “becoming readers” they must be “able” according to that which is identifiable as markers of ability in terms of “reading and literacy” here. These claims, the “resolution” provided here, the issues broached through this narrative about “children” and their reading and the “potential to develop a different reading pedagogy” and “remaking it” is what it is to understand “children’s literature” according to the narrative premise of this text. Time here is about a constant deferral and what children can become, how this “becoming” can be brought about and through what “tools”.

Some of the fiction books that I have worked on and read ideas and constructions of time in are: *Alice in Wonderland*, *Mrs Dalloway* and *The Namesake*. Other texts that have furthered and been significant for my research are Piaget’s *The Child’s Conception of Time*, Maria Nikolajeva’s *In From Mythic to Linear Time in Children’s Literature* and Clémentine Beauvais’ *Mighty Child: Time and Power in Children’s Literature*. In *Alice in Wonderland*, time is always “for” something else. It is narrated in terms of things other than time and for the purpose of control and supremacy over the child in different ways. In *Alice in Wonderland*, “Time” is “for” something, things can be done “to time”, “good terms” can be “with” time. But what “time” is “for” or what can be done “to time” or, “with time” is what is known within the perspective which is narrated as the Hatter’s. What is narrated as according to Alice’s perspective as that which “I have to” do to “time” is that which according to the Hatter, “he wo’n’t stand” and this means that “you” had not “kept on good terms with him”. So, I read here claims to knowledge about “time” and claims to supremacy made through claims to knowledge which I read in “if you knew Time as well as I do”. This can also be read in the claim that it is known within the perspective of “the Hatter” that “Time” is not “it. It’s him”. Therefore, claims to supremacy are made within the narratorial perspective through

claims to knowledge and the use of language because of knowledge. It is also claimed that different and differing perspectives exist about “time” but one is superior to the other because it “knew time” “well” while the other does not know “time as well as I do” but can potentially know as such.

In Piaget’s *The Child’s Conception of Time*, “time” is segregated in terms of psychological, conceptual, temporal, physics and multiple other such distinctions; yet, they are all known as time. Time then here can be read as an umbrella term. The child’s conception of time is problematic according to this narratorial perspective. There can be different understandings and hence more than “a” “understanding”. “The fundamental concepts” are external to but are “of temporal order”. “The fundamental concepts” which are “of temporal order” are not “temporal order”. The claims which are about “a clearer understanding” are not “of temporal order but “the constructive processes”. But this “clearer understanding” “will no doubt prove helpful to them in their work”, part of which is the “problems raised by the failure of school-children to grasp the idea of time”. “The constructive processes that go into the development of the fundamental concepts of temporal order, simultaneity, and the equity and colligation of durations” are not of “the child” but, these are what are part of that which is being “at a stage” which is “when” “the child” is.

Maria Nikolajeva’s *In From Mythic to Linear Time in Children’s Literature and Clémentine Beauvais’ Mighty Child: Time and Power in Children’s Literature*, move towards their narratives about time and particularly time in children’s literature in quite similar strains. Time is yet again understood and narrated in terms of distinctions such as whether it is linear, mythical or Bakhtinian. In my reading of Beauvais’ ideas on time it emerges that “the time of life” is different to and therefore what “Grimaldi also contrasts” to “the “time of physics”, which is the time of predictability”. “The time of life” which is narrated as that “which is the time of “creation, and consequently of unpredictability” is not

“unpredictability”. “The time of life” is “consequently of unpredictability” but is other to “unpredictability”. Claims are made in this text about that which is “unpredictable” and that which is “unpredictability”. “Unpredictable” is not “unpredictability” but they are narrated in terms of association with each other via multiple and different other components. What is “unpredictable” and what “unpredictability” is as a derivative, is narrated because of that which “can therefore only be unpredictable”. But while “adult ‘power’ in children’s books can... therefore only be unpredictable”, “unpredictable” is constituted in myriad other ways. “Unpredictable” then can be read as an umbrella term within which there are multiple differences and various components which are all different to each other but are all narrated as that which is “of the unpredictable” and therefore by extension “of unpredictability”. So those which are multiple and unknowable, are in fact in perspective always knowable because they are known to be unknowable and, in their unknowability, they are known. This “unpredictability” has in a sense nothing to do with “time” because they are about a “human” which is outside of “time”. There is no “time” that does anything to the “human” because even “unpredictability is profoundly human”.

## II. ‘Of molluscs and men: Piaget and Developmental Psychology’

Piaget has been held responsible for a number of specific contributions to developmental psychology. He is credited with the recognition that children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults, that different ways of thinking predominate at different ages and that these correspond with progressively more adequate ways of organising knowledge – hence his status as a stage theorist, and the association of his name in education and welfare practices with the apparatus of ages and stages (e.g. Burns 1986), despite the fact that notions of stage sequences were in wide circulation by the beginning

of the twentieth century. His work is generally portrayed as humanist, countering the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training put forward by behaviourism, and emphasising children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment (Ginsberg and Opper 1979; Gardner 1982). Piaget's focus on the organisation of knowledge and the elaboration of rules governing this organisation places him firmly as the exponent of the wider intellectual movement of structuralism within developmental psychology (Broughton 1981a).

(Burman, 2008, pp. 243, 244)

What "Piaget" is, is known and narrated according to a perspective which is not "Piaget" but knows "Piaget". According to this perspective, "Piaget" can be and "has been held responsible". There are different fors that are part of being "held responsible for". While they are all "for", they are different fors because of being "specific" which there can be "a number of". "Developmental psychology" is different from "psychology" because of being "developmental". While "developmental psychology" is different to "psychology" because of the necessary excess of "developmental", it is still "psychology". The "specific contributions" are other to "developmental psychology" but can be to "developmental psychology". What "responsible" is, is different to being "held responsible". While "Piaget has been held responsible", it is implied that "Piaget has been held responsible" by that which is other to "Piaget" but can hold "Piaget" "responsible" and knows that "Piaget" is that which can be "held responsible". What "a number" can be "of" can be different but is still that which is "a number of". "Specific contributions" while being "specific" are that "of" which there can be "a number".

The “recognition” is not his as he “is” and can be “credited with the recognition”. “He is credited with the recognition” by that which is not the “he” but can credit the “he”.

“Recognition” is different to “the recognition that children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults” because of being “the recognition that children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults” but is still “recognition”. “Thinking” can be “different” but they are all “thinking”. “Thinking” can be “children’s” while it is “that” which is “of adults”. These claims about “children’s thinking” and “that of adults” are made according to a perspective which is neither “children’s” nor “of adults”, but the claim is that what is “children’s” and “of adults” is known within this perspective. “Thinking” being “qualitatively different” is distinguished from being “different”. Children are not “adults” but it can be recognised “that” what is “children’s” “is qualitatively different from that of adults”. “He is credited with the recognition that children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults” however, the implication is that it is already known that “children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults”. What “the recognition” is, is already known, is known within a perspective which is not “he” but, “he” “is credited with the recognition”. By implication then “he” can also be “credited” without “the recognition”. While the “ways” are “different”, the “different ways” are “ways” while also being “different ways”. “Thinking” is that “of” which there are “ways”, which are “different ways”, and the “different ways of thinking predominate at different ages”. “Ages” are predominated by “thinking”. The “different ages” are known in terms of being predominated by “different ways of thinking”. While “children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults” is other to the “different ways of thinking predominate at different ages”, it is still “the recognition” that “he is credited with”.

“Organising knowledge” is not “knowledge”. There are “ways” which are “of organising knowledge”. That there are “ways of organising knowledge” is claimed within the perspective which is not “organising knowledge”, which is not “he”, but claims to know what

“organising knowledge” is, what “progressively more adequate ways of organising knowledge” are, and that “he is credited with the recognition”. “The recognition” is not “that” which “correspond[s] with progressively more adequate ways of organising knowledge” but it is part of “the recognition” that “he is credited with”.

“Children’s thinking”, “different ways of thinking”, and “organising knowledge” are not done by the “he”. However, it is “he” that “is credited with the recognition”. “Ages” are “different” and are “at” what are predominated by “thinking”. There are “different ways of thinking” which “predominate at different ages”, and while “thinking” and “ages” are both “different”, “thinking” is not “ages”, but predominates “at” “ages”. “Different ways of thinking” which “predominate at different ages” are the “these” which “correspond with” the “more adequate ways of organising knowledge”. “Different ways of thinking” which “predominate at different ages” are not the “more adequate ways of organising knowledge”. The narratorial perspective is not part of the “different ways of thinking”, neither are they “at different ages”. This is a perspective on the “different ways of thinking”, on what are “at different ages”, and what “correspond with progressively more adequate ways of organising knowledge”. “Thinking” is not “knowledge”, and “thinking is” “children’s” and “that of adults”, but the claim is that it is known within the narratorial perspective which is located outside this “thinking”, “children’s”, “adults”, “different ages”, “different ways”, “more adequate ways”, what is “progressively”, what are “more adequate ways”, and “of organising knowledge”; “that children’s thinking is qualitatively different from that of adults, that different ways of thinking predominate at different ages and that these correspond with progressively more adequate ways of organising knowledge”.

“Stage theorist” is not “status” but “status” can be “as a stage theorist”. There is more than “a stage theorist” but it is “his status” which is different from “a stage theorist” but is also “his status as a stage theorist” which differentiates him from “a stage theorist”. “He is”

not “a stage theorist”. It is because “he is credited with the recognition”, “hence his status as a stage theorist”. The narratorial perspective is on “his status” and “his name”. “His name” is other than what “he is”. “Education” is different to “welfare practices” but “the association of his name” can be “in education and welfare practices” because “he is credited with the recognition”. While “education” is different to “welfare practices” but “the association of his name” can be “in education and welfare practices” as it is “with the apparatus of ages and stages”. Though “ages” are not “stages” “the apparatus” is “of ages and stages” and “with” which his name is associated “in education and welfare practices” as “he is credited with the recognition”.

“His status as a stage theorist” is not “his name”. “A stage theorist” is not “in education and welfare practices”. However, “education and welfare practice” is “with the apparatus of ages and stages”. “Ages and stages” are “of” which “the apparatus” is. “Stage sequences” are not “the apparatus of ages and stages” and they are not “in education and welfare practices”. “Stage sequences” are “of” which are “notions”. What “were in wide circulation by the beginning of the twentieth century” is other to “the recognition that” “he is credited with”. “Notions of stage sequences” which “were in wide circulation by the beginning of the twentieth century” are not “the recognition” “he is credited with”, they are not “in education and welfare practices”, and are not part of “his status as a stage theorist”; but according to the claims made within this narratorial perspective, “he is credited with the recognition”, “hence his status as a stage theorist, and the association of his name in education and welfare practices with the apparatus of ages and stages” but, this is “despite the fact that notions of stage sequences were in wide circulation by the beginning of the twentieth century.”

“His work is” not “humanist” as it “is [only] generally portrayed as humanist”. There are “accounts” which are “of” “child learning and training”. These accounts are not “child

learning and training”. The “accounts of child learning and training” can be “mechanistic” or not as “his work” which “is generally portrayed as humanist” is “countering the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training”. What “child learning and training” is, what the “accounts of child learning and training” are, whether they are “the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training”, what “countering the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training” “is”, are narrated according to a perspective which is not the child. “Child learning” is not “training” since “training” is in addition to “learning”. There can be “child learning and training” according to a perspective which is not the “child” but knows what “child” is and that “child” can be constituted in terms of “child learning and training”.

“Emphasising children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is why “his work is generally portrayed as humanist”. “Emphasising children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is what is “countering the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training put forward by behaviourism”. “Children’s active involvement” is different from “children’s” “involvement”. While the “involvement” which is specified as “active involvement” is “children’s”, the “emphasising” and narration is according to a perspective which is not the “children’s”. “Children’s active involvement” is not “their learning environment”. “Their” “environment” is distinct from “their learning environment” because of being “their learning environment”. “Their learning environment” is that “of” which there is “construction”.

“Children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is not “child learning and training”. “Children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is that which can be emphasised, and that “emphasising” is not “children’s”, and that it can be emphasised and what is “emphasising children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is known to a perspective which is not “children’s”. What is “humanist” is different to what is “generally portrayed as




humanist” which is different to “behaviourism” because of what is “put forward by behaviourism”. According to the claims made within this perspective, “emphasising children's active involvement in, and construction of, their learning environment” is not “the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training put forward by behaviourism”. The implication here is that “emphasising” while other to “countering” is what is narrated as the “countering” which is “countering the mechanistic accounts of child learning and training put forward by behaviourism”.

“The organisation” is “of knowledge”, it is not “knowledge”. What is “knowledge” and what is “the organisation of knowledge” is narrated through a perspective on “knowledge”. What “Piaget’s focus” is, that is different from other “focus[es]” because of being “Piaget’s focus”, and what “Piaget’s focus” is “on”, is narrated according to a perspective which is “on Piaget’s focus”. “Developmental psychology” is different from “psychology”. What is “within developmental psychology” is narrated according to a perspective which is not “within developmental psychology” but knows what is “within developmental psychology”. “Structuralism” is other than “structuralism within developmental psychology” but is still narrated as “structuralism”.

“The organisation of knowledge and the elaboration of rules governing this organisation” are not “the wider intellectual movement of structuralism within developmental psychology”. “The wider intellectual movement of structuralism within developmental psychology” is that “of” which there is “the exponent”. What “places him firmly”, “places him... as the exponent” but the “him” is not “the exponent” despite being placed “firmly as the exponent”. What “places him firmly as the exponent of the wider intellectual movement of structuralism within developmental psychology” is the “focus”. This “focus” is distinct because of what it is “on”. “Focus” while being “focus” “places him firmly as the exponent”

by being the “focus” which is “on the organisation of knowledge and the elaboration of rules governing this organisation”.

The “rules governing this organisation” are other than “the organisation of knowledge”. The “focus” is “on the organisation of knowledge and the elaboration of rules governing this organisation”. “This organisation” is governed by “rules” of which “the elaboration” is part of what “Piaget’s focus” is “on”. “Structuralism within developmental psychology” is “the” “movement” which is “intellectual”, “wider” and which has “the exponent”. “Him” can be placed “as the exponent of the wider intellectual movement” and this is known to a perspective which is not “within” and is not “him”. This perspective knows what “knowledge” is, that “the organisation” is “of the knowledge”, “this organisation” is governed, and the “governing” is by “rules”, “of” which “the elaboration” is, “on” which “Piaget’s focus” is.



Ταράσσει τοὺς Ἀνθρώπους οὐ τὰ Πράγματα,  
Ἀλλὰ τὰ περὶ τῶν Πραγμάτων Δόγματα.

This is the text in Greek that *The Life and Opinions of Tristram Shandy, Gentleman* begins with, if it can be read as a beginning at all; but then what can be read as a beginning is always a question of context and perspective. The text can be read in English as “what disturbs people is not things themselves but their beliefs about them”. This is pertinent to my reading of the claims that are made about time in Laurence Sterne’s *Tristram Shandy* as it is often quoted as an example of a literary text that disturbs ideas of time as well as one that

might disturb readers who are not fond of digressions because of its manifold digressions. This eighteenth-century text has been termed as “mercurial” and anticipating “modernism and postmodernism” in the blurb of the Wordsworth Classics edition. It has been narrated as a “huge literary paradox for it is both a novel and an anti-novel.”

The novel does not follow a conventional timeline but is persistently concerned about various ideas of time. This text is thus very interesting to me and the passage that I have discussed below broaches different ideas of what “time” is and narrates time as that which is important for making “use of” “wisdom”. These are ideas that discuss the importance of time in education and that wisdom, enquiry and education should be timed and be achieved within certain age ranges.

### III. Reading Time in *Tristram Shandy*

... —Was not the great Julius Scaliger within an ace of never getting his tools sharpened at all?—Forty-four years old was he before he could manage his Greek;—and Peter Damianus, lord bishop of Ostia, as all the world knows, could not so much as read, when he was of man's estate.—And Baldus himself, as eminent as he turned out after, entered upon the law so late in life, that everybody imagined he intended to be an advocate in the other world: no wonder, when Eudamidas, the son of Archidamas, heard Xenocrates at seventy-five disputing about wisdom, that he asked gravely,—If the old man be yet disputing and enquiring concerning wisdom,—what time will he have to make use of it?...

(Sterne, 2009, p. 280)

“Time” while singularly known as “time” can be of different types. “Time” can be had. “He” “will have time” and this is known within the perspective of “Eudamidas” which is narrated as such according to the narratorial perspective. “To make use of” something “time” must be had and “what” kind of “time” “he” “will” “have” depends on what making “use of it” is according to the perspective which is not “he”. While it is not known “what time will he have to make use of it”, it is known that “he” will “make use of it” and that making “use of it” by the “he” requires “time” and the “what” of this “time” depends on the “he” making “use of it”. “What time will he have to make use of it” is “asked” because “Xenocrates” is “heard” “at seventy-five disputing wisdom” and “the old man be yet disputing and enquiring concerning wisdom”. “Disputing and enquiring” about something then requires a type of “time” to be had “to make use of it”. “Wisdom” can be made “use of” as long as it is disputed and enquired about. While the “disputing and enquiring” is “concerning wisdom”, “wisdom”

is already known. “It” is known as “wisdom”, it is known as that which can be disputed and enquired “concerning”. It is known as that which can be “made use of” and, using it requires the having of “time”, which can be varied time and therefore the question arises about “what time will” the “he have to make use of it”.

“Xenocrates at seventy-five” is different from “Xenocrates” who is not “at seventy-five”. That “Xenocrates” is “at seventy-five” is narrated according to a perspective which is not “Xenocrates”. “Seventy-five” is known, it is that “at” which someone can be and that someone is “at seventy-five” is known, narrated and is something to “wonder” or not “wonder” about, according to a perspective which is not “at seventy-five”. This is therefore a claim to knowledge about being “at seventy-five” and what it means to be “at seventy-five” from the outside. “Disputing and enquiring concerning wisdom” is what causes those who are not “at seventy-five” to ask about it “gravely” and “wonder” at it. When “Xenocrates” is “at seventy-five” he is “the old man”. “The” specific “old man” is other to “Xenocrates”, but it is “Xenocrates” because of where he is “at”. So, being “the old man” then becomes about where one is situated “at”. “The old man” is a term in which “man” becomes specifically known in terms of whether he is “old” or not. Depending on where one is “at”, if “he” is “at seventy-five”, he is known as “the” specific “old man”. So “the old man” while known in terms of his specifics of being a “man”, who is “old” and therefore is “the”, this is an idea which anyone can be depending on where they are “at”, whether they are “at seventy-five” or not and, these are all narrated according to an external perspective which is not “the old man”, is not “at seventy-five” but knows what “the old man” is and what it means to be “at seventy-five”.

“The great” is what differentiates “The great Julius Scaliger” from “Julius Scaliger”. “The great Julius Scaliger” was “within an ace of never getting his tools sharpened at all” yet he is “the great Julius Scaliger”. He is “the great Julius Scaliger” but is known as “the one” who was “within an ace of never getting his tools sharpened at all”. That he had “tools” and

that these “tools” required sharpening is known within and narrated according to a perspective which is not “the great Julius Scaliger”. “Never” is that which has aces “within” it. “An ace” is differentiated in terms of whether it is “of” “never” or not. “An ace” which is “of never” is that which one can be “within” or not. Although it is narrated that “the great Julius Scaliger” “was” “within an ace of never getting his tools sharpened at all” what being “within” this “ace” means is that he “was” never at “never” as he did “manage his Greek”. As long as “he could manage his Greek” means that he did get “his tools sharpened” and was not part of the “at all” anymore. So, to get “his tools sharpened” means that “he could manage his Greek”. What “his tools” and “his Greek” are, is narrated according to a perspective which is not “his”. The “tools” and the “Greek” while known as such are distinct because they are “his” and are therefore different from those “tools” and that “Greek” which are not “his”. To be “forty-four years old” “before” managing “his Greek” is being “within an ace of never” doing so. While how “old” “he” “was” is independent of whether “he could manage his Greek” or not, he is narrated as being known in terms of “before he could manage his Greek”. However, whether he did get “his tools sharpened at all” or not depends on whether “he could manage his Greek” or not which is a question of “before” how “old” “he” “was” when “he could manage his Greek”. So how “old” “he” “was” while being independent of him being able to “manage his Greek”, is also dependent on the “before” of how “old” “he” “was” when he could “manage his Greek”. “The great Julius Scaliger” then is constructed in terms of his ability to “manage” “Greek” which is distinguished as being “his”. This depends on how “old” “he” “was” “before” he “could manage”. This matters because when he is not part of this “before” because of what he “could” do when not in this “before”, he then is narrated in terms of not being in the “never” but being “within ace of that” which is “of never”.

“The law” is specific and is known as that which can be “entered upon”. When this entering “upon” should be is narrated as that “Baldus himself” “entered upon the law so late in life”. The “when” therefore, can be read as specified in terms of lateness. Entering “upon

the law” may be “late” but it becomes a case of “no wonder” when “the law” is “entered upon so late”. Therefore, the “so” of lateness is what makes a difference to whether this is an idea which is of “wonder” or of “no wonder”. Where being “late” is located “in” is also of significance to my reading here. To enter “upon the law” can be “late” but this has to be “in life”. What “life” is and what is “in life” is narrated through a perspective on “life” as this perspective is located outside that which is this “life” and is not itself “in life”. “Everybody” who “imagined” what “he intended to be” is not “Baldus”, nor “himself”, nor “he”. But that “everybody imagined he intended” is narrated according to the narratorial perspective which frames the “everybody” but is not part of “everybody”. To enter “upon the law” means others can imagine the intention of the self who has “entered upon the law”. “An advocate” is something this self can “be”, and this differentiates him from the “himself”. To “be an advocate” is an intention. Being then can be intentional. Intentions can be “imagined” within the perspective of the other. “To enter upon the law” means that there is the intention “to be an advocate” and this can be “imagined” by the others who are not the ones to enter “upon the law”.

“Eminent” is a known specific. It is about a sameness but also about a comparison. I read this from “as”. To turn “out” “eminent” is other to being “Baldus” and to being “himself”. But “eminent” is not about being, it is what “he turned out” as, therefore while “he turned out” “eminent”, “he” is still “out” and not “eminent”. In fact, “he turned out” “eminent” and was not already this “out”. So, to be this “out” “he” had to turn to be where and what this “out” is. That the “he turned out” and that “he turned out” “as eminent” or what is the “as eminent as he turned out” is narrated according to an external perspective which is not “he”, not “eminent” and not “tuned out” but stakes a claim to knowledge about all of these. There are different worlds which are “other” to each other. The narratorial perspective is not part of these “worlds” but has a perspective on these worlds. Being “in life” is part of “the” “world” which is not “the other world”. “He” can “be an advocate” in all worlds, as

long as he “entered upon the law” and therefore “everybody imagined” his intention “to be an advocate”.

“Peter Damianus” is other to the “lord bishop of Ostia” but is also part of that which is “the lord bishop of Ostia”. “The lord bishop of Ostia” is distinct because of being the “bishop” which is the “lord bishop” which while being the “lord bishop” is different to other “lord” bishops because of what he is bishop “of”. “Peter Damianus” is not “the great Julius Scaliger” and whether he “could” “read” is not whether “he could manage his Greek” but these are all constituted in terms of each other through the “and”. So, whether “he could manage his Greek” then is associated with and therefore is about, “and” whether “he could” “so much as read”. Both he(s) are different but similar because of what they “could” or could not do and when. Who these he(s) are, what they “could” do and when is narrated according to a perspective which is not “he” and is a perspective framed within the perspective of the narrator which is not part of these he(s) as well. “The world” is different from “all the world”. “The world” is singular but has parts within it which are different from each other and are collectively known as that which is “all the world”. What “all the world knows” is known to a perspective which is on “the world” and is therefore outside “the world”. “Peter Damianus, lord bishop of Ostia” is also not part of “all the world” and what it “knows” but what “all the world knows” is about “Peter Damianus, lord bishop of Ostia”. While “Peter Damianus” is not part of “all the world” or what “all the world knows”, he is “as” what “all the world knows”.

What it means to “read” and what it means that one “could” or “could not” “read” is claimed to be known within a perspective other to the one who “could” or rather “could not” “read” and, this knowing is narrated according to a perspective which is other to the perspective which is claimed to be the one which “knows”. There are different could(s). The could(s) are distinguished in terms of what they are “as” and in terms of their much-ness. To



“read” is constituted as a function of “could” or “could not, that which is known and the “when”. “Peter Damianus, lord bishop of Ostia” continues to be “Peter Damianus, lord bishop of Ostia” even “when he was of man’s estate”. That “he was of man’s estate” is not narrated by this “he”. “He was of man’s estate” so “he was” not man. What “could” be done is about the “when” it can be done. What “he was” also depends on “when”. What “could” or “could not” be done and “when” is known and narrated according to a perspective who is not doing it.

#### IV. 'The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own in Time'

Certainly good dreams can go too far. On the other hand, do not the simple fairy-tale dreams remain too far behind? Of course, the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present. How can it mirror our wish-projections against a background that has long since disappeared? Or, to put it in a better way: How can the fairy tale mirror our wish-projections other than in a totally obsolete way? Real kings no longer even exist. The atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world from which the fairy tale stems and to which it seems to be tied has most certainly vanished. However, the mirror of the fairy tale has not become opaque, and the manner of wish-fulfilment that peers forth from it is not entirely without a home. It all adds up to this: the fairy tale narrates a wish-fulfilment that is not bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents. In contrast to the legend, which is always tied to a particular locale, the fairy tale remains unbound. Not only does the fairy tale remain as fresh as longing and love, but the demonically evil, which is abundant in the fairy tale, is still seen at work here in the present, and the happiness of 'once upon a time,' which is even more abundant, still affects our visions of the future.

(Bloch, 2017, p. 349)

From the title I read that this is a narration about the specificity of the tale which is a fairy tale. So, this is a tale yet different from other tales due to this very specificity. This specificity makes the tale something more than the tale. The fairy is an addition to the tale which narrates what kind of tale it is through this addition. The narration here about 'The Fairy Tale' moving 'on Its Own in Time'

is thus a claim that tales can move and that they can move in time, but this is only about “the Fairy Tale” and not tales which are not the fairy tale.

From the title time seems to be a constant while “the fairy tale moves on its own”. Yet, as I read from the narration further on, this time is certainly not a constant according to the claims made within the narrative premise of this text. Time is the frame within which the fairy tale seems to be bound according to the narratorial perspective here. The fairy tale moves but this movement is framed “in time”. It is an independent movement but independent from what? I discuss this later in the essay. In the narration that “The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own”, an implication can be read that this “fairy tale” could move with something else but it does not. Along with the movement of the fairy tale being bound within the frame “in time”, I also read here a claim about the movement of time itself. This can be read from the title as well as from the other claims made about time. This “time” can be read from the claims made through the narratorial perspective about the “future”, the “present”, about what “no longer belongs to the present”, what “has long since disappeared” and that which “has most certainly vanished”. While the narration narrates about the movement of the fairy tale, it also narrates the movement of time through the “once upon a time”. This “time” cannot be defined within this narration. This time is “a time” so can be any time but this is narrated in the context of the “happiness of ‘once upon a time’, “which is even more abundant” in the fairy tale, and while the claim is that the fairy tale belongs to a world that has “most certainly vanished”, this “happiness” which belongs to the “once upon a time” can affect “our visions of the future”.

The claims made through this narration are about how fairy tales work and specifically how they are “still seen at work”. But this working is based upon them being framed within “time”. The “our” which is narrated in “our wish projections” doesn’t belong to the “background” which is the “fairy-tale world, especially as the magical one”. Nevertheless, according to the claims made in the text, this our’s “wish projections” require a background. The “background” narrated here is “the fairy-tale world, especially as the magical one” and “no longer belongs to the present”; while the “our” and the “wish” that can be projected belong “to the present”. The question asked within this narration then is can something, which is the fairy tale in this case, mirror this our’s “wish-projections” despite not belonging to the “present” any “longer”? So, the implication is that this “background” of the “fairy

tale world” belonged to “the present” at some point which has now ceased to exist. The “present” then according to the perspective here is that to which “the fairy tale world, especially as the magical one, no longer belongs”. But the claim at stake, which answers this question through the narratorial perspective, is that the fairy tale, even though its “world” as a “background” has “most certainly vanished” and it “no longer belong[s] to the present” can “still” “work in the present”. Additionally, the fairy tale can also affect this our’s “vision of the future”.

What “no longer belongs to the present”, is that which “remain(s) too far behind”. Belonging to the “present” then is about not remaining “too far behind”. The “present” is about an ownership. Things can belong to it, but this belonging is not permanent and is about a movement to not “remain too far behind”. So, as this narration is about how “The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own in Time” and the claim correspondingly is that the “fairy tale” or the “demonically evil” which is “abundantly in the fairy tale”, “can be seen still at work in the present”, I read that according to this perspective “the present” is part of this time, as is “the future” and that which “no longer belongs to the present”. But time is about a movement within this perspective. This is a movement from that which “has most certainly vanished” which is the “world” from which the fairy tale “stems”, and the “fairy tale world, especially as the magical one” which “no longer belongs to the present” but the part that moves is the “fairy tale” by remaining “as fresh as” and by “still” working in the present and affecting “our visions of the future”. Thus, the fairy tale works by moving within the frame of time which is itself moving. The claim at stake here is that the fairy tale works because of this movement. However, while the narration answers the question it posits about how the fairy tale can still work through the delineation of how it moves in time, the movement of time and its working are not questioned within this perspective.

Claims are made in the narratorial perspective about “dreams”. The narration knows for sure that “dreams” which are “good” “can” “go too far”. So, this claims that “dreams” have the ability to “go” as they “can go too far”. While the narration is certain of their ability to “go too far”, it is not narrated whether they certainly do “go too far”. The question then is “too far” from what and what is entailed by this going “too far”? These are also claims about movement, but the movement of dreams is different to the movement of fairy tales. While they are both about movement, regarding dreams it

is about going “too far” as opposed to remaining “too far behind”. This is similar to the claims about the movement of the fairy tale in time. Movement according to this perspective is a movement about not remaining “too far behind”, as that implies “no longer” belonging “to the present” which makes that which remains behind part of that which has “long since disappeared” and thus has “obsolete way(s)”.

The claim here is that dreams can be different. The difference can be read from the narration of “dreams” as “good dreams” and “the simple fairy-tale dreams”. Not only are these two types of “dreams” narrated as a difference, they are also juxtaposed to each other and held in comparison with each other, which can be read from the narration: “On the other hand”. The “fairy-tale dreams” are narrated as “simple” while the “good dreams” are not. Thus, the implication here is that “the simple fairy-tale dreams” are not “good dreams”. This can be read from the narration as the “good dreams can go too far” while “On the other hand, do not the simple fairy-tale dreams remain too far behind?” While this is a question, it is also narrated through the definitive answer “of course, the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present”. The implication here is that the “good dreams” belong “to the present” as they “can go too far” and unlike “the simple fairy-tale dreams”, they do not “remain too far behind”. If the “background” is read as “the fairy-tale world, especially the magical one”, then the claim about this “fairy-tale world” is that it “has long since disappeared”. Thus, according to these claims that which “has long since disappeared” doesn’t belong “to the present”.

One of the questions raised in this narrative is about “the simple fairy-tale dreams” that are part of “the fairy-tale world” which “no longer belongs to the present”, whether they can mirror “our wish-projections”? Therefore, the claim within this perspective is that “our wish-projections” can be mirrored, and it is “dreams” of a certain kind, which is “the simple fairy-tale dreams” here, that can do this mirroring. This question arises within the narration due to the claims made about “the present” within the narratorial perspective as, according to this perspective “the simple fairy tale dreams” “no longer” belong “to the present”. However, the implication is that the “our”, mirroring whose “wish-projections” is the issue here, belong to the “present”. As read earlier in this essay, this “wish-projection” can be mirrored “against a background”. But according to this perspective, that which

“has long since disappeared” because it “no longer belongs to the present”, means its ability to mirror the “wish-projections” which still belong to this present, is questionable.

“How can the fairy tale mirror our wish-projections other than in a totally obsolete way?” This is a question about “the fairy tale” in terms of it being a question about the fairy tale’s ability to “mirror our wish-projections”. This is framed by the claims of what belongs or rather “no longer belongs to the present” as the ability of the “fairy tale” which is in question, depends upon the claim of it being “a totally obsolete way”. So, “our wish-projections” “can” be mirrored in different ways. There are ways “other than” “a totally obsolete way”. Here, I can read time as that which is “no longer” part of “the present” and according to this perspective it “has long since disappeared” and its “way” is thus considered “totally obsolete”. The claim at stake here is that while “of course, the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one” might have become “obsolete”, the fairy tale continues to belong “to the present” as it “moves” and thus “remain(s) fresh”. This question according to the narration is an alternative to the claims made earlier. There is an implied claim that the “totally obsolete way” is that which cannot “mirror our wish projections”. My analysis below will discuss that this is the case as claims are made through the narratorial perspective later about how the fairy tale “affects our visions of the future” and is “still seen at work here in the present”; none of these claims are about whether the fairy tale can “mirror our wish-projections”. Thus, the narration shifts from “our wish-projections” and “how can” the fairy tale mirror them.

According to the narration, “Real kings no longer even exist”. So, the kings which do exist are not “real kings”. This is narrated in relation to the claim that “The atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world from which the fairy tale stems and to which it seems to be tied has most certainly vanished.” So, the claim within this perspective is about the “world” in which “real kings” existed. This claims that there are other worlds but the “world” in which “real kings” existed is “atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental” and the world which exists is none of these or at least it is not “simultaneously” so. According to the claims made within this perspective, “the fairy tale stems” “from” and “seems to be tied” to this world which “has most certainly vanished”. But the fairy tale seems to live on. This is a discussion of this “world” in terms of that which “has long since disappeared”. This can be read from the narration whereby; the fairy tale is firstly narrated through

“the simple fairy-tale dreams”. It is implied through a question that these “simple fairy tale dreams remain too far behind”. Next the narration discusses “the fairy tale world, especially the magical one” and claims that “of course” this world “no longer belongs to the present”. Then “the mirror of the fairy tale” is narrated in terms of “a totally obsolete way” albeit not becoming “opaque”. So, while the “simple fairy- tale dreams, “the fairy tale world, especially the magical one” and “the mirror of the fairy tale” have not moved in time, “the fairy tale” has moved “on Its Own in time” and has thus remained “fresh” by “not being bound by its own time”.

The claims that the fairy tale is tied to this “world” that has “vanished” is a seeming and not a being. Also, though “the atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world” “has most certainly vanished”, “the mirror of the fairy tale has not become opaque, and the manner of wish-fulfilment that peers forth from it is not entirely without a home.” Within this perspective it is claimed that not only do the fairy tales “mirror our wish-projections” but also that “the mirror” is “of the fairy tale”. So, while the “fairy tale” “no longer belongs to the present”, “the mirror” that belongs to “the fairy tale” “has not become entirely opaque”. Through the “become” I can read that the becoming opaque entails claims about time. As “the fairy-tale world” “no longer belongs to the present”, its mirror has “become” “opaque” but “not” “entirely”. The claim here is not anymore a question about “the fairy tale” mirroring “our wish-projections” rather, it is the mirror that is “of the fairy tale” “from” which “wish-fulfilment” peers forth”. This “wish-fulfilment” as narrated here has different manners. So, the claim at stake here is that while the “atavistic and simultaneously feudal transcendental world” that “the fairy tale stems from” and “seems to be tied” to “has most certainly vanished”, the fairy tale can still “mirror” “wish-fulfilment” in a certain “manner” and while “it is not entirely without a home”, at least its partially being “without a home” is implied. So, within the perspective of the narrator, being “without a home” can be partial when “not entirely”. This is narrated in relation to the fairy tale and from the claims that have been discussed above being “without a home” in this context is about the “manner of wish fulfilment” and these are all framed by time and movement in time, which according to this perspective is not remaining “too far behind” and belonging “to the present”.

While the narration is about “the fairy tale” mirroring, it is about mirroring “our wish-projections”. However, when the narration is about “the manner” of peering “forth from” “the mirror of the fairy tale”, it is about “wish-fulfilment”. “wish-projection” and “wish-fulfilment” are different from each other. “wish-projection” is of the “our” while “wish-fulfilment” has different manners, and these manners can peer “forth from” a mirror; wish-fulfilment also requires a home. These differences can be read from the claims made about them within the narratorial perspective and yet they are both being narrated within this context in terms of the fairy tale and its mirror or its ability to mirror them.

“It all adds up to this: the fairy tale narrates a wish-fulfilment that is not bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents.” So, the claims made above are claims about “the fairy tale” which “narrates a wish-fulfilment that is not bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents.” While earlier the question was about “how can the fairy tale mirror our wish-projections”, the claim about “the fairy tale” now is that it “narrates”. This narration is not a mirroring, it is of “a wish-fulfilment” and not “our wish-projection”. However, it is claimed through the narratorial perspective that this is the answer to the questions raised above.

Time is narrated here in relation to “a wish-fulfilment”. According to the narratorial perspective, this “wish-fulfilment” has “its own time” but is not bound by it. The claim at stake here is that there can be different wish fulfilments as this is “a” “wish-fulfilment”; “time” can be owned, and it can bind its owner. It is implied that “wish-fulfilment” can be “bound by its own time”. While the title of this text reads that ‘The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own in Time’, the kind of wish-fulfilment that “the fairy tale” “narrates” is claimed to be one “that is not bound by its own time”. So according to this perspective while the fairy tale moves in time, this time is not owned by the fairy tale. Whereas it can be read from the title that “Time” is the constant in this case, “The Fairy Tale” is what moves here; however, this movement of the fairy tale and the fairy tale itself is bound by time or rather framed within this “Time”.

This can be read in juxtaposition to the claim made according to the narratorial perspective that “in contrast to the legend, which is always tied to a particular locale, the fairy tale remains unbound”. While the former sentence states that it is the “wish-fulfilment” that is “not bound”, the



claim in this sentence is that “the fairy tale remains unbound”. This is however the case when the fairy tale is “in contrast to the legend”, according to the narratorial perspective. The claim about “the legend” here is that it “is always tied to a particular locale”. This is in contrast to the claims made about the fairy tale earlier whereby, the narration states that “the fairy tale stems” “from” “the atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world” “to which it seems to be tied”. Thus while “the legend” “is always tied”, in the case of the “fairy tale” the claim about tying is a seeming.

The narration about “the fairy tale” remaining “fresh” which seems to be a requirement within this perspective for “the fairy tale” to be “still seen at work here in the present” and to be able to “still” affect “our visions of the future”, is a claim about a requirement of freshness as this is a case of how it is fresh. This can be read through “as fresh as”. “Longing and love” are both claimed to be “fresh” and “the fairy tale remains as fresh as” them. Thus, here they are similar to each other and “the fairy tale” because of their freshness. The claim at stake here is that this freshness has got to do with remaining “unbound”. But this remaining “fresh” is about not being “always tied to a locale” and this stands true when “in contrast to the legend”. Claims have been made that “the fairy tale stems” from “the atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world” and “seems to be tied to” this world. But can the claims to freshness be made as this is a seeming and not a being? Read the seeming! So, it is not the case but only ‘seems’ so and the perspective knows this difference .... This “world “has most certainly vanished” and the fairy tale “remains fresh” as it is not “always tied to a locale”, which is this vanished world in this case. But while this can be read as “a locale”, according to the claims made through the narratorial perspective, the vanishing of this world is linked to the claims made about time. This world no longer exists as it “no longer belongs to the present”, it doesn’t move in time and it is about a “once upon a time”, all of which are of a time that has “long since disappeared”.

According to the claim made earlier “of course, the fairy tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present”; but on the other hand, “the demonically evil, which is abundant in the fairy tale, is still seen at work here in the present...” So, the claim at stake here is that “the demonically evil” even though it “is abundant in the fairy tale” is not part of “the fairy tale world, especially as a magical one which no longer belongs to the present” as “the demonically evil” “is still

seen at work in the present”. Or it can also be read that this “evil” which is “abundant in the fairy tale” can “still” “work in the present” despite the world of which it is a part “no longer belong[ing] to the present”. Thus, something can “still” be “seen at work here in the present” while “no longer” belonging “to the present.”

The claim here is that the fairy tale consists of “the demonically evil” and “happiness”. The “fairy tale” as claimed earlier does not belong “to the present” as it “remains” “fresh” from something that is not “the present”. This remaining is a continuation. This something that the “fairy tale” is part of “no longer belongs to the present” yet, “the fairy tale is still seen at work here in the present”. Thus “the present” is constituted as such, so that despite no longer belonging to it something can still work in it. While the fairy tale still works in the present, it is a remnant of something which “has long since disappeared”, “is no longer part of the present” and consequently existed prior to “the present”. So, I read that it also doesn’t belong “to the present” because according to this perspective, the fairy tale “remains unbound” and “moves” “in time”.

“The present” within this perspective is about the “demonically evil” and the fairy tale can still work in the present because of the abundance of the “demonically evil” in it. The claim is that “our visions of the future” are affected by the “happiness of ‘once upon a time’”. So “our visions of the future” according to this perspective are not about “happiness” but get affected by this “happiness”. The “happiness of ‘once upon a time’” is part of the fairy tale and this “happiness” belongs to “a time”. It has been previously claimed that the world of the ‘fairy tale’ has certainly vanished but, this part of the fairy tale, which is the “happiness”, “affects our visions of the future”. Reading from these claims, “the fairy tale” is thus distinct from “the fairy tale world, especially as the magical one”.

The fairy tale can be divided into that which is “abundant” and “even more abundant” in it. The happiness belongs to this “once” and the conditionality for this happiness is it being “upon a time”. Yet this “once” is claimed to be abundant. Not just abundant but “even more abundant” in comparison to the “demonically evil”. So, this abundance is associated with “time” but this is “a time” that cannot be specified. However, this “a time” is different from “the future” as it can be read from

the narration that “the happiness” that is “of” the “once upon a time” “still affects our visions of the future”. So, while “the happiness” continues to “affect”, the “time” to which this happiness belongs doesn’t continue and is thus not “the future”.

So, because of the what the fairy tale consists of, in terms of “the demonically evil” and “the happiness of ‘once upon a time’”, it can work in the present and the future- staying not just fresh but “as fresh as” something else. This is what is stated through the narratorial perspective within the frame of what is claimed in the title that ‘The Fairy Tale Moves on Its Own in Time’. This is the movement through time: of the past, the present and the future. That which can be “obsolete” can still work in “the present” and “affect our visions of the future” if it “remains” “fresh”. The claims made here are that, that which has “obsolete” ways which is “the fairy tale” which “no longer belongs to the present” (but, it is implied,) it did belong at some point, can still work in the present and can affect that which is “of the future”. Time then is narrated through differences and similarities and yet through all the claims made about time, these differences become questionable through this narration of “the fairy tale” and how it works framed within “time”.

V. 'The young protagonist who sets out to find happiness is still around, strong as ever. And the dreamer, too...'

The young protagonist who sets out to find happiness is still around, strong as ever. And the dreamer, too, whose imagination is caught up with the girl of his dreams and with the distant secure home. One can also find the demons of old times who return in the present as economic ogres. The politics of the leading 200 families is fate. Thus, right in America, a country without feudal or transcendental tradition, Walt Disney's fairy-tale films revive elements of the old fairy tale without making them incomprehensible to the viewers. Quite the contrary. The favourably disposed viewers think about a great deal. They think about almost everything in their lives. They, too, want to fly. They, too, want to escape the ogre. They, too, want to transcend the clouds and have a place in the sun. Naturally, the fairy-tale world of America is more of a dreamed-up social life with the kings and saints of big business life. Yet, even if it is deceiving, the connection emanates partly from the fairy tale. The dream of the little employee or even- with different – contents of the average businessman is that of the sudden, the miraculous rise from the anonymous masses to visible happiness. The lightning of gold radiates upon them in a fairy-tale-like way. The sun shines upon them from commanding heights. The name of the fairy-tale world is publicity (even if it is only for a day). The fairy-tale princess is Greta Garbo. Certainly, these are petty Bourgeois wishes with very untrimmed, often adulterated fairy-tale material. However, this

material has remained. And where does one ever really get out of the Bourgeois style of living? Yet, there is a certain surrealist charm in presenting old, fairy-tale materials in modern disguise (or, also, in divesting them of their apparel). It is precisely the unbound character of the fairy tale that has floated through the times that allows for such developments, such new incarnations in the present, incarnations that not only occur in the form of economic ogres or film stars.

(Bloch, 2017, pp. 349- 350)

According to the perspective of the narrator, it has been claimed in the previous paragraph of the text that there are things which have “certainly vanished” and “no longer exist”, things which are thus no longer the case like “real kings”. This perspective knows what “real kings” are and that they “no longer exist” but they used to because that is the implication of the claim. Other things in the earlier paragraph have also been narrated in terms of whether they do or do not “exist” anymore. But now the perspective is claiming that “the young protagonist” and “the dreamer” “are strong as ever”. So, I’m reading a contrast here between ideas of things which disappear even though there are also things which are also claimed to remain. “The young protagonist” and “the dreamer” within this narration are those who the perspective can identify as such and know as such. So the perspective of the narrator is itself other to them in order to be able to say so because it’s a perspective on them. So, it’s not speaking from their position. But it is speaking of them as others, others that it claims to know about. What it knows about them is that they “are strong as ever”. Strength thus is something which can fluctuate within this perspective, but it can be measured that it is “still strong as ever”. So, these two things, “the young protagonist” and “the dreamer” are still there. “The young protagonist”, “the dreamer”, “the politics of the first 200 families”, these are what constitute the “fairy-tale” within this perspective.

I read these claims in connection to the claims made earlier in the text about what it is that is “in the fairy tale” that “is still seen at work here in the present” and “still affects our visions of the future”. So that which is “still” “here” is that which is “in the present”. Reading the claims made

about “the young protagonist who” “is still around”, within the narratorial perspective this “young protagonist who sets out to find happiness” is part of “the fairy tale world”. But while it is claimed through the narration here that this “young protagonist” “is still around”, earlier it has been claimed that “the fairy tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present.” So, this “young protagonist is not part of the “fairy-tale world” which is “a magical one”, as “the young protagonist” is “still around”; but it has been claimed earlier within the narratorial perspective that “Of course, the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present.” Thus, “the present” according to this perspective is not associated to “magical”.

I read this “still” as part of that which continues to “exist”, that which has “remained”. According to the claims made within the perspective of the narrator, this is what constitutes things that are “in the present” and “still affects our visions of the future”. In the words “strong as ever”, I read a claim that being “still around” is about strength. This strength can fluctuate. So, the implied claim is that “the young protagonist” “is still around”, but this might be the case because he is “strong as ever” and his being “still around” then is about continuing to be “strong as ever”. Thus, that which cannot continue to be “strong as ever” might not continue to be “still around”. This narration follows on from the claims made about “the fairy tale” that it continues to “work” because it “moves on its own in time”; I read the claims discussed above as a “how” to this “why”.

Part of how “the fairy tale” “still” works “here in the present” is as “the young protagonist” “is still around”. “The protagonist” is narrated in terms of a specificity which can be read from “the”. The perspective of the narrator knows that this “protagonist” is “young” and “who” it is depends on what the “protagonist” “sets out to find”. The perspective which is other to the “protagonist” knows that it is “happiness” that “the protagonist” “sets out to find”. According to the claims made here it is “the protagonist” who is narrated in terms of the above mentioned that “is still around” and is “strong as ever” but by implication might not have been while being “still around”. This protagonist’s strength is about a comparison which can be read from the “as”. So, within this perspective, “ever” is “strong” and the protagonist’s strength can be narrated in comparison to “ever”.

“The young protagonist” according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective “sets out to find happiness”. But I read that this is not “the happiness” which has earlier in the narration been claimed to be “of ‘once upon a time’, which is even more abundant, (and) still affects our visions of the future.” According to the perspective, in this case “happiness” is something that can be found and requires a setting out to find it for “the young protagonist”. But this “protagonist” who is narrated in terms of his setting “out to find happiness”, “is still around”. So, this happiness hasn’t “still” been found by “the young protagonist”, as it is narrated that “the young protagonist” “sets out to find” and “is still around”. This is a state of continuous finding of “the happiness” by “the young protagonist”. This is something that has “remained” from that which “no longer belongs to the present” and has continued to be part of the “material that has remained” in “the present”.

“The dreamer” is also claimed to be “still around” which I read from him being likened to “the young protagonist” through the “too”. However, “the dreamer” is not “the young protagonist” according to the claims made within this perspective as he is narrated in terms of who he is. “Who” “the dreamer” is, is claimed to be different from “who” “the young protagonist” is. Although the perspective of the narrator is other to the perspective of “the dreamer”, it claims to know who “the dreamer” is, where and with what the “imagination” of “the dreamer” “is caught up” and what his “dreams” are about. “The dreamer” is also part of what constitutes “the fairy tale world”, like “the young protagonist”. However, they are both different, according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective as who “the dreamer” is, is narrated in terms of “his” “imagination”. “The dreamer” is narrated as a he. The narratorial perspective claims to know that “the dreamer” has “imagination”, this “imagination” is his, it “is caught up” and that it “is caught up” with something which is “of his dreams” and that which is “distant”. This perspective also knows what the dreamer’s “dreams” are “of” and that the “home” which is “secure” is distant and something that the dreamer’s “imagination is caught up with”. Earlier a question about “dreams” has been asked within the narratorial perspective: “do not the simple fairy-tale dreams remain too far behind?” I read an implied claim here that as the “fairy-tale dreams are simple, they “remain too far behind” and thus do not “move on [their] own in time” like “the fairy tale”. “The dreamer”, however, who is part of what constitutes “the fairy tale” “is still around” like “the young protagonist”, but what about “his dreams”?

If they do not “remain too far behind”, then they are not “the simple fairy tale dreams”, according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective. “The dreamer” “still” being “around” is a claim to being part of that which remains. That which “is still around” in this case can be read to be someone who is defined by setting out to find something and by another someone, who is similar to the first someone but is defined differently in terms of who he is which is about his “imagination” being “caught up”. In both the case of “the young protagonist” and “the dreamer”, “who” they are seems to be a continuous state of being.

It has been claimed in the text that “the fairy tale” “still” works in “the present” because of not being “bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents”. The “contents” of “the fairy tale” according to the claims made within this perspective are “the young protagonist”, “the dreamer” and “the demons of the old times”. Claims are being made through the narration that “the fairy tale” “still” works “in the present” because of how these “contents” continue to be “still around”. Also, the claim is that “the fairy tale” “moves” “in time”. I can read from the claims made within the narratorial perspective that what works “in the present and” “affects our visions of the future” is what has continued to remain from that which is not “the present” or “the future” within this perspective: that which has not “disappeared”. Part of what constitutes “the fairy-tale world” are “the demons of old times”. They are narrated in terms of their “return”. The claim here then is that these “demons” are “still around” “in the present” but this is about a “return”. So, as opposed to the “young protagonist” and “the dreamer”, their remaining is not about a continuation. Returning implies a not being “in the present” in this case, but then this is a “return” to that which constitutes “the present” within this perspective. The “return” of “the demons” is not about a continuation as they existed in something which was not “the present”. But then they “return” to what is “in the present” so there is a when they are not there, as in order to return they need to not be there at some point. “The demons” are “of old times” and that is when they existed. So, these “old times” are not “the present”. They were then not there after the “old times” and then “return” in “the present”.

“In the present” there is a returning of “economic ogres” but this “return” is based on the conditions of finding by “one” and the one’s ability to find them. So, within this perspective, “the economic ogres” which are “in the present” can be identified as “the demons of old times who return”



from that which is not “the present”. But this claim is about an “also” as this is also how “the fairy tale” “is still seen at work here in the present”. I read that the claim at stake here is: that which is “of old times” “can” “still (be) seen at work here in the present” if and when “one” finds it. “The demons” are narrated in terms of “who” they are. According to this perspective they are “who return” but they “return” not as “the demons of old times”. This is a likening which can be read from the “as” yet there is a difference. “The demons of old times” “return” “as economic ogres” yet they are still “the demons” which are also “of old times” and this makes them different from the “economic ogres” “in the present”. These “demons of old times” can also be found by “one” as “demons of old times” even though they “return in the present as economic ogres”. Through the “return” I can read a claim that the “old times” are that which have gone away, because “return” implies a going away and then coming back. So, this is not about a continuous presence.

What is “fate” is “the politics of the leading 200 families”. The narrator is located outside these “200 leading families” and yet claims to know that “the politics” which is “of the leading 200 families” is what “fate” is. These are claims about what is “in the present” and I read here that the claim made within narratorial perspective is that “the politics of the leading 200 families” is what constitutes “fate” “in the present”. This “politics” is other to “fate” which is part of the “elements of the old fairy tale” which “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films revive”. Yet, the narratorial perspective knows that this “politics of the leading 200 families” is what constitutes “fate”. So, even though a difference can be read in their narration which narrates them as belonging to different “times” according to the narrative premise of this text; this difference is thereafter subsumed by the narration of “fate” in terms of its definition as to what it “is” which “is”: “the politics of the leading 200 families”.

According to the claims made within the narrator’s perspective, the “fairy tale” is “old” and has “elements” which can be revived. So even though its “elements” can be “revived”, “the” “fairy tale” continues to be narrated as “old” here. The “old” within this perspective is something of which “elements” can be “revived” and that is narrated in terms of a revival to be “still seen at work here in the present”. It is because

“the young protagonist who sets out to find happiness is still around, strong as ever. And the dreamer, too, whose imagination is caught up with the girl of his dreams and with the distant secure home. One can also find the demons of old times who return in the present as economic ogres. The politics of the leading 200 families is “fate”

“thus”, “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films revive elements of the old fairy tale without making them incomprehensible to the viewers.” But within these claims is also the claim that this works “right in America”. “America” according to this perspective is “a country without feudal or transcendental tradition”. This implies that “a country” can be with “tradition” and this can be “feudal or transcendental”. Within this perspective “feudal” and “transcendental” are both traditions so they are similar in this way but then again, “feudal” is not “transcendental”, and yet they can be narrated in a way which makes them interchangeable. This can be read from the “or”. What is at stake here is that all these claims being made about how “the fairy tale” “is still seen at work here in the present” and how it “affects our visions of the future” are claims made in relation to the “country” which is “America”. Thus, what is “in the present” and what is “of the future” is related to “America” according to the claims made within this perspective.

Earlier it has been claimed that “The atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world from which the fairy tale stems and to which it seems to be tied has most certainly vanished.” Here, “feudal-transcendental” is about a “world” and it is not about an “or”. But here “the fairy tale stems” from “the feudal-transcendental world” and “it seems to be tied” to this “world”. However, in the next case it is claimed that “elements of the old fairy tale are revived”. According to the text: this being “tied” “to” is a seeming since, “the fairy tale moves on its own in time” and, “the fairy tale remains unbound”. I read that these claims are related to each other. As I have read earlier in the essay, parts of the fairy tale do not exist anymore. “Certainly” the “especiually” “magical” “fairy-tale world” has disappeared. Thus, it is not “the fairy tale” that is “revived” but “elements of” it. From what I read from the narration this doesn’t correspond to the claim about “the fairy tale” not being “bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents” as these are what seem to be the contents of the fairy tale.

According to the text, “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films” can “revive elements of the old fairy tale without making them incomprehensible to the viewers”. There is an assumption within this perspective that “right in America” “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films” have “viewers”. Also, in this case “the viewers” can comprehend the “films” that they are viewing. The claim here is that “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films” not only “revive elements of the old fairy tale” but they also make “them” comprehensible “to the viewers”. So, the claim here about the viewers’ comprehension is about how they are made to comprehend. According to this perspective which has been making claims about “the fairy tales” and how they “still” “work” “in the present” and “affect our visions of the future—this claim is about “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films”. “Contrary” to “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films” making them “incomprehensible to the viewers”, contrary to that incomprehensibility is the viewers’ thinking. This is not just thinking but it is a thinking “about” which is “a great deal”. The narratorial perspective is located outside the perspective of these “favourably disposed viewers” and claims to know that these “viewers” are “favourably disposed”. This is a perspective on the “viewers”.

It is known within this perspective that these “favourably disposed viewers think about a great deal.” It also knows that “they think about almost everything in their lives.” But the claim is that this is not “everything in their lives”, this is “almost everything”. What does this “almost everything in their lives” entail? “They, too, want to fly. They, too, want to escape the ogre. They, too, want to transcend the clouds and have a place in the sun.” So according to this perspective this is what it involves for “the favourably disposed viewers”, to “think of almost everything in their lives” and, this is what it means to “think about a great deal”. But while the claims about “the viewers” are that they are “favourably disposed” and think about “almost everything in their lives”, I can read here through the “want”, a lack. Claims are made according to the narratorial perspective about that which is not there “in their lives” and thus they “want” it. “They, too, want to fly”-So, they are not flying. They, too, want to escape the ogre- this means that this “escape” is not “in their lives”; and that which is “in their lives” is not transcending “the cloud” nor “having a place in the sun”. The claim at stake here is that, the “fairy-tale world of America”, is about flying, escaping “the ogre” and transcending “the clouds and” having “a place in the sun.” But this is all about a “want”. A “want” which “the favourably disposed viewers” “think” about because they comprehend “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale

films” which “revive elements of the old fairy tale”. But this comprehension is not just about “the viewers” comprehending, it is about “Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films” not “making them incomprehensible”.

Within this perspective it is natural that “the fairy-tale world of America is more of a dreamed-up social life with the kings and saints of big business life” because, according to the claims made earlier “America” is “a country without feudal or transcendental tradition”, “real kings no longer even exist” and “the fairy tale stems” “from” “the atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world”- a “tradition” which “America” is “without”. Also, “the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present.” Moreover, “America” does belong to “the present”. So according to this perspective, it is natural that “the fairy-tale world of America is more of a dreamed-up social life with the kings and saints of big business life”. But this is a claim about “more of a” and thus by implication that which is not part of this “more” is not a “dreamed up social life with the kings and saints of big business life”. I read a claim here that this “fairy-tale world of America” is not completely “dreamed-up”. Also, the claims here are about “life” which can be narrated as “social life” and “big business life”, so they are different from each other but are still both “life”. As such, “the fairy-tale world” is about “life”. It is “more of a dreamed up” “world” because of what no longer belongs to “the present” and that which “no longer even exist(s)”. So, this “fairy-tale world” which is “of America”, is about “social life” and though this “social life” has been narrated as distinct from “big business life”, this “social life” is that which is “with” those that are “of” this “big business life”, who are “the kings and saints of big business life”.

There are “elements” of the fairy-tale world which have remained in “the present” as “the fairy tale moves on its own in time” but “the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one, no longer belongs to the present.” “Real kings no longer even exist.” “The kings and saints of big business life” however, exist in the present in this “world of America” but according to the claims made earlier these “kings” who are “of big business life” are not “real kings”. So, that which exists in “the present” is not “real” in this case and becomes “more of a dreamed- up” thing according to the claims made within the perspective here.

“Yet, even if it is deceiving, the connection emanates partly from the fairy tale.”

So, according to the claims made here that which “is more of a dreamed-up” “connection” “is deceiving”. By implication that which “is deceiving” is not really about a “connection” then. “The connection” between “America” and “the fairy-tale world” “is deceiving” because “the fairy-tale world, especially as a magical one no longer belongs to the present.” “America”, however belongs to “the present” and the claims made further in the narration are about “incarnations in the present”. The claim about “the fairy-tale world of America” is that there is a “connection”. This “connection” “is deceiving” according to this perspective yet, it is within this perspective that it has been claimed that “the fairy tale” “is still seen at work here in the present”. “The connection” is also “deceiving” as it has been claimed that “America” is “a country without feudal or transcendental tradition” and “the fairy tale stems” “from” and “seems to be tied to” “the atavistic and simultaneously feudal-transcendental world”. I read an implied claim here that “the connection” can be not “deceiving”. “The fairy tale” here is something from which “the connection” can emanate, “partly”. So, “the connection” which “emanates” “from the fairy tale” is in excess of “the fairy tale” that it “emanates from”. “The connection” according to the narration is:

The dream of the little employee or even- with different contents- of the average businessman is that of the sudden, the miraculous rise from the anonymous masses to visible happiness. The lightning of gold radiates upon them in a fairy-tale-like way. The sun shines upon them from commanding heights. The name of the fairy-tale world is publicity (even if it is only for a day). The fairy-tale princess is Greta Garbo.

According to the perspective of the narrator, “the little employee” has “the dream” which is similar to that “of the average businessman”. But neither of them are “the dreamer”. “The dream” “of the little employee” and “the average businessman” is similar which can be read from the “or” yet “the dream” is different for each of them and this difference can be read from “even with different contents”. Though their “contents” might be “with” difference, within this perspective they are still both “the dream”. This narration is neither according to the perspective of “the little employee” nor

“of the average businessman” but according to a perspective that provides a perspective on these two and is located outside the perspectives of these two. Yet, this narratorial perspective claims to know what “the dream of the little employee or even—with different contents—of the average businessman is”. Within this perspective, “the little employee” and “the average businessman” although distinct from each other, which can be read through the specificity of them being narrated separately, are similar as they are both part of the “anonymous masses”. “The masses” which are “anonymous” according to this perspective can be risen “from” and it is not just the “rise” but specifically “the sudden, miraculous rise from the anonymous masses” which leads to “happiness” which is “visible”.

It has been claimed earlier within this narration that because “the fairy tale remains unbound”, it “is still seen at work here in the present, and the happiness of ‘once upon a time’ which is even more abundant, still affects our visions of the future.” and this is why it is claimed that “the fairy tale moves on its own in time”. “The connection” here is about “the sudden, the miraculous rise” “to visible happiness” however, the claim is that this “connection” is “deceiving” and “emanates partly from the fairy tale”. So, I read a claim here that “even if it is deceiving” and “emanates partly from the fairy tale” yet, it is through this kind of “connection” that “the fairy tale” continues to “work in the present” and affect “our visions of the future”. According to this perspective then, this is what it entails for “the fairy tale” to move “on its own in time”.

“The connection” according to this perspective is that which happens “in a fairy-tale-like way”. The claim is that “the sudden, the miraculous rise” “to visible happiness” is “the lightning of gold” which “radiates upon them in a fairy-tale-like way”. This is what it means for “the connection” to “partly” emanate from “the fairy tale” according to this perspective. So, that which is “a fairy-tale-like way” is what “emanates partly from the fairy tale”. “The sun” shining “upon them from commanding heights” is what it means for the “deceiving” “connection” to emanate “partly from the fairy tale”. Earlier it has been claimed within the narration that “in the present”, “the fairy tale world” “no longer belongs”. But it has also been claimed that parts of “the fairy tale” “still” “work” in the present”. The claims made here are about “the fairy-tale world of America” “in the present” whereby “the fairy-tale world” has a specific “name”. So, while this perspective recognises “the fairy-tale world” as such, it claims that “the name of the fairy tale world” is other to “the fairy-tale world” even

though it is “of” “the fairy-tale world”. “The name” which is “of” “the fairy-tale world” is an excess to it as while “the fairy tale world” remains to be so narrated, the claim is that “the name” “is only for a day”. “The name” however is such that it seems to be a requirement, “even if it is only for a day”. So, it is another thing which is “of” “the fairy-tale world” which doesn’t remain.

The claim made about “the fairy-tale” here is that one of “the elements of the old fairy tale” is that it has “the” “princess”. Within the narratorial perspective, “the connection emanates partly from the fairy tale” and so that which is of “the fairy tale” is narrated as something other than “the fairy tale princess” in this case and other than “the name of the fairy-tale world.” This can be read from the narration that “Greta Garbo” is “Greta Garbo” and is also “the fairy tale princess” which implies that “Greta Garbo” is other to “the fairy tale princess” while being “the fairy-tale princess”. This is how the “deceiving” “connection emanates partly from the fairy tale”.

“Certainly, these are petty bourgeois wishes with very untrimmed, often adulterated fairy-tale material.” So according to the narratorial perspective, that which “the favourably disposed viewers think about a great deal”, all that they “want” are “wishes”. The narratorial perspective claims to know this “certainly”. It also knows that these “wishes” are “petty” and “bourgeois”. The claim here is that the “deceiving” “connection”, of “the dream of the little employee” and “of the average businessman”, “of the sudden, the miraculous rise from the anonymous masses to visible happiness”, “the name of the fairy-tale world” as “publicity” and “the fairy-tale princess is Greta Garbo”- these are what constitute “very untrimmed, often adulterated fairy-tale material”. So, the claim within this perspective is that it knows what “fairy-tale material” is and that it can be “untrimmed”, “very” and “often adulterated”. But, according to the claims made earlier within this perspective, it is these “wishes” and what is narrated as “very untrimmed, often adulterated fairy-tale material”, those are why and how “right in America, a country without feudal or transcendental tradition, Walt Disney’s fairy-tale films revive elements of the old fairy tale without making them incomprehensible to the viewers”. Reading from the claims made earlier, this is how according to the narratorial perspective, the “fairy-tale” “still works in the present” and “affects our vision of the future” even though “the fairy-tale world” “no longer belongs to the present”. According to this perspective, “the fairy tale moves on its own in time” because of what has “remained” in “the present”. It is narrated that

although this “material” is “very untrimmed, often adulterated”, “this material has remained”. So, what is at stake here is that claims are made within the narratorial perspective that with respect to “the favourably disposed viewers” who are “in America” and who “think about a great deal”, their thoughts are “wishes” which are “petty bourgeois” and this is “the dream” which is “of the little employee” or “the average businessman” who constitute “the anonymous masses”. This is what makes up the “material” that “has remained”. So, the claim is that “the fairy-tale” has always consisted of this “material”. “And where does one ever really get out of the bourgeois style of living?” This is a question asked by the narrator about “the favourably disposed viewers” who are also “the little employee” “or” “the average businessman” and who are part of “the anonymous masses”. The narrator however is located outside all of these and narrates according to a perspective which is a perspective on all of these. So, he is also not what constitutes the “one” but knows that this “one” can get out of the “bourgeois style of living” but questions “where” “one ever really” does so?

“Yet, there is a certain surrealistic charm in presenting old, fairy-tale materials in modern disguise (or, also, in divesting them of their apparel)”: so according to this perspective, “this material” which “has remained”, which is “very untrimmed, often unadulterated fairy-tale material”, is about a presentation. This presentation which is “very untrimmed, often unadulterated” and is “petty bourgeois” is “in modern disguise”. In this “presenting” “is a certain surrealistic charm” which I can read as seeming to be in some way better than the “certainly” “petty bourgeois wishes”. This can be read from the “yet, there is”, as if that which is “bourgeois” according to the narratorial perspective needs to be got “out of” but in this moment, “one” doesn’t “get out of it” or doesn’t “ever really get out of” it.

It has been claimed earlier in this narration that the fairy tale still works “in the present” and “still affects our vision of the future” as “the fairy tale narrates a wish-fulfilment that is not bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents”. But the claim here is that “in presenting old, fairy-tale materials in modern disguise” it is “divesting them of their apparel” and, that’s how the fairy tale continues to “still” “work” “in the present”. So I read from this claim that the fairy tale then is in its “apparel”, even though it “is not bound by” the “apparel” of what the fairy tale contains and, to make the “old fairy-tale materials” work in the present which is “in America”, there is a “presenting of the



old, fairy-tale materials in modern disguise”. This is effectively “divesting” “the fairy tale materials” which are the “contents” of the fairy-tale “of their apparel” and this is thus what constitutes “modern disguise” within this perspective. The claim at stake here is that this is what is involved in “the connection” being “deceiving” “yet” emanating “partly from the fairy tale”. This is how “precisely” “the fairy tale” has “the unbound character”. It is then this “unbound character” which is “of the fairy tale”, “that has floated through the times that allows for such developments, such new incarnations in the present, incarnations that not only occur in the form of economic ogres or film stars.”

That which has “floated through the times” is that which has “remained”, “remained as fresh as longing and love”, from that which “no longer belongs to the present” or hasn’t “long since disappeared”. “Such developments” are something that can be allowed according to this perspective. “Such developments” are also “incarnations” which are “new incarnations in the present”, “incarnations that not only occur in the form of economic ogres or film stars”. “Such developments” are those which are “presenting old, fairy-tale materials in modern disguise”. So, floating “through the times” in this case is about “presenting” “old” “materials” “in modern disguise”. While these are “incarnations” and “new incarnations” of the “fairy tale”, the claim is that it is still “the fairy tale that moves on its own in time”. This is how the fairy tale “material has remained” but this is also about how “the fairy tale is not bound by its own time and the apparel of its contents”. So even though the “new incarnations” and “developments” are about “the fairy tale” and its “unbound character”, they are still other to “the fairy tale”. So, the fairy tale can continue to “still” “work” “in the present”, in “modern disguise”, “still” affecting “our visions of the future”, “right in America, a country without feudal or transcendental tradition”. It can continue to “remain”, or at least “materials” of it can, and do so through a “deceiving” and partial “connection” floating “through the times” by being something which is “developments” and “new incarnations” and that which is other to itself. It can then be read as that which is of “unbound character” and is still claimed to be “the fairy tale”. This is how “the fairy tale moves on its own in time.”



## VI. Toward dusk may be the best time to tell stories...

Toward dusk may be the best time to tell stories. Indifferent proximity disappears; a remote realm that appears to be better and closer approaches. Once upon a time: this means in fairy-tale manner not only the past but a more colourful easier somewhere else. And those who have become happier there are still happy today if they are not dead. To be sure, there is suffering in fairy tales; however, it changes, and for sure, it never returns. The maltreated, gentle Cinderella goes to the little tree at her mother's grave: little tree, shake yourself, shake yourself. A dress falls to her feet more splendid and marvellous than anything she has ever had. And the slippers are solid gold. Fairy tales always end in gold. There is enough happiness there. In particular, the little heroes and poor people are the ones who succeed here where life has become good.

(Bloch, 2017, p. 352)

Claims are made within this narrative about “stories”. There can be different times “to tell stories”. The claim made here is that the narrator knows that “stories” are told and the other times in which the “stories” are told are those which are not “the best”. This is known to the one who is not telling the “stories”. Also, what is being narrated here is not these “stories” and thus this narration is not a telling of these “stories”. While claims to knowledge are made within the perspective of the narrator about what “stories” are in terms of those which are told, the telling of which can have different times and that there can be “the best time” for this telling, I read a paradox in these claims to knowledge. These claims are based on that which is both specific and specified and yet they are not. While it is specified that there “may be” that which is “the best time to tell stories”, what is this “best time” is uncertain, which I read from “toward dusk” and “may be”. I read in this claim made about “stories” that “to tell stories” has a purpose and that's why it is narrated as what “may be the best time to tell stories.” This purpose is that in the kind of “stories” that are being told, i.e. “fairy tales”, “there

is enough happiness there”. The claim is that this is known within the narratorial perspective. The purpose of these “stories” is for “people” who are other to this perspective as these are “in particular, the little heroes and poor people” who “are” “the ones”, “who succeed” there in the “stories” and the purpose of these stories is for “life” to “become good” for these other “people”.

While what “time” is “the best time to tell stories” is that which is known to the narrator as “may be”, it is known to the narrator why “toward dusk may be the best time to tell stories”. This is because: “Indifferent proximity disappears; a remote realm that appears to be better and closer approaches.” So, the purpose of telling “stories” is to make the approach of “a remote realm” happen and this can be achieved if stories are told towards what “may be the best time”. So, this “best time” then becomes the conditionality upon which the achieving of this purpose is based according to the claims made here. I read a paradox here whereby “a remote realm” is both known and not known according to the claims made here. “Realm” is known to be “remote”, but it is narrated as any “remote realm” which can be read from it being narrated as “a”. “Proximity” can be different and “indifferent”, but it is known what “indifferent proximity” is within the narratorial perspective. This is a perspective on “proximity” and thus this perspective is located outside this “proximity” and yet stakes a claim to knowing what “proximity” is and that it is “indifferent”. However, according to my reading this knowledge entails a not knowing which can be read in the indefiniteness. This can be read in what the “indifferent proximity” does which is that it “disappears”. This disappearance is a continuous process. This disappearance has a beginning whereby it can be identified according to this perspective as that which has not been a disappearance then becomes that which can be narrated as “disappears” but when this happens is uncertain. It is certain that it happens “toward dusk” yet, it is in this very “toward” “dusk” that I read the uncertainty. When “a remote realm” “approaches” is also a continuous process. When it “approaches” is when the “indifferent proximity disappears”. Reading from this then the approach cannot happen until the disappearance has happened. However as discussed earlier, the “disappears” is continuous and according to the text “a remote realm” also “approaches”. The “indifferent proximity” then cannot be located in a certain moment which can define when the disappearance has happened and “a remote realm” has appeared. It is located in this in between state where “indifferent proximity disappears” and “a remote realm” “approaches”.

Though it is narrated that “a remote realm” “approaches”, in order for this approach to happen the “indifferent proximity disappears”. Thus, I read here that “a remote realm” “approaches” while the “indifferent proximity” has not disappeared and is therefore not in the past but “disappears” as a continuing process. However, as these claims are being read in retrospect these are therefore already necessarily in the past. “A remote realm”, the approach of which seems to be the reason why “the best time to tell stories” “may be” “toward dusk” is about how it “appears”. “A remote realm” is “that” which “appears” “to be better and closer” according to the narratorial perspective. So, “a remote realm” is about how it “appears” to the narrator. The claim is that it is “a” “realm” and it is narrated as being “remote”, as “that” which “appears” as “better and closer”. So, while the claim is that it is “a” “realm”, it is also that which is other to a “realm”. I read these as excesses to the “realm”, however these are necessary excesses to make this “realm” “a remote realm that appears to be better and closer”. This “realm” is about appearance as it is narrated in terms of how it “appears” to the narrator who views and narrates it as “better and closer”. But where this “realm” is located is narrated in terms of specifics according to the narratorial perspective. I read these specifics to be about an un-specificity. This “realm” is “a realm” which means that it could be any realm. This “realm” is remotely located and it “approaches” which is again about an indefinite moment and a continuity. This can also be read, as discussed earlier, where this “realm” “approaches” as the “indifferent proximity disappears” which again is a continuous and unidentifiable moment but the claim at stake is that these are all knowable and known within the perspective of the narrator. And this is how the narrator claims a mastery about knowing what “may be the best time to tell stories” and why.

While it is not known which is this “remote realm” as it is “a remote realm”, this “remote realm” is known as that which “appears to be better and closer” within the narratorial perspective. “The best time to tell stories” is for the purpose of this “realm” to approach however, that which “approaches” and whose approach seems to be aspired to is something which is already other than the “realm”, as it is “better and closer”. Then again, the claim is also that this is how it “appears”. In this context, what it “appears” as means what it is which I read from “to be”. “A remote realm that” seems to be sought after here, is about how it “appears”, is something other than a “realm” and cannot be located in a certain moment in terms of its approach as to when it “approaches” and whether or when

it has approached as this approach is narrated as a continuity. It is also based upon the conditions which “may be”, is “toward” and is about the telling of “stories”. So, this is what telling “stories” “toward dusk” which “maybe the best time to tell stories” does according to the narration.

What “Once upon a time” “means” is narrated and thus known to the narrator. The claim about “once upon a time” is that it is something other than “once upon a time”. “Once upon a time” is “this” and what “this means in fairy-tale manner” is narrated here. This implies that it also “means” other things “in” other “manner(s)” than that which is narrated here. Meaning then is about being “in” a “manner”. Meaning then can be different based on what it is “in” and the “manner”. Within this perspective, “Once upon a time” is that which “means”. “Once upon a time” is what “a remote realm that appears to be better and closer” entails. The narrator is narrating this “realm” in terms of a perspective on the “realm” and in order to have a perspective on it, the narrator has to be outside of it. So, this is a claim to a knowledge from the outside.

According to the claims made here, “once upon a time” “in fairy-tale manner” “means” “the past” “but” “not only the past”. So “once upon a time” then is also other than that which is “once upon a time” as it means “the past”. As a corollary then, “the past” is that which “means” “once upon a time” “in fairy-tale manner”. But reading from these claims “the past” is that which is other than “the past” as “once upon a time” “means” “not only the past but a more colourful easier somewhere else.” Thus, “the past” is never only “the past”. “A more colourful easier somewhere else” is “the past” and that which is “not only the past” “but” “somewhere else”. “The past” then is about a location which can be read from “somewhere”. “Once upon a time” is also about a location which in terms of what it “means” “in fairy-tale manner” is located in “the past” but also this is located “not only” in “the past” “but” in “a more colourful easier somewhere else”. “Once upon a time” then cannot really be located, reading from where the “somewhere else” is. The “somewhere else” is “more colourful easier” and this is a narrative which is a comparison. This is a comparison to that which is not the “somewhere else” and the claim is that this, which is not the “somewhere else”, is not as “colourful” or “easy”. The location of this “somewhere else” is the purpose of telling “stories”. This “somewhere else” seems to be desirable as it is “more colourful” and “easier”. Therefore, that which is desirable is that which is “more colourful” and “easier”. But this is located in that which cannot be specified. I read this as such

because “Once upon a time” can be any “time”. It is claimed to be “the past” “but” also “not only” in “the past”. “A more colourful easier somewhere else” is not in “the past” according to the claims made here, however, it has to necessarily be in the past as it is only retrospectively that the “somewhere else” can be identified as “more colourful” and “easier”. These are claims about what “once upon a time” “means” and “this” is in “fairy-tale manner”. So, the “stories” that are told are “fairy-tales”. “Fairy-tales” implies that there are other kinds of “tales” which are not “fairy-tales”. In this case “stories” are “fairy-tales”. I read in “somewhere else” an idea of a lack. By this I mean that, that which is not part of “a more colourful or easier somewhere else” can be identified as such within the narratorial perspective because of its lack in being “more colourful or easier”.

This narration is about a promise of “happiness” in that which is “somewhere else” which is “a remote realm” which is how it “appears” to the narrator. “Happy” is something that the “who” can “become”. This “who” is not the narrator, but the narrator has a perspective on “those who” “have become happier” and “are still happy today”. So, this is a claim to knowledge about “who have become happier”, where and what it means to be “happy” according to the narratorial perspective. These claims are about a mastery of knowledge regarding what it entails to be “happy today” within this perspective. This perspective is not part of “those who have become happier” but makes claims that they “are still happy today” on behalf of “those who” “have become” so. Being “happy” is located “there” which is not where the narrator is and thus this location is a “there” for the narrator. The narrator has a perspective on this “there” and is narrating this location from outside of “there”. This “there” is “not only the past but a more colourful easier somewhere else.” Thus being “happy” is about being in “a more colourful easier somewhere else”. Happiness then is that which is “more colourful” and “easier” and, this is located “somewhere else”. This “there” is in “once upon a time” which also “means” “the past”. But “those who have become happier there are still happy today”. So, this is what “once upon a time” entails. This “happ[iness]” is a continued state of existence as it is “still” “today”. So, while this is about “the past”, this is also “today” which is “a more colourful easier somewhere else”. While I read a state of continuity in “still happy today”, there is an end to being “happy” and that is being “dead”.

Death thus is juxtaposed to happiness here and narrated as a difference. Being dead is not being “happy”. I read being “dead” here as an end, a cessation to being “happy”. “Those who have become happier there” continue to be “happy” “still” “today”, “if” “they are not dead”. So, “if” they are “dead”, they cease to be “happy” and become “dead”. But then again being dead is not an ending in itself as when the “who” become dead this is what they then continue to be. Both “happy” and “dead” are about what the “who” “become” and then continue to be which can be read in the “are”. Both being “still happy” and being “dead” is what the who “are” today. Being “dead” then belongs to the that which the “who” “are” “today”. This is not located in “the past” of the text, according to the claims made here. But “are” “dead” necessarily is about a retrospection and has to thus be something which has happened in the past and continues to be. There are “those who have become happier there” and these are the “who”, “are still happy today”. It is implied here then that there are also “those” “there” in the “once upon a time”, “in fairy tale manner”, who are excluded from those “who have become happier”. Those who are not part of those “who have become happier” then also exist in the “fairy tales” but, they are not narrated as part of those who “are still happy today”. Those who are not part of “those who” “are happy” become similar to the other “who” when the “happy” “who(s)” become dead. Reading from these claims then, death in fairy tales is about a similarity between “those who have become happier” and those who are not part of the becoming and still stay “happy”.

The “who” narrated here is split which can be read from “those”. It is split into “those who have become happier there” and thus by implication “those who” are not part of “those who have become happier there”. As becoming “happier there” is about a comparison, then where it is not “there” the “who” are happy if not “happier” than “there”. But this happiness which is not about “becoming” and “there” is something that the “who” cannot “still be happy today”, according to the claims made here. However, the “becoming happier there” also stops being “still happy today”, “if” “they are” “dead”. Being “happy” then, according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective here, is something that cannot be continued in either case; whether the “who” are happy and not “there” or, even if they “have become happier there and are still happy today”, the “who” can’t continue to be “happy” “if” “they are” dead”.



The narrator is not “in fairy tales” but is “sure” “there is suffering in fairy tales. While “fairy tales” are the stories that are for telling according to the text, I also read “fairy tales” here as being about a location in terms of what is located “in” them, “who” “are” “there”, what “are” they “there”, what happens “there”, “changes” happen there and “return” can happen there but, in this instance, “never returns” is what happens “there”. These are the terms in which “fairy tales” are narrated according to the narratorial perspective. What is “in fairy tales” is known within the perspective of the narrator and it is narrated through a perspective on “fairy tales” as this narrator is located outside the “fairy tales”. “Suffering” is the opposite of being “happy” here and thus is undesirable according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective. I read a connection here to Freud’s (1922) idea of “the pleasure principle” whereby, “the avoidance of pain” can be defined as “a relaxation of ... tension” or “production of pleasure” and this is what is sought after.

“To be sure, there is suffering in fairy tales; however, it changes, and for sure, it never returns”: I read this as a response to an implied question about “suffering” being “in fairy tales” if the claim is about happiness and becoming “happier” until death in fairy tales. So, by implication then, where there is happiness till death, there should be no “suffering”. However, according to the narratorial perspective, “in fairy tales” while there “is suffering”, there is, what I read as a promise of no return of this “suffering”. “In fairy tales” then is the where, where the “who” can “become happier” and still be “happy” until they become dead. Continued happiness therefore can be present “there” where “suffering” is absent, absent because it was present at some point “in fairy tales” but then it “never returns”. Being “happy” is about a conditionality according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective. The “who” can “still” be “happy” based upon the condition “if” “they are not dead”. The other condition is for “suffering” to change and surely “never” return.

The narratorial perspective is located outside “fairy tales” and is narrating through a perspective on “fairy tales”. The claim stake here is a knowledge of what “suffering is in fairy tales”. The narrator is not undergoing this “suffering” but knows what “suffering in fairy tales” is. This perspective knows that “suffering in fairy tales”, “changes”, “and for sure, it never returns”, yet the claim is that “to be sure, there is suffering in fairy tales”. So, even when this “suffering” “changes”, it is still identified as “suffering” “in fairy tales” according to the perspective of the narrator. While the

claim here is that “for sure, it never returns”, paradoxically, the claim is also that “to be sure, there is suffering in fairy tales”. So that which is claimed to change and never return still stays identifiable as the same thing within this perspective. Also, while “the suffering in fairy tales” “changes” “and” “never returns”, the “fairy tales” do not change because of the “suffering in fairy tales” as “there is suffering in fairy tales” and the narrator is “sure” of this. Although the narrator is located outside the “fairy tales” what is “in” the “fairy tales” is something that the narrator is “sure” of. So, these claims then are about a being of the narrator in terms of being “sure”, they are made according to the narrator’s perspective. Despite not being “in fairy tales”, claims made about what’s “in fairy tales” are according to the narrator’s being which can be read from the claim “to be sure” and from the “be” specifically.

While the absence of “suffering in fairy tales” in the form that “it changes, and for sure, it never returns” seems to be how and why the “who” can “become happier there and” remain “still happy today”, this absence is not a guarantee of becoming “happier”, as there are those who are also part of “who” but they are those “who” have not become happier there. This is a retrospective reading of the claims, but I read a tension here in the claims made about “today”. These are claims made in retrospect about happiness and the absence of “suffering”, but this is about having “become happier” and a continuity of being “happy” which is about a “today”. These are claims about what can happen in the future in terms of happiness and success and suffering changing and never returning but these are claims made in retrospect and through what has happened in the past. The future then is about what has happened “in the past” and that what “always” happens as there is “always enough happiness there”.

Who “Cinderella” is, what she does and what happens to her are narrated here as an example of “those who have become happier there” and how “suffering in fairy tales” “never returns”. What happens with Cinderella is an example of what “always” happens “in” “fairy tales”. Who Cinderella is, is narrated as “maltreated, gentle”, as “her” and as whose mother is dead. How she achieves “happiness” is when “a dress falls to her feet” and she gets “solid gold” slippers”. But this “happiness” is not about “becoming happier there”. This is about what Cinderella does and what she knows; and what she knows can be read as a claim to knowledge within the narratorial perspective

which claims to know what Cinderella knows. This knowledge can be read wherein Cinderella knows that she can go “to the little tree at her mother’s grave”, she knows that this “little tree” can “shake” itself and consequentially something will happen which will bring her “happiness”. The claim at stake here about “happiness” is that for becoming “happier” and for “suffering” to “never return” requires a change. In this case, the change for “the maltreated, gentle Cinderella”, is “a dress”, “more splendid and marvellous than anything she has ever had” “and” “solid gold” “slippers”. While the narrator is not Cinderella, it is known to the narrator what “happiness” for Cinderella is and what it means for suffering to change and never return for her. So, the claim made here according to the narratorial perspective is that for “gentle Cinderella”, and for her condition of being “maltreated” (which was her “suffering”) to change and to “never” return means a change in dress and slippers. However, they are not just any dress and slippers. The conditions which are attached as requirements for this change to take place mean that the “dress” has to be not just splendid but “more splendid and marvellous than anything she has ever had” and “the slippers” have to be not just gold but “solid gold”. These claims are made according to the perspective of the narrator, so it is known within this perspective what Cinderella “has ever had” and thus, accordingly, claims can be made on behalf of Cinderella about her “happiness”, “suffering” and “changes” in these conditions according to this perspective.

From the narration about Cinderella as “the maltreated, gentle Cinderella” and her slipper as “the slippers”, I read Cinderella’s story as something that is commonly known according to the perspective of the narrator. Therefore, Cinderella being “gentle” and “maltreated” is narrated as an example of the “suffering in fairy tales” and a change in her circumstances, through “a dress” and “slippers” is narrated as change in “suffering” which means “happiness” according to the claims here. The claims here then are about that which is recognisable as common knowledge according to the perspective of the narrator. “The slippers” being “solid gold” is the end of the fairy tale of Cinderella according to the claims made here. “Happiness” then is the “end” “in fairy tales. However, earlier in this text, it has also been claimed that being “dead” is the end of continuing to be “happy” in fairy tales. Fairy tales then are about an “end” and they have an “end”. What the “fairy tales always end in” are known to the narratorial perspective which narrates this through a perspective on the “fairy tales” as it is located outside the “fairy tales”. While this is a claim about knowing what “fairy tales always

end in”, through the “always”, it is a claim to continuity. “Fairy tales always end” implies that once it has ended it is going to start again and then “end” again, as it “always” does, “in gold”. So, if the “fairy tale” is not “in gold”, then it has not ended or if it does not “end in gold”, then according to this perspective, it is not a “fairy tale”. This is a claim which has been made retrospectively within this perspective about that which “always” happens and thus will continue to happen as such. It is a claim to knowledge of the future events based on the past and it is a claim about an “end”. But this “end” is not an end which I read from how it is narrated as being cyclical in terms of being a repetition. “Fairy tales” then are being narrated as repetitive in terms of what they “always” do, i.e. they “always end” and they “always end in gold”.

What is “happiness”, what and how much is “enough happiness” is known to the narrator. The narrator is not “in” “fairy tales” but claims to know about what is there. As the narrator is not “there” he is also not part of what is “enough happiness there”. But he has a perspective on what “is enough happiness there”. The claim about what is “happiness”, where it “is” and how much “is enough happiness” is made according to the narratorial perspective for the “who”, who apparently seek to “become happier there” and “in particular, the little heroes and poor people”. From what I read, where the “there” is cannot be specifically located but according to the perspective of the narrator, the “there” is known and identifiable in terms of being “a more colourful or easier somewhere else”, the setting of which depends upon what “maybe the best time to tell stories” which again is about an appearance in terms of “a remote realm that appears to be better and closer”. “Enough happiness is” in “fairy tales” which “always end in gold”. “Happiness” therefore is that which can be located “there” and the “there” which is “fairy tales” can be located in terms of its “end” which can be located “in” something which is “gold”. The claim at stake here is that within the perspective of the narrator “enough happiness” for the “who” and “in particular, the little heroes and poor people” is thus about an “end in gold”. While the narrator is neither the “who” nor “the little heroes and poor people”, the narrator can make these claims for them. The claim is that “happiness” is about an “end in gold” so, the “end” is to be “in gold”. “Happiness” is about a comparison “there” which is measured in terms of “enough happiness” or becoming “happier” both of which are “there”. This is compared to what happiness is there which is not the “there” of this text.

“The little heroes and poor people” are narrated as “in particular” amongst “those who have become happier there”. The narrator is neither “the little heroes” nor the “poor people” but they are known as such within the narratorial perspective. According to this perspective, “the little heroes” and “poor people” are the same because they “are the ones” and they are similar in terms of being the “who” “succeed here”. So, their similarity is based upon them succeeding “here”. They are part of “those who have become happier there” but also, they are distinguishable from “those who” as “the little heroes and poor people” and “in particular”. It is known within this perspective that “the ones who succeed” in fairy tales are “heroes” but they can be differentiated from “heroes” as they are the known as “the little heroes”. Similarly, this claim about succeeding “here” is about “people” but this not for all people, it is “in particular” for those people who are known to be the “poor people” within this perspective. “The little heroes” and “poor people” are narrated as distinct from each other which can also be read from the “and”. These differences however get subsumed under the sameness as they become “the ones”. These “ones” “are” about that which is “in particular” from amongst “those who” “have become happier there” and are yet further distinguishing the “who” as the ones who “succeed here”. So, while there are these differences which are narrated here they are all subsumed under that which is the same for these “ones” which is to “succeed here”. Succeeding “here” then is what brings about a sameness between “the little heroes” and the “poor people” here.

This is a narrative which claims a knowledge about “life” in terms what life can “become” and that it can “become good”. So, the claim is that before becoming this, “life” is not “good”. These claims about “life” of “the little heroes and poor people” are made according to the perspective of the narrator who has a perspective on them and can view them as such and is thus not part of them. “Life” becoming “good” can be located in “where” which is “here” in the text. This “here” is in “fairy tales” where the narrator is not within the fairy tales but narrates what fairy tales are and what is in them. There is a shift in the position of narratorial perspective from “there” to “here” in terms of the narration of “fairy tales”. Fairy tales are narrated as what is in “there” when they are being narrated as a construct according to the narratorial perspective and the perspective then narrates it as “there”. When this narration has been done, the position of the perspective shifts to “here”, as now what is being narrated is what fairy tales are constituted of and it is “here”.

The claim at stake here is that “the little heroes and poor people are the ones who” want to “succeed here” and want “life” to “become good”. What is offered in this narrative is “hope” which I read from Bloch’s idea of “The Principle of Hope” (Bloch, 2013). The text discussed in this essay is from Bloch’s writing entitled *The Utopian Function of Art and Literature*. From this text I can read claims being made that telling “stories” which are fairy tales can offer “hope” to “the little heroes and poor people” and this is “the utopian function of art and literature” and is in line with Bloch’s Marxism (Bloch, 2013).

## VII. The Problem of Time

Moreover, psychopathologists, too, often come face to face with the problem of time. Now, it is fairly well known to what extent the interpretation of pathological concepts is conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts in child psychology. As far as time itself is concerned, J. de la Harpe has endorsed the claim of a well-known psychiatrist that the analysis of duration must be based exclusively on Bergsonian ideas and on phenomenology, and that the problem of the development of the conception of time in children must be ignored on principle. We nevertheless hope that the results we are about to present will prove of use to all those psychopathologists who wish to base their work on the laws of real development rather than on a priori dialectics.

Finally, teachers and educational psychologists constantly come up against problems raised by the failure of school-children to grasp the idea of time. A clearer understanding of the constructive processes that go into the development of the fundamental concepts of temporal order, simultaneity, and the equality and colligation of durations, at a stage when the child does

not yet suspect that time is common to all phenomena, will no doubt prove helpful to them in their work. It is partly because of the possible educational applications that we shall be quoting so many concrete examples.

(Piaget, 1969, p. X)

“Time itself is” not the concern here. “The problem of time” is known as “the” singular and definite one which is “the problem of time”. “Time” is not “the problem” even though “the problem” is “of time”. That which is “of time” is external to and other to “time”. “Time” is that “of” which there are things. “The problem of time” is not always there and therefore can be “come face to face with” and “often”. It is known within the narratorial perspective what “the problem of time” is and therefore that which is also not “the problem” which is “of time” and that which is not “the problem of time”. While “time” is distinguishable as that which is “time”, it is also similar to that “of” which there are problems. “The problem” is similar to other problems as it is known as a “problem”, but it is different to other problems because of being “the” specific “problem” which is “of time”. So being “of time” is why “the problem” is distinct.

This is a perspective on “psychopathologists”, on “the problem” which is “of time” and on “time”. This perspective is not part of “psychopathologists” and within this perspective “psychopathologists” are other to, as well as part of those who are the “too” who “often come face to face with the problem of time”. In the “too”, I read an implied claim that “psychopathologists” should not otherwise come “often come face to face with the problem of time” but this “too” is the case. The others who “too, often come face to face with the problem of time” are not “psychopathologists” despite being those who “too, often come face to face with the problem of time”. So, “often” coming “face to face with the problem of time” does not mean that they are “psychopathologists” however, being “psychopathologists” means that they “too, often come face to face with the problem of time”. So, in this way “psychopathologists” are othered from those who do not “come face to face with the problem of time” or, who do not “often come face to face with the problem of time” as well as those

who are not “psychopathologists”. “Time itself” is not that which “is fairly well known”. “It is fairly well known” is other to itself as it “is” “it”. This “it” is distinct because of being “fairly well known” but is also similar to other things which are also “fairly well known”. That “it is fairly well known” is the case according to the claims made within the narratorial perspective. “Pathological concepts” have “interpretation of”. This is “the” singular, definite, known “interpretation of pathological concepts”.

There is a claim to difference and a claim to knowledge about what is “in child psychology”. This claim to difference is through the claim to knowledge. What is “in child psychology” is different to other “psychology” because of being “child psychology”. What is “in child psychology” is other to the “child” as it is “in” “psychology”. Through the claim to knowledge about what is “child psychology”, “child psychology” itself is about a difference as what is “in child psychology” is different from and other to that which is not “in child psychology”. That which is “in child psychology” is known to a perspective which is not a “child” and which has a perspective on “psychology”, the “child”, “child psychology” and is therefore not “in child psychology” but knows what is “in child psychology”. Therefore, claims to knowledge are made according to a perspective which is not “in” what is being claimed about what it is and what it is “in”, while also claiming by implication that which is thus not “in”.

What “is fairly well known” is different to that which “is” “well known”. What “is fairly well known” is not “the interpretation of pathological concepts”, neither what “the interpretation of pathological concepts is conditioned by”, nor what is “child psychology”. What is “fairly well known” is about what is “in child psychology”. What is “fairly well known” is narrated according to the perspective which is not “in child psychology” neither is it a “child”. “Child psychology” is that “in” which there is “the interpretation” which is “of pathological concepts”, which “is conditioned” and “is conditioned by” and, “is conditioned by the genetic study” which is “of corresponding concepts”. While I read that “pathological concepts” are similar to “corresponding concepts” because of being “concepts”, according to the perspective here, “pathological concepts” though conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts”, are not “corresponding concepts”. “Pathological concepts” “is” also “conditioned by the genetic study” which is not the “corresponding concepts” but is “of corresponding concepts”. While “the genetic study” is “of corresponding concepts” it is not



“corresponding concepts”. “The genetic study” is known, specific and other to itself. It is “the” “study” which while being similar to other studies is distinct because of being “the genetic study”. “The genetic study” while being known and specific in one way can also be that which can be any “genetic study” as it is “of corresponding concepts” but, in that very specification I read the possibility that “the genetic study” can also then not be “of corresponding concepts” and, “of corresponding concepts” which are not “in child psychology”. So, while “the genetic concepts” are known as such in terms of being specified, they can also be any “genetic concepts”. What “is fairly well known” is about what is “in child psychology” but what “is fairly well known” is not “fairly well known” to that which is “in child psychology”.

As there is a “now” when “it is fairly well known” therefore there is also a now when it is not “fairly well known”. When it is not “fairly well known” is not this “now”, then. So, the difference in when “it is fairly well known” or not is what constitutes the “now” here. “The interpretation of pathological concepts” which “is conditioned by the genetic study of concepts” may also not be “in child psychology” but when “the interpretation” is “in child psychology” is known within this narratorial perspective. That “it is fairly well known” is a claim made about others within a perspective which others itself by claiming that “it is fairly well known” as it is being claimed that “it is fairly well known” to perspectives which are other than the narratorial perspective but, that “it is fairly well known” and “it is fairly well known” to others, is a claim made according to this perspective on behalf of those who are other to this narratorial perspective.

“The interpretation of pathological concepts is conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts in child psychology” to an “extent” which is a “what”. Thus, there is also a part of “the interpretation” which “is” not “conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts in child psychology”. This is not part of this “extent”. However, that which is not part of the “what extent” is still “the interpretation of pathological concepts” despite not being “conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts” and this is also still “in child psychology”. So, what is “in child psychology” and “to what extent” while being claimed as known in terms of that which is narrated here is also that which is not narrated here but can be read from the narration. According to the claims made here, “time itself” is not “in child psychology” and “time itself” is also not “the

problem of time”. That “it is fairly well known to what extent the interpretation of pathological concepts is conditioned by the genetic study of corresponding concepts in child psychology” is not part of the concern which is “time itself”.

“The claim” is “of” someone but can be “endorsed” by another. That this is “the claim” and that it is “of a well-known psychiatrist” but that it can be and therefore is “endorsed” by another who is not “a well-known psychiatrist” is known within an external perspective. It is known within this perspective what “a” “psychiatrist” is which is different to other psychiatrists because of being “well-known”; also, there are more than “a well-known psychiatrist”. “J. de la Harpe” is not “a well-known psychiatrist then”. “A well-known psychiatrist” is other than itself because of being “a” “psychiatrist” who is “well-known” and because of this could be any “well-known psychiatrist”. But this “well-known psychiatrist” is known because of “the claim” which is “of” this “well-known psychiatrist”. “Well-known” psychiatrists therefore are those who can make claims which are “endorsed”. “A well-known psychiatrist” can make “the claim” about “time itself”, although “the claim” that is narrated as “endorsed” here” is not about “time itself” and is other to itself as it is “that”. “The problem of the development of the conception of time in children” is not “the problem of time”, even though it is “the problem”.

What is “in children” is known to one who is not “children”. “The development of the conception of time in children” is not “the problem” but, “the problem” is “of the development of the conception of time in children”. So “the development of the conception of time in children” is other to “the problem” while “the problem” is “of” it. “The problem of the development of the conception of time in children” is that which “must be ignored” but is known as that which is “the problem”. A “problem” then can be, and in this case “must be,” “ignored”. While the narratorial perspective is not “J. de la Harpe”, neither is it “a well-known psychiatrist”, nor is it “Bergsonian ideas and” “phenomenology” but the claim here is that, it is known within this perspective that “J. de la Harpe”, “a well-known psychiatrist”, “Bergsonian ideas” and “phenomenology” are all outside “time” and therefore can “claim” about that which is “concerned” with “time itself”. “Bergsonian ideas” are different to other “ideas” because of being narrated as “Bergsonian”. “Bergsonian ideas” while being distinct are also similar to “phenomenology” because they are what “the analysis of duration must be

based on". "Ideas" therefore are what "analysis" "must be based" "on". "The analysis of duration" and "the problem of the development of the conception of time in children" are both part of that which is "as far as time itself is concerned" but they are not "time itself". Through the narration of "the development of the conception of time in children" which "the problem" is "of", "children" are othered from those "in" whom "the problem of the development of the conception of time" does not exist. "Children" therefore are that "in" which there is "the problem" and "the problem" is that which "must be ignored" and "must be ignored on principle". Part of "the problem of time", which is also not "the problem" and not "the problem of time", is that "the analysis of duration must be based exclusively on Bergsonian ideas and on phenomenology, and that the problem of the development of the conception of time in children must be ignored on principle"; it "must" be so, but it is not the case. It is implied in these claims that "the analysis of duration" is "based" "on Bergsonian ideas and on phenomenology", if not "exclusively" so. That which "the analysis of duration must be based on exclusively" is that which "must" also be "and". So, claims to exclusivity here entail claim to "and".

"The problem" is external to "time". It is not "of time" but "of the development" which is also "of" "the conception of time". "The conception of time" can be developed "in children" so it is external to "children". That which is claimed to be development "of" something "in children" is outside of them and can be developed "in" them according to a perspective which is not them. What is "the development" "in children" is also "the problem of" it and "must be ignored on principle" according to this external perspective. "Time itself" is a concern. "The problem of the development of the conception of time in children" is not "the analysis of duration". However, they are similar to each other because of both being part of "the claim of a well-known psychiatrist" which "J. de la Harpe has endorsed" as that which is about "time itself". "As far as time itself is concerned", according to "the claim" which "has" been "endorsed", it is about the "duration of analysis" "and" "the problem of the development of the conception of time in children" but, neither of these are "time itself".

"We" are not "psychopathologists", "those psychopathologists" or, part of "all those psychopathologists". But, that which "we are about to present will prove of use to all those psychopathologists". Therefore, it is known within the narratorial perspective who the "we" are, who are "all those psychopathologists" who are other to the "we", who are other to the narratorial

perspective. While the claim here is that the narratorial perspective is part of the “we”, it is located outside the “we” and has a perspective on “we” which knows that “the results” which are “about to” be presented by this “we” can be “of use to all those psychopathologists”. The position of the narratorial perspective shifts from being part of “we”, to being both included as well as excluded from “we”, to being located on the outside having a perspective on “we”. There is a constant othering that is happening here through the claims made within the narratorial perspective about who is “about to present” “the results” and through the claim “that the results” are that which can “prove of use” to another who is other to the perspective within which these are known as “results” and, what “results” can do, which is that they can “prove” and “prove” to be “of use” and, to those others whose “results” these are not and who “are” not “about to present” “the results”.

“Work” is “their work” but that it is “work” which is theirs and that “their work” has a “base” is known within a perspective which is not “their”. “Psychopathologists” are “who”. “Who” are those that “wish”. While “psychopathologists” are “all” similar, there is a difference in this “all” as “those” who are part of “all those psychopathologists” are different because they “wish to base their work on the laws of real development rather than on a priori dialectics”. So “who” they are, is because of this difference as well as the similarity within which is this difference. “Psychopathologists” are “those” “who” “work” and this “work” is “their work”. “Their work” is what they “wish to base” but this “base” is not “their work”. “All” “psychopathologists” both “who” are part of “those” and not part of “those” “base their work on” “a priori dialectics”. What they “wish” is what distinguishes them in terms of “who” they are, which is in terms of what is the “base” of “their work”. While it is narrated as “their work” and “their work” is similar because of the “base” which is “a priori dialectics”, there is scope for difference within “their work” which is similar as “work” and as being “their work”: this difference is what they “wish” for. What “we” “hope” is “that the results we are about to present will prove of use” for the purpose of this difference. So the “hope” of one is to “prove of use” for another which is for the purpose of difference that can potentially be within that which is another’s. The claim is that it is known within the narratorial perspective that “hope” is different to “use” which is different to “wish”. But it is known within this perspective that there are different hopes, uses and wishes

within different perspectives and that according to one perspective the hope is to be of “use” for the “wish” of another.

“The laws of real development” are “laws” but are distinct because of what they are “of”. What they are “of” is what differentiates them from other “laws”. This is also why they are “the laws” which are known as “laws” but are also the definite “laws” which are “of real development”. “A priori dialectics” are not “the laws of real development” but are similar to “the laws of real development” as they are both what “work” can be based “on”. Despite this similarity, it is the difference between “them”, and it is what “their work” is based “on” or rather more specifically, what “their work” is wished to be based “on” that distinguishes other “psychopathologists” from “all those psychopathologists”. So “wish” about “their work” is about a difference which is that which can be “rather than” what is and, despite this difference to be something other than that which is, it is still “their work”.

“Problems” are those which are “raised by the failure” so they are not always there. “The failure” then is other than itself as it is that which “by” which “problems” are “raised”. It is not “failure” but what the “failure” is “of” that raises “problems”. A mastery of knowledge is claimed within the narratorial perspective. This perspective is not “teachers”, “educational psychologists” or “school-children” but knows who “teachers”, “educational psychologists” and “school-children” are and makes claims on behalf of them. “Time” is distinct from “the idea of time”. “The idea of time” is not of “school-children” but the claim here is that “school-children” are those that should be able to but fail to “grasp the idea of time”. “The idea of time” therefore is that which might be known to “school-children” but is not grasped and this is known within a perspective which is not “school-children” but has a perspective on “school-children”. It is known what it means for “school-children” to “grasp” something and “school-children” not grasping “the failure of” this. “The idea of time” then is that which must be grasped in order to avoid “the problems raised by the failure of” grasping “the idea of time”. “The idea of time” therefore is the singular, known definite “idea” which is distinct from other ideas because of what it is “of”. “The failure” or not “of school-children” is therefore known in terms of their grasping or not of “the idea of time”. An “idea” then is that which can be grasped or not and depending on this grasping or not is what raises the “problems” of “failure”.

“Educational psychologists” are other to “psychologists” because of being “educational”. “Teachers” are not “educational psychologists” and “educational psychologists” are not “teachers”. They are similar to each other while being different because of what they “constantly come up against”. “Teachers and educational psychologists” are distinct to others who “constantly come up against problems” because of what the “problems” are. Through the claims made within the narratorial perspective about “the idea of time”, “the idea of time” is that “to grasp” which or not, is what others different perspectives and this is what “the failure” is “of”. The claim made about “school-children” is that they do not “grasp the idea of time” and this is what “the failure” is, which is a failure “of school-children” but the “idea” which is “the idea of time” is not “of school-children” but can be potentially grasped by them and as that is not the case, this is what the “failure” is “of” them which raises “problems” which are not “of” the “school-children” but are “problems” which are “raised by the failure of school-children”.

“A clearer understanding of the constructive processes” is not available to “them” or “the child”. “The child” can “suspect” and that which it can “suspect” is “that” which is what “time is”. “Time” is that which “is common to all phenomena” but it is not “all phenomena” or “phenomena”. “The child” can be “at” different stages and while they are stages, “a stage” is different to another “stage”. The difference in the stages can be read from “when”. As “the child does not yet suspect” there is also a “when” which is not part of this “yet” “when” “the child does” “suspect” what “time is”. But this is a suspicion so what “time is”, is known to the external perspective which is outside of “time” as well and has a perspective on “time”. In order for “the child to suspect that time is common to all phenomena”, “the child” then knows “all phenomena” but does not know “time”. What “will” “prove helpful” and “to” whom is known within a perspective which is not “them”. That the “work” is “their work” is known to an external perspective. “Their work” requires help. What “will” “prove helpful” is “a clearer understanding” of that which is not part of “their work” and this is according to a perspective which others itself to “them” and “their work” but the claim is that it is known within this perspective who “them” are and what “their work” is and this is “no doubt” the case.

The claim is that part of “their work” is what “teachers and educational psychologists constantly come up against” which are “problems”. While “a clearer understanding of the constructive

processes” “will no doubt prove helpful to them in their work”, “the problems” and “the failure of school-children” will continue to be known and narrated as such. “The child” is other to “school-children” but “the failure of school-children to grasp the idea of time” is part of the “stage” which is “when the child does not yet suspect that time is common to all phenomena”. To “grasp the idea of time” then is “to suspect that time is common to all phenomena” but, the “grasp” is of “the idea of time” and not “time” but to “suspect” is that which is “time”. This perspective which is external to and is on “the child” knows that there are stages which are other to this “a stage” “when the child does” “suspect that time is common to all phenomena”. When in these other stages, “the child” is still “the child” while being other to “the child” who is “at a stage when the child does not yet suspect that time is common to all phenomena”. “The child” therefore is that within which there are differences because of which “stage” “the child” is “at” and “when” and this is in terms of whether they “suspect” what “time” “is” “yet” or not.

The “a stage” is similar to other stages but is distinct from other stages because of what it is and “when”. “A stage” could be any stage but is specific because of what is “at”. “A clearer understanding” is not “of” “the child” or “of” “them” but “will no doubt prove helpful to them in their work” part of which is because of that which is “raised by” that which is “of school-children”. To “constantly come up against problems” does not mean “a clearer understanding”. “A clearer understanding” is different from “understanding”. What “a clearer understanding” is, is “of” something, and what it is “of” and who it can be for (though they do not have it), is known within a perspective which others itself in terms of this “understanding”. “Processes” are that “of” which there can be “understanding” and “a clearer understanding”. So, there can be different understandings and hence more than “a” singular “understanding”. “The fundamental concepts” are external to but are “of temporal order”. “The fundamental concepts” which are “of temporal order” are not “temporal order”. The claims which are about “a clearer understanding” are not “of temporal order but “the constructive processes”. But this “clearer understanding” “will no doubt prove helpful to them in their work”, part of which is the “problems raised by the failure of school-children to grasp the idea of time”. “The constructive processes that go into the development of the fundamental concepts of temporal order,

simultaneity, and the equality and colligation of durations” are not of “the child” but, these are what are part of that which is being “at a stage” which is “when” “the child” is.

“Applications” can be “educational” as well as those that are not “educational”. “Educational applications” can also be not “possible”. “Concrete examples” are different from other examples. “Concrete examples” are not “possible educational applications”. However, “we shall be quoting so many concrete examples”, “partly because of the possible educational applications”. “Concrete examples” can “be” quoted which makes them distinct from other “examples” and other “concrete examples” which are not part of the “so many concrete examples” that “we shall be quoting”. While the narratorial perspective claims to be included in the “we”, it is outside the “we” and has a perspective on “we” according to which it is claimed that it is known that “we” can quote and that what “we shall be” doing is “quoting”. What “educational applications” are, that there are “possible” and therefore by implication not “possible educational applications”, are known within a perspective which is not part of “teachers and educational psychologists” and claims that the “we” who “shall be quoting so many concrete examples are also other to “teachers and educational psychologists” but can and “shall be quoting so many concrete examples”, “partly because of” that which is “possible”, which is “educational applications”.

## VIII. Resolution... in the Search for Linguistic Patterning and its Significances.

### Resolution

Just one moment in one class with one text and one particular teacher. But perhaps there is a suggestion here that children might be able to participate, with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances.



Margaret Meek observes that ‘Children read stories<sup>2</sup> they like over and over again; that’s when they pay attention to the words- after they’ve discovered what happens’ (1988: 36). What we have yet to find more about is the means through which children can be assisted to attend to ‘words’. Heath’s work, and that of others who have followed her lead, suggests there is nothing natural about these processes. Indeed Vygotsky’s meticulous analysis of the ontogenesis of voluntary attention shows just how deeply social these apparently natural processes of attention are (Vygotsky 1981). It seems that offering children some access to semiotic tools which enable them to describe visual and verbal patterning in literary text may have some potential to develop a different reading pedagogy, remaking it to include the possibility of children delighting intelligently and critically in the nature of a text’s composition without excluding their enjoyment of the constructed story.

(Williams, 2003, pp. 160, 161)

The above text is from the last paragraph of a chapter which discusses ‘Children Becoming Readers: Reading and Literacy’. This chapter is part of a book entitled *Understanding Children’s Literature*. The claim at stake here is that part of “understanding children’s literature” entails discussing “children becoming readers: reading and literacy”. “Children’s literature” then is distinguished from literature by the specificity that it is “children’s”. However, this is about a sameness which can be read through literature which can be “children’s” and therefore by implication, that which is not “children’s literature”; yet they are both “literature”. “Literature” within the perspective of the narrators of this text, then is known. It is known as that which can be recognised as “children’s”, that which is not “children’s” and that which is not “literature” which therefore leads to the claim of what is “literature” and the claim that it is understood within the narratorial perspective and can be narrated as such to facilitate “understanding” for those who are other to the narrators of

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<sup>2</sup> See Chapter XII for my reading of Maria Tatar’s ideas on stories and the storytelling space that was shared by adults and children. See also, Chapter XIII for my reading of Rovelli’s claims about “the free and fantastic stories which humans have told nightly around campfires for hundreds of thousands of years.”

this book. “Children’s literature” is that which can be understood as a continued process as the book is entitled “understanding children’s literature”. I read this claim regarding “understanding children’s literature” as worrying because in this “understanding” I read a continuous process. However, this continued understanding is dependent on reading which assumes a position of “understanding” the contents of this book which has already been written and is thus located in the past. The claim here then is that the continued and future “understanding” of “children’s literature” is based on the contents that have already been written. So, the continuous and the future is that which is based on that which has already been written. This claim about “understanding children’s literature” as a continuous and that which can be and will be understood because of this book is made retrospectively. The perspective according to which these claims are made is other to children but claims to know what “children’s” is.

It is known within the perspective of the narrator of this chapter who “children” are as they are not “readers” but can become “readers”. This perspective is positioned as not “children” itself. “Readers” are something that “children” can become and yet, continue to be identified as “children”. So, while there is a difference here between “children” and “readers”, one can become the other i.e., “children” can become “readers”, however they still remain identifiable as “readers” who are “children”. Therefore, “readers” can be other than “children”. So, while one can become the other, I read here the claim that this difference continues to exist, and this “becoming” then doesn’t take away the difference between “children becoming readers” and other “readers”. The “children”, despite “becoming readers”, remain identifiable as such i.e., “children”. This “becoming” is a continuous and continued process. While it is recognisable as something that has a beginning, which is when “children” start “becoming readers” as prior to this beginning the “children” aren’t “readers”, this “becoming” can’t be located in terms of where it stops or finishes. There isn’t an idea here that “children” become “readers” as they continue to be “children” who are “becoming readers”.

“Children becoming readers” entails “reading and literacy”. While these two things seem to be part of each other, there is also a distinction between them. This is a difference which can be read from the “:” colon, in the text. What “children becoming readers” is about, is about “reading and literacy”. However, this is narrated by a perspective which is not “children” but claims to know what

how “children” can become “readers” which is through “reading and literacy”. Readership then involves “reading and literacy”. “Reading and literacy” are different to each other as they are narrated as distinct from each other. This difference can also be read from the “and”. But this difference is also about a sameness which can also be read from the “and”. Their similarity can also be read as they are both what is involved in “children becoming readers”. It is known within the perspective of the narrator what “reading”, “and” “literacy” are. According to my reading, “reading and literacy” are not “children’s” but they are what are required for “children” to become something other than themselves which in this case is “readers” and, this is according to a perspective which is not the “children’s”. This perspective is making claims about the “children”, about “children becoming readers” as a perspective on “children” and in order to have a perspective on “children”, this perspective has to be outside “children”. Yet, it makes claims for “children” about them “becoming readers” and what it entails. This is what it means to “understand children’s literature”. The implication is that this “understanding” of that which is the “children’s” is for those who are not “children” and according to claims of those whose perspective is outside “children’s” in order to be able to have a perspective on that which is the “children’s”.

What is narrated in this paragraph is a “resolution” according to the perspective of the narrator of this text. The “resolution” is about “children becoming readers” which is about “reading and literacy”. “Children becoming readers”, “reading and literacy” therefore seems to be something that requires a “resolution”. The claim made within this perspective is that it knows what the “resolution” is for “children” to become “readers”. Through the “just” it can be read that the “just” “one moment”, or the “one class”, or the “one text” “and”, the “one particular teacher” are not enough. However, this is what is narrated as the “resolution” for the “children”. What is about this “just one” is being narrated as what “children might be able to” do while it is also being narrated as “just one” along with “but” and “perhaps”. So, this “just” “one” “moment”, “class”, “text”, “particular teacher” are not all “children” but the claim that this is the “resolution” for all “children becoming readers” is made though this “just” “one(s)”. While this is the “resolution”, what is “there” in this “resolution” “is a suggestion”. This “suggestion” is located in “just one moment”. By implication then, in moments which are not this “one moment”, it is known that “children” do not “participate,

with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances.” But this participation which is known to be not done by the “children” is about an ability. What the “children” do or do not do, because of their ability or what “might be” the lack of it is narrated according to a perspective which is not of “children”. Claims about “children”, their participation, their ability, their “enthusiasm”, or lack thereof, are made through a perspective on “children”. These are claims made on behalf of “children” by those who are not “children”.

What requires “resolution” is “children” not being “able to participate, with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances”. Therefore for “children becoming readers: reading and literacy”, what is required is this ability. So, “reading and literacy” within this perspective is “the search for linguistic patterning and its significances.” “Reading” according to the claims made here is an idea of repetition as it is narrated as “linguistic patterning”. In the idea of patterning, I read the repetition and “reading then is about this repetition which is known to be “linguistic”. Also, in the claim about “children becoming readers”, I read an idea of repetition whereby the “process” is repetitive for “children” to become “readers” and, this repetitive process is narrated as an ability to not only “participate” but “with enthusiasm”, “in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances”. Reading then is “the search”. What is narrated as “the search” is already known as that which is “linguistic patterning” and “its significances” which are also known. “Reading and literacy” is that which is known within this perspective and is located in specifics as narrated here. This specificity can be read in “the” of “the search”. It is “the search” of that which is known as “patterning”, this “patterning” is “linguistic” and; the specificity of this “patterning” being “linguistic” is known to have “significances” which are “its” and thus belong to the “linguistic patterning” but are known to the narratorial perspective and need to be enthusiastically searched for by the “children” so that the “children” can then become “readers”. What can be identified as ability to “participate”, which is of “children”, is known within this perspective. It is also claimed that it is known within this perspective what “enthusiasm” is which is of “children” and not the narrator’s but, can be identified as “children” participating “with enthusiasm” and narrated as such according to the perspective of the narrator who is not part of what is narrated as “children” here.

What is at stake in the claims made here is that it is known what is required for “children” to become “readers” which is “reading and literacy”. It is known that this can be achieved if “children” not only “participate” but “participate with enthusiasm”, and when they “participate” in this way, they have to be “in” “the search” which is “for” something, in this case “linguistic patterning and its significances.” While the claim made through this narration is that all of these are known to the narratorial perspective, these claims are made on “but”, “perhaps” and “there” being “a suggestion” which is dependent on that which is “just one moment” and; all of these conditions can be met if “children might be able to”. Therefore, the implied claim here is that if “children” are not able to meet these conditions, it is then known within the narratorial perspective about “children” that “children” then cannot become “readers” and will not know what is known within this perspective as “reading and literacy”. These claims have already been made and are being read retrospectively here about what “children” are “becoming” in the present and will continue to become in the future. The claim at stake here then is that what “children” will become and how they can become this specific thing which is “reader” in this case, is already known within this perspective and is dependent on claims that have been made retrospectively. This is because it can only be retrospectively recognised what a “reader” is and that “reading and literacy” are required to become a “reader”. So, what “children” “might be able to” do in the future is already known according to this perspective.

What “Margaret Meek observes” is how “children read stories”. So, this is a claim about children’s reading based on someone’s observation who is not included in “children”. This observation is then narrated according to the perspective of the narrator, who is neither “children” nor “Margaret Meek”. Thus the claim about how “children read stories” is made by those who are not “children”, it is a claim made about “children” and their reading through a perspective within a perspective, none of which are the children’s perspective but this perspective claims to know how “children read stories”. While this claim is about how “children read stories” in particular, this is part of the claims made about “children becoming readers: reading and literacy”. Thus, how “children read stories” is how they become “readers” and this is their “reading and literacy according to this narratorial perspective. Therefore, the claims to knowledge about “children” and their “reading” are based upon observation of a perspective which is other than children’s, which is narrated framed

within the narratorial perspective which is other to both the perspective of the observer and “children”. These are claims made in retrospect but further, the claim is that it is known within the perspective of the narrator based upon Margaret Meek’s observation “that ‘children read stories’ and how they “read”. So, this is a claim to knowing what “children” do and will continue to do in terms of reading which is of “stories”. This knowledge of what is happening and will happen regarding “children” as “readers” is based on observation that has already happened and is narrated retrospectively but the claim is that this is what will continue to happen.

This observation is only about “stories” “children” “like”. It is thus known within the perspective of the observer which are the “stories” that “children” “like”. The claim according to the perspective of the narrator then is that it can be known to the perspective of the observer which “stories” “children” “like” and by implication then there are “stories” that “children” don’t like. Here is also a claim to knowledge of that which is known within the perspective of the observer, is also known to the perspective of the narrator which is then narrated as this text. The claim through this retrospective narration of that which has already been observed, is that this observation about “children” and them reading “stories they like over and over again” will continue to be the case. I can read a chronological sequence in this claim narrated as an observation about how “children read stories”. First comes the “stories” “children like” because according to the observation as narrated here this is what “they” “read” “over and over again”, then “they” discover “what happens” and “after” “they’ve discovered” is “when they pay attention to the words”. So, “children read stories they like” and not only “read” but “read” “over and over again”, they also discover “what happens”, but they do all of these without having paid “attention to the words”. Therefore, the claim at stake here is that “children” can “read stories they like over and over again”, they can also discover “what happens” without paying “attention to the words”. Yet, for “children” to become “readers” they need “to attend to words”. But it is also narrated “when” “children” do “pay attention to the words”. However, despite paying “attention to the words”, the claim still is about “children becoming readers” and not “children [being] readers”.

The “stories” “children” “like” are those which “they” “read” “over and over again”. So, if “children read” something “over and over again” they are “stories” and “stories” that “children”

“like”. Children’s liking of “stories” is about that which “they” “read”, and it is about repetition. Liking therefore is about repetition. However, through this very repetition, the “stories” change while simultaneously still being the “stories” that “children” “like”. While they continue to be “stories” that “children” “like”, they also thereafter become that in which something “happens” and “what happens” and this has been “discovered” by “children”. Then as part of the chronological sequence that this has been claimed to be according to the perspective of the observer, framed by the perspective of the narrator, these “stories” also become that which are about “words”, as after the discovery has happened, children then “pay attention to the words”. So, the claim here is that while they remain “stories” that “children” “like”, through repetition of reading, these “stories” become about discovery of “what happens” and then about paying “attention to the words”. The “words” are then separate to the “stories” as they have to be and are paid “attention to” after the “stories” have been identified as those that “children” “like”. However, they are also part of these “stories”. “Stories” that “children” “like” are those that “children read”, “over and over again”, in which something “happens”, which is “discovered” by “children”, and they also contain “words” which require paying “attention to”.

This discovery is separate from the reading while being part of the reading. It is part of the reading as it is when “children read” “over and over again” that they discover “what happens”. However, even “after they’ve discovered what happens”, “they” continue to read these “stories” “over and over again”. The reading continues further after the discovery as after that is “when they pay attention to the words”. So, the discovery has happened and it has been done by the “children”, who continue to “read” these “stories” but that which has been “discovered” is now located in the past. Paying “attention to the words” is related to this discovery as they are both part of this reading and chronologically it comes “when” the discovery has happened. But they are also distinct from each other because this discovery is located in the past and is in the past as that which has been “discovered” as “what happens” in the “stories”. Only after that, can paying “attention the words” happen. So according to the claim made here, in the “stories” that “children” “like”, discovery of “what happens” is different to paying “attention to the words” while they are both part of “children” reading and specifically reading “stories they like”. This is a repetitive process and is therefore claimed to be how children read what “they” “like”. While this is what entails “children” reading it is

still about “children becoming readers” as a continued process. So those who read are still “becoming readers” in the case of “children”.

While these claims are made in retrospect, they are about “children” becoming readers as that which is in the present, will be and will continue to be the case. Thus, the knowledge about “children”, their reading of “stories”, them “becoming readers” now and continuing to be so is based on observations “that” have already been made and that which is already known within the narratorial perspective. The claim here is that “children” do not “attend to ‘words’”. For “children [to] becom[e] readers”, for “reading and literacy” to take place, it is required that “children” “attend to words”. But I read this as a requirement from the claims made within the narratorial perspective; the perspective which locates itself within the “we”. This “we” is not “children” but has a perspective on “children becoming readers” and for that purpose knows that “children” do not “attend to ‘words’”, which is something that they need to do to become readers, while the claim just prior to this is that “children read stories” and that “they pay attention to the words”. The perspective of the narrator is not part of who “children” are but know who they are, what “they like”, what “they” do or do not do and how they do it. This perspective while locating itself within the “we” is also located outside the “we”. It is known within this perspective “what” the “we” “have” to do, which is “to find more” and “about” what. In order to know this, the perspective has to be situated outside the “we” and thus have a perspective on the “we”. Therefore, there is a shift in the position of the perspective here.

“We” “have” already found “about the means through which children can be assisted to attend to ‘words’” but the “we” “have” “to find more about” this. This is something the “we” needs to do according to the perspective of the narrator. So, what needs to be done by “we” which is “about” and for “children” is known within the perspective of the narrator, who is both outside “we” and “children” but is making claims on behalf of them. “What we have yet to find more about is the means through which children can be assisted to attend to ‘words’”. This is for the purpose “that children might be able to participate, with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances”. So, what has already been found is from the “just one moment...”, which “is a suggestion” and, the observation about “children” reading. Children’s reading then is about findings by the “we” who are not “children” but who “find” and then narrate the findings about “children



becoming readers”. These findings are then narrated, framed within the perspective of a narrator who is both part of the “we” and is excluded from this “we” as it has a perspective on this “we”.

According to Margaret Meek’s observation which is narrated as framed within the perspective of the narrator of this text, “children” “pay attention to the words”. However, according to the perspective of the narrator, “children” do not “attend to ‘words’”, but “can be assisted to” do so. So, while the ability might be there for “children” “to attend to ‘words’”, this requires assistance which in turn requires “means”. This is something that has already been found and thus the “we have yet to find more about” this. For “children” “to attend to ‘words’”, not only requires assistance but it also requires “the means through which” this assistance can be provided. While there is “more” to be found “about” this “means” “yet”, it is known that this “means” is required.

Children’s reading is about them attending “to ‘words’”. For “children” to become “readers” then is about “what” “we” “find” “about” “the means” and therefore provide “the means” for assistance “to attend to ‘words’”. According to the narratorial perspective, “there is nothing natural about these processes.” This is about “children “becoming” something other than “children” which is “readers” while still staying “children” and therefore “becoming readers” but “readers” who are still identifiable as “children” who are “becoming readers” and not as those who have become “readers” and are not identifiable as “children” anymore. According to the claims made in this narrative, for “children” to become “readers” and for “reading and literacy” there are specific requirements. These are: “children” participating “with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances”, reading “stories they like over and over again” but more importantly paying “attention to the words” and the “we” finding “more about” “the means through which children can be assisted to attend to ‘words’”. These are narrated as “processes”, “processes” “about” which “there is nothing natural”. This is suggested “about” “these processes” by “Heath’s work, and that of others who have followed her lead”. The narratorial perspective here is not Heath and is not part of “Heath’s work” but it seems to be part of the “others who have followed her lead”. This perspective is split as it is located within the “others” and narrates the suggestion that “there is nothing natural about these processes”; it is also positioned outside the “others” as it has a perspective on them and it is making a claim on behalf of the “others”. What “Heath’s work, and that of others” “suggests” “about these processes” is

framed within the perspective of the narrator of this text. Thus, “there is nothing natural about these processes” according to the perspective of the narrator as well. The implication here is that “these processes” could be “natural” or there could be something “natural about” them but that is not the case. So, while “we have yet to find more about” “the means”, it is known according to “Heath’s work, and that of others who have followed her lead”, that “there is nothing natural about these processes”. The finding “more” then is bound within this framework of “these processes”.

“Attention” is required for “children” to become readers”. This “attention” is the “attention” that “children” “pay to the words- after they’ve discovered what happens”. “Attention” has “processes” as these “processes” “are” “of” attention”. “Attention” can be “voluntary” or otherwise. What is claimed to be “voluntary attention” can be analysed meticulously in terms of its “ontogenesis”. “Voluntary attention” is uniform for “children” as can be read from it being uniformly meticulously analysable by Vygotsky. According to the narratorial perspective the “processes of attention are” not “natural” but more specifically there are degrees of not natural-ness here. These can be read from “nothing natural” and “deeply social”. “Deeply social” is the very opposite to “these processes” being “apparently natural”. That which is “social” then is different from being “natural” and the deeper the “social” is the more not “natural” it is. What “voluntary attention” for “children” is, is known within the perspective of the narrator. It is identifiable within this perspective where the “voluntary attention” starts which can be read from the “meticulous analysis of the ontogenesis of voluntary attention”. There is an idea here that what this “attention” is about has developed into something which I read from “ontogenesis”, however through this development while it has become different, this difference is still identifiable as that which is “voluntary attention”. While the “attention” in discussion here is children’s and is thus “voluntary” for them, according to the claims made in this narration, it is available for “analysis”, or rather “meticulous analysis” which is “Vygotsky’s”. This “analysis” is then narrated according to the perspective of the narrator here. This “meticulous analysis” is for a purpose; it is narrated for the purpose here that it “shows” something. This narration of the “analysis” is thus a showing about the “voluntary attention” of children by those who are not children. As “these processes” are for “children becoming readers”, I can read from the claims made here that “children becoming readers” is not “natural”. It is “deeply social” as induced by

these “processes” of “attention” which seem to be an absolute requirement for “children becoming readers” to pay “attention” to “words”. that which has been narrated as “voluntary attention” is something which has to be paid by the “children” to “words”. “These” “processes of attention are” “apparently natural”. This might be apparent according to the perspective of the narrator, but they are not “natural” within this perspective. So “these processes” being “apparently natural” is a claim on behalf of someone who is not the narrator, but the claim is made according to the perspective of the narrator.

This is a seeming and not a being. But what “seems” is claimed to be the “resolution” for “children becoming readers”. The aim here is “to develop a different reading”. “Different” because the “reading” that is now does not “include the possibility of children delighting [...] in the nature of a text’s composition” or doing so “intelligently and critically” . And, even if they do so this would exclude “their enjoyment of the constructed story”. All of these are claimed to be known within the perspective of the narrator who is not the “children” who are “reading”. According to this perspective “offering children”, “some access”, “to semiotic tools” is enough to remake their “reading”. There seems to be the “potential” to offer more than “some” “access” but within this perspective “offering” “some access” is what is required. What is required to change the children’s “reading” is known within this perspective. What the “children” do now with “a text’s composition” is still identified as “reading” however, a “different reading” is what seems to be the requirement according to the claims made here. This claimed difference is subsumed under “reading” however this difference is still sought after. But this “different reading” is about a “reading pedagogy”.

The claim is that there “may” be “some potential to develop a different reading pedagogy”. So, what “may” be the case in terms of “reading” which “may” become “different” is about a “pedagogy” and this is dependent on what is already known, and this is how it “seems”. “A different reading pedagogy” is required. This is something that can be developed, and this development is a “remaking”. This is because something is not included in what the “reading pedagogy” is now. That which is not included is “children delighting intelligently and critically in the nature of a text’s composition without excluding their enjoyment of the constructed story”. The claim at stake here is that it is known within the perspective of the narrator which is not “children”, whether the “children”

are “delighting” or not; if they are “delighting” what is “delighting”, intelligently” “and” critically” for the “children” and, what is “their enjoyment of the constructed story”. The claim that “a different reading pedagogy” might be developed is a claim about what may be done in future compared to what is now. This claim is made in retrospect based upon a retrospective reading of what is claimed to be the current “reading pedagogy”. What “may” be developed as different is a claim to difference made in retrospect about what is now and thus “may” be “different” in the future. However, that which may be read as the now in this situation is already that which has been the case, and only then can it be read retrospectively, and these claims can be made about it. All these claims are based on what “seems”, what then “may” be, potentially and this is about a “possibility”. So, the future of the current “reading pedagogy” needs to be “different” according to the claims made here. While this is known, what it potentially might be remade into is what “may” be the case if what “seems” is followed in terms of its “possibility”. All of these claims are framed within the perspective of the narrator. The implication of these claims is that while the narrator is not “children”, it knows what “reading pedagogy” needs to be developed and remade into for the “children” in the future based upon that which has been in the past and is also currently the case according to the claims made in this text. The implication of these claims are that “children” are all the same and there is no scope of difference among the “children”; there is no difference in the “reading” of “children” and their “reading” is uniformly the same. Those who are identified as “children” remain the same and identifiable as such through that which has been, is currently happening and will potentially happen in the future, in which there is a possibility of “difference” in terms of the “reading” of children and “reading pedagogy”.

There are different kinds of “semiotic tools”. Those to which “some access” must be offered to “children” are the ones “which enable them to describe visual and verbal patterning in literary text”. Which “tools” might “enable them” is known to the perspective which is not “them” but has a perspective on “them”. So, the claim here about “them” is that they are not able to do so now, and this is a claim in retrospect because it can only be identified retrospectively what the “them” are unable to do. However, what the “them” might be enabled to do in the future is already known within this perspective and is based upon the claims made in retrospect upon that which has already happened in

the past. But the claim is also that this is what is happening now, and this “might” change if the “tools” are offered according to what is known to this perspective.

“Literary text” is that which has “visual and verbal patterning” and to be able to “describe” this means to read differently. But this is about a development so then this is a continued “process”. What is known and is already identifiable as describing “visual and verbal patterning in literary text” is about developing “a different reading” and this is a continuous process. “Delighting” in “reading” which is done by “children” is not about “a text”, not just the “text’s composition” rather “in the nature of a text’s composition”. So “a text” is that which has a “composition” which has “the nature”, and all these are known within this perspective. A “different reading pedagogy” for “children” is required as the current one does not “include” “children delighting intelligently and critically in the nature of a text’s composition”. “Delighting” in this case can be done “intelligently” “and” “critically”. Intelligent “delighting” is different from “delighting” “critically” but they are both “delighting” despite their difference. They are both required for developing “a different reading pedagogy” for “children” according to the perspective of the narrator who is not “children” but is making claims on behalf of “children”. This perspective knows what it is for “children” to delight, what is “delighting intelligently” and what is “delighting” “critically” for “children”. It is known within this perspective that a “story” is “constructed” which is part of “the nature of a text’s composition”. It is implied here that when “children” are “delighting intelligently and critically”, “their enjoyment of the constructed story” is excluded, and this should not be the case. Therefore “a different reading pedagogy” is required as to “include” something “without excluding” something else. What should be included and what shouldn’t be excluded is known within this perspective but this inclusion and lack of exclusion is about a difference to that which already exists. While the claims are of inclusion in both cases here, it is in effect about exclusions which I read in the claim that current “reading pedagogy” needs to be changed and thus excluded in terms of excluding “the possibility” where “children” do not delight “intelligently and critically in the nature of a text’s composition”. But the “delighting” is to be done by “children” and “intelligently and critically” which has to be according to what is claimed to be “delighting intelligently and critically” within the perspective of the narrator.

What is at stake in the claims made within this narrative about “children becoming readers is that “children” are not “natural” “readers”. This is because they do not “attend to ‘words’” even though “they” might “pay attention to the words”. “They” can be enabled and “assisted” to do so as that which is “voluntary” in terms of “attention” is a “process” which is not only “nothing natural” but contrarily “deeply social”. “Children becoming readers” is about “reading and literacy” which is about the ability “to participate, with enthusiasm, in the search for linguistic patterning and its significances”. “Reading and literacy” is about “children delighting intelligently and critically in the nature of a text’s composition without excluding their enjoyment of the constructed story”. “Children becoming readers” then is about how they become “readers” according to the known parameters which are of “reading and literacy” and are known to be so within the perspective of the narrator of this text. These claims are made about children’s reading and according to the text children’s reading only entails reading “stories”. This “deeply social” “process” of reading for “children” “seems” to be a requirement and it is an issue which requires “resolution” in terms of finding “more about” “the means through which children can be assisted to ‘words’”. According to this perspective this assistance needs to be provided for “children becoming readers” so that they can read and thus enjoy “the constructed story” in the terms that are identifiable as such within this perspective. These claims then are all about “tools” of assistance which can be provided, ideas of ability of the “children” and the inadequacy of this ability and therefore the need for assistance through “means” and “tools” in order to “enable” “children” to become “readers”. So, while the “children” might already be reading “stories they like over and over again and then pay(ing) attention to the words” and also discovering “what happens” in these “stories”, this is not enough. For “children” to be considered as “becoming readers” they must be “able” according to that which is identifiable as markers of ability in terms of “reading and literacy” within the perspective of the narrator here. These claims, the “resolution” provided here, the issues broached through this narrative about “children” and their reading and the “potential to develop a different reading pedagogy” and “remaking it” is what it is to understand “children’s literature” according to the narrative premise of this text.

## IX. The Framework for “the mighty child”

Clementine Beauvais' *The Mighty Child Time and power in children's literature* explores “theoretical debates around the constructions of time and power which characterize conceptions of childhood and adulthood in children's literature” (2015). According to the abstract “the ‘hidden’, didactic adult of children's literature, ... is not solely the dictatorial planner of the child's future, but also a disempowered entity, yearning for unpredictability in the semi-educational, semi-aesthetic endeavour of the children's book.” I have chosen to discuss in detail a part of the concluding chapter of this book as it claims to lean on “current work in the field of children's literature theory, on French phenomenological existentialism, and on the philosophy and sociology of childhood”. This book was pertinent to my research as it “is addressed to contemporary theorists and critics of children's literature”<sup>3</sup>. However, on further analysis I found that the approach to the concept of time in children's literature in this work is very different to where my readings and focus are inclined and headed towards.

In Beauvais' text discussed below I read the idea of “restrictive ‘determiners’”. This idea is taken by Rose from the French writer on children's fiction, Marc Soriano. This idea is helpful here for my reading as I discuss the meanings of the claims made about “adult power in children's books”, the “framework” for this, “the mighty child” and what then is time in children's books and “within this framework”. I read out the underlying implications behind the process through which the claims are being made. “Children's books” here operate according to what Rose calls “a régime of attraction which draws the child straight into the path of identification”. “The path of identification” is set out for children according to the narratorial perspective in terms of what is known, desirable and aspirational for adults. Repetition is what I read here because “of what it implies by way of something uncertain which therefore has to be constantly reenacted.” “Adult” can be referred to as a subject. Rose refers to “the very constitution of the adult as a subject, a process” which is repetitive in itself as it is repeated through the books which the adult “gives to the child”. (Rose, 1984, p. 141) Repetitions, that which is aspirational, a known future, the predictable unpredictability, that which is known to the

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<sup>3</sup> <https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/books/9789027269157#overview> John Benjamins e-Platform

point that the unknown is also known, are the different parts that constitute the “restrictive ‘determiners’” that I am reading at play in the piece below.

Within this framework, adult “power” in children’s books can only oscillate between authoritative representations of the future, and calls to the mighty child<sup>4</sup> for a future which would not be authoritative – and can therefore only be unpredictable<sup>5</sup>. Unpredictability is profoundly human; arguably, it characterises only the works of a consciousness. Beauvoir mentions the “shock of the unpredictable” (1948: 59) which characterises all human encounters. Grimaldi also contrasts the “time of physics”, which is the time of predictability, with the “time of life”, which is the time of “creation, and consequently of *unpredictability*” (1992: 114, original emphasis). Biesta concurs: the unpredictability of others’ behaviours is the condition of one’s existence: “one needs others who take up ones’ beginnings, always in new and unpredictable ways, in order to come into the world” (2006: 40). The future, in all its desirable unpredictability, is the locus of human aspirations. Even when adults are apparently asking children to replicate what they themselves did when they were young, even when adults are apparently asking children to further the endeavours they will not have time to finish, they are often placing before them ways of escaping what has been predicted.

(Beauvais, 2015, p. 208)

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<sup>4</sup> According to Beauvais, “The child as a symbol is mighty because it “owns” the only thing that the adult does not: the future, and the indeterminacy that goes with it... the mighty child is all the mightier because it belongs to the realm of the imagination, to the symbolic sphere, and is inseparable from contemporary constructions of childhood; it therefore invades every representation of childhood, every instance of dealing with a child, every reflection on childhood.” (Beauvais, 2015, p. 57)

<sup>5</sup> The “disempowered” and not “authoritative” “adult power” can be read in terms of how Lee Edelman broaches the relation of the child to futurity in *No Future*: “For Politics, however radical the means by which specific constituencies attempt to produce a more desirable social order, remains, at its core, conservative insofar as it works to *affirm* a structure, to *authenticate* social order, which it then intends to transmit to the future in the form of its inner Child. That Child remains the perpetual horizon of every acknowledged politics, the fantasmatic beneficiary of every political intervention. (Edelman, 2004, pp. 2-3, italics in original)



“Children’s books” are different from other “books” while being similar to other “books”. “Children’s books” are distinct because of being “children’s” and this is narrated according to a perspective which is not “children’s” but has a perspective on what is “children’s”, what are “books” and what then are children. “Books” can then be “children’s” or not. “Adult ‘power’” is distinguishable from other powers because of being “adult”. “Adult” is not what is “children’s”, “adult” is not children but “adult ‘power’” is in “children’s books”. Despite being “in children’s books” it is still known and therefore narrated as “adult”. “Books” are that “in” which there can be “power”. But this “power” is of another who is other to the one whose “books” they are. These claims are made within a perspective which is other to both “adult” and children. “Adult ‘power’” is other than itself as it is narrated in terms of what it “can” do “and” “therefore” what it “can” “be”. Therefore, “adult ‘power’” needs to “be” something else but “can” “only be” that which it “can” do which is “only oscillate between”. “Adult ‘power’” “can” potentially be something else but “can therefore only be unpredictable” because of what it is “in” which is “children’s books”. Therefore, because of being “in children’s books” “adult” “power” “can” “be” “only” and in this I read, that “adult ‘power’” could hence have been other than that which is this “only” but is this “only” because of what it is “in”.

“Adult ‘power’ in children’s books” is distinct from “power” which is different from “adult ‘power’ which is different from that which is not “in children’s books”. “Adult ‘power’ in children’s books” “can” “only be” something because of that which is “therefore”. What “therefore” is “and” as “adult ‘power’ in children’s books can only oscillate between” two predetermined positions. But none of which that “adult ‘power’ oscillates “between” is “children’s books”. “Children’s books” are constituted as what is “in” it. While the claim is that “adult ‘power’ is “in children’s books”; “authoritative representations of the future, and calls to the mighty child for a future which would not be authoritative” are not “children’s books” and are not “adult ‘power’”. They are “only” what “adult ‘power’ in children’s books can” “oscillate between”, therefore the implied claim is that “authoritative representations of the future, and calls to the mighty child for a future which would not be authoritative” are also “in children’s books”. “Children’s books” then are constantly something other than themselves and are thus constituted in terms of what is “in” them. While the claim is that “adult

'power' in children's books can only oscillate between authoritative representations of the future, and calls to the mighty child for a future which would not be authoritative - and can therefore only be unpredictable", this is not necessarily the case. It "can" "be" so "within this framework" but that does not mean that it is so. Also, this "can" "only be" as such "within this framework" and therefore that which is not "within this framework" will therefore "be" different to that which "can therefore only be" "within this framework". However, even when it is not "within this framework"<sup>6</sup> while being different because of not being "within this framework", it will still be "adult 'power' which is 'in children's books'".

"Authoritative representations" are "of the future" but are not "the future". "Authoritative representations" are different from "representations" as they are "authoritative" which are different from other "authoritative representations" because of being what they are "of". "The future" is known, definite and is that "of" which there are "authoritative representations". These claims are made according to a narratorial perspective which is outside these "representations" and outside "the future" but knows "the future" and what "authoritative representations" are and what they can be "of" and that "the future" is that "of" which there are "authoritative representations". "The future", "of" which there are "authoritative representations", is different from "a future" which could be any "future", but despite this difference it is still "future". So "future" then is that which can be different, is claimed to be known and also unknown but still known in terms of what it "would not be". Yet, this is known and narrated as that which is "future" and is thus different from that which is not part of "future". So that which is unknown is still located within terms of that which is already known. As the "calls" are "for a future which would not be authoritative" so the implication here is that the "future" then is "authoritative". But this is different from the "representations of the future" which is "authoritative".

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<sup>6</sup> I read the claims made here about what is within this framework, how it matters and why by referring to Derrida's discussions about deconstruction, especially as a process or a method that happens and is applied from within a framework: "...an analysis which tries to find out how their thinking works or does not work, to find the tensions, the contradictions, the heterogeneity within their own corpus... What is the law of this self-deconstruction, this 'auto-deconstruction'? Deconstruction is not a method or some tool that you apply to something from the outside... Deconstruction is something which happens and which happens inside." (Derrida, 1997A, pp. 9 -10)

“Calls” are “for” something, and this is known within a perspective which is outside these “calls”, but the claim is that it is known what “calls” are “for” and “to” whom<sup>7</sup>, within this perspective. “Adult ‘power’ in children’s books” does not call but “can only oscillate between authoritative representations of the future, and calls to the mighty child for a future which would not be authoritative”. While “adult ‘power’ in children’s books can” does not mean that it does. These “calls” are external and other to the “adult ‘power’ in children’s books”. However, “adult ‘power’” is narrated in terms of being “in children’s books” which is further narrated in terms of what it “can only oscillate between” and therefore is narrated in part in terms of these “calls”. “The mighty child” is other to and distinct from another “child” who then is not “mighty”. “The mighty child” is known, specific and singular which therefore excludes and others the “child” who is not “the mighty child”. “The mighty child” while known as “the child” who is “the mighty child” is part of that which “can therefore only be unpredictable”. Thus, that which “can therefore only be unpredictable” is known and known in different parts. “The mighty child” is neither “the future” nor “a future” but is called “to” “for a future”. The call is “for a future which would not be authoritative”. So “the mighty child” is located outside of that which is “authoritative”. The authority for that “which would not be authoritative” therefore lies somewhere else. The calls “to the mighty child” is “for a future” which I read to be unknown, but it is known as “a future” and what it “would not be” to “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” which is bound “within this framework” which is narrated as framed within the narratorial perspective. So, what “the mighty child” is called “to” and “for” is external to, other to, not known to and is known in terms of those who are not “the mighty child” but know “the mighty child” as such and claim that “the mighty child” is that which these “calls” can be made “to” and “for”.

“Unpredictability is profoundly human” which is different from what “unpredictable” is. “Unpredictable” is something other than itself as it is what something else “can” “only be”. But it is then also singular while being other to itself and thus always something else as it is what something other than “unpredictable” “can” “be” but then it “can” “only be unpredictable”. In this claim to “only” “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” is “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” which is “within

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<sup>7</sup> This is an example of “the fantasy” that Rose identifies “behind the concept of children’s fiction”. “The idea that there is a child who is simply there to be addressed and that speaking to it” or in this case calling “might be simple”. (Rose, 1984, p. 1)

this framework” but it “can” “be” something else which is that it “can” “be unpredictable” but, in this being “unpredictable”, it is claimed to be “only” despite all else that it is narrated to “be”. In what “adult “power” in children's books”, “within this framework” “can therefore only be” I read a deferral. The claim is that “adult ‘power’” which is “in children’s books” is “within this framework” but “can be” and “can therefore only be” something other than “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” while continuing to be “adult ‘power’ in children’s books”. Therefore what “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” “can” “be” and “can therefore only be” is a constant deferral.

“Unpredictability is profoundly human” so “unpredictability” is other than itself while also being “unpredictability”. This “is” the case. So, “unpredictability” while being “unpredictability” “is” also that which is “profoundly human” and therefore is not “unpredictability”. “Unpredictability” then is constituted in terms of it being “human” and “profoundly” so. The narratorial perspective is outside the “profoundly human”, has a perspective on the “profoundly human” and is thus not part of that which is “profoundly human”. “Profoundly human” is different from “human”. What “unpredictability is”, is different from what “it characterises”. “A consciousness”<sup>8</sup> can be any “consciousness” so there is more than “a consciousness”. In the narration that “unpredictability is” something other than what “it characterises” and is different from “unpredictable” but the “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” “within this framework” “can” “only be unpredictable”, I read a claim to deferral while there is also a claim to knowledge here about what “adult ‘power’ in children's books” “within this framework” is as also that which it “can” “be” and “can” “only be”. So, there is a constant shift in claims being made about what “adult ‘power’ in children’s books” is and specifically

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<sup>8</sup> Consciousness: “Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure ‘I’; or I am in it only as a pure ‘This’. I, *this* particular I, am certain of *this* particular thing, not because I, *qua* consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways; and also not because *the thing* of which I am certain, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things. Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty: here neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation; the ‘I’ does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the ‘thing’ signify something that has a host of qualities. On the contrary, the thing *is*, and it *is*, merely because it *is*. It *is*; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure *being*, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. Similarly, certainty as a *connection* is an immediate pure connection: consciousness is ‘I’, nothing more, a pure ‘This’; the singular consciousness knows a pure ‘This’, or the single item.” (Hegel, 1998, p.79)

“within this framework”. The “adult ‘power’” is about that which is “within this framework” but what it “can” “only be” “within this framework” “is” not “within this framework”. So, for something which is located “within this framework” to “be” something other than itself “within this framework”, is that which it “can” “be” and that is not “within this framework”; and this “can only be” the case. What is “within this framework” and what is not “within this framework” is narrated according to a perspective which is outside this “framework”, but the claim is that it is known within this perspective what “this framework” is and what can be “within” or not “within” it.

“Unpredictability is profoundly human” and “the shock of the unpredictable” is that “which characterises all human encounters” but that which “can therefore only be unpredictable” is not part of that which is “human” as neither “unpredictability” nor “unpredictable” are “within this framework”. As “Beauvoir mentions” that “which characterises all human encounters”, “Beauvoir” then is not part of “all human encounters” and is not “human”. This is narrated according to a perspective which is neither “Beauvoir”, nor “human”. This perspective is also not part of “all human encounters” but has a perspective on “Beauvoir”, the “human” and “all human encounters”. So, there is a claim at stake here to a knowledge about “all” while being located outside this “all” and that which is “human”<sup>9</sup>.

“The shock of the unpredictable” is different from other shocks while being a shock as it is “the” specific “shock” which is further distinct because of being what it is “of”. “The unpredictable” is known as something “of” which is “the shock”. “Human encounters” can be different within themselves but “the shock of the unpredictable” which characterises” them, is what makes them similar as “human encounters” which are then “all”, while implying differences amongst them. What “human encounters” are, that “encounters” can be “human”, that they can be characterised, are narrated according to a perspective which is not “human” and is outside “all human encounters”. “The shock of the unpredictable” is not “all human encounters” but because “the shock of the

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<sup>9</sup> There are underlying assumptions here about the “child” and children's literature which “permeate explanations of ‘identification’” (Lesnik-Oberstein, 2003, p. 26). “Identification” here is a problematic concept as it cannot account for “imaginative insight into what another person may be feeling, and the contemplation of possible human experiences which we are not at that moment going through ourselves” (Harding, 1967, p.7)

unpredictable” “characterises all human encounters” thus, “all human encounters” are distinguished from those which are not “encounters” and further not “human encounters”. Therefore, “the shock of the unpredictable” which is other to itself as well because of being the “which”, “which characterises all human encounters”, is that which is known. “The shock of the unpredictable” is known as such and is itself distinguished and distinguishes “all human encounters” because of being this “which”, “which characterises all human encounters” and thus, “all human encounters” while being “all human encounters” are also other to themselves as they are constituted in this narration in terms of what “characterises” them.

“Grimaldi” is not “Beauvoir” and, to mention is not to contrast. However, what “Beauvoir mentions” while not being what “Grimaldi” “contrasts” is similar to each other because of what is “also” the case. That which is “of unpredictability” is not “of the unpredictable”. It “is the time” which is “of ‘creation, and consequently of unpredictability’” while it is “the “shock of the unpredictable”. There are multiple differences here, yet that which “Grimaldi” “contrasts” “which is” “of unpredictability” is “also” to what “Beauvoir mentions” as “of the unpredictable”. In this “also” while I read a claim to similarity, I also read claims to that which is additional and therefore different. “The shock of” is similar to “the time of” because of what is “unpredictable” and “unpredictability”. However, what “the shock” is “of” is not what “the time” is “of” just as “the shock” is not “the time”. In what “Grimaldi” “contrasts” there are claims to different times, but they are all known as “the time”. So that which is “the” singular, specific, known “time” has multiple differences within it and despite and through these differences, it is constituted as this singular, known “the time”. “The time” “which is the time of” one thing is also claimed to be “the time of” another thing. This one thing while being different to the other thing is narrated and understood in terms of the other. “The time” is then that which is “of” something. In this of-ness of “time” are claims to difference, similarities and knowledge. “The “time of physics”<sup>10</sup> is other to itself as it is the “which”. “The time of physics” while

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<sup>10</sup> Piaget elaborates upon the different types of time and the differences within time in his book “devoted to the development of time concepts in children”. While discussing the time of physics in this context, he wrote that “it is significant that Bergson, far from applauding the fact that Einsteinian time presents physics with a much closer model of psychological time (we might say of Bergsonian time) than Newtonian time did, challenged relativity theory with the claim that relative time was a characteristic of life alone. (Piaget, 1969, Pp. 278- 279).

it is claimed to be “the time of predictability” is also not “the time of predictability” as it is “the time of physics”. However, as “the time of physics” is claimed to be that “which is the time of predictability” therefore that which is “of physics” is then that which is “of predictability”. “Physics” then is “predictability” while also being “physics” and therefore other to “predictability”. But as I read here that one thing is narrated in terms of the other<sup>11</sup> and is thus known in this way, therefore there is a claim here that “physics” can be known as “predictability”.

“The future” is known to be “the future” and more than that it is also known to be “the locus of human aspirations”. I read an irony in the claim that in this perspective that which is “in all its desirable unpredictability, is the locus of human aspirations”. There is an irony between the claim to the “desirable unpredictability” and the notion that this is already known as “the future” and “the locus of human aspirations”. So, this is a perspective on another perspective where the knowability of the “unpredictability” is what produces the irony. “Unpredictability is profoundly human” so it is predictable and already known in this way. Also, that which is not “human” and specifically not “profoundly human” is not “unpredictability”. So, the narratorial perspective is outside that which is “human” as it knows and therefore predicts what “unpredictability is”. Despite being external to that which is “human”, what is “profoundly human” is known within this perspective.

“Adults” are not “children”. “Adults” can ask and “are” therefore “asking children” but this is “apparently” so. So, those who “are apparently asking children to replicate what they themselves did

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<sup>11</sup> “Among the countless differences cropping up here we find in every case that the crucial one is that, in sense certainty, pure being at once splits up into what we have called the two 'Thises', one 'This' as 'I', and the other 'This' as object. When *we* reflect on this difference, we find that neither one nor the other is only *immediately* present in sense-certainty, but each is at the same time *mediated*: I have this certainty *through* something else, viz. the thing; and it, similarly, is in sense certainty through something else, viz. *through* the 'I'.

It is not just we who make this distinction between essence and instance, between immediacy and mediation; on the contrary, we find it within sense-certainty itself, and it is to be taken up in the form in which it is present there, not as we have just defined it. One of the terms is posited in sense-certainty in the form of a simple, immediate being, essence, the *object*; the other, however, is posited as what is unessential and mediated, something which in sense-certainty is not *in itself* but through [the mediation of] an other, the 'I', a *knowing* which knows the object only because the object is, while the knowing may either be or not be. But the *object* is: it is what is true, or it is the essence. It is, regardless of whether it is known or not; and it remains, even if it is not known, whereas there is no knowledge if the object is not there.” (Hegel, 1998, p.80)

when they were young” are other to “children” and “children” are those who do not do this “asking”. “Children” are not “young” as it is “adults” who “were young”. But these “adults” are also not “young” anymore. So, while neither the “children”, nor “adults” are “young”, what “young” is, is known within and narrated according to a perspective which is not “young” either. This perspective is also neither “adult” nor “children”, but the claim is that it is known within this perspective what “adult” and “children” “are”, what “they were” and “when”.

“Concurs”, “mentions” and “contrasts” are all about the idea of predictability and “unpredictability” which in this perspective are seen to be about a concurring and a contrasting. But in “Biesta concurs: the unpredictability of others’ behaviours is the condition of one’s existence: “one needs others who take up ones’ beginnings, always in new and unpredictable ways, in order to come into the world”, I read within this perspective which is on Biesta’s perspective all kinds of predictable “unpredictability”. “Even when adults are apparently asking children to replicate what they themselves did when they were young, even when adults are apparently asking children to further the endeavours they will not have time to finish, they are often placing before them ways of escaping what has been predicted.” The claim here is that what is seen according to another perspective as the “when” where “adults are” “asking children to replicate what they themselves did when they were young” and the “when” where “adults are” “asking children to further the endeavours they will not have time to finish”, is not really the case as it is “apparently” so. Through this “apparently”, the narratorial perspective others itself to the perspective within which the “when” what “adults are” is. “Adults are” different in the different whens. So, there is more than one “when”. While these whens are similar to each other because of being “when”, they are distinctive because of what “adults are” or, “what they themselves did” and what “they were” in each “when”.

What “time” is, is known. “Time” is known within the narratorial perspective and the claim is that “adults” who are other to this perspective also know what “time” is as they know that “they will not have time to finish” “the endeavours”. “Time” is that which “they will” have as well as “they will not have” “to finish”. So that which “they will” have as well as “not have” are both “time”. While “to



finish” “they” need to “have time”<sup>12</sup> and “they will not have time to finish” are both known, why “they will not have time to finish” is not narrated. But “time” is that which has to be had “to finish” “the endeavours”. “What has been predicted” is different to “unpredictability”. Ironically, the “ways of escaping what has been predicted” is to achieve “unpredictability” yet, it is not “unpredictability”, neither is it part of this “unpredictability”. In the narration of “when adults are apparently asking children to replicate what they themselves did when they were young, even when adults are apparently asking children to further the endeavours they will not have time to finish”, I read “adult ‘power’”. But this “adult ‘power’” is that which is “apparent”. In “when adults are apparently asking children to replicate what they themselves did when they were young” and, “when adults are apparently asking children to further the endeavours they will not have time to finish”, I read “authoritative representations of the future”. In “when they are often placing before them ways of escaping what has been predicted”, I read “calls to the mighty child for a future which would not be authoritative”. But this is ironic as this “can therefore only be unpredictable” but what “can” “be unpredictable” is already known and predicted and, is narrated as that which can “only” be so. That “they are often placing before them ways of escaping what has been predicted” is also already known and “predicted”. But the implication is that this is what leads to “the future” which is known and known as “desirable” by another because of being “the future” which is “in all its desirable unpredictability”.

“The time of life” is different to and therefore what “Grimaldi also contrasts” to “the “time of physics”, which is the time of predictability”. “The time of life” which is narrated as that “which is the time of “creation, and consequently of unpredictability” is not “unpredictability”. “The time of

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<sup>12</sup> According to Derrida: “What is it *to have time*? If a time belongs, it is because the word *time* designates metonymically less time itself than the things with which one fills it, with which one fills the form of time, time *as form*. It is a matter, then, of the things one does *in the meantime* (cependant) or the things one has at one's disposal *during* (pendant) this time. Therefore, as time does not belong to anyone as such, one can no more *take* it, itself, than *give* it. Time already begins to appear as that which undoes this distinction between taking and giving, therefore also between receiving and giving, perhaps between receptivity and activity, or even between the being-affected and the affecting of any affection. Apparently and according to common logic or economics, one can only exchange, one can only take or give, by way of metonymy, what is *in time*.” (Derrida, 1992, p.3)

life” is “consequently of unpredictability” but is other to “unpredictability”. Claims are made in this text about that which is “unpredictable” and that which is “unpredictability”. “Unpredictable” is not “unpredictability” but they are narrated in terms of association with each other via multiple and different other components. What is “unpredictable” and what “unpredictability” is as a derivative, is narrated because of that which “can therefore only be unpredictable”. But while “adult ‘power’ in children’s books can... therefore only be unpredictable”, “unpredictable” is constituted in myriad other ways. “Unpredictable” then can be read as an umbrella term within which there are multiple differences and various components which are all different to each other but are all narrated as that which is “of the unpredictable” and therefore by extension “of unpredictability”. So those which are multiple and unknowable, are in fact in perspective always knowable because they are known to be unknowable and, in their unknowability, they are known. This “unpredictability” has in a sense nothing to do with “time” because it is about a “human” which is outside of “time”. There is no “time” that does anything to the “human” because even “unpredictability is profoundly human”.

## X. 'If you knew Time as well as I do'

Time as an idea, the concepts of time and the “personification” of time in the *Alice* texts have been of continued interest in realms wherever it is deemed fit and fanciful to look at time in the arena of literature. While the *Alice* texts are delightful and full of exciting material in themselves, how time and space are negotiated and written about in these texts retain noteworthy attention for multiple reasons. One of them being that Charles Lutwidge Dodgson (alias Lewis Carroll) was a mathematician and logician at Christ Church, Oxford. “It is argued, Dodgson was a ‘schizophrenic’, both a mathematician and a writer for children (as if mathematics and verbal play were somehow incompatible).” (Rose, 1984)

Gillian Beer discusses the *Alice* texts as books which contain “all the puzzles about identity and time”. She mentions both in her writings and her lecture at Harvard University on ‘Alice in Time’, that what time in the *Alice* texts is, is because of what Charles Dodgson “was aware of” as he was a “mathematician and logician” (Beer, 2016, p. 28), (Beer, 2011). This is the premise of the Hatter’s tea party for Beer. However, whilst “Alice has been saved as a classic for children, ... the question of what we mean by that ‘for’ - the question of its more difficult implications - remains unasked” (Rose, 1984, p. 3). Beer discusses “somatic time” and “our fundamental and universal experience of somatic time” in the *Alice* books. She discusses how time is contrary in the “experience of children” as these children “are always in a world scaled for adults”. This is different to my discussions of time which deal with what perspective time is being narrated according to and, what is invested in the claims made within such a perspective. Beer’s reading of time in ‘Alice in Time’ is about a universality where the time is “of the young”, but this time, while being unchangeable, is that which always changes. I read this when she writes of Charles Dodgson’s “infatuation with childhood as a form of eternity, as well as with particular children. Particular children grow up and cease to be children: it's happened to us all” (Beer, 2016, p. 43).

My analysis here differs from Beer's and is on the lines of Rose. Beer's premise is a clear demarcation, operating on what is adult, what is child and therefore what is children's and, what is not. This is how she deals with discussing time in *Alice* texts in her chapter 'Alice in time'. However, I am operating on Rosean theory of closely reading the language. What then is time in the *Alice* texts, exploring ideas of time through identity and meaning as they can be read from and through language? What is time when read through meaning, knowledge, perspective, whose perspective and why? What is it when I read the I, the you and, the different types of knowing in the text?

“Have you guessed the riddle yet?” the Hatter said, turning to Alice again.

“No, I give it up,” Alice replied. “What’s the answer?”

“I haven’t the slightest idea,” said the Hatter.

“Nor I,” said the March Hare.

Alice sighed wearily. “I think you might do something better with the time,” she said, “than wasting it in asking riddles that have no answers.”

“If you knew Time as well as I do,” said the Hatter, “you wouldn’t talk about wasting it. It's him.”

“I don’t know what you mean,” said Alice.

“Of course you don’t!” the Hatter said, tossing his head contemptuously. “I dare say you never even spoke to Time!”

“Perhaps not,” Alice cautiously replied; “but I know I have to beat time when I learn music.”

“Ah! That accounts for it,” said the Hatter. “He won’t stand beating. Now, if you only kept on good terms with him, he’d do almost anything you liked with the clock. For instance, suppose it were nine o’clock in the morning, just time to begin lessons: you’d only have to whisper a hint to Time, and round goes the clock in a twinkling! Half-past one, time for dinner!”

(“I only wish it was,” the March Hare said to itself in a whisper.)

“That would be grand, certainly,” said Alice thoughtfully; “but then—I shouldn’t be hungry for it, you know.”

“Not at first, perhaps,” said the Hatter: “but you could keep it to half-past one as long as you liked.”

(Carroll, 1998, pp. 62-63)

“I” is not “you”, but “I” can “know what you mean”. While it is narrated that “I” does not “know what you mean(s)”, the claim is that “I” knows that “you” means. What “Alice” “said” is narrated according to a perspective which is not Alice. This external perspective claims to know that what “Alice” is doing is a saying and the claim here is that “Alice” is other to “I”. It is this “I” who does not “know what you” means but it is “Alice” who “said”. Therefore, the claim here is that “Alice” knows what “I” is and that “I” can but does not “know what you” means. “What you mean” is other to itself as it is “what”. There are different meanings and while “what you mean” is still to “mean”, “what you mean” is distinct because of being “what you mean”. “What you mean” is to “mean” when narrated according to what “Alice” “said”. But what “Alice” “said” as that which is “what you mean” is what “the Hatter” “said”. Saying therefore is that which means something. The claim is that while

it can be “said” according to another perspective that within this perspective what the other “said” is that which the “you” means; “what” the “you” means is not known within this another perspective. So, what within the perspective which is narrated as “Alice” says is to “mean” by the “you” which is not “Alice”, is also narrated as what “the hatter” “said”.

“The Hatter”<sup>13</sup> is that which “said”. The “I” is other to “the Hatter” but what “the Hatter” “said” is about the “I” who knows “time as well as”. What the “I” “knew” can be narrated according to an external perspective and what this “I” “knew” is therefore known within this external perspective. This “I” which “knew time as well as” is different to the “I” which “do[esn’t] know what you mean” but they are both “I”s. That which is “I” when the narration is according to what “the Hatter” “said” is “you” when the narration is according to what “Alice” “said”. Therefore, what is “I” when narrated according to one perspective is “you” when narrated according to another. This is important for my reading here as there are claims here about what, which “I” knew and not “as well as” and how then “you” does not know what another means. Therefore, this is important for my reading of claims that are

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<sup>13</sup> The Hatter is “a local as well as mathematical link within Carroll’s treatment of time” according to Beer. This is a different reading than mine as I read “the Hatter” according to the narratorial perspective within the text. Beer on the other hand writes:

The model for the Mad Hatter was almost certainly a furniture dealer called Theophilus Carter, who lived near Oxford and was well known to Carroll, a lecturer in mathematics at Christ Church. Carter was actually known in the locality as the mad hatter because of his eccentric ideas and because he was in the habit always of wearing a top hat. He was also something of an inventor and one of his more bizarre creations, an alarm clock which woke the sleeper by tipping him out of bed, was exhibited at the Crystal Palace in 1851. This may explain why the Mad Hatter in Alice was so obsessed with time; he certainly was not poisoned with mercury. (Beer, 2016, p. 40)

Another version of the “Mad Hatter” is enacted by Johnny Depp in Tim Burton's 2010 movie *Alice in Wonderland*. The references to the Hatter as the “Mad Hatter” keeps popping up in different discussions about the text. However, the Hatter is not narrated as the mad Hatter anywhere in the text itself.

made here about what it is to know, to know<sup>14</sup> “as well as” and what is saying and what it is to “mean”<sup>15</sup>.

The narratorial perspective is elsewhere; it is on the outside and it is claimed within this perspective that a perspective which is other to itself is known. But this perspective others itself to another perspective in terms of what is known within the perspective of the other as the perspective of another, which is other to the narratorial perspective as well, does not “know what you mean”. So, claims are made here about meaning and knowledge<sup>16</sup>.

What “you” talks “about” and what “you wouldn’t talk about” is already known to a perspective which is not “you”. What “you” “talk about” then depends on what “you knew”. Talking is thus that which is “about” something. To “talk about” depends upon what “you knew” and “if you knew”. Knowing is not talking. But, what “you wouldn’t talk about” is “if

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<sup>14</sup> “90. The knowledge or knowing which is at the start or is immediately our object cannot be anything else but immediate knowledge itself, a knowledge of the immediate or of what simply *is*. Our approach to the object must also be *immediate* or *receptive*; we must alter nothing in the object as it presents itself. In *apprehending* it, we must refrain from trying to *comprehend* it”. (Hegel, 1998, p.79)

<sup>15</sup> According to Beer in the *Alice* texts, Carroll is treating time and, in this treatment, she discusses "his quirky and ingenious mindset" through his puzzles which were earlier than the *Alice* texts. She discusses these as "in these early puzzles, the Hatter's tea party is already on its way - and with it all the puzzles about identity and time". (Beer, 2016, pp.28, 40)

So, the puzzles about identity that she reads here are additional to and distinct from the puzzles about time. However, the Hatter's tea party, identity and time are all those about which there are puzzles. I am reading identity through claims made about time in this section of the *Alice* texts which does not correspond to Beer's reading in this way. My analysis of the text by close attention to understanding meaning through language is reading what is puzzling, if at all, about the Hatter's tea party, identity and time.

<sup>16</sup> This is exactly how I am reading Beer's claims about Carroll and Alice traversing between the child and adult world. This is how I read her claim about Carroll that “he dipped into childhood games anew whenever he was with children. He entered the entertainment as child and organizing adult at once. Multiple times of life rippled through each other in such moments.” Again I read claims made about meaning and knowledge within a perspective which is other to the narratorial perspective in the *Alice* texts as according to Beer’s claims,

something of the same double capacity marks the *Alice* books, so intimately lodged alongside the experience of the child reader, while the adult reader enjoys the frisson of re-entering child experience with adult awareness. The collusion between adult reader and narrator never outwits the nonchalant friendship between Alice and the words that carry her story. Alice herself is confident in her occasional role as instructive adult as well as that of inquiring child. She does not observe the time boundaries marked by (adults) between adult experience and childhood innocence. She wants to know and she wants to dispose. Thresholds may daunt her but she crosses them.

(Beer, 2016, p. 28)

you knew” “as well as I do”. “I” is not “you”, but what “you knew” can be “as well as I do” and while this could be so, this is not the case. So, “I” knows what “you knew” and what “you” could have known but does not. Therefore, the claim here is that to know can vary in terms of “as well as”. It is claimed within the narratorial perspective that while what it is to know is different within different perspectives, what is known can be compared and in terms of well-ness and this matters whether it is “as” another perspective or not. So while to know can be different within different perspectives, it should be “as” another perspective so that “you wouldn’t talk about” as you do now because of what “you knew” which is not “as” a perspective which is another to “you”.

Knowing is not talking. But what “you wouldn’t talk about” is “if you knew [...] as well as I do”. “Time” is that which can be known “as well as I do” but this is not the case here. What “Time” is, is therefore already known, it can be known, and it can be known “as well as I do” or not. To know “Time as well as I do” is to know that “Time” is other than itself. To know “Time as well as I do” is to know that it is not “it” but “it’s him”. “Yet” is that in which “you” can guess “the riddle”. So that which is not part of this “yet” is not part of what it means for the “you” to “have guessed the riddle”. “The Hatter” is not “you” but knows that “you” can guess and can guess “the riddle” which is different from other guesses. To have “guessed” is something that the “you” can “have”, and this is what “the Hatter” which is not this “you” “said”. Therefore, what it means to guess and to guess “the riddle” and what it means for “you” to “have” is known to one who is not “you”. What it means for “I” to “give it up” when narrated according to one perspective which is narrated as “Alice” is what it means for “you” to not “have” “guessed the riddle yet”. But this is not what it means to “you” but is what “the Hatter said”.

“The riddle” is that which can be “guessed”. Guessing is something that “you” can “have” or not “have” and this is known within a perspective which is not “you”. What “the



Hatter said” is different to “turning”. While the claim is that “the answer” is not known, it is known that there is an answer, which is a singular and specific answer as it is “the answer”. Also, this “answer” is other to being “the answer” as it is known that it is what. To not “have” “the riddle yet” is to “give it up”. But, that which the “I” gives “up”, is that which the “I” does not “have”. The “I” does not “have” “it” but gives “it up”<sup>17</sup>. So that which “I” does not have can be and is given “up” by “I”. To not “have” “guessed” “yet” is to “give it up”. What “the Hatter said” is different to that which “said the Hatter”. What “the Hatter” is and what is “said” are narrated according to a perspective which is external and has a perspective on both “the Hatter” and that which is “said”. What “Alice replied” is not “the answer”. “The answer” is a what so, an “answer” is known to be a what. Answering is different from guessing.

The “I” which hasn’t “the slightest idea” is split and narrates according to a perspective on this “I”. This perspective is framed within the narratorial perspective. It is known that “I” can have ideas which can differ in terms of being “the slightest” or not. Within the claim to that which is “haven't the slightest idea”, it is known what ideas are and what is “the slightest idea” and that “the slightest idea” is that which “I” can have. “The answer” then is that which is known as “the answer” within what is narrated as Alice’s perspective but it is that which the “I” which is not “Alice” knows can be had as “idea” or as “the slightest idea”. “The answer” therefore is that which “I” can “have”. The “I” which is to have “guessed the riddle yet” can have “the answer” if this “I” had “guessed the riddle yet”.

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<sup>17</sup> Derrida writes about time, time belonging and “what is it to have time?”

“The King takes all *my* time,” she says, a time that belongs to her therefore. But how can a time belong? What is it to *have time*? If a time belongs, it is because the word *time* designates metonymically less time itself than the things with which one fills it, with which one fills the form of time, time *as form*. It is a matter, then, of the things one does *in the meantime* (cependant) or the things one has at one's disposal *during* (pendant) this time. Therefore, as time does not belong to anyone as such, one can no more *take* it, itself, than *give* it. Time already begins to appear as that which undoes this distinction between taking and giving, therefore also between receiving and giving, perhaps between receptivity and activity, or even between the being-affected and the affecting of any affection. Apparently and according to common logic or economics, one can only exchange, one can only take or give, by way of metonymy, what is *in* time.

(Derrida, 1992, p. 3)

The other “I” can also have “the answer” if this “I” had “the slightest idea”. That “the answer” is that which different “I”s can “have” but they “haven’t” and what is required and implied for these “I”s to “have” or not have “the answer” is narrated according to the narratorial perspective which is external and other to the “I”s<sup>18</sup>.

What “said the Hatter” is different from what “said the March Hare” but they are both “said”. That which is “said” can be different to each other while there is a claim to sameness where they are that which is “said”. While “the Hatter” is “the” “Hatter”, “the March Hare” is “the” “March Hare”, “Alice” is not “the”. “I” is other to “the March Hare”. The claim within the narratorial perspective is about other perspectives which know that their “I” is other to and different from other “I”s. I read this in what “said the March Hare” which is “nor I”. Therefore, the claim here is that it is known within this perspective what “I” is and while that which is “nor” is also “I”, it is different and not to the “I” which “haven’t the slightest idea”. The difference is within what are claims to similarity since both the “I”s are narrated as that

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<sup>18</sup> Hegel’s discussions on “knowing”, “object”, “experience” and “its reality in the ‘I’” are useful for my readings on the “I” which is split.

...We now have to see what experience shows us about its reality in the ‘I’.

101. The force of its truth thus lies now in the ‘I’, in the immediacy of my *seeing, hearing*, and so on; the vanishing of the single Now and Here that we mean is prevented by the fact that I hold them fast. ‘Now’ is day because I see it; ‘Here’ is a tree for the same reason. But in this relationship sense-certainty experiences the same dialectic acting upon itself as in the previous one. I, *this ‘I’*, see the tree and assert that ‘Here’ is a tree; but another ‘I’ sees the house and maintains that ‘Here’ is not a tree but a house instead. Both truths have the same authentication, viz. The immediacy of seeing, and the certainty and assurance that both have about their knowing; but the one truth vanishes in the other.

102. What does not disappear in all this is the ‘I’ as *universal*, whose seeing is neither a seeing of the tree nor of this house, but is a simple seeing which, though mediated by the negation of this house, etc., is all the same simple and indifferent to whatever happens in it, to the house, the tree, etc. The ‘I’ is merely universal like ‘Now’, ‘Here’, or ‘This’ in general; I do indeed *mean* a single ‘I’, but I can no more say what I *mean* in the case of ‘I’ than I can in the case of ‘Now’ and ‘Here’. When I say ‘this Here’, ‘this Now’, or a ‘single item’, I am saying all Thises, Heres, Nows, all single items. Similarly, when I say ‘I’, this singular ‘I’, I say in general all ‘Is’; everyone is what I say, everyone is ‘I’, this singular ‘I’. when Science is faced with the demand- as if it were an acid test it could not pass- that it should deduce, construct, find a priori, or however it is put, something called ‘this thing’ or ‘this one man’, it is reasonable that the demand should say which ‘this thing’, or which ‘this particular man’ is *meant*; but it is impossible to say this. (Hegel, 1998, pp. 81, 82)

which “haven’t the slightest idea” to “what’s the answer”. In the claims to what “I haven’t” and “nor I” are claims to knowledge about what the “I”s could have. Therefore, the narratorial perspective, while othering itself, claims to know of different perspectives who can have but “haven’t the slightest idea” whereby what “the slightest idea” is that which is also known and narrated according to this external narratorial perspective<sup>19</sup>.

“Sighed” is different to “sighed wearily”. The “wearily” is an excess to “sighed”. That “Alice” “sighed wearily” is external to “Alice” but is narrated as “Alice sighed wearily”. This is narrated according to a perspective on “Alice” and “sighed” which is “wearily”. “Alice” is not “I” and is not “she”. It is “Alice” who “sighed wearily” but it is the “I” who “think[s]” and the “she” who “said”. What “I think” is different to what “she said” but what “I think” is what “she said”. There are “riddles” which have “answers” and there are “riddles” which have “no answers”. While they are the same because of being “riddles”, there is a difference within this sameness because of those which have “answers” and those which “have no answers”. What “answers” are and what it is to “have” “no answers” is narrated according to a perspective on “answers” and what it is to “have” “answers” or not. What “you might do” and are therefore not doing is that which “I think”. “I think” implies that “I” knows that “you” can do “something” and can “do something” “with the time”. “The time” is that “with” which different things can be done by “you” and the thing which “you” are doing “with the time” is not “something better”. What doing “something better” is, is narrated in terms of “than”. So, what “you” are doing “with the time” while still being a doing “something with the time” by “you” is only “something better” if it is not “wasting it”. Even then, it is about a conditionality of what “wasting it” is “in”<sup>20</sup>. “Riddles” can be asked and it is known to an

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<sup>19</sup> My reading here “is a questioning of language itself as the means through which subjective identity” “is constituted and then imposed and reimposed over time” according to the perspective of the other. (Rose, 1984, p. 140)

<sup>20</sup> “The King takes all *my* time,” she says, a time that belongs to her therefore. But how can a time belong? What is it to *have time*? If a time belongs, it is because the word *time* designates metonymically less time itself than the things with which one fills it, with which one fills the form of time, time *as form*. It is a matter, then,

external perspective that “I think” “you might” but are not doing “something better with the time” because you are wasting it “in asking riddles that have no answers”. So, to “have answers” then is not “wassting it” as it is doing “something better with the time”. “The time” is that “with” which “something” and “something better” “might” be done by “you” but this depends on what “I think”. That “I think” and that “you do” and what “you do” is “with time” is narrated according to a perspective on “I” and “you” and, the claim is that it is known within the narratorial perspective what “I” is and that “I think”; it is also known within this perspective what “you” is, what “you might do” and is thus not doing and this is narrated as what “I think”.

“Contemptuously” is an excess to “tossing his head”. That it is a “head” which is distinct because it is “his head” which is other to him and that it is being tossed and tossed “contemptuously” is narrated according to an external perspective. What “the Hatter said” is what “you don’t”. So, the claim within this perspective is that there are different perspectives within which it is claimed that they know what it is to “know” and to “mean” and perspectives which are other to these perspectives “don’t know what you mean”. “You” because of what is known within these different perspectives is what others them from each other because of claims of what it is to “know” and to “know” what it is to “mean” and this is “of course” the case within the perspective of the other. “Time” can be spoken “to”. That “you” can speak and can speak “to Time” but have not done so is known to “I”. To “say” is not to have “spoken to”. What “I” says about “you” is “perhaps not” the case. To know

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of the things one does *in the meantime* (cependant) or the things one has at one's disposal *during* (pendant) this time. Therefore, as time does not belong to anyone as such, one can no more *take* it, itself, than *give* it. Time already begins to appear as that which undoes this distinction between taking and giving, therefore also between receiving and giving, perhaps between receptivity and activity, or even between the being-affected and the affecting of any affection. Apparently and according to common logic or economics, one can only exchange, one can only take or give, by way of metonymy, what is *in* time.

(Derrida, 1992, p. 3)

“Time” is not to speak “to Time”. So, while “you” know “Time” but not “as well as I do”, “you” could speak “to Time” but “I” “say” that “you never even spoke to Time”.

“I” knows what “music” is, but “I” has to “learn music”. As there is a “when I learn music” there is also “when” I does not “learn music”. In the “when I” does not “learn music”, “I” still knows what “music” is and “music” is still “music”, but it is not “when I learn music”. “Music” is that which can be learnt. “I” can “learn”, can and does “learn music”. That “I learn music” and there is a “when I learn music” is part of what “Alice cautiously replied” but “Alice” is not “I”. To reply is not to “learn” but the claim in what “Alice” “replied” is that “Alice knows what “I know”, what it is for “I” to “learn”, that it is “when I learn(s)” and what is the “when I learn(s)”. While the claim is that “I learn music” in the “when” that “I learn music” something other than learning “music” is to be done and this “I know”. But the “I” who knows is other than the “I” which learns “music” which is split from the “I” that “have to beat time when I learn music”. While this “I” who has “to beat time” has been narrated as the “you” who doesn’t know “Time as well as” the “I do”, the claim is that despite not knowing “Time as well as” the other “I”, it can do to “Time” what it already has which is “to beat” it. However, this knowing is not knowing “as well as I do”. So, the claim is about knowledge being that which has to be “as well as I”. The claim within the narratorial perspective is that there are different perspectives, and they are other to one another because of what is known within these perspectives. So, what I can read from the interplay of perspectives here framed within the narratorial perspective is that to know and not know “as well as” the other is what others perspectives to each other. The claim within the narratorial perspective here is that it knows the other perspectives, what is known within these perspectives, what it is to know and what it is to know “as well as”.

“Time” is “Time” when narrated according to “the Hatter” and it is “time” when narrated according to “Alice”. So, even though “Time” is not “time”, the claim according to

“the Hatter” is that while what “Alice” “said” and what she “replied” is about “Time”, “the Hatter” knows that “you wouldn’t talk about wasting it”, “if you knew Time as well as I do<sup>21</sup>”. “Time” here is constantly other to itself. The narratorial perspective is itself outside of both “time” and “Time” and therefore has a perspective on them. “The time” is not “time”; “time” is that “with” which “something” can be done, and something can be done “to” “time”. The claim here is that “you” can like, and “you” is who “liked” things that can be done “with the clock”. While these things are not done “with the clock” by “he”, it is already known within a perspective which is not “you” that what “you liked” is that which is “anything” which can be “almost anything” which can be done “with the clock” by “he”. “He” is not “you” and not “him” as it is “him” “with” whom “you” could keep “on good terms” but “you” do not. “He” is other than “the clock” but can do things “with the clock”. “The clock” is known as singular and that “with” which “almost anything” can be done. “Anything” that can be done “with the clock” is external to “the clock”. It is the “almost anything” that “you liked” and not “the clock”<sup>22</sup>. What “I know” and what “I know I have to do” is not that which “you liked”. This is narrated according to a perspective which is not “I” and is not “you” and, according to which this “I” is “you”. As there are “good terms”, there are also that which are not “good” “terms”. “You” can keep “on good terms with him” but do not do so because of what it is that “I know”. Because of doing what “I know”, he does not “do” what he can “do” which is what “you liked”. So that which is already “liked” by “you”

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<sup>21</sup> Differences in time, “my time” and the time that “I” know can be read in Derrida’s *Given Time: I. Counterfeit Money* (1992). Madame de Maintenon says in her letter not that

“she was giving all her time but rather that the King was taking it from her (“the King takes all my time”). Even if, in her mind, that means the same thing, *one word does not equal the other* (italics mine). What she gives, for her part, is not time but the rest, the rest of the time: “I give the rest to Saint-Cyr, to whom I would like to give all.” But as the King takes it all from her, then the rest, by all good logic and good economics, is nothing. She can no longer take her time. She has none left, and yet she gives it. Lacan says of love: It gives what it does not have, a formula whose variations are ordered by the *Ecrits* according to the final and transcendental modality of the woman inasmuch as she is, supposedly, deprived of the phallus.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>22</sup> For a different reading see Beer, 2016. Her reading of time in the *Alice* texts is more generic. She writes about “a certain hauteur about watches and their implications of busyness is frequent in Victorian fiction”. Her claims about time in this context are that “here the Hatter’s monthly watch seems to be grandstanding.” (Beer, 2016, p. 39)

is that which is not done at all. “Good terms” are known. “Good terms” are external to “you” and to “him”, but this is what “you” can be “on” “with him”, according to a perspective which is a perspective on “you” and on “him”.

What “you liked” is other than what “you” did not like which is different to that which “you” like. What it was that “said Alice” is narrated and it is also narrated how it is “said” which is “thoughtfully”. So that which is “said” can be “said” in different ways and can be “said” not “thoughtfully”. While that which is “said” can be “thoughtfully” “said”, it is also other to being “thoughtfully”. That which is narrated here is that which “said Alice” and that this is “thoughtfully” is narrated according to a perspective on “Alice”, on what is “said” and that it is “thoughtfully”.

In “but you could keep it half-past one as long as you liked”, to “keep it” to that which is “as you liked” there has to be an “only” which is about an “if”. But this is what “he’d do” but does not do and this is “for instance”. So, there are constant shifts and conditionalities to get to the hat which is “as you liked”. But this is about a deferral of that which is “as you liked”. What is narrated as, “as you liked” is that which is claimed to be “liked” by the “you” according to a perspective which is other to “you” and to he and is framed within the narratorial perspective.

“Time” is “for” something, things can be done “to time”, “good terms” can be kept “with” time. But what “time” is “for” or what can be done “to time” or, “with time” is what is known within the perspective which is narrated as the Hatter’s. What is narrated as according to Alice’s perspective as that which “I have to” do to “time” is that which according to the Hatter, “he wo’n’t stand”<sup>23</sup> and this means that “you” had not “kept on good terms with him”. So, I read here claims to knowledge about “time” and claims to supremacy made through

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<sup>23</sup> For a different reading see Beer, 2016, p. 39. Beer discusses time in terms of “personification”.

claims to knowledge which I read in “if you knew Time as well as I do”. This can also be read in the claim that it is known within the perspective of “the Hatter” that “Time” is not “it. It’s him”. Therefore, claims to supremacy are made within the narratorial perspective through claims to knowledge and the use of language because of knowledge. It is also claimed that different and differing perspectives exist about “time” but one is superior to the other because it “knew time” “well” while the other does not know “time as well as I do” but can potentially know as such.



## XI. Tea-Time and Chronometers

Piaget in his book *The Child's Conception of Time*, attempts “to determine the role of time in human experience generally, and that of children in particular”. The claim in this text is that “we invariably discover that temporal ideas are linked to memories, to complex causal processes, or to clearly defined motions.” But within the narratorial perspective in this work “time” is that “of” which there is “the problem” and, it is “the problem of the development of the conception of time in children”. This however “must be ignored on principle”. (Piaget, 1969, pp. X, 5)

In the following passage from Lewis Carroll's *Alice Adventures in Wonderland*, I read time in a book that is often placed within the arena of children's literature, but time is a problem as this text is fraught with various claims about time. Claims are made about understanding, feelings, remarks, meaning, all through claims made about time and in which language. Claims to supremacy are made within the narratorial perspective through claims to knowledge and the use of language because of knowledge. I read time here as a way of control. As Dame Gillian Beer points out “time and its troubling haunt both the Alice books.” (Beer, 2016, p. 28). Beer reads the Hatter's tea party as “the scene” which is only

“tolerable because tea- time is not an instant but a period, so that the participants at the tea party can continue their own lives and conversations within the arrested time. Six o'clock is understood here as tea-time, not as the moment of six p.m. Indeed, the Hatter's watch “tells the day of the month, and doesn't tell what o'clock it is” (and in any case, it's two days out because it's been polluted by butter-though “the best butter” and some crumbs).

My reading of this section of Carroll's text is based on Pheng Cheah's ideas that

“the perfection of chronometers had long been the aim of geographers, to fix more precisely the positions of islands and continents in relation to Europe. With the spread of cables under the sea and over land, that followed the development of electric telegraphy, time was taken from the master clocks of London and Paris and sent to the colonies.

The lines on maps were miniature renderings of the real lines on cables that snaked around continents, or drew great arcs across the floors of oceans. Sending and receiving stations followed the cable and marked the end of lines tethering the center to the satellite colony. The clock and the colonial observatory completed the mapping of the world.

The strings of cables, these birds’ nests of copper, turned the world into a giant switchboard, for commerce and control. The world was covered by a huge dented bird cage of time zones, of liens of agreement of control, all sent out by the clock rooms of Europe. Local suns were shifted further and further from local zeniths.”

(Cheah, 2016, ‘Introduction’)

These ideas can be read in what time is in the passage focussed on below: what is English, what is meaning and whose watch shows what kind of time?

Also, Beer mentions “a certain hauteur about watches and their implications of busyness” as “frequent in Victorian fiction, and here the Hatter’s monthly watch seems to be grandstanding” (Beer, 2016, p. 39). This is also the case in another such children’s book written by Mrs. Molesworth in the 19th century entitled *The Cuckoo Clock*. Time in what is claimed to be children’s books such as *The Cuckoo Clock* and the *Alice* texts, is a form of

exercising control over the child through claims made about time and what it entails. While *The Cuckoo Clock* is Victorian fiction that is didactic and the Alice books are categorised as part of nonsense literature and appear to be far from didacticism, they both attempt to exercise power, authority and control over the child through claims made about time and, claims made about other things through such claims made about time and in relation to ideas of time.

The Hatter was the first to break the silence. “What day of the month is it?” he said, turning to Alice: he had taken his watch<sup>24</sup> out of his pocket, and was looking at it uneasily, shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear.

Alice considered a little, and said, “The fourth.”

“Two days wrong!” sighed the Hatter. “I told you butter wouldn’t suit the works!” he added, looking angrily at the March Hare.

“It was the *best* butter,” the March Hare meekly replied.

“Yes, but some crumbs must have got in as well,” the Hatter grumbled: “you shouldn’t have put it in with the bread-knife.”

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<sup>24</sup> Dame Gillian Beer in her lecture at Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, 2011, discusses the significance of a “watch” in the Alice texts. According to her “time in the *Alice* books is a fraught matter”. “Wonderland is preceded by Tenniel’s image of the dapper white Rabbit... earnestly consulting his watch”. “It’s the watch that startles Alice”. “A rabbit with pink eyes runs past her and then we are told... there was nothing so very remarkable in that nor did Alice think it’s so very much out of the way to hear the Rabbit say to itself, “oh dear, oh dear, I shall be too late.” But when the Rabbit actually took and he underlines this a watch out of its waistcoat pocket and, looked at it and then hurried on, Alice started to her feet for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat pocket or a watch to take out of it and burning with curiosity she ran across the field after it.” Curiosity, the core feeling of Alice.... The rabbit, is an animal which speaks, but that’s not what the child finds remarkable: it’s the accoutrements of adult business, busyness: waistcoat pocket and watch... this is a watch out of kilter, challenging human exceptionalism. The watch usually signifies the particularly capacity to invent complex technology

The March Hare took the watch and looked at it gloomily: then he dipped it into his cup of tea, and looked at it again: but he could think of nothing better to say than his first remark, “it was the best butter, you know.”

Alice had been looking over his shoulder with some curiosity. “What a funny watch!” she remarked. “It tells the day of the month, and doesn’t tell what o’clock it is!”

“Why should it?” muttered the Hatter.

“Does your watch tell you what year it is?”

“Of course not,” Alice replied very readily: “but that’s because it stays the same year for such a long time together.”

“Which is just the case with mine,” said the Hatter.

Alice felt dreadfully puzzled. The Hatter’s remark seemed to her to have no sort of meaning in it, and yet it was certainly English<sup>25</sup>.

“I don’t quite understand you,” she said, as politely as she could.

(Carroll, 1998, pp. 61-62)

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<sup>25</sup> Pheng Cheah in his book *What is a World? On Postcolonial Literature as World Literature* discusses time as an idea of control by the colonisers. He writes that “the hierarchical ordering and control of the world as we know it is based on technologies of temporal calculation. Kentridge shows how the cartographical organisation of the capitalist world-system relies on Northern- and Eurocentric regimes of temporal measurement. The subordination of all regions of the globe to Greenwich Mean Time as the point zero for the synchronisation of clocks is a synecdoche for European colonial domination of the rest of the world because it enables a mapping that places Europe at the world’s center. This tethering to the uniform march of European standard time is a form of imprisonment that smothers lived local temporalities.” (Cheah, 2016, p. 1)

“I” can “understand you” but the claim is that it is known that “I don’t” “understand you”. To “understand you” is different from “quite understand you” and through this difference it is narrated what “I” can do to “you” which is to “understand you” but this is not “quite” the case. Through the claim about what “I don’t”, the “I” is split as this is a perspective on “I” according to which “I” and “you” are narrated, and it is also narrated what it means to “understand”<sup>26</sup>. What “it was” is other to itself and “it was certainly English”. “English” is that which can “certainly” be and therefore can also not “certainly” be. “English” is that which is known and can be recognised as what “it was”. “The Hatter’s remark” is other than being a “remark”, “the Hatter’s remark” is that which “was” “it” which “was certainly English”. That “the Hatter’s remark” is a “remark”, and that it is “the Hatter’s” which distinguishes it from other remarks, is narrated according to a perspective on “the Hatter” and on the “remark”. So, what is “the Hatter’s” is known to and is narrated according to a perspective which is not “the Hatter”. It is claimed within this perspective that “the Hatter” is one who can have a “remark”. “The Hatter’s remark” is also that which “said the Hatter”. So, a “remark” can be “said” and that which is “said” can also be a “remark”. “The Hatter’s remark seemed to her to have no sort of meaning in it”, so, this is a seeming and not

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<sup>26</sup> “Consciousness, for its part, is in this certainty only as a pure ‘I’; or I am in it only as a pure ‘This’, and the object similarly only as a pure ‘This’. I, *this* particular I, am certain of *this* particular thing, not because I, *qua* consciousness, in knowing it have developed myself or thought about it in various ways; and not because *the thing* of which I am certain, in virtue of a host of distinct qualities, would be in its own self a rich complex of connections, or related in various ways to other things. Neither of these has anything to do with the truth of sense-certainty: here neither I nor the thing has the significance of a complex process of mediation; the ‘I’ does not have the significance of a manifold imagining or thinking; nor does the ‘thing’ signify something that has a host of qualities. On the contrary, the thing *is*, and it *is*, merely because it *is*. It *is*; this is the essential point for sense-knowledge, and this pure *being*, or this simple immediacy, constitutes its *truth*. Similarly, certainty as a *connection* is an *immediate* pure connection: consciousness is ‘I’, nothing more, a pure ‘This’; the singular consciousness knows a pure ‘This’, or the single item. (Hegel, 1998, p.79)

a being<sup>27</sup>. The claim here is that it can be known to an external perspective what “seemed” to be the case about something within the perspective of the other about a “remark” which is another’s. That it can seem and that it “seemed to her” is narrated according to a perspective which is not “her” but claims to know about “her” and that which is “to her”.

“Meaning” can be “in it”. There are different sorts “of meaning” but a “sort of meaning” is other to “meaning”. “Remark” can be “English” or not but that which “was certainly English must “have” some “sort of meaning in it”. While this is what is narrated, the implication is that, that which “was certainly English” can also “have no sort of meaning in it”<sup>28</sup>. What “was certainly English” can be known within a perspective but whether something

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<sup>27</sup> Hegel discusses being in the following ways:

97. “...What we say is: ‘This’, i.e. the *universal* ‘This’; or, ‘it is’, i.e. *Being in general*. Of course, we do not *envisage* the universal This or Being in general, but we *utter* the universal; in other words, we do not strictly say what in this sense-certainty we *mean* to say, and since the universal is the true [content] of sense-certainty and language expresses this true [content] alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we *mean*.

98. The same will be the case with the other form of the ‘This’, with ‘Here’. ‘Here’ is, eg., the tree. If I turn round, this truth has vanished and is converted into its opposite: ‘No tree is here, but a house instead.’ ‘Here’ itself does not vanish; on the contrary, it abides constant in the vanishing of the house, the tree, etc., and is indifferently house or tree. Again, therefore, the ‘This’ shows itself to be a *mediated simplicity*, or a *universality*.

99. *Pure being* remains, therefore, as the essence of this sense-certainty, since sense-certainty has demonstrated in its own self that the truth of its object is the universal. But this pure being is not an immediacy, but something to which negation and mediation are essential; consequently, it is not what we *mean* by ‘being’, but is ‘being’ defined as an abstraction, or as the pure universal; and our ‘meaning’, for which the true [content] of sense-certainty is *not* the universal, is all that is left over in the face of this empty or indifferent Now and Here. (Hegel, 1998, p.81)

<sup>28</sup> Rose writes about “the order of folklore, nursery rhyme and nonsense” literature as “a whole domain surrounding children’s fiction which is normally placed in opposition to the canons of narrative fiction in the name of rhythm and play”. “For as long as the first (rhythm and play) is seen as melody or archaic lore which stretches back in time, and the second (narrative fiction) as the forward progression of advancing literary form, then the challenge of the one to the other, the idea that one might actually erupt inside the other, forcing open the issue of what constitutes continuity in speech, is effectively denied. They remain worlds apart, the distance between them working to transmute and becalm what might otherwise be felt as too present and insistent a difference. Classifying ‘otherness’ in language as infantile or child-like reduces it to a stage which we have outgrown, even if that stage is imbued with the value of something cherished as well as lost. In the end, the very association of linguistic rhythm and play with childhood becomes a way of setting the limit to what we

has some “sort of meaning in it” or not is not “certainly” the case and is rather what “seemed” to be so. Thus, while what “was” “English” is that which is “certainly”, “to have” “sort of meaning in it” or not is what “seemed”. What “was certainly” is not what “seemed”.

“Meaning” is related to feeling which is because of what “seemed to her” which might not be so, despite that which “was certainly”. “English” must “have” some “sort of meaning in it”.

But that which “seemed” “to have no sort of meaning in it” “was” “yet” “certainly English” therefore, being “certainly English” can also be the case when something has “no sort of meaning in it”. While “meaning” is that which “the Hatter’s remark” can “have” “in it”, that “the Hatter’s remark” does not have some “sort of meaning in it” is what “seemed to her”.

So, what something may or may not “have” can seem to another. What does “have no sort of meaning in it” is still a having which is claimed to be “the Hatter’s” but what “seemed” is “to her” who is other to “the Hatter”.

The narratorial perspective knows that “Alice felt” and what “Alice felt”. So, what is “felt” by another can be known to an external perspective. The claim here is that it is known within the perspective that the other can feel and what it means for this other to feel and that the feeling is “felt”. “Dreadfully puzzled” is different from other things that can be “felt”. “Dreadfully puzzled” is also different from “puzzled”. “The Hatter’s remark” is what “said the Hatter” but what “she said” is not a “remark”. What “said the Hatter” is different to what “she said” despite them both being “said”. What is “said” by whom and what this is, is narrated according to another perspective which constitutes “the Hatter” and “Alice” as those that have “said” and thus can say. What is “said” can be “said” differently. What “she said” is other than being that which “she said”. What “she said” is distinct because of what it is “as”. “Politely” can be in different ways, it is that which “could” be, and which “could” be “as”.

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are allowed to conceive of as a language which does not conform to the normal protocols of representation and speech.” (Rose, 1984, pp. 139, 140)

So, what is “said” can be said “politely” or not and there are different degrees of saying “politely”. How “politely” something is being “said” depends on how “politely” it “could” be “said” and by whom. I read an implication here that what was “said” could be “said” more or less “politely” than how “she said” but this is not the case because of what, how and “as she could”. “As she could” is narrated according to perspective which is not “she”.

“The silence” is known, specific and singular. “The silence” can be and is to be broken. Even after being broken, “the silence” remains as “the silence”. There are more than one that can “break the silence”. While “the silence” remains as “the silence” after the “break”, “to break the silence” is narrated as that which “was”. “The Hatter” when he “was the first to break the silence” is other than himself while being himself. “The first” is a singular that “break(s) the silence”. What “he said” is other than “the silence” but what “he said” is what breaks “the silence”. So that which is “said” can and does “break the silence”. There are different days. A “day” is a “day” and is “what”. A “day” is distinct from “day of the month”. While it is not known “what day of the month is it”, it is known that “it” “is” a “day” and that it is a “day of the month”. What “it” “is”, is other to itself and other to the “day of the month” as “it” “is” “what”. It is a “month” which is different from “the month”. “The month” is known as “the” specific “month” which is other than “day”. “Day” is “of the month” but is distinct from “the month”. That “he said” something and what “he said” is split from “turning to Alice”. Saying therefore is not “turning”. What “he said” breaks “the silence”, and while the “turning” is “to Alice”, what “he said” is not specified as “to Alice”. Therefore, that which is said does not have to be “to” someone or something.

This “watch” is distinct from another “watch” because it is “his”, but it is similar to other watches because of being a “watch”. What is “his” is narrated according to a perspective which is on him and on the “watch”. Claims about what are “his” and therefore by implication about those that are not “his” are made within this perspective which narrates



him as a “he”. “Watch” is that which can be in a “pocket”, can be and is “taken” “out of his pocket”, can be looked “at”, shaken “every now and then” “and” can be held “to his ear”. That he “was looking at it uneasily” is distinct from him taking “his watch out of his pocket”, “shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear”. What he “was” doing is known as “looking” and where he “was looking” is known as “at it”. So, the claim within this perspective is that what is “looking”, who “was looking” and what the “looking” “was” “at” are known within the perspective of the other. Therefore, the claim is that what constitutes “looking” for the other and where this “looking” is “at” and how, can be and is known within an external perspective<sup>29</sup>. That “he had taken his watch out of his pocket” does not mean that he “was” going to be “looking at it” but he does so. His “looking at it” is separate from and additional to taking “his watch out of his pocket”; I read this from the “and” in the text here. There are different kinds of “looking” and his “looking” is “at it” and it is also “uneasily”. He “was looking at it uneasily” is distinct from he was “shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear”. But this is a continued “looking” which is narrated as that which “was”. So, while this “looking” is distinct it is also part of the “shaking it every now and then, and holding it to his ear”.

“Now” is not “then”. There are multiple nows and thens and “every” “now and then” are known. “Now” and “then” are different to each other but they are also similar because of both being “every” and because of being “now” “and” “then”. Also, “every” “now” is other to the previous and another “now”. Similarly, “every” “then” is different from the other

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<sup>29</sup> Beer’s reading differs from my reading as she writes about the “double capacity” that “marks the *Alice* books”. According to Beer, this “double capacity” which is “so intimately lodged alongside the experience of the child reader, while the adult reader enjoys the frisson of re-entering child experience with adult awareness. The collusion between adult reader and narrator never outwits the nonchalant friendship between Alice and the words that carry her story. Alice herself is confident in her occasional role as instructive adult as well as that of inquiring child. She does not observe the time boundaries marked (by adults) between adult experience and childhood innocence. She wants to know and she wants to dispose. Thresholds may daunt her but she crosses them.” (Beer, 2016. P. 28)

thens. However, there are claims to difference as well as homogeneity here. I read “every now and then” as a claim to homogeneity as “every now and then” is that in which something can be done<sup>30</sup>.

What is “two days wrong” is the “watch” and the Hatter knows this because of what “Alice” “said”. So, what Alice “said” then is that which is not “wrong”. So, the claim within this perspective is to a knowledge about another perspective which knows what is “wrong” because of that which is not “wrong”, and this depends on what is “said” by another. While it is not known “what day of the month is it”, it is known that what Alice “said” “the day of the month” is, is not “wrong”. Therefore, it is then known “what day of the month is it” and that this “day of the month is” that which is not “wrong”. “Alice” can consider. To consider can be “a little” or not. What is considered is not “said”. What is “said” is not what is “told”. “I” is not “you” but “I told you”. In “I told you” I read a claim to knowledge that “I told you” because “I” know that “butter wouldn’t suit the works” and “I” then claims to know about “you” that “you” does not know that “butter wouldn't suit the works”. What “I told you” is what is not “wrong” because “his watch” is “two days wrong” but this is dependent on what “Alice considered a little, and then said”. Therefore “Alice”, what “Alice considered”, which is “a little” and, “and then said” are all that which is not “wrong”.

There are different watches. “A” “watch” is that which “tells”. “Watch” can be “his” and it can be “your”. “His watch” is not “your watch” but they are “a” “watch”. By being “his watch” and “your watch” they are distinct from each other. However, they are similar because of both being “a” “watch”. “A” “watch” can be “funny” or not because of what “it tells” “and” also because of “what” it “doesn’t tell”. “A funny watch” is also other to itself as

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<sup>30</sup> . “There would be a gift only at the instant when the paradoxical instant (in the sense in which Kierkegaard says of the paradoxical instant of decision that it is madness) tears time apart. In this sense one would never have the time of a gift. In any case, time, the "present" of the gift, is no longer thinkable as a now, that is, as a present bound up in the temporal synthesis. (Derrida, 1992, p.9)

it is a “what” and it is that which “tells” “and doesn’t tell”. The claim here is that it is known within different perspectives that their watches are different because of telling different things but, they are both watches because despite the different things that are being told by the watches, the watches still “tell”. It is known within the different perspectives that “a” “watch” “should” “tell” but what it “should” “tell” is known differently. The difference in knowledge is what causes the feeling of “dreadfully puzzled”. It is also this difference in knowing about “a” “watch” and what it “should” “tell” and “why”, that is why “the Hatter’s remark seemed to her to have no sort of meaning in it”. Therefore, I read here the claim that the seeming of meaning, of any sort, depends on what is known. “I don’t quite understand” because of that which seems “to have no sort of meaning in it”.

“The day of the month” is different from “what o’clock” but they can both be told and also not told by “a” “watch” and, depending on what is told by “a” “watch”, the “watch” then is “a funny watch” or not. “A” “watch” is not a clock but can tell, tells or, “doesn’t tell what o’clock it is”. It is known what “the day of the month” is, what “o’clock” is and “what year” is. But, “a” watch” is that which can, does or “doesn’t tell” these. So, “the day of the month”, “what o’clock” and “year” are both known as well as unknown but can be known in terms of what “a” “watch” “tells” or “doesn’t tell” but whether it is “wrong” or not depends on what is “said”. That which “stays the same” “for such a long time together” is “of course” that which is not told because of staying “the same” “for such a long time together”. There are different years, but they are all years. A “year” is that which “stays the same” “for such a long time together” but it also does not. So, in this way then what a “year” is, is known but also unknown. “A year” is also that which after “such a long time together” does not stay “the same”. It therefore becomes that which is not “the same” but still continues to be a “year” and that which is “of course not” told by a “watch”. “Time” can be “a long time” and also that which is not “a long”. “A long time” can be any “long time” but is known as that which is “a long time”.



## XII. ‘Imagine a Time Before Electronic Entertainments...’

Fairy tales, like myths, capitalize on the kaleidoscopic with its multifaceted meanings: sparkling beauty, austere form, and visual power. Once told around the fireside or at the hearth, with adults and children sharing the storytelling space, they captured the play of light and shadow in their environment, creating special effects that yoked luminous beauty with the dark side. Imagine a time before electronic entertainments, with long nights around campsites and other sources of heat and light, and it is not much of a challenge to realize that human beings, always quick to adapt, began exchanging information, trading wisdom, and reporting gossip. “Literature,” Vladimir Nabokov tells us, “was born on the day when a boy came crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him.” And that boy’s story was no doubt compact, electrifying, and vivid. Once the conversation started about that wolf, it was easy enough, in subsequent versions, to begin adding, embellishing, exaggerating, and doing all the things that make for lively entertainments. Fairy tales are always more interesting when something is added to them. Each new telling recharges the narrative, making it crackle and hiss with cultural energy.

(Tatar, 2017, pp. xii-xiii)

“Fairy tales” are not “myths”, they are “like myths”. So, they are also other than “fairy tales” themselves because of being “like myths”. In this claim to likeness is also a claim to difference. “The kaleidoscopic” is known and it is “the” “kaleidoscopic” but “the kaleidoscopic” is different to “the kaleidoscopic” which is “with its multifaceted meanings”. Despite both being “the kaleidoscopic” there is a difference because of the “with” which is

additional to “the kaleidoscopic”. “The kaleidoscopic” is different from “the kaleidoscopic with its multifaceted meanings” because it is “the kaleidoscopic with its multifaceted meanings” that can be and is capitalized “on” by “fairy tales, like myths”. “Sparkling beauty, austere form, and visual power” are other than themselves as these are “its multifaceted meanings” which “the kaleidoscope” is “with”. These “multifaceted meanings” are known as “meanings” which are “sparkling beauty, austere form, and visual power”. These “multifaceted meanings” continue to be known as such despite being capitalized “on”. “Fairy tales” are known to be “like myths” as they “capitalize on the kaleidoscopic with its multifaceted meanings”. While “fairy tales, like myths, capitalize on the kaleidoscopic with its multifaceted meanings”, they continue to be “fairy tales” which are “like myths”, “myths” continue to be “myths”, the “kaleidoscopic” continues to be “with its multifaceted meanings” and the “multifaceted meanings” continue to be known as such.

The narratorial perspective is outside “adults and children”. “Adults” “and” “children” are different. But they are similar because they can both share and share “the storytelling space”. “The storytelling space” then is the same for “adults” who are not “children” as it can be shared, and it is still known as “the storytelling space” which is specific and known. This is not that “once” as the “once” when it was “told” is in the past. So, what is “told” now is not part of that which was “once told”. “Around the fireside” is different from “at the hearth” as it is “or”. However, what was “once told” is the same as it can be “told” whether “around the fireside or at the hearth”. While “around the fireside” is different to and is “or” to “at the hearth”, they are both “the storytelling space” and can thus both be shared by “adults and children”. What is “once told around the fireside or at the hearth” is not “told” by “adults” or “children” as it is “told” “with adults and children”. What is “their environment” is known to a perspective which is not part of “their” or “their environment”. But the claim is that this perspective knows what “environment” is, what consists of “their environment” which differentiates it from other environments and what is

“in their environments”. I read here that what was “once told” is a story as it is implied that this was “told” in “the storytelling space”. This story is different from other stories because of how it is constituted in terms of being that which was “once told” “around the fireside or at the hearth” and because of what “they captured”. “Luminous beauty” which is different from “beauty” is not “the dark side”. “The dark side” is known and specific. “They captured the play of light and shadow in their environment, creating special effects” only if “once told around the fireside or at the hearth,” with the addition of being “with adults and children sharing the storytelling space”. “Special effects” are different to “effects” and “special effects” can be created. But these “special effects” are distinct because they are “that” which “yoked luminous beauty with the dark side”. But these “special effects” are not there, they can be created but they can only be created when “they captured the play of light and shadow in their environment” only when “once told around the fireside or at the hearth, with adults and children sharing the storytelling space”.

The narratorial perspective claims that there are other perspectives which can but do not “imagine a time before electronic entertainments”. This perspective which does not “imagine a time” like this is not part of “human beings”. The narratorial perspective is not part of “human beings” as well but has a perspective on “human beings” and knows what “human beings” are. There are different times and “time” is something that can be imagined. That which is “before electronic entertainments” is more than “a time”. “A time” which is “before electronic entertainments” is different to “a time before electronic entertainments” which is “with long nights around campsites and other sources of heat and light”.

“Realization” can be “a challenge” and in varying degrees of muchness. However, “realization” is not “a challenge” but is associated “to” “a challenge”. The narratorial perspective which knows about the perspective that can but does not “imagine” such “a time” knows what “a challenge” can be for this other perspective. It is also known what is “not much of a challenge” and therefore what then is “much of a challenge”. What “human

beings” are can be realized but this realizing depends on imagining “a time” which is specified as “before electronic entertainments” which is again specifically “with long nights around campsites and other sources of heat and light”. While this realizing is dependent upon the imagining of such “a time” it is also additional to and happens after this imagining, as it is “and”. Those who are not “always quick to adapt” or, begin “exchanging information, trading wisdom, and reporting gossip” are not “human beings”. But all of these depend on the conditions that “a time” which is to be imagined, which is “before electronic entertainments, with long nights around campsites and other sources of heat and light”, is imagined. “Information” can be exchanged, “wisdom” can be traded “and” “gossip” can be reported. But this is not always the case as there is a when “human beings” “began” to do these.

That which was before this “day” is not part of “literature”. “Vladimir Nabokov” is not “us”. “Us” is who can be told about “literature”. The narratorial perspective is located outside “us” while claiming to be part of “us”. This perspective is not ‘Valdimir Nabokov’ but narrates according to a perspective on “Vladimir Nabokov” and “us”. “Literature” is that which can be “born”. “Literature” is not just about that it “was born” but it is “on the day” and further it is about the “when a boy came crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him”. So whatever else “was born on the day” which is not part of the “when a boy came crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him” is not “literature”. “A boy came crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him” is part of “exchanging information, trading wisdom, and reporting gossip”. Therefore, this is what constitutes “literature” here. “The day when a boy came crying wolf wolf” is part of “a time before electronic entertainments, with long nights around campsites and other sources of heat and light”. Though, ‘the day’ has not continued and this time is not that “a time” which is “before electronic entertainments”, that which “was born on the day” continues to be “literature”. In this way then, “literature” which “was born on the day” and in “a time” other to this time, does not continue to be part of “the day” or such “a time” while at the same time being part of “the day” and “a time” because of



being “born on the day” which is part of such “a time” which is known to be “before electronic entertainments”. “A boy” is part of “human beings”. Coming “crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him” is what means “exchanging information, trading wisdom, and reporting gossip” and this is because “human beings” are “always quick to adapt”. All of this is based upon imagining “a time”. “Literature” therefore depends on imagining such “a time”.

“Crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him” is “story”. “A boy” who could be any boy becomes a specific “that” boy because of “that boy’s story”. So “that boy’s story” is what makes him specific and identifiable as “that” specific “boy” who is different to other boys and other “human beings”. Despite “that boy’s story” because of which that boy becomes different from other boys and other “human beings”, he also continues to be “a boy” and part of “human beings”. There can be different kinds of stories. That which is not “compact, electrifying, and vivid” can also be a “story” but it is not “that boy’s story” so, it might then not be part of “literature”. “That boy’s story” is known to another who is not “that” “boy”. What “was” “that boy’s story” becomes “the conversation” that “started”. So “story” then is “conversation”. A “story” is other to itself. “Story” can be doubtful as in this case the claim about what “that boy’s story was”, is that it “was no doubt compact, electrifying, and vivid”. “Compact, electrifying, and vivid” do not exist in themselves. They are what “that boy’s story was no doubt”. What “that boy’s story was” is additional to the “when”. So as “literature” “was” already “born” “when”, it is therefore independent of “compact, electrifying, and vivid”. But, what “literature” is, that it “was born”, “when” it “was born” and how this “when” is constituted, is about what “Vladimir Nabokov tells us”.

A “story” is a “conversation”. This “story” is distinct from other conversations and is “the” specific “conversation” as it is “that boy’s story” which is then narrated as “the conversation”. “That boy’s story” is also other to being “that boy’s story” as it is “the

conversation". When it is "the conversation" which "once started" it is not "that boy's story" and becomes "the conversation" but also continues to be "that boy's story". "That boy's story" becomes "the conversation" "about that wolf" and is therefore not "that boy's story" anymore while continuing to be known as "that boy's story". This "conversation" is ongoing. "Conversation" is something that can be "started", and it can be "started" "once". This "once" is distinct as what is not part of this "once" is not when "the conversation started". This "once" is in the past as it was when "the conversation started". This "once" has not continued as "the conversation" has "subsequent versions" and has already been "started". "Subsequent versions" have something "in" them. "Subsequent versions" are of "the conversation". "The conversation" is "about that wolf" and not "that boy's story". "That boy's story" is about "a boy" who "came crying wolf wolf, and there was no wolf behind him" which is different to being "about that wolf".

"Entertainments" can also not be "lively". "Lively entertainments" are that which can be made "for". What constitutes "lively entertainments" are "adding, embellishing, exaggerating, and doing all the things". What "doing all the things" are, are known only in terms of "that" which "make for lively entertainments". "Subsequent versions" are different from themselves but they are similar as they are "subsequent versions". "Subsequent versions" are other to "the conversation" but are "subsequent versions" of "the conversation". What "make for lively entertainments" are already known and "lively entertainments" are already known. Yet, what is "in subsequent versions" are "adding, embellishing, exaggerating and doing all the things that make for lively entertainments". "Subsequent versions" are other than themselves and each "adding, embellishing, exaggerating" is different, yet these differences are subsumed as they are "all" what "make for lively entertainments". While "the conversation" is "about that wolf", what "makes for lively entertainments" is not specifically "about that wolf" or "the conversation". So, what "makes for lively entertainments" and what "lively entertainments" are, are independent of and

already known before the “once the conversation started”. “Lively entertainments” are not “easy enough” and “to begin adding, embellishing, exaggerating, and doing all the things that make for lively entertainments” become “easy enough”, “once the conversation started”. “Fairy tales” are “subsequent versions” of “the conversation” that “once” “started”. “Fairy tales” are “subsequent versions” of “the conversation” “about that wolf”. “The conversation” that was “once” “started” has continued as “fairy tales” and will “always” continue as “fairy tales are always”.

“Fairy tales are” other than themselves as they “are” “interesting”. But they “always” become “more interesting”. So, there are differences between “fairy tales” among themselves as well but these differences get subsumed as they are all “fairy tales” but “are always more” than “fairy tales” which are “interesting”. “When something is added to them” is that which will happen. But that which will happen is already known and what “fairy tales are” which is not in this “when” is narrated in terms of that which will happen. What “fairy tales are” is known in terms of an addition which is always deferred, and this is “always” the case. So, whatever “fairy tales are” they will be “always” be “more” than what they are “when something is added to them”. There is also then a “when”, “something is” not “added to them”. The “something” which “is added to them” is what makes “fairy tales” that which “fairy tales are always”. But this is about the “when”. When is this when is known in the terms that there is such a “when”, and it is this “when something is added to them”. But the claim here then is that when it is not this “when”, “when something is added to them”, “fairy tales” while being narrated as “fairy tales” are not what “fairy tales are always” which is “more interesting”. Therefore, in this way, “fairy tales” can only be what “fairy tales are always” because of and only in this “when”.

“Fairy tales” are “the narrative”. They are “the” specific, known “narrative”. It is known that there is a “telling” which is different to “new telling” and there are more than one

“new telling”. “Each new telling” is different from other tellings and also other “new” tellings. The implication here is that “when something is added to them” then, there are “new” tellings. So “fairy tales are always” and the additions “to them” are therefore always told. The claim here is also that this has “always” been and will continue to be so and this is already known and claimed necessarily retrospectively. “The narrative” is that which is told. I read repetition here whereby there is a “telling” which is different from the “new telling” which is different from “each new telling”. But they are all tellings which are of “the narrative”. There is a repetition of “telling” which while being a repetition of “telling” is different from “telling” as it is a “new telling” which while being a repetition because of being a “new telling” is different from both “telling” and “each new telling”. Similarly, “each new telling” while being repetitive is different from the other “each new telling(s)”. “Each new telling” which is of “the narrative” makes “the narrative” other to itself as it “recharges the narrative”.

“Cultural energy” is different from “energy” but is “energy” nevertheless. “Each new telling” makes “the narrative” other than itself though it is still narrated as “the narrative”. “Each new telling” is that which will happen but is already known as that which is a “telling” which is “new” and is different from other “new” tellings. So, what “the narrative” will become in terms of “each new telling” is always about a deferral. But that which will be is already known and claimed retrospectively. For “the narrative” to be made to “crackle and hiss” there has to be “new” tellings. “Cultural energy” is additional to “the narrative”. It is not part of “the narrative” and it is what “the narrative” becomes “with” when it is made to be other than itself which is “crackle and hiss”. “It” is therefore not “the narrative” but is still claimed to be “the narrative” as this is what “the narrative” can be and is made to be. The narratorial perspective does not do this “telling” but knows what “telling” is and what “each new telling” is. This narration is not “the narrative”. This narratorial perspective is located

outside “the narrative” and has a perspective on “each new telling”, “the narrative” and what “each new telling” is “making it”.

“The narrative” can be “with cultural energy” when it is recharged and made “it” which “crackle and hiss”. But “cultural energy” is not “the narrative. “Cultural energy” is about a “telling” which is distinct as it is “new” which is different from other “new” tellings as it is “each new telling” which leads “the narrative” to be made “with cultural energy”. While “each new telling” makes “the narrative” into other than itself, “cultural energy” remains the same. However, “cultural energy” is known and it is what can be “with” because of “each new telling”. “Each new telling” is “when something is added to them”. To be “with cultural energy” requires “each new telling”. This “when” shifts and is “always”. “Cultural energy” is fixed and is the constant which is known as “cultural energy”. But those which are required to be “with” “cultural energy” shift. “When something is added to them” they are “new telling[s]” which are “subsequent versions” which have “adding, embellishing, and doing all things” which make “for” “lively entertainments”. So, they are made into “lively entertainments”. “Lively entertainments” are constituted as “the conversation” which has “subsequent versions” which have things “added to them” and are “the narrative” which can be “with cultural energy” after it is made into “it” which is other to itself. So, to be “with cultural energy” is about a constant deferral and requires being “something” other than itself.

### XIII. ‘The gaze of those same men in the first light of day...’

When we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space, what we are doing is not a continuation of the free and fantastic stories which humans have told nightly around campfires for hundreds of thousands of years. It is the continuation of something else: of the gaze

of those same men in the first light of day looking at tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah- scrutinizing and deducting from the details of reality in order to pursue something which we can't see directly but can follow the traces of. In the awareness that we can always be wrong, and therefore ready at any moment to change direction if a new track appears; but knowing also that if we are good enough we will get it right and will find what we are seeking. This is the nature of science.

(Rovelli, 2015, pp. 66- 67)

“We talk about” something so, “we” talking is that which has an excess as it is “about” something. “We” do not always “talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” as there is a “when” “we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space”. What is “talk” is known, what “we talk about” is known and it is also known “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space”. “The Big Bang or the fabric of space” are similar as this is what “we talk about”. Their similarity can also be read in the “when” as this “when” is the same “when” the “we talk” and this “talk” is the same as this is “about” those which are the same. “The Big Bang or the fabric of space” are also distinct from each other which I read from the “or”. What “the Big Bang” is “or” what “the fabric of space” is are known. There are bangs other than “the Big Bang”. “The Big Bang” is known as such because of the necessary excesses with which this “bang” is narrated, which are that this “bang” is “Big” and even more specifically its narration with the definite article “the” makes it known as “the Big Bang”, which is different to other bangs, which is different to other bangs which are a big bang, as this is specifically “the Big Bang” which “we talk about” “when”. This “the Big Bang” is like “the fabric of space” as this is what “we talk about” as an “or” during the “when”. However, “the fabric of space” is different to “the Big Bang” which means that “the

Big Bang” is not “of space” like the “fabric”. “Space” is that which has “fabric” and this “fabric” is singular and specific which can be read from “the”. This “fabric” is different to other fabrics as this is “the fabric” which is “of space”. “The fabric of space” is that which is the “or” to “the Big Bang”. It is that which “we talk about” during the “when”.

The perspective here is both a part of the “we” as well as outside the “we” as it narrates the text through a perspective on “we”. It knows that “we talk” and “when” “we talk” and “about” what. It also knows “what we are doing”. So “we” do something which is a “what”. These claims are made retrospectively and necessarily so. According to these claims about “when we talk about”, it is that which “we” will “talk about” in the future, a future that is known. But the claim is that “what we are doing is not a continuation of” that “which humans have” done “for hundreds of thousands of years” which is already in the past. So “what” “we” will do in the future is claimed as “what we are doing” and this is a claim to a presence, made in retrospect which can be read retrospectively. Talking is a “doing”. It is “a continuation of” “stories”. Here, “when we talk”, “we are doing” “what”. So, “we” talking is that which is other to itself. “When we talk about” things other than “the Big Bang or the fabric of space”, then there is an implication that “we are doing” that which “is” “a continuation of the free and fantastic stories”. So that which is “about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” “is not a continuation of the free and fantastic stories”. There is a lack “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” as this is that which is “not”, but by implication could be, “a continuation”. The claim about “what we are doing” as “not a continuation” is a claim about why it “is not a continuation”, which is because of what “we talk about”. But this is also a claim about “when”. So why this “is not a continuation” is because of what “we talk about” but this becomes “not a continuation” because of “when we talk about the Big Bang and the fabric of space”.

“The free and fantastic stories” are “a continuation” which can be done, which is a continued “doing” and this continued “doing” of the “continuation” can be done by “we” who “talk” and, is being done by talking in whens which are other than “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space”. I read “doing” or in this case “not” “doing” “a continuation of the free and fantastic stories” as separate from continuing “the free and fantastic stories”. So, what these “stories” are, is that which cannot be continued but there “is” “a continuation of the” “stories”. Therefore, that which “is” “a continuation” is different to these “stories” as it is not these “stories” but “of” these “stories”. Also, there are many continuations “of the” “stories” which can be read from “a” and from the different whens. There are different “stories” which are other to “the free and fantastic stories”. While “the free and fantastic stories” are multiple they are singular as they are “the” “stories” which are known as “free and fantastic”. “Free and fantastic” are part of each other as “the” “stories” but they are also distinct from each other which can be read from “and”. While being similar in being part of “the” “stories”, they are different to each other as that which is “free” is other to “fantastic” and vice-versa. I read them both as additional to each other as well as to “the” “stories”. These “free and fantastic stories” are again different to other “free and fantastic stories”, as they are known as “the” [...] stories” “which humans have told nightly around campfires for hundreds of thousands of years”. So other kinds of “free and fantastic stories” also exist. “We” then are not “humans” as these “humans have told” “the free and fantastic stories” “nightly around campfires for hundreds of thousands of years”, which “we” are “not” “doing” as “a continuation of”. This is narrated through a perspective on “humans” by an external perspective. This perspective claims to know “hundreds of thousands of years” and what has been done “for hundreds of thousands of years” and by implication, what “we” who are not these “humans” should be “doing” “as a continuation of” that which has been done “for hundreds of thousands of years”. “The free and fantastic stories” are something other to themselves as they are “which”. This “which” is that which can be “told” by those who are



“humans”. The telling of these “stories” is also about a “when” as they “have” been “told nightly”. Where they have been “told” are “around campfires” and “for” “hundreds of thousands of years”. The claim here is that “humans have told” these “stories” so this is not the case anymore. Therefore, that which is “hundreds of thousands of years” is in the past and “not” “what we are doing”.

“What we are doing is” a “when” which is “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” and this “is” “it”, so, this is something other than itself. “It is the continuation of something else”, so, while “it is a continuation” it is “of something else”. This “something else” is not “the free and fantastic stories which humans have told nightly around campfires for hundreds of thousands of years” so, “something else” is the difference here, as “what we are doing is not a continuation of the free and fantastic stories” but “it is the continuation of something else”. Therefore “it is” “the continuation of” something while “not” being “a continuation of” what has already been discussed. What “is the continuation of something else” is “what we are doing” and “what we are doing” is the “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space”. “What we are doing is” that which is a “continuation of” something specific as it is known as that which is “the continuation of something else” and is thus different to that which can be and is “a continuation of the free and fantastic stories”. So “what we are doing” is known in terms of its being as what “it is” through a difference.

As “it is the continuation of something else” so it is a part “of something else” but it is not “something else”. It is located outside “of something else” and therefore is something other to “something else”. “Something else” is that which has a “continuation” which is “of” “it”. The claim is that there is only one “continuation of something else” which is known as “the continuation”, that which it “is the continuation of” is “it” and is also “what we are doing”. While there is a claim to sameness through singularity here, “what we are doing” is other to “it”. But “what we are doing” is what “it is”: “the continuation of something else”.

What “continuation” is, is known. It is known as that which is “of” things, is multiple and is known as which is “a” and which is “the”. Through the claim to “the continuation of something else”, it can be read that, that which is the “something else” ends and what continues as “the continuation of something else”, which is what we are doing, is what remains as “the continuation”. But what remains as “the continuation” is other to what it is “the continuation of”. Similarly, as there is an implication that there “is” “a continuation of the free and fantastic stories”, this thus means that those “free and fantastic stories” end where that which is the “continuation of” those “stories” begins.

What “of something else” is, is again something other than itself; that which is “of something else” is “of the gaze of those same men”. “The continuation” “of the gaze of those same men” is “what we are doing” “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space”. So, while “we are” not “those same men” what “we are doing” is “the continuation” “of the gaze of those same men”. So “the gaze of those same men” can have a “continuation of” it which is specifically known as “the continuation”. So there can be “a continuation of” gazing, which has been continued as “talk” by those who are not part of those whose “gaze” it was. That which is “of those same men” as “the continuation of” becomes “what we are doing” and is yet claimed to be “of those same men”. “The gaze of the same men” is known to a perspective which is external to “those same men” but it knows what “men” are, which are different to “those same men”, who have “the gaze” and what “the gaze of those same men” consists of. “The gaze” is “of” “those same men” and also is “of” that which is “the continuation of” that which is “something else” to “the free and fantastic stories”, which is “what we are doing”. “The gaze” implies that there can be more than one “gaze” but this “gaze” is different as it is specified as “the gaze” and is known as that which is “of those same men”. “The gaze” is “of” “those same men” and “the continuation” “is” also “of the gaze”. In the “of” I read that, “the gaze” is outside “those same men” but is also “of” “those same men”. “The gaze” then is both part of “those same men” while being external to them.

It is that which is outside them, is claimed to belong to them and is narrated by a perspective which is not them but has a perspective on them, knows what their “the gaze” is and has a perspective on “the gaze”. “What we are doing” “is” “the continuation” “of the gaze”, this means that “the continuation” is other to “the gaze” but is claimed to be part “of” “the gaze”. As it is “the continuation of” something and “is” “what we are doing”, while the claim is that it is “of the gaze” it is not “the gaze” anymore but “what we are doing”. Here, that which is “of the gaze” is again both a part of it but is also other to it.

“Those same men” are “men” and it is known what “men” are. “Those same men” are different to other “men”. They are more than one but are a unit as they are “those same men”. “The gaze” is the single unified “gaze of those” “men” who are more than one but are the “same”. “The gaze” here is located “in” a moment which is “the first light of the day”. By implication then “gaze” is also that which is not “in the first light of the day”, but this “in” is what makes this “gaze” “the gaze” which is “the continuation of” something else. What “the gaze” is “in” is specific as “day” is that which has other lights but only one “first light” as it is “the first light, which is “of the day” but is “the first light” and is other to “day”. This specificity is what “the gaze” is, which is “of those same men” who are “looking” “in the first light of the day”, which is “the continuation of” something else, which is “what we are doing”, “when we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space.

What “those same men” do is “in the first light of day”. What they are doing “in” this is that they are “looking at tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah- scrutinizing and deducting from the details of reality in order to pursue something which we can’t see directly but can follow the traces of”. While “the gaze”, “those same men” and what they are “looking at” are all in the past, as that which has already happened, I read the “looking” as something that continues. All of these are narrated in retrospect, as is always the case with narration. But “the looking” which I read as a continuation is framed in the past and is

retrospectively read as such. The “looking” is “in” something, “at” something and something is done through the “looking”. “Those same men” “looking” “in the first light of day” is what “the gaze” is about. “Gaze” then is about a “looking”. This “gaze” is about who is “looking”, “in” what, “at” what are they “looking” and what is being done through this “looking”. This “looking” is a specific “looking” which is different to other lookings because of what is being looked “at” and when. There can be different “tracks” and “those same men” are “looking at tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah”. “Those same men” are doing something through this “looking” which is “scrutinizing and deducting”. So “looking” is for something.

“Scrutinizing and deducting” are distinct from each other but they are similar as they can both be done by “those same men in the first light of the day” by “looking at tracks”. “Scrutinizing and deducting” are additional to each other but a necessary addition to each other in this case for that which “those same men” “pursue”. So “scrutinizing and deducting” is that which is done. “Those” by whom it is done are “those same men”. How it is done, is by “looking”. This is what “the gaze” consists of. “Scrutinizing and deducting” is done “from” something “in order to pursue something” and it is done by someone. These are claims made in retrospect by an external perspective about that which has already happened but as if this is how “reality” is about the “we” who continue to exist. So, this is a claim to a presence, a continuous presence which is based on that which has already happened. “Reality” has “details” which are multiple but unified and specific which I read from “the details”. “The details of reality” are known. They are “of reality” but not “reality”. So, they are both a part “of reality” as well as other to “reality” as they are “the details” which are “of reality”. Thus, despite being “of reality” they are different to what “reality” is. “Reality” consists “of” more than one detail. “The details of reality” here are “tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah”.

The claim here is that while “we” are not “those same men”, what “those same men” are doing through “looking” by “scrutinizing and deducting” is “in order to pursue” that “which” the “we can’t see directly” “but” “we” “can follow the traces of”. There is “something which we can’t see directly”. So, by implication “we” should be able to “see” this “something” “directly”, but it is known by the perspective which is outside “we” what “we” “can’t see” and how, which is “directly”. This “something” is other to itself as it is “which”: it is that “which we can’t see directly but can follow the traces of”. So “something” has traces which are distinct from other traces as they are “the traces of” “something”.

“The nature of science” is other to itself as it is “this”. “The nature” is “of science” but it is distinct from “science”. So, it is both a part “of science” and is also external to it. What “is” “the nature of science” is known. There is also a claim to the present here through “is”, but this is a retrospective claim according to which, what “the nature of science” is, is both about a now-ness and how this “nature” continues to be. But this is an absent present as these claims are made retrospectively and also read retrospectively.

“The gaze” is “looking” so “the gaze” can look. It is “the gaze” then that is “scrutinizing and deducting” through the “looking”. “Scrutinizing and deducting” are “in order” “to” do something. “The gaze” that is “scrutinizing and deducting” is “of those same men” but what it is doing is “in order to” do that which “we can follow”. “The details of reality” which are distinct from “reality” and are still “of reality” can be scrutinized “and” deducted “from”. So that which is “scrutiniz [ed] and deduct[ed] from the details of reality” is different to “the details of reality” as they are that which is “from” “the details” and are not “the details”. This “scrutinizing and deducting” is what it is required “to pursue something”. “To” do this, “scrutinizing and deducting” has to be “in order”. It can therefore, by implication, also be not “in order”. So, the “scrutinizing and deducting” which are not “from the details of reality” and are not “in” this “order” and “to pursue” this specific “something”

then is not part of what “is the nature of science”. “The details of reality” here are “the tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah”. So “antelope” are that which leave “tracks” and these “tracks”, are “the tracks” which are different to other “tracks”. These specific “tracks” are also distinct as they are “the tracks left by antelope in the dust of the savannah”. So “the tracks” are distinct and different to other “tracks” even though the other “tracks” might be “left by antelope”, because of what they are “in” and what that “in” is “of”. So “the details of reality” is about “the” specifics and what it is located “in” and what this “in” is “of”.

The “scrutinizing and deducting” that is done by “the gaze” which is “from” something, is “in order” and “to pursue something” is “in the awareness”. What “the awareness” is, is “that” which “we can” “be” and “that” which “we can always be”. “The gaze is of those same men” but they are “in awareness” which is about “that” which is what “we” “can always be”. “The continuation” is “of the gaze of those same men in the first light of day”. This I read to be as that which has already happened. But the claim here is that “the gaze” continues “in the awareness” about “that” which “can always be”. So that which is “in the awareness” of what “can always be”, is that which has already happened and is part of the past events. This “awareness” is different from another awareness which I read from “the”. It is “the” specific “awareness” which “the gaze is “in”. So, this “awareness” is what also specifies what “the gaze” is, as it is “in” this “awareness” which makes it different to other gazes and the possibility of not being “in” this “awareness”. “The awareness” is what “the gaze can be “in”. “The gaze” then while being “in the awareness” is still not “the awareness”. “The awareness” also, is other than “the awareness” as it is “that”. “We can always be wrong” but this not what “we” are despite what “we can always be”. This is not what “we” are because of “therefore”. It is “the gaze” which is “in the awareness” “and” it is also “the gaze” which is “therefore ready at any moment to change direction”. While it is “the gaze” which is “of those men” who are not “we”, it is this “gaze” that is “ready” “to change direction” to “find what we are seeking”. While “the gaze” is not “the awareness” despite

being “in the awareness”, “the gaze” is “ready” while also being other to “ready”. “The gaze” is “ready” because it is “in the awareness” “and” it is “therefore” “ready”.

“To change direction” requires being “ready”. “To change direction” can be done “if a new track appears”. So this is a claim as to what can be done, “if” something happens but these claims of what can happen are made retrospectively and, are about “the gaze of those same men in the first light of the day” which is in the past and is “in the awareness”. So, this has also already happened, about “that” which “we can always be” and “therefore” what “the gaze” is which is “ready” and “at any moment”. “Knowing” is different to “in the awareness” as it is “but knowing”. While it is different, I can read it as similar to “in the awareness” as “knowing” is “also”. So that which is “in the awareness” is also “knowing”, “but” a different “knowing” to “knowing also”. This is because that which is “in the awareness” is “that we can always be wrong, and therefore” are “ready at any moment to change direction”. While this is also about “knowing”, “but” it is different to “knowing also”, this “knowing also” is other to itself as well, as it is “that”. What knows this “knowing” is “the gaze”. What the “knowing” is that “we are seeking” is something which is “what”. “What we are seeking” is that which can be found and “we” “will find” it and this is what “the gaze” knows which is a continuous “knowing”. So, “the gaze” is that which is in the past but continues as that which is “knowing” about “we”, who continue “seeking” and the definite claim which can be read from “will”, is that what “will” happen in the future is known, as that which “we” “will find”. The present is also known as that which is “are” and this is a continued present: this is “what we are seeking”. But I read this claim to the present as continuous, as an absent present as these claims have been necessarily made in retrospect and, the nature of this reading is such that these claims are retrospectively read.

“What” “we are” is known to the perspective which is not “we” and claims about “the gaze” which is external to this “we” as “knowing” “what” “we are”. “Seeking” is “what we

are” and “we are good enough” but this is based on the conditional “if”. I read the claims made here as a claim to a definite knowing that “we are seeking” and “we will find” but this is based upon the conditionality of “if” “we are good enough” only then “will” “we” “get it right”. So “the nature of science” is about “seeking” that which is to be found but this finding can only happen “if” “we are good enough”, only then “we will get it right”. So “the nature of science” is about “seeking”, finding, getting “it right” which can only happen “if we are good enough”. “The nature of science” therefore is about “what” “we are” and what “we will” do according to claims made by the perspective which is not “we”. “The nature of science” is about “what we are seeking” and this is what “we” can “find and “will find” but this requires getting “it right” which can only happen “if we are good enough”. Being “good” is not enough and the requirement is to be “good enough”. What it is to be “good enough” for the “we”, and that “we are” this “good enough”, is known and claimed according to a perspective which is outside this “we” while also locating itself within this “we”. This perspective also claims to know “the gaze” which is “of those same men” who are also not the “we” and according to this perspective it is this “gaze” that is “knowing” about the “we” which is about “the nature of science”.

What “is the nature of science” is a claim to a present through “is” and I read in this a claim to a continuous present which means that “this is the nature of science” and will thus continue to be so. That which is “the nature” is that which is “the continuation of”. So it is that which has already happened but continued as “something” which is other to that which is being continued but is known as being “the continuation of” it. “When we talk about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” means that this “we” have already talked “about the Big Bang or the fabric of space” and “when” this was, has already happened, but the claim is that this will happen again and reoccurs. Thus “the nature of science” is known as re-occurring and that which has already happened. It is also known in terms of what it is not, as that which has happened and continues to happen “nightly”. But this re-occurring of “the free and fantastic



stories” which “have” been “told nightly” “for hundreds of thousands of years” is not “the nature of science”. “The nature of science” requires “we” to not “be wrong” and not “always be wrong” although the claim is that “we can always be wrong”. “The nature of science” then is about what “we can” “be”, what “we can always be” but what “we” by implication should not “be”. “The nature of science” then is about the being of “we”. Where I read that “we” should not “be wrong” is in “therefore” being “ready at any moment to change direction if a new track appears”. “The nature of science” therefore is that “we” are not “wrong” and need to be “ready at any moment to change direction if a new track appears”. So “if a new track” does not “appear”, we can continue in the same “direction” which is “in the awareness that we can always be wrong”.

“The gaze” is “looking” but “can’t see directly”. So, what it means for “the gaze” that “can’t see directly” is that it “can follow the traces of” something. “The gaze” then is that which “can follow”. “The gaze” which is “of” someone “can follow” that which is “of” something. “The nature of science” entails knowledge that “something” is “to” be pursued. “Something” which is “to” be “pursued” is already known as that “which we can’t see directly but can follow the traces of”. So, the “something” is already known and is that which is yet to be pursued. “What we are seeking” is both part of as well as external to “the nature of science”. It is known that “we are seeking” and that “we are seeking what” and “we” “will find” this “what”. So, that which “will” be found in the future is already known as “what” it is, that it can be found and that it “will” be found. “The nature of science” entails what “we talk about” and “when we talk”. “The nature of science” is both not “a continuation” and it is “the continuation of” something other. It is what “we are doing”. It is “scrutinizing and deducting from the details of reality” which is other to “the nature of science”. “The nature of science” involves a “knowing” which is a “knowing also” as the claim is that “what we are seeking” is yet to be found and is therefore not part of this “knowing”. “The nature of science” requires “we” to not “be wrong”, to be “good enough” so that “we” can “get it right”

and “find what we are seeking”. “The nature of science” is therefore finding “what we are seeking”.

## XIV. The Mystery of Time

...The nature of time is perhaps the greatest remaining mystery. Curious threads connect it to those other great open mysteries: the nature of mind, the origin of the universe, the fate of black holes, the very functioning of life on Earth. Something essential continues to draw us back to the nature of time.

Wonder is the source of our desire for knowledge, and the discovery that time is not what we thought it was opens up a thousand questions. The nature of time has been at the center of my life's work in theoretical physics. In the following pages, I give an account of what we have understood about time and the paths that are being followed in our search to understand it better, as well as an account of what we have yet to understand and what it seems to me that we are just beginning to glimpse.

Why do we remember the past and not the future? Do we exist in time, or does time exist in us? What does it really mean to say that time "passes"? What ties time to our nature as persons, to our subjectivity?

What am I listening to when I listen to the passing of time?

(Rovelli, pp. 7, 8, 2018)

"The nature of time" "is" that which is other than itself. It "is" "the greatest remaining mystery". While the claim is that it is known what "the nature of time" "is", this is "perhaps" so. "The nature" is "of" "time" but is other to "time" and is external to "time". "Time" is that

“of” which there is “the nature”. What is “of time” is known to be “the nature” so there are other things which can be “of time”. There are also other natures which while being “nature” are different to “the” specific “nature” which is “of time”. There are different mysteries which are all similar because they are mysteries. The “remaining” mysteries are different to those which are not “remaining” mysteries. “The greatest remaining mystery” is different to other “remaining” mysteries as it is “the” singular, known, definite “mystery” which is known in terms of comparative degrees to the others as it is the “greatest”. What “the nature of time is”, is already known. “The greatest remaining mystery” is already known as a “mystery”. In “is”, I read a claim to a knowledge of the present. But what is claimed as “is”, is based on the knowledge of the past. This is narrated retrospectively and read retrospectively. So, this “is” can only be framed within that which has already happened and is therefore in the past.

There are different “threads”. “Curious threads” are similar to other “threads” but they are different as they are “curious” which is an excess to “threads”, but a necessary excess here, as they are known in terms of this necessary excess. “Curious threads” are that which “connect”. They “connect it”. “It” is something other than itself. “It” is “the nature of time” which “is” “perhaps the greatest remaining mystery”. What the “other great open mysteries” are is connected to that which “is perhaps the greatest remaining mystery”. “The other great open mysteries” are also “remaining” mysteries. While they are connected “to” each other, they are also “other” to each other. That which is “remaining” is also that which is “open”. So “those” “mysteries” which are not “remaining” are also not “open”. What are “mysteries” is known. What is “the greatest remaining mystery” is part of the “great open mysteries”. But it is also “other” to “those” which are the “other great open mysteries”. While “it” is part of “other great open mysteries”, “it” still is that which can be connected “to” “those” “mysteries” because of being the “other”, while the claim is that “those” “great open mysteries” are the “other”. What “mysteries” are, is known, as that which can be “open” or

not, which again can be “great” or not, which are “other” to “those” which are not the “other great open mysteries” and are therefore not “those” “to” which “curious threads connect” “it”, which is “the nature of time” which “is perhaps the greatest remaining mystery”.

“The nature of mind”, “the origin of the universe”, “the fate of black holes”, “the very functioning of life on Earth” are similar to each other because they are “those other great open mysteries”. They are also similar to “the nature of time” because it is also claimed to be part of the “great open mysteries”. However, they are different to each other and “the nature of time”. Their difference gets subsumed under the similarity of being part of the “great open mysteries”. Yet, their difference is also narrated as they are specified and narrated as different things. “The nature of mind” is different to “the nature of time”. It is “of mind” but is “the nature” and is external to “mind”. “Mind” is known as that “of” which there is “the nature”. This “nature” is specific and singular as it is “the” “nature” which is “of mind” and is different to “the nature of time” but is that “to” which “the nature of time” is connected”. “The universe” is known as specific, singular “of” which there is “the origin”. “Black holes” are “holes” which are different because of them being “black holes”. These “black holes” are “of” which there is “the” known, singular, specific “the fate”. “The very functioning” is “of” “life” but is not “life”. “The very functioning of life” is that which is “on” something which is known as “Earth”. “Earth” is other to “life” and to “the very functioning of life”. Thus, that which is “on Earth” is other to “Earth”. So, all those which are claimed to be similar to each other because they are all “those other great open mysteries” entail multiple differences within them.

“Something” is different from other somethings as it is “essential”, it can “draw us”, “draw us back to the nature of time” and “continues to” do so. While these are known about “something”, it can still be any “something” and thus, I read a claim to a known unknown thing in this “something” which is “essential”. So, the claim to knowledge here is also that

which is not known. The narratorial perspective is located both within “us” as well as being external to “us”. This perspective narrates through a perspective on “us” and is making claims on behalf of “us”. In these claims “us” are not where “the nature of time” is. “Us” “continues to” be drawn “back to the nature of time”. There seems to be a requirement for “us” to be “back to the nature of time” and this is done by something which is not “us” which is “something essential” and is narrated by a perspective on “us”. This “something” is “essential” according to the perspective on “us”. “To draw us back” is that which is done externally and is done “to” “us”. “The nature of time” here seems to be stationary while “us” “continues” to move away from “the nature of time” and therefore “continues” to be drawn “back”. So, I read a claim to cyclicity and repetition here about “something essential”, about what “something essential continues to draw”, about “us”, about “the nature of time” and, about “time”. So, these are claims about what the past is in terms of what has been happening, the present as this is what is happening and “continues to” be so and, the future as this “continues to” happen. That which is claimed to be happening and is claimed to be known as that which will “continue to” happen is based on a knowledge of the past. This can only be claimed in retrospect and necessarily so. Also, this reading is retrospective. Therefore, the claims to knowledge about the past, present and future are located within the past. While “the nature of time is perhaps the greatest remaining mystery”, “the nature of time” is also known in terms of the aforementioned claims. Therefore “the greatest remaining mystery” is something other than “the greatest remaining mystery” which can be read from what is known about it and the claims that are therefore made about it.

“Wonder” whilst being “wonder” “is” simultaneously known as something other than itself. It “is” known in specific terms as being “the” singular “source”. So, what “wonder is”, is known in terms of it being something other than itself which is being “the source”. There are different kinds of sources and while “wonder” “is” similar to them as it is also a “source”, it can be read differently from them as it is known as being “the” specific “source” which is

“of our desire for knowledge”. The narratorial perspective here is both located with what “our” is and is also outside “our”. This perspective knows what “our” is and makes claims “for” “our”. It knows that “our” has “desire” and this “desire” is “for” something. What it is “for” is also known as “our desire for knowledge”. “Desire” then is “for” something and “knowledge” is what can be desired. “Desire” has a “source”. This “source” is “of desire” but is not “desire”, it is external to “desire” and is other to “desire” as it is “the source” which is “of desire”. “The source of our desire” is doubly othered from “our desire” as it is “the source of desire” and not “desire” and it is also “wonder” which “is” “the source”. “Knowledge” seems to be continuously deferred as it is desired “for” and “wonder” “is the source of our desire for knowledge”. So, this is a claim to a present which continues to be the case. “Knowledge” then is that which continues to be desired “for” by those who are part of the “our” and who then have “wonder”, which continues to be “the source for our desire for knowledge”.

“Time is not what we thought it was” is “the discovery”. “The discovery” is not part of “knowledge”. It is additional to “knowledge”. “The discovery” is known as that which has already happened. Thus, it is in the past and continues to be “the discovery” which is “that”, “time is not what we thought it was”. “Knowledge” is that which continues to be desired “for”. It is known in terms of the past, but the claim is that it is somewhere which is still desired “for” and therefore not located in the past, according to the claims made here. “The discovery” can be known as such only retrospectively. It is known what “the discovery is”, that it is “the discovery” which makes it different to other discoveries, while the claim is that “the discovery” itself is other to itself as it is “that”. It is also known what “the discovery” does which is that it “opens up” and specifically “opens up a thousand questions”. What “our” is, is different from “we” because “our” has “desire” and “we thought”. The “desire” is that which continues to be so framed within the knowledge, which is in the past and of the past, which knows “desire” as such. “Desire” here is claimed as being in the present and in

the future as that which continues to be “our desire for knowledge”. “Thought” is that which has already happened and is located in the past.

“Time is” known in terms of what it is “not”. Therefore “time is” known in terms of a lack of being “what we thought it was”. There seems to be a need for “time” to be something other than itself. What “time is” is a claim to a knowledge about “time” as what it “is” in the present. This knowledge is based on what is known as “what we thought” about “time” which is in the past. “Time is” “what we thought” about. “What we thought” is known to a perspective which claims to be part of the “we” but is also outside and has a perspective on “we” and we’s “thought”. “The discovery” which is about “what we thought” is not by “we”. What “opens up a thousand questions” is “the discovery”, which is about “what we thought” and is not by “we”. “A thousand questions” are also not by “we” but by the narratorial perspective on “we” about “what we thought”. This perspective knows what “questions” are, that they are multiple, can be “a thousand”, which can be any “thousand questions” but, the claim is that they are distinct from other “questions” and other “thousand questions” because they are “a thousand questions” which have been opened “up” because of “the discovery that time is not what we thought it was”.

According to my reading, the claims that are made about “the nature of time” are “about time” within the narratorial perspective here. However, “the nature of time” is not “time”. The perspective is split in the claim to “my”. It is both located within “my” and is outside “my” whereby it is narrating through a perspective on what is “my”. Life is “my” and “work” is “life’s”. So “work” which is “my life’s work” is separated from “my” as it is “my life’s work” and “my” is not “life”. It is “my” life but not “my work”. What “my” “life” is, is known and it is also known what “the center of my life’s work” is. “My life’s work” has “the center” which has a location within itself and “the nature of time has been at the center”. “The center” is singular, defined and known in these terms. “My life’s work” is also that



which is not “in theoretical physics”. “Theoretical physics” is distinct from “physics” because of being “theoretical” but it is still “physics”. The claims about “the nature of time” are about where it is located which are what it “has been”, in terms of where “it has been”, which is “at the centre of my life’s work”, which is “in theoretical physics”.

Because “the nature of time has been at the center of my life’s work” therefore, “in the following pages, I give an account of what we have understood about time and the paths that are being followed in our search to understand it better”. This is because of “our desire for knowledge, and the discovery that time is not what we thought it was”. “An account” is that which “I give”; it is what is “in the following pages”. It is given by “I” and it is “of” “what we have understood”. The narratorial perspective shifts position here. It is split between being with the “I” and narrating through a perspective on the “I”. It shifts again as the claim is that “I” is part of “we”, the narratorial perspective is also part of “we”, but it shifts to being on the outside and is doubly split as it is splits from the “I” and from the “we” and narrates through a perspective on “I” as well as a perspective on “we”. “An account” can be any “account”, it is however distinguishable by “what” it is “an account of”. This “account” is “of what we have understood” but is given by “I”. “An account” can be “in”, it can be “give[n]”, it is “of” that which is “what” “we have understood”. It is narrated according to a perspective on both the “I” and “we” and this is an external perspective. A mastery of knowledge is claimed within this perspective as this perspective knows both “I” and “we”; what “we have” and what “I give”.

What “the following” are, are known as “pages”. They are different to other “pages” because they are “the following pages” and because of what is “in” them. So “pages” then are known in terms of what they are and what is “in” them. “Time” is “about” being “understood”. It is not only what has been “understood” by the “we” according to the “I” but, it requires “better” understanding and is “yet to” be understood. “Time” then is divided into

parts as that which “we have understood” which is not “time” but “about time”, it is that which is to be understood “better” as “it” which is “time” but is also other to time. “What we have understood” is “about time” while, what “our search” is, is “to understand it better”, “it” implying “time” here. That which is “about time” is not “time” while being “about time”, it is that which is other than “time” and is external to “time”. “What we have understood about time” is known to a perspective which claims to be part of “we” but is narrating through a perspective on “we”, on “what we have”, what it is to “have understood”, “what we have understood”, on what is “time” and that “what we have understood” is “about time”. “What we have understood about time” has “an account” which is “of” this understanding but is not “what we have understood”. This “account” can be and is given by “I” who claims to be part of the “we” but is also positioned outside the “we” as the “I” who gives “an account” which is “of” “what we have understood”. This “account” is neither I’s nor we’s but is “of” what “we have”. “What” is “about time” can be “understood” and this is “what” “we have”. So, this is in the past and has already happened, but the claim is that this continues to be so and “what we have understood about time” continues to be that which then “I give an account of”. Thus, this is a claim to a past based on the knowledge of the past, which is being retrospectively claimed but the claim is to “give an account of” in the present. But this is an absent present. Furthermore, the way “what we have understood about time” continues to be the case within the narratorial perspective is a claim to a future which is framed within the past.

“What we have understood about time” is not what it is “to understand it better”. While “what we have understood” is “about time” and not “it”, what “our search” is, is “to understand it better”. While “what we have understood” is not “it”, it is already known that “the paths that are being followed” are “in our search to understand it better”. While “it” has not been understood “better”, the claim is that it is known that “paths” which are multiple, are what “are being followed” “in our search to understand it better”. These “paths” are known as

definite, multiple yet unified as “the” specific “paths” which, “are” different to other “paths” because they “are being followed in our search to understand it better”. “What we have understood about time” is not “to understand it better”. Thus “our search” is what is “to understand it better”. The claim is that what “our search” is, is already known. It is also known what is “in our search” and, what “our search” leads “to”. “The paths that are being followed” means that these “paths” were already there and yet, the claim is that “the paths” “are being followed” “in our search”, “to understand it better” which implies that this understanding is not already there. So, despite following that which already exists, the “search” “in” which the following is, leads to that which has not yet been understood or rather more specifically, understood “better”. What “our search” is, is known to an external perspective which is both located inside as well as outside what is “our”. This perspective shifts in its position as it narrates through an external perspective on what is “our”, that “our” has a “search” which is “to” something. It is known within this perspective what it means for the “our” to “understand it” and by comparison “understand it better”. This understanding of “our” which is narrated in terms of a comparative degree, is claimed to be that which can be “to understand better”, this “better” can be for “our” but, is known to a perspective external to what is “our”.

“What we have understood about time” is not “to understand it better”; “what we have understood about time” is also different, additional and other to “the paths that are being followed in our search to understand it better”, yet, “I” can and does “give an account” which is claimed to be “of”: “what we have understood about time” “and”, “the paths that are being followed in our search to understand it better”. The differences that I read among these are subsumed and they become similar and singular within this “an account”. This “an account” is like other accounts and can be read as any “account” from the “an”. However, it is different to the other “an account” because “of what” they are.

What is “in the following pages” is “an account”, “as well as an account”. So, in the claim to one thing which are more than one, which are similar, is a claim to difference. I read this as in “the following pages”, “the” “pages” are a definite, known, one thing which are more than one but, are one because of being unified and specified as the definite “the” which, are all “following” and “pages”. They are also similar because of what is “in” these “following pages”, which are “an account”, which are yet again similar as they are both what “I give”. Yet, within this claim to similarity are differences because “an account” is different to that which is “as well as an account”. Their difference can also be read from “what” each “an account” is “of”. “An account of what we have yet to understand and what it seems to me that we are just beginning to glimpse” is additional to, other than, and is therefore not “an account of what we have understood about time and the paths that are being followed in our search to understand it better”.

It is because “the nature of time has been at the center of my life’s work in theoretical physics” that “in the following pages, I give an account of what we have understood about time”. This is despite “the nature of time” being different to that which is “about time”. “Time” is constituted as “what we have understood” which is not “time” but is “about time”; this is different to “the nature of time”. “Time” is claimed as that which can be understood “better”, and this is something that “our” are searching “to” do. “What we have yet to understand” is then that which “we have” not “yet” understood” but, it is already known that “we have yet to understand” it and this is “what”. There seems to be a need to “understand” this “what” by “we”. This is known and narrated according to a perspective which claims to be part of “we” but is positioned outside “we” and is narrating through a perspective on “we”. Claims are made within this perspective on behalf of “we” that this “what”, “we” does not “yet” “understand” but can potentially “understand”, and there is a requirement for “we” to “have” this understanding of this “what”. “What we have yet to understand” is already known and the claim is that it continues to be so. Therefore, a claim to a present can be made in

terms of what “I give” “as well as an account of”. But this can only be known retrospectively, and the claim is also made necessarily, retrospectively. However, there is also a claim to a future here whereby it is narrated that “we have yet to understand” “what”, so “we” can “understand” it and there is a need for the “we” to “have to understand” this “what”. The claim to this kind of future is based on what is known and is framed within claims made retrospectively, within a retrospective narration.

“What it seems to me that we are just beginning to glimpse” is additional to and different from “what we have yet to understand”. But they are both “what” “of” which there is a singular “an account” which can be given by “I” and which “I give”, “in the following pages”. So, while they are both different, they are both located “in” the same “following pages”. “To glimpse” is not “to understand” as the claim is that “we are just beginning to glimpse” but “we have yet to understand”. “What we have”, while it is claimed as that “we have” is, what I read as a lack in the “what”. That which “we have yet to understand” is not “what we have understood”. So, while both is a having by the “we”, one is about what “we have” while the other is about a lack. “To glimpse” is what “we are”. So, this is a claim to a present that the “we” continues to be, and this is already known. “To glimpse” is known in terms of “we” and “it” is “what”. However, both this “what” and the “glimpse” are narrated as “what it seems to me”. “Me” claims to be part of “we” but is located and narrating from an external perspective which is on “we”. What “we are” then is “what it seems to me”. “To glimpse” is what “we are just beginning” to do but it is external to “we”. “To glimpse” has a “beginning” which can be “just” or not, and these are known and narrated as “what it seems to me” by the narratorial perspective which is split between being part of “me” and being outside and narrating through a perspective on “me” and “we”.

Though “the past” is “not the future”, both “the past” and “the future” are known. They can both be remembered but this perspective knows that “we remember the past and not

the future”. To “remember” is to “do”. What “we remember” has a “why”. “The past” is single and definite; so is “the future”. What is claimed to be “the past” “and” “the future”, is framed according to what is known. This is known, claimed and narrated retrospectively by a perspective on “we”, their doing, their remembering, “the past and” “the future”. “We remember” and “we” also “exist”. They are different from each other but are similar as they are both what “we do”. To “exist in time” is what “we” can “do”. “Time” is that “in” which “we” can “exist” “or” that which can “exist in us”. “Time” therefore is about existing “in” and this is about a doing. For “time” to “exist in us” is different to “we” existing “in time”. “Us” is not “we” as “time” can “exist in us” and when we “exist in time”, time is external to “we” and to “us”. “Time” is external to both “us” and “we” and though “we” can “exist in time” “or” “time” can “exist in us”, “time” continues to remain other to that which it exists “in” or that which exists “in” it. This is different to “the nature of time” and “what” is “about time”. Therefore, “I” does not give an account” of this. “That time “passes”” is known to be said and this continues to be said. This is said by that which is other to the narratorial perspective but is known within this perspective. “To say” is to “mean” which is different to “really mean”. Both “mean” and “really mean” are “what”. Saying then is about meaning which can be “really” or not and this is about a doing. “What” “it” “really mean(s) to say that time “passes”” is different to “what “it” means “to say”. The difference can be read in what I read as an excess which is “really”, but it is a necessary excess to “mean”, in this case. “To say” is narrated as other than itself as it is “that”.

“What ties time to our nature as persons, to our subjectivity” is known. But the claim is that what this “what” is, is not known. Nevertheless, it is known that “what” “ties time to our nature as persons, to our subjectivity”. “Time” therefore is that which “what” “ties”. This tying is both “to our nature as persons” as well as “to our subjectivity”. This tying is tying “time”, it is done by “what” and it is “to”. It is also tying “to” more than once therefore I read a repetition here. Also, I read a continuous tying in “ties” which is also a repetition as “what

ties time to our nature as persons, to our subjectivity” and this continues as such. “Our nature” is different to other “nature” as it is “our[s]”. This again is distinct as what is “our nature” is “as persons” which is different to other “nature[s]” as well as different to that which is “our nature” but other to “our nature as persons”. There is a claim to similarity in the multiple “persons” through “our nature” which is claimed to be singular and similar for multiple “persons”, and as this “our nature”. “Our subjectivity” is not “our nature as persons”. “Subjectivity” is different to “nature as persons” while they are both “our”. Despite their difference, they are also similar as they are both that “what ties time to”.

“When I listen to the passing of time”, “I” “am” “listening to” “what”. “Time” is that “of” which there is “passing”. So, while “the passing” is “of time”, it is not “time”. This “passing” is known, definite and continuous. This “passing” is “of time” and is other to “time”, while being “of time”. “The passing of time” is continuously happening. So, it is repetitive and there is a cyclicity in it. It is already known that there will be “the passing” which is “of time”. So, this is a claim to a present, which is a continuous present, which is what the future will be. These are already known, and these claims are made retrospectively. “The passing of time” is also that which “I listen to”. This is claimed through a perspective which is split between the “I” and the perspective which is on “I”. This perspective knows that “I listen to the passing of time” but it is known and claimed through a perspective which is outside “I” while claiming to be located within “I”. “When I listen to the passing of time”, “I” then “am” that which “I” “am” doing, which is “listening to”. But this “listening” which, “I” “am” doing is other than “listening to”; it is also other “to” the listening of “I” “to the passing of time”, as it is “what”. While the claim is that this is known, the “what” is also that which is not known. But that which is not known is claimed to be known through being “what”. “I” also listen to other things which are not “the passing of time” as there is a “when I listen to the passing of time”. There is a repetition and return to the “when I listen to the passing of time” from when I am not listening “to the passing of time”. This is part of “What

we have understood about time”, what it means “to understand it better”, “what we have yet to understand” and “what” “we are just beginning to glimpse”. Therefore, this is “the greatest remaining mystery”. But this is all “perhaps” so.



## XV. Elastic Time

'Time is elastic': an extract from Carlo Rovelli's *The Order of Time*

### [Science and nature books](#)

This article was published in the online version of the newspaper *The Guardian* as an extract from Carlo Rovelli's book *The Order of Time* as part of "Science and nature books". This book discusses "the order of time" which is claimed to be Carlo Rovelli's and is narrated here according to the perspective of the narrator of this article. This narrator is not Carlo Rovelli and has a perspective on "Carlo Rovelli's *The Order of Time*". The claims made within this perspective are that time can have an order, both time and "the order of time" can be narrated in a book and this narration can be narrated as "science and nature books". Time then is part of "science and nature" in terms of "books". "Science" "and" "nature" are distinct from each other as they are so narrated. A difference can also be read through the "and" which is also about an additionality, an excess, as if "nature" is not part of "science" and vice versa. So, "nature" then can be read as an excess to the "science" "books". However, this difference is subsumed when both "science" "and" "nature" are narrated through "books". I read books here as a term which is about a uniformity. While the claim is that "science" "and" "nature" are different to each other, they can both be narrated as "science and nature" through "science and nature books". This is where a book about time can be narrated. So "*The Order of Time*" which is Carlo Rovelli's is a narration which the narratorial perspective has identified as something that can be and is located within "science and nature books". The claim about "an extract" from Carlo Rovelli's book then narrates that time as narrated through this "extract" is about "science" "and" "nature". Thus, claims are being made about time which is then about an additionality, about difference and a uniformity which overrides this difference.

Time is narrated here in terms of what “time is” and that “the order” can be “of” it. The claim here is that it is known within the perspective of the narrator that time has “order” and “the” specific “order” “of time” is also known to this perspective. This “*The Order of Time*” however is claimed to be “Carlo Rovelli’s” and is narrated according to the perspective of the narrator of this article and it is narrated as “an extract”. So, this makes the ideas that are in the narration where this “extract” has been extracted from an excess within this perspective. The ideas about time which are narrated here are bound within a frame of the narratorial perspective though this “extract”. Yet the claim is that it is known within this perspective what “time is” from this “extract” and that “time is elastic”. Also, this “extract” is “an extract” and thus could be any extract from Carlo Rovelli’s *The Order of Time*. In this indefiniteness which I can read from the “an”, which is bound within the frames of being “an extract” and being “from Carlo Rovelli’s *The Order of Time*”, I read an implication that any “extract” from “Carlo Rovelli’s *The Order of Time*” would make this claim about time that “time is elastic”. However, other claims are also made about time within the narrative premise of this text and they are discussed further on in this essay. So according to the perspective of the narrator, all the claims made about time within this narration and Carlo Rovelli’s *The Order of Time* then are still about: “time is elastic”.

What does it really mean to say that time ‘passes’? Why does time pass faster in the mountains than it does at sea level?

The physicist explains in this extract from his latest book.

It is a claim to knowledge made within this perspective that it is said “that time ‘passes’”. Time then can be read in terms of what is said about it; that to “say” something can “mean” something and can further “really mean” “what”. This “really” meaning is a doing which can be read from the “does”. It is known within the perspective here that “time passes”. The claims made here are about time but specifically in terms of its passing. Time

here is narrated in terms of the speed of its passing and through comparison. An explanation is required for the “what” and the “why” of the varying speed of time. These are known within the narratorial perspective but what it “really” means “to say” this or the “why” this happens is explained “in this extract” by “the physicist”. “The physicist” is not the narrator but the narrator claims to know that “the physicist explains” and that the explanation is “in this extract from his latest book”. Carlo Rovelli is narrated as “the physicist” here and he can and does explain these claims which have been made about “time” according to this perspective. I read an implication here that there is more in “his latest book” than the two questions asked here as “this extract” contains explanations to these two questions. “Book” is narrated in terms of whose it is and that it is “his” but what “the physicist explains in” “his book” which is also “his latest book” can be extracted and narrated by someone who is not “the physicist” and whose book it is not claimed to be. Yet, it is known within this narratorial perspective what this “extract” does and what is “in this extract”. Therefore, this narration is about what “the physicist explains” according to the perspective of the narrator. That which is known and questioned through the narratorial perspective can be and is explained by “the physicist”. What “it really mean(s) to say” something about “time” and “why” “time pass(es) faster in the mountains” are both narrated in terms of “does” and can both be explained. Time can do something, which in this case is passing “faster in the mountains than it does at sea level” but this doing which is done by time can be narrated and requires an explanation. According to the perspective of the narrator, “The Order of Time” which is Carlo Rovelli’s, entails these.

I stop and do nothing. Nothing happens. I am thinking about nothing. I listen to the passing of time. This is time, familiar and intimate. We are taken by it. The rush of seconds, hours, years that hurls us towards life then drags us towards nothingness ... We inhabit time as fish live in water. Our being is being in time. Its solemn music

nurtures us, opens the world to us, troubles us, frightens and lulls us.  
The universe unfolds into the future, dragged by time, and exists  
according to the order of time. What could be more universal and  
obvious than this flowing?

(Rovelli, 2018)

The text that is narrated above has been claimed to be “an extract from” “Carlo Rovelli’s” “latest book” *The Order of Time*. According to the perspective of the narrator of this book which is narrated framed within the perspective of the narrator of this article, “nothing” can be done, “nothing” can happen, and it can be thought “about” by this “I”. This thought is a “thinking” which I read as a becoming. This is something that the “I” in the text becomes which can be read from the “I am”. This “thinking” is also a doing which is “nothing”; it is also a happening or a not happening which is also “nothing” as “nothing happens”. All of these are because the “I” in the text claims that it stops. The doing “nothing” of the “I” is additional to its stopping. In order to “do” this “nothing” the “I” first stops and then the doing “nothing” can happen. This is a requirement for the “nothing” to happen and for the “I” to think “about nothing”. Thus this “thinking” is also what it means for the “I” to “stop”. The claim at stake here is that this “I” knows what “nothing” is, what is required to “do nothing” and how “nothing” can be thought about. This “I” then can make claims about what “time” “is” and that it passes in relation to this “nothing”. This “I” can make claims about “we”, “us” “our being”, “the universe”, what is “universal and obvious” in terms of time and its “passing”. All of these claims are made after “I stop and do nothing”. What happens then is what is claimed to be the “familiar” “time”. This “time” which “is familiar and intimate” for the “I” when it stops and does nothing is claimed to be the same “time” which the “we inhabit”, “in which” “our being is” and the time whose “solemn music nurtures us, opens the world to us, troubles us, frightens and lulls us.” These claims are made

within a perspective which is both included but also not included in “the universe” because to have a perspective on this “universe” means that this perspective is positioned outside of it. Paradoxically a claim to “what” is “universal” is a claim in which the perspective itself is excluded from that which is “universal” because it can look at it, narrate what it is and thus stake a claim to knowing it.

This perspective knows what “the universe” is, that it “unfolds”, this unfolding is “into the future” and that this unfolding is “dragged by time”. According to this perspective “the universe” “exists according to the order of time”. I read a claim here that the “I”, “we”, what is “our” and the “us” are both part of “the universe” but “the universe” is also distinct from all of these. What “the future” is, is known to this perspective; necessarily so as this is a retrospective reading of the claims made about “the future”. “The universe unfolds into the future” as a present continuous but this is happening because of something that has already been done by “time” and thus is located in the past as “the universe” has been “dragged by time”. But this which has already happened results in what is the present and continues to be the case. “The universe” is “dragged by time” and because of this it “unfolds into the future”, “and” thus additionally which is part of what continues to be this “universe” then “exists according to the order of time”. So, according to these claims that which is “into the future” is as a reason of what has already happened, but this also continues to happen and yet is located in its state of being in the past. Further, these events then are the what, why and how “the universe” continues to exist in relation to “time” rather more specifically “according to the order” which is “of time”. This existence is outside “the order of time”. The “order” can only be read retrospectively. That which is “the order of time” can only be known as such retrospectively because only in retrospect can it be identified as what constitutes “the order of time” and what is not part of this “order”.

“The future” is bigger than “the universe” as “the universe” “unfolds into” it. So then “the universe” becomes both part of “the future” and yet is not this “future”. In this sense, I read “the future” as an excess to “the universe” but in this moment it is a necessary excess for “the universe” to exist within this context. This is an excess that frames “the universe” because when ‘the universe unfolds into the future dragged by time’ it then becomes “the universe” which “unfolds into” and is thus bound within “the future”. According to the claims made here, “the universe” becomes something other than itself as “it unfolds into the future”, is “dragged by time”, “and” then “exists according to the order of time” but it is still narrated as “the universe”. Thus, this is about differences which can be read from the narration but within the perspective of the narrator, what I read as differences, are still the same singular “the universe”. These differences then can be read as being about a singularity which is about a similarity which is “the universe”. “The universe unfolds into the future” so it then becomes inside “the future” but it is still not “the future”. It is outside “time” as well, as it is “dragged by time” and “exists according to the order of time” and continues to be narrated as that which is not “time” but in terms of what can be done to it “by time” and how this changes how it exists. The perspective of the narrator is outside the “order”, “the universe” and “time” but knows what all of these are. This is a claim to knowledge from the outside and that which can be narrated from this position of being outside of that which is claimed to be known.

The claim here is that “the passing” which is a specific “passing” is “of time”. I read a difference here from the claim made earlier in this article which narrates that “time ‘passes’”. “The passing” is “of time” but that doesn’t mean that “time” is “passing”, according to my reading. However, within the perspective of the narrator this “explains” “what” “it really mean(s) to say that time ‘passes’”. “The passing” which is “of time” in this case can be listened “to” by the “I” in the text. This listening means that the “I” can “stop and do nothing”, “nothing happens” and “I am thinking about nothing”. While the “passing” is “of

time” and it is not “time” that is “passing”, “this is time” according to the claims made within this perspective. The “I” stopping, doing “nothing”, “nothing” happening, “thinking about nothing”, “listening to the passing of time” is what “time is”. This “is” “time”, but it is also “familiar and intimate”. It is these to the “I”, but the claim is that this “is time” which “we are taken by”. The “I” is distinct from the “we” but makes these claims about “time” for the “we”. The perspective of the “I” and the “we” are both narrated through the perspective of the narrator of the extract which is narrated within the perspective of the narrator of this article. So, the “we” and the “I” are both split as the narratorial perspective locates itself both within the “we” but at the same time is also excluded from both the “we” and the “I”. This is because this narration is according to a perspective which is a perspective on the “we” as well as the “I”.

“The passing” seems to be a continuing process. What is narrated as “this is time” in this particular moment in the text is what this continuous process is, and the claim is that “we are taken by it” which is a claim to something that has already happened and is in the past. Yet this is what “time is” according to the claims made within this perspective. Time can take and has “taken” the “we”. The “I” is located outside this “we” but stakes a claim to know that “we are taken by it” which is “time”. This is the “time” which is “familiar and intimate” for the “I”. Though time is a doing of “nothing”, time also has the ability to do something which in this case is a taking of the “we”. What is invested in these claims made about “time” is a claim to knowledge made within the narratorial perspective that knows what “time is”. It is known within this perspective who the “we” and the “us” are and this narration is a perspective on them. It is a claim to a mastery through this claim to knowledge whereby claims are made about “time” and, what it does to the “we” and its implications for the “us”, “I” and “our” according to the perspective of the narrator on behalf of that which constitutes the “we”, “I”, “us” and “our”.

What is meant by “we are taken by it” is “the rush of seconds, hours, years that hurls us towards life then drags us towards nothingness...”. This “rush” is what “is time, familiar and intimate”. This “rush” is what the “I” is listening “to” as “the passing of time”. “The rush” is “of” something which are “seconds, hours, years”. I can read a difference in seconds, hours and years as they are narrated as distinct from each other. However, this difference gets subsumed as they are all narrated within this perspective as something that “the rush” is “of”. The “I” within this narration is located both within and outside the “us”. This “I” knows “the rush” and it knows the “seconds, hours, years” and it narrates them according to a perspective which has a perspective on the “us”; in terms of what “the rush of seconds, hours, years” does to the “us”. The “seconds, hours, years” as narrated here are not part of “life” as “the rush of” these “hurls us towards life”. They are also not part of “nothingness”. However just prior to this, it has been claimed in this narration that what “is time” entails stopping and doing “nothing” by the “I”, “nothing” happening and the “I” “thinking about nothing”. These are what it takes for the “I” to “listen to the passing of time” which then can be narrated in terms of “this is time”. “Life” is not “nothingness” but the “us” can both be hurled “towards” and dragged “towards” both of these respectively by “the rush”. Although “life” and “nothingness” are not the same here, I can read a similarity in them from the narration “we are taken by it”. What it means by “we are taken by it” according to this perspective is “the rush of seconds, hours, years” hurling the “us towards life” and “then” dragging us “towards nothingness”. I can also read an association between “life” and “nothingness” as according to the claims made here the drag “towards nothingness” is a “then”- something which happens after the hurl “towards life”. “The rush” is “that” which both “hurls” and “drags”. This “rush” which is “of seconds, hours and years”, which is hurling the “us towards life” and “then drags towards nothingness” is what “the passing of time” means.

The “we” who “are taken by it” which “is time” which “is intimate and familiar”, also “inhabit time as fish live in water”. The narrator here is located within this “we” but also has



a perspective on the “we” and is therefore outside the “we”. “We” then is something that is split and can be both inside and outside. The narratorial perspective thus stakes a claim to knowing who and what this “we are” by both being part of the “we” and by not being part of it but having a perspective on it and narrating it accordingly. Within this perspective “we” inhabits, and “time” is something that can be inhabited. This perspective knows that “fish live in water”. To “inhabit” is “as” is to “live”, specifically “we” inhabiting “time” is “as fish live in water”. I can read similarities here between inhabiting and living, between time and water. However, the “we” is not the “fish” as “fish live in water”, not “we” and “we inhabit time” which “fish” don’t. Time can be inhabited “as” water can be lived in and something can be “in time”. “Time” is not “water”, but what it means to “inhabit time” is narrated here through “as” living “in water”. This is a continuous state of “being” which is “in time” but is also in the past which can be read from the narration of how the narratorial perspective knows what “our being is”. “Our” can be read as something that is split because the narratorial perspective is located both within and outside this “our”. This narration is a perspective of the narrator on “our being” which “is being in time” and this “time” is narrated in terms of what it means within the narratorial perspective. There is an implication here that there are beings other than “our being”. These are differentiated from “our being” on the basis on “being in time”. The perspective of the narrator is situated both inside and outside “our being” and knows what “our being” is and where it is. By narrating this “being” as what it “is”, it becomes both that which is “being in time” and it is “our being”. I read “time” here as that which frames “being”. The “being” which is “in time” is “our being”. It can be “in time” but it is not “time”. This “time” then is an excess to “our being”. According to the narrative premise of this text, existence is also outside and distinct from “time”. However, according to my reading, “being” is not the same as existence in this text.

This perspective stakes a claim to knowledge about the “us” and what “time” does to this “us”. The claim here is that time has “music” which is “solemn”. There is a shift in the

narration from “time” to what is time’s which can be read in the “its”. It is known within this perspective that “us” can be nurtured, troubled, frightened, lulled and “the world” can be opened “to us” and, all of these can be done “to us” by time’s “solemn music” which are “music”, “solemn” and time’s according to the perspective of the narrator. What “nurtures us” is different to what it means to open “world to us”, to trouble “us”, to frighten or lull “us”. While there is a difference there are also similarities as all of these can be and is done by the “solemn music” which is of time. The narratorial perspective knows this and narrates this according to a perspective on the “us”. Again the “us” is both inclusive and the non-inclusive. It is knowing from the outside the “us” is different to “solemn music”. In “opens the world to us”, I read a perspective which is a perspective on the world. So “the world” is known as opened and closed in that opposition. “The us” therefore has that perspective on “the world”. In the narration “lulls us”, “troubles us”, the implication is that the perspective has a view on the “world”.

This is a “flowing” which I read as a claim to a continuous state of being, that which is and will continue to exist as such. The perspective knows this and according to the claims made within the narration, this is what comprises “the order of time” within the perspective of the narrator. This “flowing” which is of time but involves claims made about things which are not time is “universal and obvious” within this perspective. The implication here is that there “could be” nothing “more universal and obvious than this”. The claim at stake here is that it is known within this perspective that the time which is “familiar and intimate” for the “I” is what “time is”. This is also what “time is” for the “we”, the “us and “our”. The “I” is not the “we” which is not the “us”, which is not “our”. They are all narrated distinctly. Yet what “time is” for all of them can be narrated according to the narratorial perspective in terms of what time is “familiar and intimate” for the “I”. Through perspectives on “us”, “we”, and “our”. All of these are about the passing of time which is “universal and obvious” but it is so

within the perspective of the narrator which claims this universality and obviousness for the “we”, “us”, “our” and “the universe”.

“The universal” is the excess of the perspective which in that sense is more universal than “the universal” because it can see “the universal”. It is more and greater than that in order to see it. This perspective has no position in relation to that because it is not its intention, it is not something it knows that it is claiming about itself. While at the one and the same time the perspective is included but, it is not engaged with the consequences of the fact that it is always a mastery of that view, that it can make those claims to inclusion on behalf of the others. The others which are moreover already differentiated from the perspective itself. The difficulty for me here is that how this text sets itself out as the project of communication of somehow sharing something about “time” with others while at the same time that sharing is very limited in many ways according to the perspective which already positions itself outside of all of this. So, this is a reading of how time shifts within this narration. It is always already a time which there is mastery over on part of the perspective.

## XVI. The History Children are Taught in School

... As she had in earlier novels, Woolf explores two histories throughout *Mrs Dalloway*: the official public history which constitutes the genealogical stud book of “The Journal of Mistress Joan Martyn,” and the private history incarnated in Joan Martyn’s diary. Most obviously these two ways of recording time are represented by “Big Ben... with his majesty laying down the law, so solemn, so just,” and by “the other clock, the clock which always struck two minutes after Big Ben” and which “came shuffling in with its lap full of odds and ends ... all sorts of little things... on the wake of that solemn stroke”. Compared earlier in the novel to “a young man, strong, indifferent, inconsiderate... swinging dumb-bells this way and that, Big Ben keeps track of the almost redundantly repetitive public events— war, invention, “King following King, Prime Minister Prime Minister, and Law Law”— which make up the history children are taught in school. Metonymically associated with love (for Clarissa, meditating on “the miracle” incarnated in the old lady next door, has just begun to dwell on love when the other clock comes shuffling in), the alternative history that the “other clock” symbolizes only seems to be a chronicle of “little things.” In fact, Woolf shows, such trifles may have as much power for changing the world as the dumb-bells deployed by Big Ben— and those little things may have more potential for healing wounds in the body politic.

There are multiple “histories”. “Histories” are similar to each other and are therefore known as “histories” because of this sameness. However, there is also a claim to difference here as what “two histories” within these multiple “histories” are, is known. It is claimed to be known within the narratorial perspective which is outside “histories” and these “two histories”. “Histories” are those which are known but ironically, they can be and are explored. So, what “Woolf explores” is that which is already known within a perspective which is not “Woolf”. But it is known within this other perspective that what “Woolf” does is “explores” and what “Woolf explores” are “histories” which is specifically known as “two histories”, which is a claim made according to the narratorial perspective which is not “Woolf”, is located outside these “histories” and is making these claims through a perspective on “Woolf”, on what is explored and, what “histories” are. How “Woolf explores two histories” is “as she had in earlier novels”. So, exploring “histories” is repetitive and that which is being explored has also been done previously and is known. While “exploring histories” is repetitive because of being “as” “in earlier novels”, it is different from that which is “in earlier novels”. Yet, these are “histories”, which can be and “Woolf explore[d]” and they are “in novels”. But part of what constitutes their difference is because of what they are located “in”, which is whether they are “in earlier novels” or not. “*Mrs. Dalloway*” is distinct because it is known as such but it is also generic as it is part of “novels” and is similar to “earlier novels” because of what “Woolf explores” [...] throughout *Mrs. Dalloway*. Therefore, what “Woolf explores” which are “two histories” are repetitive in multiple ways; it is repetitive because of being explored “throughout *Mrs. Dalloway*”, because of being “as” and because of being “in earlier novels”. So, exploring here is constituted in terms of repetition.

The “two histories” while collectively known as “histories” are distinct from each other. They are also other from themselves as they are other to the “two histories” and are

further “the official public history” “and the private history”. “History” is that which is narrated with the definite article “the”, is known and singular; yet, it is narrated as multiple other things which also other it to itself. While it is known that “Woolf explores two histories”, it is implied that there are other “histories” as well which while being “histories” are different from these “two histories”. “The official public history” is different from “the” “public history” which is not “official”. “The” “public” is distinct from “the private” yet they are both “the” “history” and are parts of that which make up the “two histories”. “The official public history” is other than itself as it is “which” and it “constitutes”. Similarly, “the private history” is also other than itself as it is “incarnated” and further “incarnated in” something else. Therefore, what is narrated as exploring “histories” is “constituted” and “incarnated in” something else. So, these “histories” then although known as “histories” are always placed somewhere else and “in” something else. That which “Woolf explores” according to the narratorial perspective as “two histories throughout *Mrs. Dalloway*” then is about a constant deferral. “The genealogical stud book” is “the official public history” and a “diary” is “the private history”. While “the public” or rather more specifically “the official public” is not “the private” yet they are both “histories”, so their difference is subsumed under being “histories”. They are both known yet, they are that which “Woolf explores”. So, the claim then is, what is known within the narratorial perspective is that which “Woolf explores” and, this too is known within the narratorial perspective which is not “Woolf” but, knows “Woolf”, knows that “Woolf explores” and what it is that “Woolf explores.

“Time” can be recorded, and it can be recorded in multiple “ways”. While all “these” are “ways” “of recording time”, they are different to each other. They are also different to other “ways” because of being what they are “of” and what they do, which is that they record “time”. That “these” are “ways” and that they are “ways of recording time” is claimed according to a perspective which is outside “time” and which is not “recording time”. What “time” is, that “time” can be recorded and in what “ways”, is known to this external

perspective. This perspective is located both outside “time”, outside the “recording” of “time” and is also other to that which is “recording time” in “these two ways”. While “these two ways” are “of recording time”, “time” is other to and is independent of this “recording”. That “these two ways” are “of recording time” can only be known and narrated as such retrospectively. What “these two ways of recording time are” and what “these two ways of recording time” “most obviously” “are” is narrated according to a perspective on “time”. This is also a perspective which is on “recording time” but it is known within this perspective what is “obviously” and more specifically “most obviously” the case here. What “these two ways of recording time” “most obviously” “are”, are other than themselves as they are that which is “represented”. So “these two ways of recording time” which “are” “most obviously” the case, are other than what they are narrated as, as they are “represented”. In “most obviously”, I read “most” as an excess to “obviously” but as a necessary excess here. Not only are they “represented” but they are “represented by ‘Big Ben’”. So, “time” is doubly framed within retrospection as “these two ways” “of recording time” can necessarily only be known retrospectively as such and; “these two ways of recording time are” that which “are” further “represented”. So, while “time” is narrated within these frameworks, “time” is also outside that which are “these two ways”, outside of “recording time” as also outside of the “represented”.

What “these two ways of recording time are” is what “Woolf explores” which are “two histories throughout *Mrs. Dalloway*”. So, exploring “histories” is “ways of recording time”. Both “time” and “histories” are quantifiable and separable in terms of quantity. As they “are represented by”, this is a further othering from themselves. What “Woolf” then “explores” “throughout *Mrs. Dalloway*” which are “two histories”, means that the claim here is that “histories” are othered from itself through multiple layers. “Histories” become distinguishable and therefore othered in this way in terms of their quantity. Then they are othered through what is “the” “public”, what is “the official public history” and what is “the

private history”. Further othering happens through “which constitutes” what and what is “incarnated in”. Furthermore, “histories” become a question of “time” and othered to themselves as exploring “histories” here are “ways of recording time”; which means this is not about “histories” anymore, while continuing to be about “histories”. What I read “exploring” “histories” to be about, is “time”, which can be and is recorded; “exploring” “histories” is about the “ways” this “recording” is done, which are through “represent[at]ions”.

A “clock” can lay “down the law”. A “clock” can also be gendered as it is narrated as “his” here. Clocks, while being known in terms of their sameness, are constituted through differences between them as there is “the other clock”. Why “the clock” is “the other clock” is because of what it “always” does. Despite “always” doing this, it is this “the clock” which is “the other clock” because of what it is not. Despite being “the clock”, it is “the other clock” because of not being “Big Ben”. “The other clock” is not “Big Ben” as it does not lay down “the law”, is not “so solemn” or even solemn, neither is it “so just”, nor “just” at all. It is not “Big Ben” because it is “the other clock, the clock which always struck two minutes after Big Ben”. But despite “Big Ben” being narrated as “his majesty laying down the law, so solemn, so just” and not being narrated in terms of what it “struck” and when; it is implied that “Big Ben” is also another “clock” which “always struck two minutes” before “the other clock”. “Big Ben” then is also othered from itself. While I read here that it is implied that “Big Ben” is also a “clock”, it is narrated in terms of multiple things which are other than itself. It is that “by” which “ways of recording time are represented”. It is also narrated as “his majesty” which is “laying down the law”, which is also “so solemn” and “so just”. It is also that which is not “the other clock”. Representing “ways of recording time” is different from “laying down the law”. “Time” therefore is not “the law”. “The law” while already known as such is still laid down and this “laying down the law” is repetitive. So, every time that “the law” is laid “down” it changes from the earlier “the law” which has been laid “down” and is different



from the next “laying down the law” yet, these other “the law(s)” are also part of that which is the singular and definitive “the law”. The claim here is that which has already taken place, that which is now happening and that which is yet to happen as “laying down the law” are already known within the narratorial perspective.

The “ways of recording time” are other than “ways” which are “of recording time” as they “are represented”. They “are represented by” different parts which further contain different parts. “These two ways of recording time are represented by” “Big Ben”, “and by “the other clock”. “Big Ben” here is that which is “with his majesty laying down the law, so solemn, so just”; “the other clock” is “the clock which always struck two minutes after Big Ben” and which “came shuffling in with its lap full of odds and ends... all sorts of little things... on the wake of that solemn stroke”. “Big Ben” then is part of what “these” “ways” “of recording time are represented by” but I can also read that “Big Ben” is the authority on “that” “stroke” which is distinctively “that solemn stroke”. As “the other clock” does not strike as does “Big Ben”, it is therefore “always” that “which” “struck” “after Big Ben”. As “Big Ben” is “laying down the law” that “which” is “after” is not part of “the law” and is therefore not that which is “so solemn, so just”. As it is “compared earlier in the novel to a young man” in that which is not part of this “earlier”, it is not “compared” “to a young man” but in both cases it is “Big Ben”.

Not all “events” are “public”, not all “public events” are “repetitive”, not all “public events” are “redundantly repetitive”. The claim here is that it is known within this narratorial perspective which is outside the “public” what “the” “redundantly repetitive public events” are but this is “almost” the case. Therefore, I read ambiguity in this claim to knowledge. While “the” “redundantly repetitive public events” are “almost” so, it is known what they are: “--war, invention, “King following King, Prime Minister Prime Minister, and Law Law”. That which “keeps track of the almost redundantly repetitive public events” and according to

the narratorial perspective is thus “compared” “to “a young man, strong, indifferent, inconsiderate... swinging dumb-bells this way and that” is what “ways of recording time are represented by”. Therefore, this kind of “a young man” or “the almost redundantly repetitive public events” are not part of “time” or “these” “ways” which are “of recording time”.

“Children are” those who “are taught”. That “children are taught” is known within and narrated according to a perspective which is not “children” and therefore not “taught” but has a perspective on what “children are”, that they “are taught”, what they “are taught” and where they “are taught”. “History” can be “taught”. It is “children” who “are taught” “history”. “The history” “children are taught in school” is different from other histories. It is “the history” which is made “up”. While it is “the history” that “children are taught in school”, it is not “children” who “make up” this “history”. “History” can be variant and is constructed in terms of difference within itself. “The history children are taught in school” is different from other histories because of that “which make[s] up” this specific “history” which is further distinguished as that which “children are taught in school”. “School” is that “in” which “children are taught” and this is the case according to the external narratorial perspective. That “which make[s] up the history children are taught in school” is not “history” at all; they are “the almost redundantly repetitive public events”. “The” “events” are distinct from each other as are the components of what makes up these “events”. “King” “following” “king” is every time a distinctive event as each “King” different from the other “King” that they are “following”. However, the event becomes the same because of the repetition of “King” “following” “King”. So, within this perspective, repetition takes over differences and it is the sameness which is narrated. Repetition here then is that which has parts that can be omitted because of the sameness under which differences can be obliterated. This is what constitutes “the” “events” “which make up the history” and specifically “the history children are taught in school”. In this way, “Prime Minister” becomes indistinguishable from another “Prime Minister” “and” “Law” from the other “Law”.

Similarly, “King following King, Prime Minister Prime Minister, and Law Law” become all the same to each other as do “war” and “invention” because they are “the almost redundantly repetitive public events” “which make up the history children are taught in school”, all of which “Big Ben keeps track of”. Therefore, “Big Ben keeps track of” “the history children are taught in school”. Within the narratorial perspective this is how “children” are constructed through a sameness in terms of what they “are taught”, where “in”, and there is no scope for difference among “children” in this case.

“The alternative history” is other to “history” but it is “history” nevertheless. “The alternative history” is known, singular and definite. “The alternative history” is doubly othered as it is “that” which is symbolized and that which “symbolizes” this “alternative history” is “the other clock”. “The alternative history” is “alternative” to “history” because of being symbolized by “the other clock”. By corollary then, “the other clock” is “other” to “the” “clock” as it “symbolizes” “the alternative history”. What “seems to be a chronicle of “little things” is not so as this “only seems to be” so but is “in fact” not. So that which is “only” a seeming is not that which is “in fact”. A seeming then is not a “fact”. The implication here is that “little things” would otherwise constitute “the alternative” which is “the other” but this is not “in fact” the case here as this is “only” what “seems to be” so. Why this seeming is “in fact” not a being is because of what has “power” and “potential”, how “much” and “for” what, but that which is claimed to be “in fact” is what “may” be so.

Though “History” is about keeping “track” and about “ways of recording time”, “History” is also a “chronicle”. “The alternative history that the “other clock” symbolizes” is distinct from “the alternative history”. That which is “associated with love” is not “love” and is additional to “love” as it is “with love” which, while being additional to “love” also makes “love” an excess. “The alternative history that the “other clock” symbolizes” is other to itself as it is narrated in terms of what it is “associated with”. That which is “metonymically

associated with love” is “the alternative history” as it is not “the official public history” nor is it “the history children are taught in school”. So, while it is not “the almost redundantly repetitive public events”, it is what is claimed to seem “to be a chronicle of “little things”. However, the claim at stake here is that this seeming is to a perspective which is other to the narratorial perspective but it is known within the narratorial perspective what “seems” like what within the other perspective. So, the claim is to knowing what seeming is: what “seems to be” what, in the perspective of the other as well as being a claim to a knowledge that this seeming is “only” a seeming and is not “in fact” a being. Therefore, there is also a claim within the narratorial perspective here that the other perspective does not know what “fact” is.

“Love” is narrated in terms of things which are not “love” but are “with”, “for” and “on love”. “The alternative history that the ‘other clock’ symbolizes” is “metonymically associated with love” because “Clarissa, meditating on ‘the miracle’ incarnated in the old lady next door, has just begun to dwell on love when the other clock comes shuffling in”. So, “the other clock” is not already there when “Clarissa” “has just begun to dwell on love”. Dwelling “on love” has a beginning which can be “just” or not. “When” “Clarissa” “has just begun to dwell on love” is known to perspectives other than “Clarissa” as this is framed within the narratorial perspective which frames the perspective which narrates Clarissa’s dwelling “on love” and “when” this dwelling “has just begun”. That “Clarissa” “has just begun to dwell on love” while “meditating on “the miracle” and that what “Clarissa” “has just begun to dwell on” is “love” is narrated according to perspectives which are not “Clarissa”. But the claim is that Clarissa’s dwelling, what it is “on” and when, are all known and hence narrated according to these other perspectives. So, this perspective on “history” which is narrated as “the alternative history”, what it is “associated with”, how, why and when, are all narrated from an external perspective which claims a supremacy of knowledge

and narrates “for” another. This narratorial perspective is outside “history”, “love”, “meditating”, dwelling, the “when”, clocks, “chronicle” and “little things”.

“Little things” are “trifles” which are different from other “trifles” because of being “such trifles”. What is “in fact” is what “Woolf shows”. So that which is “in fact” can be shown and from what I read here, there seems to be a need to show that which is “in fact”. But that which is “in fact” according to the claims made here, is also that which “may” be so and therefore is not definitely so. So that which “may” be is that which is “in fact” within this narratorial perspective. This perspective is outside “the world” and knows that “power” is “for changing the world”. “The world” is that which requires constant “changing”, this “changing” is happening as “the dumb-bells” are “deployed by Big Ben” yet the “changing the world” seems to be constantly deferred. According to my reading, this deferral is because according to the narratorial perspective, there are “wounds in the body politic” which have not healed but there is “potential for healing” these “wounds”. However, “the dumb-bells deployed by Big Ben” have “power for changing the world”, yet, this having of the “power” does not mean that what is known as “changing the world” is really “changing the world”. “Potential” is not “power” but they can both be had, “as much as” or “more” and they are both part of that which is “in fact”. That which “may have as much power” “as” another is still not the same thing as the other despite the “power” and having “as much power” “as” “may” be “for” one thing. That which “may have more potential for healing wounds” is known as “those little things”.

“The dumb-bells deployed by Big Ben” which “have” “much power for changing the world” are “the almost redundantly repetitive public events- war, invention, ‘King following King, Prime Minister Prime Minister, and Law Law’”. So, “the almost redundantly repetitive public events” have “much power for changing the world”. The “repetitive public events” although “repetitive” are still “changing”. While they “may have” “much power”, this does

not mean that they are “changing the world”. Even if they are, there seems to be more requirement for “changing the world”. This “changing” then is also “repetitive” and still requires “much power”. In this way then the “changing” does not change but is constantly deferred and is other to itself. Therefore “the history children are taught in school”, while “changing”, is “repetitive” and requires “changing the world”.

## XVII. A Perfectly Normal Delivery

Extracts from *The Namesake* have been analysed in this chapter as my thesis endeavours to explore ideas of language, language of the child, language as an idea of control as well as, language in terms of the postcolonial effects, language as identity and the othering through language.

... “Everything is looking perfectly normal. We are expecting a perfectly normal delivery, Mrs Ganguli.”

But nothing feels normal to Ashima. For the past eighteen months, ever since she’s arrived in Cambridge, nothing has felt normal at all. It’s not so much the pain, which she knows, somehow, she will survive. It’s the consequence: motherhood in a foreign land. For it was one thing to be pregnant, to suffer the queasy mornings in bed, the sleepless nights, the dull throbbing in her back, the countless visits to the bathroom. Throughout the experience, in spite of her growing discomfort, she’d been astonished by her body’s ability to make life, exactly as her mother and grandmother and all her great grandmothers had done. That it was happening so far from home, unmonitored and unobserved by those she loved, had made it more miraculous still. But she is terrified to raise a child in a country where she is related to no one, where she knows so little, where life seems so tentative and spare.

(Lahiri, 2003, pp. 5-6)

What is “normal” is narrated as a difference. It is different when narrated according to a perspective which is not “Mrs Ganguli” and, it is different for “Mrs Ganguli”. What is “normal”, narrated according to a perspective which is not “Mrs Ganguli”, “is everything”. This “normal” is what “is looking perfectly normal”. This is different to “normal” as it is that

which is “perfectly normal” which “is” “everything” and what this “perfectly normal” is, “is” how “everything is looking”. I read an implication here that “everything” could potentially not be “looking perfectly normal” and then “we” would not be “expecting a perfectly normal delivery”. Within the perspective narrated here which is not “Mrs Ganguli”, “we are expecting a perfectly normal delivery” because “everything is looking normal”. This is a perspective on “we” and on Mrs Ganguli. “Everything is looking normal” is the reason why “we are expecting a normal delivery, Mrs Ganguli.” So, because of how “everything is looking”, “we are expecting”. What “we are expecting” is that which will happen, can be and is expected in continuity because of how “everything is looking”. So, the claim here is that how “everything is looking”, is how it will continue to look and is therefore what is to happen, is what “we are expecting”. That which is to happen then is already known and therefore can continue to be expected as that which “is”, will continue to be as such. But this is a claim made retrospectively about what “normal” and “perfectly normal is” and what “we are” therefore “expecting”. These are already known as what is about to happen because of how “everything is”, which can only be known as “everything”, “perfectly normal” and therefore what “we” should expect, is because of what has happened in the past. However, the claim here is to what “is”, what will be as that which is known which, I read in what “we are expecting” as “perfectly normal”. The “delivery” is about “Mrs Ganguli”, but “Mrs Ganguli” is not part of the “we” who “are expecting a perfectly normal delivery”. What “everything is”, that it can look and “is looking “perfectly normal” is claimed according to a perspective which is not “Mrs Ganguli”. However, the claim is made about “a” “delivery” which is Mrs. Ganguli’s.

“A perfectly normal delivery” is not part of the “everything which is looking perfectly normal”. What “we are expecting” is because of how “everything is looking”. How “everything is looking” is “looking” to a perspective which is not “Mrs Ganguli”. The claims to what “perfectly normal” “is” are also made according to a perspective which is not “Mrs



Ganguli”, but the claims about what is “perfectly normal” are made about “a delivery” which “Mrs Ganguli” is about to deliver. “Normal” here “is” that which is “everything”, and because of the “is” the claim is that it will continue to be so. “Normal” can be “perfectly” so, thus there can be an excess to the “normal”. I read this as an excess because what is “perfectly normal” for the “we” is not what is even “normal to Ashima” who is “Mrs Ganguli”. The claims made about what is “normal” and that this “normal” can be different and can be known with an excess of “perfectly normal”, are about what “normal” is for “Ashima”. The difference can be read from the claims being made according to the different perspectives of “Ashima”, who is “Mrs Ganguli” within the perspective which is other to “Mrs Ganguli” and according to this perspective “everything is perfectly normal”. These claims are all framed within the narratorial perspective. So, the claim at stake here is that according to this perspective, what can be “everything [...] looking perfectly normal” within one perspective can be that in which “nothing feels normal to” the other.

“We” can and does expect something to be “perfectly normal” as “everything” which is not this something “is looking perfectly normal”. We’s “expecting” thus depends on how “everything” “is looking. “Everything” is not what “we are expecting” neither is it “a” “delivery” but the “expecting” is about “a” “delivery”. “Expecting” which is about something else therefore can depend on how something other “is looking”. How “everything is looking” is claimed about Mrs Ganguli’s “delivery” but this “looking” is not done by “Mrs Ganguli”. That this is a “looking” is narrated according to a perspective which is a perspective on the “looking” and on the perspective within which it is claimed to be a “looking”. What constitutes “everything”, how “everything is”, that “everything is looking perfectly normal” and what “perfectly normal” means are narrated according to a perspective which is other to “Mrs Ganguli” but can make claims about Mrs Ganguli’s “delivery”. According to the claims made here, this is “a” “delivery” and can therefore be any “delivery”. However, this “a” “delivery” which “we are expecting” as “a perfectly normal delivery” is Mrs Ganguli’s. Mrs

Ganguli's "delivery" while being Mrs Ganguli's delivery is any "delivery" because of what "we" who are not "Mrs Ganguli" "are expecting" and therefore, while this "delivery" is Mrs Ganguli's, it is also not hers because of being "a perfectly normal delivery". Therefore, Mrs Ganguli's "delivery" then becomes not hers because of being "a perfectly normal delivery" which is because "we are expecting" it to be so because of how "everything is looking" but, this "looking" is not to, neither is it done by "Mrs Ganguli". So, within the narratorial perspective, claims can be made about Mrs Ganguli's delivery on behalf of her.

"But nothing feels normal to Ashima"- the implication here is that as "everything is looking perfectly normal" and as "we are expecting a perfectly normal delivery", therefore things can feel "normal to Ashima". "But" "nothing feels" so. The underlying implication here then is that depending on how "everything is looking" and what "we are expecting", things can "feel normal to" one who is not part of "we" and who is not "looking". Also, what is not part of "everything" and is "nothing", can "feel normal" because of how "everything is looking". "But" this is not the case. Why this is not the case is because of "the consequence". "Normal" is that which can be felt, can be felt "to". Things can feel "normal" in parts "but" "normal" here is that which is what "nothing feels" and it is "to Ashima". Why it could potentially feel "normal to Ashima" "but" does not is because "it's the consequence". So, "the consequence" is other than itself as while it is "the consequence", it is also the cause why "nothing feels normal to Ashima". While "the consequence" is why "nothing feels normal to Ashima", "the consequence" will be as such because "everything is looking perfectly normal" and therefore "we are expecting a perfectly normal delivery". "The consequence" is of "the pain" which is "not so much" why "nothing feels normal to Ashima". However, "the pain" then is partially why "nothing feels normal to Ashima". But "the pain" is "not so much" why "nothing feels normal to Ashima" because it is that "which she knows, somehow, she will survive".

“For the past eighteen months, ever since she’s arrived in Cambridge, nothing has felt normal at all”. So, “nothing has felt normal at all” has continued to be so “for the past eighteen months”. I can read a beginning to when “nothing” started to feel “normal at all” as this has been the case “for the past eighteen months” and it has been from “ever since she’s arrived in Cambridge”. So before “she’s arrived in Cambridge”, which is not “the past eighteen months”, things have “felt normal”. What “felt normal at all” then is prior to this “past” which is before “she’s arrived in Cambridge”. Why “nothing feels normal to Ashima” is because of “the consequence”. Why “for the past eighteen months, ever since she’s arrived in Cambridge, nothing has felt normal at all” is because of what it means for her to arrive “in Cambridge”, which is that she is “in a country where she is related to no one, where she knows so little, where life seems so tentative and spare”. Therefore, “nothing has felt normal at all” means is that here “she is related to no one”, “knows so little” and “life seems so tentative and spare”. But all these are situated in “where”. So, feeling “normal” then is about not being “related to no one”, not knowing “so little” and “life” not seeming “so tentative and spare”. This is what is known about what it means to feel “normal at all”. Feeling then is about what is known.

What “but nothing feels normal to Ashima” means is “the consequence”. What is “the consequence” is “motherhood in a foreign land”. “The consequence” is of “the pain, which she knows, somehow, she will survive”. However, “the consequence” is not “the pain”. “The consequence” and “the pain” are because she is “pregnant” “but”, “to be pregnant” is distinct from both “the consequence” and “the pain”, “for it is one thing to be pregnant” which is “the experience”, “but” it is not “the consequence” or “the pain”. “The experience” “throughout” which “she’d been astonished” by is external to her as it is “that’ which “was happening”. So, she was not making it happen even though it is her “experience”, moreover, it is not hers as it is “the experience”. Also, it is further external to her as although “the experience” is of her being “pregnant”, the claim is “that it was happening so far from home, unmonitored and

unobserved by those she loved, had made it more miraculous still.” So, it is that which can be “made” “more” by that which is external to her, not part of her and other to her. As “it was happening so far from home, unmonitored and unobserved by those she loved” it was not only “miraculous” but “more miraculous still”. But this is not part of why “nothing feels normal at all”. It is part of “for the past eighteen months, ever since she’s arrived in Cambridge, nothing has felt normal at all”. Although they are both claims to what is “normal at all”, they are distinct in their meaning in the context of the text here. “Motherhood” is different from the “one thing” which is “to be pregnant”. “Motherhood” is part of “the consequence” while, “to be pregnant” “was one thing”. “To be pregnant” is part of what it means “for the past eighteen months, ever since she’d arrived in Cambridge, nothing has felt normal at all”. This is in “the past”. “The consequence: motherhood in a foreign land” is what it means that “nothing feels normal to Ashima”. The claim here is that this is now the case and will continue to be so. So, what is to happen is already known. What is going to happen is already known because of what “was happening” and this is going to happen because that which “was happening”, “was happening so far from home” so, if this “was happening” not “so far from home”, it would then feel “normal to Ashima”.

“The consequence” is the “it’s” which is what is “but nothing feels normal to Ashima”. This is “motherhood in a foreign land” but, it is still known as “motherhood”. Why it is what “nothing feels normal to Ashima” is because of “but” what “she is”; which is “but she is terrified”. The reason “she is terrified” is “to raise a child in a country where she is related to no one, where she knows so little, where life seems so tentative and spare”. So, the claim at stake here, through the “but” is it would feel “normal to Ashima” if “she” is not “terrified”. What “she is”, is because of a lack which is because of raising “a child in a [certain] country” and what this “country” is, in terms of “where” “she is” “in” this “country”. This is a lack because of a claim to knowledge. It is claimed through this narration that it is known that “she is” “to raise a child”. This “is” to be done “in a country”, but there

is a lack here, a lack which is because of “where she is”. She could be related to “one” but is “related to no one”. She could be “where she knows” other than “so little”. She could be “where life seems” other than “so tentative and spare”. But because these are lacking by not being the other “she is terrified” and this can also be read in the “but”. And, because “she is terrified” therefore “nothing feels normal to Ashima”. However, the implication is that it should feel “normal to Ashima” which I read from the “but” in “but nothing feels normal to Ashima”.

What is “miraculous” is what “she’d been astonished by” and what “she’d been astonished by” is “in spite of her growing discomfort”. So, “her growing discomfort” is not what “she’d been astonished by” and is other to what “she’d been astonished by” which is “her body’s ability to make life”. “Life” then is that which can be made and the claim is that when “her body” is making “life”, this is not her but an “ability” which is “her body’s”. Though this “ability” entails “her growing discomfort”, this “ability” is not “her” but “her body’s”, it is “she” who had “been astonished”; and, “she’d been astonished by her body’s ability” “in spite of her growing discomfort”. So, “growing discomfort” then is different to her being “astonished”. “Her body” is hers but is also other to her as it is “her growing discomfort” but the “ability to make life” is “her body’s” and it is this that “she’d been astonished by”. The “ability to make life” is “her body’s” but it is “exactly as her mother, grandmother and all her great grandmothers had done.” So, that which “she’d been astonished by” which has been claimed to be “her body’s ability” is that which is repetitive. “Her body’s ability” is “exactly as” those which are “her, but they are not “her” as they are “her mother, grandmother and all her great grandmothers”. The claim here is that it is known and it is known “exactly” what “her mother, grandmother and all her great grandmothers had done”, so what is “her body’s ability” and that which “she’d been astonished by” is what has already been “done” by those that are hers but not “her”. This “ability” which astonishes can

be “done”, can be “done” “exactly as”, is “her body’s” and those who are hers and is repetitive.

“Her body’s ability to make life” is claimed to be “exactly as her mother and grandmother and all her great grandmothers had done” but there is a claim to difference in that which is “exactly as”. I read the claim to difference as “it” “had” been “made” “more miraculous still” because “it was happening so far from home, unmonitored and unobserved by those she loved”. So, the claim within the narratorial perspective is a claim to knowledge about what “the experience” entails for “her”. It is not “normal” as the perspective on “her” and “the experience” knows what “exactly” “her mother and grandmother and all her great grandmothers had done”.

“The experience” which “was happening” is “miraculous”. “But she is terrified” is not part of that which is “miraculous”. “A child” is known as that which is “to” be raised and “she is terrified” because of what she is “to” do which is “to raise a child in a [particular] country”; “but” this is because of the “where” which makes this “country” different to another “country”. This “a country” could be any “country” and the implication is that there is more than “a country”. But while this is one such “country” could be any “country”, it becomes specified because of “where” and what “she is” in terms of this “where”. What “she is” according to the narratorial perspective, which is a perspective on this “she”, “is terrified”. But while the claim is that this “is” what she is here and this is what she continues to be here, what “she is”, is that which is known as that which has already happened because “she is terrified” and this is already known. Also, this is claimed necessarily retrospectively and can only be read retrospectively to be the case. However, the claim is that “she” continues to be this which “is terrified”. “She is” also narrated as who “she is” in terms of who “she is related to” and what “she knows”. But all these according to which “she” is narrated are in relation to “where” she is, which is “a country”.

It is known within the narratorial perspective what it means for the “she” to be “related to no one”. While it is claimed that “she is related to no one”, this is what “she is” here, “where she is related to no one” and yet “she is related”. So, I read a need here to narrate this “she” in terms of who “she is related to” because of the “where” “she is”, which is “a country” known as such. This narration of “she” matters because of why “she is terrified” which is “to raise a child in a country” like this. The implication here is that it is known within the narratorial perspective that she might not have been “terrified to raise a child in a country” if this “where” was other to what it has been narrated as here.

The claim within this perspective is that it is known what “she knows” which is “so little”, and this is because of “where” “she is”. This is part of why “she is terrified to raise a child in a country” and this is again because of “where” this country is situated in terms of her knowledge of that which is “so little”, which is narrated about her framed within the narratorial perspective. What “life” is, is narrated as what it “seems” and “where”. But the narration is about “life” “seeming” “where” and what to “she” and this narration is according to a perspective on this “she”. What “life seems” in this “where” is a claim about “she”, but I read claims here that within this perspective it is known what “life” is, because this is a seeming not a being. This is “where life seems so tentative and spare” but that does not mean that this seeming is what “life” is in this “where”. “But” how “life seems” is part of why “she is terrified to raise a child in a country” which is this “where life seems” as such to her.

... "Hoping for a boy or a girl?" Patty asks.

“As long as there are ten finger and ten toe,” Ashima replies. For these anatomical details, these particular signs of life, are the ones she has the most difficulty picturing when she imagines the baby in her arms.

Patty smiles, a little too widely, and suddenly Ashima realizes her error, knows she should have said “fingers” and “toes”. This error pains her almost as much as her last contraction. English had been her subject. In Calcutta, before she was married, she was working towards a college degree. She used to tutor neighbourhood school children in their homes, on their verandas and beds, helping them to memorize Tennyson and Wordsworth, to pronounce words like sign and cough, to understand the difference between Aristotelian and Shakespearean tragedy. But in Bengali, a finger can also mean fingers, a toe toes.

(Lahiri, 2003, pp. 5-6)

“Suddenly Ashima realizes her error” because of how “Patty smiles”. How “Patty smiles” is narrated with what I read as an excess but a necessary excess here. How “Patty smiles” is “a little too widely”. This implies that “Patty” can also smile not “a little too widely”. These are claims about what is known about “Patty” through how “Patty smiles”. While the narration about how “Patty smiles” is in the past, the claim about “Patty” is made retrospectively and can only be read retrospectively, I read it is as a claim to a continuity as “Patty” continues to smile “a little too widely” “and” “suddenly Ashima realizes her error”. “Suddenly Ashima realizes her error” because “Patty smiles” and because “Patty smiles, a little too widely”. But it is also other to “Patty smiles, a little too widely”. It is that which happens as “and”. “Suddenly Ashima realizes her error” is what happens after “Patty smiles, a little too widely”. While “suddenly Ashima realizes her error” seems to be because “Patty smiles” and how. I read that why Ashima “suddenly [...] realizes her error” is because of what “she” “knows”. Within the narratorial perspective it is because of what “she” “knows” that



she “suddenly” “realizes her error”, after and because “Patty smiles” and how “Patty smiles” which is “a little too widely”. So, the claim is also made here that “smiles” can be different and depending upon the different “smiles”, errors can be realized. However, this realization can only happen if the one who realizes already knows what is to be realized and can realize what an “error” is. The different “smiles” which can lead to realization of an “error” are done by one who is other to the one realising. The claims made about the “smiles”, “error” and realization of “error” are all made according to a perspective which is other to both the one who “smiles” and the one who “knows” and “realizes her error”. There are claimed through the narration which is according to the narratorial perspective which is on “Patty” and on “Ashima”.

What “Ashima realizes” is because of what “she” “knows” but is different to what “she” “knows”. That which is narrated as “her error” is both hers and not hers. It is an “error” and is known within the narratorial perspective as such. According to the narration it is also known to “Patty” who thus “smiles, a little too widely”. This “error” while similar to other errors because of being an “error” is distinct by being “her error”. However, while the claim is that it is “her error”, it is also not hers because it is an “error” which is claimed to be known by “Patty” and is narrated according to the narratorial perspective. This “error” is an error because of being known to be as such in “English”; however, it becomes “her error” because it is “she” who “should have said”. “Her error” is different to what “suddenly Ashima realizes”. It is already known as an “error” and that it is her “error”. It is already there before “Ashima realizes” so, “her error” is in this way independent and other to Ashima realizing. The “error” already exists and is known as “her error” “and” then “suddenly Ashima realizes her error”. This is important for my reading because of what is at stake here. What is at stake here is that “suddenly Ashima realizes”, why she “realizes” is because of what “she” “knows”; because of what “she” “knows” “this error pains her”. But “this error” is an “error” which is known and can be read as any “error” but “pains her” because it

becomes “her error” as she “knows” what “she should have said” because “English had been her subject”. Therefore, while “English” is not “her” and it is a “subject”, the knowledge of what “she should have said” remains with her and therefore “pains her”.

What “hoping” is, is known: “hoping” is “for” something. Whether this “hoping” is “for a boy or a girl” is not known but it is known that there is “hoping”, and it is “for a boy or a girl”. “A boy” is different to “a girl” as the “hoping” is “for” one “or” the other. However, “a boy” “or” “a girl” are similar because the “hoping” can be “for” either. While “Patty asks”, “hoping for a boy or a girl” which means that it is known that there is “hoping for a boy or a girl”, “Ashima replies” “as long as there are ten finger and ten toe”. “As long as there are ten finger and ten toe” is different from what it means to be “hoping for a boy or a girl”. “Ten finger” is different from “ten toe” but they are similar as they are both what “Ashima replies”. “The baby” is that which “she imagines” “in her arms”, since this is “imagines” it has not yet happened here, but it is known what “she imagines” and this is claimed retrospectively. Therefore, that which is to happen is already known and is narrated through what “she imagines”. What “she imagines” is that which is in the past as “she imagines” “the baby in her arms” but this is a claim to a past which continues as I read here that “she” continues to imagine “the baby in her arms”.

There are different types of “anatomical details”. “Ten finger and ten toe” are like other “anatomical details” but are distinct because of being the specific “these anatomical details which are “these particular signs of life”. “These anatomical details” are claimed to be part of “these particular signs of life” but they are also different to “these particular signs of life”. “These anatomical details” while being “these particular signs of life” are other to “these particular signs of life” because of being “these anatomical details”. “The baby” is that which has “these anatomical details”, “these particular signs of life” and it is that which she is “picturing when she imagines the baby” and “in her arms”.

What “she has” “when she imagines the baby in her arms” is other to imagining “the baby in her arms”. This “difficulty” and “picturing” are part of “when she imagines the baby in her arms” but are different to it. “The most difficulty picturing” is not what “she” always “has” as it is that which “she has” “when she imagines the baby in her arms”. “The baby” is narrated in terms of a specificity which can be read from “the”. What “imagin[ing]” is, is known. It is also known that it is “she” who “imagines”, what “she imagines” and “when she imagines”. It is known to an external perspective that “the baby” is what “she imagines” and that “she imagines” it “in her arms”. What “she has” is also claimed to be known and is narrated according to this perspective on the “she”. “The baby” is known as specific and is known as that which has “these anatomical details, these particular signs of life”, “as long as there are ten finger and ten toe”. Therefore, “ten finger and ten toe” are part of “particular signs of life” and can be distinguished as they are the “these particular signs of life”.

But “these anatomical details, these particular signs of life” which “are ten finger and ten toe” which are about “the baby” become part of what “suddenly Ashima realizes” as “her error” because of what “she” “knows she should have said” which is “‘fingers’ and ‘toes’”. So “error” can be realized, known and is because of what “should have” been “said” but is not. “Her error” is also “this error”. So, what is “her” is also not “her”. When “this error” is not “her error” and is “this error”, it then “pains her”. “This error” becomes similar to that which is hers.

What is “her” “contraction” is known. What is “her last contraction” is also known. “Her last contraction” is different from other “contraction” which are not “her” but is also different from “her” other contractions because of being “her last contraction”. It is known that “her last contraction” “pains” her. “This error” is similar to “her last contraction” because it “pains” “as her last contraction”. Yet, there is a claim to difference here through the claim to knowledge about “her” pain, within an external perspective. So, there are

different kinds of “pains”. “This error” while being similar to “her last contraction” is different because it “pains her” “as her last contraction” but only “almost as much as” that did.

“English” is a “subject”. “English” “had been her subject” but continues to be known as “English” which is other to “her subject”. While the “subject” which “had been her [s]” is in the past, “English” which “had been her subject”, continues to be “English” and is therefore not part of the past in this way. What “Ashima replies” therefore is “in” English. What “Ashima replies” has the “error” which “suddenly Ashima realizes” as “her error” because “she knows” what “she should have said” because “English had been her subject”. So, that which “had been her subject” can be why “she” “knows”. This knowledge can lead to realization of “error” which then causes “pain”.

There can be many “college” degrees, and what “she was working towards” can be any “college degree”. “A college degree” is that which requires “working towards” by “she”. What “she was” is “working towards a college degree”. What “she was” changes as “she was no longer “working towards a college degree” and “she was” now “married”. What “she was” since was also something other than “working towards a college degree” and “married”, when “in Calcutta” “she was” something other than “married” “before she was married”. “She used to tutor neighbourhood schoolchildren in their homes, on their verandas and beds, helping them to memorize Tennyson and Wordsworth, to pronounce words like sign and cough, to understand the difference between Aristotelian and Shakespearean tragedy” because “in Calcutta, before she was married, she was working towards a college degree” and, because “English had been her subject”.

“Neighbourhood schoolchildren” are distinct from those who are not part of the “neighbourhood” and are not “schoolchildren”. “Schoolchildren” are different from those “children” who are not “schoolchildren”. But they are “children” nevertheless. The claim

here is that while “Aristotelian” and “Shakespearean” are both “tragedy”, there is “difference” “between them” and this is a known, singular “difference” which is “the difference” “between them”. “She” understood “the difference between them” and therefore “used to” help “them” who are other to “she”, “to understand the difference between them” as “English had been her subject”. “The difference between them” is that which can be helped “to understand”, “to” “them” by “she” who is not the “them” who are the “neighbourhood schoolchildren”. These “neighbourhood schoolchildren” are also different as they are known by where they are “in” or “on”. They are “in their homes, on their verandas and beds”. It is known to the narratorial perspective which is located outside and is a perspective on “them” what is “their”, what are “homes”, that these are “their homes”, what are “verandas and beds” and, that these are “their verandas and beds”.

“To pronounce words” is different from “words” and requires “helping them” by one who is not “them” but can help “them” because “English had been her subject”. What is “in Bengali” is different to that which is not “in Bengali”. What “Bengali” is, is known and it is that which has something “in” it. “A finger can also mean fingers, a toe toes” so, “a finger” is different from “fingers” and “a toe” is different from “toes”. What it is to “mean” is different from that which is to “also mean”. Meaning can therefore be different and “also”. Meaning depends on what it is “in”. The claim here is that “Bengali” is different to “English”.

However, what is in “English” “can also mean” “in Bengali”. “Her error” is that which “pains her”. It “pains her” because she “knows she should have said “fingers” and “toes”. But what she “said” was part of her reply which was in “English”. “This error” is the “error” because of being part of “English”, because of what “she should have said” “in English”. But it becomes “her error” and that which “pains her” because “she” “knows” what “she should have said” because “English had been her subject”. So, while “English” is no longer “her subject” and what “she” “said” as part of her reply is still in “English”, it is the “error” which causes her “pain”. That which “can also mean” something “but in Bengali” to one

perspective, within which, the claim is that “Bengali” and “English” are both known. This claim is made according to a perspective on this perspective which is claimed to know both “English” and “Bengali” and, this is also a perspective which is therefore claiming to know “English” and “Bengali”. “English” is known as that which “had been her subject”, so is not “her subject” any more but continues to be a “subject”, the “subject” in which “she” “knows” what “she should have said”. The “error” is because what she “said” is in “English” and not “in Bengali”. So that which “can also mean” is an “error” if it is not what “she should have said”. “What she should have said” is an “error” because of the “subject” that it is being “said” in. Meaning can therefore be an “error” if it is not what “should have” been “said”. What “should” be “said” therefore is known and fixed in this way and is independent of what it “can also mean” “in” something else. To know what “should have” been “said” despite knowing what it “can also mean” “in” something else and therefore knowing what meaning is, causes pain. Therefore, it is not the “error” but the realization of the “error” and to know is what leads to pain.

## XVIII. Not Conclusive Concluding Readings (Towards a Conclusion)

For my conclusion, because I am not giving answers and because this thesis is not about mastery, I will return to Rose's arguments about language and the child which underpin the readings in my thesis.

The language of the child – the language which it speaks, the language it reads, and the relationship between the two – was one of the central arenas within which this contradiction was played out. Here, the question of language becomes the question of literacy, and the question of literature hands over to that of literary language (how and what to speak, what to read and to what end?). By this almost imperceptible shift, both language and literature are released as objects of policy – policy by means of which the child's relationship to its culture can be defined. Language is not simply there to be spoken, any more than literature waits to be read, like matter almost to be imbibed by the child ('When you give your child a bath, bathe him in language' – the exhortation of the 1974 Bullock Report on literacy, *A Language for Life* (Bullock, 1974, p. 58). Both the language and the literature available to the child fall inside institutions which constitute them differentially and with different values and meanings at different times. The point of examining Peter Pan's encounter with the schools is not, therefore, so much to demonstrate an outrage – the repressive educational machinery clamps down on the book for the child – as to show how both language and literature are constituted by just such 'machinery' in the first place. In this context, natural language or the

idea of language as naturally expressive – a concept which we have seen to be so central to writing on children’s literature – appears not as something outside the range of these determinations, but as one pole of a fully structural opposition between natural and cultured language in the schools.

(Rose, 1984, P. 118)

“The child” is known in terms “of” “the language”. “The language” is different from “language” because of what it is “of”. “The language which it speaks” is not “the language it reads” and this is different from “the language of the child”. The “it” that “speaks” is not the “it” that “reads” and this “it” is not “the child”. This is all narrated according to a perspective that “the language” is not “of”, this perspective is not “of the child” or of the “it” which “speaks”, or “reads”; but narrates through a perspective which is on “the child”, on “the language of the child”, on the “it” which “speaks” and the “it” which “reads”. “Speaks” is not “reads” but “it” “speaks” and “reads”.

What “the relationship” is, is already known. “The relationship” is distinct because of being “the relationship between the two”. “The relationship between the two” is not “the language which it speaks”, nor “the language it reads”, but it is part of that which is “the language of the child” despite not being “the language of the child.” What “the central arenas” are, are already known. “The language of the child” is not “the central arenas”, but “the language of the child – the language which it speaks, the language it reads, and the relationship between the two – was one of the central arenas.” “The language of the child – the language which it speaks, the language it reads, and the relationship between the two” which “was one of the central arenas” was distinct from other “arenas” and other “central arenas” because of what it is and because of what “was played out” “within” this “central arena”. The perspective is not “within” “the central arenas” but knows what is “within” and



narrates according to a perspective on what are “the central arenas”, what is “within”, and what is “played out” “within” “the central arenas”.

“The language of the child – the language which it speaks, the language it reads, and the relationship between the two – was one of the central arenas within which this contradiction was played out”. “This contradiction” “was” that which “played out”. “This contradiction” “was” that which “played out” “within” “one of the central arenas”. “Here” is where “the question of language becomes the question of literacy, and the question of literature hands over to that of literary language (how and what to speak, what to read and to what end?).” “Language” is that “of” which there is “the question”. “The question” is distinct because of what it is the “question of”. “The question of language” while known as “the question of language” “becomes” other than “the question of language” as it “becomes the question of literacy”. “The question” which is “of literacy” is distinct from “the question of language” because of what “the question” is “of”. So, while it is still “the question”, “the question” can be different to itself because of what it is “of”. “The question of literature” is not “the question of language”; “the question of literature” is also not what “the question of language becomes”, “and the question of literature” is different from “the question of literacy”. “Literary language” is other than “language”. “The question of literature hands over to that of literary language” but is not “literary language”.

“Speak[ing]” here, is that “to” which there is a “how and what”, and “how” to speak is not the same as “what to speak”. “How” is not “what to speak”. “To read” is distinct from its “end”. But “what to read” does have an “end” here. “What to read” is different from the “what” of “what end” because of “what” it is “to”. “To speak” is not “to read” and not “end” but there is “what to speak”, “what to read”, “and to what end”. While there is “how and what to speak”, “how” is not part of what it is “to read” and “to” “end”.

“Language” is not “literature” but they constitute the “both” as well as the “and” which “are released as objects of policy”. “Policy” is that “of” which there are “objects”. “Both language and literature are released as objects of policy”, but they are not “objects of policy” because they “are released as objects of policy”. “Both language and literature are released as objects of policy”, but this is only because of what it is “by”. “Imperceptible shift” is different from “shift” which is different from “almost imperceptible shift”. “This” is known within the narratorial perspective as that which is an “almost imperceptible shift” and is narrated through a perspective which is on “this almost imperceptible shift”.

“The child’s relationship to its culture can be defined” is known within a perspective which is not “the child’s”. “Relationship” is “the child’s” and is narrated as such according to a perspective on “relationship” and that which is of “the child’s”. “The child’s relationship to its culture” is already known as “the child’s relationship to its culture” but “can be” and is “defined”. “Its culture” is other than “culture” because of being “its culture” but is known as “culture” that is specific to the child. This is narrated as “its culture” according to a perspective which is not “its” and is a perspective on what is “its culture”. “Policy” “of” which there are “objects” is different to “policy by means of which the child’s relationship to its culture can be defined.” “Policy” is not the “which” through “which the child’s relationship to its culture can be defined”, it is rather the “means” which are of “policy” through “which the child’s relationship to its culture can be defined.”

What “language is not”, is known. Therefore, by implication, what “language is”, is known within a perspective on “language”. “Language” is “there to be spoken” but this can “not simply” “be” the case. Additionally, “Language is not simply there to be spoken” but this is the case in terms of being “any more than literature waits to be read, like matter almost to be imbibed by the child”. “Language” is not “literature”. What “language is not”, that it “language is not” “any more than literature waits to be” is what is “like”. “Matter” is distinct

from “matter” which is “almost to be imbibed by the child”. But what “language is not” “any more than literature waits to be” is not “matter”. It is “like matter” and “like matter” which is “almost to be imbibed”. “The child” is that “by” which “matter” can “almost be imbibed”. This is known within and narrated according to a perspective which is not “the child” and not “like matter almost to be imbibed by the child”.

“You” is not “your child” and “you give your child a bath” is known within a perspective on “you”, “your child” and “a bath”. It is known within this perspective that “him” is not being bathed “in language”. What is “in language” is narrated through a perspective which is not “in language” but claims to know what is “in language”. “Your child” is not “him” but “bathe him” can be “in language” with the implication that “bathe him” can also be not “in language”. To “give your child a bath”, is different from what “bathe him in” is. What “bathe him” should be “in” and that “bathe him” should be “in language” is not the perspective of him but has a perspective on “him”. “Language” which can be to “bathe him in”, is different from the “language” which is “not simply there to be spoken, any more than literature waits to be read, like matter almost to be imbibed by the child”, and this is different from “a language” which is “for life”. However, this is what is part of “the 1974 Bullock Report” which is “on literacy” and is about “A Language for Life”. What “language” is, is different but is known as and is part of “A Language for Life”.

What is “available to the child” and what means to be “available to the child” is known within a perspective which is not of “the child” but knows what “the child” is. “Language” is not “literature”, but “both” “language” and “literature” are available to the child”. However, “both the language and the literature available to the child” are different from language and literature, because of being “both the language and the literature available to the child”, as well as being different from that which is “the language and the literature” which is not “available to the child”. While “both the language and the literature available to

the child fall inside institutions which constitute them differentially and with different values and meanings at different times”, “both the language and the literature available to the child” are other than “institutions which constitute them differentially and with different values and meanings at different times”. “Both the language and the literature available to the child” are that which can be constituted “differentially and with different values and meanings at different times”. “Both the language and the literature available to the child” which “fall inside institutions” are constituted “differentially and with different values and meanings at different times”. But that “which” is constituted “differentially”, “with different values”, “and meanings at different times” is still “both the language and the literature available to the child” which “fall inside institutions”.

“Both language and literature” which “are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” is different to “both the language and the literature available to the child” which “fall inside institutions which constitute them differentially and with different values and meanings at different times. This is because of “how both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place.” “Both language and literature” which “are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” are also not “the language of the child – the language which it speaks, the language it reads, and the relationship between the two” which “was one of the central arenas within which this contradiction was played out.” The “language and literature ” which “are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” is different to “both language and literature” that “are released as objects of policy.”

The “language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’” is known to the narratorial perspective which is not “such ‘machinery’” and has a perspective on “such ‘machinery’”. “How both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’” and “in” what “place” is known to the perspective which is not “in the” “place” but knows “the” “place” and what is “in the” “place” through a perspective on “the” “place”. “How both

language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” is not “the point”; neither is this “Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools”. “How both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” is that which can be shown by the perspective located on the outside “as to” what is being shown. “The point of examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools is” “to show how both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place.” However, “the point of examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools is not” “to show how both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place” because this is “as to show”. “The schools” is that “with” which there is “Peter Pan’s encounter”. The perspective “examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools” is narrating what “the point of examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools is” through a perspective on “the schools”, and on “Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools”.

“The point of examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools is not, therefore,” “to demonstrate an outrage” but this is “so much”. “An outrage” is that which can be demonstrated, through “examining”, and this can be “so much” or “not”. An outrage” is other than “the repressive educational machinery clamps down on the book for the child”, but “to demonstrate an outrage” is about “the repressive educational machinery” that “clamps down on the book for the child”. “The” “machinery” is distinct from other “machinery” as it is “the educational machinery” which is “repressive”. That “the” “machinery” is “repressive educational” which is different from “educational” is known within a perspective which is on “the repressive educational machinery”. “The book” is “for the child” but “the repressive educational machinery clamps down on the book for the child”. This is narrated according to a perspective which is not “the child”; has a perspective on “the repressive educational machinery”; knows what is “repressive”; what is “educational”, and what is clamping “down on the book for the child”.

“The point of examining Peter Pan’s encounter with the schools is not, therefore,” “to demonstrate an outrage – the repressive educational machinery clamps down on the book for the child – as to show how both language and literature are constituted by just such ‘machinery’ in the first place”, but this is “so much” the case. Therefore, by implication is it also “the point” which is not part of the “so much” as opposed to the “not” “so much”.

“Language” can be “natural” which is different from the “language” which is not “natural”. What is “natural language” also differs according to whether it is located “in this context” or not. “Natural language” is not the same as “the idea of language” “as naturally expressive”. “The idea of language” is different from the “idea of language as naturally expressive”. Despite “the idea of language” being other to the “idea of language as naturally expressive”, it is known within this narratorial perspective “as” that which is “naturally expressive”. “The idea” is not “language” and is distinct from other ideas because of being “of language”. While “natural language” is different to “the idea of language” which is known in terms of “the idea of language as naturally expressive”, “natural language” is known in terms of being “or” to “the idea of language as naturally expressive” because of being located “in this context”. “Natural language or the idea of language as naturally expressive” is other to “a concept”. “Natural language or the idea of language as naturally expressive” is “a concept” despite not being “a concept” because of being “in this context”. “A concept” is not “writing on children’s literature”, “a concept” is that “which we have seen to be so central” which is a necessary excess to that which is “central to writing on children’s literature”.

The claim here is that this perspective is located within the “we”, but I read that the narration is from a position that is located outside “we” and has a perspective on “we”. “We” are not part of children but know what “children’s literature” is, what is “writing” which is “on children’s literature”, and what is not only “central” but “so central to writing on children’s literature”. This is because “we” are that which can see and “we have seen” what is

“so central to writing” which is “on children’s literature”. “Writing” can be “on children’s literature” or not “on children’s literature”. “Language” which is “in the schools” is different from language which is not “in the schools” and this is claimed to be known as such within a perspective which is not “in the schools”. While “natural” is distinct from “cultured”, the “language in the schools” is known as that which is “natural and cultured”. It is these kinds of arguments that underpin the policies which determine the differences in teaching between state schools and public schools in England.

This thesis reiterates through multiple texts and across disciplines that reading ‘time’ is of enduring critical importance by demonstrating how ideas and constructions of time shift and change and will always do so when read. The different chapters undertake critical readings of works that are either directly or by implication on, or about time. The readings and arguments for all their engagement with ideas of unity, wholeness, certainty, knowledge, supremacy, language and perspective each make a substantial contribution towards what is the concept of time, to what purpose and why. The task undertaken here is to question and not transform “our” thinking about time.

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