The Moral Component of Fighting Power in the British Army Reserve: a qualitative study

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ABSTRACT

The UK's Army Reserve has undergone significant investment and transformation over the last decade under *Future Reserves 2020*; it now represents around 30% of the UK's land forces. However, Reservists have legally enshrined options to defer or avoid mobilisation for permanent service. This could undermine the Army's ability to deliver soldiers for operations. This potential is examined through an analysis of an under-researched cornerstone of British military doctrine, the Moral Component of Fighting Power, analogous to the academically contested concept of 'morale'. Having operationalised the Moral Component, this thesis examines Army Reserve policy and strategy, as well as two autoethnographic case studies that illustrate precedent, to understand the demand on the organisation and the ideal-typical reservist. It then presents qualitative evidence from Focus Groups to argue that the Army Reserve has a Moral Component of Fighting Power characterised by Fighting Spirit, Pride and a Spiritual Foundation. Despite a drive toward professionalisation, the bonds between Reserve soldiers remain primarily social. The evidence suggests that the Moral Component is moderately well aligned with the needs of the organisation regarding the relationship between soldier and Army, but it may struggle where relationships with families and employers impinge upon military Service. Thematically, the Moral Component presents as more intrinsically than extrinsically influenced and might be diminished where the Army is perceived to undervalue reservists' contribution, especially through administrative failings and short notice demands. In summary, this study finds that the Army Reserve has met the demands placed on it, in part by ensuring its operational aspirations do not exceed the availability of its soldiers. In presenting these findings, this thesis expands upon the existing literature on the Army Reserve and the Moral Component of Fighting Power and examines the prospects for the organisation in a new epoch of policy and strategy: *Reserve Force 2030*.

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Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.'

GP Randell

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GLOSSARY

Abbreviation	Full term	Description
A2020	Army 2020	The British Army's 2012 plan for the force out to 2020.*
A2020R	Army 2020 (Refine)	A 2016 amendment to A2020.*
CHACR	Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research	A British Army think-tank.
CSF	COVID Support Force	British military units allocated to the response to COVID-19.
DRA14	Defence Reform Act 2014	Primary legislation that made changes to the structure of the Reserve forces (including renaming the Territorial Army as the Army Reserve).
EST	External Scrutiny Team	A group of retired officers charged with reporting to Parliament about the state of the UK's Reserve Forces.
FR20	Future Reserves 2020	Set out the UK's vision for all three services' Reserve forces developing toward 2020.*
FRRP	Future Reserves Research Programme	Ministry of Defence sponsored research into the progress of Future Reserve 2020. Published in 2018.
IA	Individual Augmentee	A single soldier or officer deployed away from their unit to support another unit or headquarters.
MACA	Military Aid to the Civilian Authority.	A type of operation that sees the UK military supporting Other Government Departments.
MOD	Ministry of Defence	The government department responsible for the UK's Armed Forces.
Operation CABRIT		The UK's ongoing contribution to NATO deterrence in Estonia and Poland.
Operation ELGIN		The UK's ongoing contribution to the NATO mission in Kosovo.
Operation GRITROCK		The UK's operation in Sierra Leone to combat Ebola 2014-15.
Operation HERRICK		The UK's military operations in Afghanistan 2002-2014.
Operation OLYMPICS		The UK military's support toward hosting the London Olympic Games in 2012.
Operation RESCRIPT		The UK military's support to Other Government Department's response to COVID-19.
Operation TELIC		The UK's military operations in Iraq 2003-2011.
Operation TOSCA		The British Army's ongoing peacekeeping contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)
Operation TRENTON		The British Army's peacekeeping contribution to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), 2016-2020.
ResCAS	Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey	An annual attitudinal survey of reservists' attitudes toward service.
RF30	Reserve Forces 2030	Set out the UK's vision for all three services' Reserve forces developing toward 2030.

RFA96	Reserve Forces Act 1996	Primary legislation that concerns UK's Reserve Forces.
SDSR10	Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010	A Cabinet Office planning document that directs how all government departments will contribute to defence and security*
SDSR15	Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015	As above.

* See Table 4.1 for more detail

INTRODUCTION

The Army Reserve is a component of the British Armed Forces, comprising part-time soldiers who are usually paid for their service on an attendance basis. When required, they can be called-out (mobilised) for permanent service, usually for a specific operation. Once mobilised, they can be treated as a regular soldier for the duration of that operation until demobilised. The Reserve provided a significant contribution to the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq with 24,329 soldiers deployed on operations between 1 April 2003 and 31 March 2013,[1] forming up to 10 percent of some units.[2] This was primarily because Defence's Planning Assumptions had been exceeded and regular forces could not meet the demand.[3]

This thesis investigates the assumption that Army Reserve soldiers will be able and will want to mobilise and deploy if called upon,[4] as a vehicle to explore part of the British Army's doctrine framework, the Moral Component of Fighting Power. Connelly and Kirke[5] suggest that regulars did not trust reservists, and that they, "cannot be trusted to go on ops." In summary, the evidence in this study suggests that the ambition to get reservists more involved in operations has been successful and reservists, especially junior soldiers, are orientated towards mobilising for operations, though relationships with families and employers remain a challenge which will likely endure. The historic ethos of 'volunteerism' epitomised by the Army Reserve's antecedent, the Territorial Force, remains deeply rooted today through the premise of 'Intelligent Selection' and is likely to frame soldiers' relationships with the Army and the way they perceive operations for the foreseeable future, which may impact on their utility when mobilisation is required in an emergency scenario.

This introduction describes the key concept of Fighting Power, a means by which military effectiveness can be judged, before outlining the organisational and societal background, and why changes to the demands placed on Reserve soldiers may be challenging, and lays the foundation for the Research Question: 'What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?' The structure of the thesis will also be outlined.

[1] MOD (2013a), p68.
[2] CHACR (2015), p7.
[3] Phillips (2012), p16.
[4] Connelly (2018), p34.
[5] Connelly (2021); Kirke (2008).

Fighting Power

Doctrine can be described as that which is taught to armed forces about how to understand warfare.[6] It is as much a product of the social context, technology and ideology as of military thinking. Early-modern British Doctrine in the form of *Field Service Regulations,* first published in 1905 and exemplified by the 1909 edition[7] which was extant at the outbreak of the First World War, notes that "success in war depends more on moral than physical qualities," while also explaining the importance of "skilful direction." This is a precursor to the modern British Army's concept of Fighting Power, comprising three interdependent components that describe capability, or the ability to fight: Conceptual, Physical and Moral (see Figure 0.1[8]). The Conceptual Component of Fighting Power concerns the "intellectual basis for our Armed Forces."[9] It guides how forces are structured, how they are intended to be used and how they interact with other elements. It defines how the Physical and Moral Components manifest. Self-referentially, the concept of Fighting Power exists within the Conceptual Component as a means of understanding military potential and utility. The Physical Component consists of aspects like workforce, training, equipment, and sustainment; the means to fight. Finally, the Moral Component of Fighting Power is also perhaps the hardest to measure and comprises morale, leadership, and an ethical foundation; the will and motivation to fight.

Figure 0.1 - The British Army's Model of Fighting Power.



[6] Sloan (2012) further provides a detailed history of the idea and purpose of doctrine itself.
[7] War Office (1909[1914]), p13.
[8] MOD (2017), p3-1.
[9] MOD (2014a) p28.

The notion of Fighting Power was properly operationalised with the British Army's adoption of the 'Manoeuvrist Approach' in 1989.[10] Influenced by the United States' AirLand Battle, this tactical doctrine is extant and intends to "blend lethal and non-lethal actions to achieve objectives which shape the enemy's understanding, undermine their will and break their cohesion."[11] It describes the concerted approach to avoid the enemy's strength and attack their weakness to compel the enemy to 'give up' before having to be utterly destroyed; often through attacking the Moral Component.

To be considered effective, a force's Fighting Power must be balanced against the context and the requirement. While the Physical Component can often be quantitatively measured, the Conceptual and Moral Components are usually subject to subjective qualitative assessment[12] or through observable implications. Indeed, the House of Commons Defence Select Committee called for an assessment of Army Fighting Power considering the A2020 changes.[13] However, the Council of Reserve Force's and Cadets Association External Scrutiny Report to Parliament for 2019[14] contains no mentions of Fighting Power, morale or other related concepts and contains no new references or recommendations pertaining to leadership or ethics. This despite the Army's plan to test its ability to mobilise Reserves, with a focus on numbers and processes (Physical and Conceptual Components) on Exercise AGILE STANCE in 2020.[15] This absence could be interpreted as a recognition that the force does not suffer from any motivational issues, or more likely, that any criticism of morale would be seen as pejorative against the people that comprise the organisation and, incidentally, the same kind of people that comprise the inspection team. The team may lack a frame of reference or metric for judging the current state of the Moral Component against or may lack objective judgement to recognise where it may be lacking.

The Moral Component of Fighting Power can be seen as strong, where reservists are willing and ready to mobilise for operations when called upon. Conversely, if Reserve personnel indicate that they are unavailable or unwilling to deploy on operations, the Moral Component of Fighting Power can be said to be weak. While soldiers may still report for duty under duress, they may perform less effectively than those who were not compelled. Edmunds *et al* caution that "established assumptions about regular personnel [in relation to] deployment

[10] Pugsley (2011), p
[11] MOD (2017), p5-4. Cohesion is further discussed in the Literature Review.
[12] MOD (2017), p3-2.
[13] HOC (2014).
[14] RFCA (2019).
[15] Carter (2019).

– cannot be carried over [to Reserves] without modification."[16] There are both practical and conceptual reasons why generating reservists' Fighting Power may be different from that of regulars. In physical terms, they are simply less available as military personnel than full-time soldiers. Where, as Catignani and Connelly[17] suggest, that professional metric lies with regular soldiers, reservists may not be able to meet the standard aspired to because they do not have the time available to dedicate to the profession due to civilian careers and social commitments which are not integrated into the military.[18] Being a regular soldier is necessarily an all-encompassing profession that influences all aspects of individual and family life and while the Army identifies ethos as a "binding" factor that is common across all of its soldiers, this does not take into account any 'distractions' that impinge upon a reservist's Army commitment[19] The challenge in simultaneously maintaining 'loyalty' to the Army Reserve, a civilian employer, family and friends, when they all demand significant attention, should not be underestimated. It is reasonable to assume that the Reserve's Fighting Power might be different and that they cannot necessarily meet the demands of commitment and deployment as readily or in the same way as might a full-time soldier. Furthermore, this form helps to define their perceived function and their identity; reservists simply see themselves as different from regulars.[20] The place that the military holds in a reservist's life means something different from that of a regular. While a comparison between regular and reserve is not the aim of this study, the ways that a reservist's motivation may differ from a regular's are embodied in the Model described in Chapter 2.

This study does not necessarily assume that the Army Reserve's Moral Component is deficient if it does not meet the model laid down by scholars or doctrine if its soldiers are still highly motivated to their tasks. The motivation of reservists, as 'transmigrants'[21] between the military and civilian spheres, may diverge from what the Army requires of them to deploy given that reservists are influenced not only by their 'internal' military terms of service, but 'externally' by the expectations and values of wider society, which are changing faster than Army.

[16] Edmunds et al (2016), p126.
[17] Catignani and Connelly (2018a), pp1-2.
[18] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a); Connelly (2021).
[19] Keene (2015), p21, Connelly (2014), p71.
[20] Dandeker (2010), p269; Kellett (1990), p225, Janowitz (1960), p215; Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p597.
[21] Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008).

Increasing aspirations for Reserves

As part of the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) 2010, the way that the UK would respond to security challenges was re-evaluated and the Ministry of Defence (MOD), started to outline how reservists would contribute to the Armed Forces in *Future Reserves 2020*[22] (FR20). The new Army Reserve narrative was an evolution from that of the Territorial Army and reflected a greater commitment in scale and frequency of deployment than previously demanded.[23] Traditionally, reservists were only required to mobilise for emergencies or home defence and were deployed only *in extremis* (a strategic reserve), but with fewer threats to national survival and more 'wars of choice,' the requirement on the force had changed.[24] There was also a need for civilian employers to release personnel for military duties. The Army Reserve was to become, in theory, a crucial part of future operations and form an integral part of regular units' structure, (an operational reserve) deploying more frequently and on more different kinds of operations.[25] This was exemplified in SDSR 2015[26] (SDSR15) where Reserves could comprise as much as 15% of a 50,000-strong Joint Force 2025,[27] and again in 2018 when the Minister for the Armed Forces detailed the aspiration that Reserves should comprise 5% of deployed forces in 2019 and 8% in 2020 and beyond[28] across all types of operations and deployments.[29] Though quality rather than quantity is the focus of this study, fewer mobilised Reserves would be required for smaller deployments in the UK or overseas, which are more likely to occur than Warfighting with the Joint Force.

These increased requirements focus on the tasks that reservists might be asked to do; though there is evidence for a lack of consensus between reserve and regular soldiers, and employers as to what that actually meant.[30] There remains no consensus within policy or academic literature on the moral demand; what sorts of attitudes and beliefs Army Reserve soldiers should have toward service this different level of use given they may be required for any task that a regular could be used for. Contradictorily, it was recognised that reservists could not be expected to be like regular soldiers in light of their, perhaps euphemistically

[22] MOD (2013).
[23] Waite (2014).
[24] Edmunds et al (2016), p120, 127; Dandeker et al (2011), p348.
[25] Wall (2012), p30, MOD (2013b), p14.
[26] During this research, 2021 saw another SDSR, titled *The Integrated Review*, which spelled further change for the Army Reserves, espousing an even greater operational role, including the lead for some operations, and closer integration with regular forces. The prospects for this are outlined in the conclusion.
[27] HMG (2015), p29.
[28] RFCA (2019), p10.
[29] House of Commons (2014), p46.
[30] Giga et al (2018a).

named, “volunteer ethos.”[31] This is partly addressed in wider literature which identifies that in order to meet this demand, reservists will have to dedicate more time to the organisation[32] and leaders will have to rely on them more.[33] This study focuses on moral rather than practical requirements and Chapter 4 sets out in more detail what the purpose and role of the Army Reserve is and what might be needed to meet them.

To support this potential increase in activity, the law on mobilisation changed. Under the *Reserve Forces Act 1996,*[34] Reserves could be called-out for “national emergencies or attack on the UK” for up to three years, or for “warlike operations” for up to one year. This was quite restrictive, requiring an existential threat or a serious armed conflict to occur to be able to mobilise them. These conditions had existed since the previous Act in 1980 meaning that the manner of Reserve employment was well entrenched. Certainly, there would have been few, if any, soldiers who would have known anything different. The *Defence Reform Act 2014*[35] (DRA14) added an additional category that allowed call-out for “certain purposes [where] necessary and desirable” to use Reserves “for any purpose for which members of the regular services may be used”[36] for up to one year. It provided both a wider opportunity for Reserves to be employed and, crucially, offered Defence an option when it comes to choosing what personnel resources to use to accomplish its tasks. This element of organisational choice is important, because it sets the conditions for the expectation of individual choice; the policy of ‘Intelligent Selection.’

Reservists’ Terms of Service mean that while they must report for duty if called-out, with the right to apply for deferment or exemption, the reality of limited deployments fulfilled by ‘Intelligent Selection’ for mobilisation, where volunteers are asked for first, is a recognition of a Psychological Contract. For instance, Julian Brazier MP said in 2015 that reservists could serve on a “voluntary basis for smaller operations.”[37] It is assumed by the Army that reservists will respond positively when they are called-out to deploy on operations but soldiers’ perceptions may have been eroded by the ‘habit’ of their lack of use, and associated messaging. This Psychological Contract is informed, in part, by this precedent. Mobilisation demands mal-aligned with those expectations may be perceived as unreasonable regardless of the content of their written contract. These expectations could

[31] House of Commons (2014), Ev28; MOD (2013a), p10; Phillips (2012), p13.
[32] Edmunds et al (2016), p121, p128; Bury (2018), p419.
[33] Williams and Lamb (2010), p53, Keene (2015), p35.
[34] HMG (1996), part vi, sect 52, 54.
[35] HMG (2014).
[36] HMG (1996), part vi, sect 56.
[37] Letts (2015).

revolve around the type of operations they are used on, the roles they conduct and the notice period and length of time for which they are mobilised.

Transforming the Army Reserve

Following SDSR10, the Army started to restructure from a force configured to conduct enduring operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, to one that was adaptable to future threats and tasks ranging from fighting wars to early conflict prevention under *Army 2020* (A2020). The key aspect of this force was its ability to react quickly to many types and scales of threat as defined within the UK's National Security Objectives and the Defence Tasks,[38] rather than a narrow set of circumstances. The Army sought to accomplish these Objectives through the execution of three types of operation; combat, including Warfighting, stability; including peace-support, humanitarian support and training foreign forces, and Military Aid to the Civilian Authority (MACA), including homeland resilience operations supporting local councils and other government departments.[39]

A2020 was centred around a force of 30,100 Army Reserve (formerly Territorial Army) soldiers as part of AN integrated Army of 112,000, fully staffed by 2018 and for routine, rather than exceptional, use on an "ad hoc and reactive"[40] basis. The new name was designed to reflect the more integrated routine role for the Force, rather than one that was rooted in homeland defence. However, while the Government White Paper published in 2013 focused on capability[41] the Defence Select Committee noted that "that Army 2020 was designed to fit a financial envelope…[which] took primacy over the country's abilities to respond to the threats, risks, and uncertainties"[42] in the wake of the 2008 recession and a real-terms reduction in the Defence budget. As personnel were, and remain, a significant cost to Defence, numbers of employees became inherently linked to financial savings.[43] The Army, with the greatest number of employees of all the Services, was subject to the most intense scrutiny and consequently regular soldier numbers were reduced from 102,000 to 82,000, compensated for by an increase in the Reserve from 20,000 to over 30,000. This, combined with a steady level of global ambition meant the Army was 'busier' and had to get more output from fewer soldiers making an understanding of the quality of the reduced quantity more important. Operation FORTIFY was the name given to the Army's concerted effort to increase the size of the Army Reserve to meet this requirement and the Defence

[38] MOD (2019).
[39] MOD (2017), p2-6.
[40] Phillips (2012), p90.
[41] MOD (2013a), p11.
[42] HOC (2014), p26.
[43] Keene (2015), p15.

Secretary made it clear that there was no 'Plan B'.[44] Correspondingly there was a great deal of pressure on Reserve units to grow and maintain their numbers[45] to contribute to this capability and it was "hoped"[46] than the ethos of the organisation would evolve to meet their changing role.

As codified within the Fighting Power concept, numbers alone are not sufficient to guarantee a force that can effectively deploy on operations[47] and they do not necessarily consider those who are injured or who remain on strength but have stopped engaging with their training. Soldiers must be medically fit and able to deploy, they must be trained to deploy and, in all but the most desperate circumstances ('General War'), must be willing to deploy and either volunteer to mobilise or at the very least, not apply for deferment, exemption or cancellation. "For operations short of general war, mobilization…will normally be preceded by a trawl for volunteers,"[48] therefore the quality and willingness of soldiers is as important as the quantity. Academic thought on the Army Reserve and its conceptual place in British society has focussed on "the difficult issues of recruitment and retention,"[49] rather than that quality or operational effectiveness.[50]

> "Most military organisations quickly develop myths that allow escape from unpleasant truths…it has often taken defeat to force substantive adaptation to the actual conditions."[51]

It is easy to focus on 'the West's' technological superiority and forget the human element[52] and too hopeful to think that the UK's adversaries will lie dormant until the Army Reserve is at full strength before being needed.

The Iron Triangle - The Army Reserve within society

FR20 and A2020 were developed against a backdrop which included an existentially safe homeland where war was a "spectator sport,"[53] recent controversial overseas endeavours (such as Iraq and Afghanistan), and generally high prosperity contrasting perceived restrictive military standards,[54] meaning that fewer young people considered the Army as a

[44] HOC (2014), p 11 para 33.
[45] Perraudin (2019).
[46] BBC (2012).
[47] Keene (2015), p15.
[48] HQ Army (2011) p45A-2.
[49] Edmunds et al (2016), p124, Philips (2012), p14.
[50] Alford (2001), p6.
[51] Murray (1999), pp32-33.
[52] Finlan (2013), p1.
[53] MOD (2011), p9; Ignatieff (2002) p191.
[54] Sabbagh (2019).

career option.[55] Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, remarked that, "Millennials… are too "self-interested" to consider a career in the military…current reserve recruitment assumes an over-reliance on individual citizens to volunteer that is out of step with society and is failing to achieve target,"[56] a "selfishness" which threatens military effectiveness.[57]

This trend of diminishing civic responsibility in Western society has been identified in academia[58] juxtaposed with war now an increasingly collective, rather than individual affair.[59] There is less scope for 'heroes' or 'champions' to usefully contribute to the success of operations which require mass and cooperation. Nevertheless, while actions once deployed may be collective, the decision for a Reserve soldier to mobilise is inherently individualistic. They must actively and individually submit to a collectivist idea at a time when Western society is developing a more individualistic perspective and reservists may see their service as an individual contribution to a team goal, rather than a common achievement by a collective.[60] In Downes' analysis of the UK military against the Institutional-Occupational (I-O) model,[61] they describe a military which is "distinctive, unique, serving and comparatively mysterious,"[62] and although aloof from society, was in 1988 a firmly Institutional organisation based upon its historic alliances with other ruling institutions. These alliances can be seen within the Army Reserve given the links with social institutions, including the Government through the Parliamentarians who have served. However, the military experience of those who give orders to the military has diminished. Brazier notes that in 1976 around one-third of MP's had military experience. By 1997 that had fallen to one-tenth (63), of whom only one-third (21) were under 55 years old and therefore outside the 'National Service' generation.[63] In 2019 there were only fifty-one MP's who had previous or current (reserve) military service, though more common in the House of Lords. The Army Reserve may not be immune to any I-O shift occurring in the wider UK, albeit manifesting in a unique way from other elements of the Armed Forces including the Regular Army.

Even those who have already enlisted are not immune to this. Richard Holmes, a reservist himself, acknowledged that the relative safety in which we now live and the pressures of

[55] Edmunds et al (2016), p126; Griffith (2011), p276.
[56] In Green (2017).
[57] Brazier (1998), p66.
[58] Moskos, Williams and Segal (2000); Coker (1998), pp27-29.
[59] Burk (2008).
[60] Edmunds et al (2016), p127.
[61] Downes (1988).
[62] Downes (1988), p174.
[63] Brazier (1998), p63.

employment and family life mean that "society has other pressing concerns"[64] "Total commitment and sacrifice,"[65] where military service makes families and spouses an adjunct to a soldier, is less tolerated.[66] Families therefore may be less invested in the role that the Army plays in life and less likely to support a 'compartmentalised' aspect of the soldier's time. The increase in dual-income families also increases the time commitments placed on all members of a household meaning that there is less flexibility to absorb the upheaval of deployments. Consequently, even in 1995 it was observed that reservists, "are unlikely to volunteer for full-time service in operations short of war."[67] Such attitudes, if prevalent, might undermine the 'quality' of those who had enlisted in the Reserve and should be available for any tasks that a regular might be used for,[68] just as surely as General Carter's observations quoted above point to the problems in generating the quantity needed. While there may be merit in asking for volunteers for some operations; conducting Intelligent Selection for 'wars of choice,'[69] with compulsory mobilisation in mind, he argues not to "ask them to volunteer twice,"[70] remembering that by enlisting they already volunteered and they may not answer the call with as much gusto as hoped because of other pressures of life that may undermine deployment intentions. Despite this scepticism, Connelly notes that the British Army persists with this policy despite the success of previous compulsory mobilisations, such as for Iraq in 2003,[71] and *prima facie*, though this study argues it as an atypical case, in response to COVID 19 in 2020.

The Army Reserve is a growth area with increased opportunities for those who are willing and or able to commit to the organisation. The interpretation of the increased prospect of deployment as an 'opportunity' or a "danger"[72] will influence behaviour, especially when in competition with demands from soldiers' families and civilian employers[73], forming an "iron triangle" about which the MOD has a "fundamental misunderstanding."[74] That the organisation does not recognise the extent of all demands placed on modern reservists and that it is not prepared for the conflict between all aspects of a soldier's life may jeopardise

[64] Holmes (2011), p115-116.
[65] Griffith (2011), p276.
[66] Williams (2000), pp270-271, Moskos and Wood (1988), p8, Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p601.
[67] Kennedy and Holmes (1995) p54.
[68] MOD (2014b), p10.
[69] Dandeker et al (2011), p348.
[70] Holmes (1998), p23.
[71] Connelly (2021).
[72] Morrison (1994), p356.
[73] Dandeker et al (2010), p267; Dandeker (2011), p352; Keene (2015), p17; Howard in Sloan (2012), p330.
[74] Edmunds et al (2016), p131, Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p604.

the Psychological Contract and impinge upon their potential utility.[75] The Army's Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research concedes that impressions of the 'Volunteer Reserve's' utility are often "over-optimistic."[76] This friction is not new[77] and the personal reaction to this change is a "fight-flight"[78] response where reservists must make difficult decisions between committing to the Army or other parts of their life.

The closer incorporation of the Army Reserve within operations is a strategic change that faces the situational challenges outlined above; the Army is becoming an increasingly demanding second employer for its members which may be at odds with their expectations, existing within a society where people may be less inclined to submit themselves to serve others with no alternative sources of workforce. That which is relied upon must be reliable, or at least be perceived to be reliable by your adversary and understood by your own side. This thesis is not an attempt to 'explain failure' in the manner that Black suggests a 'cultural turn' was used to explain NATO difficulties in Afghanistan and Iraq[79] or to accept the "identity crisis"[80] thesis as was used for the US failure in Vietnam,[81] not least because the Army Reserve concept has not been a failure; it was not truly tested before the *Integrated Review* 2021, Reserve Forces 2030 (RF30) and *Future Soldier* programmes were launched against the backdrop of a resurgent Russia, a state whose crisis resilience has shown a lot to be desired in the fight against COVID-19 and their invasion of Ukraine, and Brexit, which had far reaching and long-term implications for the UK, domestically and internationally. This study is intended to be investigative and descriptive to develop an understanding of the potential of the organisation.

Research Question and scope

This situation provides the rationale for the main Research Question, 'What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?' The main concept of Fighting Power is outlined above and described in more detail in Chapters 1 and 2. This study will focus on Army Reserve Fighting Power as it exists latently; before an operation is conceived. Military doctrine offers

[75] However, Beckett (1991), p261 identified this issue as existing in the mid-twentieth century too suggesting it is not a new problem. Furthermore, it may be unevenly distributed: Coser and Coser (1974) highlighted that traditionally, families are greedier for women's time than for men and that they were expected to ensure that family commitments came above all others, therefore gender may play a significant role in the deployment intentions of reserve soldiers.
[76] CHACR (2015), p7.
[77] Anon (1921), p119.
[78] Morrison (1994), p356.
[79] Black (2012), p153.
[80] Frost (1998), p3.
[81] Griffith (2011a).

that there is “an important, although not an absolute, distinction between having Fighting Power and generating it” and that the Moral Component is an important “supporting foundation” before operations begin.[82] The Fighting Power model, discussed later, can be applied both in battle and in the preparation for it too.[83] This study is concerned with the latter, as a conceptual framework for describing the state of a military force and its potential for delivering military effects.[84] Latent capability, that which exists within a force before it is used, is important because it contributes toward credible deterrence and credible planning, based upon realistic assumptions about your own forces. Of note, Fighting Power and its constituent components exist within a force or group, rather than individuals, though the items that comprise a particular component can be held by and seen within individuals. ‘Readiness’ is the speed and ease with which that Fighting Power or capability can be brought to bear in a given situation; the more complete the state of Fighting Power and its three components, the higher the level of readiness.[85] At present there is no such guide to these assumptions beyond anecdote that soldiers’ underlying attitudes align with organisational needs with respect to deployments and that this will be borne out in their behaviour. This thesis will not seek to provide a number of troops that could be provided for operations but will investigate the circumstances across the spectrum of conflict[86] and variables that might impact upon the underlying ability of the organisation to generate soldiers. In particular, a strong Moral Component is most important for those operations which would be delivered through Intelligent Selection rather than compulsion.[87] Even in the case of compulsion for a short notice and highly demanding operation, units whose Moral Component is strong, with the Physical and Conceptual Components being equal, will likely operate more effectively.

The population of concern for this study into the Army Reserve is the Volunteer Reserve,[88] although other part-time service people exist on other terms of service: Regular Reserves,[89] High-Readiness Reserves[90] and Sponsored Reserves.[91] High Readiness Reserves and Sponsored Reserves are excluded by virtue of their small numbers and niche roles.

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[82] MOD (2014a), p40.
[83] Borton (2002), p28; Depuy (1992), p23.
[84] MOD (2017), p3-16.
[85] MOD (2017), p3-2.
[86] Such as the location, risk, activity, notice and duration of the task.
[87] Dandeker et al (2010), p267.
[88] The bulk of the force who commit to routine training on 1 evening per week, 1 weekend per month plus 1 fortnight per year.
[89] Ex-regular personnel who leave the service with a residual commitment to be recalled.
[90] Small cadres of Volunteer Reserves who are specialist personnel committed to being available at short notice.
[91] Reserves with specialist skills, such as heavy transport drivers, who are dual employed by the private sector for contracted requirements conducted with Army equipment.

Volunteer Reserves are the focus in preference to the Regular Reserve because they specifically volunteered to join the Army Reserve. The Regular Reserve in contrast volunteered to leave the Regular Army but retain a recall liability until the point at which they would have 'naturally' retired from the military and are, to all intents and purposes, now civilians with little to no contact with the Army. Anecdotally they are often unclear of their residual liability and would likely only be used in large numbers *in extremis* and in practical terms may be hard to find and access for a study, let alone mobilise, an issue recognised by the Chief of the Defence Staff.[92]

The question of whether a particular soldier or unit is fit for the task they will deploy on (an element of the Physical Component) is beyond the scope of this study. Similarly, the appropriateness of recruiting or force structure chosen by the MOD compared to the assessment of the financial situation and threat facing the UK is not within this study's remit. Nor does it seek to address the integration of, or the task load apportioned to the Army Reserve (an element of the Conceptual Component), though it may offer a comment on how realistic a demand may be given the attitude of soldiers that is revealed. Instead, it seeks to assess the quality of the Moral Component and whether it is sufficient to deliver the Fighting Power required; morale is not something that can be quantified. The exact combination of Moral, Physical and Conceptual ingredients required is situationally dependent so this study will offer description rather than prediction.

Research Approach

The literature on Fighting Power discussed later concurs that it is an intangible concept that comprises psychological aspects. In the context of latent Fighting Power, data on the Moral Component will be confined to attitudinal data which indicates an individual's thoughts and motivations. These data can be obtained most directly through surveys and interviews. The largest source of survey data on the Army Reserves is the MOD's annual Reserves Continuous Attitude Survey (ResCAS) and data from this has been used in this research to guide the development of the fieldwork, including the question schedule and target demographics, as well as offering initial evidence toward answering the Research Question. This is expanded upon in Chapters 2 and 5. Furthermore, assessing the Moral Component will require a synthesis of policy, theory and experience to develop a sense of planned use for the Army Reserve. This will inform a metric for the demand placed on the organisation, which can then be compared with the current state of the Moral Component of Fighting Power to enable a judgement of sufficiency.

[92] Carter (2018).

Original contribution and intended impacts

It is assumed that soldiers join the Army with a purpose which aligns with that of the organisation; with the expectation that they will deploy on operations. However, they are not in all cases compelled to do so and the political appetite must be there for compulsory mobilisation;[93] which may not yet be normalised in the eyes of the public or indeed the Army Reserve itself. It is this unknown that that could undermine the reliability of the Army Reserve, which forms an increasingly important part of the UK's Defence 'insurance policy.' This study seeks to make several contributions to the literature.

Firstly, it intends to contribute to the understanding of the Army's Master Question list: "What contribution will land forces make to the full range of potential mission sets?" It is on this basis that funding was secured to undertake this project. It also intends to assess the moral demands that are placed upon the Army Reserve, which are not clear in policy or academic literature and, consequently assess the Moral Component of the force's Fighting Power against those demands. It will also develop an understanding of the force's Moral Component of Fighting Power, its potential to be used, including areas of strength or weakness which could be improved upon or protected to improve organisational effectiveness moving forward toward the RF30 programme. The literature on the people that comprise the modern UK Reserves is relatively sparse so this study can add to that in the broadest sense. Finally, it will assess whether the concept of Fighting Power is applicable to the UK Army Reserve as an organisation and whether modifications to military doctrine might make it more useful in this context.

Thesis structure

The **first chapter** reviews the literature on military effectiveness, Fighting Power and on the UK Army Reserve. Fighting Power has not been used as a framework to assess the Army Reserve as an organisation nor is it operationalised in an academic sense despite being a key part of military doctrine. **Chapter 2** follows with definitions and an operationalisation of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, an outline of the three-stage research design, and hypotheses supported by observable implications. It describes a four-component model comprising Individual Morale, Team Spirit, Leadership and External Support adapted from the doctrinal model (of Morale, Leadership and Ethics) to develop variables that are complete, distinct, and relevant. It also sets out the rationale for using focus groups to investigate this subject. **Chapter 3** reviews methods literature and describes the research design. **Chapter 4** is an historical survey of the demand placed upon the Army Reserve's

[93] Janes Defence Weekly (2003), Morrison (1994), p371, Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p602.

Moral Component of Fighting Power using a three-part framework to describe operations, comprising Operation Type, Operational Role, and Predictability. It will identify the purpose or roles for the Army Reserve as defined in policy and wider literature, and identify issues which have impacted upon the generation of Fighting Power in the past. It also uses two case studies of Reserve mobilisation to illustrate the demand places on soldiers by policy and strategy when applied. This will enable the development of a metric of sufficiency to inform the remainder of the study. **Chapter 5** analyses what ResCAS and other recent data can contribute toward answering the Research Question, and how it shapes the research design. **Chapter 6** presents the fieldwork design, execution and the findings of the original qualitative research, outlining the state of the Moral Component and what factors might influence it. The thematic analysis presented identifies two groups of themes, intrinsic and extrinsic, underpinned by the environmental context, mostly driven by soldiers' civilian lives. **Chapter 7** discusses how closely the Moral Component aligns with the demand identified in Chapter 4, what might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component and whether the Moral Component Model is appropriate for application to the Army Reserve. The conclusion then offers analysis of the prospects for RF30 and *Future Soldier*.

CHAPTER 1 – LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter starts with a review of how military effectiveness or Fighting Power has been investigated in a theoretical sense and how similar ideas have been applied in research. Fighting Power, or a similar idea, is usually used as a framework for explaining operational success or failure. It then examines UK Reserve forces literature that draws from academic sources and research sponsored by the MOD. While the academic literature does not reflect military doctrine and its codification of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, analogous concepts like morale, cohesion and leadership are more widely examined, though not often applied to UK Reserve Forces, and are unpacked here. Where the literature supports, the focus is on its application to the UK Army Reserve. Where it does not, literature on reserve forces in general, or regular forces is used to examine the key concepts.

A detailed conceptual definition and operationalisation of the Moral Component of Fighting Power is conducted in Chapter 2.

Assessing Military Effectiveness

In researching military forces, some academics seek to explain military performance or effectiveness. In approaching this outcome there is a natural tendency to look either from a top-down organisational or cultural perspective, or bottom-up from the point of view of soldiers themselves, usually using socio-psychological or workplace relations methods; a dichotomy recognised by Sandman, which they label as "micro vs macro" perspectives[94]. Brathwaite offers that Combat Effectiveness, with a focus at the lower, tactical levels of war, is a sub-set of Military Effectiveness, which reflects the ability of the state to turn resources into military power.[95] This highlights a key philosophical consideration in the literature, whether Fighting Power or analogous concepts are: generated from individuals creating a whole, from a state or society creating individuals, or a combination of both. For the British Army and its concept of Fighting Power (reviewed later in this chapter) it is the latter, with its doctrine applicable across all levels of warfare, though focussed on the interactions of people, where organisations are collective of people, resources and ideas.

Top-down: Effectiveness

Most recent research into military forces has tried to understand them through the underlying assumptions or characteristics that the organisation has to determine the utility and success of the organisation. This also applies to the much narrower body of research into the Army

[94] Sandman (2023).
[95] Brathwaite (2018), p2.

Reserve and its antecedents. The wider theme of drawing conclusions from the past links to the interest in the post-Boer War Haldane reforms and the First World War as a vehicle to understand the modern Army Reserve. Where 'Fighting Power' is referred to, it is not usually in the sense adopted in British Army doctrine, laid out in more detail in Chapter 2 as part of the operationalisation. For instance, Depuy[96] uses moral issues as the means to describe the difference between victory and defeat, 'intangibles' which cannot be explained though ratios of troops or technical superiority, especially where the obviously weaker participant defeats the stronger. He identifies these "behavioural variables" as leadership, training, experience, morale and manpower quality.[97] While Depuy describes these as variables, he does not examine in any detail how they might manifest or how they might be represented except as the 'remainder' once all quantifiable elements have been accounted for. Van Creveld[98] focusses on the socio-psychological context and the effects of physical, policy, process, and organisational aspects, however, his qualitative analysis of 'Fighting Power' is more analogous to just the Moral Component as it appears in British doctrine rather than the wider concept. He identifies sub-factors; highlighting leadership as the most decisive, alongside a combination of "discipline and cohesion, morale, initiative, courage and toughness, and a willingness to fight and die."[99] Pertinently for modern operations, he also identifies ethics and duty as a factor too, noting that while German forces in the Second World War were effective in combat, this was sometimes at the expense of what would now be considered 'low' ethics, intolerable in Western armies today. This study also places the organisation as a passive entity to which things are 'done' by the political establishment rather than an actor with both external and internal agency. Both Depuy and van Creveld draw on wars of existential threat to the combatants in the Second World War and Arab-Israeli Wars. While this means that some of their immediate conclusions should be contextualised, this is one, albeit unlikely, demand that could be placed on the Army Reserve.

Millett and Murray[100] take an holistic view of Military Effectiveness (the process of converting resources into positive outcomes in battle) by assessing the gamut of military tasks, operationalised in a way comparable with Fighting Power, then applied against four levels of war (political, strategic, operational and tactical). For them, "Combat Power" is what UK doctrine labels Fighting Power, applied in war to destroy the enemy while limiting damage to oneself. An effective military will be optimally efficient at deriving Combat Power from its

[96] Depuy (1992).
[97] Depuy (1992), p106.
[98] Van Creveld (1982).
[99] Van Creveld (1982), p3.
[100] Millet and Murray (2010).

resources. The final element of effectiveness is the consideration of the context, or: 'effective for what?' They therefore take a concept like Fighting Power, this expression of potential, as an intervening variable in Effectiveness. The impact that social, philosophical, industrial, and political decisions have on potential is a matter of qualitative judgement and for each level of warfare they identify performance indicators against which to judge the Effectiveness of the major powers between 1914 and 1945. Key questions they identify at the political and strategic levels have implications for the Moral Component of Fighting Power in force generation including legitimacy, moral and public support for the armed forces, the perception of efficacy toward worthwhile goals, the confidence in success and perception of achievability. Their approach gives organisations agency to pursue their objectives within their nation. Context informs how armed forces are conceived and concludes that the potential for generating Fighting Power is not boundless, it is likely to be nationally and culturally specific.

Connable *et al* focus specifically on the "will to fight" which they characterise as the product of the "disposition to fight" and the "decision to fight,"[101] and, through a five-layer model[102] comprising 29 factors and 61 subfactors, all with substantial operationalisation, seek to develop a model that could deliver parameters for gaming and simulation that analyse holistic combat effectiveness. They attempt to move beyond the likes of Depuy, van Creveld, and Millet and Murray, by offering a means of predicting combat outcomes through their tactical-operational model of will, though they concede it remains unpredictable.[103]

Top-down: Military Culture

A sub-set of the literature looks specifically at military culture and the impact that has on Armed Forces' performance. Concepts of military culture tend to nest within existing ideas of cultures in general, for instance Johnson *et al*[104] or Schein.[105] The assessment of these military cultures points to the existence and importance of moral issues as part of the fabric of military organisations in general, and as such closely align with indicators and variables of the Moral Component.

Burk[106] argues that there are four aspects common to all military cultures: discipline, professional ethos, ceremonies and etiquette, and esprit de corps and cohesion; while

[101] Connable et al (2018), p4.
[102] Comprising: (1) individual, (2) unit, (3) organization, (4) state, and (5) society.
[103] Connable et al (2018), pxi
[104] Johnson et al (2017).
[105] Schein (2010).
[106] Burk (2008).

Wilson[107] identifies five institutional aspects of militarism, or 'adherence to military culture': belief in mission (jus ad bellum)[108], relationship to the state, relationship with society, internal structure and resources. He distinguishes militarism as an ethos, as "the mental and cultural willingness" to conduct warfare and militarisation as the "capacity to wage war."[109] Similarly, Janowitz wrote of a "code of honour"[110] in the US military and Johansen *et al*[111] identify 'warriorism' as a concept in the Norwegian Armed Forces. Accepting that militaries have a distinct culture that includes an awareness of moral issues, indicates that the Moral Component of Fighting Power may be broadly relevant to armies. Further, this culture presumes that the conduct of military operations is an integral behaviour of the organisation and therefore that and the development and existence of latent Fighting Power is crucial in enabling that. Connable *et al*[112], and Monahan notes that organisational culture is key to Fighting Power, reflected in UK doctrine for the first time in December 2023, because it influences the complete system in which armed forces exist; from school education to government procurement, but also organisational constraints and biases.[113] Sandman takes this approach further by positing that socio-political approaches can actually help elevate the debate beyond the "here and now" of combat,[114] something that this study also attempts to do by looking at choices made before deployment, bridging the gap between Sandman's "will to serve" and "will to fight." They also highlight that military motivation is constantly developing in response to the situation. However, these developments need not relate directly to the sorts of behaviour that militaries need, for instance Griffith and Ben-Ari note that culture can guide expectations for satisfaction, compensation, conflicts with other aspects of life and identity.[115]

They may also presume a degree of homogeneity within an organisation which may not exist within the Army Reserve, given its breadth of membership. It does not necessarily account for any practical factors that conflict with underlying assumptions and, in being primarily about consensus, does not fully account for divergence from the mainstream especially with an organisation like the Army Reserve which is 'nested' within the wider British Army and indeed society. It assumes that a particular behaviour, such as deploying on operations, has equal or at least sufficient value to all members of an organisation simply by virtue of their

[107] Wilson (2008).
[108] This is also identified as a factor in military morale by Britt and Dickinson (2005).
[109] Wilson (2008), p40.
[110] Janowitz (1960), pp217-225.
[111] Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2013).
[112] Connable et al (2018), p50.
[113] Monahan (2023), p8, 11.
[114] Sandman (2023).
[115] Griffith and Ben-Ari (2020).

membership. There also tends to be an assumption that notions of culture are static, challenged by Sandman[116] and others on the grounds that all elements of social phenomena are malleable. This challenge has some face validity; for instance, when viewing populist political arguments about the merits of British or American society now based on the performance of their Armed Forces in the Second World War, a conflict often studied by those looking at military motivation, when significant societal development has clearly taken place. In this historical approach, there is also little consideration about how the experience of mass-militarisation of the World Wars may have influenced that societal context, something that Catignani and Basham highlight as a role, on a much smaller scale, of the modern Army Reserve.[117] Furthermore, the link between culture, intentions and behaviour is problematic,[118] making it an incomplete lens through which to view this research problem. Culture may be context, but not the cause.

Bottom-up: Socio-psychology

Socio-psychological approaches share relevance with the military culture literature in that they address underlying factors that affect performance in relation to individual or group goals. They examine how and why factors which can be identified within the Moral Component contribute or detract from Fighting Power and military outcomes. This literature offers two obvious groups.

The first is an historical perspective, including cases from the World Wars[119] or more recent examples[120] that concern combat motivation and killing as an alien fascination unfamiliar to most in society and the effect on individuals. They seek to identify how killing and combat activity that are considered an extreme and undesirable actions in wider society are an integral (and necessary) part of culture, even if it is only military sub-cultures that physically do those deeds on society's behalf. Indeed, identifying a 'military sub-culture' may be a way of distancing society from these unpleasant realities. They explore how, alongside the morality aspects, soldiers perform. The reality of modern military life is far more mundane than daily combat, even if the demands placed on an operational reserve are greater than on a strategic reserve, but the distilled questions these studies address are still relevant; 'Why do soldiers do what they do?' and, 'Why do soldiers not do what they are trained and have committed to do?' The conclusions that both historical and modern studies draw point to the

[116] Sandman (2023).
[117] Catignani and Basham (2020), p4, 13.
[118] Finlan (2013), p9.
[119] Stouffer (1949); Moran (2007); Marshall (2012); Brathwaite (2017).
[120] Jones (2006); Sherman (2010), Kellett (1990); Grossman (1996); Williams (2000); Berkowitz (1990); Ignatieff (2000), p186; Bourke (1999).

existence of a moral aspect to military activity that comprises factors that overlap with those outlined in doctrinal Fighting Power.

The second group concerns the situation as it is currently. FRRP suggests that UK Reserves want to "be, and feel, useful…[and] experience the thrill of deploying on operations."[121] It is this intent and behaviour before battle rather than in battle that is the subject of this thesis and further illustrates that while the Components of Fighting Power are interdependent, their manifestations may not be mutually supporting. Tools and metrics have been developed to try and understand the latent Moral Component or similar concepts and how they might influence military behaviour. In common they cover issues of confidence, leadership, and unit cohesion, with the addition of perceived legitimacy of action in the Israeli CRMQ.[122] Griffith[123] applied this approach to the US Army Reserve during the Iraq War in 1990/91 but took it further by linking soldier attitudes and perceptions (potential) to mobilisation intentions and behaviour (realisation). Perceived spouse and employer attitudes, confidence and leadership were found to be important influencers on behaviour. ResCAS lacks this dimensional step of linking attitudes to potential behaviours.

Other studies have assessed cohesion and morale and linked it to observable indicators of effectiveness such as exercise performance, sickness, discipline issues and unauthorised absence (AWOL) rates. Britt and Dickinson used their previous work into morale of US soldiers deployed on Peacekeeping duties in Kosovo to develop a model of morale. Their data were gathered through longitudinal surveys administered to deployed troops and found that morale and depression were predicted by different variables and so were not two aspects of the same spectrum.[124] Their model is examined in more detail in Chapter 2, but their approach offers some insights for this study. Firstly, they recognise that morale can fluctuate and while this study is not intended to be longitudinal, it recognises the limitations of taking a view at a single point in time and may be able to offer guidance on the development of tools to better capture the morale of reserve forces. They also recommend that external, event or non-military factors, be considered and that while survey data provides a broad overall picture, a diary-type study would enable individual variations to be assessed.[125] This recommendation reflects their focus on morale once a specific

[121] Catignani et al (2018), p2.
[122] Israel's Combat Readiness and Morale Questionnaire (CRMQ) developed by Gal; Military Company Environment Inventory from Moos; Mael (1989).
[123] Griffith (1995).
[124] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p178.
[125] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p180.

deployment is identified or soldiers are actually deployed, [126] which are circumstances clearly bound in time and space, rather than the more open-ended latent 'morale' considered in this study. Their identification of external factors may provide a means by which to expand the UK military's conception of the Moral Component and this study recognises the need to understand variation in a sparsely examined field, therefore administering questionnaires may not be useful in answering the Research Question before the Moral Component in context has been fully examined.

Broadly this kind of research has found that higher morale correlated with higher performance and lower levels of defection which would diminish military effectiveness.[127] They illustrate a link between factors in common with the Moral Component, particularly those with a social dimension, and latent Fighting Power.

Bottom-up: Workplace Relations

The Army Reserve is an employer of soldiers, albeit often a secondary employer. Models pertaining to workplace relations are designed to illuminate the challenges that all employers face in trying to get the best from their workforce and what factors may affect high performance. In the context of this study this relates to the challenge of ensuring that the Moral Component of the Army Reserve's latent Fighting Power is strong. Until the late-1950's, 'job satisfaction' was not distinguished from 'morale' in workplace relations research, a field which has subsequently been applied to the military environment. Outside of the military these ideas have also been applied to civilian workplaces, where 'satisfaction' is attitude toward the job and 'morale' is the attitude toward and cooperation with the organisation/group[128] indicating the potential for confusing homonyms in different audiences, further emphasising the need for clear operationalisation here.

From a basis of Self-Determination Theory,[129] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler used the Canadian equivalent of the Continuous Attitude Survey to investigate 'Workplace Engagement' and 'morale' within service personnel in a non-operational context. They found that both concepts were positively correlated and predicted positive performance, including the "willingness to deploy on operations"[130] as measured on the YSS Scale. Further, they

[126] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014), p8.
[127] Motowidlo and Borman (1978); Fennell (2011).
[128] Latham (2012), p31.
[129] Mael (1989), p12: suggests that theories that include intrinsic motivation may not be appropriate for military contexts because of the loose relationship between performance and career longevity, the extent to which service is purely instrumental and the extent to which peacetime limits individual and unit performance.
[130] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014), p1.

recommended Britt and Dickinson's Morale Scale[131] for future investigations into both operational and non-operational settings, including deployment intentions.[132] They sought to counter prevailing trends and investigate 'positive psychology,' with a focus on motivations that resulted in positive behaviours that support organisational goals rather than defects. Having identified morale as being poorly defined, they developed a comprehensive academic operationalisation of morale, with factors relating to the mission, leadership, unit and the individual, similar to those discussed by Ben-Dor *et al* for Israeli Reserves, which also considers an ethical element too.[133] They include intrinsic and extrinsic factors; those that are mission relevant include "public support for operation" and individual factors including "military identity."[134] This morale is then a motivator with psychological and performance consequences including contextual job performance such as deployment intentions and behaviour. They identified that unit cohesion and morale were likely to be independent constructs and that higher commitment, and the attendant positive behaviour were consequences of high morale. The antecedents and consequences they identify could offer a means to investigating the Moral Component from a qualitative point of view. Their model of morale offers the closest operationalisation to the British Army's model of Fighting Power within the literature, albeit excluding ethics, and their model has not been tested against a British context. While also supported by their evidence, this has further face validity as morale is recognised as a military concept even if not well defined and understood as doctrine by members of the Army. Investigating morale itself may therefore be less useful than investigating its constituent parts individually because while organisations cannot easily influence a concept, they might be able to influence constituent parts.

Organisational Commitment has been linked to military moral factors and military performance.[135] Allen[136], co-author with Meyer of the Three-Component Model of Organisational Commitment, offers that the military provides an opportunity to further develop the field. Their model comprises three types of psychological bond with an organisation: feelings of obligation and duty (Normative Commitment), emotional attachment (Affective Commitment) and a sense of the costs that may come with leaving the organisation (Continuance Commitment). These can be simplified into feelings of 'ought,' 'want' and 'need. The latter can be further divided into 'Low Alternative,' where other organisations subjectively offer worse opportunities, and 'High Sacrifice,' where the current

[131] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p164.
[132] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014), p8.
[133] Ben-Dor et al (2008).
[134] Britt, Castro and Adler (2005), p160.
[135] Cotton (1990); Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2013); Manning (1991).
[136] Allen (2003).

organisation is perceived to be a good deal. While the bulk of Organisational Commitment research is focussed on retention behaviour, albeit important to the Army Reserve, it can be related to other job behaviours. Considered individually, Affective Commitment is expected to have the strongest positive effects on in-role and discretionary performance, followed by Normative Commitment; Continuance Commitment is expected to be unrelated or negatively related to discretionary performance,"[137] with different profiles or combinations of commitment possible.

The US Army has been more active than their British counterpart in researching the motivation of their regular and reserve components but tend to focus on enlistment, retention or combat performance issues rather than deployment intentions.[138] Mirroring conclusions on UK Reserve populations,[139] the US research identified the impact of external actors, like employers and family as important in reservists' readiness for operations. Attempts to quantify the Moral Component in a modern UK context have been limited to small-n studies of convenient captive audiences (such as those on training courses).[140] They draw on Psychological Contract and Organisational Commitment models to infer morale rather than through observable implications (such as indiscipline, unauthorised absence and voluntary departure). FRRP only utilised Organisational Commitment as small part of their explanatory framework rather than as a main research method. One drawback of Organisational Commitment is that while NC or a sense of 'ought,' a moral or ethical compulsion, may have face validity within the military, as it is mentioned within British Army doctrine and academic literature, as a concept it does not analyse distinctly from AC, a sense of 'want' in either a US civilian, US military or UK Reserve military context,[141] albeit only sparsely applied to the latter group. Workplace relations theories highlight that moral issues or commitment are strongly linked with performance and behaviour, but that different employees may be motivated in diverse ways toward the same outcome or indeed motivated in the same way toward different outcomes. The way that individuals relate to their employer, and thus the way that they contribute toward latent Fighting Power may be diverse. The extent to which a reservist considers that they are a 'volunteer', rather than a part-time employee may affect their level of dependence on the organisation and their scope for finding acceptable excuses for not performing.[142]

[137] Meyer et al (2011a), p1.
[138] Gade et al (2003); Heffner and Gade (2003); Hom and Hulin's (1981); Uhlaner (1966); Martin and O'Laughlin's (1984); Payne, Huffman and Tremble (2002); Segal and Tiggle (1997).
[139] Keene (2015), pp11-13, Heinecken (2009), p490; Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a/ 2018b).
[140] Ainslie (2001); Twentyman (2005); Caswell (1999).
[141] Karrasch (2003); Cohen (2007), p337; Woodward et al (2018b), p3.
[142] Pearce (2012), p178.

Fighting Power - Origins

The British Army's means of understanding effectiveness is the model of Fighting Power, outlined in the Introduction. While it would be considered highly unusual for military thinking to have remained static since the days of Clausewitz, the concept of Fighting Power is volatile even within the modern British military reflecting that the Conceptual Component is under constant development. Examples of the codification of the Moral Component of Fighting Power from as recently as 2011 illustrate this point and further support Clausewitz's notion of morale's intangibility.[143] In 2011, the Moral Component comprised "Motivation, Moral Cohesion and an Ethical Foundation."[144] Three years later the updated *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01*[145] offered that the Component consisted of "moral cohesion (prepared to fight), motivation (enthused to fight) and leadership (inspired to fight)." Most recently in 2017, *Army Doctrine Publication: Land Operations* describes 'morale', 'leadership' and 'an ethical foundation' (the framework used as a start-point for this study). It then changed again in 2022, after the fieldwork for this study was completed, to a four component model comprising morale, leadership, team cohesion and an ethical foundation,[146] discussed later in Chapters 2 and 7. In December 2023, close to the completion of this study, *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01* was updated again, to include even more factors in the Moral Component.[147] The intangibility of the Moral Component means that either Fighting Power as a concept is constantly under revision (as perhaps all good theories should be) or that even within the British military establishment (between the Army and the 'joint' Defence level) there is no clear agreement as to what the Moral Component actually includes. While both may be true it suggests that military doctrine as it stands is not detailed or stable enough to provide the sole basis for research into Fighting Power and further operationalisation is required. Despite this in 2014, the Defence Select Committee judged that, "the concept of fighting power provides a useful framework for analysis of the operational effectiveness of the Armed Forces" and that assessments of current and projected Fighting Power must be presented[148] in the light of organisational change. Chapter 2 outlines how the Moral Component will be operationalised for this study, to navigate incomplete, indistinct or self-referential definitions, or contextually irrelevant factors.

[143] Clausewitz (1989), p127.
[144] MOD (2011b), p1-4.
[145] MOD (2014a), p25.
[146] MOD (2022a), p 1-4 – 1-5.
[147] Leadership, Followership, Culture, Warfighting ethos, Moral cohesion, Motivation, and Moral integrity. MOD (2023), p24. Connable et al (2018) pxiv note that within the American ground forces and joint doctrine, there is also no consensus on a model for 'will to fight,' illustrating that this is not specifically a British problem, and perhaps highlighting how complex the issue is.
[148] HOC (2014), p26.

What is particularly stark is that Defence does not seem to acknowledge or engage in explanations for why either the conception or the substance of Fighting Power might have changed, nor indeed even where the idea came from in the first place. Notwithstanding that doctrine is for practitioners rather than academics, there is a sense of 'social fact' about successive incarnations of the concept, and indeed the content. For instance, it describes, the UK's geopolitical context[149] as the starting point for fairly static assumptions about the nature of its Defence strategy,[150] before describing legal and moral principles that ultimately should affect the actions of soldiers; "the actions of land forces are guided by their obligations as soldiers and an ethical foundation shared with that of UK society."[151] While it clearly situates the attitudes and actions desired of soldiers in a cultural, societal and geo-political context; that context is seen as largely unchanging, particularly in respect of 'mythical' national identity.

Fighting Power as an idea has a long history within military theory. Both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz[152] (as seminal thinkers from the East and the West respectively) conceive of war as comprising both physical and moral elements, what Brathwaite succinctly describes as "skill and will"[153]. Their influence has permeated throughout much of modern military thinking, including that of the British Army, though both see armies as 'tools' for the commander with little internal agency.[154] Understanding the Moral Component as an idea to help defeat your enemy is as important as preserving that Component within your own forces. Machiavelli also alludes to factors which could be recognised as elements of modern Fighting Power as essential to success for a ruler building their own city-state and applies the concept to the mutually supporting political and military domains. He wrote that a ruler must prepare his state for war by understanding warfare conceptually, building up sufficient resources and a sufficient army (physical) and maintaining the morale of his subjects and by avoiding the use of mercenaries whose primary motivator is money rather than loyalty.[155] The implication of this is that their extrinsic rather than intrinsic motivation renders their Moral Component poorly founded and so they are deficient in Fighting Power.

[149] MOD (2018), p2-1.
[150] Expanded on in more detail in Chapter 4.
[151] MOD (2018), p3-12.
[152] Sun Tzu (2002); Clausewitz (1989).
[153] Brathwaite (2018).
[154] Van Creveld (2017), p3.
[155] Machievelli (2006), Ch 12-14.

Moral Component

The Moral Component is identified as a crucial element in building and generating forces before they are employed.[156] It is particularly important to UK Reserves because they essentially 'volunteer twice'[157] every time they deploy and realise their Fighting Power, rather than withholding their labour. The difficulty in being truly reflective about the Moral Component should not be underestimated and the difficulty of recognising where it may be deficient, harder still. It concerns the very core of being and understanding and as such it can be seen to exist as a paradigm for understanding military service.

The literature approaches the Moral Component of latent Fighting in varying ways, which in part reflects differing operationalisation of the concept. Conceptualisations of military culture also offer close links with the Moral Component because culture is seen as the foundation from which military effectiveness develops. Clausewitz, van Creveld, Depuy, and Millet and Murray[158] examine the Moral Component through evaluation of a broader concept similar to Fighting Power. Others, outlined earlier in this chapter, who take a social-psychological or workplace relations approach are also relevant through their assessments of individual attitudes and morale. They address further context in which Fighting Power exists and examine what can influence and predict positive military performance.

The 'indicators' of the Moral Component as it appears in doctrine have not been applied as a concept in whole or part to the Army Reserve. Throughout the literature, the constituent variables of morale, leadership and ethics, the indicators of the Moral Component, drift in and out of focus reflecting the lack of academic consensus on the definitions and overlap between related concepts of cohesion, motivation and performance.[159] Brathwaite, for instance, offers that 'will' and motivation comprises 'morale,' 'discipline' and 'initiative,'[160] though their viewpoint is very much at the micro or individual level, while engaged in battle. Clausewitz poetically suggests that moral factors, "will not yield to academic wisdom,"[161] inferring that an agreed definition might be difficult to develop. Across the breadth of the literature, 'morale' is often used as a synonym for all moral issues[162] and is examined throughout, with special attention given to cohesion. Connable *et al* note that 'morale' as an indicator "often has counterintuitive and misleading meanings"[163] leading to

[156] Clausewitz (1989); van Creveld (2017); Kniskern and Segal (2015), p511, Murray (1999), p27.
[157] Firstly, on enlistment and subsequently on accepting an opportunity or an order to deploy.
[158] Clausewitz (1989); van Creveld (2017); Depuy (1992); Millet and Murray (2010).
[159] Manning (1991) offers a broad summary of these definitions.
[160] Brathwaite (2017), p4.
[161] Clausewitz (1989), p184.
[162] Mael (1989), p4; Manning (1991), p454.
[163] Connable et al (2018), p43.

operationalisation issues; indeed, they omit it entirely from their model. The next section looks at cohesion,[164] which has been linked to military performance or the realisation of Fighting Power and is examined as a key concept given its recent application to the British Army Reserve in research by Patrick Bury. It also features in other literature noted above. Next, ideas on leadership, which also feature prominently in wider literature, and ethics are reviewed, though there is little to no direct application in the literature specific to the Army Reserve, therefore more general works are considered. These Moral Component indicators and variables are described in detail in Chapter 2 as part of conceptual definition prior to operationalisation.

Cohesion

Cohesion has been identified as a critical factor in military performance under stress[165] and has been applied to the UK Army Reserve recently, using Siebold's Standard Model and therefore deserves separate attention as a concept separate but interrelated with morale. Fundamentally, this idea is important to the British Army, which bases its organisation, the Regimental System, around this idea of the "primary group model" where "soldiers essentially fight for their buddies," rather than for abstractions.[166] This is also reflected in the way that the Army has organised Reserve units into 'pairings' with regular units, outlined further in Chapter 4.

Standard Model Cohesion comprises peer-peer, peer-leader, organizational, and institutional bonding within small groups (up to the level at which UK Reserve units may be expected to deploy together – the primary group) and can affect performance outcomes where stress is high but does take time to develop and must therefore exist before it is called upon.[167] It must exist as part of latent Fighting Power. It is the difference between a team or group and a collection of co-located individuals. It can offer some correlation between cohesion and performance[168] but is weighted toward combat environments rather than military routine where Fighting Power is latent. It is highly reliant on social bonds leading to the "Horizon Problem" where groups with no shared social history can immediately and 'inexplicably' act coherently.[169] To some degree this is answered in alternative conceptualisations of cohesion which recognise aspects of a professional military such as shared practices and procedures.[170] The Standard Model has been applied to the British Army in the Falklands

[164] In the doctrinal Moral Component, cohesion is a variable of the indicator morale.
[165] Stouffer (1949); Shils and Janowitz (1948); King (2013).
[166] Sandman (2023).
[167] Siebold (2011), p450,454.
[168] Siebold (2007), p50.
[169] Siebold (2011), p458.
[170] E.g., King (2006); Strachan (2006).

War by Stewart,[171] but may be less useful for this study where behaviour before a deployment is concerned. Kirke's 2010 work on the British Army identified two frameworks for cohesion based on ethnography: 'social structures' and 'friendship.' While he admits that it is highly contextual to the British Army, unlike the more externally valid Standard Model, it does help to explain instances of conflicting loyalty and therefore could be combined to be mutually supporting. The latter approach's reliance on culture as a model means that it may be highly tied to the dominant 'regular' Army rather than immediately applicable to Reserves.

Bury's Research

Patrick Bury's research into the Army Reserve logistic elements is focussed on soldiers' service in general and the nature of their cohesion, though he does identify that their motivations for joining the Army Reserve correlated with their reasons for reporting for mobilisation when called-out.[172]

They combined qualitative interviews and quantitative survey research; the first research to do so focussing on the British Army Reserve.[173] Measured on multiple scales they found that among Reserve logistic units, soldiers perceived their sub-unit morale and cohesion to be "high", but their readiness, what may be recognised in doctrine as latent Fighting Power, as "moderate."[174] This reinforces that Fighting Power is influenced by a combination of moral and other factors and while it is necessary to ensure a readiness to fight, it may not be sufficient alone to guarantee it. In this specific case, the impact of organisational transformation and the recent changes to logistic units as part of A2020 may have had an influence. This research does not link to military doctrine (for instance it does not cite Fighting Power as a concept) and focusses on organisational change rather than assessment of potential output. Bury does address the ability of sub-units to deliver capability in the context of that organisational change but only as a matter of subjective assessment from participants as a measure of their confidence, highly dependent on their understanding of individual and unit role, rather than objectively or from the point of view of the organisation. In these studies, cohesion is used as a measurable surrogate for morale or the whole Moral Component of Fighting Power, though in common with the wider literature, does not include ethical considerations or elements of Reserve service that lie outside the military.

[171] Kirke (2010), p148.
[172] Bury (2017a), p623.
[173] Bury (2016), p225.
[174] Bury (2016), pp248-250.

For his 2016 work that used “group interviews,” complete interview schedules are not available.[175] His key findings and observations in relation to this study, though they do not necessarily guide lines of questioning, are that participants: identified leadership as a key issue in matters away from combat, though this is not specifically mentioned in Army Reserve doctrine or policy,[176] and were concerned over their ability to provide the required trained individuals and groups and therefore did not feel competent to deploy or generate troops over a protracted period.[177] These concerns may have stemmed from increasing awareness of the standards expected of them on operations and the recognition that they would be closely compared with regular soldiers.[178] Comradeship and a sense of family was identified as very important and correspondingly, self-discipline over imposed discipline was important; indeed resorting to formal disciplinary measures was seen as a social failure.[179]

Contested Cohesion?

The Moral Component of Fighting Power details Moral Cohesion,[180] “corporate will-power,”[181] but the definition offered is very broad, and there is no clear evidence base for its inclusion in doctrine; in many way suffering from the same poor definition that Connable *et al* note with ‘morale’ as an idea.[182] Recognising that doctrine is not necessarily bound by academic rigour; it also includes ideas of social cohesion,[183] for instance through “Comradeship” and “friendships and collective bonding,”[184] and task cohesion,[185] as professional teams working on a specific task. It also describes Moral Cohesion as inherently linked to physical cohesion; for instance, both the confidence in being sustained as well as the reality of sustainment.[186] As a concept itself, ‘moral cohesion’ only tends to appear academically when referring to or from a military source, such as Mileham, quoted above. Maccoun notes that task cohesion, rather than social cohesion correlates with performance,[187] yet it is the latter, social cohesion or comradeship, which has traditionally been important to the Army Reserve. Moral Cohesion is therefore ‘challenged’ by other types of cohesion which have more academic foundation.

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[175] Bury (2016) p52: group interview questions are cited as being “at Annex B” but are not in the manuscript.
[176] Bury (2016), p198.
[177] Bury (2016), p211, 220-211.
[178] Bury (2016), p280-281.
[179] Bury (2016), p282, 286-287.
[180] MOD (2017), p3-8.
[181] Mileham (2020), p27.
[182] Connable et al (2018), p43.
[183] Shils and Janowitz (1948); Marshall (2012); Stouffer (1949); Connable et al (2018), p65; Kirke (2010); Siebold (2007).
[184] MOD (2017), p3-8.
[185] Sandman (2023); Connable et al (2018), p65; Segal and Knestbaum (2002); King (2015), p94.
[186] MOD (2017), p5-4.
[187] MacCoun et al (2006).

Further, there is a subtle definitional difference here; 'moral cohesion' may describe a state where soldiers share the same morals (being morally coherent) or it may describe soldiers operating in a cohesive and effective way by virtue of sharing the same morals, or indeed by virtual of liking each (social) other or being professionally coordinated on a task. In the case of the latter, Wong *et al* note that identifying the basis for soldiers acting coherently, whether social or task, is largely an academic exercise.[188] This thesis attempts to navigate the debate by exploring the possibility for multiple notions of cohesion in the operationalisation using separate variables in the Team Spirit indicator, outlined in the next chapter. Notwithstanding this, the doctrine also says that Comradeship (or social cohesion) is in fact the "basis for Moral Cohesion,"[189] which then becomes the positive by-product of common family-like bonds formed between people who work together frequently, making some elements of the Moral Component self-referential.

Bury's definition of cohesion shares some elements with 'moral cohesion' within the Moral Component. He identified that cohesion manifested differently between regulars and reserve soldiers,[190] suggesting that the wider Reserve Moral Component may not align with that of the regular force, with potential implications for latent Fighting Power. A combination of Standard Model (or social cohesion), cultural and professional bond cohesion may be useful in operationalising the Moral Component given the emphasis placed on cohesion in the literature. However, isolating cohesion as a factor within the Moral Component may not be appropriate as it is likely to be interrelated and reciprocal with other factors, like leadership, morale, and ethics. The intent of this study is not to determine the causality of any one factor or combination of factors but to describe the contribution of the Moral Component in latent Fighting Power.

Leadership

Leadership is a quality which is typically associated with the military but has not been examined in the Army Reserve context. It is a factor in the Moral Component as it appears in doctrine (see Figure 0.1) and is relevant because of the significant role leaders typically play in hierarchical organisations like the Army, and are assumed to have in espousing organisational goals such as maintaining latent Fighting Power. The literature suggests that leadership can influence multiple levels of follower behaviour and performance as well as

[188] Wong et al (2003).
[189] MOD (2018), p3-9.
[190] Bury (2019), p5.

intra-team relationships and values. Perceptions of leadership, then, may have affected the Moral Component as well on other indicators and on Fighting Power as a whole.

Alongside the substantial number of memoirs and research which offer thoughts on military leadership,[191] there is also a body of leadership theory which can be used to codify it and assisted practitioners.[192] There is also academic literature that situates it within a non-doctrinal idea of Fighting Power. Van Creveld[193] offers that for leadership to have a positive effect on building or generating forces, its four facets - exhortation and example at the individual level and reward and discipline (formal and informal) at the organisational level - must be applied in a timely and appropriate fashion and in proportion to the situation to make an effective contribution. Strachan notes that formal discipline in the form of punishment is often overlooked when considering morale;[194] though the examples offered by Sandman[195] in support of this point are mostly from the World Wars and even those from more recently are all combat rather than pre-deployment focussed. There is, however, little suggestion that imposed discipline of this kind delivers an optimal fighting force.

Generic leadership theories have been applied to the military as they may be to any organisation.[196] Those that are applied specifically to the military, including as part of Standard Model Cohesion,[197] are often concerned with organisational 'level,'[198] with direct or proximal leadership taking precedence over organisational or system leadership; and with the context,[199] such as deployment/combat, training/garrison and schooling/evaluation. Of those three it is the first, operational situations that, as with morale, garner the greatest interest.[200] Leadership is seen as crucial in developing Fighting Power because it is the Army's lever to monitor and influence the Moral Component of its soldiers through the agents it generates to do this on its behalf. Ulmer *et al*[201] take a more thematic approach to military leadership but agree with Wong *et* al, that tasks accomplished by leaders and the perceptions held by soldiers of their leaders have a direct bearing on soldiers' military potential. Connable *et al* offer that, a "leader's primary role is to build and sustain the

[191] E.g., Slim (1958); Jary (1998); Keegan (2004).
[192] Well covered in Northouse (2013).
[193] Van Creveld (2017), p67.
[194] Strachan (1997), p374.
[195] Sandman (2023).
[196] Csoka and Bons (1978); Deluga (1991); Roush and Atwater (1992); Hollander (1954).
[197] In these cases, an element of leadership is in 'vertical' cohesion bonding, alongside 'horizontal bonding' between comrades. Connable et al (2018), p65.
[198] Van Creveld (2017); Siebold (2011), p455; Wong et al (2003), p676.
[199] Wong et al (2003), p676; Taylor (2008).
[200] Campbell (2012); Hunt and Phillips (1991).
[201] Ulmer et al (2001). Also supported by Mael (1989), p20.

disposition to fight of the unit and of each soldier within that unit[202] and that further, competence proven by 'success' is a key criterion, however, as outlined in Chapter 4, the Army Reserve does not seem to judge reservists' leaders by this principle. There is no real perception of 'leadership failure' if a unit fails to encourage people to mobilise.

Workplace relations research again offers an alternative perspective for assessing leadership and may have more relevance for latent Fighting Power which should exist during routine Reserve activity. Perceived Supervisor Support and Perceived Organisational Support[203] are concepts which could be used to assess perceptions of leadership. Within civilian contexts, it has been observed that employees who have higher Perceived Supervisor Support and Perceived Organisational Support[204] are more likely to perform positive workplace behaviours.[205] These concepts have not been widely applied to a military context, but higher Perceived Supervisor Support and Perceived Organisational Support[206] could be indicators of positively perceived leadership and thus contribute more to the Moral Component. Leadership theory has not been widely applied to the UK Army Reserve despite the importance placed on leaders in doctrine and lay-thought. Overall, the literature suggests that positive leadership can improve performance in military and civilian contexts.

Ethics

Van Creveld cites Sun Tzu as to the importance of ethics in war:

> "Those who excel in war must first cultivate their own humanity and justice and maintain their own law and institutions."[207]

As with leadership, ethical issues are not considered in UK Army Reserve literature, despite the diversity of the organisation and the additional civilian considerations that they bring with them to their service. Mileham[208] suggests that moral issues concern the ability to cause harm effectively, whereas ethics is about causing harm 'to do good'. In this case, ethics and the baseline of 'right and wrong' will be highly contextual to the individual and the situation, and further, is separate from, through related to moral issues.

[202] Connable et al (2018), p72.
[203] Shore et al (2012), p6.
[204] Shore et al (2012), p6.
[205] Schmidtchen (1997), p6, Shore et al (2012), pp8-9, Coyle-Shapiro and Parzefall (2008), pp26-27.
[206] Shore et al (2012), p6.
[207] Van Creveld (2017), p158.
[208] Mileham (2020).

Ethics is a very specific section of military studies[209] and a belief in the justness of a mission was considered by Griffith in his study of US reserves[210] and only sparsely applied to a UK context,[211] focussing on how ethics are taught to British soldiers; 'very informally' they conclude, rather than how it might affect their Fighting Power. The literature agrees that it is important that soldiers believe they are justified in participating in military endeavours,[212] but this feeling of justness may be divorced from the impact that their military service has on others, whether that be 'the enemy' or those closer to home. Such sources tend to take an individualistic approach to ethics, recognising that it is an individual responsibility with individual psychological repercussions. By volunteering to serve in the Army, it is assumed that soldiers already subscribes to "the set of values"[213] that underpin its core activities, such as: the justness of using force; the acceptance of hierarchy, the morality of being involved directly or indirectly in killing and the state's legal monopoly on violence. A person who had moral concerns about these ideas would likely not have enlisted. The significance of this is even more profound for our understanding of the Moral Component, however, as the 'Ethical Foundation' is the only element of the doctrine that overtly but briefly, considers the impact of societal context on any element of Fighting Power, less a recognition that the concept also exists in other NATO nations. To some extent, this suggests that societal context is largely overlooked in the conception of all three components of Fighting Power, perhaps leaving it detached from society; a potentially problematic idea for this study when the Army Reserve is meant to represent an obvious bridge between the military and the people it protects. This may also potentially skew the idea of Fighting Power toward the study of micro examples of 'small units,' rather than more widely, and potentially towards "why they fight," rather than "why they serve."[214]

Most literature is highly focussed on ethics once deployed, usually in retrospect given the difficulties in accessing soldiers on operations and is often focussed on regular soldiers or conscripts. It does not account for the nuances that may affect Reserve soldiers. By virtue of their sense of volunteerism, Reserve soldiers, more than regulars, may be more discerning about the type of conflict they volunteer to serve in,[215] although McMahan

[209] E.g., Sherman (2010); Montrose (2013); McMahan (2013); Beard (2014).
[210] Griffith (2009), p58.
[211] Todd (2010); Mileham (2008); Deakin (2008); Robinson (2007).
[212] Werner (2013), p35; McMahan (2013), p13; Sherman (2010) p41; Levinson et al (2013); Huntington, (1957), p76.
[213] Schmidtchen (1997), p6.
[214] Sandman (2023).
[215] Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p602.

suggests that most soldiers simply do not engage in “scrupulous moral deliberation,” a notion supported by Mileham in the British Army context.[216] However, for reservists the perspective McMahan envisages may be more complex. As well as *jus ad bellum*, there may also be a sense of ‘justice at home,’ to contend with. Reservists may be more aware of the wider moral choices they have in being called out; for instance, the justness of their military service vice their familial or employment obligations; the feeling that “it is not right”[217] to expect Reserves to leave their jobs and family. Catignani and Basham argue that, while it may not be ‘right’ it is normalised by the establishment and that Reserve soldiers frequently leverage perceptions of military duty to pursue their military “serious leisure” in preference to their domestic responsibilities.[218]

The current literature on military ethics does not reflect its place within military doctrine. In focussing on ethics on operations, soldiers are homogenised and the differences between regulars and reserves in an all-volunteer army are lost. There is little consideration of how ethics, as a stand-alone concept or as an indicator of the Moral Component, might influence Army Reserves or their Fighting Power when the demands of the military, family and civilian employer collide. The iron triangle factors are not explored from a moral or ethical perspective, only as practicalities without a psychological effect, such as time apart from spouse or childcare, which might impact on the serviceperson as a family member rather than a soldier.

Army Reserve Literature

Despite the importance of Fighting Power and the Moral Component in military thinking, these concepts are not considered as a framework within academic literature on reserves, indeed most research conducted on the Armed Forces in general has been on regulars rather than “marginal organisations,”[219] as reserves are often treated. Literature which does use aspects of the Moral Component does not identify it as such, rather as a stand-alone psychological or behavioural concept. Until the 2010’s most reserve forces literature focussed on US and Israeli examples; this may only be applicable to the UK with caveats given that each reserve force is informed by its parent society and therefore as unique as each nation. For instance, Israeli reserves are still essentially conscripts and therefore less like the ‘volunteers’ of the UK. Focus has been given by *Armed Forces and Society’s* ‘Forum on Military Reservists in the “New Wars,” inaugurated 2021.

[216] McMahan (2013), p20; Mileham (1998), p231.
[217] Waite (2014).
[218] Catignani and Basham (2020).
[219] Zurcher and Harries Jenkins (1978).

Most studies conducted on UK reserve forces tend to be from an historical point of view, with particular focus on the distinguished heritage of the First and Second World Wars, though some extend into the Cold War era. Those studies which cover the years 1900-1918 may be partially relevant to this study given that this period was also one of reform and reorganisation of the reserve forces. The Haldane reforms of 1906-1912 sought to re-energise the Army and put it onto a more cost-effective basis while ensuring that its part-time soldiers were more useful. The reforms were mired by political compromise but laid the organisational foundations in time for the First World War when the Territorial Force, as it was then called, helped to prevent defeat until the Britain could mobilise its total resources. Indeed, Spiers wrote of 'Learning from Haldane.'[220]

The modern literature about the UK Army Reserve tends to focus on external or organisational issues, such as structure and policy, rather than the individuals that comprise the force. The closest approach to the individual perspective tends to be on the issue of support for and from families and employers. Where individuals are considered, this tends to be through empirical research rather than conceptual discourse.

Academic Literature

In the historical research, the Moral Component of Fighting Power and the links between motivation and deployment intentions are a largely unexplored. Of those sources which are focussed on the British Army's reserve, a large quantity of it is historical analysis of procedures and the interactions of 'great men' that led to the generation of the Force[221] the development of military culture, or its friction with the society and the establishment that created it.[222] There are also those sources that devote themselves to 'the soldier,' their motivation and their social history of service,[223] including those which focus on the regional or territorial aspects.[224] These sources often cover difficulties of the process and motivation for volunteering and fighting. Inherent within the historical literature is a sense of organisational exceptionalism that sets the Army Reserve and its antecedents apart, though this may be a natural consequence of presenting research that highlights a single, 'marginal' organisation in the context of the complete machinations of a state.

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[220] Spiers (2010).
[221] Royal Commission (1903); Mitchinson (2005); Mitchinson (2008); Speirs (2006); Messenger (2005); Bowman and Connelly (2012); Hay (2014).
[222] Simkins (2003); Speirs (1980); Speirs (2003); Barnett (1970); Beckett (1982/1991/2003); Dennis (1987).
[223] Fuller (1991); Cunningham (1975); Cousins (1968); Baldwin (1994), Holmes (2004/2011); Sellwood (1974).
[224] Bonner (2008); Bull (1993); Clammer (2011); Cookson (1993); Wilson and Collinson (1982); Johnson (1993).

The existing literature on the modern Army Reserve broadly concludes that, as with the late Cold War assessments, there is nothing 'wrong' with the soldiers or their mentality but that a raft of practical (including the situation of a reservists' families and employers), organisational and political issues prevent the realisation of their full potential. To criticise the foundations of reserve soldiers' mentality might potentially question the fundamental ability of UK society to produce people willing to serve as soldiers. The literature instead focusses on the mutable aspects of the Force (for instance structures or equipment) rather than the nature and characteristics of the people it must recruit from, over which it has no direct control. Furthermore, since its advent, quantity rather than quality has been the primary concern of the Army Reserve and as is discussed later, there are theoretical challenges in operationalising intangible concepts of quality like the Moral Component.

Chichester and Wilkinson's 1982 and Walker's 1990 works are among the most recent comprehensive works about the Territorial Army and its role as the Cold War ended but these are now over thirty years old. Both sources highlight the different organisational and cultural outlook between regular and reserve forces, and the key issues of retention and utility which endure today. Both Chichester and Wilkinson, and Walker conclude that the Territorial Army would likely have been unable to contribute meaningfully to defending the country.[225] While they did not overtly use the concept of Fighting Power to frame their findings, organisational and political practicalities (conceptual) and demographic and resource (physical) constraints form the basis of their arguments rather than any concern over motivation or moral issues. A theme that permeates throughout all the historical literature, including these works, is the ethos of the organisation offers inertia against change. They present the idea of the noble part-time soldier who would rather not fight but will if they must, and who holds a sense of duty and volunteerism in their heart, a scheme potentially at odds with the modern rhetoric of increasing professionalism.

Given the *prima facie* benefits in reducing Defence spending during the economic slowdown of 2008, there has been an increased in interest in reserves as a means of retaining military capability at lower cost. The increased use of reservists in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s also increased public and academic interest in the reserve forces. For the UK Armed Forces this manifested in the FR20 plan summarised in the introduction. The challenges of this plan form the inspiration for much of the recent literature which tends to look at the

[225] Chichester and Wilkinson (1982); Walker (1990), p3.

potential for the Reserve to fulfil their expanded role,[226] their place in the military establishment, [227] the affordability of the plan,[228] their place in society,[229] or a combination of these ideas.[230] While these studies examine the Army Reserve at a relatively high level, they do not do so with much regard to the effectiveness of the force or the output it must deliver. They are therefore not necessarily positioned to assess the components of Fighting Power. Even articles from *The Wavell Room,*[231] a space to publish 'divergent' military thinking often authored by those within the organisation, also broadly falls into these categories. While Kirke[232] and Connelly[233] look at the position of reservists on operations, it is from the narrow viewpoint of their integration with regular forces[234] and is neither codified as, nor broad enough to make, a wider assessment about the components of latent Fighting Power.

Bottom-up 'personal identity' or motivation has been used as a perspective to understand regular forces undergoing changes in the twentieth century[235] and considering the increased demands on Western reserve forces, the assumption has been that they would need to 'professionalise' like regular soldiers. One question that the identity literature addresses is how reserve forces cope with that mode of use and how it might affect their motivation and behaviour. As such it also features in literature on other nations' reserves, including USA, Norway and Israel, but has not been widely applied to the UK Army Reserve, despite being assessed as a factor with "significant implications for the…readiness of reservists,"[236] and thus acting as a potential predictor of latent Fighting Power[237] and whether they will "turn up."[238] While not corroborated by modern empirical data, French[239] offers the observation that while reserve forces may be weak in aspects of the Physical Component (such as training and practical military experience), though he does not use this concept directly, their

[226] Dandeker et al (2011); Bury (2017a); Williams and Lamb (2010).
[227] Yardley (2003); Weitz (2007); Kirke (2008); Bury and Catignani (2019); Connelly (2021).
[228] Alcock (2015).
[229] Hines et al (2015).
[230] Edmunds et al (2016); Phillips (2012); CHACR (2015); Keene (2015).
[231] www.wavellroom.com. A site designed to publish articles on 'Contemporary Military Thought.' The length of articles does not lend themselves to empirical research and they are often designed to be thought provoking or divergent, and offers a medium for lesser considered subjects to be discussed. The Army Reserve is a prominent topic reflecting the often-controversial place it holds within British military circles.
[232] Kirke (2008).
[233] Connelly (2021).
[234] Something that Smith and Jans (2011), p311 also describe as a significant challenge for Australian reservists.
[235] Huntington (1957); Janowitz (1960); Moskos and Woods (1988).
[236] Griffith (2011), p275.
[237] Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2013).
[238] Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p603.
[239] French (2005).

strong identity distinct from regulars confers an advantage in the Moral Component, including cohesion created by an identity centred on local volunteerism. This follows a trend throughout the literature which tends towards the reverence of reservists' motivation, either through partiality or evidence, which rest on the Territorial Force's performance in doing 'enough' in the First World War and having been sufficient, albeit largely untested,[240] during the latter half of the Twentieth Century.

The use of identity as a predictor of military behaviour which could be linked to aspects of Fighting Power offers an opportunity to answer this Research Question, however, both Griffith's and Johansen *et al*'s work illustrate that identifying identities or profiles as linked to a broad conception of Fighting Power encompassing a sufficiently rich operationalisation of its components would be problematic. Indeed, Edmunds *et al* suggest that reservists' identities are formed almost completely outside the military sphere[241] potentially diminishing the predictive and explanatory power of the concept within the context of the Army Reserve. Controlling for this effect would be rendered more difficult because the greatest access to Reserve soldiers is during their time on-duty, during which they might be expected to bias their answers towards the military. This lack of homogeneity among reservists, the dynamism and lack of exclusive identities would make it difficult to draw direct links between identity, how reservists see themselves, and latent Fighting Power or behaviour. Furthermore, the comparative metrics for expected behaviour to-date are unmistakeably 'regular.' While there is an acceptance that reservists are different, there is no comprehensive study or collective consensus on how they might be different.

One aspect of identity theory that is applied to the Army Reserve is Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari's "transmigrant" thesis to explain the way that part-time soldiers negotiate their civilian and military lives. This concept is widely replicated throughout the literature[242] and itself has implications for Fighting Power as the civilian aspect of a reservist's life mediate attitudes toward and behaviour in the military space and could render them less effective as a result. These assertions about the UK Army Reserve were not necessarily supported by empirical research on the Army Reserve in the same way as they had been for US or Israeli soldiers until the *Future Reserve Research Programme* (FRRP) of 2018 reported that UK

[240] Keene (2015), p6; Walker (1990), p160.
[241] Edmunds et al (2016), p127.
[242] Griffith (2011a), p620; Woodward et al (2018b), p1; Edmunds et al (2016), p128, 130; Sherman (2010) p4, 13, 115; Beard (2014), p280; Jones (2006), p246.

reservists compartmentalise their military, family and employment concerns, leading to the requirement to migrate between spheres.[243]

Empirical research are the topical and methodological outliers in the literature on UK Reserve Forces, like Dandeker *et al's*[244] work on the Territorial Army in Iraq 2003-2006. Prior to this, most research appears to take a perspective whereby individuals are bound by the structure they inhabit, rather than as actors themselves. Dandeker *et al's* qualitative study of 191 soldiers is more empirically focussed than many of the previously cited studies which rely on limited cases or anecdote but, like many of the quantitative studies mentioned later, focusses on short-term issues of retention and wellbeing rather than enduring morale or Fighting Power[245]. What is relatively surprising is that despite a government report outlining the procedural, organisational and cultural failings in the mobilisation for Iraq in 2003-4[246] and media reports corroborating those findings,[247] very little academic research has been devoted to the largest single mobilisation of UK Reserves in recent times illustrating that while research could have be done into Reserve moral issues, they have been overlooked in favour of the previously highlighted areas.

Bury's contribution to the Army Reserve literature focusses on the logistic elements of the Army Reserve, a part of the force that underwent significant changes as part of Army 2020. Their quantitative examination of recruitment and retention in the Army Reserve logistic component reflects both the continuing contemporary emphasis on quantity rather than quality in the force but also an attempt to break away from the combat-centric assessments of international reserve forces to date. However, the research did also investigate 'reasons for mobilising' and, working from Moskos' Institutional-Occupational model[248] determined that soldiers that joined for institutional reasons correlated with intrinsic motivations for mobilisation and that those that joined for occupational reasons correlated with extrinsic mobilisation motivations.[249] This suggests that there may be an uneven distribution of support for different variables of the Moral Component across distinct profiles. Most participants in Bury's study were identified as institutionally motivated rather than

[243] Giga et al (2018a), p1; Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a); Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b), p2; Catignani and Basham (2020), p7.
[244] Dandeker et al (2010).
[245] Diehle, Williamson and Greenberg (2019); Fairweather (2018).
[246] HOC (2004).
[247] E.g., Tweedie (2003); Gillan (2004).
[248] Institutional motivations are described as traditional values such as loyalty, duty, and an acceptance of the collective good over an individual, where soldiers are separate from but respected by society for those values. Occupational motivations are more civilianised revolving around compensation and received benefits. Moskos (1977).
[249] Bury (2017a), p623.

occupational and as such were judged to be “more reliable” and thus by inference may have greater latent Fighting Power. The inference that reservists are mostly intrinsically motivated is supported by Betts’ research[250] (and ResCAS - see Chapter 5) though their findings do suggest that soldiers’ motivations are not necessarily orientated toward generating Fighting Power. Their results imply that soldiers believe they can do their “duty,” “serve their country” and fulfil the requirements of “comradeship” without necessarily participating in operational deployments. Despite the empirical evidence in support, Bury’s work[251] on organisational transformation of the Army Reserve echoes the focus on policies, procedures and cultural inertia present in much of the modern Reserve literature but also include a consideration of cohesion, a factor with a potentially significant effect on Fighting Power which will be discussed in more detail later in the chapter during an examination of the Moral Component literature.

Official Research

Two large scale pieces of research on attitudes within the UK Reserve Forces offer a significant foundation for this study from both a qualitative and quantitative perspective. The FRRP and ResCAS are sponsored by the MOD but designed and executed by academics. The data are primarily collected for official purposes and are not subject to peer review. Despite their official roots, neither source uses the framework of Fighting Power and neither use an overt theoretical foundation.

Future Reserves Research Programme (FRRP)

FRRP[252] was an investigation into the relationship between reservists and their civilian domestic lives across four discrete projects conducted by UK universities and the Economic and Social Research Council. It ran 2014-2017 and used qualitative data to draw its findings. Of note for this study, a total of 80 reservists took part in focus groups as part of the research. One project, for instance conducted 5 focus groups with 30 reservists. The programme did not intend to achieve statistical representativeness but worked toward data saturation, where the researchers judged that no new attitudinal data was being generated.

The research was not specifically focussed on deployments but did collect data on that topic as part of the gamut of military service. Its results were collected into four areas: ‘the role of reserves,’ ‘Keeping Enough in Reserve’ (including issues of identity), ‘Negotiating Military and Civilian Lives’ and ‘Sustaining Future Reserves 2020’ (including commitment and family

[250] Betts (2014), p29.
[251] Bury (2018/2019). NB These are articles partly derived from Bury (2016) research.
[252] Future Reserves Research Programme | Understanding issues around the integration of regular and reserve personnel (www.future-reserves-research.ac.uk).

or employer pressures). The latter two projects include factors which may relate to Fighting Power. While their population contained Tri-Service reserves rather than only the Army Reserve, accepting that the Royal Naval Reserve and the Royal Air Force Auxiliary have different demographics and modes of employment, their findings may have some relevance to this study. They explored the beliefs, experiences, motivations, and behaviours across the full remit of military service, primarily retention but including deployment, with a view to developing recommendations for improvement. Their 271 individual participants included 24 family members and 19 employers, and the 143 focus group participants included 24 employers. They were limited in their access to more families due to the perceived compartmentalisation of military service by Reserve soldiers and the attendant ethical considerations.[253] Broadly they offer that reservists are keen to deploy, and thus that their motivation and Organisational Commitment[254] supports latent Fighting Power, but that family and employment concerns are critical issues especially when faced with the burden of 'short notice' deployments,[255] supporting the trend identified within the older literature. Further, though not linked to a particular theoretical approach, is the identification of demographic factors that may affect deployment intentions. FRRP and other research identifies that that Reserve forces still rely upon unpaid female labour to enable service, especially routine training, regardless of whether the service person was male or female.[256] This opens a potentially rich vein of enquiry into gender but also other demographics such as age and race which are otherwise sparsely considered as part of deployment intentions. These may pose 'tough questions' for the organisation.

FRRP identified several aspects of Reserve's motivation which align with academic operationalisations of morale offering a degree of applicability to the Army Reserve. In particular they highlight that public support, in the form of family and civilian employer orientation, collective efficacy through unit cohesion and not wishing to let others down and that the esteem and self-worth generated through valuable and defined missions are important in motivating soldiers.[257] One of the key findings of relevance for this study are that, "there is a mismatch between the expectations [held by soldiers, families and

[253] Woodward et al (2018a), p3.
[254] Woodward et al (2018b), p3. A Three Component Model developed by Meyer and Allen comprising Normative, Affective and Continuance Commitment.
[255] Catignani et al (2018), p2; Giga et al (2018a), p2.
[256] Woodward et al (2018a), p2; Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a), p3; Catignani and Basham (2020), p3.
[257] Catignani et al (2018), pp2-3; Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a), p2; Woodward et al (2018b), p1.

employers] and realities of service," which supports one of the premises that inspired this research.[258]

Reserves Continuous Attitudes Survey (ResCAS)

Since 2015, ResCAS has delivered an annual quantitative attitudinal survey to gauge employee satisfaction and guide policy development on the UK Reserve forces. The results are generated from around 5,700 responses, approximately 34% of all reservists, using a census approach; though it does exclude those who are currently deployed, already mobilised or who had not been paid, and therefore had not reported for duty, in the six months preceding the research. It collects sufficient demographic data to disaggregate single services, rank type (officer or soldier), age, length of service and personal circumstances. It rarely identifies dramatic changes year-on-year but aims to identify trends. Since its inception, positive trends have included the impact of Reserve service on civilian career, family support and personal development.[259] Some questions in the survey align with Organisational Commitment scales, such as those on organisational attachment and motivation to help the organisation achieve objectives and joining and retention motivations. It contains questions about mobilisation, deployment and increasing commitment, the perception of individual and familial support provided by the organisation, and the level of support that employers and families have for Reserve service. It also asks soldiers about the effect of Reserve service on their civilian employment, which is likely to affect their commitment and intentions toward the organisation. These data have some impact on the organisation, for instance being used to support a change in policy to enable Reserve soldiers to volunteer for worldwide non-operational tasks in response to a perceived lack of opportunity.

Ivey, Blanc and Mantler[260] used the Canadian 'Your Say Survey' to gather their data on the 'intangible' of morale, albeit by adding additional measures rather than interpreting that which was already collected giving them broad reach across the Canadian Armed Forces. In a similar vein, over eight months, two separate efforts were made to get access to the raw data collected as part of ResCAS that related to questions that had prima facie relevance to the Moral Component of Fighting Power or mobilisation, initially directly to Army department that administers the questionnaire and secondly as a Freedom of Information request. These were both rejected on the grounds that the participants had not consented to their data being used for other purposes including research, even when anonymised, and were

[258] Giga et al (2018b).
[259] MOD (2019).
[260] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014), p2.

considered Personal Data and therefore absolutely exempt from disclosure requirements. This meant that only publicly available processed data were available for this study. The effect of this on the study design is discussed in the Chapter 3 Purpose Statement.

Conclusion

This study seeks to qualitatively assess the Moral Component of latent Fighting Power in the Army Reserve. This underlying quality is that which exists within the force and will affect the potential utility of the organisation for operations that are yet to be conceived. Once an operation is identified and orders are given, that latent Power must be realised if it is to be effective. Linked to the intangibility of the Moral Component, the literature conflates notions of what UK doctrine calls the Moral Component. Studies often operationalise moral concepts differently but tend to generate similar findings regardless of the conceptual framework. For instance, they often agree that military motivation has an important and disproportionate effect on military success and failure. Notwithstanding the varying operationalisations within the research already discussed, 'morale' is often used as a synonym for various aspects of the Moral Component. This confusion means that clear operationalisation is required to establish the place of indicators and variables.

There is limited research on the UK Army Reserve's latent Fighting Power, and its indicators and variables despite the concept's centrality in military thinking, though it may be inferred by applying the framework to the literature retrospectively. This is unusual as it is a capstone of Army doctrine[261] (at the top of the hierarchy of military thinking) and examining the Army Reserve against this model may offer evidence as to its applicability to the Force. While a small aspect of morale, cohesion, has been recently addressed albeit in a non-doctrinal sense, aspects of leadership and ethics in the Army Reserve have been overlooked. Investigating the relevance of the military's key doctrine concept as it applies to the Army Reserve, an increasingly important part of the force, is worthwhile. Furthermore, studies which do consider moral factors often focus on purely military-psychological factors at the expense of those which also recognise soldiers as members of a wider society. These practical factors that have a motivational or psychological impact, like pay, may affect the soldiers' motivation, especially the commitment and relationships with family and civilian employers. Existing frameworks may need be adapted as they do not incorporate these iron triangle factors. Despite the sparse literature on the Army Reserve in this context, there is a

[261] Fighting Power appears in *Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01* (MOD (2014a)) and *Army Land Operations* (MOD (2017), described as 'Joint Capstone' and 'Army Capstone' Strategic and Operational doctrine in the *Army Doctrine Primer* (MOD (2011b), p5-3).

wider range of research on international forces which might offer options for how the literature for the UK Army Reserve might be expanded.

UK Reserve literature is primarily focussed on historical studies of Haldane and the First World War or modern force development including politics, culture, or structures. Even research aimed at the lower level focuses on two extremes, combat or recruitment and retention rather than readiness or military potential. The latter is in common with the political *zeitgeist*, recruitment, and retention of numbers, has taken precedence over quality and reliability because the number of troops employed and the bill for training new employees are significant factors in Defence costs, approximately one third of the budget,[262] at a time of financial squeeze. This focus leaves a gap in the research currently only filled with assumptions over whether reservists can and will 'turn up.' Most studies draw the conclusion that there is nothing fundamentally wrong with the people within the organisation that would prevent them from fulfilling the demands placed upon them, rather that practical, structural, and political issues may potentially prevent their full engagement. The most significant common theme throughout the literature is the effect of family and civilian workplace as crucial to the availability of reservists. Where support for and from these actors is deficient, motivation is found to be low, and Fighting Power could be undermined. Family and Employer considerations are two areas that this study will seek to explore.

Chapter 2 seeks to assess the British Army's model for the Moral Component of Fighting Power and provide conceptual definitions for the operationalised model.

[262] MOD (2018), p17; Sables (2020).

CHAPTER 2 – CONCEPT DEFINITION AND OPERATIONALISATION

The last chapter reviewed the literature on both the Army Reserve and the Moral Component of Fighting Power. This chapter provides an overview of the Research Questions, before outlining the conceptual definitions and observable implications, organised in a four-component model derived from the three-part Moral Component from Army doctrine noted in Figure 0.1. Defining the Moral Component of Fighting Power in a model is important to describe what could otherwise be considered military jargon and to develop clarity from a lack of academic consensus. Furthermore, from the Literature Review, the Moral Component in doctrine is not considered sufficiently complete or distinct to constitute an operationalisation without modification.

The key propositions, supported by the Literature Review, that underpin this study are that: the Army Reserve will have a Moral Component to its Fighting Power that will affect its ability to deploy on operations when called upon, and that there are myriad factors which might affect the Moral Component, which may not be the same as for the regular Army. Finally, the central puzzle for is study is whether there is a mismatch between organisational assumptions of Reserve Fighting Power and reality, which could have operational consequences for the UK. This study seeks to assess the state of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power and what factors may influence it.

Research Questions

The main Research Question is:

- **RQ:** 'What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?

Secondary Research questions that contribute to the Research Question are:

- **SQ1:** What is demanded of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?
- **SQ2:** What is the state of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?
- **SQ3:** How far does the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power align with the demands placed upon the organisation?
- **SQ4:** What Moral Component factors influence the ability of the Army Reserve to generate soldiers for operations?

Research questions that will be discussed subsequently are:

- **SQ5:** What conditions might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component of Fighting Power?
- **SQ6:** Is the Moral Component Model appropriate for application to the Army Reserve?

Conceptual Definition

Operationalisation is a process which formulates how a concept is defined and measured[263] and requires a constant set of conceptual definitions.[264] The specific observable implications of an ideal-typical 'positive' and 'negative' Moral Component in the context of Army Reserve Fighting Power will be examined to provide expectations for data collection and analysis.

The hierarchy of abstraction used here is: theory, concepts, indicators, variables, values.[265] Theories are abstract statements about how the world works and provide a degree of prediction and a guide to execution. Concepts contribute to that theory and remain abstract. Fighting Power is a concept which is taught during military training as a means of describing the conduct and effectiveness of Armed Forces. The Moral Component is a part of the Fighting Power concept. Indicators illustrate the existence of the concept and variables are the parts thereof which can be measured. Values are the unit of measure for the variable and are determined by the methods in use. Of note, individuals can be said to 'have' a quality of a given variable, but only a group or a force collectively can be said to have 'Fighting Power,' or a Moral Component thereof.

This section develops a baseline understanding for the Moral Component of Fighting Power and identifies what aspects of it can be assessed.

Concept – The Moral Component of Fighting Power in military doctrine

This study investigates how a strong Moral Component leads to latent Fighting Power. This Component is one of three that are interdependent and mutually supporting; the others being the Physical and the Conceptual. In looking at a part of latent Fighting Power, or potential capability, this study seeks to broaden academic work away from the thoroughly researched areas of morale and behaviour in battle, to motivation before conflict starts.

[263] Walliman (2018), p36.
[264] Punch (2013), p74.
[265] Walliman (2018), p74.

Combat behaviour is but one measure of a Component which must be manifested long before battle commences. It must be inherent within a force and cannot be deliberately surged at the point of need. One observable implication of the Moral Component of Fighting Power is the willingness of soldiers to deploy on operations in the future; that they are ready and available when required, contributing to the concept of 'readiness,' which includes mental as well as physical preparedness for operations.

While the Moral Component offers *prima facie* clarity to the issue from the point of view of the military practitioner, it is not suited to academic operationalisation without modification. This is perhaps not surprising given that it is designed for the military practitioner rather than the academic. While this section will start from the British Army's Moral Component framework, comprising the indicators of Morale, Leadership and Ethics, it will develop a model which attempts to solve the issues of definition and operationalisation; that Morale is incompletely described by the variables, that Leadership is indistinctly defined and given cross-cutting influence on other indicators and that the impact of Ethics is incompletely reflected in this context, and indistinct in that its influence is accounted for elsewhere. These issues are outlined in more detail below, followed by a description of the Moral Component Model, which aims to be broadly applicable to all armed forces including the Army Reserve.

The literature agrees that "when morale is high, good things happen."[266] The overall assumption of observable implications for this study is that where data suggest that where reservists indicate that they would mobilise for operations, then the Moral Component of Fighting Power is strong. However, as Fighting Power comprises three inter-related elements, a positive Moral Component cannot guarantee higher Fighting Power. Fighting Power can only be fully assessed through an appreciation of the Physical and Conceptual components which are beyond the remit of this study. Further, high unit morale or cohesion may not guarantee Fighting Power. For instance, a soldier may see the benefit of deploying primarily to the Army (distal), to which they feel little affinity, when they see their obligations actually falling to their colleagues within their unit or sub-unit (proximal) who may derive little benefit from their latent Fighting Power.[267] In that case, soldiers may elect to display their commitment in a way that they feels benefits their immediate colleagues rather than the Army.

[266] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p157.
[267] Edmunds et al (2016), p127.

The military motivation literature reviewed in Chapter 1 provides an insight into how the Moral Component of Fighting Power could be operationalised beyond doctrine to develop some clarity from the intangible in an area which is also often seen as having a disproportionate impact upon the outcome of military matters. The factors identified in doctrine are primarily intrinsic motivators,[268] they do not consider factors which are external to the soldier or the organisation, or which might practically affect latent Fighting Power. Of note, Britt and Dickinson's model of morale contains four indicators and thirteen variables which are antecedent to motivation and enthusiasm for accomplishing missions. For them, morale is a state of mind which has psychological and performance consequences,[269] analogous to the Moral Component used in this study. It provides a means of understanding operational and non-operational military activity or where the willingness to deploy, the realisation of Fighting Power is a focal outcome.[270] They developed this model of morale citing the inconsistency of single and multi-item measures to date and the potential implications for readiness for and the potential to perform on operations. Their mission-relevant, leadership, unit and individual antecedents of morale offer a means to clearly define what military doctrine describes and offer new concepts such as efficacy. Bury's research[271] into the Army Reserve is particularly useful in trying to understand the organisation. His topics focus on cohesion and readiness in logistic units during their organisational transformation since 2014, part-derived from work by Siebold, Gal (Israel) and Griffith (USA)[272]. While Bury isolates the concept of cohesion and links it to readiness, this study follows the perspective in British Army doctrine, shared by Manning,[273] which sees cohesion as a constituent of Morale rather than a separate concept. As such, his work provides a means to develop the operationalisation of some Moral Component variables further, with the benefit of supporting empirical data drawn from a sub-population of this study.

The rationale for change

The doctrine used as a start-point for operationalisation is from 2017. During the fieldwork in 2022, a revised framework was published by the Army.[274] This new doctrine is considered in Chapter 7 against the study's findings. This update was not seen as a fundamental issue for the thesis as the participants of the study would have only been familiar with the existing

[268] Ryan and Deci (2000).
[269] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p160.
[270] Ivey et al (2014), p8.
[271] Bury (2016/2017a/2017b/2018/2019).
[272] Bury (2016), pp226-230.
[273] Manning (1991).
[274] MOD (2022a), p 1-4 – 1-5.

2017 model, and as the study is about the population and policy during the FR20 and A2020 era, the 2022 update falls out of scope.[275]

As in Figure 0.1, the Moral Component of Fighting Power comprises three interrelated 'indicators' of Morale, Leadership and an Ethical foundation.[276] Of these, only Morale contains sub-elements which could be analogous to variables, were they to be directly operationalised; the other two are essentially 'single items' with indistinct definitions. Morale comprises a Fighting Spirit, Moral Cohesion, Discipline, Comradeship, Pride, Confidence in equipment and sustainment, and the Spiritual Foundation. Leadership is described as the "critical element of the moral component"[277] and is explained through three further elements of doctrine: The Army Leadership Framework[278], The Army Leadership Model[279] and the Army Leadership Code[280]. The ethical, moral and legal foundation is explained through the responsibilities that soldiers accept to place their right to "life and liberty"[281] behind that of their responsibilities to their country in a way that ordinary citizens do not, the Military Covenant. The practical guide to conduct is embodied by the Values[282] and Standards[283] of the Army. In the first instance, a reservist must recognise that on mobilisation, they will have accepted the 'unlimited liability' of service and that they must place their own "life and liberty" behind that of others.

Firstly, the Moral Component of Fighting Power in doctrine is not apt for operationalisation, with only Morale containing concepts which could be recognised as variables, therefore, to study the doctrine, it must be modified. Secondly, the particular context chosen for this thesis, the latent Fighting Power of an Army Reserve unit with regard to mobilising for operations, may not lend itself directly to the Army's model which is written with the most dangerous conditions of combat in mind; essentially the Fighting Power of units when 'fighting.' Thirdly, the doctrine fully recognises that the three elements described are mutually supporting and interrelated, undermining the face-value distinctness of the items.

[275] It also does not include more developed ideas on culture, that were included in doctrine in December 2023.
[276] MOD (2017), p3-1.
[277] MOD (2017). p3-10.
[278] The characteristics of 'What leaders are' (such as showing integrity and a positive example), ' What leaders know' (e.g. professional competence) and 'What leaders do' (how they lead to accomplish tasks).
[279] The role of leaders to achieve tasks, build teams and develop individuals.
[280] Detailing 7 behaviours: Lead by example, encourage thinking, apply reward and discipline, demand high performance, encourage confidence in the team, recognise individual strengths and weaknesses, and strive for team goals.
[281] MOD (2017), p3-12.
[282] Courage, Discipline, Respect for others, Integrity, Loyalty and Selfless commitment.
[283] Lawful behaviour, Appropriate behaviour and Total professionalism

These, and other operationalisation issues, can be seen across all three elements of the Moral Component as in doctrine. The literature pertaining to the elements of the Moral Component was reviewed in the first chapter.

Morale

Morale is among the most contested aspects of the Moral Component in the literature, except that it is recognised as important at all levels of military operations. The British Army's definition of Morale, as a "positive state of mind" and a will to fight and win and its variables of "fighting spirit, moral cohesion, discipline, comradeship, pride in self and unit, confidence in equipment and sustainment, and a firm spiritual foundation,"[284] are used initially as a framework but these variables are indistinctly defined and incomplete when broader literature is considered. Morale contains some 'variables' which are primarily individualistic (e.g. Pride) and others which are inherently linked to relationships with others (e.g. Comradeship) making the concept vague as an indicator without amendment. Furthermore, *Land Operations* doctrine poses a logical hierarchy problem.

> "Moral cohesion relies on leadership, perception of success, confidence and trust that forces will be supported and sustained."[285]

By including ideas of leadership and "confidence in equipment and sustainment"[286] within the definition of Moral Cohesion, that 'variable' within the indicator of 'Morale,' is itself dependent on another variable (confidence in equipment) and another indicator (leadership), demonstrating the need for clear operationalisation.

Leadership

Leadership does not have clearly defined factors in doctrine as morale does, therefore a measure of interpretation is required. As a hierarchical organisation, leadership is present at multiple levels simultaneously and is something that the Army presents as an organisational unique selling point. Leadership is seen as the catalyst for all military-motivation and performance outcomes, as outlined in the Literature Review.

Descriptions of the Moral Component in doctrine focus on proximal, personal (within-unit) rather than distal or impersonal (above unit and organisational) leadership[287] to engender leadership behaviours. This distinction is also made in academic work, as is the salience of

[284] MOD (2017), p1A-1.
[285] MOD (2017), p5-4.
[286] MOD (2017), p3-9.
[287] MOD (2017), p3-10.

leadership to performance which renders it all pervasive and thus not distinctly defined[288], but what leaders do, and what they are seen to do, has an impact on their subordinates. Some of this is encompassed elsewhere in the model, for instance, Britt and Dickinson suggest that leaders can have an important role in instilling a sense of efficacy.[289] A soldier merely recognising that a leader has the ability or requirement to 'instil high efficacy' has a minor impact unless that leader is effective in actually doing so, noting that other factors may influence soldiers' actual perception of efficacy.

Doctrine defines seven 'leadership behaviours,' to operationalise 'values-based leadership' into action, though accepting the notion of situational leadership, not all are relevant to latent Fighting Power. Beyond generic Army leadership doctrine and military training which develops those in positions of authority so that they can influence subordinates, there is no specific role codified for Army Reserve leaders to persuade their soldiers to mobilise. However, the extent to which leaders 'lead by example,' 'apply reward and discipline,' and 'demand high performance' could be expected to influence military motivation in this context, but it is not 'what leaders do' that is important here, but the effect they have on Fighting Power; whether they are successful, or at least positively contribute to, getting soldiers to mobilise.

Ethical Foundations

As with Leadership, this indicator of the Moral Component does not have clearly defined variables within doctrine meaning that it is not obvious how the constituent parts of this element of the doctrine, which are so subjective, could be observed. The Military Covenant may offer a more tangible means of examining this variable, as it concerns the relationship and the perception of relationships and mutual responsibilities between soldiers and society. The Ethical Foundation places an importance on 'doing the right thing' and 'doing things right.' In the context of military law this is usually expressed as *jus ad bellum* and *jus in bello* respectively. For latent Fighting Power, it is the former that may be relevant as it is accounted for before a deployment takes place, but it is not clear that it is well suited to the individual context, though it is possible that reservists might consider the justness of a cause, or at least the balance of moral costs, when considering whether to deploy. For instance, this could be a consideration of whether it is 'right' to mobilise and leave their family at home. More generally, the extent to which reservists believe that it is intrinsically right for them to be available for operations in different situations across the spectrum of

[288] Bartone and Kirkland (1991); p395; Britt and Dickinson (2005); Wong et al (2003).
[289] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p161.

conflict,[290] is linked to their perception of their unlimited liability (once mobilised) which may be informed by their Spiritual Foundation. Another issue with this element of the doctrine, operationally speaking, is distinction. For instance, resolving the conflict between 'discipline' (one of the Army's Values within the Ethical Foundation) and 'discipline' (found within Morale).

In the Army Reserve context

Edmunds *et al* caution that "established assumptions about regular personnel [in relation to]…deployment – cannot be carried over [to reserves] without modification."[291] There are both practical and conceptual reasons why reservists' Fighting Power may be different from that of regulars. In physical terms, they are simply less available as military personnel than full-time soldiers. Where, as Catignani and Connelly[292] suggest, that professional metrics lie with regular soldiers, reservists may not be able to meet the standard aspired to because they do not have the time available to dedicate to the profession due to civilian careers and social commitments separate from the military.[293] Being a regular soldier is necessarily an all-encompassing profession that influences all aspects of individual and family life and while the Army identifies ethos as a "binding" factor that is common across all of its soldiers, this does not take into account any 'distractions' that impinge upon a reservist's Army commitment[294] The challenge in simultaneously maintaining 'loyalty' (one of the Army's Values) to the Army Reserve, a civilian employer, family and friends, when they all demand significant attention, should not be underestimated. It is reasonable to assume that the Reserve's Fighting Power might be different and that it cannot necessarily meet the demands of commitment and deployment as readily or in the same way as the regular army. Furthermore, this form helps to define their perceived function and their identity; reservists may simply see themselves as different from regulars.[295] While a comparison between regular and reserve is not the aim of this study, the ways that a reservist's motivation may differ from a regular's can be embodied in the Model described below.

The Moral Component Model

There are definitional and contextual issues that mean that amendments are necessary to enable operationalisation. The Moral Component Model outlined in this section is designed to address the potential for alternative explanations, including practical considerations and

[290] For instance, diverse types of missions, in various places, at different levels of notice.
[291] Edmunds et al (2016), p126.
[292] Catignani and Connelly (2018a), pp1-2.
[293] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a).
[294] Keene (2015), p21, Connelly (2014), p71.
[295] Dandeker (2010), p269; Kellett (1990), p225, Janowitz (1960), p215; Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p597.

extrinsic factors, and to develop completeness and distinctiveness between indicators and variables. The intent is to create an operational model of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, which having been derived from doctrine, will be broadly applicable to all armed forces, and thus be suitable for the Army Reserve. Morale will be split into two indicators: Individual Morale and Team Spirit, reflecting the inclusion of individual and group variables within the original indicator. The indicator Leadership is more clearly defined than doctrine provides and is operationalised across four variables at personal, organisational and system levels. Elements of the Ethical Foundation, such as the 'Military Covenant' are adopted as part of Public Support, an External Support variable, along with Family Support and Employer Support; for instance, questions of the 'rightness' of leaving one's family for military activity. This proposed model of the Moral Component then comprises four indicators and sixteen variables, outlined in Table 2.1, subject to further refinement following empirical research conducted as part of the study.

Table 2.1 - The Moral Component Model

Moral Component			
Individual Morale	***Team Spirit***	**Leadership**	***External Support***
Fighting Spirit	Moral Cohesion	Personal Persuasion	Public Support
Self-Discipline	Comradeship	Personal Example	*Family Support*
Pride	*Group Efficacy*	Organisational Compulsion	*Employer Support*
Spiritual Foundation		*System Enabling*	
Individual Efficacy			
Occupational Benefits			

Plain text = Army doctrine 'indicator'/'variable' retained

Italic text = Additional indicator/variable

While some of these variables may be found to be necessary for Fighting Power, it is unlikely that any of them would be sufficient alone and must interact with other variables to effectively deliver Fighting Power. For instance, as noted above, higher Moral Cohesion may lead to a divergence from organisational goals. This is "the dark side of cohesion;"[296] where loyalty to a small unit outweighs that to the organisation, with negative consequences. Furthermore, pairs of variables may be 'optionally necessary,' that is that one or other is required rather than both. For example, Organisational Compulsion may be irrelevant if Self-

[296] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p171.

Discipline is sufficiently high. An appreciation of all variables will be important to situate the place of Moral Cohesion as a factor that supports or undermines Individual Morale.

Individual Morale

As the doctrine includes both individual and collective elements, the new model breaks these out into Individual Morale and Team Spirit for clarity. The existing variables that are directly retained are Fighting Spirit, Self-Discipline, Pride and Spiritual Foundation. Variables of Individual Efficacy and Occupational Benefits are added to develop completeness from factors identified in the literature. The original item of Confidence in Equipment and Training is included within variables of Individual and Group Efficacy (within the Team Spirit indicator) and within System Enabling. This is because the adoption of the idea as a variable as-is poses definitional and contextual issues. Firstly, the variable would be related to participants' attitudes towards two separate aspects of their service: their equipment and their training. It is possible that participants' attitudes toward these two aspects of service might be different, meaning that measuring this variable would be indistinct. Secondly, it is expected that perceptions of equipment and training would be highly contextual to a specific operational type (e.g. Warfighting or Peacekeeping), location or role (the tasks undertaken while deployed).

Outside of this operationalisation, it is assumed that a soldier's confidence in their equipment and training influences their belief in their chances of success. Variables that consider a soldier's belief in their potential success, as an individual or as part of a team, across a wide range of as yet unknown circumstances is important. The distinction between Individual and Group Efficacy is important because of the way reservists operate; while they might train as part of a Reserve unit, they might deploy on their own.

While Bury's study of Army Reserve morale and cohesion attempted to measure 'personal morale' directly, this was removed after Confirmatory Factor Analysis[297] because it did not fit the model. Though he does not offer an explanation, this may have been because individuals are not necessarily reliable measures of their own morale because it relies on each soldier's understanding of what is a contested concept. It may therefore be more effective to investigate variables which can be more easily understood, than to try to approach the issue directly. This is a similar approach to that taken by Connable *et al*[298]

[297] Bury (2016), p344.
[298] Connable et al (2018), p43.

who excluded morale from their model. This study also takes a lead from them, seeing Individual Morale as a "partial indicator," rather than a complete explanation.

Fighting Spirit

An individual factor comprising, "courage, resilience, determination and toughness."[299] This doctrinal definition is supported by other literature.[300] It has also been described as 'warriorism,'[301] 'militarism,'[302] 'courage/toughness' and a 'willingness to fight and die'[303] and as 'hardiness,' displayed by individuals who "enjoy the challenge of demanding situations."[304] These can be summarised as the willingness to persistently accept the privations of military life: traditionally, preparing for battle is central to military identity.[305] While these have an in-operation rather than a pre-operation focus, individuals who have a Fighting Spirit will display a willingness to deploy on operations before the situation actually arises,[306] hence contributing to the Moral Component of latent Fighting Power. Separately, in a study on the Norwegian Armed Forces, 'hardiness'[307] was also identified as a predictor of military prowess, though their use of the Short Hardiness Scale[308] conflates ideas of control, challenge and commitment which are dealt with separately here. In the case of Fighting Spirit, the potential for military service to offer soldiers a 'challenge' is likely to be most relevant.

A degree of Fighting Spirit should be presumed within all members of the Army Reserve for them to have joined the organisation in the first place but in all but general mobilisation scenarios, the policy of Intelligent Selection, means that Reserves must be willing to "volunteer twice;" to be willing to mobilise and deploy.

The observable implications of a Fighting Spirit are that soldiers would: deploy when demanded, not avoid deployment or would actively seek deployment. Additionally, it may be observed that a perceived absence of opportunity may be seen as an implication of higher Fighting Spirit, as the individual feels that their 'needs' cannot be met by the organisation. The observable implications of lower Fighting Spirit may include that an absence of

[299] MOD (2017), p3-8.
[300] Britt and Dickinson (2005); Manning (1991).
[301] Johansen, Laberg, Martinussen, (2013), p863.
[302] Wilson (2008), p40.
[303] Van Creveld (1982), p170.
[304] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p172.
[305] Burk (2008), Kurth (2010), p328.
[306] Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014), p3; Edmunds et al (2016), p126; Woodward et al (2018b); Catignani et al (2018).
[307] Johansen, Laberg, Martinussen, (2014), p528.
[308] Bartone (1995).

opportunity is not concerning, or that the requirement to deploy is a contributing factor in dissatisfaction with service.

Self-Discipline

Doctrine outlines both imposed and self-discipline, the latter of which is seen as more powerful and has been linked to military effectiveness and readiness.[309] In order to distinctly define the variables, Morale/Discipline will refer to self-discipline, that which is intrinsic to the individual. This more closely aligns it with other variables within the Morale indicator which are also primarily intrinsic, rather than Leadership which is focussed on the perceptions of another actor. Self-Discipline is the ability to exercise self-control and self-motivation without external input. In the context of latent Fighting Power, this may be measured in the extent to which individuals are prepared to mobilise because it is something to which they have already committed. This makes it an expression of personal duty or obligation and may be seen as something which is matter-of-course or beyond question. The literature indicates that discipline in the Army Reserve and its antecedents is different from that of military stereotype, and that self-imposed discipline has long been important for it as a voluntary organisation.[310] While discipline could be measured from official records, this would only serve to indicate instances of 'imposed discipline' for which remedial action had been taken rather than 'Self-Discipline' where there would be no need for the organisation to record a censure. Furthermore, within Reserve units, the application of discipline is often inconsistent due to the reliance on self-discipline. Furthermore, there may be no history of discipline relating to the referent concept of Fighting Power. The sense of fulfilling duty is important in the context of Army Reserve because in most circumstances there are few levers that the organisation must encourage or enforce effective performance.

The observable implication of higher Self-Discipline would be high levels support among soldiers for deployment as an expectation, duty or responsibility that must be fulfilled. It may also be indicated by a high degree of correlation between soldier and organisational understanding of expected behaviour. The observable implications of lower Self-Discipline are that soldiers do not feel that they have an obligation to deploy on operations. It may also be indicated by a weak correlation between soldier and organisational understanding of expected behaviour. This is not mutually exclusive, and soldiers may have multiple reasons for mobilisation behaviour, alongside the normative consideration of Self-Discipline.

[309] Van Creveld (2017), Burk (2008); p69; Shamir et al (2000), p115.
[310] Walker (1990), p71; Bury (2016), pp286-289.

Pride

Is the sense of affect generated from an organisational association or behaviour. It is an emotion which derives from an individual's sense of worth or purpose in conducting a particular activity.[311]

Pride is addressed in the literature as the extent to which soldiers feel their work is 'meaningful' or 'significant.'[312] Britt and Dickinson identify several antecedents in their morale model which can be identified with pride. Both the mission-relevant factor of "clear purpose" and the leadership factor of "ability to clarify objectives" hinge around the extent to which soldiers believe their task to be worthwhile. They highlight that where a mission is lacking a purpose, morale tends to be lower, even when success is objectively not hard to achieve.[313] Where there is ambiguity about the purpose of a military organisation or a mission, it can be seen to undermine performance. Bury and others[314] found that the opportunity "to do [the] job on operations"[315] was a factor in a reservists' acceptance of mobilisation.

Inherent within Pride is also a sense of identification with one's behaviour. While reservists are often characterised as 'volunteers,' Catignani and Basham suggest that Army Reserve service is much more like "serious leisure": more self-serving than altruistic given that it is often to the detriment of domestic responsibilities.[316] While Moral Cohesion is, in part, generated by social identity, military Pride requires a 'personal identity' which supports the activity and will have implications for military performance and perceived readiness.[317] Griffith notes that where US Reserves were found to 'distance' themselves from the military due to boring tasks or a perceived lack of respect, feelings which would undermine Pride, their performance also suffered.[318] Britt and Dickinson also identify that those who identify more strongly as soldiers are more likely to have higher morale and show higher levels of performance.[319] While these military identities may be diverse, that they are military in character is important for Pride in the ability to identify with the task and the organisation. Individual identity is not included within doctrine, though group identity is, but is supported in the wider literature. This may reflect a degree of 'regular bias' that does not account for

[311] Van Creveld (2017), p61; Borton (2002), p47.
[312] Bartone (1995); Ivey et al (2014), p3; Borton (2002); Strachan (2006).
[313] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p166, p170.
[314] RFCA (2019), p10, 23; Woodward et al (2018b); Dandeker et al (2010), p274.
[315] Bury (2017a), p623.
[316] Catignani and Basham (2020)
[317] Griffith (2011); Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2014)
[318] Griffith (2009), p43.
[319] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p177.

Reserve soldiers who have frames of reference outside the military.[320] Pride is distinct from the Spiritual Foundation discussed below, where actions or organisational membership are instrumental as serving a set of higher ideals, such as service to their country.

The observable implications of higher Pride will be the expression of feelings of high pride, attachment, or self-worth by soldiers for their actions in uniform or their membership in the organisation, either at face value or through secondary actions such as recommending the Armed Forces to others or talking openly about their service. They will also be clear about their purpose and their tasks and be motivated towards achieving them and will also have a sense of personal military identity. The observable implications of lower Pride are personal expressions of low pride, low attachment or a lack of self-worth placed in their activity or membership, or the extent to which soldiers kept their service a secret or would not recommend it to others. Ambiguity of purpose and a lack of motivation to achieve organisational goals can also be seen as an indicator of low pride as can a lack of personal military identity. It is not expected that 'pride' and 'shame,' with its moral and normative connotations, are opposite ends of the spectrum in this case, but that 'high pride' is opposed by 'low pride.'

Spiritual Foundation

An individual attitude which relates to a "belief in a cause"[321] and relates to the sense that one's actions are instrumental towards a higher cause,[322] like national interest, as Bury found to be a factor in Reserve mobilisation.[323] A lack of belief in purpose or organisation can undermine morale and lead soldiers to 'fall back' on other sources of motivation such as camaraderie.[324] A Spiritual Foundation is the antithesis of "military boredom"[325] and Griffith highlights that this is particularly important for Reserves, perhaps in the form of an ideology, because they spend less 'real time; with the military community.[326]

By implication there is a degree of moral judgement within this variable and what comprises the Spiritual Foundation may not be shared among all soldiers, for instance, some may subscribe to more political foundations as described by Griffith's US Reserve 'Conservative Ideologue.'[327] While Britt and Dickinson do not directly address moral issues in their model,

[320] Woodward et al (2018b); Edmunds et al (2016), p127; Dandeker et al (2011), p353
[321] MOD (2017), p3-9.
[322] Kennedy and Holmes (1995) p52; Borton (2002), p37; Manning (1991), p461; Labuc (1991), p484.
[323] Bury (2017a), p623.
[324] Sherman (2013), pp139-140.
[325] Mæland and Brunstad (2009), p1.
[326] Griffith (2009), p45.
[327] Griffith, (2011), p623.

their emphasis on positive psychology implies that soldiers should not fundamentally disagree with the activity they are undertaking and they should not perceive their own actions as "illegitimate"[328] even if they have a 'clear purpose,' as outlined as part of Pride.

> "No soldier has ever been prepared to risk his life for a cause he knew, or felt, to be unjust."[329]

Any perceived illegitimacy could stem from the very notion of the UK Armed Forces being involved in a certain operation, though as discussed below, this risks conflating a state-level concept of *jus ad bellum* with individuals. In context, this is more likely to manifest in the perception that *their* involvement as a reservist is justified, informed by their Spiritual Foundation. This allows for individual interpretations which may vary between personal and operational circumstances. A Spiritual Foundation and a belief in justness is not directly required by policy and strategy but may be influenced by a specific operation as it is presented. In a Homeland Defence scenario, justifying the involvement of the Reserve may be straightforward as their service is in direct support of their home, while 'wars of choice' may be harder to justify and therefore organisation must try harder to engage the Spiritual Foundation.

The observable implications of a stronger Spiritual Foundation will be a higher degree to which soldiers view deployment as an activity instrumental in the pursuit of a higher cause and that their participation is justified, and this will be reflected in their faith in the organisation. The observable implications of a lower Spiritual Foundation will be a lower degree of associating activity with the pursuit of a higher cause and that their participation is not justified and low faith in the organisation.

Individual Efficacy

The literature also indicates that perceived Individual Efficacy is also important in military motivation and performance but is not included directly in the Army's Moral Component concept.[330] Van Creveld highlights that this is critical in military motivation: if one's own actions do not make a difference, then why act, especially if it costs your life?[331] He describes this as "self-confidence" in 'building forces'[332] The Short Hardiness Scale includes measures of a soldiers' perception of being able to exert 'control,'[333] Ivey *et al* measured

[328] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p166.
[329] Van Creveld (2017), p167.
[330] Millett and Murray (2010).
[331] Van Creveld (1982), p170.
[332] Van Creveld (2017), p61.
[333] Bartone (1995).

'job-specific self-efficacy' within the Canadian Armed Forces as a proxy for 'competence need'[334] and Britt and Dickinson offer several factors that have links to Individual Efficacy. The belief in 'achievable objectives' and the delivery of 'incremental success' will increase optimism and confidence in success and they also suggests that leaders have a key role in instilling 'high self-efficacy' and 'emphasising positive outcomes' and that all four contribute to increasing morale.[335] Further, Bury's research into the Army Reserve created the construct of 'personal confidence' comprising five measures of which two were "confidence doing job on operations [and]…confidence in own professional skills and abilities."[336] This construct had the "strongest and most significant association" with cohesion, a concept which overlaps significantly in definition with aspects of Morale as defined here. In a later study he identified that 87 percent of Reserves felt 'high' or 'very high' confidence in their ability to perform to the required standard on operations given the necessary training and linked this to higher morale and readiness.[337]

Contributing to this is Confidence in Equipment and Training,[338] a factor that appears in the doctrinal definition of Fighting Power. For latent Fighting Power, a soldier does not know where they will be sent or what they will be asked to do, therefore cannot fully understand what training or equipment will be needed. As a result, this idea is better understood more generally as being 'ready for anything' and 'confidence in success.' This is an example of where the Physical Component interacts with the Moral Component to influence Fighting Power. As a variable of Morale within latent Fighting Power, this describes the extent to which soldiers have confidence in the steps taken toward their preparation for operations, including the equipment they have, and thus influences their perception of the impact they might make. Direct questioning may be effective as negative perceptions of equipment or sustainment may be seen as pejorative on the organisation rather than the individual. While this does rely on the perception of reservists to recognise what equipment and training is appropriate as opposed to merely desirable or prestigious, it would not be unreasonable for reservists to compare their equipment with that of regulars given that they can, in theory, deploy on operations for the same tasks. As Morale is a psychological concept, it is perception that is more important than objective reality. This was identified as an issue by Dandeker *et al* and Bury,[339] the latter's qualitative research suggesting that the perception of equipment, especially role specific vehicles, had a real effect on morale and readiness and

[334] Ivey et al (2014), p3.
[335] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p167, 180.
[336] Bury (2016), p240, 342.
[337] Bury (2018), p420.
[338] MOD (2017), p3-9.
[339] Dandeker et al (2010), p275, Bury (2016), p196, 248.

therefore self-perceptions of potential effectiveness. The factor of 'confidence in personal kit/weapon' was removed from following Confirmatory Factor Analysis,[340] potentially due to issues with individual variations in understanding what was sufficient for their task. If reservists are employed "for any task that a regular may be used for," they must believe that they can make a difference and feel Individual Efficacy. Without this belief, then their motivation to perform well is likely to be lower. Policy and strategy require Reserves to believe they can contribute valuably and on time, potentially at short notice.

The observable implication of high perceived individual efficacy will be the expression of attitudes that indicate that soldiers feel that by participating in operations they will make an impact and that their actions make a difference. They will be confident in their individual equipment and training which will enable them to have a positive effect. The observable implication of low perceived individual efficacy will be the expression of attitudes that suggest that soldiers feel that their participation in operations will make limited or no impact. Contributing to this, they may also lack confidence in their personal equipment and training and feel that they are individually unprepared to contribute to operations. The perceptions of efficacy may vary by type of referent operation.

Occupational Benefits

The extent to which the material rewards available for deploying are perceived to be sufficient to outweigh the costs of deploying are not included in doctrine, which focuses primarily on intrinsic motivation, but may still affect the Moral Component of Fighting Power. While research suggests that reservists are not motivated by pay or other benefits,[341] it may still provide some source of motivation, either for the boon derived from the benefit itself or instrumentally as indications of the worth the organisation places in the deployed soldier. This may be particularly relevant considering any increasing 'occupationalisation' of the Army Reserve.[342] Indeed, Bury's study of recruitment and mobilisation motivation (based on Moskos' Institutional-Occupational model) indicated that those who joined for occupational reasons were more likely to mobilise for financial reasons.[343] Tangible benefits may also act as a hygiene factor[344] in the Reserve's Moral Component. The Occupational Benefits, financial or skills accrual, of mobilisation or deployment are not emphasised as being better than remaining in service and not deploying. The benefits of deploying are in most cases

[340] Bury (2016), p344.
[341] Giga (2018b), p2; Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b); Catignani et al (2018); Keene (2015), p28.
[342] Edmunds et al (2016), p127.
[343] Bury (2017a), p623.
[344] Where the factor does not provide a specific positive benefit but is detrimental when not present.

only internally relevant within the Army and the organisation is more likely to rely on the cognitive or intangible benefits of service to encourage positive behaviour.

The observable implications of higher perceived Occupational Benefit are the extent to which Reserves recognise and value the material benefits of deploying on operations, such as pay, training and experience or to further their civilian or Army career. The observable implications of lower perceived Occupational Benefits which may lead to lower Morale are the extent to which soldiers do not recognise or value the material benefits of deploying on operations. Reservists may not value the Occupational Benefits offered highly but it does not follow that this will lead to lower morale: they may not be salient.

Team Spirit

Both Dandeker *et al* and Edmunds observe that reservists face many challenges on mobilisation, including those associated with joining a pre-existing team[345] as a new individual without established networks,[346] therefore the way that soldiers, regular and Reserve, interact with others is likely to be important. Furthermore, armies in general are inherently built around 'teams,' therefore it follows that groups, as separate from individuals, should have an influence on the Moral Component of Fighting Power. Team Spirit is a new indicator which adopts the collective variables from the Army's idea of morale: Moral Cohesion and Comradeship, which rely on a soldier's perception of their relationship with others. It also includes an additional variable in Group Efficacy, reflecting the importance of soldiers believing that their team can make an impact by volunteering their time. By separating Individual Morale and Team Spirit, the indicators are made more distinct by splitting variables which are individually based and those which relate to relationships with others.

Moral Cohesion

First identified by DuPicq[347] as comprising the effect of knowledge and trust in colleagues and leaders, it reflected the increased lethality of weapons that rendered physical cohesion on the battlefield impossible. Mileham describes it as "corporate will-power."[348] It is a sense of shared identity and collective spirit that engenders confidence in colleagues. It is about the trust-bond of the proximal group as a team.[349] It is a sense of 'oneness' about a group as an idea. Shamir *et al* found this sense of mutual "identification" to be the strongest

[345] Dandeker et al (2010), p274.
[346] Edmunds (2018), p129.
[347] Du Picq (1921), Ch6.
[348] Mileham (2020), p27.
[349] Britt and Dickinson (2005); Bartone and Kirkland (1991), p397; Shamir et al (2000), p106; van Creveld 2017), p61; Burk (2008).

predictor of perceived combat readiness in their study of Israeli soldiers.[350] Unlike Comradeship, it does not necessarily require soldiers to be personally known to each other. Cohesion is anchored in the symbols and customs of the organisation such as hierarchy, and shared experience and values, even when collected separately. Moral Cohesion, or the trust bond with the proximal team, would be important if the strategic aspiration to deploy reservists integrated within regular units as formed cohorts outlined in A2020 becomes more widespread.

Cohesion has been examined separately in research on UK Reserves through Instrumental Horizontal Bonding or "teamwork."[351] Bury also uses Siebold's Sub-Unit Cohesion Index, including measurement of shared values, mutual trust between comrades, individual efficacy, and organisational justice. This definition places cohesion as a variable where the perspective of the participant as a third-party observing the relationship between two other individuals is as important as their perspective as a first or second party involved in the relationship. They found that units with higher cohesion showed higher levels of 'readiness and morale' with a both strong and significant correlation,[352] also supported by Ivey *et al's* study of Canadian Forces in a pre-operational setting, derived from Self-Determination Theory.[353]

Moral Cohesion also includes the bonds that reservists feel between themselves and regular soldiers that they might work with; people who are familiar to them in their shared experience as soldiers but also potentially strangers, not personally known to them. This could be in the form of the perceived trust that regulars have in them as reservists when operating as part of a complete force, important for latent Fighting Power, though Bury's research suggests that perceptions of cohesion, readiness and morale were separate from reservists' actual experiences with regular soldiers.[354] ResCAS also collects data on reservists' perceptions of their relationship with regular soldiers. Further, Moral Cohesion is separate from efficacy, discussed later, because it is conceivable that comrades may be strongly bonded together and trust each other despite having little belief in their chances of making an impact on a given situation.

Higher Moral Cohesion can be expected to lead to higher Morale, the observable implications of which include higher levels of shared identity or 'corporate-ness', as soldiers.

[350] Shamir et al (2000), p114.
[351] Bury (2016) p227.
[352] Bury (2016), p240.
[353] Ivey et al (2014), p8.
[354] Bury (2016), pp286-289.

It may also be indicated by higher levels of trust in peers and the hierarchy, as well as higher trust perceived between others in the wider unit and organisation. It may also be seen through shared perceptions of the "group prototype"[355] of what is expected. Lower Moral Cohesion would be indicated by lower levels of trust in peers and the organisation, and lower levels of perceived corporate identity with the Army Reserve or their unit. It may also be seen through a lack of shared understanding of expectations placed upon them. This variable reflects the 'moral cohesion' noted in the analysis in Chapter 1.

Comradeship

This is distinct from Moral Cohesion, though it also has its foundations in shared experience. It is a sense of family between members of a unit and reflects a sense of affect between individuals within an organisation rather than trust or efficacy and is close to 'Peer Bonding' within Standard Model Cohesion. While van Creveld offers that it is less personal than 'friendship,'[356] this is probably by virtue of the lack of individual, personal choice of one's comrades; illustrated by King's example of 'comrades' who would risk their lives for fellow soldiers they did not necessarily like, though Bury, and Catignani and Connelly separately suggest that personal 'liking' is much more important in Army Reserve units.[357] Historically, since the days of the Militia and Yeomanry, the bonds within the Army Reserve's antecedents have been socially based[358] where soldiers turn out for each other based on affective fellowship and service, where people felt a sense of duty to volunteer and serve their communities[359] or country,[360] and these ideas have significant cultural inertia; but that the demands of strategy and warfare are changing to require a greater sense of professionalism. In his research on logistic soldiers in the Army Reserve, Bury identified that while social cohesion was still important to Army Reserve units, there was a slowly increasing value in professional cohesion,[361] of performing for the satisfaction of meeting a high standard rather than fulfilling affective bonds. However, while FR20 and A2020 may propose a regular-centric view of professionalism, Bury notes that this demand may never be totally met within the Army Reserve, "given this distinct nature of reserve service and discipline." This suggests that the social aspect of the Army Reserve is stronger than in

[355] Griffith (2009), p43.
[356] Van Creveld (2017), p61.
[357] King (2013); Bury (2016), pp269-270; Bury (2017b), pp5-6; Catignani et al (2018).
[358] Walker (1990), p102, 105; Cunningham (1975), p104, 108; Beckett (1982), p108, Wilson and Collinson (1982), p7, Bonner (2008), p222, French (2005), p210.
[359] Spiers (2003), p189; Clammer (2011), Cookson (1993), p162, Beckett (1982), p22, Berry (1903), p166, Wilkinson (1921), p51.
[360] Beckett (1982), p107, 259, Bonner (2008), p223, 227; Wilson and Collinson (1982), p3.
[361] Bury (2017a), p19.

regular forces who may be moving toward more 'professional' comradeship.[362] It requires people to be personally known to each other, which can only be developed over time as part of a single unit or team. Where soldiers are individuals or small groups embedded in a new team or regular unit, comradeship will take time to develop.

The observable implications of higher Comradeship are higher levels of interpersonal commitment between soldiers. This may be expressed through the desire to deploy or remain within an organisation to maintain personal relationships. Other observable implications of high levels of Comradeship would be through expressions of 'friendship' or 'family' used when reservists describe their relationships within the organisation, as also identified by Bury. The observable implication of lower Comradeship would be in lower interpersonal commitment between soldiers. There would be less expression of friendly or familial relations and the commitment between individuals may be judged to be low. This variable reflects the idea of social cohesion discussed in Chapter 1.

Group Efficacy

In the same manner as Individual Efficacy, the literature also supports perceived Group Efficacy as a variable in military motivation. Britt and Dickinson and Shamir *et al* support a place for 'collective efficacy'[363] and Bury offers the concept of Sub-Unit Readiness, or 'potential to have an impact,' applied to the Army Reserve.[364] This variable also includes elements of the doctrinal factor of Confidence in Equipment and Training[365], in this case perceptions of the group's collective training and preparedness for operations and how that will affect their ability to make a positive impact on operations. Where reservists are deployed as a formed unit, their perceptions and expectations will be important in shaping their performance. They must believe that they can contribute valuably, and on time, and much of A2020 has been focussed around improving equipment, training, and integrating with regulars.

The observable implications of high group efficacy are that soldiers indicate that their unit could make an impact on operations. They will show high levels of confidence in the equipment and training that the group have received such that they are well prepared to make an impact on operations. The observable implication of low individual efficacy will be

[362] Bury (2017a); Burk (2008); Catignani and Connelly (2018a); Johansen, Laberg and Martinussen (2013); Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Ari (2008), p597; Keene (2015), p20; Kellett (1990), p225, Janowitz (1960), p215; Dandeker et al (2010), p269.
[363] Britt and Dickinson (2005), p170.
[364] Bury (2016), p243, 342; Bury (2018), p420.
[365] MOD (2017), p3-9.

the expression of attitudes that suggest that soldiers feel that their unit would make limited or no impact. They may have low levels of confidence in the equipment and training that the group has received and may feel that the team is unprepared for operations. The perceptions of efficacy may vary by the type of proposed operation. This variable reflects task cohesion, or at least the prospects for success on a task as a group, discussed in Chapter 1.

Leadership

Noting the issues of definition within the doctrine, the variables of this indicator are Personal Persuasion and Example, Organisational Compulsion and System Enabling, developed from the literature discussed below to better incorporate, completely and distinctly, the ways that leadership might influence the Moral Component of Fighting Power during Reserve mobilisation. This Model attempts to incorporate the different levels from which leadership affects soldiers' Fighting Power, at the personal level and the 'impersonal' organisational level.

Bartone and Kirkland offer five critical characteristics whose manifestation varies by the maturity of the unit:[366] competence, caring, respect, commitment and means of feedback. Again, it is the effect that these have on soldiers that is relevant rather than their practice. Leadership also forms part of Standard Model Cohesion used by Bury in his study of the Army Reserve[367] in Vertical Bonding through "leader caring" and "leader competence." In common, these all reflect face-to-face or personal leadership rather than including the organisational context in which leaders and subordinates operate. Furthermore, issues of affect and 'leader competence' are unlikely to be distinct from Group Efficacy and Comradeship.

Other conceptions of leadership's influence on soldiers are simpler, for instance Slim's: "example, persuasion and compulsion"[368] or Perceived Supervisor Support (PSS) which has been linked to higher levels of soldier motivation.[369] Slim's model offers parsimony, ease of understanding and applicability in the specific content of latent Fighting Power for an hypothetical operation rather than general service or for a specific deployment. Field Marshal Slim's model is quoted within the *Army Leadership Doctrine*[370], which cites these activities as parts of a leaders' abilities: to persuade, to inspire through example and to

[366] Bartone and Kirkland (1991), p397.
[367] Bury (2016), p227.
[368] Slim (1957).
[369] Gillet et al (2017).
[370] MOD (2021), p1-1.

compel. The first two of these account for personal leadership and cover the effect of leaders in inspiring their soldiers to deploy on operations and demonstrating that they are willing to do the same themselves. Where leaders fail to inspire or set the example, lower performance could be expected. The element of compulsion allows for organisational context to be accounted for, because the ability to compel subordinates is granted by the organisation as a responsibility of rank that does not exist outside the organisation. Missing from Slim's model is a recognition of systematic support for deployment, suggested by Wong et al. This impersonal element of leadership would reflect the perception of the processes through which reservists come to be deployed. The perception and expectations of leadership are likely to be subjective, based on an individual's own place within the hierarchy.

Personal Persuasion

Is the extent to which leaders are successful in their deliberate attempts to ensure their subordinates contribute to the organisation in the desired way. Distinct from example, which is the indirect influence of a leader's relationship with the organisation as a servant, persuasion is their behaviour as an agent of the organisation. The relevant tenets of persuasion within Army Doctrine in the context of latent Fighting Power are: "applying reward" (in that leaders acknowledge the contribution of those who are ready for deployment),[371] "demand high performance" (that leaders set an expectation that their subordinates should be available for deployment), "recognise individual strengths and weaknesses" (that leaders understand which of their subordinates is available in what circumstances and why).[372] There is also an aspect of inspiration[373] or "exhortation"[374] which may address this variable; the impact of a leader on improving or undermining effectiveness, as identified by Bury within the logistic element of the Army Reserve.[375]

The observable implications of higher Personal Persuasion will be evidence of perceptions that leaders are effective in promoting behaviour which supports deployment on operations. The observable implications of lower Personal Persuasion will be evidence of and perceptions that leaders are not effective in promoting behaviour which encourages deployment on operations or that they promote behaviour which encourages non-deployment.

[371] Also supported by Van Creveld (1982), p105; Van Creveld (2017), p67.
[372] MOD (2017), p3-11; Britt and Dickinson (2005).
[373] Shamir et al (2016), p111.
[374] Van Creveld (2017), p67.
[375] Bury (2016), p188.

Personal Example

Is the perception of the extent to which leaders fulfil their own obligations toward the organisation by deploying on operations which then affects the behaviour of others. Those leaders who fulfil their own obligations demonstrate the required behaviour to others and develop an obligation for their subordinates to fulfil their own obligations. Army Doctrine and other research also recognise the importance of example setting in morale.[376]

In the context of latent Fighting Power, the extent to which subordinates perceive that their leaders are ready and available to deploy on operations will be important and will set the example for their own Fighting Power. Leaders who do not set the example by their own behaviour in preparing for and being available for deployments have no cause to expect their subordinates to do the same and thereby may have a negative impact upon Fighting Power.[377] Of note, what is important is the perception of leader willingness and preparedness rather than their actual deployment.

The observable implications of higher Personal Example will be expressed perceptions of proximal leaders that they are seen as ready and willing to deploy on operations under the same conditions or parameters as their subordinates. The observable implications of lower Personal Example will be perceptions that proximal leaders are not seen as ready and willing to deploy on operations under the same conditions or parameters as their subordinates. They may be seen as expecting different standards from others than themselves.

Organisational Compulsion

The tools of compulsion that can be exercised by a military leader are linked to organisational authority. While Van Creveld[378] suggests that these are part of an individual leader's characteristics, without the legal framework supporting their mandate to command as part of the military hierarchy, there would be no real sense of compulsion within a democratic volunteer force. Unit and Army "rules and norms" are included as part of the Standard Model Cohesion in Bury's study of the Army Reserve,[379] the adherence to which is analogous to discipline. On the receiving side of these, a soldier's discipline is, in part, their tendency to respect that authority and direction. To resolve this conflict in definition, 'compulsion' is distinct from Self-Discipline and will reflect the influence of extrinsic discipline

[376] Britt and Dickinson (2005) p169; Bury (2016); Bartone and Kirkland (1991), p397; Van Creveld (1982).
[377] Captain F in Tweedie (2003).
[378] Van Creveld (2017), p67.
[379] Bury (2016), p227.

on a soldier and the perceived efficacy of rules and regulations designed to control behaviour, in this case regarding reporting for duty. The concept of 'Intelligent Selection' means that compulsion is not routinely relied upon as a means of generating UK Reserve forces, though was "successful" for Iraq in 2003.[380]

The observable implications of higher Organisational Compulsion will be that soldiers would report for duty or mobilise out of a sense of contractual or legal obligation or that they do so to avoid disciplinary action. Until a particular operation is conceived of, there are no 'instructions' to follow or disregard that relate specifically to the activity therefore official statistics would not necessarily be of use. Self-reporting to direct questions may be unreliable when applied to a hypothetical situation and individuals may be unwilling to answer in a fashion that appears negative. Indirect questioning that explores perceptions of compulsion are likely to be more effective. The observable implications of lower Organisational Compulsion will be that soldiers do not report for duty or mobilised out of sense of contractual or legal obligation or that the possibility of disciplinary action is not a strongly compelling factor.

When interpreting data for this variable, it must be recognised that Self-Discipline may be sufficient to ensure that soldiers meet their obligations without identifying Compulsion as a factor, or that both Compulsion and Self-Discipline are factors. These variables may be mutually supporting or individually sufficient and may lead to the identification of different profiles or 'types' of Moral Component that exist within the Army Reserve. These possibilities were identified by Bury[381] as part of his work applying Moskos' Institutional-Occupational thesis to the Army Reserve, suggesting that soldiers who deployed for institutional reasons may be more reliable than those who deployed for occupational reasons or who felt compelled to do so. Lower Organisational Compulsion may therefore not significantly undermine the Moral Component of Fighting Power where other variables provide the support required, rather it is one potential lever for delivering the required Fighting Power.

System Enabling

Reflects systemic factors that make deploying or mobilising seem 'easy' or 'difficult.' Van Creveld highlights the importance of a soldiers' faith in their system;[382] the extent to which reporting for duty is seen to be an activity which is 'worth the trouble' will affect Fighting

[380] Connelly (2021).
[381] Bury (2017a), p623.
[382] Van Creveld (1982).

Power. System Enabling exists at the higher levels of the organisation but the impact of perceptions of it can be seen among individuals. Defence would likely wish that reservists see mobilisation as an 'easy' or 'frictionless' process.

A2020 and subsequent developments have sought to develop a sense of ordinariness in using the Army Reserve and that they are enabled and supported in their service. Where processes or bureaucracy make the prospect of deployment daunting or that requirements are unjustified, reservists may be less inclined to pursue that behaviour. Previous experience may also affect a soldier's perception of prospective deployments.[383]

This variable also includes aspects of the doctrinal factor of Confidence in Equipment and Training[384]. As explained above, for latent Fighting Power a specific situation cannot be known, therefore it is better understood as 'have I been given the best support possible by the organisation?' or 'has it does its duty to me?'. Perceived high levels of confidence could be seen as a measure of tacit Perceived Organisational Support, often applied to civilian organisations,[385] because it reflects a tangible investment in the organisation and its people by the system. Where equipment and training are seen to be insufficient, this may be perceived as the system failing to enable their activity.

The observable implications of higher System Enabling will be evidence of reservists feeling that mobilising for duty is 'easy' or straightforward. The system will support the end-state of generating soldiers for operations. They may express positive opinions of previous experiences and that they perceive that mobilisation is a routine activity. Soldiers will perceive that the system provides sufficient resources for them to do their job.

The observable implications of lower System Enabling will be evidence of Reserves feeling that mobilising or reporting for duty is difficult or bureaucratic and that the process is not worth the effort. They may express negative previous experiences or perceive that their service is seen as unusual. Soldiers will perceive that the system does not provide sufficient resources to support them.

External Support

Throughout the literature, it is recognised that Reserve soldiers do not exist in isolation. The relationship between the Army and a Reserve soldier is much more complex than that of a

[383] Dandeker (2011), p273, Bury (2016), p161, Edmunds et al (2016), p130; Woodward et al (2018b); Catignani and Basham (2018).
[384] MOD (2017), p3-9.
[385] Linde (2015).

regular soldier in their interaction with the 'Iron Triangle' of Army, Employer and Family. The existing conception of the Moral Component of Fighting Power is quite military-introspective, at the expense of potentially important external factors, particularly relevant for reservists. This indicator comprises Public Support, Family Support and Employer Support to try to encompass those 'Iron Triangle' elements not explicitly included in doctrine. As noted by Henderson on why regular and reservist Fighting Power may differ; because despite the military context which encapsulates the individual, for a Reserve soldier there is always a civilian element to sustenance, socialisation, esteem, mediation with higher military authorities and having limited means of influencing events.[386] This model attempts to address this issue. While the 'Iron Triangle' idea was developed with reservists in mind, the same principle may also apply to regular soldiers; they may also feel a tension between their service and their family and public perception, though of course the Army is also their sole employer.

Public Support

Included within this indicator is the 'Military Covenant,' mentioned within the Ethical Foundation element of the original model (see Figure 0.1), developed concurrently with FR20 to deliver fairness, or the perception of Societal Justice for the debt that society owes to members of the Armed Forces. This comprises "moral rather than contractual obligations"[387] for the public to support their actions on behalf of UK society. The difference between Public Support and Familial or Employer Support, discussed below, is primarily proximity. Whereas the former is provided by distal individuals who are unknown to the soldier and may have only an intangible impact upon them, elsewhere described as "esprit,"[388] the latter are individuals personally known by the soldier with a day-to-day effect on their life. In many respects, this reflects the extent to which Reserves feel their Psychological Contract regarding deployment is mutual, aligned and reciprocated with and by the society they serve. Sandman suggests one way that this could manifest, with soldiers, "stunned with boredom', which could be reinforced by widespread apathy in society at large and a lack of support from back home."[389]

The perception of this Covenant may be indicated by the extent to which reservists perceive that UK society at large values and supports their service. Sandman notes that, believing that "actions and sacrifices are promoting the common good is crucial for the motivation to fight, but also that these actions and sacrifices are recognized by the home front, by society

[386] Henderson (1985).
[387] MOD (2017), p3-13.
[388] Manning (1991), p457.
[389] Sandman (2023).

at large" is critical.[390] While the context of a specific mission will engender different feelings among the public, reservists can still perceive the general level of support they have from the public and the perceived legitimacy of their activity which will impact upon their latent Fighting Power,[391] indeed as a theme, military-society relations feature strongly in UK Reserve literature.[392] This may be more important for reservists than regular soldiers because their status as part-time soldiers may render them 'closer' to the society by which they feel judged, though Catignani and Basham suggest that UK society tacitly endorses military service through the acceptance of a selfless commitment narrative as part of a "military normal." Indeed, they suggest that the Army Reserve's primary contribution to the Army is to normalise militarism and 'war-preparation' rather than provide actual military capability.[393]

By recognising and operationalising these wider factors, this model attempts to keep society and the real, and changeable context, clearly in view. The observable implications of higher perceived Public Support are that Reserves express attitudes that they feel supported by the public or that they feel valued by the public. The observable implications of lower perceived Public Support are that Reserves express attitudes that they do not feel supported or valued by the public.

Family Support and Employer Support

The literature identifies that family and civilian employment concerns,[394] provide both psychological and practical challenges; indeed "family support" is the biggest predictor of…readiness of Reservists."[395] The extent to which it is considered right or appropriate for reservists to be available for operations when their domestic or civilian responsibilities are taken into consideration may be important and requires a subjective judgement on the part of the individual. This relates to Gert's examination of 'loyalty' and 'morality' where one must choose between which other group is 'harmed' when exercising one's duty.[396] It is important to the organisation that soldiers perceive support from their families for their service but there have been fewer direct appeals to this than toward civilian employers. Service impacts on families may be perceived as part of the inevitable sacrifice of military service that cannot

[390] Sandman (2023).
[391] Van Creveld (1982), p18; Britt and Dickinson (2005), p166, 169; Hines et al (2015); Ingham (2014); Millett and Murray (2010).
[392] Edmunds et al (2016); Hines et al (2014); CHACR (2015); Woodward et al (2018a/2018b); Dandeker et al (2011); Alcock et al (2015).
[393] Catignani and Basham (2020), p4, 13.
[394] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a/2018b); Alcock et al (2015); Dandeker et al (2011); Edmunds et al (2016); Dandeker et al (2010); Keene (2015); Phillips (2012), p53.
[395] Keene (2015), pp11-13, Heinecken (2009), p490; Dandeker (2010), p267.
[396] Gert (2013).

be easily recompensed. While allowances for childcare and home maintenance are available for reservists who mobilise, most engagement with families is left for individual soldiers to manage. Gaining the support of families is recognised as important but does not form a significant part of the Reserve strategy in the same way as civilian employers. This may be to avoid perceptions of intruding into private lives but may also seek to avoid engaging with highly diverse demands and concerns. The impact of this may be to accidentally exclude people who would be keen to serve but for more family support, specifically women who still retain primarily childcare responsibilities in most families.

FR20 invested a great deal of resources in improving Employer Support and getting buy-in from the civilian sector. By their very nature, Reserves spend the bulk of their time as civilians and Defence is keen to sell the benefits of service to employers. It is here that Defence has identified the vital ground in ensuring that reservists are available to deploy, particularly where short notice periods or increased training commitments are concerned. Employers are likely to have a narrower set of concerns than families and, through trade and industry bodies, are likely to have greater political and economic influence. It is especially important to the organisation that soldiers perceive Employer Support for their service. This is seen as important in encouraging Reserve service and enabling personnel to mobilise.

The extent to which families and employers support reserve deployment may also be psychologically important, though as with the wider public, the narrative of selfless commitment is leveraged to ensure family support for the "military normal."[397] Further there may be an accounting of the practical costs of deployment such as ability to conduct childcare or perceived impacts on civilian employment that support or undermine Fighting Power in ways that the Moral Component does not capture.

While both family and employers are external to the military, it should not be assumed that their effect on Reserve service is the same and therefore they should form separate variables within the External Support indicator. Reserves are more likely to perceive a sense of sacrifice and responsibility directly towards their family where the bond is significantly emotional. It is a relationship that involves a small number of people and individuals who are very close to the serviceperson make significant compromises to enable their service. Where that is undermined, the Moral Component of Fighting Power can be seen to be weakened. The benefits to families of Reserve service are primarily financial.[398] On the

[397] Catignani and Basham (2020), p4.
[398] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018a).

other hand, relationships with employers are perceived in more practical terms with less emotional investment. While it is inconceivable that Reserve service could be kept from family, it is possible that it could be kept secret from one's civilian employer to self-protect the Moral Component. The benefits of Reserve service to civilian employers are broader than to the family, including increased skill levels that lead to improved performance.[399]

The observable implications of higher Family Support are that Reserves perceive that their family values and supports their deployment on operations. Negative family pressure would also not be a significant factor in influencing them. The observable implications of lower Family Support are that reservists perceive that their family do not value and would not be supportive of their deployment on operations. Negative family pressure may be a considerable influence on their thinking.

The observable implications of higher Employer Support are that Reserves perceive that their employer values and would be supportive of their deployment on operations. Negative employer pressure would also not be a significant factor in influencing them and they may also be more open with their colleagues about their Reserve service. The observable implications of lower Employer Support are that reservists perceive that their employer does not value and support their deployment on operations. Negative employer pressure may also be a significant factor in influencing them and they may also be less open with their colleagues about their Reserve service.

Model Summary

While the Moral Component in doctrine has necessarily been amended to enable conceptual definition, many of the original components remain, albeit more clearly defined, or combined within new indicators and variables. This four-component model of the Moral Component, comprising Individual Morale, Team Spirit, Leadership and External Support, has been derived from the doctrine which is supposed to be applicable across all Armed Forces. The Model is therefore similarly expected to be a broadly applicable operationalisation of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, but applied here to the UK Army Reserve before a deployment. The methods that are used to explore this concept must therefore account that while some variables may be recognisable from doctrine, and therefore may already be measured in some form, others are composite or new factors for which evidence collection may require development. The novelty of this Model and the sparse research background into the topic of the Moral Component and the Army Reserve means that methods that

[399] Giga et al (2018a).

collect qualitative data are likely to be appropriate. The next section describes the overall approach of the research.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the approach to answering the Research Question, 'What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?' and the six Secondary Questions. It first laid out a conceptual definition and operationalisation of the Moral Component to develop clarity from a lack of consensus. Drawing on the doctrinal three-component concept, comprising Morale, Leadership and Ethics (see Figure 0.1), it proposes a model for this context based on wider academic literature on military motivation that attempts to be relevant, distinct, and complete. This model comprises four indicators: Individual Morale, Team Spirit, Leadership and External Support. The next chapter describes the research design.

CHAPTER 3 – RESEARCH DESIGN

First, this chapter examines specific methods literature before outlining the research approach and data collection methods, outlining how the question will be investigated and how the metrics will be set. The contested nature of morale and related concepts lends itself to qualitative methods. The value of historical surveys and focus groups to understand an otherwise sparsely charted subject area is also laid out. Focus groups are a particularly relevant method given the individual and group relationships inherent within the Moral Component of Fighting Power.

It concludes with a consideration of the ethical issues inherent in the study and a reflection on the researcher's impact.

Purpose statement[400]

This study will explore the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power; the organisation's ability to generate soldiers for operations before deployment occurs. It was originally intended that the study use mixed-methods (quant>QUAL), but this was amended to qualitative only after being unable to access raw ResCAS data as outlined in Chapter 1. Administering an original survey on a comparably useful scale was considered beyond the resources of this project. Had access to the data been granted, they would have been used to help answer the Research Questions, to understand as well as guide the design of the qualitative data collection, which would have been designed to address any data gaps in what ResCAS could offer about the Moral Component Model, and identify typical or atypical demographics to explore. This would have been a similar design to that used by Bury[401] in his study of Army Reserve cohesion and readiness. A mixed-methods approach might have been able to offer a more comprehensive insight into the topic through triangulation or extrapolation, given the longitudinal element of ResCAS data. It might also have been possible to compare regular Army data (similarly collected annually in the Armed Forces Continuous Attitude Survey) with ResCAS data to look at the broad applicability of the model and more closely address any relationships between demographic groups and deployment intentions. There would also have been an opportunity for the qualitative element of the research to feed back to the design of ResCAS. Along with these unrealised opportunities, the unsuccessful process of obtaining ResCAS data took around eight months, including

[400] Structure of statement derived from Cresswell and Cresswell (2018), p128; Cresswell and Plano Clark (2011), p153.
[401] Bury (2016).

redesigning the project, though this was not critical in the context of a six-year part-time study.

The redesigned project as presented here revised the focus to primarily qualitative methods, supported by analysis of available quantitative data. This study intends to be descriptive or evaluative rather than causal, to provide an assessment of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power. While the overriding perspective of this study is qualitative in nature, given the academically recognised intangibility of the Moral Component and the limited research conducted into moral issues in the context of the Army Reserve, Chapter 4 will start by defining the requirement, something that the literature is not clear on.

Methods: Literature Review

The literature indicates that the Moral Component of Fighting Power is intangible, a contested concept, and is a fundamentally human or social issue that is sparsely researched. These factors usually lend themselves to a qualitative research approach.[402] This section discusses the value that historical surveys and focus groups could bring to the project; the methods that this thesis will primarily use. The most relevant quantitative source to this project is ResCAS, reviewed in Chapters 1 and 5.

Studies that use surveys offer correlation between variables[403] whereas interview-based research[404] tends to conclude on a combination of factors rather than a magnitude of influence. Both the 'historical' and 'original' data approaches try to examine what it is that makes military organisations effective but tend to differ in the presumed source of that effectiveness, respectively organisational or individual factors. They both also suffer from the same issue that expressed or perceived attitudes do not necessarily translate into future behaviour, hence the strength of applying historical evidence to indicate whether the contemporary findings might be applicable to the future.

Bury's[405] research into the Army Reserve, noted in more detail above, combines three strands of research. Firstly, he examined the organisational, strategic and policy factors that form the context for his study before looking at organisational transformation, perceived cohesion, and readiness at the soldier level where policy may have a tangible impact

[402] Walliman (2018), p30; Cresswell and Cresswell (2018), p63, 104; Merriam and Tisdell (2016), p17; Teddlie and Tashakkori (2009), p25; Hopf (2004), p203.
[403] Shamir et al (2000); Bury (2016), p44, Ivey, Blanc and Mantler (2014).
[404] FRRP (2018).
[405] Bury (2016).

through interviews and focus groups, and a survey based on Siebold's 'Standard Model Cohesion.' Without this wider understanding of political and historical factors, it would not have been possible for Bury to argue for a 'partial transformation' delivered by new policy as it manifested at the lowest level of execution. Further, without the original data collection of soldier attitudes, the research would not have progressed debate much beyond the existing modern or First World War based literature which focusses on the higher level of decision making, nor rendered any findings that gave an indication as to extant capability and cohesion at the lower level. Using historical analysis with multi-method original research provides a rich picture of a phenomena that is rooted in the current organisational reality. It also helps to demonstrate the value that available data from ResCAS can still offer to this study.

Accepting that reality can be viewed from multiple perspectives concurrently can help to ground the research in its context while accepting the diversity within that context. In the case of this research, examining recent examples of Reserve contributions to operations will provide a benchmark of past behaviour against which current expectations exist.

Historical Survey

There is little digression in the literature from the idea that there is a psychological element to being a soldier. Previous attempts to approach military moral issues in a meaningful way yield some lessons for the methods used in this study. The first is the use of historical analysis of which Depuy and van Creveld are two examples in the field of military-moral issues.

While Depuy, an avowed follower of Clausewitz, posits a theory of combat rather than war in general and therefore is not specifically concerned with the existence of latent Fighting Power, his approach offers one way to approach military-moral issues. His attempt to develop a quantifiable method of understanding performance in combat recognises that, even in his numerical model, some elements cannot be quantified and moreover, must be applied before battle.[406] His approach to these is to undertake historical analysis, the "laboratory of the soldier,"[407] to interpret defeat and victory. This provides some support for using historical survey to assess the Moral Component, in the same way that Clausewitz offers that this method can provide a means to study an idea.[408] Depuy accepts that 'morale' is important but also includes combat-specific situational factors like surprise,

[406] Depuy (1992), p87.
[407] Depuy (1992), p200.
[408] Clausewitz (1989), Book 2, Chapter 7.

fatigue and perception of vulnerability which apply at the point of combat, when Fighting Power is realised, but are less applicable in latent Fighting Power.

Van Creveld also uses historical analysis of society, military organisation and personnel structures, drawing on the German Army's experience in the Second World War, to explain the potential of the moral over material when compared with the US Army. In later work he widens his base of examples, though his explanation of "building the forces,"[409] with which this study is concerned through latent Fighting Power, is supported only through shallow and often antiquated passing references used to explain rather than prove his argument.

Both Depuy and van Creveld illustrate that historical analysis can offer an insight into military moral matters where there is sufficient data on a large population, in their case to national mass armies. The predictive ability of this approach diminishes where there is insufficient relevant data on the topic, and it cannot generate new data, only offer the opportunity for new interpretations. This kind of approach tends to "emphasise uniformity"[410] and homogeneity and may overlook complex factors that exist within a diverse organisation like the Army Reserve. Given the sparse literature on Reserve Fighting Power, a narrow but thorough examination of recent historical subject matter is likely to yield the most understanding.

Focus Groups

Recognising the contested and intangible nature of military-moral issues, many studies[411] focus on individual meaning by collecting data directly from soldiers. Investigations into these concepts, such as Hardy,[412] have used individual interviews to explore the topic with candour, but others such as Bury[413] and Connolly[414] used focus groups. These studies are naturally narrower in their focus, at unit level or below and tend to use survey, interviews, or a combination to collect data, but may not be representative of a whole organisation.[415]

Focus groups can accommodate group dynamics, appropriate because the Moral Component of Fighting Power includes both individual and collective elements. They also enable topics to be probed in depth to understand the impact, rather than just opinion. While

[409] Van Creveld (2017), pp62-75.
[410] Maxwell and Mittapalli (2010), pp159-160.
[411] E.g. Griffith (1995); Britt and Dickinson (2005); Ben-Dor (2008); Bury (2016); FRRP (2018); Connelly (2021).
[412] Hardy (2009), p79.
[413] Bury (2016).
[414] Connolly (2021).
[415] Walliman (2018), p23; Cresswell and Cresswell (2018), p8; Merriam and Tisdell (2016), p9, 24.

this may reduce reliability, the development of the conversation beyond the question schedule can show what is important to a particular group when compared with others. The potential to raise issues not previously considered could help to develop the otherwise untested Moral Component Model developed from within a sparse literature field with limited existing data, as identified in Chapter 1. Further, focus groups offer an effective way to collect data from as many participants as possible within a compressed time.[416]

There is little published by the Army on Reserve moral issues and limited academic research into the topic, meaning that generating additional data would be of benefit. Given the limited understanding of the Moral Component within the Army Reserve context, this is likely to be best approached from a qualitative point of view to develop a sense of the range of views present.

Methods: Data Collection and Analysis

First, this thesis will seek to define the standards of 'sufficiency' for the Moral Component in the context of the Army Reserve. This will involve data collection from policy and precedent, through an historical survey, and to determine what is demanded of the Army Reserve Fighting Power and by extension how the ideal-typical Moral Component may present [SQ1]. The thesis will examine what existing research can contribute toward the Research Question and research design before qualitative data collection (focus groups) to explore indicators and variables of the Moral Component and the factors that affect Fighting Power [SQ2, SQ4]. Finally, it will discuss the presentation of the Moral Component against the previously developed criteria of sufficiency. It will also examine the suitability of the Moral Component as a means of understanding motivation in the Army Reserve [SQ3, SQ5, SQ6]. Each element of the research is discussed in more detail below.

Developing a metric of sufficiency

This thesis first outlines what requirement is placed upon the Reserve and develops a metric of sufficiency against which the Moral Component of Fighting Power can be assessed. This includes identifying the ideal-typical Moral Component with respect to latent Fighting Power [SQ1]. This is required to develop an answer for the second part of the Research Question, '…can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?' This is not well developed in the literature and looks to provide a clear baseline against which the fieldwork data are assessed.

[416] Matthews and Ross (2010) p235.

This baseline will be developed from publicly available policy on the Army Reserve, including public statements of purpose or intent made by authoritative figures such as members of government or high-ranking officers. It comprises an historical survey of recent requirements and responses from the organisation, including case studies with an autoethnographic component, to investigate the actual trend of use and identify differences with future direction. It is from these policies and the operational conditions that might follow[417] that the required Moral Component of Fighting Power will be assessed. The historical survey evidence prioritises the most recent data from 2014, noting that while there is a significant body of literature relating to the Territorial Force in the First World War, the legacy of this organisation will have diminishing relevance to the modern Army Reserve.

While technically reservists can be involved in the same activity as regulars, a judgement must be made on the realism and practicalities of their participation across the spectrum of potential activity. While new policies, RF30 and Future Soldier, were published in 2021, these are dealt with as a prospect in Chapter 7. Sufficiency is determined by the characteristics of the demand; the type of operation, their role within the operation and the temporal boundaries set. This framework, derived from the literature, is further discussed in Chapter 4. Part of a qualitative metric of sufficiency for the Army Reserve Moral Component will describe the ideal-typical Reserve soldier and identify points of friction to investigate further. Broadly, a willingness to deploy on a wide range of operations as required by Defence would indicate a strong Moral Component of Fighting Power. Where soldiers are unwilling to mobilise or express significant caveats toward deploying, it would indicate a weak Moral Component of Fighting Power.

Fieldwork

The fieldwork will collect qualitative focus group data to explore the Moral Component [SQ2], suitable to investigate an incompletely defined concept and accommodate group dynamics, as well as enabling enable topics to be probed in depth. Chapter 6 outlines these findings and identifies what factors might affect the Moral Component of Fighting Power [SQ4].

The fieldwork seeks to identify the diversity of factors which might impact the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and what may influence it. It also aims to identify significant themes and implications for the Moral Component of Fighting Power.

[417] Such as the location, risk, activity, notice and duration of the task.

Question schedule development

Research Methods literature[418] recommends that having provided an overview of the purpose of the group and having received informed consent, questions be kept simple and open, and start with basic information and ice-breaker[419] before tackling the main topics for discussion, focussing on participants own experiences.[420] Prompts or probes should focus on personal narratives or experience rather than observations.[421] "Deliberate naivete"[422] is a useful tactic to gain information from participants and the sole researcher's professional background compared with the occupation of the participants lent itself to this.

Analysis of available ResCAS and FRRP data will inform the development of the focus group question schedule and identify a suitable demographic to investigate, as well as providing some contribution toward answering the Research Question, outlined in Chapter 5.

Demographic information on rank and personal experience, collected by a questionnaire, will enable the comparison of groups, and will provide important 'personal context' to the data collected. This will be particularly important in understanding any unanticipated data that are collected.[423] The question schedule (including prepared prompts and probes) is at Annex A. In overview, after an icebreaker, it leads with questions on the perceived importance of mobilisation in general, moving on to questions of how participants' and their units might be used before addressing issues of choice and the policy of 'Intelligent Selection.' It ends with questions on frequency and notice periods given for mobilisation. As outlined in Chapters 4 and 5, a review of policy and FRRP suggests that the role of the Army Reserve (or at least soldiers' understanding of it), their perceptions of 'choice' within mobilisation, and their views on notice periods are likely to be significant. The role of leaders and soldiers' perceptions of the mobilisation process are also of interest.

Sampling

Saturation sampling[424] is a contentious issue, interpreted either as theoretical saturation, where additional data do not add to understanding, or code saturation, where additional data do not generate any new codes. This study aimed for theoretical saturation, given that the

[418] Adams and Cox (2008), p22.
[419] Hermanns (2004)
[420] Adams and Cox (2008), p33; Hopf (2004), p213), DeMarrais et al (2003), p653.
[421] Bohnsack (2004), p220.
[422] Mcgrath et al, p1003: "prepare yourself as an interviewer" – a researcher must be highly knowledgeable in the subject area to enable them to act with deliberate naivete.
[423] Hopf (2004), p205.
[424] Kvale (1996).

Moral Component Model provides an initial coding framework, though this does not preclude the importance of recognising new codes if required, discussed in more detail below.

Guidance on sufficient participation is imprecise, ranging from 5-60,[425] though Mason identifies that 31 participants is a mean total number of participants. Practical factors will also influence sample size, particularly the sheer quantity of data collected. With focus groups, more data points can be collected in a single sitting than individual interviews, with groups of 5-10 possible[426] with 6-7 as optimal,[427] supported by a schedule of questions and a research diary. The large scale and well-resourced FRRP involved 188 military participants on a saturation sampling basis, a breadth which was assessed as beyond the resources of this project. Bury conducted 14 group interviews of logistic Army Reserves, a sub-population of the whole organisation, with between 2 and 15 participants[428] in each group.[429] Connelly spoke with 105 regular soldiers in 12 focus groups in only 2 months for his study on regular-reservist integration from the perspective of the former.[430] Matthews and Ross suggest that up to 20 interviews is feasible for a study conducted by a single researcher.[431] The greater the homogeneity of the group and between groups, the fewer interviews required to achieve saturation. It would be counter-intuitive to the principles of saturation and qualitative research to specify a target number of interviews to be conducted or participants to reach,[432] however, this study planned for up to 15 focus groups given the time and resources available; noting that reservists themselves may only be available on one evening per week (in line with their routine training), rather than potentially daily, as with the regulars Connelly's study.

Synthesis

Chapter 7 discusses the data collected to contribute to understanding how far the Moral Component aligns with the demand [SQ3], what might strengthen or diminish it [SQ5] and whether the Moral Component Model is appropriate for the Army Reserve [SQ6]. As part of the conclusion, it also looks at the initial prospects for RF30, released in 2021, shortly before data collection began.

[425] Mason (2010); Guest et al (2006); Crouch and McKenzie (2006); Creswell (1998); Morse (1994).
[426] Merriam and Tisdell (2016) p114.
[427] Adams and Cox (2008), p24.
[428] The average number of participants per group was 6-8, with the widespread due to opportunistic sampling of those people available in each location.
[429] Bury (2016) p50; Bury (2017b).
[430] Connelly (2021).
[431] Matthews and Ross (2010), p169.
[432] Mason (2010)

The input comprises attitudinal and narrative data collected and processed in the fieldwork, assessed against the metric of sufficiency. There is documentary analysis of RF30 policy and strategy, with a focus on significant changes from the baseline established in the literature review. Evidence of what might improve or threaten the Moral Component is identified where variables are judged to be 'low' or in tension with aspects of service, or are 'high' but are at risk of being undermined by current policy, practice or malign influence. Evidence for whether the Moral Component is an appropriate model to be applied to the Army Reserve was identified in the extent to which data for the Model's variables and indicators were present and relevant.

A narrative answer is given to the main Research Question by identifying whether the state of the Moral Component is sufficient against the criteria. Chapter 7 concludes that the Moral Component is sufficient to deliver the required Fighting Power, but that may be because the organisation self-limits its aspirations. A null hypothesis, where the Reserve was assessed to have an insufficient Moral Component of Fighting Power for any operational tasks was considered *prima facie* unlikely because reservists continue to deploy on operations voluntarily. It recommends improvements and assesses that the Moral Component and the Fighting Power concepts are broadly appropriate to be applied to the Army Reserve, but that the Model requires further refinement.

Research ethics

Both University and MOD[433] ethical approval was required for this research. The latter was known to be a lengthy process[434] and was applied for at the earliest opportunity; granted in early 2022 after 16 months. While the research was sponsored by the MOD's Higher Defence Studies Programme, it still had to apply the same rigorous standard as any academic work. Along with MOD ethical approval, Commanding Officers were also approached to request access to their units and soldiers as participants.

Despite being conducted during military time during which soldiers were already paid, informed consent and voluntary participation was central to the research and participants were free to withdraw without stigma. A benefit of this setting is that there was no requirement to provide incentives for participation, relying on interest, curiosity, and a willingness to help, and that it focussed the minds of participants on the military topic of discussion.

[433] https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/ministry-of-defence-research-ethics-committees#applying-for-review
[434] Bury (2016), p45.

A further ethical issue arising from the nature of focus groups is the inherent lack of confidentiality within the group setting,[435] which may be acute where participants are likely to know each other. This issue cannot be removed entirely because although the participants may be anonymous to the researcher and anonymised in the data, it is impractical to create research groups of usually disparately located soldiers, especially where demographic population sampling has been applied and would negate the benefit of selecting unit comrades for the interviews when investigating moral issues that are thought to include a proximal group element. This was mitigated against by requesting that participants respect each other's confidentiality. Though this falls some way short of a guarantee, the content of the interviews surrounds what the groups had in common, their military service, therefore might have had an unintended benefit in improving mutual understanding. These issues are not insurmountable as data collection among known social groups is a recognised method that enables observation data to be collected as part of the fieldwork.[436] While it was not foreseen that the topic was of an objectively emotional nature but it was thought prudent to be aware of the potential links to military specific mental health issues surrounding deployments.

Research Reliability

The fieldwork sampling contains convenience bias. Those soldiers who are technically in the Army Reserve but are 'hard-to-reach' were omitted from sampling and therefore the population is limited to those who attended training and may therefore have been more highly motivated than those who do not attend. This could skew data away from potentially extreme attitudes by omitting those who have already shown high commitment (already mobilised) or low commitment (do not attend training at all). While the number of mobilised Reserves is published quarterly and is in part controlled by the available opportunity, the number of soldiers who do not attend training is likely to be classified information. The findings of this study could only be considered indicative of the attitudes of those who actually attend training and routinely engage with the organisation; indeed by excluding those who are 'hard to reach,' the data may be more indicative of 'ordinary' soldiers. There was also an uncontrollable factor of which soldiers were available in locations on fieldwork days, which added an element of randomisation. The extent to which attitudes identified in qualitative collection were broadly reflected by published ResCAS analysis and previous research (discussed in Chapter 5) helps to put the participants in context.

[435] Matthews and Ross (2010), p243.
[436] Arksey and Knight (1999), p75.

The fieldwork could be replicated with the appropriate access granted by the MOD by using the same sampling criteria and conducting focus groups in the same environment, though the exact conduct may be difficult to copy. The same convenience bias would apply to subsequent researchers, forcing them exclude 'hard to reach' soldiers. Involving human participants in research tends to reduce reliability,[437] though control factors such as conducting fieldwork in comparable locations and times may improve this.

It was foreseen at the start of the project that the time needed for part-time study meant that subsequent SDSR or other political events may occur during the period of research which may impact upon the Fighting Power of the Reserve. This was mitigated by conducting the fieldwork within as short a time as practical. The prospects of RF30, released during the project, are addressed in the Conclusion to offer additional relevance to the research going forward.

Reflection: The Researcher in the Research

Löwenheim suggests that it should be "standard to have at least a paragraph that tells the reader where the author is coming from;"[438] the conclusions of any work are the result of researcher interpretation. This section outlines the 'researcher in the research' to highlight my perspective as a regular Army officer and an academic. I embarked upon this research during a posting to an Army Reserve unit in 2017. At that time, I had previously commanded Reserve soldiers on operations in Afghanistan in 2012 and 2014 and did so again in Cyprus in 2022-2023 on Operation TOSCA, which forms one of the cases, albeit chosen before that deployment was a prospect. In this 2017 role I managed around 350 reservists as a unit Adjutant[439] and saw a lot of investment being made in developing the capability of the Army Reserve under FR20 based on large assumptions that were not challenged. They were all predicated on reservists being 'reliable' despite a wide range of commitment on display to me as part of my day-to-day management duties and the mechanisms that the organisation had in place to use them. I then had a subsequent role managing and directing Reserves within HQ Field Army, the organisation responsible for generating soldiers for operations and was involved in issuing higher level orders and budget management including during the COVID pandemic.

[437] Merriam and Tisdell (2016), p250.
[438] Löwenheim (2010), p1023.
[439] A unit role for a Captain, usually of 6-8 years' service, responsible for administration and discipline within the regiment.

While I have never been a reservist myself, I have seen them from the bottom-up, as individuals, and top-down, as a collection of units. I have worked with the policy and law surrounding mobilisation and have an insight into the individual Reserve soldier, though their diversity makes any claim of 'total' understanding problematic, one can only ever offer a "partial vantage point."[440] Depending on where one draws the boundaries of the Army Reserve as an 'organisation' I might be considered either an informed insider, as a member of the Army working with the Army Reserve or an informed outsider, where the Reserve is seen more separately.[441] In either case, my experience has been developed opportunistically through the "luck" of postings rather than deliberate design on my part. My understanding of the Army Reserve makes me an atypical member of the regular Army and more atypical still by my academic interest in it.

It is highly likely that I would have been identifiable as an Army officer, even without the 'full-disclosure' introduction during fieldwork, which may have helped to build a rapport with participants but could also affect their responses. Employing a proxy to conduct the interviews was beyond the resources of this study. All interviews were conducted in an academic capacity but without disguising the background of the researcher. This may compromise between "insider" and "outsider"[442] and avoid inferences of "authority,"[443] though this may be unavoidable in seeking Commanding Officer's approval to visit. There is evidence to suggest that Reserve soldiers do covet the opinion of regular soldiers,[444] which may have led them to try to present themselves in a positive light.

Case Studies - autoethnography

The roles I have undertaken have given me a first-hand insight, and in some cases a directive role, into how reservists have been used. This naturally lends itself into providing information and analysis, especially for the cases studies akin to autoethnography. This subjectivity is especially relevant in the case study of Operation RESCRIPT in Chapter 4 where the description of the operation is from my own perspective as a participant.

In 2020, my position was as the Army Reserve 'expert' in our HQ, and I was tasked with designing the Army Reserve contribution to Operation RESCRIPT according to the demand given to us by the operational commander. This included how we could bring them into service while reducing travel around the country to protect Army sites from virus

[440] Anderson (2006), p381.
[441] Anderson (2006), p379.
[442] Merriam and Tisdell (2016), p64.
[443] Walliman (2018), p49.
[444] Woodward et al (2018b).

transmission.[445] In this situation, relative to reservists, I took on the role of the organisation and was part of the demand. Few others had the wider view and understanding of Army Reserve issues as they unfolded nor the view of how we developed the plan to generate reservists for the Operation. Where appropriate corroborating data collected in the fieldwork has been used to augment my own narrative in Chapter 4. My own role in this Operation means that I was, albeit unwittingly at the time, helping to create some of the data that I have now collected, through my own actions in setting the conditions that Reserve soldiers acted in. I later saw a MACA operation first-hand as a military commander leading regular soldiers in January-March 2022, when my sub-unit was called to support the Yorkshire Ambulance Service before deploying to Cyprus in September 2022 for the Peacekeeping mission which forms the second case-study.

Conclusion

This chapter outlines the intent of the research, reviews relevant methods literature, describes the project and considered issues of ethics, reliability and also considers the role of the researcher; particularly relevant in the use of auto-ethnographic data.

The questions will be addressed in three stages, firstly, Chapter 4 will set the context and develop a metric of sufficiency and an ideal-typical Moral Component of Fighting Power through historical surveys and case studies, with the intent to Chapter 6 then presents the data gathered from the population and assesses the state of the Moral Component, before Chapter 7 assesses the Moral Component of Fighting Power in context, identify areas of opportunity and threat for the organisation and to assess the suitability of the model overall in the context. The main data source will be the Reserve soldiers themselves, through focus groups, to address what is agreed as an intangible and poorly defined concept in 'morale.'

[445] Ordinarily, Reserves would travel to a barracks in Nottingham to conduct mobilisation administration at the Military Training and Mobilisation Centre, a prospect which was not attractive with COVID-19 transmission in mind.

CHAPTER 4 – DEFINING THE DEMAND

Chapter 4 seeks to develop an understanding of the requirements placed on the Army Reserve's Moral Component by policy, strategy, and circumstances. It will contribute to the Research Question through SQ1, "What is demanded of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?" by examining how policy and strategy outlines the purpose of the organisation and what precedent may have been set by recent operational demands. For instance, an organisation that is geared solely to deliver 'low risk' Homeland Resilience tasks is likely to require a different kind of mentality from one which is required for 'high risk' warfighting operations. As Smith and Jans suggest, they may be seen as "second rate" or be demotivated conducting tasks that a civilian contractor could perform.[446] Secondly, having a clear purpose is inherently motivational for military units, something already recognised by the MOD,[447] but that nevertheless they have historically struggled to deliver for the Army Reserve. Understanding what is required of the Army Reserve will help to set metrics for subsequent analysis and identify lines of investigation for data collection. It also makes an original contribution to the literature as an examination of UK Army Reserve policy, strategy, and practice.

Part 1 of this chapter reviews Army Reserve policy and strategy, including ministerial statements which can be seen to create policy *ad-hoc*. Policy and strategy indicate what the organisation envisages reservists are for and how they might be used, and a sense of the ideal-typical. This falls some way short of a specific and clear role or set of tasks for many Reserve units and much is left to inference. This may be because the level of analysis available in public documents is aimed at the overarching organisation, the Army Reserve as a whole, rather than specific units or groups of units. There is no consensus within policy or academic literature that outlines their tasks beyond the idea that they can be used for anything that a regular could be used for, but with the contradictory caveat recognising that Reserves are different from regular soldiers.

Part 2 will develop this through two case studies which will look at how actual use compares with the plan and how this may set a precedent for Army Reserve requirement and purpose. Military planning on force employment can never be complete and there will always be a requirement to react to emerging unforeseen circumstances. Actual use (or lack of use) of the Army Reserve will set expectations within the organisation and among their soldiers as

[446] Smith and Jans (2011), p308.
[447] General Wall in HOC (2014), p41, EV60; NAO (2006), p36; Bury (2018), p422-423.

habits develop[448]**.** In summary, while the role of the Army Reserve is planned as very broad, in practice it has been used for a narrow range of tasks at the low-risk and low-controversy end of the spectrum.[449] This may be a matter of capability (concerns that the soldiers were not up to the task), finance (regulars already being a sunk cost), risk (the negative perception of the government being seen to 'fall back' on reservists and the impact of them dying), or a combination of all these. The mode of using Reserves for which the Army is structured, as formed units of military specialists, has been seldom used in practice. While temporal limits are planned for using reservists, these are easily broken by the constraints of operational demands, contributing to uncertainty.

Part 3 of this chapter will holistically assess the demand placed on soldiers through these plans and precedents and examine the implications for Fighting Power. It will focus on the inconsistencies and uncertainties caused by the divergence between policy and practice.

FR20 outlines several conclusions of the Independent Commission on the Reserves which identify areas for improvement, including the place that the organisation has within society. It also offers three characteristics that can be used to define operations and will be used as a framework in this chapter and throughout the research. (1) The type of operation that Reserves might be involved in, across the gamut of Army doctrine, which includes environmental factors such as location and risk and will be broadly common to all participants; (2) the role that Reserves have in those operations, as generalists or specialists, as individuals[450] or a formed unit team, which will be situation specific; and (3) the predictability: the length of deployment, frequency and notice periods provided to soldiers and other stakeholders.[451] A similar framework is applied by Smith and Jans in their study of reservists in the Australian Defence Force.[452]

Part 1 – Policy and Strategy

Part 1 of this chapter examines the policy and strategy aspirations for the Army Reserve in context. Policy and strategy set out 'the plan' for the Army Reserve while also situating it within the wider Army organisational context.

[448] Smith and Jans (2011), p314.
[449] As Smith and Jans (2011), p308 observed was the trend for the Australian Defence Force Reserve.
[450] Either soldiers deployed in isolation from an immediate military team or as small groups of Reserves embedded within a regular unit.
[451] MOD (2011), p6.
[452] Smith and Jans (2011), p307-308.

It is UK policy to defend itself by military force and strategic decisions inform the composition of those forces, including ratios of regular and reserve components. Policy sets the political outcomes and are designed to enable consistent decision making. Strategy is the interpretation of how to deliver on those goals within the resources available.[453] This strategy may, in turn, lead to sub-policies which govern the activity of subordinate parts of the organisation.

The SDSR, as policy, define and prioritise the threats and risks that the UK faces and as such provide boundaries within which all government departments operate: they are owned by the Cabinet Office, not the MOD. Army strategy, including A2020 is therefore more specific than Defence policy, though while policy aims to deliver consistency, this chapter highlights that the multitude of documents on the Army Reserve diverges from this principle.

In overview, since 2010 there has been little consensus between Defence and the Army as to whether Reserves are for routine use in a wide variety of operations or for emergencies and Warfighting only. The lack of coherence between FR20 and Army strategy stems from their initial miscoordination and FR20's unclear place as both a policy appendix to SDSR10 and a personnel strategy. The ideal-typical Reserve soldier is not readily identifiable beyond one who is a regular-in-waiting, ready to mobilise at all times.

Context - Territorial Army to Army Reserve (2010-2020)

Stretched public and Defence finances[454] had a significant influence on the transition from a Territorial Army of 19,000 to an Army Reserve of 30,000 as part of the SDSR10.[455] Published in October 2010, this saw Reserves planned as an integral part of military operations, transitioning from a strategic reserve to an operational reserve, a further development from *Future Army Structure* published in 2004[456]. It gave rise to two sets of plans, FR20 and A2020, which should have been complimentary but, as will be outlined below, diverged since their publication. It was updated in 2015 by SDSR15, which described the most dangerous, highest demand scenario of state-on-state conflict following the increase in malign Russian activity over the preceding five years, but is significantly less detailed on the more likely but lower-level demands than SDSR10, and there is little detail on

[453] McKeown (2011); Chandler (1962).
[454] NAO (2010), para 1.10; NAO (2012), p4; MOD (2011a); MOD (2012).
[455] A document which outlines the threats facing the UK and how Defence will response to them through force design - Defence Planning Assumptions (DPA).
[456] Kirke (2008), p181.

reserves which was left for single-Services to develop.[457] The 2018 *National Security and Capability Review* (NSCR18) committed to maintaining the size of the regular Army and Army Reserve[458] but developed little in the way of role or purpose. During this time financial pressure on the MOD remained[459] and was further complicated by Brexit related decision-making paralysis across government. Table 4.1 outlines the chronology of relevant policy and strategy up to 2019, when the last policy and strategy under the epoch in question, FR20 and A2020, was released. The new programme, RF30 was planned for release in 2020 but was delayed by COVID until 2021.[460] This new epoch of policy and strategy was considered too new for full consideration within this study, given that the organisational culture has significant inertia. Analysis of this embryonic policy against the current situation is presented in the conclusion.

The first of these divergent plans is FR20, the MOD's policy on all reserve forces which outlines what they may be used for. This was published in July 2013, significantly after single-Service strategy decisions had been made, as will be outlined below. FR20 was not amended following SDSR15 or NSCR18. The second is Army strategy. The Army's response to SDSR10 started in July 2011 where a Defence Basing Review[461] included the Army's new structure with 5 multi-role brigades, each with a portion of the Reserve assigned. This was never implemented and was replaced in mid-2012 by A2020 which was to deliver a 3-component Army (Reactive Force, Adaptive Force and Force Troops), dependent on reserves as part of a routine cycle. This was amended in December 2016 with *Army 2020 Refine* (A2020R) which outlined changes to the Army following SDSR15, including the creation of new types of units (STRIKE and Specialised Infantry). Separately from these pan-Army documents, in April 2017, the Army sought to provide a clear purpose and task for the Army Reserve within its strategy by devising a Reserves sub-strategy. In summer 2019, the Army was restructured again; with the three divisions taking on more specific operational roles.

It was recognised in Parliament that many decisions made in SDSR10 and subsequently in A2020 were economically motivated,[462] including the timescale. The former was completed in less than 5 months to ensure concurrency with the Comprehensive Spending Review[463]

[457] Specific mention of the Army Reserve was limited to its inclusion as part of units to conduct hybrid warfare and intelligence (HMG (2015), p17.)
[458] HMG (2018), p46.
[459] Haynes and Fisher (2017).
[460] HOC (2021).
[461] HOC (2011).
[462] HOC (2014), p26.
[463] Cornish and Dorman (2012), p216.

meaning that key areas, including FR20, which reported as an Independent Commission,[464] were left to separate reports. The Chief of the General Staff, Peter Wall, described the plan to grow the Reserve to compensate for a reduction of regulars, detailed therein, as a financially motivated "obfuscation and a deliberate lie,"[465] "not grounded in military experience, military fact or any credible evidence."[466] Failing to gain the support of the Service leadership at an early stage sets the scene for some of the tensions described later. From the outset, planning for how Reserves might contribute to Defence (i.e. FR20) and planning for how the Army would contribute to Defence (A2020) were poorly aligned. This divergence centres around two issues: the first, the deliberate political and strategic choices made between using reserves routinely or for emergencies only,[467] and the second, accidental systemic 'drift': the nature of iterative development and constant change on an inherently slow-moving organisation which means the Reserve gets 'left behind.' FR20 and A2020 are described in more detail below.

[464] MOD (2011).
[465] General Sir Peter Wall in Bury (2016), p111.
[466] General Sir Peter Wall in Bury (2016), p117.
[467] Noting that The Army Reserve is an expression of both physical capability (organisational structures and soldiers) and philosophy (a 'nation in arms' concept to support Defence).

Table 4.1 - Summary of key policy and strategy documents

Date	Publication	Synopsis	Implications
October 2010	Strategic Security and Defence Review (SDSR 10)	Outlines National Security risks and Defence Planning Assumptions, the role of the Territorial Army beyond Afghanistan campaign integrated into the 5 multi-role brigade structure (reduced from 8 brigades in 2008 announcement).	Reserves role in Defence increased against background of financial pressure. Op ENTIRITY (Afghanistan) a focus until 2014. Focus on numbers rather than capability.
July 2011	Defence Basing Review: Headline Decisions	Initial Response to SDSR10 outlining Army structure with 5 multi-role brigades.	Reserve units within these brigades given a predictable deployment rotation in like with FR20 proposition later published (1 deployment/5 years).
June-July 2012	Army 2020 (A2020)	Implementation of the Reactive Force, Adaptive Force, Force Troops structure.	Army structured to be reliant on Reserves integral to structure. Army developed into 3-year cycle – prospect of 1 deployment/3 yrs. Afghanistan key role until 2014 – otherwise little clear role for Reserves except 'mass'.
July 2013	Future Reserves (FR20)	Set out Defence's vision for all three services' Reserve forces developing toward 2020.	Plans to use Reserves routinely rather than war/emergency only – though omits Warfighting as a role. Otherwise very broad remit – "be like a regular." Codify 90/28-day notice periods.
November 2015	Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR15)	Outlines National Security risks and Defence Planning Assumptions, commitment to Joint Force 2025 and key strategic decision on services' structure and staff, including headcount and	Reserves for national emergency or Warfighting. Refocus the Army towards a war-fighting division and away from the rotating 'smaller contingency' of previously – and away from Reserves.

		implementation of STRIKE brigades and Specialised Infantry.	
December 2016	Army 2020 Refine (written ministerial statement)[468] (A2020R)	Evolution of the A2020 plan with greater detail on STRIKE and Specialised Infantry.	3 Division Reserves consolidated within fewer brigades and therefore tempo speeding up – 2 years on-2 years off. Further reductions in log and ES units and structures.
April 2017	Army Reserve Sub-Strategy	Not publicly available. Sought to provide clear purpose and tasks for Army Reserve within Army strategy.	No significant impact – gave new terminology to 4 tasks for Warfighting/emergency use.
March 2018	National Security and Capability Review (NSCR18)	Focus on cross-government cooperation (Fusion Doctrine) with military as just 1 security/defence tool. Increase focus on information, cyber and 'grey zone.'	Commitment to maintain size of Army Reserve but little to direct role or capability.
July-August 2019	Restructuring of Field Army	Development of a three-division structure, replacing Force Troops with 6 Division.	Clearer mission for each of the divisions which could filter down to Reserve units. Tempo and expectations of flexibility remain high.

[468] MOD (2017a).

Future Reserves 2020

FR20 was developed following the 2011 Independent Commission and a consultation paper published in late 2012. While FR20 outlines the vision for reserves of all three services it does contain a section dedicated to the Army Reserve. This Commission also concluded that the Territorial Army had not been restructured to reflect the current strategic environment. It assessed that there was a diminished risk of large-scale operations since 2005 and that therefore the organisation lacked a purpose or meaningful role and that its members were poorly motivated to serve; it was an organisation in decline.[469] This was despite its ability to service demands for Iraq and Afghanistan,[470] though those units specifically earmarked to deploy to Afghanistan and Iraq benefitted from having a clear purpose and task to fulfil in the short-term.[471]

FR20 was built on two pillars to "provide clarity of the purpose and role of the Reserve Force,"[472] specifically the role of Reserves within the Armed Forces and the role of reserves within society. The former is chief among these when considering what is required of soldiers. There is an impact on the external societal stakeholders in the second pillar as a demand on soldiers becomes a demand on family and employers. Mooney and Crackett describe FR20 as requiring significant "democratic salesmanship"[473] to ensure that society was willing to support the large numbers of volunteers needed. However, it was arguably already out of touch on publication in July 2013; the Army's second response to SDSR10, A2020, had already been public for one year.[474] FR20 was further left behind by the subsequent amendments of SDSR15, A2020R and the more recent developments in the Army's operating structure described later in this chapter. It included a change to the Reserve Forces Act 1996 (RFA96)[475] through DRA14[476] which renamed the Territorial Army as the Army Reserve and allowed reservists to be used more widely, for anything that a regular service person could be, rather than only "war-like" operations.

The context of FR20's publication undermined its effectiveness and its coherence with single-Service strategy. Furthermore, FR20 perhaps suffers from being a document supplementary to SDSR10 policy, describing "what to do," while also being an inherently strategic document by virtue of its parochial interest in one type of military personnel,

[469] Bury (2016), p93; Williams and Lamb (2010).
[470] MOD (2011), p15-17.
[471] General Sir Paul Newton in HOC (2016a); Bob Stewart MP in: HOC (2014), Ev 60.
[472] MOD (2013).
[473] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p88.
[474] General Sir Peter Wall in RUSI (2012); HOC (2014), p34.
[475] HMG (1996).
[476] HMG (2014).

describing “how” to carry out that policy by directing single Services to include them, regardless of whether financial realities had already forced that approach to some extent. In sum, FR20 does not appear to deliver on the promised “clarity of purpose” for the Army Reserve beyond the very broad boundaries of DRA14. The model for their use implies that they must be as employable as regular soldiers, a prospect that was perceived as unpalatable by the head of the Army in 2014.

Army Strategy

A2020 created a three division structure, comprising a Reaction Force for high intensity war-fighting (3 Division and 16 Brigade), an Adaptable Force with flexible forces to react to UK or overseas commitments short of war-fighting (1 Division) and Force Troops (later 6 Division) which commanded elements common to both activities such as artillery, intelligence and engineering.[477] Reserve units were ‘paired’ with a regular unit of the same capability with the intention that they would integrate, train and deploy together.

Alongside the A2020 reorganisation was an ongoing requirement to generate forces for the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan until 2014 which demanded a structure and training system which did not align with the eventual A2020 plan. The focus to generate forces for these campaigns meant that while Reserve units identified to deploy were provided with a clear and time-bounded purpose, those units not immediately required were not provided with a meaningful objective and undermined the Army Reserve in the longer term.[478]

SDSR15, reflected in A2020R, outlined that in 2025 the UK should be able to project an expeditionary force of 50,000, including a land division (30,000 to 40,000 personnel) with three brigades, including a new STRIKE Force.[479] CHACR offers that this “best effort” division would require around 1700 reservists in the first rotation; a “significant risk”,[480] with subsequent forces including greater proportions of Reserves as they are mobilised and trained for the requirement. Further, “when not deployed on this scale, the armed forces will be able to undertake a large number of smaller operations simultaneously, which might include: a medium-scale operation, often drawing mostly on just one Service e.g. the current counter-ISIL mission in Iraq…[or] a wide range of Defence Engagement activities;”[481] all of which could involve reservists. The Reserve was not included in the plans for STRIKE and Specialised Infantry, and were concentrated in other formations; the role of the Reserve was

[477] *Janes Defence Weekly (2012).*
[478] MOD (2013), p17; HOC (2014), p46.
[479] Brook-Holland and Mills (2016), p10.
[480] CHACR (2015), p7.
[481] Brook-Holland and Mills (2016), p10.

not significantly developed upon, and the focus remained on recruitment and retention of personnel.

The 2019 changes[482] saw 3 Division and 16 Air Assault Brigade remain focussed on Warfighting, 1 Division absorbing most of the engineering, logistics and medical enabling elements from Force Troops Command, which itself was retitled as 6 Division, focussing on intelligence, information warfare and unconventional operations. As a result, some units which had planned to move between formations as part of A2020R[483] announced in 2016 never moved[484] and others changed significantly.[485] While this is unlikely to have affected these units' tactical role, it may have had an impact on the operational focus of regular and Reserve units alike.

Operation Type

Exploiting the planned changes to RFA96 under DRA14, FR20 outlines tasks that Reserves may conduct at home and abroad,[486] with a remit was across all military operations including evacuating UK citizens from conflict, stabilisation, conflict prevention and Peacekeeping as well as homeland security and resilience operations (e.g. 2012 Olympics or flooding response). Support to the regular forces in time of large-scale war is barely mentioned, as has been the trend for Armed Forces across Western Europe and North America,[487] albeit a role presumed. This may have been a deliberate narrowing of roles towards those seen as more relevant given that SDSR10 had identified a diminished conventional threat to the UK.[488] Routine involvement in all operations rather than only under conditions of emergency was a key part of the transition from a strategic reserve (as the TA was) to an operational reserve.

A2020, responding to the National Security Strategy and SDSR10 rather than FR20, was designed to deliver on three distinct roles; conventional defence, defence engagement and conflict prevention overseas, and Homeland Resilience.[489] The Army Reserve was expected to be integral to all these operations. Under the Reactive-Adaptive-Force Troops structure, the Chief of the General Staff outlined that while he saw some Reserves forming part of the

[482] British Army (2019).
[483] MOD (2017a).
[484] For instance, the aborted disbandment of 102 Logistic Brigade which would have required six Army Reserve units to move from 1 Division to 3 Division (3 units) and Force Troops (3 units).
[485] For instance, the move of all 8 Engineer Brigade (7, all but 1, Army Reserve engineer units) and 2 Medical Brigade (13 Reserve units) from Force Troops to 1 Division. Later, in 2020, 11 Signal Brigade (2 Reserve units) moved from 6 Division (formerly Force Troops) to 3 Division.
[486] MOD (2013), p17.
[487] Edmunds et al (2016), p120.
[488] MOD (2011), p9.
[489] HOC (2014), p25.

Reactive force, the majority would serve within the Adaptive Force and Force Troops.[490] The type of operation that a Reserve might be involved in therefore depended which part of the Army they might be in, though this suggests that most Warfighting operations, at least at short notice, would largely fall, initially, to regular soldiers with reservists being given roles that may be lower risk or with more notice. However, this would not necessarily have entailed a complete reduction of 'short notice' demands on the Army Reserve; the kind of tasks most would conduct would be those that required an ability to react to situations flexibly and would not be reliant on equipment intensive training that part-time service might not support. Indeed, those reservists in Force Troops had a responsibility to support both the Reactive and Adaptive Force and therefore could have been involved in the gamut of military tasks.

While FR20 planned for Reserves to be routinely involved in all operations, the organisational structure of the Army in 2020 tended to keep them away from high-demand Warfighting operations, though this was not tested by circumstances.[491] Those reservists in the Reactive Force had a clear purpose, as did some specialists such as medics. They were to train and prepare for Warfighting and had planned contributions to their paired regular units. Roles for the Adaptable Force and Force Troops, where most Reserve units resided, were less clear given their wide remit of tasks, only one year before SDSR15 and two years before A2020R led to changes to the Army again. In 2013 the Parliament commissioned EST observed that the promised clear role and "proposition for Reserves had yet to be articulated,"[492] a problem that was not resolved in 2014.

> "One of the problems is that - I will go back again to my example of a CSS unit[493]- you did not have a role before SDSR and you actually still do not have a role. Three years later, we still do not have new operational roles to give a sense of purpose so that we can deliver the proposition. If you are a soldier on the proverbial gun park, you are still waiting."[494]

While the EST identified that Reserves did not have a clear strategic or operational role, in a Radio 4 interview, Chief of the General Staff Nick Carter outlined that the Army Reserve did have a clear role; as a separate force for national emergencies rather than routine use,[495] which, despite the organisational dependence on the Reserve, undermined the cornerstone

[490] HOC (2014), Ev4.
[491] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p84. Also see the list of Army Reserve operations since 2007 (Table 4.4).
[492] CRFCA (2013), p5.
[493] Combat Service Support – logistics, equipment maintenance or administration units.
[494] Major General Lalor in HOC (2014), EV45.
[495] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p88.

narrative of FR20[496] that EST would have referred to. This is evidence of a lack of coherence between MOD policy and Army strategy.

Concurrent with the end of the campaign in Afghanistan, SDSR15 led to A2020R in which one of the major changes for the Army was the conversion of two traditional Armoured Brigades[497] to a new STRIKE role[498] and the creation of Specialised Infantry[499], which would not include Army Reserve personnel. This policy reorientation back toward state-on-state conflict further justified Carter's 2014 line that the Army Reserve would have a less-than-routine role. While some specialist elements of the Army Reserve (such as those in medical or intelligence roles) benefitted from a clear role which demonstrated an integrated approach with regular troops,[500] others were to provide a "mirror image" of their paired regular units. The situation from A2020 endured with the Reactive Force focussed and the Adaptive Force and Force Troops less so.

The issue of role was recognised in SDSR15 as unresolved from SDSR10. Director Reserves, Major General Crackett gave evidence to the Defence Select Committee that:

> "The role of the Reserve needs to be sensibly calibrated. You will recall that when Army 2020 was announced—given what I said about a defence planning assumption that worked on an enduring operation—our Reserve structure, while integrated with the Regular structure, was designed for regular and routine use. I think that, unsurprisingly, we discovered that that was extremely difficult to recruit a Reserve against. What SDSR 15 has allowed us to do—and the evolution of Army 2020—is recast that role into one that is essentially there to support the Army's war fighting. Therefore, it is there, in a sense, for a nationally recognised emergency."[501]

This "softer narrative" where the main Reserve commitment is to train for Warfighting rather than routine deployments[502] seems to counter much of the planned routine operational integration of regular and reserve forces in A2020 and FR20 and move the aspirational role for the Army Reserve back towards 'National Emergency' as it was before SDSR10, albeit aligned with General Carter's 2014 comments. However, because of force reductions in

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[496] The transition from a strategic to operational reserve which would be used more frequently for all types of operations.
[497] These would be equipped with CHALLENGER 2 tanks and WARRIOR Armoured Fighting Vehicles.
[498] Which would have newly procured AJAX (tracked reconnaissance vehicle) and BOXER (wheeled infantry carrier) vehicles.
[499] Fallon (2016).
[500] Such as 77 Brigade, a tri-service unit tasked with providing specialist cultural, communications and information warfare expertise https://www.army.mod.uk/who-we-are/formations-divisions-brigades/6th-united-kingdom-division/77-brigade/groups/. Also see HMG (2015), p15, p17; AVM Luker in HOC (2016b).

[501] HOC (2016c).
[502] AVM Luker in HOC (2016b).

SDSR10 and SDSR15, the Army was under-resourced to accomplish the gamut of routine 'non-national emergency' tasks and therefore required an integrated Reserve which had not fully materialised. As Professor Theo Farrell testified to the Defence Select Committee, the Army Reserve was structured to support a 'worst-case' scenario but not optimally placed to provide the routine support that the Army requires.[503]

Crackett's thinking appears to have developed between 2016, when he reported to the House of Commons (see above) and 2017 when he led on the publication of the Army Reserve Directorate's sub-strategy[504] which sought to dispel the "vagueness"[505] of FR20 and A2020. It outlines fours strategic tasks: Reinforcement, Resilience, Regeneration and Reconstitution.[506] They envisaged Reinforcement across the gamut of operations and commitments, though in Resilience they do identify a specific operation type that Reserves may participate in. The final two, Regeneration and Reconstitution primarily refer to Warfighting scenarios where routine means of staffing the regular Army cannot be maintained. The sub-strategy was intended to communicate a "clear purpose for the Reserve"[507] but adds little that was not already evident. It codifies the role of Reserves in the broadest terms, but not, as Crackett said the previous year to the Defence Select Committee, just for "nationally recognised emergencies." This may have presented a confusing narrative to its members and continued a trend where the Army Reserve's "strategic role…flitted unconvincingly between national defence and providing routine reinforcements to the Regular Army overseas"[508] more evidence of the repeated, "clumsy tinkering,"[509] that Mooney and Crackett themselves identified in the 1990s and 2000s. In 2016 Air Vice Marshal Luker of the EST told the Defence Select Committee that despite this disconnected narrative, Army Reserve morale was high and that soldiers were enthusiastic for the roles they were offered,[510] though there is no evidence that these were any more specific than before.

[503] Farrell in HOC (2014), EV36-37.
[504] While this sub-strategy is not publicly available, two of its architects have published a summary of its key aspects: Mooney and Crackett (2018),
[505] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p89.
[506] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p90. Reinforcement: to provide skills and/or mass to the regular force for operations. Resilience: support to Military Aid to Civilian Authorities nationally. Regeneration: existing reserve soldiers used to restore regular units depleted by operations. Reconstitution: during a prolonged conflict, provide the basis to rebuild the Army in concert with wider national resources.
[507] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p91.
[508] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p85.
[509] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p85.
[510] HOC (2016b).

The 2019 changes to the Army structure retained the broad remit for the Army Reserve as a whole, in that there were no types of operations from which they were obviously excluded, but it did narrow the types of operations that specific units were likely to be involved in. The role of 3 Division and 16 Brigade's Reserve units allowed their 18 Reserve units to plan and train for Warfighting, however, their part in this was to provide 'more of the same' to the regular forces identified for this task. Despite being aligned to the 'worst case scenario,' they had a role within the organisation to train for, though they could still be called-out for tasks beyond this role. Similarly, the 12 Reserve units in 6 Division could focus on their role of providing intelligence and communications activity focussed on unconventional operations, albeit diverging from the "Warfighting" role outlined by Gen Crackett at the House of Commons Defence Select Committee in 2016. There was a greater proportion of hybrid (mixed regular and Reserve) and all-Reserve units which provide specific capabilities not held elsewhere in the Army. This provided a daily focus for their activity, with the concurrent requirement to support 3 Division in Warfighting should the need arise. Having inherited enabling units from what was Force Troops Command, 1 Division now had a broad remit to enable the activity of 3 and 6 Division, to develop the military forces of overseas partners and respond to humanitarian crises and disasters and other operations short of Warfighting. The 42 all-Reserve and 4 hybrid units, covering 16 unit roles could not train for a coherent overarching mission, rather they must focus on their specific trade skills, for instance medical provision or contract support. Compared with the situation that Farrell and Bury describe, this structure may have offered a more realistic proposition than the plans developed over seven years, though these changes were not made with only reservists in mind, if at all. While this structure offered an opportunity for Reserve units to identify what types of operations, short of war, they were likely to be involved in as part of a wider direction within their division, there is no evidence that these have translated into a strategy to inform Reserves how they might be used.

The organisation continues to struggle to identify clear roles beyond either 'just Warfighting,' or 'everything.' An unclear role and uncertain demands have the potential to reduce soldiers' morale, and thus their Fighting Power, through uncertainty. While the requirements placed on reservists in different divisions should vary, this is overlooked in favour of an overly broad whole-of-Reserve interpretation which does not reflect reality. Policy and strategy make significant demands on a soldiers' Fighting Spirit and Spiritual Foundation, to want to be involved in operations and have faith that it will be worthwhile activity. It also places a demand on both their Individual and Group Efficacy; to believe in their ability to perform across a broad range of tasks.

Intelligent Selection

The type of operation that reservists are used for may also have implications for their perception of choice. While all call-outs are technically compulsory, soldiers do still have some choice; to informally rule themselves out of contention for mobilisation under the principle of 'Intelligent Selection' dependent of the scale or urgency of the requirement.[511] They or their employer may also formally request an exemption or deferment of mobilisation under RFA96. This long-standing principle[512] allows the Army to identify those who are most willing and able to deploy in advance of conducting formal call-out and as such can offer flexibility to individuals, employers, and families. Straying from this principle would only likely be considered in response to the most challenging situations like warfighting. In 2016, General Sir Nick Carter, Chief of the General Staff, revealed that reservists would be free to deploy on operations and exercises if they could spare the time but would not be compelled.[513] This further emphasises the importance of Intelligent Selection as a topic for investigation. Even since the early deployments to Iraq in 2003, it has been recognised that while this principle may offer flexibility to individuals, it may not be presented as such to families and employers. Any call-out may be presented as 'simply' compulsory or demanded by the Army despite the individual 'volunteering' early.[514] Despite the intent of Intelligent Selection to understand the availability of Reserve personnel, access to families and employers, who have a key stake in soldiers' motivation, is mediated by the soldier themselves. While employers can claim material support from the government, this potentially places a burden on families to "just make it work."[515] The implications of this policy of Intelligent Selection are that there is a significant demand placed on soldiers' willingness to be involved in operations as well as the support of external stakeholders. Further, this ability to choose "clashes with the professional identity of the regular soldier" and may undermine integration within the wider force.[516]

Role

Among the types of operations that reservists might deploy on, the roles that they might undertake vary between those of generalist and specialist soldiers, and as individuals or as formed units. Although it states that "reservists will be required, at least in small numbers, for almost all future operations [and] they must be trained to the levels required to perform their roles,"[517] it seems to imply that the Army Reserve should provide a mirror to the regular

[511] MOD (2013), p21; MOD (2015).
[512] NAO (2006), p37; Janes Defence Weekly (2003); BBC (2012).
[513] Carter (2016).
[514] NAO (2006), p37; Woodward et al (2018a); p3.
[515] Catignani et al (2018), p2; Woodward et al (2018b); Catignani and Basham (2020).
[516] Connelly (2021).
[517] MOD (2013), p9.

force in terms of commitment and ability while at the same time exhorting the value of exploiting what makes them different, for instance being able to access civilian skills.[518] Indeed, it outlines the requirement for these "small numbers" to comprise both individuals and formed units, such as those replacing elements of the regular structure[519] and therefore presumably delivering to the same standards. Indeed, when announcing A2020, the Defence Secretary, Philip Hammond, outlined that regulars and reservists would "seamlessly complement each other in an integrated structure."[520]

Generalists or specialists?

While the decision to use Reserves as generalists, providing a mass of soldiers trained to a basic level, or specialists, soldiers trained in specific skills, for specific roles, aligned with civilian vocations, is not clearly outlined in FR20 or A2020, it is evident that the latter was planned for. Soldiers who have been trained as specialists, with a baseline level of soldiering skills, could also be employed on general duties[521] if required whereas the reverse would be harder to implement. Holding reservists for a specific task, where there is a known requirement, is also easier to justify militarily and financially than a large pool of generalists 'just in case.'

The 'specialist' focus is also evident from the organisational structure, by having units with specific roles rather than general workforce. The wider effect of the financial constraints outlined above included removing 12 regular units,[522] disbanding 19 Light Brigade and reducing artillery and tank equipment by around 40%,[523] which endured into 2019.[524] Nine Reserve units were disbanded, three units were given new logistic roles and six new equipment engineering and intelligence units were created.[525] With significant artillery and logistic resources moved into the Reserve, some capabilities would now only be available at longer notice, commensurate with their terms of service.

Under A2020, the Army was being designed such that it would be reliant on the Reserve to not just bring it up to full strength and full capability. Previously they had only been called

[518] MOD (2011), p25.
[519] HOC (2014), EV28.
[520] Hansard (2013)
[521] The notion of "soldier first": tasks such as physical labour, basic combat, or camp guard.
[522] 1 tank regiment, 1 cavalry regiment, 5 infantry battalions, 1 REME battalion, 1 RMP Regiment and 6 regular and 8 reserve RLC regiments were merged with others or disbanded. However, 1 new Gurkha infantry battalion and 2 Reserve Infantry battalions were created.
[523] Akinyemi (2014).
[524] Fisher (2019).
[525] Hansard (2013).

upon when the regular forces could not cope with the demand.[526] A2020 started to develop a strategic purpose for the Army Reserve and to meet it, reservists would need to be available quickly and to perform effectively to integrate with the rest of the force successfully.[527] For instance, the Reserve must now provide a troop or squadron[528] to provide transport in logistic supply units or provide elements of an infantry battalion's support weapons sub-unit,[529] which may mean that a regular unit's is short-handed until reservists can be mobilised. Reservists would therefore be employed in direct support of regulars to fill known gaps, meaning that they may be expected to meet the same standards of commitment and skill. While FR20 does include significant investment for Reserve training and equipment[530] to improve effectiveness and efficacy, as outlined in the Literature Review, applying regular-centric expectations on them is perceived as unrealistic and not optimally effective. This thinking was not widely expanded upon through SDSR15, A2020R and beyond; Reserve units and personnel have been left to 'follow' their same standards of commitment and performance as their regular counterparts. The 2019 changes to the Army further promote this specialist path. With each division given a clearer purpose, it was theoretically easier for Reserve units to train for that purpose within the limited time available.

The increasing integration and inter-reliance of regulars and reserves outlined in FR20 and A2020[531] have increased the demands on specialism, professionalism and commitment in the Army Reserve toward the levels expected of regulars; an issue oft cited by the EST.[532] The specialist/generalist debate appears to focus around the more difficult state to generate, the higher state of training, noting that it is easier to 'downgrade' quickly than 'upgrade.' This places demands on Individual Efficacy and the belief in their ability to deliver to the same professional standards in-trade as regular soldiers. Nevertheless, the added benefits that reservists can bring is when they are "misemployed,"[533] such as Andrew Alderson who was mobilised to a brigade staff but applied his skills as a merchant banker to set up Southern Iraq's Economic Planning and Development Department, or more recently, Eb Mukhtar,[534] who applied his skills as Director of Operations for Google Shopping to the NHS supply chain during the COVID pandemic. In such cases, there is a reliance on Individual Efficacy.

[526] Phillips (2012), p16; Edmunds et al (2016), p121.
[527] HOC (2014), p19, Ev36; Phillips (2012), p20**;** Bury 2018 - P411-412.
[528] Teams of 30-40 (commanded by a Lieutenant) and 100-140 soldiers (commanded by a Major) respectively.
[529] Bury (2017a), p2, 17.
[530] MOD (2013), p20.
[531] HOC (2014), Ev62.
[532] RFCA (2021), p11, 16, 17, 41.
[533] Kirke (2008), p187.
[534] https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/10/major-mukhtar-mbe/

Individuals or Formed Units?

Mobilisation as individuals or formed units may have implications for the Moral Component because it directly relates to the immediate unit around a soldier.[535] FR20 outlines that reservists may be used, "often as small numbers of individuals but also, principally in the Army's case and as the situation demands, as formed sub-units or units."[536] Official announcements on A2020 focussed on the sub-unit role, "ready and able to deploy routinely."[537] This greater emphasis on sub-unit deployments from 2013 onwards places a greater demand on the Moral Component elements of Team Spirit than before. Indeed, that whole parts of regular units had been converted to the Reserve under A2020 suggests that the plan was for complete sub-units of reservists to deploy together. In 2016 Air Vice Marshal Luker of the EST told the Defence Select Committee he was confident that the Army Reserve could deploy complete sub-units if required; "an upward trajectory" per FR20.[538] However, the majority of roles that might require an all-Reserve sub-unit were based around a Warfighting or 'national emergency' scenario, yet this was not what the organisation actually required of them more routinely due to the structural inter-reliance created by SDSR10 and A2020. Furthermore, the sunk cost of regular soldiers' pay makes deploying reservists, who are paid by attendance,[539] less attractive. This means that while the plan may have been for formed units to deploy on operations regularly, the demand for smaller groups of Reserves has endured where gaps cannot be filled in another way.

There is also the question of how reservists are used once mobilised and attached to their regular units. Kirke highlights that regular units would often spread the 'risk' of "second class [Reserve] soldiers"[540] by either splitting them up among regular soldiers to maximise their immediate 'professional' support or by putting whole Reserve units on less demanding tasks until they had proven themselves. Kirke suggests that the former method was more successful for both individuals and the whole because while it did dilute the existing reservist team and command structure, the latter tactic led to complete Reserve teams being and feeling marginalised: "the more complete the TA group the less easy it appeared to be to integrate them into the existing regular unit structure."[541] In both cases, Kirke notes that it took time for Comradeship and Moral Cohesion to develop.[542]

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[535] Edmunds et al (2018) p129; Dandeker et al. (2010), pp 274-275.
[536] MOD (2013), p17.
[537] Hansard (2013).
[538] HOC (2016b).
[539] MOD (2015b); Edmunds et al 92016), p123.
[540] Kirke (2008), p185-186.
[541] Kirke (2008), p185.
[542] Kirke (2008), p186.

The Army Reserve Directorate's 2017 sub-strategy's four tasks: Reinforcement, Resilience, Regeneration and Reconstitution, cover both generalist/specialist and individual/formed unit dichotomies. The first two tasks imply that a reservist may do 'anything an regular can do,' provided that Reserve soldiers can provide an effect in time and that this might be as either 'qualitative;' "giving the British Army easy access, when necessary, to certain skills and capabilities that are difficult to maintain on a full-time basis," or "quantitative" reinforcement; providing individuals, teams, sub-units and even units – of nearly every arm and service… bringing [the Army] up to strength." As with the preceding policy and strategy, it rules little out. The second two tasks rest on subsequent actions during or after a large-scale conflict, though Farrell suggested to the Defence Select Committee that he was "not convinced that Reserves are the right basis for regeneration."[543] The Regeneration task implies that specialists would be generated from the Reserve, either as individuals or formed units. Albeit a worst-case scenario, the Reserve would provide a generalist force from which to rebuild the Army.

The strategy for using reservists as either formed units or individuals (or small groups) is less clear. Again, it is assumed against the more difficult state to attain; that of a cohesive group over individuals, demanding Group Efficacy as well as a sense of cohesion. Combined with the emphasis on specialist skills and the requirement to work with unfamiliar regular soldiers, professionally founded Moral Cohesion is likely to be prized over Comradeship alone.

Predictability

Temporal predictability comprises three aspects: tour length, frequency of deployment and the notice afforded for mobilisation. While FR20 outlines the plan for how reservists might be used, it also recognises the reactive nature of some operations which may require these assumptions to be exceeded.[544]

Length of tour

RFA96, amended by the DRA14,[545] governs the length of time that reservists may be mobilised for. For very serious threats (Section 52/53/53A: "national danger, great emergency or attack on the UK") Reserves may be mobilised for 3-5 years, for Warfighting operations (Section 54/55/55A) they may be mobilised for 12-24 months and for any other purposes (Section 56/57/57A: "Call-out for certain purposes") for 12 months in a rolling 3-

[543] HOC (2014), Ev36-37.
[544] MOD (2013), p20.
[545] HMG (2014).

year period, which may be extended to 18 months with the soldiers' consent. Before 2014, the maximum period for which a reservist could be mobilised under Section 56 was 9 months in a rolling 27-month period.[546] Broadening the freedom to mobilise reserves for less-than-Warfighting activity both indicates and enables the intent to increase their utility. It is reasonable to assume that the longer the deployment, the greater the demand on the Moral Component.

While some requirements will necessarily be reactive to circumstances, FR20 outlines a "worst case" requirement for the Army Reserve to mobilise for one year, including a 6-month deployment[547] suggesting that Reserves are planned to be used under Section 56 of RFA96, for activities short of warfighting or national emergencies. This indicates that while Defence intended to use reserves more routinely, the Army has frequently erred from this when describing the Reserve for emergency use only.

Frequency

While legislation allows for Reserves to deploy for 1 year in every 3, since the early 2000's the MOD had planned to use them up to 1 year in every 5, though this frequency proved hard to abide by given the pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, where by 2005 only 63% (approximately 12,000 of 20,000) of the Territorial Army's trained strength was available for operations.'[548] As Mooney and Crackett put it, the proposition had changed from "'part-time' soldiering (evenings and weekends) to 'short-term' soldiering (bursts of mobilised service)."[549] Nevertheless, the original planning assumption continued into FR20.[550]

The intention was to enable soldiers and employers to predict their military service and plan periods when they might be required at short notice, a key lesson identified in the FR20 consultation period.[551] This predictability was designed to placate the fears of employers, families and reservists themselves that they would be used as pseudo-regulars on an uncontrolled basis given that FR20 intended to "ask more of reserve personnel… more frequently and with considerably less flexibility for individual circumstances than has been the case in the past."[552] Despite the reliability that this was designed to offer, in 2014 the

[546] HMG (2014), Sect 45.
[547] MOD (2013), p19; HOC (2014), Ev25.
[548] NAO (2006), p25.
[549] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p86.
[550] MOD (2013), p19; HOC (2014), Ev25.
[551] MOD (2013), p21, 41.
[552] Edmunds et al (2016), p128.

Army erred from this policy (in General Carter's Radio 4 interview) on the grounds that even this tempo may undermine recruiting as well as public and employer support.[553]

While the original FR20 aspiration for reservists to deploy up to 1 year in 5 aligned with the Army's original 2011 plan comprising five multi-role brigades each with their own support elements, under the 2012 A2020 plan, this proposition was already less sustainable, let alone by the time General Carter spoke in 2014. To meet this aspiration, the Army planned to hold its units on a rotating cycle of 'readiness' so that if an operation occurred there was some indication of who would be first to be used and introduce some predictability. Under FR20, it was intended that reservists would be given at least 1 year's notice of being held at this shorter notice.[554]

Reserve units which were paired with regular counterparts within the A2020 structure and prepared for operations on a rotating cycle of 1 'readiness year' in 3 (which had not had the opportunity for even one complete cycle before it changed), were left without the surety of that rotation. The structure remaining after A2020R could only sustain a two-step, two-year cycle for some formations, meaning that soldiers might be nominated over a two-year period, more intense than the original FR20 proposition intended. One implication of speeding up the cycle of readiness is that it increased the potential for the Reserve to be used for unplanned, short-notice commitments, something that the British Army's Centre for Historical Analysis and Conflict Research identified as "beyond the ability of the UK to arrange"[555] and likely to pressurise relationships between soldiers, their employers and their families.

Notice period

FR20's intent to broaden the range of operations that Reserves might participate in, as outlined above, also broadened the notice period at which they might be called-out; from "short-notice contingency operations to longer term enduring operations"[556] where the repeating demands make them easier to predict.

The MOD have aspired to provide 28 days' notice for Reserve mobilisation[557] even before FR20.[558] The Independent Commission identified this notice period before call-out as particularly important for MOD-employer relationships and recently, Defence policy was to

[553] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p88.
[554] FR20 (2013), p51.
[555] CHACR (2015), p28.
[556] MOD (2013), p17.
[557] MOD (2013), p21.
[558] NAO (2006), p15.

give 90 days' notice of mobilisation for a planned operation and where possible to give 28 days' notice for un-planned operations.[559] Where these timelines are not sufficient and the demand is below that of a national emergency (Section 52) or Warfighting (Section 54), Intelligent Selection may be used to determine those soldiers who are available at shorter notice.

Though FR20 notes that reservists must be "available when required,[560] that they have replaced regulars in the Army structure increases the demands on those soldiers to perform. While not even all regular units are expected to be available and ready immediately, reservists may be required at shorter notice than previously expected;[561] implying that they must deliver on equivalent levels of professionalism and commitment. In turn, this may have an impact on what draws those bodies of soldiers together, from social bonds to increasingly professional or vocational bonds.

While inferences might be made about the notice that is likely to be available to different Army Reserve units within different formations under the 2019 Army structure, with, for instance, units in 3 Division preparing for Warfighting with a likely long lead time, the reality is that any notice period will be largely based on the situation. Attempts at time bounding did not survive implementation within A2020 and subsequent iterations and reservists cannot necessarily rely on any programmed periods of higher priority for mobilisation, and it is much more likely that they will be called-out at short notice. Current strategy demands that reservists be "like regulars" in many respects; highly flexible, ready for almost any task, at short notice and with a high degree of professional knowledge and understanding. This makes the Army Reserve more like a second career, even beyond the "serious leisure"[562] concept. This aligns with the Defence vision for Reserves as part of a Whole Force, but under operational stress the Army strategy is less able to reconcile that they are less available and have different expectations of commitment. This may cause friction where the Psychological Contract is mal-aligned and soldiers must decide whether to prioritise military service over families and employers.

Part 2 – Cases

Part 2 of this chapter intends to illustrate the characteristics of recent Army Reserve deployments, which may set a precedent that diverges from the policy and strategy outlined

[559] MOD (2015).
[560] MOD (2013), p13.
[561] Edmunds et al (2016), p121, 123.
[562] Catignani and Basham (2020).

in Part 1; Part 3 will then synthesise policy and practice. Given the vaguely defined role and time boundaries for reservists outlined in Part 1, actual use may further help to indicate the required Moral Component of Fighting Power in the Reserve. Indeed, actual use may have a greater effect on the perception of soldiers and will develop habits beyond the strategic plan to become the lived reality. The operations described are those which require a physical deployment, noting that some cyber activity could be conducted from one's home. Scale is not necessarily the issue but the cause or justification for deployment, the length of time and the risk involved to personnel will impact on individuals, teams, leaders, employers, families, and the public's perceptions.

The cases of Operation RESCRIPT (2020) and Operation TOSCA (enduring) comprise 60% of the total mobilised personnel 2013/14 – 2020/21, but also contain characteristics common to other operations. These are diverse cases[563] designed to show the variation across all characteristics; type[564], role and predictability, within the Army Reserve universe based on the criteria used in Part 1. Operation type is the primary defining factor for these cases because of the way the MOD present the universe data (see Tables 3.3 and 3.4); by operation name, from which the type can be determined, though operations of the same type may have distinct characteristics in role and predictability. The characteristics of these operations may have an impact on soldiers' expectations within the Moral Component Model.

The first case, Operation RESCRIPT, was a MACA operation that saw around 2000 Reserves mobilised at short notice for service in the UK in response to COVID-19. It is an example of the operation type involving the most soldiers (39%) within the universe and further, provides a recent example for which the author can provide significant, otherwise unrecorded, background knowledge,[565] on which reservists deployed in generalist roles in formed units at short notice. The second case is Operation TOSCA, a long running peacekeeping operation in Cyprus which is an example of the second most prevalent operation type (21%), but also shares characteristics with other predictable enduring operations of other types, on which reservists usually deploy as augmentees to a regular unit, either as generalists or for their special skills, such as engineers or medics. Again, the author has first-hand experience of deploying on this Operation.

[563] Gerring (2009).
[564] As outlined in doctrine: Warfighting overseas, homeland resilience, security and peace support, and Defence engagement (MOD (2017), p8c2.
[565] See Chapter 2 – "The Researcher in the Research" for Author's background.

Neither of the operations above might be considered objectively 'high risk' and therefore may exclude part of what the Reserve may be called upon to do, this does reflect the recent universe of cases outlined in Table 4.3. While the operations in Iraq or Afghanistan were examples of the warfighting/security operations, the mode type of operation for which reservists were mobilised 2007-2021 and tasks that represent the most demanding end of what soldiers may be called upon to do (see Table 4.4), these operations occurred before the formation of the Army Reserve in 2014. Similarly, the mobilisation for operations in Iraq in 2003, the largest since the Suez Crisis in 1956[566] is also out of scope. That these types of operation have not re-emerged in recent years illustrates that they, in practice, may be diminishing due to the lack of political will to involve the UK Armed Forces in such conflicts or that there is currently relatively low political will to deploy the Reserve on riskier operations where regulars are available.

Universe of cases

The universe of cases is outlined below and covers 2013/14 - 2020/21. In most cases, reservists will have formed only part of the force alongside regular soldiers. While the strategy outlined in Part 1 commences in 2010 with SDSR10, the data universe starts in 2013/14 (see Table 4.3) to encompass the initial execution of A2020, announced in June 2012, the delivery of the FR20 report in June 2013 and subsequent developments.

The universe comprises 12 named operations and an unspecified number of unnamed operations[567] across a period of 8 years between 1 April 2013 and 31 March 2021, during which 6240 Reserves were mobilised. Some of these operations commenced before 2007 and therefore may have a legacy that affects the period for which these data are available, though political will more than legacy will affect their use in the future. To contextualise, while 7-9% of Reserves in the organisation[568] served on operations between 2007 and 2012 (assumed), [569] to a high point of 16% in 2012/2013 due to Operation OLYMPICS,[570] the Reserve was comparatively seldom used (1-4% of strength) thereafter. The reality for Reserve soldiers is that until the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic caused a surge in demand

[566] NAO (2006), p8.
[567] Each operation will certainly have been 'named' for reference, but those names are not broken out separately in the data from MOD.
[568] Compared with total numbers in the organisation: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2020
[569] The military's computerised administration system, Joint Personnel Administration (JPA), was only introduced to the Army in June 2007 therefore annual personnel and mobilisation data not available before 2007 but other sources suggests that the mobilisation and size demand was driven by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.
[570] Where the military supported the UK's presentation of the Games at short notice due to contractor failure.

(Operation RESCRIPT), they were only half as likely to be mobilised after the Army Reserve and its 'frequent use' operational Reserve narrative was created in 2014 than during the six years that preceded it under the Territorial Army. This means that the frequency for deployment is not particularly high when compared to the FR20 benchmark of 1 deployment in 5 years, especially when it is likely that these operations were also likely to be subject to Intelligent Selection. In part, this is due to the end of operations in Afghanistan (Operation HERRICK) which employed at least 500 Reserve soldiers per year and Iraq (Operation TELIC), which initially employed over 3000 part-time soldiers every 6 months, coinciding with the A2020 announcements. Successive British governments have been cautious to repeat lengthy military campaigns and as such the opportunity for reservists to participate could be reduced. This relative dearth of experience, combined with long Reserve careers, suggests that many of its current personnel will have participated in operations as part of the Territorial Army, and not as part of the Army Reserve and that the legacy of those deployments within a 'slow changing' organisation may still affect the Army Reserve today.

Of the operations conducted 2013-2021 (see Table 4.2) MACA forms 39% of the Reserve's operational commitments, though appearing inconsistently as spikes in demand, and Peacekeeping forms 21%, more consistent year to year. While Warfighting and security operations formed the greatest commitment for reserves 2007-2021 overall, this demand was diminishing by the time A2020 and FR20 were announced and the Army Reserve was created and therefore represents only 9% of the demand 2013-2021. Humanitarian response (1%), Training Support (6%) and NATO operations (1%) comprise a small proportion of commitments, though the small numbers committed may not fully explain their impact on the operation, which itself may be a small endeavour. For instance, while Operation GRITROCK to Sierra Leone only required 60 Reserve personnel, the Operation was short and only required around 900 personnel in total[571], meaning that while only 0.3% of all Reserves mobilised for it in a year, they comprised nearly 7% of the Operation.

Table 4.2 – Summary of mobilisation by operation type

Operation type[572]	Numbers mobilised 1 Apr 2013 – 31 Mar 2021	% of all mobilisations
Peacekeeping (UN&EU)	1320	21%
Humanitarian	60	1%
Security Operations	540	9%
MACA	2470	39%

[571] Imperial War Museum.
[572] These broadly align with the types of operation outlined in Army Doctrine - MOD (2017), p8c2.

Training Support	370	6%
NATO	70	1%
Other	1480	23%
Total	**6310**	

This suggests that, alongside the broad demands on the Army Reserve, the Army has still mobilised smaller groups of specialists in small numbers to deliver critical qualitative effects. While 'other' or unnamed operations comprise nearly one quarter of all mobilisations in this period, these are not disaggregated and cannot be identified,[573] and form an inconsistent pattern of annual mobilisation demand, fluctuating between 90 and 360 per year. The same principle may apply as for the Operation GRITROCK example. Though these deployments cannot be identified, and each separate operation may be quite small, the effect that reservists had may have been significant. While this thesis does not question the impact that Reserves have on operations, only the demands placed on them, such questions could only be addressed by considering the wider universe of all operational deployments, regular and Reserve. Furthermore, there is an inherent bias that by basing these case studies on named, identifiable operations which are generally larger, and may require formed units to create the mass to make them 'worth' naming in the statistics, the multitude of small operations in the universe where Reserve specialists apply their civilian profession to their military work may be overlooked. As these data come from the MOD in the first instance, it may indicate that they are systemically more interested in the presentation of mass rather than effect which is harder to describe.

[573] They may be personnel serving on the name operations but incorrectly recorded or may be the result of other 'few large' or 'many small,' but otherwise unnamed operations.

Table 4.3 – Universe of Cases 2013-2021 by operation

Number of Army Reserves mobilised by Operation name												
1st April 2013 - 31st March 2021												
			Year of mobilisation									
Operation name	**Country**	**Description**	**2013/14**	**2014/15**	**2015/16**	**2016/17**	**2017/18**	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	**2020/21**	**Total**	**%**
Total Mobilised Reserves		**Total number mobilised in year**	860	540	360	580	190	250	770	**2690**	**6240**	
		%	14%	9%	6%	9%	3%	4%	12%	43%		
Op TOSCA	Cyprus	UN Peacekeeping [2 deployments per year]	110	100	150	200	0	10	220	250	**1040**	**17%**
Op HERRICK	Afganistan	Security operations and training to local military [2 deployments per year]	490	50	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**540**	**9%**
Op GRITROCK	Sierra Leone	Humanitarian and medical response to Ebola outbreak	-	60	0	-	-	-	-	**0**	**60**	**1%**
Op FALKLANDS	Falkland Islands	Routine defence garrison of Falkland Islands [2 deployments per year]	-	-	10	80	0	0	10	**10**	**110**	**2%**
Op COMET	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (UK Commonwealth Games)	-	160	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**160**	**3%**
Op PITCHPOLE	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities in case of floods	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**10**	**0%**
Op CABRIT	Estonia	NATO support [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	0	0	20	20	**30**	**70**	**1%**
Op ELGIN	Bosnia	Peacekeeping (UK contribution to EU security force in Balkans) [2 deployments per year]	-	20	0	0	20	40	20	**30**	**130**	**2%**
Op TRENTON	South Sudan	UN Peacekeeping (engineering and medical) [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	0	40	50	60	**0**	**150**	**2%**
Op SHADER	Iraq	Training support to local military [2 deployments per year]	-	0	20	30	10	20	20	**30**	**130**	**2%**
Op TORAL	Afganistan	Training support to local military [2 deployments per year]	-	30	50	20	20	20	60	**40**	**240**	**4%**
Op RESCRIPT/BROADSHARE	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (COVID-19 response)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**2300**	**2300**	**37%**
Other Operation			40	40	40	50	20	40	70	**40**	**340**	**5%**
No named Operation			210	80	80	180	70	50	290	**70**	**1030**	**17%**
Reserves https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2020			**19928**	**20061**	**21026**	**23028**	**26657**	**26957**	**27072**	**27304**		
		% of personnel mobilised	**4%**	**3%**	**2%**	**3%**	**1%**	**1%**	**3%**	**10%**		

Notes:
-Source: Defence Statistics (Tri Service)
-In "white/plain" from Defence Statistics, grey = provisional data, **Bold** = my analysis, *italics* = assumed data
-The figures by Operation name are estimates and should be treated as indicative only.
-Some of those with no named operation may have been mobilised for one of the named operations, but the information was not recorded on JPA.
-Figures in this table have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in a "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent the systematic bias caused by always rounding numbers upwards.

Table 4.4 – Mobilisation data 2007-2021 by operation

Number of Army Reserves mobilised by Operation name																		
1st April 2007 - 31st March 2021																		
			Year of mobilisation															
Operation name	**Country**	**Description**	**2007/08**	**2008/09**	**2009/10**	**2010/11**	**2011/12**	**2012/13**	**2013/14**	**2014/15**	**2015/16**	**2016/17**	**2017/18**	**2018/19**	**2019/20**	**2020/21**	**Total**	**%**
Total Mobilised Reserves		**Total number mobilised in year**	1700	1650	1560	1630	1430	3180	860	540	360	580	190	250	770	**2690**	**17390**	
		%	10%	9%	9%	9%	8%	18%	5%	3%	2%	3%	1%	1%	4%	15%		
Op TOSCA	Cyprus	UN Peacekeeping [2 deployments per year]	30	240	240	220	100	190	110	100	150	200	0	10	220	250	**2060**	**12%**
Op TELIC	Iraq	War fighting then security operations and training to local military [2 deployments per year]	200	150	20	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**380**	**2%**
Op HERRICK	Afganistan	Security operations and training to local military [2 deployments per year]	890	850	680	590	490	480	490	50	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**4520**	**26%**
Op GRITROCK	Sierra Leone	Humanitarian and medical response to Ebola outbreak	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	60	0	-	-	-	-	**0**	**60**	**0%**
Op FALKLANDS	Falkland Islands	Routine defence garrison of Falkland Islands [2 deployments per year]	-	-	0	0	0	-	-	-	10	80	0	0	10	**10**	**110**	**1%**
Op COMET	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (UK Commonwealth Games)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	160	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**160**	**1%**
Op OLYMPICS	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (UK Olympics) [1 month]	-	-	-	-	-	1630	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**1630**	**9%**
Op PITCHPOLE	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities in case of floods	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	**0**	**10**	**0%**
Op CABRIT	Estonia	NATO support [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	0	20	20	**30**	**70**	**0%**
Op ELGIN	Bosnia	Peacekeeping (UK contribution to EU security force in Balkans) [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	20	0	0	20	40	20	**30**	**130**	**1%**
Op TRENTON	South Sudan	UN Peacekeeping (engineering and medical) [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	40	50	60	**0**	**150**	**1%**
Op SHADER	Iraq	Training support to local military [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0	20	30	10	20	20	**30**	**130**	**1%**
Op TORAL	Afganistan	Training support to local military [2 deployments per year]	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	30	50	20	20	20	60	**40**	**240**	**1%**
Op RESCRIPT/BROADSHARE	UK	Military Aid to Civilian Authorities (COVID-19 response)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	**2300**	**2300**	**13%**
Other Operation			50	50	30	30	60	30	40	40	40	50	20	40	70	**40**	**590**	**3%**
No named Operation			520	360	600	790	780	850	210	80	80	180	70	50	290	**70**	**4930**	**28%**
Reserves https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/quarterly-service-personnel-statistics-2020			*19990*	*19990*	*19990*	*19990*	*19990*	**19998**	**19928**	**20061**	**21026**	**23028**	**26657**	**26957**	**27072**	**27304**		
		% of personnel mobilised	*9%*	*8%*	*8%*	*8%*	*7%*	**16%**	**4%**	**3%**	**2%**	**3%**	**1%**	**1%**	**3%**	**10%**		

Notes:
-Source: Defence Statistics (Tri Service)
-In "white/plain" from Defence Statistics, grey = provisional data, **Bold** = my analysis, *italics* = assumed data
-The figures by Operation name are estimates and should be treated as indicative only.
-Some of those with no named operation may have been mobilised for one of the named operations, but the information was not recorded on JPA.
-Figures in this table have been rounded to the nearest 10, though numbers ending in a "5" have been rounded to the nearest multiple of 20 to prevent the systematic bias caused by always rounding numbers upwards.

Case 1 – OPERATION RESCRIPT (March – September 2020)

In late January 2020 the disease COVID-19 arrived in the UK. The virus had been tracking around the world from China since December 2019 and the response to the UK's 'first wave' in March 2020 eventually led to a national 'lockdown,' where non-essential businesses closed, and people were told to distance themselves from those outside their households. The number of cases that required hospitalisation stretched the NHS and other care providers, and there was a surge in demand for Personal Protective Equipment. Defence was directed to support other government departments under the regulations for MACA, called Operation RESCRIPT. In Spring 2020, the virus was poorly understood and consequently the requirement for the military was unclear and dynamic. Initial estimates suggested that up to 40,000 soldiers might be required to support other departments, later reduced to around 20,000. Initially around 2000 Reserves were mobilised under Section 56 of RFA96 to support the national effort,[574] the largest MACA demand since Operation OLYMPICS in 2013 (1630 soldiers mobilised). This operation occurred against a backdrop of atypical social and economic conditions which caveat some observations from it.

Operation type

The first indication to units that Reserves might be called-out was on 16 March 2020[575] when the Army had to determine how many Reserve units and soldiers would be available for mobilisation under the principle of Intelligent Selection, which would filter out those who were not personally available, as well as those considered to be 'Key Workers'[576] who should not be removed from their civilian work. In the event, many more Reserve units and individuals than required offered themselves for service; there was a significant swell of enthusiasm to 'be involved' from all quarters of the Army Reserve at a scale that was not required at that time.

As a Homeland Resilience task providing service to one's local community, it was legally and morally non-contentious. Despite the presence of the virus, it was not an objectively risky operation, at least not greater than the base level of risk to ordinary people in the UK. Perhaps the clearest observation is that this was an operation, something to do, when other employers and most recreation were facilities closed, as well as being a chance to volunteer to help country and community.

[574] Heappey (2020); Wallace (20200.
[575] Official notice of the call-out order was published on 19 March 2020.
[576] E.g., Emergency Services and transport workers. The criteria for key workers were not clearly defined and could never be exhaustive.

Role

The operational demand for the Reserve was split into COVID Support Forces (CSF), formed units which would conduct tasks on the ground, and Individual Augmentation (IA), who would provide support to headquarters and other government departments, though the details were ever-changing and the detail of when and for what tasks often unclear.[577]

Most Reserves, both units and individuals, were required in generalist roles ready to provide mass support local communities. Even those who were mobilised as individuals were mostly as generalist military planners, though with some notable exceptions who were able to use their civilian skills in support of the response.[578] The prohibition against mobilising Key Workers meant that many of those who might have been mobilised as specialists were excluded. Under MACA provisions, reservists are usually only mobilised for specific tasks but the scale and unknown nature of the threat in 2020 meant that they were mobilised in advance of these tasks being clear and indeed before the specific requirement to commit them to MACA had been confirmed, to ensure their availability at shorter notice than would be possible if they were not yet in permanent service.

Predictability

Between 18 and 26 March a novel mobilisation process was developed, to move the conduct away from a centralised location of experts into ordinary unit locations. This involved taking risks in some areas of the process and imposed some capacity limits to ensure that they could be processed correctly. The model was agreed for use on 26 March, with orders issued the same day for the first units to mobilise on 31 March, only five days later, around two weeks after the initial scoping began. This unpredictability may be in common with other MACA demands which will also likely arise at short notice. For the military to be useful, they must deliver an effect quickly to allow civilian authorities time to meet the demand using more routine or contracted resources in the longer term, such as with Operation OLYMPICS and flooding response.[579]

Around 1500 Army reservists were mobilised this way over a two-week period, albeit for an undefined set of tasks on the assumption that the worst of the situation was yet to emerge.

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[577] Including constructing and staffing temporary medical facilities, transporting patients, distributing supplies, conducting virus testing and providing planning advice to civilian agencies.
[578] E.g., the Head of Operations for Google's European, Middle East and Africa Shopping Division. https://www.army.mod.uk/news-and-events/news/2020/10/major-mukhtar-mbe/
[579] Under the principles of MACA, other options should be used in preference to the Armed Forces if time and resources allow. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/2015-to-2020-government-policy-military-aid-to-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk/2015-to-2020-government-policy-military-aid-to-the-civil-authorities-for-activities-in-the-uk

In mobilising these reservists for unknown tasks for an unknown about of time, the Army made a clear 'offer' and committed to mobilise Reserves for a minimum of 3 months, from April to June, rather than demobilising them with "all convenient speed" as required by policy once the demand had receded. The intent here was to reciprocate the commitment of those who had volunteered to serve by not being seen to "mess them around." Some individuals were mobilised for 6 months, and others longer still where they volunteered to remain in their role.

While individual reservists were embedded within civilian organisations in short-order, the Reserve CSF sub-units were largely unused for two months until late May, when, with the situation under greater control and the prospect of a short-notice mass demand on military units diminishing, they were put onto tasks to replace the regulars who had been employed initially. Most Reserve CSF were employed for around one month until demobilised, though some remained employed until August. During this mobilisation time, regular soldiers were used to deliver mobile testing units and immediate assistance to hospital construction.

Aftermath

By September, most Reserves had demobilised, and the Army faced a much lower demand, albeit with the prospect of a winter COVID resurgence, Brexit transition and seasonal events lined alongside routine operational activity. The legacy of Operation RESCRIPT was, in the short term at least, the novel model of mobilisation used, dubbed 'Distributed Mobilisation.' While having personnel brought into permanent service in their own unit locations rather than at a 'centre of excellence' in Nottinghamshire was expedient at the time, it was loaded with administrative risks which would not ordinarily have been tolerated.[580] That the routine mechanisms for mobilisation were geared around individuals and small groups mobilising in a central location with at least 1 months' notice, rather than large numbers at short notice also indicates that, in the first place, the Army did not plan to use the Reserve in large cohorts, nor at short notice despite being forced to do so here.

The groundswell of opinion from within the ranks was that the model should be the default method despite the consequences, inherent risks and the lack of supporting machinery. The Army's refusal to do this immediately may have been seen as a slight of trust in them and a desire to keep centralised control. For them, Distributed Mobilisation allowed Reserves to

[580] The Mission Training and Mobilisation Centre was set up in the late 1990's to ensure that, among other things, the administrative side of mobilisation was conducted correctly first-time, every time. This is not an unreasonable expectation but the delegation of these tasks to staff who were not familiar with the process led to some errors and an unsustainable assurance burden on the staff who would have conducted it centrally anyway.

prove their usefulness to the regular force; that they could be ready in permanent service quickly.

Case 2 – Operation TOSCA (ongoing)

Operation TOSCA is the UK's Peacekeeping contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) which has kept opposing Greek Cypriot and Turkish troops separate since 1974.[581] While UN forces are no not routinely armed, no peace agreement has been signed by the two sides. The UK provides the Mobile Force Reserve,[582] Military Police, and is also responsible for Sector 2 of the Buffer Zone which runs for 30 kilometres through Nicosia city-centre as well as agricultural and development areas outside of the city. It is an area where the 'frozen' war is further complicated by the desire of many residents to get on with their lives; the buffer zone is often contested by local civilians as much as by opposing armed forces.

Operation type

While the Operation itself may be perceived as minimal risk given the decades long ceasefire[583] and the island's status as a tourist destination, the terrain and conflict are complex. As a Peacekeeping operation, with international legal and moral authority, it may be considered a fundamentally 'good' operation. It is a well-established operation with significant infrastructure in an EU state and therefore would not be considered an austere environment. In practical terms it is a five-hour flight from the UK, is usually significantly hotter and operates 2 hours ahead of UK time making it moderately cognitively and physically remote from the UK, especially for a prolonged time. Mobilisation for Operation TOSCA is usually under Section 56 of RFA96 and subject to Intelligent Selection of personnel.[584]

Role

The UK's operation itself primarily requires general military skills rather than specialists as the tasks while deployed do not need a specific trade or equipment, though it was originally an infantry and mounted reconnaissance mission.[585] Units from across the Army have deployed on Operation TOSCA recently including artillery, engineer and logistics units; regular and Reserve. In this respect it is atypical from other Peacekeeping operations such as Operation TRENTON in South Sudan which made use of the UK's pedigree in military

[581] MOD (2011c)
[582] A sub-unit of around 100 soldiers, commanded by a Major, which can be used to reinforce any part of the Mission's work.
[583] Not all peace keeping missions could be considered as such. See https://Peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities.
[584] e.g. Howe (2015).
[585] Some specialists like medics and engineers do make up a small part of the Force.

engineering and medical specialists, or Operation ELGIN in the Balkans to which the UK commits intelligence specialists, which other nations may not have. The scale of Reserve involvement in the 250-strong force (2 deployments per year requires around 500 soldiers each year) has varied between 2013 and 2021. Concurrent with the demand of Operation HERRICK and the immediate aftermath, during which the Army was still attempting to reorganise in line with A2020, reservists provided 20-40% of the force. At this scale it is likely that smaller teams of Reserves were employed to augment regular units, either as part of the main force or as specialist force enablers such as chefs and medics, rather than formed sub-units with their own integral command structure. 2017-2019, the Reserve contributed few to Operation TOSCA when, anecdotally, there were few commitments for the Army overall. Reservists were re-introduced in larger numbers to Operation TOSCA in 2019/20 where they have contributed around 50% of the annual requirement including two consecutive 'all Reserve' deployments in 2020.[586] The model of 'fluctuating' Reserve contributions may continue dependent on wider demands on the Army. Of note, these two mobilisations were not conducted at the usual centralised location, but in a novel manner within the units' training locations. That an *ad-hoc* process was used to bring these larger formed-units into permanent service suggests that, as with Operation RESCRIPT, the Army did not expect nor ordinarily resource large scale mobilisation.

While this development appears to mark the culmination of the FR20 proposition to deploy complete units,[587] in both cases a composite unit was created from two infantry battalions, meaning that a significant pool of forces was required to create one contingent of around 230 reservists; a ratio of around four to one.[588] This ratio does not indicate that the Reserve is fully ready to deploy full-size units on operations based on its current structure, for an operation that falls significantly short of the 'national emergency only' principle outlined by General Carter in 2014. It does, however, suggest that the less ambitious FR20 proposal and the A2020 and A2020R plans to mobilise up to sub-unit size are realistic in the right circumstances, as highlighted by Air Vice Marshal Luker to the Defence Select Committee when discussing SDSR15 in 2016.[589]

[586] Though both deploying to Cyprus in the calendar year 2020, they were mobilised in consecutive financial years, 2019/20 and 2020/21.
[587] MOD (2013), p18.
[588] The first deployment of around 250 soldiers combined 7th Battalion The Rifles and 5th Battalion Royal Regiment of Fusiliers and the second combined 6th Battalion The Rifles with 2nd Battalion Royal Irish Regiment.
[589] HOC (2016b), Q106.

Predictability

There may be a significant appeal in using reservists for the more predictable Operation TOSCA and leaving potentially more flexible regular troops for other tasks. While a single operation case study cannot indicate the broader frequency of operations placed on the Reserve, the regularity of Operation TOSCA should make it easy to plan and assign forces to in advance. Theoretically, at least 12-18 months' notice of this commitment can be given to units and soldiers, with a period of months rather than weeks feasible for formal notification of mobilisation. Indeed, this lead time is required in advance to enable a predictable mobilisation period of around 11 months, comprising 3 months' pre-deployment training on top of that which may be conducted before permanent service, 6 months on the operation and 2-3 months of accrued leave allowances on return home. While stakeholders may baulk at the 11–12-month commitment to the Army, the regularity and predictability provides significant confidence when compared with more unpredictable operations.

Summary

These two cases encompass more than 3000 of the 6200 Reserves mobilised between 2013 and 2021. A consistent factor between them is that there is low inherent risk in the types of operations that reservists are used for, with regulars used where the threat to life is greater and conditions more austere. They are also both uncontroversial operation types. This may reflect both a diminished political appetite in the UK to involve any armed forces in 'risky' operations but also, where they are undertaken, to avoid using the Reserve for them.

Despite being structured for military specialists within their Warfighting roles, these cases suggest that the greater part of their use has been as generalist formed units. Specialist employment has been limited to individuals utilising a professional skill or else reserved for pseudo-Warfighting or NATO support (such as Operation CABRIT) where small groups of reservists support regular forces. While planned operations such as Operation TOSCA are apt to provide temporal predictability, the nature of MACA tasks makes them unpredictable and the scale of the demand for Operation RESCRIPT would have exceeded the availability of any Reserve units that might have been in a duty rotation at the time, meaning that those off-duty (e.g. not in their 'task' year) would have been approached anyway.

Both cases highlight that the mechanisms for mobilising forces for the gamut of tasks outlined in FR20, A2020 and senior officers' statements at a large scale are not fully developed. While processes exist to deliver on the most-likely activity at a small scale and long notice, that a long notice is required to prepare the Reserve soldiers who might deploy on a predictable deployment like Operation TOSCA, let alone the system stress caused by

an ‘emergency’ or high demand scenario like Operation RESCRIPT, suggests that the Army Reserve is some way off meeting the aspirations of full integration outlined in policy and strategy.

Part 3 – Moral Component demand – Policy, Strategy and Precedent

This Part of Chapter 4 will outline the demands placed on the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power by policy and strategy, and precedent, before going on to highlight where tensions exist between organisational plans and reality. It is here where friction between organisation and soldier may occur and thus where the most effective areas to investigate the Army Reserve's Moral Component may be.

The demands of and frictions with policy, strategy, and precedent

While policy and strategy do not clearly outline the demands placed on Reserve units, when combined with the way that the Army is organised and the way that they have been used, illustrated by the cases, some inferences can be made as to the Moral Component requirement. Policy and precedent make broad demands on reservists across the Moral Component Model, but some elements are more salient: especially Fighting Spirit, Employer Support and Family Support. These are outlined in more detail below using the operation type-role-predictability framework.

A clear summary of what FR20 intended to demand of Reserve soldiers comes in the form of a vignette set in 2020 from the fictitious Corporal Steve Gray,[590] though not focussed on mobilisation. With an underlying tone of positive Fighting Spirit, this outlines that mobilisation is intended to be predictable, recognising the wider life commitments of a Reserve soldier as part of the Spiritual Foundation, and be inherently linked with regular counterparts, developing Moral Cohesion between them. His employer and family would actively support his deployment and he would receive training to give him the confidence to perform while deployed with his friends and comrades. He would receive Occupational Benefits in the form of skills that he could use in his civilian career and have an unrivalled opportunity to be challenged and undertake worthwhile tasks to be proud of. The cases illustrate that the Army Reserve has been used in a way that is like this, though the focus on Occupational Benefit (skills) is not borne out by wider policy or the cases, nor is Moral Cohesion with regular soldiers fully developed.

However, policy and strategy do not necessarily directly translate into action and the challenges of organisational reality and inertia, and operational demands imposed upon the organisation may not neatly correspond.

[590] MOD (2013), p30.

The increased demand placed on reservists by FR20 and A2020 has been likened to the way the USA uses its reserve forces; described as overambitious in the UK context. In 2014 Farrell suggested to the Defence Select Committee that by using the US Army Reserve and National Guard as references for the UK's own Army Reserve, the MOD is misunderstanding a key cultural difference between the countries:

> "The United States is at war and has been for over a decade. People believe that they are going off to war, and that is the culture in the population, so they are prepared to mobilise and to go overseas for long stretches. Their families tolerate that, and it is valued by society. Here in Britain, we do not talk about being at war; we talk about being on campaign, so we must fundamentally change how people view current campaigns and military service. That requires political engagement at the highest level—by the Prime Minister—but as yet we have not seen that."[591]

Speaking toward the end of the UK's major involvement in campaigns in Afghanistan, he suggested that if, as in the FR20 and A2020 plans, reservists will be required to deploy on operations, potentially at short notice and potentially for long periods of time, there must be a change in the way that part-time military service is perceived by soldiers and the public. To develop Reserve soldiers who will accept this kind of frequency and possibly 'high risk' requires a more militaristic culture throughout society to enable it. Farrell's 2014 inference is that this did not exist within the Army or wider society and that it would take time to develop. The routine use of reserves is still perceived as novel for individuals, families and employers despite the additional support provided by law and policy; it is still perceived in some quarters that 'resorting' to the Reserve,[592] as opposed to deliberately choosing them is proof of failure on the part of the government to properly resource Defence. As previously noted, until this is normalised the Moral Component of Fighting Power may be out of step with policy and strategy, and indeed the Physical and Conceptual Components of Fighting Power. This mal-alignment was identified by Bury in 2018, where reservists perceived that they could not deliver on the increasing demands of FR20 and A2020R.[593] This is not surprising given the level of amendment to the original A2020 plan against a static FR20 policy.

Operation Type

Liability for all types of operation requires flexibility and with such a broad remit requires soldiers to judge what they are doing as inherently worthwhile. Without a specific mission in mind, a Spiritual Foundation must exist in the sense that soldiers trust the organisation to provide the means to serve a higher cause. Both cases described are likely to have

[591] Professor Theo Farrell in: HOC (2014), EV41.
[592] Giannangeli (2020), p22.
[593] Bury (2018), p411.

garnered Public Support and reinforced soldiers' sense of Pride and their Spiritual Foundation; when soldiers are used for 'good,' their general perception of service may be improved. In the case of Operation RESCRIPT, this manifested as an appeal to national community, something that was easy to have Pride in. Intelligent Selection, as employed in the cases described, demands Fighting Spirit, Self-Discipline, Employer, and Family Support. For Operation RESCRIPT, a non-contentious operation, Fighting Spirit and Pride may have been felt among soldiers quite readily, and given that most reservists, less Key Workers, would be removed from civilian payrolls at a time of financial uncertainty, Employer Support may have been forthcoming. Family Support may have been harder to secure. Worries about getting sick, along with the reduction in social and recreational activity may have made the prospect of losing a family member to military tasks for an unknown amount of time unappealing. Without the societal and economic conditions imposed by the virus, the willingness and patience of mobilised reserves and other stakeholders may have been different and cannot be guaranteed for subsequent MACA or other operations. Compulsion remains a potential tool but throughout it is planned that Fighting Spirit and Self-Discipline will prevail, negating the need for Compulsion to deliver Fighting Power.

Nevertheless, Intelligent Selection demands a great deal of soldiers' Fighting Spirit, their willingness to mobilise, borne out by the recent cases.[594] Each case tacitly embeds the 'right to individual choice,' as volunteers in all circumstances, rather than a 'privilege' afforded by Defence where circumstances allow. Here policy and practice align, though the precedent of "volunteering twice" could undermine the requirement for general mobilisation in an emergency or Warfighting scenario, on which Army planning has been based. This may lead to an increased reliance on Compulsion in the future if the Army is to get the soldiers it needs. Mobilisation and deployment are avoidable in most situations and Reserve soldiers may have developed a habit whereby although operational experience is prized it is not necessarily mandatory. The place that Intelligent Selection has within the expectations of reservists is likely to have a considerable influence over Fighting Power.

Both Defence policy and strategy are designed to enable the Reserve to be used more widely, as is the crux of the narrative, but without any specificity. Even Crackett's "Reinforcement, Resilience, Regeneration and Reconstitution" framework is too general to really tell soldiers what is expected of them. However, the sub-strategy is more overt in what it might demand of the Reserve Moral Component, through its long-term objectives. In using the Reserve in the manner outlined, Individual and Group Efficacy would be important as

[594] All those within the universe.

would a belief in System Enabling, providing the resources and processes to mobilise. The support of society, employers and families would be critical in delivering success as would individual Pride, Comradeship and Fighting Spirit. In addition, the personal Occupational Benefits of pay and development opportunities were also highlighted.[595]

If policy and strategy require a generic Pride in one's service, this is borne out by the narrow selection of operations that Reserves have been involved in. Despite policy allowing Reserves to be involved in the full range of operations, their involvement has been primarily in non-controversial and objectively 'good' operations such as Peacekeeping and Homeland Resilience. These 'good' operations are likely to reinforce Reserve soldiers' Pride when they do undertake worthwhile operations and their Spiritual Foundation, their trust in the organisation and its goals. When specific operations are compared with their expectations, though, they do not necessarily align with the Army's structure and training which holds them in formed units with a Warfighting role in mind. Further, the public uncertainty over the role of the Reserve evident even before 2014, with a spectrum wavering between 'emergency only' and 'all operations' can only add to this issue. The understanding that reservists have about their role and the requirements placed on them is worth investigating and may influence their expectations and effectiveness. What they think about what operations they might be involved in may affect their Readiness. Further, the contrast between a broad role or specific remit for the organisation may be investigated, given the limited time, or at least wide-ranging external commitments of reservists.

Role

Both Defence and Army plans err toward retaining Reserves as specialists rather than generalists, though they have been deployed as the latter; a combination of the Reinforcement and Resilience cited by Money and Crackett. As such it demands a degree of individual Pride in doing a 'good job' and a belief in Individual Efficacy, that one's training and equipment is of a standard that enables them to contribute meaningfully. This may also be more important where reservists are deployed as individuals as on Operation RESCRIPT. The transition towards the Army Reserve providing a more 'professional' contribution may also change the way that Comradeship is framed but makes it nonetheless potentially important. FR20 and A2020 also increase the prospect of regular-reserve integration and Reserve formed units deploying, suggesting increasing demands on all Team Spirit factors, also evident in the cases discussed in Part 2; Moral Cohesion, where smaller groups of reservists work within regular Army units or teams and need to build relationships based on

[595] Mooney and Crackett (2018), p92.

mutually held standards in the absence of personal familiarity to be effective, Comradeship and Group Efficacy, where complete Reserve units are deployed.

A key aspect of FR20 policy is integration with the regular forces and this is reflected in A2020 strategy and structures. These place demands on Reserve soldiers' perceptions of Group Efficacy and Comradeship, whether socially or professionally based, where Reserve formed units are increasingly employed. However, this proposition has taken some time to come to fruition and is by no means widespread. While Operation RESCRIPT and Operation TOSCA are recent examples where Reserve units have been deployed and may form a large numerical part of the universe, these occur in large spikes only in recent years, and seldom integrated with regular units. More consistent throughout the universe has been the model of using reservists as small teams or individuals embedded within regular units which places greater emphasis on Moral Cohesion to develop trust between soldiers who are otherwise, initially, strangers. It is likely that the latter mode of employment, as small teams or individuals has a greater precedent in experience than deploying as formed units. However, because the Army Reserve is structured against an emergency or Warfighting scenario, the ability to develop this Moral Cohesion and Individual Efficacy in specialist skills, which might make the integration with regulars more effective, may be harder to develop because routine training and structures are geared towards developing Group Efficacy and Comradeship to generate Fighting Power. Investigating reservists' perceptions of the importance on bonds within their unit or with regular soldiers may help to understand the extent to which they are aligned with the policy aspirations for closer integration with and to deploy as formed units. The confidence they have in their prospects to deploy as individuals or cohorts may also have a bearing on Readiness.

Predictability

The potential for longer deployments and increased frequency places greater demands on individual willingness to be involved and sense of duty, their Fighting Spirit and Self-Discipline, especially where demands are dynamic are present, or the task is in response to a national crisis as for Operation RESCRIPT. This compares with the greater predictability and smaller scale of Operation TOSCA which reduces the pressure of 'duty.' There are also increased demands on Family and Employer Support which FR20 seeks to mitigate with the offer of greater predictability. As shown in Part 2 of this chapter, deployments have broadly been at a frequency below the 1 deployment in 5 years outlined in FR20 and certainly below the 12 months in 3 years mandated in law.[596] However, it is not clear whether these policy

[596] Overall, the commitment of Reserves in any given year has not exceeded one fifth or one third of its workforce, numerically speaking, thereby allowing for this rotation in theory.

aspirations are realistic when ‘high and late’ commitments like Operation RESCRIPT are required. Deployments with a longer lead time and more certain mobilisation dates, like Operation TOSCA, reduce these demands on Family and Employer support. Implied throughout is that leaders will need to persuade and set the example for soldiers to invest in their service, in many respects to act as the panacea to “democratic salesmanship” mentioned by Mooney and Crackett, to fill in the gaps where Defence and Army planning do not align, especially where time is a critical factor. Responding to the demand, the organisation does seem open to develop System Enabling, to make mobilisation as easy as possible where circumstances dictate, as in the cases where COVID prevented large groups gatherings, and for Operation TOSCA where whole Reserve units were mobilised which would have exceeded routine practice.

These deployments have also been under Section 56 of RFA96 and Intelligent Selection applied. While all call-outs are technically compulsory, this places an early filter for those who may not be available. While Intelligent Selection offers this early ‘opt out’ this may not be perceived by the soldier, who may take all ‘offers’ to deploy as an order or a duty. This choice may not be ‘passed on’ to family or employer stakeholders who might perceive their volunteerism negatively. Significant Self-discipline is demanded of reservists when the Army uses Section 56 combined with Intelligent Selection. While it may placate employers and families if they perceive that they have an influence, it places significant responsibility on the soldier as a mediator between the military and other stakeholders. The place that reservists feel they have in mediating between the military and external agencies bears investigation as does the extent to which they are encouraged to ‘volunteer’ to deploy more frequently and any attendant stress on the Moral Component. Similarly, the broad range of potential operations combined with Intelligent Selection means that the notice periods could be boundless which may stress external relationships. Many military situations short of warfare will emerge and recede rapidly meaning that policy timelines conflict with operational reality and soldiers’ expectations.

Omissions

FR20 places little emphasis on Occupational Benefits of mobilisation, despite the aspirations of Corporal Gray, offering increased benefits of military service in general. These benefits are not advertised routinely in practice but in certain circumstances like Operation RESCRIPT, where civilian employment was disrupted, they may be inferred as employment was ‘guaranteed’ for a longer period than strictly necessary. Since the planned demands in MOD policy and Army strategy are so broad, the demand mobilisation places on the Spiritual

Foundation is difficult gauge, except that soldiers must have broad faith in the purpose and activities of the Army.

Despite the Army presenting itself as a leadership-strong organisation by reputation, the role of leaders in mobilisation through Personal Persuasion or Personal Example is not emphasised in policy, strategy, or precedent, less the implied intent to make routine mobilisation seem ordinary, nor is it evident in the cases. This may reflect that these factors would manifest at a personal level, below the policy and strategy discussed here but may be seen in bottom-up data collection. It may also reflect the lack of focus that the strategy has; it is not clear what leaders should be encouraging and persuading their soldiers to be prepared for. Leaders may suffer from this lack of higher focus as much as followers do. While the resources of this lower-level leadership as mediators are not overtly exploited by either policy or practice in favour of an apparent direct relationship between the Army and individual soldiers on the issue of mobilisation, the role of leaders in mobilisation may have an impact on the Moral Component if they indeed assume one at all. This potential omission may place stress on Fighting Power by not fully exploiting the motivational opportunities available. Alternatively, leaders may be unofficially pressed into making good the reality-gaps between plans and a given operational situation, especially when presented with a novel or short-notice demand.

While Employer Support (for Service as a whole, not only deployment) is emphasised in FR20, forming around one third of the main document with individual and Family benefits forming one quarter, the ways of securing Public Support are not covered. The general support of the public for the Armed Forces is taken for granted in the Foreword and the wider Military Covenant which recognises ‘service’ over specifically mobilisation or deployment

While reservists are supposed to be used more frequently within the FR20 and A2020 epoch and the Army is keen to develop a sense of both normality and ease in their use, there is no real emphasis in improving the perception of System Enabling; there has been little tangible difference in mobilisation since the establishment of the Reserve training and Mobilisation Centre in the 1990’s. The cases of Operations RESCRIPT and TOSCA offer an insight into the challenge the Army faces in resourcing the ambition to use the Reserve more often. Operation TOSCA is usually at a small scale, though full-Reserve unit mobilisations stretch the system, with a predictable routine and so is absorbed within the Army’s current resources. It usually fits with the policy and strategy narrative of System Enabling and therefore places little stress on the Moral Component. Operation RESCRIPT diverged from this, being a large scale and short notice operation with added environmental

complications[597] which in many respects replicates the characteristics of a 'national emergency' scenario, the very type of scenario for which the Army Reserve is structured. The need for a hastily developed Force Generation process[598] for this Operation, in the absence of an existing contingency plan, illustrates that the Army was ill-prepared to generate Reserve forces for a short-notice operation. Changes to the mobilisation process were only adopted out of necessity rather than a desire to improve Fighting Power through System Enabling. Further, that a novel process of mobilisation was implemented and was perceived by many to be both a convenient and forward-thinking model for other UK based operations may have changed soldiers' expectations of System Enabling. They may now expect to be able to mobilise quickly, away from a centralised location of exerts and accept some of the administrative risks if it means they can get onto operations faster. Those administrative risks, if realised, may undermine the delivery of Occupational Benefits, for instance through accurate and timely pay, and undermine trust in the organisation. The extent to which Reserves perceive that it is easy to mobilise may have an impact on Fighting Power.

Neither policy nor strategy, nor the case studies emphasise Occupational Benefits, FR20 illustrates these benefits only in respect of wider service rather than specific to mobilisation. The positive effect of this factor is only inferred for Operation RESCRIPT due to the unusual economic conditions imposed by the virus. It is therefore not clear at this stage if this aspect of the Moral Component is stressed by the prospect of deployment, whether these benefits are considered sufficient recompense for their commitment, though this may be determined in subsequent analysis.

SQ1 What is demanded of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?

This chapter has outlined the demands that policy, strategy, and practice place upon the Moral Component of Army Reserves pursuant to SQ1. Understanding the requirement on the Moral Component is not straightforward given the conflicting policy and strategy, and the myriad permutations of operations they might be called-out for. While policy and strategy are designed to guide practice, which should then fall within their boundaries, FR20 and Army strategy offer few limits on and little of the promised clarity for Reserve service therefore it would be difficult for any practice to diverge from them.

[597] It had to be executed in a way that mitigated virus transmission by avoiding large congregations of people.
[598] Distributed Mobilisation: with the attendant risks of wasted time and effort through errors in administrative checks and pay.

Soldiers' flexibility to respond to organisational needs is highly valued. Consistently necessary between policy, strategy and precedent is the emphasis on the volunteer nature of the Army Reserve, central to which is their Fighting Spirit to want to be involved. Soldiers and other stakeholders must be invested in the activity they conduct, both morally and instrumentally; Reserve activity is intended to be seen as 'good' and concerned parties are, on paper at least, incentivised to see that they do not get a raw deal from a 'greedy' military (Employer and Family Support). Regardless of the scale of Reserve deployment, neither policy nor precedent overtly uses the lower-level leadership resources to encourage positive behaviour: mobilisation. In these matters the Army presents its relationship directly with individual soldiers without mediation from the chain of command.

Pride in professional ability is demanded but this is harder to define where a reservist's military role is not aligned to a civilian-type trade. Where soldiers must rely on a poorly defined role, as in most Reserve policy and strategy to date, there is limited leverage to engender pride of purpose, especially when the precedent of their use since 2013 has been for Peacekeeping, MACA and small-scale deployments embedded within regular units, some way different from the formed-unit Warfighting for which they are structured. This suggests that not all elements of the Moral Component Model appear to be holistically applicable; for instance, theory appears to place demands on Spiritual Foundation, that the organisation is trusted such that mobilisation is perceived to be in support of a higher cause and not 'spurious,' whereas practice, specific operations, appear to trigger demands on Pride, that a specific operation is worthwhile. Data collected during this study may illustrate where these demands are perceived to lie by those that experience the effect of theory and practice. It is equally possible that the theoretical and practical aspects of Reserve service act on different factors, as together they form part of the environment that these soldiers inhabit.

The most important areas of friction to explore in data collection appear to be: the impact that operation type may have on soldiers' availability, the demand on soldiers' Fighting Spirit by the policy of Intelligent Selection, the complex way that the Army Reserve's role demands a combination of belief in Individual Efficacy, Group Efficacy, Comradeship and Moral Cohesion, the role of Reserve soldiers in mediating between the Army and their families and employers, and crucial elements that are identified as omissions in this chapter such as the role of Occupational Benefits, System Enabling and Leadership.

The use of the Army Reserve has largely mirrored Smith and Jans' observations of the Australian Defence Force: following the "archetypal role of…low-risk, long-notice, and local

operations."[599] The next chapter will analyse existing data available on the Army Reserve to contribute toward answering the Research Question and the design of the question schedule.

[599] Smith and Jans (2011), p308.

CHAPTER 5 – RESERVES CONTINUOUS ATTITUDE SURVEY

Chapter 5 contributes to SQ2, 'What is the state of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?' by reviewing ResCAS data, the largest longitudinal quantitative source of Army Reserve attitudinal data. As outlined in the Literature Review, this study could only access publicly available ResCAS data which necessitated a redesign of the research, outlined in the Purpose Statement in Chapter 3. While it was originally intended that ResCAS data form an integral part of the research, the limited data access restricts that data to a supporting role as detailed below; to provide an initial indication or partial answer to the Research Question, but primarily to guide the fieldwork design by highlighting gaps in the data. This chapter also looks at the findings from the qualitative FRRP from 2018 before combining both with the key observations from Chapter 4 as part of SQ1, understanding what is demanded of the Moral Component of Fighting Power. This then informs the design of the fieldwork, including the focus group question schedule. This, and the data collected with it are presented in Chapter 6.

This section reviews the findings of two main studies conducted into the Army Reserve in the last five years, ResCAS and FRRP. In general, research into the Army Reserve does not focus on the issue of mobilisation and deployment, but does provide some insights into which areas may be important to focus on, and provides an indication of the underlying environment that Reserves exist in. These studies provide important supporting arguments for the findings outlined in the next chapter.

ResCAS gathers attitudes on a wide range of topics including remuneration, support and training to identify measures to improve policy development, and understand personnel motivation and retention.[600] It follows that the majority of questions concern perceptions of service in general, with only 9 of the 131 questions relating to perceptions of deployment and mobilisation (see Table 5.1[601]). Of those, 2 are demographic, 1 is in relation to joining the Reserve, 1 in relation to remaining in service and 3 in relation to leaving the Reserve. This suggests that the organisation is less concerned with deployment and mobilisation as a focus of service compared with the wider service experience. Despite now being an operational reserve (rather than strategic) where deployment is an integral part of the narrative, it is keeping personnel in service and placating employers, rather than operations,

[600]MOD (2020), Background Quality Report, p1.
[601] N.B. some questions on deployment are 'nested' within other themes.

which appear most important. There are 15 demographic questions, the output of which may be useful to compare with the participants of this research to situate this study's participants within the wider organisation.

Table 5.1 - Question topics

Topic	Number of questions
Life in Reserves	11
Reasons for joining	19
Reasons for staying	18
Reasons for leaving	22
Pay and allowances	4
Equipment	2
Mobilisation	4
Training	4
Career progression	3
Perception of Reserves	2
Family support	3
Civilian employment	13
Fairness at work	11
Demographic	15

Table 5.2 - Responses[602]

	Response rate (2020)	Response rate (2022)
Officers	48%	37%
Soldiers	25%	18%
Total	32%	23%

The sampling and response rate to ResCAS offers evidence to support narrowing the sample for this study to junior other-ranks (Private and Lance Corporal), excluding more senior staff (Corporals, Sergeants, Warrant Officers and Officers). Published ResCAS statistics are weighted by rank to account for disproportionate levels of participation on the Missing at Random principle. The response rate from officers is much higher than from soldiers therefore there is a case to focus on those more junior in this study, as a lesser researched demographic. Published statistics do not attempt cross-tabulation or conduct deeper demographic breakdown,[603] therefore this analysis cannot directly identify any key demographics to sample. However, the data provided on length in service indicates that most respondents have been in the Army at least 5 years (55%), biasing the weighted data against those in earlier years of service, and by inference, those in lower ranks, potentially under-represented, despite the structure of the Army (as a pyramid) suggesting that there should be more lower ranked respondents than higher ranks. As Missing at Random weighting can only amplify or abate data which has been collected, the overall results will be

[602] MOD (2020/2022)
[603] MOD (2020), Background Quality Report, p8.

homogenised on only a few criteria which may cause issues in a diverse organisation like the Army Reserve. For instance, Reserve soldiers often join later and spend longer in rank than a regular might, meaning that the attitudes of older soldiers may be used to represent the attitudes of younger soldiers of the same rank, when they might differ dramatically.[604]

While the general attitudinal data from ResCAS can be mapped to the Moral Component Model, the broad range of circumstances against which personnel may have answered the questions make the data less relevant to this study's focus on mobilisation save to illustrate that, broadly speaking, participants in the survey, reported having a positive attitude to their service. Most participants said they were satisfied with (79%) or felt neutral towards (15%) their service, felt proud to serve (94%), felt a strong personal attachment to the organisation (71%), felt motivated to do the best job they can for the Army (78%) and achieve the organisation's objectives (63%). The average 'approval' rating was calculated as 77%, a modest increase of 1% per year from 2018. Families were perceived to value (81% positive) and support (90% positive) participants' service in general; employer value (59%) and support (76%) was perceived as lower, with feelings of value from society only 51%. Participation excluded hard-to-reach soldiers (estranged or currently mobilised), as will this research necessarily, meaning that those who participate are likely to be those who continue to engage with the organisation and therefore at least see some value in continuing to attend and therefore are likely to have some positive motivation in doing so.

Implications for this study

ResCAS had a response rate of 4% (weighted) 'yes' to, 'Have you been mobilised as a reservist in the last 3 years?' This correlates with the overall mobilisation statistics presented in Chapter 4 as part of the Universe of Cases.[605] Results are a snap-shot only and may vary in-year, notably the results analysed here are from fieldwork conducted January to March 2020 which will include significant numbers who participated in the research before the large mobilisation in response to COVID-19 in March 2020 described in the cases used in Chapter 4. That both these sources suggest that recent mobilisation experience is rare despite Reserve policy outlining an ambition to use reservists more further highlights this as a potentially rich vein of investigation. It also offers a point of caution, that

[604] To put this into perspective, in the 2022 ResCAS, a trained Private had a weighting of 34.61 and a Lance Corporal 15.87. (https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/62c2b1028fa8f54e8aadc70c/Reserves_Continuous_Attitude_Survey_2022_Main_Report.pdf) This means that one person of each of these ranks would be amplified such as to represent almost every single person of their rank (or in some cases significantly more) that actually attend training in their location; assuming that most Army Reserve locations are sub-unit sized (a company/squadron of approximately 54 Privates and 13 Lance Corporals at full strength) or smaller (platoon - 18 Privates and 3 Lance Corporals at full strength).

[605] Noting that the reporting dates differ slightly.

many participants may be answering questions from their imagination of mobilisation and deployment, rather than experience. Of those who had mobilised before, most were satisfied with the support from the Army (62%, valid responses=310) but were more sceptical about the support their family had received (36% positive, 35% neutral, 29% negative, valid responses = 282).

Half (49%, valid responses=3311) of participants reported that being deployed was one of the main reasons they joined the Army Reserve.[606] Fewer soldiers (45%) cited deployment as a main reason to stay in the Army Reserve. This suggests that despite reorientating from a strategic to an operational reserve since 2014, mobilisation and deployment are still not key factors in service for many soldiers. However, when these reasons are grouped, deployment compares favourably alongside other motivations which involve tangible benefits or physical action, though abstract reasons are more important (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore, many of the other motivations are intangibles which can be achieved through many other aspects of service whereas deployment is a specific action which is harder to guarantee. FRRP also found that Reserves are "keen to deploy and experience the "thrill of adventure and deployment."[607]

Of those who reported that they intended to leave within the next 12 months (n=142), negative issues surrounding the prospect of mobilisation played a relatively small part in the decision, as has been the case consistently since 2015.[608] Conversely among this cohort, 17% cited a 'lack of opportunity to mobilise on operations' as a factor in their decision to leave, among other reasons, a sentiment also recognised by FRRP.[609] The size of the cohort renders an 8.9% margin of error making further conclusions difficult to draw, especially if it is assumed that those who intended to leave actually did so, and therefore play no further part in the organisation.

[606] For comparison, 64% said they joined for the more abstract reason, "To serve my country," and 55%, "to do something worthwhile."
[607] Catignani *et al* (2018).
[608] 2020 results – 3% 'Yes' to B2c.2 'I don't want to be mobilised on operational tours' and 0% 'yes' to 'I was not happy with my role during my last operational tour'. On the latter it is conceivable that none of the 142 who were considering leaving within the next 12 months were among the c300 who reported that they had mobilised before.
[609] Catignani et al (2018).

Figure 5.1 – Reasons for joining/staying in the Army Reserve 2020



The questions asked by ResCAS can be mapped to most elements of the Moral Component Model outlined in Chapter 2, though these are posed in relation to service in general rather than mobilisation. Most questions can be aligned with Individual Morale and External Factors, with Team Spirit and Leadership elements less explored. Similarly, FRRP collected data about the gamut of Reserve service rather than solely in relation to mobilisation. Both suggest that reservists are positively disposed toward their service, though they were limited to accessing only those who were not hard-to-reach or estranged. While little is offered about attitudes toward mobilisation and deployment, it does suggest that recent mobilised experience is likely to be rare, excluding those who may have been deployed on Operation RESCRIPT in 2020.[610] This suggests that mobilisation and deployment as a distinct element of service is an under-researched area of the Army Reserve. Nuances surrounding the type of operations, deployment as cohorts or individuals and the temporal elements of mobilisation are not thoroughly explored.

The limited questioning on mobilisation and deployment, and soldiers' responses, suggests that both the organisation and participants do not see it of singular importance in the grander scheme of service. The organisation may still be orientated toward recruitment, retention, and employer relations per the original FR20 concept rather than engendering an

[610] This is borne out by ResCAS (2022), where the % of Army other Ranks who reported having mobilised in the last 3 years rose from 4% in 2020 to 41% in 2022.

Operational Reserve ethos. The prospect of mobilisation or deployment appears not to have a specific negative effect on soldiers' attitudes and presents as being at least as important as most other issues when it comes to joining or remaining in the organisation. Furthermore, it suggests that soldiers believe they can achieve their abstract goals, such as giving service to their country, without mobilisation being inherently instrumental. Both ResCAS and FRRP place far greater emphasis on the impact of service on families and employers in both their lines of questioning and findings.

Specific issues raised by FRRP are also identified at the end of Chapter 4 as important matters and therefore bear further investigation. In 2018, the authors commented that, "the MOD need to clarify what the role of reservists is,"[611] something that was not clear to the soldiers and employers that took part in their research, nor objectively clear in the documents assessed in Chapter 4 and is worthy of continued investigation. They also identified that reservists do not wish to present deployment as a choice or voluntary to their families and employers[612] despite the importance of "intelligent selection" highlighted in Chapter 4. Two temporal issues were also noted; that unplanned or short notice commitments have a serious impact on soldiers' families and employers and therefore their availability,[613] and linked to that, there is a broad assumption of 6 months' notice being given to soldiers prior to any deployment.[614]

While identified in Bury's research as generally important, the role of individual leadership in Reserve Force Generation is omitted from other literature, as are the perceptions of the mobilisation process itself. These two issues may be of specific interest to investigate, provided questions can be phrased in terms that avoid referring to the Moral Component directly to avoid relying on participants' understanding of the concept. The demographics investigated by ResCAS suggest that lower-ranked, less experienced soldiers are likely to be an interesting demographic to focus on.

The existing research provides support for a line of questioning in interviews around the topic of deployment based around the framework used in Chapter 4: operation type and task boundaries that are appropriate (which will inform perspectives on the policy of Intelligent Selection), operational role (specifically their mobilisation as individuals or cohorts, and integration with regulars) and predictability (the frequency and notice periods that Reserve

[611] Giga et al (2018b).
[612] Woodward et al (2018b).
[613] Catignani et al (2018).
[614] Catignani and Basham (2018).

deployments may entail). This framework will also help to control the total number of questions and reduce the risk of them becoming self-referential by accidentally injecting the concepts of the Moral Component into the discussion through the questions. It also enables the questions to have sufficient "scope" to discuss a topic fully while retaining "specificity" in the questions themselves.[615] In particular, Intelligent Selection and Fighting Spirit, the impact of family and employer relations and the prospect of deploying with one's own unit are likely to be key areas of interest for the focus groups.

This chapter has set out what existing data, primarily from ResCAS, can contribute toward the Research Question and how it guided the development of the fieldwork. While much of the existing research is not focussed on deployment, it has highlighted opportunities for the population to be sampled and areas of interest for developing the question schedule. Chapter 6 will set out the fieldwork design, including the question schedule, the execution and data coding, and the results. Those results contribute to SQ2, the state of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, and SQ4, the factors that affect it.

[615] Hopf (2004), p205.

CHAPTER 6 – FIELDWORK DESIGN, CONDUCT AND RESULTS

Chapter 4 examined SQ1, 'What is demanded of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?' setting out the ideal-typical Moral Component. Chapter 5 then laid out the foundations for the fieldwork and examined what existing data, most notably the ResCAS, could contribute to SQ2, understanding the state of the Moral Component of Fighting Power. Chapter 2 laid out the rationale for the data collection methods for this study. This chapter sets out the design and findings of the fieldwork, contributing to SQ2 and SQ4, 'What Moral Component factors influence the ability of the Army Reserve to generate soldiers for operations?' Initially, it will outline the fieldwork conduct, before describing the coding, the data, themes, and analysis. Two groups of themes have been created from the data: 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic,' to help explain attitudes toward mobilisation. Underpinning these groups and their themes are the relationships that reservists must navigate, between the Army, their families, and employers, which form the context for their mobilised service, and by labelling them as 'intrinsic' and 'extrinsic' is not to imply that they are necessarily distinct spheres that do not interact.

Addressing SQ2, there is evidence to suggest that the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power is characterised by a positive Fighting Spirit, Self-Discipline, Efficacy, Moral Cohesion and Comradeship. The Personal Example of leaders can also have a positive impact. Occupational Benefits, Persuasion, Compulsion and System Enabling do not present as strong motivators to mobilise. Looking at SQ4, the Moral Component need not be positive across the board to deliver Fighting Power but there are some variables which appear to be more salient, particularly Fighting Spirit, Pride and Spiritual Foundation; the latter two specifically are noted as being 'swing' factors that could be positive or negative, depending on the conditions, which could 'make or break' attitudes. This is especially relevant where the organisation is perceived not to respect the time and sacrifice that soldiers make through ambiguous timelines or poor administration. The data did not provide substantial evidence for Family, Employer or Public Support directly impacting on the Moral Component of Fighting Power, rather these form the context underpinning the themes. This leads to some proposed changes to the Moral Component Model operationalisation, discussed in the next chapter.

Fieldwork Conduct

Fieldwork for this study took place over 27 weeks, 23 February – 1 September 2022, conducted at best effort in terms of time and locations, around the military duties and personal responsibilities of the sole researcher. The researcher contacted the Commanding Officer of each unit in advance to request permission to approach soldiers. Each sub-unit was provided with the explanation of the project to request participation before conducting focus groups. A range of unit roles and locations (within the bounds of a single researcher's resources) were targeted and reflect purposive sampling[616] that took advantage of existing convenient groups rather than probability sampling. This is appropriate in this study because analysis of themes is more important than representativeness.[617] A range of unit roles and locations also increased the potential for variation between groups.[618]

The units who participated were also partly opportunistic, in that only those units who responded positively to access requests were available, and potential participants excluded 'hard-to-reach' soldiers.[619] Soldiers participated during their training evenings and focus group size was limited by availability on the day of data collection. This did provide a control factor, as each group took place during a comparable period of activity. This method has been used previously by Bury[620] as part of their research into the Army Reserve. This element of the research was not intended to be longitudinal.

During this study's field work, it was rare to get groups of four or more participants and three was both the mean and mode group size. While this is usually considered the bare minimum suitable for focus groups, it allowed fuller participation from all group members and where groups were larger, it was obvious that some personalities naturally dominated the conversation, requiring more active management by the moderator. 13 focus groups, comprising 41 participants, were conducted within 8 sub-units across 5 units from the infantry, Royal Logistic Corps (RLC) and Royal Signals based in South-East England and the North Midlands/Yorkshire (see Annex B for research diary). This was at the lower end of the initial estimate for fieldwork instances but was sufficient to achieve theoretical saturation, where successive groups offered similar opinions on the same topics. All groups were conducted to conclusion, except Group I which had to be terminated early due to a late start and the need for participants to leave. The group dynamics of all groups was positive and

[616] Adams and Cox (2008), p31; Glaser and Strauss (1967).
[617] Walliman (2018), p151; Merriam and Tisdell (2016) p96.
[618] Merriam and Tisdell (2016), p257; Merkens (2004), p167.
[619] Bury (2016), p203 reported that there is an acceptance of 40-70% turn-out compared with those who are enlisted.
[620] Bury (2016).

conducive to useful data collection, less Group L where the conversation was rather stilted and difficult, with little 'natural flow' as there was with the other groups.

Data Collection

Demographic questionnaires were administered electronically[621], or on paper where phone signal was insufficient.[622] Discussions were recorded on a digital Dictaphone, supported by handwritten notes. Questions were piloted before the main research started to test participants' likely comprehension; the pilot did not lead to significant changes to the question set. Data were transcribed as soon as possible after collection[623] and systematically analysed using Nvivo software, which was also used to record each participant as an individual case with their demographic characteristics. Transcription and initial analysis were conducted concurrent with collection to enable iterative development of focus groups, using Peraza[624] as a handrail. In the first instance, written field notes (much shorter than the transcribed data) were coded and organised to help determine when data saturation was likely to have been achieved and no new codes were being generated. Working on the basis of "incremental validity"[625] toward saturation, this allowed for dynamic changes to, or a shift in emphasis within, the question schedule to explore interesting ideas, as well as identifying where question phrasing had to be refined, otherwise not seen during trials.[626]

Some predictable issues identified initially were sufficiently covered early-on in data collection, but some new factors emerged which justified further exploration. Interpreting prevalent themes within the data as soon as possible after collection helped to guide subsequent collection and may have increased efficiency by remaining responsive to findings and practicalities of collection. Some topics of interest were not covered organically by the groups therefore a specific line of questioning was added for them. These were primarily questions about leadership, which were introduced in Group D, because the previous three groups had not mentioned it at all despite the importance placed on the topic in the Literature. While Group B mentioned medallic recognition early in the fieldwork, it then re-emerged in Group K and was introduced directly thereafter. Group F was specifically asked about compulsion as it had not been discussed organically to that point, but it did not prove to be a rich vein of questioning.

[621] With a direct link to a Microsoft Form database on a secure server.
[622] With data input to the database as soon as practicable after the event.
[623] Including a 7-day period during which participants could withdraw after focus groups.
[624] Peraza (2019).
[625] Morse (2010), p349.
[626] McGrath et al (2019), p1004; Saunders et al (2018).

Field notes made both before and during the first focus groups record the non-verbal communication from participants that indicated that many were not familiar with the concepts of Fighting Power and the Moral Component, vindicating the decision not to ask about them directly. Discussions in some groups also highlighted soldiers' uncertainty as to their terms of service and their legal obligations.

Early and concurrent coding helped identify broad patterns in the data support later stages of analysis and also enabled an early reflexive recognition of where 'researcher fatigue' may have set in, characterised by the moderator speaking much more than planned, and allowed corrective action to be taken for subsequent focus groups.[627] On reflection it was also evident that some themes presented in the early groups could have been examined in more depth, leading to some observations within the data having unclear implications. This was improved upon with later groups through increased use of probes and prompts. Questions posed about Operational Characteristics did, on face value, yield speculative responses about hypothetical operations in the future, but provided a useful foil to get participants to engage with the questions and understand their attitudes toward mobilisation in general. Many groups digressed into discussing wider Reserve training and administrative matters and had to be re-focussed to the question of mobilisation by the moderator.

Sample characteristics

Comparing the demographics of the fieldwork with Defence Personnel Statistics and ResCAS 2020 and 2021 results (see Annex C) indicated that the sample of participants generated was typical of the wider Reserve population, though this does not imply statistical representativeness, and, further, that the deliberate targeting of a more junior cohort than responds to ResCAS was achieved. As expected, this targeting generated a sample that was younger and had a lower level of service experience than ResCAS participants. It follows, then, that participants of this research had less regular service experience, which tallies with the expectation that those leaving at a more junior level are less likely to join the Reserve as a second career alongside civilian employment. Despite their relative inexperience, participants of this study had slightly more experience of mobilisation[628] and much more in the way of recent (within the last three years) mobilisation experience[629] than ResCAS participants. However, this was not evenly distributed between the groups (see

[627] Identified specifically in transcription notes for Group H.
[628] 39% here against 34% in ResCAS.
[629] 88% here against 15% in ResCAS.

Table 6.1). While all infantry participants and some RLC had recent mobilisation experience, none of the Signals participants did.

Table 6.1 – Mobilised experience among participants

Mobilised before?	RLC	Infantry	Signals
Yes	6	10	0
Of which in the last 3 years	4	10	0
No	11	7	7

Prima facie this might suggest that soldiers who have been recruited more recently have more naturally bought into the 'operational reserve' narrative, having known nothing else, than those who are more experienced and perhaps are still in a 'strategic reserve' mindset. Participants were also much more likely to have civilian employment than ResCAS respondents, which is also open to those in Full-Time Reserve Service who were excluded from this study. This may reflect that units were based in urban or affluent areas where being unemployed is far less affordable than in more rural areas and may account for a greater consideration of the impact of employers on soldiers' attitudes than might be the case across the force.

Context

In the broadest sense, this research took place toward the end of the FR20 programme, the transformation of which is detailed by Bury,[630] and at the start of the RF30 programme, which was belatedly announced in May 2021, delayed due to COVID-19. The first focus group took place the day after Russia's invasion of Ukraine which set the tone for the remainder of the fieldwork and gave an added emphasis to Warfighting as a potential task in a way that might otherwise have been absent, though many groups did not directly mention this conflict at all. This group also took place shortly after a significant period of bad weather in the UK which saw three storms in as many days, potentially focussing the mind of soldiers toward supporting Homeland Resilience. Furthermore, a considerable number of reservists had been exposed to Operation RESCRIPT, the MACA provided in response to COVID-19, reflected in the 11% increase of ResCAS respondents who said they had mobilised within the last 3 years between 2020 and 2021. This further framed many of the discussions. Two of the units also had activities planned in the short-term which provided context for the contributions of their participants. 151 Regiment RLC were preparing to send a small number of soldiers on Operation TOSCA, the UK's contribution to the United Nations Force in Cyprus in September 2022[631], and 4th Battalion the Princess of Wales Royal Regiment

[630] Bury (2016).
[631] Coincidentally, the same operation that the researcher deployed on: see Chapter 2.

(PWRR) were training to send around 100 soldiers to the Falkland Islands as part of the rotating garrison while also preparing to re-role to join the new 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, designed to train and advise foreign armies under the Future Soldier programme, discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. 31 Signal Regiment did not appear to have any recent or upcoming activities. These commitments, or lack thereof, will likely have been in soldiers' minds while participating in discussions.

Results

Coding and theme development

To develop familiarity with the data and to ensure maximum accuracy, all transcripts were initially coded by individual participant with demographic data attributed, to enable subsequent cross-referencing. The data were then coded by attitude toward mobilisation to get a broad understanding of prevailing attitudes. Initially, six codes were generated, later refined to four (see Table 6.2). The two codes that were removed were either indistinct from other codes ('Uncertainty') or considered, on reflection, to be not relevant to the specific matter of 'attitude toward mobilisation'.

Table 6.2 – 'Attitude toward Mobilisation' Coding Frame

Code	Definition	Remarks
Mobilisation Positive	Positive attitude toward mobilisation expressed.	
Mobilisation Negative	Negative attitude toward mobilisation expressed.	
Mobilisation Neutral	Mobilisation mentioned but without clear attitude expressed.	
Mobilisation Tentative	Uncertain or unsure attitude toward mobilisation expressed.	
Expectations	Expression of expectations of mobilised experience.	Merged with other codes or un-coded.
Uncertainty	Uncertainty with the prospect of mobilisation expressed.	Merged with 'Mobilisation Tentative'

The data were then coded by reference to the Moral Component Model (see Table 2.1), using the variables as codes. This was important to further increase familiarity with the data set and to confirm that the data collected were indeed relevant to the Model. It also allowed identification of the frequency with which data were coded to those variables. Variables that were coded more frequently could be said to be more important to participants than those less frequently coded. On this basis, Employer Support, Fighting Spirit, Individual Efficacy and Pride are mentioned most frequently and therefore may be among the more significant factors. Conversely, Public Support, Organisational Compulsion, Personal Example and Personal Persuasion were mentioned much less frequently therefore may be seen as less significant to participants. The data were then coded against the operational characteristics

used in Chapter 4 (Operation Type, Operational Role, and Predictability) to understand the effect of different circumstances on the Moral Component of Fighting Power. This systematic approach allowed for cross-tabulation to identify connected ideas during later analysis and, more importantly, to confirm that data collected were relevant to the Research Questions.

Overall, we can infer that the attitude of the participants toward mobilisation was broadly positive; there were twice as many more positive references made in relation to the Moral Component variables (see Table 6.3) and Operational Characteristics than negative ones.

Table 6.3 – Moral Component Model variables against Attitude (number of coded references in data)

Model Indicator	Code/Variable	Positive	Neutral	Tentative	Negative	Total
External Support	Employer	45	4	13	47	**109**
	Family	33	2	6	29	**70**
	Public Support	6	2	0	3	**11**
Individual Morale	Fighting Spirit	79	6	3	15	**103**
	Individual Efficacy	66	4	18	28	**116**
	Occupational Benefits	28	2	2	23	**55**
	Pride	84	1	3	26	**114**
	Self-Discipline	24	1	4	7	**36**
	Spiritual Foundation	40	2	1	7	**50**
Leadership	Organisational Compulsion	11	3	6	11	**31**
	Personal Example	12	2	2	13	**29**
	Personal Persuasion	4	3	0	14	**21**
	System Enabling	19	1	6	31	**57**
Team Spirit	Comradeship	38	1	2	2	**43**
	Group Efficacy	44	1	5	23	**73**
	Moral Cohesion	60	1	4	13	**78**
Total		**593**	**36**	**75**	**292**	

This matches the findings of FRRP which reported that reservists were, "keen to deploy,"[632] though as with this study, their method of interviewing only lent itself to accessing soldiers who were actively engaged in the organisation. The outlier to this were the Royal Signals participants who proportionally made fewer 'mobilisation positive' comments and more 'mobilisation negative' comments than RLC or infantry participants (see Table 6.4). This may be a consequence of the difficulty that Royal Signals participants in Groups G and J noted in 'recovering' from the training disruption caused by COVID-19 and a perceived paucity of up-to-date communications training equipment, which is comparatively 'hi-tech' and therefore expensive and scarce, when compared with logistics or infantry equipment.

Table 6.4 – Attitude to Mobilisation against Army corps (% of total references)

Attitude Code	Royal Logistic Corps	Infantry	Royal Signals
Positive	55.83%	54.33%	45.03%
Negative	31.1%	36.17%	47.1%
Neutral	2.92%	4.18%	3.41%
Tentative	10.14%	5.31%	4.46%

Other cross-tabulation between demographics and either Moral Component variables or Operational Characteristics did not offer significant results. While no inferences were drawn as to the real importance of the issues based on numerical mentions, it provided a useful start point for thematic analysis as part of Peraza's "Level one," which entails identifying

[632] Catignani et al (2018), p1.

patterns within the data and whether they fit a theme before moving onto "Level two," understanding the extent to which themes represent the whole dataset. A word frequency analysis of the data set did not offer substantially useful insights for analysis. Having coded the data in these ways, it became clear that it would be difficult to provide evidence toward the thesis' questions because the coding based on the Moral Component Model was self-referential; the data were being described in the same terms as the question, and did not address the underlying meaning of participants' contributions, ultimately generating only shallow analysis.

To try to solve this issue, the dataset was coded, without reference to the Moral Component Model or Operational Characteristics, rather, codes were created based on the data to thematically interpret the data and to understand the meaning of what was said, rather than simply the words. Preconditions were not placed on the codes that might be generated, except that they should have face validity to the Research Question. These codes were collected into themes based on patterns presented in the coding, refined and named. Codes that were vague or seemed less relevant, by virtue of low frequency for instance, were refined or discarded. The final codes are noted in Table 6.5.

Table 6.5 – Thematic Coding Frame

Group	Code	Sub Codes
Intrinsic	Competence	Comparison with regular soldiers
	Camaraderie	War Stories Leadership
	Purpose	
	Control	Opportunity Uncertainty Choice
Extrinsic	Pay	
	Medals	
	Gains and Losses	

To aid understanding of these themes within the context of the project, they are presented in two groups, intrinsic and extrinsic, groups the themes intuitively fell into. This binary division is also supported in the literature.[633] Selected quotations from the data are used in this chapter to represent the themes and ideas expressed, supported by references to relevant recent research. Data within the themes are then related back to the Moral Component Model to understand better attitudes to mobilisation beyond the 'obvious' mention of a certain benefit or drawback.

[633] Bury (2017a), p623; Betts (2014), p29.

Intrinsic themes

The first group of themes are those which are inherent to the individual in relation to mobilisation rather than something visible or that only have value in relation to something external. The theme of Competence derived from perceptions of how soldiers perform their job, their ability to apply their training and their desire and potential to improve as soldiers. Camaraderie is a theme that relates to intra-military relationships, including friendship and interaction with leaders. That this theme is like the Moral Component variable of Comradeship suggests that this may be an important aspect of Reserve service.[634] Purpose encompasses the extent to which mobilisation is seen as worthwhile including excitement and adventure, feelings of duty, and the worthiness of the task itself. Control describes soldiers' desire to have efficacy over their career and their lives, chiefly the opportunity to deploy and offer their labour, through both information and certainty about the future. These themes start to reveal why and under what conditions, mobilisation might be an attractive proposition. The themes identified: Competence, Camaraderie, Purpose and Control, are reminiscent of the "autonomy, competence and relatedness"[635] identified by Deci and Ryan. This has some face validity because the Army naturally wishes to attract intrinsically motivated people who thrive on teamwork, challenge and comradeship (aspects of Service that ResCAS identifies as important (noted in Chapter 5) because the offer, extrinsically speaking, is relatively poor; average pay, potential danger and limited opportunity for acclaim outside of a narrow circle.

The evidence of what soldiers said relating to these themes indicates that the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power includes a positive Fighting Spirit, with soldiers showing a high degree of confidence and a desire to be part of operations. There is positive Individual and Group Efficacy in that participants expressed a desire to improve through mobilisation and that they can raise their performance to the required level and make an impact on a worthwhile operation they could have Pride in. Furthermore, there is a sense of Moral Cohesion; that mobilising and working as a team makes the team better, which in turn makes it more attractive to be mobilised. This aligns with Bury's observation that cohesion and performance were mutually supporting;[636] that closely knit teams perform better and that groups who perform better have stronger bonds. Working with comrades can be a motivator and can counteract some uncertainty. They show a positive Spiritual Foundation, through service to their own people and the organisation and positive Self-Discipline, mobilising

[634] 'Camaraderie' was deliberately chosen as the name over 'Comradeship' to avoid confusion.
[635] Deci and Ryan (2000), p54.
[636] Bury (2018), p414.

because they 'ought.' Uncertainty and instances where the Army is not seen to consider reservist's circumstances or properly value their time are damaging to the Moral Component.

Competence

Most groups expressed the view that mobilisation was the integral means by which they did their job. The sentiment of "what is the point if you don't mobilise?" was evident across multiple groups[637] and some went as far as to say they joined the organisation specifically to mobilise for operations.[638] Many noted that it was the culmination of their training, in which they would actively participate and which gave them a sense of Pride in a job 'well done.'[639] Evident here is a positive Fighting Spirit, satisfaction from mobilisation and an enjoyment of being able to 'do the job' for real, something that was also shown in ResCAS results.[640]

This extract from a group of infanteers, is particularly rich, expressing both instrumental motivation, that being a soldier is inherently linked to mobilisation and normative motivations of obligation and duty. They describe a sense of stigma which is ordinarily driven by expectations.

> I2[641]: You're here to be a soldier.
>
> I1: I signed up because I want to be a soldier.
>
> I2: I think that's probably more of a stigma you get if reservists didn't mobilise and didn't deploy.
>
> I1: Yeah, yeah.

This suggests that soldiers are at least partly self-regulating in their support of mobilisation, imposing social sanctions on dissenters, rather than a formal punishment, and implies that there is a strong belief in the Spiritual Foundation rather than a reliance on discipline.

> K4: So, personally I think reservists should mobilise. Ultimately, it's not a hobby or a club. We all here to do a job at the end of the day if needed, however, I don't personally hold it against anyone, as it was mentioned, people have careers, people have families. You know, fitting it in, can be difficult. I've got more flexibility, so I've been able to go away and do something. I understand others don't have as much flexibility.

Mobilisation is the mark of a competent soldier, but it is measured as described above. While the groups generally agreed that soldiers should mobilise and deploy because it is part of the commitment they have made, this is not boundless and there is a recognition that

[637] Groups B, D, F, G.
[638] Group E, F, G, I.
[639] Group C, F, I, M.
[640] 53% of Army Other Ranks reported joining the organisation to deploy on operations and 47% stayed in the Army for that reason, among the highest ranked reasons.
[641] Participant code: the letter relates to the group and the number relates to the participant.

some operations might not meet the threshold to supersede other commitments. As noted in the theme of Choice, competing demands placed on Reserve soldiers may be more important.

Attitudes within the theme of Competence were broadly confident. Some participants, like these logisticians, felt 'ready now':

> D3: We're already ready. We're already prepared. We're already fit.
>
> D1: So, I think, yeah, as you say, we are there and we are trained to do the task, then we should be able to go anywhere really.

This Signaller was also confident:

> G1: I mean, we are in a service, and we are expected to do this. And it shows up what we can do as reservists is, we can go and do our job and we are good at it!

Most, like these infanteers from two separate groups, were confident that they would meet the required standard for any task with a period of training and preparation before deployment.

> E1: But it all depends on what your pre-mobilisation training is going to be like. Because if you've effectively got months to really hone your skills based on whatever activity you are going to be going out and doing, as long as that is really good quality training, then, you know, we should be at the level we need to be, otherwise we shouldn't be going.
>
> K4: I think there is that apprehension initially, if you've not done it before, but as soon as you've done it. Like, oh cool, I do know this! My training that I've been taught is right and you slot in quite quickly and settle in rapidly.

The desire to improve one's military performance has long been seen as the mark of professional soldiers,[642] and as with this study, Bury recognised a desire for reservists to develop themselves and their comrades,[643] something that he suggested was linked to "the nature of modern conflict."[644] Similarly he also identified a high degree of confidence in individuals and sub-unit groups to do their job on operations given a period of pre-deployment training,[645] and this is also reflected in ResCAS 2021 where 63% of Army Other-Ranks reporting being satisfied with the amount of training they had for their role and 72% being satisfied with the quality of their training. This might show a sense that soldiers feel like their training is sufficient 'for now' but have the confidence that more will be delivered as required, linked to their confidence in pre-mobilisation training.

[642] Huntington (1957); Janowitz (1960) p6.
[643] Bury (2016), p290.
[644] Bury (2016) p261.
[645] Bury (2016) p236.

While this mirrors the perspective of participants in this study, what is noticeable is that the tone recorded in field notes from several groups[646] gave the sense that this training would be 'done' to them, rather than them being an active participant. In common with some of Bury's interviewees,[647] participants here highlighted the difficulties in completing individual technical training, a precursor to being eligible to mobilise overseas, which bred low Efficacy,[648] which they wanted to improve upon. This was particularly acute in among Royal Signals participants[649] who expressed a lack of confidence in their preparedness to deploy and a lack of confidence in their basic and technical equipment. In recognising this, it suggests that reservists have the Fighting Spirit to want to improve as soldiers.

Attitudes of low competence were much less prevalent among the RLC and infantry and were mostly confined to worries about the skill-level of other people, usually with specific people in mind, rather than the participants themselves: self-confidence in their competence was generally high. What is evident from this theme is a positive Fighting Spirit; a desire to be involved, to rise to meet any challenges and do the job well and to improve. Linked to this is the notice or lead time highlighted later, with this time providing crucial space to train and develop confidence before a deployment within a mobilised period. The faith that soldiers appear to have in this training and their subsequent impact on operations suggests that they have a positive attitude of Individual Efficacy.

Beyond the current level of competence, there was also an evident desire in some groups[650] to use mobilisation as a vehicle to improve as soldiers and as a team.

> L2: I think it is important in the Army. Because reservists, we have only two hours at Tuesday night, like once a week like a drill night. We haven't learned anything at all. So, if we go to, like, the serious one, like deployed, mobilised from one place to another place, we have to learn lots of things and we can see the activities what the regulars are doing on. And I think this way we have to learn lots of more things in Army to do…if we go to the mobilised in my view.
>
> GR[651]: So, you feel it's…you learn a lot more about being a soldier by mobilising and getting to practise your skills.
>
> L2: That's it, yes.

[646] For instance, groups B and D.
[647] Bury (2016), p211, 216.
[648] Groups A, L and M.
[649] Groups G and J.
[650] E.g. Groups I, L and M.
[651] GR = Gavin Randell – the sole researcher and moderator

This ties in with the idea that for the Reserve to be 'useful', it must be 'used'; demonstrating Fighting Spirit, a desire to engage with and improve individual martial skills but also that mobilisation builds Moral Cohesion within a group, acting as both a motivator for and a benefit of working together and that both Individual and Group Efficacy is a motivator and can be improved with practice, most directly, through mobilisation and being soldiers full-time for a set period.

Reservists in this study show a positive Fighting Spirit. They want to mobilise, have a military identity, and derive satisfaction from mobilisation which is seen as an inherent part of their service. There is also evidence for a positive sense of Self-Discipline, mobilising because they recognise that they have obligations and promises to fulfil. They have shown a belief and a desire to improve their martial performance and make an impact when they mobilise and a sense of Moral Cohesion in that they want to work as part of a team which will in turn improve the team, making it more attractive to work with that team. They also have a positive Spiritual Foundation, serving a higher cause, though only specifically identified through their service to their own people.

Comparison with Regulars

The most frequently mentioned military relationship was that between regular and Reserve soldiers, mentioned with respect to mobilisation in ten of thirteen groups, and mentioned in all groups in more general terms. Foremost, the perceived performance level of regular soldiers is seen as the benchmark standard that is aspired to.[652] This is something that contemporary research also identified.[653] These infanteers epitomised that concern:

> C1: Yeah, jumping into a load of different military lads. Stuff like that. What are you thinking in the back of your head? Am I up to scratch? Do I know everything? Can I perform to their standards? Stuff like that, really. It's always there, isn't it?
>
> C3: I mean you can get settled into it pretty quickly. I was just like, just a little, like this…the first day of a new job. Well, yeah…. [trails off].

The perceived regular standard affects perceptions of Individual Efficacy by determining what 'good' looks like for reservists. In this aspiration there is an awareness that it takes time to meet that standard, due to the practicalities of time spent dedicated to military activity, but also a confidence that they will meet that standard.[654] From a reservist's point of view, this sense of a shared standard of performance is part of their Moral Cohesion with the wider Army. Reservists hold each other to this perceived shared standard and importantly,

[652] Group I.
[653] Bury (2016), p277; Catignani et al (2018), p2.
[654] Groups G and K.

want to demonstrate to regular soldiers that they can meet or exceed their expectations.[655] Despite this positive Moral Cohesion, it is recognised that initially at least, this may be one-sided; that regulars may not immediately feel that this cohesion exists.[656] One soldier described an initial "apprehension"[657] of a regular-reserve divide that quickly diminished once mutual familiarity was established. Another group pointed out that, in some cases this divide appeared to be endorsed by the organisation through perceived lower investment in equipment for reservists. These signallers had concerns about their basic personal equipment:

> G4: We should be ready and given equal footing in the regulars.
>
> G3: With the regulars, yeah.
>
> G4: And I do feel that we are always treated as a…when I said back-up, what I meant by that was that you were there, ready to go. Not, oh yeah, they are the cousin you don't talk about. [laughing]. And it shows with things like equipment and things like that. You know, we don't get issued a lot of the stuff that the regulars do. I'm not saying we need everything the regulars do, but little things like daysacks for heavens' sake. We don't even get issued them!

Another group also had concerns about the provision of technical equipment for them to train and deploy with,[658] issues that were recognised in FR20 that have clearly only been partially addressed overall, with only 55% of Army Reserve Other-Ranks satisfied with the availability and 57% satisfied with the quality of their equipment.[659] The sense that reservists are 'second-class' may be damaging to Moral Cohesion and the Spiritual Foundation from both a reserve and a regular perspective; the former feel under-valued and the latter may perceive that they are not initially worth valuing. Until working relationships are developed on a specific operation then units deployed there may be less effective. This interpretation supports existing research which paints a mixed picture of the regular-reserve relationship. Despite some of the negative implications of the regular-reserve relationship, Bury[660] found that reservists did like working with regulars (68%) and found it a valuable experience (65%) for their individual skills (55%) and team skills (46%), among the highest levels of agreement he recorded. While not specifically tailored to mobilisation, ResCAS 2021 found that while only 36% of Other-Ranks felt valued by regulars, only 12% of those who were planning to leave the Army were considering doing so because they did not like the way regulars treated them. 56% said they felt treated fairly by the Army compared with regulars. FRRP noted

[655] Groups K and M.
[656] Catignani et al (2018), p3.
[657] Group M.
[658] Group J.
[659] MOD (2020).
[660] Bury (2016), p238.

that there was a “culture gap”[661] between regulars and reservists that put the latter group on the backfoot at the start of any deployment, a gap in cohesion that would take time together to bridge.

Based on this research, the organisation may still have work to do to engender a more comprehensive sense of Moral Cohesion across all aspects of the force. This does not present as being a critical issue for the Moral Component of the Army Reserve regarding mobilisation and there are positive signs in that there are shared standards of performance.

Camaraderie

Camaraderie is another theme that illustrates a series of positive Moral Component factors towards mobilisation. This relates to reservists’ relationships with each other as well as with their leaders, who are both comrades and agents of the organisation. Social cohesion was central to the Territorial Army that Walker observed in the late 1980’s[662] but more recently, Bury noted that different trades might account for different perceptions of cohesion and teamwork between Army Reserve units.[663] This study includes infantry, that Bury considered to be a collectivist trade, requiring individuals to work as part of a coherent team to succeed on operations at the lowest level but also RLC drivers (which were also included in Bury’s work) and Royal Signals (which were not), which Bury would see as “individually focussed” in their activity. Field notes made during data capture highlighted that RLC groups[664] had an individual focus to their discussions, whereas the tone of infantry groups[665] were noticeably more collectivist which supports Bury’s idea about differences between individual and collective trades. Furthermore, only Group E, an infantry unit, suggested that bonds might exist between soldiers outside of their own unit on professional grounds, in this case as mortar operators, rather than purely on social grounds. Social bonding remains important for all Reserve units, which do not have the time or resources to develop or maintain professional bonds, even with periodic collective exercises. Social cohesion can supplement the bonds forged with professional training with additional shared experiences contributing toward Moral Cohesion. Both FRRP and Bury,[666] where the unique feeling of military comradeship and the desire to not “let anyone down”[667] or ‘miss out,’ and ResCAS, which identified it as one of the top reasons for staying in the Army, support the importance

[661] Catignani et al (2018), p3.
[662] Walker (1990), p102, 105-106.
[663] Bury (2016), p260.
[664] Groups A, B and D.
[665] Groups F, H and K.
[666] Bury (2016), p250, 309.
[667] Catignani et al (2018), p2-3.

of Comradeship and Moral Cohesion identified within the Camaraderie theme. They are both significant motivators for mobilisation and can also be improved upon by mobilisation.

It matters that reservists deploy together with their friends and they believe are more effective when they do so, a these infanteers suggest:

> GR: You mentioned, actually, the deploying with your unit. Do you think that's a big motivating factor; the opportunity to go with other people from _____ [this sub-unit]?
>
> E2: Yeah.
>
> E1: Yeah, people you know. A structure that you know as well, sort of, trying to fit in and form a new team.
>
> E2: But you know your confidence going into a situation if you're with more of your mates, it's going to be it's going to be higher and morale will follow that, I think it's really good.

Groups expressed the idea that they would have greater "confidence"[668] mobilising with close colleagues from the same unit and "would love the ideal of [mobilising with] the guys that I work with"[669] and that there is a "real different sense than even the best team might have on civvy street;"[670] "it is easier to go [mobilised] with a mate"[671] and can help to overcome some uncertainty and reinforce Fighting Spirit.

The participants of this study certainly value the Comradeship that comes from prospective mobilisations with their friends from within their own unit but also recognise that there are benefits that derive from Moral Cohesion including being more effective as a team (Group Efficacy), which itself is a motivator to mobilise; the prospect of being part of a successful and effective force. An indicator of the strong impact of Comradeship and Moral Cohesion was identified when the reverse proposition was offered; that people would be left behind. The 'Fear Of Missing Out' and not being part of a shared experience appears to be a significant motivating factor.

> GR: So, linking those two ideas together. If the team here were to mobilise, but you couldn't go for whatever reason, how would that make you feel? What would be the impact of that?
>
> G1: Oh, I'd be gutted.
>
> G2: Yeah, I'd be gutted.

[668] Group C.
[669] Group G.
[670] Group M.
[671] Group H.

> G1: I would love to be mobilised. My job can be quite demanding. I know if the Squadron was deployed, and I wasn't able to go, I feel like I wasn't being a team player. I feel like I'm letting the team down, because I'm not able to go and support my guys.

While a premium is placed in Comradeship and mobilising with people that they already know and in Moral Cohesion, the prospect of working with people with whom they have an established bond, most groups were also quick to highlight that new cohesive bonds were forged with outsiders; either those who had not been with the unit for very long or with regular soldiers. Group Efficacy is also recognised as important, not only for military effectiveness but also as a motivating factor in itself; soldiers derive satisfaction from and look forward to being part of a successful team. All the groups recognised the importance of Comradeship and Moral Cohesion for effectiveness and all except one were positive in their perceptions of themselves and their own unit. A Group J (a Royal Signals unit) noted that while they were important, they were not experiencing the benefits of that themselves, primarily because they saw that their unit was struggling to regain its momentum and routine in the aftermath of COVID-19 in the same way that others struggled to recover individual technical training. The group felt that there had been a significant churn in personnel over the preceding two years and that the unit had not been 'used' and therefore were a less effective team for it.

War Stories

A particularly important way that reservists interact is through 'War Stories' that become part of a unit's lore that is passed between soldiers and may be learned by new soldiers as part of their socialisation.

> GR – How do you feel about, you know, hearing stories about what other people have got up to?
>
> B2 – Yeah, it makes you want to do it.
>
> B3 – Yeah
>
> B2 – Makes you definitely want to put your name in.

Positive experiences of others' mobilisations seem to lead to increased Moral Cohesion as shared experiences that may encourage mobilisation. Positive experiences shared can breed positive perceptions of future operations and develop expectations of Pride and reinforce Moral Cohesion and the Spiritual Foundation.

ResCAS 2021 reported that 67% of Army Other-Ranks were satisfied with the support they received when they last mobilised and only 12% were dissatisfied but inevitably, negative stories may be more prevalent and certainly would be more attractive as gossip. The negative experiences of other may discourage mobilisation especially where they become

expectations that undermine the Spiritual Foundation and impact on future mobilisation behaviour, where mobilisation may be seen as "an ache,"[672] or with Pay as discussed later.

These procedural issues influence mobilisation in general, but stories or experiences of specific operations or tasks can also have an impact on soldiers' Pride, where some tasks do not appear to be worthwhile. This was a particular issue for those groups from an infantry unit who were preparing to deploy to the Falkland Islands:

> E2: I think some of the ex-regulars who were saying you're going into the Falklands in winter. You've been sold on summer pictures of penguins and it's going to be miserable [laughing] You can't see your hand in front of your face for three months. Some of them definitely, yeah. It wasn't something they were diving at, for sure.

Another soldier from the same unit preparing for this task, from a different group, said:

> K1: I think the people that are higher up as well, a lot of them have been there already and everyone I personally know, family and friends that have been to the Falklands, have all said they would rather not go back there. So you know, you get told their stories and the people that are now…before they were pushing you to go there telling you how crap it is basically. And now there's this come up they're now, pushing people to go. Whereas a lot of people are remembering how crap they said it was and they know they're not gonna go because of that. So why would brand new people want to go? Because they've been told the experience was awful, to a certain extent, because of how it is out there. Whatever the reason was, why would someone want to come out there?

There is clearly a feeling of Pride towards their service which can be affected by the perception of their own or others' experiences when they were last mobilised and may affect decision making.

Leadership

A particular relationship that reservists must navigate is with the military itself; how they interact with it and agents of it, primarily their leaders. Elements of leadership were included within the operationalisation of the Moral Component through Personal Example, Personal Persuasion and Compulsion. Reservists in this study valued Example more than Persuasion or Compulsion. Those leaders who are seen to mobilise have credibility, but this is not a critical or deciding factor in the decision making of their subordinates. This infanteer said:

> E2: It's a little bit showing they put in the time as well. So, they made that sacrifice again. If you talk to young families, things like that, the expecting people to do it and being able to go, "look, I've done it as well. I've been away and had to leave my family for six months when I was…wherever it was."

And this soldier, also at an infantry unit said:

> K4: So, I think it would have made bigger difference to me. I was on the tasking and went up to BHQ and there was a lot of fingers pointed to me as a Junior NCO, "Why

[672] Group M.

> aren't you going to the Falklands? Why aren't you doing that?" I'm looking at the people who are asking the questions and thinking, why aren't you going out? Why aren't you leading from the front? And it didn't fit in with what I'm doing at the moment, and I couldn't really fit in my time scale and everything. It didn't appeal to me, but it was those people higher up and head up and push it down as this great opportunity. You need to do this, go and do it, but they are not out there themselves.
>
> GR: And you feel that…?
>
> K4: And I felt slightly personally attacked! It's like, "why aren't you going to the Falklands? It's going to be a great opportunity." But no-one else is backing it.

The soldiers in this study also recognised that, like them, even leaders' personal circumstances might prevent them from deploying and while they did not hold it against them personally, the influence of leaders might be diminished if they are not seen as 'ready and willing' in the same way that they demand of their subordinates. The 'proof' of a leader's Fighting Spirit can be a positive influence on soldiers and conversely, efforts to persuade may be ineffective unless supported by credibility which may be improved upon through example. Some groups did also recognise that leaders could still be effective even if they did not have significant operational experience.

While leadership was an indicator within the Moral Component operationalisation, it was not organically discussed in the first three groups and therefore was specifically questioned at the end of the fourth group and in subsequent groups where not mentioned. That prompting of this topic was required suggests that it may not be a significant factor in reservists' attitudes toward mobilisation.

Purpose

Since mobilised reservists dedicate a substantial part of their lives to military pursuits potentially to the detriment of other aspects of their life, it makes sense that they do it for 'something' that they consider it to be worthwhile and that they get some satisfaction from. The simplest of these is that mobilisation and deployment on operations is seen as an exciting prospect. They may also feel an expectation to mobilise and deploy, a sense of duty, albeit qualified.

The perception of worthwhileness of operations is partly considered in the stories that are told by comrades and is also considered later in terms of the threshold that might be needed to overcome the pull of other commitments at home, within Control. That threshold will be a matter for individual consideration. This theme displays a sense of Fighting Spirit, through the satisfaction they have from being part of mobilisation as a military activity. Pride, and the perception of an operation as worthwhile is a consideration within Purpose, as is the Spiritual

Foundation, with mobilisation representing an opportunity to serve a higher cause through support to one's own people or the Army.

Mobilisation is seen as an exciting prospect that offers adventure and something different to soldiers, as shown by these Infanteers:

> GR: what did you feel when you were called-up, called-out to mobilise? When you got the letter or E-Mail through?
>
> C2: Good, felt good.
>
> C1: I got it through the post, me.
>
> C2: Yeah, quite exciting to be going away.

And this Signaller suggested:

> J2: It's literally duty or fun. And I see the two go hand-in-hand, so…

As mentioned under the theme of Control, while uncertainty of timing can be damaging, uncertainty of task can be exciting. MACA in response to COVID-19 was a task that many participants had experience of in this study and formed the most recent basis of experience for many of them. Certainly in that specific case, it offered an escape from boredom at home where there was a dearth of competing demand from civilian employment.[673] In the event, many soldiers in this study found this operation an exciting prospect in the unknown but, on reflection, not exciting or "interesting"[674] in execution compared with other operations.

> C3: So, it was a really good, like, in for me with the Battalion, kinda get to know people and it was just, just, really glad to get on it. It was just good timing for me. I know there some of the other lads who've done a lot more who maybe might have found it a bit more boring than I did. It was all new for me.
>
> …C3: Yeah, yeah, well if I'd joined the Reserves and they'd said, "this is how you do a COVID test" I'd have been very disappointed! [laughs]

Nevertheless, mobilisations can be recognised as important and worthwhile and therefore still be 'supported' even if not necessarily an exciting proposition, especially where it is a task that "everyone understands…,"[675] especially where there is an "obvious benefit to people."[676]

[673] Groups C, D, E, and H.
[674] F1, Group F.
[675] M4, Group M.
[676] E1, Group E.

Overseas humanitarian operations were also mentioned by several groups[677] as "rewarding and fulfilling"[678] operations, specifically "worthwhile to giving up a period of time in my civilian career."[679] Humanitarian and UK operations certainly avoid implications of controversy, though the one group that mentioned this idea suggested that controversy was not a deciding factor in their thinking. Warfighting operations or national defence operations were not mentioned at all in terms of their worth, more they were considered as imperatives, perhaps where the worth was not in question. Addressing both the MACA operation they had taken part in and the prospective change of role that their unit would be undertaking, these infanteers were positive about future mobilisations that they might be called-out for.

> GR: Do you think UK-type operations are inherently a worthwhile thing for you to be doing?
>
> H3: Yeah, but I don't know if I'd want to be on them forever. So, it'd be nice to go to rotate, through it.
>
> GR: Do something of everything?
>
> H3: Yeah. But it's certainly a role I'd happily get stuck into.
>
> H2: Yeah.
>
> GR: And how about the overseas training team idea? Do you think that is something that is worthwhile doing that?
>
> H3: Ah, yeah, 100%.
>
> H1: Yeah definitely.
>
> GR: What is it about it you think makes it worthwhile?
>
> H3: For me, it's the whole, without being too cheesy is one of the whole reasons why I joined up, which was to give something back a bit. Do something different but give something. You know, make a difference somewhere. And if it is just, if you got an oppressed country that's trying to fight off terrorists or something like that. To be able to help them, maybe pass a bit of knowledge on. If you do that, you'd go away from there with quite a sense of achievement.

What is clear from this extract and those from other groups[680] is that making a difference or having an impact as an individual or as a group is also an important factor in reservists' perceptions of worth or purpose when mobilising. The counter-proposition that emphasises this further, though not illustrated here, is that if they did not have the chance to make an impact then they may question the worthwhileness of their participation. Serving one's own people, for instance against COVID or in support of the Olympics,[681] is especially seen as

[677] Groups B, F, K and L.
[678] B4, Group B.
[679] K3, Group K.
[680] Groups B, E, H, J and L.
[681] Group B.

worthwhile even if the task is not exciting. While not specifically referring to mobilisation, "serving my country" is consistently reported by ResCAS as among the top reasons for joining (67%) and staying (60%) in the Army. Nevertheless, participants in this study did not state that they mobilise to satisfy a desire to serve their country, an abstract, but did discuss that they did so to serve their own people or to support the Army. This is similar to the FRRP[682] where few reservists reported that they served out of "duty to their country."

None of the groups seriously questioned the morality of any of the operations they might be called to participate in, only, as mentioned, the morality of them personally taking part over their other commitments. They did note that an overtly 'good' operation made other relationships easier to navigate but it was by no means a critical factor. Pride is clearly a powerful motivator to mobilise, while some operations may trigger more Pride because of their clear and obvious benefit. They also have a strong Spiritual Foundation, that service to a higher cause may be accomplished through service to the organisation and to their own people is worthwhile, and that they trust the organisation such that what they will be asked to mobilise for will be inherently just. Alternatively, as suggested by McMahan, they "don't engage in moral deliberation,"[683] in which case the Spiritual Foundation would be 'strong' simply through low engagement with those issues.

The findings in this theme support FRRP research that reservists want to "be, and feel, useful…[and] experience the thrill of deploying on operations,"[684] excitement and making an impact are important motivators. It also aligns with ResCAS results which see "doing something worthwhile," "doing something different/challenging" and "to serve country" as highly rated reasons more widely within the organisation for joining and staying in the Army Reserve, though all these reasons could be achieved without mobilising for operations.

Control

Soldiers want to have a measure of control over what happens to them. They want to be able to influence how, when and where they are employed and find a way to successfully blend their military and civilian commitments. Salient components of this include having mobilisation opportunities available to them and being empowered by certainty and the ability to choose between mobilising and not. The elements of this theme are linked with reservists' terms of service and are therefore partly within the gift of the organisation to affect, and are also linked with volunteerist traditions outlined in the Literature Review. The

[682] Catignani et al (2018), p2.
[683] McMahon (2013), p20. Noted in the Literature Review.
[684] Catignani et al (2018), p2.

need for this efficacy is broadly linked to the external relationships that reservists must navigate. When they mobilise, they make a choice for others as well as themselves.

Referring back to the elements of the Moral Component Model, this theme speaks to Fighting Spirit (reservists 'want' to mobilise' and do not have to volunteer twice), Self-Discipline (to choose mobilisation over other activities), Pride (feeling that the activity is worthwhile), Spiritual Foundation (based on the trust that soldiers have in the organisation to give due deference to things they feel are important), Compulsion (as an alternative to choice) and System Enabling (the extent to which the organisation makes it easy to mobilise).

Opportunity

Most groups were in favour of any opportunity to mobilise that could be afforded to them, with broad agreement that "any opportunity whatsoever"[685] was a good thing, though opinions varied over the length of deployments based on individual circumstances. Several participants said they had volunteered for an operational tour but had not been selected. The attitude of the groups collectively was that the Army should keep the opportunity at a level high, with the perception that sometimes demand for opportunities outstripped supply. This infanteer said:

> H3: I was hoping to join the second op, but there wasn't one.

This Signaller said:

> J1: I think it's pretty important. I put my name down multiple times to do different things or whatever came up, there hasn't been that much. It was a TOSCA and a TORAL. Nothing anywhere near your level. But that was the only sort of like opportunities other than the Kenyas come up and I put my name down. But it wasn't successful for either, obviously.

And is supported by these Signallers from another group:

> G4: That was the point I was making earlier. You'd put your hat in the ring, but you were not chosen, or you couldn't go. And that's what I'm getting at is that…. Like, how often do you get the opportunity? Not very often! You may say you do, but to actually get chosen, to be the chosen one is not that easy.
>
> G2: It's not easy. It comes for everyone. So, if there is a deployment for, for example a couple of Signallers to go away with whoever for six months that will go round probably, all the Reserve Signal regiments.

The disappointment at a lack of opportunity hints at a positive Fighting Spirit and a desire to be involved in operations and military activity.

[685] G2, Group G.

Uncertainty

Having the opportunities was seen as a good start but there was a clear feeling across the groups that it was important for soldiers to be empowered with information about the parameters of the job they might be undertaking. Most soldiers could accept uncertain task parameters, or even found it a matter of excitement or adventure (discussed later) but temporal or administrative uncertainty was a challenge. Changing timelines was identified as a real problem with an infantry unit's deployment to the Falklands,[686] a mobilisation for Operation TOSCA in Cyprus,[687] as well as with a UK deployment:

> K3: I volunteered for RESCRIPT, but I had to give my work 4 weeks' notice and when I came back to the unit with the dates that I could do, they said they had already mobilised too many people and that I was no longer needed. So, wanted to and volunteered but didn't end up mobilising…[and] dates change. I know someone else who's _____ [other sub-unit] who works at the same office as I do. She was supposed to be going on FIRIC and the dates kept on changing and in the end, she had to pull out because, you know, it was very difficult to then follow the processes and procedures required.
>
> GR: So, uncertainty is a massive disadvantage?
>
> K3: Yeah, when dates keep changing. It makes it really difficult. But if the normal processes are followed, then absolutely no problem. I've full confidence that my employer would recognise my time off, I'd have the same role to go back to, I'd have my normal salary to go back to and everything would be fine.

The military cliché of, "on the bus, off the bus," describing a situation whereby, through perceived poor planning or rapidly changing circumstances, an order is given only to be swiftly counter-ordered, epitomises the frustration that participants had about uncertainty, something that ultimately undermines their Spiritual Foundation and their faith in the organisation. Many indicated that they would commit to the organisation more but for the uncertain aspects of their service that were so commonplace that they expect last minute changes or cancellations that affects not just on the soldier but on their family and makes them feel undervalued.[688]

> B1 – You just want like a brief description of where we going. How long is it for? And this is what you'd be doing. Roughly.
>
> B3 – This is when I go, this is when I come back.

This conversation between two logisticians is representative of that frustration:

> M4: and you'd already told your family…
>
> M5: Having already told the family that it doesn't look like it's going to happen. Or having to then re-have that conversation.

[686] Group H.
[687] Group M.
[688] Group B.

> GR: Does that kind of uncertainty and, frankly, mess around have a damaging effect?
>
> M4: It's the worst thing. From both your family and individuals…
>
> M5: From some people's response it definitely put them off. People that were good to go, were told they were not needed, were then told three months later if they wanted to go, were actually, well, no, now I've moved on and made plans.
>
> M4: And you lost some good soldiers that way. I can name at least three people that would have had something to offer this tour.

The final phrase from participant M4 outlines the real effect of this; that the organisation fails to fully exploit the human capital that it has available. This demonstrates the effect that the Moral Component can have on Fighting Power. This was also identified by FRRP[689] where short notice changes to arrangements, even those less demanding than mobilisation, are inhibitors to service suggesting that limited progress has been made since 2018 in this regard.

Particularly important among all groups, as in the extract above, is the notice period that soldiers might get before they were mobilised.

> H1: I think it will be, I think it depends what it is. Sometimes it's sort of quite you get quite a while because it's like if you volunteer to do it, which a lot of the stuff in Reserves, you got quite a bit of time, most of the time.
>
> H1: But then sometimes it can be quite quick-
>
> H3: Like, "what you doing Wednesday?"
>
> H1: Yeah, yeah. Yeah. What you doing next week? Do you wanna go somewhere? And then it's very much sometimes the information is only getting passed around as well, then you start getting angry E-Mails or phone calls being like, "why haven't you done this?" "Well I didn't know I had to!" Yeah, I think, sort of, the time, notice wise, isn't that much of an issue, I don't think. From what I've heard.
>
> H3: No, I don't think it's that.
>
> H2: I think if you are able to, mobilise and disappear within, like two weeks then, fine do that but I think the vast majority of us need to give at least a month's notice to work, if not more.

Formal notice, marked by the receipt of call-out papers, and informal notice in the form of conversations with the Chain of Command were differentiated, partly, as is outlined later, due to the expectation that the situation might change anyway.

> M5: Well, ironically, the paperwork did not come out for thirty days.
>
> M4: Mine was even less. Mine got lost in the post.
>
> M3: Yeah, it was about thirty days, wasn't it?

[689] Giga *et al* (2018a); Catignani and Basham (2018).

M1: Mine was-

M2: Before we came here there was a guy who turned up on the Friday before we came here. And he was like, I just got told about this last night…

M4: So, we were given the heads up the year before. But confirmation was about a month.

GR: I see. So the unofficial feelers-

M4: -but we can't do anything until you have got your letter. And we were like, I wanted to give up my house, I was renting. I wanted to give it up.

GR: Well, given the uncertainty you described…

M4: Yeah, well it, like genuinely was stressful.

GR: You feel like it is not real notice if it changes so frequently and it is so, tentative?

M5: Yeah, but then I think that ultimately that comes down to the conversations we were having with the Regiment were actually, if we had gone…and yes, because you want to prepare soon as possible…once the paperwork came through, it was very easy to start doing stuff. Whereas when you've got people going, "oh yeah, you are on it, wait for the paperwork," the extra conversation didn't help.

These notice periods also provide the time to develop Competence (discussed earlier). More time before deployment is more time for training and to develop a sense of Efficacy. To a lesser extent, longer-term predictability was discussed but there were broadly no real expectations of predictability unless that also led to an ability to have greater notice of mobilisation for a specific operation.

This might be seen to affect System Enabling, considering the lead time used by the organisation to issue the formal call-out paperwork for both planned or predictable operations and those that are new and emerging unpredictably. Reservists perceive that it is within the organisation's gift to give more notice for operations and that they don't make it as easy as possible to mobilised. The uncertainty that this can cause may be within the gift or the organisation to address. While Defence policy is to provide a minimum of 28 days' notice for all operations,[690] the Army also seems to use this as a maximum notice period at which paperwork will be issued, which can cause friction by removing certainty that could be delivered by issuing mobilisation orders sooner (with more notice). That the organisation may be seen to make it harder to mobilise than it should through either lack of notice or paucity of information, when they actually *want* to mobilise may be *prima facie* a failure of System Enabling that undermines Fighting Power. Further, though this scenario also appears to undermine their Spiritual Foundation; their belief in the organisation and the 'task'

[690] MOD (2015).

of mobilisation. Their belief in a higher cause is undermined if the Army is not also seen to recognise their status as reservists.

Choice

Having the ability to choose was widely noted as important. It was inherently seen as a benefit of being a reservist rather than a regular, as noted by this infanteer:

> C2: Well, that's the beauty of being a reservist, you can kind of…you have that choice.

And these soldiers also:

> I2: It's one of the big incentives of people joining is so they have the option to do that, to mobilise and to deploy; or the option not to…
>
> I1: That's for the benefit of, you can have the best of both worlds. I really enjoy that about Reserves here. Being able to just choose not necessarily be forced to go on the deployment you might not want to go on.

As well as being a part of Reserve service, there were also perceived Fighting Spirit benefits for the organisation by choosing motivated volunteers first. One commented:

> E1: And, looping back to what you said about sort of the importance of volunteering. I think the majority of see having the opportunity to volunteer and assessing then the pool from which you might use more enforced mobilisation from. I think everyone is accepting that we're in that situation that you…that might happen. So, you know if you're like well, Johnny's got a 2-month-old baby, probably won't go for him. But as long as that's kind of being taken into account to a certain extent. Then, you know, you've got the volunteers first, or the highly motivated and whoever, you know, is being sort of dragged along a little bit more is going to be much happier to be in sort of a group of motivated people.

This quotation also highlights another idea that was prevalent within the groups; that to be deserving of loyalty from soldiers, the organisation must account for individual personal circumstances.

> K2: I think what's instilled, at least what has been instilled in me is fact that your civilian career always takes precedence; regardless. Because we choose to do this as long as you're fulfilling your minimum requirements and all the rest of it at the end of the day. It's your civilian career comes first because it's…
>
> K3 It's what pays the bills.
>
> K2: It's what pays the bills.
>
> GR: So, you feel like the Army Reserve accepts real life, as it were, non-army life comes first?
>
> K4: Yeah.
>
> K2: Yes. Officers will and leaders push that. And are accepting of that and then anything that you give on top is a bonus. So your ability and yes, whilst it makes things very difficult to organise, training events and training weeks and things like that. At the end of the day, if they can show willingness to be able to be responsive to your commitments and issues and things like that then you're more likely to come back. Into okay, I can't do that week because such as such, however, I can do this and then you're

> giving up as much of your availability as possible, and then that gives them sort of greater scope to work with.

This reinforces the importance of giving a choice as an organisational behaviour which supports reservists' Spiritual Foundation. This is a more positive situation than described by FRRP, where participants felt that attempts to prioritise family or civilian employment led to them being branded as unreliable.[691] As in the very early days of the Territorial Force outlined in the Literature Review, modern reservists strongly value their sense of Volunteerism and this forms a key part of their Spiritual Foundation and military identity as was intended by FR20.[692] Indeed, this is seen as a critical element of service and that where personal circumstances are overlooked then the Spiritual Foundation would be undermined, much as the "breach of faith" in the First World War described by Nicholson in Holmes[693] and earlier in this chapter with System Enabling and notice periods. By implication, this links to the idea of Compulsion, which while it was seldom discussed within the groups organically without prompt from the moderator, was recognised but not dwelled upon.[694]

The thematic analysis suggests that Compulsion works in several ways; primarily in relation to the way that reservists manage their wider relationships and, theoretically, as a means for the organisation to get the soldiers it needs for operations that meet a threshold of seriousness, such as those that might require General Mobilisation or where they skills needed don't exist elsewhere in the Army. Participants widely recognised that there was a threshold where personal choice was less important than military necessity and that this fell at the most demanding end of the spectrum of conflict. Compulsion and reduced notice would be justified "if something really big kicks off;"[695] General Warfare or other emergency rather than long-planned commitments of lower seriousness that could or should have been known about, but the indications are that in most cases this would not be needed. In these sorts of situations, a sense of Pride is triggered that means reservists see a conflict as sufficiently worthwhile to put their personal preferences to one side. Were this threshold not met and an operation not deemed important or sufficiently worthwhile to bypass intelligent selection then the Spiritual Foundation may be undermined.

[691] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b), p3.
[692] Edmunds *et al* (2016), p127.
[693] Holmes (2004), p136.
[694] Group F.
[695] G4 in Group G.

This links with Edmunds *et al's*[696] observation that enthusiasm in British society for participating in military activity is relative to the perception of external threat; what the mobilisation is worth and what the cost is. Keenness for opportunity suggests that the organisation has been at least partly successful in inculcating an ethos in its soldiers that leads to an expectation and desire for deployment, though the perceived acceptable threshold for abandoning Intelligent Selection still aligns with the age-old understanding of the Territorial Army as a strategic rather than an operational reserve for 'wars of choice.'

Extrinsic themes

The next group of themes are extrinsic which concerns three factors that come from outside of the individual. Pay, financial recognition of service being the most prevalent method of rewarding work done for an organisation regardless of sector was identified by codes that related to money. Pay has both practical and intangible consequences; allowing people to survive within an economic framework but also representing the worth that an organisation places on a person's contribution. Of note, pay presents as a hygiene factor[697] in the data. One reward that is particular to armed forces is medallic recognition, though again, it is not the value of the metal and ribbon itself that is of interest but what it represents. Potential gains, such as personal skills and development as benefits derived from mobilisation; and losses or perceived costs, like personal inconvenience and risk to civilian employment, were also identified here.

Pay

Despite financial payment being the most common reward for employment, only four groups discussed that pay might be an attractive factor and there was not necessarily consensus in those groups, dependent on the individual situation of the participants. Two groups suggested that the pay associated with mobilisation was not a key factor, largely because most reservists earned more in their civilian employment. This soldier from a logistic unit said:

> M4: What else do you get in recognition from the Army?
>
> M5: You don't, you get the pay, there's all the extra stuff.
>
> M4: Yeah, but recognition?

Suggesting that pay might be seen only as fair and necessary recompense for a soldier's time but not for their wider sacrifice and dedication. These infanteers said:

[696] Edmunds *et al* (2016) p126.
[697] Herzberg, Mausner and Snyderman (1959).

> G1: I do this as a part time. I'd probably still do it if I wasn't getting paid, 'cause we want to be here.
>
> H3: Yeah, you don't do it for the money, but I think it's important to know that you still got bills to pay for if you're away. Yeah, you need to know mortgages and tax is taken care of.

Simple positive or negative terms were not used by reservists discussing their pay, suggesting that it does not greatly affect the Moral Component through the factor of Occupational Benefits; defined as the recognition of the value of material gains that support mobilisation. An infantry unit commented on the practicalities of getting their civilian pay recognised so that they receive sufficient Reservist Award[698] to not be disadvantaged by mobilisation. While this was not a widespread complaint within this study's relatively small population, it may have an impact on the wider force. This kind of issue with System Enabling and the difficulties of some kinds of payment being recognised is a negative factor that cannot be compensated for even by extreme positivity in other factors, such as Fighting Spirit. Some reservists simply cannot afford to mobilise. Others have suffered from administrative errors even if their expenses should have been fully covered:

> K2: But we shouldn't even be there in that position wherever discussing this. Yeah, it should just be done correctly and unfortunately it probably the largest negative for this whole, morally what would we do? Because morally, yeah, of course. I'd like to put myself forward.
>
> K1: It's trust.
>
> K2: But I know that they're not going to cover what I pay myself.
>
> K1: You can't trust…
>
> K2: You know so financially its unviable for me to ever be deployed.
>
> K1: Basically, you get told these policies are in place, but it's just trust. People…there's no trust, people don't trust the, anybody, to actually do it, that's what it all comes down to.
>
> K4: For RESCRIPT it was, don't worry, there are policies in place. We'll get you the emergency funds. No one will be out of pocket. And then everyone was put on basic rate. Some people got basic rate for their correct wage, for the correct salary and wage. And there was others who didn't. People who had claimed the Reservist Award were put on basic rate. So, if you were claiming for, say 70,000, and all of a sudden your now on private's wage basic rate, you're at a massive disadvantage. I was disadvantaged by the fact that I was put on the wrong rate completely. Yeah, and that takes a big hit. So those policies albeit they are in place, still didn't cover what was needed.
>
> K1: It's not like the trust was broken once or twice; it's happened so many times to people that you hear stories about that. It puts everyone off. Unless the Army is your number one, your focus. That's your life, you know, that's your job, you're a regular. Then it's not a problem, but when you're doing it for self-satisfaction or whatever

[698] On mobilisation, the Army will pay reservists their military pay by rank, topped up to the level of their civilian pay (up to a limit) to ensure that they are not 'worse off' by mobilising.

> reason, and you've got another income supporting your life and then you drop that to let the Army takeover for a short period of time and then they don't go by what they say and it puts…
>
> GR: They let your trust down?
>
> K1: Yeah, they let you down. And you've put in the sacrifices, your life basically. You know.
>
> K4: You know, when you mobilise, the Army's asking for huge amounts from you. But we can't ask the Army back for these basic necessities that should be correct.

As with System Enabling within the Control theme, the Occupational Benefit variable from the Moral Component over-simplifies the issue of pay, covering only the impact on a soldier and their family's ability to survive in the economy rather than explaining the emotive issue of what it means to reservists and how it affects Fighting Power. For the sacrifices that soldiers commit to mobilising, pay errors make them feel undervalued and unappreciated. The loss of trust discussed in Group K is one example of this, with the impact on the Spiritual Foundation.

While ResCAS results illustrate that 49% of Army Other Ranks surveyed are satisfied with their pay, albeit not mobilisation specific, most groups here stressed that they did not serve for the money, but did refer to their mobilisation pay being incorrect, suggesting that pay may function as a Hygiene Factor. When present and functioning correctly it is neither positive nor negative but if poorly executed or non-functioning it has a negative impact, not just practically, but for the same reasons above, because of broken trust between soldiers and the Army. In some quarters there is low confidence that pay issues would be dealt with correctly and the issue takes on the characteristics of a War Story:

> D2: Oh, OK. So, if I was to get called up on the 1st of January, then I wouldn't actually get paid that until first of March. So that's me technically two months without any pay!
>
> GR: Quite a big gap! Especially with bills to pay families to support.
>
> D1: Especially as you're usually only one month away from losing your house, aren't you? [chuckles]. Most people, most people live to just the edges of their means, don't they?
>
> D2: So, pay is a …
>
> GR: It's big risk is putting a lot of trust in the system to get it right, first time.
>
> D2: Being reservists our pay is always probably wrong!
>
> D1: Ahh yeah!
>
> D2: It's not going to be correct straight away...it's just being Army' isn't it? You'll go out there, it'll be a few months before it's even saw it…

Here there is a practical impact that varies by individual circumstances, from annoyance to short-term financial difficulties, with a tangible outcome on the ability to generate troops for operations.

> E2: Yeah, and I think some people, you know, pay's obviously hugely emotive thing. And I think that, that being messed up and certainly being very vocal about that was a lot of people didn't come in for a huge amount of time after mobilisation…
>
> GR: It left a bad taste?
>
> E2: Yeah, because they were really messed around and that kind of all feeds into this sort of morale of everyone and to a certain extent, I think it's affected the numbers on FIRIC.

There is a clear sense that reservists feel that for everything they put into the organisation, both with routine training and for deployments, the Army as an employer should at least get their basic compensation correct. Failing to get mobilisation payments correct undermines the Spiritual Foundation of soldiers; they infer that the organisation has broken their faith and trust.

Medals

A factor which was only mentioned organically (unprompted by the moderator) in three groups was the provision of medals by the organisation to reservists. Specifically, this refers to campaign or operational medals, rather than gallantry medals for acts of bravery. It may be obvious that militaries would not invest in what are fundamentally 'trinkets' if they were not effective tools for motivation. It is clear from the discussion, that while they are an externally provided physical item, they mean much more to recipients and to the organisation and are a "potent tool"[699] in motivating subordinates.

This logistician mentioned that receiving a keepsake for their work at the Olympics in 2012, which although could not be worn, was a source of pride for them personally and something that they could use to demonstrate their service to their family.

> B1: I mean that what, was it 2012, that war? So that's quite a while back, I still keep looking at my little medal and all. Yes, I got a little medal. I'm dead proud of that though. I did love it was a completely different atmosphere. I probably won't talk about that if I went towards somewhere then doing some grotty job.

These infanteers discussed the way that medals influence their feelings of Pride in the task. There may be a link between medallic recognition and which operations reservists perceive that the organisation is signalling as being more worthwhile.

> K2: …like, whilst there are also opportunities, for example, being deployed, but no medals. And you're giving up a lot of your time, and effort, and all the rest of it? And

[699] Keegan (2004), p323.

you're not being…I know it's not just about the medals, and that's a lot of the time, however….it is because you want to be something represented, the sacrifice that you made. And if it's just a short deployment that doesn't have one, then, why won't I hold out to something that is?

GR: So, it's interesting you mentioned medallic recognition. What does that represent to you? Because it means more than just the piece of metal and the cloth attached to it.

K2: Yes. Yourself. You have medals, and I do not. We've been in a similar time duration, haven't we?

K1: Yeah.

K4: I didn't particularly do it for the medals. It is a nice to have. Going to functions and it's nice to show off and show that you've been. It's that physical item that you have been there and done the job. The main reason I went away was, to mobilise and actually get out and use the skills I've been taught.

These logisticians also recognise the intangible value of a tangible medal:

M4: To me, I think it's important. One, because I've got family who have earned medals and I would like to be able to do the same and two, for my kids as well. It allows them to be proud of something like I was when I saw those from my grandparents and great grandparents. And also, it has a bit more of an impact on myself because it relates to my day-job, so they go hand in hand. I can wear my medals in relation to my day job and vice-versa. So, it has a bit more of an impact whereas with some people…it's, you earn a medal with the Reserves and that will only impact you when you are doing Reserves stuff. If that makes sense?

M5: I mean, I don't know how everyone else feels…Getting a medal is not the sole reason for going on tour.

M4: No, No.

M5: But it's a nice thing. Because it's a recognised element of, you go on tour, you are recognised for doing something in this manner. And it's something that, particularly for the Reserve, and you get new guys coming in, you are going to go on parades you are going to have something that others potentially don't, it just helps to generate conversation. It's that little bit of…almost aspirational. And I get some of the…you do get some of the guys coming in, the regulars coming in with their absolute racks, Afghan, all these tour medals. The guys, not necessarily want to have the same experience, because some of their experiences are quite harrowing, but at the same time, they have been recognised and it's quite nice to get some of that recognition in the same way. It's not the be-all and end-all, but it is a nice add-on to the rest of what we are doing.

GR: So, it's a recognition of your commitment and your activity as a Reserve soldier…like a mark of honour within the organisation.

M5: Kind of…You see someone with a medal, and you know they have done something.

For reservists, medals appear to be lasting proof of their dedication and sacrifice; their Fighting Spirit writ for all to see. They are a mark of shared experience, either in the specific operation or wider operational service, between all service people. It is also distinctive to those in the military and a visible symbol that civilians would not have and acts as a force for

Moral Cohesion. The reservists participating here were keen to point out that they don't "do it for the medals" but that they are a positive factor in attracting them to mobilise. Correspondingly the military awards medals to try to encourage preferred modes of behaviour, repay and acknowledge the debt of service and by limiting their issue to certain areas or conditions, create scarcity, making them more desirable.

Gains and losses

Another tangible factor that was mentioned by less than half the groups[700] was using mobilisation as an opportunity for personal development that might benefit their civilian or military careers. ResCAS results recognise the benefits of wider Reserve service in obtaining skills and training[701] but were much less positive over the benefit to their civilian career.[702] Certainly it was recognised that mobilising might have a positive benefit for a reservist's military career. These infanteers imply that their 'OC'[703] also recognised the potential benefits of mobilisation for his military career.

> K3: I thought the OC was out there?
>
> K4: The OC has gone. But he did for his career and everything. You look at the higher ups past him and where the Battalion all the original generation came from the Battalion. None of them have gone.

However, benefits in employment were not seen as a decisive benefit or significant factor, though they would fall within the scope of Occupational Benefits as a Moral Component factor. Greater concern came with perceived tangible costs of mobilising over remaining in civilian employment; that personal development gains from mobilising might be outweighed by ground lost at work. This was seen as vital ground under FR20 with significant resources invested in supporting soldier-employer relations.

> H1: Trying to slot back in, into the rhythm of it, means you sometimes get put being behind the people as well, so I think you gotta weigh up, civilian career versus the actual, your Army career, in a sense.
>
> H2: You won't get sacked if you go but someone else will be the one that was there getting the opportunities for training courses, getting a pay rise, getting promotion where you've been? So, you're back here and I can you re-join here and they're up here already?

How reservists manage their desire to serve with their employers in practical terms when they are called-out to mobilise is an interesting issue. Even when the policy of Intelligent Selection is followed, while some soldiers said they would be honest with their employers

[700] Groups E, G, K, L and M.
[701] 55% joined and 50% stay in for those benefits.
[702] 26% joined and 24% stay in for those benefits.
[703] Officer Commanding - an officer of Major rank in charge of their sub-unit (Company or Squadron).

and trusted them to support their military service, most participants suggested that they would not expose this choice to their employers.

> GR: And well, when it comes to mobilisation and how would you have to explain it to your families and employers, do you say, "I've been asked to go"? or "I've been told to go"?
>
> C1: I say to my employer I've been told [laughs]…it's just easier.
>
> C3: I don't give them the impression I have much choice. It's like, sorry mate, I've got to go! [laughs]
>
> C2: Yeah, I'm the same. I wouldn't really tell my employer I've been given an option.

This approach may serve to protect the soldier from potential recriminations or perceived losses later, as outlined in the previous theme and in FRRP,[704] but also illustrates that while Organisational Compulsion does not have a strong impact upon individuals, it is used as a tool to secure the support of civilian employers for mobilisation. Indeed, some participants would welcome greater compulsion being exerted on employers for the wider elements of Reserve service, not just mobilisation, though this is a complex relationship for Defence to manage; to make Reserve service seem attractive through employer support initiatives[705] rather than be coerced into it. FRRP also highlighted that reservists seldom want to present deployment as voluntary to their employers.[706] Nevertheless, ResCAS reported only 9% of Army Other-Ranks feeling that they had been unreasonably disadvantaged by Army service in their civilian employment. This may reflect lower levels of disadvantage perceived by general service than by mobilised service, or that the potential losses are a fear that tend not to materialise.

Family considerations were presented in a comparable way to those of civilian employment, though mentioned slightly less frequently as practical concerns. Families are perceived to be more supportive of mobilisation based on the strength of personal relationships and understanding of the value that the service person places in their Army activity. Family demands, and the emotional and practical impact of leaving them, are weighed up against the benefits derived from mobilisation but are not moral issues in themselves. ResCAS reported than 49% of Army Other-Ranks were satisfied with the family support provided during their last mobilisation.

> L1: I support if you've got, like, commitments outside of it, like family and personal matters, and things, it might be a bit difficult to leave that behind for long periods of time.

[704] Cunningham-Burley et al (2018b), p3.
[705] Edmunds et al (2016), p131.
[706] Woodward et al (2018b).

> L2: Yeah. I'm with him. If you're a family person and if you have kids. Sometimes it may feel hard to leave them and go on operations. But if you are single and if you have then you can go then you must go and help the Army.

More participants suggested that they would be honest with their families about mobilisation than with their employers and to support these discussions, the amount of notice given for a deployment is important. This is also linked to the pay issues described in an earlier theme, because it is at home that the costs of any problems with money will be felt, and more time allowed for preparation allows for greater control of these issues. As outlined in previous themes, it is important for the Spiritual Foundation that the Army recognises this. This sense of perceived cost links with another sub-theme of personal inconvenience. The difficulties of mobilising and being ready for operations, through lack of time or procedural problems featured in many groups. The frustration that this causes was evident in these soldiers from a logistic unit preparing to mobilise for Operation TOSCA, the UK's contribution to the Peacekeeping mission in Cyprus:

> M2: I had a lot of med appointments that they checked for the same thing, and they go, oh, you haven't got it. And then someone else calls and goes, no, "we need to check you again." And then we need to check you again, and again for the same thing and it just feels like a waste of time. In the end, they were like, all your tests are clear.
>
> GR: So, the system is not helping itself.
>
> M5: No. There has been a lot of repetition, a lot of show us this, have you done this? [overtalk]
>
> M4: We must have shown our passports at least twenty times.
>
> M1: Yeah. The amount of times I've had to show a driving licence, passport, everything…
>
> M4: You run the risk of losing it every time you ask us to bring it in.
>
> M1: You just have to carry it around everywhere!
>
> M4: You run the risk of losing it bringing it in and taking it home. It's safer if I put it in my top drawer and leaving it where it is.

In this instance, and others cited by other groups, reservists were treated 'like regular soldiers.' *Prima facie* this is an issue of System Enabling, with the organisation making it difficult for soldiers to mobilise, but this may be a matter of Perceived Organisational Support,[707] or more simply, trust. In instances like this, they do not feel trusted or supported by the organisation, or recognised as being part-timers, and the Spiritual Foundation is undermined. These examples further demonstrate that the Spiritual Foundation, and the relationship between soldier and Army, are conditional. It can be damaged and must be actively maintained by the organisation, in many cases by being seen to act justly as an

[707] Linde (2015).

employer in cases like this and in those described earlier with regard to soldiers' personal situations, but also by being seen to be setting the conditions to allow soldiers to do what the organisation demands of them; mobilising for operations.

Conclusion (SQ2 and SQ4)

This chapter has presented the evidence to answer SQ2, "What is the state of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?" and SQ4, "What Moral Component factors influence the ability of the Army Reserve to generate soldiers for operations?" It argues that within the Intrinsic themes identified, that the soldiers have a positive Fighting Spirit and are disappointed where they are stifled by a perceived lack of opportunity; but this is conditional. They get satisfaction from the prospect of mobilisation and military life itself; they have a sense of Self-Discipline and will mobilise to do what they feel they 'ought' to do, rather than because they are forced, and they want to make a difference as individuals and as a team. That the prospect of being part of a larger military team is attractive points to positive Moral Cohesion and there is also a keen sense that they want to mobilise with their comrades and do not want to miss out. They also have a positive Spiritual Foundation, and it is inferred that they serve a higher cause through the Army though were not specific as to what that cause is. The Extrinsic theme further expands upon reservists' Fighting Spirit and their desire to show off their military identity and their membership of a cohesive team through wearing medals, which are also perceived to indicate what worth the organisation places in an operation. System Enabling and Occupational Benefits are seen as 'hygiene factors' which do not promote mobilisation but could undermine it. The organisation is often seen to make mobilisation difficult and pay administration, when poorly executed, has the potential to undermine mobilisation. Both these elements can influence the Spiritual Foundation through a loss of trust.

Within Control and Competence, while soldiers show a positive Fighting Spirit, through wanting to be involved and improve, it is again seen that mobilisation is not as easy as reservists feel it should be. Pride and Self-Discipline are both seen as positive, provided an operation is perceived as sufficiently worthwhile, and in the most serious circumstances where Intelligent Selection would be set aside, soldiers suggest they would mobilise because they ought rather than because they are compelled to do so. This suggests that reservists have a low sense of Organisational Compulsion, that is to say they do not mobilise out of contractual or legal obligation and the risk of punishment, but more out of a moral obligation and Self-Discipline to follow through on an agreement. Low Organisational Compulsion is inferred from the preponderance of high Self-Discipline and Pride in most circumstances.

The Spiritual Foundation is generally positive but is fragile. Where the organisation does not provide sufficient certainty and is not seen to account for personal circumstances, their volunteer ethos or treat them equitably compared with regular soldiers against whom they measure their performance, mobilisation efforts may be undermined. While ambiguity of task may be acceptable, ambiguity of timeline is intolerable, especially where that degrades into confusion over changing requirements at short notice. In routine circumstances, these instances can be seen to undermine the sense of System Enabling because they make it harder for reservists to mobilise than it should be. Cumulatively this may have created an endemic situation whereby they 'expect the unexpected,' or short-notice changes, and therefore temper their expectations and their Fighting Spirit; their eagerness to volunteer may be lower until full details are known which may simply be too late for some. Practical barriers can be overcome with sufficient notice but conversely, making 'high and late' demands against the Army Reserve may simply be unachievable and are perceived by soldiers to demonstrate that the organisation does not value them or their situation, an enduring issue identified by FRRP.[708]

Similarly, where pay and administration is poorly executed then it becomes a significant negative factor, again because they have a practical effect on a soldier's life and demonstrates to them that the organisation does not value their time. Issues identified within the extrinsic themes have important and far-reaching effects on Fighting Power through the Spiritual Foundation. They can also form part of the organisation's lore as stories passed between comrades that could undermine mobilisation in the future. There is also a sense that the recovery from COVID has been tougher for some Reserve units than others. The professionalisation of the Army Reserve as an operational rather than a strategic reserve is still in progress; social bonds and Comradeship remain incredibly important for them.

There was little evidence to suggest that Public Support plays an influential role in mobilisation and the impact of Leadership variables was also less than expected, given the premium that the Army places on this aspect of inter-personal relationships. As variables external to the Army, Family and Employer Support present as underlying context throughout and have many individual permutations. The data here suggest that where reservists feel they and their families have been treated fairly and are not forced to leave their families unnecessarily, for operations which are considered unworthwhile or below the threshold, then justice and morality are served, just as if pay and administrative issues are

[708] Catignani *et al* (2018); Catignani and Basham (2018).

dealt with effectively. The Moral Component issue here exists in the Army's perceived recognition and treatment of the soldier and their circumstances rather than directly in the requirement to leave one's family, which is more practical. They are also vulnerable to uncertainty imposed by the Army and qualify most of the thematic observations made in this chapter that mean that soldiers 'do their best' for the Army within that context.

The 'threat' of Organisation Compulsion is used as a tool for reservists to manage relationships with non-military entities and when combined with the theme of Duty, the evidence here is that there is little to no consideration of repercussions for not mobilising. This may be because the prospect of suspending the policy of Intelligent Selection seems remote. The risk of punishment, where it is considered, therefore becomes an evaluation of practical costs against benefits, rather than a Moral issue. Both pay and medals are tangible ways for the organisation to recognise the contribution of soldiers. Successful application of Occupational Benefits by the organisation should help to maintain the Moral Component of Fighting Power, with pay acting as a hygiene factor that is most significant when seen as deficient. Additionally, Occupational Benefits are also interpreted as signals of the worth that the organisation places in each operation and a soldier's contribution and thus also influences the Pride that soldiers might feel in it.

The next chapter will discuss SQ3, "How far does the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power align with the demands placed upon the organisation?", SQ5, "What conditions might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component of Fighting Power?" and SQ6, "Is the Moral Component Model appropriate for application to the Army Reserve?"

CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION

This chapter builds on the fieldwork results by discussing SQ3, "How far does the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power align with the demands placed upon the organisation?", synthesising the demands of the organisation (outlined in Chapter 4) and the findings of Chapter 6. This chapter also examines the evidence presented for SQ4 to develop an answer for SQ5 "What conditions might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component of Fighting Power?", to identify what the organisation might do to improve prospects for mobilisation and better meet the demands placed upon it. Finally, it will look at SQ6, "Is the Moral Component Model appropriate for application to the Army Reserve?", taking the experience from the last chapter to inform whether the operationalisation used in this study could be improved.

SQ3 - The Alignment of Moral Component and Future Reserves 2020

Comparing the demands that the organisation makes on its solders with the Moral Component of Fighting Power as evidenced in the fieldwork will enable an assessment of the success that the organisation may have in force generating in the future. We return to the Operation Type, Role and Predictability structure used in Chapter 4 to examine how the Moral Component presented in this study aligns with the demand as understood through policy and precedent. Notably, many of the participants had first-hand experience of one or both operations described in the Case Studies[709] in that chapter which offers the potential for close comparisons and further supports their selection retrospectively.

As outlined in Chapter 4, the number of reservists mobilising has been steadily increasing and the Army has continued to operate suggesting that any point of critical failure has not been reached. At the very least the Army Reserve is doing 'enough' to survive within the context that it operates in. The EST, reporting to Parliament, recommended in 2019 that 5-8% of the deployed force[710] should be made up of reservists to maintain the Whole Force in the long-term. The increase in mobilisation suggests that the Army is working toward this aspiration, albeit without commitment to maintain it. Overall, the organisation has been moderately successful in aligning the demands it places on soldiers with their ability or desire to commit, though this may be a matter of compromise; the organisation tailoring its demands to avoid failure rather than being fully responsive to operational needs.

[709] Operation TOSCA, the UK contribution to the United Nations Force In Cyprus (Peacekeeping) and Operation RESCRIPT, Military Aid to the Civilian Authority during COVID.
[710] RFCA (2021), p47. How that is quantified by the single-Services can be infinitely gerrymandered.

The data gathered in this study suggest that the organisation's demands (outlined in Chapter 4) and the force's Moral Component of Fighting Power (described in Chapter 6) are moderately well aligned, especially in regard to the relationship between the individual soldier and the Army, such as Fighting Spirit, Spiritual Foundation and Pride. Reservists are broadly supportive of mobilisation for any opportunity and use any of their skills, general or technical, as individuals or established teams. Where the Army Reserve may struggle to meet the demand is when relationships outside the Army are affected or practical matters are raised, which tend to manifest themselves around issues of mobilisation predictability and notice. Short notice demands or changes of plan have a detrimental effect on the numbers of personnel available and a wider moral impact that the Army seems to have struggled to address; the perception among participants is that mobilisation is often a 'high and late' demand. By recognising that the liability of reservists can never be unlimited before mobilisation, the Army tries to position itself to avoid failure by tailoring its aspirations to fit the mood of its members. This compromise cannot but objectively reduce the operational utility of the Army Reserve within the current environment, it keeps the organisation relevant and avoids failure; it can at least provide a useful contribution to Defence.

As proposed in Chapter 4, this research suggests that Fighting Spirit is particularly salient for the Moral Component of Fighting Power; it is necessary but is not sufficient alone. Reservists simply won't 'turn up' without this, given the policy of Intelligent Selection, to which the Army is committed in most foreseeable circumstances. A combination of other factors can create sufficient Fighting Power, though these combinations are as diverse as the soldiers within the organisation; there is more than one way to be effective. Employer Support is also important but as outlined later in this Chapter as part of the examination of the Model's appropriateness, the way that this affects the Moral Component may not be so direct. Of note, the ideas identified within the data are often cross-cutting, not easily or neatly contained within single Moral Component variables or indicators.

Turning to Moral Component factors which are not directly demanded by the organisation, there is only an implied demand on Leadership. Despite being an important factor in miliary service in general, and some limited discussion in the focus groups about the impact of Example, there is little evidence in this study that it plays a significant role in decision making for reservists. While Leadership is important for the Army[711] and has been identified in other

[711] MOD (2021); MOD (2017) p3-10.

research as important,[712] there is insufficient evidence here to make a full judgement and this area may warrant further study. Similarly, there is only an implied demand on soldiers' belief in System Enabling, though this factor may have a more significant impact on mobilisation where soldiers perceive a lack of trust in them as employees, or that the process is more burdensome than it should be, in both cases undermining the Spiritual Foundation. There is also a low demand placed upon Occupational Benefits. The organisation places a low emphasis on the benefits that mobilisation can offer but this factor does appear to play a role if compensation is poorly executed by the organisation, again undermining the Spiritual Foundation. This in turn places an implied burden on leaders and the mobilisation system to deliver troops effectively. This study suggests that there is relatively low confidence in System Enabling, because the mobilisation process is perceived as much less straightforward or reliable than soldiers feel it should be. Public Support is neither demanded by the organisation nor is there evidence here that it is a significant factor.

Operation Type - Meeting the Demand

Despite struggling to clearly define a role for the Army Reserve over the past decade, the position into which it seems to have fallen by precedent leads to a set of tasks that appears to engender Pride in its soldiers. While it may not be strictly defined in policy, the combination and variation of activity that the Army Reserve participates in appears to work, even if it is reactive to operational necessity.

Part of the difficulty in defining a role for the Army Reserve lies in the legislation and policy that sees it being used for any operation that a regular could be used for, not only for war-like operations which might be seen as the most demanding scenario. This breadth demands a Fighting Spirit from its soldiers, a desire to be involved in military activity across the spectrum of tasks. There is evidence to suggest that this is met by soldiers, who are also keen to prove that they are highly skilled and to improve those skills to meet new challenges, and that mobilisation is seen as part of the *raison d'etre* for their Service; part of a 'warrior's journey.' Also important is a Spiritual Foundation, to believe that their Service is for a higher cause and therefore inherently worthwhile as a duty, even if not in response to an obviously existential threat. These two variables were considered highly salient in the Chapter 4 analysis and the evidence suggests that reservists want to be involved and rise to the challenge to improve their performance. Moreover, they relish the opportunities available across the spectrum of operations, not just in a limited sub-set of operations.

[712] Bury (2016), p198; Ulmer et al (2001); Griffith (1995); Depuy (1992), p106. Van Creveld (1982).

While the aspiration to be involved across all types of operations aligns between soldiers and the Army, this demands both Individual and Group Efficacy in different measure depending on the circumstances. The structures and resources for training are geared toward technical training for a Warfighting role, one that is seldom, if ever, tested on operations. This may represent 'hedging;' being ready for the most demanding role while using that as a vehicle for developing general military effectiveness, though this may be undermined by the perceived difficulties in completing that training during the limited time that reservists have. When questioned, most groups had confidence that they were 'ready for anything' but probing further, suggested that they would rely on a period of mission specific training before any deployment. Soldiers are confident in their ability to develop the necessary efficacy even if it is not immediately realisable.

As outlined in Chapter 4, the two largest demands on the Army Reserve 2013-2021 have been objectively uncontroversial missions, MACA and Peacekeeping, which do not challenge soldiers' Pride in their Service and would be unlikely to undermine Public Support for mobilisation. Notwithstanding, there was little evidence that Public Support plays a large role in Reserve mobilisation; potential controversy or endorsement did not influence their decision making.

Operation RESCRIPT, for example, also demanded Self-Discipline, to volunteer, and Group Efficacy to believe in the effectiveness of the team in initially unknown novel tasks. It was unusual in that it placed little or no demand on Employer Support due to the furlough scheme which saw many people away from work with little else to occupy them. It therefore did not have to compete with the usual rigours of civilian life, making Self-Discipline relatively easy to fulfil. Participants in this study broadly saw MACA as an important but not always exciting group of operations, and for many Operation RESCRIPT was the most recent or indeed the only mobilised experience. Certainly, it offered an escape from boredom at home where there was a dearth of competing demand from civilian employment or social activity.[713] This case demonstrates that many reservists are keen to be involved across the spectrum of operations (Fighting Spirit) and that Service in the Army is seen as worthwhile in itself (Spiritual Foundation). Many of them also look back with Pride on the work they did on that operation. The deployment demanded a significant amount of faith in System Enabling and the ability to provide Occupational Benefits. Participants in this study seldom found mobilisation to be straightforward, either for this operation or others that used the more

[713] Groups C, D, E, and H.

standard process. This is an issue also identified by the EST.[714] Furthermore, perceived errors with Occupational Benefits that leave soldiers out of pocket by virtue of their Service undermine faith in the organisation and the Spiritual Foundation.

The policy of Intelligent Selection sets expectations of the way that soldiers will be called-up as a matter of routine. It avoids Compulsion and places a premium on reservists having the Self-Discipline, Fighting Spirit, and Pride to submit to mobilisation; to volunteer twice. The evidence in this study is that reservists have a strong Fighting Spirit and want to mobilise, or they would not be in the Service. They recognise the operational need for mobilisation in most cases and have a Spiritual Foundation that manifests in a trust that the Army would not deploy anywhere it was not worthwhile and while they feel like they ought to mobilise, their Self-Discipline is qualified by personal circumstances and reality. It is suggested that the reliance on Fighting Spirit and maintenance of Intelligent Selection is desirable until a defence scenario were very serious, whereupon Compulsion would be accepted, though by that stage many reservists would recognise the severity and volunteer to mobilise in any case. Intelligent Selection is a necessary tool that acknowledges that reservists' commitment is not boundless and without which the organisation would not have the character that it does, even if it might make it less useful in some cases within the current paradigm. The policy also makes the oft headline issue of numerical strength much more complex than it appears. While a headline figure of some 30,000 may be quoted, the policy means that in most cases a mere fraction of that would really be available. Compulsion is not relied upon by the organisation but is used as a tool by reservists, ultimately on behalf of the Army, to navigate external relationships rather than directly by the organisation to mobilise soldiers. Previous research identified that reservists often do not wish to present mobilisation as a choice or voluntary to their families or employers.[715] In this way there is alignment, even if an unintended manner.

Operational Role - Meeting the Demand

By way of precedent, MACA and Peacekeeping have been the two greatest demands for mobilisation between 2013 and 2021 which have tended to focus on general soldiering skills rather than technical or military trade skills.[716] Both have demanded and engendered a Pride in their task and a sense of Moral Cohesion, to work as a team, even when building new teams, for instance when embedded with regular Army units. Moral Cohesion is an

[714] RFCA (2021), p47.
[715] Woodward *et al* (2018b).
[716] There has been some employment 'in trade,' such as the Falkland Islands Reinforcement Infantry Company deployment that some participant units were undertaking and other technical deployments within the wider universe.

evident demand of the pairing between regular and Reserve units, where soldiers are called upon to work effectively even though they do not personally know each-other. That Cohesion is also fulfilled, in a desire to reach the standards set by regular soldiers. There is a common benchmark of acceptable performance. While there is mutual understanding of standards, this has not yet readily translated into Moral Cohesion between regulars and Reserves based on professionalism, which reservists have precious little time to develop. It is not yet ingrained in the ethos of the organisation, which remains socially orientated toward Comradeship, further indicated by the apparent closeness of the coding theme, 'Camaraderie.' This is not a critical divergence that affects the ability to generate soldiers; the desire to mobilise with known colleagues is positive and cohesion appears to exist within the Army Reserve but not in the way eventually intended by the organisation.

Cohesion of some kind, Moral or social (Comradeship), is also demanded of the Reserve under the A2020 aspiration to deploy whole sub-units of reservists, where some whole parts of regular units were transferred to the Reserve. While this was quickly downscaled as an aspiration, as outlined in Chapter 4, it did take place as part of Operation RESCRIPT and was a facet of the operation that was seen as positive. The routine has been to use smaller numbers of reservists embedded with regular units, demanding a high degree of Moral Cohesion to make working with new colleagues who are otherwise strangers an attractive proposition. Mobilisation builds Cohesion and Comradeship through shared experiences while at the same time, mobilising with one's own unit is also attractive, as it was for this study's participants. While Moral Cohesion driven by professionalism is demanded under the Army's plans, it remains an organisation geared towards Comradeship, despite Sandman's criticism of the concept,[717] the power of which is exemplified by the strong feelings expressed about the 'Fear of Missing Out' on operations; further demonstrating the sense of Pride participants of this study had at the prospect of being part of a successful team.

The aspiration to deploy as formed Reserve units, combined with the most prevalent operational type, MACA and Peacekeeping which demand general rather than technical skills, demands a high belief in their Group Efficacy. The participants in this study certainly want to be part of a successful team and moreover believe that as a team they will succeed. This is balanced by a more modest demand on Individual Efficacy and though individuals are confident in their own ability, some participants did worry about the Efficacy and professional effectiveness of others but did not discount their ability to catch up. This concern about

[717] Sandman (2023).

some comrade's professionalism countered by the faith in their potential may further reinforce the proposition above, that the Army Reserve remains socially rather than professionally cohesive.

Predictability - Stretching the Demand

The previous two sections have outlined areas of fair success for the Army Reserve in fulfilling its requirements. Where the Army Reserve may struggle is where reality, rather than concept, is involved. Uncertainty is particularly likely to undermine Fighting Power. The organisation demands a strong Fighting Spirit,[718] Self-Discipline and support from families and employers within the current model, with the latter stretched by the way that any potential mobilisation would manifest.

The preferred amount of notice varied by individual circumstance but broadly speaking, soldiers showed a cautious Fighting Spirit by suggesting that they were willing to commit if the organisation could meet them part of the way. Similarly, the aspiration of 1 year's mobilisation every 5 years[719] outlined in Chapter 4 is an idea that will clearly work for some individuals but not for others. In broad terms, it was considered reasonable for most participants of these focus groups, provided the routine could be kept to. With the 'deal' between soldier and Army intact, the Spiritual Foundation remains strong.

The organisation asks a great deal of soldiers' Spiritual Foundation with respect to the notice demanded for operations and the expectations that soldiers and employers should have. 28 days for unplanned operations and 90 days for planned operations is specified in policy, but MACA, like Operation RESCRIPT and the ever-predictable Operation TOSCA have failed to deliver on these. The military's policy is not reflected in the precedent set by reality and demands more of the Spiritual Foundation than many can accept. The notice that is actually given is simply too short and the evidence here is that even when shorter notice is tolerated, it is sub-optimal and reduces the number of soldiers who are available for operations.

Cumulatively, the demands of commitment over years and acute notice periods place a significant burden on families and employers, who must bear the greatest burden of a soldier's absence. This was identified as highly salient in Chapters 4 and 6. While the timelines outlined in policy for notification were tolerable, the precedent is that these are seldom kept. Both families and employers need details for the future, primarily over timings

[718] Operationalised in the 'pre-deployment' context of this thesis as the willingness to mobilised and deploy on operations.
[719] MOD (2011).

and the Army struggles to provide this, which undermines, in the first instance, Family and Employer Support, but secondarily trust and the Spiritual Foundation. The Army recognises the importance of this and invested significant money during the A2020 programme to improve, particularly, Employer Support but this remains a salient factor that might influence Fighting Power.

Where reservists are asked to be "available as required" for all circumstances, they are being held to regular standards and the Army risks setting itself up to demand more of the Spiritual Foundation than soldiers can give, which at worst will see soldiers lose faith in the organisation and its causes. The Self-Discipline demanded to prioritise military over civilian pursuits for many cannot be met. While compulsion might be accepted in the most demanding or serious circumstances, there would almost certainly be a sense of Pride or Spiritual Foundation that would supersede the need for Compulsion. The participants of this study did not appear to see these circumstances as a realistic prospect. Compulsion if used too soon is unlikely to be effective, hence the policy of Intelligent Selection, and thus the organisation is committed to this policy beyond the point where it might have to be exceeded for operational reasons but before the case for abandoning it might be successfully made. This offers some tentative support for Connelly's idea that compulsion could be used more widely.[720]

SQ5 – What conditions might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component of Fighting Power?

Having established evidence to suggest a moderately successful alignment between what the Army Reserve needs and the Moral Component of Fighting Power, this section looks at SQ5, the conditions that might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component to influence alignment and improve the prospects for reservists to mobilise.

Operation Type

Among the more successful areas of Moral Component alignment was operation type. The positive Fighting Spirit and Spiritual Foundation identified suggests that the opportunity for the Army Reserve to be involved in a broad range of operations should continue, though this will inevitably be led by operational demands, partly outside of Defence's control. To have the potential to get the most from the Army Reserve, the habit of use must be built and maintained. Further evidence for this lies in the correlation between higher rate of 'mobilisation negative' attitudes among the responses of the Royal Signals participants, who

[720] Connelly (2021).

had no mobilisation experience, had not seen their unit comrades deploy recently nor were they planned to deploy, had a low sense of efficacy and perceived that their unit cohesion was struggling to recover from COVID (assessed in Chapter 6). The soldiers perhaps felt 'less used' which can make them perceive themselves as 'less useful.'

Mobilisation for operations that are objectively uncontroversial, like humanitarian or Peacekeeping operations may seem like obvious opportunities that will attract reservists but are sometimes not seen as sufficiently serious to warrant the upheaval to their lives. MACA, with its inherent 'home service' and recency, and Warfighting, given its seriousness, are seen as especially worthwhile. Other operations and the case for involvement in them can be harder to define, noting that the parameters of any future operation will always be hypothetical until it emerges in context. The experience that soldiers have on any type of operation may also influence future success. War Stories from comrades present as influential on soldiers' opinions, for the perceived worthwhileness of the task and the Pride it engenders, but also the administrative experiences and perceived benefits and losses that comrades had on previous mobilisations. Where the potential costs outweigh the benefits, Pride and Occupational, then mobilisation may appear less attractive. While the Army cannot only deploy reservists on 'prime' or attractive operations rather than a cross-section of all commitments, it may be able to do more to ensure that reservists (and regulars) benefit from worthwhile activity while deployed and a full understanding of the importance of deployments that are being undertaken. Understanding 'why' a deployment must take place may reinforce a soldiers' Pride and offset the negative effect of a challenging work environment or War Stories.

One attractive factor in mobilised service is medallic recognition, primarily because of the organisational cultural significance attached to them and that a token of Service validates the sacrifices made and engenders a sense of Pride in the task and the Spiritual Foundation, that soldiers feel valued by the Army. While medals and awards are subject to assessments of risk and rigour, the value that the organisation is seen to place in a deployment is seen to be signified by its medallic status, which in turn affects how soldiers see the operation. Finding a way to acknowledge soldiers' service publicly and personally beyond the current scope of medallic recognition might make mobilisation more attractive.[721]

[721] Following a recommendation in the Haythornethwaite Review of June 2023 (MOD (2023a), p53), in July 2023, the UK Government instituted the Humanitarian Service Medal, for which soldiers (including reservists) may be eligible when serving on MACA or overseas relief operations. This was followed in March 2024 by the Wider Service Medal. These potentially provides an incentive for previously 'unrecognised' operations.

Operational Role

Operational role is a persistent issue: "the MOD need to clarify what the role of reservists is,"[722] appears to endure, though tentatively RF30 has taken some steps to address this, discussed later. There is little clarity on how reservists should participate in the broad range of operations they could take part in. From a soldier's point of view, any mobilisation improves the force regardless of the parameters of that deployment. Mobilisation breeds effectiveness and encourages future mobilisation, but the lack of clarity on role means there is limited understanding on how they might contribute to a deployment; as formed units or individuals embedded in regular units, or even as the lead unit for a deployment. This affects the prospects for and confidence in mobilisation for the future. While recent generalist deployments have been successful and proportionally significant for reservists, there is potentially a gap in their confidence in deploying in their trade roles for Warfighting. Reservists are keen to be effective and improve their martial skill, but the end-state is unclear, so the training not linked to a known outcome. This is significant because participants described mobilisation as the culmination of their training, which makes it important that the training is relevant to their task.

It was also noted that COVID-19 had a critical impact on vehicle training, which necessarily required students and instructors to avoid close contact. Difficulties in initial training may set the conditions and expectations for mobilisation and pre-deployment training early in a soldier's career. Efforts must be made to close this gap to improve soldiers' confidence in their ability to contribute to operations once mobilised.

Changing the perspective of reservists, noted in Chapter 6, from passive recipients of training to active participants may help to reduce any training gaps early on and so reduce the training demand for the period between warning-off and deployment for an operation. The breadth of opportunity to mobilise, especially with one's own unit, is important as is the perception of the ability to make a difference. This suggests that it might be beneficial to engender active participation by operationalising training toward deployed roles and mobilisation. As noted in Chapter 6, building reservists' sense of control is valuable when promoting a positive Moral Component of Fighting Power. The opportunity to deploy as a formed Reserve unit is also important, as an inherently attractive prospect and as a means of building efficacy; to be useful, they must be used. Deploying as an existing team will also start to build a cadre of leaders with operational experience which will give them credibility when later trying to persuade others to mobilise even when they are not.

[722] Giga et al (2018b).

Some reservists in this study offered that they would welcome more compulsion to mobilise than they are currently subject to, though similarly, preserving the boundaries between the organisation and soldier's external commitments is important. Reservists, from their own point of view, should as far as possible continue to be the conduit between Army and employers or families, or at the very least ensure that bypassing them is on their own terms.

Predictability

In direct contrast to the title of this section based on the operational characteristic, 'uncertainty,' a theme identified in the previous Chapter, is particularly challenging for mobilisation prospects. Uncertainty of task can be tolerated but temporal uncertainty is damaging, especially where this degrades into confusion over changing requirements or commitments at short notice. Unexpected short notice periods are potentially damaging to the Army's ability to generate soldiers and at best make mobilisation an unattractive prospect which even the strongest Fighting Spirit cannot overcome. They have a significant impact on families and employers, the former specifically recognised in the 2023 Haythornetwaite Review on Army incentivisation,[723] published after the substantial drafting of this thesis was completed. Previously identified[724] and enduring; in routine circumstances, instances of short-notice demand can be seen to undermine System Enabling because they make it harder for reservists to mobilise than it should be. Cumulatively this may have created an endemic situation whereby reservists 'expect the unexpected,' or short-notice changes, and therefore temper their expectations and their Fighting Spirit; their eagerness to volunteer may be lower until full details are known and formal paperwork is issued, which may simply be too late for some soldiers or some circumstances. There may be an opportunity for the organisation to treat this risk by issuing call-out papers earlier than the usual 28-day point to provide more certainty to soldiers but will require a sustained change of organisational behaviour. It means the organisation must take on the risk posed by changing circumstances rather than this being borne by soldiers. It may make using reservists less tenable for circumstances which are inherently quick to emerge or unpredictable. Reserve soldiers perceive that it is within the organisation's gift to give more notice for operations and that they don't make it as easy as possible to mobilise.

Administrative unpredictability is also a significant issue. Some soldiers commented on the practicalities of not having elements of their civilian pay recognised to receive the full Reservist Award so as not to be disadvantaged by mobilisation, but many more remarked

[723] MOD (2023a), p26; 37.
[724] Catignani *et al* (2018b); Catignani and Basham (2018).

that, on mobilisation, their basic pay was incorrect, leaving them temporarily out of pocket. Administrative issues place stress on the families of soldiers relying on their income and, in turn, undermines the trust that soldiers have in the organisation and the extent to which they feel valued. These then become War Stories that affect the attitude of those who were not even there in the first instance. While pay was not perceived to be a significant motivator, getting recompense correct is hugely important if mobilisation is not seen as simply too costly to undertake. Making the whole mobilisation process easier and more accurate might pay dividends.

SQ6 – Is the Moral Component Model appropriate for application to Army Reserve?

This section will look at the fieldwork and analysis to assess whether the operationalisation used in this study could be improved upon and whether the Moral Component Model is appropriate for the Army Reserve. As the Army Reserve moves towards closer integration with the regular force a model that has utility for the whole organisation may be important. This Chapter concludes that the Moral Component Model is likely to be broadly applicable to the Army Reserve, supported by a coincidental change to Army Fighting Power doctrine in 2022. There were no indications in the data that the Model is fundamentally unsuitable in this context. While the relatively small population of this study does not provide strong support for dramatic changes to the Model, there are avenues for future investigation into factors that may be incomplete, indistinct, or at least interrelated, or where limited data were collected. In summary, the main change proposed is that the External Support indicator may act more as an environmental or support factor, based on the multi-layered impact of data coded to it.

Incomplete factors

System Enabling is a variable that relates to the ease that soldiers perceive in the conduct of their mobilisation. While it presented as an important factor in influencing the Moral Component during the fieldwork, deficiencies in System Enabling do not seem to have a direct impact on Fighting Power.[725] As a concept, it does not explain what it really means to reservists and how it affects their attitudes toward mobilisation as many seemed content to push through the difficulties to mobilise anyway. That the organisation may be seen to make it harder to mobilise than it should through either lack of notice or paucity of information or process, when they *want* to mobilise appears to undermine their Spiritual Foundation; their belief in the organisation and the 'task' of mobilisation, especially where they perceive that

[725] Groups A, D, E, G, H and K.

they are not trusted by the organisation. Their belief in a higher cause is undermined if the Army is not also seen to recognise their status as reservists and treat them accordingly. While an issue may manifest within one aspect of the Moral Component, for instance, deficient System Enabling as a factor in deficient Leadership, the effect on the Moral Component of Fighting Power may lie elsewhere.

Similarly, Occupational Benefit fails to explain what the provision or loss of benefits, for instance pay, means for soldiers. In the first instance there is a physical effect, potentially a disruption to income, but the impact on the Moral Component is broader. There is no evidence that increasing the amount of pay soldiers receive for mobilising, within the bounds of the wider organisational compensation scheme, would encourage them to mobilise. By failing to get compensation correct, soldiers feel that their Service is not valued, and their Spiritual Foundation is undermined, as with System Enabling.[726]

Family and Employer Support both feature within the indicator of External Support and substantial amounts of data were collected on them in all groups. However, on analysis, they also do not seem to fully capture the effect on Fighting Power. The impact of these competing demands is not specifically triggered by mobilisation, they are present throughout a Reserve soldier's service as described in Chapter 6. Even where mobilisation is concerned, an absence of Family or Employer Support may undermine the Moral Component in a variety of ways; for instance through reduced desire to mobilise (Fighting Spirit), reduced Discipline (to choose the Army over other pursuits), or a diminished Spiritual Foundation (where soldiers do not feel the Army recognises their situation therefore does not deserve their support). The way that the Army orientates itself toward those elements will affect reservists' attitudes toward the organisation, though the input of families and employers does not appear to directly affect mobilisation, especially where both the Army and reservists accept the role of the soldier as the interlocutor in that relationship, sitting in the middle of the Iron Triangle. The reservists in this study suggested that their competing commitments did not fundamentally change their attitude toward mobilisation. They felt that reservists should mobilise if they can, but that they might elect not to for practical or personal reasons that supersede military service, indicating a reduction in Fighting Power through reduced workforce. These issues might then have a wider effect on Fighting Power. One example cited was having children[727] a significant competing commitment which may impact on a soldiers' Fighting Spirit, Pride in their military work or Self-Discipline (to choose military

[726] Groups A, E, H and K.
[727] Groups B, C, E and K.

duties vice their domestic responsibilities). Another was that the Army did not recognise their civilian income,[728] therefore they simply could not afford to mobilise, which may have implications for the Spiritual Foundation (where the Army does not recognise their status as a reservist), and the recognition of Occupational Benefits. What might influence the Moral Component of Fighting Power, therefore, is the organisation's reaction to the presentation of these competing commitments. Limited evidence was gathered on the effect of Public Support, but that which was recorded suggests that it had limited implications for Fighting Power, and therefore also bears further investigation. The External Support indicator may, in fact, be a descriptor of the environment or a 'supporting factor' by virtue of the way that data coded to the variables therein seemed to have a wider impact on other variables.

Indistinct factors

There is evidence to suggest that Individual and Group Efficacy may be interrelated with Pride, where the prospect of effectiveness and making a difference on operations influences the perception of the worthwhileness of the endeavour. [729]

> B2 – It's me as a person as well helping and being that part of the team that helps that makes a difference.

For reservists, the extent of the impact they might make contributes to the Pride they perceive for a mobilisation; doing a worthwhile job well is worthwhile and engenders Pride. The prospect of being unable to make an impact as an individual or a group makes the task appear less worthwhile and therefore undermines Pride. This does not necessarily call into question the operational definitions of these variables, but further demonstrates that elements of the Moral Component may be mutually influential on Fighting Power.

Similarly, the apparent link between Example and Persuasion within the Leadership indicator, through the credibility of individual leaders,[730] among other ideas, suggests that they may be mutually supporting variables. As identified in the Literature Review, leadership theory offers multiple models for explaining effective leadership, many of which overlap or which may be relevant concurrently. Leadership is "critical"[731] to the Army and the way it understands the Moral Component but as outlined in Chapter 6, soldiers in this study did not appear to see that it had a particularly critical role. Future research into the Moral Component could further develop the idea of Leadership to fully explore it and understand the interrelationships or refine the distinctiveness of variables.

[728] Groups G, K and M.
[729] Group B (see quotation), also Groups C, G, and I.
[730] Group E.
[731] MOD (2017) p3-10.

Reservists also appear to have a low sense of Organisational Compulsion. They do not mobilise out of contractual or legal obligations and the risk of punishment, but more out of a moral obligation and Self-Discipline to follow through on an agreement. The 'threat' of Organisation Compulsion is used as a tool by reservists to manage relationships with non-military families and employers, similarly observed in 2006 with regard to Operation TELIC in Iraq[732], and when combined with their sense of purpose, the evidence here is that there is little to no consideration of repercussions for not mobilising. This may be because the prospect of operational circumstances arising that would lead to the suspension of the Intelligent Selection policy seem remote. Resorting to compulsory mobilisation would be a 'physical' response from the Army to soldiers' cumulative moral failure of Individual Morale (from the perspective of the organisation) to respond to their legal obligation, rather than an element of the Moral Component.

Outcome – a revised model

The revised model sees the External Support indicator move below the other three to reflect that they provide environmental context or 'support' across all factors in the Model. That the effect of variables is often overlapping, as outlined above, suggests that further research using the Model would be fruitful. This may resolve some of the potential issues with distinction and completeness and also offer the opportunity to gather more data on variables which were sparsely covered in this study.

Table 7.1 – The revised Moral Component Model

<table>
<tr><th colspan="3">Moral Component</th></tr>
<tr><td>Individual Morale</td><td>Team Spirit</td><td>Leadership</td></tr>
<tr><td>Fighting Spirit</td><td>Moral Cohesion</td><td>Personal Persuasion</td></tr>
<tr><td>Self-Discipline</td><td>Comradeship</td><td>Personal Example</td></tr>
<tr><td>Pride</td><td>Group Efficacy</td><td>Organisational Compulsion</td></tr>
<tr><td>Spiritual Foundation</td><td></td><td>System Enabling</td></tr>
<tr><td>Individual Efficacy</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td>Occupational Benefits</td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">External Support
Public Support
Family Support</td></tr>
</table>

[732] NAO (2006), p37.

Employer Support

Plain text = doctrinal 'indicator'/'variable' retained
Italics = additional indicator/variable

Of note, in 2022, the Army modified its doctrine[733] in isolation from this study, which presents the Moral Component of Fighting Power as a four-part concept, comprising: morale, leadership, team cohesion and an ethical foundation, compared with the 2017 three-part model from which this study derived, comprising: morale, leadership and ethical foundations.[734] The significant change here being the disaggregation of morale, an individually centred concept, from team cohesion, concerning group dynamics; a key difference between the Moral Component Model as operationalised in Chapter 2 and the source material from 2017. This amendment is also supported in the wider literature reviewed in Chapter 1, and demonstrates that doctrine can and should change to be as relevant as possible. That this doctrine is designed to be broadly applicable to all armed forces, even beyond the UK, supports the applicability of the Moral Component Model to the Army Reserve, though there is scope for further research.

Conclusion (SQ3, SQ5 and SQ6)

This chapter has discussed the extent to which the Moral Component of Fighting Power aligns with the demand on Reserve soldiers, the prospects for strengthening or diminishing the Moral Component and the validity of the Model to the Army Reserve based on the evidence. It concludes that the Moral Component is moderately well aligned with the demands placed upon it, especially with the psychological aspects of service, but struggles when Service affects civilian life and external agencies. The most obvious face-valid observation that supports this is that the organisation has not been seen to fail to deliver. This is likely to endure in the short term as demand increases on the Army Reserve under RF30 and *Future Soldier* plans discussed in more detail in the Conclusion. The Moral Component is vulnerable to short notice changes to requirements which the organisation could take steps to address while still retaining the breadth of opportunity to mobilise that Reserves find appealing. This may require the organisation to take on more risk when mobilisation plans change, rather than soldiers holding that risk; such a move would strengthen the Spiritual Foundation. The Moral Component Model is assessed to be broadly applicable to the Army Reserve, supported by a recent change in military doctrine implemented independently of this study, which adopts separate indicators for individual and team factors, as was operationalised here.

[733] MOD (2022a), p 1-4 – 1-5.
[734] See Fig 0.1 in Introduction.

The concluding chapter outlines how the findings of this study relate to the research aims, including the organisation's short-term prospects, how this research fits into the literature and the limitations of this study which might guide future research.

CONCLUSION

The thesis concludes by reviewing the work presented, discussing the key findings in relation to the research aims and the Research Questions before outlining the value that it adds to the wider body of literature. It also offers analysis of the initial prospects for the Army Reserve (as it presents in this research) under RF30 and *Future Soldier*, published in 2021. It will then outline its own limitations and offer opportunities for future research.

The first chapter outlined the place of the Army Reserve within British Defence under the FR20 and A2020 plans, before stating the Research Questions and scope, and then defining the key terms, especially the Moral Component of Fighting Power and its place in military doctrine. It then reviewed the literature to identify where this thesis sits within the existing research, covering academic and government sponsored research into reserve forces before reviewing how different authors have sought to understand military effectiveness as a basis for the Army's Fighting Power doctrine. Of note, it highlighted that research into the British Army Reserve's motivation is relatively sparse, certainly where mobilisation is concerned, and that the concept of 'morale' in warfare is a contested concept, except that both academics and practitioners tend to agree that it is very important. Chapter 2 set out the research methods and operationalised the Moral Component into a four-component model derived from British military doctrine. Chapter 3 outlined the research design before Chapter 4 described the 'ideal typical' Moral Component from the point of view of the organisation to set the metric of comparison; the demand against soldiers was judged, to answer SQ1. It did this firstly by examining policy and strategy and then by looking at precedent through two operational case studies. Chapter 5 examined what existing research contributed to the Research Questions. Chapter 6 described the fieldwork method (focus groups) and presented the findings against SQ2 and SQ4. Chapter 7 then discussed those findings to contribute toward SQ3, 5 and 6.

Review of Research Aims and Contribution

In simple terms, this thesis aims to address the propositions summarised by Keene, that, "the motivation of reservists…needs to be better understood" and that "concerns [of low effectiveness] are not based on evidential data, but instead on prejudice."[735] As the Army Reserve was planned to become a more important part of the Army under FR20, a trend continued under RF30, it is important to understand the extent to which Reserves might contribute to UK Defence. This overlaps with the Army's Master Question list: "What

[735] Keene (2015), p x, 37.

contribution will land forces make to the full range of potential mission sets?," which was the basis for gaining MOD funding for this research. It seeks to do this by examining the Moral Component of Fighting Power, a key concept of British Army doctrine which has seldom been challenged by practitioners, simply taught to those who join the Army, self-referentially forming part of the Conceptual Component of Fighting Power. It also contributes to the broader literature on the UK Reserve Forces and wider understanding of military morale, which in Chapter 1 is established as a contested academic concept.

It offers an evaluation of the success of A2020 in transforming the Army Reserve from a strategic reserve into an operational reserve, one that in broad assessment, comprises soldiers who want to be routinely involved in operations and often join the organisation specifically to do so and reaffirms some of the findings of recent research such as FRRP and Bury, but also those from other nations' armed forces, especially the USA. In this way it also offers an insight into current and projected Fighting Power, something demanded of the MOD by the Defence Select Committee in 2014 while looking at the implementation of A2020. The Army Reserve has a Fighting Spirit and wants to be involved in operations,[736] highly values Comradeship[737], and that the impact of soldiers' families and employers is significant, especially where 'high and late' demands from the Army are seen to undervalue a reservists' time and commitment.[738] While it was not part of the Research Question, it can also be assessed that there is evidence that reservists are 'transmigrants'[739] in keeping their military and civilian lives apart and acting as interlocutors between Iron Triangle elements[740]. However, while Bury[741] suggests that leadership is a key issue for the Army Reserve in matters away from combat, this study did not find much evidence to reinforce those findings, and the participants of this study felt more broadly confident in their readiness to deploy than his participants did.[742] The participants of this study also seem to present an Army Reserve which, although 'greedy' on time, is more comfortable with the fact that soldiers have other commitments, a potential improvement in more recent years.[743]

It also contributes to the understanding of the Army Reserve as a population, which the first chapter also identifies as a sparsely researched field, indeed Chapter 4 offers a novel

[736] Catignani *et al* (2018).
[737] Bury (2016), p250, 309.
[738] Catignani *et al* (2018); Catignani and Basham (2018).
[739] Lomsky-Feder, Gazit and Ben-Airi (2008).
[740] Outlined in the Introduction: The Army, families, and civilian employers – with reservists sitting in the middle.
[741] Bury (2016), p198.
[742] Bury (2016), p111, 220-221.
[743] Cunningham-Burley (2018b).

comparison of Reserve policy and strategy with actual use. This has informed presentations given to Reserve soldiers to better inform them about their own service at a practitioner level. It looks at junior ranks who were identified as disproportionately under-represented in other research. Later in this chapter, it also offers early insights into the prospects of RF30 and *Future Soldier* from an Army Reserves perspective. The plan to increase the involvement of the Army Reserve on operations is assessed as ambitious but positive, though it is likely to struggle to assume primacy for Homeland Resilience[744] to the organisation in any meaningful sense by 2025 because of the short timelines often involved in these operations. This study is likely to generate sufficient material to develop further research outputs for publication in Defence Journals.

The Main Research Question for this thesis is: "What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power, and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?" Before considering this Research Question directly, the contributing Secondary Research Questions will be evaluated.

SQ1: What is demanded of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?

The demand is outlined in Chapter 4, through an analysis of policy and precedent, which sometimes contradict. There are few limitations placed on Reserve use. A Fighting Spirit, a desire to be involve in operations, is required. Indeed, there is a significant reliance on Self Discipline from individuals to prioritise the military, and consent from their families and employers to volunteer twice. The Army also needs its soldiers to have Pride in their work and believe in the wider justness of their Service through the Spiritual Foundation. The Army strives to develop a Moral Cohesion between its soldiers as part of an increasing push for professionalisation. The role of Leadership in mobilisation is not clearly codified by the Army, nor are the Occupational Benefits of mobilising emphasised. Compulsion is avoided through the Intelligent Selection policy.

SQ2: What is the state of the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power?

Chapter 6 presents the data collected during the fieldwork, assessed to fall within two thematic groups, intrinsic and extrinsic. The Reserve Moral Component of Fighting Power as seen in this study did have a Fighting Spirit, Pride in their work and a Spiritual Foundation, though potentially vulnerable if not supported by the Army. Soldiers have a sense of Moral Cohesion through shared standards with regular soldiers, but their mutual

[744] British Army (2021).

bonds are still primarily social, Comradeship. Leadership does not appear to play a large part in generating Fighting Power for mobilisation, and the potential for Compulsion of mobilisation would be seen as heavy-handed in most circumstances. The data analysis suggests that reservists are more intrinsically motivated than extrinsically. These two groups do loosely reflect the Institutional-Occupational (I-O) model developed by Moskos and applied to the British Army by Downes.[745]

SQ3: How far does the Army Reserve's Moral Component of Fighting Power align with the demands placed upon the organisation?

The Moral Component is generally well aligned with the demand, though aided by the organisation tailoring its aspirations to their workforce. Soldiers want to mobilise; they are proud when they do so and believe in Service more broadly. They do choose Reserve Service over other activities, and they are generally confident in their Efficacy as Individuals and as a Group to accomplish any mission, though are reliant on 'top-up' training. There is a well aligned understanding of Compulsion, centred around the prevalence of Intelligent Selection except in the most serious cases. The Army Reserve is still reliant on Comradeship over Moral Cohesion, despite the shared standards with regular soldiers with 'real time' in service the limiting factor in developing professional bonds, but this substitution is not critical.

SQ4: What Moral Component factors influence the ability of the Army Reserve to generate soldiers for operations?

Among the most salient Moral Component factors that affect mobilisation are Pride, the perception of worthwhileness of tasks, and Fighting Spirit, that reservists want to mobilise and that they feel able to make that choice to do so. Occupational Benefits and System Enabling act as hygiene factors with the potential to undermine mobilisation, if administration is executed poorly, through damage to the Spiritual Foundation. Family and Employer Support are constant contextual elements across all of Reserve Service including mobilisation, though Public Support and Leadership are assessed to play little role.

SQ5: What conditions might strengthen or diminish the Moral Component of Fighting Power?

Continued opportunity to mobilise and deploy may reinforce the Moral Component by stimulating the Fighting Spirit, especially if those operations are uncontroversial and the Army can find a way to recognise the commitment that reservists make by mobilising and trigger their Pride, noting that medals are not always the most appropriate way to do that.

[745] Downes (1988).

Conversely, reservists who feel dormant or stagnating may be much less effective if called upon in an emergency. Tailoring training requirements to operational demands, informed by unit roles and upcoming responsibilities will help to increase feelings of Efficacy among the Force. The 'vital ground' remains the relationships between the Army, families, and civilian employers, with the soldier in the middle. Protecting the Spiritual Foundation by improving pay and mobilisation administration and reducing uncertainty as far as possible with longer formal notice periods for mobilisation. Failing to resolve these issues will continue to be a significant risk to Reserve Fighting Power, though some of these have also been identified by the 2023 Haythornethwaite Review.[746]

SQ6: Is the Moral Component Model appropriate for application to the Army Reserve?

From within the existing literature, this is the first attempt identified at operationalising the Moral Component used in British doctrine, and the evidence in this study suggests that the Model is broadly appropriate for the Army Reserve. A minor alteration is suggested to reflect the presentation of the External Support indicator as an environmental or support factor, given that these factors seem to have simultaneous effects on other variables. The revised 2022 British Army Fighting Power model also, coincidentally, contains aspects of the Moral Component Model as operationalised here: a distinction between individual and group-based morale factors.

Research Question: What is the state of the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power and can the organisation meet the demands placed upon it?

Returning to the Main Research Question, the results indicate that the Army Reserve is an organisation with dedicated employees who commit a great deal to supporting it. The organisation has been able to meet the demands placed on it over the last epoch of FR20, marked by an increase in mobilisation, investment in Reserve organisations and administration, and tailoring demands to avoid over-facing its members. In the short-term it will likely meet the demands placed upon it. RF30 is a more ambitious plan, which must initially be delivered with the same organisation and workforce as the end of the FR20 epoch. As a result, the concept presented is unlikely to be fulfilled in the short term and may not be completed, as FR20 was not, but the organisation will develop. Taking on "principle

[746] MOD (2023a). Specifically: recognising the impact of service on families (recommendation 1), a smoother regular-Reserve spectrum of service (recommendation 17), wider medallic recognition (recommendation 20) and removing cultural and procedural barriers to using reserves (recommendation 49).

responsibility"[747] for Homeland Resilience tasks, such as MACA and protecting the UK's territory, from 2025 is likely to be the greatest challenge during the programme because of the characteristics of short-notice, a short-time frame and novel tasks that require training that these operations often have. As the organisation transforms, it is likely that the Army Reserve could be mobilised more ambitiously; more frequently and in greater numbers, if sufficient notice can be given to its soldiers.

The Moral Component and Reserve Forces 2030

This section considers the post-study near-future, applying the findings to new policy released since the research was conducted. During this research, in March 2021, the UK published the Integrated Defence and Security Review,[748] the successor to SDSR 2015, which outlines the way that the UK will meet the challenges it might face out to 2025. In common with previous reviews, this was followed up by a Reserve Forces strategy, RF30,[749] building on the foundations set by FR20[750] to outline the contribution that Reserves might make in the next decade, and the Army's plan, *Future Soldier*[751], in November 2021. These changing assumptions follow on from the metric setting and understanding of demand proposed in Chapter 4 and, like that chapter, these documents are analysed here to offer an insight into how the demand might change. This is relevant because while the policy may change with the stroke of a pen, the personnel resources and the culture of the organisation that is asked to deliver on that demand is not significantly different from that which was asked to deliver on the previous plan, and this will affect the prospects for early success.

While not specifically mobilisation focussed, RF30 proposes a model for the 'offer' and 'experience' of Reserve service[752] that links to areas of the Moral Component of Fighting Power, which does include operational deployments as a component indicating that mobilisation is likely to continue to be an important part of Service. Furthermore, as the Regular Army decreases in size, the Army Reserve will represent an increasing part of Defence[753] which, if not matched by a reduction in aspiration, will likely lead to an increased demand for reservists to mobilise as they form a greater proportion of the whole workforce. Analysis of the embryonic policy suggests that the greater proportion of the Army Reserve within the whole Army coincides with a greater demand on the range of tasks reservists

[747] British Army (2021).
[748] Cabinet Office (2021).
[749] MOD (2021a).
[750] Which RF30 quotes as being "largely successful" in reversing the decline of UK Reserve forces. No judgement of the success of the whole programme is made here. MOD (2021a), p16.
[751] MOD (2021b).
[752] MOD (2021a), p67.
[753] MOD (2021b), p8,19; MOD (2021c).

might be used for. Closer integration of these forces will necessitate greater reliance on Moral Cohesion and professional standards which the Army Reserve must continue to develop to deliver upon, alongside both Individual and Group Efficacy to meet broader challenges. This increased role may also demand increased temporal commitment for some soldiers, in terms of notice periods or cumulative mobilised time which the organisation already struggles to deliver on in moral terms, in Employer and Family Support. For some there may be an opportunity to develop greater Pride in their tasks within the bounds of a smaller range of operational activity. Of note, there is also a policy recognition of Occupational Benefits, and the need to recompense those who dedicate their time and skills to the Army.

Operation Type

While wrestling with the perennial aspiration to clearly define a role for Reserves,[754] RF30 offers a partial solution by defining three groups of Reserves,[755] who will in principle be used under different operational circumstances. How these groups transpose onto the existing structure of the Army Reserve, comprising volunteer reservists, High Readiness Reserves, Sponsored Reserves and Regular Reserve, of which this study is focussed on the first group, is not fully developed. While this may be more of a re-labelling than a revolution in Reserve use, the clarity provided may help to boost the Spiritual Foundation by orientating soldiers towards a more specific set of circumstances to frame their Service in a narrower context. Concurrently, by recognising that the smaller Regular Army will be orientated towards other tasks presents an opportunity for reservists to be increasingly involved in filling the gaps left behind. Both RF30 and *Future Soldier* see this as the most viable way to maintain contingent capabilities while also encouraging increased commitment.

> "With the balance of the regular forces' activity shifting to operate against constant security threats, the reserves will increasingly be required to contribute more of Defence's Warfighting capabilities… [and] reserves also play a more significant role in the strategic resilience of the nation."[756]

This will also necessitate improved mobilisation processes[757] and better System Enabling than is currently perceived by the soldiers in this research. Warfighting and national resilience tasks, of which MACA is a sub-set, are both tasks that reservists saw as worthwhile activity that they were keen to be involved in. Indeed, Defence sees that increased contributions to Warfighting and other operations should improve overall motivation to serve[758] by engendering Pride in those specific tasks.

[754] MOD (2021d), p35.
[755] Reinforcement, Operational and Strategic. MOD (2021a), p7.
[756] MOD (2021a), p7.
[757] MOD (2021a), p12.
[758] MOD (2021a), p9.

By taking on "principal responsibility for Homeland Protect and Resilience operations"[759] the Army Reserve may have greater focus than before and provides further reinforcement of the Spiritual Foundation, that the Army is a way to serve one's country. While this speaks to the positivity that was felt surrounding Operation RESCRIPT and the MACA undertaken in response to COVID-19, late 2022 saw a wave of strike action around the UK which raised the prospect of reservists being used to cover for strike action in key sectors, a role hitherto avoided for the Army Reserve.[760] This kind of operation could conceivably see some reservists striking in their civilian roles while being asked to mobilise to conduct their civilian job in uniform, a prospect which may detract from their Pride, though the prospect of mobilising for future MACA operations in general was welcomed among this study's participants.

Alongside this, the clear Warfighting roles in *Future Soldier*,[761] which outlines which units would be aligned to which Brigade, each with a specific capability, will also help to focus the Army Reserve and build their Spiritual Foundation and Pride. It will allow training to be more tailored and address some of the concerns outlined in this research that soldiers were not clear what they were training for and build Individual Efficacy. Certainly, infanteers who participated in this study were enthusiastic about their future role as part of the Security Assistance Force, a new capability, and saw it as a worthwhile undertaking.

Operational Role

In addition to clearer roles, RF30 and *Future Soldier* intend to increase regular and Reserve integration, supported by legislative changes,[762] which will further converge shared standards of performance and necessitate a greater sense of Moral Cohesion. This will be within headquarters[763] and within units, though *prima facie* the resubordination of regular and Reserve units to different brigades has left some orphaned from their paired counterparts developed under A2020. A further side effect of this policy is that, barely 3 years after the previous developments, there is yet another carousel of changes imposed on units, if not by role, then at least by affiliation. In an organisation where comradeship and familiarity are still important, breaking the bonds comradeship may undermine effectiveness in the short-term. This is particularly pertinent where Reserves are the sole custodians of a capability, for instance in 4th Light Brigade Combat Team where Reserves will provide all

[759] British Army (2021).
[760] Martin (2022).
[761] MOD (2021b), pp29-97.
[762] MOD (2021a), p11, 50.
[763] Wallace (2021).

artillery, engineering, logistic and equipment repair.[764] In some cases they will be a step beyond just augmenting the regular force, they will be a critical component of a deployment, or indeed the lead element. This will require a managed cultural change; changes to structures and equipment (physical component) and doctrine (conceptual component) can be relatively quick, by the moral component has significant inertia. It may be a challenge to maintain that cohesion under different operational commanders with different priorities, though the benefit of Moral Cohesion is primarily that it exists to bond those who do not personally know each other within the organisation. This will endure on operations with reservists contributing both mobilised formed units and individuals.[765]

The twin emphasis for the Reserve on resilience operations and being the sole custodian of some capability suggests that both generalist and trade skills will be called upon, increasing demands on meeting the shared standards of professionalism with regulars but also the ability to work together as a Reserve team. Deepening the demand placed on specialist skills, RF30 suggests that the Army Reserve may mobilise more soldiers specifically for their civilian skills and that, in recognition of their Individual Efficacy, they should receive greater remuneration, or Occupational Benefit.[766] Participants in this study suggest that they want to mobilise if they feel valued and it fits in with their life, and harnessing special skills would contribute to that. Specifically addressing the prospect of increased reward for those who mobilise in specific roles is a new concept that is yet to be fully developed but suggests that Defence recognises the need to improve on the intrinsic and extrinsic offer to increase mobilisation potential and thus operational capability. This is a recognition that A2020 did not make. While targeted here to encourage those who might mobilise for their specialist skills, it points to an acceptance of Occupational Benefits within part-time military Service. Increased incentives would reflect the special nature of Reserve service and may increase the Spiritual Foundation through trust between the soldier and Army.

Despite the *zeitgeist* for civilian 'skills' and expertise, identified in RF30 as a demand across military operations and a lever for change that will help prevent the military being 'left behind',[767] the spectre of mass and recruitment figures that dominated the early years of the Army Reserve's inception has already returned at a time when the Army as a whole is shrinking, making the Army Reserve an even larger proportion of the force; "Mass is indispensable," noted General Sir Patrick Sanders, Chief of the General Staff.[768] To deliver

[764] MOD (2021b), pp40-41.
[765] MOD (2021b), p19.
[766] MOD (2021a), p67-68.
[767] MOD (2021a), p10.
[768] Obese-Jecty (2023).

on this 'skills agenda,' the headline grabbing issue of recruitment and retention must be solved in short order to avoid a repeat of the wrangling that beset the early years of A2020. Nevertheless, at a time of constrained public finances, it is the Army itself that may try to retain the focus on numbers of soldiers because they can be quantifiably linked to a budget that can be defended.

Predictability

Control and Choice were themes identified in Chapter 6 and RF30 recognises the need to give reservists more control of their own destiny and, "greater choice and control over how they offer their service," combined with "more incentives"[769] to mobilise more frequently. This suggests that in principle, the policy of Intelligent Selection will remain and may be enhanced. The "offer" of service, a guarantee of a commitment to mobilise, will likely need to be obtained before the point of need given the increased reliance on the Reserve for Homeland Resilience; tasks that can emerge and recede faster than they can currently react.

> "Key to this will be an enhanced relationship between Defence and the employers of Reservists who may be asked to release them for military duties at shorter periods of notice."[770]

This is an area of friction that the Army currently struggles to deliver on; especially with regards to the 28 or 90-day aspired notice period. Without significant improvement, even shorter notice periods may be hard to meet without significant Employer Support which is currently uncertain for many. This tension may almost certainly exclude most reservists from the 'Global Response Force' mooted in the 2023 Defence Command Paper Refresh,[771] though they might be used in follow-on forces or to add strength in depth. This new release refreshed a document barely two years old in a repeat of the continual and iterative policy changes of the 2010s. Nevertheless there is an opportunity for the Army Reserve to embrace the new 'categories' of reservist that RF30 proposes: the Reinforcement Reserve to routinely provide an active contribution to ongoing operations, the Operational Reserve to provide a surge of workforce for contingencies, and the Strategic Reserve largely for 'emergency' use. These categories have the opportunity to allow reservists to engage with the Army in a way that suits their availability and overcome some of the temporal challenges outlined by participants in this study.

RF30 also lays out the need for a "Reserves Support Organisation," designed to enhance single-Services and, among other things, to assure their ability to mobilise and champion

[769] MOD (2021a), p9.
[770] Cabinet Office (2022), p30.
[771] MOD (2023)

integration. Though short of detail, this may indicate that the MOD recognises that the organisation needs to better enable its soldiers to get into service and improve perceptions of System Enabling. The cases outlined in Chapter 4 and the experience of the participants presented in Chapter 6 suggest that there is evidence that such an organisation could improve the performance of the Army Reserve against the demands placed upon it and improve its responsiveness and utility.

The prospects for Reserve Forces 2030

The increased demands likely to be placed on soldiers' Moral Component compared with A2020 and its successors are, in the short-term, going to be hard to meet. Development will take time, recognised by the 2025 horizon for the Reserves taking primacy for Homeland Resilience.[772] Even the transformation planned during A2020 has not yet been completed over the 8 years of that programme, illustrating how difficult that 2025 aspiration might be to meet. There is a risk that the planned increased role that reservists are due to take in Homeland Resilience tasks, which are often short-notice and unpredictable, is a decision that has been taken based on the perceived success of the Army Reserve's contribution to Operation RESCRIPT, which this study has established as an outlier case rather than more broadly generalisable. However, if RF30 is more about long-term transformation, rather than delivery to a specified conclusion, this becomes less important.

In the short-term, higher demands placed upon the same workforce with the same attitudes will not necessarily yield the desired results as habits have inertia, however, A2020 has delivered significant change, even if incomplete suggesting that, providing the Army is not too 'greedy' too quickly, the enthusiasm for an increased commitment to service can be developed if still constrained by reservists' civilian pursuits.

What RF30 may be able to address is A2020's consideration of the Army Reserve as a homogenous force which does not have discrete parts which provide different contributions. Evidence of this is in the proposed legislation changes that would more clearly define what different groups on different Terms of Service might provide. This would also require a cognitive leap within the Army Reserve to accept that understanding their role as a single entity rather than discrete parts may contribute to a lack of focus for the organisation and subsequently, reduced effectiveness and reduced financial defensibility rendering it open for budget cuts as the Army pursues a closer amalgamation between regulars and reserves. Longer-term, it is likely that reservists would embrace closer integration with regular units.

[772] MOD (2021b).

Research limitations

As with all research, decisions must be made to limit the scope of the investigation. This thesis deliberately selected a population of junior ranks but was also limited by the nature of a convenience sample; three unit types (infantry, logistics and communications), of personnel who were already actively engaged with the organisation, in units that were willing to participate, from areas of the country that were convenient to access. The same research into different trades, rank ranges or locations might yield different results. Similarly, the participants of this research were self-selecting, within the parameters just outlined. The conclusions drawn should therefore be generalised to other groups with great caution, even within the UK military such as the Royal Navy Reserve or RAF Auxiliary. Ultimately, this study answers a narrow question about a narrow slice of the Army Reserve.

Despite narrowing the scope of the study, defining the research metrics was challenging. Quantifying the metric of sufficiency for SQ1 was particularly involved, against a context of inconclusive definitions, inconsistent policy and strategy and myriad circumstances to which it could apply. This required a high degree of interpretation on the part of the researcher; such interpretation, as outlined in Chapters 2 (operationalisation) and 4 (defining the ideal-typical), almost certainly relies on the military background of the researcher making replication of the study a difficult prospect. The research is inextricably linked to the researcher and even another military-scholar may make different judgements from the very start which would fundamentally change the conclusions.

Being from a military background was particularly useful in building a rapport with participants but may also have affected their contributions. The general issue of single-researcher projects also raises the prospects of unconscious biases, by virtue of experience, but also other issues, such as fatigue, which was identified and self-corrected during the fieldwork. Budget was not a constraint here with the costs of executing the research very low.

Despite being an MOD sponsored study, through the Higher Defence Studies Programme, the failure to gain access to raw data from ResCAS necessitated a change in research design mid-way through, away from mixed methods as outlined in Chapter 2, which removed an element of triangulation initially planned and affects the potential generalisability of the findings. Similarly, the substantial length of time (16 months) needed to gain ethical approval from the MOD was a limiting factor which delayed the start of the fieldwork. This delay reduced the number of focus groups that could be conducted within the 7 months available,

and when combined with the limitations of self-selection and access, means that the number of participants (41) and the number of groups (13) was below that which is usually considered optimal for research of this kind. Nevertheless, the aim of saturation was achieved, helped by the relatively narrow sampling frame.

Future Research[773]

A follow-up study which takes forward the revised operationalisation outlined in Chapter 7 may be worthwhile. The operationalisation in this thesis does not fully resolve the issues of leadership and the role that it plays in the Moral Component of Fighting Power and mobilisation. The extent to which officers (and other leaders) are seen to represent the organisation while also being employees themselves, subject to much the same strain as junior soldier bears further investigation, as does their effect on generating Fighting Power as a whole. Similarly, the issue of ethics was not explored here. While it is included in the doctrinal description, there was little coherent evidence gathered here to present any findings on it. As identified in the Literature Review, Fighting Power (all three components; Moral, Physical and Conceptual) has not yet been used as a means of investigating the prospects for future success, only examining the past; which offers another avenue for research. Alternatively, a model like that proposed by Britt and Dickinson could be usefully applied to the Army Reserve, or wider British Army, to provide some means of comparison with allied armies. The notion of identity might also be further explored and profiles of variables that comprise different types of identities could be developed to aid understanding. There are also opportunities to re-examine the British Army's Moral Component in light of the operationalisation conducted here and in other research.

From a methodological perspective, the resources and time to conduct more focus groups over a larger sample of soldiers would be of benefit, as might a more longitudinal study, which at this juncture might be able to chart the progress and prospects of the implementation of RF30 in more detail and also might inform a critical review of the decision to apportion primacy for Homeland Resilience to the Army Reserves under the Future Soldier programme,[774] a decision which this thesis argues is based primarily on an outlier case rather than a trend. RF30 offers further opportunities for research due to its proposed further integration between regulars and reserves. A comparison of regular and Reserve perspectives on Service may be useful for the organisation. Access to further data may also be of utility to generalisability and reliability, especially if access to the ResCAS raw data

[773] The data gathered in this study will be deposited in the University of Reading Research Data Archive: https://researchdata.reading.ac.uk.
[774] British Army (2021).

were granted, a mixed-methods study, as originally planned for this thesis, would be viable and offer significant benefits in triangulation. This might require central MOD sponsorship as the data owners. An expansion of the scale of a study into the Army Reserve may also allow for the identification of profiles of reservists, as Griffith[775] did, given the multiple ways that sufficient Moral Component could manifest.

More broadly, a further avenue of study is to compare the Army Reserve with other military reservists, such as the Royal Naval Reserve or RAF Auxiliary or pseudo-military organisations such as the First Aid Nursing Yeomanry. Comparison with other hierarchical volunteer groups, such as charities, bands, or amateur sports teams, might also be instructive. Noting that the Army Reserve are an outlier in terms of volunteers, in that they are paid for their Service, it is also worth notice that the Moral Component of Fighting Power is likely a military centric model which may not translate well to civilian pursuits and therefore other models, such as the Psychological Contract or Organisational Commitment might be a means of comparing the Army Reserve with civilian agencies. This could include an assessment of the extent to which reservists see themselves as part-time employees or paid volunteers.

This thesis aimed to explore the Moral Component of Army Reserve Fighting Power in the context of mobilisation for operations against a backdrop of uncertain academic definition of the central concept 'morale.' In doing this it has also concluded at the start of a new programme for the organisation, RF30, which will see the Army Reserve take on more responsibility in the coming decade, at home and abroad. Continued research into the organisation is commended in the broadest sense, because as it becomes a larger proportion of the Armed Forces, understanding it as part of the UK's ultimate insurance policy becomes increasingly important.

[775] Griffith (2011/2011a).

ANNEX A – QUESTION SCHEDULE

- **Sound Check**
- **Confirm everyone has completed the consent form and pre-questionnaire.**

Thank you for participating today. My name is Gavin Randell I am conducting a PhD through Reading University and the discuss today will provide me with important data in conducting my research. I am also an Army officer and have served on operations with reservists and worked with them as an Adjutant at a Reserve unit and a Staff Officer.

Introduction. Mobilisation is an administrative process which results in a legal change of status for reservists that will often result in soldiers deploying on an operation. It allows them to be paid full-time and be employed, in most respects, like a regular soldier. We will be discussing your attitudes toward mobilisation and deployment and what might affect your point of view and ultimately, your Moral Component of Fighting Power.

I am really interested in everyone's view, so I request that everyone respects others' opinions when they are speaking and also the privacy of others after we have finished and not discuss outside of this group. We will be recording today, so that I can anonymise and transcribe the conversation before analysis. If you would prefer I did not, or wish me to stop at any point, please let me know. I may also take some notes of key points to make sure I don't miss any contributions.

We will be discussing the topic for around 1 hour today. Are there any questions before we start?

Serial	Question (possible probes/prompts in bullets)	Intent/what data do I expect to gain from it?	Remarks
1	**Who here has deployed on operations with the Army Reserve before?** ○ Perhaps you could say when and where you have deployed, please?	Icebreaker. General opening question – fact based to build rapport.	Expect short responses
2	**How important do you think it is that Reserves mobilise and deploy as part of their service?**	Understand whether participants consider mobilisation salient. This will contextualise subsequent data. Will explore the understanding of key cornerstone of the move from a strategic to operational reserve.	
3	**What kinds of operations do you think you and your unit are best suited for?** ○ Can you explain why you think that? ○ What makes it easier/harder or better/worse for Reserves to deploy on those operations? ○ How would deploying on these types of operations make you feel?	Understand perceptions of how different operation types might affect Reserve force generation. May be instructive to understand where on spectrum of conflict Reserves see their contribution and how 'ambitious' they may be.	Types: Warfighting, Peacekeeping, humanitarian, security, MACA, training support, NATO Or participants may use operation names as examples.
4	**How important is it that you have some choice over whether to be mobilised?** ○ Do you feel this changes between different kinds of operations we discussed before? (e.g., Warfighting to project a NATO ally and a Peacekeeping operation?)	Understand perceptions of intelligent selection. This is potentially complex as Reserves appear to eschew imposed discipline yet feel they must present their mobilisation as mandatory. How does that affect their force generation potential?	Concept of intelligent selection may not be understood therefore need to ask question 'simply.'

	○ How would you feel if you were mobilised against your "choice"? ○ How might you present mobilisation to your families/employers?		
5	**How do you think you will be deployed as part of a force? (e.g., as a whole unit, individuals, small teams?)** ○ How well prepared/trained do you feel you are for that?	Understand Reserves perception of their role within organisation: expectations of being deployed as small teams, individuals or formed units, and/or embedded with regulars. . How does that affect force generation potential?	. Question may need explanation. Could be rephrased after trialling.
6	**How often do you think is reasonable for you to be deployed?**	. Understand how predictability (frequency) affects Reserve force generation potential?	. Expect that ser 6 and 7 may be answered together as issues of temporality.
7	**How important is the amount of notice you could be given in advance of an operation?** ○ What makes that notice period important?	. Understand how predictability (notice) affects Reserve force generation potential?	

Thank you for your contributions today, our time is nearly up. Before we finish, are there any final points that anyone would like to make?

Demographic Data Questionnaire

Participant code (researcher use only):

Before we start our discussion, it would be very helpful if you could answer a few questions on your experience within the Army Reserve. This will help me to contextualise your contribution today when the data are analysed. Please circle answers that are appropriate to you.

1. What is your rank?

2. How long have you been in the Army Reserve (in years)?

3. Have you ever served in the regular forces (any branch)? Yes / No

4. Have you ever been mobilised? Yes / No (if no - go to Q6)

5. Have you been mobilised in the last 3 years? Yes/No (if no – go to Q6)

    a. Was this in your military trade role? Yes / No

    b. Was this in a generic or non-trade role? Yes / No

    c. Was this with your own unit (as a formed body)? Yes / No

    d. Was this as an individual? Yes / No

6. What is your age?

6. Do you have a civilian job or are in full-time education? Yes/No

    a. Are you a: Full-time worker / Part-time worker / Full-time student / Unemployed / Retired / Voluntary worker

ANNEX B – RESEARCH DIARY

Group	Participation Date	Unit	Location
B[776]	23-Feb-22	217 Squadron, 150 RLC	Leeds
A	6-Mar-22	124 Squadron, 151 RLC	Scotland
C	15-Mar-22	D Company, 4 MERCIAN	Stoke-on-Trent
D	5-Apr-22	562 Squadron 151 RLC	Aldershot
E	6-Apr-22	A Company 4 PWRR	Farnham
F	12-Apr-22	D Company, 4 MERCIAN	Stoke-on-Trent
G	26-Apr-22	94 Squadron, 31 Sig Regt	Windsor
H	27-Apr-22	D Company 4 PWRR	Portsmouth
I	27-Apr-22	D Company 4 PWRR	Portsmouth
J	3-May-22	94 Sqn, 31 Sig Regt	Windsor
K	25-May-22	A Company 4 PWRR	Farnham
L	7-Jun-22	562 Squadron, 151 RLC	Aldershot
M	1-Sep-22	Multiple Squadrons, 151 RLC	Nescliffe

RLC = Royal Logistic Corps

MERCIAN = The Mercian Regiment

PWRR = Princess of Wales Royal Regiment

Sig Regt = Signal Regiment

GR = Gavin Randell (moderator/researcher)

[776] First group deliberately labelled out of order to ‘disguise’ first group.

ANNEX C – DEMOGRAPHIC COMPARISON

Characteristic	2020 (%)	2021 (%)	Focus Group Participants (%)	Remarks
Rank*				
Private	56	56	63	2020/2021 % derived from number of a given rank divided by total number of Pte-Sgt.
Lance Corporal	20	19	32	
Corporal	15	15	2	
Sergeant	*9*	*9*	*2*	Acting Sgt
Length of Service (years)**				
0-2	26	25	29	
3-4	22	19	22	
5-6	14	17	22	
7-10	8	10	17	
10+	28	30	10	
Prior Regular Service**				
Yes	24	23	15	
No	76	77	85	
Mobilised Before**				
Yes	21	34	39	Experience of these groups more closely represents the experience levels found in 2015 (Yes - 39%), which were in steady decline until 2021.
No	79	66	61	
Mobilised within last 3 Years**				
Yes	4	15	88	
No	96	85	13	
Age**				
18-24	16	12	22	
25-34	30	31	37	
35-44	23	22	29	
45-54	27	29	10	
65+	5	7	0	
Employment Status**				
Full-time	70	68	88	
Part-time	6	5	7	
Unemployed	8	8	2	
Student	4	4	2	
Other	4	5	0	
Full-Time Reserve Service	8	10	N/A – excluded from population	

* Defence Statistics 1 Jan 2022

** ResCAS 2021

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