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
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Alan Swinbank

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Reconciling Britain's agricultural trade policy initiatives with world trade rules: 1960–1975

Alan Swinbank 

School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, Lichfield, UK

ABSTRACT

Between 1960 and 1972 successive British governments explored, and sometimes pursued, a series of agricultural trade policy initiatives designed to shift the burden of supporting UK farmers from taxpayers to consumers, and to reduce the UK's agri-food imports by expanding home production. These included a minimum import price scheme for cereals; a Selective Expansion Programme; debate about *Agriculture's Import Saving Role*; and 1970 proposals for a fundamental change to farm policy that would apply *whether or not* the UK joined the European Communities (EC). Prior to EC membership the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), bilateral agreements with a number of countries, and pressure from the UK's trading partners (particularly the United States) constrained its room for manoeuvre. Consequently, this dimension of farm policy could not safely be left to agriculture ministers and the Treasury, but was one that involved other departments, and prime ministers, as it necessitated detailed international negotiations. Following EC entry, GATT Article XXIV deliberations and the UK's renegotiation of its terms of entry failed to secure meaningful reform of the common agricultural policy (CAP). The 1975 referendum confirming EC membership meant the UK no longer had an independent agri-food trade policy.

KEYWORDS

Minimum import price;
deficiency payments; CAP;
Article XXIV

Introduction

In his Presidential Address to the Agricultural Economics Society in July 1964 John Kirk, then an economist in the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), included the following comments, which serve as an exemplary introduction to the contents of this paper:

Let us turn now to the constraints imposed by the Government's external policies. The binding nature of many of these is not sufficiently appreciated. ... this country is signatory to a formidable network of international agreements which govern not only our external trade but necessarily our freedom to develop internal policies as well.¹

The article is bookended by the appointment of Christopher Soames as the United Kingdom's Minister of Agriculture in July 1960, and the country's referendum on

CONTACT Alan Swinbank  A.Swinbank@reading.ac.uk  School of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading, UK

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continued membership of the European Communities (EC) in June 1975, although echoes of earlier policy decisions (the Ottawa Agreements of the 1930s for example) reverberate through the narrative, and other authors might have chosen different events to frame their analysis.²

This was a turbulent time for the UK's agri-food trade regime as the country progressively refined its protectionist policies as it sought to reduce the cost to the Exchequer of farm support, despite opposition from the United States, and other trading partners. These policy developments were not decided by MAFF, agricultural ministers, and the Treasury operating in isolation. Other departments, and prime ministers of the day, were frequently drawn into the debate.

The UK's first application for membership of the European Economic Community (EEC), which would have meant adopting the EEC's expected protectionist policies for agriculture, was rebuffed; but the second application—after stalling—did lead to entry on 1 January 1973. Although the Conservative Government in 1970 led by Edward Heath was already embarked on a fundamental reform of UK farm policy, mimicking the border measures of the common agricultural policy (CAP), it was still critical of the EC, believing the CAP's level of support too high. It—and the US—believed the CAP could be reformed from within. Despite British hopes, by 1975 however it was evident that enlargement would not lead to a fundamental reform, and the world commodity boom led some to conclude that reform was no longer required. The 1975 referendum, confirming continued membership meant that the UK was locked into the CAP's protectionist embrace.

Throughout this successive governments: i) participated in the Dillon and Kennedy Rounds of tariff negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); ii) introduced a minimum import price (mip) regime for cereals; iii) adopted a Selective Expansion Programme for Agriculture; iv) embarked upon a 'fundamental' change to farm policy which was intended to apply had the second set of EEC entry negotiations failed; and v) abrogated its trade agreements with (mainly) Commonwealth suppliers dating from the Ottawa Agreements of the 1930s; whilst vi) seeking to deflect United States' criticisms of British policy.

Although a number of authors document *agricultural* policy changes through the 1960s (Bowers, Brassley *et al.*, Kirk, Martin, Winter for example) they invariably do so paying little attention to the *trade* policy dimension, which is this article's distinctive approach. There were a number of critiques of the minimum import price regime of 1964 (e.g. Peters); the agricultural trade dimensions of the Kennedy Round attracted some attention (e.g. Lee); but the Heath Government's approach to farm trade policy prior to EEC membership was barely noticed (but see Brummer and Swinbank). Agricultural policy was of course a core concern in the UK's negotiations for EEC membership in 1970–72, and the subsequent referendum (see, for example: Franklin, Benvenuti, Aquil), but apart from Swinbank the UK's role in the EC's GATT Article XXIV negotiations after the first enlargement was largely ignored.³

The article is arranged as follows. First, to benchmark the subsequent discussion, the text summarises relevant policy provisions at the end of the 1950s. The discussion then follows in a more-or-less chronological sequence, identifying the UK's major agri-food trade policy debates and decisions, and the countervailing pressures exerted by the UK's trading partners and GATT disciplines, over the period under review. A final section

outlines some tentative conclusions. Sources include material from the National Archives (TNA) in Kew, and GATT documents accessible through the World Trade Organization website.⁴

Farm policy at the turn of the decade

British agriculture supplied almost half of the nation's overall food requirements, including 'roughly two thirds' of the temperate zone products that could potentially be produced.⁵ Food rationing had ended and the Ministry of Food had merged with the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1955, creating the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF). The *Agriculture Act, 1957* had revised the 1947 legislative package and placed limits on the speed with which ministers could reduce the financial support enjoyed by British farmers. The agricultural departments engaged in an annual 'negotiation' with the farmers' unions before ministers determined the price guarantees for the review commodities (cereals, potatoes, sugar beet, milk, eggs, wool, and fat cattle, pigs and sheep) and production grants for the following year. Although arrangements varied from commodity to commodity, the basic arrangement for delivering price guarantees was a system of 'deficiency payments' under which producers, collectively, were paid any shortfall between average market prices and the guarantees. In 1958–59 the taxpayer cost of implementing the price guarantees was £154.7 million, with a further £80.9 million spent on farming grants and subsidies: the top two expenditure items of the latter being the fertiliser and calf subsidies (£25.8 and £14.3 million respectively).⁶ Horticulture (other than main crop potatoes) was not included in these price guarantees—but did benefit from a protective tariff.

Tariffs also applied to a number of the products covered by the price guarantees. On cream and barley for example the so-called MFN (most-favoured-nation) duty was 10%, on butter £0.75 per hundredweight (cwt.), but wheat imports were free. However, stemming from the Ottawa Agreements of the 1930s, imports from Commonwealth countries were free. Thus, Rooth's comment that the Ottawa Agreements offered 'negligible additional protection' to British farmers: their aim was to switch 'trade to the Empire at the expense of foreign suppliers'.⁷

The United States considered Commonwealth Preferences a 'protectionist perversion' and tried hard to ensure that in the negotiations that created the GATT in 1947 the practice would be outlawed. But 'for the UK, the immediate elimination of ... imperial preferences was a red line that could not be crossed'. The British outpaced the Americans, and consequently:

Contracting Parties were allowed to retain tariff preferences, but the margin of preference was bound in Part II of the Schedules and could not be exceeded (i.e. existing discriminatory treatment could be retained, but not increased). Article I:2(a) of the GATT expressly states that the MFN clause shall not require the elimination of any preferences among territories in Annex A, which lists the Commonwealth territories.⁸

Furthermore, the UK (and, for that matter, other states) was still applying quantitative restrictions—'contrary to the provisions of the General Agreement and without authorization from the Contracting Parties'—on a limited number of products, long after the original justification (balance of payment difficulties) was deemed to have

lapsed. For import licencing purposes, the UK divided the world into zones, with imports from the Dollar Area subject to the most severe restrictions, and those from the Sterling Area the least. Canada, despite being a member of the Commonwealth, fell in the former camp. In its 1962 submissions to GATT, the UK conceded, *inter alia*, that butter imports were subject to 'bilateral quotas with traditional supplying countries', that imports of whole hams were prohibited, and that rum, bananas and grapefruit from the Dollar Area were subject to quota.⁹ The latter particularly irked the USA, as will be seen later.

Agricultural trade policy had developed quite differently in Britain compared to much of continental Europe, particularly in France and Germany. Following the repeal of the Corn Laws in the 19th Century, the UK had adopted what is often referred to as 'free trade'. There were some offsets during the First World War, the interwar period, and the Ministry of Food's trade regime during the Second World War. As we have seen, under the post-war Agriculture Acts farmers were supported by subventions from government. Although in the 1950s there were marked differences in approach between France and West Germany, which complicated their attempts to forge a *common* agricultural policy, the EEC's approach might be characterised as a closed, 'managed', market with consumers, rather than taxpayers, funding farmer support. It was this divergent approach which was the dilemma British governments faced as they explored closer commercial relations with their European neighbours.¹⁰

In March 1957 six west-European nations (the 'Six') had signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European Economic Community (EEC) which would lead to the formation of a customs union covering trade in all goods, including agriculture. The United Kingdom had declined to participate, in part because of the inclusion of agriculture. Its attempt to form a free trade area covering all west-European states, including the Six, but excluding agriculture, had flopped; and in consequence seven states (the 'outer Seven': Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK) had signed the Stockholm Convention in January 1960 creating the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). This was a free trade area (FTA), allowing for free trade between the partners for goods *originating* within EFTA, but without a *common* external tariff that would be characteristic of a customs union. Moreover, its provisions largely excluding trade in agricultural products, although the British had conceded tariff concessions on four Danish products—bacon, blue-veined cheese, canned cream and canned pork luncheon meat—to make EFTA more palatable to Denmark.¹¹ Britain was still struggling to define its place in Europe, with some hoping that the mere existence of EFTA would bring pressure on the Six to agree to more open European trading arrangements.

It would be wrong to imply that the *status quo* was settled and unchallenged. Throughout the 1950s there had been considerable debate about the appropriate level of support for British agriculture. In his book completed in May 1961, for example, McCrone claimed: 'It is common knowledge that the Government's post-war policy has involved substantial support for agriculture and that this has become an expensive burden for the rest of the community to bear'.¹² Deficiency payments increased farmers' returns and consequently the volume of home production, which was a source of ongoing friction with countries wanting to export their produce to the UK. One of the reasons Australia had wanted in 1956–7 to renegotiate its 1932 Ottawa Agreement was its frustration at 'the

decline in the share of their primary products, particularly wheat, in the British market, which was largely caused by a marked increase in the volume of British (in many cases subsidised) home-grown products and subsidised competition from third countries'.¹³

Nor were farmers content. The 1960 Farm Price Review had been received badly, with the newly elected President of the NFU, Harold Woolley, suggesting the government had a 'clear determination to restrict home agricultural production and make way for more imported food-stuffs'.¹⁴ When Woolley met the Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, in the garden of No. 10 Downing Street on 25 May 1960 he voiced the agricultural industry's 'genuine and widespread anxiety ... , an anxiety which had been focused but not created by the 1960 Price Review'. He claimed:

The whole industry was worried by the way in which the support system is often represented as a burden on the taxpayer. The support system was the Government's chosen method for protection of the agricultural industry; other forms were used for the protection of other industries. He himself believed that the policy had proved very successful and that today we were as well and as cheaply fed as any nation in the world.¹⁵

1960: a new Minister

Macmillan undertook a mini reshuffle of his cabinet in July 1960 promoting Christopher Soames to the cabinet as Minister of Agriculture. Soames' predecessor in that role, John Hare, became Minister of Labour. According to Twining, 'there was a clear change at MAFF from the protectionist John Hare to Christopher Soames, a known pro-European'.¹⁶ Lord Home—who later would disclaim his peerage and as Sir Alec Douglas-Home succeed Macmillan as Prime Minister—became Foreign Secretary.

As the new Minister of Agriculture was settling into his summer holiday, Sir John Winnifrith, Permanent Secretary at MAFF, wrote mentioning 'one or two points on which I ought to bother you'. Two highlighted were the UK's future relations with the EEC, and the ongoing 'Cod War' with Iceland. On the former there was to be a meeting of ministers on 13 September to determine what the government would say about 'two alternative plans' at a forthcoming meeting of Commonwealth finance ministers. These were: '(a) The Six to join the Seven. (b) The U.K. to join the Six, but to contract out certain categories of trade, including food'. In Winnifrith's view: 'any variant of the ideas now under discussion will be hated by our farmers'.¹⁷

In his letter of 7 September Winnifrith declared:

1. We must preserve our present agricultural support system intact, including:

(a) our right to make such changes as we want from time to time, even if the foreigner thinks that he may lose out as a result;

(b) our right to get from the Exchequer any extra money we need if the new relations with Europe and the Commonwealth depress food prices in the U.K.

2. We must make the minimum concessions to Europe on tariffs. Whitehall assumes, rightly, that we shall not induce the Six to let us contract out of food and raw materials unless we offer them some concession in return. All Whitehall is terribly keen on making all these concessions at our expense. We must fight to save horticulture and if possible to keep the tariff on Dutch bacon. We should make the most of the argument that a concession on wine

will be far more valuable to the French than one on horticulture. Why shouldn't the Treasury sacrifice some wine revenue?¹⁸

Soames, however, had his own agenda, and in February 1961 wrote to the Prime Minister as follows:

I now incline to the opposite view to that which has hitherto been current in Whitehall about the future of our agriculture. I am now firmly of the opinion that not only could we with benefit alter the system of our support for agriculture in the interest of associating ourselves more closely with the Six, *but that regardless of the issue of the Six*, we should in any event be giving thought to this for the future health of our agricultural industry. . . . I think we should give serious thought to shifting the emphasis of protection for agriculture from the Exchequer to the consumer (*my emphasis*).¹⁹

Winter too identifies, in 1960, a pivotal change in post-war farm policy but suggests a rather different catalyst. The NFU, he declares, secured 'a notable victory' in securing a series of 'talks between the agricultural ministers and the NFU leaders outside the normal review process'. These originated before Soames' appointment—the meeting of Harold Woolley and Harold Macmillan in May noted above—and continued to the year end. The 'resulting white paper', Winter suggests, 'was considerably more favourable to farming than the annual reviews of the time'. Consequently, 'protection came to the fore in British agricultural policy'.²⁰

The UK lodged its application to join the European Economic Community (EEC) in August 1961 (with applications later to the other two European Communities (EC): the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and Euratom, the atomic energy community). Towards the end of the year Harold Macmillan's Government was warned of an alarming increase in the projected budgetary cost of its deficiency payments programme. In a meeting with the Prime Minister on 8 December 1961, Soames explained that fat stock market prices had declined, triggering an increase in deficiency payments. In part, this had been because 'imports were uncontrolled and farmers have been buying Irish cattle which, if kept in this country for fourteen weeks, attracted the deficiency payment'. Macmillan commented that as 'he understood it, if the negotiations with the European Community failed it would be our aim to adopt the same pattern of agricultural policy as we would were the talks to succeed. . . . the Treasury and the Board of Trade would need to consider how to deal with our existing trade agreements, and with the GATT, if we were to adopt a policy for which, as it were, joining the Common Market would have been an explanation'. Accordingly, the Ministers present agreed 'that officials . . . should now make an investigation of the effect on our trade agreements and the GATT of carrying out the Common Market agricultural policy without joining the Common Market'.²¹

When the cabinet met the following week it considered the memorandum, now finalised, prepared by the Chief Secretary of the Treasury on the cost of farm support. This revealed that the Exchequer cost of the price guarantees in the 1961–62 financial year was now forecast to be 47% higher than originally estimated (see [Table 1](#)). This meant the Government would have to ask Parliament for a Supplementary Vote, 'close on £76 millions for the implementation of the price guarantees . . . in the current year'; and there was no guarantee, that come the Spring, this would suffice. At the meeting on 8 December Soames had said that 'it seemed to him that there was no alternative to a system of import controls'. Echoing his Minister's stance in a briefing to MAFF officials

Table 1. The cost of exchequer support, £ millions.

	Price guarantees	Production grants	Administration costs	Total*
1958–59 Actual	154.7	81.0	4.8	240.5
1959–60 Actual	154.8	95.1	5.9	255.8
1960–61 Actual	151.2	104.5	6.1	261.8
1961–62 Estimates	159.4	106.3	6.2	271.9
1961–62 End-November Forecast	234.6	107.5	6.2	348.3

*Includes Scotland, but excludes an average of £1 million a year paid in grant to Northern Ireland.

Source: TNA, CAB 129/107, 'Agricultural Support Policy. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury', 8 Dec. 1961.

a few days later Winnifrith wrote: 'The more I think about it the more I am convinced the answer is import controls of one sort or another'.²²

On 9 August 1961, the UK had finally launched its bid for EC membership. A year and a half later French President Charles de Gaulle's press conference of 14 January 1963 in effect vetoed the initiative. Among other remarks, he commented on

the means by which the people of Great Britain nourish themselves ... by importing food-stuffs purchased at low prices in the two Americas or in the former dominions, while still granting large subsidies to British farmers. This ... is obviously incompatible with the system the Six have quite naturally set up for themselves.²³

Addressing the House of Commons four weeks later about the collapsed Brussels negotiations, the Prime Minister turned to

another of the problems which we have been discussing so much in recent months—that of home agriculture. ... the present system of open-ended subsidy on a number of items, combined with free entry often at far lower prices, has serious drawbacks.

He went on to say:

The mere fact that the Common Market negotiations have failed does not relieve us of ... the need to fit our agricultural policy into overseas trading arrangements. We have been saying for some time now—*my right hon. Friend the Minister of Agriculture has said it on many occasions*—that, whether we join the Common Market or not, some changes in our support system are inevitable. The amount of agricultural support, particularly the Exchequer's open-ended commitment, must be brought under greater control (*my emphasis*).²⁴

Indeed, a review was already underway, prompted by concerns about a further escalation of budgetary expenditure in 1963/64. The day after de Gaulle's intervention (15 January 1963) an interdepartmental committee—with Winnifrith in the chair—met to discuss the Minister of Agriculture's latest ideas for agricultural policy reform.

The Minister had suggested that we ought to be ready to say something about the intention to close the two open ends in our support system, i.e. the quantity of home production on which the guarantee was paid and the level of the market price which determined the size of the deficiency payment.

Import controls would likely raise problems in GATT, on which it was 'noted ... that for broad reasons of commercial policy it had been considered to be in our interest to observe G.A.T.T. rules even though many other countries ignored them, particularly in the agricultural field'. Moreover, 'many of the measures proposed would create difficulties in connection with our Commonwealth commitments ... on duty-free entry and the guaranteed preferential margins'.²⁵ This exercise culminated in the Minister's quest to

impose minimum import prices (mips), which will be discussed below after a brief examination of the Dillon Round.

The Dillon Round

The EEC was to be a customs union, and as such had to comply with GATT's Article XXIV. That this would be the case was recognised early on; for example, at GATT's Eleventh Session in November 1956. Although the Treaty of Rome establishing the EEC was signed on 25 March 1957, it was some time before the Article XXIV examination could begin. This occupied the period 1 September 1960 to 5 May 1961. The EEC tried to convince other GATT members that it did meet the GATT criteria, and (under Article XXIV:6) negotiated compensation for countries that would suffer less advantageous access provisions than they had previously enjoyed in the EEC's constituent parts.²⁶ A second phase—a conventional round of GATT tariff negotiations known as the Dillon Round—took place between 29 May 1961 and the Spring of 1962. The UK was neither in the EEC, nor out. During the Article XXIV negotiations, it was still contemplating its European links. Its application for EEC membership came some months after the tariff negotiations had begun, and these were concluded whilst the accession negotiations were still underway.

In October 1958 at GATT's Thirteenth Session (whilst the UK was still nursing the prospect of an industrial-free trade area embracing the Six and other European states) the President of the Board of Trade (Sir David Eccles) did not 'doubt that under the GATT the Six, in working out their Customs Union, have an obligation to ensure that their fellow members are not harmed by their agricultural policy'; and—possibly the UK's main concern at the time—asked whether 'the Six [are] ready to discuss ways to reduce the harmful effects upon our Colonies which will follow from the preferences they intend to afford to their dependent territories?'²⁷

Roy Denman, then a relatively junior official of the Board of Trade based in Geneva, conducted the UK's negotiations during the first (Article XXIV) phase, and records that the UK 'was the first major trading partner of the Community to settle'. The British team in Geneva was then reinforced for the tariff negotiations. With the possibility of UK accession looming, Denman recalls asking 'whether it was really useful to continue our tariff negotiations ...? But it was felt that to pull out now would undermine the worldwide negotiations in the GATT. And it was not yet certain that we would be joining'.²⁸

The UK concluded its bilateral tariff negotiations with the USA on 7 March 1962 and those with the EEC on 16 May 1962. Through the MFN clause it also benefited from other bilateral agreements: for example, from 'concessions on the duties on motor-vehicles and parts' granted by both the US and the EEC in their bilateral deals. The reports in the *Board of Trade Journal* identify UK benefits on whisky and biscuits from the earlier Article XXIV negotiations with the EEC, but otherwise it would appear that the UK's agri-food sector was largely unaffected by the Dillon Round.²⁹

As an aside it might be noted that the outcome of the US-EEC negotiations on agriculture was more momentous. For example, as an Article XXIV:6 concession, the EEC agreed to a 'bound' (i.e. a maximum) tariff of zero on 'soyabeans, rapeseed, sunflowerseed and oilcakes and meals'.³⁰ Whilst not immediately apparent, this breach in the integrity of the CAP's variable import levy mechanism proved problematic when the EEC set about supporting its own producers of oilseeds. But oilseeds aside, there was impasse over the

EEC's plans for agriculture. In particular, the two sides agreed to defer a resolution of their differences over maize, sorghum, wheat, rice and poultry. When, a few weeks later the EEC began applying its new trade regimes for cereals and poultry, the 'chicken war' began. The EEC agreed that, by applying its new trade regime to imports of frozen chicken into West Germany, the legitimate trade interests of American exporters had been impaired. But, with the Europeans unable to offer any acceptable redress, the US withdrew tariff concessions on four products designed to hit EEC exports: brandy (France), light trucks (Germany), dextrin and potato starch. A number of those tariffs were still in force forty-years later.³¹

Minimum import prices (mips)

Cabinet debated the UK's 'Future Agricultural Policy' on 25 April and 2 May 1963. Soames suggested the time had perhaps come to rethink policy: 'it was becoming increasingly urgent to bring to an end the present arrangements under which no limit could be set to the cost to the Exchequer of support for United Kingdom farmers. Some means would have to be found to limit the volume of home production; and it would be necessary at the same time to introduce controls over imports'. For cereals he suggested a minimum import price: 'This price would be fixed at a level which would prevent dumping; and exporting countries offering wheat at prices below the minimum would be required to pay a levy on the difference in order to bring their imports up to the minimum price. For meat it would be necessary to impose quantitative restrictions and to allot a specified quota to the main exporting countries'. Eventually, it was agreed that 'future policy in relation to cereals should include the introduction of a standard quantity for domestic production ... together with the negotiation of effective minimum import prices'; and that 'in the forthcoming international negotiations' the UK's objective would be 'to secure an effective limitation on imports of beef and lamb by means of voluntary agreements with the main exporting countries'.³²

Negotiations began with the main suppliers but proved more prolonged and difficult than originally envisaged. By February 1964 the attempt to negotiate voluntary import restraints on meat had been abandoned, and it was only after the Prime Minister (now Sir Alec Douglas-Home) had written personally to the relevant prime ministers or presidents that agreement on cereal mips was secured. In an *Exchange of Letters* on 15 April 1964, Australia, Canada, the Argentine Republic, and the USA agreed not to invoke their GATT (and bilateral) rights should the UK need to impose an import levy to ensure respect of its mips. The bilateral rights cited were the trade agreements of 1937 with Canada, of 1957 with Australia, of 1936 with the Argentine Republic. The UK set down specific commitments regarding support for domestic production, to be reviewed annually, 'with a view to securing a fair and reasonable balance between home production and imports'. Furthermore, the UK agreed it would 'not make any significant change in the general level of minimum import prices except after agreement with the ... principal co-operating Governments'. All of this was based on the expectation (hope?) that the GATT Cereals Group, mandated by the GATT Ministerial Meeting on 21 May 1963, would come up with an effective plan for 'appropriate international arrangements for cereals'. The Government later reported that by January 1965 'fifteen minor suppliers' had concluded similar

Agreements to co-operate, together accounting 'for well over 90% of the United Kingdom's total imports of cereals'.³³

The Kennedy Round

Although the formal negotiations of the Kennedy Round did not begin until May 1964 it had been made possible by the passage of the USA's *Trade Expansion Act* in October 1962, under President John F. Kennedy's stewardship, and preparatory talks had been taking place in Geneva for some time (for example at the GATT Ministerial Meeting in May 1963 referred to above). It was not concluded until 30 June 1967, the last day permitted by the Act. The delay in part was due to the EC's inability to determine the final shape of its CAP, its refusal to abandon its planned variable import levy mechanism, and the 'empty-chair crisis' in which France absented itself from the EC's Council chamber from July 1965 to January 1966. It was again a battle between two giants—the USA and the EC—and with the end of the mandate given to the President (Lyndon B. Johnson following Kennedy's assassination on 22 November 1963) the US in effect gave-up its attempt to curb the CAP.

A MAFF briefing paper for the Economic Development Committee (EDC) for the Agricultural Industry noted:

The Kennedy round was the first GATT trade negotiation in which agriculture was included effectively. Inevitably in the agricultural sector as a major net importer the UK stood to give more than it gained, and the importance of the Kennedy Round for British agriculture was not the possibility of export benefits, *but the risk of ill-effects on the industry's import saving role*. The latter consideration was kept well in mind by the UK negotiators and in the event the final settlement contained nothing which is likely seriously to prejudice the industry's role (*my emphasis*).

The 'most important' element of the agricultural package, MAFF wrote, was an agreement on cereals. This had 'now been incorporated in the new International Grains Agreement [*sic: it was actually called an Arrangement*] due to run for three years from 1 July 1968'. The new minimum-maximum price range that the signatories hoped to sustain was above the UK's mips, and 'the main exporters agreed to our maintaining our minimum import price (mip) system for wheat and coarse grains for the duration of the International Grains Arrangement'. The UK would 'contribute' 5% of the cost of a new food aid programme.³⁴

Importantly, for the UK, the Americans had abandoned their earlier insistence on minimum access provisions, which had been a key feature in the 1964 mips scheme. According to Preeg, access 'was the most difficult issue' in the agriculture negotiations. Exporters he notes, 'wanted firm assurances of access to commercial markets, especially the EEC market. Importers such as the EEC and the United Kingdom were not, however, prepared to make any firm commitment'. Lee reports that 'after a series of bilateral meetings between the British and the Community in June 1966, the two submitted offers on access for grains which would maintain self-supply ratios of 90% for the EEC and 75% for Britain. These were higher than the existing levels' and were unacceptable to the exporters. Negotiations on access continued until May 1967, before they were finally abandoned.³⁵

The new mip arrangements were articulated in the Five-Party Agreement of June 1967, which came into force on 1 July 1968 in parallel with the International/World Grains

Arrangement ('International' and 'World' seem to be used interchangeably). A MAFF briefing of October 1970 reported that 'in addition to the Five-Party agreement with Canada, the USA, Australia and Argentina we have bilateral agreements with 20 other countries'.³⁶

The 1964 agreement had obliged the government to consult with overseas suppliers if it wished to change the level of mips. The October 1967 devaluation, from £1 = \$2.80 to \$2.40, increased the sterling equivalent of dollar prices by 16.7%. However, it was not until July 1968 that agreement could be reached for a corresponding increase in mips. This fell well short of the extent of the devaluation, resulting in increases for wheat of between 12% and 13%, and for coarse grains by 9.3%. The Minister (now Cledwyn Hughes, who had succeeded Fred Peart in April 1968) assured the House of Commons that he had 'made clear to overseas supplying countries that we regard the increase as an interim measure subject to further adjustment, if necessary'.³⁷ These mips, nonetheless, were those inherited by the Conservative Government elected in 1970.

The selective expansion programme and agriculture's import saving role

The Selective Expansion Programme was an integral part of the *National Plan* unveiled by the Labour Government in September 1965. The Plan was 'designed to achieve a 25% increase in national output between 1964 and 1970'. Agriculture's 'main contribution' would be twofold: to increase production to meet the increase in demand, and to release labour to other sectors of the economy. However, as the UK was 'already virtually self-sufficient' in 'eggs, poultry and main crop potatoes', meat would 'have one of the most important parts to play in any selective expansion programme'. As beef was a joint product with dairy this would necessarily 'entail an expansion in milk production'. The expansion in beef and milk would 'increase considerably the demand for cereal feed'. The report cautioned however that: 'In considering the scope for import saving we must ... have regard to the interest of ... suppliers in our market and to our international commitments'.³⁸

With a worsening deficit in the balance of payments (*which in October 1967 resulted in a devaluation of the pound*) the cabinet in August 1966 had asked the Committee on Agricultural Policy 'to consider whether greater savings of imports of agricultural commodities could be achieved without serious damage to our international trading relationships, commitments and policies'. The Committee's unanimous view, endorsed by cabinet on 16 September 1966, was that:

as the objectives for the saving of imports set for agriculture last year under the National Plan had been thoroughly considered in regard both to the use of national resources and to the implications for our trading relationships, and as there had also been consultations with our overseas suppliers before the objectives were adopted, it would be unwise to reopen these discussions, with a view to increasing the objectives for production, so soon after the announcement of the Plan.

On the contrary, the challenge was to achieve the targets set in the National Plan: 'Agricultural Ministers had ... drawn the Committee's attention to certain risks threatening the achievement of the existing objectives for the saving of imports under the Plan',

and of the need to 'to restore confidence in the industry so as to assure the achievement of current objectives'.³⁹

By the end of the year, MAFF had been asked to think yet again about what expansion of home production might be 'technically' feasible 'by the end of the agricultural year 1969/70, with the object of achieving a further saving of imports over and above what it is planned to save under the selective expansion programme'. Under the rubric 'Maximum Expansion Programme' the Minister of Agriculture's document warned: 'If we openly set out to achieve the additional import saving technically possible by 1969/70, several of our multi-lateral or bi-lateral international commitments would have to be revised or abrogated'.⁴⁰

The National Plan had 'been drawn up in consultation' with the National Economic Development Council (NEDC), which was established in 1962. Under the umbrella of the NEDC, Economic Development Committees (EDCs) for various industries would be 'an essential complement to the efforts of the Government ... to ... improve ... competitive efficiency'. At the time, however, the EDC for the Agricultural Industry had not been established: it was not until December 1966 that it became operative. In welcoming members to this inaugural meeting, the Director-General of the National Economic Development Office (NEDO)—which serviced the NEDC and the EDCs (the 'little Neddies')—said that he 'would like the EDC to look at imports and see if anything could be done to reduce the burden, but in the main the EDC should decide itself what to do'. The hint, no doubt prearranged, was taken, and the Chairman summing up 'said there was fairly general agreement that the EDC should concentrate first on two studies: the long-term role of agriculture, with particular reference to import saving, and the manpower situation in the light of the National Plan's agricultural proposals'.⁴¹

It was in September 1967 that NEDO staff first heard that the House of Commons Select Committee on Agriculture planned to examine agriculture's import saving role. This 'inevitably gave the EDC cause for concern and we took various steps to impress upon the Select Committee the fact that the EDC had already put a great deal of effort into import saving'. In the event 'the Select Committee ... decided to postpone further discussion of import saving until June, when they hope to have the EDC's report'.⁴²

When published in June 1968, the EDC's report on *Agriculture's Import Saving Role* sought to present 'a realistic and practical statement of agriculture's potential contribution to the economy by 1972/3', and carefully set out its assumptions. 'The two principal assumptions were that *all import saving possibilities should be considered, whether or not they might conflict with Britain's present international commitments*, and that, over the next five years, the industry would not become subject to the common agricultural policy of the European Economic Community' (*my emphasis*).⁴³

When Cledwyn Hughes attended a meeting of the EDC later in the year, perhaps to flatter his audience he told them that he thought they had written 'one of the most important reports ever produced on British agriculture'. He cautioned however that 'the Government regarded Britain as a trading nation and restraints on imports could not be imposed without negotiation'.⁴⁴

The reaction of *The Economist* however had been hostile:

With the balance of payments on its knees, Britain's farmers have seized their chance to ask for more protection against beastly cheap foreign food. The Economic Development

Committee (or little Neddy) is mainly an alliance of the three wings of the farm lobby —the farmers, the farm workers, and their own government department. This week it argues predictably that the Government's present farm policy, which already points towards a large expansion of home food production, should be boosted and imports kept out.⁴⁵

Farmers too seemed to believe the EDC was arguing for more support, which led to some concern in MAFF. The Permanent Secretary (now Sir Basil Engholm) had formed

a very strong feeling that the farming community had accepted the E.D.C. report at its face value, i.e. had ignored the reservations which the E.D.C. had made about international considerations and support costs, but had taken the technical possibilities of expansion as representing a realistic programme for the industry. There could therefore be disappointment and disillusion if, in the event, the Government were not to back the 'programme' to the full.⁴⁶

Some weeks later, a longish draft note intended for MAFF's regional offices was circulated which read in part:

The Minister has made it clear that the E.D.C. assessment is a useful starting point in the consideration of future policy. The real problems arise in relating the expansion proposed to wider national questions such as our international trading relations and the increase in the resources required. ... the U.K. probably has a more complex network of trading agreements than most other countries. ... The level of increased production that could be technically possible is only a part, albeit an important part of the complex of issues to be taken into account.⁴⁷

At lunch with a MAFF civil servant, a senior official at the Australian High Commission warned that the Australian government was 'considering whether they should present H. M.G. with an aide-memoire to register their concern about the possible impact on Australia of the adoption of the production targets in the E.D.C. Report'.⁴⁸

As Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and The Netherlands had each expressed particular concern, their London representatives would be called in for an 'oral briefing' on 12 November 1968 following the Minister's statement in the House of Commons on 'objectives for British agriculture in the medium term'. This would include confirmation of the Government's decision 'to continue the existing programme for the selective expansion of agriculture, ... and to project it forward to 1972/73', together with the assurance that—as they had 'in framing the 1965 selective expansion programme'—the Government had 'taken full account of considerations of the most economic use of resources and of the United Kingdom's international obligations—matters which the E. D.C. excluded from its purview'. Furthermore, MPs were to be told that 'the new programme does not represent any major change in British agricultural policy; this continues to be one of "selective expansion"'.⁴⁹

In its report published on 5 March 1969 the Select Committee, 'having investigated the possibilities of expanding British agriculture and saving imports', took a rather different stance to the government in reporting their conclusion that 'it is desirable that expansion which has hitherto been intended to keep pace with the major part of the increase of home demand should go further and aim at a positive substitution of home grown food for part of the present imports of temperate foodstuffs'. Furthermore, they emphasised that 'domestic agricultural expansion should no longer be inhibited by rigid provisions in international

agreements which offer sections or proportions of the British market to overseas suppliers'. In the main body of their report they declared: 'Britain is ... less protectionist in terms of agricultural trade than any comparable country'. A report of the press conference circulated within NEDO suggested that one of the topics 'on which the Committee obviously felt strongly [*was*] the Board of Trade's bias against agricultural expansion'.⁵⁰

The role that agriculture might play in saving imports had been debated for many years. The academic economist perhaps most associated with this controversy was E.A.G. (Austin) Robinson. 'Again and again', writes Cairncross, 'throughout the post-war years and into the 1960s he emphasised the vulnerability of the British economy in the absence of a change in the structure of its trade. ... From this diagnosis he drew the conclusion that adjustment required a special effort of import-saving of which the main element proposed was a large increase in agricultural production'.⁵¹

The NFU's chief economist Asher Winegarten was also a keen advocate. Addressing an NFU meeting in January 1969, for example, he declared:

To spend about £1,000 million a year on importing the kinds of food that we ourselves could grow is a luxury that a country with a £650 million balance of payments deficit cannot afford. ... A very substantial contribution will ... have to come from import substitution — and not least from agriculture, which remains the biggest import saving industry.

And he went on to refute the idea of reciprocity in international trade: 'It is ... fallacious to argue that because we buy beef from the Argentine ... the Argentine will necessarily buy our motorcars or machinery. Indeed, as we all know, the Argentine imports more motorcars and machinery from the United States than she does from us'.⁵²

Despite repeated British assertions that the mips system was not inherently protective, that it simply sought to target abnormally low-priced shipments that could trigger a collapse in market prices, and thus protected the interests of *both* the British taxpayer and the legitimate price expectations of unsubsidised suppliers, different perceptions prevailed elsewhere. For example, in a 1969 presentation to the American Agricultural Economics Society, Hal Malmgren—who later was to occupy an important post in the American team in the Article XXIV negotiations following the UK's accession (discussed briefly below)—claimed that 'The minimum import price scheme, which was introduced in 1964 for grains, is highly protective'; and—not entirely inaccurately—that 'The Economic Development Committee for Agriculture was established to develop import-saving policies'.⁵³

The 1970 *Annual Review*, before the change in government, recapped the main 'measures to help provide market stability':

Minimum import prices for cereals have been in operation since 1964. As a result of the Kennedy Round in 1967 these were continued without a corresponding obligation to hold down home production. ... The Bacon Market Sharing Understanding, which was revised last year, now gives home producers the opportunity to win a larger share of the market. ... Imports of butter are subject to quota. Cheese is subject to voluntary restraint on imports coming into our market. ... The arrangements for voluntary restraint on imports of broilers have been continued. Lastly, discussions are proceeding to provide for more orderly marketing and price stability for beef.⁵⁴

Heath's 'fundamental' change to farm policy

In opposition, the Conservative Party came to the view that the mip scheme for cereals they had introduced in 1964 was inadequate. In the House of Commons in July 1968, for example, well before de Gaulle's resignation of the French Presidency in April 1969 rekindled the prospect of EC membership, their shadow minister (Joe Godber) had said:

The last Conservative Minister of Agriculture tried to stabilise the cereals market when he introduced minimum import prices for cereals. ... I have since come to the view that it is not the best way in which to control imports. ... my party and I now advocate a system of levies whereby imports can be controlled, but the additional amount paid by the importer goes to the Treasury instead of to the foreign supplier.

A section of their election manifesto in 1970 indicated that a Conservative government would 'introduce levies on imports in order to enable us to eliminate the need for deficiency payments in their present form'. The Conservatives, led by Edward Heath, won the election, and the new Minister of Agriculture (who turned out to be Jim Prior, not Joe Godber) then tried to implement this 'fundamental change' to the system of farm support which would 'provide much-needed scope for agricultural expansion'.⁵⁵

Furthermore, the EC entry negotiations began; but at the time it was by no means certain that they would be successful, or that Parliament would endorse entry. The Government recognised that EC membership would entail full adoption of the CAP, but that to openly criticise the policy prior to accession would undermine the UK's European credentials. Although critical of the level of CAP price support, the Government was set on adopting CAP-like policy mechanisms *even if the entry negotiations proved unsuccessful*, and determined that in the interval (pending entry to the CAP or the introduction of a new permanent regime) an *interim* levy scheme would be introduced for 'cereals, beef, lamb and certain minor dairy products'. For cereals, the plan was to increase by £7 per ton the mips written into the Five-Party Agreement, which was due to expire in June 1971, and then to 'seek to replace our current system of mip, which provided for country levies, by a system of general levies'. The 'net Exchequer benefit' on cereals, beef and lamb would be 'between £25 million and £75 million depending on the level of possible import levies we were prepared to try to negotiate'.⁵⁶

The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced the new approach in the House of Commons on 27 October 1970, although the UK's trading partners were of course well aware of the government's intentions. The negotiations did not proceed smoothly.

From time-to-time British officials asked themselves why the Americans were so confrontational? Had they not implicitly accepted the EC's variable import levy scheme when they signed-off the Article XXIV negotiations that preceded the Dillon Round: why was the UK different? For example, Sir William Nield, meeting with Stanley Cleveland of the US Embassy on 20 November 1970,

again asked why they [*the Americans*] could not treat us at least as well as they had treated the EEC since 1962 with far higher prices and general levies; they had in 1962 as I remembered it put their GATT rights into cold storage but not renounced them? ... Mr Cleveland replied that what was biting them was the implication in our price and general levy proposals that we might move, even if still outside the EEC, to still higher cereal prices and so to the rest of the EEC system *including export restitutions*. I asked if they really thought we

would go (if outside the EEC) to the extremes of the EEC system when our agriculture was more efficient ... ? (*my emphasis*).⁵⁷

But this ignored three realities: first that the US, whilst still supportive of European *political* unification as a bulwark against Communism, rather resented the *economic* baggage that came with it; second, they bitterly regretted the so-called 'standstill' agreements of 1962 and had repeatedly sought their repudiation; and third that the EC was a much larger and more intransigent economic power in world affairs than was the smaller (and thus potentially more compliant) UK. Moreover, Nield seems to be unaware that the UK would soon propose export restitutions as a counterpart to its interim import levy schemes.

By early December, the Minister of Agriculture, as a 'concession' to the Americans, was proposing 'an arrangement under which the levies would be on a country basis instead of being general levies'. This did not please the Treasury. A difficulty,

which is of particular concern ... , but on which we are fully supported by the DTI, arises on the balance of payments cost of a country levy system. With a general levy scheme, it is much more difficult for all importers to gang up so as to raise their export prices to the m.i.p. level, thus avoiding payment of the levy and securing the extra return to themselves. Under a country levy system, this is much more feasible for the exporters of an individual supplying country.⁵⁸

The USA's objections were reiterated when its Secretary of State for Agriculture, Clifford Hardin, visited London in December 1970. Although told that: the Government's 'levy proposals had been Conservative policy for a long time'; that 'it was necessary to shift the burden of agricultural support away from the tax payer to the consumer'; that the UK's 'proposals were not protectionist'; and that the policy 'fitted in well with our EEC negotiations and had been well received by the Community'; Hardin was not assuaged. He was 'disappointed' that the British Government 'had taken this line at a point in time when the US were becoming increasingly concerned by the policies of the EEC. ... Almost every single action of the Community constituted another attack against US agriculture'.⁵⁹

A brief produced by the cabinet Office following the meetings characterised the initial American attitude 'very hostile and obdurate'. There was, it suggested, a 'further consideration, stressed privately by the Americans, that President Nixon is worried about the Middle West agricultural vote in the 1972 election'. In conclusion, it was 'clear that our interim levy proposals raise issues which the Americans feel can only be settled, at least in principle, at Presidential level'. Among the considerations likely to influence the President was the Government's ability to convince him that the UK would 'be a liberalising influence in agricultural and trade matters if we succeed in joining the EEC'.⁶⁰

The mip proposals for cereals were refined (that is, weakened) in the hope of making them more palatable to the Americans, and the Prime Minister was briefed for his meeting with President Nixon in Washington. But still the Americans were opposed, and the Five Party Agreement would expire at end of June. A deal with the Americans was finally secured in March, after the UK had further weakened its mip provisions for cereals. The Americans had not achieved all their aims: as the House of Commons was told, 'the ... "country levy" provisions are being discontinued and the new system will be based on variable general levies'. But the US made clear its belief that it had 'fully preserved' its 'GATT rights for use in the negotiations which will take place with the enlarged European Community if

Britain joins, or in respect of our future relationship with Britain, should it not join (*my emphasis*)'. The UK's new trade regime for 'cereals and cereal-based products', beef and veal, mutton and lamb, and 'milk products other than butter and cheese', came into force from 1 July 1971.⁶¹

But meanwhile further machinations had been afoot. Already, at the end 1970, Michael Franklin had written to Nield warning him 'that, in discussion of our levy proposals with trade interests in this country, we are coming under pressure to accept that they ought to be accompanied by a system of export restitution allowances'; as Stanley Cleveland from the US Embassy had feared in November. In April 1971 the British had decided that

as it was likely that mips would raise the prices of certain manufactured products above prevailing world prices, Ministers ... agreed ... that British exporters, who would have to pay more for their raw materials because of the mips, ought to be repaid the extra cost (in 'allowances') to maintain their international competitive position. When the export allowance scheme was discussed with the Americans, they reacted very unfavourably, their main objection being that our scheme is similar to the EEC export restitution scheme which the Americans argue has reduced their exports to third markets.⁶²

On 15 August 1971, in a surprise move, Nixon had suspended the convertibility of the dollar into gold, imposed a 'temporary' 10% import surcharge, and set about securing trade concessions and currency revaluations from its trade partners, principally the EC, Japan and Canada. This flurry of diplomatic activity led to currency realignments in the Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971, a lifting of the 10% import surcharge, and (in February 1972) a mini-trade deal between the US and the EC involving cereals, citrus and tobacco.⁶³

Under these challenging circumstances Ministers had

refrained from going ahead with the enabling legislation needed for the export allowances scheme until the international monetary and trade situation became clearer. They had no wish to introduce a fresh factor, however minor in intrinsic importance, into an already complicated situation and thereby to risk delaying the international settlement for which we, the EEC and other countries were working.

The UK would deploy export refunds/restitutions/allowances as part of the CAP, but—Ministers announced on 29 February 1972— it was now too late to put a temporary scheme in place.⁶⁴

Rum, grapefruit and bananas

The UK's agricultural trade restrictions were not always imposed to reduce the Exchequer cost of deficiency payments or promote an import-saving expansion of British agriculture. The US twice raised formal GATT challenges to a policy the UK claimed was 'necessary to assist economic development of Commonwealth suppliers in the Caribbean'. First, in 1963 the US sought consultations with the UK 'with regard to the discriminatory quantitative restrictions maintained by the United Kingdom on imports of fresh winter grapefruit and processed orange and grapefruit products from the United States'. Although this led nowhere, the UK in March 1964, 'in accordance with requests received from the Governments of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago', did remove 'the restrictions ... imposed on imports into the United Kingdom of frozen concentrated orange juice from the dollar area'.⁶⁵

The second occasion in 1972, in the run-up to the UK's EC membership, again concerned grapefruit. Bananas, rum and cigars were also cited: 'The products in question are subject to quantitative restrictions on being imported into the United Kingdom from the United States and certain other "dollar area" countries'. The provisions had 'been carried forward from the period prior to 1960, when the United Kingdom ceased to supply (*sic?*) import restrictions for balance-of-payments reasons'. The US had made 'numerous representations' to the UK, including the 1963 instance cited above. The UK, supported by Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago, claimed that it 'maintained these restrictions solely in the interest of the Commonwealth countries in the Caribbean area'. Cuba later stating that 'this is a blatant attempt on the part of the United States Government to obtain niggardly trade advantages at the expense of the legitimate interests of a number of small developing countries in the Caribbean area whose fragile economies are dependent on a few export products'.⁶⁶

The US might have expected that under EU law the UK would have to desist from applying quantitative restrictions on third-country imports of fruits and vegetables from the date of accession, but in the enlargement negotiations the British had already secured the right to apply quantitative restrictions to fresh grapefruit and some grapefruit products until 31 January 1975. On 19 January 1972 the UK's Delegation in Brussels was contacted by the Commission of the European Communities asking 'what if any reduction we could accept' in the tariff on grapefruit in the mini-trade deal then being negotiated with the Americans (briefly mentioned above). In its formal request to GATT the US said that it had made 'written representations to the Government of the United Kingdom on 14 January 1972 On 17 August 1972, the United States modified its request, to one that a timetable be established for the elimination of these restrictions well before 31 January 1975'.⁶⁷ It is tempting to conclude that these developments were in some way connected.

A panel was established. Its interim report 'noted that the United Kingdom had never denied that the Dollar Area Quotas were in formal contravention of the provisions of the General Agreement on quantitative restrictions'. The panel 'strongly requested the parties concerned to actively seek a mutually acceptable solution to the problem which especially would pay due regard to the importance to the Caribbean countries and territories of . . . fresh grapefruit and grapefruit juice and orange juice'. The two parties did so, and three months later the US withdrew its complaint. The Caribbean economies were not particularly satisfied at the outcome of these bilateral negotiations. Discussing the matter in the GATT Council on 30 July 1973 the Jamaican delegate 'recalled that the request by the United Kingdom that a settlement be sought in a multilateral context was rejected by the United States. The matter had now been settled bilaterally, but the Council had not been informed of the terms of the settlement. The settlement did not include any alternative means of safeguarding the interests of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries in the future'.⁶⁸

It is not particularly apparent what advantage, if any, the Americans secured in this encounter. The US critique of the UK/EC trade regime for bananas would continue well into the future. In the Article XXIV renegotiations, discussed in the next section, the US did obtain further concessions on citrus which, according to the UK's Washington Embassy, 'effectively muzzled the citrus and tobacco lobbies who could have blocked action on the Trade Bill within the Senate Finance Committee'.⁶⁹ Passage of the Trade Bill was an important precursor for the subsequent launch of the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations.

Article XXIV again, renegotiation, and referendum⁷⁰

By many objective criteria, the accession of Denmark, Ireland and (particularly) the UK to the EC, and adoption of the CAP, worsened the access of temperate zone agricultural products to the enlarged Communities. The UK did secure limited concessions on the import of butter and cheese from New Zealand, and largely succeeded in obtaining 'bankable assurances' on access for sugar from *developing* Commonwealth countries once the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement expired in 1974, but otherwise it largely accepted the CAP as part of the *acquis communautaire*.⁷¹

The Article XXIV negotiations that were triggered by enlargement failed to deliver CAP reform in any meaningful way. Of the three new member states it was changes to the UK's import regime that dominated the Article XXIV deliberations. By adopting the EC's existing Common External Tariff, UK duties on the import of many industrial goods would decrease, whereas trade barriers on many agricultural products (particularly cereals) would increase. The Commission of the European Communities—strongly challenged by its trading partners—argued that the gains overseas suppliers would secure from the former would more than compensate for the latter, and therefore that compensation was not warranted. After prolonged and difficult negotiations however, the EC accepted that some industrial tariffs could be cut by way of compensation, whilst conceding very little on agriculture.⁷²

The UK's Permanent Representative to the EC, reporting to the new Foreign Secretary (Jim Callaghan, following the General Election of March 1974) on the closure of the EC-US negotiations on 31 May 1974, which essentially concluded the deliberations, claimed that the UK 'played a large part in promoting the final outcome and this is known to the Community's principal negotiating partner, the United States'. The EC was adamant that it would not change the CAP, particularly its policy on cereals, and eventually the US came to realise that it 'could not find ... a jemmy with which to prise open the Common Agricultural Policy'. He asserted 'that the danger of a trade war has been averted' and 'we were able to safeguard all our own manufacturing interests. Ideally, another of our interests would have been served if in the cereals sector the negotiations had led to improved access to the Community market. But this was never realisable'.⁷³

A press release from the White House said the agreement would reduce 'Community import duties on a significant number and volume of American exports ... in compensation for changes which occurred when the European Community was enlarged to include Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark'. A background memorandum explained this involved 'increased market access for tobacco, oranges and grapefruits, kraft paper, photographic film, non-agricultural tractors, excavating machinery, diesel and marine engines and outboard motors, engine additives, measuring instruments, pumps, plywood and other items'.⁷⁴

The Smithsonian Agreement of December 1971 had not settled the international monetary turmoil. In June 1972 Edward Heath's Government allowed the pound to float, and it depreciated steeply against the German Deutschmark. By the end of the year world wheat prices were on the rise. Under the circumstances it was not easy for the UK to criticise excessive CAP prices. Moreover, in May 1973 Heath reassured the French President Georges Pompidou that: 'The British attitude to the Common Agricultural Policy remained as he had described it in the past... We accepted the Policy and should continue to support it'.⁷⁵

The General Election of February 1974 brought to an end the Heath Government's lukewarm attempt to reform the CAP. Harold Wilson's Labour Government by contrast was committed to renegotiating the terms of entry, and in particular to seeking major changes to the CAP. In this it convinced itself that it had an ally in the German government's disquiet with the soaring budgetary costs of the CAP, aided by the Commission of the European Communities' February 1975 paper: *Stocktaking of the Common Agricultural Policy*.⁷⁶

This is not the place to explore the motives or diplomacy adopted by Harold Wilson's Government in its renegotiation of the terms of entry, in particular of its attempts to secure 'major changes in the Common Agricultural Policy so that it ceases to be a threat to world trade in food products, and so that low-cost producers outside Europe can continue to have access to the British food market'.⁷⁷

Suffice to say, relatively little was achieved. The Foreign Secretary's memorandum to the cabinet, following the Dublin meeting of the European Council in March 1975 (which concluded the renegotiation) listed only one definite decision of that Council relating to the CAP: continuing access for New Zealand butter and cheese. Other policy developments were cited as evidence of the UK's negotiating success: the Lomé Convention of February 1975, which had attached to it a Sugar Protocol under which the EC had 'agreed to provide access on an indefinite basis for up to 1.4 million tons of sugar from the ACP [*African, Caribbean and Pacific*] sugar producing countries (mainly Commonwealth countries)'; a deficiency payments scheme for beef, partially funded from EC coffers, that Member States could choose to apply; and Article XXIV 'tariff reductions on ... canned pineapple and fresh and canned salmon as well as improved access for frozen beef and cheddar cheese'. Moreover, the Government had 'made it clear to other Member States that any new Community arrangements for mutton and lamb would have to take satisfactory account of our interests, and in particular would have to provide adequate and continuing access for imports of New Zealand lamb'.⁷⁸

One factor that possibly influenced Ministers' thinking was the world food situation. The section on the CAP ended with a paragraph that began: 'The world food situation is of critical importance when considering the CAP'. It cited a report that had said: 'there are strong grounds for thinking that what has happened since 1971 is not just a temporary self-reversing phenomenon, but represents a more permanent change. In the next 10 to 20 years there seems little likelihood of a return to anything like the cheap food regime of the 1950's and 1960's'. Indeed, Loux concludes that 'the international market situation that lasted from 1973 to 1975 helped convince crucial decision-makers in the cabinet—namely Wilson, Callaghan and Peart—fundamental reform of the CAP was unnecessary or even counterproductive to their goals of providing cheap food to British consumers and limiting costs to the Exchequer'.⁷⁹

Some members of the cabinet were clearly unimpressed, claiming:

It was doubtful whether there had been a fundamental change in world food factors: events of the last two years might constitute only a temporary change ... Already grain prices had fallen sufficiently far for the EEC to reintroduce levies on imports.

Other comments were that ‘there had been no change in the fundamental structure of the CAP—Community preference, variable levies on imports, and support buying’. On the other hand, others suggested that the ‘stocktaking of the CAP would be an important forum in which to pursue our objectives’. The Prime Minister ‘summing up the discussion, said that by a significant majority the cabinet agreed that the United Kingdom should remain a member of the EEC. This would therefore be the Government recommendation’. Of Wilson’s twenty-two cabinet colleagues, seven had said that ‘they wished to exercise their right ... to differ from the Government recommendation’, and many of them then campaigned for a No vote.⁸⁰

The June 1975 referendum secured a comfortable majority (two to one) for continued membership of the EC. The UK was now firmly enmeshed within the CAP. Inside that protective embrace with the EC’s budget receiving import levy revenues and paying export refunds/restitutions, the relevant benchmark for assessing the case for UK agricultural expansion would no longer be the price prevailing on world markets, but instead that set by the CAP.

As a postscript, it might be noted that the *Stocktaking* exercise fizzled out at the December 1975 European Council in Rome. World market prices fell. But British reluctance to make changes to the ‘green pound’ (*the coefficient used to convert CAP support prices, expressed in units of account to pounds sterling*) that fully reflected the pound’s continuing depreciation against other EC currencies meant that for the next few years British farmers often received (and consumers paid) CAP support prices well below those that applied elsewhere, particularly in Germany.⁸¹

Soames, the new Minister of Agriculture in 1960, was by 1975 the EC’s Commissioner for External Relations and as such had been responsible for concluding the EC’s Article XXIV negotiations following British, Danish and Irish accession. Winnifrith retired from MAFF at the end of 1967, became Director-General of the National Trust in 1968, and then campaigned against EC membership. He was a patron of the Common Market Safeguards Campaign formed in February 1970. Douglas Jay, the veteran Labour politician, notes a number of Winnifrith’s interventions, saying of one in November 1973 that it was the ‘best speech at this meeting ... tearing the CAP coolly to pieces with all the authority of an ex-Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Agriculture’. Soames’ principal private secretary at MAFF (from March 1961), Michael Franklin, writes that ‘it was widely known’ that Winnifrith ‘shared with Harold Woolley (*President of the National Farmers’ Union from 1960 to 1965*) a deep distrust of matters Continental and a strong emotional attachment to the Commonwealth’. By 1975, Franklin was Deputy Director-General for Agriculture in the Commission of the European Communities, with administrative responsibility for implementing the CAP’s market support mechanisms.⁸²

Concluding comments

This article has demonstrated that trade was an important, and constant, consideration in UK agricultural policy through the 1960s to 1975 and needs to be considered alongside the historiography of the UK’s *domestic* farm policy deliberations. Agricultural trade policy was not enacted in a policy silo in which only MAFF and the Treasury operated: other departments of state (notably the Board/Department of Trade and the Foreign Office) and overseas missions and embassies were inextricably involved, and prime ministers often intervened. The historical literature understandably stresses the centrality of CAP in an

understanding of the UK's failed and successful bids to join the EC, but equally it should be recognised that agricultural trade policy was an integral component of the UK's overall trade strategy.

The article has *not* attempted to chart or assess the UK's courtship of the EC over this period, but it has shown that Macmillan's Government in the early 1960s—encouraged by the Minister of Agriculture, Soames—was contemplating a switch in farm support from taxpayers to consumers *before* de Gaulle's veto of the UK's first membership bid. Repeated attempts to change the system of farm support, particularly but not exclusively by Conservative ministers, shifting the burden from taxpayers to consumers, came up against GATT constraints and opposition from the UK's trading partners. Even the Heath Government, elected in 1970, had to curtail its ambitions despite its declared intent to change the system of support *whether or not* the UK's bid for EC membership was successful. Heath's administration was not opposed to the CAP's method of farm support, only its level. Once inside the EC (within the CAP's protective embrace), and after the 1975 referendum confirmed continuing EC membership, it was the EC rather than the UK that had to rebuff the opprobrium of its trade partners. Moreover, from a domestic policy perspective, CAP rather than world market prices now became the relevant opportunity cost/benefit when assessing agriculture's import saving role.

The article has *not* attempted to assess the level of support or protection to British agriculture in the 1960s through to 1975, although it has documented a continuous clamour for protection—in part orchestrated by the NFU, the EDC for the Agricultural Industry, and the Select Committee on Agriculture—and the resistance of the UK's trading partners. Paradoxically, for a brief period in the 1970s following the surge in world commodity prices coinciding with accession to the EC, the level of protection for British agriculture (as measured by the excess of producers' returns over world market prices) was probably *lower* than it had been throughout the 1960s. Quite what agricultural trade policy would have been pursued—and how it would have been received by the US and the UK's other trading partners—had the 1973 membership bid failed, or if the electorate had voted to withdraw from the EC in the 1975 referendum, are speculative questions well beyond the aspirations of this study.

Notes

1. Kirk, "The Economic Activities," 171.
2. It was written in support of a presentation to the British Agricultural History Society's Winter Conference, December 2023. I am grateful to two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier draft.
3. Bowers, "British agricultural policy"; Brassley et al., *The Real Agricultural Revolution*; Kirk, *UK Agricultural Policy*; Martin, *The development of modern agriculture*; Winter, *Rural Politics*; Peters, "The 'new' agricultural policy"; Lee, *Middle Powers*; Brummer, *Anglo-American relations*, Chapter 4; Swinbank, "The Heath Government's."; Franklin, *Joining the CAP*; Benvenuti, "Dealing With"; Aqui, *The First Referendum*; Swinbank, "British Perspectives".
4. https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/gattdocs_e.htm.
5. Agriculture. Report on Talks, 3.
6. Kirk, *UK Agricultural Policy; Annual Review, 1960*, Appendix V. See also Table 1 later in this article.
7. GATT, Committee II, *First Round of Agricultural Consultations. United Kingdom. Commodity Information*, COM.II/11, 21 Aug. 1959, at pps. 2, 15; Rooth, 'Trade Agreements', 174–5.
8. Santana, "70th Anniversary," 124, 125, 129–30.

9. GATT, "Consolidated Lists of Residual Import Restrictions," 29 May 1962, L/1769, United Kingdom pps. 78–81.
10. See for example, Tracy, *Government and Agriculture*.
11. Camps, *Britain and the European Community*; Chancellor of the Exchequer, "European Free Trade Association," *Hansard* (HC), vol. 615, 14 December 1959, col. 1064.
12. McCrone, *The Economics*, 46.
13. Ogawa, "Britain's Commonwealth Dilemma," 4.
14. As quoted by Smith, *A History*, 134.
15. TNA, PREM 11/2895, "Record of a Meeting Between the Prime Minister and the President of the National Farmers' Union," 25 May 1960.
16. "Lord Home Foreign Secretary," *The Times*, 28 July 1960, 10; Twining, *No Clear Course*, 46.
17. TNA, MAF 255/430, Winnifrith to Minister, 19 August 1960 & Winnifrith to Minister, 7 September 1960.
18. Winnifrith to Minister, 7 September 1960.
19. TNA, PREM 11/3194, Soames to the Prime Minister, 22 February 1961.
20. Winter, *Rural Politics*, 113. See also *Agriculture. Report on Talks*.
21. TNA, MAF 317/91, "For the Record. Agricultural Support Policy," circa 8 December 1961.
22. TNA, CAB 129/107, "Agricultural Support Policy. Memorandum by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury," 8 December 1961; "For the Record. Agricultural Support Policy"; TNA, MAF 317/91, Winnifrith to Bishop, 11 December 1961.
23. "President de Gaulle Holds Seventh Press Conference. Full Text of President de Gaulle's Press Conference Held in Paris at the Elysée Palace on January 14, 1963," Ambassade de France, New York. Speeches and Press Conferences No. 185, 14 January 1963. A copy is in: Henry A. Kissinger papers part II, Yale University Library Digital Repository.
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25. TNA, MAF 317/92, "Group on Farm Support Costs and Agricultural Import Arrangements, Minutes of the First Meeting held on 15th January, 1963 ... Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food".
26. GATT, Contracting Parties Eleventh Session, "Summary Record of the Thirteenth Meeting Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, on Thursday, 8 November 1956," SR.11/13, 13 Nov. 1956. For a detailed account of the Article XXIV negotiations see Dam, 'Regional Economic Arrangements'.
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28. Denman, *The Mandarin's Tale*, 92, 95.
29. *Board of Trade Journal*: "U.K.-U.S. Tariff Cuts are Major Steps in GATT Negotiations," 16 March 1962; "U.K.-E.E.C. Agreement Concluded in GATT Tariff Conference," 25 May 1962; and "Changes in British Customs Tariff Arising from GATT and EFTA," 19 October 1962.
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31. Swinbank, "British Perspectives,"; Ikenson, Ending the "Chicken War".
32. TNA, CAB 128/37, 26th and 28th Cabinet Conclusions, 25 April and 2 May 1963; For a fuller discussion of material in this and the following paragraph see Swinbank, "The Heath Government's".
33. *Exchange of Letters*: the text cited is from paras. 4, 7 & 2 of each of the letters; GATT, "Changes in agricultural policies United Kingdom. Recent Developments in United Kingdom Agricultural Policy in relation to Bacon and Cereals", COM.II/138, 28 Jan. 1965, 4.
34. TNA, FG 2/736, Economic Development Committee for the Agricultural Industry, "Kennedy Round—Agricultural aspects," Note by the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries & Food, 25 January 1968.

35. Preeg, *Traders and Diplomats*, 154; Lee, *Middle Powers*, 98.
36. *Agreement between*; TNA, MAF 308/265, Henshaw, "The New Support Policy—Implications for Cereals Division," 2 October 1970.
37. Cledwyn Hughes, "Agriculture," *Hansard* (HC), vol. 768, 11 July 1968, col. 773.
38. *The National Plan*, 1, 135, 141, 139.
39. TNA, CAB 128/41, 46th Cabinet Conclusions, 16 September 1966.
40. TNA, CAB 134/2613, "Agriculture and Import Savings: Maximum Expansion Programme", Memorandum by the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, Ministerial Committee on Agricultural Policy, 30 Dec. 1966.
41. *The National Plan*, 44; TNA, FG 2/434, Economic Development Committee for the Agricultural Industry, "Minutes of the First Meeting held ... On 22nd December 1966," 4 January 1967.
42. TNA, FG 2/742, Shillito (NEDO) to Catherwood, "Agriculture EDC," 17 April 1968.
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44. TNA, FG 2/434, Economic Development Committee for the Agricultural Industry, "Minutes of the Sixth (1968) Meeting held on Tuesday 3 December 1968," 23 December 1968.
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47. *Ibid.*, "Note on the E.D.C. Report and Further Agricultural Expansion," circa 10 October 1968.
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51. Cairncross, "Austin Robinson," 912–3.
52. "Britain's Exports do not Depend on Food Imports—N.F.U. Chief Economist," *NFU News*, Cyclo 10/69, 3 January 1969 (copy in TNA, MAF 276/350).
53. Malmgren and Schlechty, "Technology and Neo-Mercantilism," 1329.
54. Annual Review ... 1970, para. 20.
55. Joseph Godber, "Agriculture," *Hansard* (HC), 11 July 1968, vol. 768, cols. 759–60; Conservative Party, "Conservative Party General Election Manifesto. A better tomorrow", (1970) <http://www.conservativemanifesto.com/1970/1970-conservative-manifesto.shtml>. (accessed October 19 2023); The following discussion is largely based on Swinbank, "The Heath Government's,".
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69. TNA, FCO 30/2312, Sykes, British Embassy, Washington, to Maitland, FCO, "The GATT Article XXIV Negotiations 1972–74," 16 July 1974.
70. For more details, see Swinbank, "British Perspectives," and Swinbank, "Something significant,".
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73. TNA, CAB 134/3760, Sir Michael Palliser, UKREP Brussels, to The Right Honourable James Callaghan MP, "The GATT Article XXIV Negotiations: 1972 – 1974," 24 June 1974.
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82. Commission of the European Communities, *Directory*; *The Times*: 'National Trust's New Chief', 15 July 1967. 2, and "Anti-Market forces unite," February 5 1970, 5; Jay, *Change and Fortune*, 473; Franklin, *Joining the CAP*, xvi.

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ORCID

Alan Swinbank  <http://orcid.org/0000-0003-2526-2026>

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