Exploring the Left-Right Ideological Variance of National Independence Parties in Canada and Western Europe.

PhD in Politics

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Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Adam Stokes

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to address a single research question: "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" This thesis analyses left-right ideology from two perspectives, the traditional perception of left-right ideology and mainstream-radical ideology, which compares parties from mainstream ideological positions with those from the radical-left and radical-right. This thesis is a mixed methods study. This thesis analyses a newly created database, made up of two datasets of cases of national independence parties standing in both regional and statewide elections, in order to establish patterns regarding what might influence their ideology. The thesis then applies these results to pairs of nested cases, aiming to determine what specific factors might influence the ideological variation found between two different cases through controlled comparisons. When looking at traditional left-right ideology, this thesis compared the Faroe Islands and Greenland and then Flanders and Quebec. When looking at mainstream-radical ideology, this thesis compared the Basque Country and Catalonia and Scotland and Wales. It was found that monarchy, military spending and unemployment influence the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties. Unemployment was found to be especially influential in both the cases of the Faroe Islands and Greenland and Flanders and Quebec. This thesis also finds that language, competition from a rival national independence party and immigration influence the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. Language was found to be especially relevant when comparing the Basque Country and Catalonia while party competition was found to be most relevant when comparing Scotland and Wales. This thesis adds to the current literature by exploring national independence parties in their own right, rather than looking at regionalist parties more broadly. It also offers a new perspective on a number of different variables which were found to influence ideology, for example, the effect of monarchy.

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Chapter One: Introduction

In the past few decades there has been an increased focus within political science literature on the emergence and success of new nationalist political parties in many Western democratic states. Parties such as the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany and Vox in Spain have drawn a lot of attention from the media as well as from a large number of academics. Nationalist parties follow an ideology that utilises the symbol of their nation "through discourse and political activity, as well as the sentiment that draws people into responding to this symbol's use," (Verdery, 1993: 38). For nationalist groups, it is important that the nation shares a number of common features. These include "certain forms of culture and tradition, and a specific history," (Ibid). In general, we find that the overwhelming majority of statewide nationalist parties are considered to be ideologically right-wing (Rydgren, 2007: 242). This thesis focuses on one subsection of nationalist parties, national independence parties, which are active at the subnational level. Like statewide nationalist parties, national independence parties argue for the right to self-determination and sovereignty of their own perceived national territory and advocate that said territory should be separate from any larger political units (Pereira et al, 2018: 198).

Research Puzzle and Motivation

While they do share some core ideological similarities, the one key difference between national independence parties and statewide nationalist parties is their significantly broader ideological makeup. Unlike their statewide counterparts, national independence parties do not overwhelmingly come from the right. Observing the cases which have been analysed in this thesis, it is clear to see that while there are examples of right-wing national independence parties, such as Vlaams Belang (in the past known as the Vlaams Blok) in Flanders and the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin in the Faroe Islands, there are also many other national independence parties who are positioned further to the left or more towards the centre, for example Plaid Cymru in Wales and Inuit Ataqatigiit in Greenland. The difference on the left-right ideological axis between statewide nationalist parties and national

independence parties is an interesting puzzle which should be explored in more detail. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to address the following research question:

"*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?"

In line with much of the literature (e.g. De Winter, 1998; Dandoy, 2010; Pereira et al, 2018), this thesis defines national independence parties as nationalist parties at the subnational level that have an ambition to separate their own perceived nation from a larger parent country in order to establish a new separate state.

Like statewide nationalist parties, national independence parties are not new. Discussions around the importance of one's own national identity and the rights of certain distinct groups to have their own political institutions, including in some cases their own independent nation states, are matters which became part of mainstream political discourse at the end of the First World War. This was partly due to the nationalist elements which existed within the conflict but also due to the emergence of new independent nation states in Central Europe, encouraged by US President Woodrow Wilson's support of national self-determination immediately after the conflict (Breuilly, 2013: 3). The importance of questions surrounding nationality and ethnicity have continued to play a vital role in political discourse. Hechter described nationalism and ethnicity as "the most potent political forces in the world," (2001: 3). Given the historic importance of questions surrounding nationality and the rights of statehood for a nation, it is vital that further research is conducted on those parties that claim their nation has its own right to independent statehood.

There are a number of reasons why a study such as this, which explores the left-right ideological nature of national independence parties, is required. There has been a general increase in the number of cases of Western national independence parties standing in major elections since the end of the Second World War. This has been shown through a database of cases of notable Western regionalist parties produced by Schakel. In this database, between 1945 and 1967, the number of cases of

"secessionist" parties standing in regional elections was 19, making up 25.33% of the total cases in the database. Between 1968 and 1989 this figure increased to 67, making up 29.38% of cases. Furthermore, between 1990 and 2010, this figure had increased again to 168, with the total proportion in the database increasing to 35.37% (2020). Given the increase in cases of national independence parties, it has become more important than ever to better understand their broader ideological positionings. This includes their positioning on the left-right spectrum.

One of the most important reasons for why we should study the nature of national independence parties is that the members of these parties, as well as many of their voters, are individuals who have rejected their current legal nationality in favour of a new one. This means they have rejected the country they are legally recognised to be a member of. This is something which should be considered a fundamental failure of a state even if it is just a small number of people. It is for this reason that this thesis has included smaller national independence parties, such as the Alberta Independence Party (AIP) and Siciliani Liberi, in the scope of its study. By studying the reasons for why certain national independence parties hold certain left-right ideologies, it may be possible to better understand what the grievances were that made the members of these parties reject their current nationality and join movements which advocate the creation of a new one.

Looking further at why there should be a study of the left-right ideology of national independence parties, there is very little research looking at these parties' ideological diversity specifically. Given the fact that national independence parties do not follow the same pattern as statewide nationalist parties, by not universally coming from the right, there has to be a study which begins to answer the question of why this is the case. This insight could also offer a possible explanation as to why individuals choose to support these parties and offer an insight into the grievances they have against the central state, which caused them to support these parties. The left-right ideology of national independence parties is also worthy of study because this aspect of this specific group of parties has

never been studied in detail in its own right. The gaps in the current literature that this thesis intends to fill are explained in more detail throughout.

Contribution

This thesis makes a number of contributions to the current existing body of political science literature. The most significant contribution made by this thesis is that it provides the first in depth study of the left-right ideology of national independence parties in their own right. Previously, when the left-right ideology of national independence parties has been explored, they have been grouped in with a larger party family. For example, the Vlaams Blok has previously been included in discussions on radical right-wing nationalist parties. In these cases, the Vlaams Blok is often compared with statewide parties, such as the French National Front, meaning that the secessionist nature of the party is broadly ignored (e.g. Golder, 2016: 481).

The most common example of national independence parties being grouped in with a broader party family is their inclusion in the regionalist party grouping. Regionalist parties follow an ideology that "originates from the defence and promotion of territorially defined identities and interests, and is programmatically centred on self-government claims … trying to push the territorial dimension into the political agenda," (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 866). This grouping includes national independence parties, due to the fact that they promote a specific territory within a state and push the territorial dimension. However, there are also a large number of regionalist parties that do not support independence for their territory. Some wish to simply defend the cultural and linguistic distinctiveness of their region, such as those in the French Basque Country. Others demand the decentralisation of decision-making powers from the central state and to see an increase of autonomy for their region, such as the Fryske Nasjonale Partij in Friesland (see Dandoy: 206-210). Given that national independence parties are ideologically distinct from other regionalist parties, as they are uniquely in favour of setting up an independent state for their territory, it would be beneficial to study their ideological nature in its own right.

An issue with studying regionalist parties more broadly is that there are some policy issues, relevant to building a new independent state, which are pertinent to national independence parties, due to their desire to create a new state, but not to most other regionalist parties. This includes questions as to what sort of system of government the state would have and what the size of its military would be. The ideology of national independence parties is shaped by the policies they have on issues such as this. However, due to the focus on regionalist parties more broadly, many of these issues have been broadly ignored. Therefore, this thesis makes an additional contribution by directly addressing some of these issues in relation to the ideology of national independence parties. Two of these issues are the nature of the head of state and military.

Another contribution, which comes from the study of national independence parties more specifically, is the study of smaller national independence parties, previously not included in comparative research on regionalist parties. Previous big-n research on regionalist parties does not include smaller national independence parties, for example, the Regionalist Party Database developed by Schakel. This could be an issue of practicality, caused by the larger number of regionalist parties that are active in Western Europe and Canada. Two examples of parties which have been included in the research for this thesis, but were not included in the Schakel database, are the English Democrats and Ålands Framtid. As was discussed earlier, the reason for studying the ideology of national independence parties is that the members and supporters of these parties feel a grievance towards their current parent country and seek to take, what they perceive to be, their own unique territory away from it. A group wanting to break away from a state to form their own should be considered a failure of that state, even if it is just a small number of people who support it. Given this is the case, it is important we better understand the nature of the ideology of these parties, in order to better understand the grievances of those who follow their ideology.

Theoretical Framework

This thesis addresses a single research question, exploring the different factors that explain the variation in the left-right ideology of Canadian and Western European national independence parties. This thesis looks at left-right ideology from two different perspectives. The first is the traditional left-right ideological divide, measuring parties from left to right. The second is left-right ideology from a mainstream-radical perspective. This perspective compares parties who are considered to be either on the radical far-left or far-right of the ideological spectrum with parties who are considered to be more traditionally conservative, socialist or centrist. There is a vast literature which explores ideological positions of political parties, the left-right dimensions and cleavages that can emerge from different issues (e.g. Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Hooghe et al, 2002; Rovny & Whitefield, 2019). When measuring the left-right ideological position taken by national independence parties, this thesis uses the more traditional measurements, combing views on the economic dimension and social dimension. The reasoning for the way ideologies were defined in this thesis is laid out in more detail in Chapter 3, along with specific examples of how parties were given different ideological labels.

Economic Performance and Unemployment

This thesis explores the impact of economic performance, including unemployment, on the ideological positioning of national independence parties from both a left-right and mainstream radical perspective. This thesis relies on different theories and academic works conducted on economic development and the left-right ideology of regionalist parties. In comparatively richer regions a discourse of "bourgeois regionalism" can develop, pushing regionalist parties to the right (Harvie, 1994). On the other hand, in comparatively poorer regions a discourse of "internal colonialism" can be present which pushes regionalist parties to the left (Hechter, 1975). In a comparative study, Massetti and Schakel also found that regionalist parties from poorer regions are more likely to be left-wing and parties from richer regions are more likely to be right-wing (2015: 874).

Further research has previously explored economic performance and left-right ideology of political parties more generally. It has previously been argued that in "prosperous countries people are more likely to support extreme right-wing parties" (Lubbers et al, 2002: 371), and that the losers of globalisation and those who struggle to make ends meet, i.e. those who are poorer "have a higher likelihood to vote for LWPPs [left-wing populist parties]" (Santana & Rama, 2018: 569). This thesis also addresses the debate over the impact of higher unemployment on the support of right-wing radicalism, which has been explored in previous research (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019).

National State Characteristics

This thesis explores the impact that characteristics of the central state can have on the left-right ideology of national independence parties. This thesis focuses on two in particular which have previously been found to be relevant to the left-right ideological dimension, the head of state and military. When looking at national independence parties in the West, it is clear to see that there are many examples of left-wing parties which have strong republican traditions. These include the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) in Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana, 2019), the Scottish Green Party (Scottish Greens, 2021) and Tjóðveldi in the Faroe Islands (Pieters, 2021: 96). Literature which explores monarchy and the left-right dimension has also found that a larger level of support for monarchy is found amongst more right-wing voters (e.g. Rose & Kavanagh, 1976: 555). This would suggest that monarchy does have relevance to the left-right dimension. Given the importance of the head of state to a newly independent country, it then makes sense to explore the impact of this factor in relation to the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

There is a significant body of literature which explores a country's military and its military spending in relation to the left-right dimension. In modern western democracies, it has been argued that right-wing parties traditionally favour increases in military spending while left-wing parties are more ideologically in favour of promoting peace and prefer to increase spending on other areas of social

welfare (e.g. Klingemann et al, 1994; Bove et al, 2017). The nature of the military is an important issue for parties that wish to create a new independent state. Therefore, given the relevance the military and military spending has to the left-right dimension, it makes sense to explore it in relation to the ideology of national independence parties. An example of a case where the military seems especially relevant is Scotland. Scotland is a case with a left-leaning national independence movement. Opposition to increased military spending and military interventions from within this movement, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons, is a notable part of its left-wing ideological makeup (see Ritchie, 2016).

Language

This thesis explores the relationship between language and the radicalism of national independence parties on the left-right axis. There is a significant body of literature which highlights the importance of language in sub-nationalist movements (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; Sorens, 2005; van Morgan, 2006). This makes it a vital variable to consider when analysing the ideology of national independence parties.

There is a body of literature which discusses cases language and nationalist groups in the context of the left-right dimension. On the right, it has been known for nationalist groups to become involved in the protection of what is perceived by them to be their own national language (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003). A prominent example of this, within the national independentist prism, is Vlaams Belang, a far-right party which places a strong emphasis on the protection of the Dutch language in Flanders (De Cleen, 2016a). There is also evidence to suggest that there are ethnic protectionist elements within certain cases of left-wing nationalist movements (Jeram et al, 2016: 1232). There are a number of examples of stateless nations whose nationalist discourses are viewed as predominantly civic or left-wing in nature which place a strong emphasis on protecting their national language, such as the Basque Country, Catalonia and Wales (Carlin, 2013). The fact that language is such an important factor for nationalist movements on both the left and the right raises the question as to whether it can be a factor in radicalising parties on the left-right axis in both directions.

Party Competition

This thesis explores how party competition can alter a national independence party's position on the left-right axis. There is a large body of literature which explores how the electoral competition faced by a party might impact its position on the left-right axis (e.g. Downs, 1957; Erikson et al, 1989; Green-Pederson, 2004). Research by Massetti and Schakel also found that regionalist parties changed their position in order to adjust to competition from both statewide and other regionalist parties (2015: 871). Therefore, it makes sense to study the potential impact of party competition in the prism of national independence parties.

Immigration

There is a large body of literature which links right-wing radicalism and anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014). A high-profile example of this relationship from the national independence party grouping is Vlaams Belang (e.g. Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Moufahim et al, 2015; De Cleen, 2016b). Given this, it is logical to test levels of immigration against the left-right ideology of national independence parties. While the majority of the focus regarding immigration and nationalism focuses on the right, there is also justification to explore if there is any impact on the left from immigration. This is because are some left-wing nationalist movements which have protectionist tendencies regarding certain cultural elements, especially language. Research by Halikiopoulou et al (2012) has also argued that nationalism plays a "central element" in the opposition to European integration which is seen in radical-left political parties (p. 504). This evidence shows that nationalism can influence radical-left parties as well as those on the radical-right. This is an important thing to consider when exploring the relationship between immigration and the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

Methods and Case Study Selection

This thesis is a mixed methods study which uses a nested analysis. This thesis takes the approach of first conducting a large-n quantitative analysis and then nesting pairs of cases into the analysis. A qualitative approach is also taken in Chapter Three. In this chapter a simple qualitative observation is made of cases of secessionist parties from the Schakel Regionalist Party Database. This was done to show the ideological variation that exists within the national independence party group as a whole, justifying the research question of this thesis.

In Chapter Four, multivariate regression analysis was applied to two datasets, one including cases of national independence parties who have stood in regional elections and the other including cases of national independence parties who have stood in statewide elections. This analysis determined which variables were most relevant in influencing the left-right and mainstream-radical ideological nature of national independence parties.

Once the large-n analysis was completed in Chapter Four, pairs of cases were then nested into the analysis in Chapters Five and Six. Using a most similar systems design, this thesis focuses on pairs of case studies, looking in more detail at the most relevant variables in relation to each pair. These chapters looks at how each pair of cases relates to the findings from Chapter Four. This was done in order to explore in more detail the mechanisms behind what had been found in Chapter Four. A strength of paired comparisons is that you can look in more detail at how they differ and gain a better understanding of the causes of these differences. A weakness of using an exclusively large-n approach, like the one in Chapter Four, is that it cannot directly explain the cause mechanisms behind what is found. Each of the pairs was chosen on the basis that the cases in each pair had a large number of similarities but the ideological nature of their national independence parties had a distinct difference. The exploration into the factors explaining these differences was the primary focus of both of these chapters.

Case Selection

The cases included in this thesis are based in Western Europe and Canada. This is because in comparable Western democratic systems, national independence parties have only been notably active in these two places. In Western Europe, since the turn of the century, there have been a number of high-profile cases of national independence movements which have become part of their respective mainstream political landscapes, including in Scotland and Catalonia (Liñeira & Cetrà, 2015: 257). There has been multiple high-profile national independence parties in Canada dating back decades (Kornberg et al, 1979: 890). The province of Quebec is a particularly notable case. There is a significant body of literature which has compared to a number of different Canadian and Western European national independence and sub-national cases (e.g. Keating, 1996; McEwen, 2006; Massetti & Schakel, 2016). This thesis follows in that tradition.

This thesis is only studying national independence parties who have stood in elections at the regional or statewide level. This has been done in order to streamline the number of cases included in this thesis, making sure the only parties which were included were those which have been active and have behaved like traditional political parties, in the sense that they are aiming to achieve political power in order to further their political ambitions. That being said, electoral success has not been taken into account when assessing the validity of cases for this study. This thesis has included an extremely broad range of parties, from those that have absolutely no seats at all in either their regional or statewide political institutions, such as the English Democrats (Hunt, 2014), all the way up to those which are a party of government at the regional level and having a significant number of seats at the statewide level, such as the SNP (Mitchell & Henderson, 2020).

In the analysis in Chapter Four, the cases included in the two datasets cover a period of 21 years, between 2000 and 2020. There were 171 cases in the regional dataset and 153 cases in the statewide dataset, totalling 324 cases overall. 76 different parties and electoral coalitions were used in the regional database and 55 were used in the statewide database. The total number used was 90. These

cases came from 23 regions, within 10 countries, in the regional elections dataset and 22 regions, within nine countries, in the statewide elections dataset. 25 regions in 10 countries were used in total.

The analysis conducted in Chapters Five and Six focuses on the differences in left-right ideology between pairs of cases. Chapter Five focuses on traditional left-right ideology and Chapter Six on mainstream-radical ideology. The selected cases were chosen on the basis that they were comparable but their national independence parties had clear ideological differences. This was a puzzle which could be explored. This was done to better understand the causal relationship between independent variables and the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

Chapter Five first looks at national independence parties from the Faroe Islands and Greenland. These cases are very comparable. For example, they both use a distinct majority-spoken language and they both exist within the same monarchy, Denmark. Despite this, the Faroe Islands has notable cases of national independence parties on the right whereas Greenland only has cases of national independence parties on the left. Chapter Five then analyses Flanders and Quebec. These two cases are also comparable for a number of reasons. For example, they both have languages spoken by a majority of their respective populations which are distinct from their wider parent countries and the parent countries of both cases spend similar amounts on their military. However, the majority of Quebec's national independence parties come from left-wing positions while Flemish national independence parties come from the right.

Chapter Six first analyses the cases of the Basque Country and Catalonia. These two cases are also comparable, both coming from the same country, Spain. Two additional reasons for this are that they use the same type of electoral system and have a similar level of party competition between their national independence parties. While they are have many similarities, there is a notably larger proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia. The chapter then looks at cases from Scotland and Wales. Like in the previous case, the fact that these two cases come from the same country, the UK, helps make them very comparable. Both Scotland and

Wales also use the same electoral systems, both at the regional and statewide levels, and have experienced similar levels of immigration. Despite this, there have been numerous radical national independence parties active in Scotland but not in Wales.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

Literature discussing nationalism and the formation of new nation states dates back for centuries. One of the most high profile earlier works of this nature was Machiavelli's 16th Century text *The Prince*, in which he declared the need to create a unitary Italian state in order to "liberate" the nation from foreign barbarian rulers (2019: 88). More recently Alter defined nationalism as "both an ideology and a political movement which holds the nation and sovereign nation-state to be crucial indwelling values," (1994: 4). An addition to this literature came towards the end of the 20th Century, when Hobsbawm argued that traditional nationalism, for those nationalities without their own state in particular, was "past its peak," (1992: 192). Contributing to the well-known Europe of the Regions concept, he instead argued that "West European separatist nationalisms like the Scottish, Welsh, Basque or Catalan are today in favour of bypassing their national governments by appealing directly to Brussels as 'regions'," (p. 185). Clearly, as is shown by this study, as well as much of the existing literature from the past 20 years, this has not come to pass.

There is substantial body of literature on nationalism, sub-nationalism and specific case studies of national independence movements. There is also a significant body of literature addressing the left-right ideology and mainstream-radical ideology of political parties and how different characteristics can impact it. Despite this, the question of why national independence parties come from such a wide range of ideological positions has not been addressed in much detail at all. Therefore, this is a gap in the literature which needs to be filled. This is gap in the literature is addressed by Erk who argued that the left-right ideology of sub-state nationalist parties had been "underexplored," (2010: 423).

Regionalism, Sub-nationalism and National Independentism

Regionalism, sub-nationalism and national independentism have been discussed for decades in political science literature. A lot of the early literature on the ideology of secessionism, particularly in the Western European context, is embedded within literature which discusses regionalism and sub-nationalism more broadly. However, one notable earlier attempt to create a theory of secessionism,

in its own right, came from Wood (1981). Wood discusses a number of different elements of secessionist ideology. He argues it is something which is facilitated by "the existence of separable territory which contains the bulk of the potentially secessionist population," (p. 112). Wood also argues that secessionism can be either "violent or accommodative" when attempting to find a political resolution (p. 133). However, he does also emphasise that the majority of secessionist cases "are resolved by peaceful means," (p. 129). One limitation of the scope of this work is that it does not discuss the varied left-right ideological nature of secessionist movements.

There have also been other more recent attempts to define secessionism and secessionist movements, as well as attempts to look at theories relating to secessionism more broadly (e.g. Buchanan, 1991; Sorens, 2012; Griffiths, 2016; Requejo & Sanjaume-Calvet, 2021). For example, Buchanan, when writing a theory on secession in the context of the increased secessionist activity in Eastern Europe, argued:

> "There is a moral right to secede, but it is a qualified right. Two of the chief qualifications are (a) that secession be consistent with the requirements of distributive justice as they apply to the resources the secessionists appropriate, and (b) that secession not deprive parties (in particular the children and later descendants of the secessionists) of their fundamental rights and liberties," (p. 342).

The broader literature discussing the nature of regionalism and sub-nationalism has included many discussions on elements of national independence movements and their ideologies. It has been argued that calls for further autonomy from a specific region can be based on perceived feelings of a distinct culture, shown through a clearly defined cultural border and possibly even a distinct indigenous language (Parks and Elcock, 2000). Another important theory in this area of literature relates to the economic rivalry that can exist between different regions within a single country. One such example, which was developed by Hechter (1975), is a discourse known as "internal colonialism," which can be found within the cultural identity of some poorer regions. When making this argument,

Hechter uses the example of the UK. He argues that there is an internal colonialist discourse within the UK's "Celtic territories." He makes the case that the incorporation of the Celtic regions into the UK "substantially affected" the course of their development by contributing to their "economic, cultural and political dependence." Hechter argues this is particularly clear in the economic sphere, in which "the English market was both relatively larger and wealthier than that of the Celtic regions," (p. 80). While Hechter focused on the discourse of poorer regions, there has also been discussions of the discourses that can emerge from wealthier regions. It has been argued that the primary discourse which has emerged from these regions is one of "bourgeois regionalism," (Harvie, 1994). Discussions of this discourse are newer than the discussions of internal colonialist discourse, emerging in the 1980s. Bourgeois regionalism places an emphasis on the grievances felt by more prosperous regions when their financial capital is transferred to, from their perspective, poorer and less hard-working regions. These theories from Hechter and Harvie show that regional economic inequalities can lead to rivalries between multiple regions within the same state which can cause economic grievances to develop. These theories create a basis for much of the work on the ideology of regionalist parties. More recent literature has continued the study of the impact of comparative economic relationships between different regions within a country, with an additional focus being given to national independence movements in Western Europe (e.g. Franco-Guillén, 2016; Mulle, 2018).

An important area of literature which is related to the ideology of regionalism and secessionism was the discussions surrounding the Europe of the Regions concept. As European policies began to take more of a regional approach, arguments developed in the literature about how this changed the nationalist ideologies of many parties from historic regions and nations which did not have their own states. The Europe of the Regions was an ideal which was based on hope, from many regionalist and sub-nationalist movements, that as European integration progressed, regionalist movements would be able to bypass their respective nation states and develop a new European unity "built on a federation of these subnational entities," (Loughlin, 1996: 143). As previously mentioned, this argument was supported by Hobsbawm in the early 1990s. This argument was also later supported by

Keating who argued that European integration had created "a trend among the nationalities movements to adopt a post-sovereign stance; to express a civic, inclusive form of nationalism; and to emphasize their territorial basis," (2004: 383).

However, the idealised version of the Europe of the Regions concept did not emerge and regionalists in Europe became much less unified about the ideal of growing their national identities in a European paradigm. The reasons for why this occurred have also been discussed in much of the literature (e.g. Elias, 2008; Hepburn, 2008; Massetti & Schakel, 2021). Elias argued that by the turn of the millennium, "much of the 'hype' associated with the Europe of the Regions idea had faded." This was partly due to the fact that as time passed, "Europe was still dominated by sovereign states and sovereignty-based understandings of politics," (2008: 485). This argument is also supported by Hepburn who argued that amongst regionalist parties in Europe, the "perceived failure of a regionalized Europe" caused them "to revert back to state-focused strategies," (p. 547). This meant that as we moved into the 21st Century, regionalism in Europe was left in a state in which "the constitutional aims of regional parties were more polarized—with those seeking independence and other forms of self-determination on one side and the rest devising strategies to prevent this from happening on the other," (p. 552).

Some of the more recent literature on sub-nationalist ideology looks at the concepts of ethnic and civic nationalism. At the core of this discussion is the debate over whether sub-nationalist political parties and movements are more likely to be inherently ethnically or civically nationalist (Jeram et al, 2016: 1230). A fundamental clash between civic and ethnic nationalism is the disagreement of the membership criteria required for an individual to be considered a part of their nation. Civic nationalist movements will only ask newcomers to their nation "to adhere to its political values and institutions," while ethnic nationalist movements include the more exclusive "membership requirements of ethnicity and ancestry," (Koning, 2011: 1976). More ethnic based sub-nationalist movements are more fearful of outsiders due to a perceived threat to their national distinctiveness, for example in Quebec (Banting & Soroka, 2012: 158). However, some more civic sub-nationalist movements take a different

approach, creating a more inclusive image of their national identity. This is especially effective if the nationalism of the sub-nation's parent country is recognised as more ethnic as it allows the sub-nation to appear more distinct, such as the case of Scotland within the UK (Jeram et al: 1232).

Ideology of Regionalist Parties

While there has been a large amount of literature which addresses the ideology of regionalism more broadly, there is also a significant body of literature which looks more specifically at the ideology of regionalist political parties. Given the diverse and complex nature of the regionalist party family, there have been a large number of different approaches taken to analysing their ideological makeup. A number of works in the 1970s found that regionalist parties were creating a challenge to the status quo in many western states by attempting to bring about the end of their more centralised nature (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Berger, 1979). Regionalist parties offered an alternative measure of the ideological positions of parties, offering an alternative measurement in particular to the traditional left-right ideological measurement. For example, Inglehart argued, when discussing regionalist parties in Belgium, that regionalist parties threatened the more centralised nature of the Belgian state and offered an alternative political cleavage in Belgian politics to the traditional left-right divide. This threat emerged because of the significant and historic cultural divide which continues to exist between the Dutch speaking population in Flanders and French speaking population in Wallonia (p. 235). Just two years afterwards, a broader study of Western European politics, conducted by Berger, came to a very similar conclusion. Berger argued that regionalist parties fundamentally oppose the status quo as, in order to be successful, the one key element which "must be exposed and exploded is that of the inevitable triumph of the … nation-state within its present boundaries." Berger then also argued that the ideology of regionalist parties placed them in direct conflict with the ideologies of both traditional left-wing and traditional right-wing political parties (p. 39).

Within the more recent literature on regionalist parties, there has been multiple attempts to categorise them. These categorisations, in general, focus on distinguishing the key differences

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between regionalist parties from the perspective of their constitutional ambitions. When categorising different types of regionalist party, there seems to usually be a distinguishment between those parties which aspire for separation from their current nation state and those that do not (e.g. De Winter, 1998; Dandoy, 2010). Within the literature, there are differences in categorisation of non-separationist regionalist parties (see De Winter: 205; Dandoy: 207-210). There are also differences in the categorisation of irredentist and rattachist parties (see De Winter: 207; Dandoy: 212-213). However, there does seem to be a broad agreement that independentist parties, i.e. those who wish to separate from a larger nation state and form their own independent state, do fit within their own single and distinct category, within the broader regionalist party family (see De Winter: 207; Dandoy: 211).

A number of works have been conducted on the multi-dimensional nature of regionalist party ideology. An earlier high-profile piece, from Newman, found that the ideology of regionalist parties was spread along two ideological axes. The first axis was the left-right ideological positioning of a regionalist party and the second was a regionalist party's constitutional ambitions (1997: 32). Newman makes a number of findings, looking both at how regionalist parties shift their left-right ideology and their constitutional ambitions. With regards to left-right ideology, Newman claims that you are more likely to find ideologically radical pro-independence parties in "multi-party systems" as these parties must aim to "differentiate their agendas from those of other ethnoregional parties," (p. 34). Newman also argues that pro-independence parties in "majoritarian two-party systems" will adopt a more moderate left-right ideological position, in order to attract voters from both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum (p. 35). Newman contradicts earlier literature by claiming that more modern regionalist parties did not entirely oppose the ideological status quo. In fact, Newman argued that the socio-economic agenda of many regionalist parties resembled "the ideological position of the regionally dominant party," (p. 56). This suggests that regionalist parties, in some respects, "are more ideological followers [than] the ideological leaders they have been portrayed to be by post-industrial

theorists," (Ibid.). Since Newman, a lot of other works continued to focus on the multiple dimensions which existed within the ideological nature of regionalist parties.

Further work has been conducted addressing the factors behind the significant diversity that can be found within the ideology of regionalist parties, analysing both the left-right axis and constitutional ambition axis. Two academics that have contributed to this research are Massetti and Schakel. These works have analysed the economic performance of regions. Multiple studies have found that regionalist parties from comparatively wealthier regions will be more likely right-wing, while regionalist parties from poorer regions will be more likely left-wing (Massetti, 2009: 524; Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 872). These findings further support Harvie's discourse of "bourgeois regionalism" and Hechter's discourse of "internal colonialism".

Further research conducted on the impact of electoral systems on the ideology of regionalist parties has supported Newman's argument that a majoritarian electoral system pushes regionalist parties to more independentist positions (Massetti & Schakel, 2016: 68). Additional research has also found that regionalist parties do, in general, follow the ideology of the dominant party in their region (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871), supporting Newman's theory that regionalist parties can be followers of an ideology as well as ideology setters. Research has also found that the ideology of regionalist parties can be impacted by the competition from other regionalist parties. Evidence suggests when a regionalist party faces competition from an alternative rival, it will become more extreme in terms of its constitutional offer (Massetti & Schakel, 2016: 68), and it will change its left-right ideological position in order to find a free space on the spectrum (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871). This again supports the earlier arguments put forward by Newman.

Interestingly, there is evidence in the literature to suggest there are a significant number of regionalist parties which hold a more centrist position on the left-right spectrum. Massetti and Schakel argue this could be due to these parties adopting a "blurring strategy" in order to obtain as many votes as possible but do concede that further research is needed to confirm this (2015: 869). Finally, the

literature suggests that language plays an important role in the ideology of regionalist parties. Research from the literature finds that parties from regions with their own language are more likely to be more radical in terms of their constitutional aims (Massetti & Schakel, 2016: 68).

Dimensions of Political Ideology

The policies of political parties being packaged into structured ideological dimensions has been central to political science for decades. One of the most common of these in Western democratic politics is the standard economic left-right dimension (Rovny & Whitefield, 2019: 4-5). Some of the earliest modern work on ideological dimensions looks at what is known as cleavage theory. Cleavage theory was developed by Lipset and Rokkan (1967). Lipset and Rokkan theorised that ideological dimensions came from cleavages within society. These included cleavages between rural and urban communities, the central state and peripheral communities and employers and workers. These cleavages provided support to different political parties. More recent research has continued exploring cleavage theory. For example, Hooghe and Marks (2018) argue that traditional cleavages such as religion and class are no longer as influential as they had been previously. Hooghe and Marks make the argument that a new cleavage has arisen from transnationalism. This has allowed the emergence of new political parties which focus more on issues relevant to transnationalism. These parties have either promoted a traditional, authoritarian and nationalist (TAN) ideology or a green and international ideology.

A variety of literature explores the different dimensions of ideology that can be found within political systems, comparing them against each other (e.g. Hooghe et al, 2002; Bakker et al, 2012; Rovny & Edwards, 2012; Coman, 2017). A common feature of much of this research is that one of these dimensions is usually the traditional economic left-right dimension. It is quite common for research to focus on two dimensions, an economic left-right dimension and a social dimension, which considers levels of authoritarianism and nationalism. When looking at correlations between ideology and views on European integration, Hooghe et al study two dimensions. One is the economic left-right dimension and the other is a social dimension, "ranging from Green/alternative/libertarian (GAL) to

traditional/authoritarian/nationalist (TAN)," (p. 966). Hooghe et al conclude that parties on the extreme left and extreme right of the left-right economic dimension were more likely to be sceptical of European integration. It was also concluded that on the GAL-TAN dimension, parties closer to the TAN pole were far more likely to hold Eurosceptic positions (p. 985).

Bakker et al make the argument that there are three notable dimensions in European politics. They make the case that positions on the EU should be considered as a distinct third dimension, alongside the economic left-right and social dimensions. Bakker et al explore correlations between the three dimensions, coming to the conclusion that the three dimensions "are distinct from one another" but that some countries, "such as the UK and Poland, have simpler spaces with far higher correlations between the different latent dimensions (i.e. in some countries, economic and social left/right are virtually indistinguishable from one another)," (p. 238). This literature clearly shows the importance of considering different dimensions when measuring the left-right ideology of political parties in research. The left-right dimensions used when defining left-right ideology in this thesis is explored further in Chapter Three.

Measurements of Left-Right and Mainstream-Radical Ideology

Alongside looking at the theoretical dimensions within political parties' ideology. It is also important to explore the number of different approaches, used in political science literature, to measuring the left-right and mainstream radical ideology of political parties in western democracies and beyond. Debates on the measuring of ideological positions of parties is something which impacts a wide variety of research including, for example, public opinion surveys. As put by Kroh, "although left-right items are a standard tool of public opinion research, there is little agreement about the optimal response format," (2007: 204). There have been a number of different surveys and databases which have offered general measurements of the ideological positioning of political parties in western democracies (e.g. Chesdata, 2019a; Manifesto Project, 2021; Nordsieck, 2022; Political Party Database Project, 2022).

The Nordsieck database of elections in Europe offers a summary of each regional and statewide election in Europe. For each election, the database states the number of votes and seats won by every significant party. It also offers a brief ideological description of every party included. For example, in the 2021 Scottish Parliament Election, it included the five Scottish parties with seats in the Scottish Parliament and an "Others" category for the minor parties who also stood (Nordsieck, 2021b). Two national independence parties were included in the five major parties, the Scottish National Party and the Scottish Green Party. The two ideological labels given to the SNP were "Separatism" and "Social Democracy." The two given to the Scottish Greens were "Separatism" and "Green Politics". A limitation of this database is that these ideological labels are simplistic in nature, failing to offer as detailed a description as is found in other databases. Another weakness of this database is that it does not include minor political parties. This includes many smaller national independence parties.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey measures the ideological positions of every major political party in statewide European elections. The survey database measures the left-right ideology of political parties from zero to ten. Zero is given to parties who are considered "Extreme left", five is given to "Center" parties and ten is given to parties on the "Extreme right," (Chesdata, 2019c). This database does include some of Europe's most significant national independence parties. For example, looking at its data on the 2019 Belgian Federal Election, both the N-VA and Vlaams Belang are included. The left-right measurement of Vlaams Belang is 9.58, confirming that it is a radical-right party and the N-VA was given a measurement of 7.92, measuring it as a more traditional right-wing party (Chesdata, 2019b). A limitation of this database is that it does not include regional elections. Another limitation, as for the Nordsieck database, is that it does not include many of the national independence parties analysed in this thesis. This is due to the fact that they are too small to be considered major political parties at the statewide level.

Looking more specifically at regionalist parties, the most comprehensive database of regionalist parties standing in elections in Western Europe and Canada was produced by Schakel (2020). This

database includes all cases of major regionalist parties who have stood in regional and statewide elections between 1945 and 2010. This database measures the left-right ideology of regionalist parties with two measurements. The first is a one to six measurement, with "radical left" parties being denoted with a one and "radical right" parties with a six. The second is a dummy variable in which "left" parties are denoted with a zero and "right" parties are denoted with a one. For example, in the 2010 UK General Election, the database labelled the SNP with a three on the one to six scale, meaning it was measured as a left-leaning centrist party, and as a zero on the dummy measurement. The database also measures the constitutional ambition of regionalist parties, also using two distinct measurements. The first is a one to four measurement, in which "protectionist" parties are denoted with a one and "separationist" parties are denoted with a four. The second is a dummy variable in which "autonomist" parties are denoted with a zero and "secessionist" parties are denoted with a one. Using the example of the SNP in 2010 again, the party was labelled with a four on the one to four scale and a one on the dummy measurement. This is unsurprising given the strong commitment the party has to Scottish independence. This database was used in the analysis conducted by Massetti and Schakel in their 2015 and 2016 papers on the variation of ideology within the regionalist party family. One limitation of this database is that it excludes smaller, less significant national independence parties, due to its broader focus on regionalist parties.

Looking specifically at mainstream-radical ideology, there are numerous papers which offer definitions of both the radical-right and the radical-left (e.g. Lubbers et al, 2002; Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Santana & Rama, 2018; Vrakopoulos, 2022). For example, Halikiopoulou et al argue that the ideology of radical-right parties "is centred on nationalism" and that these parties "highlight the need for resistance against external threats to the nation," (p. 505). They also argue that there are three key common features found in radical-left parties:

"A rejection of the values of capitalism and the free market economy; the protection of collective economic and social rights in pursuit of social justice; and the idea of states working together to address shared concerns in support of internationalism," (Ibid.).

Focusing on the right, Vrakopoulos distinguishes between the mainstream-right and extreme-right, looking at how different factors related to the former have impacted electoral support for the latter. Vrakopoulos argues that the definition of the extreme-right "emphasizes nativism, populism, [and] authoritarianism," (p. 58).

Looking at regionalist parties more specifically, Massetti and Schakel have previously paired radical-left and radical-right regionalist parties and compared them with their more mainstream counterparts. This was in order to look at the increased levels of euroscepticism found in the regionalist party grouping as a whole. This research found that radical-left and radical-right regionalist parties were more likely to hold Eurosceptic positions than more centrist regionalist parties (2021: 437).

Economic Theory and the Left-Right Axis

There is a broader literature on economic theory and the left-right ideological axis in addition to the literature specifically addressing economic performance and regionalism. There is a wide range of literature which claims economic conditions play a significant role in the left-right ideological dimension of political parties (e.g. Huber & Inglehart, 1995; Wagner, 2012). Huber and Inglehart go as far as to claim that "in almost all countries, there is a strong linkage between the left-right axis and conflict over economic issues," (p. 90). Wagner argues that while the majority of parties do emphasise the importance of economic performance, the exception to this rule is smaller "niche" parties who instead prefer to campaign "on a small number of non-economic issues," (p. 860).

Some of the literature addresses economic performance and left-right ideology from a voter preference perspective. For example, a study by Furnham found that, in the UK, Labour voters were

more likely to blame societal problems for higher levels of poverty while Conservative voters were more likely to blame individualistic problems (1982: 314). Therefore, Furnham argues "that a person's lay theory of poverty and wealth in a society is a possible predictor of their voting pattern," (p. 319). There have been a number of more recent works which have taken a comparative approach to the study of economic conditions and left-right ideology, looking at a European perspective more broadly. Some of this literature focuses on the support for radical right-wing political parties. There is evidence in the literature that more prosperous countries are more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties, possibly due to the fact that voters in these countries are more fearful of losing what they have gained to outsiders (Lubbers et al, 2002; Lucassen & Lubbers, 2012). Other pieces of the literature focus on the other end of the ideological spectrum, analysing support for radical left-wing parties. There is evidence that the losers of globalisation, i.e. those who are poorer and more likely to be unemployed, are also more likely to vote for more extreme left-wing parties (March & Rommerskirchen, 2015; Santana & Rama, 2018). These studies support the findings from the works conducted which addressed economic performance and the ideology of regionalist parties.

Within much of the literature on economic theory, unemployment is considered to be a key economic performance predictor, constantly being discussed in relation to wider economic conditions and a common focus when analysing a nation's economic performance (e.g. Phillips, 1958; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 1998; Berument et al, 2006). In the literature on political science, unemployment has also become an important topic of discussion. This is due to the fact that, towards the end of the 20th Century, unemployment became a significant political challenge for Western societies (Korpi, 2003: 605). Unemployment is a phenomenon which has hit certain regions in the West harder than others, even within the same country. For example, unemployment is a major issue in Italian politics but it is particularly an issue for those living in the south of the country (Baglioni et al, 2008: 827).

There is also a large amount of literature which discusses the specific link between the increase in extreme right-wing politics and higher levels of unemployment. There have been debates over the

varying degrees of the impact of higher unemployment on the support of right-wing radicalism. Some studies have argued that unemployment does play a significant role in facilitating increased support for the extreme-right, for example, Jackman and Volpert (1996), conducted a study in which it was found that the extreme-right had "drawn the bulk of their support from economically marginalized individuals," (p. 517). In some cases, it has been found that higher levels of unemployment can even lead to an increase in violent right-wing extremism (Falk et al, 2011). However, other studies have found this relationship to be more complex (e.g. Arzheimer, 2009; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). Arzheimer, like in previous studies, found that unemployment did have an impact on the support for extreme-right parties. However, in certain cases, it was also found that unemployment benefits could reduce this support (p. 274). Vlandas and Halikiopoulou found that, in general, there was no significant relationship between unemployment and far-right support. However, in the circumstances in which unemployment benefits were low, there was a positive relationship between the two variables (p. 433).

By looking at this body of literature, the importance of unemployment as an economic performance variable and as a factor in relation to the left-right ideological axis is clear. However, unemployment is a variable which has, up to this point, largely been underdiscussed in much of the literature on regionalist and national independence parties. This is a gap in the literature which can be filled through making more references to unemployment in future comparative analysis of national independence parties.

Monarchism and the Left-Right Axis

The concept of monarchy is something which is addressed in both early socialist and conservative literature. In his 17th Century text, *Leviathan*, Thomas Hobbes argued absolute monarchy was the strongest form of governance, superior to both democracy and aristocracy (2014: 146). In contrast, Friedrich Engels, in his 19th Century work *Principles of Communism*, criticised the concept of constitutional monarchy, arguing that it only favoured those in society who were better off and who

possessed a certain level of capital (2020: 22). The academic literature on monarchy in the modern Western democratic context, especially in relation to the left-right ideological axis, is limited. Von Daniels goes as far as to describe monarchy as "liberalism's little secret" due to the lack of attention given to it in broader discussions of liberal democracy. This is especially surprising given the fact that the constitutional monarchy model is used by many Western democratic states (2018: 456). The concept of the monarchy is completely absent in comparative literature on national independence movements and regionalist parties. This is extremely surprising given the fact that some of the countries with the most high-profile national independence movements, for example Canada, Spain and the UK, are constitutional monarchies. Therefore, it is a concept which should be addressed in future research.

That being said, there is still a body of literature which links monarchy to conservatism. A number of early works on the English conservativism identify the monarchy as an important element to the origins of the ideology (e.g. Wolin, 1954; Huntington, 1957). Wolin argued that the Tories (the predecessors to the modern-day Conservatives) claimed to be "the sole defenders of monarchy" and that the Tories considered it to be their mission "to insist on the primacy of the allegiance owed by subject to sovereign," (p. 1010). Similarly, Huntington argued that, in England, 17th Century conservatism defended the monarchy due to the fact that the strength of the monarch appealed to the conservative belief in both obedience and order (p. 464). Some more modern definitions of conservatism also make reference to monarchy. Allen (1981) makes the case that "a commitment to monarchy and aristocracy (in countries where they existed)" should be included in a list of terms which best describe the modern conservative ideology (p. 593).

While much of the literature finds an ideological link between conservatism and monarchism, some literature has found that more radical right-wing populist ideology can clash with the monarchism. De Cleen argues that the populist right-wing Vlaams Belang includes anti-monarchist sentiment within its ideology. This is due to the fact that the monarchy is considered by them to be part of the Belgian elite

and, therefore, is also considered to be a threat to the Flemish movement and even the Flemish people (2016a: 235). The Vlaams Belang's opposition to the monarchy might also be due to the national symbolism of the Belgian monarchy. According to some academic literature, the Belgian monarchy is considered to be a tool of the federal government for encouraging Belgian citizens to oppose further degrees of regional autonomy (Swenden & Jans, 2006: 890). There is also evidence, from parts of the literature, that certain elements of the left hold more pro-monarchist attitudes, despite the anti-monarchist sentiment found in older and more radical socialist literature. For example, in the UK Labour Party, since the end of the First World War, the general sentiment towards the monarchy has been a positive one. That being said, there are still some elements of republicanism and anti-monarchism within the Labour Party, however, these elements have only represented a small part of the party's political thought (Hayman, 2014: 176).

There has also been a small number of quantitative studies conducted, showing that there is a clear left-right divide in terms of support for monarchism. A number of these studies have been conducted within the UK (e.g. Blumler et al, 1971; Rose & Kavanagh, 1976). The Blumler study found that there was a "tendency for Conservatives and Liberals to support the Royal Family more ardently than Labour voters did," (p. 160). Rose and Kavanagh's study, because it was conducted in Glasgow, included SNP voters as well as Labour and Conservative voters. The study found that support for the monarchy was higher amongst Conservative voters than amongst Labour voters and that the lowest support for the monarchy was amongst SNP voters (p. 555). There have also been studies, conducted in Australia, looking at the ideology of those who support the continuation of the British Monarchy as the Australian Head of State (e.g. Mansillo, 2016). As seems to be the case within the UK, Mansillo found that partisanship was a strong predictor for support of the monarchy, with support being higher amongst conservative supporters (p. 220).

<u>Militarism and the Left-Right Axis</u>

Like with the monarchy, military spending, as well as militarism more broadly, are factors which have broadly been ignored by the comparative literature on regionalist parties and national independence movements. However, there is a broader body of literature on military spending which looks at the left-right ideological axis. A lot of earlier work on this topic focuses on the United States (e.g. Nincic & Cusak, 1979; Russett, 1982; Abell, 1990). A particularly interesting argument found in the earlier literature is that within societies which are more sceptical of increased levels of government spending, increased levels of military spending can still be seen as a positive on the basis of national security and defence (Nincic & Cusak: 112).

There is a body of literature which links the conservative ideology with support for increased military spending (e.g. Carothers, 1981; Joe et al, 1981; Abell, 1990). Abell argues that, when faced with the possibility of spending cuts, US conservatives place an emphasis on the number of individuals employed, both directly and indirectly, as part of military operations, arguing that cuts to military spending would increase unemployment (p. 406). Within the literature, there is also empirical evidence to support the fact that pro-militarism and national security are important values to conservative voters (Joe et al: 28). Further evidence of an ideological left-right divide on the issue of military spending, as well as militarism more generally, can be found within the literature on the early days of the modern Spanish state, during its earlier days as a democracy. This literature discusses the debate concerning whether or not Spain should join NATO. There was an ideological divide on the issue in which the left was opposed to NATO membership while Spain's largest non-leftist party, the UCD, was strongly in favour (Carothers: 299-300).

While much of the literature on military spending and the left-right axis portrays it as a left vs right issue, there are also some alternative theories. Some parts of the literature discuss the idea of opposition to militarisation being something which comes from both the populist far-left and the populist far-right, particularly in regard to NATO membership (Podobnik et al, 2019). One of the earlier

examples, found in the literature, of a far-right populist party which held a largely negative perception of transatlantic military cooperation, and therefore by extension NATO, was the Vlaams Blok in Flanders (Swyngedouw et al, 2007: 88).

A lot of the literature which discusses the relationship between military spending and left-right ideology focuses on the "butter versus guns" hypothesis. This is the theory that as government spending increases on military activities, spending must also decrease on civilian activities (Russett, 1982: 767). While this has been disputed by a number of studies (e.g. Russett: 774; Domke et al, 1983: 33), it does bring up the question as to whether right-leaning governments would put military spending ahead of spending in other areas, as well as vice versa, as the literature on their ideologies would suggest that they might. Some of the evidence in the literature does suggest that more left-wing governments do spend extra on social policies while more right-wing governments tend to prefer increasing spending on their military (Bove et al, 2017: 595). However, there is also evidence that has found that this relationship is more complicated. It has been argued that, in some cases, left-wing governments may increase their military spending as a disguised way of increasing their overall welfare expenditure (Whitten & Williams, 2011: 132). There is also evidence that, in some countries, the left-right ideology of a government simply has no statistically significant impact on its military spending, for example in Germany (Kauder & Potrafke, 2016).

There have also been some interesting findings, from within the literature, looking at military spending and specific case studies of non-independent nations with national independence movements. For example, the citizens of the Åland Islands, as part of their rights set out in the Self-Government Act of Åland "are becoming ever more active in making Åland a place associated with efforts towards peace and cooperation," (Rotkirch, 1986: 373). Another example is Scotland. There is an argument that opposition to military interventions, such as the one in Iraq, and opposition to the continued ownership of nuclear weapons are important elements to the centre-left ideology of the SNP, as well

as the leftist nature of the independence movement more broadly. Therefore, they have now become important factors within the wider debate on Scottish independence (Ritchie, 2016: 653-654).

Language in Regionalist and Nationalist Discourses

As we have seen from the work conducted by Massetti and Schakel, the existence of a unique national language is a factor which can encourage secessionist ideals amongst regionalist parties (2016: 68). There is a large body of literature which looks at language as a variable within different nationalist ideological standpoints and looks at its importance for many regionalist and sub-nationalist movements. However, the literature covering larger scale comparative studies, looking at language as a factor across a larger number of national independence movements, is more limited.

Within the body of literature on language, some of it looks at language as something which is used, by nationalists, as a tool for defining a specific nation and for nation building (e.g. Urciuoli, 1995; Blommaert & Verschueren, 1992; Kamusella, 2001). Looking at the nature of language and borders, Urciuoli argues that language, and even distinct accents, can create divides between different groups of people. These divides create borders in which those who reside within a certain set area will speak a certain language or have a certain accent and those outside of that area will not (pp. 538-539). Looking at the European perspective, it has been argued that the role of language in Europe's nationalist movements has been presented as "largely political," (Blommaert & Verschueren: 374). This is due to the fact that language can be a unifying identity marker which more romantic and accessible than other markers of national identity (p. 375). It has been argued that language can be "the main binding factor" for newly created nations which had historically not had a single state, for example, Germany prior to 1871 and Poland before the end of the First World War (Kamusella: 244).

There is a body of literature which directly links language and language protection to ethnic and right-wing forms of nationalism (e.g. Smith, 1994; Muller, 2008). From both a historical and ethnic perspective, language is something which has been fundamental to the claims of national identity of many nationalist and sub-nationalist groups (Calhoun: 224). It is argued in the literature that for ethnic

nationalist movements, a common language is usually an important part of their perceived common national heritage, something which is "core" to the ethnic nationalist ideology (Muller: 20). These views of ethnic nationalism are supported by Smith, who argues that, for ethnic nationalists, historic and cultural national traits, including language, are more important than absolute equality of all individuals and inclusive citizenship (p. 188). The focus on national traits leads to a nationalism which is exclusionary in its nature, which can then lead to increased persecution of minority groups within a state (p. 196). Language protection in many modern states is also something in the literature which has been associated with far-right political parties and movements. Two notable examples can be found in Germany and Flanders where groups who place an emphasis on language protection also have strong ideological links with the far-right (Pfalzgraf, 2003; De Cleen, 2016b).

While a lot of literature relating to language and nationalism focuses on ethnic nationalism and the right, there is also a body of literature which focuses on the approach to language found within more civic nationalist ideologies (e.g. Ipperciel, 2007; Stilz, 2009). It has been argued that language plays a crucial role in civic nationalism and the building of a nation. Looking at language in a much more practical sense, Ipperciel argues that language is "an instrument of communication" in constitutional democracies. It allows people to express their opinions and is vital in formulating the will of the people (pp. 412-413). This view is supported by Stilz, who argues that it is in the interest of a civic state to support a common language on the basis of "democratic participation" and "economic opportunity," (p. 291). However, Stilz also argues that civic nationalism can justify the protection of minority languages as well without showing ethnic nationalist tendencies, using an argument relating to democratic principles that "the state's policy with respect to minority languages ought to track the present preferences of its citizens," (Ibid.).

There have also been a number of works conducted on the language policy within specific regions and nations with particularly high-profile regionalist and sub-nationalist movements. Two notable examples, which also have active national independence parties, are Galicia and Wales. These are two

nations whose language policies have been directly compared in the literature (e.g. van Morgan, 2006). In Wales, protection of the Welsh language has become an important issue for Welsh nationalist campaigners, with a notable campaign in the second half of the 20th Century being the campaign of bilingual road signs (Merriman & Jones, 2009). The Galician language is something which became important to many left-wing Galician nationalists during the Franco dictatorship as, particularly before the 1960s, it was something which had been strongly oppressed by the fascist regime (Núñez, 1997: 31-32). When looking at these two cases, van Morgan argues that there is a paradox in which "mobilization on language grounds is more pronounced where language is least threatened," (p. 451). In the case of Galicia and Wales, van Morgan argues that Welsh is more threatened than Galician but, of the two, the Galician language is more pronounced in its nationalist movement. Van Morgan argues that this is because there is now a perception that the Welsh language is now "winning the battle against English supremacy" while the Galician language "is seen as slowly but perceptively losing the battle against Spanish," (p. 471). This argument would suggest that perception of language, from within a region, is important when studying national independence parties.

Political Party Ideology and Party Competition

In regionalist party literature, Massetti and Schakel found that regionalist parties, in general, followed the left-right ideological leaning of a region's dominant non-regionalist party. This was due to the fact that these parties are naturally going to follow the most electorally successful ideology in their region. The research also found that when regionalist parties face competition from each other, they will shift their ideology in order to find an ideological free space (2015: 871). On top of the narrower literature which looks specifically at regionalist parties, there is a wider body of significant literature which discusses how political parties, more broadly, might compete with one another. It is also worth noting that these matters have never been applied specifically to a broad comparative study of national independence parties. Therefore, it is important to fill in the gap in the literature by looking at how

national independence parties, specifically, might change their ideology when faced by competition from both the largest non-national independence party in their nation and also by other possible national independence rivals.

There is a considerable body of literature which discusses how political parties will shift their ideologies in order compete with each other at elections. Downs (1957) made the case that a stable and democratic two-party system is centripetal in nature. This is because the political parties in this type of system will converge towards the centre, becoming more similar to each other. The two parties would do this in order to appeal to the maximum number of voters, maximising their political success (pp. 142-143). Further support for this theory can be found in research conducted by Erikson et al. They found that in the US, a well-known example of a stable two-party system, both Republicans and Democrats would moderate their positions in order to respond to the opinions of their electorate (1989: 743). However, in a multiparty system, Downs argues that political parties will pick a much more specific ideological position and emphasise the differences between each other. This is done in order to appeal to a very distinct section of the electorate (pp. 143-144). Interestingly, further research on multiparty systems has found evidence to suggest that multiparty systems can also be centripetal in their nature but only in the event of there being a centrist party which is electorally significant (Green-Pederson, 2004).

Another interesting element to party competition in the literature is the discussion of parties from a similar ideological position. This idea was proposed by Budge (1994). Budge argued that, when looking at competitors, parties may focus more on a smaller number of specific parties rather than looking at every party as an equal competitor. Budge suggested that this could particularly be the case in a circumstance "where two parties have been competing for leadership of a particular ideological tendence," (p. 454). This theory has since been supported quantitatively by Adams and Somer-Topcu. Adams and Somer-Topcu found "that parties are more responsive to policy shifts by other members of their ideological family than to the policy shifts of other parties," (2009: 842). Interestingly, in the

same study, it was also found that that "political parties respond to rival parties' policy shifts by shifting their own policies in the same direction," (Ibid.).

An interesting recent case study, addressed in the literature, which looks at different elements of party competition is the UK Conservative Party under David Cameron. We find in the literature that when Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party, he set himself the task of needing to win power. A significant part of this strategy was to emphasise a move to "the centre ground of British politics" in which his party would be moved away from previous Conservative Prime Ministers (Evans, 2008: 313). This follows Downs' theory that parties move towards the centre when competing with each other in order to achieve electoral success. However, as time progressed, it is argued that pressure from the right of the political spectrum pushed Cameron to hold more right-wing positions, particularly on immigration, and hold a more sceptical view towards the European Union. One element of this pressure was the electoral threat to the Conservatives which came from the right. This threat was created by an electoral competitor, UKIP, a party which held both strong anti-EU and anti-immigration positions (Bale, 2018: 274). This follows Budge's theory that parties are more reactive to other parties with similar ideological makeups.

<u>Immigration, Nationalism and the Left-Right Axis</u>

There is a large body of literature which links right-wing radicalism and anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014). Focusing on the US, Diamond argued that in the 1980s, a small number of right-wing intellectuals began devoting themselves to developing "anti-immigration arguments," (p. 156). These arguments were based on traditional ethnic nationalist ideological perspectives, with these intellectuals focusing "on the threat to cultural homogeneity posed by the influx of nonwhite immigrant groups" and protecting the dominance of the English language in the US (p. 157). Interestingly, Diamond concluded by arguing that a focus on illegal immigration, by the right, would be advantageous in elections but that there was also an electoral advantage to limiting anti-immigration sentiment to some extent, in order not to appear "stridently

racist," (p. 166). Rydgren's analysis focuses on Western Europe. Rydgren's research found clear evidence that those who wanted to either stop or extremely limit immigration were far more likely to vote for radical right-wing parties (p. 740). Rydgren argued that "the new radical right gives priority to issues related to national identity" and views immigration, especially from Muslim countries, as something which puts Europe's distinct cultures and values at risk (p. 745). Rydgren does also try to emphasise the distinction between radical-right parties and many of the individuals who vote for them. He argues that just because "radical right-wing parties pursue xenophobic political programmes and discourses does not automatically imply that xenophobic attitudes among the voters are a major reason why these parties get the support they do in elections," (p. 760). The thing that unites the majority of the literature on immigration and the right, is the argument that radical right-wing parties used ethnic nationalist policies in their platforms, therefore, meaning they are far more likely to hold anti-immigrant sentiment in their policy platforms.

There is a body of literature surrounding immigration and sub-nationalism, in which sub-nationalist parties are torn between being in favour of or opposed to encouraging immigration to their own territories (e.g. Baldacchino, 2004; Jeram et al, 2016; Newth, 2019). Jeram et al lay this challenge out, arguing that sub-nationalist parties are torn between two key factors. The first is the risk that increased immigration "may undermine the basis for their claims of national distinctiveness," (p. 1229). The second is the potential benefit that increased immigration could boost "the territory's demographic weight" and enhance "its legitimacy as a liberal democratic actor," (Ibid.). Focusing on sub-nationalist movements on islands, Baldacchino argues that threats of overpopulation "loom larger" due to their small size. Baldacchino argues this may lead to the following:

> "Many small islanders from sub-national jurisdictions look upon citizenship rights as a double
> privilege. It is a condition which grants the basis for property ownership and employment on
> their own island, to the possible exclusion of foreigners or even of other citizens of the same
> metropolitan power, while providing them with a passport for potential emigration and

freedom of access to the territory and labour markets of the same metropolitan power," (p. 83).

Some of the literature discusses left-wing nationalist movements which also have protectionist tendencies regarding certain cultural elements (e.g. van Morgan, 2006; Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Hjorth & Larsen, 2020). Van Morgan argued that language was an important factor for nationalist movements in Galicia and Wales, two cases with historically left-wing nationalist parties. Research by Halikiopoulou et al argued that nationalism plays a "central element" in the opposition to European integration which is seen in radical-left political parties (p. 504). What is interesting about this finding is that it suggests that there is a paradoxical similarity in the nationalism applied in the Eurosceptic ideology found in both radical left-wing and radical right-wing political parties. Hjorth and Larsen's research focuses on the concept of traditional left-wing parties taking more nationalist stances on immigration, in order to appease the increased support for the far-right. They make the argument "that a strategy of accommodation in the form of taking a more restrictive position on immigration can increase mainstream left party support as well as support for the left bloc as a whole," (p. 8). Their research also argued that "accommodation should be less effective in countries where co-operating with the far left is an infeasible option for the mainstream left," (Ibid.). These findings suggest that, at least in some circumstances, there can be an electoral incentive for a left-wing party to hold more restrictive policies on immigration. What is clear is that the discussions around left-wing nationalism are far less common, and also less explicit, than the discussions around right-wing nationalism.

National Independence Case Studies

A lot of the literature on national independence case studies in the 20th Century focused on national independence movements from non-democratic states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (e.g. Denich, 1994; Muiznieks, 1995). There was also literature which discussed high-profile national independence movements in democratic states, for example, the case of Quebec (e.g. Pinard, 1992). The literature on specific national independence case studies has continued to grow over time,

particularly focusing on the stateless nations which have had high-profile cases of national

independence movements such as Catalonia and Scotland. This section will look in depth at the body

of literature on the following eight case studies which are the focus of Chapters Five and Six of this

thesis:

- Faroe Islands

- Greenland

- Flanders

- Quebec

- Basque Country

- Catalonia

- Scotland

- Wales

This review will discuss the earlier literature on each these cases, looking at each from a historic

perspective. It will look at how perceptions of each of these cases in the literature has changed over

time and study the focus of the most recent literature on each case. This section will also address the

gaps in the literature on each of these cases which need to be filled.

The Faroe Islands

There is a significant body of literature which discusses the Faroe Islands and its national movement.

A lot of the literature compares the Faroe Islands with Greenland (e.g. Grimsson, 1978; Archer, 2000;

Jensen, 2003; Arter, 2008; Jensen, 2015; Stephen, 2017; Kočí & Baar, 2021). This is unsurprising given

the fact that they are both Nordic islands who share Denmark as their parent country. Grimsson's

analysis of nationalism in the Faroe Islands and Greenland lays out 13 "indicative factors" which justify

the study of these two cases (pp. 317-324). Some notable factors include a separate language from

Danish (p. 318) and a distinct culture (p. 319). As part of this outline of both movements, Grimsson's

paper gives an outline of the origins of the modern Faroese independence movement which dates

back to the early 20ᵗʰ Century. One especially interesting element of this history, discussed by Grimsson, was impact of the Second World War and the immediate aftermath which saw the entrenchment of the nationalist cleavage in Faroese politics that we see today (pp. 324-325). There are also other examples of literature on the Faroe Islands which discuss its history and the origins of the islands' current autonomous status in the Danish Kingdom (e.g. Arter: 40-41).

There is a body of more recent literature which discusses the concept of the Faroese nation and the movement for its independence (e.g. Ackrén, 2006; Marnersdóttir, 2007; Thomassen, 2011). Ackrén's work focuses on the options available to the Faroe Islands, when looking at the discussion around its independence. Ackrén makes the argument that there are three options for the islands:

> "Independence or full sovereignty (as is Iceland); a freely associated statehood (as are Niue and the Cook Islands in relation to New Zealand); or a confederation, probably involving changes at both the central level of the Danish state and the European Union level," (p. 223).

Ackrén concludes by arguing that the most likely of the three is freely associated statehood, with independence being a possibility but not something the islands, as a whole, were in much of a rush to see (pp. 235-236). Thomassen offers an interesting overview of the case of the Faroe Islands. An interesting argument he makes is that "the only barriers for Faroese independence are psychological" due to the fact that there is a general agreement, both between both sides of the debate in the islands and in Denmark itself, that the Faroe Islands should be allowed independence if they so wish (p. 82). An interesting observation of this literature is that there seems to be more of a focus on the movement in general, rather than on its specific national independence parties. This is a gap in the literature which this thesis aims to fill.

There is also a body of literature which discusses the Faroese independence movement from a post-colonial perspective (e.g. Adler-Nissen, 2014; Jensen, 2015; Kočí & Baar, 2021). Kočí and Baar look at both the Faroe Islands and Greenland from a postcolonial perspective. The paper discusses a wide range of different elements of the Faroe Islands and the independence debate. For example, looking

at the current independence debate, one issue which they raise is the issue of economic sustainability and the supply of Danish subsidies to the islands (pp. 197-198). Adler-Nissen discuss postcolonial home rule in the Faroe Islands in the context of Europeanisation. She argues "that it is increasingly difficult to understand the connection between the Faroe Islands and Denmark without taking the rest of the world, and Europe in particular, into account," (p. 73). Adler-Nissen argues that the EU is a factor which must be considered for both the Faroe Islands itself and the central Danish state, on issues related to the islands' autonomy (p. 74).

Greenland

There is also a large body of literature on Greenlandic nationalism. This literature covers a number of different topics. Much of the literature on Greenland addresses its history, looking both at origins of the island's political autonomy (e.g. Arter, 2008: 41-43), and also the origins of the Greenlandic national identity (e.g. Langgård, 1998). As was previously discussed, there is a body of literature which compares Greenland with the Faroe Islands. One interesting note from the literature is that it focuses much more on the constitutional relationships of Greenland and the nature of Greenlandic nationalism more generally than it does on the specific Greenlandic national independence parties. One exception to this comes from Ackrén (2015) who offers an analysis of the performance of Greenlandic political parties up to the 2014 Greenlandic General Election. This includes Greenland's two largest national independence parties, Siumut and Inuit Ataqatigiit. An in depth study of the left-right ideological nature of Greenland's national independence parties is something which is lacking from the current literature.

Early literature on Greenland focuses on the island from a strategic perspective and addresses the disputes between different countries who have wished to have control or influence over the island (e.g. Knaplund, 1925; Bellquist, 1931; Weigert, 1944). It is important to note the focus, in the earlier literature, on Greenland as the property of other countries rather than as a nation in its own right. A key historic dispute over the island was between Denmark and Norway. This dispute, in the early 20th

Century, "embittered the relations between the two countries" as there was a strong feeling in Norway that Denmark had "tricked" the country out of valuable hunting and fishing resources on the east of the island (Knaplund: 374). Looking at the cases of Greenland and Iceland, Weigert emphasised the "great strategic importance" of both islands to the United States (p. 112). Weigert referenced the historical desire of the US to have influence over the islands, due to their strategic importance, including a serious desire from the US Secretary of State, William Henry Seward, to buy the islands from Denmark in the 19th Century (Ibid.). Specifically in relation to Greenland, Weigert concluded that the then current agreements between the two countries had led to "a permanent solution" in which Greenland would remain part of Denmark while the US would be allowed to continue its military operations on the island (p. 122).

As the 20th Century progressed, literature began to focus more on the internal national identity of Greenland and its political autonomy. This literature focused particularly on the issue of Greenlandic home rule (e.g. Gulløv, 1979; Foighel, 1980; Dahl, 1986). This literature discusses the process in which Greenland was able to obtain its own status of autonomy, through a referendum, in 1979. Dahl argued that this was something which was "a political reform recognizing a politically, geographically, and demographically undivided Greenland," (p. 323), and began the process of Greenland "becoming a self-governing nation in confederation with Denmark," (p. 324).

One of the reoccurring topics in the literature on Greenland is its relationship with the EU and its predecessor, the European Economic Community (EEC) (e.g. Johansen & Sørensen, 1983; Johansen, 1992; Archer, 2000; Gad, 2014; Stephen, 2017). Johansen and Sørensen study Greenland's decision to exit from the EEC, via a referendum, in 1982. They claim that the issue of the EEC accelerated Greenlandic calls for autonomy from Denmark. This was because when Denmark originally had its referendum on whether to join the EEC, in 1972, the people of Denmark voted 2:1 in favour but 70.3% of people in Greenland voted against (p. 271). An interesting point raised by Johnsen and Sørensen was the nature of the Greenlandic EEC Referendum in 1982. They argue that it was a "harsh and bitter"

campaign, with protection of Greenlandic fisheries being a particularly strong theme (p. 272). Stephen, in comparison with Åland and the Faroe Islands, looks at the current relationship Greenland has with the EU, looking at how, from a legal standpoint, the EU accommodates Greenland, in the context of it being a Danish overseas territory (pp. 283-291).

Since the turn of the century, the literature on Greenland has continued to grow, focusing more on different elements of Greenlandic nationalism, identity and independence (e.g. Jensen, 2003; Otte, 2015; Grydehøj, 2016). Jensen explores the legal and constitutional positions of both Greenland and the Faroe Islands within the Kingdom of Denmark. One interesting section of Jensen's paper is a discussion around whether Greenland and the Faroe Islands have the right to pursue full independence. Jensen argues that the "basic question to decide when considering the possible right to full independence is whether the population in the Faroe Islands and Greenland can be considered as separate peoples," (2003: 177). With regards to Greenland, Jensen argues that this is the case, with Greenland having its own distinct language and culture from Denmark and its population having "a completely different ethnic origin" to those from the Danish mainland (Ibid.). From a legal perspective, Jensen also argues that "The Danish Constitution would not have to be changed" in order for Greenland to pursue independence (2003: 178).

Flanders

There is a considerable amount of literature which discusses the nature of Flemish nationalism. This literature dates back decades, discussing its evolution and ideological makeup. There is also a significant amount of literature on Flemish nationalist political parties, particularly the N-VA and Vlaams Blok/Belang. One limitation of the literature is that it does not discuss in much detail the party competition aspect, in respect to left-right ideology, of Flemish national independence parties, particularly the current relationship between the N-VA and the Vlaams Belang.

Literature on Flemish nationalism dates back to before the Second World War. Callender (1937) discusses the nature of Flemish nationalism, describing the attempt by Flemish nationalists to set up

a Flemish Parliament towards the end of the First World War and their subsequent arrest and imprisonment for treason (p. 561). However, Callender does also make the point that, at that moment in time, Flemish independence itself was not very strongly supported and the more pressing issue was the recognition and protection of the Dutch language (Ibid.). Discussions soon after the Second World War continued this argument, arguing there had been a "revival" in the Flemish nationalist movement but still describing those who wanted an independent Flemish state to be the more "extreme" element of the Flemish movement (H. I., 1949: 213).

In the 1960s, Flemish nationalism was still seen to be a relatively new movement. Kelly (1969) argued that the Flemish movement was always "bound to awake from its circumscribed peasant lethargy" due to the democratisation process which followed in Belgium after the Second World War. Interestingly, at this stage, Kelly argued that while Flemish people made up the majority of the Belgian population, the nationalist movement still had "many of the attributes of a psychological minority," (p. 348). Kelly also argued that "the growth of Flemish economic and cultural power" was partly responsible for the increased language divides seen in Belgium (pp. 352-353). Later literature supported the argument that competition, with regards to economics, had assisted in fuelling the Flemish nationalist movement after the Second World War (e.g. Nielsen, 1980). Literature in the 1970s on sub-nationalist movements placed the Flemish movement amongst a group of other emerging sub-nationalisms in Europe and Canada, such as the Scots and the Québécois (e.g. Mughan, 1975; Gourevitch, 1979).

Given the continued success of Flemish nationalist parties, it is unsurprising to see that there has continued to be a large amount of literature on the topic. There has been continued works on the ideological nature of Flemish nationalism. There are examples of more recent literature which have continued to explore the nature of Flemish nationalism from a historical perspective (e.g. Hooghe, 1993; Erk, 2005b; De Wever, 2013). Hooghe discusses Belgium's historic ethnic divides, arguing that it combines historic linguist elements with more recent socio-economic elements (p. 44). Hooghe

argued that the grievances held by Flemish nationalists were just one part of a wider Belgian story. He argues that there are three elements to the inter-ethnic tensions observed in Belgium: "Flemish nationalism versus the Francophones on cultural identity, Walloon nationalism versus Flanders and Brussels on socio-economic grievances, and (Francophone) Brussels versus the rest of the country on centre-periphery matters," (p. 48). Erk (2005b) argues that the origin of the right-wing nature of Flemish nationalism, comes from the Catholic Dutch language trade unions which claimed to represent the interests of Flemish workers. These unions were set up to oppose the socialist French speaking trade unions which were being set up in French speaking parts of Belgium. Not only does this explain the origins of the right-wing nature of Flemish nationalism but also the origins of the division between Flanders and Wallonia, emphasised by the language cleavage.

A common theme of much of the Flemish language literature is the issue of the Dutch language. This is made clear in the historic approach made by Erk (2005b) when discussing the Catholic Dutch language trade unions which claimed to represent the interests of Flemish workers. There is a large body of literature which addresses the Dutch language in regard to Flemish nationalism (Laurent, 1931; Kelly, 1969; Vogl & Hüning, 2010; Van Hoof, 2020; Xhardez, 2020). The language divide in Belgium was discussed before the Second World War, with Laurent making the following summary:

> "Racially, Belgium is cut in two by an almost straight line, which runs from south of Ypres on the French frontier, north of Liège toward the point where Belgium, Holland and Germany meet. North of this line, in the provinces of West and East Flanders, of Antwerp and Limburg, as well as in Northern Brabant (which takes in Brussels and Louvain), the majority of the population is Flemish, a branch of the Germanic race, speaking the Flemish language," (p. 834).

Laurent concluded his argument by offering a harsh criticism of the Belgian state's handling of the Flemish issue:

> "The verdict as a whole on the concessions made to the Flemings since 1918 can only be harsh toward the successive governments which have ruled Belgium. Not one among them has

frankly undertaken to solve the Flemish question, by exhibiting a spirit at once national yet

considerate of the ethnical right of Flemings and Walloons," (p. 840).

The language divide in Belgium has continued to be discussed in far more recent literature. For example, Vogl and Hüning provide an overview of the current language divides which exist within the country. They conclude that "Belgians over time have become subdivided into separate (language) communities," (p. 244). They argue a significant reason for this divide is due to the fact that Flanders and Wallonia have always been divided economically. Initially Wallonia was the far wealthier of the two communities but this changed in the second half of the 20th century, with Flanders becoming the wealthier community (Ibid.).

Other more recent literature discusses alternative aspects of the Flemish movement. For example, Collard (2014) discusses the consequences of the now infamous spoofed "Bye-bye Belgium" news broadcast, in which a faked 30-minute news broadcast on French language TV announced an imminent unilateral declaration of an independent Flemish Republic. Collard argued that at the time of this broadcast, Flemish "secession from the federal union had never been envisaged by the mainstream francophone politicians," (p. 550). This broadcast in fact assisted in forcing those politicians to contemplate this issue, at least publicly, for the first time (Ibid.). This point is noteworthy as it shows just how new the idea of Flemish independence was to many in Belgium's political establishment.

There is a significant body of literature which discusses the ideological nature of the radical-right Vlaams Belang, as well as its predecessor the Vlaams Blok. Earlier literature explored the Vlaams Blok as part of a new form of extreme right-wing party. Billiet and De Witte (1995) found that the Vlaams Blok originally attracted voters mostly due to its anti-immigration policies rather than for its policies on increasing powers for the Flemish Parliament, essentially turning it into "a single-issue party," (p. 193). The opposition to immigration and the right-wing ideology of the Vlaams Blok and Vlaams Belang is discussed in a wide range of literature (e.g. Billiet & De Witte; Moufahim et al, 2015; De Cleen, 2013; De Cleen, 2016b). Erk (2005a) discusses the decision made by the Belgian Court of Cassation to outlaw

the Vlaams Blok on a count of breaking anti-racism laws and the subsequent formation of Vlaams Belang. Erk argued that the party used the court decision as an excuse for a rebrand, in order to make it appear more professional and look more like a party ready for government, rather than simply appearing to be a radical anti-establishment party. This point emphasises the fact that national independence parties, like most other political parties, desire the need to appear more ideologically mainstream in order to attract a larger vote share. However, more recent literature on Vlaams Belang still argues it acts as a far-right anti-establishment party, combining traditional nationalist language with strong populist and anti-elitist sentiments (e.g. Moufahim et al; De Cleen, 2016a; van Haute et al, 2018).

There is also a body of literature which discusses the largest Flemish nationalist party, the N-VA. Due to it being a relatively new party, only being founded in 2001 (Beyens et al, 2017: 2), literature on the nature of the N-VA is quite recent. Some of the literature discusses the origins and rise of the party. This literature discusses a number of elements, including the origin of how the party grew out of the collapse of its predecessor party, the Volksunie, and its early ideological positions on issues such as immigration (e.g. Beyens et al; Adam & Deschouwer, 2016). One of the few studies of the N-VA which discusses its more centrist ideological position, especially in comparison to the more extreme nature of the right-wing Vlaams Belang, argues its more moderate ideological platform offers an explanation for its increased and more consistent electoral success. This is particularly clear when it is compared to the more inconsistent levels of success found with the ideologically radical Vlaams Belang (Maly, 2016).

Quebec

There is a substantial body of literature on Québécois nationalism and the Québécois independence movement, covering a broad range of topics. This is unsurprising given the fact that Quebec has held two sovereignty referenda, the first being in 1980 and the second being in 1995, with the Québécois sovereigntists losing both (see Pammett & LeDuc, 2001). While there is a considerable literature on

Québécois nationalism, the literature on the left-right ideological positioning of specific Québécois national independence parties is less extensive and provides only a partial picture. One notable example which does explore the left-right ideology of Québécois sub-state parties came from Erk (2010). Erk concludes that the left-right ideology of Québécois nationalist parties was formed by "critical junctures." Erk argues that the Quiet Revolution was the critical juncture which pushed Quebec's previously right-wing and conservative nationalist movement to a more left-wing position, one still held by the Parti Québécois to this day (pp. 435-436).

There is a large early literature on the Québécois nationalist movement and Québécois independence (e.g. Gingras, 1975; LeDuc, 1977; Pinard & Hamilton, 1977; Smiley, 1978). Pinard and Hamilton discuss the importance of the 1973 Québécois Election in the polarising of voters on the issue of independence and how that polarisation impacted Quebec's largest parties, including the Liberal Party and Parti Québécois. They conclude that in the election, "the independence issue became so crucial that it gradually polarized a large portion of the electorate between the P.Q. and the Liberals," (p. 257). Looking at the challenge of Québécois nationalism to the Canadian state, Smiley argued that the electoral success of the Parti Québécois "vastly" complicated the relationship between the French-speaking and English-speaking societies of Canada (p. 199). However, he did also discuss the existence of a strong "resistance to the destruction of the Canadian Confederation" which would offer a significant challenge to the Québécois independence movement and particularly to the Parti Québécois (p. 224).

There is also literature which specifically focuses on the two Québécois sovereignty referenda (e.g. Nadeau et al, 1999; Pammett & LeDuc, 2001; Oklopcic, 2012; Rocher, 2014). Comparing the two referenda, Pammett and LeDuc found that in both votes there was no single key issue which encouraged voters to choose yes or no (p. 278). They also made the point that another referendum in Quebec would only ever be held when it was felt that victory was a certainty, though also adding a caveat to that by pointing out that any certainty of a victory would likely be "an illusion" given that in

"both 1980 and 1995, polls taken in advance of the campaigns anticipated different results from those which actually occurred," (p. 279).

There is a body of literature on Québécois nationalism which makes reference to the importance of the French language to the Québécois identity (e.g. Pinard, 1992; Oakes, 2004; Kircher, 2012; Brie & Ouellet, 2020). Pinard argued that French language has historically been crucial to Québécois nationalism, claiming that "nationalist sentiment has constituted the core ideology of French Canadians for at least two centuries, and it has provided a powerful cultural force during each new phase of ethnic conflict," (p. 476). More recent research on the 2018 Québécois election found that exposure to written English was a predictor of nationalist sentiment amongst the Québécois who encountered English frequently in their everyday lives (Brie & Ouellet: 245). This finding would suggest that language has continued to be an issue for many living in Quebec.

There has been a more recent body of literature on Québécois nationalism which has discussed a variety of different topics (e.g. Rocher, 2002; Stevenson, 2004; Changfoot & Cullen, 2011; Blanchet & Medeiros, 2019; Pérez-Lozano, 2021). Changfoot and Cullen discuss the decline of the Québécois independence movement after the 1995 Referendum. They emphasise the drop in support for the Parti Québécois between 1994 and 2008 (p. 769). They make the argument that Quebec has now "carved for itself a new place in the Canadian federation" and that the Québécois and Canadian governments "have moved towards a restructuring of their relationship that continues to allow for very public disagreement" but "a foundation for compromise that avoids the pitfalls of a hardline approach by either partner," (p. 781). They conclude by arguing that, despite this new relationship, "Quebec will continue to preserve its identity, distinctiveness and autonomy," (p. 782). Blanchet and Medeiros study the relationship between authoritarianism and nativism and the support for national independence parties in Quebec. Interestingly, the study found that voters who were more sceptical of immigration and who expressed anti-elite sentiment were more likely to be in favour of independence (pp. 811-812). Pérez-Lozano's recent research on Quebec attempts to answer a single

research question: "To what extent can a constitutional right of secession be useful in order to minimise exclusion and domination … stemming from secession political conflict in modern democracies?" (p. 475). This research makes a number of interesting findings, summarised as such:

> "The constitutional right of secession outlined in the Reference is a useful device in democratic republican terms, due to its non-unilateralist spirit, and that (b) it nevertheless left open a series of unresolved issues in need of an arbiter, with Quebec and Ottawa fighting to assume this role. Thus, we find that a constitutional right of secession, at least in the case of Quebec, seems to be a firewall against domination, albeit an imperfect one," (p. 481).

While not as vast as the more general literature on Québécois nationalism, there is still a body of literature which discusses specific Québécois national independence parties. Parts of this literature discuss Quebec's largest provincial national independence party, the Parti Québécois (e.g. Pinard & Hamilton, 1978; Pinard, 2005). Other parts of the literature focus on Quebec's largest federal national independence party, the Bloc Quebecois (e.g. Fournier et al, 2013; Lachapelle, 2021). Additionally, some of the literature has focused on Quebec's smaller national independence parties such as Québec Solidaire (e.g. Dufour, 2009).

Basque Country

There is a significant early literature on the Basque nationalist ideology and Basque independentism (e.g. Payne, 1964; Payne, 1971; da Silva, 1975; Heiberg, 1975). In a piece on Spanish nationalism more broadly, Payne (1964) discusses the origins of Basque nationalism, arguing that it came from a clerical background. Payne claimed that early Basque nationalists believed that they "possessed an ethnic homogeneity and a religious devotion superior to that of other Spaniards." Payne went as far as claim that early nationalists believed "that the Basques constituted a special "race" in the Iberian Peninsula" based on "the uniqueness of Basque customs, Basque law, Basque psychology - in short, the Basque way of life," (p. 410). Payne then continued his study of Basque nationalism in a 1971 paper focusing specifically on the Basque and Catalan movements. With regards to Basque nationalism, Payne offered

a detailed historical account of the development of the movement. Payne made reference to its origins, its downfall during the Spanish Civil War and its subsequent re-emergence in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s, discussions in the literature on Basque nationalism continued. Heiberg produced an additional historic account of the topic, addressing Basque nationalism in its own right rather than in comparison to Catalonia or wider Spain. Research from da Silva questioned the degree of the importance of ethnicity and detrimental economic performance, two factors associated with stronger sub-nationalist movements, to the Basque nationalist cause. De Silva argued that the cultural differences between the Basques and its neighbouring populations were "virtually nonexistent," (p. 237) and that in terms of economic performance, both Spain and the Basque provinces had seen economic expansion during the 1960s. This coincided with a period where support for Basque nationalism was increasing (p. 239).

More recent pieces of literature have continued to discuss the theme of ethnicity in Basque nationalism, seen in the earlier pieces. For example, Watson (1996) argued that the 1880s/1890s, 1920s/1930s and 1960s/1970s were periods in history where the Basque nationalist movement had experienced an "ethnic quest for identity," (p. 26). Interestingly, the most recent literature on Basque nationalism would suggest that the movement, and particularly the more moderate nationalist EAJ-PNV, has turned away from its ethnic nationalist past and is now much more in favour of a more open and civic nationalist approach (e.g. Jeram, 2013; Jeram et al, 2016). This is particularly clear on the issue of immigration, in which the EAJ-PNV has become "a strong supporter of robust social rights for immigrants and vociferous critic of the Spanish's state treatment of 'illegal' migrants," (Jeram et al: 1236).

Some of the literature on Basque nationalism focuses more on the Basque language (e.g. Shabad & Gunther, 1982; Urla, 1988). The analysis of the Basque language is a particularly important element of the literature due to the fact that Basque is a language isolate, meaning it "is a language which has no relatives," (Campbell, 2010: 16). In a paper discussing both Basque and Catalan, Shabad and Gunther

argue that the Basque language itself, for those within the Basque nationalist movement, was not ever key for defining their movement. Instead, it was simply a way for Basque nationalists to defend their own perceived national identity. This was done by using the Basque language to emphasise the clear differences between the Basque identity and the central Spanish identity (p. 447).

One of the most important and largest sections found within the literature on Basque nationalism and the Basque independence movement is the literature which discusses the armed group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (e.g. Jauregui, 1986; Douglass & Zulaika, 1990; Barros, 2003; Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007). In an earlier piece on ETA, Jauregui discusses the origins of the group, stating that it was a result of the interaction of two factors, "traditional Basque nationalist ideology" and "Francoism," (p. 587). Jauregui also discussed the left-wing nature of the organisation, arguing that one of the three main currents of the organisation supported a reconciliation "of ETA and the revolutionary movements of the new European Left," (p. 597). Douglass and Zulaika continue the discussion of the history of ETA, additionally looking further at the behaviour of the organisation in the post-Franco era. This period saw Spain transition into a democratic state and the Basque Country given its own political institutions and autonomy (p. 246). More recent literature on ETA has focused on a number of different aspects of the organisation. For example, Barros focused on the effectiveness of the responses of the Spanish authorities to the terrorist activities of ETA. In a comparative piece on ETA and the IRA, Sànchez-Cuenca distinguishes nationalist terrorist organisations from others, arguing that they make a territorial claim, always asking "for independence or greater autonomy for some territory," (p. 289). More recent research has also explored the electoral support for the group's political wing, Batasuna (e.g. de la Calle & Sánchez-Cuenca, 2013).

There is a smaller and more recent literature which discusses the ideological nature of specific Basque nationalist parties. However, it is also notable that the radical left-wing national independence party EH Bildu has broadly been ignored in the current literature on Basque nationalism. This is strange given its electoral success in the two most recent Basque Parliament elections, finishing second in

both 2016 and 2020, winning 21.3% of the vote in 2016 and 27.8% of the vote in 2020 (Departamento de Seguridad, 2020). There has been some research conducted the largest Basque nationalist party, the EAJ-PNV (e.g. Mees, 2015; Elias & Mees, 2017). Mees argues that the EAJ-PNV has always balanced two contrasting positions, "radical claims for the future (independent state within Europe) and relatively more pragmatic demands for the party's short-term politics," (p. 60).

Catalonia

Earlier literature on Catalan nationalism has approached the topic from a number of different perspectives. In his same discussions on Basque nationalism, Payne, when specifically looking at Catalan nationalism, offers the same historical background to the origins of the Catalan nationalist movement, finding it originally started as a movement of the middle class, with it only attracting the working class at a later time (1964: 409). Payne also examined the origins of modern left-wing Catalan nationalism, discussing the founding and early electoral success of the ERC in the early 1930s (1971: 40-41). Discussing the Catalan language, Inglehart and Woodward (1967) in a broader discussion on language conflict, argued that the situation in Catalonia was an example "in which language conflicts are encouraged by political leaders to promote their special interests," (p. 37). With Catalan nationalism originally being a product of the middle class but becoming a more left-wing movement, Harrison (1976) discusses the failure of the right-wing Catalan nationalist movement in the early 20th Century, particularly the downfall of the right-wing Catalan nationalist party, Lliga Regionalista.

More recent literature on Catalan nationalism has focused more on its ideological nature (e.g. Keating, 2000; Dinas, 2012). In an analysis on Spain's most high-profile sub-nationalist movements, Keating described Catalan nationalism "as modernizing and European," (p. 33). Keating found that many in the Catalan movement "continued to stress the need to operate within the Spanish state" and focus on its strategy of representing Catalan interests at the European level (p. 35). Dinas, in a study of both Basque and Catalan nationalism, explores the left-right leanings of both movements and their respective nations more broadly. Dinas found that both Catalan and Basque voters tend to "lean

towards the left" arguing part of this explanation is due to fact that within these nations there is an "the association between nationalism and the left." This association comes from a perception of "a right-wing-driven 'Spanish Nationalism'," particularly from within the Spanish conservative party Partido Popular, which, from the perspective of Catalan and Basque nationalists, opposes the interests of their respective nations (p. 482).

During the 2010s, the literature began focusing more specifically on Catalan independence, rather than Catalan nationalism more broadly (e.g. Carrera, 2014; Guibernau, 2014; Elias, 2015; Elias & Mees, 2017). Both Carrera and Guibernau offer some of the first literature which explicitly discusses the likelihood and prospects of an independent Catalan state. This is significant as it represented a shift in the academic literature towards studying Catalan independence as a serious possibility, rather than a long-term ambition for a minority of the movement, as it was portrayed by Keating (2000: 34) just 14 years prior. Other more recent works on Catalan independence have addressed the party strategies involved. Elias analyses the strategies of, at the time, Catalonia's two largest national independence parties, the CiU and ERC, and how they brought the issue of Catalan independence to "the top of the Catalan and Spanish political agenda," (2015: 83). More recent research on Catalan independence has continued past research looking at the left-right ideological nature of the movement, addressing both its more centre-right middle class element and also its more left-wing element (e.g. della Porta & Portos, 2020), but has also looked at the issue from other perspectives, for example looking at the issue of Catalan secession from the perspective of the EU (e.g. Holesch & Jordana, 2021).

Another element of the Catalan independentist ideology which has gained more attention in the literature recently is the populist element to it (e.g. Barrio et al, 2018; de las Heras-Pedrosa et al, 2020). Barrio et al claim there has been a "populist drift" within the Catalan nationalist movement, which has been fuelled by the "ascent of Catalan secessionism," (p. 994). They argue that this populist ideology is mostly expressed through a "fiscal grievance" which exists in Catalan nationalist discourse,

with regards to the rest of Spain, due to Catalonia being one of Spain's wealthier Autonomous Communities (p. 1000).

Other more recent literature has focused on public votes in Catalonia and how they have related to the independence movement (e.g. Martí & Cetrà, 2016; Anderson, 2017; Öner, 2019; Ferreira, 2021). Martí and Cetrà discuss the 2015 Catalan Parliament election, in which a pro-independence majority, made up of the electoral coalition Junts pel Sí and the CUP, was elected (p. 114). Anderson and Öner analyse different elements of the legally unrecognised 2017 Catalan independence referendum, Anderson looking at the perspective before the vote and Öner looking at it from the perspective of after the vote from both the Catalan and European points of view. Ferreira also analyses the 2017 referendum, as well as the events which followed soon after, analysing why there was an escalation between the Spanish and Catalan governments, which had led "to the point of extreme institutional disruption," at the time of the referendum (p. 1). Ferreira argues that this escalation was "explained by the expectations and the self-justification attitudes of the decision-makers" both in the Spanish and Catalan Governments. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy was "committed to a policy of non-negotiation due to Spanish unity being a principle enshrined in law" while "the Catalan cabinet repeatedly promised to deliver some sort of self-determination arrangement for Catalonia," (p. 15).

The recent literature on Catalan nationalism also continues to make reference to the Catalan language (e.g. Rendon, 2007; Woolard, 2013; Argelaguet, 2021). Though interestingly, the recent literature which specifically discusses the political importance of the Catalan language is less frequent, with the focus instead being on the political issues referenced above. Evidence of the importance of the Catalan language in Catalan society can be found in the research conducted by Rendon. Rendon found "that speaking and reading Catalan increases the probability of being employed by 3 to 5 percentage points," (p. 683). Other interesting studies of the Catalan language have included the research by Woolard, who studied the experiences of young Castilian speakers who had moved to Catalonia and, therefore, had to incorporate Catalan into their lives. Interestingly, the research found that these new

Catalan speakers were more opposed to the politicisation of the Catalan language (p. 221). Argelaguet's research found that those who spoke Catalan were more likely to support Catalan independence. This work found this was the case in 1996, when independence was not as big an issue, and also in 2020, when independence has become far more significant. The evidence also showed that those who spoke only Catalan as a primary language were slightly more likely to support independence in 2020 than they were in 1996 (p. 431).

Scotland

Scottish nationalism has been discussed significantly within the literature on national independence case studies. As had already been discussed, there is research on Scottish nationalism which addresses the more republican nature of SNP voters when compared with Conservative and Labour voters (Rose & Kavanagh, 1976). There has also been research which has discussed the link between anti-militarisation and the left-wing nature of modern Scottish nationalism (Ritchie, 2016). The large amount of literature on Scottish nationalism is unsurprising due to the fact that Scottish nationalism, and particularly the SNP, has played a significant role in British politics, especially since the 2011 Scottish Parliament Election and the subsequent 2014 Independence Referendum. The literature broadly focuses on the ideological nature of Scottish nationalism and on the SNP. There is much less literature discussing Scotland's smaller national independence parties such as the Scottish Greens and SSP.

While Scottish nationalism has become much more high-profile in recent years, it has been discussed in the literature for decades. Early discussions on Scottish nationalism began in the late 1960s, after the SNP surprisingly won the 1967 Hamilton by-election and had further successes in the 1968 Scottish local elections (Hanham, 1968). Hanham makes a number of different interesting findings in relation to Scottish nationalism. For example, he argued that the Scottish nationalist movement and the SNP had survived within the UK due to "the sense of national self-consciousness which is general throughout the country," (p. 584). Other early literature discusses the religious elements of Scottish

nationalism (e.g. Reid, 1973). Reid argued that the Scottish Reformation in particular played an important role in the development of Scottish nationalist feeling amongst Scottish Christians, creating an anti-English sentiment amongst Catholic Scots but also creating a strong sense of Scottish national pride amongst Protestants as well (p. 29). Over this earlier period, within the literature, there is evidence that the ideology of the Scottish nationalist movement, and particularly the SNP, had somewhat evolved by the 1970s (Farbey et al, 1980). In a study of SNP literature, Farbey et al found that "the central elements" of the SNP ideology had remained unchanged (p. 416), but certain policy areas, such as discussions of oil and energy, had only become more important to the nationalist ideology at a later period (p. 408). A particularly interesting finding, from Farbey et al, was that, at that moment in time, "Scottish nationalism had moved from the center of the political stage in Britain," (p. 421), suggesting support for the movement was on the decline. There is also an early literature which discusses the ideological nature of the SNP. Research in the 1960s looked at the case of the SNP from a theory of violence perspective, discussing the fact that it is a prominent example of a non-violent "separatist" movement (Schwarz, 1969: 496).

In the 1970s, further studies of the SNP and its voters were conducted (e.g. Mansbach, 1973; Taylor, 1973). Looking at the SNP's electoral success of the 1960s, Mansbach argued that the increased support for the party in urbans areas was only "temporary" while support in more rural areas was more reliable, being "rooted in traditional opposition to political and economic centralization and perceived cultural deprivation," (p. 210). When analysing both the SNP and Plaid Cymru, Taylor made a number of interesting findings, including the fact that the SNP's support was "not strongly correlated with social and cultural characteristics" and that the nature of its support appeared to be as "a vehicle for protest, appearing as a result of temporary dissatisfactions and disappearing as quickly," (p. 45). A later study by Agnew (1985) analysed the geographical distribution of the support for the SNP in Scotland. Agnew finds support for the SNP in Scotland is not evenly spread, with there being some "nationalist" parts of the nation where "The SNP is either the major political party or major opposition party" and other parts where SNP support is "weak and volatile," (p. 193).

More recent literature on Scottish nationalism addresses the topic from a number of different aspects. In one of the few pieces that addresses an alternative national independence party in Scotland, looking at the combination of green politics and nationalism, Hamilton (2002) discusses the environmentalist agenda of both the SNP and the Scottish Greens. Hamilton discusses the fact that a tension exists between the two, with the SNP continuing to favour the use of fossil fuels in order to bolster the Scottish welfare state (p. 42). Connell (2004) critically addresses the label of a colony sometimes given to Scotland within nationalist discourse. Connell makes the case that other than "its service to a nationalist political agenda, it remains unclear what is gained by defining Scotland as an English colony," (p. 262). Kearton (2005) discusses the use of myths and history by the Scottish nationalist movement in order to improve its own political success. Kearton argues that the use of history pushes the limits of the supposedly civic nature of Scottish nationalism, with these tactics traditionally being used by ethnic nationalist movements (p. 39).

More recent research on the left-wing nature of modern Scottish nationalism has linked it to the resistance, from within Scotland, to the neo-liberal politics of the conservative Thatcher Government of the 1980s (Jackson, 2014). The left-wing ideological view of the SNP, which continues to this day, is especially interesting given that it was viewed by many quite differently before the 1980s. In the 1970s, many on the left in Scotland labelled the SNP as "Tartan Tories," (Lynch, 2009: 630). This would suggest that there was a more nationalist and conservative perception of the party's ideological nature. Unsurprisingly, given how significant an event it was, a lot of the more recent literature discusses the nature of Scottish nationalism in relation to the 2014 Independence Referendum (e.g. Mullen, 2014; Pattie & Johnston, 2017). There have also been examples of recent literature which has offered a broader historical overview of the Scottish nationalist movement, analysing how it has evolved into one of Europe's most high-profile national independence movements (e.g. Elliot, 2018).

More recent literature has also continued to focus on the SNP. After the SNP won the Scottish Parliament Election in 2007, Leith and Steven (2010) addressed two arguments as to, what was at the

time, the SNP's inconsistent levels of success. These two arguments were the ability of the party to take advantage of short-term political opportunities" and "the ability of the party to play down its core policy of independence in Europe," (p. 263). Massetti (2018) in a study of both the SNP and Plaid Cymru, argued that, as a response to the austerity programme of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the SNP used a combination of "regionalist, leftist, and populist ideologies/discourses," (p. 950). Massetti compared this approach to the nature of the left-wing euroscepticism found in Southern European parties such as Podemos and Syriza (Ibid.).

Wales

Due to its distinct language and the continued activity of its main nationalist party, Plaid Cymru, there has been a significant body of literature written on Welsh nationalism. A lot of the focus in the literature has been on the Welsh language. That being said, there has also been broader work conducted on the topic. Some of this literature has focused on the political evolution and nature of Wales's main national independence party, Plaid Cymru. However, in more recent years, the literature on secessionist movements in the UK has focused more on the Scottish case rather than the Welsh case. This is understandable given the recent electoral successes of the SNP, particularly in comparison to the more modest success of Plaid Cymru, and the 2014 Referendum. It should also be noted that development of the left-wing nature of the Welsh nationalist ideology in relation to British militarism is a topic which has been broadly ignored so far in the literature.

Much of the early literature on Welsh nationalism focuses on the importance of the Welsh language (e.g. Thomas, 1966; Bourhis et al, 1973; Taylor, 1973). Thomas offers a historical discussion of the Welsh language, discussing the decline of its usage within Wales, particularly over the 19th Century, as well addressing a number of examples of where the Welsh language had been suppressed. Other early literature focuses on the Welsh language as more of a political tool. Bourhis et al found that individuals in Wales who either spoke Welsh or were learning Welsh felt more of a Welsh national identity than

those who did not speak Welsh (p. 457). Unsurprisingly, in his analysis of Plaid and the SNP, Taylor found that the Welsh language was closely associated with support for Plaid Cymru (p. 45).

Other early literature has focused on Welsh nationalism more broadly (e.g. Morgan, 1971; Jones, 1978; Ragin, 1979). Looking at a broader history of Welsh nationalism, Morgan came to the conclusion that the movement was "essentially linguistic", and also found that Plaid Cymru in particular were more focused on campaigning "for the British government to remedy its neglect of Wales … rather than for Wales to be left separatist and alone," (p. 172). Discussing the "new brands of Celtic nationalism," Jones analysed the possible factors "for the growing disaffection between London and its so-called Celtic fringes," (p. 37). One element discussed by Jones was the economy, for example, the fact that unemployment consistently ran "at a higher level than in England," (p. 42).

Discussions of the Welsh language have continued in more recent literature on Welsh nationalism. Some of this literature has discussed the impact of language protection reforms which were introduced in the late 1980s and 1990s (e.g. May, 2000; Huws, 2006; Edwards et al, 2011). May studied the effects of the most high-profile developments of Welsh language protection at the end of the 20th Century, the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 1993 Welsh Language Act. He argued that these reforms, at the time he was writing, had highlighted "tensions over compulsion and voluntarism" when it came to the Welsh language being reintroduced more widely into Welsh society (p. 124). Looking specifically at the effect of the 1993 Welsh Language Act in promoting the Welsh language in the Welsh legal system, Huws concluded that it had been "a successful measure, but one that has only had a measure of success," (p. 159). Other literature on late 20th Century reforms relating to the Welsh language have looked at other perspectives. Edwards et al, for example, looked at the reforms from the perspective of Conservative governments of the 1980s and 1990s. More recent discussions of the Welsh language have focused on other more specific areas of its impact. Interestingly, some of the literature has even analysed the use of the Welsh language on social media (e.g. Honeycutt & Cunliffe, 2010; Jones et al, 2013).

While language is clearly a widely discussed element of Welsh nationalism within the literature, more recent parts of the literature have also discussed other elements of Welsh nationalism too (e.g. Pitchford, 2001; Nguyen et al, 2015). Pitchford argues that "Welsh nationalists have framed their claims using appeals to values such as tolerance … the right to resist domination … and the importance of community," (p. 60). Pitchford argues that the community aspect is especially important, given the fact that the perception of the existence of a single community in Wales is far stronger than in England (Ibid.). Other research has looked further at the community aspect of Welsh nationalism, particularly in how it is framed by Plaid Cymru (e.g. McAllister, 1998). Nguyen et al emphasised the existence of "a tension between the English and the Welsh" which had elements of nationalism to it (p. 16).

Other elements of literature on Welsh nationalism have focused on the ideological nature of Plaid Cymru. Some of the literature exclusively looks at Plaid Cymru (e.g. McAllister, 1998; Jones, 2009). Jones looks at the ideological nature of Plaid Cymru, discussing its historic positions on the left-right spectrum, its positions on EU integration and its positions of Welsh devolution and independence. Other literature on Plaid Cymru has analysed the party in comparison to other national independence parties. One particularly common comparison, looking at national independence movements in the UK perspective, is with the SNP (e.g. McAngus, 2016; Massetti, 2018). However, there have also been other comparisons. For example, Van Atta (2003) compares Plaid Cymru to the BNG in Galicia, arguing that there are a large number of similarities between the two parties and their respective nations (p. 36).

Chapter Three: The Puzzle and Research Design

The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following research question: "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" This research question is based on a puzzle. This puzzle is, given that statewide nationalist parties are overwhelmingly right-wing (Rydgren, 2007: 242), why do national independence parties hold such a wide variety of positions on the left-right spectrum? This chapter first confirms the premise that there is variation among national independence parties along the left-right political dimension. This is done in this chapter through an analysis of secessionist cases from an already established database of cases of regionalist parties, the Schakel Regionalist Party Database (2020). This section will verify that these parties are in fact significantly varied on the left-right axis, justifying the need to tackle this puzzle and to find an answer to the research question.

The second section of this chapter outlines the research design of this thesis, the hypotheses that are being tested and the methodological choices made when answering the research question. This section will also offer theoretical justifications for the methodological choices made in each chapter, as well as for the research design as a whole. The methods chosen for this thesis were a mix of qualitative and quantitative approaches. The thesis first conducts a large-n quantitative analysis of a database of cases of national independence parties standing in regional and statewide elections, in order to test eight hypotheses. This chapter outlines and makes reference to previous research in order to provide theoretical grounding to these hypotheses, justifying their testing in this thesis. The findings from this chapter are then further supported and enhanced through qualitative research in the subsequent chapters. This was done through pairs of cases being nested into the analysis. This was done in order to address in more detail the causal mechanisms behind the correlations found in Chapter Four. Controlled comparisons of two pairs of case studies were used to investigate the variation in traditional left-right ideology while two others were used to further investigate the variation in mainstream-radical ideology.

The puzzle at the heart of this thesis is as follows: given the universally right-wing nature of traditional statewide nationalist parties, why is the left-right ideology of national independence parties so varied? Clearly, for this puzzle to be logically correct, it requires for there to be a significant degree of variation in the left-right ideology of different national independence parties. Previous research has found that this is the case amongst regionalist parties (e.g. Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015). Earlier research found that regionalist parties created an ideological challenge to the status quo in many western states by attempting to bring about the end of their more centralised nature (e.g. Inglehart, 1977; Berger, 1979). This research found that these parties were creating an alternative ideological axis to the traditional left-right axis. Following on from this, later research explored more specifically the left-right ideology of these parties (e.g. Newman, 1997; Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015). This research has shown that there is significant left-right ideological variation within this group of parties. This research also found that multiple factors can impact this variation, including party competition and comparative regional economic conditions. Despite this previous work, it still needs to be explicitly shown that this is the case specifically in national independence parties. This is the purpose of this section of this thesis.

This variation is shown through an analysis of the Schakel Regionalist Party Database. The database is the largest of its kind. It has recorded all the significant cases of regionalist parties which have been active in elections, in both Western Europe and Canada, between 1945 and 2010. This database records the ideology of these parties, from both a left-right perspective and from a centre-periphery perspective. Given the fact that this thesis is only looking at national independence parties, the analysis will specifically focus on cases recorded in the Schakel database as "secessionist". While the centre-peripheral ideology of the secessionist parties in the Schakel database do, broadly speaking, correlate with the ideology of the national independence parties in this thesis, it should be noted that a small number of parties in the Schakel database would not qualify as national independence parties

in this research. One such example of this is Sinn Fein. While being a secessionist party in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein is not included in this thesis as a national independence party. This is because Sinn Fein seeks for Northern Ireland to leave the United Kingdom and join an already recognised country, the Republic of Ireland, rather than seeking full independence for Northern Ireland. These parties have still been included in this analysis as it was the more straightforward way of running this investigation as opposed to trying to pick out all the non-independentist secessionist parties in Schakel's database.

Observations From the Schakel Regionalist Party Database

The Schakel Database has recorded cases of regionalist parties from between 1945 to 2010. These cases come from 11 countries, Canada and 10 Western European countries. The database records all notable cases of regionalist parties in both national and regional elections.

<u>The Centre-Periphery Divide</u>

The centre-periphery ideology of these parties is measured with two variables. The first is an ordinal variable which measures the parties from one to four, with one measuring "protectionist" parties and four measuring "separationist" parties. The second is a binary variable in which zero is designated to "autonomist" parties and one to "secessionist" parties. Due to the focus of this thesis, this chapter will analyse the ideological nature of the parties labelled as secessionist. Of the eleven included countries, eight had cases of secessionist parties (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK) and three did not (Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland).

At the regional level, all eleven countries included in the database had at least one case of a regionalist party. There were 639 cases overall with 207 of those cases being secessionist. The countries with the lowest number of cases were Sweden with just one case, followed by Switzerland with only five cases. The country with the highest number was Spain with 171 cases. This was only six cases more than the second highest number, 165 in Italy. Looking at secessionist parties specifically, three countries had no cases (the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland). The next lowest number of cases of secessionist

parties was found in France which had just three. The case with the highest number of secessionist cases, by some distance, was Spain with 61. The two countries with the next highest number were Canada with 36 cases and Denmark with 33 cases.

Table 3.1: Total Number of Cases in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database (Regional Level)

Country	Total Number of Cases	Total Number of Secessionist Cases
Belgium	30	16
Canada	47	36
Denmark	64	33
France	18	3
Germany	86	15
Italy	165	21
Netherlands	11	0
Spain	171	61
Sweden	1	0
Switzerland	5	0
United Kingdom	41	22
Total	639	207

Table 3.2: Total Number of Cases in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database (National Level)

Country	Total Number of Cases	Total Number of Secessionist Cases
Belgium	116	40
Canada	7	7
Denmark	62	29
France	14	2
Germany	123	10
Italy	180	41
Netherlands	0	0
Spain	164	63
Sweden	0	0
Switzerland	5	0
United Kingdom	92	62
Total	763	254

At the national level, two of the included countries, the Netherlands and Sweden, had no cases of regionalist parties. There were 763 cases altogether at the national level with 254 of these cases being secessionist. Switzerland and Canada had the next lowest numbers of cases, with five and seven respectively. The party with the highest number of regionalist cases was Italy with 180, followed by Spain with 164. Looking at secessionist parties, along with the Netherlands and Sweden, Switzerland

had no cases at the national level. France and Canada had the next lowest numbers of cases with two and seven respectively. The case with the highest number of secessionist cases was Spain with 63, one more than the UK which had 62 cases. What is clear from these observations is that there are a large number of secessionist cases in Western countries which can be analysed. This then makes it possible to clearly show the large ideological variation which can be found in this group of political parties.

The Left-Right Divide

This section analyses the left-right ideology of the secessionist parties in the Schakel regionalist party database. As was explored in detail above, these parties come from eight countries. There are 461 cases of secessionist parties in the database, 207 cases at the regional level and 254 at the national level. This section will look at the ideological variation found in the group of cases as a whole, at both the regional and national level. The analysis will then look at each country specifically, in order to explore variation on a country by country basis. Left-right ideology, in the Schakel database, is measured using two variables. The first is an ordinal variable which measures the left-right ideology of regionalist parties from one to six. One has been designated to the most left-wing parties and six to the most right-wing parties. The second variable is a binary variable in which left-wing parties are denoted with a zero and right-wing parties with a one. This analysis will focus on the ordinal variable. This is because the ordinal variable gives us a more detailed picture of the variance in left-right ideology of the parties being analysed. This variable also makes it possible to look at ideological variation from a mainstream-radical perspective.

Looking at Table 3.3 below, it is clear that there is significant variation in the left-right ideology of secessionist parties at the regional level. Across the entire group of cases, all six of the left-right ideological positions are represented. The ideological position which was most common is two, which is a label given to traditional social democratic parties and green parties, with 80 cases holding that position. The least common ideological position was three, which is the label given to left-leaning centrist parties. Broadly speaking, there is a left-wing leaning to these cases overall. There were 122

cases which held a left-wing position, those measured between one and three, while there were 69

cases which held a right-wing position, those measured between four and six. The most common right-

wing position held by these parties was a five, which represents traditional conservative parties.

Crucially to this thesis, it is clear that, at the regional level, secessionist parties hold a wide variety of

different left-right ideological positions.

Table 3.3: Breakdown of Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology (Regional Level)

Ideological Position	Number of Cases
1	33
2	80
3	9
4	14
5	39
6	16
No Measurement	16
Total	207

Table 3.4: Breakdown of Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology (National Level)

Ideological Position	Number of Cases
1	37
2	81
3	47
4	25
5	20
6	22
No Measurement	22
Total	254

As is shown in Table 3.4, there is significant variation in the ideology of secessionist parties at the

national level. As was the case at the regional level, all six ideological positions are represented in this

group of parties. The most common ideological position in this group of parties was a two. This is an

interesting similarity between secessionist parties at the regional and national levels. An interesting

difference between the national and regional levels is that the ideological position which is least

common at the national level is a five. This was not the case at the regional level, where this ideological

position was the second most common. As was the case at the regional level, there is a left-wing leaning to the cases at the national level. There were 165 cases which came from a left-wing position while there were only 67 cases which came from a right-wing position. The most common right-wing position held by these parties was a four, which represents right-leaning centrist parties. It is clear that, at the national level, secessionist parties hold a large variety of different left-right ideological positions.

Overall, it is clear that, at both the regional and national levels, that there is a large degree of variation in the left-right ideology of secessionist parties in the Schakel database. This supports the claim that there is a puzzle which needs to be solved and justifies the need to answer the research question of this thesis. The rest of this section will look specifically at each of the eight countries in the database which had secessionist cases and see if this variation is also witnessed within specific countries.

Belgium

In the Schakel database, the only secessionist parties that were active in Belgium were Flemish nationalist parties. In regional elections, these parties were active in both Flanders and in Brussels. At the national level, these parties were only recorded as being active in Flanders. The parties from Belgium, included in the database, were the Volksunie, Vlaams Belang[1] and the Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA).

Looking at the left-right ideology of these parties, it is clear that the overwhelming majority of recorded cases of secessionist parties in Belgium were right-wing. 85% of cases were right-wing at the national level and 81.25% of cases were right-wing at the regional level. Looking at parties specifically, both Vlaams Belang and the N-VA consistently held right-wing positions. The only left-wing cases in the database came from the Volksunie. Interestingly, the Volksunie was recorded as a right-wing party

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[1] Before 2004, the predecessor party to Vlaams Belang was the Vlaams Blok. Vlaams Belang emerged after the Vlaams Blok was banned from Belgian politics due to breaking the country's anti-racism laws (see Erk, 2005). Given the close connection between these two parties, in the Schakel database, they are both referenced as Vlaams Belang.

in the 1980s and a left-wing party in the 1990s. Looking at the percentage of right-wing cases, it could be argued that there is not as much ideological variation within Belgium. However, it should be noted that there was variation with the degree of radicalism found on the right. When the Volksunie was recorded as a right-wing party, it was recorded as a right-leaning centrist party and the N-VA was always recorded as a traditional conservative party. In contrast, Vlaams Belang was consistently recorded as a radical right-wing party. This would suggest that, in the case of Belgium, there has been more ideological variation on the mainstream-radical axis than on the traditional left-right axis.

Figure 3.1: Breakdown of Belgium Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

Canada

In Canada, there were two groups of secessionist parties recorded in the Schakel database. The first was the cases from Quebec and the second was the cases from Western Canada. At the national level, only cases from Quebec were recorded. At the regional level, both Québécois and Western Canadian cases were included. The only Western Canadian case which was included was the Western Canadian Concept (WCC). The WCC took party in 14 regional elections in four provinces (Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba and Saskatchewan). In Quebec, there was only one party active at the national

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level, the Bloc Québécois. In contrast, there were five secessionist parties recorded at the regional level. The most notable of these was the Parti Québécois.

Looking at Canada as a whole, there is a large degree of ideological variation found in its secessionist parties. Excluding the cases which did not have a recorded left-right ideological position, 57.58% of Canadian cases were found to be right-wing while 42.42% were found to be left-wing. Interestingly, there was more variety found on the left than on the right. On the left, there were examples of radical left-wing, traditional social democratic and left-leaning centrist cases. In contrast, on the right, there were only cases of traditional conservative parties. It should be noted that there was significant variation at the regional level but not at the national level. Due to the Bloc Québécois being the only recorded case at the national level, all cases were the same ideological position, left-leaning centrist.

Figure 3.2: Breakdown of Canadian Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

Looking at the two cases specifically, there was more variation in Quebec than in Western Canada. However, both these cases still had a clear leaning towards one ideological position. The reason for there being more variation in Quebec was because of the fact that were was only a single active party in Western Canada, the WCC. In all the cases in which it stood, the WCC was recorded as a traditional

conservative party. In Quebec, parties came from both right-wing and left-wing cases. The majority of these cases (80.77%) were left-wing. This is an interesting observation because it shows that, while there is a significant degree of variation in Canada as a whole, there is much less variation when you look at the sub-national level.

Denmark

In Denmark, secessionist parties come from two autonomous communities, the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Both Faroese and Greenlandic secessionist parties were found to be active at both the regional and national level. In Greenland, at both the national and regional levels, just a single secessionist party was recorded, Inuit Ataqatigiit. In comparison, three different parties, at both levels, were recorded in the Faroe Islands. These were Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin, Sjálvstýri and Tjóðveldi.

Figure 3.3: Breakdown of Danish Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

In Denmark as a whole, the overwhelming majority of recorded secessionist cases came from left-wing ideological positions. This was the case at both the regional and national levels. An interesting observation is that, on the left, every party recorded was recorded as a mainstream left-wing party. This suggests there is a strong consistency in the left-right ideology of left-wing secessionist parties in

Denmark, with a reluctance for these parties to take radical left-wing positions. Looking at the right, there is more variation than on the left. At both the regional and national levels, half of the right-wing Danish secessionist parties were traditional conservative parties while the other half were right-leaning centrists. While there is more variation than was found on the left, it is still an interesting observation that none of these parties have moved to the radical-right.

An interesting observation is the ideological difference between the secessionist parties in Greenland and the Faroe Islands is the fact that there is no variation in Greenland but there is in the Faroe Islands. In Greenland, the only recorded secessionist party, Inuit Ataqatigiit, consistently remained a traditional left-wing party. In contrast, in the Faroe Islands, while there was a comparable traditional left-wing party, Tjóðveldi, there were also two right-wing cases, Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin, a traditional conservative party, and Sjálvstýri, a right-leaning centrist party. The puzzle around the difference in ideology of secessionist parties in Greenland and the Faroe Islands is explored in great detail in Chapter Five of this thesis.

France

An obvious but important observation of the recorded secessionist parties from France is that there were significantly less cases than in most of the other countries which were included in the Schakel regionalist party database. Despite there being a small number of cases, secessionist parties still came from two different regions, Corsica and the Rhone-Alpes. There were two parties included from Corsica, Corsica Nazione and Accolta Naziunale Corsa (ANC). The ANC was only active in national elections while Corsica Nazione was only active in regional elections. In the Rhone-Alpes, the only included party, the Ligue Savoisienne, only stood in a single election, the 1995 Rhone-Alpes regional election.

Looking at the ideological variation seen in these cases, there is some left-right ideological variation when looking at France as a whole. However, the majority of French cases are left-wing. At the regional level, two of the three recorded cases were left-wing. At the national level, both of the cases were

also left-wing. The one right-wing case was the Ligue Savoisienne in the Rhone-Alpes. Looking more specifically at Corsica, it is interesting that every case is left-wing. Looking at the two Corsican parties, Corsica Nazione is a mainstream left-wing party while the ANC is a radical left-wing party. This shows that while all parties are left-wing in Corsica, there is some variation on the mainstream-radical axis. While France does not have many cases of secessionist parties, it does follow a similar pattern seen in a number of other countries in the database. This is because their secessionist parties, like those in other countries, both come from the left and from the right. However, this ideological variation is reduced when you look at specific regions within the country.

Figure 3.4: Breakdown of French Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

Germany

Germany is only one of two countries in the Schakel regionalist party database, along with the UK, which has only cases from either the left or from the right. This is because Germany has only ever had one case of a secessionist party, the Bayernpartei. The Bayernpartei has consistently stood in both German national elections and Bavarian regional elections between 1945 and 2010. The Schakel database consistently measured the party as one which held a traditional conservative ideological

position, both when standing at the regional level and the national level. Therefore, given the fact there has only been one secessionist party, Germany does not have the same ideological variation in its cases of secessionist parties that was seen in other countries in the Schakel database. However, it should be noted that Bavaria and the Bayernpartei share an ideological similarity with other regions and parties in the Schakel database. What we see in the database is that secessionist parties, within a single region, will almost always consistently hold either right-wing or left-wing positions. Therefore, while Germany may seem, at first glance, very different to other countries in the database, the ideological positioning of the Bayernpartei in fact consistently follows what has already been observed.

Figure 3.5: Breakdown of German Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

Italy

In Italy, secessionist parties were found in 19 regions at the national level and four regions at the regional level. The reason why there were so many different regions included at the national level was partly due to the fact that, in 1996 Italian General Election, the Lega Nord stood in ten regions, standing on a "hard-line secessionist" platform for Northern Italy, also known by the party as Padania

(Giordano, 2000: 456). The two regions in which secessionist parties seem to be most active, at both the regional and national levels, were Sardinia and Trentino-South Tyrol.

Figure 3.6: Breakdown of Italian Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

Looking at the left-right ideology of secessionist parties in Italy as a whole, there is clear ideological variation found in these cases. An interesting observation is that the average leaning of these cases is different at the regional and national levels. At the regional level, there was a right-wing leaning to these cases. 68.42% of the cases in Italy, at the regional level, were recorded as right-wing. It is also interesting that there is a large degree of variation within this group of right-wing cases. Of the 13 right-wing cases, six were either right-leaning centrist or traditional conservative. The other seven cases were recorded as radical right-wing. This suggests that there is mainstream-radical ideological variation in Italy as well as traditional left-right variation. However, in contrast, all left-wing cases at the regional level were recorded as traditional social democratic parties.

At the national level, there was a left-wing leaning to the included cases. 65% of the Italian cases, at the national level, were recorded as left-wing. The majority of these left-wing cases were left-leaning centrist and the rest were traditional social democratic parties. None of the included cases were

recorded as radical left-wing parties. This suggests that left-wing secessionist parties, at both the regional and national levels, have chosen to hold more mainstream left-wing positions and have never taken more radical positions. Looking at the right-wing cases included at the national level, the majority hold right-leaning centrist or traditional conservative positions. There were also a small number of cases which held radical right-wing positions. This would suggest that there is more variation within Italian secessionist parties on the right than there is on the left, at both the regional and national levels.

This variation on the right is best shown by the cases which have been active in Trentino-South Tyrol region. There have been numerous right-wing secessionist parties active in the region. These include Die Freiheitlichen, the Lega Nord and Union für Südtirol (UfS). In the database, UfS was consistently found to hold a mainstream right-wing position. In contrast, Die Freiheitlichen were found to always hold a radical right-wing position. Interestingly, the Lega Nord was found to be a radical right-wing party in some elections but a mainstream right-wing party in other elections. Italy and Trentino-South Tyrol perfectly represent the general findings of this chapter. We see in the case of Italy that there is a larger degree of variation in left-right ideology. However, looking at specific regions, this variation lessens. While there is less variation in traditional left-right ideology in specific regions, Trentino-South Tyrol shows that there is still mainstream-radical variation.

Spain

In Spain, the same five regions had cases of secessionist parties at both the regional and national levels. These regions were the Balearic islands, the Basque Country, Catalonia, Galicia and Navarre. An interesting observation is that, in the period recorded by the database, the Balearic Islands, Catalonia and Galicia all had one notable secessionist party which was active throughout the recorded period. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) was the most prominent party in both the Balearic Islands and Catalonia while the Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG) was the most prominent party in Galicia.

In contrast, in the Basque Country and Navarre, there were numerous Basque nationalist parties active in both regions.

Figure 3.7: Breakdown of Spanish Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

The overwhelming majority of cases of secessionist cases in Spain were found to be left-wing, at both the regional and national level. At the regional level, 88.33% of cases were left-wing and 90.48% at the national level. The dominance of left-wing cases in Spain is best shown by Galicia and Navarre. In both these regions, 100% of secessionist cases were recorded as left-wing. This left-wing leaning is also further emphasised by the fact that, of the small number of right-wing cases, none are radically right-wing. In fact, at the regional level, all right-wing cases were recorded as right-leaning centrist. The majority of right-wing cases at the national level were also right-leaning centrist but there was also a very small number of traditional conservative cases.[2] The large left-wing leaning of secessionist parties in Spain shows that its secessionist cases do not have the same left-right ideological variation as is seen in some other countries.

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[2] The two traditional conservative cases recorded in Spain were the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (EAJ-PNV) in the 1977 and 1979 Basque Parliament Elections.

However, while there is a lack of variation from a traditional left-right perspective, Spanish secessionist parties do vary more from a mainstream-radical perspective. At the regional level, 43.40% of left-wing cases in Spain were found to be radically left-wing. This figure was 43.86% at the national level. This would suggest that, while most secessionist parties in Spain hold left-wing positions, there is a split over the degree of radicalism expressed in these parties' ideologies. While the majority of these cases hold more mainstream left-wing positions, there is a significant minority of cases where Spanish secessionist parties have moved to radical left-wing positions.

United Kingdom

Secessionist cases have been recorded in three of the UK's four nations, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. Two parties were active in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP). Three parties were active in Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Scottish Greens and the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). Just one party was found to be active in Wales, Plaid Cymru. An interesting divide between secessionist parties in Scotland and Wales and in Northern Ireland is that parties in both Scotland and Wales want their respective nations to be fully independent. In contrast, secessionist parties in Northern Ireland wish for the Northern Ireland to be reunified with the Republic of Ireland. This is why cases from Scotland and Wales are included in the later chapters of this thesis but not cases from Northern Ireland.

Looking at the left-right ideology of secessionist cases in the UK, it was just one of two cases, along with Germany, which did not have a mix of left-wing and right-wing parties. However, unlike Germany, all cases from the UK came from a left-wing position. What is interesting is that in the case of Germany, this could be explained as it only had one secessionist party which was recorded, the Bayernpartei. This is clearly not the case in the UK, with it having cases from three of its nations and multiple secessionist parties being active in two of these nations. Therefore, the UK is a unique case when compared with the other countries included in the Schakel database.

Figure 3.8: Breakdown of British Secessionist Parties in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database by Left-Right Ideology

That being said, there is still some ideological variation found from a mainstream-radical perspective. This variation is found in both Northern Ireland and Scotland. It is not found in Wales due to the fact that it has only had one recorded case of a secessionist party, Plaid Cymru. Plaid Cymru was measured as a traditional social democratic party during the 20th century but was then recorded as a left-leaning centrist party from 2001 onwards. In Scotland, all three types of left-wing party were recorded. The most dominant secessionist party, the SNP, was consistently recorded as a centrist left-leaning party. The Scottish Greens were recorded as a traditional social democratic party and the SSP were a radical left-wing party. In Northern Ireland, there is a mainstream-radical split between Sinn Fein and the SDLP. Sinn Fein was recorded as a radical left-wing party while the SDLP was found to be a traditional social democratic party. This would suggest that while secessionist parties were found to be universally left-wing in the UK, it would be wrong to suggest that there was no ideological variation between its cases. Throughout the Schakel database, it was found that secessionist parties will almost always consistently hold either right-wing or left-wing positions in a specific region. Therefore, while the UK may seem like a unique country in the database, the ideological positioning of the secessionist

parties in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland is in fact consistent with what has already been observed in the majority of other regions.

The Puzzle of the Ideological Variation of National Independence Parties

This section has highlighted the puzzle at the centre of this thesis, the ideological contrast between statewide nationalist parties and national independence parties. It has explored the degree of variation in the left-right ideology of western secessionist parties. This was done through an analysis of the left-right position of secessionist parties recorded in the Schakel regionalist party database. This analysis has clearly shown that there is a significant degree of variation in the left-right ideology of national independence parties across Canada and Western Europe. This was found to be the case in both regional and national elections. It was found that there were numerous cases of both left-wing and right-wing secessionist parties. There was also variation found within both these sub-sets. There were numerous cases of parties which held more centrist positions, others which held more traditional conservative or social democratic positions and others which positioned themselves either as radically left-wing or right-wing. Therefore, this shows that there is significant variation on the traditional left-right and the mainstream-radical axes within the national independence party family grouping.

This section also looked at the variation which could be found in specific countries. What was interesting was that, for the most part, there was less variation in left-right positions as the analysis became more localised. There was less variation at the country level than at the international level. There was even less variation when looking at the regional level. Interestingly, it seems that the mainstream-radical ideology is less impacted by this effect than traditional left-right ideology. This observation further justifies the large-n method used in this thesis. This is because, when analysing variation in left-right ideology, it makes sense to analyse it where the variation is at its largest. In this case this is at the international level. This analysis has confirmed that the puzzle behind the research question, "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" is a valid one to be answered.

It has now been established that the puzzle being solved in this thesis is indeed a legitimate one.

Therefore, the second section of this chapter will address the research design, discussing the research

methods which have been used in order to solve this puzzle. This will include laying out specific the

hypotheses being tested. The broad aim of this research is to explore which factors influence the left-

right ideological positions of Canadian and Western European national independence parties. It

should be noted that this research is designed to highlight the factors which make it more likely for

national independence parties to hold certain ideological positions, as opposed to stating that certain

factors guarantee that a national independence party will hold a certain ideological position.

Table 3.5: Primary Research Methods Used in the Analytical Chapters

Chapter	Primary Research Method
Chapter Four: Large-N Analysis of National Independence Parties	Large-n comparative study of cases (quantitative)
Chapter Five: Left-Right Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies	Most similar systems design, using two pairs of cases (qualitative)
Chapter Six: Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies	Most similar systems design, using two pairs of cases (qualitative)

This thesis is a mixed methods project which uses a mix of qualitative and quantitative research

methods (see Table 3.5). Mixed methods approaches are used commonly in political science and have

been subject to much investigation within the literature (e.g. Varshney, 2001; Lieberman, 2005;

Harrits, 2011; Weaver-Hightower, 2014). The use of a mixed methods approach makes it possible to

answer the research question of the thesis with more confidence and in a more rigorous fashion. Both

the quantitative and qualitative methods used in this thesis add something important and unique to

this study. The mixed methods approach used in this thesis is a nested analysis (see Lieberman: 437).

This research design takes the approach of first conducting a large-n quantitative analysis. This

approach was taken in order to identify which factors influenced both the left-right and mainstream-

radical ideology of a large number of cases of Canadian and Western European national independence

parties. Once the large-n analysis was completed, pairs of cases were then nested into the analysis. Controlled comparisons of two pairs of cases were used to further explore variation in left-right ideology while two others were used to further explore variation in mainstream-radical ideology. These controlled comparisons are crucial to this thesis because they offer a closer look at the causal mechanisms behind the findings from the large-n analysis.

This mixed methods approach is beneficial to the thesis as a whole as it also improves both the internal and external validity of the results. The quantitative analysis identifies correlations between the left-right ideology of national independent parties and the factors which have been identified as having a possible influence over that ideology. Once these factors have been identified, the nested qualitative analysis then makes it possible to investigate how these relationships are causal by exploring the details behind how these factors influence the left-right ideology of national independence parties. By having previously used a large-n quantitative analysis, it is possible to confirm that the relationships found in the qualitative chapters are generalisable across a larger number of cases. This, therefore, emphasises the external validity of the results. Further discussion of the internal and external validity of the findings can be found later in this Chapter, primarily within the sections which are focused on Chapters Five and Six.

Hypotheses

This section sets out the hypotheses being tested in this thesis as well as laying out the theoretical background behind each. This thesis tests eight hypotheses. This is first done in Chapter Four through a quantitative analysis of hundreds of cases of national independence parties standing in both regional and statewide elections. The causal mechanisms behind these hypotheses are explored in Chapter Five and Chapter Six, steered by the findings produced in Chapter Four.

A pair of variables related to unemployment are tested against the left-right ideology of national independence parties. The first is percentage unemployment in the party's region and the second is the level of unemployment in the region compared with at the national level. This thesis is testing two hypotheses relating to unemployment.

The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis (H1): _Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more left-wing national independence parties._

The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis (H2): _Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more radical national independence parties._

The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis is primarily based on the number of different theories and academic works conducted on economic development and the left-right ideology of regionalist parties. The most significant of these was developed in Massetti and Schakel's paper, "From class to region: How regionalist parties link (and subsume) left-right into centre-periphery politics." The research from this paper found that regionalist parties from poorer regions are more likely to be left-wing and parties from richer regions are more likely to be right-wing (2015: 874). This hypothesis is also supported by a number of more general theories which discuss the relationship between economic performance and left-right ideology. It has previously been argued that in "prosperous countries people are more likely to support extreme right-wing parties," (Lubbers et al, 2002: 371), and that the losers of globalisation and those who struggle to make ends meet, i.e. those who are poorer "have a higher likelihood to vote for LWPPs [left-wing populist parties]," (Santana & Rama, 2018: 569). In this thesis, unemployment is used as a proxy for economic performance. This is due to the fact that it is a key economic indicator, discussed frequently in political science but has not been discussed as frequently in the literature on regionalist and secessionist parties.

The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis is based on the large body of literature which discusses the specific link between the increase in extreme right-wing politics and higher levels of unemployment. There have been debates over the varying degrees of the impact of higher unemployment on the support of right-wing radicalism but, in general, there seems to be an agreement that it can, at least in some circumstances, assist in facilitating it (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). Therefore, it is valid to also test the hypothesis that higher levels of unemployment could breed ideological radicalism, on both the left and the right, in national independence parties.

This thesis analyses the unemployment rate of a region in its own right but also analyses comparative unemployment, i.e. how a region's unemployment rate stands in comparison with its wider parent country. This has been done on the basis that, within the literature on regionalist parties, there exist comparative discourses which can be present within both richer and poorer regions. These offer an explanation as to why economic conditions play an important role in determining the ideology of regionalist parties. In comparatively richer regions a discourse of "bourgeois regionalism" can develop. This is where an aggrievance develops over the fact that resources are being taken from the wealthier region and given to poorer ones (Harvie, 1994). On the other hand, in comparatively poorer regions a discourse of "internal colonialism" can be present. This occurs when individuals living in a poorer region feel that the central state has allowed a lag in their region's economic development intentionally due to the prioritising of other regions (Hechter, 1975). It should be expected that the bourgeois regionalist and internal colonialist discourses would be relevant to specifically national independence parties as we know they are relevant to regionalist parties more broadly. This is why comparative unemployment is included in the testing of the two unemployment hypotheses.

National State Characteristics

Two hypotheses have been tested which are relevant to two distinct characteristics of the nation state, the head of state and levels of military spending. These two hypotheses are grouped as they share a

common theme. This theme is characteristics of the state which could potentially impact the left-right ideology of national independence parties. These two characteristics are also important specifically in the context of the ideology of national independence parties. This is because issues such as governing institutions and the military are important in the context of nation building. Each of these characteristics is directly linked to a single hypothesis tested in this thesis:

The Monarchy Hypothesis (H3): *National independence parties which exist within a constitutional monarchy are more likely to be left-wing.*

The Military Expenditure Hypothesis (H4): *Countries with higher levels of military spending are more likely to have left-wing national independence parties.*

When looking at national independence parties in the West, it is clear to see that there are many examples of left-wing parties which have strong republican traditions. These include the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) in Catalonia (Esquerra Republicana, 2019), the Scottish Green Party (Scottish Greens, 2021) and Tjóðveldi in the Faroe Islands (Pieters, 2021: 96). These examples could suggest that there is a strong republican element that exists within many Western left-wing national independence parties. There is also evidence, found within the literature, to support the fact that a larger level of support for monarchy is found amongst more right-wing voters (e.g. Rose & Kavanagh, 1976: 555). If this is the case, it is plausible to expect to find that regions within monarchies would be more likely to have left-wing national independence parties. This is due to the fact that these parties are naturally opposed to the political establishment of their parent country. In the case of monarchies it would make sense for that opposition to include at least some hostility towards the monarchic nature of the parent country's head of state.

This thesis analyses the left-right ideology of national independence parties against the military spending of the party's parent country. This line of enquiry is suggested by the fact that, in modern western democracies, it has been argued that right-wing parties traditionally favour increases in military spending while left-wing parties are more ideologically in favour of promoting peace and

prefer to increase spending on other areas of social welfare (e.g. Klingemann et al, 1994; Bove et al, 2017). Therefore, if a political establishment is spending more on its military, the political parties which have a natural opposition to that establishment, including national independence parties, are more likely to oppose this spending and therefore are more likely to have a more leftist ideological position. An example of a case which appears to fit *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis* is Scotland. Scotland is a nation with a left-leaning national independence movement. The opposition to military spending and military interventions from within this movement, particularly with regards to nuclear weapons, is a notable part of its left-wing ideological makeup (see Ritchie, 2016).

Language

This thesis tests the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties against a single language variable. That variable measures the existence of a historic language spoken within a region, distinct from the primary language of its parent country. For many nationalist movements, a language can mean so much more than simply being a tool of communication. In some cases, we have seen language transformed from "an aspect of the everyday cultural means of social life" into "a historical/ethnic claim to nationhood," (Calhoun, 1993: 224). There is a significant amount of literature on nationalist discourse which discusses the importance of language (e.g. Blommaert & Verschuere, 1992). Some of this literature focuses more specifically on the importance of language in sub-nationalist movements (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; Sorens, 2005; van Morgan, 2006). This makes it a vital variable to study when analysing the ideology of national independence parties. This thesis tests a single hypothesis relating to language:

The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis (H5): Regions with their own distinct language are more likely to have radical national independence parties.

The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis is based on the literature which discusses cases of nationalist groups, on both the left and the right, which emphasise the importance of a national language in their political discourses. On the right, it has been known for nationalist groups to become

involved in the protection of what is perceived by them to be their own national language (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003). A prominent example of this, within the national independentist prism, is Vlaams Belang, a far-right party which places a strong emphasis on the protection of the Dutch language in Flanders (De Cleen, 2016a). Therefore, it could make sense to find that some regions with their own distinct language have national independence parties which come from the right. This is on the basis that they have something which is important to their distinct national identity that they wish to protect.

However, there is also evidence to suggest that there are ethnic protectionist elements within certain cases of left-wing nationalist movements (Jeram et al, 2016: 1232). There are a number of examples of stateless nations whose nationalist discourses are viewed as predominantly civic or left-wing in nature which place a strong emphasis on protecting their national language, such as the Basque Country, Catalonia and Wales (Carlin, 2013). Therefore, it could also be possible that regions with their own distinct language have national independence parties which come from the left. Given that both left-wing and right-wing nationalist movements have been known to place an emphasis on language protection, it would then make sense to expect those regions with their own distinct language to turn to more radical ideologies, on both the left and the right, in order to protect an important element of their distinct national culture.

Party Competition

This thesis analyses the impact of the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties in the event of which more than one national independence party stands in the same election. In line with this analysis, the following party competition hypothesis is proposed:

The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis (H6): *A national independence party will become ideologically radical when facing electoral competition from an ideologically mainstream alternative.*

The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis is based on the fact that in an election with multiple national independence parties, these parties would broadly speaking be in direct competition with each other, in terms of their constitutional offer to the electorate. Therefore, you might expect to find these parties search for an opening on the left-right ideological spectrum so they can appear distinct from their closest competitors. This is something which has already been proven to be the case of regionalist parties more broadly (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871). In this thesis national independence parties in the majority of cases come from the same general ideological leaning, either broadly from the left or from the right.[3] Therefore, it would then make sense that the variation of ideology would appear from the mainstream-radical perspective. A notable example where this can be observed is in Scotland. In this thesis, it was found that all cases of Scottish national independence parties were left-wing. However, some of these cases took more mainstream left-wing positions, for example the Scottish National Party (SNP), while others took more radical left-wing positions, for example the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). Therefore, you would expect to find that in the event a national independence party has competition from another national independence party that is ideologically mainstream, the first party will become ideologically more radical in order to appear distinct from its rival.

Immigration

This thesis looks at two hypotheses relating to immigration, one focusing on left-right ideology and the other on mainstream-radical ideology:

The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis (H7): *Countries with a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals will have more right-wing national independence parties.*

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[3] Of the 25 regions analysed in Chapter Four of this thesis, 20 had national independence parties which exclusively came from either the left or the right (80%). The five cases which had a mix of left and right-wing national independence parties were the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Faroe Islands, Quebec and Sardinia.

The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis (H8): *Countries with a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals will have more radical national independence parties.*

The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis is based on the large body of literature which finds anti-immigrant sentiment to be a common feature amongst radical-right groups (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014). This sentiment is one that is shared by radical-right national independence parties. A high-profile example of this from the national independence party grouping is Vlaams Belang (e.g. Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Moufahim et al, 2015; De Cleen, 2016b). Given this, it is then logical to test levels of immigration against traditional left-right ideology. It could be that in countries with higher levels of immigration, national independence parties criticise the state for not being tough enough on border security and immigration. Therefore, these parties would then take a more right-wing ideological position.

The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis is based on the fact that there are some left-wing nationalist movements which have protectionist tendencies regarding certain cultural elements, especially language. Some of cases which are considered to be broadly left-wing but where language protection is still crucially important include the Basque Country, Catalonia and Wales (Carlin, 2013). If this is the case, then it may be possible that these parties may also be more sceptical of immigration, on the basis that they wish to protect their language. Research by Halikiopoulou et al (2012) has also argued that nationalism plays a "central element" in the opposition to European integration which is seen in radical-left political parties (p. 504). This evidence shows that nationalism can influence radical-left parties as well as those on the radical-right. Therefore, when combined with the natural tendency to protect their language, this might mean that radical-left national independence parties, like their right-wing counterparts, also hold some scepticism of immigration. If this is the case then it could be found that countries with higher levels of immigration have more radical national independence parties on the left as well as on the right.

The Methods

<u>*Large-N Analysis of National Independence Parties*</u>

Chapter Four of this thesis is a quantitative study which analyses a database of cases of national independence parties which have stood in elections between 2000 and 2020. This is a new database, constructed for this research, which has recorded every notable case of a national independence party which has been active in Canada or Western Europe. This database is unique, with no previous political party database including only national independence parties. This database includes smaller national independence parties which have not been included in previous research on sub-national political parties. This database is divided into two datasets. The first of these datasets focuses on cases in regional elections and the second focuses on cases in statewide elections. There were 171 cases in the regional dataset and 153 cases in the statewide dataset, totalling 324 cases overall. 76 different parties and electoral coalitions were used in the regional database and 55 were used in the statewide database. The total number used was 90 (see Table 3.6).

Table 3.6: Included National Independence Parties and Electoral Coalitions in Canada and Western Europe (2000-2020)

Country	Region(s)	Party/Electoral Coalition	Abbreviation
Belgium	Flanders	*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie*	N-VA
		Vlaams Belang	VBe
		Vlaams Blok	VBl
Canada	Alberta	*Alberta Independence Party*	AIP
	Alberta and British Columbia	*Western Block Party*	WBP
	British Columbia	*Western Canada Concept*	WCC
		Wexit British Columbia	WBC
	Quebec	*Action Démocratique du Québec*	ADQ
		Bloc Québécois	BQ
		Option Nationale – Pour l'Indépendance du Québec	ON-PIQ
		Parti Indépendantiste	PaI
		Parti Québécois	PQ
		Québec Solidaire	QS

Country	Region(s)	Party/Electoral Coalition	Abbreviation
		Union des Forces Progressistes	UFP
Denmark	Faroe Islands	*Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin*	FF
		Framsókn	Fr
		Sjálvstýri	Sj
		Tjóðveldi	Tj
	Greenland	*Inuit Ataqatigiit*	IA
		Nunatta Qitornai	NQ
		Partii Inuit	PIn
		Partii Naleraq	PN
		Siumut	Si
Finland	Åland Islands	*Ålands Framtid*	ÅF
France	Corsica	*Corsica Libera*	CL
Germany	Bavaria	*Bayernpartei*	BP
Italy	Sardinia	*Autodeterminatzione*	Au
		Fortza Paris	FP
		Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna	IRS
		Partido Sardo D'Azione	PSd'Az
		Partido Sardo D'Azione – Sardigna Natzione	PSd'Az-SN
		Partito dei Sardi	PdS
		Progetu Repùblica de Sardigna	ProgReS
		Rossomori	RM
		Sardigna Natzione	SN
		Unidade Indipendentista	UI
		Unidos	Un
	Sicily	*Siciliani Liberi*	SL
	South Tyrol	*Die Freiheitlichen*	dF
		Süd-Tiroler Freiheit	STF
		Union für Südtirol	UfS
	Veneto	*Indipendenza Noi Veneto*	INV
		Indipendenza Veneta	IV
		Partito Nasional Veneto	PNV
		Veneto Stato	VS
Spain	Andalusia	*Nación Andaluza*	NA
	Aragon	*Puyalón de Cuchas*	PYLN
	Asturias	*Andecha Astur*	AA
	Basque Country	*Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista*	EHAK
		Euskal Herritarrok	EH
		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	EAJ-PNV
	Basque Country and Navarre	*Amaiur*	Am
		Aralar	Ar
		Euskal Herria Bildu	EHB
		Eusko Alkartasuna	EA
		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea – Eusko Alkartasuna	EAJ-EA
	Canary Islands	*Ahora Canarias*	AC
		Alternativa Nacionalista Canaria	ANC

Country	Region(s)	Party/Electoral Coalition	Abbreviation
	Catalonia	*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular*	CUP
		Candidatura d'Unitat Popular – Per la Ruptura	CUP-PR
		Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya	CDC
		Convergència i Unió	CiU
		Democràcia i Llibertat	DiL
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	ERC
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Catalunya Sí	ERC-CatSí
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Sobiranistes	ERC-S
		Front Republicà	FR
		Junts pel Sí	JxSí
		Junts per Catalunya	JxCat
		Reagrupament	Re
		Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència	SCI
	Galicia	*Bloque Nacionalista Galego*	BNG
		Bloque Nacionalista Galego – Nós–Candidatura Galega	BNG-Nós
		Comunistas da Galiza	CdG
		Frente Popular Galega	FPG
		Nós–Candidatura Galega	Nós
		Nós–Unidade Popular	N-UP
	Navarre	*Bildu – Eusko Alkartasuna/Alternatiba Eraikitzenea*	B-EA/AE
		Geroa Bai	GBai
		Libertad Navarra	Ln
		Nafarroa Bai	NaBai
Sweden	Scania	*Skånepartiet*	SP
United Kingdom	England	*English Democrats*	ED
	Scotland	*Respect, Independence, Socialism and Environmentalism – Scotland's Left Alliance*	RISE
		Scottish Green Party	SGP
		Scottish National Party	SNP
		Scottish Socialist Party	SSP
		Solidarity – Scotland's Socialist Movement	SSM
	Wales	*Cymru Annibynnol*	CA
		Plaid Cymru – The Party of Wales	PC

Source: Compiled by the author.

The left-right ideology of the national independence parties included in this database is tested against a group of variables in order to test the eight hypotheses previously outlined in this chapter. This analysis was conducted by running binary and ordinal logistic regressions. The choice to use these two specific types of regressions was based on the nature of how the left-right ideology of the national independence parties was recorded. Ordinal regression analysis was used when analysing left-right ideology on a scale of one to six. When left-right ideology is measured in this way, it creates a clear logical order. Therefore, this means that ordinal logistic regression is the most appropriate form of analysis to use (see Koletsia & Pandis, 2018). Binary logistic regression analysis was appropriate due to the second measurement of left-right ideology and the measurement of mainstream-radical ideology both being dummy variables (see Midi, Sarkar & Rana, 2010: 254).

Table 3.7: Relevant National Independence Parties and Electoral Coalitions in Europe on the Left-Right Ideological Spectrum (2000-2020)

Left-Leaning	Right-Leaning
(59)	(31)
AA, AC, Am, ANC, Ar, Au, B-EA/AE, BNG, BNG-Nós, BQ, CA, CdG, CL, CUP, CUP-PR, EA, EAJ-EA, EH, EHAK, EHB, ERC, ERC-CatSí, ERC-S, FPG, FR, GBai, IA, IRS, JxSí, Ln, NA, NaBai, Nós, NQ, N-UP, ON-PIQ, PC, PdS, PI, PN, ProgReS, PSd'Az, PSd'Az-SN, PQ, PYLN, QS, Re, RISE, RM, SCI, SGP, Si, SN, SNP, SSM, SSP, Tj, UFP, UI	ADQ, ÅF, AIP, BP, CDC, CiU, dF, DiL, EAJ-PNV, ED, FF, FP, Fr, INV, IV, JxCat, N-VA, PI, PNV, Sj, SL, SP, STF, UfS, Un, VBe, VBl, VS, WBC, WBP, WCC

Source: Compiled by the author using academic literature and party websites.

Table 3.8: Relevant National Independence Parties and Electoral Coalitions in Europe on the Mainstream-Radical Ideological Spectrum (2000-2020)

Ideologically Mainstream	Ideologically Radical
(59)	(31)
ADQ, ÅF, AIP, Au, BNG, BNG-Nós, BP, BQ, CDC, CiU, CL, DiL, EA, EAJ-EA, EAJ-PNV, ERC, ERC-CatSí, ERC-S, FF, FP, Fr, GBai, IA, INV, IRS, IV, JxCat, JxSí, NaBai, Nós, NQ, N-VA, ON-PIQ, PC, PdS, PI, PN, PNV, ProgReS, PSd'Az, PSd'Az-SN, PQ, Re, RM, SCI, SGP, Si, Sj, SL, SN, SNP, STF, Tj, UfS, UI, Un, VS, WBC, WCC	AA, AC, Am, ANC, Ar, B-EA/AE, CA, CdG, CUP, CUP-PR, dF, ED, EH, EHAK, EHB, FPG, FR, Ln, NA, N-UP, PI, PYLN, QS, RISE, SP, SSM, SSP, UFP, VBe, VBl, WBP

Source: Compiled by the author using academic literature and party websites.

As you can see in Tables 3.9-3.12, this chapter has included cases from 25 regions in 10 countries. These cases all come from either Canada or Western Europe. These two territories are the focus of this analysis due to the fact that these are the two areas, in the western democratic world, in which these cases are by far the most common.

Table 3.9: Frequency of Cases by Country: Regional Database

Country	Frequency	Percent
Belgium	7	4.09
Canada	24	14.04
Denmark	24	14.04
Finland	5	2.92
France	2	1.17
Germany	4	2.34
Italy	25	14.62
Spain	59	34.50
Sweden	1	0.58
United Kingdom	20	11.70
Total	171	100.00

Table 3.10: Frequency of Cases by Region: Regional Database

Nation	Frequency	Percent
Åland Islands	5	2.92
Alberta	1	0.58
Andalusia	1	0.58
Asturias	2	1.17
Basque Country	14	8.19
Bavaria	4	2.34
British Columbia	3	1.75
Canary Islands	4	2.34
Catalonia	15	8.77
Corsica	2	1.17
Faroe Islands	13	7.60
Flanders	7	4.09
Galicia	12	7.02
Greenland	11	6.43
Navarre	11	6.43
Quebec	20	11.70
Sardinia	12	7.02
Scania	1	0.58
Scotland	15	8.77
Sicily	1	0.58
South Tyrol	9	5.26
Veneto	3	1.75
Wales	5	2.92
Total	171	100.00

As is also shown in Tables 3.9-3.12, some cases are far more frequent than others. Spain in particular

is a country which has a large number of cases within both datasets. In order to account for this,

multiple robustness checks were conducted. The first removed all Spanish cases from the party database and reran the regressions, in order to see if the removal of Spanish cases had any impact on the findings (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10). In addition, other larger cases were also removed in order to see if they had any influence on the findings (see Appendix E).

Table 3.11: Frequency of Cases by Country: Statewide Database

Country	Frequency	Percent
Belgium	9	5.88
Canada	12	7.84
Denmark	23	15.03
France	1	0.65
Germany	5	3.27
Italy	12	7.84
Spain	65	42.48
Sweden	1	0.65
United Kingdom	25	16.34
Total	153	100.00

Table 3.12: Frequency of Cases by Region: Statewide Database

Nation	Frequency	Percent
Alberta	2	1.31
Aragon	2	1.31
Asturias	2	1.31
Basque Country	17	11.11
Bavaria	5	3.27
British Columbia	3	1.96
Canary Islands	4	2.61
Catalonia	15	9.80
Corsica	1	0.65
England	3	1.96
Faroe Islands	15	9.80
Flanders	9	5.88
Galicia	10	6.54
Greenland	8	5.23
Navarre	15	9.80
Quebec	7	4.58
Sardinia	6	3.92
Scania	1	0.65
Scotland	16	10.46
South Tyrol	4	2.61
Veneto	2	1.31
Wales	6	3.92
Total	153	100.00

Qualitative judgments had to be made when deciding which parties to include and when coding their ideological positions. Three selection criteria were used when deciding which parties to include. First, the party had to have been active in a regional or statewide election between 2000 and 2020, in either Western Europe or Canada, in order that it could be included in at least one of the datasets. Second, there had to be enough available information about the party so that it could be concluded that it was a national independence party at the time the election took place. This criteria meant that many high-profile regionalist parties were excluded due to the fact that they are not national independence parties. This included the Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP) in South Tyrol, which is autonomist, and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland, which is rattachist. Finally, there had to be enough information about the ideology of the party so it was possible to code the party's left-right ideology in the databases. There were some very small cases which, despite clearly being independentist, could not be included because of this criteria. One example which fell into this category was the Scottish Jacobite Party.

When determining if a party was a national independence party, a qualitative judgment was made. Previous judgements of the nature of secessionist and pro-independence parties were used when making this judgment (e.g. De Winter, 1998; Dandoy, 2010; Pereira et al, 2018; Schakel, 2020). For some more high-profile cases, such as the N-VA and Parti Québécois, there was an existing body of literature which made it clear that these parties met the required definition to be included. However, in many other cases, parties were too small to have been included in previous academic literature. Some examples of this included the Alberta Independence Party and the Comunistas da Galiza. Party websites and web archives had to be used to confirm the independentist nature of these parties.

As is outlined in Figure 3.9 below, three distinct perspectives of the left-right ideology of national independence parties were included. The first two measure the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties. The first of these is an ordinal variable which measures left-right ideology from one to six, with one representing the most left-wing parties and six the most right-wing parties. The second is a binary variable which grouped all left-wing parties, those measured one to

three in the original measurement, and all right-wing parties, those measured four to six. Left-wing

parties were denoted as a zero and right-wing parties as a one. A second binary variable was used to

measure a party's mainstream-radical ideology. Radical parties, those measured one or six in the

ordinal left-right measurement, were denoted with a one. Mainstream parties, those measured

between two and five in the original measurement, were denoted with a zero.

Figure 3.9: Measurements of Left-Right Ideology

Table 3.13: Definitions of Left-Right Ideological Measurements

Left-Right Ordinal Measurement	Definition (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 869).	Left-Right Binary Measurement	Mainstream-Radical Binary Measurement
1	"Marxist parties, or parties with influential Marxist components."	0	1
2	"Socialist, social-democratic and green parties supporting state-oriented economic policies."	0	0
3	"'Broad church' parties with more prominent leftist tendencies."	0	0
4	"'Broad church' parties with more prominent rightist tendencies."	1	0
5	"Bourgeois (Conservative or Liberal) parties supporting market oriented policies."	1	0
6	"Combining market oriented economic policies with xenophobic, anti-immigrant policies."	1	1

Given that the binary left-right and mainstream-radical variables were determined based on the

ordinal left-right variable, the coding of the ordinal variable was vital when conducting this research.

The ordinal left-right variable is the same measurement used in the Schakel regionalist party database.

This database is then used in the 2015 paper by Massetti and Schakel, who use this left-right

measurement when exploring the ideology of regionalist parties. A strength of this scale is that it finds

the right balance between showing the nuance of ideology within the national independence party family but without being overly complex. It is also the only scale of its kind which has been applied specifically to sub-national level political parties.

When coding each party, this thesis used exactly the same definition for each of the six ideological positions as was used in the Massetti and Schakel paper. These definitions are shown clearly in Table 3.13. When looking at the dimensions considered in the measurement of left-right, Massetti and Schakel's measurement relies primarily on the traditional economic left-right dimension. When validating the positions of regionalist parties on their scale, Massetti and Schakel used left-right measurements from two expert surveys and the Manifesto Project Database. These measurements focused on the traditional dimension of left-right ideology (see Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 882). This is most clearly reflected in the definitions of the different ideological positions, with five being for parties which are at their core parties that support "market oriented policies" and two for parties which support "state-oriented economic policies." However, while the economic dimension is primary in these definitions, it is not the only factor. The social dimension also had to be considered when distinguishing between certain ideological positions. This was most notable the case on the right. In order to contrast between parties measured as a five and those measured as a six, Massetti and Schakel included support for "xenophobic, anti-immigrant policies" as part of the definition of radical-right parties. This was necessary as both parties measured as a five and measured as a six were recorded economically as being in favour of "market oriented economic policies," (see Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 877).

Given that this paper uses the same one to six scale of left-right ideology as was previously used in work by Massetti and Schakel, it was possible to code some of the cases by directly using the Schakel regionalist party database. For example, this was the case for the SNP in elections between 2001 and 2010. However, many other parties were not included in this database. These were parties which stood in elections after 2010 and parties which were too small to be included in the regionalist party

database. These parties had to be coded manually using qualitative judgments. This paper used a number of different pieces of academic literature to code the ideology of the most high-profile national independence parties. However, given the smaller nature of many of the included parties, party documents, party websites, web archives and other online resources also had to be used. Below are six examples of national independence parties included in this thesis, one for each of the six positions on the ordinal left-right scale, along with a brief explanation as to how and why each was given its respective coded position.

1. **Radical left**: *Respect, Independence, Socialism and Environmentalism – Scotland's Left Alliance (RISE)* stood in a single election, the 2016 Scottish Parliament Election, and was coded as a radical-left party. Due to the smaller nature of this party, there was no academic works conducted on it, meaning coding had to be done using the party's manifesto and primary sources. RISE was coded as radical-left because of the clear anti-capitalist ideology embedded in its policies and a clear desire for radical economic reform which was focused on redistribution. For example, the party stated it believed in "a democratic economy, run for the mass of people who create the wealth not the minority who hoard it," (p. 2). RISE also openly called itself "a socialist organisation," and wanted all public utilities "brought back into public hands and run democratically by the people," (p. 10). Therefore, this party met the clear criteria of a radical-left party, having Marxist components at the centre of its ideology.

2. **Mainstream left**: *The Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC)* is one Catalonia's most recognisable national independence parties, standing consistently in elections to the Spanish and Catalan Parliaments since the fall of the Franco Regime. In this thesis, the ERC has been coded as a social democratic party in every election it has stood in. Given its more high-profile nature, the ideology of the ERC has been studied and recorded in previous academic works and in the Schakel Regionalist Party Database. Numerous works have found that the ERC is a traditional left-wing or social democratic party, which supports state-oriented economic policies (e.g. Martí, 2013; Elias, 2015; Delis et al, 2020). The Schakel Database recorded the

party consistently as a 2 on the left-right scale from 1996 onwards in both Catalan and Spanish Parliament elections. The party's ideology has also been recorded at Spanish General Elections by the Chapel Hill Survey (Chesdata, 2019a). Since the turn of the century, the survey has consistently measured the party's traditional economic left-right position to be on the centre-left, falling between 2.5 and 4 on a scale which goes from 1 at the most left-wing to 10 at the most right-wing. This further highlights the left-wing and social democratic nature of the party. In addition to relying on academic sources, manifestos and policy documents relevant to each election recorded were also analysed when coding the ideology of the ERC. These primary documents confirmed the party's social democratic nature.

3. **Left-leaning centrist**: *The Bloc Québécois* is Quebec's only significant national independence party active at the statewide level. The party has stood in every Canadian General Election since 1993. The party has been recorded as a centrist left-leaning party in the thesis in every election that it stood in. This was the same as was done in the Schakel database, which recorded the party's left-right ideology as a 3 in every Canadian General Election between 1993 and 2008. The left-leaning and centrist, sometimes even broad church, nature of the party is something which is referenced in a variety of academic sources (e.g. Gagnon & Lachapelle, 1996; Fournier et al, 2013; Lachapelle, 2023). The Bloc Québécois' manifestos for Canadian General Elections were also used when coding the party's ideology. These primary sources, combined with the secondary sources from academic researchers allowed me to code the party's left-right ideology confidently and accurately.

4. **Right-leaning centrist**: *The Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (EAJ-PNV)* is a major political party in the Basque Country, standing regularly in regional elections in the Basque Country and in the Spanish General Election. The EAJ-PNV in this thesis has been recorded as a centrist right-leaning party in every election it has stood in. When discussed in the literature, the EAJ-PNV is usually referred to as right-wing or centrist, as well as sometimes a combination of the two, (e.g. Leonisio, 2012; Strijbis & Leonisio, 2012; Leonisio & Strijbis, 2014). The Schakel Database

recorded the EAJ-PNV consistently as a 4 on the left-right scale since 1990. This was the case in both Basque and Spanish Parliament elections. The party's ideology has also been recorded at Spanish General Elections by the Chapel Hill Survey. Since the turn of the century, the survey has consistently measured the party's traditional economic left-right position to be on right-leaning but still in the centre, always falling between 5 and 6. These databases further highlight the more centrist but still right-leaning nature of the party. The EAJ-PNV's manifestos for elections to the Basque Parliament were also used when coding the party's ideology. This was especially important for elections after 2010, as these were not included in either the Chapel Hill or Schakel Databases. The use of a variety of sources allowed me to code the party for this thesis with a large degree of confidence that the coding was accurate.

5. **Mainstream right**: *The Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* is a major political party in Flanders, standing regularly in both Flemish and Belgian Parliament elections. The party has been coded in this thesis as a mainstream right-wing party for all the elections it has stood in. There is a body of literature which supports this, emphasising the right-wing and conservative nature of the party (e.g. Maly, 2016; Beyens et al, 2017; Abts et al, 2019). The party was also recorded as a 5 on the left-right scale in the Schakel database in every election it stood in. This was at both the regional and statewide levels. The party's ideology has also been recorded in Belgian Parliament Elections by the Chapel Hill Survey. Since the 2006 Election, the survey has consistently measured the party's economic left-right position to be right-wing, always falling between 7 and 8. The election manifestos from regional and statewide elections and additional policy documents from the party's website were also consulted when coding the party's ideology. The use of these documents combined with secondary sources allowed for the accurate coding of the party's ideology for this thesis.

6. **Radical right**: *The English Democrats* are a minor party which has stood regularly in UK General Elections in England. Given this is a smaller party which does not receive much political support, there has been no academic research conducted on it. Therefore, the party's

manifestos and policy documents had to be used. The party has been coded as radical-right in all elections it has stood in. This is because it has consistently stated it is in favour of a market economy, which focuses on limiting spending and bringing down debt. Alongside that, the party holds strong xenophobic and anti-immigration positions. In its Manifesto for the 2019 UK General Election, it said the party "favour a market economy." With regards to immigration, the party references this issue throughout, placing an emphasis on "ending mass immigration" and giving "priority to local people" on things such as housing and welfare.

In this thesis, the ideology of national independence parties has been analysed against seven unique variables. Each of these variables has a theoretical basis for their inclusion, grounded in the previous research on regionalist parties and left-right ideology. The included variables were percentage unemployment, comparative unemployment, the proportion of foreign-born individuals at the statewide level, a country's military spending as a percentage of its GDP, if a country was a monarchy, if an alternative mainstream national independence party was standing in the election being analysed and the existence of a distinct regional language. As is outlined clearly in the introduction, each of these variables was chosen due to findings from previous literature on regionalist parties and on influences on left-right ideology.

The unemployment figures were primarily sourced from the OECD regional database (2020). The only exceptions to this were the unemployment rates in the Åland Islands (Statistics and Research Åland, 2020), Faroe Islands (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2020), and Greenland (StatBank Greenland, 2020). Two types of unemployment were used when analysing both left-right and mainstream-radical ideology. The first was simply the percentage unemployment in the region, in the year the election took place. The second was comparative unemployment. Comparative unemployment was measured as the unemployment rate in the region divided by the unemployment in the region's parent country. This was done due to the emphasis placed on the importance of comparative economic relationships in influencing the ideology of regionalist parties, found in works numerous academic works, including those by Hechter (1975) and Harvie (1994).

The monarchy variable was a dummy variable in which cases of elections in monarchies were denoted with a one and cases in republics were denoted with a zero. The military spending variable used, which measured military spending as a percentage of a country's GDP, came from the World Bank (2020). The statewide levels of foreign born individuals were also from the OECD (2021). This measurement was simply the percentage of foreign born individuals, at the statewide level, in the year the election took place. This variable was less than ideal, given the fact that it measures immigration at the statewide level rather than the regional level. However, there was no way of getting comparable data for 25 regions, over a period of 21 years, which would have been reliable enough for the study. Given the importance of immigration in discussions of left-right ideology, it was better to include a less than perfect immigration statistic than no immigration statistic at all.

The language variable measured if a region had a distinct language and the degree to which that language was spoken. The variable scored cases from one to three. Regions with no distinct language were denoted a one, regions with a distinct minority-spoken language were denoted a two and regions with a majority-spoken language were denoted a three. Given the complexity around the issue of defining what a distinct language is, the SIL International language database (2020), was used as an

independent measurement to confirm that all the languages included were in fact languages in their own right, rather than regional dialects of the language used in the wider parent country. The variable which measured the existence of an alternative mainstream national independence party was a dummy variable. Cases which did have an alternative mainstream national independence party were denoted with a one and those which did not were denoted with a zero.

Three variables have been controlled for in the analysis of traditional left-right ideology. These were the existence of a distinct regional language, if there was another national independence party standing in the same election and the left-right ideological leaning of the largest non-national independence party. The distinct regional language variable was the same variable used in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology. This was included as a control for left-right ideology, due to the academic literature which discusses the involvement in language protection from the far-right of the political spectrum (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003; De Cleen, 2016), as well as the fact that language is factor analysed in much of the literature which discusses topics relating to sub-nationalism and secessionism (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; van Morgan, 2006). The other two control variables relate to party competition. These were included due to the fact that research has shown that regionalist parties change their ideological position, both in response to a dominant non-regionalist party and to other regionalist parties (e.g. Massetti and Schakel, 2015: 871). The variable which measured the existence of another national independence party was a dummy variable. Cases which faced another national independence party in the same election were denoted with a one and those which were not with a zero. The left-right leaning of the largest non-national independence party was also measured using a dummy variable. The cases in which this party was right-wing were denoted with a one and the cases in which this party was left-wing were denoted with a zero.

Three variables have been controlled for in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology. The first control was the electoral system. This variable measured if an election took place under a proportional, mixed or majoritarian system. Proportional systems have been denoted with a three,

mixed systems with a two and majoritarian systems with a one. The electoral system has been controlled for due to the literature which has argued that proportional systems can encourage more radical political parties (e.g. Hain, 1986; Norris, 1997). The other two control variables are related to electoral success and have been included due to the literature which has found that radical parties are less likely to be electorally successful than their more centrist rivals (e.g. Ezrow, 2005; Forestiere, 2009). The first of these variables is simply the percentage of votes the party won at the election. The second is a dummy variable which measures if the party was in government at the regional level when the election occurred. Parties which were in government were denoted with a one while those which were not were denoted with a zero.

Case Study Comparisons

The results from the large-n quantitative analysis are then applied, through a qualitative analysis, to pairs of case studies which have experienced cases of national independence parties. This is done in two chapters. The first further explores the findings relevant to traditional left-right ideology and the second explores the findings relevant to mainstream-radical ideology. This method is equally as important to the thesis as the large-n analysis because it explores the causal mechanisms which influence the ideology of national independence parties in specific cases. This is something which cannot be done with a large-n quantitative study. These chapters analyse the variation in the ideology of national independence parties from the following pairs of cases:

- Chapter Five: Faroe Islands and Greenland and Flanders and Quebec

- Chapter Six: Basque Country and Catalonia and Scotland and Wales

Chapter Five focuses on the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties and Chapter Six focuses on mainstream-radical ideology. Both of these chapters have a similar structure and use a similar methodological approach. Through controlled comparisons, this analysis seeks to explain why there is a variation in the ideology of the national independence parties within each of the pairs. This is done by comparing key features in each case. One feature offers the main distinction

between the two cases and the primary explanation for the ideological variation between the two cases. The rest of the characteristics act as controls. These characteristics were chosen as they have been found to be most important in influencing the left-right or mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. Therefore, by showing these characteristics are similar in both cases, it is possible to come to the conclusion that they cannot be responsible for the ideological variation being explored.

The choice to use this method was partly inspired by Varshney's work on ethnic conflict in India, which used a similar methodological approach when analysing different cities (2001: 373). Varshney's work also chose to analyse cases in pairs. A significant advantage of comparing cases in pairs is that you can compare two cases which are directly comparable but have a clear difference in the factor being explored. By comparing two cases, it is then possible to make clear and direct distinctions between the two which could then explain the difference you are investigating. One potential weakness of the pair approach is that it looks at less cases, potentially then running the risk of lacking external validity. This is why this analysis analyses two separate pairs of cases for each perspective of left-right ideology. More general issues regarding external validity are discussed later in this section of the thesis.

There is a significant amount of literature which discusses the methodology behind the comparative method (e.g. Lijphart, 1971; Lieberson, 1991; Slater & Ziblatt, 2013). While it is still argued that "comparisons remain indispensable to the craft of comparative politics," (Slater & Ziblatt: 1322), there are some issues related to the method which must be addressed when it is used.

The first of these is the issue of controlling for all possible variables. As we know from previous discussions on the comparative method, the social world is infinitely complex. Therefore, it is impossible to control for all possible impacts on our key dependent variable (Lieberson: 309-310). Given this, it has been argued that such an analysis should "restrict itself to the really key variables, omitting those of only marginal importance," (Lijphart: 690). Given the complex nature of the social world, it is likely that there will be some variables which will not have been included which some argue

should have. Therefore, later on in this chapter, a strong theoretical basis for the inclusion of each variable is provided. The quantitative findings from Chapter Four of this thesis also provide further justification for the choice of included variables. This justification clearly shows why these variables are most important in the discussion of the left-right ideology of national independence parties and why they have been included ahead of other possible independent variables. Another benefit of comparing only two cases at a time is that this reduces the likelihood of additional unknown variables impacting the analysis. When including a larger number of cases into a single comparison, it increases the likelihood of unknown additional variables, specific to the newly added case, being relevant to the analysis and not being factored into the analysis.

Another factor which should be taken into account are interaction effects between included variables, i.e. that other independent variables are not having an effect on the dependent variable (see Lieberson: 312-313). Possible interaction effects between other variables and the dependent variable are considered in both chapters. Another factor which should be considered are issues related to internal validity and endogeneity. When running this analysis, it is important to be sure that the key differing characteristic is in fact responsible for the variation in the ideology of the parties being studied and not another factor. In order to address these issues, the analysis of each pair controls for a number of additional characteristics which have previously been found to influence the ideology of national independence parties, showing clearly that these cannot be responsible for the variation in ideology being explored. The use of only two cases in a comparison also reduces the likelihood of an additional unknown variable having an impact as these become more likely when you add additional cases to a comparison. The analysis of each pair also clearly lays out the reasoning behind the proposed flow of causation, clearly showing the proposed mechanism which explains why a certain factor is having an effect on the ideology of these parties and not the other way around.

Another issue which has to be considered when using the comparative method is the issue of external validity, i.e. do the findings from the analysis hold true in a wider range of cases? (see Slater & Ziblatt:

1306). The issue of external validity is somewhat managed by the fact that each chapter analyses two pairs of cases, as opposed to just a single pair. It has also been argued that large-n analyses can be used to confirm the external validity of findings produced from a comparative method (e.g. Slater & Ziblatt: 1313). The findings from Chapters Five and Six are all supported by the large-n quantitative analysis conducted in Chapter Four. Therefore, this clearly shows that these findings can be generalised across a larger number of cases, showing that external validity holds.

Left-Right Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

The first pair compared in the analysis of traditional left-right ideology are the Faroe Islands and Greenland. The aim of this comparison was to explain why the Faroe Islands has right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not. There is a considerable amount of logic in comparing these two cases. Both are autonomous communities in the Kingdom of Denmark. Both also have internationally recognised autonomy agreements with Denmark (Stephen, 2017). Given these agreements, both cases are members of the Nordic Council in their own right, recognised as distinctive from Denmark (Nordic Co-operation, n.d.). Both cases are also not part of the EU (Gad, 2014: 105). Both cases also have a majority-spoken language distinct from Danish.

The chapter then analyses the ideological variation found between national independence parties from Flanders and Quebec. The aim of this analysis was to explain why, since the turn of the century, Flanders has only ever had right-wing cases of national independence parties while Quebec's cases overwhelmingly come from the left. There is a strong logic in comparing these two cases. Both cases exist within monarchies, Flanders in Belgium and Quebec in Canada. Belgium and Canada have spent a similar amounts on their military, as a percentage of their GDP. Both have their own distinct majority-spoken language. Another reason to compare these two cases is that they are both high-profile examples of stateless nations which have been previously compared in the literature (e.g. Xhardez, 2020).

Four characteristics which were found to be most important in influencing left-right ideology were included in this analysis. The choice to include these characteristics can be justified both through the previous literature and findings from Chapter Four of this thesis:

- Economic Conditions

- Monarchy or Republic

- Militarism of the Parent Country

- Language

Economic conditions have been analysed due to the previous literature which shows the impact of comparative economic differences on the left-right ideology of regionalist parties (e.g. Hechter, 1975; Harvie, 1994; Massetti & Schakel, 2015). The general consensus from this literature is that comparatively poorer economic conditions lead to more left-wing regionalist parties while comparatively richer conditions lead to more right-wing regionalist parties. Economic conditions were also included due to the clear findings from Chapter Four of this thesis, which showed that regions with higher levels of comparative unemployment were much more likely to have left-wing national independence parties while regions with lower levels of comparative unemployment were much more likely to have right-wing national independence parties (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). Multiple different aspects of economic conditions were analysed when looking at the two pairs. In the analysis of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, comparative unemployment and comparative GDP were analysed. This was to show how the Faroe Islands and Greenland performed economically in comparison to the central Danish state. Financial contributions from the Danish state were also included. This was done in order to show how much each of the two cases relied on financial support from Denmark. When comparing economic conditions in Flanders and Quebec, comparative unemployment, comparative GDP per capita and comparative disposable household income were included. This offered a clear image of the comparative economic performance of both cases.

Monarchy has been included for two reasons. First, the literature shows that a left-right ideological divide on the issue of monarchy is something which has existed for centuries. For example, Allen argues that "a commitment to monarchy and aristocracy (in countries where they existed)" should be included in a list of terms which best describe the modern conservative ideology (1981: 593). Other evidence has shown that conservative voters are more likely to support the concept in monarchy, in places where it is a relevant institution, than left-wing voters (e.g. Blumler et al, 1971; Rose & Kavanagh, 1976; Mansillo, 2016). The second reason to include monarchy was due to the evidence in Chapter Four which found that national independence parties within monarchies were more likely to be left-wing than national independence parties in republics (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). When looking at the issue of monarchy in each pair, this analysis takes a historical approach. The analysis not only looks at each case's current relationship to its respective monarchy but also looks at how historically this relationship was developed.

Militarism was included for two reasons. First, there is an argument within the literature that there is a left-right ideological divide on the issue of military spending. There is a body of literature which specifically links the conservative ideology with a belief in increased military spending (e.g. Joe et al, 1981; Abell, 1990). There is also some evidence that left-wing governments do spend additionally on social policies while right-wing governments prefer to increase spending on their military (e.g. Bove et al, 2017: 595). The second reason to look at militarism as a possible cause of ideological variation is the evidence found in Chapter Four which suggested that higher levels of military spending made national independence parties more left-wing (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5). When looking at militarism in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the factors discussed were Danish military spending as a proportion of GDP, Danish military activities in the two cases and the broader interest in the two cases by NATO. When analysing militarism in Flanders and Quebec, Belgian and Canadian military spending as a proportion of GDP, the numbers of armed forces personnel in Belgium and Canada and Belgian and Canadian UN peacekeeping operations were all taken into account.

Language has been included due to the past literature which discusses the emphasis placed on language protection by organisations which came from the far-right (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003; De Cleen, 2016). It was also important to include language as it was vital to control for a cultural characteristic relevant to the regions of the cases included. Language has also been included due to the fact that it is an important cultural element of the ideology and broader politics of many sub-nationalist movements and has been analysed in much of the literature which discusses topics relating to sub-nationalism and secessionism (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; van Morgan, 2006; Massetti & Schakel, 2016). The same perspective of language was examined in this chapter as was examined in Chapter Four. This meant the focus of the analysis, when looking at both pairs of cases, was the extent to which the language was spoken in the respective cases. The broader political importance of the distinct languages, in all four cases, is also discussed.

Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

The first pair of cases examined in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology is the Basque Country and Catalonia. The aim of the analysis is to explain why the Basque Country has a higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Catalonia. The Basque Country and Catalonia are very comparable cases. Most obviously, they are both Autonomous Communities in Spain. Both cases also experience regular competition between multiple national independence parties in elections, use proportional representation in both regional and statewide elections and have experienced similar levels of immigration.

The chapter then focuses on the variation in ideology of national independence parties from Scotland and Wales. The aim of the analysis was to explain why Scotland has a higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Wales. There is a strong logic for comparing these two cases. Scotland and Wales are both nations within the UK. Both nations also have distinct minority-spoken languages, use a mixed electoral system in regional elections and a majoritarian system in statewide elections and have similar levels of immigration.

As was the case in Chapter Five, four characteristics were included in this analysis. There characteristics were found to be most important in influencing mainstream-radical ideology. The choice to include these characteristics can be justified through the previous literature and the findings from Chapter Four:

- Language

- Competition Between National Independence Parties

- Immigration

- Electoral System

Language was originally included in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology because of the previous literature on national and sub-national identities and language. The literature clearly showed that it was common for right-wing nationalist groups to become involved in the protection of their own national language (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003; De Cleen, 2016). However, some literature found that there are also ethnic protectionist and nationalist elements within certain cases of left-wing nationalist movements and parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Jeram et al, 2016). Based on this literature, it was hypothesised that regions with a majority-spoken language would have more radical national independence parties, on the basis of having something they wished to protect. However, the quantitative analysis from Chapter Four of this thesis found the opposite. It was found that regions with a minority-spoken language or no unique language at all which were more likely to have radical national independence parties while regions with a distinct majority-spoken language were more likely to have mainstream national independence parties. Given this finding and the importance of language in the literature, it was crucial to continue to include language in this analysis. As was the case in the previous chapters, the focus of the analysis of language was on the level to which distinct regional languages are spoken.

Competition between national independence parties has been included due to past literature which has found that regionalist parties will change their positions on the left-right spectrum when facing

direct competition from another regionalist party (e.g. Massetti & Schakel, 2015). In their 2015 paper, Massetti and Schakel found that regionalist parties would try to be ideologically distinct from each other because they are always searching for a "free space" on the left-right axis (p. 871). From a mainstream-radical perspective, this would mean parties may take a more radical position in order to appear distinct, if they are competing against a mainstream rival. This was supported by the quantitative findings from Chapter Four of this thesis. This research found that national independence parties would move to a radical position if they were faced with an independentist rival that was ideologically mainstream (see Table 4.6). In line with the research conducted in Chapter Four, competition between national independence parties was studied at both the regional and the statewide level.

Immigration has been included in this chapter because of the finding in Chapter Four which found that higher levels of immigration, at the statewide level, cause national independence parties to become more radical (see Table 4.6). This finding supported the large body of literature which linked together radical right-wing ideology and anti-immigrant sentiment (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014), as well as the literature which has shown that some left-wing political groups can display broader ethnic protectionist and nationalist tendencies (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al, 2012; Jeram et al, 2016). When analysing both pairs of cases, immigration was analysed from both the statewide and regional perspectives. At the regional level, net-migration was used. This figure was calculated per 100,000 persons. This adjustment was made in order to account for population differences within each of the pairs of cases. In the analysis of the statewide level, net-migration and the percentage of foreign-born individuals in the population were both included.

The electoral systems used have been included in this analysis for two reasons. First, there is a body of literature which argues that more radical parties are more likely to be successful in PR electoral systems than in majoritarian systems (e.g. Hain, 1986; Norris, 1997). This would then give parties more of an incentive to stand on a more radical platform if an election is taking place in a PR system. By

extension, it would then be expected that you would see more radical national independence parties standing in PR systems than in majoritarian systems. The second reason for analysing electoral systems in this chapter is because the electoral system was included as a control variable in Chapter Four of this thesis, in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology. The results from that chapter supported the aforementioned literature, finding that national independence parties were more likely to be radical in PR systems than in majoritarian systems (see Table 4.6). The electoral systems of used at both the regional and statewide level were included when analysing both pairs of cases. This was in line with the large-n quantitative analysis.

Chapter Four: Large-N Analysis of National Independence Parties

This chapter is the first of three analytical chapters, aiming to address the research question of this thesis, "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" In this chapter, the relationship between the left-right ideology of national independence parties and different characteristics relevant to these parties is explored. This is done through a large-n quantitative analysis. As has been discussed in previous chapters, there is a significant body of literature which has explored the variation in the left-right ideology of regionalist parties (e.g. Newman 1997; Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015). In the case of the Massetti and Schakel paper, this research was conducted using a large-n quantitative method. However, this type of approach has yet to be taken with a study on national independence parties specifically. As has been highlighted in previous chapters, there is an ideological uniqueness of national independence parties. Therefore, the absence of a study of these parties, represents a gap in the literature that this chapter will directly address.

This thesis looks at left-right ideology from two perspectives, the traditional left-right perspective and the mainstream-radical perspective. This chapter tests eight hypotheses (see Table 4.2) by running binary and ordinal logistic regressions on two datasets which contain cases of national independence parties which have stood in elections. The first of these datasets includes cases in regional elections and the second of these datasets includes cases in statewide elections. Four of these hypotheses are relevant to the traditional left-right ideology of these parties and the other four are relevant to their mainstream-radical ideology. This analysis tests the ideological positioning of cases against seven independent variables.

The Data

In order to conduct this analysis a database was created made up cases of national independence parties which have been active in elections. These elections were held between 2000 and 2020. These

elections were held in 25 regions in 10 countries. When putting this database together, a total of 324

cases were identified in regional and statewide elections.

Table 4.1: List of Included Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Dependent or Independent	Description
Left-Right Ideology	Dependent	An ordinal variable measuring the left-right ideology of national independence parties. This variable measures the ideology of parties from one to six. One is designated to the most left-wing parties while six is designated to the most right-wing parties.
Left-Right Ideology (Dummy)	Dependent	A dummy variable measuring the left-right ideology of national independence parties (0 = left-wing, 1 = right-wing).
Mainstream-Radical Ideology	Dependent	A dummy variable measuring the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties (0 = mainstream, 1 = radical).
Unemployment (%)	Independent	The percentage unemployment of the region the election is taking place in the same year it took place.
Comparative Unemployment	Independent	The percentage unemployment of the region the election takes place divided by the percentage unemployment of that region's parent country.
Monarchy	Independent	A dummy variable indicating if the region exists within a monarchy (0 = no, 1 = yes).
Military Spending	Independent	The military spending of the party's parent country, as a percentage of GDP, in the year the election takes place.
Statewide Foreign Born Population	Independent	The percentage of foreign-born individuals in the country in which the election takes place.
Language	Independent	An ordinal variable which measures the status of a region's distinct language (1 = no distinct regional language, 2 = a minority-spoken distinct regional language, 3 = a majority-spoken distinct regional language).
Alternative Mainstream NIP	Independent	A dummy variable indicating the existence of an alternative ideologically mainstream national independence party (0 = no, 1 = yes).

The database was split into two datasets, one containing cases from regional elections and the other

containing cases from statewide elections. The regional elections dataset contains 171 cases and the

statewide elections dataset contains 153 cases. The decision to split these two datasets was taken due

to the fact that there are significant differences between statewide and regional elections which make

the cases from each less comparable. One difference between the two is that the turnout in regional

elections is usually much lower than in national elections (Kouba et al, 2021: 58). Another difference

is that the party of government usually does worse outside of national elections due to a protest vote. This protest vote traditionally favours smaller parties (Reif et al, 1997: 112). The approach of analysing regional and national elections separately has been taken in previous large-n research on regionalist parties (e.g. Massetti & Schakel, 2015; Massetti & Schakel, 2016). An alternative way of addressing the difference in these elections might have been to conduct an analysis of a single dataset, containing all cases from the database, and control for the type of election in which the party is taking part. Such an approach has been included within the robustness checks later on in this chapter.

In this analysis, ten dependent and independent variables are included (see Table 4.1). The sources of these variables can be found within the Research Design section of the thesis. These do not include the control variables which are discussed later on separately. The left-right ideology of national independence parties has been measured using three dependent variables (see Figure 4.1). The first two measure traditional left-right ideology. The first is an ordinal variable, measuring left-right ideology from one to six, with one being denoted to the most left-wing parties and six to the most right-wing. Each individual case was coded with its own ideological position at the time the election took place. The process for coding each party, including specific examples of parties for each ideological position, can be found in the Research Design section of Chapter Three. This includes definitions for each of the six ideological positions, which can be found in Table 3.13. The second is a binary variable which denotes left-wing parties with a zero and right-wing parties with a one. The third dependent variable measures mainstream-radical ideology. This is also a binary variable, denoting radical parties with a one and mainstream parties with a zero. The coding of these two binary variables was based on the coding of the ordinal left-right variable. This is also shown in Figure 4.1 below.

Figure 4.1: Measurements of Left-Right Ideology

In order to test the eight hypotheses (see Table 4.2), seven independent variables have also been included in this analysis. Two of these variables measure a region's level of unemployment. These variables have been included in order to test *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis* and *The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis*. This thesis uses the OECD definition of percentage unemployment, the percentage of individuals who are "of working age who are without work, are available for work, and have taken specific steps to find work," (2020). The percentage unemployment measurement used for each case is the figure for the year of the election being analysed. The comparative unemployment figure is the percentage unemployment of the party's region divided by the percentage unemployment of the party's parent country.

Two national state characteristics, monarchy and military spending, are included. Monarchy is measured through a dummy variable in which elections that take place within a monarchy are coded with a one, for example those in Canada and the UK, while elections which do not are coded with a zero, for example elections in France and Italy. This variable has been included to test *The Monarchy Hypothesis*. The military expenditure variable is simply the military expenditure of the party's parent country as a percentage of its GDP. This variable has been included to test *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis*. This figure "includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, including peacekeeping forces; defence ministries and other government agencies engaged in defence projects," (World Bank, 2020).

In order to test *The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis*, a variable has been included that separates regions into three categories based on their regional languages. These are regions which have a distinct language spoken by a majority of the population, for example Flanders, regions which have a distinct language spoken by a minority of the population, for example the Basque Country, and regions which have no distinct language, for example Alberta. All languages were checked against the SIL International language database (2020), in order to ensure that they were internationally

recognised languages in their own right and not simply dialects of other languages used in the rest of the region's parent country.

Competition from alternative national independence parties was measured with a single dummy variable. This was included in order to test *The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis*. The variable indicated if there was at least one alternative ideologically mainstream national independence party in the election being analysed. Cases which did face a mainstream rival were coded with a one while those which did not were coded with a zero.

The final two hypotheses, *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis* and *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*, are measured using a single variable related to immigration. This variable measures the proportion of foreign born individuals living in the parent country of the national independence party being analysed.

Table 4.2: Table of Hypotheses

Hypothesis Name	Hypothesis Description
The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis (H1)	*Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more left-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis (H2)	*Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more radical national independence parties.*
The Monarchy Hypothesis (H3)	*National independence parties which exist within constitutional monarchies are more likely to be left-wing.*
The Military Expenditure Hypothesis (H4)	*Countries with higher levels of military spending are more likely to have left-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis (H5)	*Regions with their own distinct language are more likely to have radical national independence parties.*
The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis (H6)	*A national independence party will become ideologically radical when facing electoral competition from an ideologically mainstream alternative.*
The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis (H7)	*Countries with a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals will have more right-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis (H8)	*Countries with a higher proportion of foreign-born individuals will have more radical national independence parties.*

In order to account for additional factors which might influence the ideology of national independence parties, control variables have also been included in all of the models. The status of a distinct regional language, the left-right ideological leaning of the region's largest non-national independence party and the existence of an alternative national independence party running in the same election were all used as control variables in the analysis of traditional left-right ideology. The electoral system, the percentage vote share won by the party and if the party was in regional government going into the election were used as control variables in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology. The theoretical reasoning for the inclusion of these controls is provided in the Research Design section of the thesis.

Descriptive Statistics

There are a number of interesting observations which can be made when looking at the descriptive statistics relevant to the variables used in this analysis (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4). For example, the average ideological leaning of the included parties in both datasets is mainstream and leftward. When looking at the ordinal variable, the average left-right ideology of national independence parties is 2.82 in the regional dataset and 2.97 in the statewide dataset. The average mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties is 0.33 in the regional dataset and 0.31 in the statewide dataset.

Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics: Regional Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Left-Right Ideology	171	2.82	1.61	1	6
Left-Right Ideology (Dummy)	171	0.34	0.47	0	1
Mainstream-Radical Ideology	171	0.33	0.47	0	1
Unemployment (%)	171	9.44	5.82	1.7	29.5
Comparative Unemployment	171	0.90	0.36	0.18	1.90
Monarchy	171	0.79	0.41	0	1
Military Spending	171	1.41	0.32	0.93	2.30
Statewide Foreign Born Population	171	11.99	4.15	3.5	21.0
Language	171	2.61	0.60	1	3
Alternative Mainstream NIP	171	0.67	0.47	0	1
LR Ideology of the Largest NNI Party	171	0.64	0.48	0	1
Alternative National Independence Party	171	0.80	0.40	0	1
Electoral System	171	2.46	0.75	1	3
Vote Share (%)	171	12.00	12.13	0	44
In Government Regionally	171	0.19	0.39	0	1

The variables which had the largest degree of variation were vote share and percentage unemployment. In both datasets, unemployment ranged from 1.7% to 29.5%. The vote share ranges from 0% to 44% in the regional dataset and 0% to 50% in the statewide dataset. The significant variation found in the vote share between different cases has been accounted for using the robustness checks conducted in Appendix D. These tests removed the least and the most electorally successful parties from the datasets. This was done to ensure that minor or major parties were not having any disproportionate impact on the results from the analysis. As is discussed within Appendix D, these tests further emphasise the robustness of the results.

Table 4.4: Descriptive Statistics: Statewide Dataset

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Left-Right Ideology	153	2.97	1.62	1	6
Left-Right Ideology (Dummy)	153	0.33	0.47	0	1
Mainstream-Radical Ideology	153	0.31	0.46	0	1
Unemployment (%)	153	8.70	4.94	1.7	29.5
Comparative Unemployment	153	0.85	0.32	0.33	1.88
Monarchy	153	0.88	0.32	0	1
Military Spending	153	1.41	0.32	0.93	2.37
Statewide Foreign Born Population	153	11.78	3.66	3.6	21.0
Language	153	2.46	0.65	1	3
Alternative Mainstream NIP	153	0.54	0.50	0	1
LR Ideology of the Largest NNI Party	153	0.50	0.50	0	1
Alternative National Independence Party	153	0.65	0.48	0	1
Electoral System	153	2.46	0.87	1	3
Vote Share (%)	153	12.50	12.38	0	50
In Government Regionally	153	0.29	0.46	0	1

Another variable of note which has a larger degree of variation is the statewide foreign born population. The percentage of foreign born individuals in a country ranges from 3.5% to 21% in the regional dataset and 3.6% to 21% in the statewide dataset. Excluding the binary variables, the two variables with the lowest degree of variation are comparative unemployment and military spending. Comparative unemployment ranges from 0.18 to 1.90 in the regional dataset and 0.33 to 1.88 in the statewide dataset. Military spending, as a percentage of national GDP, ranges from 0.93% to 2.30% in the regional dataset and 0.93% to 2.37% in the statewide dataset.

Left-Right Ideology

Looking at Tables 4.6 and 4.7 below, the results from the analysis of the regional dataset (shown in the tables as "REG") can be found in Models 1, 3, 5 and 7 while the results from the statewide dataset (shown in the tables as "SW") can be found in Models 2, 4, 6 and 8. All models use the same independent variables with the exception of the unemployment variable. Percentage unemployment and comparative unemployment were included in separate models due to the fact that there was a large degree of correlation between the two variables. This correlation was highest in the regional dataset, being at 50% (see Table 4.5). Given these figures, these two variables being included in the same models could have risked a multicollinearity problem (see Daoud, 2017). Therefore, these two variables have been put in separate models to avoid such a problem arising.

Table 4.5: Correlation Matrix - Percentage Unemployment and Regional Unemployment

	Percentage Unemployment (Regional)		Percentage Unemployment (Statewide)
Comparative Unemployment (Regional)	50%	Comparative Unemployment (Statewide)	40%

The analysis of percentage unemployment is included in Models 1, 2, 5 and 6 and the analysis of comparative unemployment is included in Models 3, 4, 7 and 8. The results from this analysis provides some interesting findings relating to all four of the hypotheses as well as some interesting findings regarding the control variables.

The control variables and fixed effects have also been displayed in the below tables. This analysis has included cases from 25 regions in 10 countries. Some cases are far more frequent than others. Spain in particular is a country which has a large number of cases within both datasets.

Table 4.6: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	1 REG	2 SW	3 REG	4 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.16***	-0.23***		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.43***	-1.93***
			(0.40)	(0.44)
Monarchy	-1.46***	-1.36***	-1.42***	-1.49***
	(0.31)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.37)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.67*	-1.50*	-0.78+	0.33+
	(0.69)	(0.73)	(0.69)	(0.65)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.04+	0.14**	0.04+	0.22***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Language	0.20+	-0.14+	0.44+	0.29+
	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.45)	(0.40)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.49+	0.66	0.03+	0.95**
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.30)	(0.35)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.33+	-0.28+	-0.25+	-0.13+
	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.36)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.65+	-0.27+	-0.30+	0.28+
	(0.60)	(0.55)	(0.59)	(0.53)
2008-2011	0.33+	-0.39+	0.06+	-0.72+
	(0.54)	(0.60)	(0.53)	(0.56)
2012-2015	0.01+	-0.29+	-0.29+	-0.30+
	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.56)	(0.64)
2016-2020	-0.32+	-1.55*	-0.24+	-1.59**
	(0.57)	(0.61)	(0.55)	(0.59)
Cut 1	-6.02	-6.51	-3.46	-1.30
	(2.34)	(2.53)	(2.15)	(2.18)
Cut 2	-4.52	-4.70	-2.04	0.29
	(2.33)	(2.54)	(2.15)	(2.18)
Cut 3	-3.84	-3.71	-1.39	1.21
	(2.32)	(2.52)	(2.16)	(2.20)
Cut 4	-2.82	-2.73	-0.44	2.10
	(2.32)	(2.48)	(2.16)	(2.16)
Cut 5	-1.53	-1.57	0.80	3.15
	(2.31)	(2.47)	(2.16)	(2.18)
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.15	0.08	0.10
Number of Cases	171	153	171	153

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table 4.7: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	5 REG	6 SW	7 REG	8 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.24***	-0.30**		
	(0.07)	(0.10)		
Comparative Unemployment			-3.53***	-3.94***
			(0.81)	(0.78)
Monarchy	-3.45***	-2.85***	-4.18***	-2.85***
	(0.93)	(0.70)	(0.80)	(0.74)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-7.21**	-5.67***	-8.07**	-3.29
	(2.41)	(1.30)	(2.52)	(1.98)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.00+	0.02+	0.07+	0.12+
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Language	-0.38+	-1.31*	0.00+	-0.44+
	(0.43)	(0.62)	(0.42)	(0.41)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.82+	-0.33+	-0.29+	-0.04+
	(0.57)	(0.45)	(0.53)	(0.48)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.02	0.83	-1.10	0.34+
	(0.57)	(0.45)	(0.65)	(0.47)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.67+	-0.67+	0.03+	0.01+
	(0.98)	(0.82)	(1.11)	(0.84)
2008-2011	1.12+	-0.40+	0.87+	-0.73+
	(0.72)	(0.83)	(0.76)	(0.88)
2012-2015	-0.70+	-0.42+	-1.02+	-0.68+
	(0.88)	(0.89)	(0.93)	(1.02)
2016-2020	-0.43+	-1.22+	-0.75+	-1.63
	(0.76)	(0.83)	(0.88)	(0.97)
Constant	16.32**	15.14**	16.78**	9.66*
	(5.25)	(4.66)	(4.96)	(4.09)
Pseudo R^2	0.40	0.33	0.40	0.32
Number of Cases	171	153	171	153

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

The issue with the frequency of the number of Spanish cases is discussed much further in the robustness checks conducted later within this chapter. Time fixed effects were also included in order to control for the years the elections took place. This was required because there were significantly more cases in some years than in others. For example, in the statewide dataset there were 14 cases between 2000 and 2003 but 50 cases between 2016 and 2020.

The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis

The findings below support **The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis**, showing strong evidence to support the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the level of unemployment found within a region and the left-right ideology of its national independence parties. These findings are in line with the expectation that regions with higher levels of unemployment are more likely to have left-wing national independence parties and regions with lower levels of unemployment are more likely to have right-wing national independence parties. This relationship was found in both regional and statewide elections. It was found in all four models that there was a statistically significant relationship between higher levels of percentage unemployment and more left-wing ideological positions.

It was also found that there was a strong relationship between left-right ideology and comparative unemployment. All four relevant models found that higher levels of comparative unemployment pushed national independence parties to more left-wing positions. This specific finding fits Hechter (1975) and Harvie's (1994) discourses on regionalist parties which emphasise the importance of a region's economic performance specifically in relation to its parent country. Therefore, these results clearly show that the comparative economic performance of a region has a large effect over the left-right ideology of its national independence parties.

The Monarchy Hypothesis

The interaction between the left-right ideology of national independence parties and the existence of a monarchy was found to be statistically significant in all eight of the models, meaning that the impact on the left-right ideology of national independence parties was impacted by whether the case was in a monarchy or not. In all eight models, as was anticipated in **The Monarchy Hypothesis**, it was found that national independence parties in monarchies were more likely to hold a more left-wing ideological position.

The Military Expenditure Hypothesis

In Models 3 and 4, there was no statistically significant relationship found between the left-right ideology of national independence parties and levels of military spending. Furthermore, in Model 8, again no highly significant relationship was found. However, in in the remaining models (1, 2, 5, 6 and 7) a strongly significant negative relationship was found. This analysis, therefore, provides some support for **The Military Expenditure Hypothesis**. This result provides some evidence which can support the theory that the military activities of their parent country is something of concern to national independence parties, pushing these parties to more left-wing positions. These findings could also suggest that Ritchie's theory (2016) regarding the relationship between British militarism and the left-wing nature of Scottish nationalism could also be applicable to other cases of national independence parties in Canada and Western Europe. This could also include the other significant case in the UK, Wales.

The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis

In Models 2 and 4, there was a statistically significant relationship found between national independence parties' left-right ideology and the level of immigration at the statewide level. This effect was found to be strongest in Model 2. It was found in these models that national independence parties which held right-wing positions were more likely to be in countries where immigration levels were higher.

However, there was no significant relationship found between the left-right ideology of national independence parties and the proportion of foreign born individuals at the statewide level in any of the other models (1, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8). This means that, in these models, an increase in proportion of foreign-born individuals, at the statewide level, did not increase the likelihood of national independence parties becoming more right-wing. Therefore, these results contradict **The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis**. The explanation for this result may lie in the use of a statewide level

measurement which, whilst the most fined grained available across cases, is an imprecise way of estimating regional levels of immigration.

Given the evidence from Models 2 and 4, as well as the large body of literature which links the right-wing politics and positions on limiting immigration (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014), including when discussing some national independence parties such as Vlaams Belang (e.g. Billiet & De Witte, 1995; Moufahim et al, 2015; De Cleen, 2016), the role of immigration should still considered within future research on the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

Control Variables

The language control variable used is the same as the language variable used in the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology, a three-fold variable measuring regions based on the existence of a unique language and the proportion of those in the region who speak it. The analysis found that this variable had no significant relationship with the left-right ideology of national independence parties in every model except for one, Model 6. Interestingly, it was found in Model 6 that a unique language in a region made it more likely for the national independence parties in that region to be left-wing. While no significant relationship was found, this does not mean that language should not be considered in future research which addresses the left-right ideology of national independence parties. This is primarily due to the large body of literature which has found that language is an important factor in the ideology and broader politics of many national independence movements (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; Sorens, 2005; van Morgan, 2006).

The second and third control variables are both relevant to the competition faced by national independence parties. The variable measuring the left-right ideological leaning of the dominant non-national independence party is a dummy variable in which right-leaning parties have been coded with a one and left-leaning parties have been coded with a zero. In the majority of the models, no highly statistically significant relationship was found between these two variables. The only exception to this was in Model 4. In Model 4 it was found that if the dominant non-national independence party in an

election was right-wing, the national independence party standing in the same election would also be right-wing. Interestingly, this null finding, in the majority of models, contradicts previous research conducted on regionalist parties. Previous research has shown that regionalist parties do follow the left-right ideology of the dominant non-regionalist party in their territory (e.g. Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871). In the majority of the models above, this was not found to be the case. The existence of an alternative national independence party was also measured as a dummy variable in which those cases which faced an independentist rival in the same election were coded with a one and those that did not were coded with a zero. There was also no highly significant relationship found between this variable and the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

<u>Mainstream-Radical Ideology</u>

Table 4.8 below lays out the results of the regression analyses ran which have tested what factors influence the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. The cases of national independence parties in the regional dataset were analysed in Models 9 and 11 and the cases from the statewide dataset were analysed in Models 10 and 12. The below models use the same independent variables with the exception of the unemployment variable. As was the case in Models 1-8, these two variables were separated in order to avoid issues related to multicollinearity. Percentage unemployment is analysed in Models 9 and 10 while comparative unemployment is analysed in Models 11 and 12. These models also include time fixed effects, as well as using the same group of control variables. The reasoning for the inclusion of the time fixed effects is the same as in Models 1-8. The theoretical reasoning for the inclusion of the controls in these models is discussed in the Research Design section of this thesis.

The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis

The results below show there is no significant relationship between the ideological radicalism of national independence parties and levels of unemployment. This was both the case with percentage

unemployment and comparative unemployment. Therefore, these results offer no evidence to

support *The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis*.

Table 4.8: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	9 REG	10 SW	11 REG	12 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.06+	0.01+		
	(0.05)	(0.08)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.05+	-1.06+
			(0.81)	(1.19)
Language	-1.59**	-3.21***	-1.52**	-3.10***
	(0.47)	(0.65)	(0.46)	(0.65)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	3.71***	2.32**	3.78***	2.37**
	(0.83)	(0.88)	(0.85)	(0.81)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.67***	0.55**	0.60***	0.53**
	(0.58)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.20)
Electoral System	3.46***	2.29***	2.89***	2.12**
	(0.58)	(0.50)	(0.68)	(0.61)
Vote Share (%)	-0.12***	-0.09**	-0.12***	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
In Government Regionally	-3.92***	-3.88***	-3.96***	-3.90***
	(1.11)	(0.73)	(1.11)	(0.67)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.28+	-0.48	-1.05+	-0.34+
	(1.01)	(1.09)	(1.05)	(1.22)
2008-2011	-3.65***	-3.34	-3.52***	-3.13*
	(0.89)	(1.62)	(0.90)	(1.58)
2012-2015	-2.94**	-2.13	-2.89**	-2.06+
	(0.94)	(1.38)	(0.91)	(1.37)
2016-2020	-2.84**	-2.42	-2.46**	-2.26
	(0.91)	(1.27)	(0.94)	(1.35)
Constant	-11.69***	-3.02+	-9.49**	-1.85+
	(2.74)	(2.19)	(3.43)	(2.85)
Pseudo R^2	0.52	0.54	0.52	0.55
Number of Cases	171	153	171	153

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

These models would also suggest that, when it comes to the study of the ideology of national

independence parties, unemployment is a factor which should be looked at from a traditional left-

right perspective, rather than from a mainstream-radical perspective. This suggestion is in line with

the findings from this chapter which strongly supported *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*

and previous work conducted on regionalist parties, for example, the work from Massetti and Schakel which found a clear relationship between the left-right ideology of regionalist parties and economic performance (2015: 874). Further evidence to support this argument can be found in the fact that there are many cases of right-wing national independence parties in cases which had a lower level of an unemployment than their parent country. This included radical right-wing parties such as Die Freiheitlichen in South Tyrol and Vlaams Belang in Flanders.

The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis

The results from this analysis, regarding the impact of language on the radicalisation of national independence parties, are interesting and noteworthy. Contrary to ***The Mainstream-Radical Language Radicalisation Hypothesis***, all of the models found that regions with their own majority-spoken language are significantly less likely to have radical national independence parties. In contrast, regions with their own minority-spoken language and, further still, no unique language at all were more likely to have radical national independence parties. The possible reasoning for this finding is discussed in the conclusion of this chapter and tested further in Chapter Six when looking at the radicalism of left-right ideology in Basque and Catalan national independence parties.

The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis

The results from this analysis support ***The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis***, which states that when a national independence party is faced with a direct mainstream independentist rival in an election, it will become more ideologically radical. This finding supports the theory that national independence parties make themselves ideologically distinct in order to provide a unique offer to the electorate. This is something which has also been found to be the case with regionalist parties more broadly (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871), so it would make sense that it is also the case for national independence parties specifically.

It is interesting to compare this finding to the finding regarding the left-right position of the largest non-national independence party. In the analysis of traditional left-right ideology, it was found, in seven of the eight models, that there was no relationship between the left-right positioning of a national independence party and the left-right ideology of the largest non-national independence party in its region. This would then suggest that national independence parties are more likely to respond to the ideology of other rival national independence parties than they are to a significant non-national independence party in their region. This finding would support previous literature which has found that political parties are more responsive to other parties closer to them ideologically (e.g. Budge, 1994; Adams & Somer-Topcu, 2009).

The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis

The results from all four models support ***The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis***. All four models suggest that higher levels of immigration at the statewide cause national independence parties to become more radical. Further evidence to support this hypothesis can be found by looking at the cases which have had the largest increases in their immigrant populations since the turn of the century. Of the ten countries included in this study, the three which saw the largest increase in the proportion of immigrants in their populations, between 2000 and 2019, were Belgium, Spain and Sweden (see OECD, 2021). In Sweden, the only national independence party active in that period was the minor radical right-wing Skånepartiet. In Belgium, between 2000 and 2019, the radical-right Vlaams Belang consistently achieved electoral successes. Most notably in 2019, the party finished second in the popular vote in both the Flemish and Belgian parliament elections (Nordsieck, 2019a; Nordsieck, 2019c). In Spain, there have been notable successes from radical-left national independence parties. This includes the emergence of EH Bildu in the Basque Country and the CUP in Catalonia, two parties which now have elected representatives in their respective regional parliaments (Nordsieck, 2020; Nordsieck, 2021a). The fact that both Belgium and Spain saw notable successes of radical national independence parties while the proportion of immigrants in their respective

populations increased is an interesting observation and does provide evidence to support ***The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis***. However, this observation still requires further analysis.

Control Variables

The three controls included in this study provide some interesting, but also unsurprising, findings. It was found that proportional systems were more likely to have radical parties than mixed or majoritarian systems. This finding supported the literature which argues that proportional electoral systems encourage radical political parties (e.g. Hain, 1986; Norris, 1997). It was also found that radical national independence parties were electorally less successful. Radical national independence parties were both less likely than their mainstream counterparts to win votes and significantly less likely to be parties of government at the regional level.[4] This supports the literature which argues that more centrist political parties do better in elections and are better represented in government than their more radical electoral rivals (e.g. Ezrow, 2005; Forestiere, 2009).

<u>Robustness Checks</u>

Robustness checks have been included in this analysis to further ensure the reliability of the results. These robustness checks combine both datasets into a single dataset and add an additional control variable in order to account for the differences in the types of election the party is standing in. This control is a dummy variable in which parties standing in a regional election have been denoted with a one while those standing in statewide elections have been denoted with a zero. As was previously mentioned, this was an alternative to splitting the original database into two datasets. Therefore, this robustness check shows that the choice to split the database into two datasets does not profoundly

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[4] Only a single case was found in both datasets of a radical national independence party that was in government at the regional level, EH Bildu in Navarre. It was found that EH Bildu was a governing party in Navarre during three Spanish statewide elections, between 2015 and 2019, and during the 2019 Navarre regional election.

change the results of the analysis. The types of regressions ran in this check are identical to those used on the regional and statewide datasets.

In addition, this new dataset has been used to run a second robustness check, one which removes all Spanish cases. It is clear from the database used in this chapter and the Schakel regionalist party database that Spain has had a far larger number of national independence parties than other Western nations. As is discussed in Chapter Three, the country with the largest number of cases by a large margin, in both the regional and statewide datasets, is Spain. 34.5% of cases in the regional dataset and 42.5% in the statewide dataset are Spanish (see Tables 3.6 and 3.8). This prominence of Spanish cases is something which dates back decades, since the end of Francoism in the 1970s. This is shown by the Schakel database. In this database, in both regional and statewide elections, Spain had the largest number of secessionist cases (see Tables 3.1 and 3.2).

The reason why this is especially significant is due to the ideological leaning of secessionist cases in Spain. As was discussed in Chapter Three, in the Schakel Database the overwhelming majority of cases of secessionist cases in Spain are left-wing. This is at both the regional and national levels. 88.33% of cases were left-wing at the regional level and 90.48% were left-wing at the national level. This was also found to be the case in the two datasets analysed in this chapter. In the regional dataset, 52 out of 59 Spanish cases were left-wing (88.14%). In the statewide dataset, 53 out of 65 Spanish cases were left-wing (81.54%). The considerable left-wing nature of Spanish secessionist parties and their over representation within the dataset could mean that Spanish cases have an unrepresentative impact on the left-right ideological leaning of the cases, as a whole, in the database. Therefore, removing the Spanish cases in a robustness check ensures that this impact has had no notable effect on the results from this analysis.

Both of these robustness checks are presented in Tables 4.9-4.11 below. Each table presents the results from both the check of all cases and the check which removes the Spanish cases.

Table 4.9: Robustness Checks: Ordinal Logistic Regression Models (Left-Right Ideology)

Model	RC1 All Cases	RC2 Spanish Cases Removed	RC3 All Cases	RC4 Spanish Cases Removed
Unemployment (%)	-0.16***	-0.18***		
	(0.02)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.67***	-2.43***
			(0.31)	(0.41)
Monarchy	-1.63***	-1.63***	-1.68***	-1.12***
	(0.24)	(0.35)	(0.25)	(0.32)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.59**	-4.24***	-1.06*	-3.94***
	(0.52)	(0.83)	(0.51)	(0.83)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.06	-0.08	0.07*	-0.08
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
Regional Election	-0.35+	0.32+	-0.55*	0.41+
	(0.22)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.31)
Language	-0.08+	-1.98***	0.18+	-1.96***
	(0.30)	(0.39)	(0.31)	(0.42)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	0.03+	0.33+	0.26+	0.61*
	(0.23)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.30)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.35+	-0.77*	-0.30+	-0.87**
	(0.22)	(0.35)	(0.23)	(0.33)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.74+	-1.17+	-0.29+	-0.74+
	(0.49)	(0.75)	(0.52)	(0.79)
2008-2011	-0.45+	-1.27*	-0.54+	-1.23*
	(0.44)	(0.61)	(0.44)	(0.63)
2012-2015	-1.02*	-1.53*	-1.62***	-1.43*
	(0.44)	(0.67)	(0.43)	(0.68)
2016-2020	-0.76	-1.20*	-0.69+	-0.85+
	(0.45)	(0.60)	(0.46)	(0.62)
Cut 1	-7.25	-19.19	-5.86	-19.24
	(1.79)	(2.87)	(1.67)	(2.96)
Cut 2	-5.68	-16.92	-4.35	-16.90
	(1.78)	(2.83)	(1.66)	(2.92)
Cut 3	-4.88	-15.88	-3.55	-15.74
	(1.77)	(2.79)	(1.66)	(2.87)
Cut 4	-3.91	-15.01	-2.61	-14.77
	(1.76)	(2.75)	(1.65)	(2.82)
Cut 5	-2.74	-13.45	-1.47	-13.13
	(1.76)	(2.67)	(1.65)	(2.73)
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.17	0.10	0.20
Number of Cases	324	200	324	200

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 4.10: Robustness Checks: Binary Logistic Regression Models (Left-Right Ideology)

Model	RC5 All Cases	RC6 Spanish Cases Removed	RC7 All Cases	RC8 Spanish Cases Removed
Unemployment (%)	-0.25***	-0.51***		
	(0.06)	(0.11)		
Comparative Unemployment			-3.66***	-5.20***
			(0.56)	(0.78)
Monarchy	-3.45***	-6.64***	-4.02***	-4.95***
	(0.52)	(0.96)	(0.53)	(0.80)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-5.77***	-14.87***	-5.96***	-13.86***
	(1.02)	(2.56)	(1.35)	(2.80)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.03+	-0.17*	0.10	-0.15+
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.11)
Regional Election	0.03+	-1.33*	-0.23+	-1.23
	(0.30)	(0.57)	(0.33)	(0.64)
Language	-1.03**	-4.02***	-0.47	-3.56***
	(0.33)	(0.97)	(0.28)	(0.88)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.60	0.64+	-0.36+	1.31
	(0.33)	(0.66)	(0.34)	(0.75)
Alternative National Independence Party	0.09+	-0.70+	-0.19+	-0.89+
	(0.32)	(1.11)	(0.33)	(1.05)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.74+	0.51+	0.45+	2.06+
	(0.68)	(1.18)	(0.82)	(1.39)
2008-2011	-0.08+	-0.58+	0.15+	-0.11+
	(0.50)	(0.88)	(0.58)	(1.02)
2012-2015	-1.00*	-2.69**	-1.71**	-2.41*
	(0.50)	(0.99)	(0.56)	(1.00)
2016-2020	-1.32	-1.75	-1.27*	-0.89+
	(0.52)	(0.91)	(0.61)	(0.92)
Constant	15.32***	43.20***	14.96***	39.33***
	(2.68)	(6.82)	(2.61)	(6.86)
Pseudo R^2	0.35	0.59	0.37	0.64
Number of Cases	324	200	324	200

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 4.11: Robustness Checks Binary Logistic Regression Models (Mainstream-Radical Ideology)

Model	RC9 All Cases	RC10 Spanish Cases Removed	RC11 All Cases	RC12 Spanish Cases Removed
Unemployment (%)	-0.03+	-0.20**		
	(0.03)	(0.07)		
Comparative Unemployment			-0.92	-2.02**
			(0.51)	(0.63)
Language	-1.74***	-1.33**	-1.71***	-1.45**
	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.31)	(0.47)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	2.32***	2.00**	2.38***	2.21**
	(0.47)	(0.73)	(0.47)	(0.72)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.38***	0.35***	0.36***	0.36***
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Regional Election	0.27+	0.07+	0.26+	0.07+
	(0.37)	(0.49)	(0.36)	(0.52)
Electoral System	1.82***	1.21*	1.62***	1.09*
	(0.33)	(0.47)	(0.33)	(0.46)
Vote Share (%)	-0.13***	-0.10***	-0.13***	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.70+	-0.79+	-0.67+	-0.56+
	(0.76)	(1.02)	(0.76)	(0.99)
2008-2011	-2.97***	-2.25**	-3.01***	-2.28**
	(0.67)	(0.69)	(0.67)	(0.68)
2012-2015	-1.97**	-1.59*	-2.01**	-1.72*
	(0.61)	(0.71)	(0.58)	(0.68)
2016-2020	-1.76**	-1.48*	-1.69*	-1.47*
	(0.67)	(0.74)	(0.68)	(0.75)
Constant	-4.03**	-2.67+	-2.89	-1.81+
	(1.54)	(2.05)	(1.71)	(2.05)
Pseudo R^2	0.42	0.37	0.43	0.37
Number of Cases	324	200	324	200

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table 4.9 runs ordinal regressions on the left-right ideology of the cases, Table 4.10 runs binary regressions on the left-right ideology of cases and Table 4.11 runs binary regressions on the mainstream-radical ideology of cases. The key independent and dependent variables used in these checks are identical to the ones used in the analysis of Models 1-12. The controls used are also all the same with two exceptions. The first is an additional control variable added to all three checks in order to control for the type of election the party stood in. The second is that the in-government control has

had to be removed from the analysis of mainstream-radical ideology. This had to be done due to the fact that the only case of a radical national independence party which was included in the database was EH Bildu. Therefore, when all Spanish cases are removed, this case is removed. This meant the control variable perfectly failed and had to be omitted.

All Cases

There were 324 cases of national independence parties altogether in the database. A notable observation is that there are very few differences between the results in this robustness check and the results observed in Models 1-12. In all four relevant robustness checks (RC1, RC3, RC5 and RC7), it is still found that unemployment has a statistically significant relationship with left-right ideology, with an increase in unemployment leading to more left-wing national independence parties and vice versa. This is the case with both percentage and comparative unemployment. This further supports **The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis**. In the same four robustness checks, it was found that monarchy and military spending both had a statistically significant relationship with left-right ideology. With both variables, this relationship was still found to be negative. This further supports both **The Monarchy Hypothesis** and **The Military Expenditure Hypothesis**. Of these four robustness checks, three of them (RC1, RC5 and RC7) show no highly significant relationship between higher levels of immigration at the statewide level and more right-wing national independence parties. One of the checks (RC3) does find a small but statistically significant relationship, offering some evidence to support **The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis**. These findings are similar to what was found in Models 1-8.

The two relevant robustness checks (RC9 and RC11) further support the findings found in Models 9-12 relevant to mainstream-radical ideology. There was no highly significant relationship found between mainstream-radical ideology and percentage unemployment and comparative unemployment. In both robustness checks, as was the case in Models 9-12, it was found that a unique regional language pushed national independence parties to more mainstream positions. The robustness checks also provided additional evidence that national independence parties take will take

more radical positions when they face an independentist rival, supporting *The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis*. Finally, both robustness checks show that there is a statistically significant relationship between the mainstream-radical ideology national independence parties and statewide levels of immigration. This relationship further supports *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*.

Spanish Cases Removed

There are 124 cases from Spain in the database. When these cases are removed, 200 cases are left in the database. It is notable that these results are similar to the results from Models 1-12 and from the previous robustness checks. In all four of the relevant robustness checks (RC2, RC4, RC6 and RC8), it is still found that unemployment has a statistically significant relationship with left-right ideology. This is the case with both percentage and comparative unemployment. This continues to support *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*. In all four robustness checks, there is a statistically significant relationship between left-right ideology and both monarchy and military spending. These findings further support *The Monarchy Hypothesis* and *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis*. When looking at the relationship between left-right ideology and statewide levels of immigration, there was no statistically significant relationship found in the majority of robustness checks (RC2, RC4 and RC8). However, an interesting observation is that there was a statistically significant negative relationship found between the two variables in one of the checks (RC6). This finding suggests that as levels of immigration increase, national independence parties become more left-wing. This contradicts *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis*.

In both relevant robustness checks (RC10 and RC12) the majority of the results support what was previously found in Models 9-12 and in the robustness checks which include all cases (RC9 and RC11). It is found in both of these robustness checks that national independence parties will be more radical when they face an independentist rival, when they have a minority-spoken unique language or no unique language and when levels of immigration at the statewide level increase. The most significant difference is that it is found in one of the checks (RC10) that there is a statistically significant negative

relationship between mainstream-radical ideology and percentage unemployment. This suggests that as unemployment increases in a region, its national independence parties are less likely to be radical. This further contradicts **The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis**.

Robustness Checks: Concluding Remarks

Overall, the robustness checks support the findings from Models 1-12. The robustness checks which combine all cases have shown that either way for controlling for types of elections produce the same types of results, emphasising the robustness of the results in Models 1-12. The robustness checks which remove the Spanish cases show that Spanish cases have not had an unrepresentative influence over the results in Models 1-12. This was crucial to show given the large number of Spanish cases and their significant ideological leaning to the left. In addition to these robustness checks, in order to further increase the reliability of the results, additional robustness checks have been conducted and can be viewed in the appendices. an additional OLS regression analysis was conducted, using the same dependent and independent variables as in Models 1-4 (see Appendix C). This appendix further shows the strength of the relationships found in Models 1-8, providing additional evidence of the factors which influence the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties. An additional robustness check removes the most electorally successful and unsuccessful cases from each of the datasets (see Appendix D). This was done in order to ensure that the most high profile and minor parties have not had any excessive influence over the results from this analysis. Overall it can be concluded that the results from this analysis are robust especially in relation to the correlation between the dependent variables and the key independent variables.

Conclusion

This chapter has looked at the impact of multiple different variables on the left-right ideology of national independence parties, through a quantitative study of both regional and statewide elections. The findings in this analysis support **The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis**, finding a correlation between higher levels of unemployment and more left-wing ideological positions. This supports

previously literature which has found that poorer economic conditions can lead to an increase in support for left-wing political parties (e.g. March & Rommerskirchen, 2015; Santana & Rama, 2018) as well as the previous research on regionalist party ideology which found that comparatively poorer economic conditions pushed these parties to the left (e.g. Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015). There was also no highly significant relationship found between levels of unemployment and mainstream-radical ideology, contrary to *The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis*.

The results from this analysis found evidence that national independence parties are more likely to be left-wing in monarchies, supporting *The Monarchy Hypothesis*. This supports previous literature which has argued that monarchy is a more conservative concept both in terms of natural ideological placement (e.g. Allen, 1981) and also in terms of levels of support (e.g. Rose & Kavanagh, 1976). This finding adds to an extremely limited body of literature on the importance of monarchy in western liberal democracies. This gap is especially clear in the regionalist party literature, which has seen the system of constitutional monarchy be completely ignored, despite it being the system of governance of many countries with high profile regionalist movements.

Furthermore, the analysis of military spending provided some evidence of a correlation between higher levels of military spending and more left-wing ideological positions, supporting *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis*. This supports the past literature which has previously argued that military spending is a more conservative ideological position (e.g. Abell, 1990) and that there is a left-right divide on the issue of spending priorities and defence (e.g. Bove et al, 2017: 595).

Contrary to *The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis*, the evidence suggested that regions with their own distinct majority-spoken languages were more likely to have cases of moderate national independence parties standing in elections. In contrast, regions with a distinct minority-spoken language and no distinct language at all were more likely to have cases of radical national independence parties. One possible explanation for this finding could be that parties might be more centrist in a region with a majority-spoken language in order to appeal to a common median voter. If

the majority of a national independence party's region speak the "national" language, the party has an opportunity to win over a large amount of support from the large body of voters who identify with that language. In order to appeal to as many voters as possible, the party may take a more centrist position in order to appeal to both left-leaning and right-leaning voters.

Another explanation could be that national independence parties from regions with their own majority-spoken language might feel less culturally threatened as the majority of people in their region speak, what is perceived by them to be, their own culturally distinct 'national' language. In contrast, regions with a minority-spoken unique language may feel more of a cultural threat, particularly from their parent country, due to the fact that less people speak their own language and instead speak the language of their parent country. This could create a cultural insecurity which could cause these parties to turn to more radical ideologies either on the left or on the right. If this theory is correct then it would also explain why regions with no unique language also have a larger number of radical national independence parties. These parties might find it harder to make the case of their own region's right to recognised nationhood due to the fact that they are missing a language which would distinguish them from their parent country. This may cause these parties to turn to more radical ideologies as they become more desperate to portray themselves and their region as a culturally, and possibly even ethnically, distinct nation, fundamentally different from their wider parent country.

One such example of this can be found in England. Despite English being the primary spoken language in England, it is not a unique language to England, being the primary spoken language in all parts of the UK as well as in many foreign countries such as Australia and Canada. Therefore, it is no longer a trait uniquely attributable to the English nation. In this study, the only English case of a national independence party was the English Democrats, a minor radical right-wing party. It could be argued that this nature of the English language has played some role in pushing the English Democrats towards a more radical ideological position, particularly in terms of emphasising the English origins of the English language. This would be due to a feeling of insecurity over the loss of a significant factor

which made England a unique nation. In their manifesto, the party argued that it was "clearly impossible in a unified country" for all languages to be treated equally and, therefore, "the public culture of England should be that of the indigenous English," (2020: 19). This is a clear example of protectionist ethnic nationalism which, it could be argued, partly originates from an insecurity caused by the English language no longer being a unique trait of the English nation. This theory is also supported by literature on English nationalism which emphasises a broader feeling of insecurity in the English national identity, both in economic terms (e.g. Kenny, 2016: 10), and also in terms of the place of England in both the UK and in Europe (e.g. Wellings, 2010; Black, 2019). However, this theory is still only a working hypothesis and would require further analysis to be confirmed.

This research found evidence to support *The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis*, which stated that an ideologically moderate national independence party will likely force another national independence party to become more ideologically radical. This supports the previous research on regionalist parties which suggests that regionalist parties change their left-right ideology when faced with a regionalist rival (Massetti, 2015: 871). This finding is especially interesting in the context of what was found regarding the party competition controls in the analysis of traditional left-right ideology. These findings suggest that the ideology of a national independence party is more responsive to the ideology of other national independence parties than to the ideology of larger non-national independence parties.

There was only limited evidence which supported the claim that higher levels of immigration caused national independence parties to become more right-wing, offering only limited support to *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis*. There was stronger evidence to support *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*, finding a correlation between higher levels of immigration and ideological radicalism. This hypothesis is further supported by both the Spanish and Belgian cases. This supports previous literature which has found anti-immigrant sentiment in radical right-wing parties (e.g.

Diamond, 1996) and also previous literature which has suggested there is also nationalist sentiment in radical left-wing parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al, 2012).

This analysis also included a number of control variables in its models. It was found that language and party competition did not have a highly significant relationship with the left-right ideology of a national independence party. Interestingly, the control variables did find evidence to support the claims that the electoral system and electoral success can be significant predictors of a national independence party's mainstream-radical ideology.

Chapters Five and Six of this thesis will explore the left-right ideology of national independence parties from the following four pairs of case studies:

- The Faroe Islands and Greenland (Chapter Five)

- Flanders and Quebec (Chapter Five)

- The Basque Country and Catalonia (Chapter Six)

- Scotland and Wales (Chapter Six)

This analysis will be conducted using a most similar systems design. This approach is designed to explore the possible factors which can explain the ideological variance between the cases in each pair. Chapter Five will focus on the traditional left-right ideology of the national independence parties within pairs of case studies. This chapter will focus on the three key findings from this current chapter, which relate to the following three hypotheses, which have been laid out and analysed in both this chapter and the introduction of this thesis:

- ***The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis***

- ***The Monarchy Hypothesis***

- ***The Military Expenditure Hypothesis***

Chapter Six will focus on the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties within pairs of case studies. This chapter will focus on the three key findings, from this chapter, which relate

to the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. Each of these findings relates to the following three hypotheses, which have been previously laid out and discussed in this thesis:

- ***The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis***

- ***The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis***

- ***The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis***

Chapter Five: Left-Right Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

The aim of this thesis is to address the question as to why national independence parties come both from left-wing and right-wing positions. This is approached through looking at this question from a traditional left-right perspective but also from a mainstream-radical perspective. Therefore, this thesis is not only analysing why some national independence parties are right-wing and others are left-wing but is also looking at why some position themselves in the centre ground and others turn to more radical positions. The focus of this chapter is on the former of these two perspectives. Through the analysis of two pairs of cases, this chapter explores the mechanisms that might lead certain variables to push national independence parties either more to the left or more to the right.

Table 5.1: Influences on the Left-Right Ideological Variation Within National Independence Parties

Independent Variables	Effect on Left-Right Ideology
Military Spending	Higher levels of military spending cause national independence parties to hold more left-wing positions.
Monarchy	A monarchic head of state causes national independence parties to hold more left-wing positions.
Unemployment	Higher levels of unemployment cause national independence parties to hold more left-wing positions. Lower levels of unemployment cause national independence parties to hold more right-wing positions. This effect is strongest when unemployment is comparably higher or lower than the region's parent country.

The quantitative analysis in Chapter Four of this thesis highlighted a number of factors which influence the left-right ideology of traditional national independence parties (see Table 5.1). The next stage of this analysis is designed to explore how the results from this quantitative analysis can be applied to real world case studies. This is partly done in order to further show that the correlations found in Chapter Four are also causal. Another benefit of this method is that it highlights the mechanisms behind these correlations. This chapter applies a most similar systems design in order to analyse the

variation in traditional left-right ideology between different national independence parties from across two pairs of case studies:

- The Faroe Islands and Greenland

- Flanders and Quebec

The choice to include two pairs instead of one was done in order to improve the robustness and external validity of the findings. This is discussed further in the Research Design section of Chapter Three. The choice to include these cases is based on the fact that the two cases in each pair are extremely comparable but there is a clear distinction in the left-right ideology of their respective national independence parties. Looking specifically at the two pairs in this chapter, national independence parties are predominantly left-wing in Greenland and Quebec but are predominantly right-wing in the Faroe Islands and Flanders. This analysis finds that, in both cases, it is economic conditions which offer an explanation as to why we see this ideological variation. It is notable that there is a clear economic divide between these pairs, which fall in line with the left-right positioning of their national independence parties (see Table 5.2). Given this analysis uses a most similar systems design, it is unsurprising that the cases which are compared in each pair share many similarities. This includes a number of control variables focused on in this analysis.

Table 5.2: The Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties and the Economic Conditions of their Regions

	Better Economic Conditions	Worse Economic Conditions
Right-Wing	Faroe Islands Flanders	
Left-Wing		Greenland Quebec

Alongside economic conditions, other relevant characteristics are also studied in this analysis. These have been chosen due to their previously found importance in influencing left-right ideological positions. This importance is derived from both the literature and the findings from Chapter Four of this thesis. The reasoning for the inclusion of each characteristic is discussed further in the Research

Design section of the thesis. In addition to analysing economic conditions, this analysis includes the three additional characteristics which act as control variables:

- Monarchy or Republic

- Militarism of the Parent Country

- Language

The focus on controlling key variables is one which has been supported in previous literature on the comparative method (e.g. Lijphart, 1971: 690).

In addition, this chapter also addresses the issue of the flow of causation. This is done using process tracing. This process tracing compares the electoral success of the Faroe Islands' two largest national independence parties with its economic performance. This further shows that it is economic conditions which influence the left-right ideology of national independence parties and not the other way around. In the conclusion of this chapter the issue of external validity is also discussed. This is done to highlight the generalisability of the results found in this chapter.

The Faroe Islands and Greenland

This section explores the ideological variation found between national independence parties in the Faroe Islands and Greenland. As is clearly shown in Figure 5.1 below, all significant Greenlandic national independence parties come from a left-wing position. The universally left-wing nature of Greenlandic national independence parties is something which has been consistent for decades. The Faroe Islands also has a notable left-wing national independence party, Tjóðveldi. Tjóðveldi has stood in every Faroese and Danish general election since the turn of the century. However, unlike in Greenland, the Faroe Islands also has multiple right-wing cases of national independence parties. In particular, the Faroe Islands has had a traditional conservative case, the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin, which has stood consistently in both regional and statewide elections. The party won the popular vote in the 2019 Faroese General Election (Nordsieck, 2019b). The Faroe Islands has also seen a number of other

smaller more centrist right-leaning national independence parties standing in both regional and statewide elections. Therefore, this section addresses the question of why the Faroe Islands has these right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not.

Figure 5.1: Left-Right Ideology of Current and Significant Faroese and Greenlandic National Independence Parties[5]

Greenlandic National Independence Parties (Left-Wing)	Faroese National Independence Parties (Left-Wing)	Faroese National Independence Parties (Right-Wing)
• Inuit Ataqatigiit • Partii Naleraq • Siumut	• Tjóðveldi	• **Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin** • **Framsókn**

Source: Compiled by the author.

This section is split into two parts. The first part addresses a group of three characteristics which act as control variables. Importantly, these three characteristics were found to be similar enough between the two cases that they could act as controls and also be ruled out as possible explanations for the ideological variation being explored. This analysis then addresses the characteristic which offers the main variation between the two cases, comparative economic conditions. This analysis shows that comparative economic conditions are the key explanation as to why there is ideological variation between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties. This finding contributes to the current literature by emphasising the importance of relative economic conditions on the ideology of national independence parties. As is highlighted in the literature review, previous research has shown that economic conditions can impact the ideology of regionalist parties and impacts the support for left-wing and right-wing political parties more generally. This analysis further supports the general argument made in this thesis that comparative economic conditions also impact the ideology of national independence parties specifically.

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[5] Parties which have seats in either the Faroese Løgting or the Greenlandic Inatsisartut.

When using a comparative method such as this, it is important to ensure both the internal and external validity of the findings. Regarding internal validity, this chapter controls for key variables which could explain the ideological variation seen between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties. These variables were chosen based on both the findings from the previous chapter and the existing literature. Additional evidence that the direction of causation is in fact what is being argued, i.e. that economic conditions are responsible for variation in the left-right ideology between national independence parties rather than the other way around, is also included. This is done through process tracing which tracks the electoral support of Faroese national independence parties against the economic conditions of the Faroe Islands. Regarding external validity, the findings from this chapter are supported by the large-n analysis conducted in Chapter Four. Therefore, it can be confidently argued that these results can be generalised across both Canada and Western Europe.

Table 5.3: Faroe Islands and Greenland Comparison

		Faroe Islands	Greenland
Independent Variable	Better or Worse Economic Conditions	**Better**	**Worse**
Control Variables	Monarchy or Republic?	Monarchy	Monarchy
	Average Statewide Level of Military Spending per Year (% GDP) (2000-2020) (Compiled from the following source: World Bank, 2021b).	1.33	1.33
	Status of Distinct Language (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2011b; Valijärvi & Kahn, 2020).	Majority-Spoken	Majority-Spoken
Dependent Variable	Number of Right-Wing Cases of NIPs in Regional and Statewide Elections (2005-2019)	**19 (67.86%)**	**0 (0%)**

As is shown in Table 5.3, there is a considerable amount of logic in comparing these two cases. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are both Nordic islands, both being part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Both cases have a majority-spoken language distinct from Danish, Faroese in the Faroe Islands and Greenlandic in Greenland. Both islands also have internationally recognised autonomy agreements

with the central Danish state (Stephen, 2017). As an extension of these agreements, both cases are members of the Nordic Council in their own right, recognised as distinct from Denmark (Nordic Co-operation, n.d.). Another interesting and notable similarity between the two cases is that both are not part of the EU, despite Denmark being a full member state (Gad, 2014: 105).

Control Variables

In this analysis, three characteristics, which could influence the left-right ideology of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands and Greenland, have been controlled for:

- Monarchy or Republic

- Militarism of the Parent Country

- Language

These characteristics have been included as they have been found to be important in the context of the left-right ideology of political parties, either in the literature or in the previous chapter of this thesis. A factor which must considered are interaction effects, i.e. do any of the control variables have an influence over the key independent variable, economic conditions? It is unlikely that the existence of a monarchy or a distinct regional language would have any notable impact on the economic conditions in Greenland or the Faroe Islands. The only control where this could be an issue is Danish militarism, especially regarding Danish military expenditure. Therefore, when military spending is discussed, its relationship with economic conditions is considered.

Given that these characteristics act as control variables, this section finds that it is very unlikely that they can offer a convincing explanation as to why we see right-wing national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland. This is because each of these characteristics is found to be similar in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands. It is also important to emphasise the similarities between these two cases as it further justifies the use of a most similar systems design to compare them. These similarities also further highlight the fact that there is a puzzle surrounding why the Faroe

Islands has right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not. It should also be noted that monarchy and militarism could offer an explanation as to why the two cases both have had left-wing cases of national independence parties.

Monarchy or Republic

If monarchy did explain the ideological variation seen between national independence parties from these two cases, it would be because the monarchy in Greenland was dragging its national independence parties to the left. However, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland are part of the Kingdom of Denmark. The Faroe Islands became part of the Danish crown in 1380. In 1662, a policy of "Danish absolutism" forced the Faroese Løgting "to pledge allegiance to the Danish monarch," (Adler-Nissen, 2014: 58). Like the Faroe Islands, Greenland has also had a long history under the rule of European monarchs. The island became part of the Kingdom of Norway in 1261 and then was absorbed into the Danish Kingdom in 1397 (Pettigrew & Mancke, 2018: 24-25). Therefore, the Danish monarchy has had a historic influence over both the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Given this similarity, it is extremely unlikely that the monarchy is the reason that the Faroe Islands has right-wing national independence parties but Greenland does not.

However, the Danish monarchy could explain why the Faroe Islands and Greenland both have cases of left-wing national independence parties. Evidence of this can be found in the Faroe Islands' largest left-wing national independence party, Tjóðveldi, whose name translates as "Republic" in English (Nordsieck, 2019b). The republican nature of Tjóðveldi has also been referenced in other literature (e.g. Bergqvist, 1999: 318; Pieters, 2021: 96). Given this, as well as the past literature on monarchy and the quantitative evidence from Chapter Four of this thesis, it would make sense that the Danish monarchy is partly responsible for the left-wing position of Greenland's national independence parties and of Tjóðveldi.

If Danish military activities were the reason for the ideological variation found between the Faroe Islands and Greenland, it would be because these activities were dragging Greenlandic national independence parties more to the left than Faroese national independence parties. However, as is explained below, this does not make sense due to the fact that the Faroe Islands and Greenland both experience the same level of statewide military spending as part of the Danish state. More broadly, both cases also experience direct military influence from their parent country.

Figure 5.2: Military Expenditure (% of GDP) - Denmark

Source: World Bank, 2021b.

When looking at military spending in particular, it is important to consider any possible interaction effects which may occur with economic performance. This is due to the large body of previous literature which has explored the direct relationship between military spending and economic growth (e.g. Cappelen et al, 1984; Joerding, 1986; Knight et al, 1996; Yakovlev, 2007). Any possible interaction between these two variables is controlled for due to the fact that both cases come from the same country. Given that the Danish state is responsible for the military matters of both the Faroe Islands

and Greenland, the economic performance variable is already controlled for when looking at both cases.

In terms of its overall levels of military spending, since 2010, Denmark has consistently been the third largest spender on its military, as a percentage of its GDP, out of the five Nordic countries (World Bank, 2021b). As both the Faroe Islands and Greenland are part of Denmark, they have historically experienced, and continue to experience, the same level of military spending at the statewide level. In the case of Denmark, this was 1.44% of GDP in 2020 (see Figure 5.2). Therefore, it is unlikely that military spending is the cause of the right-wing cases of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands.

Broader Danish military activities have had an impact on both cases and, therefore, further show that militarism is not the explanation for the ideological variation seen between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties. Looking at the current military strategy of Denmark, the Danish government has explicitly referenced that both the Faroe Islands and Greenland are important elements of its broader defence strategy, especially regarding having an influence in the Arctic (Danish Ministry of Defence, 2018: 10). Denmark also has "a joint operational territorial command" based in both the Faroe Islands and Greenland, called the Joint Arctic Command (JAC). The role of the JAC is "surveillance, assertion of sovereignty and military defense of Greenland and the Faroe Islands," (Danish Armed Forces, 2021). Last year, Denmark decided to "increase its military spending in the Arctic after it unveiled a $250m investment in surveillance capabilities in Greenland and the Faroe Islands to counter Russia's military build-up in the region," (Milne, 2021).

Regarding international military cooperation, Denmark is also a founding member of NATO. By extension, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have been part of the alliance since its inception. This is something which is specifically referenced by the organisation itself (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, n.d.). Looking at Greenland specifically, Greenland has a large strategic military advantage for the West. This is shown by the fact that there is an active US air force base on the island

(U.S. Embassy and Consulate in the Kingdom of Demark, n.d.). Regarding the Faroe Islands, the Danish government has now re-established "a Cold War-era radar station" on the islands (Milne, 2021). This further shows that the Danish state and NATO both have a clear interest in the Faroe Islands and Greenland from a military strategic perspective. Given this similarity between the two, it is extremely unlikely that Danish military activities can explain why the Faroe Islands has right-wing national independence parties but Greenland does not.

However, Danish militarism could still explain why there are left-wing cases of national independence parties in both the Faroe Islands and Greenland. As has been clearly shown above, Denmark plays an active role in the military affairs of both the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Therefore, militarism of the central Danish state could offer an explanation for the left-wing ideological position of Tjóðveldi and Greenland's national independence parties.

Language

If language was responsible for the variation in ideology found between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties, it would mean that the Faroese language has been dragging Faroese national independence parties to the right of their Greenlandic counterparts. However, both the Faroe Islands and Greenland have distinct majority-spoken languages which are very important to their respective nationalist movements. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that language is responsible for the ideological variation found between the national independence parties from these two cases.

Faroese is a language, distinct from Danish, which is spoken by a majority of the population (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2011b). The 2011 Faroese census recorded the total population of the islands as 48,346 (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2011a). The same census found that Faroese was the native language of 35,501 people living in the islands and an additional 1,604 people were recorded as being able to speak the language "well," (Statistics Faroe Islands, 2011b). It has been argued that Faroese plays an important part in the origins of the nationalist movement of the islands and played a vital role in the reawakening of the Faroese national identity. Before the 19th century, the sole written language used

on the islands was Danish. However, there was a Faroese "cultural awakening" in the 19th century and the Faroese language achieved official recognition in 1938. Since then use of the language has continued to grow, with it now being the dominant language of the islands (Vikør, 2010: 25).

Like in the Faroe Islands, the majority of Greenland's population speak a language distinct from Danish, Greenlandic (Valijärvi & Kahn, 2020). Greenlandic is an Inuit language with four main dialects, East Greenlandic, South Greenlandic, West Greenlandic and Thule, with West Greenlandic being the island's official language (Visit Greenland, 2019). Research has found that in Greenland's capital, Nuuk, West Greenlandic is at the "centre" of many aspects of everyday life, such as public information signs and food labelling (Valijärvi & Kahn: 291-292). As was the case with Faroese in the Faroe Islands, Greenlandic plays an important part in the Greenlandic national identity. In the 1980s, after Greenland had obtained home rule from the Danish state, there was a policy of "Greenlandization" which promoted Greenlandic culture and language. This included prioritising the Greenlandic language, as well as the broader Greenlandic culture, in schools (Brincker & Lennert, 2019: 47).

The fact that both these cases have a distinct majority-spoken language, which plays an important part of their respective national identities, means that it is unlikely that language is the reason why there are right-wing cases of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland. The status of language in the Faroe Islands and Greenland is another example of a similarity between the two cases. Similarities such as this further emphasise the need to solve the puzzle as to why, if these two cases are so similar, does the Faroe Islands have right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not?

Economic Conditions

It is argued in this section that economic conditions are the primary explanation as to why we see right-wing cases of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland. This section takes a broader look at economic performance by comparing three key economic performance indicators in both Greenland and the Faroe Islands:

- Comparative Unemployment

- Financial Contributions from the Danish State

- Comparative GDP per Capita

The argument being made in this chapter is clearly highlighted in Figure 5.3 below. The theoretical basis of this hypothesis originates from Harvie's discourse of bourgeois regionalism (1994) and Hechter's discourse of internal colonialism (1975).

Figure 5.3: Flow of Argument

Comparatively Better Economic Conditions	Comparatively Worse Economic Conditions
⬇	⬇
Perception of Economic Mistreatment by the Central State	Perception of Economic Exploitation
⬇	⬇
Bouregois Regionalism	Internal Colonialism
⬇	⬇
More Right-Wing National Independence Parties	**More Left-Wing National Independence Parties**

Source: Compiled by the author.

Regions with comparatively worse economic conditions are more likely to see discourses of internal colonialism. This is because people in these regions feel that the central state has mismanaged their economic development, usually in favour of supporting other wealthier regions. It has been found that this discourse will usually push regionalist parties to the left. In contrast, regions with comparatively better economic conditions are more likely to see discourses of bourgeois regionalism. This occurs when people in a region feel the central government is taking too many of their resources away from them and giving them to other poorer regions within the same state. It has previously been argued that bourgeois regionalism is "based on grievances of exploitation" in which individuals from the

wealthier region believe that they are "hard working" and that this is being exploited by poorer "self-indulgent" regions (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 867). It has been argued that this discourse will push regionalist parties to the right. Other research has also made this argument, further supporting the theory that regionalist parties in economically more prosperous regions tend to be more right-wing and regionalist parties in economically poorer regions tend to be more left-wing (e.g. Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015).

In addition to the existing literature, there is also quantitative evidence from this thesis to support the argument that economic conditions are crucial in explaining the ideological variance seen between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties. In the previous chapter, it was found that national independence parties in regions with higher levels of unemployment were more likely to be left-wing and national independence parties in regions with lower levels of unemployment were more likely to be right-wing (see Table 4.5 and Table 4.6). It was found that this relationship existed when looking at both the percentage unemployment of a region and also a region's unemployment in comparison with the unemployment rate of its parent country. Interestingly, it was found that the relationship between left-right ideology and comparative unemployment was much stronger than the relationship between left-right ideology and percentage unemployment.

The Flow of Causation

Before we accept the argument about comparative economic performance, the issue of the flow causation should be addressed. How can we be sure that causation does not flow in the other direction? This is done through process tracing of the performance of the Faroe Islands' two largest national independence parties with its comparative economic performance. As has already been discussed, the two most notable national independence parties in the Faroe Islands are the centre-right Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin and the centre-left Tjóðveldi. Assuming the proposed flow of causation is correct, if economic conditions improve in the Faroe Islands the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin should become more electorally successful while Tjóðveldi should become less so. Table 5.4 below compares

the electoral success of the two parties in Faroese Løgting elections with the comparative economic

conditions of the Faroe Islands. The electorally more successful party in each election has been bolded.

Table 5.4: Faroese Løgting Election Results (Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin and Tjóðveldi) and Economic Performance

Election Year	Percentage of Votes (Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin)	Percentage of Votes (Tjóðveldi)	Comparative GDP per Capita	Comparative Unemployment	Percentage Change in Danish Government Financial Contribution From 1994
1998	21.3%	**23.8%**	0.72	0.86	+11.50%
2002	20.8%	**23.7%**	0.80	0.40	-12.83%
2004	20.6%	**21.7%**	0.76	0.66	-16.63%
2008	20.1%	**23.3%**	0.79	0.65	-14.96%
2011	**22.5%**	18.3%	0.84	0.68	-15.40%
2015	18.9%	**20.7%**	0.98	0.52	-13.06%
2019	**24.5%**	18.1%	1.07	0.27	-10.04%

Compiled from the following sources: Nordic Statistics database, 2019; Statistics Faroe Islands, 2019; Schakel, 2020; Statistics Denmark, 2020; World Bank, 2022c.

This table includes three economic performance predictors, closely related to the three analysed later

in this section:

- Comparative Unemployment (Faroese Unemployment/Danish Unemployment)

- Comparative GDP per Capita (Faroese GDP per Capita/Danish GDP per Capita)

- Percentage Change in Danish Government Financial Contribution From the Previous Election

What we see, between 1998 and 2019, is an improvement in the comparative economic performance

of the Faroe Islands. We see comparative unemployment trending downwards and comparative GDP

per Capita trending upwards. We also see a decrease in the financial contributions that Denmark gives

to the Faroe Islands. Between 1998 and 2019, these contributions decreased by 23.6%, with the most

significant drop being between 2001 and 2002 (see Figure 5.7).

As economic conditions improve, we see a change in the support for both Tjóðveldi and the Føroyski

Fólkaflokkurin. Tjóðveldi was the most electorally successful of the two in all four elections between

1998 and 2011. However, this was only the case in one of the past three elections, with the Føroyski

Fólkaflokkurin being more popular in both the 2011 and 2019 elections. Between 1998 and 2019,

Tjóðveldi has also seen its support decrease by 5.7%. In contrast, in the same period, the support for the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin has increased by 3.2%. More significantly, in the 2019 election, the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin won 6.4% more of the vote than Tjóðveldi. This was the largest gap between the two parties, in a Faroese Løgting election, in the period of time analysed. The 2019 election also saw the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin win its highest vote share in a Faroese Løgting election in the same period. This would suggest that, in the past two decades, as comparative economic conditions have improved in the Faroe Islands, the main centre-right national independence party has seen its electoral fortunes improve while the main centre-left national independence party has not. This would support the argument that improved comparative economic conditions do result in the prominence of more right-wing national independence parties. This finding becomes even more clear when the Faroe Islands are compared to Greenland. As is discussed later in this chapter, the economic conditions have remained consistently worse. Therefore, this explains why the island has only seen left-wing national independence parties, since the emergence of Inuit Ataqatigiit in the late 1970s.

Comparative Unemployment

Looking at the recent unemployment rates of both the Faroe Islands and Greenland, the above arguments offer a strong explanation as to why the Faroe Islands has right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not. The average comparative unemployment in the Faroe Islands, between 2010 and 2019, was 0.5 (see Figure 5.4). This means unemployment in the Faroe Islands in that period was, on average, half of what it was in Denmark. Looking at the wider perspective, in the two datasets used in Chapter Four only two of the 25 regions analysed experienced lower comparative unemployment than the Faroe Islands.[6] In contrast, Greenland's average comparative unemployment was 1.20, meaning its unemployment rate was, on average, higher than

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[6] In 2019, comparative unemployment in the Faroe Islands was 0.33. The only two regions in which it was lower than that were the Aland Islands in 2003 (0.18) and in 2007 (0.3) and South Tyrol in 2003 (0.22) and in 2018 (0.28).

in Denmark. Again looking at the two datasets used in Chapter Four, just four of the 25 regions analysed experienced higher comparative unemployment than Greenland.[7]

Figure 5.4

Comparative Unemployment - The Faroe Islands and Greenland (2010-2019)

Compiled from the following sources: StatBank Greenland, 2019; OECD, 2020; Statistics Faroe Islands, 2020.

The significant difference between the comparative unemployment of the Faroe Islands and Greenland is clearly shown in Figure 5.4 above. Given the lower levels of comparative unemployment in the Faroe Islands, you would then expect to find a bourgeois regionalist discourse which would impact the ideology of its national independence parties. This would, therefore, then explain why the Faroe Islands does have cases of right-wing national independence parties. In contrast, you would expect to find in Greenland, where comparative unemployment is higher, a more internal colonialist discourse. This would then explain why Greenland has only ever had left-wing cases of national independence parties. Therefore, recent unemployment statistics support the hypothesis that

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[7] In 2014, comparative unemployment in Greenland was 1.45. The only four regions in which it was higher than that were Andalusia in 2018 (1.50), the Canary Islands in 2008 (1.54) and in 2019 (1.46), Sardinia in 2001 (1.88), in 2004 (1.73), in 2006 (1.58), in 2008 (1.81), in 2009 (1.70), in 2014 (1.47) and in 2019 (1.49) and Sicily in 2017 (1.90).

economic conditions are key in explaining why the Faroe Islands has right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not.

Figure 5.5

Percentage Unemployment - Denmark and the Faroe Islands (1995-2009)

Source: Nordic Statistics database, 2019.

However, the analysis above only addresses a recent period of time. Therefore, a more historic approach must also be taken. The unemployment data from both the Faroe Islands and Greenland is somewhat limited, with reliable data only being found which dated back to the mid-1990s. The unemployment rate in the Faroe Islands was consistently lower than the unemployment rate in Denmark in every year between 1998 and 2009 (see Figure 5.5). This would suggest that, from a job creation perspective, the Faroese economy has performed better than the central Danish economy for the past couple of decades. However, in Greenland the opposite is the case. Between 1996 and 2006, unemployment in Greenland was constantly higher than it was in Denmark (see Figure 5.6). Unemployment was also an issue in Greenland in the 1980s, especially amongst younger people (Lyck & Taagholt, 1987: 54). This would suggest that, from a job creation perspective, the Greenlandic economy has performed worse than the Danish economy for decades. These findings suggest that the Faroe Islands has performed economically better than Denmark while Greenland has performed

economically worse. This supports the argument that economic conditions are a key explanatory factor in why the Faroe Islands has right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not.

Figure 5.6: Percentage Unemployment – Denmark and Greenland, 1996 - 2006

Source: World Bank, 2022e.

Financial Contributions from the Danish State

When comparing the economic performance of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, it makes sense to include a comparison of the financial contributions which have been made by the Danish state to both territories. This is because if either territory was performing better economically than the other then it would require less economic contributions from the central Danish state. As is clearly shown in Figure 5.7 below, Greenland has received significantly larger amounts of subsidies from the Danish state than the Faroe Islands. In 1971, Denmark's net-spend on the Faroe Islands, per person, was 1622.06 DKK. In the same year in Greenland, this figure was 5148.31 DKK. By 2001, this figure was 23574.97 DKK in the Faroe Islands and 57355.81 DKK in Greenland. In 2020, this figure had decreased to 16064.67 DKK in the Faroe Islands but had further increased to 79053.35 DKK in Greenland.

Figure 5.7

General Danish Government Net-Spend per Person - Faroe Islands and Greenland (DKK) (1971-2020)

Compiled from the following sources: Statistics Denmark, 2020; World Bank, 2022d.

These figures would suggest that, over the last two decades, Greenlandic economic conditions have worsened. This means the island has then required additional funding from the central Danish state. In contrast, the Faroese economy has improved and, therefore, requires less financial support. Overall, these figures would suggest that the Faroe Islands economy has performed far better than its Greenlandic counterpart. This is clearly shown by the fact that the Faroe Islands relies on financial contributions from Denmark far less than Greenland does. The comparatively better economic performance of the Faroese economy supports the argument that economic conditions can explain why we see right-wing cases of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland.

One thing which should be highlighted is the fact that the Faroe Islands is still a net-beneficiary from the central Danish state. This means that it cannot be said that the Danish state is taking money away from the Faroe Islands and giving it to other parts of the Kingdom, something which is usually found in bourgeois regionalist cases. This is an interesting difference with the unemployment variable, which consistently showed the Faroe Islands performing better than Denmark as a whole. This would suggest

that the economic relationship between the Faroe Islands and Denmark is more complicated and could explain why we see a mix of left-wing and right-wing national independence parties from this case.

Comparative GDP per Capita

GDP per Capita has been included as it measures general economic performance while also taking into account population. This means that the GDP per Capita of the Faroe Islands and Greenland can be directly compared with the GDP per Capita of Denmark. As was the case with unemployment, historical comparable data from the Faroe Islands on GDP per Capita is limited, going back to only 1998.

Figure 5.8: GDP per Capita – Denmark, Faroe Islands and Greenland (current US$) 1998-2019

Source: World Bank, 2022c.

Interestingly, the GDP per Capita of the Faroe Islands and Denmark tell a mixed story. As is shown in Figure 5.8 above, in the Faroe Islands GDP per capita has grown from just over $24,000 in 1998 to just over $62,000 in 2018. Interestingly, the Faroese GDP per capita had remained lower than GDP per capita in Denmark up until 2015. However, since 2016, GDP per capita has been higher in the Faroe

Islands than in Denmark. The above factors would suggest that economic conditions in the Faroe Islands are improving, both in their own right and also in comparison with Denmark. As was the case when looking at the other economic performance predictors, Greenland has also performed worse than both Denmark and the Faroe Islands in terms of its GDP per Capita. While Greenland's GDP per capita has increased between 1998 and 2019, it has continued to remain lower than both the Faroe Islands and Denmark. The mixed economic performance of the Faroe Islands, in comparison with its parent country, could offer an explanation as to why this case has both left-wing and right-wing national independence parties. In contrast, the continued comparatively worse economic performance of Greenland explains why it has only ever had left-wing cases of national independence parties and never any right-wing cases.

Comparative Economic Performance in the Faroe Islands and Greenland

It has been shown that economic conditions are responsible for the ideological variation seen between Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties. The focus on three key economic performance indicators had made it possible to directly compare the economic conditions of the Faroe Islands and Greenland with Denmark. In all three indicators, we find that Greenland has had comparatively worse economic conditions than Denmark for decades. In contrast, the economic performance of the Faroe Islands is far more positive than Greenland but is mixed when compared directly with Denmark. These factors still emphasise a large economic difference between the Faroe Islands and Greenland. Given this difference, it then makes sense that we see right-wing national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland. As was discussed when addressing the flow of causation, the Faroe Islands' economic improvements over the past two decades are strong conditions for the growth of a right-wing national independence party. This could explain the growth of the success of the Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin in the past decade, emphasised by its performance in the 2019 Faroese election. In contrast, Greenland's continued economic lag, in comparison to Denmark

as a whole, offers a strong explanation as to why its national independence parties have only ever come from the left of the political spectrum.

<u>Flanders and Quebec</u>

This section explores the ideological variation found between national independence parties in Flanders and Quebec. Between 2000 and 2020, national independence parties in Flanders all came from a right-wing position. The most notable of these cases is the conservative Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie (N-VA) which, since the turn of the century, has been consistently active in both Flemish and Belgian elections. In contrast, the overwhelming majority of cases of national independence parties in Quebec have been left-wing. An example of an especially high-profile case from Quebec is the Parti Québécois. The party has stood consistently in regional elections for decades and is a traditional left-wing social democratic party. Therefore, the aim of this section is to explore the question of why Québécois national independence parties primarily position themselves to the left while Flemish national independence parties position themselves to the right.

Figure 5.9: Left-Right Ideology of Current and Significant Flemish and Québécois National Independence Parties[8]

Québécois National Independence Parties (Left-Wing)	Flemish National Independence Parties (Right-Wing)
• Parti Québécois • Québec Solidaire	• Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie • Vlaams Belang

Source: Compiled by the author.

In the analysis of these two cases, three characteristics have been included to act as control variables. As was the case in the analysis of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, these controls were found to be similar between the two cases. These similarities allow it to then be possible to rule out the likelihood that these variables are responsible for the ideological variance found between the two cases. The

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[8] Parties which have seats in either the Flemish Parliament or the Québécois National Assembly.

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comparability of the two cases, which is emphasised in this section, also further justifies the choice to compare them using the most similar systems comparative method. This analysis shows that comparative economic conditions offer the main explanation as to why there is ideological variation between these two cases. This finding makes a contribution to the current literature by further emphasising the importance of relative economic conditions on the ideology of national independence parties. This analysis also supports the broader argument made in this thesis that comparative economic conditions significantly impact the ideology of national independence parties.

It is important to ensure both the internal and external validity of the findings. In order to confirm that other variables are not responsible for the ideological variation being explored, this analysis controls for multiple key characteristics. These characteristics were chosen based on both the findings from the previous chapters of this thesis and previous relevant literature. The theoretical reasoning for including these variables is discussed further in the Research Design section of this thesis. Furthermore, the detailed process as to why economic conditions have pushed these national independence parties to either left-wing or right-wing positions is discussed later in the chapter. This clearly shows why economic conditions are responsible for the ideological variation being explored. Regarding external validity, the findings from this chapter are supported by the large-n analysis conducted in Chapter Four and the analysis conducted on the Faroe Islands and Greenland earlier in this chapter. Therefore, it can be confidently argued that these results are generalisable across Canada and Western Europe.

As is shown in Table 5.5 below, there is a considerable amount of logic in comparing these two cases due to the fact that both share a number of common features. It is important to emphasise the similarity between the two cases in order to justify their inclusion in this chapter and the use of the most similar systems method. It is especially important to emphasise the comparability of these two cases because of the fact that they come from two very different countries. Therefore, it may appear, at first glance, illogical to compare the two cases. However, as is emphasised throughout this chapter,

this is not the case. Flanders and Quebec are two of the most high-profile examples of western stateless nations which have been referenced in a significant amount of literature on sub-nationalism and regionalism (e.g. Gingras, 1975; Nielsen, 1980; Rocher, 2014; Mulle, 2018). The comparability of these cases in emphasised by the fact that they have also been compared in previous literature (e.g. Erk, 2014; Xhardez, 2020). Both Flanders and Quebec exist within monarchies, Flanders in Belgium and Quebec in Canada. Since the turn of the century, both Belgium and Canada have spent just over 1% of their GDP on military spending. Both cases also have their own majority-spoken language, distinct from the dominant language in the rest of their respective parent countries, Dutch in Flanders and French in Quebec.

Table 5.5: Flanders and Quebec Comparison

		Flanders	Quebec
Independent Variable	Better or Worse Economic Conditions	**Better**	**Worse**
Control Variables	Monarchy or Republic?	Monarchy	Monarchy
	Average Military Spending (% GDP) (2000-2020) (Compiled from the following source: World Bank, 2021a).	1.07%	1.18%
	Status of Distinct Language (UCL, n.d.; Government of Canada, 2019).	Majority-Spoken	Majority-Spoken
Dependent Variable	Number of Left-Wing Cases of NIPs in Regional and Statewide Elections (2000-2019)	0 (0%)	**21 (77.78%)**
	Number of Right-Wing Cases of NIPs in Regional and Statewide Elections (2000-2019)	**16 (100%)**	6 (22.22%)

Control Variables

Three characteristics, which have a significant influence on left-right ideology, have been included as control variables within this analysis. These are the same three variables used in the analysis of the Faroe Islands and Greenland:

- Monarchy or Republic

- Militarism of the Parent Country

- Language

These variables have been included as they have been found to have an important influence on the left-right ideology of political parties, both in the literature and in the previous chapter of this thesis. Regarding interaction effects, as was discussed in the previous section, it is unlikely that the existence of a monarchy or a distinct regional language would have any notable impact on the economic conditions in either of the cases being analysed. The only control where this could be of concern is militarism. Therefore, in the discussion on the military activities of Belgium and Canada, the relationship with economic performance is also discussed.

It is found to be unlikely that any of these variables can offer a convincing explanation as to why we see more right-wing national independence parties in Flanders and more left-wing national independence parties in Quebec. This is because these three characteristics are found to be similar in both cases. It is also important to emphasise the similarities between these two cases as they further highlight the fact that there is a puzzle surrounding why Flemish national independence parties are more right-wing while Québécois national independence parties are more left-wing.

Monarchy or Republic

If monarchy was the reason for the ideological variation found between the two cases, it would be because the monarchy in Canada was pushing Québécois national independence parties to the left. However, this does not make sense because Flanders also exists within a monarchy. Therefore, it does not make sense that monarchy would push Québécois national independence parties to the left but not do the same to their Flemish counterparts.

Both Flanders and Quebec exist within monarchies, Flanders in Belgium and Quebec in Canada. The Belgium Kingdom was established in 1831, becoming independent from the Netherlands after a revolution in 1830 (Witte et al, 2009: 24). Canada currently shares its monarchy with the UK, along

with other countries from the commonwealth, a feature which was inherited from the period in which it was part of the British Empire. Canada has had a monarchic head of state for centuries. It first became under the rule of the French Kingdom in 1534 (Government of Canada, 2018).

A common feature of these two cases, in relation to the issue of the monarchy, is that both Québécois and Flemish national independence parties hold anti-monarchist and pro-republican views. For example, the N-VA has described the Belgian monarchy as an "outdated form of government," (2014).[9] Québécois parties are also critical of the concept of monarchy. For example, in its 2017 party programme, the Parti Québécois refers to the Canadian monarchy as "a backward-looking and costly monarchical relic," (p. 9).[10] Therefore, both Quebec and Flanders not only exist within monarchies, and have done for centuries, but also that the national independence parties from both hold hostile positions regarding their respective monarchies. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that monarchy cannot be the reason for why Québécois national independence parties are left-wing while Flemish national independence parties are right-wing.

Militarism of the Parent Country

If militarism was the reason for the ideological variation found between Québécois and Flemish national independence parties, it would be because increased militarism in Canada was dragging Québécois national independence parties to the left of their Flemish counterparts. However, this is illogical due to the fact that Belgium and Canada have spent similar amounts on their respective militaries for decades. There are also a number of other similarities, regarding militarism more broadly, between Belgium and Canada which further emphasise the similarity between these two cases.

When looking at military spending, it is important to consider any possible interaction effects which it may have with economic performance. This is due to the large body of previous literature which has

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[9] Translated from Dutch.
[10] Translated from French.

explored the direct relationship between military spending and economic growth (e.g. Cappelen et al, 1984; Joerding, 1986; Knight et al, 1996; Yakovlev, 2007). Any possible interaction between these two variables is controlled for due to the fact that the main military spending variable used measures spending as a percentage of GDP. Therefore, the differing economic sizes of Belgium and Canada are controlled for in this analysis. It should also be noted that, in per capita terms, Belgium and Canada are very similar sized economies. In 2020, Belgium had a GDP per capita of $45205 while Canada has a GDP per capita of $43258 (World Bank, 2022b). This further emphasises the comparability of the two cases.

Figure 5.10: Military Spending (% of GDP) – Belgium and Canada

Source: World Bank, 2021a.

The difference between military spending in Belgium and Canada is minimal. Historically, there had been some variation between the two cases. In the early 1960s, Canada's level of military spending, as a percentage of its GDP was higher than Belgium's. Then, between the 1965 and 1990, Belgium's level of military spending was consistently higher than Canada's. However, since 1990, the level of military spending of both has been relatively similar. Looking at more recent military spending, since the turn of the century, Belgium and Canada both had an average annual military spend of just over

180

1% of their GDP (see Table 5.5). Another common feature of both cases is that, since 1960, there has been a general trend of decline in the proportion of military spending, as a percentage of GDP, of both countries. In Belgium, military spending was 3.4% of total GDP in 1960 but was only 1.1% in 2020. In Canada military spending made up 4.2% of GDP in 1960 but had decreased to 1.4% by 2020 (see Figure 5.10). Therefore, given these similarities, it is extremely unlikely that military spending is the primary explanation for the left-right ideological divide seen between Flemish and Québécois national independence parties.

There are also a number of more general similarities between Belgium and Canada, in terms of policies regarding militarism and defence, which further emphasise the similarities between the cases. Both Belgium and Canada have a similar number of active armed forces personnel, as a percentage of their total labour forces. In 2019, armed forces personnel made up 0.5% of the Belgian labour force and 0.35% of the Canadian labour force (World Bank, 2022a). Both Belgium and Canada have made international military and defensive commitments by being members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Both countries became founding members of the military alliance in 1949 (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, 2020). Another similarity between the two cases, regarding international defence policy, is that both play an active role in UN peacekeeping, with both countries providing a small number of military and police personnel to current UN peacekeeping operations (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2021). This analysis has shown that Belgium and Canada share a number of similarities in terms of their military activities. Therefore, this shows that it is extremely unlikely that military spending is a primary reason for the ideological divide seen between Flemish and Québécois national independence parties.

Language

If language was responsible for the variation in ideology found between Flemish and Québécois national independence parties it would be because the status of the Dutch language in Flanders had been pulling Flemish national independence parties to the right of Québécois national independence

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parties. However, both Flanders and Quebec have distinct majority-spoken languages which are extremely important to their respective nationalist movements and have been important historically. Both these movements have also been found to feel insecure regarding the protection of their respective languages. Therefore, it is extremely unlikely that a distinct language is the factor which has caused the ideological variation found between national independence parties from these two cases.

Before Belgium became an independent nation, it was part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (Witte et al, 2009: 24). After achieving its independence, the Belgian state attempted to emphasise the fact that French should be the only official language of the new state (Witte et al: 57). There was immediately resistance to this from the Flemish movement. For example, the Flemish movement petitioned for Dutch to be taught in schools in the 1840s (Witte et al: 58). Historically, the Dutch language was also promoted by Catholic trade unions, which were set up in opposition to the socialist and French-speaking trade unions which were being set up in Wallonia (see Erk, 2005b). To this day, Dutch has continued to be a majority-spoken language in Flanders (UCL, n.d.). The language divide in Belgium is emphasised by the fact that Flanders is one of Belgium's three recognised language communities, along with the French-speaking Wallonia and the German-speaking Community (Belgian Federal Government, 2022). The Flemish nationalist movement continues to place an importance on protecting the Dutch language (Blommaert, 2011: 243). It has also been found that the Flemish Community "have strong collective memories of victimhood" especially in relation to the Dutch language (Jasini et al, 2017: 102).

The French language is something which has been crucial to the Québécois nationalist movement for centuries, being a core part of an "ethnic conflict" found in the province (Pinard, 1992: 476). Like Dutch in Flanders, French is a majority-spoken language in Quebec. It is also the only province in Canada which has a majority French-speaking population (Government of Canada, 2019). Another similarity with the Flemish movement is that the Québécois nationalist movement places a strong emphasis on

the importance of protecting the French language (Thomson, 1995: 69). More recent research has continued to show that language is an issue for those living in Quebec. Research on the 2018 Quebec election found that exposure to written English was a predictor of increased nationalist sentiment amongst French-speaking Québécois who encountered English frequently in their everyday lives (Brie & Ouellet, 2020: 245). These findings would suggest that language has continued to be an issue for many living in Quebec and that there continues to be a perception of threat and an insecurity within the Québécois movement over the issue of the French language.

It is clear that the status of French in Quebec and Dutch in Flanders are very similar. Both languages are spoken by a majority of each of their respective populations. Both the Flemish and Québécois nationalist movements place a strong emphasis on the importance of protecting their respective languages and also continue to emphasise the potential threat to their languages from the central state. Given these similarities, it is extremely unlikely that language is responsible for the ideological divide seen between the national independence parties from these two cases. The position of language in Flanders and Quebec is also another similarity between the two cases which emphasises their strong degree of comparability, justifying the comparison between them in this chapter.

Economic Conditions

Economic conditions are the primary explanation as to why Quebec has had more left-wing national independence parties while Flanders has only ever had right-wing national independence parties. This section takes a broader look at the economic performance of both cases by comparing three key economic performance indicators:

- Comparative Unemployment

- Comparative GDP per Capita

- Comparative Disposable Household Income

Throughout this chapter, the economic performance of Quebec will be compared directly with the economic performance of Canada. However, the economic performance of Flanders has been compared with the economic performance of both Belgium and also Wallonia. This is due to the importance of the relationship between these two regions in the history of Belgian politics. As was discussed in the analysis of the Faroe Islands and Greenland, there is a significant amount of evidence to support the hypothesis that economic conditions are a key factor in explaining the ideological variance seen between different national independence parties. The basis of this hypothesis comes from Harvie's theory of bourgeois regionalism (1994) and Hechter's theory of internal colonialism (1975). The quantitative evidence from Chapter Four of this thesis also supports the argument that economic conditions are crucial in explaining the ideological variance seen between Flemish and Québécois national independence parties.

Comparative Unemployment

Comparative unemployment in both Flanders and Quebec offers a strong explanation as to why Flemish national independence parties are more right-wing and Québécois national independence parties are more left-wing. The average comparative unemployment in the Flanders, between 2000 and 2019, was 0.61. This means unemployment in Flanders, during that period, was considerably lower than in Belgium as a whole. In contrast, Quebec's average comparative unemployment was 1.09, meaning its unemployment rate was, on average, higher than in Canada. What is interesting is that comparative unemployment in Quebec, while above 1 on average, falls below 1 in 2010 and from 2017 onwards (see Figure 5.11). This could offer an explanation as to why we do see a small number of right-wing cases of Québécois national independence parties. The decrease in comparative unemployment from 2015 onwards could also explain the rise of the conservative Québécois autonomist party, the Coalition Avenir Québec (CAQ).

Figure 5.11 clearly shows that there has consistently been lower levels of comparative unemployment in Flanders since the turn of the century. Therefore, it would then be expected that there would be

bourgeois regionalist discourse within its national independence parties. This would then offer an explanation as to why Flanders has only ever had right-wing cases of national independence parties. In contrast, in Quebec, where comparative unemployment is higher, a more internal colonialist discourse will develop in its national independence parties. This then explains why the majority of cases of Québécois national independence parties come from a left-wing position. Therefore, this supports the argument that comparative unemployment is a key variable in explaining the left-right ideological divide which exists between Flemish and Québécois national independence parties.

Figure 5.11

Comparative Unemployment - Flanders and Quebec (2000-2019)

Compiled from the Following Source: OECD, 2020.

However, the above analysis only addresses a recent period of time, 2000-2019. Therefore, a more historic approach must also be taken in order to provide further evidence that relative economic conditions are responsible for the ideological variation witnessed between national independence parties from these two cases. Historic unemployment data has also been used in both cases to support the argument being made in this chapter. As is clearly shown in Figure 5.12 below, Flemish unemployment has consistently been lower than in wider Belgium for over thirty years.

Figure 5.12: Percentage Unemployment – Belgium and Flanders (1985 – 1995)

Source: Belgian Federal Public Services, 2017.

Figure 5.13

Source: Statistics Canada, 2022.

This supports the claim that Flanders has performed comparably better than Belgium, from an economic perspective, for decades. This further supports the argument that a bourgeois regionalist

discourse has been allowed to develop in Flanders, pushing its national independence parties to right-wing positions.

Quebec's worse unemployment rate, when compared with Canada as a whole, is something which has been a consistent feature since the 1970s (see Figure 5.13). This would suggest that, from an economic perspective, Quebec has consistently performed worse than Canada as a whole for decades. These comparatively poorer economic conditions would then create an internal colonialist discourse. This discourse would then push Québécois national independence parties to the left. Therefore, this could offer an explanation as to why we have seen Quebec's national independence parties traditionally come from the left.

Comparative GDP per Capita

The second economic performance indicator explored in this section is GDP per Capita. When looking at the case of Flanders, its GDP per capita is analysed against the GDP per capita of Wallonia. This is due to the economic and political history between the two regions. When looking at Quebec, its GDP per capita is analysed against Canada. This is in line with the previous work conducted in this thesis. When discussing the economic performance of Flanders, it is important to note that there is a broader story around the economic performance of Belgium, which relates to its two most significant historic regions, Flanders and Wallonia. It has been argued that the Flemish movement started to make significant progress when, economically, Flanders began to perform far better than Wallonia, having previously been economically worse off (Erk, 2005b: 563). Witte et al explain this situation, arguing that:

> "As long as Flanders was an economic backwater compared to industrialized Wallonia, the Flemish movement made little headway. It could not challenge the bastions of 19th century francophone nobility and bourgeoisie. The first successes of the Flemish emancipation movement came at the turn of the century, when the economy of Flanders finally began blooming and when political democratization started to have an impact ... Linguistic fever rose

quickly during the 1960s when Wallonia's economic decline coincided with Flanders' economic

boom. It gave the conflict a new dimension," (2009: 15).

Figure 5.14

GDP per Capita (USD per Head, Current Prices, Current PPP) - Flanders and Wallonia

Source: OECD, 2022.

This analysis shows there was a shift in Belgium in which Wallonia and Flanders' economic situations

switched, with Wallonia becoming poorer and Flanders becoming richer. This shift is something which

has now become embedded, with Flanders continuing to be the economically better off of the two

regions. Therefore, this explains both the emergence and growth of the Flemish national

independence movement and also, most importantly in addressing the puzzle being explored this

chapter, the right-wing nature of this movement. As is shown in Figure 5.14, it is clear that this

economic relationship between Flanders and Wallonia has continued into the 21st century. Between

2000 and 2020, Flanders has consistently had a higher GDP per capita than Wallonia. This supports

the argument that Flanders, from an economic perspective, is the better performing region in Belgium.

This then support the argument that a bourgeois regionalist discourse has developed in Flanders,

which has in turn pushed its national independence parties to more right-wing positions.

In contrast to Flanders, the economic performance of Quebec is completely the opposite, as can be seen in Figure 5.15. For the past couple of decades, Quebec has performed economically worse than Canada as a whole. The GDP per capita of Quebec is something which has historically been lower than Canada as a whole. In 1950, Quebec's GDP per Capita was lower than Canada's, with the province's GDP per capita being the fifth highest of the ten provinces (Statistics Canada, 2019). This would support the argument that an internal colonialist discourse has developed in Quebec, leading its national independence parties to broadly come from a left-wing position.

Figure 5.15

GDP per Capita (USD per Head, Current Prices, Current PPP) - Canada and Quebec

Source: OECD, 2022

Comparative Regional Income per Capita

The third economic performance indicator explored in this section is disposable household income of individuals in each case. As was the case with GDP per capita, this analysis will compare Flanders with Wallonia and Quebec with Canada. As is shown in Figure 5.16 below, it is clear that, since the turn of the century, people in Flanders have had a larger disposable income than their counterparts in Wallonia. It should also be noted that the gap between the two cases has increased. This is additional evidence that Flanders is the economically stronger of the two regions.

Figure 5.16: Disposable Household Income (USD PER Head, Current Prices, Current PPP) Flanders and Wallonia

Source: OECD, 2022.

Figure 5.17:

Disposable Household Income (USD per Head, Current Prices, Current PPP) - Canada and Quebec

Source: OECD, 2022.

This supports the previous literature which has discussed the economic performance of the two. The comparably better economic performance of Flanders further supports the argument that it is a bourgeois regionalist discourse which has pushed Flemish national independence parties to the right.

Figure 5.17 above clearly shows that, for the past couple of decades, people living in Quebec have had a lower disposable income than the Canadian average. This is something which has also been the case more historically. In 1950, Quebec's relative real gross domestic income per capita was 86.1% of Canada's, ranking Quebec as fifth of Canada's ten provinces. In 2016, this figure had decreased slightly to 84.5% and Quebec's ranking had dropped to seventh, falling behind Saskatchewan and Newfoundland and Labrador (Statistics Canada, 2019). These figures provide additional evidence that Quebec has remained consistently poorer than Canada as a whole. This would then further support the argument that an internal colonialist discourse has been the primary factor which has pushed Quebec's national independence parties to the left.

Comparative Economic Performance in Flanders and Quebec

Overall, it is clear that comparative economic conditions have been better historically in Flanders than in Quebec. Quebec has consistently had comparatively worse economic conditions than Canada for decades, even as far back as the 1950s. In contrast, Flanders has performed well economically, especially in comparison with Wallonia. These factors emphasise a clear difference between the economic circumstances which have faced Flanders and Quebec. Given this difference, it then makes sense that we see right-wing national independence parties in Flanders and left-wing national independence parties in Quebec.

The comparatively better economic performance of Flanders has allowed a bourgeois regionalist discourse to develop, pushing its national independence parties to the right. It should also be highlighted that the increased economic success of Flanders, in relation to Wallonia, coincided with, first, the emergence of the far-right Vlaams Blok and, second, the collapse of the broad church Volksunie and the emergence of its successor, the conservative N-VA. This would suggest that as

Flemish economic superiority over Wallonia has become more solidified, as has the right-wing ideological position of the Flemish nationalist movement. This would further support the argument that the right-wing nature of Flemish nationalism is primarily due to economic conditions. In comparison, Quebec has seen historically worse economic conditions. This has facilitated the rise of an internal colonialist discourse which pushed Quebec's national independence parties to the left. This analysis found that Quebec's comparatively poorer economic performance can be dated back to the 1950s. Therefore, it could be argued that the rise of the left-wing Parti Québécois in the 1960s was a result of a continuation of this comparatively worse economic performance and the internal colonialist discourse which this would have produced. The fact that Quebec performed comparatively worse than Canada economically throughout second half of the 20th century then also provides an explanation as to why the Parti Québécois established itself, and remained as, a left-wing nationalist party. The correlation between Quebec's comparatively poorer economic conditions and the success of left-wing national independence parties further supports the argument that economic conditions offer a strong explanation for the left-wing ideology of these parties.

Conclusion

Using a most similar systems design, this chapter has analysed the left-right ideology of national independence parties from two pairs of cases, Greenland and the Faroe Island and Flanders and Quebec. It has addressed two puzzles. First, why does the Faroe Islands have right-wing cases of national independence parties but Greenland does not? Second, why do Flemish national independence parties come from a right-wing position while the majority of Québécois national independence parties come from a left-wing position? When looking at both pairs, this chapter controlled for three characteristics which were previously found to be important regarding the ideology of political parties, both in the literature and in the quantitative findings from this thesis. These were whether the region exists within a republic or a monarchy, militarism of the parent country and the status of the region's distinct language. These three variables were found to be similar in both

cases, meaning it is unlikely they are responsible for the variation of ideology seen between the national independence parties in either pair of cases. These similarities also justify the comparison of these two cases.

This analysis found that economic conditions offered the key explanation as to why we see ideological variation within both pairs of cases. When looking at both pairs, economic conditions were looked at from multiple perspectives. In both pairs, it was clear that there was a contrasting economic story between the two respective cases. Given what we know from previous literature, it can then be concluded that this is the primary reason for why we see ideological variation between national independence parties in both pairs of cases. This chapter has added to the current literature on the relationship between economic performance and left-right ideology. This is because it has shown that the accepted relationship between left-right ideology and economic performance can be applied to national independence parties specifically.

One thing which should also be considered is the external validity of these findings, i.e. can these findings be applied to other cases? Given the findings in Chapter Five, regarding unemployment and left-right ideology, and the previous literature on regionalist parties and comparative economic performance, it is possible to make the claim that these findings can be generalised to other cases in western democratic nations. The next chapter of this thesis will focus mainstream-radical ideology, using a similar methodological approach as was applied in this chapter. This chapter analyses cases from the Basque Country and Catalonia and from Scotland and Wales.

Chapter Six: Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

The aim of this thesis is to answer the question as to why national independence parties hold a significant variety of different left-right ideological positions. This thesis looks at this question from both the traditional left-right and mainstream-radical perspectives. Therefore, this thesis is not only analysing why some national independence parties are right-wing and others are left-wing but is also looking at why some position themselves in the centre ground and others turn to more radical positions. The focus of the previous chapter was on the former of these two perspective. The latter of these two perspectives is the focus of this chapter. Through the analysis of two pairs of cases, this chapter explores the mechanisms which can explain why certain factors will push national independence parties to either more radical or more mainstream left-right positions.

Table 6.1: Influences on the Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation Within National Independence Parties

Independent Variables	Effect on Left-Right Ideology
Competition Between National Independence Parties	Higher levels of competition between national independence parties causes more national independence parties to hold more radical positions.
Immigration	Higher levels of immigration cause national independence parties to hold more radical positions.
Language	When a region has a majority-spoken language which is distinct from the language of its parent country, its national independence parties will hold more mainstream positions. Regions which either have a distinct minority-spoken language or no distinct language at all will have more radical national independence parties.

The quantitative analysis in Chapter Four of this thesis highlighted a number of factors which have an influence over the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties (see Table 6.1). However, as was the case in the previous chapter, it is important to confirm that the results from this quantitative analysis can be applied to real world cases. This is partly done in order to further show

that the correlations found in Chapter Four are also causal. Using a most similar systems design, this chapter analyses the variation in mainstream-radical ideology between different national independence parties from across two pairs of case studies:

- The Basque Country and Catalonia

- Scotland and Wales

Table 6.2: The Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties and the Status of Language in their Regions

	Distinct Majority-Spoken Language	Distinct Minority-Spoken Language
Mainstream	**Catalonia**	Wales
Radical		**Basque Country** Scotland

The choice to include two pairs instead of one was done in order to improve the robustness and external validity of the findings. This is discussed further in the Research Design section of Chapter Three. The choice was taken to analyse these two pairs because of the fact that they are both made up of extremely comparable cases. However, despite this comparability, there is a clear distinction in the mainstream-radical ideology of their respective national independence parties. Looking specifically at the two pairs in this chapter, there is a significantly larger proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country and in Scotland than in Catalonia or in Wales. This analysis finds that the status of language is responsible for ideological variation seen between Basque and Catalan national independence parties. Looking at Table 6.2 above, the majority-spoken nature of the Catalan language and the minority-spoken nature of the Basque language can offer a plausible explanation as to why Basque national independence parties are more radical than their Catalan counterparts.

This analysis then finds that increased levels of party competition between national independence parties is responsible for ideological variation seen between Scottish and Welsh national independence parties. Higher levels of competition between national independence parties in

Scotland than in Wales is the reason as to why Scotland has a higher proportion of radical national independence parties (see Table 6.3).

Table 6.3: The Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties and the Levels of Party Competition Between National Independence Parties in the Region

	High Levels of Competition	Low Levels of Competition
Mainstream	Catalonia	**Wales**
Radical	**Scotland** Basque Country	

A set of relevant characteristics, which have previously been found to have an influence over mainstream-radical ideology, have been included in order to determine the key factor for explaining the ideological variation found in each pair. This chapter focuses on four key characteristics which are relevant to the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. This approach is one which has previously been supported in the literature on the comparative method (Lijphart, 1971: 690). The theoretical reasoning for including these characteristics has been discussed in the Research Design section of this thesis. The following characteristics have been included:

- Language

- Competition Between National Independence Parties

- Immigration

- Electoral System

In addition, when looking at each of the pairs, issues related to internal validity, the direction of the flow of the arguments and possible interaction effects between the characteristics are all addressed. This is done to ensure the reliability of the results. In the conclusion of this chapter, the issue of external validity is also discussed. This is done to highlight the generalisability of the results found.

The Basque Country and Catalonia

This section explores the ideological variation found between national independence parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia. As is clearly shown in Figure 6.1 below, there has been a significantly

higher proportion of cases of radical national independence parties found in the Basque Country than in Catalonia. An example of an especially high-profile radical national independence party from the Basque Country is EH Bildu. EH Bildu has stood consistently in regional and statewide elections over the past decade. Between 2000 and 2020, there have also been other cases of radical national independence parties which have stood in the Basque Country. Therefore, this analysis explores the question as to why the Basque Country has had a significantly higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Catalonia.

Figure 6.1: Position of Relevant Basque and Catalan National Independence Parties on the Mainstream-Radical Spectrum (2000-2020)[11]

Basque National Independence Parties (Mainstream)	Basque National Independence Parties (Radical)	Catalan National Independence Parties (Mainstream)	Catalan National Independence Parties (Radical)
• Eusko Alkartasuna • Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	• **Amaiur** • **Aralar** • **EH Bildu** • **Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista** • **Euskal Herritarrok**	• **Convergència i Unió** • **Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya** • **Democràcia i Llibertat** • **Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya** • **Junts pel Sí** • **Junts per Catalunya**	• Candidatura d'Unitat Popular

Source: Compiled by the author

The analysis of this pair is made up of two parts. The first part analyses three of the relevant characteristics, which in this analysis act as control variables. These three characteristics have been selected on the basis that they have previously been found to be relevant to the mainstream-radical ideology of political parties in both the previous literature and the previous chapters of this thesis. Importantly, these characteristics were found to be similar enough between the two cases that they could act as controls and also be ruled out as possible explanations for the ideological variation being explored. This analysis then addresses the status of language in the Basque Country and Catalonia. This analysis shows that the status of Basque and Catalan in their respective communities can explain

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[11] Relevant parties have been measured as those who have won at least 4% of the vote in at least one regional or statewide election.

why there is ideological variation between Basque and Catalan national independence parties. This finding contributes to the current literature by emphasising the importance of distinct regional languages on the radicalism of ideology amongst national independence parties. As is highlighted in the literature review, previous research has shown that language is a vital factor for many secessionist and regionalist movements. However, little research has specifically looked at how language influences the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

When using a comparative method such as this, it is important to ensure both the internal and external validity of the findings. Regarding internal validity, this analysis takes a number of steps to clearly show the fact that language has had an influence of the mainstream-radical ideology of Basque and Catalan national independence parties. The first of these steps was to control for key characteristics, in order to show that these are not influencing the ideological variation being examined. These variables were chosen because of both the quantitative findings from Chapter Four and the literature on regionalist parties and influences on mainstream-radical ideology. The direction of causation is also addressed when discussing the effect of language status in both cases. This is done in order to further emphasise the relationship between the two variables and to show further show that language has had an influence on the ideological positioning of the national independence parties from these cases. Regarding external validity, the findings from this chapter are supported by the large-n analysis conducted in Chapter Four. Therefore, it can be confidently argued that these results can be generalised across both Canada and Western Europe.

As is shown in Table 6.4, there is a considerable amount of logic in comparing these two cases. The Basque Country and Catalonia are both autonomous communities in Spain. Both cases have similar sized economies. Over the past 20 years, both have consistently had similar levels of GDP per capita, both of which have remained higher than Spain has a whole (OECD, 2022). Both cases experience regular competition between multiple national independence parties in elections and both use proportional representation in both regional and statewide elections. Both cases have also

experienced similar levels of immigration. With both being within Spain, immigration at the statewide

level is the same for both. At the regional level, average levels of immigration in both cases, since

2000, have been low. Both have experienced annual net-migration of less than 100 per 100,000

persons. Both cases also share some historic similarities, especially regarding how the nationalist

movements in both were treated when Spain was a fascist dictatorship under Francisco Franco. The

significant number of similarities between these two cases justifies the use of this method to compare

them. Given these similarities, it interesting that there is a significant amount of ideological variation

between the two cases on the mainstream-radical axis.

Table 6.4: The Basque Country and Catalonia Comparison

		Basque Country	Catalonia
Independent Variable	Status of Distinct Language (Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2018; Basque Autonomous Community Department of Culture and Language Policy, 2019).	**Minority-Spoken**	**Majority-Spoken**
Control Variables	Level of Party Competition Between National Independence Parties	Regular Competition	Regular Competition
	Average Annual Net-Migration (Per 100,000 Persons) (2008-2019) (Compiled from the following sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2020; OECD, 2021b).	30.76	75.54
	Average Statewide Foreign-Born Population (%) (2000-2019) (Compiled from the following source: OECD, 2021a).	11.05%	11.05%
	Electoral System (Álvarez-Rivera, 2020; Ace Project, 2021; Doherty, 2021).	Proportional Representation	Proportional Representation
Dependent Variable	Proportion of Radical Cases of NIPs (%) (2000-2020)	**45.16% (Higher Proportion)**	**16.67% (Lower Proportion)**

Control Variables

Three characteristics have been included in this analysis to act as control variables. These

characteristics have been selected based on the current literature and on the findings from Chapter

Four of this thesis. The reasoning behind the inclusion of each of these variables can be found in the Research Design. The following three characteristics have been controlled for:

- Competition Between National Independence Parties

- Immigration

- Electoral System

A factor which must also be considered is the possibility of interaction effects, i.e. do any of the control variables have an influence over the key independent variable, language status? It is unlikely that competition between national independence parties or electoral systems would have any impact on the status of language in Catalonia or the Basque Country. However, immigration could be something which could impact the status of the languages being spoken in both communities. Therefore, the relationship when immigration is discussed, its possible effects on language are referenced.

Given that these characteristics act as controls, this section finds that it is very unlikely that they can offer a convincing explanation as to why we see a much larger proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country than we do in Catalonia. This is because of the significant degree of similarity in both cases regarding all three characteristics. It is also important to emphasise the similarities between these two cases as they further highlight the fact that there is a puzzle surrounding why the Basque Country has a significantly higher proportion of radical national independence parties in comparison to Catalonia.

Competition Between National Independence Parties

If competition between national independence parties did offer an explanation as to why there have been more radical cases of national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia, then this would be because of a larger degree of competition between national independence parties in the Basque Country. This would then push more Basque national independence parties to radical positions in order to appear distinct from their independentist rivals. However, as is explained below,

there is a large amount of competition between national independence parties in both the Basque Country and Catalonia. Therefore, this would suggest that it is very unlikely that party competition is the main reason for the ideological variation seen between Basque and Catalan national independence parties.

There has been a large amount of competition between national independence parties in both the Basque Country and in Catalonia, at both the regional and statewide levels. For example, looking at the statewide level, in the November 2019 Spanish General Election, two national independence parties stood in the Basque Country and three stood in Catalonia. The EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu stood in the Basque Country and the CUP, the ERC and Junts stood in Catalonia (Ministerio del Interior, 2019).

Table 6.5: Support for National Independence Parties in Basque Parliament Elections (2001-2020)

	Ar (R)	EHB (R)	EHAK (R)	EH (R)	EA (MS)	EAJ-PNV (MS)
2001	-	-	-	10.0%	42.4%[5]	
2005	2.3%	-	12.4%	-	38.4%[12]	
2009	6.0%	-	-	-	3.7%	38.1%
2012	-	24.7%	-	-	-	34.2%
2016	-	21.1%	-	-	-	37.4%
2020	-	27.8%	-	-	-	39.1%

Source: Compiled by the author

In the Basque Country there has consistently been party competition between at least two national independence parties since the turn of the century at the regional level (see Table 6.5). The ideologically mainstream EAJ-PNV has consistently stood in elections since the turn of the century. Alongside the EAJ-PNV, there has always been at least one radical national independence party standing against it. These parties have always come from the radical-left. In the past three elections, the radical left-wing party which has competed against the EAJ-PNV has been EH Bildu.

In Catalonia, like in the Basque Country, there has also been significant competition between national independence parties at the regional level. In 2003 and 2006, the ERC was the only national

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[12] In the 2001 and 2005 Basque Parliament Elections, the Eusko Alkartasuna and EAJ-PNV stood in an electoral coalition (Historia Electoral, 2020).

independence party to stand, however, it did face electoral competition from the CiU, which at the time was an autonomous party (Schakel, 2020). However, since 2010, there has been competition between at least two national independence parties (see Table 6.6). What is especially interesting is that, despite this increase in competition, only one party has taken a more radical ideological position, the CUP. The majority of Catalan national independence parties still choose to position themselves as ideologically mainstream.

Table 6.6: Support for National Independence Parties in Catalan Parliament Elections (2003-2017)

	CUP (R)	CiU (MS)	ERC (MS)	JxSí (MS)	JxCat (MS)	Re (MS)	SCI (MS)
2003	-	N/A[13]	16.5%	-	-	-	-
2006	-	N/A[3]	14.0%	-	-	-	-
2010	-	38.4%	7.0%	-	-	1.3%	3.3%
2012	3.5%	30.7%	13.7%	-	-	-	1.3%
2015	8.2%	-	-	39.6%	-	-	-
2017	4.5%	-	21.4%	-	21.7%	-	-

Source: Compiled by the author

The fact that both the Basque Country and Catalonia have consistently experienced a high level of competition between multiple national independence parties shows that party competition is not the explanation as to why we see a higher proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia. The fact that Catalonia's national independence parties, including some which are much smaller, have stuck to more mainstream ideological positions suggests that there is some resistance to moving to radical positions, amongst Catalan national independence parties, which does not seem to be present amongst Basque national independence parties. Therefore, this emphasises the question of why many more cases of Basque national independence parties have been more radical than their Catalan counterparts.

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[13] In the 2003 and 2006 Catalan Parliament Elections, CiU was an autonomous party and not separationist. The CiU won 30.9% of the vote in 2003 and 31.5% in 2006 (Schakel, 2020).

If immigration was the factor that explained the ideological variation seen between Basque and Catalan national independence parties then it would be because immigration in the Basque Country was higher than in Catalonia. This would then in turn push Basque national independence parties towards more radical positions. However, this is not the case. Both the Basque Country and Catalonia have experienced similar levels of net-migration. Therefore, it can be concluded that immigration is not a key factor in explaining the ideological variation seen between Basque and Catalan national independence parties.

When looking at immigration, it is important to consider any possible interaction effects which may occur between numbers of migrants entering the two cases and the main independent variable explored in this chapter, language. If either the Basque Country or Catalonia faced a sudden large increase in immigration, this could cause a decrease in the percentage of people who speak the distinct language of the community. This is a common challenge faced by many sub-nationalist parties when deciding how to approach the issue of immigration, as some fear it "may undermine the basis for their claims of national distinctiveness," (Jeram et al, 2016: 1229). However, in this case, the levels of immigration do not seem to have any significant effect on the status of Basque and Catalan in their respective communities. As is shown in the analysis below, levels of immigration have varied significantly over time in both the Basque Country and Catalonia, as well as in Spain as a whole. In contrast, the status of Basque and Catalan have remained constant, with Basque continuing to be a minority-spoken language and Catalan a majority-spoken language. Therefore, this would suggest that the impact of immigration is minimal and any possible interaction effect between the two variables will not have an influence over the results of this analysis.

This section focuses on immigration from two distinct perspectives, a statewide perspective and a regional perspective. From the statewide perspective, this chapter analyses the percentage of foreign-born individuals within Spain's total population since the turn of the century and levels of net-

migration in Spain since 1962. From the regional perspective, this chapter mainly focuses on annual net-migration in both the Basque Country and Catalonia. This variable has been included in order to gain a more accurate view of the specific immigration stories in both the Basque Country and Catalonia. An analysis of the regional level also made it possible to further emphasise the similarities between the two cases, regarding levels of immigration, in order to further show that immigration is not a key factor in explaining the ideological variation found between the two.

Figure 6.2: Net-Migration -Spain

Source: World Bank, 2022d.

Regarding the statewide level, as is shown in Table 6.4, the average percentage of foreign-born individuals in Spain, between 2000 and 2019, was 11.05%. Between 1962 and 1987, Spanish levels of immigration were incredibly low, with net-migration for much of that time being negative (see Figure 6.2). However, net-migration suddenly rose rapidly in the 1990s and early 2000s, reaching a peak of just under 3 million in 2002. Net-migration then shrunk again, returning to negative levels by 2012. Since then, net-migration has slowly been increasing. In 2017, net-migration had returned to positive levels, being at 200,000.

Based on this, it is unsurprising that the foreign-born population, as a percentage of the total Spanish population, increased significantly between 2000 and 2009 but has since remained quite stable, only increasing slightly since 2010 (see Figure 6.3). What is interesting is that, despite the seemingly quite radical shifts in levels of immigration seen in Spain, the mainstream-radical ideological positioning of Catalan and Basque national independence parties has remained relatively stable. As was discussed previously, the Basque Country has had high-profile cases of radical national independence parties for decades, something which is not the case in Catalonia. Therefore, it can be argued that the mainstream-radical ideological positions of Catalan and Basque national independence parties are unresponsive to changes in the levels of immigration within Spain. This further supports the argument that levels of immigration do not have a significant impact on the mainstream-radical ideology of these parties.

Figure 6.3: Foreign- Born Population (%) - Spain

Source: OECD, 2021a.

Looking at the regional level, it is difficult to make a historic comparison between Catalonia and the Basque Country due to the lack of detailed historical data at the regional level. However, there is data which shows that, between 1988 and 1999, net-migration from the Basque Country was consistently

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negative (Eustat, 2020). This supports the argument that immigration is not the reason why we see a higher proportion of radical cases of national independence parties in the Basque Country. This is because the Basque Country consistently had radical cases of national independence parties in this period, despite of the negative levels of immigration. Looking at more recent data, between 2008 and 2019, the average annual net-migration in both cases was similar, being under 100 per 100,000 persons (see Table 6.4). Looking at Figure 6.4 below, there are also some interesting similarities in the net-migration trends in both cases.

Figure 6.4: Annual Net-Migration (per 100,000 Persons) – the Basque Country and Catalonia

Compiled from the following sources: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2020; OECD, 2021b.

In 2008, net-migration was positive in both cases. However, between 2009 and 2014, both cases experienced negative net-migration. Since 2015, net-migration has returned to positive levels in both cases and has been trending upwards. These levels of net-migration also broadly follow what was happening at the statewide level in the same period. For example, in 2012, net-migration was both negative in the Basque Country and Catalonia, as well as in Spain as a whole. This analysis has shown that, at both the statewide and regional levels, the Basque Country and Catalonia have experienced similar levels of immigration. Therefore, this would suggest that immigration is not the factor that is

responsible for the larger proportional of radical national independence parties found in the Basque Country.

Electoral System

If electoral systems were to explain the ideological variation seen between Catalan and Basque national independence parties then this would be because the PR electoral systems used in the Basque Country, at both the regional and statewide levels, would be pushing Basque national independence parties to a more radical position. However, Catalonia uses the same PR electoral systems, at both the regional and statewide level, as the Basque Country. Therefore, the electoral system cannot be the reason why we have seen a higher proportion of radical cases of national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia.

Elections to the Basque Parliament are conducted using a closed list PR system, in which the d'Hondt method is used to distribute seats (Álvarez-Rivera, 2020). As has previously been discussed, there have been high-profile radical cases of national independence parties in the Basque Country since the Spanish transition to democracy. It could be argued that the PR system offered these parties an incentive to stand in these elections on a more radical platform and has made it easier for these parties to continue to have an electoral foothold in the parliament. Elections to the Catalan Parliament are also conducted using a closed list PR system, in which the d'Hondt method is used to distribute seats (Doherty, 2021). What is interesting is that despite having used a PR system, like the one used in the Basque Country, national independence parties in Catalan Parliament Elections have overwhelmingly come from mainstream ideological positions. The one main exception to this is the CUP. It could be argued that the electoral system provided some incentive for the CUP to stand in elections on its more radical-left platform. However, this does not explain why the overwhelming majority of cases in Catalonia have chosen to take more mainstream ideological positions, especially given the high level of party competition seen between Catalan nationalist parties. At the statewide level, Spain uses a PR

list system for its General Elections (Ace Project, 2021). Therefore, at the statewide level, the electoral system used in Catalonia and the Basque Country are also the same.

This analysis has clearly shown that national independence parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia are involved in elections which use the same types of electoral systems. Therefore, the electoral system cannot be the reason why Basque national independence parties are more radical than Catalan national independence parties. It could be possible that PR has offered some incentive to radical national independence parties in the Basque Country. However, this does not then explain why this incentive has not had as strong an impact on their Catalan counterparts.

Language

When language was originally included in this thesis, it was expected that regions with their own distinct language were going to be more likely to have radical national independence parties than regions with a minority-spoken or no distinct language.[14] However, contrary to this expectation, the analysis from Chapter Four found that regions with no distinct language or a minority-spoken language were more likely to have radical national independence parties than regions with a distinct majority-spoken language (see Table 4.7). It was then suggested, using the example of England, that this might be due to a feeling of insecurity of national identity that emerges from the lack of a distinct language.

Looking more in depth of the direction of the flow of this argument, it has been argued that a language can be fundamental to the claims of national identity of many nationalist and sub-nationalist groups (Calhoun, 1993: 224). We also know that fears of losing the cultural distinctiveness of their region, within a larger parent country, are common in sub-nationalist parties (Jeram et al, 2016: 1229). If a region lacks a distinct language or has historically had a distinct minority-spoken language then there is an increased possibility of a perception of threat to that region's distinct identity. This is because language is a key factor which distinguishes many stateless nations from their parent countries.

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[14] See previous references to **The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis** in the Introduction and Chapter Four.

Figure 6.5: Flow of Argument

Minority-Spoken or No Distinct Language	→	Increased Possibility of Threat to Distinct National Identity	→	Increased Feeling of Insecurity in National Identity	→	Radical Ideology

Source: Compiled by the author.

Given these factors, it would not be surprising that national independence parties in regions with no distinct language or a minority-spoken language would then develop a feeling of increased insecurity, regarding their own national identity. This could then lead these parties to turn to more radical ideological positions (see Figure 6.5). With regards to the Basque Country and Catalonia, Basque is a minority-spoken language while Catalan is a majority-spoken language (see Table 6.4). This is important in explaining the higher proportion of radical national independence parties seen in the Basque Country.

Table 6.7: Proportion of Catalan-Speakers in Catalonia (%)

Year	Proportion of Catalan-Speakers in Catalonia
2003	81.6%
2008	78.3%
2013	80.4%
2018	81.2%

Source: Statistical Institute of Catalonia, 2020.

Table 6.8: Proportion of Full Bilinguals in the Basque Country (%)

Year	Proportion of Full Bilinguals in the Basque Country
2001	29.4%
2006	30.1%
2011	32.0%
2016	33.9%

Sources: Basque Autonomous Community Department of Culture and Language Policy, 2008; Basque Autonomous Community Department of Culture and Language Policy, 2013; Basque Autonomous Community Department of Culture and Language Policy, 2019.

Over the past two decades, the proportion of Catalan-speakers in the autonomous community has consistently remained at approximately 80% (see Table 6.7). In the Basque Country, it was found that the proportion of full bilinguals, those who can speak both Spanish and Basque, was 33.9% in 2016.

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This is a figure which has been increasing since the turn of the century but very slowly, being at 29.4% in 2001 (see Table 6.8). This shows a clear contrast in the status of Catalan in Catalonia and Basque in the Basque Country.

Another factor which further shows the insecure nature of the Basque language is the fact that it is a language isolate. It is generally agreed that:

> "An isolate is a language which has no relatives, that is, that has no demonstrable genetic relationship with any other language. It is a language which has not been shown to be the descendent of any ancestral language which has other descendants (daughters). Thus, language isolates are in effect language families with only one member," (Campbell, 2010: 16).

Given that Basque is totally unique, it could be argued that its status is less secure than other European languages. This is because it would be harder for speakers of other languages to learn because of the fact that it is shares no common features with any other languages. This includes those living in the Basque Country who only speak Spanish. In contrast, Catalan is part of the Indo-European family of languages. More specifically, it is part of Ibero-Romance group of languages. It shares this group with numerous languages from the Iberian peninsula, including Portuguese and Spanish (Ethnologue, 2022). This means that it shares some common features with these other languages. It could be argued that this makes it more secure due to the fact that it would be easier for speakers of other Ibero-Romance languages to learn. This interesting contrast between the two languages further shows that it is easy to perceive the Basque language as far more insecure than Catalan.

Given the more insecure nature of the Basque language, it makes sense that Basque national independence parties are more radical, based on the argument presented above. Given that it could easily be perceived that Basque is far less secure in the Basque Country than Catalan is in Catalonia, it could then, by extension, be perceived as a more threatened language. This means that more Basque national independence parties may feel this threat and become more insecure, leading them to turn to more radical ideologies. Further evidence to support this theory can be found in Appendix A. When

comparing how Basque and Catalan national independence parties have discussed the issue of language, the analysis from this appendix found that the radical-left party, EH Bildu, referred to threats to the Basque language far more than the EAJ-PNV as well as far more than any Catalan national independence party referred to threats to the Catalan language (see Table A.10). An example of the insecurity in national identity found in the discourse of EH Bildu, from its 2020 Basque Parliament Manifesto, is where the party claims that the Basque people consider themselves "second-class citizens" and "feel like foreigners," (p. 98). While this is just one case, it does provide some additional evidence that radical-left national independence parties in the Basque Country do strongly perceive the Basque language to be under threat. Further study of literature from more historic cases, such as Batasuna, would be required to provide further support for this theory. Nonetheless, this evidence does support the theory that the status of the Basque language does play an important role in pushing many Basque national independence parties towards more radical ideological positionings. Based on the analysis and resulting discussions above, it is possible to conclude that the level of insecurity of Basque and Catalan, in their respective native autonomous communities, plays an important role in explaining why we have seen a higher proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia.

Scotland and Wales

This section explores the ideological variation found between national independence parties in Scotland and Wales. As is clearly shown in Figure 6.6 below, there has been a significantly higher number of cases of radical national independence parties found in Scotland than in Wales. One example of a radical Scottish national independence party is the Scottish Socialist Party (SSP). The SSP won a small number of seats in the Scottish Parliament in both the 1999 and 2003 elections (The Scottish Parliament, 2021). Between 2001 and 2019, there have also been other cases of radical national independence parties which have stood in Scotland. Therefore, this analysis explores the

question as to why Scotland has had a higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Wales.

Figure 6.6: Position of Scottish and Welsh National Independence Parties on the Mainstream-Radical Spectrum (2001-2019)

Scottish National Independence Parties (Mainstream)	Scottish National Independence Parties (Radical)	Welsh National Independence Parties (Mainstream)	Welsh National Independence Parties (Radical)
•Scottish National Party •Scottish Green Party	•**RISE** •**Scottish Socialist Party** •**Solidarity**	•Plaid Cymru	•Cymru Annibynnol

Source: Compiled by the author

This section first analyses three characteristics which have been included to act as control variables in this analysis. These characteristics were found to be similar within the two cases. Given their strong similarities in both cases, it is then possible to rule out that these characteristics are responsible for the ideological variation found between the two cases. This section then analyses a fourth characteristic, which acts as the main independent variable, party competition. This analysis shows that a larger amount of competition between national independence parties in Scotland offers an explanation as to why there is a higher proportion of radical national independence parties in Scotland than in Wales. This analysis makes a contribution to the current literature by emphasising the importance of competition in influencing the ideological positioning of national independence parties.

It is important to discuss both the internal and external validity of the findings. As was the case in the analysis of the Basque Country and Catalonia, this analysis clearly shows other key characteristics are not responsible for the ideological variation being explored, through the use of controls. This is done by clearly showing they are too similar in the two cases to be responsible for the ideological variation being explored. These characteristics were chosen based on both the findings from the previous research in this thesis and the current literature on mainstream-radical ideology and on regionalist parties. The direction of the flow of the argument is also discussed, with a further examination of what causes party competition and how this results in competition between national independence parties. The interaction effects between the electoral system and levels of party competition are also

discussed. Regarding external validity, the findings from this section are supported by the analysis conducted in Chapter Four. Therefore, it can be confidently argued that these results are generalisable.

Table 6.9: Scotland and Wales Comparison

		Scotland	Wales
Independent Variable	Level of Party Competition Between National Independence Parties	**Regular Competition**	**Little Competition**
Control Variables	Status of distinct language (Scotland's Census, 2011; Welsh Government, 2021b).	Minority-Spoken	Minority-Spoken
	Average Annual Net-Migration (Per 100,000 Persons) (1995-2013) (Compiled from the following sources: StatsWales, 2013; National Records of Scotland, 2021; OECD, 2021b).	160.52	100.52
	Average Statewide Foreign-Born Population (%) (2000-2018) (Compiled from the following source: OECD, 2021a).	10.82%	10.82%
	Electoral System (Institute for Government, 2021).	Mixed System and Majoritarian System	Mixed System and Majoritarian System
Dependent Variable	Proportion of Radical Cases of NIPs (%) (2000-2020)	**35.48% (Higher Proportion)**	**9.09% (Lower Proportion)**

As is shown in Table 6.9, there is a considerable amount of logic in comparing these two cases. This is because Scotland and Wales are very similar in many ways. Both are recognised as nations within the UK and have, in per capita terms, similarly sized economies. Over the past 20 years, both Scotland and Wales have consistently had a GDP per capita lower than the UK as a whole (OECD, 2022). The economies of both cases are also significantly smaller than that of their mutual neighbour within the UK, England (Ibid). Both cases have distinct minority-spoken languages, Welsh in Wales and Scottish Gaelic and Scots in Scotland. Both cases use a mixed electoral system in regional elections and a majoritarian system in statewide elections. Both cases also have similar levels of immigration. Both being within the UK means that they experience the same statewide level of immigration. At the regional level, between 1995 and 2013, net-migration in both cases was below 200 per 100,000

persons. Given these similarities, it is therefore interesting that there is a significant amount of ideological variation between the two cases, on the mainstream-radical axis.

Control Variables

The following key characteristics have been controlled for due to the fact that they could influence the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties in Scotland and Wales:

- Language

- Immigration

- Electoral System

These characteristics have been included as they were found to have a significant influence on the mainstream-radical ideology of political parties. Regarding interaction effects, it is unlikely that immigration or a distinct regional language would have any notable impact on the level of competition between national independence parties in Scotland or Wales. However, it is possible that the electoral system could impact levels of party competition. Therefore, the relationship between party competition and the electoral system is briefly explored during the analysis of this particular control.

This section finds that it is very unlikely that any of these variables can offer a convincing explanation as to why we see a larger proportion of radical national independence parties in Scotland than we do in Wales. The main reason for this is because there is a significant degree of similarity between the two cases in all of these characteristics. It is also important to emphasise the similarities between these two cases because it further highlights the puzzle of why Scottish national independence parties are more radical than their Welsh counterparts.

<u>*Language*</u>

If language was responsible for the ideological variation seen between Scottish and Welsh national independence parties then this would be because the minority-spoken status of Scotland's distinct languages would be pushing Scottish national independence parties to more radical ideological

positions. However, Welsh is also a minority-spoken language. Despite this, Wales has not experienced the number of radical national independence parties that Scotland has. Therefore, it is unlikely that language is responsible for the ideological variation seen between the national independence parties from these two cases.

Both Scotland and Wales have a minority-spoken language which exists alongside the UK's dominant language, English. In Wales, the Welsh language has historically been a minority-spoken language. The number of Welsh speakers declined during the 20th century. In 1911, there was just under one million Welsh speakers in Wales. However, by 1981, this figure had dropped to approximately half a million (Welsh Government, 2015: 20). This decline did halt in the 1980s and 1990s. This halt coincided with two legislative measures which reintroduced Welsh into the public and civic spheres. These were the 1988 Education Reform Act and the 1993 Welsh Language Act (see May, 2000: 105). In 2001, the number of Welsh speakers had increased to just under 600,000 people. This figure had then dipped again by 2011, with the total number of Welsh speakers in Wales being 562,000, 19% of the total population (Welsh Government, 2015: 20). Since 2011, the proportion of Welsh speakers has increased although it is still spoken by a minority of the Welsh people. A survey, commissioned by the Welsh Government, found that 29.1% of people in Wales were able to speak Welsh (2021b). An interesting observation is that Plaid Cymru never turned to a more radical left-wing ideological position, despite the fact that historically Welsh was a language which was under threat, shown by the decline of its use throughout most of the 20th century.

In Scotland, there are two notable distinct minority-spoken languages, Scots and Scottish Gaelic. In the Scottish 2011 census, more than 1.5 million people said they could speak Scots and 57,000 people said they could speak Gaelic (Scotland's Census, 2011). Interestingly, the 2011 census was the first to record the use of Scots. In contrast, the use of Gaelic is something which has been measured in the census for over a century (Scotland's Census, 2021). Scottish Gaelic has been a minority-spoken language in Scotland for that entire period and the number of Scottish Gaelic speakers has continued

to decline. In 1881, there were 231,594 Gaelic speakers in Scotland, making up 6.2% of the total population. This number had decreased to 158,779 in 1921 and decreased again to 95,447 in 1951. By 1981, the number of Scottish Gaelic speakers was at 82,620 (MacAulay, 1992: 141). This decrease has continued into the 21st century. In 2001, the total number of Scottish Gaelic speakers had decreased to 59,000 and would decrease again to 57,000 by 2011 (Scotland's Census, 2011). An interesting observation is that, despite Scotland's distinct language being a minority-spoken language for over a century, radical Scottish national independence parties did not emerge until the 1990s. This would support the argument that language is not responsible for the larger proportion of radical national independence parties seen in Scotland.

Given that both Scotland and Wales have a distinct minority-spoken language, it is unlikely that language is the explanatory factor in the larger proportion of radical national independence parties found in Scotland than in Wales. This is further supported by the fact that this ideological distinction did not emerge until the 1990s, while the distinct languages in both had historically been spoken by a minority of their respective populations for far longer.

Immigration

If immigration was the cause of the ideological variation seen between Scottish and Welsh national independence parties then it would be because immigration in Scotland was pushing its national independence parties towards more radical positions. However, this is not the case, with both Scotland and Wales experiencing similar levels of net-migration. There is also additional evidence in the literature which supports the argument that immigration is not responsible for the higher proportion of radical national independence parties in Scotland. Therefore, it can be concluded that immigration is not a key factor in explaining the ideological variation seen between Scottish and Welsh national independence parties.

This section analyses immigration from two different perspectives, the statewide perspective and the regional perspective. From the statewide perspective, this section analyses the levels of net-migration

in the UK since 1964 and the percentage of foreign-born individuals within the UK's population since the turn of the century. From the regional perspective, this chapter primarily focuses on annual net-migration in both cases. The regional perspective was included in order to gain a more accurate view of the specific immigration stories in both Scotland and Wales. This was especially important due to the significant differences between the immigration stories of Scotland and Wales and the immigration story of the UK as a whole.

Figure 6.7: Annual Net-Migration (per 100,000 Persons) – Scotland and Wales

Compiled from the following sources: StatsWales, 2013; National Records of Scotland, 2021; OECD, 2021b.

Looking at the regional level, between 1995 and 2013, the average annual net-migration in both Scotland and Wales was similar, being between 100 and 200 per 100,000 persons (see Table 6.9). Looking at Figure 6.7 above, there are also some interesting similarities in the net-migration trends in both cases. We see in both cases that, for the most part, net-migration remains positive. However, in a minority of the years included, both cases do also experience negative net-migration. In addition to having similar levels of net-migration, the proportion of foreign-born individuals in Scotland and Wales is also similar, being below 10%, in 2019, in both cases (House of Commons Library, 2021).

There is an interesting distinction between Scotland and Wales and the UK as a whole. In the UK, net-migration was consistently positive from 1994 onwards (see Figure 6.8). Not only has net-migration been positive but it has also trended upwards throughout both the 1990s and 2000s, reaching a peak in 2014. This is further reflected in the fact that the proportion of foreign-born individuals in the UK has gradually increased since the turn of the century (see Figure 6.9). However, this story has not been as clearly reflected in Scotland and Wales which, in a number of the years analysed, both experienced negative net-migration in that same period. This could suggest that the immigration experience of the UK as a whole may not be representative of the experiences of either Wales or Scotland. The story of immigration in the UK is one of consistent increases in the levels of migration since the mid-1990s. This has not been the case in either Scotland or in Wales.

Figure 6.8

Source: Office for National Statistics, 2020.

This analysis shows that, at both the statewide and regional levels, Scotland and Wales have experienced similar levels of immigration. Therefore, this would suggest that immigration is not responsible for Scotland's larger proportion of radical national independence parties. There is also additional evidence, within the current literature, which would disprove this theory. Jeram et al find

that in Scotland the "debate on immigration takes place on the left," (2016: 1235). Additionally, this

has been seen in the Scottish nationalist movement, with Jeram et al claiming that the "SNP has

effectively linked openness to diversity with the Scottish identity" and that there is a "link between

Scottish nationalism and pro-diversity discourses," (Ibid.). Therefore, based on this, it is unlikely that

the more radical nature of Scottish national independence parties can be explained by immigration.

However, this analysis does further emphasise the comparability of Scotland and Wales and also

further highlights the puzzle of why we see mainstream-radical ideological variation between national

independence parties from the two cases.

Figure 6.9

Foreign-Born Population (%) - United Kingdom

Source: OECD, 2021a.

Electoral System

If the electoral systems were to explain the ideological variation seen between Scottish and Welsh

national independence parties then this would be because the electoral systems used in Scotland

would be more likely to encourage the emergence of radical national independence parties than the

electoral systems used in Wales. However, Wales uses the same mixed system at the regional level

that is used in Scotland. Both cases also use a majoritarian electoral system at the statewide level, using the first-past-the-post (FPTP) system in UK Parliament elections. Therefore, the electoral system cannot be the reason why we have seen a higher proportion of radical cases of national independence parties in Scotland than in Wales.

Given it is argued that party competition explains the variation in mainstream-radical ideology seen between Welsh and Scottish national independence parties, the possible interaction effects between electoral systems and levels of party competition should be explored. This is because past literature has argued that smaller and more radical parties are more likely to gain electoral representation in proportional systems than they are in majoritarian systems (e.g. Hain, 1986; Norris, 1997). This would then create an incentive for smaller national independence parties to stand in proportional systems. This incentive would then increase the level of party competition between different national independence parties. However, as is explained below, Scotland and Wales use identical electoral systems for both statewide and regional elections. Therefore, the level of incentive for smaller national independence parties in both cases, specifically regarding the electoral system, is the same. This means that any possible interaction effects between electoral systems and party competition have been controlled for.

Elections to the Scottish Parliament are held using a mixed system, called the additional members system (AMS). This system gives each voter two votes, a constituency vote and a regional list vote. The constituency vote is counted first, being the majoritarian section of the system, with the winner being the candidate who gets the most votes. The regional list is then counted, working as the proportional part of the system (The Scottish Parliament, 2022). It could be argued that the PR section of the mixed system in Scotland encourages radical national independence parties to stand. This is shown by the fact that the SSP has only ever won seats in Scottish Parliament elections via the regional list vote. In the 1999 Election, the party won a single seat in the regional section and in the 2003 Election, the party won six seats in the regional section. The party did not win a single constituency

seat in either election (The Scottish Parliament, 2021). Furthermore, in the 2016 Election, the two radical-left national independence parties, Solidarity and RISE, only stood on the regional list side of the system and did not contest any of the constituency votes (BBC News, 2016). These factors show that there is an incentive for radical national independence parties to contest Scottish Parliament elections, with a focus on the proportional section of this system. However, the question then arises, why has the same thing not happened in Wales?

Elections to the Welsh Senedd use the same electoral system as in Scotland, the AMS (Senedd Cymru, 2021). Therefore, the election is divided into two parts, a majoritarian constituency part and a proportional regional list part. What is interesting is that, despite the PR section in the Welsh electoral system, only one radical national independence party has ever stood, trying to take advantage of this system. This was Cymru Annibynnol in the 2003 Election, who won less than 1% of the regional list vote and did not win any seats (Senedd Cymru, 2022). It should be noted that the Welsh system does still attract radical parties from other party families and has seen them gain electoral success through the proportional section of the system. For example, the radical right-wing United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) won seven seats in the regional section of the 2016 Senedd Election, more than any other party (Jones & Holzinger, 2016: 2). This is important to emphasise as it shows that the Welsh system can still be used to garner support by smaller radical parties. This is just something which has not been done by any radical national independence parties.

At the statewide level, the UK uses a majoritarian electoral system, the FPTP system. The UK is divided into 650 constituencies, each electing a single Member of Parliament (MP). Given the current literature and previous findings in this thesis, it is unsurprising that, when observing the two datasets used in Chapter Four, the number of radical national independence parties in Scotland and Wales was lower in the statewide election database than in the regional election database (see Table 6.10). However, there were still more radical cases of national independence parties in UK elections that came from Scotland than that came from Wales.

Table 6.10: Cases of Radical National Independence Parties in Major Scottish and Welsh Elections

Number of Cases of Radical National Independence Parties in Scotland (Regional Elections)	Number of Cases of Radical National Independence Parties in Scotland (Statewide Elections)	Number of Cases of Radical National Independence Parties in Wales (Regional Elections)	Number of Cases of Radical National Independence Parties in Wales (Statewide Elections)
7: SSP, 2003 SSP, 2007 Solidarity, 2007 SSP, 2011 Solidarity, 2011 Solidarity, 2016 RISE, 2016	4: SSP, 2001 SSP, 2005 SSP, 2010 SSP, 2015	1: Cymru Annibynnol, 2003	0

Source: Compiled by the Author

Given that Scotland and Wales use the same electoral systems, in both regional and statewide elections, it is very unlikely that it is the primary factor as to why we have seen a larger number of cases of radical national independence parties in Scotland than we have in Wales. It is possible that the proportional element of the Scottish Parliament electoral system has encouraged and allowed radical national independence parties to be more successful. However, this does not explain why the same has not been the case in Wales, especially given Wales uses the same system and this system has allowed for other radical political parties to achieve success, for example, UKIP in 2016.

Party Competition

The quantitative findings from Chapter Four of the thesis found that national independence parties would move to a radical position if they were faced with an independentist rival that was ideologically mainstream (see Table 4.7). It is clear, in the case of Scotland and Wales, that this offers a convincing explanation as to why we have seen a far larger proportion of national independence parties in Scotland than in Wales.

Looking at the direction of the flow of this argument, it has previously been argued that regionalist parties will change their left-right ideological positions when facing competition from another regionalist party (Massetti & Schakel, 2015). In their 2015 paper, Massetti and Schakel argued that

this is because regionalist parties are searching for a "free space" on the left-right axis, in order to appear distinct from other regionalist parties (p. 871). Therefore, it should be expected that national independence parties will behave in the same way. Of the 25 included regions in this thesis, 20 only had cases from either the left or the right. Given this, it would be expected that national independence parties would look for a free space on the mainstream-radical axis. The flow of the argument, shown in Figure 6.10, shows how this process occurs. When a national independence party chooses to stand in an election, they have to choose a left-right ideological position. If there is already an established national independence party which holds a mainstream ideological position, it would make sense for new party to hold a more radical position. This is in order to find the previously mentioned free space.

Figure 6.10: Flow of Argument

Source: Compiled by Author.

Table 6.11: Regional List Support for National Independence Parties in Scottish Parliament Elections (2003-2016)

	RISE (R)	Scottish Greens (MS)	SNP (MS)	SSP (R)	Solidarity (R)
2003	-	6.5%	**21.5%**	6.5%	-
2007	-	4.0%	**31.0%**	0.6%	1.5%
2011	-	4.4%	**44.0%**	0.4%	0.1%
2016	0.5%	6.6%	**41.7%**	-	0.6%

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Looking at Scotland and Wales, Scotland has had a significantly larger degree of competition between national independence parties than has been seen in Wales. In all the elections in Scotland, since the turn of the century, the SNP has faced competition from other national independence parties to the left of it. Looking at the regional level, between 2003 and 2016, there was at least one radical national independence party in every election to the Scottish Parliament. What we see in these elections is that the overwhelming proportion of the support for national independence parties is given to ideologically mainstream national independence parties. This support mainly goes to the SNP and, to a lesser extent, the Scottish Greens (see Table 6.11).

This then means that other smaller parties, for example Solidarity, have to move to a radical left-wing position, in order to offer something distinct to the Scottish electorate. Therefore, due to the large amount of electoral competition between numerous national independence parties, it makes sense that you see a higher proportion of radical national independence parties in Scotland. A similar process occurs in UK Parliament elections. In these elections, the SNP takes the overwhelming majority of the total votes cast for Scottish national independence parties (see Table 6.12). Therefore, it makes sense for parties, like the SSP, to move to a more radical position in an attempt to appear electorally distinct. For the SSP, it especially made sense to move to a distinct radical left-wing position as they also had to compete with the Scottish Greens.

Table 6.12: Support for Scottish National Independence Parties in UK Parliament Elections (2001-2019)

	Scottish Greens (MS)	SNP (MS)	SSP (R)
2001	0.2%	**20.1%**	3.1%
2005	1.1%	**17.7%**	1.9%
2010	0.7%	**19.9%**	0.1%
2015	1.3%	**50.0%**	<0.05%
2017	0.2%	**36.9%**	-
2019	1.0%	**45.0%**	-

Source: Compiled by the Author.

In contrast, in Wales, Plaid Cymru has stood as the only national independence party in the overwhelming majority of elections. Plaid Cymru was the only Welsh national independence party to

contest UK Parliament elections between 2001 and 2019. Between 2003 and 2016, Plaid Cymru only faced competition in one Welsh Senedd election, in 2003, facing no independentist rivals in any of the other elections (see Table 6.13).

Table 6.13: Regional List Support for National Independence Parties in Welsh Senedd Elections (2003-2016)

	Cymru Annibynnol (R)	Plaid Cymru (MS)
2003	0.8%	**19.7%**
2007	-	21.0%
2011	-	17.9%
2016	-	20.8%

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Therefore, given the lack of competition, it makes sense that there is significantly less radical national independence parties. The reason why Plaid takes a more mainstream left-right position, when faced with no electoral competition can be explained by Newman's work on regionalist parties. Newman argues that national independence parties in majoritarian two-party systems, like we see in the UK, will adopt a more moderate left-right ideological position, in order to attract voters from both the left and the right of the ideological spectrum (1997: 35). This could also offer an explanation for the ideological position of the SNP who, between 1945 and 1990, were Scotland's only national independence party.

Overall, this analysis clearly shows that, in the case of Scotland and Wales, party competition is the key explanatory factor in why we see a significantly higher proportion of radical national independence parties in Scotland than we do in Wales. A higher level of competition between national independence parties in Scotland, pushes some of these parties to more radical positions. This is because these parties need to find an ideological free space, in order to appear distinct to the electorate. In contrast, a lack of competition between national independence parties in Wales means such a process does not occur.

This argument does raise another interesting question regarding the mechanism behind it, why is there more competition between national independence parties in Scotland than in Wales? There are

a number of possible explanations for this. For example, as has already been discussed, one could argue that the mixed system used in Scottish Parliament elections has encouraged smaller national independence parties to stand in elections. However, we know from the analysis in this chapter that the electoral system cannot be the explanation for increased competition in Scotland, due to the fact that it uses exactly the same system as in Wales. Another possible explanation for increased competition in Scotland could be due to devolution. With the establishment of the Scottish Parliament in 1999, it is possible that this might have offered an opportunity for new pro-independence parties, such as the SSP, to emerge. However, this does not explain why Scotland has more competition between national independence parties than Wales. This is because devolution in Scotland and Wales occurred at the same time, with the Welsh Senedd being created at the same time as the Scottish Parliament.

The most likely explanation is that support for independence from the United Kingdom in Scotland has consistently been higher than in Wales. As is shown when comparing Tables 6.11 and 6.13, support in regional elections for national independence parties is higher in Scotland than in Wales. We also know from recent polling that the current levels of support for independence are higher in Scotland than in Wales (see Nyatanga, 2020; What Scotland Thinks, 2022). Given the fact that there is a higher level of support for independence in Scotland, this means there are more voters willing to back national independence parties. If the pool of voters willing to support national independence parties is higher, then it is logical that there would be a larger number of national independence parties active in elections. Therefore, this offers a plausible explanation as to why we see a larger number of national independence parties competing with each other in Scotland than we do in Wales.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties from two pairs of cases, the Basque Country and Catalonia and Scotland and Wales. It has addressed the question of why the Basque Country and Scotland have a higher proportion of radical national

independence parties than Catalonia and Wales. In the analysis of both pairs, three characteristics were included as control variables. Two of these characteristics, electoral systems and immigration, were used in the analysis of both pairs. The third characteristic in each pair was different. In the analysis of the Basque Country and Catalonia, the third characteristic was party competition. In the case of Scotland and Wales, it was language.

This analysis found that language offered a likely explanation as to why we see more radical cases in the Basque Country and that party competition explained why we have seen more radical cases in Scotland. This chapter has added to the current literature on the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. It has shown that multiple factors can influence the mainstream-radical ideology of these parties. This is something which supports the quantitative findings from Chapter Four.

One thing which should also be considered is the external validity of these findings, i.e. can these findings be applied to other cases? Given the findings in Chapter Four, regarding language and party competition, in relation to mainstream-radical ideology, as well as the current body of literature on these topics, it is possible to make the claim that these findings can be generalised to other cases in Canada and Western Europe. The conclusion of this thesis will summarise the findings from all the analytical chapters of this thesis and make some general comments on what can be learned from them.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

This thesis is the final result of a rigorous mixed methods study, designed to answer the following research question: "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" In order to fully answer this question, the left-right ideology of national independence parties has been studied from two perspectives, the traditional left-right perspective and the mainstream-radical perspective (see Figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1: Included Perspectives of Left-Right Ideology

Radical Left	→	Mainstream Left	→	Left-Leaning Centrist	→	Right-Leaning Centrist	→	Mainstream Right	→	Radical Right

This study has made a number of vital findings in regards to the ideology of national independence parties in Canada and Western Europe. This research found that multiple factors had a significant influence over the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties. These factors were a monarch as head of state, increased levels of military spending and economic conditions. A combination of factors were also found to have a significant influence over the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. These factors were levels of immigration, the status of regional languages and competition between different national independence parties. This thesis has made a significant contribution to the existing literature. This thesis has filled the gap in the current literature by providing the first broad in depth study of the left-right ideology of national independence parties specifically. This was in contrast to previous research which analysed the left-right ideology of regionalist parties more generally or the ideology of specific cases of independentist movements. The research methods from this thesis could also be applied to future research related to this subject. This could include research in a number of different areas, including the study of the ideology of national independence parties from a wider variety of territories, such as those in Curaçao, and a study of the ideology of other types of separationist movements, such as rattachist movements

in Northern Ireland and Wallonia. Overall, it can be stated with confidence that the research produced within this thesis has successfully taken a large step in answering the research question at its heart. I am confident in the significant value of this research to all of those who have an interest in national independence parties and their ideology.

The Findings

Important findings have been made in all three of the analytical chapters of this thesis, Chapters Four, Five and Six, directly addressing the research question at the centre of this thesis. Chapter Four analysed over 300 cases of national independence parties which have been active in elections, at both the regional level and the statewide level, comparing the two relevant perspectives of left-right ideology with a number of different independent variables. There was a strong theoretical reasoning for including each of these variables. This analysis was conducted in order to establish which factors could offer reasons as to why some national independence parties are more left-wing or more right-wing and why some national independence parties are more ideologically radical while others are more mainstream. The included variables were grouped into four categories, unemployment, national state characteristics, language and party competition.

In the subsequent two chapters, the results from the analysis in Chapter Four were then applied to pairs of case studies which have had active national independence parties. The first of these chapters further analysed the findings related to the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties and the second analysed the findings related to their mainstream-radical ideology. The two pairs analysed in Chapter Five were the Faroe Islands and Greenland and Flanders and Quebec. The two pairs analysed in Chapter Six were the Basque Country and Catalonia and Scotland and Wales. Through the use of controlled comparisons, this analysis aimed to offer an explanation as to why there was a variation in the ideology of the national independence parties within each pair. This research concluded that economic conditions were responsible for the left-right ideological divide seen between both Faroese and Greenlandic national independence parties and Flemish and Québécois

national independence parties. This research found that the status of language explained the ideological divide seen between Basque and Catalan national independence parties and that party competition was the reason for the ideological division between Scottish and Welsh national independence parties.

Large-N Analysis of National Independence Parties

Chapter Four analysed a database made up of over 300 cases of national independence parties standing in elections, which had been created specifically for this research. This database was made up of two datasets. One dataset included cases which stood in regional elections and the other in statewide elections. The regional dataset included 171 cases and the statewide dataset included 153 cases. Regression analysis was used in order to establish patterns regarding what might factors might influence the ideology of these parties. This analysis was designed to test a set of eight hypotheses, each of which was supported by previous work in the literature (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Table of Hypotheses

Hypothesis Name	Hypothesis Description
The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis (H1)	*Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more left-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis (H2)	*Regions with higher levels of unemployment will have more radical national independence parties.*
The Monarchy Hypothesis (H3)	*National independence parties which exist within constitutional monarchies are more likely to be left-wing.*
The Military Expenditure Hypothesis (H4)	*Countries with higher levels of military spending are more likely to have left-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis (H5)	*Regions with their own distinct language are more likely to have radical national independence parties.*
The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis (H6)	*A national independence party will become ideologically radical when facing electoral competition from an ideologically mainstream alternative.*
The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis (H7)	*Countries with a higher proportion of foreign born individuals will have more right-wing national independence parties.*
The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis (H8)	*Countries with a higher proportion of foreign born individuals will have more radical national independence parties.*

Strong evidence was found that higher levels of unemployment pushed national independence parties to more left-wing positions while lower levels of unemployment pushed them to more right-wing positions. This supported *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*. It was found that comparative unemployment, levels of unemployment in a region compared to the unemployment in the region's country as a whole, had more of an impact than standard percentage unemployment. This supported previous research which emphasised the importance of comparative economic conditions on the ideology of sub-nationalist parties (e.g. Hechter, 1975; Harvie, 1994). It was also found that the existence of a monarchy and increased levels of military spending also pushed national independence parties to more left-wing positions. This supported both *The Monarchy Hypothesis* and *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis*. However, the findings failed to support *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis*, with it not being found that higher levels of immigration caused national independence parties to be right-wing. This result should be taken with some caution due to the imperfect nature of the variable used to measure immigration. Due to the need to find a comparable immigration variable across 25 regions, over a period of 21 years, it was impossible to use regional data on immigration. Instead, a statewide immigration variable had to be used. This meant that the immigration of some regions may not have been accurately reflected, especially those which were islands, such as Greenland.

Table 7.2: Influences on the Left-Right Ideological Variation Within National Independence Parties

Independent Variables	Level of Influence
Immigration	No Influence
Military Spending	**Statistically Significant Influence**
Monarchy	**Statistically Significant Influence**
Unemployment	**Statistically Significant Influence**

There was strong evidence that competition from a mainstream rival national independence party and increased levels of immigration did make national independence parties more radical. This supported both *The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis* and *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*. However, contrary to *The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis*, it was found that you are more

likely to find radical national independence parties in regions with a minority-spoken distinct language or no distinct language than in regions with a distinct majority-spoken language. It was theorised, using the example of England, that this might have been due to a feeling of cultural insecurity in national independence parties from regions which lack a distinct majority-spoken language. There was no evidence to support **The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis**, with no relationship between higher levels of unemployment and party radicalism being found.

Table 7.3: Influences on the Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation Within National Independence Parties

Independent Variables	Level of Influence
Competition Between National Independence Parties	**Statistically Significant Influence**
Immigration	**Statistically Significant Influence**
Language	**Statistically Significant Influence**
Unemployment	No Influence

Left-Right Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

Once the large-n analysis had been completed, Chapters Five and Six then applied the findings from this analysis to pairs of nested cases, with the aim of establishing what specific factors explained the ideological variation seen between national independence parties from the two cases in the pair. This was done using a most similar systems design. Chapter Five focused on the findings relevant to traditional left-right ideology. Chapter Five compared the Faroe Islands and Greenland and then compared Flanders and Quebec. These two pairs were chosen due to the fact that they each were extremely comparable but had national independence parties with different left-right ideological positions. The Faroe Islands and Greenland are autonomous communities within the Kingdom of Denmark. As part of this relationship, both cases also autonomy agreements with Denmark, which have international recognition (Stephen, 2017). Other similarities include both being members of the Nordic Council in their own right (Nordic Co-operation, n.d.), both not being part of the EU (Gad, 2014: 105) and both having a majority-spoken language distinct from Danish. Despite these similarities, the Faroe Islands has had multiple right-wing cases of national independence parties while Greenland has

only ever had left-wing cases. Flanders and Quebec also share a number of similarities which make them very comparable. Both cases exist within monarchies, Flanders in Belgium and Quebec in Canada, both are within countries which have spent a similar amount of their GDP on their military and both have their own distinct majority-spoken language. Further evidence of their comparability comes from the fact that they have been compared with each other in previous literature (e.g. Xhardez, 2020). However, despite their clear similarities, Flemish national independence parties were found to be right-wing while Québécois national independence parties were found to be left-wing.

Table 7.4: Causes of Left-Right Ideological Variation in Analysed Pairs

Pair	Cause of Ideological Variation
Faroe Islands and Greenland	Contrasting Economic Conditions
Quebec and Flanders	Contrasting Economic Conditions

Four relevant characteristics were included in the analysis in order to determine what factor explained the ideological variation seen between the national independence parties in each pair of cases. These were if the region existed in a monarchy, the level of militarism of the region's parent country, the status of any distinct language in the two cases and comparative economic conditions in each region. In each pair, one factor was found to be responsible for the ideological variation being explored while the other three characteristics acted as control variables. In both cases, comparative economic conditions were found to be the key reason for ideological variation between the cases. Comparatively better economic conditions explained why there have been right-wing cases of national independence parties in the Faroe Islands but not in Greenland. Comparatively better economic conditions in Flanders also explained why Flemish national independence parties are significantly more right-wing than Québécois national independence parties. In both cases, economic conditions were measured from a variety of perspectives, including unemployment and GDP per capita. These findings further supported the findings from Chapter Four which supported *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*. These findings, combined with the findings on unemployment from Chapter Four, further highlight the importance of a region's economic conditions, especially in comparison with the

economic conditions of the region's parent country, in influencing the left-right ideology of national independence parties.

Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

Chapter Six focused on further exploring the findings from Chapter Four relevant to mainstream-radical ideology. Chapter Six compared the Basque Country and Catalonia and then compared Scotland and Wales. As was the case in the previous chapter, these pairs were chosen due to their strong comparability and the differing ideological positions of their national independence parties. The aim of this chapter was to gain a better understanding as to why these ideological differences have occurred. Both Catalonia and the Basque Country are Autonomous Communities in Spain. They also both experience regular competition between multiple national independence parties in elections, they both use proportional representation in elections and have experienced similar levels of immigration. Despite the clear similarities, we see a much higher proportion of national independence parties in the Basque Country taking radical left-right positions than we do in Catalonia. Both Scotland and Wales are recognised as historic nations within the UK. Both cases also have distinct minority-spoken languages, use the same electoral systems are both the regional level and the statewide level and have experienced similar levels of immigration. However, there is a much larger number of radical cases of national independence parties in Scotland than in Wales.

Table 7.5: Causes of Mainstream-Radical Ideological Variation in Analysed Pairs

Pair	Cause of Ideological Variation
Basque Country and Catalonia	Contrasting Degrees of Use of the Territories' Distinct Languages
Scotland and Wales	Contrasting Levels of Competition Between National Independence Parties

As was the case in Chapter Five, four characteristics were analysed when comparing each pair. These were status of a regional language, levels of competition between different national independence parties in the same region, levels of immigration and the electoral systems used in both regional and statewide elections. When analysing each pair, three of these characteristics were ruled out as

controls while the fourth offered the explanation for the ideological variation being explored. Interestingly, unlike in the previous chapter, different reasons were found as to why each pair experienced significant ideological variation. The minority-spoken nature of the Basque language was found to be the key factor in explaining why there was a higher proportion of radical national independence parties in the Basque Country than in Catalonia. This supported the findings from Chapter Four which contradicted *The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis*. The theory that this is a result of insecurity of national identity, as a result of a perception of an increased threat to the language, is further supported by the research conducted in Appendix A on the radical left-wing EH Bildu. The significantly higher level of competition between national independence parties in Scotland was found to be the key explanatory factor of why Scotland had a higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Wales. This further supported the analysis conducted in Chapter Four, which provided evidence to support *The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis*. It was then suggested that the reason for increased party competition in Scotland might be due to a higher level of support for independence from the UK than is seen in Wales. This analysis conducted in both Chapter Five and Chapter Six was crucial to the thesis as it allowed for the further study of the causal relationships between the ideology of national independence parties and the independent variables identified in Chapter Four.

The Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis has made an important contribution to the current literature. It has added to an important discussion within political science regarding the ideology of national independence parties. It was important to study national independence parties in their own right because of the fact that there has been an increase in the number of cases of these parties, both outright and as a proportion of regionalist parties. In the Schakel Regionalist Party Database (2020) the number of cases of "secessionist" parties standing in regional elections was 19 between 1945 and 1967. This figure increased to 67 between 1968 and 1989. This figure then increased again to 168 between 1990 and

2010. Given this factor, it has become more important to better understand the ideological nature of these parties specifically, including explanations for their positioning on the left-right spectrum.

This study is also important due to the political division national independence parties can cause at the regional, statewide and even international levels, as shown in the cases of Catalonia and Scotland. It is important to further understand the nature of these parties due to the fact that, if successful in their aims, they would be responsible for the breakup of many long standing countries, such as Spain and the United Kingdom. As I argued in the introduction of this thesis, the most important reason why I have explored the nature of national independence parties is due to the fact that many of the individuals related to these parties have fundamentally rejected their current legal nationality and instead would prefer a new one. By exploring the reasons for why these parties hold specific ideological positions, I am hopeful this thesis has highlighted some of the reasons for why individuals in these parties hold the grievances that they do against their current country.

The choice to focus specifically on the left-right ideology of national independence parties has contributed to the literature due to the fact that there is very little research looking at these parties' left-right ideology specifically. The thesis has also contributed to the current literature by offering a new perspective on a number of the different factors which were found to influence the ideology of national independence parties. For example, this thesis has added to the literature on monarchy which, in the context of liberal democracies, was previously surprisingly lacking. While the thesis as a whole makes a unique contribution to the literature, each chapter also makes a specific contribution. The rest of this section will discuss these specific contributions.

Large-N Analysis of National Independence Parties

The large-n analysis of a database, made up of over 300 cases of national independence parties which have stood in elections, has made an important contribution to the literature. This database is the first of its kind. While there have been previous databases which have specifically included regionalist parties, such as the Schakel database, as well as broader databases which also include some regionalist

parties, such as the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Chesdata, 2019a). The database used in this chapter was the first which specifically included only cases of national independence parties. This is an important contribution due to the previously mentioned increase in the prominence of national independence parties. This database also makes an important contribution as it includes much smaller national independence parties which had previously been left out of other databases, including those of regionalist parties. Some parties included in this database, which had never been included in databases previously, were the Ålands Framtid and the English Democrats.

Each of the eight hypotheses tested in this analysis (see Table 7.1) makes an important contribution to the literature. The first two hypotheses relevant to unemployment, ***The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*** and ***The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis***, both contributed to previous discussions on the impact of economic conditions on the left-right ideology of political parties, both regionalist and statewide. Regarding statewide parties, there had previously been research which had found that in "prosperous countries people are more likely to support extreme rightwing parties," (Lubbers et al, 2002: 371), and that the losers of globalisation, i.e. those who are poorer, "have a higher likelihood to vote for LWPPs [left-wing populist parties]," (Santana & Rama, 2018: 569). Research on regionalist parties found that regionalist parties in comparatively poorer regions were more likely to be left-wing while regionalist parties in comparatively wealthier regions were more likely to be right-wing (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 874). The finding that higher levels of unemployment pushed national independence parties to more left-wing positions while lower levels pushed them to more right-wing positions contributed to this body of literature by showing that this relationship effects national independence parties specifically. Comparative unemployment was found to have more of an effect on left-right ideology than standard percentage unemployment. This finding also contributed to the literature by further supporting the internal colonialist (Hechter, 1975) and bourgeois regionalist (Harvie, 1994) arguments, which placed a strong emphasis on the importance of a region's economic performance in relation to its parent country when discussing the ideology of regionalist parties. ***The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis*** was based on the body of

literature which discusses the possibility of a link between an increase in radical right-wing politics and higher levels of unemployment (e.g. Jackman & Volpert, 1996; Vlandas & Halikiopoulou, 2019). The fact that this analysis found no relationship between mainstream-radical ideology and unemployment still makes an important contribution to the literature. This finding highlights the fact that when looking at the relationship between economic conditions and the ideology of national independence parties, the focus should be on the traditional left-right ideology of these parties rather than on the parties' mainstream-radical ideology.

The testing of *The Monarchy Hypothesis* was based on a perceived historic divide between conservatism and socialism on attitudes towards monarchy. This included evidence which found that larger levels of support for monarchy can be found amongst more conservative voters (e.g. Rose & Kavanagh, 1976: 555). The inclusion of monarchy in this thesis makes an important contribution to the broader literature on western democratic states. This is because the level of academic study of the monarchy in this context is extremely lacking (Von Daniels, 2018: 456). This is also the case in the research on regionalist and national independence parties. The lack of previous research on monarchy in relation to national independence parties was particularly surprising because of the large number of high profile cases which are active within monarchies, for example, Catalonia and Scotland. It is also an important issue to discuss from a nation building perspective. Given these parties seek to create a new nation, the question of who will be the head of state of this nation is an important one. Therefore, this made the finding which supported *The Monarchy Hypothesis* an especially important contribution to the literature.

The Military Expenditure Hypothesis was based on the argument that right-wing parties traditionally favour increases in military spending while left-wing parties favour promoting peace and increasing spending in other areas of social welfare (Klingemann et al, 1994; Bove et al, 2017). The testing of this hypothesis made a contribution to the literature as there had been a lack of discussion regarding the impact of militarism on the ideology of national independence parties, and even regionalist parties. In

the sphere of regionalist research, there has only ever been work on militarism which has focused on the issue in relation to specific cases, such as Scotland (e.g. Ritchie, 2016). This is surprising given that militarism and defence are important issues when considering the establishment of a new independent nation and, therefore, will be of importance to national independence parties. The importance of this topic, as well as its underdiscussed nature, made the findings on militarism in this thesis an especially important contribution to the literature.

The decision to analyse distinct regional languages was based on the large body of literature which emphasised the importance of language for many national independence and sub-national movements (e.g. Gourevitch, 1979; Sorens, 2005; van Morgan, 2006). *The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis* was based on previous research which had found radical right-wing parties placed a strong emphasis on language protection (e.g. Pfalzgraf, 2003) and the research which found ethnic protectionist elements within certain cases of left-wing nationalist movements (Jeram et al, 2016: 1232). This led to the hypothesis that being in a region with a majority-spoken distinct language would push its national independence parties to more radical positions because of a need to protect an important element of their distinct national culture. However, this was not the case. It was found to be the opposite, with regions with no distinct language having the most radical national independence parties while those with a majority-spoken distinct language had the most mainstream. This finding is an important contribution to the literature as it adds to a fascinating discussion into how language has an impact on the ideology of national independence parties. This is an area of the discussion which had previously been underdiscussed within the literature on language and sub-nationalist movements.

The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis was based on previous research which found that regionalist parties would actively look for an ideological "free space" in order to appear distinct from other regionalist parties (Massetti & Schakel, 2015: 871). It was found that national independence parties behave in the same way, moving to more radical positions if faced with a mainstream independentist

rival. This finding has made a contribution to the current literature on party competition by showing in more detail how national independence parties compete with each other.

Two hypotheses were tested in relation to levels of immigration, *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis* and *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*. There was no relationship found between left-right ideology and levels of immigration. However, this research did find a relationship between levels of immigration and ideological radicalism, supporting *The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis*. This finding has made an interesting contribution to previous literature which has found nationalist elements within radical left-wing parties as well as radical right-wing parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al, 2012).

Ideological Variation in Pairs of Case Studies

The analysis of pairs of nested cases made some additional contributions to the current literature. The analysis of both the Faroe Islands and Greenland and Flanders and Quebec found that economic conditions were responsible for the ideological divisions which were being explored in each pair. This finding contributed to the current literature by further emphasising the importance of relative economic conditions on the ideology of national independence parties. This further adds to the previous body of literature on left-right ideology and economic conditions. This finding adds to the research conducted in Chapter Four by further highlighting the mechanisms behind why economic conditions impact the left-right ideology of the national independence parties active in these cases.

The analysis of the Basque Country and Catalonia found that language played an important role in the large proportion of radical parties in the Basque Country. This finding made a large contribution to the current literature by further adding to an underdiscussed part of this area of study, the impact of language on the level of left-right radicalism in national independence parties. Furthermore, this finding made an additional contribution by looking deeper at the mechanism behind why this relationship exists. Finding that insecurity of national identity, in relation to the status of a national language, is a possible cause of left-right radicalism in national independence parties is a significant

contribution to the literature in this area. The analysis of Scotland and Wales finds that increased levels of competition between national independence parties in Scotland is the reason for why it has a higher proportion of radical national independence parties than Wales. This analysis makes a further contribution to the current literature by highlighting the importance of competition in influencing the ideological positioning of national independence parties. This analysis also makes an important contribution to the study of independence movements within the UK by highlighting and explaining an interesting different between the Scottish and Welsh independence movements, the fact that Scotland's pro-independence parties are ideologically more radical on the left-right spectrum.

Areas of Future Research

There are a wide variety of different areas of future research which could be explored based on the outcomes from this thesis. These areas include both the general concepts relevant to the ideology of separationist and regionalist parties but also each of the included independent variables. However, there are four areas in particular which should be explored further. First, the methodology used in this thesis could have been extended to cases of national independence parties outside of the time frame analysed in this thesis. This includes cases which were active before 2000, for example, the Vlaams Blok in the 1980s and 1990s and the Lega Nord in the 1990s. This also includes cases after 2020, for example, Catalonia and Scotland in 2021. Second, this methodology could be extended to additional secessionist parties which were not included in the scope of the study this thesis. This includes rattachist parties, such as those in Northern Ireland, and national independence parties from unrepresented overseas territories, such as those in Curaçao. Third, future research could continue to explore the findings relevant to regional languages and mainstream-radical ideology. This includes a more in depth look at the theory that national insecurity, caused by the status of a regional language, can lead to the radicalism of the left-right ideology of national independence parties. Finally, the relationship between the ideology of national independence parties and levels of immigration could

also be further analysed. This would both be from a left-right perspective and a mainstream-radical perspective.

Cases of National Independence Parties Pre-2000 and Post-2020

First, with additional time and resources, the methodology from Chapter Four of the thesis could be applied to a larger time period. This would have included more historic cases of Canadian and Western European national independence parties. As is shown in the Schakel database, there have been cases of national independence parties throughout the second half of the 20th Century. Two examples which were active for that entire period were the Bayernpartei and the SNP (Schakel, 2020). Some notable cases, which date back to the 60s and 70s include Tjóðveldi and Parti Québécois (Ibid.). The Vlaams Blok emerged and was consistently active in elections from the late 1970s onwards (Ibid.). Another high profile case which would be included by expanding the time period analysed would have been the Lega Nord in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the party was in favour of an independent Northern Italy, referred to as Padania (Giordano, 2001). It could also be beneficial to apply a qualitative methodological approach to these more historic cases. It could be beneficial to retrospectively explore some of these cases. Some of these cases could include those pro-independence projects which are now no longer active, such as Padania. An expanded time period could also include an analysis of the most recent cases of national independence parties from 2021 and 2022. This includes national independence parties who stood in the 2021 Scottish Parliament Election, the 2021 Greenlandic Inatsisartut Election and the 2022 Québécois National Assembly Election.

Other Cases of Secessionist Parties

It may also be beneficial to apply these research methods to other cases and types of secessionist parties. Broadly speaking, secessionist parties are those who seek to separate a territory from a larger state. As is discussed in the literature on these parties, along with national independence parties, the other notable type of secessionist parties are rattachist parties. These are parties who seek to separate their territory from a larger state and join a neighbouring state (Dandoy, 2010: 206). There are some

high profile examples of this type of party which could be included in a future study. The most notable

example, which is where the term originates, is the movement which seeks for the French-speaking

Belgian region of Wallonia to reunify with France (Dandoy: 213). Another notable example is the case

of Northern Ireland. Rattachist parties in Northern Ireland, better known as nationalist parties, are

those which seek to separate Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and join the neighbouring

Republic of Ireland. The two most notable of these parties are Sinn Fein and the Social Democratic

Party (SDLP) (Whiting, 2016: 550). Another type of secessionist party which was not included in this

study, but could be included in future studies, was national independence parties from overseas

territories which did not have representation in the parliament of their parent country. Being from a

region which had elected representation in the parliament of its parent country was one of the

inclusion criteria for this study, which meant a number of national independence parties from

overseas territories were not included. This included national independence parties from the Dutch

Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curaçao and St. Maarten (Sharpe, 2022).

Sub-National Languages and the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

There should be further research conducted into the finding from this thesis relating to minority

languages and radicalism, and the possibility this is caused by a feeling of insecurity within the national

identity of those in these radical national independence parties. In this thesis it was found that

national independence parties which were active in regions with a minority-spoken language or no

distinct language at all were more likely to be radical than national independence parties in regions

with a majority-spoken language. The case of England was raised as a possible example of this in

Chapter Four and the Basque Country was used as an example of this in Chapter Six.[15] Therefore,

future research should be conducted by looking further in detail at cases of national independence

parties which have a minority-spoken language, such as those in the Basque Country and in Wales, or

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[15] Additional evidence to support the feeling of insecurity around language in radical Basque national independence parties was provided in the analysis of EH Bildu in Appendix A.

no unique language at all, for example those in Alberta or in England. It might also be beneficial to expand this theory further by looking more generally at the relationship between cultural insecurity in nationalism and left-right ideological radicalism. There have been many examples within the literature of those who have argued that sub-nationalist parties (e.g. Jeram et al, 2016: 1238). Therefore, it makes sense to conduct further research on the links between language and national insecurity, amongst national independence parties, and then study how this could radicalise their ideology.

Immigration and the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties

Further research is required to explore the effects of immigration on the left-right ideology of national independence parties. Following this thesis this should be done from both a traditional left-right perspective as well as from a mainstream-radical perspective. The left-right perspective should be studied further due to the imperfect nature of the immigration variable used in Chapter Four. This is because of the strong body of literature which links right-wing politics with anti-immigrant sentiments (e.g. Diamond, 1996; Rydgren, 2008; van Heerden et al, 2014). Given the difficulties surrounding a quantitative approach, it could be more useful to apply a qualitative method which looks at how both left-wing and right-wing national independence parties approach immigration. One approach to this question could be through the study of election manifestos and party documents. This would then make it possible to directly look at how national independence parties approach immigration in relation to their positioning on the left-right spectrum. Given the finding from this thesis that higher levels of immigration did cause national independence parties to become more radical, the relationship between immigration and mainstream-radical ideology should also be studied further. This would be an important contribution to previous literature which has found nationalist characteristics within radical left-wing parties as well as radical right-wing parties (e.g. Halikiopoulou et al, 2012).

Concluding Remarks

Overall, I am confident that this thesis has successfully answered its research question: "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" This thesis, through a mixed methods approach, has made a strong case that a number of factors can strongly influence both the traditional left-right and also mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties. Comparatively poorer economic conditions, a monarchy as head of state and higher levels of military were found to cause national independence parties to be more left-wing. Competition from an ideologically mainstream independentist rival national independence party, higher levels of immigration and having no distinct language were found to cause national independence parties to become more radical.

I am confident that this research has made a strong contribution to the current literature which exists on both regionalist and nationalist parties. This thesis has added to the already strong literature on ideological variation in regionalist parties (e.g. Newman, 1997; Massetti, 2009; Massetti & Schakel, 2015; Massetti & Schakel, 2016; Szöcsik & Zuber, 2021). This thesis has added to this literature by focusing specifically on national independence parties which, given their own ideological distinctiveness, are worthy of such a study. This thesis has also looked at a number of variables which were previously underrepresented in the literature on regionalist parties, which I hope will be looked at further in future research, for example militarism and monarchy. While, like all research, these methods have some limitations, I am confident in the reliability of this work. I am also confident that this research will be extremely useful to all those who are interested in the ideology of national independence parties.

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Appendix A: Content Analysis of Party Manifestos

This Appendix further shows the ideological variation found between different national independence parties. Parties from Alberta and Quebec were used to emphasise variation that exists on policies related to the variables which were hypothesised to be relevant to the left-right axis. Parties from the Basque Country and Catalonia were used to emphasise the variation that exists on policies related to the variables which were hypothesised to be relevant to the mainstream-radical axis. This variation was highlighted through content analysis of party literature, mainly election manifestos, from the most significant national independence parties from each of the cases. The coding for the content analysis was based on the hypotheses outlined in the introduction of this thesis, with four codes relevant to the left-right hypotheses and four relevant to the mainstream-radical hypotheses.

Coding Schemes

When coding policy areas in order to study variation in policies relevant to left-right ideology, the four main categories were directly based on the four hypotheses relevant to the left-right ideology of national independence parties:

- Unemployment – *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis (H1)*

- Monarchy and Republic – *The Monarchy Hypothesis (H3)*

- Militarism – *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis (H4)*

- Immigration – *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis (H7)*

The first category, unemployment, was divided into four sub-categories. The decrease and high-levels sub-categories were selected on the basis that unemployment is something which all parties are naturally opposed to. Therefore, you would expect to find references, in the party literature, either promising to reduce unemployment or to state the level of unemployment is an issue. The independence sub-category was selected on the basis that if unemployment was an influence on the ideology of national independence parties, then it could be that unemployment is discussed by these

parties in the context of independence. An "other" sub-category category was also included in order to catch any additional references to unemployment which did not fit the first three sub-categories.

The monarchy and republic category was divided into six sub-categories. Monarchism and republicanism were separated due to the fact that they are separate, though related, political systems. The three sub-categories relating to monarchism and the three relating to republicanism were designed to be broad in nature. They simply separate references to monarchism and republicanism into positive, negative and neutral statements. This was done in order to separate parties who discussed each of the two concepts either in a negative or positive manner. The neutral sub-categories for both were then used to make sure all references to both systems were catalogued, including those which could not be considered either positive or negative.

The militarism category has been divided into five sub-categories. The first two sub-categories simply pick out if a national independence party is making references which are pro-militarist or pro-pacifist. This was designed to clearly point out ideological differences between different parties. However, other more specific sub-categories have also been included. These are references to NATO and references to nuclear weapons. These two topics have been chosen as additional sub-categories due to the fact that they are frequently discussed as key issues in literature on western militarism (e.g. Hoffmann, 1981). There have also been cases where both NATO and nuclear weapons have acted as topics which have caused political division between the left and the right. For example, this occurred with the issue of NATO membership in Spain (Carothers, 1981) and with nuclear weapons in Scotland (Ritchie, 2016). A fifth "other" sub-category was included to take into account any references to militarism which did not fit into the four other sub-categories.

The final left-right category, immigration, was divided into three sub-categories, positive, negative and neutral. The positive and negative sub-categories were designed to show ideological differences over the issue of immigration. It was expected that these divides would be closely linked to parties'

positions on the left-right spectrum. The neutral sub-category was included in order to be able to categorise any references to immigration which could not be considered positive or negative.

Table A.1 – Left-Right Ideology Coding Scheme

Category	Sub-category	Description	Example
Unemployment	Unemployment (decrease)	Commitments to decreasing unemployment (includes commitments to increase employment in general or in specific sectors).	"Create an Alberta Labour Corps to provide work opportunities for unemployed Albertans," (Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta, 2021: 19).
	Unemployment (independence)	References to unemployment in the context of independence	"In a very concrete way, the fluctuations of the Canadian dollar … stifled our manufacturing industry, which saw the workforce decrease by 160,000," (Parti Québécois, 2017: 37).
	Unemployment (high levels)	References to the level of unemployment being too high	"The examples of massive layoffs are too numerous and frequent," (Québec Solidaire, 2018a: 34).
	Unemployment (other)	Other references relating to unemployment which are not relevant to the other categories	"For anyone without a job or with insufficient income, the state will provide a guaranteed and unconditional minimum income," (Québec Solidaire, 2018a: 32).
Monarchy and Republic	Monarchism (positive)	Positive references to monarchy	N/A
	Monarchism (negative)	Negative references to monarchy	"Refuse to continue to finance the post of lieutenant-governor of Quebec, which represents a backward-looking and costly monarchical relic," (Parti Québécois, 2017: 9).
	Monarchism (neutral)	Neutral references to monarchy	N/A
	Republicanism (positive)	Positive references to republicanism (includes references to a presidential head of state)	"Québec solidaire defends a set of major republican principles allowing the expression of popular sovereignty," (Québec Solidaire, 2018a: 55).

	Republicanism (negative)	Negative references to republicanism (includes references to a presidential head of state)	N/A
	Republicanism (neutral)	Neutral references to republicanism (includes references to a presidential head of state)	"A trial for the suspended justice shall be presided over by the President," (Alberta Independence Party, 2021: 40).
Militarism	NATO	References to NATO (includes discussions of potential NATO membership)	"Maintain or redefine existing relationships, treaties and security relationships with the USA and other NATO nations," (Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta: 6).
	Nuclear Weapons	References to nuclear weapons	"Will support the massive reduction of military budgets and the dismantling of the entire nuclear arsenal," (Québec Solidaire, 2018a: 73).
	Promotion of Pacifism	References to encouraging peace or pacifism in regards to international affairs (includes promotion of anti-militarism and decreasing military spending)	"Create an international solidarity agency to promote peace, human rights, just and ecological development, and equality between men and women," (Québec Solidaire, 2018b: 37).
	Promotion of Militarism	References to encouraging increased militarism or military capacity in regards to international affairs (includes promotion of increasing military spending and militarised defence capabilities)	"Ensure a capable and effective military," (Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta: 22).
	Militarism (other)	Other references relating to military issues which are not relevant to the other categories	"After separation, we will create the Alberta National Defense Service (ANDS), which shall serve as our military," (Alberta Independence Party: 59).

Immigration	Immigration (positive)	Positive references to immigration (includes discussing the positives of immigration, being welcoming to immigration, highlighting discrimination against immigrants and policies committed to assisting integration of immigrants)	"Quebec is the nation where a plurality of people can collectively flourish, regardless of their place of birth," (Parti Québécois, 2018: 16).
	Immigration (negative)	Negative references to immigration (includes discussing possible negatives of immigration, threats to cultural distinctiveness, policies to reduce immigration and policies which restrict the entry criteria of immigration, such as language and skill requirements)	"During the transition period, no new Albertan residencies will be recognized," (Alberta Independence Party: 48).
	Immigration (neutral)	Neutral statements referencing immigration	"When it comes to immigration, we must be the sole managers of our borders and the criteria to be met in order to settle in Quebec," (Parti Québécois, 2018: 18).

When creating a coding scheme relevant to the key issues related to mainstream-radical ideology, the four main categories were based on the four hypotheses which directly related to the possible influences on the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties:

- Unemployment – ***The Mainstream-Radical Unemployment Hypothesis (H2)***

- Language – ***The Mainstream-Radical Language Hypothesis (H5)***

- Rival National Independence Parties – ***The Ideological Distinction Hypothesis (H6)***

- Immigration – ***The Mainstream-Radical Immigration Hypothesis (H8)***

The unemployment category is coded in the same way for this analysis as it was in the analysis which focused on left-right ideology. Therefore, this analysis used the same four sub-categories, decreasing

unemployment, high levels of unemployment, unemployment in the context of independence and then all other references to unemployment.

The language category also was coded with four sub-categories. The first three of these categories relate to possible types of policy regarding a region's own distinct language. It is possible that a national independence party may wish to protect its own language, promote its own language or feel like its language is threatened by the central state. Language protection and promotion are seen in many language policies from regionalist parties, such as those in Catalonia and the Basque Country (Carlin, 2013: 74). It has also been seen in sub-state nations, for example the Basque Country, that groups can feel like they their own distinct language is threatened by the central state (Jeram, 2013: 1771). An "other" sub-category was also included for language in order to catalogue references to language which did not fit in any of the three other sub-categories.

The rival national independence parties category looked to determine how national independence parties referred to other national independence parties which they were competing with in elections. This category was divided into four sub-categories. The first two simply separate references to a rival national independence party which were either positive or negative. The third then looks at if the national independence parties made any references which labelled themselves as an alternative to another national independence party. This was included due to the literature which finds that regionalist parties sometimes change their ideological position to seem distinct, and look like a real alternative, to their independentist rival (Massetti and Schakel, 2015: 871). An "other" sub-category was also included in order to catalogue references to rival national independence parties that did not fit in any of the three other sub-categories.

The final category, immigration, was coded the same way in this analysis as it was for the analysis of left-right ideology. References to immigration were divided into the same three sub-categories, in order to pick out positive, negative and neutral references.

Category	Sub-category	Description	Example
Unemployment	Unemployment (decrease)	Commitments to decreasing unemployment (includes commitments to increase employment in general or in specific sectors)	"The time has come to develop an Extraordinary Employment and Economic Stimulus Program to help us rise again. The President, Iñigo Urkullu, has proposed a 2020-2024 Employment and Economic Reactivation Strategy," (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea, 2020: 8).
	Unemployment (independence)	References to unemployment in the context of independence	"Catalonia has a GDP per capita 12% higher than the European average, but it is part of the European State that has more unemployment, already higher than that of Greece, while half of the countries are below 7%, an achievable goal to achieve in the next 5 years," (Junts per Catalunya, 2021: 170).
	Unemployment (high levels)	References to the level of unemployment being too high	"The crisis generated by COVID-19 has had and will have serious consequences for employment and companies. Unemployment has increased considerably in recent months," (EH Bildu, 2020: 6).
	Unemployment (other)	Other references relating to unemployment which are not relevant to the other categories	"Collect official data and prepare the necessary indicators for knowledge of the state of the population that is racialized in different areas (health, education, employment, social participation, etc)," (Candidatura d'Unitat Popular, 2021: 20).
Language	Language (protection)	References which discuss the protection of the region's relevant language(s). Includes references to protecting the rights of specific individuals and references to protecting the language more generally.	"Preserve Catalan as the language of education in Catalonia, as well as Occitan in Aran," (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, 2021: 79).

	Language (promotion)	References to language which promote increasing the use of the region's relevant language(s)	Education must rethink its principles, methodology and contents, pivoting on the Basque language and culture, as a sign of its own identity, which must be the basis of learning and which contributes to linguistic normalization," (Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea: 131).
	Language (threatened)	References which discuss a threat to the region's relevant language (includes references to the language being a minority language(s))	"But the languages in the Basque Country do not have the same status … Basque continues to be a minority language in decline in an increasingly complex and globalized society in permanent interaction with the languages of the centralist states," (EH Bildu: 98).
	Language (other)	Other references to the region's relevant language(s) which are not relevant to the other sub-categories	"Culture and language are shaping elements of identity and nation," (Junts per Catalunya: 27).
Immigration	Immigration (positive)	Positive references to immigration (includes discussing the positives of immigration, being welcoming to immigration, highlighting discrimination against immigrants and policies committed to assisting integration of immigrants)	"A republic committed to the right to asylum and international protection of persons persecuted on the grounds of ethnicity, language, political opinion, belief or any other violation of human rights," (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya: 65).
	Immigration (negative)	Negative references to immigration (includes discussing possible negatives of immigration, threats to cultural distinctiveness, policies to reduce immigration and policies which restrict the entry criteria of immigration, such as language and skill requirements)	"Priority will be given to regular and legal entry of people," (Junts per Catalunya: 47).

	Immigration (neutral)	Neutral statements referencing immigration	"Part of the reduction in the unemployment rate from 2013 to 2019 can be explained by the fact that the active population is declining," (Candidatura d'Unitat: 61).
Rival national independence parties	Rival national independence parties (positive)	Positive references to an alternative national independence party (includes references to the government if the rival national independence party was a party in said government)	"Weave alliances to advance the Government of the Generalitat," (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya: 185).
	Rival national independence parties (negative)	Negative references to an alternative national independence party (includes references to the government if the rival national independence party was a party in said government)	"Every year thousands of stores were closed due, fundamentally, to the loss of purchasing power of the working sectors and the proliferation of supermarkets, promoted without modesty by the PNV," (EH Bildu: 39).
	Rival national independence parties (alternative)	References where a party described itself as an alternative to a rival national independence party	This country needs a new boost … With humility and effort, from honesty, we are committed to building an alternative based on these parameters," (EH Bildu: 3).
	Rival national independence parties (neutral)	Neutral references to an alternative national independence party (includes references to the government if the rival national independence party was a party in said government)	Require the Government of the Generalitat de Catalunya to implement the agreements of Motion 55 / XI … a motion approved by the Parliament of Catalonia on July 14, 2016," (Candidatura d'Unitat: 106).

<u>Differences in Policies Relevant to Left-Right Ideology: Alberta and Quebec</u>

This section analyses the ideological divides between national independence parties in Alberta and

Quebec. The focus of this section is on the divides on policies which are relevant to the left-right

ideological variance found in national independence parties. This section runs content analysis on

party literature from Albertan and Québécois national independence parties (see Table A.3), exploring

policy differences between the two. This section analyses two Québécois parties, the Parti Québécois and Québec Solidaire, and two Albertan parties, the Alberta Independence Party (AIP) and the Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta (WIPA). These four parties emphasise the ideological divide between Albertan and Québécois national independence parties. This is because the AIP and WIPA are both right-wing parties while the Parti Québécois and Québec Solidaire are both left-wing.

Table A.3 – Analysed Documents

Party Name	Document Type	Document Name[16]	Year of Publication	Original Language	Word Count
Alberta Independence Party	Party Program	*The Independence Party: Party Program*	2021	English	12373
Parti Québécois	Party Program	*The Parti Québécois Program: A Solid Plan. Zero Slogan.*	2017	French	35319
Parti Québécois	Québécois Election Manifesto	*A Strong State at the Service of People.*	2018	French	4784
Québec Solidaire	Party Program	*Québec Solidarity Policy Program.*	2018	French	39486
Québec Solidaire	Québécois Election Manifesto	*2018 Platform*	2018	French	9261
Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta	Party Program	*Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta: Policy and Governance*	2021	English	6252

Unemployment

This section discusses how national independence parties from Alberta and Quebec address the issue of unemployment. These findings are clearly laid out below in Table A.4. Interestingly, there are a large number of similarities between how the parties from the two provinces reference unemployment. The majority of references from both the Albertan and Québécois parties are related to decreasing unemployment. Both the Québécois and Albertan parties also make a smaller number of references

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[16] In the case of the Québécois parties, the document names have been translated into English (the original French translations can be found in the references list).

to unemployment being too high. However, one difference between the two is that neither of the Albertan parties refers to unemployment in the context of independence, while one of the Québécois parties, the Parti Québécois, does.

Table A.4 – Detailed Results: Unemployment

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
Alberta Independence Party	2021 Party Program	Unemployment (decrease)	2
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (high levels)	0
		Unemployment (other)	4
Parti Québécois	2017 Party Program	Unemployment (decrease)	5
		Unemployment (independence)	3
		Unemployment (high levels)	2
		Unemployment (other)	9
Parti Québécois	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	3
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (high levels)	0
		Unemployment (other)	0
Québec Solidaire	2018 Party Program	Unemployment (decrease)	23
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (high levels)	1
		Unemployment (other)	12
Québec Solidaire	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	6
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (high levels)	0
		Unemployment (other)	0
Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta	2021 Party Program	Unemployment (decrease)	6
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (high levels)	2
		Unemployment (other)	1

Between the two Albertan parties, the issue of unemployment is discussed more by the WIPA than by the AIP. The WIPA program includes a number of references to policies aimed at reducing unemployment, including creating "an Alberta Labour Corps to provide work opportunities for unemployed Albertans" with the receival of unemployment benefits being conditioned on enrolment in the Corps (p. 19). The AIP has a similar policy in its program, arguing that those who receive worker assistant benefits, and are physically and mentally healthy, "will be required to work at an assigned job, participate in community projects or be enrolled in approved training programs," (p. 8). Despite the increase in unemployment, only the WIPA makes references to unemployment being too high, arguing that Alberta must become "the lowest taxed jurisdiction in North America" in order to bring "investment, job creation, as well as prosperity back to Alberta," (p. 17).

Another interesting finding was that Albertan national independence parties did not make reference to unemployment in the context of the issue of independence. What is interesting in the Albertan cases is the fact that the parties do not discuss economic policy in the context of independence much at all. Instead, discussions around independence are far more focused on broader political and philosophical matters while economic issues are very much kept to themselves, with both parties discussing a number of issues around taxation and levels of government intervention in different economic sectors. That does not mean there are no references to economics in the context of independence. For example, the AIP argue the following:

> "i. We believe that Alberta is politically, socially, and economically incompatible with Canadian systems and power structures.

> ii. We believe history has definitively proven that any sort of union with Canada, even if constitutional changes take place, will result in the continued political, social, and economic exploitation and continued colonization of Albertans," (p. 53).

Overall, this suggests that Albertan national independence parties do not consider unemployment a key factor in their independentist ideology.

Like their Albertan counterparts, the majority of references to unemployment by the Québécois parties are references related to reducing unemployment. Both the Parti Québécois and Québec Solidaire make commitments to reduce unemployment in a number of different sectors. For example, in its 2017 program, the Parti Québécois commits to give regional economies the tools to support more localised job creation (p. 44). Both parties also make a small number of references to unemployment being too high. For example, Québec Solidaire criticises large layoffs, arguing they "are too numerous and frequent" and commits to intervene when such events arise (2018a: 34). Like its Albertan counterparts, Québec Solidaire does not refer to unemployment specifically in the context of independence. That being said, the party does also make a clear argument for the benefits of economic freedom which they believe independence could bring. The party argues:

> "Truly achieving independence is not, however, limited to merely gaining political sovereignty. By having full control over all its economic policies, i.e. budgetary, fiscal, commercial, monetary and customs policies, a sovereign Quebec will have the powers required to implement a project for an egalitarian, feminist, ecological and united society. He will be able to refuse economic domination and the plundering of natural resources," (2018a: 83).

However, the Parti Québécois does make a small number of references to unemployment in the context of independence in its 2017 program. For example, the party argues that "despite the pitfalls imposed by the federal government, Quebec has developed original instruments … which can be mobilized to support our job creators," (p. 25). This quote suggests that the Parti Québécois takes the view that Quebec is better suited to reduce its own unemployment itself, rather than it being done by a less effective Canadian federal state.

Overall, there are a number of similarities between how national independence parties from Alberta and Quebec reference unemployment. Both the Albertan and Québécois national independence parties mostly make references about decreasing unemployment. Both national independence parties from Alberta and Quebec also make a smaller number of references about unemployment being too

high. One interesting difference between the two cases is that the Québécois parties seem more willing to discuss economic issues, including unemployment, in the context of independence more than their Albertan counterparts. The similar approaches of the four parties to unemployment is especially interesting given the clear left-right ideological divide that exists between the two cases.

Monarchism and Republicanism

Given the ideological positionings of these parties, based on **The Monarchy Hypothesis**, you would expect to find the Québécois parties referencing anti-monarchist and pro-republican sentiments more than their Albertan counterparts. Interestingly, as can be seen in Table A.5, both positive and neutral references to republicanism were found from both of the Québécois parties but only one of the Albertan parties, the AIP. There was also a single anti-monarchist reference which came from the Parti Québécois (2017: 9). The factors outlined above would suggest that the issues of monarchism and republicanism are more significant for the left-leaning Québécois national independence parties than the right-leaning Albertan national independence parties, supporting **The Monarchy Hypothesis**.

In the case of Alberta, the issue of the head of state is briefly addressed by one of its national independence parties, the AIP, but is not discussed by the other, the WIPA. The AIP makes two references to the issue, both discussing the concept of republicanism. The party clearly lays out a positive position regarding republicanism, arguing that a newly independent Alberta should have an elected President "who shall serve as head of state and head of government, and who shall be the Chief Executive Officer of Alberta," (p. 60). As previously mentioned, the WIPA makes no references to either monarchism or republicanism. However, the WIPA does place a strong emphasis on general democratic principles. For example, in its program the party campaigns to "give voters the right to recall their elected representatives" and "empower citizens to initiate referenda," (p. 11). Overall, the comparison between the AIP and WIPA is an interesting one. You have two right-wing Albertan national independence parties but only one discusses the issue of the head of state.

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
Alberta Independence Party	2021 Party Program	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	0
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	1
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	1
Parti Québécois	2017 Party Program	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	1
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	4
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	3
Parti Québécois	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	0
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	0
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	0
Québec Solidaire	2018 Party Program	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	0
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	1
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	1
Québec Solidaire	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	0
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	0
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	0
Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta	2021 Party Program	Monarchism (positive)	0
		Monarchism (negative)	0
		Monarchism (neutral)	0
		Republicanism (positive)	0
		Republicanism (negative)	0
		Republicanism (neutral)	0

Due to both being left-leaning, it was expected that Quebec's two national independence parties would have pro-republican and anti-monarchist references in their literature. Québec Solidaire references republicanism in a positive manner, briefly outlining how it perceives a Québécois republic should look, arguing:

> "Québec solidaire defends a set of major republican principles allowing the expression of popular sovereignty … These constitutional principles will address the charters of social and individual rights as well as the organizational methods of political institutions, the type of secularism desired, citizen and participatory democracy, the privileged model of inclusion, the importance of public goods and decentralization of powers. The republic that Québec solidaire defends will be the depository of the general interest and will be based on a democracy that rejects any form of concentration of power, emptying popular sovereignty of its substance," (2018a: 55).

Interestingly, the issues of monarchism and republicanism are discussed more by the Parti Québécois. The party's program contained the only anti-monarchist reference found in any of the party literature analysed from these cases, with the party stating it would "refuse to continue to finance the post of lieutenant-governor of Quebec, which represents a backward-looking and costly monarchical relic rejected by several political parties in Quebec," (2017: 9). This reference both criticises the monarchy itself, describing it as a "relic" but also rejects the roll of the lieutenant-governor, whose job is to represent the monarchy at the provincial level (Government of Canada, 2020). The Parti Québécois does also make a number of positive references to republican principles. For example, it clearly states in its program that "the Parti Québécois's political objectives are to lead the people of Quebec to their full and entire freedom through independence and the founding of the Republic of Quebec," (2017: 8).

Based on this analysis, the issues of monarchism and republicanism appear to be more important to Québécois national independence parties than to those from Alberta. This makes sense given the

more left-wing ideological positioning of the Québécois parties and the evidence found in Chapter Five which supported *The Monarchy Hypothesis*.

Militarism

Given ***The Military Expenditure Hypothesis***, it is unsurprising that there was a clear ideological divide found between the Albertan and Québécois cases. Overall the Albertan parties were ideologically more militaristic than the Québécois parties, who placed a larger emphasis on pacifism (see Table A.6). However, there were also some interesting differences found within both cases between their different parties.

Looking at Alberta, there is a clear pro-militarist element in the literature of both the AIP and WIPA. For example, the AIP places an importance on its military, arguing that it "should serve as a strong deterrent to prevent foreign invasions" and that it should be used "to protect Albertans abroad, such as in the case of hostage situations or piracy," (p. 67). The WIPA holds a similar position, arguing that "all citizens have the right to live free in a civil society that recognizes the supremacy of God and the rule of law, underpinned by justice, police, and military protection," (p. 5), and favours ensuring that Alberta has "a capable and effective military," (p. 22). Both parties also are in favour of military cooperation with other countries. For example, the WIPA argues that Alberta should "develop a strategic military and economic alliance with the United States and other nations" and should also "maintain or redefine existing relationships, treaties and security relationships with the USA and other NATO nations," (p. 6). The AIP argues that if it were in government then an independent Alberta would create alliances with other countries but only those "considered trustworthy, which have consistently shown respect for Alberta's national sovereignty and customs for a suitable period," (pp. 58-59). The AIP also states Alberta should intervene in foreign military conflicts if one of its allies is threatened (p. 67).

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
Alberta Independence Party	2021 Party Program	NATO	0
		Nuclear Weapons	2
		Promotion of Pacifism	3
		Promotion of Militarism	5
		Militarism (other)	3
Parti Québécois	2017 Party Program	NATO	1
		Nuclear Weapons	0
		Promotion of Pacifism	3
		Promotion of Militarism	0
		Militarism (other)	6
Parti Québécois	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	NATO	0
		Nuclear Weapons	0
		Promotion of Pacifism	0
		Promotion of Militarism	0
		Militarism (other)	0
Québec Solidaire	2018 Party Program	NATO	1
		Nuclear Weapons	1
		Promotion of Pacifism	31
		Promotion of Militarism	0
		Militarism (other)	2
Québec Solidaire	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	NATO	0
		Nuclear Weapons	0
		Promotion of Pacifism	8
		Promotion of Militarism	0
		Militarism (other)	0
Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta	2021 Party Program	NATO	1
		Nuclear Weapons	0
		Promotion of Pacifism	0
		Promotion of Militarism	4
		Militarism (other)	3

However, one interesting difference between the two cases is the fact that the AIP does also place an emphasis on the importance of noninterventionism. The AIP argues that "Alberta should take a noninterventionist policy internationally, out of respect for other nations" and that "direct

intervention in the affairs of other nations is unethical," (p. 57). This is a view unique to the AIP and not expressed in the literature of the WIPA. That being said, the AIP is not completely anti-interventionist and is still a broadly pro-militaristic party, arguing that it would be willing to intervene in foreign conflicts in the event that an ally of Alberta, or Alberta itself, was threatened (p. 67). Another difference between the two parties, which further emphasises the fact that the AIP is still a pro-militarist party, is their respective approaches to nuclear weapons. The AIP argues that it would be willing to use nuclear weapons, as part of its defence, in extreme circumstances, claiming "that nuclear weapons, if obtained, should only be used as retaliation for an attempted nuclear strike on Alberta, and will thus uphold a strict "no first use" policy," (Ibid.). In contrast, the WIPA does not mention nuclear weapons at all in its policy program. Overall, it is clear there is a pro-militaristic element within the ideology of both the AIP and WIPA. This fits the broader right-wing ideological positioning of both these parties.

In contrast, both Québécois national independence parties place an emphasis on the importance of pacifism. For example, the Parti Québécois makes the argument that Quebec should prioritise "missions of peacekeeping and aid to civilian populations in distress," (2017: 127). However, while both parties are in favour of emphasising peace in their references on militarism, pacifism and peace are topics mentioned far more by Québec Solidaire than by the Parti Québécois. Québec Solidaire argues that Quebec should "reject all Canadian and foreign militarist policies," (2018b: 37). The party goes further, supporting a number of additional policies which actively promote pacifism. These policies include supporting "collaboration with pacifist movements around the world" and supporting "the massive reduction of military budgets and the dismantling of the entire nuclear arsenal," (2018a: 73).

There are also a number of other differences between the two parties' approaches to militarism. One significant difference is their views on NATO. The Parti Québécois supports an independent Quebec joining NATO (2017: 126). However, Québec Solidaire argues that the whole of Canada should leave

the alliance "immediately," (2018a: 73). Another noteworthy difference is the fact that the Parti Québécois favours an independent Quebec having a traditional Ministry of Defence (2017: 127). In contrast, Québec Solidaire favours an independent Quebec having an alternative "Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Solidarity and Peace," (2018a: 74). This difference in approaches further emphasises that Québec Solidaire places more of an emphasis on pacifism and anti-militarism than the Parti Québécois. Given that Québec Solidaire is the more left-wing of the two parties, the fact it places more emphasis on peace supports the theory that there is a link between left-right ideological positioning and an ideological support for militarism or pacifism.

It is clear that there is an ideological division in how Albertan and Québécois national independence parties approach issues surrounding militarism. The right-wing parties in Alberta placed a far stronger emphasis on having a strong military and defence. That being said, there was also an interesting divide between the two Albertan parties. The AIP referenced the importance that non-intervention can play in military conflicts, something not referenced by the WIPA. On the other hand, the left-wing parties in Quebec placed a stronger emphasis on pacifism. Interestingly, the Quebec case, in its own right, offers further support of an ideological divide over militarism. There are some clear differences between the approach of the radical left-wing Québec Solidaire and the more mainstream Parti Québécois. While both parties promote pacifism in their literature, it is done far more by Québec Solidaire. Overall, the cases of Alberta and Quebec do offer clear evidence of a left-right ideological divide over the issue of militarism.

Immigration

As we can see in Table A.7, there is a clear ideological divide on immigration between the left-leaning Québécois parties and the right-leaning Albertan parties. The two Québécois parties are generally more positive towards immigration while the two Albertan parties are more negative. There are also some interesting differences within both cases. In Alberta, the AIP is more negative towards

immigration than the WIPA and, in Quebec, Québec Solidaire is more positive than the Parti Québécois.

<p align="center">**Table A.7 –** Detailed Results: Immigration</p>

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
Alberta Independence Party	2021 Party Program	Immigration (positive)	0
		Immigration (negative)	15
		Immigration (neutral)	3
Parti Québécois	2017 Party Program	Immigration (positive)	21
		Immigration (negative)	6
		Immigration (neutral)	18
Parti Québécois	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Immigration (positive)	5
		Immigration (negative)	1
		Immigration (neutral)	3
Québec Solidaire	2018 Party Program	Immigration (positive)	34
		Immigration (negative)	1
		Immigration (neutral)	5
Québec Solidaire	2018 Québécois Election Manifesto	Immigration (positive)	17
		Immigration (negative)	0
		Immigration (neutral)	0
Wildrose Independence Party of Alberta	2021 Party Program	Immigration (positive)	2
		Immigration (negative)	4
		Immigration (neutral)	5

In Alberta, both the AIP and WIPA make more negative references to immigration than positive references. Both parties reference the importance of immigrants understanding, what they consider to be, the values of Alberta. The WIPA argues that immigrants who come to Alberta must "understand their obligation to respect our value system, constitution, and laws," (p. 23), while the AIP states that immigrants must "complement the culture, social fabric, and industries of Alberta," (p. 48). This more protectionist approach to immigration, which emphasises the importance of the protection of local values, is unsurprising given the right-wing ideological positioning of both parties.

However, there are also some differences between the two parties. The first is that the AIP makes a larger number of negative references regarding immigration than the WIPA. For example, the AIP specifically campaigns on a number of additional policies regarding immigration, not included in the program of the WIPA, such as introducing "measures to prevent "birth tourism"," (p. 50). Another interesting difference is the language used by both parties when discussing protection of borders. The WIPA states it will "ensure that Alberta's borders are effectively protected," (p. 22). In contrast, the AIP argues it "will strive to ensure that illegal aliens who trespass on Albertan soil are deported immediately, irrespective of circumstances" and will "secure" Alberta's borders "diligently," (p. 50). While both parties support strong border controls, the AIP uses far more emotive language when discussing the issue. This is most clear by how the party refers to undocumented immigrants as "aliens", something not done by the WIPA. Another difference is the WIPA does also make some positive references to immigration. The party claims it is in favour of "work-sponsored immigration," (p. 19), and supports a review into "Alberta's recognition of the qualifications of migrants to speed up their integration into the workforce, and society at large," (p. 23). Overall, it appears the AIP takes a more radical approach to immigration than the WIPA.

National independence parties in Quebec are generally positive towards immigration. Following the logic of *The Left-Right Immigration Hypothesis*, this is unsurprising given the left-leaning ideological positions of the two parties being analysed. The Parti Québécois puts forward an emotional and historic case for Quebec being a welcoming place for migration, arguing that "Quebec has been a welcoming land since its inception, where people from all corners of the planet live in harmony" as well as that "Quebec is the nation where a plurality of people can collectively flourish, regardless of their place of birth," (2018: 16). Québec Solidaire holds similar sentiments arguing that Quebec has "been enriched, and for a long time, by the contribution of people belonging to different communities with an immigrant background," (2018a: 8). The fact that both the Parti Québécois and Québec Solidaire are generally in favour of immigration, especially compared to their right-wing Albertan

counterparts, shows that immigration is an issue which divides national independence parties on the left-right spectrum.

However, while both parties are generally positive towards immigration, there are also some importance differences between the two. First, Québec Solidaire makes more positive references to immigration than the Parti Québécois. Québec Solidaire focuses on a number of additional policies which they argue support immigrants, which are not referenced by the Parti Québécois. One such example is specifically campaigning to support female immigrants, (2018a: 64).

Another interesting difference between the two parties is the fact that a notable minority of negative references to immigration were found in the literature of the Parti Québécois while just a single reference was found in the literature of Québec Solidaire. While the Parti Québécois is generally still positive about immigration, it does emphasise the importance of protecting the French language, arguing that immigrants must have "an intermediate knowledge of French before their arrival in Quebec," (2018: 16). The party states it will "make all immigrants aware of the civic duty of francization," (2017: 73), and even promises to offer support to specifically French-speaking students from other countries to come and study and then stay permanently in Quebec, (2017: 74). That being said, while Québec Solidaire does not make nearly as many negative references towards immigration, the issue of language still matters to them, arguing that "in the long term, the defence of the French language in Quebec society implies a real integration of the immigrant population," (2018a: 81). Given the fact that the Parti Québécois is more centrist than Québec Solidaire, it makes sense that it would be less positive towards immigration than its more left-wing counterpart. This provides further evidence of a left-right divide between national independence parties on the issue on immigration.

There is a clear ideological divide between Albertan and Québécois national independence parties on the issue of immigration. The left-leaning Québécois parties are generally more positive towards immigration while the right-leaning Albertan parties are more negative. It is also interesting that there are examples of national independence parties who are more overwhelmingly in favour of one

approach towards immigration while there are others who are more mixed. In Alberta, the AIP strongly favours the protectionist approach while the WIPA still leans more towards it but also does show some signs of being open to immigration in some circumstances. In Quebec, Québec Solidaire is strongly positive towards immigration while the Parti Québécois in general does also reference immigration in a positive manner but also does emphasise the importance of still protecting the French language.

<u>The Mainstream-Radical Divide: The Basque Country and Catalonia</u>

This section analyses the ideological divide between national independence parties in the Basque Country and Catalonia, focusing on the issues most relevant to the mainstream-radical ideology of national independence parties.

Table A.8 – Analysed Documents

Party Name	Document Type	Document Name[17]	Year of Publication	Original Language	Word Count
EH Bildu	Basque Election Manifesto	*ELECTORAL PROGRAM 2020: OUR COMMITMENT: BUILD THE COUNTRY YOU DESERVE*	2020	Spanish	68188
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	Basque Election Manifesto	*PROGRAM 2020-2024: THE BASQUE COUNTRY STANDING*	2020	Spanish	92228
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	Catalan Election Manifesto	*A NEW CYCLE TO WIN: POLITICAL PROGRAM FEBRUARY 2021*	2021	Catalan	59703
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	Catalan Election Manifesto	*Electoral program. Elections to the Parliament of Catalonia 2021: Alongside the people.*	2021	Catalan	81105
Junts per Catalunya	Catalan Election Manifesto	*ELECTORAL PROGRAM: Elections to the Parliament of Catalonia 2021*	2021	Catalan	89221

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[17] The document names have been translated into English (the original translations can be found in the references list).

Like in the previous section, this has been done through the content analysis of party literature from Basque and Catalan national independence parties (see Table A.8). This section analyses two Basque parties, the Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (EAJ-PNV) and EH Bildu, and three Catalan parties, the Candidatura d'Unitat Popular (CUP), the Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) and Junts per Catalunya (Junts). There is a clear ideological divide between Basque and Catalan national independence parties, with this study finding a significantly larger proportion of Basque national independence parties to be ideologically radical than was the case with their Catalan counterparts. In the case of these five parties, the EAJ-PNV, ERC and Junts are ideologically mainstream while EH Bildu and the CUP are radical.

Unemployment

Looking at Table A.9, the two radical parties, EH Bildu and the CUP, were more likely to emphasise high levels of unemployment in their respective nations than their mainstream counterparts. In contrast, mainstream parties referenced decreasing unemployment more frequently than radical parties. What is also interesting is that only two parties referenced unemployment in the context of independence. One was the mainstream Junts and the other was the radical EH Bildu.

Looking at the Basque Country, there are some interesting similarities and differences between how the ideologically mainstream EAJ-PNV and the radical EH Bildu frame the issue of unemployment. One key similarity is that both parties make references to decreasing employment more than to high levels of unemployment or to unemployment in the context of independence. Within these references, both parties make a number of commitments to reduce unemployment and create new jobs. For example, the EAJ-PNV pledges to bring unemployment back to below 10% (p. 8), while EH Bildu promised to "generate 10,000 direct green jobs" through "an ecological transition," (p. 15). However, it should be noted that the number of references to decreasing unemployment from the EAJ-PNV were higher than EH Bildu, both in terms of frequency and as a proportion of the total references to unemployment.

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
EH Bildu	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	26
		Unemployment (high levels)	19
		Unemployment (independence)	2
		Unemployment (other)	40
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	102
		Unemployment (high levels)	3
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (other)	61
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	35
		Unemployment (high levels)	11
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (other)	19
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	40
		Unemployment (high levels)	6
		Unemployment (independence)	0
		Unemployment (other)	22
Junts per Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Unemployment (decrease)	75
		Unemployment (high levels)	6
		Unemployment (independence)	3
		Unemployment (other)	35

There are also some other interesting differences between the two parties regarding how they refer to unemployment. First, EH Bildu makes a larger number of references to high levels of unemployment than the EAJ-PNV. Both parties make references to the increase in unemployment caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, the EAJ-PNV states that the pandemic caused pain "in the field of

employment and the economy," (p. 8). The key difference is that EH Bildu is also far more critical of the historic levels of unemployment. The party argues that:

> "In the European context, employment data in the Basque Country, both quantitative and qualitative, were bad even before the pandemic. The unemployment rate below 10% that the Government still claims as the main achievement of the legislature, places us in the last European position in terms of employment, only behind Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Italy. For a country with our level of wealth, which is among the 50 richest of the 280 European regions, it is an absolute anomaly to have such an unemployment rate," (p. 6).

The second interesting difference between the two parties is that EH Bildu makes a small number of references to unemployment in the context of independence, something which was not done by the EAJ-PNV. EH Bildu argues employment policy is just one of a number of examples that the "model of subordination" faced by the Basque Country has meant it has "not been able to decide on many issues," that impact it (p. 147). This comparison between the EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu has shown that overall, there is a significant difference in how the two parties frame the issue of unemployment.

Regarding Catalonia, there are also some interesting similarities and differences between how the three national independence parties frame unemployment. Like in the Basque cases, all Catalan national independence parties make more references to decreasing unemployment than to high levels of unemployment or unemployment in the context of independence. All three parties have a number of policies committed to reducing unemployment and to increasing the number of jobs. For example both Junts, (p. 170), the ERC, (p. 103), make it clear that the ambition for Catalonia should be to achieve full employment.

An interesting difference between the three parties is that the CUP makes more references to high levels of unemployment than the ERC and Junts. Both the ERC and Junts do discuss high levels of unemployment. Unsurprisingly, some of that discussion is in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. For example, Junts argue that the pandemic caused "massive drop in employment," (p. 95). One

distinct element of the CUP's framing of high levels of unemployment, other than the larger frequency of references, is the explicitly anti-capitalist message included within it. The party argues that "the expansion of the capitalist economy … in the world economy" has caused "structural mass unemployment," (p. 40). Another interesting distinction between the three parties is that the only party to discuss unemployment in the context of independence is Junts. The party argues that Catalonia's unemployment level is too high in comparison to its GDP and that as an independent nation, due to its economic size, it would be able to half unemployment, (pp. 169-170). Given the ideologically mainstream position of Junts, it is interesting that it was the only Catalan national independence party to reference unemployment in the context of independence. This is especially interesting given that Catalonia's other mainstream national independence party, the ERC, and its radical counterpart, the CUP, did not do the same.

Overall, there are some interesting comparisons that can be made when looking at how Basque and Catalan national independence parties frame unemployment. First, one similarity between all the parties is that they discussed decreasing unemployment more than high levels of unemployment or unemployment in the context of independence. Another interesting similarity between the two cases is that, in both, the national independence party which made the most references to high levels of unemployment was also the most ideologically radical. One interesting difference between the two cases is that the one Basque party to reference unemployment in the context of independence, EH Bildu, was ideologically radical but the one Catalan party to reference it, Junts, was ideologically mainstream. Overall, this analysis has shown there are some interesting differences between how mainstream and radical national independence parties, in the Basque Country and Catalonia, frame the issue of unemployment.

Language

As can be seen in Table A.10, the party which discussed the issue of their language under threat the most was the radical EH Bildu. It also appears that the mainstream parties make more references to

promoting and protecting their language than their radical counterparts. When comparing the EAJ-PNV with EH Bildu, it is interesting how differently the two parties frame the issue of the Basque language. Both parties make a number of references to both protecting and promoting the Basque language.

Table A.10 – Detailed Results: Language

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
EH Bildu	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Language (Threatened)	16
		Language (Protection)	10
		Language (Promotion)	35
		Language (Other)	11
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Language (Threatened)	2
		Language (Protection)	19
		Language (Promotion)	55
		Language (Other)	17
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Language (Threatened)	5
		Language (Protection)	9
		Language (Promotion)	9
		Language (Other)	0
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Language (Threatened)	9
		Language (Protection)	21
		Language (Promotion)	61
		Language (Other)	15
Junts per Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Language (Threatened)	1
		Language (Protection)	21
		Language (Promotion)	52
		Language (Other)	14

When discussing the protection of the Basque language, the EAJ-PNV argues its protection should be part of protecting the broader Basque Country, stating they would "preserve the natural and landscape environment, the material (buildings, monuments...) and intangible cultural heritage (language, traditions…)," (p. 98). The EAJ-PNV makes a number of commitments to promote the Basque language, one being in education. The party argues Basque must be central in education, stating that:

"Education must rethink its principles, methodology and contents, pivoting on the Basque language and culture, as a sign of its own identity, which must be the basis of learning and which

contributes to linguistic normalization, the Commitment to culture and social cohesion," (p. 131).

EH Bildu also emphasises the importance of promoting the Basque language, arguing that it wants "to place the Basque language at the centre of the political agenda," (p. 101). What is interesting is that while promotion and protection of the Basque language are referenced by both parties, both are referenced more by the EAJ-PNV than by EH Bildu.

The most notable difference in the discourse of the two parties relates to discussions of threats to the Basque language. EH Bildu discusses the potential threats to Basque far more than the EAJ-PNV. The EAJ-PNV does acknowledge that Basque is a minority language, (p. 301), but does not discuss Basque as something which is under threat, completely focusing instead on discussing how to protect and promote the language. For EH Bildu this is not the case at all. The party places a much stronger emphasis on the threats faced to the Basque language, especially from the central Spanish state. The party goes as far as to argue that "Basque people, who despite being the origin of the Basque Country, consider ourselves second-class citizens in our country, we feel like foreigners," (p. 98). The party, like EAJ-PNV, mentions that Basque is a minority-spoken language but takes this one step further, arguing it fundamentally limits the Basque national project as "it is impossible to build a country if it does not build its own space for communication, and even less if it is a country with a minority language," (p. 197). What is interesting when comparing these two parties is that there is a clear difference between the framing of the issue of language between the mainstream EAJ-PNV and the radical EH Bildu. This is shown by the fact that while both are committed to promoting the Basque language, there is clearly a larger degree of worry and insecurity found in the discourse of EH Bildu when it comes to the future and the security of the Basque language.

The Catalan national independence parties analysed in this study made far fewer references to threats to Catalan than they did to promoting or protecting Catalan. However, that does not mean these parties make no references to threats faced to Catalan. For example, the CUP argues that "Catalan

and language immersion in schools continues to be under constant threat," (p. 51). It should be noted that while all three parties only make a small number of references to threats faced by Catalan, the ideologically mainstream ERC does make slightly more references than the radical CUP. For example, the ERC argues "the use of our language [Catalan] is in danger if we do not protect it and put it into practice in all areas of our lives," (p. 77).

When it comes to references regarding promotion and protection of Catalan, there is a clear divide between the two mainstream national independence parties and the CUP. Both the ERC and Junts make far more references regarding promotion and protection of Catalan than the CUP does. For example, the ERC argue the following:

> "Any form of linguistic discrimination must be banished so that there can be a level playing field; not a generic and abstract equality, but a real equality that addresses and guarantees the linguistic rights of speakers who exercise as citizens in specific situations and who must be able to live them with total normality using Catalan, Occitan or the language of Catalan signs in the case of the community of signatories," (p. 147).

While the CUP does not make as many references to promoting and protecting the Catalan language, the party does still make numerous commitments regarding the language. For example, the CUP argues that "Catalan must be the language of the entire education system," (p. 52). It should be noted that all three parties also make commitments to protect and promote Aranese, a dialect of Occitan spoken in the Aran Valley (Suïls & Furness, 1999). For example, Junts made a pledge to "make unique efforts to protect the Aranese language, culture and heritage," (p. 237).

Overall, this analysis has made a number of interesting findings regarding how Basque and Catalan national independence parties frame the issue of language. In Catalonia, we see a degree of uniformity between its two mainstream national independence parties, the ERC and Junts, with both placing an emphasis on protecting and promoting the Catalan language (as well as Aranese in the Aran Valley) and both only making a small number of references to the language being threatened. Interestingly,

Catalonia's radical-left national independence party, the CUP, references the Catalan language far less than its two mainstream rivals. In the Basque Country, we see a divide between the mainstream EAJ-PNV and the radical EH Bildu. The EAJ-PNV's references to language are very similar to those of its mainstream Catalan counterparts, with much more of an emphasis on protection and promotion of the Basque language and far less references to it being threatened. In contrast, EH Bildu makes far more references to the language being threatened, although does also emphasise the need to protect and promote Basque as well. Overall, this analysis has shown, in the Basque Country and Catalonia, there are interesting differences over how the language issue is framed.

Rival National Independence Parties

What is interesting is that this analysis finds that the majority of the parties being analysed do not discuss rival national independence parties much at all. The only exception to this is EH Bildu, a party which is extremely critical of the EAJ-PNV, mainly due to their role as a party of government (see Table A.11).

Table A.11 – Detailed Results: Rival National Independence Parties

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
EH Bildu	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Rival National Independence Parties (Positive)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Negative)	32
		Rival National Independence Parties (Neutral)	5
		Rival National Independence Parties (Alternative)	1
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Rival National Independence Parties (Positive)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Negative)	0

		Rival National Independence Parties (Neutral)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Alternative)	0
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Rival National Independence Parties (Positive)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Negative)	1
		Rival National Independence Parties (Neutral)	1
		Rival National Independence Party (Alternative)	0
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Rival National Independence Parties (Positive)	1
		Rival National Independence Parties (Negative)	1
		Rival National Independence Parties (Neutral)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Alternative)	0
Junts per Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Rival National Independence Parties (Positive)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Negative)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Neutral)	0
		Rival National Independence Parties (Alternative)	0

In the Basque Country, there is a clear divide between the EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu in how they address

rival national independence parties in their respective manifestos. The EAJ-PNV does not mention EH

Bildu at all. This might be due to the fact that the EAJ-PNV is the larger of the two parties and,

therefore, sees no need to make any sort of challenge to or criticism of their independentist rival. In contrast, EH Bildu was extremely critical of the EAJ-PNV and, in particular, its record in government. At the start of its manifesto, EH Bildu clearly outlines itself as a party which wants to offer an alternative to the EAJ-PNV in government, arguing:

> "This country needs a new boost. From political honesty, democratic deepening, and the unequivocal defence of the universal public system. We need a government that asks questions, knows how to listen and constantly keeps the information channels open with the citizens. With humility and effort, from honesty, we are committed to building an alternative based on these parameters," (p. 3).

EH Bildu criticises many different aspects of the EAJ-PNV and its record in the Basque government. One example was that EH Bildu criticised the EAJ-PNV for not supporting "a law of recognition and reparation of the victims of the Franco regime," (p. 133). The huge contrast between the EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu is not really surprising. The EAJ-PNV went into the election as a party in government, in coalition with the Basque regional affiliate of the Spanish Socialist Party, the PSE-EE (Agencies, 2016). As EH Bildu was in opposition, it makes sense for them to criticise the EAJ-PNV because, as was shown in the above quote, they described themselves as an alternative government in waiting, with the aim of replacing the EAJ-PNV as the Basque Country's largest party.

An interesting similarity between Catalonia and the Basque Country is how their mainstream national independence parties refer to their rivals in their party literature. Like the EAJ-PNV, Junts does not make any references to rival national independence parties. Interestingly, the ERC does make a very small number of references (2). One of these references is a criticism of previous Catalan nationalists in government regarding language policy in schools, (p. 148). Interestingly, the other is the only positive reference of a rival national independence party found in any of the manifestos analysed. In this reference, the ERC talks positively of the possibility of working with other pro-independence parties in the future, making clear it wants to "weave alliances to advance the Government of the

Generalitat" and "lead a broad government, a pro-independence and left-wing government, with the desire to join those formations with whom we share a project," (p. 185). Overall, it is clear to see that the mainstream national independence parties from Catalonia share a common theme with the EAJ-PNV. They do not show any real interest in directly discussing their independentist rivals in their party manifestos.

Looking at Catalonia's radical-left, unlike EH Bildu, the CUP does not repeatedly criticise its national independence party rivals. The CUP only makes a single criticism of Catalan nationalists in government, criticising the outsourcing of public utilities (p. 118). Rather than focusing on portraying itself as the alternative national independence party, the CUP instead focuses on portraying itself as offering an economic alternative, as a radical left-wing party. For example, the party is in favour of "processes that raise social and economic alternatives other than imperialist policies," (p. 104). Part of the reason for this approach from the CUP could be due to the fact that the CUP works closer with the mainstream Catalan independentist parties than EH Bildu with the EAJ-PNV. The CUP even offered its support to the formation of an ERC-led Government after the 2021 Election (Catalan News, 2021). Overall, it is clear the CUP does not behave like EH Bildu with regards to how it refers to its mainstream rival national independence parties. Interestingly, its behaviour is far more similar to other mainstream Catalan national independence parties than its radical Basque counterpart.

Overall, this analysis has made a number of interesting findings, regarding how national independence parties address their rivals. There is an interesting contrast between the behaviour of national independence parties in the Basque Country and in Catalonia. In the Basque Country, there is a clear difference between the mainstream EAJ-PNV and the radical EH Bildu. EH Bildu refers far more about its independentist rival while the EAJ-PNV does not. In contrast, in Catalonia, there is very little difference between the radical CUP and the mainstream ERC and Junts. Instead, the CUP focuses on economic alternatives.

Immigration

Interestingly, all five parties analysed framed immigration in a very similar way. There is very little difference in how the EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu frame the issue of immigration (see Table A.12). Both parties use mainly positive references when discussing the issue. The EAJ-PNV argues that the Basque Country needs immigration in order "to respond to the labour market and sustain the welfare state," (p. 12). EH Bildu also makes a positive case for immigration, based on Basque history and tradition, stating that:

> "The Basque Country has always been a place of transition in which we have always welcomed with respect all the people who have come to work and live with us, we have done so and we will continue to do so," (p. 98).

Table A.12 – Detailed Results: Immigration

Party	Document	Sub-Category	Number of References
EH Bildu	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Immigration (Positive)	40
		Immigration (Negative)	3
		Immigration (Neutral)	19
Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea	2020 Basque Election Manifesto	Immigration (Positive)	44
		Immigration (Negative)	1
		Immigration (Neutral)	13
Candidatura d'Unitat Popular	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Immigration (Positive)	30
		Immigration (Negative)	0
		Immigration (Neutral)	3
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Immigration (Positive)	40
		Immigration (Negative)	1
		Immigration (Neutral)	5
Junts per Catalunya	2021 Catalan Election Manifesto	Immigration (Positive)	27
		Immigration (Negative)	2
		Immigration (Neutral)	6

While they are both overwhelmingly positive regarding immigration, both parties do also make a small number of negative references. The EAJ-PNV does accept there is a "challenge" when "welcoming and integrating people and families coming from other countries," (p. 12). Interestingly, this sentiment is shared by EH Bildu. EH Bildu does take it one step further, arguing that Basque immigration policy

must take "into account our reality as a political nation with its own minority culture," (p. 182). However, it should be noted that while there are a small number of negative references, the number of positive references is considerably larger. Overall, what is interesting is that when comparing the radical EH Bildu with the mainstream EAJ-PNV, there is very little difference in how the two parties frame the issue of immigration.

Overall, all three Catalan national independence parties mostly frame immigration in a positive manner. Junts argues that it is in favour of "an inclusive Catalonia that becomes a host country for refugees and migrants," (p. 46). The ERC is critical of the Spanish state's immigration policies, arguing it would:

> "Urge the Spanish state to repeal the law on foreigners and promote a law on human mobility that guarantees dignified treatment for all people who undertake migration processes, ensuring the availability of legal and safe routes that allow obtaining of nationality by residence in a real maximum of five years and making the granting of residence permits more flexible," (p. 68).

The CUP makes its views on immigration clear, stating that they "stand for a republic with rights for all, inclusive, in which everyone can live in peace and with respect, wherever they come from," (p. 20). What is interesting is that all three parties have very similar positions on immigration despite the fact that the CUP is a radical party while the ERC and Junts are both mainstream parties.

One difference between the CUP and its mainstream counterparts is that the CUP makes no negative references to immigration while Junts and the ERC do make a small number of negative references. The ERC states it is in favour of "a republic with a regulation of migratory flows" with "good management of inflows and outflows," (p. 65). While Junts does, in general, frame immigration positively, what is interesting is the focus the party places on legality. Junts is in favour of prioritising legal immigration and places an emphasis on the importance of immigrant registration. The party states priority should "be given to regular and legal entry of people," (p. 47). The party also discusses the issue of religious extremism, making the case that Catalonia should "promote a pact with the

collaboration of all religious entities, to regulate freedom of worship, so as to guarantee its rooting in the territory, avoiding religious extremism and fighting against radical groups," (p. 48). The fact that the one radical party, the CUP, makes no negative references to immigration while the two mainstream parties do is interesting. However, it should be emphasised that overall all three Catalan parties do frame immigration in a similarly positive manner.

Overall, what is interesting about how these parties frame the issue of immigration is how similar they all are. All five of the parties do, in general, frame immigration in a positive light. In the Basque Country there is very little difference between how immigration is framed by the mainstream EAJ-PNV and the radical EH Bildu. In Catalonia, the situation is similar with all three parties framing immigration positively. However, it should be noted that the radical CUP does not make any negative references regarding immigration while the mainstream ERC and Junts do. This shows a slight difference in how, in Catalonia, mainstream parties frame immigration compared with their radical rival. However, overall, in the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country, it appears that radical and mainstream parties do not frame the issue of immigration all that differently.

Conclusion

Overall, what these two comparisons have shown is that there are significant differences in the positions of different national independence parties both within and between cases. There are significant ideological variations which exist from both a traditional left-right perspective and from a mainstream-radical perspective. This is reflected in the significant differences found between different national independence parties, regarding many of the issues which are at the centre of this thesis. This appendix has offered additional validation to the research question, "*What factors can explain the significant ideological variance that exists within Canadian and Western European national independence parties*?" This is because it shows that there are significant ideological and policy differences between different national independence parties. Therefore, the question of why such variation exists is a valid one.

Appendix B: Full Table of Included Cases in the Chapter Four Datasets

Region	Country	Party/Electoral Coalition	Abbreviations	Relevant Elections
Flanders	Belgium	*Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* (New Flemish Alliance)	N-VA	**Regional:** June 2009, May 2014, May 2019 **Statewide:** May 2003, June 2010, May 2014, May 2019
		Vlaams Belang (Flemish Interest)	VBe	**Regional:** June 2009, May 2014, May 2019 **Statewide:** June 2007, June 2010, May 2014, May 2019
		Vlaams Blok (Flemish Block)	VBl	**Regional:** June 2004 **Statewide:** May 2003
Alberta	Canada	*Alberta Independence Party*	AIP	**Regional:** April 2019
		Western Block Party	WBP	**Statewide:** January 2006, May 2011
British Columbia	Canada	*Western Block Party*	WBP	**Statewide:** January 2006, October 2008, May 2011
		Western Canada Concept	WCC	**Regional:** May 2005, May 2009
		Wexit British Columbia	WBC	**Regional:** October 2020
Quebec	Canada	*Action Démocratique du Québec* (Democratic Action of Quebec)	ADQ	**Regional:** April 2003, March 2007, December 2008
		Bloc Québécois (Quebecer Bloc)	BQ	**Statewide:** November 2000, June 2004, January 2006, October 2008, May 2011, October 2015, October 2019

		Option Nationale – Pour l'Indépendance du Québec (National Option – For the Independence of Quebec)	ON-PIQ	**Regional:** September 2012, April 2014
		Parti Indépendantiste (Independence Party)	PI	**Regional:** December 2008, September 2012, April 2014
		Parti Québécois (Quebecer Party)	PQ	**Regional:** April 2003, March 2007, December 2008, September 2012, April 2014, October 2018
		Québec Solidaire (Quebec Solidarity)	QS	**Regional:** March 2007, December 2008, September 2012, April 2014, October 2018
		Union des Forces Progressistes (Union of Progressive Forces)	UFD	**Regional:** April 2003
Faroe Islands	Denmark	Føroyski Fólkaflokkurin (Faroese People's Party)	FF	**Regional:** January 2008, October 2011, September 2015, August 2019 **Statewide:** February 2005, November 2007, September 2011, June 2015, June 2019
		Framsókn (Progress)	Fr	**Regional:** October 2011, September 2015, August 2019 **Statewide:** June 2015, June 2019

		Sjálvstýri (Self-Government)	Sj	**Regional:** January 2008, October 2011 **Statewide:** February 2005, November 2007, September 2011
		Tjóðveldi (Republic)	Tj	**Regional:** January 2008, October 2011, September 2015, August 2019 **Statewide:** February 2005, November 2007, September 2011, June 2015, June 2019
Greenland	Denmark	*Inuit Ataqatigiit* (Inuit Community)	IA	**Regional:** March 2013, November 2014, April 2018 **Statewide:** September 2011, June 2015, June 2019
		Nunatta Qitornai (Descendants of Our Country)	NQ	**Regional:** April 2018 **Statewide:** June 2019
		Partii Inuit (Inuit Party)	PI	**Regional:** March 2013, November 2014
		Partii Naleraq (Party Breakpoint)	PN	**Regional:** November 2014, April 2018 **Statewide:** June 2015, June 2019
		Siumut (Forward)	Si	**Regional:** March 2013, November 2014, April 2018 **Statewide:** June 2015, June 2019

Åland Islands	Finland	*Ålands Framtid* (Future of Åland)	ÅF	**Regional:** October 2003, October 2007, October 2011, October 2015, October 2019
Corsica	France	*Corsica Libera* (Free Corsica)	CL	**Regional:** March 2010, December 2015 **Statewide:** June 2012
Bavaria	Germany	*Bayernpartei* (Bavaria Party)	BP	**Regional:** September 2003, September 2008, September 2013, September 2018 **Statewide:** September 2002, September 2005, September 2009, September 2013, September 2017
Sardinia	Italy	*Autodeterminatzione* (Self-determination)	Au	**Regional:** February 2019 **Statewide:** March 2018
		Fortza Paris (Forward Together)	FP	**Regional:** June 2004
		Indipendèntzia Repùbrica de Sardigna (Independence Republic of Sardinia)	IRS	**Regional:** June 2004, February 2009, February 2014 **Statewide:** April 2006
		Partito dei Sardi (Party of Sardinians)	PdS	**Regional:** February 2014, February 2019
		Partido Sardo D'Azione (Sardinian Action Party)	PSd'Az	**Statewide:** April 2008
		Partido Sardo D'Azione – Sardigna Natzione (Sardinian Action Party – Sardinian Nation)	PSd'Az-SN	**Statewide:** May 2001
		Progetu Repùblica de Sardigna (Project Republic of Sardinia)	ProgReS	**Regional:** February 2014
		Rossomori (Red Moors)	RM	**Regional:** February 2014

		Sardigna Natzione (Sardinia Nation)	SN	**Regional:** June 2004 **Statewide:** April 2006, April 2008
		Unidade Indipendentista (Independence Union)	UI	**Regional:** February 2009
		Unidos (United)	Un	**Regional:** February 2014
Sicily	Italy	*Siciliani Liberi* (Free Sicilians)	SL	**Regional:** November 2017
South Tyrol	Italy	*Die Freiheitlichen* (The Freedomites)	dF	**Regional:** October 2003, October 2008, October 2013, October 2018 **Statewide:** April 2006, April 2008, February 2013
		Süd-Tiroler Freiheit (South Tyrolean Freedom)	STF	**Regional:** October 2008, October 2013, October 2018
		Union für Südtirol (Union for South Tyrol)	UfS	**Regional:** October 2003, October 2008 **Statewide:** April 2008
Veneto	Italy	*Indipendenza Noi Veneto* (Independence We Veneto)	INV	**Regional:** May 2015
		Indipendenza Veneta (Venetian Independence)	IV	**Regional:** May 2015 **Statewide:** February 2013
		Partito Nasional Veneto (Veneto National Party)	PNV	**Regional:** March 2010
		Veneto Stato (Veneto State)	VS	**Statewide:** February 2013
Andalusia	Spain	*Nación Andaluza* (Andalusian Nation)	NA	**Regional:** December 2018
Aragon	Spain	*Puyalón de Cuchas* (Puyalón de Cuchas)	PYLN	**Statewide:** April 2019, November 2019

Asturias	Spain	*Andecha Astur* (Asturian Group)	AA	**Regional:** May 2015, May 2019 **Statewide:** April 2019, November 2019
Basque Country	Spain	*Amaiur* (Amaiur)	Am	**Statewide:** November 2011
		Aralar (Aralar)	Ar	**Regional:** April 2005, March 2009 **Statewide:** March 2004, March 2008
		Euskal Herria Bildu (Basque Country Unite)	EHB	**Regional:** October 2012, September 2016, July 2020 **Statewide:** December 2015, June 2016, April 2019, November 2019
		Euskal Herrialdeetako Alderdi Komunista (Communist Party of the Basque Homelands)	EHAK	**Regional:** April 2005
		Euskal Herritarrok (Basque Citizens)	EH	**Regional:** May 2001
		Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)	EA	**Regional:** March 2009 **Statewide:** March 2000, March 2004, March 2008
		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea (Basque Nationalist Party)[18]	EAJ-PNV	**Regional:** March 2009, October 2012, September 2016, July 2020 **Statewide:** March 2004, March 2008, November 2011, December 2015, June 2016, April 2019, November 2019

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[18] Spanish Translation: Partido Nacionalista Vasco.

		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea – Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Nationalist Party – Basque Solidarity)	EAJ-EA	**Regional:** May 2001, April 2005
Canary Islands	Spain	*Ahora Canarias* (Canary Islands Now)	AC	**Regional:** May 2019 **Statewide:** April 2019, November 2019
		Alternativa Nacionalista Canaria (Canarian Nationalist Alternative)	ANC	**Regional:** May 2007, May 2011, May 2015 **Statewide:** March 2008, November 2011
Catalonia	Spain	*Candidatura d'Unitat Popular* (Popular Unity Candidacy)	CUP	**Regional:** November 2012, September 2015, December 2017
		Candidatura d'Unitat Popular – Per la Ruptura (Popular Unity Candidacy – For the Rupture)	CUP-PR	**Statewide:** November 2019
		Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Democratic Convergence of Catalonia)	CDC	**Statewide:** June 2016
		Convergència i Unió (Convergence and Union)	CiU	**Regional:** November 2010, November 2012 **Statewide:** November 2011
		Democràcia i Llibertat (Democracy and Freedom)	DiL	**Statewide:** December 2015
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Republican Left of Catalonia)	ERC	**Regional:** November 2003, November 2006, November 2010 **Statewide:** March 2000, March 2004, March 2008

		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Catalunya Sí (Republican Left of Catalonia – Catalonia Yes)	ERC-CatSí	**Regional:** November 2012, December 2017 **Statewide:** November 2011, December 2015, June 2016
		Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya – Sobiranistes (Republican Left of Catalonia – Sovereigntists)	ERC-S	**Statewide:** April 2019, November 2019
		Front Republicà (Republican Front)	FR	**Statewide:** April 2019
		Junts pel Sí (Together for Yes)	JxSí	**Regional:** September 2015
		Junts per Catalunya (Together for Catalonia)	JxCat	**Regional:** December 2017 **Statewide:** April 2019, November 2019
		Reagrupament (Realignment)	Re	**Regional:** November 2010
		Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (Catalan Solidarity for Independence)	SCI	**Regional:** November 2010, November 2012
Galicia	Spain	Bloque Nacionalista Galego (Galician Nationalist Bloc)	BNG	**Regional:** October 2001, June 2005, March 2009, October 2012, July 2020 **Statewide:** March 2000, March 2004, March 2008, November 2011, April 2019, November 2019
		Bloque Nacionalista Galego – Nós– Candidatura Galega (Galician Nationalist Bloc – We–Galician Candidacy)	BNG-Nós	**Regional:** September 2016 **Statewide:** June 2016
		Comunistas da Galiza (Communists of Galicia)	CdG	**Regional:** October 2012

		Frente Popular Galega (Galician People's Front)	FPG	**Regional:** October 2001, June 2005, March 2009 **Statewide:** March 2000, March 2004
		Nós–Candidatura Galega (We–Galician Candidacy)	Nós	**Statewide:** December 2015
		Nós–Unidade Popular (We–People's Unity)	N-UP	**Regional:** June 2005, March 2009
Navarre	Spain	*Amaiur* (Amaiur)	Am	**Statewide:** November 2011
		Aralar (Aralar)	Ar	**Regional:** May 2003
		Bildu – Eusko Alkartasuna/Alternatiba Eraikitzenea (Unite – Basque Solidarity/Building an Alternative	B-EA/AE	**Regional:** May 2011
		Euskal Herria Bildu (Basque Country Unite)	EHB	**Regional:** May 2015, May 2019 **Statewide:** December 2015, June 2016, April 2019, November 2019
		Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Solidarity)	EA	**Statewide:** March 2000
		Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea – Eusko Alkartasuna (Basque Nationalist Party – Basque Solidarity)	EAJ-EA	**Regional:** May 2003
		Geroa Bai (Yes to the Future)	GBai	**Regional:** May 2015, May 2019 **Statewide:** November 2011, December 2015, June 2016, April 2019, November 2019

		Libertad Navarra (Navarrese Freedom)	Ln	**Regional:** May 2015, May 2019 **Statewide:** December 2015, June 2016
		Nafarroa Bai (Navarre Yes)	NaBai	**Regional:** May 2007, May 2011 **Statewide:** March 2004, March 2008
Scania County	Sweden	*Skånepartiet* (Scania Party)	SP	**Regional:** September 2014 **Statewide:** September 2014
England	United Kingdom	*English Democrats*	ED	**Statewide:** May 2015, June 2017, December 2019
Scotland	United Kingdom	*Respect, Independence, Socialism and Environmentalism – Scotland's Left Alliance*	RISE	**Regional:** May 2016
		Scottish Green Party	SGP	**Regional:** May 2003, May 2007, May 2011, May 2016 **Statewide:** May 2001, May 2005, May 2010, May 2015, June 2017, December 2019
		Scottish National Party	SNP	**Regional:** May 2003, May 2007, May 2011, May 2016 **Statewide:** May 2001, May 2005, May 2010, May 2015, June 2017, December 2019

		Scottish Socialist Party	SSP	**Regional:** May 2003, May 2007, May 2011 **Statewide:** May 2001, May 2005, May 2010, May 2015
		Solidarity – Scotland's Socialist Movement	SSM	**Regional:** May 2007, May 2011, May 2016
Wales	United Kingdom	*Cymru Annibynnol* (Independent Wales)	CA	**Regional:** May 2003
		Plaid Cymru – The Party of Wales	PC	**Regional:** May 2003, May 2007, May 2011, May 2016 **Statewide:** May 2001, May 2005, May 2010, May 2015, June 2017, December 2019

Appendix C: OLS Regression Models

Table C.1 – Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (III)

Model	C1 REG	C2 SW	C3 REG	C4 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.10***	-0.11***		
	(0.02)	(0.03)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.62***	-1.93***
			(0.27)	(0.25)
Monarchy	-0.68+	-1.33***	-0.72+	-1.68***
	(0.58)	(0.35)	(0.61)	(0.33)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.50	-3.18**	-1.15+	-3.34**
	(0.77)	(1.17)	(0.81)	(1.13)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.02+	0.02+	0.01+	0.04+
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)
Language	-0.03+	-0.32+	-0.06+	-0.29+
	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.20)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.43	0.24+	-0.21+	0.15+
	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.22)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.56	-0.27+	-0.58*	-0.35
	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.28)	(0.19)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.59+	-0.28+	-0.40+	-0.40+
	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.34)
2008-2011	0.28+	-0.13+	-0.18+	-0.50+
	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.43)	(0.35)
2012-2015	-0.02+	-0.52+	-0.54+	-1.05*
	(0.54)	(0.45)	(0.48)	(0.41)
2016-2020	-0.18+	-1.03*	-0.47+	-1.37**
	(0.51)	(0.44)	(0.50)	(0.40)
Constant	8.92***	11.58***	8.78***	12.92***
	(1.41)	(2.06)	(1.41)	(1.95)
R^2	0.35	0.45	0.27	0.34
Number of Cases	171	153	171	153

Linear regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

As an additional check on the reliability of the results from Chapter Four, a linear regression model was used to check the results found relating to the traditional left-right ideology of national independence parties. This model used the same time fixed effects methods as were used in the ordinal regression model. The linear regression model also used the same control variables. This was done to ensure comparability with the binary and ordinal models. Looking at Table C.1, these results provide further evidence to support the findings from the binary and ordinal models used in Chapter

Four. This model makes the same findings regarding unemployment. Lower levels of unemployment cause national independence parties to become more right-wing, with the impact being especially strong with comparative unemployment. This further supports *The Left-Right Unemployment Hypothesis*. Interestingly, this model finds that, in statewide elections, a monarchy and higher levels of military spending will push national independence parties to the left. However, this was not found in regional elections. This offers some additional evidence to support both *The Military Expenditure Hypothesis* and *The Monarchy Hypothesis*. This finding shares similarities to that found in the ordinal regression model. This model also does not find any relationship between statewide levels of immigration and left-right ideology. This was the same as in the majority of the models in Chapter Four. The numerous similarities between this model and the models used in Chapter Four further exhibit the reliability of the findings.

Appendix D: Removing Major and Minor Cases

Additional robustness checks have been included in this analysis to further ensure the reliability of the results. These checks remove cases from either end of the extremes in terms of voter success. Due to the significant variation in electoral support of the parties included in both datasets (see Tables 4.3 and 4.4), they include some minor parties which receive very little support and some major parties which are so successful they are able to enter government at the regional level. There is a risk that minor parties could skew the results in favour of relatively insignificant political actors. There is a risk that the largest parties could skew the results in favour of parties which win elections in their region and, in some cases, are in regional government. These cases are very much in the minority of this study. Therefore, it made sense to ensure that the most successful parties nor the least successful parties were having too significant an influence over the results. Therefore, in the first robustness check, any case of a party that achieved more than 30% of the vote in an election was removed. In the second robustness check, any case of a party that achieved less than 1% of the vote was removed.

Looking at the models below, it is clear the impact of removing the most successful and most insignificant cases has only a limited impact on the results. In the overwhelming majority of models, the relationship between unemployment and left-right ideology continues to be both statistically significant and negative. The only exception to this was Model D6. There is a statistically significant relationship between left-right ideology and both a monarchy and higher levels of military spending in the majority of these models, as was the case in the original models. The removal of the most significant and insignificant cases also had no significant impact on the previously found influences on mainstream-radical ideology. Despite the removal of these cases, it continued to be the case that the lack of a distinct language, higher levels of immigration at the statewide level and competition with a mainstream rival national independence party all cause national independence parties to become more radical.

Table D.1 – Major Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	D1 REG	D2 SW	D3 REG	D4 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.14**	0.15**		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.88***	-2.73***
			(0.44)	(0.53)
Monarchy	-0.73+	-1.04+	-1.04+	-1.74**
	(1.02)	(0.68)	(1.17)	(0.63)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.24+	-4.19*	-0.60+	-4.68*
	(1.58)	(1.83)	(1.84)	(1.88)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.02+	0.15+	0.05+	0.17+
	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.13)
Language	0.29+	0.24+	0.31+	0.24+
	(0.47)	(0.48)	(0.45)	(0.51)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.19+	0.69+	0.06+	0.62+
	(0.37)	(0.43)	(0.36)	(0.46)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.45**	-0.76	-1.48**	-0.83*
	(0.50)	(0.41)	(0.53)	(0.38)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.29	-0.60+	-1.09+	-0.74+
	(0.66)	(0.55)	(0.70)	(0.57)
2008-2011	-0.03+	-0.79+	-0.65+	-1.26+
	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.74)	(0.77)
2012-2015	-0.40+	-1.18+	-1.08+	-2.05*
	(0.89)	(0.82)	(0.89)	(0.87)
2016-2020	-0.63+	-2.44**	-1.06+	-2.97**
	(0.83)	(0.87)	(0.86)	(0.93)
Cut 1	-8.54	-10.14	-8.01	-12.95
	(2.48)	(4.10)	(2.42)	(4.19)
Cut 2	-6.76	-8.18	-6.23	-10.95
	(2.47)	(4.09)	(2.42)	(4.18)
Cut 3	-6.07	-7.30	-5.49	-10.00
	(2.46)	(4.08)	(2.40)	(4.15)
Cut 4	-5.06	-6.24	-4.43	-8.80
	(2.44)	(4.09)	(2.38)	(4.16)
Cut 5	-3.70	-4.85	-3.03	-7.30
	(2.44)	(4.13)	(2.39)	(4.20)
Pseudo R^2	0.14	0.17	0.09	0.11
Observations	150	137	150	137

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table D.2 – Major Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	D5 REG	D6 SW	D7 REG	D8 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.37***	-0.18		
	(0.10)	(0.10)		
Comparative Unemployment			-5.03***	-5.08***
			(1.09)	(1.26)
Monarchy	-2.48*	-6.45**	-3.65**	-6.69***
	(1.04)	(1.94)	(1.26)	(1.50)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-13.67***	-12.16**	-13.81***	-12.24**
	(2.99)	(3.52)	(3.40)	(3.55)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.41**	0.28+	-0.24+	0.28+
	(0.14)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.21)
Language	-0.98	-0.52+	-1.09	-0.52+
	(0.52)	(0.67)	(0.62)	(0.75)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	0.58+	-0.34+	1.55	-0.84+
	(0.79)	(0.50)	(0.88)	(0.58)
Alternative National Independence Party	-3.55**	0.35+	-3.33**	0.07+
	(1.33)	(0.47)	(1.26)	(0.53)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.42+	-1.11+	-0.19+	-1.66+
	(1.30)	(1.06)	(1.57)	(1.25)
2008-2011	1.03+	-1.51+	0.73+	-1.90+
	(1.16)	(1.23)	(1.38)	(1.19)
2012-2015	-1.43+	-2.42*	-2.12+	-3.18**
	(1.30)	(1.22)	(1.33)	(1.14)
2016-2020	0.20+	-3.69*	-0.20+	-4.19**
	(1.16)	(1.52)	(1.20)	(1.32)
Constant	33.37***	23.42**	32.71***	27.29**
	(7.27)	(8.02)	(7.47)	(8.81)
Pseudo R^2	0.58	0.36	0.47	0.32
Observations	150	137	150	137

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table D.3 – Major Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	D9 REG	D10 SW	D11 REG	D12 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.10	-0.01+		
	(0.06)	(0.10)		
Comparative Unemployment			0.02+	-1.63+
			(0.74)	(1.28)
Language	-2.02***	-3.48***	-1.84**	-3.38***
	(0.58)	(0.62)	(0.55)	(0.55)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	4.62***	2.54**	4.55***	2.66**
	(0.93)	(0.86)	(0.93)	(0.79)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.57***	0.37*	0.58***	0.38*
	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.12)	(0.18)
Electoral System	3.42***	2.49***	3.55***	2.54***
	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.92)	(0.72)
Vote Share (%)	-0.14***	-0.07+	-0.13**	-0.10
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
In Government Regionally	-5.03***	-4.13***	-4.62***	-4.22***
	(1.30)	(0.79)	(1.28)	(0.82)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.25+	0.10+	-1.24+	0.40+
	(0.85)	(1.28)	(0.85)	(1.37)
2008-2011	-3.20**	-2.38+	-3.56***	-2.29+
	(0.95)	(1.79)	(0.98)	(1.75)
2012-2015	-1.85*	-0.84+	-2.52**	-1.01+
	(0.91)	(1.51)	(0.91)	(1.59)
2016-2020	-1.56+	-0.53+	-1.79	-0.55+
	(0.99)	(1.56)	(1.05)	(1.59)
Constant	-4.92+	-0.10+	-6.62+	0.61+
	(3.32)	(3.40)	(4.21)	(3.63)
Pseudo R^2	0.49	0.51	0.49	0.52
Observations	150	137	150	137

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D.4 – Minor Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	D13 REG	D14 SW	D15 REG	D16 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.21***	-0.17**		
	(0.05)	(0.07)		
Comparative Unemployment			-2.53***	-3.69***
			(0.54)	(0.72)
Monarchy	-0.63+	-0.69+	-0.85+	-0.41+
	(0.99)	(1.50)	(1.81)	(1.36)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	0.05+	-3.06	0.29+	-3.49*
	(1.29)	(1.78)	(1.82)	(1.59)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.15+	-0.12+	-0.08+	-0.15+
	(0.10)	(0.13)	(0.17)	(0.11)
Language	2.06**	1.31	1.48*	1.44*
	(0.73)	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.72)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.57+	0.18+	-0.09+	0.18+
	(0.43)	(0.46)	(0.41)	(0.46)
Alternative National Independence Party	0.71+	2.32**	0.36+	2.62**
	(0.70)	(0.82)	(0.68)	(0.86)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.08+	0.09+	0.10+	0.00+
	(0.73)	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.68)
2008-2011	1.23+	0.86+	0.39+	0.49+
	(0.78)	(0.87)	(0.88)	(0.84)
2012-2015	1.11+	0.39+	0.06+	-0.17+
	(0.91)	(0.89)	(0.93)	(0.90)
2016-2020	1.00+	-0.10+	0.31+	-0.45+
	(0.86)	(1.03)	(1.02)	(0.99)
Cut 1	-2.33	-8.59	-4.24	-11.34
	(3.39)	(4.00)	(3.38)	(3.87)
Cut 2	-0.39	-6.50	-2.31	-9.21
	(3.40)	(4.04)	(3.40)	(3.91)
Cut 3	0.52	-5.34	-1.35	-7.91
	(3.40)	(4.04)	(3.38)	(3.91)
Cut 4	2.01	-3.92	0.19	-6.14
	(3.40)	(4.00)	(3.36)	(3.84)
Cut 5	3.76	-2.20	1.97	-4.06
	(3.40)	(4.02)	(3.36)	(3.85)
Pseudo R^2	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.10
Observations	135	120	135	120

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table D.5 – Minor Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	D17 REG	D18 SW	D19 REG	D20 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.28***	-0.19*		
	(0.07)	(0.09)		
Comparative Unemployment			-5.29***	-7.55***
			(0.92)	(1.70)
Monarchy	-3.75*	-2.86**	-4.09**	-5.30***
	(1.53)	(1.04)	(1.33)	(1.27)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-6.15*	-7.46**	-6.07*	-9.29*
	(2.76)	(2.44)	(2.87)	(4.40)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.07+	0.01+	-0.02+	-0.08+
	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.14)	(0.20)
Language	2.18*	0.17+	1.81*	1.39*
	(0.97)	(0.71)	(0.89)	(0.70)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.94+	-0.70+	-0.33+	-1.32
	(0.58)	(0.57)	(0.62)	(0.77)
Alternative National Independence Party	2.93**	2.32**	2.39*	2.62**
	(1.01)	(0.82)	(0.94)	(0.86)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.19+	-0.73+	1.06+	-1.24+
	(1.18)	(1.07)	(1.42)	(1.13)
2008-2011	0.96+	-0.39+	0.43+	-1.86
	(1.37)	(0.99)	(1.45)	(1.02)
2012-2015	-0.55+	-1.14+	-1.25+	-2.95*
	(1.64)	(1.18)	(1.56)	(1.25)
2016-2020	-0.57+	-1.50+	-0.96+	3.50***
	(1.55)	(0.97)	(1.56)	(0.94)
Constant	8.91+	11.85	10.65	17.78
	(6.35)	(6.44)	(5.87)	(9.42)
Pseudo R^2	0.38	0.32	0.50	0.50
Observations	135	120	135	120

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table D.6 – Minor Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	D21 REG	D22 SW	D23 REG	D24 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.34**	-0.12		
	(0.10)	(0.07)		
Comparative Unemployment			-6.41**	-6.66**
			(2.26)	(2.28)
Language	-2.24**	-2.90***	-2.31*	-2.35**
	(0.85)	(0.73)	(1.09)	(0.79)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	6.50**	2.97*	5.87**	3.43*
	(2.20)	(1.34)	(2.20)	(1.36)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	1.28***	0.68**	0.82***	0.76**
	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Electoral System	6.41***	2.57***	2.34**	1.00+
	(1.69)	(0.62)	(0.84)	(0.71)
Vote Share (%)	-0.10**	-0.06**	-0.08*	-0.08*
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.67)
In Government Regionally	-4.62***	-3.31***	-4.38***	-3.27***
	(1.08)	(0.73)	(1.20)	(0.67)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-2.50+	-0.79+	-1.50+	-0.74+
	(1.59)	(1.47)	(1.80)	(1.79)
2008-2011	-7.13**	-4.03	-5.37**	-4.87*
	(2.59)	(2.08)	(1.75)	(2.12)
2012-2015	-4.67**	-2.50+	-4.00**	-3.33+
	(1.76)	(1.99)	(1.32)	(2.23)
2016-2020	-6.35**	-3.46	-4.01**	-4.19
	(2.20)	(1.93)	(1.50)	(2.18)
Constant	-23.43**	-5.57	6.16+	0.53+
	(6.74)	(3.28)	(4.09)	(3.46)
Pseudo R^2	0.58	0.50	0.48	0.55
Observations	135	120	135	120

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Appendix E: Removing Other Notable Countries

Table E.1 – Canadian Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	E1 REG	E2 SW	E3 REG	E4 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.22***	-0.23***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.98***	-1.94***
			(0.47)	(0.47)
Monarchy	-1.72***	-1.18**	-1.51***	-1.35***
	(0.04)	(0.38)	(0.35)	(0.38)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.36	-1.07+	-0.20+	0.92+
	(0.82)	(0.79)	(0.81)	(0.71)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.21**	0.23**	0.03+	0.20*
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Language	1.42*	0.68+	1.25*	0.99
	(0.62)	(0.57)	(0.50)	(0.54)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.65	0.36+	-0.09+	0.73*
	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.35)
Alternative National Independence Party	0.20+	-0.41+	0.06+	-0.07+
	(0.46)	(0.36)	(0.46)	(0.38)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.05+	-0.46+	-0.38+	0.22+
	(0.68)	(0.58)	(0.65)	(0.58)
2008-2011	-0.43+	-0.92+	-0.08+	-0.75+
	(0.60)	(0.70)	(0.61)	(0.70)
2012-2015	-0.45+	-0.75+	-0.19+	-0.19+
	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.64)	(0.80)
2016-2020	-1.23	-2.09**	-0.12+	-1.29+
	(0.66)	(0.80)	(0.66)	(0.82)
Cut 1	-1.86	-3.26	-1.15	1.33
	(3.05)	(2.87)	(2.59)	(2.50)
Cut 2	-0.27	-1.45	0.34	2.97
	(3.08)	(2.89)	(2.61)	(2.52)
Cut 3	0.63	-0.67	1.19	3.70
	(3.08)	(2.90)	(2.62)	(2.55)
Cut 4	2.22	0.49	2.54	4.71
	(3.11)	(2.89)	(2.63)	(2.55)
Cut 5	3.70	1.90	3.86	5.95
	(3.17)	(2.98)	(2.68)	(2.64)
Pseudo R^2	0.18	0.15	0.13	0.10
Number of Cases	147	141	147	141

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.2 – Canadian Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	E5 REG	E6 SW	E7 REG	E8 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.25***	-0.30***		
	(0.83)	(0.09)		
Comparative Unemployment			-4.19***	-3.76***
			(1.02)	(0.87)
Monarchy	-3.17***	-2.64***	-3.98***	-2.64***
	(0.83)	(0.69)	(0.83)	(0.73)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-6.22*	-5.31***	-8.08*	-2.72+
	(2.49)	(1.19)	(3.20)	(1.81)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.14+	0.33*	-0.11+	0.22
	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Language	0.57+	-0.23+	0.51+	0.23+
	(0.65)	(0.70)	(0.84)	(0.57)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.90+	-0.70+	-0.51+	-0.35+
	(0.58)	(0.46)	(0.57)	(0.51)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.48+	0.15+	-0.69+	0.18+
	(0.64)	(0.46)	(0.49)	(0.50)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.15+	-0.70+	0.81+	-0.15+
	(1.31)	(0.76)	(1.49)	(0.86)
2008-2011	0.28+	-1.59	1.57	-1.46+
	(0.89)	(0.96)	(0.81)	(1.12)
2012-2015	-0.99+	-1.45+	0.22+	-1.17+
	(1.03)	(0.91)	(1.05)	(1.14)
2016-2020	-1.31+	-2.79**	0.26+	-2.25
	(1.01)	(0.93)	(1.05)	(1.21)
Constant	10.94	10.30*	16.57*	6.56
	(6.14)	(4.51)	(7.72)	(3.85)
Pseudo R^2	0.46	0.35	0.49	0.31
Number of Cases	147	141	147	141

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.3 – Canadian Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	E9 REG	E10 SW	E11 REG	E12 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.09+	0.01+		
	(0.06)	(0.08)		
Comparative Unemployment			-2.00*	-1.02+
			(1.00)	(1.18)
Language	-2.59***	-3.13***	-2.63***	-3.04***
	(0.66)	(0.67)	(0.68)	(0.66)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	3.31***	2.30**	3.47***	2.35**
	(0.87)	(0.87)	(0.90)	(0.81)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.64***	0.54**	0.52***	0.52*
	(0.14)	(0.20)	(0.14)	(0.21)
Electoral System	4.27***	2.23***	3.45***	2.09**
	(0.92)	(0.51)	(0.79)	(0.61)
Vote Share (%)	-0.13***	-0.09**	-0.14**	-0.10**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
In Government Regionally	-4.15***	-3.84***	-4.31***	-3.86***
	(1.17)	(0.71)	(1.13)	(0.66)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.73+	-0.48+	-0.30+	-0.35+
	(1.37)	(1.09)	(1.41)	(1.21)
2008-2011	-3.85**	-3.33*	-3.62**	-3.12
	(1.18)	(1.62)	(1.16)	(1.59)
2012-2015	-2.88*	-2.09+	-2.72*	-2.02+
	(1.22)	(1.38)	(1.23)	(1.37)
2016-2020	-2.80*	-2.37	-2.11	-2.21+
	(1.14)	(1.30)	(1.15)	(1.37)
Constant	-10.38**	-3.05+	-6.45	-1.89+
	(3.09)	(2.24)	(3.66)	(2.90)
Pseudo R^2	0.59	0.50	0.60	0.50
Number of Cases	147	141	147	141

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.4 – Danish Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	E13 REG	E14 SW	E15 REG	E16 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.15***	-0.23***		
	(0.03)	(0.05)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.57***	-1.93***
			(0.45)	(0.55)
Monarchy	-1.32**	-1.11*	-2.27***	-2.29***
	(0.47)	(0.46)	(0.46)	(0.54)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.56*	-1.52	-0.24+	0.83+
	(0.70)	(0.83)	(0.67)	(0.70)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.04+	0.11+	0.16**	0.33***
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Language	0.20+	-0.07+	0.21+	0.04+
	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.40)	(0.39)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.47+	0.72	-0.12+	0.82*
	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.37)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.31+	-0.26+	-0.21+	-0.06+
	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.34)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.59+	-0.22+	-0.37+	-0.21+
	(0.55)	(0.54)	(0.56)	(0.59)
2008-2011	0.24+	-0.27+	-0.60+	-1.53*
	(0.58)	(0.66)	(0.58)	(0.70)
2012-2015	0.14+	0.01+	-0.89+	-1.09+
	(0.68)	(0.64)	(0.63)	(0.79)
2016-2020	-0.22+	-1.31*	-0.75+	-2.20**
	(0.60)	(0.62)	(0.60)	(0.72)
Cut 1	-5.48	-6.10	-2.82	-0.87
	(2.23)	(2.71)	(1.98)	(2.15)
Cut 2	-4.25	-4.55	-1.61	0.56
	(2.22)	(2.72)	(1.98)	(2.16)
Cut 3	-3.52	-3.43	-0.90	1.63
	(2.21)	(2.71)	(1.98)	(2.17)
Cut 4	-2.58	-2.48	0.02	2.49
	(2.21)	(2.65)	(1.97)	(2.11)
Cut 5	-1.43	-1.55	1.16	3.33
	(2.22)	(2.64)	(1.98)	(2.14)
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.16	0.09	0.12
Number of Cases	147	130	147	130

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.5 – Danish Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	E17 REG	E18 SW	E19 REG	E20 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.23**	-0.30**		
	(0.07)	(0.11)		
Comparative Unemployment			-3.64**	-3.60***
			(1.21)	(0.78)
Monarchy	-2.93**	-2.54**	-5.26***	-3.79***
	(0.98)	(0.75)	(1.22)	(0.88)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-6.83**	-6.44***	-7.45**	-3.00+
	(2.10)	(1.53)	(2.74)	(2.09)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	-0.05+	-0.04+	0.22	0.25**
	(0.07)	(0.09)	(0.12)	(0.09)
Language	-0.34+	-1.16*	-0.25+	-0.80
	(0.42)	(0.58)	(0.46)	(0.43)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.54+	-0.28+	-0.46+	-0.17+
	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.80)	(0.58)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.00	0.66+	-1.09+	0.49+
	(0.53)	(0.50)	(0.67)	(0.46)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.59+	-0.86+	-0.07+	-0.82+
	(0.95)	(0.84)	(1.15)	(1.00)
2008-2011	1.05+	-0.31+	0.02+	-1.77
	(0.81)	(0.90)	(0.84)	(1.03)
2012-2015	-0.13+	0.49+	-1.48+	-1.37+
	(0.98)	(1.02)	(1.07)	(1.12)
2016-2020	-0.05+	-0.91+	-1.24+	-2.37*
	(0.84)	(0.93)	(1.04)	(1.09)
Constant	15.40**	16.22**	15.91**	9.55*
	(4.69)	(4.78)	(5.55)	(4.24)
Pseudo R^2	0.41	0.37	0.43	0.35
Number of Cases	147	130	147	130

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.6 – Danish Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	E21 REG	E22 SW	E23 REG	E24 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.10	-0.09+		
	(0.06)	(0.09)		
Comparative Unemployment			-0.44+	-1.96+
			(0.79)	(1.37)
Language	-1.44**	-3.07***	-1.26**	-2.93***
	(0.44)	(0.58)	(0.42)	(0.57)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	3.90***	2.62**	3.93***	2.79***
	(0.79)	(0.79)	(0.82)	(0.74)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.58***	0.44*	0.51***	0.40*
	(0.10)	(0.18)	(0.11)	(0.18)
Electoral System	3.46***	2.60***	2.86***	2.11***
	(0.57)	(0.58)	(0.72)	(0.55)
Vote Share (%)	-0.12***	-0.08*	-0.11***	-0.10*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
In Government Regionally	-4.30***	-4.35***	-4.19***	-4.50***
	(1.10)	(0.79)	(1.09)	(0.81)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.82+	0.09+	-0.66+	0.52+
	(0.94)	(1.20)	(0.92)	(1.37)
2008-2011	-2.95**	-2.58+	-2.94**	-2.39+
	(0.89)	(1.58)	(0.88)	(1.50)
2012-2015	-1.79*	-1.04+	-2.17**	-1.13+
	(0.85)	(1.66)	(0.81)	(1.57)
2016-2020	-1.40+	-1.15+	-1.21+	-0.98+
	(0.94)	(1.41)	(0.95)	(1.40)
Constant	-11.16***	-2.81+	-9.90**	-0.80+
	(2.75)	(2.19)	(3.60)	(2.91)
Pseudo R^2	0.54	0.54	0.53	0.55
Number of Cases	147	130	147	130

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.7 – Italian Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	E25 REG	E26 SW	E27 REG	E28 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.19***	-0.23***		
	(0.04)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.36*	-2.14**
			(0.63)	(0.66)
Monarchy	0.09+	-0.38+	-0.43+	-0.37+
	(0.60)	(0.64)	(0.71)	(0.68)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-1.76**	-1.46*	-0.78+	0.41+
	(0.65)	(0.72)	(0.67)	(0.66)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.06+	0.17**	0.06+	0.24***
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.01)
Language	0.28+	-0.13+	0.49+	0.31+
	(0.40)	(0.39)	(0.42)	(0.39)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.68	0.68	-0.09+	0.95*
	(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.12*	-0.21+	-0.74+	-0.17+
	(0.53)	(0.40)	(0.62)	(0.40)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.93+	-0.28+	-0.40+	0.21+
	(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.63)	(0.51)
2008-2011	0.62+	-0.42+	0.25+	-0.82+
	(0.56)	(0.59)	(0.54)	(0.54)
2012-2015	0.20+	-0.39+	-0.17+	-0.31+
	(0.62)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(0.60)
2016-2020	-0.48+	-1.63**	-0.31+	-1.65**
	(0.61)	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.56)
Cut 1	-5.05	-5.05	-2.49	0.06
	(2.21)	(2.60)	(2.08)	(2.28)
Cut 2	-3.64	-3.32	-1.20	1.59
	(2.21)	(2.61)	(2.08)	(2.28)
Cut 3	-2.92	-2.35	-0.53	2.47
	(2.20)	(2.59)	(2.09)	(2.30)
Cut 4	-2.01	-1.43	0.26	3.29
	(2.17)	(2.55)	(2.07)	(2.25)
Cut 5	-0.59	-0.23	-0.31	4.35
	(2.15)	(2.52)	(0.55)	(2.25)
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.14	0.05	0.09
Number of Cases	146	141	146	141

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.8 – Italian Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	E29 REG	E30 SW	E31 REG	E32 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.21**	-0.24*		
	(0.08)	(0.10)		
Comparative Unemployment			-3.34***	-3.18***
			(0.93)	(0.88)
Monarchy	-4.01**	-3.66**	-4.58**	-2.82*
	(1.25)	(1.08)	(1.45)	(1.14)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-9.32**	-5.29***	-10.22**	-3.56
	(2.94)	(1.25)	(2.97)	(1.94)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.03+	0.02+	0.09+	0.09+
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Language	-0.22+	-1.19*	-0.05+	-0.50+
	(0.45)	(0.56)	(0.41)	(0.38)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-1.65**	-0.32+	1.62+	0.02+
	(0.59)	(0.47)	(1.10)	(0.48)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.05+	1.07	-0.67+	0.43+
	(0.68)	(0.58)	(1.15)	(0.51)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.33+	-0.48+	0.05+	-0.00+
	(1.16)	(0.83)	(1.24)	(0.82)
2008-2011	2.16*	-0.36+	1.62+	-0.70+
	(1.04)	(0.85)	(1.10)	(0.85)
2012-2015	-0.39+	-0.72+	-0.67+	-0.78+
	(1.12)	(0.93)	(1.15)	(1.00)
2016-2020	0.12+	-1.25+	-0.43+	-1.56
	(0.99)	(0.85)	(1.12)	(0.94)
Constant	18.31**	14.52**	19.48**	9.75*
	(5.80)	(4.19)	(5.75)	(4.16)
Pseudo R^2	0.42	0.31	0.40	0.26
Number of Cases	146	141	146	141

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table E.9 – Italian Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	E33 REG	E34 SW	E35 REG	E36 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.03+	0.15+		
	(0.06)	(0.11)		
Comparative Unemployment			-0.05+	3.22
			(0.79)	(1.77)
Language	-1.54**	-4.94***	-1.47**	-5.13***
	(0.06)	(1.25)	(0.48)	(1.27)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	3.66***	4.36***	3.65***	4.05***
	(0.96)	(1.05)	(0.96)	(0.91)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.67***	0.96**	0.63***	1.06**
	(0.14)	(0.28)	(0.14)	(0.36)
Electoral System	3.25***	3.31**	3.00***	4.13**
	(0.71)	(1.05)	(0.77)	(1.27)
Vote Share (%)	-0.13***	-0.15**	-0.13***	-0.15**
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)
In Government Regionally	-3.72**	-5.69***	-3.62**	-5.21***
	(1.20)	(1.39)	(1.21)	(1.30)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.98+	-1.25+	-0.88+	-1.42+
	(1.07)	(1.34)	(1.12)	(1.56)
2008-2011	-3.44***	-6.59*	-3.35**	-6.40*
	(0.95)	(2.90)	(0.97)	(3.04)
2012-2015	-3.02**	-4.49**	-3.00**	-4.64**
	(1.04)	(1.46)	(1.07)	(1.70)
2016-2020	-2.64*	-4.74**	-2.46*	-5.15*
	(1.02)	(1.65)	(1.07)	(1.99)
Constant	-11.65***	-6.25	-11.03**	-10.03*
	(3.19)	(3.32)	(3.74)	(4.70)
Pseudo R^2	0.53	0.70	0.53	0.70
Number of Cases	146	141	146	141

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.10 – British Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (I)

Model	E37 REG	E38 SW	E39 REG	E40 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.14***	-0.20***		
	(0.03)	(0.04)		
Comparative Unemployment			-1.43**	-2.38***
			(0.43)	(0.51)
Monarchy	-1.69***	-2.16***	-1.98***	-2.79***
	(0.35)	(0.42)	(0.32)	(0.48)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-2.83*	-5.29***	-3.98**	-6.26***
	(1.29)	(1.36)	(1.15)	(1.37)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.03+	0.12	0.00+	0.12*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Language	0.11+	-0.02+	0.32+	0.42+
	(0.45)	(0.40)	(0.47)	(0.47)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.32+	0.62	0.16+	0.80*
	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.62)	(0.35)
Alternative National Independence Party	-0.12+	0.28+	-0.02+	0.28+
	(0.37)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.36)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.72+	-1.28+	-0.35+	-0.92+
	(0.70)	(0.83)	(0.70)	(0.80)
2008-2011	0.32+	-1.45	0.14+	-1.61*
	(0.61)	(0.84)	(0.60)	(0.82)
2012-2015	-0.16+	-1.80	0.58+	-2.27*
	(0.66)	(0.94)	(0.63)	(0.89)
2016-2020	-0.36+	-3.06**	-0.45+	-3.42***
	(0.64)	(0.90)	(0.63)	(0.87)
Cut 1	-7.76	-12.68	-8.72	-13.37
	(2.90)	(3.41)	(2.59)	(3.52)
Cut 2	-6.13	-10.73	-7.15	-11.57
	(2.88)	(3.40)	(2.58)	(3.50)
Cut 3	-5.66	-9.97	-6.68	-10.81
	(2.86)	(3.37)	(2.57)	(3.49)
Cut 4	-4.61	-8.75	-5.65	-9.57
	(2.86)	(3.32)	(2.57)	(3.44)
Cut 5	-3.29	-7.30	-4.35	-8.13
	(2.84)	(3.31)	(2.55)	(3.48)
Pseudo R^2	0.11	0.19	0.09	0.17
Number of Cases	151	128	151	128

Ordinal logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Table E.11 – British Cases Removed: Effects on the Left-Right Ideology of National Independence Parties (II)

Model	E41 REG	E42 SW	E43 REG	E44 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.24***	-0.27**		
	(0.07)	(0.10)		
Comparative Unemployment			-3.52***	-5.58***
			(0.82)	(1.38)
Monarchy	-3.35**	-3.71***	-4.16***	-5.18***
	(1.00)	(0.84)	(0.81)	(0.82)
Military Spending (% of GDP)	-6.79*	-9.24**	-8.02**	-11.99**
	(2.88)	(2.93)	(2.58)	(3.90)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.00+	0.03+	0.07+	0.04+
	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.14)
Language	-0.36+	-0.92	0.00+	-0.29+
	(0.44)	(0.54)	(0.42)	(0.63)
Left-Right Ideology of the Largest Non-NIP	-0.83+	-0.65+	-0.29+	-0.83+
	(0.57)	(0.52)	(0.53)	(0.60)
Alternative National Independence Party	-1.02	1.66**	-1.10	0.76+
	(0.58)	(0.48)	(0.65)	(0.63)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-0.66+	-0.67+	0.03+	-0.44+
	(0.98)	(1.10)	(1.11)	(1.01)
2008-2011	1.11+	-0.36+	0.87+	-0.74+
	(0.72)	(1.06)	(0.76)	(1.03)
2012-2015	-0.63+	-1.07+	-1.02+	-2.04
	(0.93)	(1.18)	(0.93)	(1.17)
2016-2020	-0.38+	-1.75	-0.74+	-3.01**
	(0.77)	(1.05)	(0.88)	(1.01)
Constant	15.56**	18.81**	16.70**	25.33**
	(5.98)	(6.50)	(5.07)	(8.19)
Pseudo R^2	0.35	0.34	0.35	0.42
Number of Cases	151	128	151	128

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Table E.12 – British Cases Removed: Effects on the Mainstream-Radical Ideology of National Independence Parties

Model	E45 REG	E46 SW	E47 REG	E48 SW
Unemployment (%)	-0.07+	-0.01+		
	(0.05)	(0.09)		
Comparative Unemployment			-0.97+	-1.58+
			(0.85)	(1.39)
Language	-1.54**	-3.02***	-1.45**	-2.90***
	(0.56)	(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.67)
Alternative Mainstream NIP	3.68***	2.61*	3.74***	2.68*
	(0.86)	(1.18)	(0.86)	(1.09)
Statewide Foreign Born Population (%)	0.73***	0.65*	0.64***	0.64*
	(0.13)	(0.26)	(0.14)	(0.27)
Electoral System	3.71***	2.80**	3.06***	2.74**
	(0.70)	(0.92)	(0.82)	(0.89)
Vote Share (%)	-0.11***	-0.08**	-0.11***	-0.10**
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
In Government Regionally	-3.97***	-4.01***	-3.95***	-4.12***
	(0.99)	(0.77)	(1.00)	(0.70)
Time Fixed Effects (Baseline: 2000-2003)				
2004-2007	-1.56+	-0.50+	-1.12+	-0.19+
	(1.29)	(1.56)	(1.36)	(1.75)
2008-2011	-4.28***	-4.00	-4.02***	-3.67
	(1.12)	(2.07)	(1.13)	(2.00)
2012-2015	-3.24**	-2.48+	-3.09**	-2.38+
	(1.04)	(1.96)	(1.02)	(1.92)
2016-2020	-3.11**	-2.58+	-2.61*	-2.28+
	(1.03)	(1.68)	(1.08)	(1.71)
Constant	-12.90***	-5.98+	-10.49*	-5.07+
	(3.64)	(4.75)	(4.38)	(4.76)
Pseudo R^2	0.54	0.59	0.54	0.59
Number of Cases	151	128	151	128

Binary logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors: + $p<0.10$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

Spanish cases were removed through a robustness check in Chapter Four, in order to establish that Spanish cases were not having a disproportionate influence on the findings from the Chapter. This was done due to the large number of Spanish Cases which were included in both the regional and statewide datasets. Spanish cases had to be removed from the combined dataset, rather than the two original individual datasets, due to the fact that removing so many cases from smaller datasets was causing some of the models to fail to converge. While Spain had the largest number of cases, there were a number of other countries which also had larger numbers of cases. Due to this, cases from the

four countries with the largest number of cases, other than Spain, have been removed from the database as a final robustness check. These four countries are Canada, Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom. In turn, cases from each of these countries have been removed and then the methods used for Models 1-12 in Chapter Four have been reconducted. This was done in order to ensure that none of the significant cases looked at in this thesis have had any disproportionate impact on the results from Chapter Four, on which the findings from this thesis heavily rely on.

Looking at the models above, there is a clear continuation with the findings from the original models in Chapter Four. When each of the four countries is removed, there continues to be a statistically significant relationship between unemployment and left-right ideology. When all four countries are removed, there is still evidence to support a statistically significant relationship between left-right ideology and both a monarchy and higher levels of military spending. Removing each of the four countries did not have any significant impact on the factors which influence mainstream-radical ideology. Despite each country being removed, it was still found that the lack of a distinct language, higher levels of immigration and a mainstream rival national independence party all cause national independence parties to become more radical.