University of Reading

A Critical Discourse Study of gender representations and gendered discourses in the debate on women's driving in Saudi Arabia on Twitter During the ban on women driving

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Department of English Language & Applied Linguistics

Arwa AlSaby

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Declaration of original authorship

‘Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.’

Arwa Al-Saby

Abstract

Before the historic lifting of the ban on women driving (WD) intense debates among men and women in Saudi Arabia took place on Twitter. These discussions were rich that various hashtags about women driving repeatedly reached the Twitter trending list in the Kingdom. The gendered nature of this richness can be explored by taking a critical approach to the study of these tweets. This qualitative research, informed by critical discourse studies, and particularly van Leeuwen's (2008) and Sunderland's approach (2004) critically analysed one of the trending Twitter hashtags about women driving that was trending during the ban on women driving. Van Leeuwen's (2008) approach is employed to critically analyse the way female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in Saudi Arabia are portrayed in the hashtag, specifically in tweets by those who were anti-women driving (Anti-WD) and pro-women driving (Pro-WD). This was combined with Sunderland's approach in order to identify and name the various gendered discourses that were drawn upon in the representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving. Thematic analysis was also used to deepen the study's understanding of how the different gender representations are constructed in the tweets, and to categorize repeated themes associated with gender in the analysed data. Combining all of these frameworks, the research objective is to illustrate how language and gender and gender roles, relations, and gendered discourses are connected discursively. The findings showed similar gender related themes in the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets and in regard to representations there were also similarities and differences in the representations of female and male supporters and opponents. The study identified several gendered discourses in the representations of the social actors in the tweets made by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users. All of the identified discourses fall within traditional gendered discourses. The study results show that, despite where the authors of the tweets overtly positioned themselves in regard to women driving, whether advocate or against, they both reinforced and drew on similar gendered discourses, indicating the same gendered ideologies are shared by opposing groups. This study contributes to the field of CDS by providing a non-

western perspective rather a Saudi perspective about an issue that exist in Saudi Arabia unlike the Western perspectives generally found in CDS studies that examined Western newspapers and media discussing the issue of women driving in Saudi. The study also contributes to the field of CDS by examining the issue, not from the narrow viewpoint of symbolic elites, such as female activists and male religious clerics, as other studies have done, but from the unique perspective of tweets by Saudi people; people who actively tweeted on trending hashtags regardless of the numbers of followers they had. The study adopts a unique perspective on the examination of women driving because it recognises that both men and women could be either opponents or supporters of the move, transcending the simplistic and narrow men versus women interpretation. It further contributes to the field of CDS and gender studies by addressing gaps in knowledge, particularly with regard to the Arabic language but also in relation to gender and social media in the Saudi context. It presents concrete and substantial linguistic evidence, in Arabic, of the ways in which female and male supporters and opponents have been represented on the Twitter social media platform. Finally, the research is noteworthy and original because it identifies and names previously uncharted gendered discourses, constituting a major contribution to the field.

Table of Contents

Abstract ..... **III**

Acknowledgements ..... **XI**

List of Figures ..... **XII**

List of Tables ..... **XIII**

Transliteration Conventions ..... **XIV**

List of Abbreviations ..... **XVI**

Chapter 1 – Introduction **1**

1.1 Background and rationale for the study **1**

1.2 Research questions **5**

1.3 Outline of the thesis **6**

Chapter 2 – Historical development of gender social roles in Saudi Arabia **9**

2.1 Politics and religion in Saudi Arabia **9**

2.2 Traditional social values and gender roles **10**

2.3 Before modernization and urbanization and oil **11**

2.4 After modernization and urbanization and the discovery of oil **14**

2.5 Education **15**

2.6 Religious Awakening Movement **18**

2.7 Post 9/11 & the 2030 vision **20**

2.8 Women driving in Saudi Arabia **23**

Chapter 3 – Literature review **27**

3.1 Social media **29**

3.1.1 From traditional media to social media *29*

3.1.2 Digital activism *33*

3.1.3 Women and social media *37*

3.2 From mass media to social media and the influence on women driving **41**

3.2.1 The introduction of printed press and broadcast media in Saudi Arabia *42*

3.2.2 The internet and the popularity of social media in Saudi Arabia *43*

3.2.3 Twitter in Saudi Arabia *47*

3.3 Gender **49**

3.3.1 Theoretical orientations to analysing gender *49*

3.3.2 The discursive construction of gender *52*

3.3.3 The representation of gender identities *55*

3.3.3.1 Masculinities 59

3.3.4 Gender ideologies *63*

3.3.5 Representation *65*

3.3.6 Gender representations *66*

3.3.6.1 Print Media and Digital media 66

3.3.7 Gendered discourses *72*

Chapter 4 – Theoretical framework **82**

4.1 Overview of Critical Discourse Studies **82**

4.2 Tenets and aims of CDS **86**

4.3 The notions of critique and criticality in CDS **87**

4.4 The notion of discourse **88**

4.5 Different approaches to CDS **90**

4.5.1 The Socio-semantic approach - Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice *93*

Chapter 5 – Description of research procedures and methodology **97**

5.1 Research design **98**

5.2 Rationale for using Twitter **100**

5.3 Twitter and its hashtag feature **102**

5.4 Data collection method **104**

5.5 Sampling techniques **105**

5.5.1 Pre-selection criteria for the hashtags to be analysed *109*

5.5.2 Exclusion of non-trending hashtags *113*

5.5.3 Preparing the data for analysis *117*

5.5.3.1 Cleaning the data ... 117
5.5.3.2 A note about the collected hashtags ... 121
5.5.3.3 Initial coding process ... 122
5.6 Data translation ... 125
5.7 Analytical framework ... 130
5.7.1 Exclusion and Inclusion ... 132
5.7.1.1 Activation and Passivation ... 134
5.7.1.2 Impersonalization or Personalization ... 136
5.7.1.2.1 Genericization and Specification ... 137
5.7.1.2.1.1 Individualization and Assimilation ... 137
5.7.1.2.1.1.1 Aggregation and Collectivization ... 138
5.7.1.2.2 Indetermination and Determination ... 139
5.7.1.2.2.1 Association and Dissociation ... 139
5.7.1.2.2.2 Nomination and Categorization ... 140
5.8 Thematic analysis ... 143
5.9 Self-reflexivity ... 151
5.10 Consideration of ethical issues ... 152
Chapter 6 – Findings ... 160
6.1 During the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia ... 164
6.1.1 Pro-WD tweet analysis ... 164
6.1.1.1 Gender related human representations dominant theme ... 164
6.1.1.1.1 Stereotypical gender roles ... 164
6.1.1.1.2 Familial relations ... 166
6.1.1.1.2.1 Stereotyped paternal relationship ... 166
6.1.1.1.2.2 Relational identification ... 168
6.1.1.1.3 Marital status, employment and education status ... 171
6.1.1.1.4 Relationship between gender and power ... 174
6.1.1.1.4.1 Female representations ... 174
6.1.1.1.4.2 Male representations ... 175
6.1.1.1.5 Power and male gender identity ... 176
6.1.1.1.5.1 Male biological sex ... 176
6.1.1.1.5.2 Manhood ... 177
6.1.1.1.5.3 Men's masculinities and women's honour ... 177

6.1.1.1.6 Female polarised roles 179
6.1.1.2 Gender related non-human representations dominant theme 181
6.1.1.2.1 Animal 181
6.1.1.2.2 Objectivation 184
6.1.1.2.2.1 Objectivation of body parts 186
6.1.1.3 Ideological stance representations dominant theme 189
6.1.1.4 Negative appraisements representations dominant theme 194
6.1.1.4.1 Male 194
6.1.1.4.1.1 Intellectual abilities 195
6.1.1.4.1.2 Sick minded 198
6.1.1.4.1.3 Fearful 199
6.1.1.4.2 Female –selfishness 199
6.1.1.5 Affiliation and geographical locations dominant theme 200
6.1.1.5.1 Nation 200
6.1.1.5.2 Society 202
6.1.1.5.3 Nationality and ethnicity 205
6.1.2 Anti-driving tweet analysis 206
6.1.2.1 Gender related human representation dominant theme 206
6.1.2.1.1 Stereotypical gender roles 206
6.1.2.1.2 Familial relations 211
6.1.2.1.2.1 Stereotypical paternal relationship 211
6.1.2.1.2.2 Relational identification 214
6.1.2.1.3 Biological sex 217
6.1.2.1.4 Women 220
6.1.2.1.5 Power and male gender identity 221
6.1.2.1.5.1 Manhood 221
6.1.2.1.5.2 Protective jealousy 224
6.1.2.1.5.3 Men's masculinities and women's honour and chastity 225
6.1.2.1.6 Female gender identity theme 226
6.1.2.1.6.1 Femininity 227
6.1.2.1.6.2 Female chastity 227
6.1.2.1.7 Female marital status and employment 228
6.1.2.1.8 Immaturity 230
6.1.2.2 Gender related non-human representations dominant theme 232
6.1.2.2.1 Animal 232
6.1.2.2.1.1 Animals and politics 238

6.1.2.2.2 Objectivation of body parts 243
6.1.2.3 Representations with affiliation and geographical locations dominant theme 244
6.1.2.3.1 Naturalization 244
6.1.2.3.2 Followers 247
6.1.2.3.3 Enemies and outsiders 248
6.1.2.4 Representations using ideological stance and political party dominant theme 248
6.1.2.4.1 Liberals and secularists 249
6.1.2.4.2 Female activists 251
6.1.2.5 Negative appraisements representations dominant theme 252
6.1.2.5.1 Intellectual and mental abilities 252
6.1.2.5.2 Deformity 254
6.1.2.5.3 Fem-supporters' morals 254
6.1.2.5.4 M-supporters' morals 255

Chapter 7 – Discussion 257

7.1 Mobilization of the same discourse in other studies 259

7.2 Identified gendered discourses and gendered ideologies 261

7.2.1 Gender differences discourse 261
7.2.2 Patriarchy discourse 262
7.2.3 Mahram discourse 263
7.2.4 Men as breadwinners' discourse 264
7.2.5 Female domesticity discourse 265
7.2.6 The socioeconomic status of men discourse 265
7.2.7 Traditional femininity discourse 267
7.2.7.1 Mother of boys as privileged 267
7.2.7.2 Selfless women discourse 268
7.2.7.3 Saudi women as queens discourse and Women as jewels or pearls discourse 269
7.2.7.4 Marriage is important to women discourse 270
7.2.7.5 Women beware women discourse 272
7.2.8 Women as sexual objects for men discourse 272
7.2.9 Male sex-drive discourse 273
7.2.10 Females are gullible discourse 273
7.2.11 Foolish women discourse 274
7.2.12 Passive Saudi women 275
7.2.13 Men as wolves discourse 276

7.2.14 Women as prey discourse ... 277

7.2.15 Women enslave themselves to men discourse ... 277

7.2.16 Men fear women's freedom discourse ... 277

7.2.17 Men-power abuse discourse and Powerless men and powerful women discourse ... 278

7.2.18 Female subordination and male masculinity discourse ... 279

7.2.19 Unequal male and female opportunities discourse ... 281

7.3 Gendered discourses in other contexts and languages ... 281

Chapter 8 – Conclusion ... 291

8.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research ... 292

8.2 Originality and Contributions of this research ... 296

8.3 Implications of the Study ... 303

8.4 Concluding remarks ... 304

References ... 306

List of Appendices ... 341

10.1 Appendix A Pro-Women Driving translations of oringal tweets ... 341

10.2 Appendix B Anti-Women Driving translations of original tweets ... 354

10.3 Appendix C Saudi public figures Twitter accounts ... 375

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List of Figures

Figure 5.1 Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Network (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 52) 130

Figure 6.1 Analytical Procedures – Inductive analysis to reveal social actor representations and themes 161

Figure 6.2 Analytical procedures for the identification of gendered discourses and gender ideologies 162

List of Tables

Table 5.1 Research questions 99

Table 5.2 All trending hashtags discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia from 2016-2018 107

Table 5.3 All trending hashtags discussing WD during the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia in 2016 110

Table 5.4 Analysed hashtag and the period in which it was trending in relation to the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia 112

Table 5.5 Number of analysed tweets that refer to social actors in total and in Pro-women driving with reference to social actors and Anti-women driving with reference to social actors 124

Table 5.6 Emoji for social actor representation 129

Table 5.7 An example: A tweet collected in connection with the hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity 148

Transliteration Conventions

The following transliteration conventions, by Bassiouney and Katz (2012), were utilised in this study.

أ	ʾ
ب	b
ت	t
ث	θ
ج	j
ح	ḥ
خ	x
د	d
ذ	ð
ر	r
ز	z
س	s
ش	ʃ
ص	ṣ
ض	ḍ
ط	ṭ
ظ	ẓ
ع	ʿ
غ	ġ
ف	f
ق	q
ك	k

ل	l
م	m
ن	n
ه	h
و	w
ى	y

Bassiouney and Katz (2012) transliteration conventions also include the following :

The use of –a in pause and –at in construct forms for feminine ending.

For the adjectival ending it is transcribed as -ī (masculine) and -īya (feminine), respectively.

In Standard Arabic Bassiouney and Katz (2012) specified that vowels are represented as a, i, u, ā, ī, ū, while ē and ō are employed for dialects transcription.

List of Abbreviations

CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDS	Critical Discourse Studies
Anti-WD	Anti-Women Driving
Pro-WD	Pro-Women Driving
M-opponents	Male opponents
M-supporters	Male supporters
Fem-opponents	Female opponents
Fem-supporters	Female supporters
WD	Women Driving
Information And Communication Technologies	ICT
Computer-Mediated Communication	CMC

Chapter 1 – Introduction

1.1 Background and rationale for the study

On the 26th September 2017 Saudi women were allowed to drive, and with that, Saudi Arabia lifted the ban on women driving. This was a monumental shift for Saudi women and a noteworthy social change. It was preceded by intense discussion on Twitter about women driving and women being in the driver's seat and having the freedom to drive on their own, without a guardian, and next to men.

This qualitative study is positioned within Critical Discourse Studies (CDS). It will draw on van Leeuwen's (2008) framework for social actor representation to examine and compare representations of social actors. The social actors in this case are female and male opponents and supporters of women's driving in Saudi Arabia who used a Twitter hashtag to discuss women driving during the ban on women driving, which was a historical period marked by gender social inequality. It will also draw on Sunderland's approach (2004) to detect and name the gendered discourses detected were identified by analysing the female and male opponents and supporters of women driving.

The rationale behind the study is to examine the representations of opposing groups of social actors (female and male opponents and supporters) at the micro level, which will show the gender stereotypes and gender norms and roles in Saudi society. The analysis will also identify and name the gendered discourses from which the social actor representations are drawn at the meso level. This will enable the study to reveal the gender ideologies at the macro level when the analysis looks across all three levels.

Analysis of the representations of named social actors in the hashtags on women driving in said period will help us to understand "the complex part language plays, alongside other social practices and institutions, in reflecting, creating, and sustaining gender divisions in

society" (Talbot, 2010, p. 16). The research aim is to show how language and gender and gender roles, relations, and gendered discourses are connected discursively.

This research is important because various studies have examined the stereotyping and negative representation of Saudi women in the Western media and have illustrated that the negative portrayal of Saudi women seems to revolve around oppression, powerlessness, and passivity. These studies, including an examination by Bashatah (2017) of Saudi women in the British press, using content and framing analyses, have found that representations of Saudi women reflect the same negative depiction as that of Muslim women in other Western media, a depiction that is ingrained in the Western ideology of Orientalism. In relation to CDS, Al-Hejin (2015) conducted a corpus-based critical discourse analysis of two news outlets, the BBC and Arab News,[1] to explore the representation of Muslim women. Within his work, he also specifically studied the representation of Saudi women, and the results revealed that they were mostly depicted using negative representations, such as powerlessness and passivity. Alharbi (2015) conducted a critical discourse study to investigate Western media representations of Saudi women which echoed the findings of other studies, as Saudi women were again depicted as oppressed and submissive. Both Al-Hejin (2015) and Alharbi (2015) studied English discourse. A review of the CDS literature with respect to issues related to Muslim women, and more specifically Saudi women, exposes a lack of examination of Arabic language and culture and a focus on Western media discourse.

By examining a hashtag about women driving, this study aims to show that Saudi women were sufficiently active and powerful to transcend gender segregation in the public sphere in the period under investigation to debate an issue that related to women, namely that of women driving, whilst simultaneously being respectful of the government and the country's laws. Moreover, the analysis of tweets may help portray an image that is more representative and

[1] An English-language Saudi newspaper.

realistic of Saudi women than the negative stereotype heavily displayed in Western media, as illustrated by Al-Hejin (2015) and Alharbi (2015). Many of the studies concerned with the representation of Saudi women have examined Western perspectives by analysing Western media. This study is unique as it provides a non-Western perspective by analysing a Twitter hashtag in Arabic discussing women driving.

With respect to CDS studies that have examined women driving in Saudi Arabia, this research is also unique because it will not analyse social media data produced by political, social, or symbolic elites, examples of which include work by Al Maghlouth (2017) who examined Saudi English-language blogs. The posts examined were specifically related to women, including about women driving, and were written by three Saudi bloggers who were deemed to be part of a liberal and forward thinking part of Saudi society. Alharbi (2016) also conducted a critical discourse study on women driving by analysing posts written by well-known Saudi female bloggers who were known activists and regularly featured in the traditional media. The posts were not compared to blogs written by conservative Saudi women as such posts did not exist, but rather to posts made by anonymous women on Islamic websites. Another example is Almahmoud (2015) who focused on tweets about the "Women2drive" campaign by religious scholars, who are considered to belong to the conservative part of Saudi society, and female activists, who are considered to be a liberal element of society. Therefore, the scope of this study is broader than that of previous research. The research is also important as it examines the Arabic language which is the official language of Saudi Arabia.

Some CDS studies have focused on women driving but have not examined elite discourses, for example, Alamrim (2017), who looked at YouTube, and particularly YouTube comments, which is a different social medium than the one examined in this study which is Twitter. The Alamri (2017) study was centred on the strategies of legitimisation, which is different from

the focus of this study. Finally, a corpus-assisted discourse study was conducted by Altoaimy (2017), who analysed tweets about women driving, but her study concentrated on the discursive strategies used to support or oppose women driving in Saudi Arabia which contrasts with the focus of the current study.

This study therefore, contributes to the growing volume of scholarly literature that explores the discursive ways in which critical movements navigate social media and looks at studies that examine the representations of marginalised groups. It also aims to enrich the field of CDS and social media discourse analysis that has examined online data. The research may add a valuable perspective to the analysis of discourses concerning other female related issues in Saudi Arabia.

Also, the study aims to add new insights to the CDS of Saudi women driving by examining it from a different angle. To the best of the author's knowledge, there is no study that has examined and compared social actor representations of Saudi females and males as opponents and supporters, as other critical discourse studies seem to limit male opponents to religious clerics only, and to group all Saudi women together in a single group or only focus on Saudi female activists. To date, there has not been a study that has examined the discourse on women driving in which females and males were categorized as both opponents and supporters.

This study will add to the limited number of studies that have examined the Arabic language and culture in the field of discourse and gender. By applying van Leeuwen frameworks to Twitter data this research will extend the application of the selected frameworks into a different context, discourse and language. This study will contribute to the limited existing knowledge and scholarship in the field of Arabic CDS using van Leeuwen's (2008) framework for social actor representations, to illustrate how it can be applied to nonstandard

Arabic, and to establish whether Van Leeuwen's categories require modification when utilised with non-standard Arabic.

By applying Sunderland's approach (2004) to identify and name the gendered discourses in tweets this research will expand utilisation of the framework into a different context, discourse and language. In relation to existing knowledge, this study contributes to the low number of studies that have identified and named gendered discourses in Arabic. To the researcher's knowledge, no study has previously identified gendered discourse in tweets about women driving in Saudi Arabia. Also, no study has compared how both supporters and opponents have employed gendered discourses. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, the only study that has identified a number of gendered discourses that relate to issues about Saudi women is by Bahammam (2018) and examines hashtag discussions about Saudi women, mainly to do with travel control for Saudi women and the plummeting number of marriages. However, the gendered discourses identified by Bahammam (2018) were not the extent of to this study.

1.2 Research questions

This study asks the following research questions concerning the representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving, who are the social actors to be found in a Twitter hashtag that discussed the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia prior to the lifting of the ban:

1. How were the named social actors represented during the driving ban by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users? To answer this question, the following sub-questions were asked.
    1.1. How are they linguistically realized, and through which discursive strategies?
    1.2. What are the similarities and what are the differences in the way female and male supporters and opponents are portrayed by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users?

To answer these questions, it will be necessary to examine how the different social actors are positioned, and subsequently to discuss the different gender identities, masculinities and femininities, and the gender relations that are drawn out for female and male opponents and supporters of women driving, together with possible explanations where differences and similarities exist.

This study asks the following research questions concerning the gendered discourses that were drawn upon in the representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in a Twitter hashtag that discussed the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia prior to the lifting of the ban:

2. What are the gendered discourses that were identified and named?
    2.1. What are the similarities and what are the differences between the types of gendered discourses that were invoked by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users?
    2.2. How did Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users draw on these gendered discourses? In answering this question it will be examined whether the gendered discourses were used to reinforce or undermine gendered stereotypes and gender ideologies.
    2.3. What are the relationships between the identified gendered discourses? i.e., are they competing discourses, mutually supportive, or dominant discourses.

1.3 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organised into eight chapters, the first of which provides a brief introduction. Chapter 2 presents an overview of the socio-political and religious context in Saudi Arabia in which the study is situated. Additionally, the chapter presents a historical and chronological overview of the progression of gender roles in Saudi Arabia, with a focus on the social, political, and economic factors and events that have shaped the current status of women and gender roles in the Kingdom. It also presents a review of the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia, examining its beginnings, the various Saudi women's campaigns for driving, and the employment of social media in those campaigns.

Chapter 3 provide the literature review and consists of three main sections that relate to the examination of women driving in social media, particularly Twitter. The first section explores the impact of the development of social media on traditional media. It also discusses the relationship between digital media and activism and examines the literature regarding the critical role of social media in socio-political participation, activism and collective movement. The section concludes with a focus on women and social media. The second section concentrates on Saudi Arabia and how the progression from traditional media to social media, particularly Twitter, has influenced the issue under examination, which is women driving. The third section introduces the main concepts and how they inform and facilitate this study in its examination of gender representations of female and male supporters and opponents of women driving and the gendered discourses in the trending hashtag about women driving.

Chapter 4 presents the theoretical background of the study in relation to critical discourse studies and discusses the concepts of critique and discourse. The chapter also provides an overview of the major approaches to CDS, with a particular focus on the van Leeuwen approach, which was used in this study to examine the representations of social actors.

Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the research procedures and methodology employed in this qualitative study. Chapter 6 presents the findings of the analysis of the hashtag discussing women driving. The chapter begins by presenting the analysis of Pro-WD tweets, followed by the examination of the analysis of Anti-WD tweets.

Chapter 7 presents a discussion of the findings, it start by exploring a key finding in this study which is the employment of similar discourses by both sides of the debate. By exploration of the extent to which such usage has been observed in other research. Then the chapter move to focus more specifically on the relationship between the gendered discourses identified in

Chapter 6, and how the Anti-WD and Pro-WD draw on these discourses. Afterwards the chapter move to broadens and refines the discussion around the gendered discourses identified in this thesis by connecting it to the broader field of CDS. It accomplishes this by conducting a comparative analysis, contrasting the gendered discourses categorized in this research with those identified in other studies that have examined different languages within various cultural settings.

The concluding Chapter 8 addresses the limitations of this study and offers suggestions for future research to overcome some of these constraints. It underscores the originality and contribution of the study to broader research on CDS and Twitter, emphasizing its potential impact. The chapter concludes with final remarks on the research.

Chapter 2 – Historical development of gender social roles in Saudi Arabia

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the socio-political and religious context in Saudi Arabia in which the study is positioned. It then provides a historical and chronological overview of the development of gender roles in the country, focusing on social, political and economic factors and events that have shaped and influenced the current status of women and gender roles in the Kingdom. The chapter concludes with a review of the issue of women's driving in Saudi Arabia, examining its beginnings, Saudi women's campaigns for driving, and the use of social media that developed and transformed those campaigns as they took them to the virtual world.

2.1 Politics and religion in Saudi Arabia

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a monarchy, ruled by the Al-Saud family (Cordesman, 2003). The official religion of Saudi Arabia is Islam, and the country is governed by *sharia* which translates as Islamic law. Sharia is derived from both the Qur'an[2] and the Sunna[3] according to Article one of The Basic Law of Governance in Saudi Arabia (*The Basic Law of Governance*, 1992). Regulations are also issued by the king. These regulations are governed by one condition, namely that they should not contradict the Qur'an and/or the Sunna (Vogel, 2000). The Qur'an is considered by Muslims to be the actual word of God which was conveyed to the prophet Muhammed, peace and blessings be upon him,[4] and the Sunna contains the sayings and actions of the prophet (Vogel, 2000). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia constitution is the Holy Qur'an, and the Sunna of the Prophet peace be upon him (*Basic Law of Governance*, n.d).

[2] There are different spellings of Qur'an. Others are Quran and Koran.
[3] Another spelling is Sunnah.
[4] Used by Muslims after the prophet is mentioned either in speech or writing as a way to show respect.

2.2 Traditional social values and gender roles

Since the founding of Saudi Arabia all tribes have united as one country, but still, people maintain their tribal customs and social and Islamic traditions (Aldhobaib, 2017; Maisel, 2014). As Saudi Arabia is a tribal, conservative society, its social values are believed to be derived from the noble tribal groups and have passed over into Islamic society (Zuhur, 2012). These social values consist of upholding specific norms of behaviour, such as generosity and hospitality, and most importantly, upholding the honour of the family and the tribe (Zuhur, 2012).

Family honour represents the value and status of the family in society (Mosquera et al., 2002). The family honour, including that of its male members, is heavily dependent on women's behaviour which should be characterised by modesty, virtue, chastity and deference to men (Abu-Lughod, 1986). All Arab societies uphold the notion of female honour, it is not peculiar to Saudi society (Zuhur, 2012). Therefore, the inappropriate actions of a woman will impact not only on herself but the entire family (Arebi, 1994), even if those actions were appropriate, but perceived as improper by her family, tribe, and society; for example, marrying a foreign man. In Saudi society, if a family loses its honour, it loses everything (Del Castillo, 2003). As traditionally women are the embodiment of the family honour, it is necessary to protect them to defend the honour of the family and the tribe (Almunajjed, 1997). The interpretation of protecting female honour varies from one family to another.

In Islam, modesty and chastity are social virtues that are not peculiar to women; men must also practice these virtues. For example, men should not speak or socialise with females who are not their relatives. Modest behaviour is interpreted in Saudi Arabia through the practice of segregation (Zuhur, 2012). Both men and women are expected to abstain from extramarital sexual relations until they wed. This is not a social value but a religious one. Women's social reputations are linked to honour, which could explain why those reputations are the concern

of their male guardians according to Zuhur (2012). In Saudi Arabia, unmarried women are expected to live with their families, as living alone would ruin a woman's reputation. It is important to highlight, however, that unmarried men also live with their families. This is the norm, and the exception is for unmarried men and women to live alone.

Overall, men assume the role of protector of all woman-related issues, while women carry and embody the most important and valuable attribute of the family, which is honour, and are also its protectors. This contradicts the view that females have a lower status than men, but women are still the ones whose movements are more restricted and whose behaviour is under scrutiny by their family.

To understand the social situation in Saudi Arabia, how the social roles of men and women developed, and the asymmetrical gendered power relations, it is essential to examine the significant events that impacted those social roles. These events are examined in an approximately chronological order. Social roles before the modernization period of Saudi Arabia and the discovery of oil are presented first, followed by those roles as they became after modernization, urbanization and the discovery of oil.

2.3 Before modernization and urbanization and oil

Earlier traditional roles are illustrated by Al-Sudairy (2017), who examined those of Saudi woman in the 19th century. According to Al-Sudairy (2017), the first significant issue that she faced was that the role of Saudi women before 1950 is barely documented. She highlighted that historically, during the early 19th century, Saudi women's roles mainly revolved around being housewives and mothers, despite the fact that they also participated in the economy. Women were workers and occupied in various jobs based on their environment. At that point, that environment was dependent on which of two categories of inhabitant they belonged to, as recorded by Al-Sudairy (2017). The first category of inhabitants were the Bedouin, or nomadic people, whose environment was always changing as tribes moved constantly due to

the scarcity of water or the frequency of raids. The second category were the Hadri, or sedentary people, and their environment was fixed as they resided in villages and cities. Bedouin, or nomadic, women would weave wool which was used to make tents, collected wood for fires, and watered animals which was a significant job that was usually performed in groups due to its difficulty (Al-Sudairy, 2017). Hadri, or sedentary, women performed different jobs, for instance milking cattle to produce milk-related products such as butter and yogurt. Thus, the roles that women played not only differed based on whether they were Bedouin or Hadri, but also based on the region in which they lived.

According to Al-Sudairy (2017), prior to the formation of Saudi Arabia, women in the south would guard their farms against Turkish soldiers. Their guarding role involved watching the farm and alerting their husband to intruders. Al-Sudairy (2017) noted that women who resided in towns and villages raised poultry and other animals, utilizing the milk products and eggs for their personal and family consumption. Women also sold these animal products, and would tan animal skins, to sell in the village or town markets. Hadri women were responsible for feeding the animals, supervising the irrigation of crops, and helping to plough the land with the aid of various animals, including camels and oxen. Hadri women also grew herbs and plants for personal use, to make remedies, or to sell for profit in the market. Bedouin women, on the other hand, had a different set of skills that qualified them for different tasks such as weaving.

Al-Sudairy (2017) also noted that there were well-known specialised women's markets in towns such as Aien Aljwa.[5] Some women would trade from their homes where they would set up a room for merchandise and receive female customers. Others provided a service, carrying products for other women for an agreed percentage. It is apparent from Al-Sudairy's

[5] Located in the north-west of the Al-Qassim region, less than 30 kilometres north-west of Buraydah, where the girls' education protests took place.

description that Saudi women were business owners who ran home businesses targeting female customers. These stores were considered to be a forum for social gathering, according to Al-Sudairy (2017). While in a number of towns women were limited to home businesses, in others they enjoyed more freedom; as Al-Sudairy comments, in some towns they even had their own shops in the market. Other female merchants were peddlers, or *dallala*, going from house to house with products on their heads. Those who were peddlers enjoyed greater freedom and mobility but had a lower status in society. It is apparent that status was connected with freedom and mobility, since women of lower status seem to have enjoyed more freedom than those of higher status. From the above, it is clear that Saudi women occupied a complex role, contributed to society, and participated in the economy. Al-Sudairy (2017) stressed that gender segregation was not equally practiced in all regions. Still, it appears that it was applied to a certain extent, but did not prevent women from participating in society.

According to Zuhur (2012), in 1932 when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was proclaimed a Kingdom, men's roles were mostly within the economic sphere while women's roles revolved around their household and family. In other words, women were confined to the domestic sphere while men dominated the public sphere. The limitation of women to domestic roles did not, however, apply to Bedouin women as they worked in herding (Zuhur, 2012). Whilst Bedouin women's freedom and mobility diminished with urbanization, they still performed roles that belonged to the public sphere in comparison to their Hadri, or sedentary, counterparts whose roles were exclusively confined to the private sphere.

The social roles discussed so far were typical of the period before the discovery of oil and the modernization of Saudi Arabia. They have had a significant impact on the roles of men and women in the Kingdom today. The next section closely examines how oil and modernization influenced gender roles in the country.

2.4 After modernization and urbanization and the discovery of oil

Modernization and oil have had a significant impact on Saudi Arabia and the roles of women and men in society. Oil was first discovered in vast commercial quantities in the Kingdom in 1938 (Altorki & Cole, 2013), and by 1980 the resultant revenues and wealth had enabled it to grow and develop (Zuhur, 2012). Oil-related wealth meant that workers could be imported and allowed the expansion of irrigation and the settling of many Bedouin (Zuhur, 2012). Ross (2008a) argues that oil, and not Islam, is the reason why women have fallen behind in numerous Muslim countries, highlighting that oil revenue "squeezed" and eliminated women from the labour force. The reason for this elimination is that economies transformed from the "traded sector" for example agriculture to the "non-traded sector" for instance construction which is dominated by male labour (Ross, 2008b).

Ross (2008a) points out that oil has a negative impact on gender relations, as it permits patriarchal norms to prevail resulting in patriarchal cultures. However, it is not only oil that has eliminated women from the labour force; there were other factors, such as cheaper imports which replaced higher costs locally crafted products produced by women (Le Renard, 2008). Another factor is that men's salaries rose and were able to adequately cover the needs of the entire family (Le Renard, 2008), which resulted in women becoming financially dependent on men.

Le Renard (2008) stated that, despite these reasons for the removal of women from the workplace, the fact that they are not required to work has been viewed socially as an indicator of wealth and moral distinction; that morally it is a "privilege" to protect women from external dangers. The social impact of being labelled wealthy or morally distinctive is another factor that has influenced the number of working women.

It is clear that oil wealth has reinforced certain social values like honour and the traditional roles of men and women. These traditional roles position men as breadwinners and defenders while women are mothers and homemakers who are vulnerable and require protection. The oil revenue enabled the Saudi government, which was actively promoting girls' education, to introduce formal standards for girls' education The way in which this has shaped the status of women and gender roles in Saudi Arabia will be examined in the next section.

2.5 Education

Oil revenue also enabled the government to introduce formal education to Saudi boys and girls. While the first Directorate of Education for boys was founded in 1926 (Almunajjed, 1997), there were no free public schools for girls in Saudi Arabia before 1960 (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991). The introduction of girls' education in Saudi Arabia can be attributed to two things. First, the Saudi government, headed by King Faisal between 1964 and 1975, who supported and prioritised girls' education (Al-Rasheed, 2010). King Faisal maintained that education within an Islamic framework must be provided for every Saudi (Almunajjed, 1997). The second reason consisted of requests received from a public that was concerned about Saudi social development. In 1950 the need for girls' education was voiced by many young educated middle-class men, who appealed to the government, mainly through the media newspapers, to address the issue of girls' education because they needed academically compatible wives (Almunajjed, 1997). They highlighted that educational compatibility is essential for families, children and even the harmony of a marriage (Almunajjed, 1997). They argued that the lack of girls' education resulted in a social problem, namely that a high number of men were opting to marry educated women from other Arab countries while Saudi girls were left single (Al-Rasheed, 2013; Almunajjed, 1997). The family unit is significant in Saudi Arabia which could explain why people who demanded girls' education approached it by emphasizing the significance of education to the traditional social role of women – that of wife and mother – and their need for qualified wives to start families. Marriages to foreign women were viewed as a significant threat to Saudi society and the maintenance of its

traditions and genealogy (Al-Rasheed, 2013). Girls' education was first addressed as a significant development by King Saud in 1959, and then in 1960 the first public primary school for girls was opened in the capital, Riyadh (Almunajjed, 1997).

The beginning of education for girls and women, which included enrolment in schools outside the privacy of their houses, was met with opposition from a number of religious scholars known as *Ulama* (Zuhur, 2012). The opposition argued that girls' education might result in Westernization and women's neglect of domestic duties (Zuhur, 2012). They also feared the corruption of girls' morals and the destruction of the family institution (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991; Almunajjed, 1997). The Ministry of Education oversaw boys' education because at that time it was the only government ministry that had experience in education (Almunajjed, 1997). In contrast, girls' education, until 2003, was the responsibility of The General Presidency of Girls' Education which is headed and managed by the Ulama (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991; Almunajjed, 1997; Zuhur, 2012).

The reasons behind The General Presidency of Girls' Education for overseeing only girls' education were:

The first reason according to Almunajjed (1997) was that the Ulama were apprehensive about the Ministry of Education and opposed the modern educational approach to be applied to girls' education, and the Saudi government agreed as it was eager to make progress. Another reason was that the Ulama, who were in charge of The General Presidency of Girls' Education, would persuade the conservatives that Islamic standards should be applied to girls' education and gender segregation upheld (Zuhur, 2012). The last reason was that the General Presidency of Girls' Education, which was under the supervision of the Ulama, would be able to ensure that women's education did not diverge from its original purpose, which was to prepare women to be good wives and mothers, and to train them for suitable occupations, for example teaching and nursing, that were deemed to suit their nature (Hamdan, 2005).

Inclusion of female education under the oversight of the Ulama was a clear indication of the level of resistance and fear of Westernization that could affect girls (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991; Hamdan, 2005).

The arguments of opponents to girls' education in Saudi Arabia are similar to those that were voiced in the West prior to the widespread introduction of female education (Zuhur, 2012), which are that education is not relevant to women's future home-based roles as mothers and wives and that it would have a negative impact on their morals (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991; Zuhur, 2012). More conservative opponents feared that girls' education would threaten and weaken family life (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991). The resistance to girls' public education in the conservative city of Buraydah, which is the capital of the Al-Qassim region in north-central Saudi Arabia, took the form of a public protest and stoning of schools (Almunajjed, 1997). King Faisal successfully opposed and convinced the conservatives who objected to girls' public education by quoting the Qur'an and Hadith to show that Islam does not prohibit or set restrictions on girls' education (Almunajjed, 1997). He also persuaded the conservatives that education would enable girls to become better Muslims because they would learn the Qur'an which would allow them to teach it to their offspring (Almunajjed, 1997). By approaching the issue of girls' education from a religious perspective and highlighting that Islam supports women's education, government attempts were successful.

Once girls gained access to education, Saudi women were, to a certain extent, brought from the private sphere to the public sphere. Despite the fact that girls gained access to education there were still various constraints set by religious scholars to ensure that girls' education was conducted in accordance with the principles of Islam (Almunajjed, 1997; Hamdan, 2005). Take, for example, the different representation of the sexes in textbooks, which Almunajjed (1997) claimed was due to the gender-based expectations that society held. The education system in Saudi Arabia used to treat the sexes in different ways (Almunajjed, 1997). The First

Year Reader book GPGE, 1978, for example, includes “my father goes to work; my mother stays at home and cooks and cares for the family” (Al Rawaf & Simmons, 1991, p. 291). According to Al Rawaf and Simmons (1991), an examination of girls’ textbooks revealed that the Department for Religious Guidance ensured that the freedom that women from overseas enjoyed was not portrayed as something deserving respect, and also that society’s traditional values were maintained. Another constraint was placed on girls’ education at the university level, where women’s degrees were limited to certain fields, such as education and teaching, human sciences, natural sciences, and Islamic studies, while the fields of engineering and agriculture, amongst others, were available only to male students (Almunajjed, 1997). It was not until 2005 that women were allowed to study law (Carrington, 2013) and become legal consultants, and not until 2013 that they were allowed to practice law before the Saudi judiciary (Naffee, 2013). This situation of limiting women to particular university majors resulted in unemployment among a large number of female graduates and over-employment within the fields of education and health (Elamin & Omair, 2010; Sidani, 2005). The fields of education and health care were considered fitting for women as they represented an extension of the stereotypical role of females as caretakers (Ismail, 2012). In Saudi society, it seems that there was an issue with gender specialization, although women’s roles have extended into other domains since they entered the workforce.

Empowerment for women in Saudi Arabia has experienced positive developments recently through reforms, as will be highlighted in Section 2.7. The next section presents an examination of a critical time in Saudi history, that witnessed the development of the Religious Awakening movement that had a significant impact on women’s roles in the Kingdom.

2.6 Religious Awakening Movement

Since the beginning of modernization in Saudi Arabia in the early 1970s, there have been growing tensions over the way in which society wanted to define the standards for its Islamic and social values, and one of the most debated issues has been the role of women (Doumato, 1991). The increasing levels of freedom and mobility that women were enjoying through education and work were seen from the very beginning by the religious groups to be dangerous Western ideas (Arebi, 1994). By 1970 Saudi Arabia had reached a point of economic development, and society had undergone rapid social change, which seemed to anger a group of rebels headed by an individual named Juhayman al-Otaybi who, in 1979, conducted a siege of the Grand Mosque which is located in Mecca (Van Geel, 2016). This siege lasted for two weeks and the rebels claimed that Saudi society had become immoral and corrupt as a result of Western impacts, amongst them cinema, working women, and even the television programs that were shown in Saudi Arabia (Alzahrani, 2013).

A result of the 1979 siege was the emergence of a conservatism that mostly influenced women as they were viewed as culture bearers (DeLong-Bas, 2009) and they became a symbol of piety (Al-Rasheed, 2013). For example, women's access to public spaces was restricted (DeLong-Bas, 2009). Women adopted conservative dress in the form of cloaks known as abayas and the face veil such as niqab, and female presenters vanished from Saudi TV channels (Doumato, 2009). Scholarships that enabled Saudi women to pursue their studies abroad were reduced (Doumato, 1992; Van Geel, 2016). For women, travel abroad was restricted by a fatwa[6] that meant that they must be physically accompanied by a male guardian (Doumato, 1992). The siege of the Grand Mosque in 1979 benefited the Islamic awakening, which is known as the Religious Awakening. In Arabic it is known as Alsahwa Al-islamiyya or just Alsahwa. The Religious Awakening is a movement that aims to revive religious conservatism and reinforce the Islamic identity of Saudis (Altoaimy, 2017). The movement first appeared in 1960 (Jones, 2005; Lacroix, 2011), then resurfaced again between

[6] Religious opinion and not a law.

1980 and 1990 which was a significant period as it had an impact on society and the roles of women and men. Alsahwa adopted what could be viewed as a strict understanding and interpretation of Islamic teaching and had a strong grasp upon, and presence in, many aspects of society, particularly religion and education (Lacroix, 2011). Gender segregation was strictly enforced following the Islamic awakening in most aspects of life in Saudi Arabia at the end of the 20th century (Zuhur, 2012). Le Renard (2008) reported that the institutionalisation of the separation between men and women resulted in the creation of public spaces that were only for women, to the extent that places in the capital, Riyadh, were sexualized due to the extensive sexual segregation. The following section will highlight the reforms and changes in the recent history of Saudi Arabia that have challenged gender segregation shaped the current gender roles.

2.7 Post 9/11 & the 2030 vision

Reforms concerning the enhancement of women's roles, amongst others, were introduced in the 2000s following the 9/11 attacks on the United States of America by Al-Qaida, where a number of attackers were allegedly Saudi (Le Renard & Rose, 2014). It is important to highlight that Saudi Arabia itself was attacked and suffered from terrorism at the hands of Al-Qaida in 2003 (Ayoob & Kosebalaban, 2009). Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia was seen as the ideological source of the terrorist attack in the United States as reported by Ayoob and Kosebalaban (2009). Reforms to fight extremist ideologies that resulted in the events of 9/11 and the attacks on Saudi Arabia emerged, and these reforms benefited women, as they are the culture carriers. Also Saudi Arabia aimed to move towards a new cosmopolitan modernity (Al-Rasheed, 2013). "In response, the government acknowledged the need for political, social, and educational reforms and began grappling with what those would entail" (Kéchichian, 2012, p. 205).

Major reforms which increased women's empowerment in Saudi Arabia occurred during the reign of the late King Abdullah (1924-2015), when in 2009 he appointed the first Saudi

woman, Norah al-Faiz, as Vice Minister (Robertson & Jamjoom, 2009). Prior to this point in time, no Saudi woman had attained a position of higher rank. Another reform by the late King was introduced by royal decree in September 2011, when he enabled Saudi women to enter public political life by joining Majlis al-Shura, also known as the Shura Council, which is the Consultative Council. The royal decree stated that women should make up 20% of the Council, which consisted of 150 members (amendment of Article three (*Shura Council Law*, 1992)). All Council members are appointed by the King according to Shura Council Law Article three (Saudi Arabia, 1992). The Council is recognized as the highest advisory body in the Kingdom, and it advises the King on vital issues concerning the country, although it has no legislative power. The decision to allow women to become members of the Council is controversial because, while it is considered a major advancement for women in a conservative society, some view it as contrary to the teachings of sharia law and in defiance of cultural customs which disapprove of women occupying leadership roles. After the news broke that women would be allowed to join the Council, people resorted to Twitter to express their views, using the hashtag "#The_new_Shura_Council_does_not_represent_me" (BBC, 2013b).

In Islam there are different views regarding female leadership according to Sulemanu (2015). There is a group that would confine female leadership to a woman's own family, whilst others believe that women should be allowed to lead, with the exclusion of becoming head of state. A third group maintains that female leadership should have no limits. The prevalent opinion among scholars is that females do not have the ability to lead, and should not be allowed to lead, particularly in the public domain (Sulemanu, 2015). Some religious discourses that oppose leadership by women base their position on a Hadith which states that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), said that "'No people will ever prosper who entrust their leadership to a woman" reported by (Al-Bukhari, n.d.). The Hadith has various interpretations and one in particular is used by opponents to female leadership to validate their position that

leadership and decision-making should be the preserve of men. Islamic history is rich with cases of Muslim women who have been influential and held leadership positions, for example as consultants.

In 2013, a televised ceremony showed the newly appointed members of the Shura who included 30 women (BBC, 2013a). This event was considered important as both female and male members were seated in the same room as King Abdullah (BBC, 2013a). At the same time, King Abdullah issued a royal decree that granted women the right to vote and participate in the 2015 municipal elections (Alsharif, 2011). These reforms are historical because they changed the political scene in Saudi Arabia that used only to be accessible to men. After the death of King Abdullah in 2015, King Salman became king and continues to make significant improvements that empower Saudi women, such as the inclusion of physical education in Saudi girls' schools (Human Rights Watch, 2017), permitting women to enter sports stadiums (Reuters, 2017b), and one among mnay of his notable reforms is the lifting of the ban on women driving , which will be highlighted in the next section.

Gender segregation started to break down and the public arena began to include a number of women. For example, in February 2018 Tamader Al-Rammah became Saudi Arabia's Deputy Minister of Labour and Social development ("*FaceOf: Tamader Al-Rammah, Saudi Arabia's deputy minister of labor and social development*," 2018). On 23rd February 2019, Princess Reema Al Saud became Saudi's first female Ambassador to the United States. These changes could be viewed as having a significant impact on the traditional social roles of women, as women in higher positions will be responsible for leading their employees who are both men and women ("*Princess Reema made ambassador to US, Khaled bin Salman appointed deputy defense minister by royal decree*," 2019). Saudi Arabia is going through a period of drastic change and transformation which is all part of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's new economic plan, known as Vision 2030. The plan aims to enhance the country's economy and

lower its reliance on oil production, and one of its aims, since it recognizes women as a "great asset", is to increase women's employment to raise household income (Saudi Vision 2030, n.d.).

The next section outlines the important campaigns which promoted Saudi women driving within the context discussed in this section and the use of social media in those campaigns.

2.8 Women driving in Saudi Arabia

At various points in history, Saudi women have initiated various women driving campaigns, but despite all the campaigns, there has never been a law or royal decree that legally prohibited them from driving; the issue was that driver's licenses were not issued to women (Baeshen, 2017). Before discussing the first pro-women's driving demonstration it is important to examine what ignited their protest. First, during the Gulf War of 1990-1991, when Saddam Hussein's[7] Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait, a neighbouring country to Saudi Arabia, the King of Saudi Arabia called on the American allies to help defend against Iraqi aggression (Hegghammer, 2010). Some of the American troops deployed in Saudi Arabia were female soldiers who drove around in military vehicles (Al-Rasheed, 2010; Lacroix, 2011). Secondly, in September 1990, King Fahad called on government agencies to train female volunteers in two sectors, namely medical services and civil defence (Bronson, 2008; Doumato, 1992). Thirdly, many drivers decided to leave their jobs in Saudi Arabia as they feared the war, and those drivers who stayed requested that their salaries were tripled, which caused the families who employed them to struggle financially (Lacroix, 2011).

All of these factors may have encouraged Saudi women to call for women driving, with the first demonstration taking place on 6th November 1990 (Almahmoud, 2015; Bronson, 2008; Lacroix, 2011; Tønnessen, 2016). On that day, a number of Saudi women using fifteen cars

[7] Then President of Iraq.

drove through the streets of Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia (Lacroix, 2011). According to Al-Mana & Al-Shiekh (2013) all women who drove had valid international licences and abided by the traffic laws of the country. However, it's important to note that, at that time, Saudi Arabia did not permit women to drive. Therefore, these women were not in compliance with Saudi Arabia's driving regulations. The streets the female demonstrators chose were central to the city and not secluded ones in quite areas, so they wanted to be seen by the public (Lacroix, 2011). Most of those women who drove had completed their studies in the 1980s in the United States and were considered liberal by members of the Religious Awakening movement in Saudi Arabia (Lacroix, 2011). The women who drove were detained by the police, and some were released immediately (Al-Rasheed, 2013; Lacroix, 2011). There were other consequences for the women who participated, such as having their passports revoked for a year, a punishment that also applied to their male guardians, and they were suspended from their government jobs (Bronson, 2008; Doumato, 1992; Lacroix, 2011). Afterwards, a royal decree was issued, allowing all suspended participants to be reinstated to their positions within their jobs and to receive retroactive payment for the suspension period (Al-Mana & Al-Shiekh, 2013). The travel ban was lalso lifted after one year (Al-Mana & Al-Shiekh, 2013).

The impact had a social perspective too which took the form of a public discourse. Various flyers were circulated by the people, which included information about the women and their guardians, and giving other private information such as their phone numbers (Bronson, 2008). The 1990 demonstration was an important event for Saudi women who wanted to drive as it succeeded in capturing international attention, but it also had a negative effect as it shocked the Islamic opposition, and it destroyed any chance of increased liberalization in Saudi society (Bronson, 2008). Also, an official fatwa was issued by the Council of the Senior Ulema,[8] prohibiting women from driving (Bronson, 2008; Schanzer & Miller, 2012).

[8] Scholars.

As a result of the severe reprisals that the 1990 demonstrators suffered, both socially and from religious extremists, Saudi women campaigning to be allowed to drive were discouraged, until September 2007 when a number of individual attempts were made. They did not, however, approach the scale of the 1990 demonstration until two decades later, when the Saudi women's driving movement resurfaced in 2011 with a new campaign, #Women2Drive. The women behind the campaign seemed to have been encouraged by the Arab Spring[9] which began in late 2010 and took over the Arab region, where social reforms were demanded in protests and social media was utilised.

Women2Drive started as a Facebook campaign which seemed to imitate the Arab Spring protest, and its aim was to encourage more women to drive. Later, Women2Drive moved to Twitter (Almahmoud, 2015). The movement from one social media platform to another appears to have happened because the campaigners realized that Facebook was not as popular in Saudi Arabia as in other Arab countries, for example Tunis and Egypt, and they needed to tailor their campaign based on their target audience. The Women2Drive campaign urged all Saudi women to go out onto the streets and drive on 17th June 2011 (Reuters, 2018). Then, in 2013, another campaign, named "Oct26driving", was launched and promoted using Twitter and Facebook (Khamis & Mili, 2017). This campaign was different as the Saudi women behind it set 26th October 2013 as a day for collective defiance of the ban on women driving (Khalil & Storie, 2020). Oct26driving received a strong backlash and warning from the government as the campaign was in defiance of the laws of Saudi Arabia which ban protests and demonstrations (Reuters, 2013).

[9] A series of anti-government revolutions that started in Tunisia then spread in the Middle East and North Africa region Khondker, H. H. (2011). Role of the New Media in the Arab Spring. *Globalizations*, *8*(5), 675-679. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621287 .

If we examine all of the campaigns, we find that what differentiates the 1990 campaign from others is the usage of social media. While the first driving campaign used face-to-face meetings to prevent news of the protest from spreading and the government and religious police from stopping the event, it also resulted in fewer campaigners and limited the number of supporters that could be recruited. The recent campaigns that used social media had greater numbers of members and supporters and also opponents. While social media helped to spread news of their protest plans it also made it easier to shut them down. With regard to media attention, the 1990 demonstration did spread the news to a few international media outlets, however the protesters' images were destroyed, while recent campaigners had the luxury of spreading their videos on various social media platforms.

The ban on women driving was brought to an end in Saudi Arabia by a Supreme Order on 26th September 2017. The royal order stated: "We adopt the application of the provisions of the Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations – including the issuance of driving licenses – to both males and females" (Saudi Press Agency, 2017). The Supreme Order clearly stated that Traffic Law and its Executive Regulations will be applied equally to both men and women. However, it is important to note that the lifting of the ban did not take immediate effect because its implementation date was 24th June 2018 (Saudi Press Agency, 2017), thus women were not allowed to drive until that date. The Saudi Ambassador to the United States, Prince Khalid bin Salman bin Abdulaziz, has commented that females will not need their male guardian's permission to obtain a license and that, when driving, women will not require a male guardian in the car (Reuters, 2017a). This is a significant step in the empowerment of Saudi women.

Chapter 3 – Literature review

As highlighted in the previous chapter, after the initial demonstration in 1990 in which Saudi campaigners for women driving took to the streets of Saudi Arabia, the issue of women driving did not resurface strongly until social media became readily available. Campaigners took advantage of this to resume their calls. That does not mean that before social media there were no individual attempts to call for women's driving, they may indeed have happened, but because of the nature of the traditional media in Saudi Arabia, which will be discussed in this chapter, people did not know about them, and the traditional media did not cover these attempts, therefore it is difficult to find records of any kind that concern them. This highlights the significant role that social media, namely Twitter, played in the dissemination of the campaign, allowing it to reach a wider audience and to navigate media restrictions. This chapter will be divided into three main sections in which concepts that are of importance to women's driving, and consequently to this research, will be discussed. The first examines social media, the second looks at how the development of mass media in Saudi Arabia from traditional media to social media influenced the issue of women driving, and the final section discusses the theoretical concepts of gender.

The primary goal of this chapter is to explore how the traditional media have monopolised power and how the emergence of social media has threatened traditional media. It considers what makes social media revolutionary by examining certain aspects that differentiate it from traditional media and have enabled it to compete with the media that have traditionally dominated and monopolised the field of communication. It reviews how social media has transformed communication. And other goal of the chapter is to examine the traditional media environment in Saudi Arabia prior to the introduction of social media to the country, and to explain how social media has become a distinct space for the Saudi people that is a fertile ground for issues, like that of women driving, that tend not to surface in the traditional media. Another aim of the chapter is to clarify the main theoretical concepts that are of importance to

this research and how does they inform and enable the study in its examination of gender representations of female and male supporters and opponents of women driving and the gendered discourses. Therefore, it will examine a number of theories in which gender has been understood and theorised before gender studies in linguistics has underwent a shift, as a result of the discursive turn, and consequently the focus on gender changed from gender differences to gender as a social category due to the influence of poststructuralist ideas, influencing the conceptualization of gender adopted by this study.

Further purpose of this chapter is to clarify the understanding of gender that it will be adopted and how this particular understanding of gender enables this research to reveal the gender ideologies sustaining the examined representations of female and male supporters and opponents of women driving in the collected tweets. Then the chapter will continue to explain other key terms, gender ideologies and the significance of its examination to women and the nature of the relationship between gender ideology and a given society. The key term, representation, will also be defined in order to avoid a recurring issue in critical discourse studies, which is the failure to clarify the meanings of terms in the knowledge that such terms have multiple definitions and interpretations. The chapter will then examine a number of studies that have looked at gender representation in Western media, and then at studies that have focused on Muslim women, and specifically Saudi women, with the aim of showing the predominantly negative representation of Muslim women and the lack of studies that have considered the representation of Saudi women in social media. The final aim of the chapter is to explain gendered discourses and illustrate Sunderland's approach in the form of steps.

The chapter will begin with an introduction to how the dynamic and participatory characteristics of social media communication transform producer and audience roles, and the significance of those transformations. It will then proceed to discuss the relationship between digital media and activism and examine the literature regarding the critical role of social

media in socio-political participation, activism and collective movements. This will be followed by an introduction to the printed press and broadcast media in Saudi Arabia, the advent of the internet and the popularity of social media in the Kingdom; focusing on Twitter, it will consider the impact of the development of mass media on the issue of women driving. The last main section of the chapter will introduce the relevant theoretical concepts starting with an introduction to theoretical assumptions about gender, then proceed to discuss the understanding of gender that influences this research. This is followed by an introduction to key terms, starting with gender ideologies and then moving on to representation. Finally the chapter examines a number of media studies that have focused on gender-related issues.

3.1 Social media

3.1.1 From traditional media to social media

The development of social media is significant because, as highlighted by Van Dijk (2000), for years in modern information societies the power held by the media has been beyond question. The power of the media does not take the form of coercion, but rather, is mostly discursive and symbolic. Media discourse has been the main source of knowledge, attitudes and most importantly the ideologies of the people (Van Dijk, 2000).

The role of the media in influencing the perceptions and shaping the ideologies within a given society was identified by Fairclough (1995b) as the power of the mass media, and he highlighted the different ways in which that power can be used, from shaping governments and political parties to influencing knowledge, beliefs, social relations, and social identities. Certainly, the media does not accomplish this by itself, but in collaboration with other elites, mainly professionals, academics, and politicians. However, when considering the freedom of the press, Van Dijk (2000) claims that it is the media elites who are eventually responsible for the dominant discourses of the media they control. However, this collaboration is also faced with resistance, as power is not only top down. As it is important to not amplify audience passivity and simplify the audience power (Khosravinik & Unger, 2016).

The media, then, as a type of dominant discourse within any society is controlled by social groups which have particular privileges and power over access, and these groups are referred to as symbolic elites (Van Dijk, 2008). As a result of their exclusive control over public communication they influence, discursively, the beliefs of the dominant group and of its members, in an extremely complex sociocognitive manner, thus obtaining greater power (Van Dijk, 2015). The preferential access that the symbolic elites have to the media and public discourse is significant as it could enable them attempt to manipulate the populace through text and the spoken word (Decock & Schaffers, 2018). As the media do not passively record and report news, but actively reconstruct events, and they do not present a "value-free reflection of (the) 'facts'" (Fowler, 1991, p. 4), discourse in the media usually, quite understandably, reflects directly or implicitly the ideological interests and stances of individuals in powerful positions (Fairclough, 2001, 2013; Fowler, 1991; Richardson, 2007; Van Dijk, 2003). These discourses are challenged by counter-discourses which are produced as Foucault (1970, as cited in Moussa & Scapp, 1996) pointed when indivuals who are genrally spoken for and about by others start to speak for themselves.

As the media have an influence on public views and opinions, the way in which they represent people is significant. One of the groups that has been negatively affected by the way the media represent them is Muslims, together with their religion, Islam. Many academic studies that have examined Western news media have demonstrated that Muslims and Islam are regularly represented negatively and stereotypically (Törnberg & Törnberg, 2016). For example, in the American media, Awass (1996) found that news articles connected Islam to fundamentalism and terrorism. In the British media, Baker et al. (2013) undertook comprehensive work in which they examined the representation of Muslims and Islam in the British press from 1998 to 2009. Their findings illustrated not only overt Islamophobic representations, but what appeared to be more common, more implicit and elusive

representations, which indirectly promote negative stereotypes. The impact of such negative representations on Muslims as a group, as discussed by Akbarzadeh and Smith (2005, p. 4), is that repetitive terms such as “Islamic terrorism” and “Muslim fanatics” that are utilised to depict Muslims and Islam can become representative of the religion of Islam and of all Muslims.

It is clear that the traditional forms of media were in control of communication and that people relied upon them until the rise of social media, the characteristics of which are different. The vital aspect of social media that allowed it to revolutionize communication and to bring about a change in roles has been the broadcast mechanism. The rise of social media has brought a novel dynamic to communication and can be described as a many-to-many broadcasting mechanism where anyone can produce content, deliver it through a network of participants, and distribute it to a large scale audience (Page et al., 2014). This is in contrast to traditional broadcasting media, such as television and newspapers, that have a one-to-many broadcasting mechanism, where content flows in a linear manner from a number of elite producers and is pushed to regular consumers (Khosravinik & Unger, 2016). Social media communication transforms the traditional, clear, and separate roles of producers and audience/consumers (Khosravinik, 2017) into new ones in which the passive role of the recipient is extended into the active role of producing and consuming (Ghaffari, 2020). This new role is labelled “prosumption” by Ritzer and Jurgenson (2010), because it combines the roles of production and consumption. The change in roles has also eliminated that of the gatekeeper or symbolic elite who traditionally controlled the media as previously illustrated.

Early studies of the internet were very optimistic, as they linked the internet with bringing back power from the media to the people and with liberating the voice of the public (Bolter, 2001). Which can be seen in many undemocratic settings, social media have the ability to function as platforms that offset the shortage of uncontrolled and uncensored spaces for

deliberation, such as a journalistic industry that enjoys the freedom of the press (Khosravinik & Unger, 2016). In the last decade of the 20th century, several writers identified the potential and capability of the internet as a medium for spreading democracy (Poster, 2013). Diamond (2010), for example, considered the internet and forms of modern social media that fall within what he called "Liberation technology" (any type of information and communication technology (ICT), later referred to as digital technology), to have the ability to expand not only political but also social and economic freedom. He stated that one of the liberating uses of digital ICT is to mobilise people against authoritarian rule. Not only the internet but social media platforms, amongst them Twitter, have been admired by many for their democratisation and social justice potential (Bouvier & Machin, 2021). Previously, individuals and groups did not have the privilege of a platform upon which to express their ideas but with the help of social media they are now able to be heard, to share their ideas and opinions, and also to mobilise themselves and other people (Castells, 2015). Social media also enable people to share unfiltered opinions and ideas which allows a larger variety of those ideas and opinions to be available and exist in the public sphere (Gillmor, 2006). The significance of the ability of social media to promote and disseminate a counter-hegemonic discourse in a given society can be observed in the hashtags discussing women's driving. Much of the support for the issue did not exist in the public sphere during the ban on women driving. Only with the arrival of Twitter did people begin to discuss it.

As previously illustrated, many have admired the internet and its potential for social media democratisation, but this potential is no longer as it used to be, because many users of the digital world now encounter a powerful challenge to their freedom of access in the form of internet filtering and surveillance systems. These are designed and sold by Western corporations, such as Nokia-Siemens, to undemocratic governments, such as that of China, in order to control and filter the flow of information, and they are becoming more widespread and increasingly sophisticated (Diamond, 2010). What is paradoxical is that, while Western

democratic governments claim that they support freedom of access to the internet, at the same time not imposing regulations and policies on Western tech companies, they are the ones exporting for profit the technological tools that enable to suppress or restrict people's access to the internet and subsequently social media platforms.

Despite the advent of surveillance systems for the internet and social media, they are still considered to provide people with more freedom when compared to the regulated control over the traditional mass media. This might explain why social media has been utilised by many people for digital activism, as discussed in the next section.

3.1.2 Digital activism

Generally, the literature around the role of social media in inciting dissent, protests, and general political change seems to be divided into two camps: there are those who have an optimistic view about the role of social media because it has opened up novel space where political deliberation is conducted which could empower citizens and could lead to reinforced democracy (see for example, Castells (2015), Papacharissi (2010)); on the other hand, there are those who hold a pessimistic and sceptical view in which they are dismissive of the role that social media could play as a tool for political change. Those who are pessimistic believe that social media may only make a minimal difference that will not have any significant impact on governments and the associated institutions through which resources are assigned, and most importantly, power is practiced over the people (Dean, 2005; Morozov, 2011). It seems, however, that social media platforms do not perceive their role as minimal. On the contrary, a number of social media platforms seem to indirectly acknowledge their role in political and social change, as, for instance, on the 15th June 2009 when Twitter announced that it had postponed scheduled maintenance as it had recognised the vital role it was playing at the time as a communication tool in Iran (Stone, 2009). Iranian people were protesting a perceived rigged presidential election, and the usage of Twitter by the Iranian people was reported by the Washington Times (2009) as follows: "Well-developed Twitter lists showed a

constant stream of situation updates and links to photos and videos, all of which painted a portrait of the developing turmoil. Digital photos and videos proliferated and were picked up and reported in countless external sources safe from the regime's Net crackdown." The New York Times reported that Iranians were relying on social media platforms, as they were blogging and posting on Facebook and clearly using Twitter to coordinate their protests (Stone & Cohen 2009).

The issue of activism and social media has been of interest to scholars from a wide range of disciplines, including communications and political science (Garrett, 2006). However, prior to mobilizing people in any form of protest or collective action, where that mobilization was intended to stimulate democracy, what the internet, social media and other digital information and communication technologies (ICT) did first was to help extend the public sphere, forming a more pluralistic and autonomous field of news, commentary, and information (Diamond, 2010). This extended public sphere made online activism possible. Online activism, which has the ability to empower marginalised people and voices, provides the chance for cross-boundary dialogue, and also provides motivation for social change (Newsom & Lengel, 2012).

The topic of activism and social media has gained more attention since the unravelling of worldwide events such as the Arab Spring, the UK Riots, the Occupy movements, and #MeToo, where social media platforms were utilised heavily (see for instance Jurgenson (2012), Lindgren (2013), Maalej (2012), Mendes et al. (2018), Tufekci and Wilson (2012)). These movements, among others, signify a "paradigm shift" in the way societies communicate (Castells, 2015), and more specifically a shift within protest culture (Baer, 2016). Even the literature on social movements has undergone a paradigm shift with the rapid development of the internet and digital technologies, especially with regard to ways of

theorizing citizens' movement engagement, in addition to the measures of evaluating movement success (Wang et al., 2016).

Social movements with different causes from environmental to political are increasingly facilitated by the use of social media, such as Facebook and Twitter. Before social media, traditional levers of government control would easily halt any protest, which reflects the vital role of social media. Highlighting the role of the new media, Tufekci (2011) points out that, in 2008, protest movements in Tunisia were crushed with no major backlash, which is partially attributed to the low penetration of new media in Tunisia at that time, when there were only 28,000 Facebook users in the country.

With the development of communication technologies, regimes could no longer have complete control over information flows, and social media became the catalyst, the trigger, which allowed large groups of people to become organised and have their voices heard all over the world (Elyas et al., 2020). In the Arab Spring of 2011 when a number of protests erupted which reverberated across many Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries, social media, in particular Facebook and Twitter, played a significant and facilitating role with regard to the dissemination of information and footage, and enabled protesters to organise themselves (Bruns et al., 2013; Rane & Salem, 2012).

Social media platforms not only helped protesters to spread the word about the different movements, but also helped them to organise and mobilise support for their movements (Yuce et al., 2014). To a significant extent, that the Arab Spring revolutions became associated with social media platform in which it was used, to the point where they labelled as "Facebook Revolutions" and "Twitter Revolutions" (Cottle, 2011). For example, in the case of 'Twitter Revolutions' citizens of different Arab countries did produce a significant amount of social media activity on Twitter only (Bruns et al., 2013). Many millions of tweets

encompassing the hashtags #libya or #egypt were tweeted during 2011, from citizens of these countries, and also by a worldwide audience and observers (Bruns et al., 2013). However, the Arab Spring online activism and protests were matched with offline actions, staged protests and the mobilization of people; this is where the Saudi utilisation of social media, especially of Twitter in calling for women driving, differed from protests in other Arab countries. That does not mean that social media had no impact on Saudi Arabia, but rather that its influence on Saudi Arabia was different.

A noteworthy development within digital activism is the emergence of what is known as "hashtag activism" (Yang, 2016). Gunn (2015) sees hashtag activism as an activist effort that takes place online, or uses online networks to foster communication, action, or awareness. However, this interpretation is very narrow as it limits hashtag activism to the activist and also fails to portray a significant component of the phenomenon, which is that a large number of tweets should appear within a common hashtag. Yang's view of hashtag activism is rather more comprehensive, describing it as a discursive protest that occurs on social media that "happens when large numbers of postings appear on social media under a common hashtagged word, phrase or sentence with a social or political claim" (2016, p. 13). Meyer and Bray (2013) view hashtag activism as beneficial in raising awareness for social causes, but its ability to foster agency and action are very limited. This restricted ability, which Meyer and Bray (2013) have noted, seems to be rather appealing, especially in countries such as Saudi Arabia as it enables people to utilise hashtag activism and to peacefully draw attention to their causes and at the same time adhering to legal boundries and respecting the law by not protesting, which is a criminal act. In Saudi Arabia many people have witnessed the consequences in other countries of protests, that have resulted in devastating outcomes, including destruction, war, and foreign intervention by neighbouring countries Western and foreign nations. Many are therefore distrustful of those who protest and will avoid participation in a physical protest, so opting for alternative means, such as hashtag activism.

In addition to the concept of hashtag activism there is “hashtag feminism” which will be discussed in the next section, which examines women and social media.

It is important to note that the use of the word activism in this section does not signify that people who tweet about women driving are activists; they may or may not identify as such. The literature on social movement has not described the profiles of Twitter activists (Wang & Zhou, 2021), and there is an agreement in the literature on social movement that merely tweeting about a social movement does not turn a Twitter user into an activist (Lee & Chan, 2018; Wang et al., 2016). However, the data under examination, which consists of tweets about women driving, includes input from people of all kinds who use Twitter to express their concerns and opinions. As hashtags discussing women driving involve an issue that relates to women directly it is important to examine women and social media specifically.

3.1.3 Women and social media

The internet is believed to be an inherently democratic environment, in which traditional distinctions of social status are demolished, and it creates opportunities for less powerful people to participate on a similar level to members of more powerful groups. For women in particular, who are the politically, socially and economically less powerful gender, it has been argued that the internet results in better gender equality (Herring, 2003). Not only the internet, but also social media, are recognised for their ability to increase social participation and open up opportunities for women to partake in public discourses (Eckert & Steiner, 2016). This could be seen during the Arab spring, where women took part in the protests, and they were active participants in the political conversations unfolding on Twitter as reported by Howard, and Hussain (2013). Only in Egypt did they represent a significant proportion (30%) of protesters on the streets (Howard & Hussain, 2013).

For women and girls in particular, whose participation in public discourse is usually very limited, social media has provided an unmatched space in which to express alternative

gendered meanings and identities and to promote and bring attention to issues that concern women. Such issues are usually either diminished or not even part of traditional media and political discourse, and include rape and sexual assault (Rentschler, 2015; Salter, 2013).

With regard to the division between public and private spheres which can be observed in many communities, and which are especially apparent in the Arab world, Saudi Arabia included, it has been suggested that social media serves as an empowerment tool for women as it makes the distinction unclear between public and private. It also provides a stage for individuals to interact publicly with an audience of many while they are in the privacy of their own home (Papacharissi, 2010). This is especially so for Saudi women, whose participation in public discourse was restricted for social, cultural and political reasons. Here the internet could potentially bridge the division between the public and private elements/division of society (Al Lily, 2011).

Al Lily (2011) claims that the internet seems to have provided Saudi women with "the courage" to communicate regardless of gender lines, without the need to obtain the permission of their male guardians, although this claim is difficult to support. What the internet seems to do in Saudi Arabia is to provide a virtual space in which it has been easier for a number of Saudi women to take advantage of being anonymous on social media to evade a variety of the social and cultural restrictions that are imposed upon them. Al Lily (2011) holds a similar view regarding the internet, that social media such as Twitter have most importantly allowed Saudi women to maintain their anonymity, which releases them from social pressures and enables them to socialise and to collect and access information, as would their male counterparts. This means that social media provide a virtual space in which Saudi women are not isolated.

While the internet and social media do successfully provide women who were excluded from public discourse with public space, there are certain social groups that continue to struggle to

access Twitter, even though it is free of charge, due to structures of inequality (Latina & Docherty, 2014). Financial constraints prevent some individuals from accessing the internet, which, in turn limit their access to social media. Another example in Middle Eastern societies is that not all girls are allowed by their male guardians to have social media accounts, or they may be precluded by family prohibition.

Due to their popularity, social media, blogs and digital spaces are argued to be a "fertile ground" for feminist activism (Portwood-Stacer & Berridge, 2014, p. 519). The different digital platforms provide potential to broadly spread the feminist idea, to shape new modes of discourse regarding gender and sexism, and to dispute anti-feminist, misogynist and anti-progressive ideologies. Most importantly, they have enabled non-traditional means of protest to surface (Baer, 2016; Eckert & Steiner, 2016). Similar to the concept of hashtag activism, which emerged as a part of general digital activism and was discussed in the previous section, is "hashtag feminism", which is when a hashtag concerns gender equity, and exclusively addresses feminist-identified topics. These hashtags seem to be increasing in the sphere of online feminism (Clark, 2016; Linabary et al., 2020).

The emergence of hashtag feminism is an illustration of how digital space is important to feminist activism (Linabary et al., 2020). Some well-known examples of hashtag feminism in recent years are #MeToo, #NotBuyingIt, #YesAllWomen, and #WhyIStayed (Linabary et al., 2020). Digital activism is significant in feminist activism because it is considered to be a paradigm shift and a turning point within feminist protest culture (Baer, 2016). The many different cases of hashtag feminism seem to trigger an increasing trend in public inclination to participate through the use of feminist digital communication in resistance and challenges to sexism, patriarchy and various other forms (Mendes et al., 2018).

A Saudi Arabian example of hashtag feminism is provided by Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) who examined the Saudi women campaign to end male guardianship and demonstrated how Twitter has been used by activists to mobilise Saudi women. The #Women2Drive campaign, in which women called for the ban on women driving to be lifted, could be viewed as another example of hashtag feminism, which Thorsen and Sreedharan (2019) claim that Women2Drive campaign became successful, because that ban on women driving was lifted by a royal decree in September 2017. Such a depiction is problematic, as it diminishes the complexity of the wider situation of women driving. The relationship between technology and social change is complicated and not clear-cut. Therefore, social change should not be depicted as the result of technological change, which is referred to as Technological Determinism (Page et al., 2014). Cottle (2011) maintains that, when we go as far as to label movements in terms of social media platforms, for example the Twitter revolution or Facebook revolution, we misrepresent and trivialise the political and media complexities and the socio-political context of the country in which the movements unfold. Rather than talking about a social media revolution, we should speak of a revolution that utilised social media and was visible on that forum (Khosravinik & Unger, 2016). Technologies do not transform societies through their existence; rather, societies are transformed through the public usage of technology and how the affordances of that technology are leveraged (Earl & Kimport, 2011). In short, the relationship between social media and social and political change is not simplistic. We are not devaluing the role that social media plays, but we are highlighting that in any of the cases where social media was used, even in the campaign for women driving, it cannot be said that they resulted in ending the ban on women driving. Any type of technology is simply a tool, open to both moral and malicious purposes (Diamond, 2010).

The next section will examine traditional media and social media within the context of Saudi which is the setting for the study, to understand how social media played a role in the issue of women driving.

3.2 From mass media to social media and the influence on women driving

To understand what caused an issue such as women driving to be raised and debated on social media – mainly Twitter – in Saudi Arabia, one must understand the history of the traditional mass media landscape in the Kingdom and how the emergence of social media transformed that environment.

There are two main reasons why the history of the mass media in Saudi Arabia, from press to internet, is important to the issue of women driving. First, it describes the difference between traditional and social media in Saudi Arabia and explains the reasons behind the popularity of social media and what sets it aside for Saudi people. The second reason is related to the issue of women driving, because the first demonstration in 1990 received no coverage in the media as there were only domestic television channels, and the event occurred before the availability of satellite TV in the Kingdom (Jarbou, 2018). According to Jarbou (2018), due to the lack of a public platform, the women who were part of the1990 demonstration faced difficulties to express their perspectives, present a counter-narrative (see Section 2.8, Women driving in Saudi Arabia). With the emergence of social media Saudi people began to discuss such issues, and it became clear that opinions on women's driving were diverse within Saudi society, with both supporters and opponents, rather than what had been previous portrayals. In short, a different discourse has emerged on social media, mainly Twitter, about the issue of women driving.

The next section will examine the emergence of traditional media in Saudi Arabia and the political, religious, and cultural aspects and incidents that shaped the media environment in the country. The reason for examining the media environment prior to the emergence of social media, is to understand why the issue of women driving was not part of the traditional media discourse, and to recognize how the initial attempts to raise its profile were negatively impacted by the media environment in Saudi Arabia.

3.2.1 The introduction of printed press and broadcast media in Saudi Arabia

One of the ways in which oil revenue brought economic growth to Saudi Arabia was through mass media and new communication technologies. In 1924, the first newspaper, Um al-Qura, was established in Mecca, and is today the official newspaper of Saudi Arabia (Mellor, 2020). Many newspapers were introduced after Um al-Qura, some inside the Kingdom and others abroad (Mellor, 2020).

At the point where the press was introduced, Saudi society was largely illiterate and the education of boys was in its early days while girls' education was later introduced in the 1960s (see Section 2.5, Education). Consequently, women were marginalised in a patriarchal society and a significant number of them were illiterate. It was challenging for them to share their perspectives in the press as Saudi newspapers were subjected to religious and political restrictions. It was not only women who were affected. Men with viewpoints considered controversial or different encountered challenges when attempting to articulate their opinions in the media.

There was a development in Saudi mass media in the 1960s, when the government introduced radio and TV, but this was controversial and met with disapproval and resistance from religious scholars, preachers and conservatives (Aarts & Roelants, 2015; Kraidy, 2013). Those who opposed the mass media were displeased in 1963 when a woman's voice was heard for the first time on the radio (Aarts & Roelants, 2015; Schanzer & Miller, 2012). Saudi national television began to broadcast to the nation in 1965 as a government initiative because it was thought to be a significant instrument of modernization that would benefit Saudi citizens, but opponents considered it to be "un-Islamic" (Kraidy, 2013). Ever since TV was introduced it has continued to be a topic of moral, political, and cultural struggle (Kraidy, 2013). One incident in which tensions over the introduction of mass media and new communication technologies became apparent occurred in the capital, Riyadh, when

opponents attacked the first TV station in an attempt to shut it down (Aarts & Roelants, 2015; Kraidy, 2013). In order to appease protesters and resolve the tension the majority of airtime on television was allotted to religious issues (Schanzer & Miller, 2012). Also, restrictions were enforced to ensure that the media followed Saudi societal customs (Schanzer & Miller, 2012). For instance, the Saudi media press stopped printing women's photographs in newspapers (Schanzer & Miller, 2012). All media outlets in Saudi Arabia, whether government owned or private, are subject to Saudi regulations.

It is important to note that the arrival of mass media and new communication technologies coincided with the emergence of the Religious Awakening Movement of the early 1970s (see 2.6 Religious Awakening Movement) in which women were removed from many aspects of the public sphere, one of these being broadcast media. Female broadcasters were no longer seen on Saudi television (Mellor, 2020). The issue of women's visibility in and on Saudi media is one that reflects the religious and political climate of the country. Thus, all traditional media and press in Saudi Arabia were subjected to different forms of regulations that varied in different time periods, but then came the internet with its capacity for wide open communication and its open realm, and it has been utilised by Saudi people to highlight many issues that relate to women, such as driving.

3.2.2 The internet and the popularity of social media in Saudi Arabia

For a very long time the press and other traditional media were the primary source of information and communication in numerous societies, Saudi Arabia amongst them (Elyas et al., 2020). Traditional media is an elite discourse and the symbolic elites in charge of Saudi traditional media are the political, social and cultural elites. As illustrated earlier, Saudi broadcasting and the press are overseen by those elites.

Only when the internet reached Saudi Arabia did a new type of mass media, tha is distinct from the characteristics observed in traditional media, became available. The internet actually

arrived in the country before 1994 but was exclusively for the use of academic institutions such as universities (Anishchenkova, 2020). It was only in late January 1999 that it was made available for public use (Lacroix, 2011; Teitelbaum, 2002). Its delayed launch was due to government concerns and reservations regarding the impact of this new medium on conservative Saudi culture (Alshahrani, 2016).

As with the introduction of television and radio, to alleviate the fears of the conservative elements of society within the country the government required that all online material must adhere to Saudi cultural and religious norms (Schanzer & Miller, 2012). The censors screen content on religious and social grounds and block websites (Noman et al., 2015). Such as gambling and pornographic sites, as examples. The debate about the introduction of the internet to the Saudi public surfaced in many newspaper articles, with some writers opposed to its introduction, viewing it as a clear and barefaced attempt to westernise Saudi society, and others supporting it as one of the most significant advances in the history of communication (Teitelbaum, 2002).

In March of 1997 the Saudi government, in preparation for the introduction of the internet to its public, issued a royal decree assigning the organization and operation of internet services to King Abdulaziz City for Science and Technology – KACST (Alshahrani, 2016; Teitelbaum, 2002). In order for the government to filter[10] material that is viewed as politically or culturally threatening, or threatening to national security, KACST created an Internet Service Unit (ISU) to monitor all content (Al-Tawil, 2001; Ayoob & Kosebalaban, 2009; Teitelbaum, 2002). With regard to this filtering system, it is important to note that the people can also request that websites are blocked or unblocked (Teitelbaum, 2002). The whole of Saudi Arabia's internet traffic goes through the ISU (Teitelbaum, 2002), but this form of

[10] The term filter is adopted as it is the one used in the annual reports of the Saudi Communication and Information Technology Commission.

filtering is not entirely successful as Saudi users find ways to evade it and successfully manoeuvre around the state proxy to access blocked websites (Ayoob & Kosebalaban, 2009; Lacroix, 2011).

The government is aware that it is exceptionally difficult to block all undesirable websites but they view it as an imperative task to at least block major pornographic websites (Teitelbaum, 2002). According to Zuhur (2012), the rapidly increased usage of the internet in Saudi Arabia has been a cause of security concerns as many extreme militants post online.

Even though the internet only became available to the Saudi public in 1999, its use has grown significantly, particularly in terms of connectivity (Alshahrani, 2016); indeed, the Saudi Vision 2030 initiative has worked to provide, and ensure that all citizens and visitors have, access to the internet and mobile services (Wheeler, 2020). The extent of internet penetration in all regions of Saudi Arabia in 2017 was 82.12%, up from 63.7% in 2014 (Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC), 2017). According to the 2017 annual report of the Saudi Communication and Information Technology Commission, the number of internet users in 2014 was reported to be 19.6 million, which had grown in 2017 to 26.1 million. The report attributes the rise in internet usage to the increased uptake of social media, content channels such as Snapchat and YouTube, and internet-based gaming (Communications and Information Technology Commission (CITC), 2017). Saudi Arabia has the largest social media footprint in the Middle East region (Wheeler, 2020), which is to be expected, since most social platforms in the region, particularly Twitter, are dominated by Saudi users (Aarts & Roelants, 2015).

In 1999, before social media became popular, regulating and managing the internet was already a difficult task, but now with the rise of social media and the increasing complexity of the internet, this task has become even trickier. Even if a website is blocked, the content, or

snippets from that website, can be made available on other social media platforms that are not blocked. While the task of censorship became more complicated, that of regulating the internet became easier, resulting in strong regulation (Noman et al., 2015). Social media in Saudi Arabia was then governed by laws and penalties that could reach the users themselves, so that it was no longer a space without constraints or ramifications (Noman et al., 2015). According to Aarts and Roelants (2015), after the Arab Spring more restrictions were imposed, such as the blocking of applications that used video calls like Skype, although many of these restrictions were lifted in 2017.

The popularity of digital media in Saudi Arabia is significant because it has had a negative impact on newspapers, which have been haemorrhaging readers to the extent that their circulation is limited to certain social groups, mainly highly educated intellectuals, politicians and other people in the field of journalism (Anishchenkova, 2020). The decline of printed media is common to many large parts of the affluent world (Khosravinik & Unger, 2016). The nature of social media platforms, for example Facebook and Twitter, has made the enforcement of regulations, like those still applied to traditional media outlets in Saudi Arabia, challenging. Social media provides a space that allows people to disseminate diverse materials that could not be disseminated by traditional media and it enables many activists and campaigners to easily reach the public and voice their views (Schanzer & Miller, 2012).

It is important to note, however, that social media content is not free of censorship (Noman et al., 2015), although despite that censorship, social media has provided Saudi people with a platform to present themselves in the way they choose, without the regulations and rules applied to the media. For example, on YouTube they have created mini-series, short films, satirical shows, and adult animated cartoons such as *Masameer* (which translates as Nails), where they discuss and criticise various economic, social and political issues. The segment of people who utilised YouTube were young Saudi males and a few females from what were

considered to be liberal or open minded Saudi families, At that time the official television channel in Saudi Arabia still had no female presenters, and this content was of interest to those who shared a talent for media production and film creation. So in short, not all Saudi people, and especially women, were able to be on YouTube, but they were able to view it. An example of the limited representation of women's voices and women's issues in the Saudi content available on YouTube is, in the Saudi anime *Masameer*. In an episode that conveyed a women's story, the female cartoon characters were absent, and the episode was produced from a male perspective (Alaoui et al., 2021).

Compared to YouTube, Twitter's popularity is significant, as will be illustrated in the next section. Twitter had a strong representation of women's voices and issues. Twitter was the main platform on which not only women's driving campaigners, but also other Saudis discussed the issue of women driving. Their thoughts materialised as tweets within trending hashtags that discuss WD, which is the focus of this study, therefore it is relevant to examine Twitter in Saudi Arabia.

3.2.3 Twitter in Saudi Arabia

Twitter is one of the fastest expanding social media platforms, with one in every there Saudis tweeting (Aarts & Roelants, 2015). Remarkably, it was only in March 2012 that Twitter updated its interface to include the Arabic language (Aarts & Roelants, 2015). This is significant, as Arabic is the main and official language of Saudi Arabia and English is not, which indicates that despite the difficulty of navigating Twitter in a foreign language the platform has been very popular among Saudi users.

Twitter is used by various individuals from different backgrounds, but these are not solely Saudi citizens. The Saudi Arabian government also uses Twitter, and in 2015 the current king of Saudi Arabia, King Salman, became the first king in its history to utilise social media, namely Twitter, to address the people (Jones & Al Omran, 2015). Many government

authorities have recognized the importance of Twitter and its rapid growth among Saudi citizens and have adopted it as a means of communication (Alasem, 2015). Examining the United National Platform website,[11] where all government agencies in the Kingdom are listed, it is notable that the only social media platform used by many is Twitter. Government agencies have a very evident and active presence on the platform; any Saudi citizen can contact them directly, and he/she will receive an answer regarding their query. For example, drivers can report careless driving to the Saudi traffic police account on Twitter just by tweeting a video of the incident. Ministers in office always have accounts and tend to use them in an official manner. Many members of the royal family have accounts, are active on Twitter, and share their opinions about local and international issues.

Another group amongst those using social media are the religious clerics, despite their objection in the early days to mass media (Aarts & Roelants, 2015). The most active social media users are the non-official religious clerics who have been able to successfully use social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook and YouTube to extend their influence (Aarts & Roelants, 2015). Other groups that have been using Twitter are Saudi journalists feminists, and political dissidents (Noman et al., 2015).

Twitter functions not only as a social media platform that people from different walks of life use to interact within its realm. In Saudi Arabia, it has a unique function because it opens up public spaces for participation in social and political debate for those whose participation would otherwise be limited (Noman et al., 2015). The unprecedented public spaces that Twitter has opened up are evident in the hashtags that Saudi Twitter users have created and utilised. Not only have they discussed religious, economic, social and political topics that even traditional media would not discuss, including domestic violence against men and women. It is difficult to say at what point in time Saudi Twitter users realized the importance

[11] https://www.my.gov.sa/wps/portal/snp/agencies

of Twitter. Was it when traditional media started to cover and discuss trending hashtags? What is important is that Twitter played a vital role in the issue of women driving.

It was Twitter that people constantly used to discuss the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia through numerous different trending hashtags, and by analysing the tweets in one of those trending hashtags, this study will examine the way women and men supporters and opponents of women driving are represented with respect to gender; aiming to reveal the gender ideologies underpinning theses representation. Moreover, this study will identify the gendered discourses in those tweets. Therefore, it becomes apparent that gender and gendered discourse are key to an analysis of the social media that will be examined in the following section.

3.3 Gender

3.3.1 Theoretical orientations to analysing gender

Gender is one of the main concepts of this study, therefore this chapter begins by discussing the theoretical orientations to analysing this notion. According to Taylor (2003), gender is an all-pervasive and incredibly influential construct in the lives of people. Over the years, it has been understood and theorised in various ways, some of the main ideas being that it is biological and closely associated with sex, that it is socially learned, that it is an activity, or is a social structure and a construct. The literature related to each of these issues will be reviewed and critiqued before the definition of gender used by this research is presented.

Early discussions of gender understood it as biological from an essentialist point of view, and according to this understanding, gender is not only innate but also fixed and dichotomy (Ahmed, 2019; Speer, 2005; Talbot, 2010; West et al., 1997). The assumption that it is innate is rooted in the belief that biological endowments are innate to a given person (Ahmed, 2019). Gender has been viewed as static because it was perceived as a set of fixed traits and behaviours that exist in females and males (Speer, 2005), and as binary because humans are

born with specific sex organs and hormones that distinguish them as either female or male. However, this understanding has been challenged because, as Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2013) highlight, while biology does provide dichotomous prototypes of "female" and "male", it also produces people who are different and do not match these prototypes.

A later view of gender is that it is socially learned, challenging the essentialist assumption that sees gender as biological and theorizing it as a product of the environment. In other words, gender is something people learn from their society. This approach concentrates on how gendered selves are created by sex role socialization and was promoted by researchers such as Tannen (1991) and Maltz and Broker (1982) who believed that women and men adopt gender roles and identities because of the different socialization patterns they undergo during childhood. Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2013) also highlighted the diversity of gender and the way gender understood across societies and communities, that an individuals attaining characteristics that are in perceived in certain cultures as masculine or feminine, which is based on the gender norms and expectation in a given community. This means that what is considered feminine or masculine is not fixed but it varies across societies and cultures.

The view that gender is a social structure, one that is produced/constructed by language and discourse (Coates, 2012; Weatherall, 2002), is informed by the constructionist view that social and cultural beliefs are primary and cannot be detached from biological knowledge (Weatherall, 2002). Advocates of this theory, including Marecek et al. (2004), maintain that, through institutions such as religion, mass media and other social systems in a given society, gender is established and expressed through different roles, values and expectations that are assigned to each person according to their sex category. Therefore, this theorization of gender emphasises that, whereas an individual gendered action or behaviour can be viewed as a performance from an individual's own choice, the ability to perform a specific gendered act is usually constrained by the dominant gender ideology of their society (Ahmed, 2019).

Although this view of gender also categorises people into males and females, binary categories that are set by social systems, these categories are prone to change to match what the social norm deems acceptable for each category.

Lastly, gender can be viewed as an activity, as a performance, which clearly challenges the notion that it is something a person has (McElhinny, 2014). This notion usually draws on the work of Butler (1990) who viewed gender as the "repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a natural sort of being" (pp. 43-44). Butler's gender performativity theory sees gender identity as constituted by repetitive stylizations of not only bodily acts but also discursive (Litosseliti, 2006). However, her poststructuralist view of gender highlights that the performance of identity is not an issue of intended and calculated choices but rather an outcome of discourses which determine what categories of gender, sex and sexuality are permitted and that masculinity and femininity are socially constructed (Baker & Ellece, 2011b). This means that she frames both masculinity and femininity as identities that are achieved by a person, instead of viewing them as aspects of the self which are essential (Jones, 2016). It is clear that Butler's (1990) concept of performativity does not consent to a stable and coherent gender identity and that gender identity, as any other identity, is fluid and not fixed. Her concept of performativity shows that it is within cultural acts, including ways of self-presentation such as language and dress, that gender is produced and re-produced (Jones, 2016).

Having reviewed the major theories on gender, we now turn to examine the way in which this study understands the concept of gender, the rationale behind this understanding, and how it enables and facilitates the analysis of gender representation in tweets discussing women's driving in Saudi Arabia.

3.3.2 The discursive construction of gender

This research adopts a poststructuralist thinking associated with a social constructionist approach to gender (Best, 1995; Butler, 1990). It views and conceives gender as a social construct that is repeatedly being produced, performed, and reproduced in both informal and formal social institutions and in people's daily interactions (West & Zimmerman, 1987). Because we are viewing gender as a social construct, it can be constituted in discourse.

To understand why social constructionism is appropriate, we must first highlight its epistemological stance, which is that "all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world, and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context" (Crotty, 2014, p. 42). This indicates that knowledge and reality are not discovered in the world, but rather are constructed from it, which means that social constructionism is anti-essentialism, and that social constructionism questions realism and rejects the notion of truth, and consequently the notion of objective facts (Burr, 2003). According to social constructionism it is through people, interaction and human experience that knowledge is constructed and as it is not objective it is shaped by historical and cultural context (Burr, 2003). This means that, in terms of gender, what is considered masculine and feminine can change over time; for example, trousers were once considered a masculine item of clothing.

An example of how people construct the world via practices is when they reprimand young boys and even men for crying, which constructs and disseminates constructed knowledge regarding gender, and especially masculinities. It promotes the view that men and boys should not cry as it shows vulnerability and weakness, which belongs to the constructed knowledge about femininity. In short, within social constructionism, gender is in large part constructed by language and discourse (Sunderland, 2004).

There is not one single social constructionist approach but there are many approaches that have many differences among them. Nevertheless, there are four main assumptions within social constructionism that most social constructionist endorse (Allen, 2004; Burr, 2003) although there are other ideas on which theorists do not agree such as the realism and relativism debate concerning the concept of reality (Burr, 2003). These key assumptions have an impact on the way social constructionism views gender, and it is therefore important to highlight them. They are that: 1) a critical stance ought to be assumed regarding taken for granted knowledge; 2) knowledge is not only culturally but also historically specific; 3) knowledge is maintained through social processes, language being central amongst them; and 4) knowledge and social action are not separate but connected (Burr, 2003). Poststructuralist theories have extended this kind of understanding of knowledge and meaning so that meaning, or even reality, is discursively constructed (Baker & Ellece, 2011b). Also, within poststructuralism, social meanings are not fixed but rather constantly negotiated and contested via language and discourse (Baxter, 2003). It was poststructuralist theorists, specifically Butler, who theorised performance.

Most importantly, it is the poststructuralist and social constructionism viewpoints that enabled and allowed gender to be viewed as something that is talked and written about and therefore allowed gender to be viewed as a set of ideas and henceforth an ideology, a set of values and norms, and simultaneously, often sexist stereotypes (Wodak, 2015). Then, as this study views gender as a set of ideas and ideologies, by examining the representation of the female and male opponents and supporters of women driving, this study will reveal the gender ideologies sustaining these representations. In viewing gender as a set of ideas or ideologies regarding what is considered normal, we focus on the fact that many of the beliefs people have regarding women and men – for example, men are naturally rational and women are naturally caring – benefit society's most powerful individuals (Jones, 2016), which Jones (2016) points out draws on Gramsci's (1971) concept of *cultural hegemony*. While Gramsci builds on the

Marxist theoretical tradition in which he theorised that most people in society live by particular ideological norms because they seem natural and generally in the interests of the entire society, yet may in fact be mainly advantageous to those with political, economic, or cultural power, what is significant about Gramscian theory is that he noted that power was maintained not just through physical and economic coercion but through ideology. Hegemony appears as the "common sense" which drives and influences people's daily, taken for granted understanding and perception of the world (Stoddart, 2007). Then one would argue that, before the lifting of the ban on women driving, women not being allowed to drive appeared like common sense in Saudi Arabia.

Gramscian's complex perspective on power suggest that power is related to binary opposition (Daldal, 2014; Olssen, 1999). In gender relations, the relevant binary opposition concept is patriarchy, which was developed in feminist theory, and defined as "the relationship of a dominant group, considered superior, to a subordinate group, considered inferior, in which the dominance is mitigated by mutual obligations and reciprocal rights" (Lerner, 1986, p. 217). Within patriarchy, men have historically had authority which is reflected in numerous everyday norms that are taken for granted. For example, men are unlikely to quit their job to be the main caretaker as women are viewed as inherently more caring. (Jones, 2016). As most Arab societies are considered to be patriarchal, including Saudi Arabia, men are generally expected to play dominant roles, such as being the breadwinner, and to exercise power over their wives and women of their family, while women are usually expected to play a supporting role to their husband and men of their family. In Saudi Arabia, one of the roles that has been restricted to men is that of driver, which entails controlling women's movement, while women have played the role of passenger. These roles are constrained by the social norms and expectations that have shaped Saudi society and were deemed acceptable for each sex during the ban on women driving.

3.3.3 The representation of gender identities

When examining gender representations in tweets that discuss the issue of women driving, gender is not always the only aspect used when representing the opponents and supporters, as gender intersects with other facets of identity such as class and nationality, among others. In these representations we have what is known as *intersectionality*, and must recognise that other aspects of identity might interact and appear in our examination of gender representation. For example, age intersects with gender in the representation of both female and male supporters of women driving in the theme Immaturity (see Section 6.1.2.1.7).

Identity is arguably multi-faceted, with ethnicity, age, ability, social class, gender and sexuality being particularly relevant at different points in time and space. This research will also draw upon the understanding that gender is considered as a dimension of an identity and particularly in terms of how gender is represented. In this study, examination of the gender representation of female and male supporters and opponents will show which roles and gender identities are represented by Twitter users and considered appropriate for women and men in Saudi Arabia.

Within a given gendered culture, gender identities, and specifically masculinity and femininity, are believed to develop in precise ways where people are usually encouraged to conform and adopt the specific stereotypical beliefs and behaviours that are expected from them in that society (Mills, 2004). Therefore, in this study Saudi Arabia serves as a case of gendered culture where the gendered identities are expected to conform to the stereotypical beliefs and behaviours specific to Saudi culture. See Chapter 2 for how gender-relevant social roles have developed historically in Saudi culture.

As this research will identify and name the gendered discourses in the different representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving, it implies

that these different social actors will be positioned differently, subsequently, different gender identities and gender relations are created for female and male opponents and supporters of women driving.

The new understandings of gender as identity, and identity as multiple, fluctuating and constantly being constructed, have resulted in making difference and dominance appear crude and insufficient (Litosseliti & Sunderland, 2002). Social constructionists view these identities as coming from the outcome of affiliation to specific beliefs and possibilities which are available to people in their social context (Ivanic, 1998), but still these beliefs and options can be resisted. Litosseliti and Sunderland (2002) draw on a similar view of identities in which a person has a multiplicity of identities, and of affiliation choices, but Litosseliti and Sunderland do not view these choices as free. Litosseliti and Sunderland (2002) acknowledge the role of individual agency in identity formation, but they also recognize the influence social structure and attributions assigned by other people. For example, in Saudi society, men who do not protective jealousy on women in their family may be labelled by others as cuckolds, which could result in men controlling women in their family just to avoid being characterised as cuckolds. Litosseliti and Sunderland (2002) suggest that identity formation is more complex interplay between a person choices and their social structure. Which means that the social, cultural, and historical factors does shape and limits the person identities. These gender attributions are best analysed at the discourse level (Cameron, 1998), which means that CDS is a suitable tool for their investigation.

Due to the discursive turn the study of men and masculinities has surfaced and has revealed that there are multiple versions of masculinity (Weatherall, 2002). Weatherall (2002) also highlights that masculine identities are not fixed but ever changing with the social world. Both feminine and masculine identities are an effect of discursive practices (Talbot, 2019). Femininity and masculinity are discursively produced (Talbot, 2010), which means they are

not natural or innate but are constructed and reinforced in language and discourse. Talbot (2010) maintain that masculinity is *performed* by people, but is certainly not an individual property or even an attribute; it is created within institutions and is historically constituted. Which means that masculinity is not an inherent or natural characteristic that a person simply has, but rather is influenced and shaped by historical, cultural and institutional factors therefore masculinity is always evolving over time. An example of how masculinity is performed within the social institution, historical, cultural context in Saudi Arabia is the role of the *mahram*,[12] which has evolved from being in ultimate control over females' members of the family to having limited powers. For instance, pre-2022, females were required to have a male mahram to perform hajj[13] and umrah,[14] which are religious activities, so men had no choice but to do that, which gave men more power and control over women, and it became an aspect of their mahram role and as a result masculinity. However, in 2022 the male mahram condition was revoked (Al-Thaqafi, 2022), indicating a change in gender roles and norms and a change in mahram role consequently masculinity.

There are several types of masculinity, the dominant form being hegemonic masculinity which is the one that is viewed as normal (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005; Talbot, 2010).

> Hegemonic masculinity is defined as:
>
> "the configuration of gender practice which embodies the currently accepted answer to the problem of legitimacy of patriarchy, which guarantees (or is taken to guarantee) the dominant position of men and the subordination of women"
>
> (Connell, 1995b, p. 77).

[12] A female's mahram is a group of male relatives that she cannot marry. It includes father, brother, uncle, and son among others

[13] Which is the Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca which occur in the last month of the year, and which all Muslims are expected to perform at least once within their lifetime *Hajj*. (n.d.). Oxford Reference. Retrieved February 21 from https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095915907.

[14] Which is a pilgrimage to Mecca at a time different from hajj. Umrah is not obligatory of Muslims, but it is regarded as meritorious *Umrah*. (n.d.). *Oxford Reference*. Retrieved 21 Feb from https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803110602439.

One would assume that hegemonic masculinity has to be enacted by all men or a large percentage in order for it to become hegemonic, but actually, according to Connell and Messerschmidt (2005), statistical prevalence is not necessary for masculinity to be considered hegemonic. It is definitely, however, the normative form of masculinity, as it embodies the current most honoured way of being a man and it ideologically legitimates the universal subordination of women to men. As hegemonic masculinity is normative, it requires all other men to position themselves in relation to it (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005), but men can behave in many different ways, not only in accordance with hegemonic masculinity.

The notion of hegemonic masculinity suggests that there is only one form of hegemonic masculinity and that other forms of masculinity and femininity are defined in relation to this form. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) highlight that hegemonic masculinity is not a fixed character type, and is not identical everywhere. Talbot (2010) emphasises that hegemonic masculinity embodies cultural ideals, in which case we can assume that in Saudi Arabia it embodies the ideals of the Saudi culture.

Hegemonic masculinity, as proposed by Connell(1995a), is a framework in which masculinities within societies are conceived as a hierarchy of masculinities, such that particular ways of being male are superior to others. Hegemonic masculinity has no female equivalent according to Connell (1991), as he argues that there is no femininity that is hegemonic in the same way that the dominant form of masculinity is hegemonic among men. Connell and Messerschmidt (2005) argue that the two concepts, which are hegemonic masculinity and "emphasized femininity" were developed in relation to each other to highlight and acknowledge the asymmetrical position of masculinities and femininities that exist in a patriarchal gender order. For this reason, they favour the term emphasized femininity because it places all femininity as subordinate. That does not, however, mean that all women will be subordinate (Wetherell & Edley, 1999). The term emphasized femininity is used to depict the most generally recognized form of femininity (Baker & Ellece, 2011b), but

others, such as Krane et al. (2004, p. 316), have described hegemonic femininity as having "a strong emphasis on appearance with the dominant notion of an ideal feminine body as thin and toned" and having strong associations with heterosexual sex, romance and whiteness. An example of performing hegemonic femininity is wearing pink.

3.3.3.1 Masculinities

The ways of being a dominant man are shifting and these changes are challenging traditional masculinity (2023b), which in turn challenges the hegemonic masculinity portrayed by Connell (1995a). It is important to note that studies have mostly been conducted in a Western context, and it might therefore be difficult to extend these emerging forms of masculinity to the Saudi context, in which this study is situated, however it is essential to demonstrate the changes that masculinities are undergoing in the 21st century. There is a relational aspect that governs the relations between hegemonic masculinity and other non-hegemonic masculinities, as they are constantly constructed in relation to hegemonic masculinities (Connell, 1991). Various studies have identified a number of different masculinities that, in relation to hegemonic masculinity, are either considered subordinate or marginalized. Marginalized masculinities are far from equal to one another as even they compete with one another Lawson's (2023a).

There is a range of different masculinities which signals that scholars have expanded on the subject beyond the restrictive binary of masculine and nonmasculine/feminine (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005). Hall (2019) suggests that, in order to develop a broad understanding of what masculinity entails in the 21st century, it is essential to examine not only the negative sides of masculinity, but also the positive. This section takes that into consideration and aims to accomplish it by closely examining two forms of masculinity that represent its negative and positive aspects of masculinity.

The first form is toxic masculinity, which has various theorisations and interpretations that can be traced back to its earliest days, and then later to diverse areas of public and academic discourse. Each of these usages infuses the concept with a specific set of meaning (Mercer & McGlashan, 2023).

The first study of toxic masculinities was by Lawson (2023b) who closely examined a unique online realm that is the subject of a growing body of research into online masculinities, namely the anti-feminist communities known as the manosphere. This is a collection of online platforms, such as websites and blogs, that are created and authored by men and mainly focus on "men's issues" (Iveson & Formato, 2022; Lawson, 2023b). The manosphere has emerged as the main channel for communication and dissemination of men's rights in Western culture (Ging, 2017), and has been criticised for promoting content that disseminates sexism, racism, misogyny, and the endorsement of traditional heteronormative masculinity (Ging, 2017). Lawson (2023a) closely researched manosphere materials on reddit which, while they were all different in terms of their priorities and interests, were unified by an antifeminist stance and ranged in relation to the positivity oriented towards men. Lawson's (2023a) analysis offers an understanding of the dynamic and nature of gender politics in the manosphere and shows how sexist and misogynistic discourses are perpetuated and promoted. He analysed the gendered lexis across four manosphere specifically focusing on three main categories of gendered noun referents: positive, such as bro; neutral, as in man; and negative, as in bitch. His studies show that, in the manosphere, gender is highly significant. However, discussion in the examined subreddits seemed to centre more on women than men. The evidence of misogynistic discourse contradicts what these online communities claim. Lawson (2023a) also noted that the denigration of women functioned as a form of homosocial male bonding, and that masculinity is perceived as hierarchal, and men who deviate from this hierarchy are not tolerated but rather ridiculed and abused. This means that masculinity is not inclusive and

suggests that men who challenge sexist and misogynistic behaviour are excluded from the masculine hierarchy.

Another study that identified and discussed toxic masculinity on a different online platform was conducted by Hess and Flores (2016) who examined Instagram page that features stories about Tinder Nightmares, Tinder being a mobile dating app. Tinder Nightmares is not part of the manosphere, unlike the material examined by Lawson (2023b), but is actually the opposite as the page posts lewd and depraved acts in an attempt to court and to attract humour and witty responses from women. Tinder Nightmares is open to the public, others can comment, and the posts are circulated online, so what is a private conversation between a man and a woman becomes public.

According to Hess and Flores (Hess & Flores), closer examination of Tinder Nightmares indicates that, as an app, Tinder serves as a distinct setting in which specific instances of toxic masculinity are commonly manifested specifically in the context of casual sexual encounters. Hess and Flores' (2016) analysis focuses on examining masculinity by closely analysing the performative aspects of gender. What Tinder Nightmares functions as a form of resistance or opposition. against men's toxic and heterosexist behaviour on Tinder. In short, it counters the performance of examples of toxic masculinity. The study results show how Tinder Nightmares functions as a series of micro and macro discourses that operate to govern gender; it concentrates on the explicit display of toxic masculinity and the showcasing of the male body in a highly sexualized way. The study demonstrates how the public and counter-disciplinary usage of Tinder Nightmares offers women discursive agency to contest the heterosexist masculine norms that are inherently characterised in Tinder and hook-up culture. Tinder Nightmares exposes and challenges toxic masculinity because, as it reveals misogynistic masculine subjects it provides women with discursive agency and grants them the tools to counter heterosexist masculine norms. The platform not only disturbs toxic

masculinity, but challenges it and pushes back against the dominant narratives and practices of toxic masculinity. It establishes new normative expectations by showcasing and ridiculing cases of toxic behaviour, which means that the chances of men who usually do adhere to the hypermasculine and heterosexist code when flirting and courting women are likely to dwindle and fade away.

The second example of masculinity discussed in this section is non-hegemonic masculinity, which is a positive masculinity. Lawson (2023c) upholds that there is a need for a healthier and inclusive notion of masculinities that transcends the limited rigid view of normative masculinities that the manosphere promotes, and he explored this notion in a study that examined positive masculinities and the role of language in shaping these configurations. Positive masculinity does encourage and promotes a non-toxic expression of masculinity that involves emotional openness, empathy and compassion, collaboration, and rejection of violence. However, as Lawson (2023c) highlights, despite the positive connotations associated with the term 'positive masculinity', it is important to note that it originated from the mythopoetic men's movement, which was not embedded in gender equality but an antifeminist position and calls for a return to traditional roles.

In his examination of media data from an American police comedy TV show, named Brooklyn Nine-Nine, Lawson (2023c) found that the male characters, who were all policemen, presented a varied portrayal of masculinity, resisting the traditional norms. These behaviours, ranged between calmness, patience, charm, and family-oriented qualities, and this deviation from the usual depictions of police masculinity indicates that the creators and writer of the show are open to challenging, and even to broadening, the boundaries of traditional masculine ideals. However, Lawson's (2023c) analysis shows that hegemonic expectations of manhood and masculinity do occasionally dominate and take precedence over this positive masculinity, especially in relation to homosociality and male friendship. Still, Brooklyn Nine-

Nine is a significant step in diversifying and expanding the variety of masculine performances and portrayal in the media.

The next section will move on to discuss gender ideologies.

3.3.4 Gender ideologies

Gender ideology is defined as "the set of beliefs that govern people's participation in the gender order, and by which they explain and justify that participation" (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2013, p. 22). Due to the importance of gender in any individual's life, the nature of gender ideologies should be an essential interest of social scientists (Philips, 2003). Beyond that Philips (2003) argues that gender ideologies are only of interest to feminists, whose concern is to detect and to recognise patriarchal gender ideologies, for the purpose of improving and enhancing the development of gender ideologies that advocate and support positive experiences for women. However, gender ideologies have broader implications and in this research those sustaining the representations of the female and male opponents and supporters of women driving will be identified.

When discussing gender ideologies it must be taken into consideration that they are shaped and reinforced by gender order which refers to "a system of allocation, that is based on sex-class assignment, of rights and obligations, freedoms and constraints, limits and possibilities, power and subordination" (Eckert & McConnell-Ginet, 2013, p. 22). Gender order and gender ideologies have a reciprocal relationship, as they are interconnected and mutually reinforce each other. For example, in the analysed data the representation of Fem-supporters and M-supporters in the theme 6.1.2.1.1 showed a gender order that manifested in unequal distribution of parenting and domestic works. Specifically, as females are the only social actor portrayed as primary child-care and domestic work reinforcing transitional gender roles. As social beliefs and expectations about gender roles for females are reinforced by social

structure and the distribution of opportunities, when the tweets were produced, women had limited job opportunities and men dominated the job market.

The significance of revealing gender ideologies is that, for women, they perform a powerful role in shaping their lives, as they are utilised to interpret and also induce behaviour and are enacted in socially meaningful behaviours (Philips, 2003). Philips (2003) gives an example of the predominant main gender ideology in Tonga which is "the sister-brother relationship" that is encoded in general gender dyads. Within this relationship the sister is depicted as the dominant partner while the brother subordinates himself to his sister. In Saudi Arabia the reverse exists, that is "the brother-sister relationship". It is important to note when examining gender ideology in a given society that gender ideologies do not have a simplistic one-to-one relationship within a society; in other words, not every society is governed by one gender ideology, but rather all societies have many gender ideologies (Philips, 2003). This is evident in the results in Chapter 6.

A study that has revealed ideologies of gender by examining representation of female and male social actors in online data is by Koller et al. (2021). In their examination of the representation of gendered social actors in a corpus collected from particular online communities, named the 'manosphere' on Reddit, which is an online network of communities where each community discusses different interests and topics, they discovered anti-feminist ideologies (Koller et al., 2021).

Having explained the definition of gender ideologies that this research draws upon, the next section deals with another key term. As gender can be constructed, performed, indexed and represented (Sunderland, 2004), and this research aims to examine the representation of proponents and opponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia, it is important to clarify what representation means, and this will be covered in the next section.

3.3.5 Representation

In the field of critical discourse studies as in other fields there is a lack of agreement regarding the meaning and usage of the term “representation”. Since representation is a key term in this study, for the avoidance of confusion it is important to clarify its meaning.

The concept of representation has been comprehensively researched in the field of cultural studies (Hall, 2013), and one of its influential theorists, Stuart Hall (2013), simply defines it as the process by which members of any culture utilise language, where language is generally defined as any system “which deploys signs, any signifying system” (p. 45), to produce meaning. So in short, it is the production of meaning via language. This definition highlights the important notion that people, objects and even events in the world or on their own do not have any permanent or final meaning because it is us, members of society and various cultures, that give things meaning. Hall (2013) established a constructionist approach to representation to clarify how representation of meaning via language operates, which is the one relevant to CDS.

This study will adopt this understanding of representation, referring to the ways in which different groups, namely females and males supporters and opponents of women driving, are presented or portrayed in tweets. This understanding of representation highlights the ways in which language and communication are used to construct our understanding of the world and our place within it. Representation is important in critical discourse studies because it highlights the ways in which language and communication are used to perpetuate or challenge social inequalities.

Wenden (2005) indicated that representation in discourse analysis tends to refer to the language used in a text or even a conversation to give and allocate a meaning to groups and their social practices, to events, and to social and ecological conditions and objects (see for

example, Fairclough (2001) and Van Dijk (2002)). In discourse analysis the term representation is commonly used, and especially in studies that examine politics and media discourses (Partington, 2015).

After examining the different definitions of representation, this section will look at the studies that have investigated gender representation, particularly with regard to Saudi women and men in the media, and social media. It does this not only to clearly show the contribution that the research will make to the literature on critical discourse studies involving gender issues for Saudi women and men, but also to demonstrate the relationship between this work and that of previous scholars.

3.3.6 Gender representations

Research on the representation of Saudi women and men in social media in general is very limited. While there are a few masters' theses and doctoral dissertations in which the representations of Saudi women are investigated (see Section 1.1, Background and rationale for the study, which situates the thesis within the existing literature and indicates the research gap), scholarly articles on this topic are still few in number. Therefore, an examination of the studies that have looked at gender representation and gender ideologies in genres other than social media was essential, and is reported upon here to demonstrate how this research contributes to existing knowledge. The following section will discuss the way in which gender representation and gender related issues have previously been examined in print media and digital media discourses.

3.3.6.1 Print Media and Digital media

A great deal of attention has been given to press, advertising, political and media discourse, but before closely examining the relevant studies it is imperative that we discuss whether print media and digital media data are pertinent to this research, which will examine a different medium, namely Twitter.

It is considered to be valid for two reasons, the first of these, as highlighted earlier, being the lack of studies that examine gender representation and gender related issues in social media. The second reason is that, while the traditional mass media has different mediums to social media platforms, tweets and news and advertisements actually resemble each other. What is meant by that is that both tweets and news are not facts. News is rather the fractional, ideologically framed reporting of an event (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003). The treatment of any topic in the news will always be determined by who is selected to comment and whose views are obtained (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003). While tweets generally will be the views of the tweet author as they are the sole producer of their tweets, news producers are social agents in part of a network of social relations who reveal their own stance regarding what is being reported (Caldas-Coulthard, 2003). With regard to ideologies, the media often directly or indirectly associate themselves with official ideologies (Molek-Kozakowska, 2015), whilst tweets are usually indicative of their authors' ideologies. In short, even though media and tweets are viewed as different genres, for tweets and news the discourse is similar even though the news undergoes a different process in terms of production and distribution; ultimately neither are facts.

The first study, by Caldas-Coulthard and Moon (2010), used corpus methodology to investigate how social actors are classified in the public discourse of the media, specifically in broadsheets and tabloids. The study focus was on the nature of the labels which provide categorisation, particularly of gender relations. The study examined how males and females were represented ideologically by examining the adjectival collocates that precede singular gendered nouns (boy, girl, man and woman) and then classifying them into different socio-semantic categories within van Leeuwen's framework. In the examined corpus. By applying van Leeuwen's 1996 categorisation of social actors to their corpus, the analysis showed the contradictions and inconsistencies of the tabloids in terms of their ideological positionings.

For example, girls are sexualized, yet child abuse is condemned. Collocational patterns undoubtedly were significant in the study as they revealed societal and sociolectal attitudes, especially in terms of stereotypes of gender, sexualization, age and behaviour. In its analysis of the press, the study deconstructed concealed meanings and showed the asymmetrical ways people are represented.

Instead of examining social actors, another study by Yating (2019) investigated a term used to refer to a group of social actors in China. It studied the use of the specific term “leftover women” , which is usually used when speaking of single women older than 27. The study analysed English-language news media in China to find out how leftover women are linguistically represented, and it adopted a corpus-assisted approach to critical discourse analysis that analysed a specialised corpus between 2007 and 2017. In addition to the corpus linguistics method, van Leeuwen’s social actors and actions theory were used. The results identified the media representations of leftover women, the contested ideologies emerging from these representations, and how shifting gender politics and identity shapes and is shaped by the media.

A study which particularly focused on the examination of women was carried out by Lirola (2016), who conducted a corpus based critical discourse analysis in which she analysed a corpus from the Irish press at the end of the Celtic Tiger Period (1997-2008). This was a period in which the Irish economy expanded, and improvement was evident in all aspects of the country. Not only did the economy improve, this period was also marked by women’s empowerment. Lirola’s (2016) aim was to examine the representation of women as social actors in the newspapers during this historical period. The study looked at a corpus of print collected from three Irish newspapers: The Irish Independent, a nationalist, Catholic and conservative newspaper; The Irish Post, a newspaper aimed at the Irish community; and The Evening Herald, a tabloid, which was selected because it targeted different readers or

represented contrasting opinions. The researcher decided to analyse the media and the press because she held the view that the media was one of the dominant discourses in society, which in the selected period was probably accurate as social media was not as prominent and popular in 1997 as it became later in the 2000s. Lirola (2016) also highlighted that the press is an elite discourse which has power over people, and the way the press and media transmit reality influences its receivers to such an extent that people adjust and change their opinions and ideologies.

Moving on to studies that have examined gender related issues in magazines, the issue of women's and femininity representations in magazines has been extensively studied and has shown that women are stereotypically depicted, but the representation of men and masculinity is not examined to the same degree. One of the few studies that did examine masculinity is by Stibbe (2004). The study conducted a critical analysis of six issues of Men's Health magazine, published between June and December 2000, to identify the ideological assumptions on which the discourse of the magazine was founded (Stibbe, 2004). According to Stibbe (2004), Men's Health magazine failed to dispute the discourse of hegemonic masculinity in relation to health, and the magazine was submerged in traditional masculine ideology and the reproduction of male power and domination. The study findings showed that the magazine discourse promoted and endorsed the attachment of symbolic importance to issues such as muscle size. While it provided beneficial health information to men in a substantial number of instances the way in which it represented men's health goals at the same time reinforced hegemonic masculinity and the unhealthy behaviour linked to it.

Despite some attempts by Western mainstream media to deliver a fair and objective depiction of Muslims, the prevalent portrayals have a tendency to be negative (Eid, 2014). In the US media, prejudice against Muslim women, and misrepresentation, are pervasive. Muslim women are presented as agentless victims who are subject to oppression (Mishra, 2007). Not

only has the veil and the hijab been subject to an exceptional level of international public attention as it became the symbol of Islamic oppression towards Muslim women (Byng, 2010; Fernandez, 2009), Byng (2010) demonstrated that it was linked with political concern and was considered a threat, as Muslim women were constructed as different and as sympathisers with violence committed against the West. Byng (2010) demonstrated this connection using CDS in her examination of 72 newspaper stories in the New York Times and Washington Post between January 2004 and December 2006; the analysed stories discussed the niqab in Britain, French legislation to ban the hijab, and the veiling of Muslim women in the USA.

Also Al-Hejin (2015) combined CDS with corpus linguistics to examine the semantic macrostructures in BBC news associated with Muslim women and the strategies used in representations of the hijab. His results indicated that the hijab was the main semantic macrostructure, which is as expected. Al-Hejin also noted that semantic macrostructures related to war and crime were frequently associated with Muslim women, and here Muslim women were portrayed as victims. With regard to the hijab, it was represented as imposed. Al-Hejin claimed that this was an expected result and based on the assumption that Muslim women are passive, submissive, and incapable of improving their own well-being. He examined Western media, namely the BBC, and his study revealed the negative representation of Muslims. The study highlighted the importance of examining representation of Muslim and Saudi women in non-Western discourse. Investigating Western media discourse on Muslim women and Saudi women, we recall Edward Said's (2003) critique of Orientalism which argued that, in studies of Islam and Arabs, the main dogmas of Orientalism exist in their purest form. Some of these dogmas are a belief in the superiority, rationality, humanity, and development of the West, in comparison to the irrational, inferior, and undeveloped Orient, which can either be feared or controlled.

Now turning to the way Saudi women are represented in the Western media, Guta and Karolak (2015) maintain that generally women in the Middle East, and in particular Saudi women, have been regularly depicted in the Western media as passive and oppressed. Bashatah (2017) maintains a similar position, linking the Western media's negative perception of Muslim women to a long-time connection with colonial discussions and ideas of Orientalism.

A study that examined an issue close to Saudi women driving concerned the Saudi women's guardianship system. In this CDS study, Elyas and Aljabri (2020) used van Dijk's analytical framework to uncover the ideologies behind the representation of the Saudi women's guardianship system; they studied six reports that appeared on three well-known Western newspaper websites, those of The Guardian, The Washington Post, and the Toronto Star. The findings indicated that in their representation of the Saudi women's guardianship system, all three newspapers conveyed the notion of otherness in their portrayals of Saudi Arabia and Saudi women. Moreover, the newspapers mutually employed the 'consensus' category, one of van Dijk's categories, and all newspapers claimed that the removal of the Saudi women's guardianship system was due to international criticism and not for the benefit of Saudi women, whilst other negative representations depicted Saudi women as subordinate and oppressed (Elyas & Aljabri, 2020).

In comparison to the negative representation of Saudi women in the Western media, local Saudi newspapers presented women differently, as shown in a study by Elyas et al. (2020) that examined how Saudi women were portrayed in a sample of 17 Arabic and English online Saudi newspapers and magazine articles written by Saudi writers, between 6th and 23rd March 2016; the weeks around International Women's Day. The study utilised critical discourse analysis, and specifically van Leeuwen's 1993 framework, which is also the framework used in this research, to reveal the ideologies underpinning these representations.

The study results showed that within Saudi society Saudi women are portrayed positively. Elyas et al. (2020) used van Leeuwen's framework with a similar goal to the current research, that is, to examine the representation of Saudi women. They also applied the framework to Arabic data, but it is no longer possible to confirm which variety of Arabic was analysed. The study did not clarify in which variety of Arabic the examined data was written, and on attempting to check the links that the study provided, all except one of the Arabic articles had been removed from the website. Since the data was taken from newspapers and magazines it may have been a formal variety of Arabic that has official status and is different from the colloquial variety used for a large number of the tweets analysed by this research.

The next, and final, section of this chapter will discuss Sunderland's approach to identifying and naming the gendered discourses in the collected tweets discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia.

3.3.7 Gendered discourses

In this research, gendered discourses will be identified and named using Sunderland's (2004) inductive bottom-up approach, which is influenced by Conversation Analysis, Critical Discourse Analysis, and Feminist Post-Structuralist Discourse Analysis (Baker & Ellece, 2011b). Sunderland's approach focuses on the ideational meaning rather than the interpersonal meaning. By using Sunderland's (2004) approach, this study links the micro textual level analysis, in which van Leeuwen's categories are used, to the social macro level, in which gender ideologies, so in other words, Sunderland's approach in this research is applied at the meso level.

Sunderland's approach to identifying and naming gendered discourses can be divided into stages. The first involves a close reading of the text in order to recognize and spot discourses using cues, while the second names the discourses, by recognising the relationships between the discourses or the function of the discourse. Before providing more detail about these

stages, however, an explanation is required of what gendered discourses entails to provide a clear understanding of Sunderland's approach. Also the definition of gender and discourse that's are drawn by Sunderland in her approach, which enable her approach to detect gendered discourses.

Gendered discourses are representations and expectations that females and males should act in particular gendered ways (Sunderland, 2004). An example of gendered discourse would be a text about parenting that suggests that women and men raise children in distinct ways indicating that men tend to use physical punishment and harsher forms of discipline compared to women. While gendered discourses reveal expectations and representations, in reality, both females' and males' actual behaviour may not match these representations (Sunderland, 2004).

The view of gender that underpins the notion of gendered discourse is the socio constructionist view (as discussed in Section 3.3.2), which is to say that within Sunderland's approach gender is viewed as produced "in large part" by language and discourse (Sunderland, 2004). However, it is not only Sunderland's view of gender that enables her approach to identify and name various gendered discourses, it is also the view of discourse that she draws on.

From the first decade of the 21st century, discourse in the Foucauldian sense – "practices that systematically form the object of which they speak" (Foucault, 2002, p. 54) – was the central idea of many studies (Mackenzie, 2021), and Sunderland (2004) was one of those researchers. She took Foucault's meaning a step further by not only explicitly identifying discourse, but also naming particular discourses (Baker & Ellece, 2011b); for example, "Privileged femininity" and "Male sexual drive" (Sunderland, 2004). In short, Sunderland incorporated

Foucault's notion of discourse in which language is not simply a reflection of reality but actually shapes and reinforces gender ideologies.

The notion of detecting discourse is possible because, as Mills (2004) highlighted, any discursive structure can be detected due to "the systematicity of the ideas, opinions, concepts, ways of thinking and behaving which are formed within a particular context" (p. 15). However, the methodological guidance on the identification and analysis of discourse is scarce. The lack of methodological direction may be explained by the fact that, for various reasons, the identification of discourses is not straightforward. For example, they are not visible nor limited (Sunderland, 2006), have neither an objective beginning nor a visibly defined end (Wodak, 1997), and they are not isolated units (Baxter, 2003). Then there is the possibility that numerous discourses may be present in any given text, and in reality it can be difficult to separate distinct strands, even slightly, as they are interconnected and intertextually connected (Baxter, 2003). They can be seen to merge, combine and interrelate (Jäger & Maier, 2009; van Leeuwen, 2009b), also they may be interpreted differently by different people (Sunderland, 2004, 2006).

Even though the identification of discourses is difficult and not straightforward for various reasons, some of which have been highlighted above, Sunderland's approach (2004, 2006) made identifying and naming them possible because, most importantly, she did not set out detailed, and rigid methodologies but provided more general strategies. Attempting to systematise the process of identifying discourses with rigid, closed steps would be difficult, but more of an issue is whether it is helpful to do so, given the complicated nature of discourse.

Turning to the way Sunderland achieves discourse detection. Within her approach (2004, 2006), she proposes that a particular discourse is recognizable and can be identified via its

manifestation in characteristic linguistic traces. These traces provide the analyst with cues for the way to understand a text (Talbot, 1998). Sunderland's approach depicts how gendered discourses can be identified or spotted and even named via linguistic traces in any text (Sunderland, 2004). Such linguistic traces can be recognized via traditional techniques of discourse analysis, including social actor representation, modality, and transitivity (Baker & Ellece, 2011b). While there is no fixed list of linguistic traces, those selected should be rational and related to the subject of the research. For example, it is illogical to use metaphors as traces to identify the gendered discourses in legal documents, where metaphorical language is usually precluded and a formal, clear, and technical language tends to be used.

Sunderland's approach, however, focuses not only on traces and what is explicitly present in the text, but also on what is missing, which is in line with Foucauldian poststructuralist theory (Mackenzie, 2021). For example, in Sunderland's (2000) examination of the absence of the linguistic items "share" and "paternity leave" with reference to men as parental subjects, she reinforces what she identifies as a "Part-time Father/Mother as main parent" discourse, a kind of discourse that supports a traditional division of labour. For the same discourse, Part-time Father/Mother as main parent, the occurrence of the transactive verb "give", suggests that the father is an empowered person positioned 'to give the mother a break' and the mother is positioned as the receiver and the goal of the verb (Sunderland, 2000). For the discourse analyst, the identification of gendered discourses can pose difficulties because gender can be indexed directly and at the same time indirectly, and those indirect instances are challenging to spot (Brookes & Baker, 2021); for example, using gender-neutral terms such as "chair" instead of "chairman" and pronouns that do not specify a gender, such as "they". In the analysed data in this study, gender was found to be indexed direcrtly and indirectly.

The identification of any discourse includes a subjective form of interpretive analysis, based on making sense of the text and its context (Baker, 2005; Baker & Ellece, 2011b; Martin &

Wodak, 2009; Sunderland, 2004). Thus, it is probable that readers and analysts from different social groups will spot different discourses even if they examine identical textual linguistics traces (Sunderland, 2004).

The fact that this research does not include the gender of tweet authors in the analysis does not prevent, but rather strengthens, the application of the subjective process of naming and identifying gendered discourses; as Litosseliti (2006) emphasised, gendered discourses are produced by both sexes in distinctive ways and in different situations, and such discourses should not be linked with the gender of their articulators. Therefore, a woman is as likely as a man to articulate and produce (and in our data, tweet) sexist and anti-women discourses, whilst on the other hand a man could produce a feminist and anti-sexist discourse (Sunderland, 2004, 2006).

This idea is of importance to this research as it identifies that females can be opponents of women driving and consequently produce tweets that are against women driving, and men also can be supporters of women's driving and tweet their support. This has not been highlighted in previous research, where it seems that supporters of women's driving in Saudi Arabia are narrowed down to female activists, and opponents are confined to religious clerics, which implicitly positions the issue of women driving as an issue between females and males and of gender polarisation. This can be seen in the work of Almahmoud (2015), and also of Al Mufarreh (2017) who, in her examination of discourse about the ban on women's driving in Saudi Arabia, only examined Saudi female advocates. This is imprecise and indirectly seems to underline the view that discourses are sex-exclusive which is incorrect. For example, the discourse supporting women driving could also be produced by men. An example of a study in which such discourses are not sex-exclusive was conducted by Eberhardt (2017) who examined how gender is represented in Harry Potter novels which are written by a female author, namely Joanne Kathleen Rowling, known by her pseudonym JK Rowling, and found

patterns of asymmetry that also reproduce typical cultural ideologies about gender, reiterating and producing stereotypical ideas regarding essential differences amongst males and females. Hunt (2015) discovered similar findings in her examnation of agency in Harry Potter, patricularly with regard to how agency is evidently gendered.

As demonstrated earlier, discouses are not sex-exclusive, but that does not mean that production and participation in a given discourse is without constraints, as production of and participation in any discourse is governed by the social positions and the institutional structures of both men and women (Litosseliti, 2006). In the case of women's driving, a male supporter with a social position in society – for example, the head of a tribe – whose family and tribe members strongly oppose women's driving, would find it difficult to participate in hashtags discussing the subject from a Twitter account that other members of his tribe and family knew he had. Thus, participation in a given discourse is not without its limitations and social ramifications.

Gendered discourses are not restricted to certain domains nor academic disciplines as they have been identified and named in various spheres, including advertisements in Singaporean newspapers (West et al., 1997), in Ugandan English textbooks (Namatende-Sakwa, 2018), in the workplace (Litosseliti, 2006), and in classrooms (Sunderland, 2006). Gendered discourses have also been examined in internet forums by Mackenzie (2018) who looked at a UK based online parenting forum known as Mumsnet and identified a number of dominant parenthood related discourses including that of "Child-centric motherhood".

While gender discourses are not restricted to domains and disciplines, they are restricted to a condition; that of being *socially acceptable*. Jaworski and Coupland (1999) underscore that a given discourse can only exist if it is socially acceptable. It does not have to be acceptable to everyone, but it must be acceptable to at least some individuals. Sunderland (2004) stresses

that to fulfil the social acceptability condition a discourse must be provisionally recognizable. A cosmetic surgery discourse, for instance, would have been confusing a hundred years ago but not today. One hundred years ago, people would have been completely confused if faced with a piece of writing encouraging and promoting cosmetic surgery for healthy young individuals and advocating concepts such as remaining young. The discourse would not be recognizable as the idea of cosmetic surgery for healthy young people would have been alien to them. Similarly, in the case of Saudi Arabia, a discourse supporting women driving would not have been recognizable before all the movements that called for women to be allowed to drive.

Recognizing a discourse is, however, not a straightforward process, as even if the discourse is socially acceptable this does not guarantee that it will be recognized, because as Baxter (2003, p. 46) clarified, "within any field of knowledge, there is never just one discourse but always plural and competing discourses". Therefore, the concept of discourse recognizability is not easy to apply because a discourse does not stand by itself in a text, but rather is found linked with other discourses in a given text. For this reason, in order to identify a discourse in a text, it must be dissected from amongst the other linked discourses. However, discourse recognizability can be operationalised and texts can be empirically examined by training the listener or reader to employ textual and extra-textual knowledge to "spot" and "name discourses" in any text (Sunderland, 2004). The number of discourses that can be recognized is more than the number of discourses that are taken up by language users as they opt to avoid the use of language that incorporates traces of non-dominant discourses (Sunderland, 2004). Sunderland (2004) attributes the reason for the selective use of discourse is related to the notion that people select discourses with the least resistance and rather compatible with how they are being subject positioned. Subject positioning refers to the way in which language use can shape how a person is perceived and positioned within social structure and power relations. For example, several people would encounter traces of racist discourse and are

positioned as somebody who holds xenophobic assumptions, they would withdraw from such interaction rather than producing language with traces of anti-racist discourse as this would create a conflictual discourse (Sunderland, 2004). Sunderland's approach does allow detection of recognizable gendered discourses which are like other discourses they pre-exist the speaker and are not produced outside of history and cultural context (Sunderland, 2004, 2006).

Having used Sunderland's approach to spot and identify recognizable discourses, we now move on to the second stage which is discourse naming. Discourse naming is not a specialist process (Sunderland, 2004). The activity of discourse naming is governed by a particular guideline in which Sunderland (2004) specified that naming of discourses can be achieved conceptually and formally. Within the conceptual aspect, Sunderland (2004) draws a distinction between "descriptive discourses", which are discourses within a specific context such as courtroom discourses, and "interpretive discourses", which represent a particular view or ideology, such as compulsory heterosexuality. Other interpretive discourse names would refer to how the discourse being named relates to other discourses (Sunderland, 2004), which is to be expected as discourses exist in relation to other discourses (Litosseliti & Sunderland, 2002). The relationships between discourses can take different forms, including dominant, competing, and mutually supportive, among others. Or instead, interpretive discourse names could reflect what is significant about the discourse – what is this discourse seen to do? – in other words, the function of the discourse; is it for example repressive or liberating (Sunderland, 2004). These different names for a given discourse can be combined in the name, for example the dominant discourse of masculinity. With regard to how the naming of discourses can be formally achieved, Sunderland (2004) proposed different patterns, such as "adjective + discourse", which can be used for both interpretive and descriptive discourses. Other patterns are only applicable to names of interpretive discourses and consist of a "discourse + noun", and the remaining pattern consists of an adjective followed by an

adjective phrase that is created specifically, such as “Battle of the sexes”. This type of name should be explained by the analyst as they are not self-explanatory (Sunderland, 2004).

Sunderland’s rule for discourse naming is useful as it enables the reader to immediately identify the type of discourse, whether it is a descriptive discourse or an interpretive one, and what type of relationships and functions it involves. It is important to highlight that discourse naming and discourse identification are not neutral activities; they say something about the person who names the discourses (Sunderland, 2004). For instance, Sunderland (2004) states that, depending on the analyst’s stance, a pornographic text could represent either a discourse of liberation or a discourse of misogyny. The discourse in this research will say something about the researcher, which is why information about the researcher can be found in Section 5.9. Mackenzie (2021) highlights that researchers of language, gender and sexuality might be reluctant to name particular discourses because doing so might convey that specific forms of knowledge are fixed, and consequently, challenging them subsequently will be very difficult. It is important to note that the process of naming and labelling a discourse is usually grounded in the discourses that we have already experienced, which is usually unconsciously experienced (Baker, 2005).

For Sunderland’s approach to yield results it should be applied to a fruitful epistemological site, although there are no fixed criteria for such sites. They are always changing because, as Sunderland (2004) highlighted, epistemological sites are influenced by the changing theoretical understanding of the gender language relationship. She has identified a range of epistemological sites, ranging from actual sites such as a Starbucks coffee shop, to institutions such as fatherhood (Sunderland, 2004, 2006), whilst in a study with Unger (2007) she also named the animated film Shrek as a relevant epistemological site for gender and language study. Within the range of epistemological sites Sunderland (2004) points out that a distinction can be made between sites where gender is likely to be represented in a traditional

way and those where it will perhaps be represented in a non-traditional way. These could consist of sites where both sexes transgress traditional norms, for example where men are pre-school teachers. This research views hashtags in which people discuss women driving in Saudi Arabia as a fruitful epistemological site for gendered discourse, given that the hashtags focus on gender, and both women and men transgress traditional norms by supporting women driving in Saudi Arabia during the ban.

This chapter has established the significance of social media, and specifically Twitter, with regard to the issue of women driving in the context of Saudi Arabia. It has introduced some of the key concepts that relate to the main focus of the study, such as gender, genderd discourses, and discussed the relationship between gender ideologies and gendered discourses in this study. The next chapter will discuss the theoretical and methodological framework utilised for analysis of the data.

Chapter 4 – Theoretical framework

This chapter will introduce the theoretical framework in which the study is situated within, which is the broader context of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS), as it is the framework that guides the research design and methods that will be used to analyse the tweets about women driving. Understanding the theoretical underpinnings of the study will make the findings and the implications of the research easier to comprehend. The chapter will begin with a summary of the CDS field of study, including its tenets and aims, then move on to examine two concepts which are of importance to CDS and any critical discourse study, namely critique and discourse, and will identify the definition of discourse that this study adopts. The chapter will end with a review of the various CDS approaches and will identify the framework within CDS that this thesis will employ to analyse the representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving.

4.1 Overview of Critical Discourse Studies

Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) developed from Critical Linguistics, an approach that emerged in the 1970s at the University of East Anglia by a number of linguists and literary theorists, but mainly Roger Fowler, Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (Blommaert, 2005). Their work was founded on the systemic-functional and social-semiotic linguistics of Michael Halliday, whose linguistic methodology is still central to CDS (Blommaert, 2005). Other roots of CDS are to be found in Classical Rhetoric, Textlinguistics and Sociolinguistics, as well as in Applied Linguistics and Pragmatics (Wodak, 2001, 2011).

CDS as a network of scholars emerged in the early 1990s (Wodak, 2011). In collaboration with the University of Amsterdam, Teun Van Dijk, Theo van Leeuwen, Gunther Kress, Norman Fairclough, and Ruth Wodak devoted two days of discussion to the theories and methodologies of discourse analysis, specifically those of CDS (Wodak & Meyer, 2016).

CDS has certainly developed and changed since then, turning CDS into a well-established field (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000). Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000), state that the starting point for CDS is usually considered to be Fairclough's landmark publication, *Language and Power* (1989). The European origins of CDS could explain the relative sparsity of studies that have examined Arabic data, a gap that this study aims to address.

CDS is a problem-oriented interdisciplinary critical approach or research program that includes a range of approaches that use various theories and analytical methods to study the way language (re) produces social realities to expose situations of injustice, discrimination, inequality, or power abuse, among other issues (Van Dijk, 2001; van Leeuwen, 2009a; Wodak, 2011; Wodak & Chilton, 2005; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDS is different from descriptive linguistic approaches, as it is not limited to describing linguistic features in a given text, but also explains, by employing multidisciplinary and multi methodological approaches (Meyer, 2001; Wodak, 2011; Wodak & Meyer, 2009). CDS also differs from other approaches in its specific interest in power, and its underlying idea that the social relations reflected and exposed in language phenomena are fragments of a larger pattern distinguished by unequal power relations (Breeze, 2011). It is not a unitary framework and does not involve one method or a single theory. Thus, there is no single theory, uniform method or systematic and detailed procedure that can be applied when conducting critical analysis (Fairclough, 2003; Meyer, 2001; Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Rather CDS incorporates a range of research issues, data, approaches and methodologies, grounded in different theoretical backgrounds (Weiss & Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2002). It can also be carried out, and integrated with, any approach and subdiscipline in the field of humanities and the social sciences (Van Dijk, 2001).

There is no CDS method that must be applied in order to conduct a critical discourse study. What CDS entails is designing and setting critical goals and later on clarifying what specific

methods will be used to achieve these goals (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). However, there is a widespread misconception that CDS is a method, as the former label of the field critical discourse analysis (CDA) conveys the notion that that is the case, and for this reason both Van Dijk (2016) and Wodak and Meyer (2016) abandoned the term CDA and adopted instead the more fitting term Critical Discourse Studies (Khosravinik, 2017). Van Dijk (2016) highlights that the term CDS depicts the field more accurately as one in which a critical perspective or attitude is held, whilst making use of various methods from the humanities and social sciences. Although the term CDA is still popular, and seems to be used interchangeably with CDS, this study will follow Van Dijk (2016) and Wodak and Meyer (2016), and only utilise the term Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) from this point onward.

What unifies the various methodologies and the scholarly influences that embody CDS is, to a certain extent, an agreed agenda or goal among CDS researchers, which, according to van Leeuwen, is to "critique […] dominant discourse and genres that effect inequalities, injustices and oppression in contemporary society" (van Leeuwen, 2009a). Van dijk (2004) shares a similar view as he considers that CDS usually examines the various forms of 'the abuse of' power in various relations of gender, ethnicity and even class, for example sexism and racism. Van Dijk (2004) view is that CDS scholars aim to reveal the reproduction of inequality by analysing how discourse enacts, expresses, condones or contributes to it. Meanwhile, Wodak (2011) considers that what brings together the different approaches in CDS is their mutual interest in the semiotic aspects of politics, political economy, power, identity and cultural change in a given society.

There is no fixed list of goals or agenda for CDS approaches as each scholar's CDS research agenda will differ according to their interest, but generally, CDS is an interdisciplinary approach which can be adopted by researchers from a variety of backgrounds to examine any social problem. As Rogers (2003) advocates, any researcher who is interested in examining

the relationship between language and society can draw on CDS to portray, explain and interpret such relationships. In the case of this study, it draws on CDS to examine the relationship between the language used in the representation of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving, and the Saudi society in which women driving is debated. There is a basic principle of CDS which is that discourse is a type of social practice; that is, discourse is mutually constitutive of and constituted by social situations, institutions, and even relationships. Consequently, discourse not only constructs but also reproduces and upholds social structures and relationships, including but not limited to gender roles and expectations (Fairclough, 1992a; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).

While there is no fixed list of goals or agenda in CDS there is a general and a clear bias toward linguistically defined text-concepts, and linguistic-discursive textual structures are attributed a crucial function in the social production of inequality, power, ideology, authority, or manipulation (van Dijk 1995). This preference could explain the popularity of drawing on corpus methods in CDS studies.

This discussion of what CDS entails brings into question whether any CDS approach is suitable for the present research, which examines tweets in hashtags discussing women's driving, because tweets are not typical of the data previously analysed by any CDS approach. Different CDS approaches have been used to examine newspaper discourses by Richardson (2007) and Van Dijk (2000), among others, in their examination of newspaper article headlines. Sunderland and McGlashan (2012) adopted a CDS approach to examine gender representation in children's picture book titles using van Leeuwen's Social Actor Network (2008). Both headlines and book titles are concise and short, resembling tweets in their structure, and since these are the main interest of this research there is some validity in adopting a CDS approach for this study.

4.2 Tenets and aims of CDS

Despite the diversity within CDS theories and approaches, there are a number of principles that are common to most of them. Some of these principles will be illustrated. The first principle is that CDS addresses social problems, for example, including racism, inequality, gender issues, discrimination, identity, and welfare (Fairclough, 2016; Fairclough & Wodak, 1997; Wodak, 2002).This does not mean that any issue that is examined by CDS has to be a political or serious problem (Unger et al., 2016).

The problems with which CDS is concerned, such as identity, clearly indicate that it is not concerned with a specific linguistics unit per se, but with social phenomena (Titscher et al., 2000). Due to the complex nature of the social problems that CDS explores, for example racism, it demands not only a multidisciplinary, but also a multi methodological approach (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Another principle of CDS is that power relations are discursive, which presupposesthat social relations of power are performed and negotiated in and through discourse (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997).

Another tenet of CDS is that discourse constitutes society and culture. This means that the relationship between discourse and society is a dialectical one, in which discourse shapes society and culture, and is in turn shaped by them (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997). This means that every use of language contributes to reproducing and transforming society and culture, including relations of power.

Besides the various approaches and theories within CDS, what differentiates CDS from other discourse analytic approaches is that CDS researchers ask their questions differently (Wodak & Meyer, 2001). Meyer elaborates on this point and states that when CDS researchers ask questions they place themselves as advocates for groups suffering from discrimination.

4.3 The notions of critique and criticality in CDS

What also sets CDS apart from other academic fields of discourse analysis and applied linguistics is the notion of criticality. The word critical is part of the CDS label and central to the concept. The history of utilizing the term critical in CDS suggests that it was inspired by a number of schools, the earliest being the Marxist, and later ones being the Frankfurt School and particularly that of 'critical theory' (Wodak, 2011; Wodak & Meyer, 2016).

According to the sense of critical used at the Frankfurt School, upon which CDS established its approaches/programming, social research should aim to critique and change society, instead of following traditional theory that merely attempts to explain and understand a given society (Wodak, 2011; Wodak & Meyer, 2016). This highlights the emancipatory agenda that has significant implications for CDS (Chilton et al., 2010). It also differentiates CDS from other disciplines. It is important to explain the use of the term critical, as there is a misconception that it implies negativity or even a judgmental stance (Unger et al., 2016). Critical should not be viewed merely as an adjective derived from the noun criticism (Le & Le, 2009), and it does not carry the same meaning as negative, as it does in common usage (Chilton et al., 2010), although what it actually means to be critical varies from analyst to analyst.

The critical aspect of CDS can be realized in numerous ways, which is to be expected as CDS draws on different schools of social inquiry, such as the neo-Marxism of the Frankfurt school, poststructuralist deconstruction, and post modernism (Locke, 2004). For Fairclough (1992a), the critical element is about showing connections for example the connections between, language, ideology and power which could be hidden. He also stresses that the term critical denotes "intervention, for example providing resources for those who may be disadvantaged through change" (Fairclough, 1992b, p. 9). For Rogers (2004), critical is linked to uncovering power relations and inequities in a society, while for Wodak (2001, p. 9), critical is

"understood as having distance to the data, embedding the data in the social, taking a political stance explicitly, and a focus on self-reflection as scholars doing research". For Wodak, critical researchers are transparent about their political view regarding the topic under examination. Wodak's view, however, involves a paradox, as researchers are encouraged to maintain a distance from the data, and at the same time to contextualise that data, which is a politically selective practice (Qu, 2014).

The notion of critique is a significant component of CDS that has shifted it away from mere description to a more analytical and critical perspective. In CDS studies, the words critique and critical seem to be utilised interchangeably, which could be due to the interdisciplinary nature of CDS that combines theoretical and methodological reflexivity with socio-political critique (KhosraviNik, 2015).

A final note about the notion of criticality in CDS is that there are those, such as Martin (2004), who oppose it and hold the view that CDS should have a reconstructive agenda and deal with social problems by adopting a positive approach, which he calls "positive discourse analysis". Early discussion about positive discourse analysis can be traced back to Baxter (2002). With regard to this, Le and Le (2009) question the necessity of the term positive, as all academic investigations have a shared goal which is to contribute to knowledge regardless of their orientation. As a result, positivity is inherent in all academic approaches and therefore it should not be marked out in titles and labels (Le & Le, 2009), a viewpoint with which this study agrees.

4.4 The notion of discourse

It is challenging and problematic to provide a clear and simple definition of discourse and is indeed one of the foremost recurring problems that face discourse analysts. The concept is fuzzy, used simultaneously in various senses, and in short has various related and loose meanings. This is primarily attributable to a lack of other terms, and results in unavoidable

duality in usage (Bloor & Bloor, 2013). Another reason is that 'discourse' has a complicated history and is utilised in a number of diverse ways by various theorists (Mills, 2004). What also contributes to the complexity of defining and pinning down the meaning of discourse is that theorists do not point out which meaning they have adopted (Mills, 2004). So the term is not a unified concept, but understanding the definition in use in a given study is important as it reflects the theoretical underpinning that informs the research (Mills, 2004). What follows is by no means a summary of all the definitions of discourse, but it highlights some of the senses and definitions used. It is a justification for the selected definition and the reason behind its selection, highlighting the distinction between the chosen definition and other senses of 'discourse'.

Starting with a general understanding of discourse, it can indicate any form of 'language in use' (Brown & Yule, 1983) or naturally occurring language. Another meaning refers to particular contexts of language usage, or simply a particular group of texts that occur within a particular setting, and in this way it resembles concepts like genre or text type (Baker & Ellece, 2011b); the language used in the media is an example of this. An interesting aspect of this definition is that the context in which the text occurs is what defines the discourse. Another sense of discourse that has been perceived by some theorists is as a way of seeing aspects of the world connected with a specific social perspective or an attitude regarding a topic, for example neo-liberal discourse or colonial discourse (Baker & Ellece, 2011b). When discussing discourse, Michel Foucault is the author to whom most refer (Macdonell, 1986). In CDS we observe that Michel Foucault's definition of discourse has been combined with a systematic framework of analysis that is established based upon a linguistic analysis of the text (Fairclough, 1989, 1992a, 1995b; Fowler, 1979; Hodge & Kress, 1988), but this integration should not be viewed as simply an application of Foucault's work.

This brings us to the definition of discourse adopted by this research; namely that of van Leeuwen. Drawing on the Foucauldian (1977, p. 6, as cited in Van Leeuwen, 2008) perspective of discourse[15], which is "a socially constructed knowledge of some social practice", van Leeuwen views discourse in the sense of social cognition. By socially constructed van Leeuwen indicates that the knowledge gained was created and grew in particular social contexts, and in ways which benefited the social actors in these contexts (van Leeuwen, 2005, 2008). By social practices, van Leeuwen means "socially regulated ways of doing things" (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 6); in other words, such practices are a series of physical and/or semiotic activities that are arranged to various extents and in various ways, such as "preparing lunch". Van Leeuwen (2008) highlights that, while others prefer to restrict 'discourse' to 'text' that indicates an extended stretch of connected speech or writing, he does not.

4.5 Different approaches to CDS

There are various approaches to CDS that differ in their analytical foci, methods and so on. Some CDS approaches are more inductively oriented while others are deductive. This division is mostly linked to the issue under examination (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Users of inductively oriented approaches, such as van Leeuwen's social approach, which will be employed in this study, tend to examine issues that they are curious about and for which they aim to conduct a thorough, in-depth examination of case studies and utilise plenty of data collection to uncover new insights (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Users of deductively oriented approaches, such as Fairclough's dialectical approach, tend to propose a closed theoretical framework which they then, with the aid of a number of suitable examples, utilise to demonstrate their assumptions, as in the dialectical-relational approach and socio-cognitive approach (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). It is important to emphasise that this division is not a fixed or clear-cut simple division, but rather should be viewed as a continuum in which

[15] Notes its plural

approaches are distinguished according to their entry points and themes (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). Certainly, there are more approaches in CDS that fall within the continuum but only the previously mentioned examples, of inductive and deductive approaches, will be discussed.

It is important to note two points before examining the various approaches: first that associating each approach with a scholar does not eliminate methodological hybridity, and second that in developing their work these scholars have drawn on diverse theories and methods that may overlap.

Starting with the Discourse Historical Approach (DHA) developed by Ruth Wodak and her colleagues in Vienna (Wodak, 2011). DHA has generally concentrated on the field of politics and drawn on various tools from argumentative, rhetorical, and pragmatic, later on combining and utilizing ethnographic methods (Wodak, 2011). Using all these different tools DHA analysed large corpora of multiple genres to examine social change, identity politics, migration, discrimination and sexism, among other things (Martin, 2017; Wodak, 2011). DHA seems to focus on the language use of people in power (Martin & Wodak, 2009), which is evident in the focus on politics and even in the researchers' subsequent move away from politics where they analysed, for example, doctor-patient communication (for further details see (Martin, 2017)).

DHA differs from other CDS approaches in a number of ways, but most importantly it emphasises the significance of the historical context. It attempts to incorporate all of the historical and socio-political context in which the discursive event is embedded in the analysis and interpretation of a discourse (Fairclough et al., 2011; Wodak, 2011). Another distinctive feature of DHA is that it has systematically utilised triangulation to a greater extent than other approaches (Martin, 2017). Triangulation is the use of multiple approaches to research which may take different forms and can include collecting data from various sources, or even

employing diverse methods of data collection such as interviews and questionnaires. Triangulation can involve employing methods of analysis that are not alike, for example, using corpus analysis as opposed to qualitative analysis (Baker & Ellece, 2011a). DHA supports the use of triangulation as a methodological technique for reducing bias in CDS (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

Another approach is Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Approach (SCA), which is distinguished from other CDS approaches by the discourse-cognition-society triangle (Van Dijk, 2016). The cognition aspect is what sets Van Dijk's Socio-Cognitive Approach apart from other approaches in CDS, as Van Dijk's approach claims that the relations between society and discourse are cognitively mediated (Van Dijk, 2016). Using his approach, Van Dijk focused on racism in the media and revealed how the media and influential public figures, such as parliamentary representatives, reproduce racist prejudices in a given society (Van Dijk, 2000). Recent developments that interrogate the cognitive dimension with CDS include the work of Koller (2005).

The third approach is the dialectical-relational approach used by Norman Fairclough. Fairclough developed a dialectical theory of discourse and a transdisciplinary approach to examining social change (Fairclough, 1992a, 1995a; Fairclough et al., 2011). He draws on Halliday's systemic functional grammar (Halliday, 1985) and the concept of *orders of discourse*, the way Foucault intended. Fairclough examined issues concerning neo-liberalism (Fairclough, 2000), the 'Knowledge based Economy' (Jessop et al., 2008), and 'globalisation' (Fairclough, 2006).

The last approach is the Socio-semantic approach by van Leeuwen that will be discussed in the next section as it is one of the approaches that this study uses.

4.5.1 The Socio-semantic approach - Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice

The CDS approach that this research will draw upon to examine the representation of social actors is van Leeuwen's approach. This is commonly referred to as "The Socio-semantic approach" in CDS literature. However, in a chapter discussing his approach, van Leeuwen (2016) titled the chapter "Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice- a guide." Although it is unclear if van Leeuwen intended this title to become the name of his approach, it is an accurate description, and therefore both names will be used to refer to it in this thesis.

Van Leeuwen's (2008) approach theoretically drew on the understanding that any representation of the world, and its different events, regardless of how abstract they are, should be regarded as a representation and reflection of social practices.

The analytical framework that van Leeuwen (2008) developed for discourse analysis drew on two main concepts:

1- Michel Foucault's concept of discourses as a semantic construction of reality that serves specific historical and social interests.
2- Bernstein notion of "recontextualization".

The first concept, Michel Foucault's, plays a significant role in van Leeuwen's (2008) framework. Van Leeuwen draws on the Foucauldian definition of discourses as "socially constructed ways of knowing some aspects of reality" (2016), which means that discourse is not merely a reflection of reality, but a way in which reality is constructed and shaped. As a result, within van Leeuwen's approach, discourses allow for the representation of aspects of reality, in a particular context (van Leeuwen, 2016). This emphasises the relationship between discourse and reality and the notion that discourses are not neutral or objective, but are shaped by underlying social practices (van Leeuwen, 2016). Social practice includes social, political, and cultural factors. For example, the discourse about dictatorship is based on the actions of

dictators in their role as such. However, discourses can transform these actions, for example by representing not only what dictators do but also the reasons behind their actions.

By drawing on Foucault's definition of discourses, van Leeuwen (2008) approach is also influneced by Foucault's view of reality (see section 3.3.2) which view reality as a social construct and not an objective truth. This means that, in the hashtag '#Women's car driving is a necessity' under examination in this study, there is no objective truth about WD. What the tweets in the analysed hashtag have is a reality which is socially constructed by each Twitter user, a group that is divided into Anti-WD and Pro-WD, and shaped by the interaction between knowledge and power in the Saudi society. Therefore this study can show how the same social actors are represented in different ways in relation to the same idea, that of women driving.

This highlights the notion emphasised by van Leeuwen (2008) that there is a difference between social practices and their representations, which means that a single social practice can have multiple representations and discourses, due to the transformation process and the existence of multiple discourses. What is interesting about van Leeuwen's view of discourse is that he also holds the view that 'discourses' are plural; that it is possible to have diverse discourses and ways of representing the same aspect of reality by including and excluding different things and fulfilling diverse interests. So competing discourses can exist simultaneously and people can have different 'knowledge' with regard to the same social practice, or in other words object or issue; as, for example, in this study, where the same social practice of women driving in Saudi Arabia is represented different ways by Anti-WD and Pro-WD. This difference in representation between the Anti-WD and Pro-WD in their depiction of the same social practice is due to the process of transformation or recontextualization which is one of the main concepts in van Leeuwen's framework.

In general, recontextualization as a concept indicates the ways that enable text, or parts of it, to be removed from their original context and afterwards incorporated in different contexts (Baker & Ellece, 2011a). However, the notion of recontextualization that van Leeuwen drew upon in his framework is by Bernstein (1990, p. 184) who highlighted that the semantic shifts happen "according to recontextualizing principles which selectively appropriate, relocate, refocus and relate to other discourses to constitute (their) own order and orderings". So simply put, according to Bernstein (1990), semantic shifts are governed by these recontextualizing principles. What Van Leeuwen did was to extend Bernstein's (1981, 1986) sociological concept of recontextualization to an analytical framework to examine any text to find the way(s) in which it draws on social practices and transforms them. Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice is an essential concept of van Leeuwen's approach because it led him to the view that discourses are and can be used as sources for instantiating social practices in text and other semiotics.

Having introduced the key concepts that inform van Leeuwen's approach, specifically the role of discourses in recontextualizing social practices, it is now possible to examine social practices with an emphasis on the specific elements that are the focus of this study, namely the actors.

Van Leeuwen defines social practices as "socially regulated ways of doing things—but the word 'regulate' may give the wrong impression here, since 'regulation,' in the sense in which we normally understand it, is only one of the ways in which social coordination can be achieved" (2008, pp. 6-7). To put in another way, social practices are the customary or standardised way of carrying out activities in a given society. These activities vary with respect to regulations. The act of women driving, or not driving, in Saudi Arabia can be regarded as a social practice in the way that it consist of pattern of behaviour that is shaped by social norms and expectations that are usniqe to Saudi society. The practice of women driving, or not driving, is formed and regulated by several elements for example cultural and

traditions, law, and even religion. These aspects have the capability to prohibit or allow women's access to driving and can also impact how women who drive, and mahram who permit women in their family to drive, are viewed in Saudi society.

Van Leeuwen (2008, 2016) identifies a number of elements of social practice, and the one that is of interest to this study is participants, or the generally accepted term that will be used in this thesis, "social actors". The social actors in this study are identified as the M-supporters Fem-supporters, M-opponents, and Fem-opponents of WD. This thesis will employ van Leeuwen's framework for Representing Social Actors (2008) – a part of his approach, which will be discussed in Section 5.7 – to examine the representations of the previously mentioned social actors.

Chapter 5 – Description of research procedures and methodology

Having examined the theoretical assumptions about gender and gendered discourse, this chapter will present the analytical frameworks that will be used to examine gender representation and gendered discourses. The chapter also explains the practical methodological decisions that were taken during the data collection period and process, and how the hashtags were chosen and the data they provided was prepared for analysis using the methods selected in this study.

This chapter will expand upon the theoretical framework discussed in the previous chapter by providing a detailed description of the research procedures and methodology used in the qualitative study. It will be divided into ten main sections. It will begin by presenting the research design, and then explain the rationale behind the decision to examine Twitter as a data source rather than other social media platforms, highlighting the unique features of the platform that make it well-suited to this research (see Section 2.8, Section 3.1.3, and Section 3.2.3 to see how Twitter became a site for debates about women driving). Its hashtag feature is of particular relevance to the data collection process of this study.

The focus will then move to a description of the data gathering approach that was used to collect the set of tweets examined in this analysis. This will include the sampling techniques used to identify a representative sample of tweets that would answer the research questions, the decisions that were taken during the data collection period and process, and how the hashtags were selected and the data they provided was prepared for analysis. This is to explain how the collected data was turned into a suitable data set that could be analysed.
To facilitate a meaningful analysis, the next section explains how the translation of the Arabic tweets was managed, including the challenges and considerations that arose during this stage. This is followed by a discussion of how thematic analysis (TA) was used to identify key themes in the data, including the steps taken to identify, code, and then categorize them into

appropriate themes. The chapter then moves on to discuss self-reflexivity throughout the research process, recognizing the researcher's role. Emphasising the commitment to responsible research practices, the chapter will conclude with a discussion of the ethical issues that were considered and the decisions made whilst conducting this research, including the protection of Twitters users' privacy and the responsible handling of users' sensitive information.

Overall, the primary aim of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the research procedures and methodology employed in the study, underlining the choices made and the steps taken to guarantee that the data was gathered, analysed, and presented in a rigorous and ethical manner. This chapter establishes a robust foundation for the subsequent analysis and interpretation of the findings by: providing a transparent, detailed account of the study research procedures and methodology; detailing the various steps involved in the research process; and supporting the rationale behind each decision and choice.

5.1 Research design

This is a qualitative study, with a focus on critical discourse study. It employs three methods to answer its research questions. The analysis of the data was conducted at three levels, although they are not necessarily presented in that order.

Beginning with the micro level analysis, this level entailed using van Leeuwen's framework (van Leeuwen, 2008) for the identification of discursive representations of social actors and the associated van Leeuwen discursive strategies. Van Leeuwen's framework will answer the first research question, as indicated inTable 5.1, as it enables an examination and analysis of the gender representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in Saudi Arabia in the trending Twitter hashtags discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia during the ban. This will provide an in-depth examination and evaluation of how language and discourse are used to establish and reinforce social and power-gender relations within the

Saudi context. Thematic analysis is then used to identify themes and patterns of gender representation using Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic approach (see Section 5.8 for more details), then Sunderland's (2004) gendered discourses (see Section 3.3.7) are used to identify and name the gendered discourses to be considered at the meso level. Finally, examining gender from the micro level using van Leeuwen, and the meso level using Sunderland's approach, enables this study to reveal gendered ideologies at the macro level.
when the analysis considerd all three levels.

Table 5.1 Research questions

#	Research question	Method (s)
RQ1.	1. How were the named social actors represented during the driving ban by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users? To answer this question, the following sub-questions were asked. 1.1. How are they linguistically realized, and through which discursive strategies? 1.2. What are the similarities and what are the differences in the way female and male supporters and opponents are portrayed by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users?	Van Leeuwen's social actor framework

RQ2	2. What are the gendered discourses that were identified and named? 2.1. What are the similarities and what are the differences between the types of gendered discourses that were invoked by Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users? 2.2. How did Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users draw on these gendered discourses? In answering this question it will be examined whether the gendered discourses were used to reinforce or undermine gendered stereotypes and gender ideologies. 2.3. What are the relationships between the identified gendered discourses?	Sunderland's gendered discourses

Since this study utilised Twitter and one of its most prominent features, which is the hashtag – mainly trending hashtags – for data collection, a description of Twitter and hashtags is essential.

5.2 Rationale for using Twitter

In this research, Twitter was selected as a means of data collection, as opposed to other social media websites, for a number of reasons. First, it is a popular form of social media among the Saudi population, as evidenced by the following statistics which reflect the popularity of

Twitter in 2016. This was a significant year for this study as it was the time period in which the hashtag analysed in this study was collected. The number of Twitter users recorded in 2016 in Saudi Arabia was 4.99 million (Statista, 2016). This significant number becomes even more important when the number of active Twitter users in the Kingdom is considered, as was reported in the 7th edition of the Arab Social Media Report, released by the Dubai School of Government reports; in March 2016, Saudi Arabia surpassed all other Arab[16] countries in terms of the number of active Twitter accounts. At that time, 2.6 million active Twitter users were recorded as being in the Arab region, and 29% were from Saudi Arabia. The 7th edition of the Arab Social Media Report also indicated that, in March 2016, 32% (the largest share) of 27.4 million tweets produced per day in the Arab region were generated in Saudi Arabia (Salem, 2017). Saudi Arabia was ranked first place in terms of tweet production with a monthly average number of 274 million. Of 2.6 million active users in the Arab region, 29% (the highest percentage) were in Saudi Arabia (Salem, 2017).

The second reason for selecting Twitter for data collection was that discussions on various campaigns about women driving were flourishing on this platform. As shown in Section 2.8, supporters of women driving utilised social media, and specifically Twitter, for their various campaigns. The campaigns that used Twitter, as highlighted in Section 2.8, include Women2Drive which initially started on Facebook but later moved to Twitter. Another campaign that used social media was Oct26driving, which was launched and promoted using Twitter and Facebook (Khamis & Mili, 2017). The reason social media was used to discuss women's driving in Saudi Arabia may be, as Noman, Faris and Kelly (2015) highlighted, that discussion of taboo topics seems to be possible using pseudonyms on social media. Women driving is a controversial topic and Saudi society tries to avoid face-to-face discussion of taboo and controversial topics. Therefore, Twitter offers a suitable platform for discussion of a debated topic like that of women driving.

[16] The report defined the Arab region as the 22 countries in the Arab league.

The third reason for choosing Twitter as a platform was its ability to bridge the religion- and culture-based segregation that is enforced by law in Saudi Arabia (Almunajjed, 1997). Segregation in Saudi Arabia, simply means that women were not allowed to mix with unrelated men. The segregation of the sexes applies to all areas of life, including education, banks, and the workplace amongst others (Almunajjed, 1997; Le Renard, 2008). Whilst this has recently reduced to some degree, due to the reforms indicated in Section 2.7, it was still practised during the ban on women driving, and accessing a sample that included both sexes would have been problematic as the researcher's gender would have constituted an obstacle. For this reason, utilizing a popular platform for Saudi Arabia, where boundaries between the sexes that exist in society seem to vanish, enabled the collection of a fair, balanced sample of data.

5.3 Twitter and its hashtag feature

Twitter was launched in October 2006 by a start-up named Obvious that is based in San Francisco (Honey & Herring, 2009) and has been described by several authors (for example, Honey and Herring (2009)), as a platform for microblogging, suggesting that there are similarities between Twitter and the practice of blogging (Halavais, 2014). It is, however, different from a blogging service, and even Twitter itself does not label its platform as a microblogging website, describing it instead as a service: "Twitter is a service for friends, family, and coworkers to communicate and stay connected through the exchange of quick, frequent messages" (Twitter, n.d.-d). Twitter users send messages called tweets that used to be limited to 140 characters (2009). According to Murthy (2013), social media, of which Twitter is an example, is a medium where "ordinary" individuals, in contrast to journalists, in what is considered ordinary social networks, are able to publish user-generated news and updates. Twitter presents its users with the option to create and customise their profile in a number of ways, such as uploading a picture, providing a name and biography, specifying

their location, and adding their birthday (Twitter, n.d.-c), which makes the user profile a rich source of information about the person (Kumar et al., 2013). However, since all of the information is entered by the Twitter user it is not guaranteed in any way to be true.

Twitter is always evolving as a platform. One of the changes that it has undergone was to the tagline, or question, that Twitter users respond to when tweeting, which changed in November 2009 from "What are you doing?" to "What's happening?" (Rogers, 2014). While this could be viewed as trivial, David Crystal, the linguist and author of *Txting: The gr8 db8,* felt it signified a shift from an ego-based to a reporting mechanism (Tate, 2009 , as cited in Rogers, 2014). Whether the tagline change had any great impact on the types of tweets that Twitter users produce is difficult to determine, but it is clear that Twitter users are tweeting and commenting on everyday events and reporting live news and incidents around the world, and the rise of Twitter journalism and activism cannot be refuted.

As explained above, tweets are short and restricted to a limited number of characters (180 at the time of the study), but by using the simple yet very powerful method of the hashtag, a unique[17] feature and integral part of the medium, Twitter was able to link tweets to larger themes and to connect the conversations of strangers (Murthy, 2013). In the collected data, for example, Twitter users who added to their tweet '#Women's car driving is a necessity', which was trending on Twitter during the ban on women driving, were able to elevate their own tweets from personal tweets to become a part of the larger discussion about the women's driving in Saudi Arabia. Hashtags are very simple, as a hash sign "#" can be followed by any word(s) to mark a subject, event or incident (Murthy, 2013). The function of a hashtag is to serve as a way of organizing material in Twitter based on topics instead of users (Squires, 2016).

[17] Hashtags are no longer exclusive to Twitter as they have been adopted by other social media platforms, but they remain a significant aspect of Twitter.

5.4 Data collection method

Within CDS there is no standardised method of data collection, with some CDS authors failing to even discuss data sampling methods or recommend data sampling procedures, except where corpus linguistics has been used (Wodak & Meyer, 2016). In contrast, this study will aim to follow a systematic data selection procedure that is also sensitive to the context in which the data is collected, and also in accordance with the research agenda for this dissertation. Therefore, this section will clearly discuss the step-by-step approach used, starting with the method that was adopted for data collection.

The data for this project was collected using the Twitter Archiver (premium edition), which is a Google add-on that extract tweets from Twitter every 10 to 15 minutes to a Google sheet, where they are stored using a spreadsheet application similar to Excel. A search rule was created by the researcher in the Google add-on to extract particular hashtags and their associated tweets from Twitter. Twitter Archiver was selected for two reasons. Firstly, it not only collects tweets, but also obtains and saves the following meta-data for each tweet: date of tweet, user screen name, user full name, tweet text, tweet id, application,[18] followers,[19] follows,[20] retweets, favourites, verified status,[21] Twitter join date, location, user Twitter account bio, the profile image of the Twitter account and the location provided by the Twitter account user[22]. It is important to note that this meta-data will not be disclosed in this thesis, for the ethical reasons discussed in Section 5.10. The second reason for using Archiver was that it enabled the researcher to create a specific query in order to collect trending data which met the data gathering requirements of this study. The rationale behind only collecting trending hashtags will be discussed in detail later, in Sections 5.5.1and 5.5.2. Before moving

[18] Refers to thetype of Twitter application used by the user to tweet, such as for Twitter for iPhone or Twitter for Android.
[19] Refers to the number of followers the author of the collected tweet has.
[20] Refers to the number of Twitter accounts the author of the collected tweet follows.
[21] At the time, a verified account was signified by a blue badge that appeared next to the username on Twitter.
[22] This is labeled in the application as Google Maps.

to the next section, it should be noted that, as a precautionary measure, the Twitter account that was used to monitor trending hashtags did not follow any accounts.

This is because the features of trends on Twitter are constantly evolving, and at the time of data collection, there were two ways to show trending topics: 1) Location, where Twitter identifies popular topics amongst people in a particular geographic location, which is set by Twitter users and was the way in which the data for this research was collected; and 2) a customisable option whereby a Twitter user can view trends that are tailored to them based on a number of factors such as who they follow, their interests, and location (Twitter, n.d.-e). This second way is always active and automatically generates feeds from Twitter. As one of the aims of this research is to examine hashtags that discuss women driving in Saudi Arabia that have received an influx of tweets from different Twitter users and resulted in these hashtags becoming trending topics in the Kingdom, only hashtags that were trending on the Saudi Arabian trend list qualified, and therefore the Twitter account that was used for data collection was set to show trends in a specific location, in this case, Saudi Arabia. Therefore, in order to avoid any confusion or human error that might cause the Twitter account to show tailored trends rather than location trend, the Twitter account used for data collection did not follow any account, and was not used for any purpose other than observing trending hashtags. This was to ensure that all trending hashtags that were shown to the researcher and subsequently collected were ones that were trending based on the location of Saudi Arabia. The Twitter account used for data collection was always set to show trending hashtags in Saudi Arabia.

5.5 Sampling techniques

The researcher's interest in social media, and particularly tweets, predates the beginning of her PhD, and consequently some of what would be used as data is from that time. She had noticed a proliferation of hashtags on Saudi Arabia's trending Twitter topics that discussed various issues relating to women in Saudi Arabia, which she decided to collect out of

curiosity and interest in the views presented in these hashtags. Her collection of trending hashtags that relate to women's issues in Saudi Arabia began on 6th June 2016, when the first trending hashtag, '#اشقاء_يضربون_اختهم_حتي_الموت' '#brothers hit their sister to death', was collected, and ended on 22nd November 2018 when the last hashtag, '#مع_او_ضد_عمل_وقياده_المراه' '#with_or_against_working _and women driving', was collected.

During this period 172 hashtags were collected. When the researcher began her PhD, she continued to collect trending hashtags, and only a few non-trending hashtags, one that related to women driving '#على_حد_سواء' '#Alike',[23] which was added to the collection on 24th January 2018. The lifting of the ban on women driving, on 26th September 2017, was a significant and contributory factor in the decision to concentrate on trending hashtags that discussed women driving.

Of the 172 collected hashtags, 32 were trending and discussed Saudi women driving, as illustrated in Table 5.2. The table shows all the collected trending hashtags discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia after 23rd of July 2016, which was the first time a hashtag that discussed the topic had become a trending hashtag. After this, the researcher closely monitored trending hashtags in Saudi Arabia until 22nd November 2018, which was when the last trending hashtag discussing the subject was collected, and also marked the end of the data collection period that had lasted about three years. The decision was taken to end the data collection on 22nd November 2018 because, at that point, sufficient hashtags had been collected about women driving for the study to make a close examination of the subject; in addition, since the issue had been resolved and women drivers had become a visible reality in the streets of Saudi Arabia, there were no longer any trending hashtags about the issue of women driving in the Kingdom.

[23] The Arabic and the English hashtag wording comes from the term used in the Royal Order to Adopt Provisions of Traffic Law, Executive Regulations, including Issuance of Driving Licenses for Males and Females alike.

Since 2016, when the researcher began to monitor and collect trending hashtags that pertained to women's issues in Saudi Arabia, non-Arabic hashtags that trend on Saudi Arabian topics have been infrequent. As illustrated in Table 5.2, only three hashtags in English, out of 32 that discussed women driving, were trending hashtags, and none during the ban which was the period prior to 26th September 2017. Two of these English hashtags were when the ban was lifted, and could have been prompted by the international media coverage and subsequent use of these hashtags to tweet about the news as international attention was focused on the historical change that allowed women in Saudi Arabia to get behind the wheel.

Table 5.2 All trending hashtags discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia from 2016-2018

Period in which the hashtag was collected	#	Trending date and collection day/month/year	Original hashtag	Translation
2016 – During the ban on women driving	1.	23/07/2016	#قياده_المراه_للسياره_ضروره	#Women Driving car is a necessity
	2.	10/10/2016	#بناتك_ياملكنا_طالبينك_يسوقون	#To the king your daughters are requesting your permission to drive
	3.	10/10/2016	#كلنا_مع_قياده_المراه_السعوديه	#We are all with Saudi women driving
	4.	14/10/2016	#قيادة_المرأة_للسيارة	#Saudi women driving
	5.	26/10/2016	#٢٦_سنه_مطالبه_بقياده_المراه	#26 years of calling for women driving

	6.	26/09/2017	#Women2Drive	
	7.	27/09/2017	#السماح_للمراه_بالقياده	#Allowing women to drive
	8.	27/09/2017	#بنات_الوطن_يرفضن_القيادة	#Saudi women reject women driving
	9.	27/09/2017	#مبروك_لنساء_الوطن	#Congratulations for Saudi women
	10.	27/09/2017	#السماح_بقيادة_المرأة_في_السعودية	#Allowing women driving in Saudi Arabia
2017 – Following the lifting of the ban on 26th September 2017	11.	27/09/2017	#الملك_سلمان_ينتصر_لقيادة_المرأة	#King Salman is victorious for women driving
	12.	27/09/2017	#wecandrive	
	13.	27/09/2017	#حريم_بيتي_لن_يقودوا	# Women of my house will not drive
	14.	27/09/2017	#السماح_للمراه_بالقياده	# Allowing women to drive
	15.	22/01/2018	#قيادة_المرأة_للسيارة	# Woman driving car
	16.	14/05/2018	#لن_تقودي_لن_تقودي	#You won't drive_You won't drive
	17.	04/06/2018	#اول_رخصه_قياده_نسابيه_سعوديه	# First Saudi woman's driving license
	18.	22/06/2018	#ستقودي_والشعب_معك	#You will drive and the people are with you
2018 – After 24th June 2018, the date from which Saudi women were allowed to drive	19.	23/06/2018	#قياده_المراه_السعوديه	#Saudi women driving
	20.	23/06/2018	#المراه_السعوديه_تسوق	#The Saudi woman is driving
	21.	23/06/2018	#SaudiWomenDriving	
	22.	23/06/2018 24/06/2018	#لن_تقودي	#You will not drive
	23.	24/06/2018	#المراه_السعوديه_تسوق	#The Saudi women is driving

	24.	24/06/2018	#المراه_السعوديه_تقود_السياره	#The Saudi women is driving car
	25.	27/06/2018	#ترضي_تتزوج_طبيبه_تسوق_سيارة	#Do you accept marrying a female doctor who drive a car
	26.	28/06/2018	#ترضي_تتزوج_طبيبه_تسوق_سيارة	#Do you accept marrying a female doctor who drive a car
	27.	29/06/2018	#زوجتك_لها_حق_تسوق	#your wife_has the right to drive
	28.	29/06/2018	#زوجتك_ساقت_ولا_ماساقت	#your wife drove or did not drive
	29.	03/07/2018	#حرق_سياره_امراه_في_مكه	#Burning a woman's car in Makkah
	30.	07/09/2018	#ترضي_تتزوج_طبيبه_تسوق_سيارة	#Do you accept marrying a female doctor who drive a car
	31.	08/09/2018	#ترضي_تتزوج_طبيبه_تسوق_سيارة	#Do you accept marrying a female doctor who drive a car
	32.	22/11/2018	#مع_او_ضد_عمل_وقياده_المراه	#with or against working and women driving

5.5.1 Pre-selection criteria for the hashtags to be analysed

Data selection is equally vital to the research process as data collection for a qualitative study (Page et al., 2014). The text that follows will explain the down sampling of the large data set and the data selection process that was applied to the collected data, which is shown in Table

5.2. As mentioned above, Table 5.2 showcases the 32 hashtags that were trending in Saudi Arabia and collected by the researcher within the data collection period of the research. To clarify, 26th September 2017 was the date of the royal order, but women were still not allowed behind the wheel; they were only allowed to drive on the day of the announcement as part of the celebration, but the implementation date of the lifting of the ban was 24th June 2018.

This particular time period was selected because this study initially aimed to examine and compare the gender representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving before and after the lifting of the ban on women driving. However, after close examination, it would have been outside the scope of a qualitative study to analyse more than one hashtag, as one hashtag, after cleaning and removing all spam, was found to be quite rich. Thus, in order to conduct a full analysis and answer all the research questions, the researcher made the decision to narrow the time period of the study to focus only on hashtags during the ban on women driving, as this is an interesting period in which intense discussion about women driving was taking place on Twitter. Therefore the first group of hashtags that were excluded were ones that were trending after the lifting of the ban on 26th September 2017, and this was because they did not satisfy the time period requirements set by this elimination step of the research. The five remaining hashtags that fit the date requirements of this study are shown in Table 5.3.

Table 5.3 All trending hashtags discussing WD during the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia in 2016

Period in which the hashtag was collected	#	Trending and collection day/month/year	Original hashtag	Translation

2016- During the ban on women driving	1.	23/07/2016	#قياده_المراه_للسياره_ضروره	#Women Driving car is a necessity
	2.	10/10/2016	#بناتك_ياملكنا_طالبينك_يسوقون	#To the king your daughters are requesting your permission to drive
	3.	10/10/2016	#كلنا_مع_قياده_المراه_السعوديه	#We are all with Saudi women driving
	4.	14/10/2016	#قيادة_المرأة_للسيارة	#Saudi women driving
	5.	26/10/2016	#٢٦_سنه_مطالبه_بقياده_المراه	#26 years of calling for women driving

Since this is a qualitative study that will analyse every tweet, and the number of captured tweets per hashtag was relatively high, it was neither possible nor feasible to clean, code, translate and analyse all of the collected data in order to answer the research questions. There were also restrictions on word count and time. Therefore, the decision was made to analyse only one hashtag out of the five, and an elimination process was used to select the one fruitful hashtag that would answer the research questions.

The first hashtag that was not chosen was number 2 in Table 5.3, '#To the king your daughters are requesting your permission to drive', because it is a plea that is specifically addressed to the King of Saudi Arabia to allow women to drive and not a general hashtag about the issue of Saudi women driving. The associated tweets were mostly pleas to the king and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia and did not include diverse tweets and views that either supported or opposed the issue of women driving. It was excluded because it would not answer the question of how supporters and opponents of women driving are represented.

Another hashtag that was excluded was number 5, '#26 years of calling for women driving', because rather than concentrating on the issue of all women driving in Saudi Arabia it centred

around a particular group, namely the well-known female activists who had engaged in various women's driving campaigns for 26 years, and it discussed the campaigns they had initiated. These have already been examined closely by others, such as Al Mufarreh (2017), Alotaibi (2017), and Almahmoud (2015), and their representation of well-known female activists is not of interest as those studies consider them to be an elite, whilst this study is interested in the general public and representations of ordinary female and male supporters and opponents of women driving.

Having eliminated all of the previous hashtags for the reasons given, only 3 of the 5 presented in Table 5.3 were left, which was still considered to be a significant number and to require downsizing. Therefore, the researcher decided to select the first trending hashtag that was trending during the ban on women driving for analysis in this study, as it has a high number of tweets. This resulted in the selection of the hashtags shown in Table 5.4.

Table 5.4 Analysed hashtag and the period in which it was trending in relation to the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia

During the ban on women driving on 23rd July 2016		
#	Original hashtag	Translation
1.	#قياده_المراه_للسياره_ضروره	#Women's car driving is a necessity

To ensure the relevance and accuracy of the selected hashtag in Table 5.4 for answering the research questions in this dissertation, it was assessed against the pre-determined criteria which are outlined in the next two paragraphs:

Firstly, the selected hashtag discusses women driving in Saudi Arabia during the period of the ban on women driving, which was the period beginning in 2016 and ending on 26th September 2017. The trending hashtag that was selected, and is shown in Table 5.4, will

provide insights into the ways in which social actors, namely female and male supporters and opponents of women driving, were represented during the ban.

Secondly, the rationale behind only collecting and analysing hashtags that were trending on the Saudi Arabian trends list has an ethical perspective, in that users are deliberately permitting other people to view their tweets. In other words, trending hashtags are public data, and once users tweet using trending hashtags, they are consenting for their tweets to be used as public data. It is important to note also that the number of tweets in the trending hashtags is significantly higher than in the non-trending ones.

The condition of excluding non-trending hashtags was not a random one set by the researcher but a requirement that resulted from closely examining and comparing non-trending hashtags and trending hashtags and understanding Twitter as a platform. To clarify how the researcher came to set this condition, and the rationale behind the exclusion of hashtags that were non-trending, the next section will explain the notable observation that emerged from the comparison between data collected from trending and non-trending hashtags.

5.5.2 Exclusion of non-trending hashtags

For a number of reasons, in this study the best procedure for investigating representations of supporters and opponents in hashtags discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia was to exclude non-trending hashtags from the analysis. Before examining the reasons for exclusion of non-trending hashtags, however, an explanation about non-trending hashtags and who can view them is essential.

Non-trending hashtags are non-viral hashtags which means they have not received an influx of tweets. Therefore, they are not visible on the Twitter trend list. Non-trending hashtags are only visible in two ways; either the person is a follower of the Twitter account that produced the non-trending hashtag, hence they can view it, or they search for it manually on Twitter.

This brings us to the first reason for eliminating non-trending hashtags, which is that they exclude users whose level of proficiency in navigating Twitter is basic; in other words, those people who are unable to navigate the platform efficiently in order to discover and participate in non-trending hashtags. This issue applies to digital spaces such as Twitter and their potential to exclude individuals due to a number of factors, in this case their level of digital literacy (Turley & Fisher, 2018). In order to find non-trending hashtags a person must have platform literacy. As highlighted by Latina and Docherty (2014), and finding hashtags on Twitter can be difficult as it requires knowledge of how to use the search bar. A person must also know what they are looking for in order to find the hashtag they seek. Trending hashtags, however, are visible to everyone and do not require a search. Moreover, non-trending hashtags exclude and lock out users who are not followers of those Twitter accounts that use and participate in non-trending hashtags.

The second reason is, one of the ways in which non-trending hashtags are visible and can be collected is by being a follower of Twitter accounts that produce non-trending hashtags. If, however, a researcher follows a public Twitter account and collects non-trending hashtags by being a follower, then if the owner of that Twitter account changes their privacy settings at any point in time and turns their public account private, this places the researcher in a difficult position. Once a Twitter account becomes private it indicates that the owner of the account has chosen for their tweets and content not to be viewed by anyone on Twitter unless they are their follower, and for their content to be restricted. Their tweets are changed from public to protected tweets,which, according to Twitter (Twitter, n.d.-a), means that the tweets of a Twitter private account can only be seen by the account followers but still can be captured and shared by followers of the account. A significant question then emerges: is it acceptable to collect these tweets and non-trending hashtags from private accounts? While there is no right or wrong answer, this research holds the view that the privacy choice of the owner of

the Twitter account should be respected and the researcher should abstain from the practice of collecting data from private accounts. Merely because it is accessible does not mean that the data can be ethically used (Boyd & Crawford, 2012).

The last reason for eliminating non-trending hashtags, relates to the types of opinions expressed in the non-trending hashtags. In short Non-trending hashtags tend to be prejudiced towrds one viewpoint. This is because non-trending hashtags tend to represent only the opinion of the individual who created it and their followers and this was reached after
The resercher examned whether there is any difference in the nature of views expressed between trending hashtags and non-trending hashtags by doing the following.
In 2016, when data collection began, the researcher created two Twitter accounts, one of which was used exclusively for the collection of trending hashtags, and this particular Twitter account did not follow any other accounts, as explained in Section 5.4. This account was used solely to monitor and collect trending hashtags about women's issues in Saudi Arabia. The second Twitter account was dedicated to collecting non-trending hashtags that were identified by following Twitter accounts belonging to people who identified as supporters of women's rights, and others who identified as activists for women's rights. Two groups of people were followed using the second Twitter account these people falls within two category: the first on Saudi public figures, whose accounts were verified, and the other one is people whose accounts were not verified (see Appendix C). At the time of data collection the verification status indicates that an account is of public interest according to (Twitter, n.d.-b). For additional information regarding the accounts that were monitored see Appendix C. At the time, all these Twitter accounts were public. The non-trending hashtags which only appeared on the accounts of those who identify themselves on Twitter as supporters of women's rights (see Appendix C) were used by those accounts to shed light on different women's issues and one of them was women driving. It is important to note that they were not trending because they were not popular at the time, so there was no surge of tweets to push them onto the

trending list for Saudi Arabia. After examination of the collected tweets in the non-trending hashtags it became apparent that, to a large extent, they only included tweets and opinions by users who supported women's driving, which could result in the gathering of data only from those who supported women's driving and other women's issues, and tweets which included the viewpoints of opponents would not be part of the collected data. In short, non-trending hashtags of women driving are representative of only one point of view, that of supporters of women driving and other women's issues as they are largely the followers of accounts such as those listed in Appendix C.

A marked observation that emerged from data comparison between trending and non-trending hashtags is that trending hashtags increase the number of participants and size of the audience and did not exclude any group from participating in the women driving hashtags. As a result, the data for this study is representative of supporters and opponents of women driving, but at the same time there is a drawback to collecting trending hashtags, which is the number of tweets per hashtag, including advertisements, spam, and retweets, among others.

Finally, the researcher is aware that this study has benefited from the advantages and opportunity of collecting data in live time, when the hashtags were trending, which is different from other studies that have relied on API and other means of data collection. Clarification of the issues about trending and non-trending hashtags is important, although as Page et al. (2014) highlighted, the practicalities involved in a particular internet study are often specific to that particular research. This research aims to clearly set out the steps that were taken so that others who approach social media, and particularly Twitter, for data collection are aware of the potential limitations when manually searching for tweets for their studies or following Twitter accounts to collect data. Studies such as Almuyidi's (2020) have manually searched for and selected their tweets, and Almufarreh (2017), for part of her data, collected tweets from the Twitter accounts of people she considered to be Saudi female

advocates, without indicating the privacy status of those accounts during data gathering. The field of CDS does not restrict data collection methods, however, manually searching for tweets is highly debatable practice.

A number of steps were applied to the hashtag selected for analysis and the next section will discuss how the tweets were prepared for this study.

5.5.3 Preparing the data for analysis

As previously explained, the data for this study consists of trending hashtags, collected from Twitter, that discuss women driving in Saudi Arabia. Twitter is regarded as a noisy environment due to the considerable number of tweets, and the ease and speed with which those tweets are posted (Honey & Herring, 2009). Due to the noisy environment from which the data was collected, there was a need to prepare it for analysis. The data preparation process that the researcher adopted in order to only analyse those tweets that answered the research questions fell into two phases. The first involved cleaning, and the second coding, the data.

5.5.3.1 Cleaning the data

Social media has unfortunately been infiltrated by automated posts, rebroadcast posts and spam (Page et al., 2014). The process of cleaning the data involved the following steps which were applied to each collected hashtag Google sheet. First, spam, retweets, replies, repeated tweets, and tweets that contained videos were removed. To eliminate spam, the researcher manually removed tweets which contained commercial URLs, fake news, harmful content, and tweets that encouraged the following of, or mentioned, random users. These were excluded because they did not answer the research questions, and as they did not discuss women driving, they had no importance or significance for the study.

To ensure that spam was removed, another step was taken, facilitated by the fact that the collected data revealed the app used for tweeting. This made it possible for the researcher to remove all tweets made by third party applications such as Tweetdeck which has the ability to "select multiple accounts through which to perform an action such as Tweeting, Retweeting, liking, or following" (Twitter, 2018a). Whilst the abilities of Tweetdeck were restricted on 23rd March 2018 (Twitter, 2018a), other third-party applications[24] still have the ability to do the following in terms of automated tweeting: they can simultaneously post similar content on various accounts, retweet, and follow unless suspended by Twitter if their creator does not comply with Twitter's rules. Third party applications usually but not always used by businesses and bots.[25]

Bots usually function as automated entities that look for trending hashtags to join, then they generally tweet spam (Leavitt, 2014). There are different types of bots, for example marketing, entertainment, and antisocial (Mowbray, 2014), and they can be harmful and have been utilised in underhand ways for political motives and employed to disseminate propaganda (Mowbray, 2014; Shorey & Howard, 2016). Social bots, for example, have been used to follow and boost politicians' social media accounts (Silva & Proksch, 2021), and studies have indicated that one of the political figures whose popularity was particularly increased by bots was Donald Trump (Onuchowska et al., 2019). For them to have a significant influence on political discourse, however, requires large amounts of capital – economic, cultural, temporal and social – which should be combined with methodological sophistication (Murthy et al., 2016). Despite whether the function of the bot is beneficial or harmful, Twitter bots undermine what Twitter was initially designed and intended for, which is communication between human beings (Mowbray, 2014). Since this study is interested in human communication, and mainly tweets written by human beings, not bots, or even

[24]Applications developed by parties other than the original vendor of the platform.

[25]Automated, or semi-automated programs that produce a large number of tweets.

human-assisted bots, the researcher made the decision to remove those produced by third party applications as they are used by bots and enable them to function.

With regard to the removal of spam, other researchers such as Altoaimy (2017) have opted to collect data from Twitter about women driving using keyword searches, which is another feature, available from the Twitter homepage, for retrieving topic related tweets. Altoaimy (2017) claimed that using keyword searches eliminated the occurrence of spam in the collected data, although she did not clarify whether bots were included within spam or whether she limited her understanding of spam to irrelevant tweets. However, given an understanding of Twitter as a platform, and how bots function, it is difficult to claim that any method of data collection will ensure a data set free of spam. As spam and bots are a limitation of any study that has analysed social media data, researchers should take them into consideration and take steps to eliminate spam that can be detected. The researcher does not claim that the hashtag-based data sets used in this research are free of spam; even after all the steps that were applied to ensure its removal, there is still a chance that some was retained, but this is a drawback and limitation of using social media data.

Following the removal of spam, the retweets were removed from the Google sheets of collected hashtags. In order to filter out all retweets, which are mainly tweets that repost another public tweet, either in its original form or with an additional comment, the researcher used the find command (control +f) to identify any tweet where RT (an abbreviation for retweet) appeared in front of the tweet. These were then deleted. Then the researcher inspected the collected data and noted the existence of repeated tweets which are tweets that are identical in their text content. Using the find command (control +f) all identical tweets were located. This was not sufficient to eliminate all duplicated tweets, because other identical ones containing spelling mistakes were not detected and therefore not removed. Another issue was spelling variations, as in Saudi Arabia various dialects exist in the

country's different regions. These dialects are characterised by differences in morphological, phonological, spelling and lexical structure (Prochazka, 2013). As these differences were reflected in the collected data, a further check of the data was manually performed to remove all identical tweets with spelling mistakes and variations.

After the removal of retweets, Arabic tweets produced by non-Saudi users were removed. This was necessary because the study aims to analyse the representations of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in tweets that are produced by Saudi people or people within Saudi Arabia. Nationality is difficult to verify on Twitter, but the researcher found that scrutiny of location and the Saudi or Arabic dialect in which the tweet was written was a suitable way to filter out tweets that were written by non-Saudis. The tweets were initially identified using the locations declared by users on their accounts (locations were collected by the tool used to gather the hashtags; see Section 5.4, Data collection method 5.4). If the tweet location was not Saudi Arabia but the dialect was local, then they were kept, as it meant that the person was Saudi Arabian but living abroad. If the location of the tweet was non-Saudi but matched the Arabic dialect used in the tweet, the tweet was removed as it was produced by a non-Saudi user. It is important to note that there are people who declare their actual location, as Twitter enables them to do. However, instead of revealing their real geographic location, they can also write any location they choose, for example Mars. Therefore, despite having conducted this step, the researcher does not claim that the tweets were all produced by Saudi users, or even produced in Saudi Arabia.

The process for handling tweets written in non-Saudi dialects is as follows. The location of the Twitter accounts from which they were collected is checked. Then, if the location matched the dialect used in the tweets, the tweets were removed. If the location was not declared the researcher reviewed the Twitter account to determine if the tweets were from a Saudi user. If

they were, they were kept, if not, they were removed. If confirmation of nationality was not possible then tweets were removed.

Tweets written in other languages were also removed as this study only focuses on the Arabic language. One of the research aims was to enrich and add to the limited number of studies that have examined Arabic, and especially non-standard Arabic, in social media. The Arabic language was selected because it is the official and national language in Saudi Arabia (Zuhur, 2012) where the issue of women driving was current and where people were tweeting about the subject.

Tweets with embedded videos were removed. These were tweets that included only videos, tweets that consisted of video and text, and tweets with gifs because gifs are considered to be videos. This step was taken because the focus of the study is on text and not video. Video would require a different analytical framework and is thus outside the scope of this research.

Finally, before moving on to the next section, it is important to state that the purpose of cleaning the data and producing a subsampling was to optimise the reliability of the data (Borra & Rieder, 2014).

5.5.3.2 A note about the collected hashtags

Collected hashtags were not divided between, or even labelled as, pro or against women driving based on the wording of the hashtags, as the wording of the hashtags did not indicate the types of view within the hashtags. The reason for this is that even if a hashtag itself expresses a positive sentiment, such as #Women's car driving is a necessity, towards a topic such as women driving, that does not mean that only advocates of women driving will use that hashtag to tweet and share their views and thoughts. Users opposing and supporting a topic tend to use the same hashtag to express different points of view. What was coded was

the tweets themselves, whether they supported or opposed women driving, as will be discussed next.

5.5.3.3 Initial coding process

Having cleaned the data, what remained was a collection of tweets that were still raw data, and as Basit (2003) highlighted, while raw data are interesting to look at they still do not help the reader to comprehend the social world under examination, and the way the contributors, which in this study are the tweet writers, view it, except if that data has been systematically analysed to explain an existent situation and issue. That is why coding or categorization of the data plays a vital role in analysis (Basit, 2003).

Coding involves dividing the data in addition to assigning categories, and when a category is created a decision is made about how to organise the data in a way that is beneficial to the analysis (Dey, 2003). The most beneficial categorization for the analysis of the way female and male supporters and opponents of women driving are represented in tweets discussing women driving in Saudi Arabia is into Pro-WD and Anti-WD. These categories not only organise the analysis, but most importantly, help to answer the research questions, as they enable the study to compare how tweets written by those who were Pro-WD represented female and male opponents and supporters and how tweets written by those who were Anti-WD represented female and male opponents and supporters.

What categorization achieves is the transfer of a segment of data from one context to a different one, which is the assigned category (Dey, 2003). In this case, the mechanical aspect was simple as the data was already organised in a spreadsheet which was sourced from Twitter and included all of the appropriate meta data (see Section 5.4, Data collection method). The researcher had only to add a column labelled codes with a drop-down list to allow her to choose between Pro-WD and Anti-WD.

However, the first attempt at manually coding each tweet in the collected hashtags was unsuccessful, because there were several tweets that did not fall within the categories of Pro-WD or Anti-WD. These mostly appeared to be in favour of women driving, but with provisions, such as women should only drive in the daytime. Initially these problematic tweets appeared to fit van Dijk's (1998) definition of "disclaimers" which tend to be typical of ideological discourse and are employed by the speaker/writer to achieve a positive self-presentation. After re-examination, however, it became clear that these disclaimers were not the problem here; rather, the problem was that they did not mention the social actor. At this point it became apparent that not every tweet in the collected hashtags referred to the social actors (the opponents and supporters of women driving) that this research aims to examine. In order to remove tweets that do not mention social actors the researcher had to examine every tweet and code it appropriately, which resulted in splitting the categories further, from pro- or anti-women driving, into pro-women driving tweets that mention social actors, pro-women driving that did not mention social actors, anti-women driving that mentioned social actors, and anti-women driving that did not mention social actors. Tweets that were categorized as pro-women driving that did not mention social actors and anti-women driving that did mention social actors were excluded from the analysis as they did not discuss the social actors that are the focus of this study. The number of tweets remaining in each group can be viewed in Table 5.5. Also, during coding of the data more spam was identified and removed. This consisted mainly of advertisements produced by individual accounts that were not detected in the cleaning phase. In short, coding of the data unintentionally triggered another cleaning step.

The study initially planned to use inter-coder reliability (ICR) for coding, but ultimately decided against it because the researcher holds similar views to others, such as Guba and Lincoln (1994), Madill et al. (2000), and Braun and Clarke (2013), who object to its use in qualitative analysis. ICR is epistemologically problematic as it adopts standards that

originated for positivist research, which assume that via the multiple coding of the data there is an accurate reality that can be captured. This strongly contradicts the social constructionist view of reality that is underpinned by CDS and discussed in Section 3.3.2. Therefore, the epistemology of inter-coder reliability does not match the epistemology of Critical Discourse Study, within which this study is positioned, which adopts an interpretive and constructivist approach to knowledge. Therefore, the more suitable epistemological method of self-reflexivity (see Section 5.95.9) was used instead.

After cleaning the data set by removing spam, advertisements and irrelevant tweets, initial coding was then performed using the binary codes "pro-women driving tweets with reference to social actors" and "anti-women driving tweets with reference to social actors". Table 5.5 shows the distribution of tweets in each category. It is important to take into consideration that the number of tweets does not equal the number of representations of social actors that were found in the analysed data, as some tweets include multiple representations while others only include one. This is reflected in the data analysis in Chapter 6.

Table 5.5 Number of analysed tweets that refer to social actors in total and in Pro-women driving with reference to social actors and Anti-women driving with reference to social actors

	Original hashtag	Translation	Number of pro-driving tweets with reference to social actors	Number of anti- women driving tweets with reference to social actors	Number of analysed tweets: tweets that mention social actors

1.	#قياده_المراه_للسياره_ضروره	#Women's car driving is a necessity	109	189	298

A note about the number of tweets in Table 5.5: in the hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity, which was trending during the ban on women driving in 2016, the number of anti-women driving tweets that referenced social actors is approximately double the number of pro-driving tweets that referenced social actors. This is interesting because it could be related to the social stance against women driving in that time period which was further reinforced by the legal ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia. This may have resulted in a clear and strong expression of opposition. In comparison, advocates of women diving, whose position was not supported by the law, were considered a powerless minority group with regard to the issue of women driving.

5.6 Data translation

As this study is concerned with the analysis of tweets that were originally written in Arabic the analysis was conducted using the original Arabic text rather than the English translation. This is endorsed by Fairclough who wrote, "discourse analysis papers should reproduce and analyse textual samples in the original language, despite the added difficulty for readers" (Fairclough, 1995a, p. 191). However, the English translation is included for the benefit of English readers and for reference only.

The researcher translated all of the analysed tweets from Arabic to English (see Appendix A and Appendix B). Initially, attempts were made to recruit a young, professional, female, Saudi translator who was familiar with Saudi dialects and had translated data for a number of other Saudi PhD students studying at different universities in the UK. However, once she had viewed the anonymised sample of tweets, she refused to translate the data because, according to her, it was inappropriate because it included a number of profanities. To avoid a

translator's attempts to naturalize the data the researcher then decided to undertake the translations herself and not to employ a translator as the role the translator plays is a significant one and their ideology and background might impact the translation of the data, which in this case consisted of hashtags that discussed an ideologically loaded topic; that of women driving in Saudi Arabia. Other CDS studies in which researchers have also opted to perform their own translation in various languages include: Yu (2017) – Cantonese data; Diabah (2011) – Akan data; and López-Bonilla (2014) – Spanish data.

The researcher was equipped to do the translation herself due to her background and fluency in Arabic and English, but in doing so discovered new problems. Providing explanations for why certain terms are viewed negatively, for example 'the males', consumed a great number of words because it involved not only translating but also conveying the context. Also, there was no reference material that defined and explained many of the non-standard Arabic terms. Thus, the researcher had to draw on her own socio-cultural knowledge as a Saudi national to explain and translate them so that not only could non-Arabic readers understand their meaning, but also non-Saudis, as these terms were culture specific.

To ensure accuracy, all the translations in this study have been checked by a Saudi female colleague. To provide an accurate translation that delivers the intended meaning of the original Arabic tweets, translated tweets were kept as close to the original Arabic tweet as possible. The exact equivalents for cultural and religious Arabic terms were not available in English, therefore close equivalent translations are provided in English, and then explained clearly. The explanation step is necessary because these terms are translated not only from one language to another but from one culture to another. For example, in the analysed data, the term "الاهل" translates to "the family", which occurs repeatedly. If translated from Arabic to English without clarification, the reader would not understand that the term "the family" is used by many people in Saudi culture/society to refer to the female members of a family, such

as wife, sisters and mothers, and it does not include the male members of the family. Another example from the data in Sections 6.1.2.1.5.1 and 6.1.2.1.5.2 is the Arabic term "غيره". In the context of the tweets that were translated, the closest translation might be the English equivalent "jealousy", but it does not fully convey the meaning of this important word, so a word-by-word translation would fail to depict and carry the intended meaning. "Jealousy" here is positive as it is an Islamic and cultural concept that is specific to men, therefore the researcher has used the term 'protective jealousy' and has provided an explanation about the term as it is used in the tweets to negatively depict M-supporters.

A number of terms used to represent the social actors under examination in this study were not only translated but were also transliterated using Bassiouney & Katz transcription system (2012) (see Transliteration Conventions). This step was conducted because these terms equivalent English does not accurately reflect the meaning of the original Arabic term, and as they were used to portray the social actors, the slight difference in the original terms impact the analysis.

Square brackets are used in the translated tweets to add words that help the reader understand the translation of the tweet. Readers might notice that the number of words in the original tweet differs from that in the translated tweet. This is because when Arabic text is translated into English a number of words become multi-word units. For example, 'الشباب' when translated becomes 'young men'.

Also, a number of issue must be discussed about the tweets and their translations it is important to highlight the following issues:

Not every tweet was written as a complete sentence by its author, therefore some translated tweets will reflect incomplete sentences. Some tweets do not convey a complete thoughts, and

while this does not impact the representation of the social actors that this study is examining, it does have an impact on the translations, some of which reflect incomplete ideas.

Twitter users come from various backgrounds and not everyone has the mental or physical ability, education, training or experience to write a full and grammatically correct tweet. Therefore, the translations of tweets which are grammatically incorrect will reflect that fact. There are tweets which include a number of spelling mistakes in Arabic which it even took the researcher several readings to understand. The English translations do not include the spelling mistakes. Whilst the issues in the original Arabic tweets did make the translation process a difficult one, they emphasise where this study is situated in CDS, which focuses on the properties of 'real language among real people' instead of examining 'ideal types' and invented examples of language structures.

The previous issues are highlighted because the reader might notice that the translations for a number of tweets are strange and could be improved, but the purpose of translating the data is not to improve on the original tweet but to convey the meaning in the closest way. The researcher has not modified the original tweets in any way or form as these tweets are authored and owned by the Twitter users who wrote them, and not by the researcher, and modification might indicate ownership.

The original tweets also included emojis which the researcher decided to retain and incorporate to aid understanding of the data. This was in recognition of the vital function of emojis that was highlighted by Herring and Dainas (2017), when public comment threads gathered from Facebook groups that focused on "graphicon", were examined. In their examination of the conversational and pragmatic uses of graphicons, which include emoticons, emojis, stickers, GIFs, images, and videos, Herring and Dainas (2017) found that graphicons have six main functions. These functions fall into two categories, the first of

which includes those that mention something or someone, and the second consists of those that do not – these are reactions, tone modifications, actions, riffs or narrative sequences. For example, in the analysed hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity, M-opponents were represented and mentioned using the 🐸 emoji as illustrated in Table 5.6. (See also Section 6.1.1.2.1).

Table 5.6 Emoji for social actor representation

🐸whoever objects to women driving, bring me a Qur'anic evidence. Go on, you school graduate'?#Women's car driving is a necessity

Herring and Dainas (2017) also found that, in the second graphicon category, emojis have the widest array of functions. In the collected data, emojis in tweets discussing women driving seem to have a very clear function; that of tone modification. Therefore, tweet tones, were taken into consideration, and when coding, the emojis used were also utilised to understand the tone of the tweets.

5.7 Analytical framework

The analytical framework that this research will draw upon to answer one of the thesis question concerning the representation of social actors is van Leeuwen's framework for Representing Social Actors (2008) presented in in Figure 1, which is part of van Leeuwen approach discussed in section 4.5.1.



Figure 5.1 Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Network (van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 52)

Van Leeuwen (2008) created a comprehensive sociosemantic inventory of the various ways in which social actors can be represented, and establish the sociological and critical relevance of his categories. The sociological relevance of van Leeuwen's sociosemantic categories is that they demonstre the connection between the different and various ways in which the social actors are represented and the larger social context in which they are sitauted. The critical relevance of van Leeuwen's categories (2008) is that not only that they show, but also critique social power dynamics and inequalities. In this study the critical relevance of using van Leeuwen's social actor framework in analysing the gender representations of M-supporters, Fem-supporters, M-opponents, and Fem-opponents of WD in tweets by Anti-WD and Pro-WD during the ban on women driving in Saudi Arabia is in its ability to provide a critical understanding of the interplay between discourse and gender in the context of Saudi Arabia. Van Leeuwen (2008) framework enables this study for the examination of how discourses, or socially constructed ways of knowing reality, shape the representation of reality, taking into consideration the established social practices that are influenced by socio-political, and cultural elements in Saudi Arabia. By examining these representations, this analysis in this thesis can provide valuable prespectives into the ways in which gender is constructed and represented in these tweets. It can also deepen the understanding of the complex interplay between gender and discourse in the context of the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia.

Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Network (2008) is different for two reasons. The first is that he address the lack of bi-uniqueness in language, meaning that there is no perfect match between sociological and linguistic categories. Van Leeuwen (2008) indicates that, if CDS concentrate heavily on specific linguistic operations or categories, they may fail to observe vital instances of representation. For this reason, van Leeuwen (2008) in his framework he gave priority to the semantic understanding of social actors' representation rather than limiting his framework to strict linguistic categories and operations such as nominalization that might miss to consider important aspects of social actors' representation. This means that employing van

Leeuwen's approach enables this study to examine the ways in which M-opponents, Fem-opponents, M-supporters, and Fem-supporters are represented in relation to gender in a discursive context rather than merely examining linguistic operations which the Anti-WD and Pro-WD used to represent the social actors. The second aspect that sets van Leeuwen's (2008) approach apart from others is that it is based on the notion that meanings are derived from culture and not language.

Having introduced the social actor framework, the following section will specifically discuss only van Leeuwen categories that were used in this study, organised in pairs. These categories are depicted in
Figure 5.1 as a van Leeuwen system network and divided into choices. The discussion will start with the initial choices that van Leeuwen presents, which concern the inclusion or exclusion of the social actor.

5.7.1 Exclusion and Inclusion

The importance of exclusion and inclusion is that the decision by the speaker or writer to exclude or include a social actor category can have many different purposes, including psychological, social and political (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001). Linguistic exclusion is not merely strategically used to conceal who is responsible for a particular discriminatory action, it can also be used for discrimination, for example, in the linguistic under-representation of ethnic minorities. Linguistic inclusion, on the other hand, is an indicator of impartial representation and treatment, although it can sometimes have a disguising or averting function (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001).

The importance of exclusion and inclusion is very evident in van Leeuwen's framework as he begins with this division whereby social actors can either be excluded or included. This division only identifies whether or not social actors are mentioned and referred to in a given text. According to van Leeuwen (2008), the distinction between these two categories is that they are

a strategic choice made by the producers to suit their interests and purposes in relation to the audience.

Exclusion can be realized in several ways, which differ in the extent to which they radically exclude the social actor. The first form of exclusion is where social actors are radically excluded where neither the social actors nor their actions and activities are mentioned. Not only are they omitted, but no trace of them and their actions can be located in the text. Other less radical forms of exclusion are backgrounding and suppression. What sets backgrounding apart from suppression is that the nature of exclusion in backgrounding is less radical, so that the excluded social actors might not be stated in connection with a given action, but they are named in other locations in the text, and the reader can infer with reasonable (though not complete) certainty who they are. While van Leeuwen (2008) viewed backgrounding as a type of exclusion, at the same time he indicated that in backgrounding, to a certain extent, social actors are not so much omitted, but rather de-emphasised and pushed more towards the background. The last type of exclusion is suppression, in which the social actors under examination are not referred to or mentioned anywhere in the text but their actions or activities are mentioned. Suppression can be realized in various ways, the first of which is through passive agent deletion; for instance, if in an example fears are being expressed, with passive agent deletion the person who expressed fear is unknown. Also, suppression can be realized via a non-finite clause which serves as a grammatical participant, such as, “to retain the deposit is obligatory”, where the social actor who is retaining the deposit is not identified.

Inclusion, on the other hand, is a category of action that simply occurs when social actors are recognized and expressed in the text under analysis. Inclusion can be realized in multiple ways and these sociosemantic categories are achieved by varying textual realizations, therefore van Leeuwen’s inventory diverges considerably at this stage. According to the van

Leeuwen framework (2008), inclusion is achieved by activation, passivation, personalization and impersonalization.

In Figure 5.1, at the same level, van Leeuwen also lists participation, circumstantialization and possessivation, but upon examination these three categories seem to be more a form of activation of social actors than a type of inclusion, which will be made clear when discussing activation and passivation in Section 5.7.1.1.

5.7.1.1 Activation and Passivation

Van Leeuwen's (2008) sociosemantic inventory is based on the basic dichotomy of the social actor either included in or excluded from the text. If social actors are included, then they can be activated or passivated. Activation happens when any social actor is represented and depicted as the active, dynamic force in an activity (van Leeuwen, 2008); that is, when the social actor is represented as the one performing an activity. Activation in this sense refers to the social role and not the grammatical realization. Using grammatical participation and transitivity structures, that distinction between activation and passivation is realized.

Using activation, a social actor can be foregrounded or backgrounded. They are foregrounded when activation is realized using participation which refers to grammatical participant roles, where the active role of the social actor under examination becomes evidently foregrounded. On the other hand, they are backgrounded and their agency is backgrounded, when the social actors are represented by circumstantialization, which is realized by a prepositional phrase (van Leeuwen, 2008), such as "from", for example, in "from friends and family". Also using premodification, such as "public" in "public outrage", and postmodification, as in "of Arabs" in "the arrival of Arabs". Possessivation, is realized by the use of a possessive pronoun to activate the social actor, such as "our consumption".

The opposite of activation is passivation, where social actors are represented as “undergoing” an activity or even “at the receiving end” of an activity (van Leeuwen, 2008). There are two types of passivation, namely subjection and beneficialization. The first type, subjection, is when the passivated social actor is treated and represented as an object, for example, as items of exchange, as in a hostage taken in return for ransom.

Subjection can be realized in a number of ways:

- Participation: which is when the passivated social actor is represented in the role of “goal in a material process, phenomenon in a mental process, or carrier in an effective attributive process” (Halliday, 1985, p. 43). For instance, “Chinese street vendors”, is an example of participation in, “fifty young white assailants assaulted Chinese street vendors”.
- Circumstantialization: which is when passivated social actors are represented through a prepositional phrase.
- Possessivation: which regularly tends to take the form of a prepositional phrase, with of ‘postmodifying a nominalization or process noun, as in “of some 33,000 trained immigrants”.
- Finally, adjectival premodification can also passivate, as for instance with “religious” in “religious tolerance”, where people of different religions are passivated.

Finally, beneficialization is realized when passivated social actors constitute a third party which benefits from an action, which can be either positively or negatively. Such as “Overseas investors bring funds to countries like the Uk” in this sentenee “the Uk” is beneficialized in relation to “bring”.

5.7.1.2 Impersonalization or Personalization

This binary division in van Leeuwen's (2008) framework divides all representational choices into two categories. As social actors are either represented using impersonalization or personalization, these two categories cannot occur simultaneously in one representation of a social actor as they contradict one another. Impersonalization refers to the representation of social actors in ways that do not include human attributes, which means they are treated as mere objects, via the use of abstract nouns or even concrete nouns whose meanings do not incorporate any human attributes. Personalization, on the other hand, represents social actors as human beings via various means, such as personal pronouns, proper names, and nouns that convey human attributes.

Impersonalization can have a range of effects and functions, for example backgrounding the identity and/or role of social actors, providing an impersonal authority or force to an action, and adding negative or positive connotations to the utterances or actions of social actors (van Leeuwen, 2008). There are two types of impersonalization: abstraction and objectivation.

- Abstraction occurs when social actors are represented via a quality assigned to them, which adds a connotative meaning. For instance, elderly people are impersonalized and are represented using abstraction whereby they are assigned the quality of being a "burden" to the economy. This type of representation can contribute to negative stereotyping and prejudice reinforcement.
- Objectivation is when social actors are represented by referring to them using a place or thing that is strongly linked to them or the action in which they are depicted. In short, objectivation is realized by metonymical reference which can have four forms: spatialization, utterance autonomization, instrumentalization, and somatization.
    - Spatialization is when social actors are represented by referring to a place with which they are associated. For example, "Saudi declares war on pollution".

- The second form of objectivation is utterance autonomization where social actors are represented by their utterances. As in, “the message says”, instead of saying the name of the sender.
- The third type is instrumentalization where social actors are represented by the instrument with which they perform an action in that they are represented as being involved. For instance, “a Jeep collided with a pedestrian”.
- The last form of objectivation is somatization where social actors are represented with refence to a body part, for example, “a steady hand”. While van Leeuwen viewed somatization as part of objectivation, Reisigl and Wodak (2001) argue against that, as the somatic parts of any person still convey human attributes and they are not objects.

Personalization, on the other hand, has various subcategories, which will be discussed in the following section.

5.7.1.2.1 Genericization and Specification

Van Leeuwen (2008) identifies the distinction between generic and specific representation in social actors. This difference is significant because social actors can be depicted as members of a class, which is known as genericization or as distinctive identifiable entities, which is referred to as specification. While there are no subcategories of genericization, generic representation can take various forms through, for example, the use of the plural without an article, such as “Non-European workers”. Specification can also be realized in various ways, but it depends on which of the two subcategories of specification is realized. Both subcategories will be examined in greater detail in the following section.

5.7.1.2.1.1 Individualization and Assimilation

There are two types of specification which are individualization and assimilation, as proposed by van Leeuwen (2008). Social actors can be represented by only one of these categories.

According to van Leeuwen (2008), individualization refers to the representation of social actors as specific individuals, which is realized via singularity, such as, “Vice Minister of Defense Prince Khalid bin Salman”. As the example shows, individualization allows the display of social actors’ titles, credentials and institutional affiliations. By contrast, assimilation refers to the representation of social actors as groups which is achieved via plurality, such as “Americans”. Van Leeuwen (2008) distinguishes two major types of assimilation, namely aggregation and collectivization, which will be discussed next.

5.7.1.2.1.1.1 Aggregation and Collectivization

Aggregation involves quantifying a group of individuals using statistical methods, while collectivization does not (van Leeuwen, 2008). According to van Leeuwen (2008) aggregation can be realized with definite or indefinite quantifiers that function as numeratives, or heads of nominal groups. For example, a number of scientists and fifty percent of Americans. On the other hand, collectivization entails treating individuals as a collective, and can be realized via the use of first-person plural pronouns, such as “us”, or mass nouns, such as “society”.

In the results of this study, the representation of social actors in Twitter debates about women driving did not employ the use of aggregation. This could be attributed to the absence of quantifiable statistics that the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweeters could have utilised in their debates about women driving, or it could be due to the casual and informal nature of tweets which tend not to use statistical facts.

On the other hand, collectivization was frequently used in the tweets about women driving that this study analysed. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that collectivization on its own did not provide any information about the gender element of social actors. It was only when collectivization was paired with other van Leeuwen categories from his social actor network (illustrated in section 4.5.1.

Figure 5.1) that gender aspects of the social actors were revealed, and collectivization become relevant in the analysis of the data. For example, opponents of women driving are represented as “a masculine society” in Section 6.1.1.5.2. This representation includes two van Leeuwen (2008) categories – collectivization through the use of the word “society”, and classification through the word “masculine” – and this pair reveals a negative representation as it depicts Saudi society as male dominated.

5.7.1.2.2 Indetermination and Determination

Social actors can be represented in terms of their identity, which can take place via determination, which is also known as differentiation or indetermination of their identity (van Leeuwen, 2008). Indetermination is when social actors are depicted as unspecified or anonymous via indefinite pronouns such as ‘someone’, or exophoric references such as “they”, and “everyone”. This can create an impersonal authority, where the social actors are seen as having a powerful, but invisible force. Indetermination was not found in the findings of this study as tweets that include this type of representation reveal no gender aspects of the social actors and were excluded during the coding phase.

On the other hand, determination occurs when the identity of the social actor is specified. According to van Leeuwen (2008), this can occur in several ways, including association, dissociation, nomination, and categorization. These will be discussed further in the next section, starting with association and dissociation.

5.7.1.2.2.1 Association and Dissociation

Other categories in which social actors can be represented as groups are those of association and dissociation (van Leeuwen, 2008). Association refers to groups created by social actors, or groups of social actors, which have never been labelled in the text, although the actors or

groups who made the association could be referred to. Association can be realized in various ways, among them parataxis, the use of circumstances of accompaniment, possessive pronouns, and possessive attributive verbs such as “have” and “possess”. For example, in this thesis association was realized in the example “her brother is available, her father is available, her husband is available-اخوها موجود ابوها موجود زوجها موجود”; (see Section 6.1.2.1.2.2), as this group is formed from different male family members who are mahram but were never labelled in the tweet as such. Alternatively, when the association is no longer exists it is called dissociation. For, dissociation to be identified, it first requires an association to be established; for example, “Sara and Mary”. Then this link has to be diffused, for example, if Sara and Mary join a team they will then be referred to as part of the collective, “the team”.

5.7.1.2.2.2 Nomination and Categorization

The representation of social actors can either be named or categorized. Nomination is the representation of social actors by referring to their unique identity (van Leeuwen, 2008). Simply, nomination is naming. According to van Leeuwen (2008), nomination can be realized in different ways, among them the formal approach of using proper nouns, or the semi-formal approach of using a surname, as in “William Shakespeare”, or informal use of a given name only, such as “Lara”. Nomination can also be achieved via nicknames or character names that are specific to one social actor. Nomination was not found in the data, which is to be expected as female and male opponents whose names are known are public figures, such as activists and religious scholars, whose representations are not of interest to the study, therefore they were excluded when the data was prepared for analysis (see Section 5.5.3). The social actors under examination in this thesis are the unidentified female and male supporters and opponents of women driving.

Categorization, on the other hand, involves representing social actors using shared identities and functions they have in common with others, and was frequently used for the depiction of the social actors female and male supporters and opponents of women driving. Categorization

has three subcategories: functionalization, identification, and appraisement (van Leeuwen, 2008). The first subcategory, functionalization, involves identifying a social actor using their occupation or role. This can be realized in several ways, including deriving nouns from verbs through suffixes such as –er as in "writer", a noun that indicates a place or instrument connected with an activity such as "drummer", or using compound nouns that imply an association with a specific location or tool such as "camerawoman".

Functionalization is one of the categories that was used frequently in the depiction of the social actors, and while male social actors were depicted in a range of roles, from stereotypical gender roles such as drivers, as seen in Section 6.1.1.1.1, to religious extremists, as seen in Section 6.1.1.3, female supporters and opponents were only depicted in relation to one role; that of slave (see Sections 6.1.1.1.6 and 6.1.2.4.1).

The second subcategory of categorization is identification, in which representation of social actors occurs with respect to what they are, rather than what they do. Van Leeuwen (2008) identifies three types of identification, including classification, relational identification, and physical identification.

Classification refers to the representation of social actors using major categories that distinguish between classes of people in a particular society or institution. These categories include age, gender, provenance, class, wealth, race, ethnicity, religion, and sexual orientation. Most importantly, they are historically and culturally variable (van Leeuwen, 2008), which means that they are not fixed and vary not only across time but also culture. One of the categories of classification that is unique to Saudi Arabian culture is the consideration of tribal affiliation. The findings of this study revealed one of the classification categories that is also culturally specific to Saudi Arabia which is a political affiliation classification which is Erdogan's Matawa (see Section 6.1.1.3).

The second type of identification is relational identification, which represents social actors according to their personal, kinship or work relations with other people (van Leeuwen, 2008). Relational identification is realized by a number of nouns that denote such relations, for example, “acquaintance” or “brother”. Generally, these nouns are possessivated, which could either be by a possessive pronoun, as in “her mother”, or by means of a genitive, “the baby’s father”, or postmodifying phrase with of, “a father of two”.

Van Leeuwen (2008) indicated that the role of relational identification, particularly for personal and kinship relations in modern Western culture, has gradually lost its significance, especially where personal and kinship relations are involved. He attributes this decline to the idea that, in the realm of public activities, employment of these relations could be viewed as nepotism or even corruption, except where the relationship is with the monarchy. It was interesting to find that the results of this study reveal the opposite, as the analysis indicates that relational identification is a significant category in the representation of social actors. This is due to the nature of Saudi society and the gender power disparity that existed during the ban on women driving. The various kinships that were employed for representations are discussed in Chapter 6.

The third type of identification, physical identification, represents social actors in terms of physical characteristics that in a particular context can be used to distinguish them from others. Physical identification can be realized by a number of nouns, such as “brunette”, and adjectives such as “short”. Physical identification can also be realized by phrases with a preposition, for example, “a woman with long hair”.

The final form of categorization is appraisement, which represents the assessment of social actors in terms of positive or negative attributes and is realized by a number of nouns and/or

idioms. Appraisement was one of the categories that revealed interesting findings in this study as it showed a divergence in the attributes that were used to represent female social actors in comparison to male social actors. For example, male social actors were repeatedly negatively appraised in terms of intelligence, but females were not (see Chapter 6).

At this point, all the categories that are relevant to this study have been discussed and what is left to point out is that the square brackets in van Leeuwen's network (see Figure 5.1) represent a binary choice, meaning that a social actor can either be represented by one category or the other, while the curly brackets signify simultaneous choices. However, these choices are not restricted, as van Leeuwen (2008) clearly articulates that: "in actual discursive practices, the choices need not always be rigidly either-or. Boundaries can be blurred deliberately, for the purpose of achieving specific representational effects" (2008, p. 53). This study has done this, as several social actor representations consisted of hybrid references, such as "the Saudi nation-الشعب السعودي", (see Section 6.1.1.5) which consists of multiple categories – van Leeuwen's collectivization in the "nation" and classification in "the Saudi".

5.8 Thematic analysis

After the initial coding of the data with the appropriate codes (see Section 5.5.3.3), the study moved on to the analysis of the social actor representations, which was conducted in two phases. It is important to note that they overlapped rather than being completed in isolation. They were: 1) Thematic analysis, to gain a greater understanding of how gender representations are constructed and to identify recurring themes related to gender in the analysed tweets; 2) In-depth analysis using van Leeuwen's framework (2008), as his taxonomy facilitated detailed insight into the patterns of strategic application of linguistic resources that create and maintain unequal representations of social actors. In employing thematic analysis and the identification of themes and dominant themes this research was guided by previous research, such as that by Krzyżanowski (2010).

The division of the two procedures in this study is similar to the approach used by Krzyżanowski (2010) in his operationalization of DHA, but the two step procedure used in this study is not linked to DHA, as in Krzyżanowski's (2010) work. Krzyżanowski's (2010) first procedure was thematic analysis that was considered to be an entry examination. It aimed to outline the contents of the analysed texts, and therefore, in accordance with DHA ideas, they were assigned to specific discourses to which they might belong. Krzyżanowski (2010) specified and established discourse topics as the main analytical categories of the thematic analysis. Topics were identified using inductive analysis, that is, by decoding the meaning of text passages, which was generally achieved over numerous readings, and then arranging them into lists of key themes and sub-themes. For the second level process, which was the in-depth analysis, Krzyżanowski (2010) focused on argumentation and linked linguistic features.

In this study the first procedure after the data was coded was the thematic analysis, and this was considered to be the first and entry level analysis. In this process, the analysis of the texts, which consisted of tweets in trending hashtags about women driving, was conducted in a different way to that adopted by Krzyżanowski (2010) who drew on thematic analysis to identify themes in data gathered from focus groups and interviews. The second level, which was the in-depth analysis, focused on the gender representations and linguistic realizations using van Leeuwen's framework (2008).

As highlighted in Section 4.1, CDS is not a unitary framework and as a result there is no one method or detailed procedure that can be simply applied (Fairclough, 2003; Meyer, 2001; Weiss & Wodak, 2003). Therefore, drawing on Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis as a method is both suitable and possible, as long as the method fits the epistemological orientation in which the CDS study is situated. In this study the themes in the data analysis emerged as a result of employing thematic analysis which, whilst it is not directly linked to critical discourse studies, is a constructionist framework. In addition, to being

epistemologically appropriate, thematic analysis was employed in this study because of its inductive bottom up approach; the research did not aim to constrain the coding processes into pre-existing codes as the social actor representations were used as codes and these came from the data itself rather than being set by the research, so a flexible method is more appropriate. Moreover, thematic analysis reduced the subjectivity of the study as the codes emerged from the data itself and not the researcher. Also, using an inductive approach ensured that the themes identified were strongly linked to the data (Patton, 1990). This is important to this study as the identified themes were easily integrated and used to facilitate the process of identifying the gendered discourses which are mainly identified and named using Sunderland's (2004) inductive bottom-up approach (see Section 3.3.7).

In its application of thematic analysis this study used a method for analysing qualitative data that involves searching through a data set to identify, analyse, and docuemnt repeated patterns (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Using thematic analysis, the research constructed themes to reframe, reinterpret, and/or connect elements of the data. Thus, themes are not merely organizational tools used to classify and label data. Within this study, themes were also used to connect social actor representations identified in different tweets. Within any data set, a theme, which is defined as a "patterned response or meaning" (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 82), is significant because it captures vital aspects about the data from which it was derived, that pertain to the research questions (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In this study, the themes capture a broader view of the identified social actor representations within the hashtag about women driving.

The identification of themes in the data enabled the study to provide an entry level examination of the tweets about women driving, present its results in a way that will make sense to the reader and tell a story that highlights the representations of the social actors found in tweets in trending hashtags that discuss women driving in Saudi Arabia. The themes were

also utilised to avoid presenting the findings in a repetitive way, using for instance van Leeuwen's categories as headers, which at a certain point becomes tedious for the reader.

Using thematic analysis, the identified themes, which are larger topics that were drawn from codes. Codes were smaller concepts which were resulted from employing the social actor representation analysis using Van Leeuwen's Social Actor Network, for example in Section 6.1.2.1.5.3 M-opponents were depicted using van Leeuwen's classification by their masculinity, then masculinity is the code. All tweets in each section Pro-WD and Anti-WD were coded with similar codes, afterward were organised under themes or sub-themes. Later sub-themes were merged if possible to create larger themes, if not they were kept as sub-themes. For example in Section 6.1.1.1.2 within familial relations theme two sub themes were found , which are stereotyped paternal relationship , and relational identification both sub-themes discussed representations that locate social actors in terms of their families, but because the first one focused on positing females social actors in relation to their father it was not combined with the second sub-theme.

The literature about thematic analysis does not specify how many times a theme should recur in a data set for it to be considered a theme. Even Braun and Clarke (2006) do not set a fixed number of recurrences for a pattern to be considered a theme even though they clearly defined other aspects of thematic analysis and attempted to draw a distinction between themes and sub-themes. What Braun and Clarke (2006) highlighted with regard to themes was that, since it is a qualitative analysis, there is no particular fixed rule for the size of the theme, but it will always need to be considered in terms of both "space within each data item and of prevalence across the entire data set" (p. 82). Preferably, for each theme there will be several instances throughout the examined data set, but that does not mean that the higher the number of instances the more crucial or significant the theme. Also, researcher judgement is indispensable in theme identification (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Braun and Clarke (2006)

decided not to set a random fixed number of occurrences to identify a theme because, rather than relying on quantifiable measures, they view the theme as key if it captures vital aspects in connection with the general research question of the research. This study will, then, consider a theme as recurring if at least three representations of social actors occurred, and not three tweets, within each of the two subsets of the coded data, which are tweets produced by Pro-WD and tweets produced by Anti-WD tweeters. This means that if three representations occurred in tweets that were coded Pro-WD then they were considered a theme. However, as the results in Chapter 6 illustrate, many of the identified themes in the data consist of more than three representations. The themes in the study data set were identified using Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis.

The six steps of Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis are set out below. It is important to note that this study refocused the six steps to suit the main interest of the research, which was the representation of female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in Saudi Arabia. While these steps are sequential, and each one builds on the previous one, the analysis is generally a recursive process rather than a linear one (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

(1) The first step for the researcher is to familiarise themselves with their data: They have first to immerse themselves in the material which generally includes multiple reading of the text, and also reading in an active way which involves looking for meanings, patterns and so on. Whilst time-consuming, this is a vital step and is the foundation for the rest of the analysis.

(2) The second step generates initial codes. In this phase the researcher has to read the data multiple times and to search actively for themes and patterns during each reading in order to generate the initial code (Braun & Clarke, 2006). The data the researcher produced the codes from in this study were the terms used to depict the social actors, namely the female and male supporters or opponents of women driving in Saudi Arabia, as the themes this study is interested in were the ones that related to these

representations. The coding was done using an Excel sheet for each hashtag about women driving which included the original tweet, translation of the tweet, a column for codes and a column for themes. A number of tweets were double coded as the social actor representations identified in them falls within to different themes. In the Anti-WD four tweets were double coded (which was clearly highlighted in Appendix A) and in Pro-WD only one tweet (which was clearly highlighted in Appendix B).

(3) The third stage involves searching the data for themes. Here the researcher examines the coded data and categorizes and collects the different codes into expected themes. The difference between the themes and the codes is that the themes are broader (Braun & Clarke, 2006). In creating themes, some codes may become main-themes while others might become sub-themes, and others are simply discarded (Braun & Clarke, 2006). Also, some codes might not fit into any of the created themes, in which case it is acceptable to place them in a "miscellaneous" theme. According to Braun and Clarke (2006), this step re-focuses the analysis at the wider level of the themes.

Table 5.7 An example: A tweet collected in connection with the hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity

#Women's car driving is a necessity despite those who call for women driving are honourable and daughters of honourable men. I say that those who belittle those calls to drive should look at themselves first.

The example shown in Table 5.7 includes a term that refers to the female supporters of women driving as 'daughters of honourable menبنات أشراف ' and 'honourable females-شريفات'. Because these two terms refer to the social actor they were also used as codes, and as these codes highlighted the father daughter relationship, the theme that was identified was 'Daughters and Fathers'.

(4) In the fourth step the researcher reviews the identified themes. This involves a review and refinement of the themes that were created in the second stage as some contending themes may not be real themes for a number of reasons. For example, there may not be adequate data to support these themes, the data within the themes may be quite diverse, or other themes might merge to create a single theme (Braun & Clarke, 2006), whilst some themes might need to be divided into separate themes. Braun and Clarke (2006) indicate that this stage should be completed on two levels, first the review and then the refinement of themes. The review is conducted at the level of the coded data extracts, which for this study were the terms used to represent the social actors. So for each theme the researcher needed to read the gathered extracts and determine whether the themes seemed to form a coherent pattern, before progressing to the second level. If they did not, then the themes themselves had to be examined if they were problematic, or if any of the data extracts merely did not fit, modifications were required or even the creation of new themes where those extracts did not fall within already created themes. It is only after creating an adequate thematic map that this level two review can be carried out to assess the validity of the themes in connection with the whole data set.

(5) Step five defines and names the themes. The main purpose of this phase is to recognise the main idea and the core of each theme, and the aspect of the data it captures. Any sub-themes within a theme should be identified at this stage as they can be helpful in providing a structure for especially big and complex themes. Final names for each theme also need to be considered. Theme names should be short, punchy, and instantly convey to the reader what the theme is about (Braun & Clarke, 2006).

(6) In step six the report is produced. The task of writing the report entails the selection of data extracts and delivery of a brief, logical report about the story that the data conveys, both within and across themes. There must be adequate evidence of the themes identified in the report within the selected data. The examples should be easily

recognisable as ones that represent the issue. However, the report should not only consist of examples and extracts – these should be embedded within an analytical narrative that demonstrates what the study is saying about the data – the analytical narrative should also transcend the description of the data, and 'make an argument' in connection with the research question(s). This study did not prepare a separate report for the thematic analysis. Instead, the results of this step will be incorporated in the findings which are presented in the chapter 6. However, prior to using the themes to show and organise how female and male opponents and supporters of women driving were represented in the trending hashtags, it is necessary to reflect upon the position of the researcher in relation to both the examined topic, of women driving, and how the subject was analysed.

At this point in the study all of the analytical methods employed to address the research questions in Table 5.1 have been discussed. Now, it is important to explain how these three separate methods are interrelated in the analysis. The data analysis was conducted at three levels, although they may not necessarily be presented in that order.

At the micro level, the study utilized van Leeuwen's approach to identify gender representations of social actors and their associated discursive strategies. This allowed for an examination and analysis of gender representations pertaining to both female and male opponents and supporters of women driving in Saudi Arabia during the ban. This in-depth evaluation sheds light on how language and discourse are employed to establish and reinforce gender-based social power dynamics within the Saudi context. Although these individual representations of social actors are informative and provide insights into each tweet, they do not present a comprehensive picture of the dataset or the societal and cultural context in which they are situated.

Only when these independent representations are utilized as codes and combined with similar representations from other tweets in the hashtags under analysis, using Braun and Clarke's (2006) thematic analysis, does the study take a step back to examine the identified gender representations as a whole. This approach enables the identification of broader patterns or themes related to gender within the larger context of Saudi Arabia. By uncovering common themes and patterns, the study goes beyond individual instances of gender representation, providing insights into the broader discursive landscape surrounding gender in Saudi Arabia.

Furthermore, the analysis continues to employ the gender representations of social actors identified by van Leeuwen, using them as cues to identify and name the gendered discourses using Sunderland's framework (2004). Additionally, the analysis considers and is guided by the themes and patterns identified through Braun and Clarke's analysis (2006) to recognize the gendered discourses that are circulating in Saudi society and have emerged in the dataset.

Having explained how the three approaches (van Leeuwen, thematic analysis and Sunderland) relate to each other in this study, it is now necessary to reflect upon the position of the researcher in relation to both the examined topic (women driving), and how the subject was analysed.

5.9 Self-reflexivity

The researcher must reflect on their positionality and their own biaseses through a process of self-reflexivity, also known as reflexivity (Baxter, 2003; Rogers, 2003). As this research has adopted a qualitative analytical approach where human ideological bias might have an impact, it is less likely to make claims about objectivity, which is considered advantageous to the study. However, taking into consideration that this is a CDS study and that one of its key features is its 'critical perspective' and CDS commitment to the emancipatory agenda (as discussed in Section 4.3, The notions of critique and criticality in CDS), an essential principle is that of self-reflexivity (Litosseliti, 2010), which is an important part of discourse analysis

(Baker & Ellece, 2011a). It was therefore important that the researcher address her subjectivity because, as Reisigl and Wodak (2001) specify, analysts "are not disembodied heremitic individuals, but interested members of specific societies and social groups with specific points of view" (p. 35).

Reflecting on my position as a researcher and on my own identity as a female brought up in Saudi Arabia, the society examined by the study, this could have impacted my decision to examine WD and to combine it with my interest in social media – which was evident even in my master's degree where I examined Twitter data – and finally to incorporate my CDS interest. While I have personally never partaken in discussions about women driving or any female related issue in Saudi Arabia, I always observed how the Western media focused on elite, mainly feminist and religious, scholars and generalised the views of these groups to all Saudi people, and I do believe that being a Saudi woman and being portrayed in a certain way in the Western media has played a role in my topic selection and close examination and highlighting of a specific, non-elite discourse that reflects public opinion. I do not, however, think that it had any impact on the way the research proceeded, especially regarding the matter of data analysis. The ethical considerations that this research has maintained in this study will be discussed in the next section.

5.10 Consideration of ethical issues

There is no single set of international practices or set of regulations that must be followed by all researchers concerning the analysis of social media data and that can be recommended universally for each research project (Page et al., 2014). In addition, there is no general agreement on how to uphold privacy in Computer-Mediated Communication research and even ethics guidelines for researchers and students differ between countries and institutions (Androutsopoulos, 2017). A review of ethical research guidelines published by major professional associations in the field of applied linguistics showed that limited attention and focus is being applied to ethical issues in internet-based research (Tao et al., 2017). The

American Association of Applied linguistics ethics guidelines (2017), for example, has no ethical guidelines for internet-based research, while documentation from the British Association for Applied Linguists (2021) very briefly discusses the difficulties of collection and analysis of online data, stressing that online data must be considered using a "case-by-case process approach" because it is not fixed but rather responsive to the different emergent forms of social interaction. Also, a small section of the BAAL documentation (2021) recognizes that the changing nature of the internet has an impact upon issues such as informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality.

The literature emphasises that studies examining social media are not unified and that each research project should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis (Page et al., 2014). Page et al. (2014) stress that ethical considerations depend upon the research and its usage of the social media under examination; that is, they should be case specific. That means that each researcher needs to tailor the ethical considerations to be applied to their research rather than exploit the lack of ethical restrictions. It is difficult to separate ethical issues of confidentiality, privacy, ownership, access, and dissemination as they are entangled (Mallinson, 2018). However, these ethical issues pertain to any research and must be discussed clearly. The decisions that were taken in this research for each ethical concern will be discussed next.

At the beginning of every research design, the first issue is to guarantee that the data is accessed ethically. Page et al. (2014) underscore the importance of having ethical access to materials, and researchers must consider the location in which this data is situated and published. This is because a researcher's right to access data is closely linked to the condition that the data is made publicly available and deemed to be free from privacy restrictions. In earlier research on language in the Computer-Mediated Communication (CMC) environment, the distinction was made between private and public, and in relation to access was understood

to be precise and defined by the technological attributes of a specific site (Bolander & Locher, 2014). This drove researchers' decisions when considering ethical practices (Bolander & Locher, 2014). Concerning the ethics of research in computer-mediated environments, a great deal has changed since the 1990s, and one of the main advances involves the understanding and application of public and private as gradable and not absolute (Bolander & Locher, 2014). Page et al. (2014) also stress that public and private in CMC are viewed as non-absolute qualities that can be easily distinguished, and that different parts of social media sites vary in the degree to which they are private or semi-private, public or semi-public. Due to the blurred boundaries between private and public online, the direct application of onsite ethical practices to online research is both problematic and difficult (Madge, 2007). This ambiguous boundary also makes conducting the ethical decision-making process for a whole platform and site, and just once at the start of the research process, both challenging and difficult (Bolander & Locher, 2014).

In social media, there is also the issue of expectations and varying notions of privacy in different sites and venues on the internet (Bolander & Locher, 2014; Madge, 2007; Page et al., 2014), which is something that this research also considered, as Twitter users who tweet in a trending hashtag have no expectation of privacy; on the contrary, their expectation is that their tweets will be public. In other words, within Twitter, trending hashtags are used by Twitter users as a public space. However Boyd and Crawford argue that "it is problematic for researchers to justify their actions as ethical simply because the data are accessible. Just because content is publicly accessible does not mean that it was meant to be consumed by just anyone" (2012, p. 672). To a certain extent, this research agrees with Boyd and Crawford's (2012) point of view, and for that reason took the decision to exclude non-trending hashtags for the ethical reason illustrated in Section 5.5.2., even though the research had ethical access to that data.

Privacy is an issue for digital media as it has made information sharing easy (Jones & Hafner, 2012). As Jones and Hafner (2012) have highlighted, studies that have examined online privacy have consistently found that people admit to concerns about their own privacy, but at the same time continue to behave in ways that expose them to surveillance. Jones and Hafner (2012) attribute this to the fact that many are not completely aware of the extent to which their online activities are monitored, the amount of personal information that is obtainable, and what it can be used for. Many individuals are also not completely familiar with the steps they can take to protect their privacy, for example, changing their privacy settings on social media platforms. Taking into consideration the privacy issues highlighted by Jones and Hafner (2012), by collecting trending hashtags this study ensured that those whose data was collected had a level of digital literacy that would enable them to know which hashtags were trending and then to employ those hashtags to write their own tweets and willingly share them with the public. Twitter users who are not familiar with how to protect their privacy are less likely to know about trending hashtags and how to add a tweet to a trending hashtag as this requires an advanced level of digital literacy when compared to switching an account to private.

Therefore, in this study the data was collected from the Twitter platform, and specifically from trending hashtags. In terms of content, these are public, as anyone with or without a Twitter account can view trending hashtags, and in terms of access, they are public, as the researcher did not access any Twitter users accounts. All tweets were made public by their authors who expected their tweets to be part of the trending hashtag that could be seen by other Twitter users.

Turning now to the ethics-related issue that arises from the fuzzy and ambiguous area of private and public data – whether it is necessary to acquire consent for data collection. The need for informed consent depends on contextual factors, such as the regulatory constrains,

for example, the terms of service (Page et al., 2014). In this study, Twitter terms of service state clearly that: “Twitter is public and Tweets are immediately viewable and searchable by anyone around the world. We give you non-public ways to communicate on Twitter too, through protected Tweets and Direct Messages. You can also use Twitter under a pseudonym if you prefer not to use your name” (Twitter, 2021). In simple terms, this says that if Twitter users opt to tweet publicly then their tweet can be viewed and easily accessed in a search by anyone. If they want their tweet not to be public, they can switch their account to private or use direct messages which are private. This will render their tweet protected and non-public.

In addition, it is also important to highlight that Twitter’s terms of service state that users have the right to own all content they post through Twitter. However, by using the social media platform, users give “a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free license (with the right to sublicense) to use, copy, reproduce, process, adapt, modify, publish, transmit, display and distribute such Content in any and all media or distribution methods (now known or later developed). This license authorizes us to make your Content available to the rest of the world and to let others do the same.” (Twitter, 2018b). This complex user agreement enables Twitter to sell users’ data in different packages, which means the data Twitter users publicly Tweet is not private and the company has implied consent from the users for their data to be used. In accordance with Twitter terms of service, it must be stressed that the researcher does not claim ownership or authorship of the collected tweets. The owner remains to be the Twitter user who tweeted each collected tweets.

According to Madge (2007), there is rising consensus concerning informed consent for private or semi-private sources, such as closed and private chatrooms, where consent is regarded as essential, while for open-access forums, such as bulletin boards, consent is not always deemed necessary. Since trending hashtags consist of public tweets that are open access, they do not require consent. Similar projects, such as those by Al Mufarreh (2017),

Alharbi (2016), Altoaimy (2017) and Bahammam (2018) (the latter also conducted at Reading University), have examined Twitter and have not required consent, due to the fact that the data is public. In all cases, this decision was deemed satisfactory.

Based upon the above discussion, this study did not obtain consent as the collected data was public, and formal ethical approval was not required. Neither was it necessary to gain consent from the individual users. This would also have been unfeasible and would have undermined the anonymity granted by social media platforms. In addition, it would have contradicted the purpose of investigating a sensitive and controversial topic on a platform where Saudi users express their views using nicknames or even real names.

Another issue that relates to research ethics on the internet and social media websites after access to the data has been obtained is that of ensuring the ethical usage of the collected data, which is a challenging part of the research process, as establishing a way to ensure the ethical usage of any type of data that is obtained for study is difficult (Jones, 2004). An important ethical issue that researchers need to consider is that of anonymity and confidentiality. In the virtual world, anonymity is what attracts people to express their stances regarding sensitive issues (Tao et al., 2017), such as the issue of women driving in Saudi Arabia. Protection of the anonymity of research informants is achieved by not openly disclosing their offline identities and by preventing the use of cues that could reveal their identity, this practice is established amongst CMC researchers (Androutsopoulos, 2017). As with other aspects of CMC, there is no unanimous practice with regard to the protection of anonymity. Indeed, there are some scholars who consider publicly posted screen names on social media platforms to be publishable (Androutsopoulos, 2017). This research will not publish any screen name from the collected data, as it holds a similar view to Androutsopoulos (2017), that screen names can be fairly easy to use to track other public utterances that were posted by that screen name on social media.

In the interests of protecting the anonymity/identities of the authors/owners of the collected tweets in this study; to ensure that no harm is done to any Twitter user whose tweets have been collected; and to prevent readers from identifying other public tweets that were posted under a given username, and in cases where user names are linked to an offline identity or are the users' real names, no details of user identity (usernames and other meta-data information) will be disclosed.

It is important to note that this is the researcher's decision, as the meta data is public information according to Twitter's terms of service, which state that "Most activity on Twitter is public, including your profile information ([2]), your display language, when you created your account, and your Tweets and certain information about your Tweets like the date, time, and application and version of Twitter you Tweeted from. You also may choose to publish your location in your Tweets or your Twitter profile" (Twitter, 2021).

Disclosure of information about Twitter users whose tweets had been collected was not the only issue that could harm them. They could also have been harmed by the inappropriate storage and mishandling of their data (Fox et al., 2003). To ensure that storage of the data was appropriate and to maintain data security the researcher stored the data on a password protected portable drive. The portable drive was never connected to any public computer because, as highlighted by Fox et al. (2003), they are vulnerable to malicious internet attacks, and as a result the data could be tampered with and corrupted. The researcher took the additional step of only connecting the portable drive to her private laptop.

Other aspects of Twitter that might violate Twitter users' privacy are retweets (Meeder et al., 2010) and mentions as they both include traces that might reveal Twitter handles (usernames of other Twitter users who did not use the hashtags). It is important to know that Twitter has

modified the retweet feature so that private account content can no longer be retweeted. All retweets and tweets that contained mentions of other accounts were removed from the collected data during the cleaning phase and were not included in the analysis. It is important to stress that, in this study, no data were analysed by following people's private accounts; only data published on the Saudi Arabian trends list, which is public, were included in the analysis, as illustrated in Section 5.5.1.

In addition, none of the original Arabic tweets analysed in this thesis will be made publicly available and they will not be distributed via an online repository or otherwise. To mitigate the risk of reidentification of Twitter users, Arabic tweets will not be included in the appendices. Exclusively the English translations of the original Arabic tweets will be included in the appendices. Only a portion of the original tweets, namely the Arabic terms used for representations of social actors, will be included in the analysis in Chapter 6, as these cannot lead to reidentification of the author of the tweet.

There was no invasion of privacy, and the researcher had ethical access to the materials. Having reviewed the ethical decision-making process, the next chapter will present the findings of the data analysis for the trending hashtag '#Women's car driving is a necessity'.

Chapter 6 – Findings

The previous chapter dealt with the research procedures, the method of selection, cleaning and coding of the hashtags, and their preparation for analysis. This chapter will present and discuss the findings of the analysis, which was conducted using a number of methods – those of van Leeuwen discussed in Chapter 4, Sunderland in Chapter 3, and thematic analysis in Chapter 5, all of which were applied whilst working mainly within the tradition of critical discourse studies.

The chapter will illustrate how these methods were utilised in a simple step-by-step procedure, as illustrated in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2, to answer the research questions. It is important to note that, while the steps are listed in a linear fashion, this is for illustrative purposes only; the steps all formed part of an iterative process. In fact, the steps in Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 intersect at the same micro level.

The following are the steps summarised in Figure 6.1 and are those used in the indicative analysis, to identify themes and representations related to social actors:

- Beginning with the micro level analysis, this level entailed using van Leeuwen's framework for the identification of discursive representations of social actors and the associated van Leeuwen discourse strategies.
- Having identified the van Leeuwen discourse strategies that were involved in the realisation of the representations of the social actors, the representations of the social actors were analysed and the tweets were coded with their linguistic realisations in an Excel spreadsheet.
- Then, the codes were used to identify themes, according to Braun and Clarke's (2006) approach (see Chapter 5 for more detail), which involved combining

the representations of the social actors with similar codes under one theme or sub-theme.

- Then, under themes, sub-themes were combined.
- Then, under dominant themes the themes were combined with other themes that had commonality.



Figure 6.1 Analytical Procedures – Inductive analysis to reveal social actor representations and themes

Discourses are not articulated explicitly but via traces which in this study are the social actor terms/linguistic realizations of representations that were identified using van Leeuwen's (2008) framework, then these traces were used for identification of gendered discourses using Sunderland's (2004) approach.

The second set of steps, summarised in Figure 6.2, were used to identify the macro topics which relate to gender ideology in Saudi Arabia and gendered discourse and are as follows:

- The representations of the social actors that were identified at the micro level using van Leeuwen's (2008) framework were used as linguistic traces for the identification of gendered discourses using Sunderland's (2004) approach.
- These gendered discourses were then used to reveal macro topic ideologies.



Figure 6.2 Analytical procedures for the identification of gendered discourses and gender ideologies

The next section where the analysis of the trending hashtag '#Women's car driving is a necessity' during the ban on women driving will be presented. The section will be divided into two main sections, one of which deals with Pro-WD tweets in the trending hashtag and the other with Anti-WD tweets in that hashtag. Within each section the van Leeuwen categories that were used by the authors of the tweets to represent the female and male supporters and opponents of women driving and their linguistic realizations will be analysed and presented separately. The qualities and specific descriptors attributed to male and female opponents and supporters of women driving will be highlighted. The gendered discourses that were identified by examining the social actor representations will be highlighted in this

chapter, and then all the gendered discourses will be discussed and compared in Chapter 7. The findings of the analysis are situated within a gender-political-social context and interpreted in terms of their implications for masculine subjectivity and gender relations in Saudi Arabia.

Each section will begin with an analysis of Pro-WD tweets, followed by an analysis of Anti-WD tweets. The arrangement for presenting the results is based on random selection. Five predominant themes were identified in both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets.

Despite the differences in the tweets from Pro-WD and Anti-WD perspectives, produced by different authors, the analysis of various representations of social actors with different linguistic realizations revealed that both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets share the same five dominant overarching themes. These encompass gender-related human representations, gender-related non-human representations, representations with ideological stances, negative appraisements, and affiliation and geographical locations.

It's important to note that while they share these overarching themes, it doesn't mean that the representations or the gendered discourses observed in Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets are identical. As our analysis will reveal, there are distinctions, including variations in the number of sub-themes within the five larger themes present in Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets.

Due to limitations in word count, this chapter will only present the terms used to represent social actors in the analysed tweets. All English translations of the original tweets can be found in Appendix A and Appendix B. The number of example tweets per theme varies depending on the nature of the representations. In some instances, all instances of a representation will be presented to capture different nuances.

6.1 During the ban on WD in Saudi Arabia

This section presents the representations of social actors found in the hashtag '#Women's car driving is a necessity', which was trending during the ban. The analysis starts with Pro-WD tweets and is followed by Anti-WD tweets.

6.1.1 Pro-WD tweet analysis

In the Pro-WD tweets, five dominant themes were identified: 1) gender-related human representations; 2) gender-related non-human representations; 3) representations with an ideological stance; 4) negative appraisements; and 5) affiliation and geographical locations. As highlighted in 6.1, dominant themes are the larger themes under which other themes with commonality will be combined. See Appendix A for all tweets discussed and identified in the Pro-WD analysis.

6.1.1.1 <u>Gender related human representations dominant theme</u>

All the six themes identified representations in which social actors were depicted in relation to human gender aspects.

6.1.1.1.1 Stereotypical gender roles

The first theme is one where representations using van Leeuwen's functionalization were found to depict M-opponents using stereotypical gender roles (see Appendix A Table-A1); for example, 'driver-سواق' in [A1-1], 'their driver-سواقهم' in [A1-2], and 'private driver- سواق خاص' in [A1-3], which are all stereotypical gender roles that applied only to the Saudi context during the ban on women driving. Examination of the nature of the roles that these representations drew upon, namely 'driver' and 'private driver', showed that these roles are ones that belong outside the house, or in what is known as the public-sphere, which has traditionally been exclusively for men in Saudi Arabia (see Chapter 2 – Section 2.4). Driving was considered to be a role solely for men during the ban.

[A1-1] and [A1-3] drew on the same stereotypical gender roles but the difference between them is that only [A1-1] is considered a negative representation because it endorses patriarchal norms and stereotyped gender roles as it depicts and juxtaposes the male role of driving and serving the family in the public-sphere in exchange for female domestic duties in the kitchen, where they are represented as 'servants in the kitchen'. This representation supports the structure of social inequality, especially the sexual division of labour between men and women, in which tasks are assigned to workers based on their sex. It also validates the spatial binary of public/private spheres and reflects the patriarchal gender system in the Saudi context. [A1-1] representations perpetuate the gendered dualism of the female homemaker/male breadwinner as common sense, therefore this representation seems to be underpinned by one of the gendered discourses, the 'gender differences discourse', in the context of Saudi Arabia.

However, females[26] were never functionalized and depicted by the occupations and roles that belonged to the outside realm in the Pro-WD tweets.[27] The division of roles was clearly linked to the gender roles in Saudi Arabia that were highlighted in Chapter 2.[28]

Moving on to the only representation that did not depict M-opponents in relation to driving, [A1-4], it depicts them as 'owners of taxis and ride service companies-اصحاب الموزينات وشركات التوصيل'. This representation is slightly different from the other representations as it portrays M-opponents as owners of businesses which is significant in relation to gender, as ownership of businesses is linked directly to financial independence. Therefore, ownership and power are often closely associated with what a person owns. In the entire subset of Pro-WD tweets, females were never once depicted as owners of any type of business. The representation of only men as business owners reflects the historical disparities in wealth, power and resources

[26] Fem-opponents and Fem-supporters of WD.
[27] In the hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity.
[28] Which explain the historical development of gender social roles in the country.

between men and women in Saudi Arabia. The representation also suggest that only men are suited to be business owner while women are more suited for domestic roles. Indicating that this representation draw on the 'gender difference discourse'.

A final note is that, in [A1-3] and [A1-4], while the representations of M-opponents are different in their linguistic realization, both roles depict M-opponents as breadwinners whose livelihoods rely on driving, and women as their customers. The implication is that WD will threaten their income and result in a loss of custom. These representations draw on the traditional masculine role ascribed to men, that of the breadwinner which is one of the dominant representations of masculine identity in Saudi Arabia. As Talbot (2010) showed, being a breadwinner is one of the key concepts and practices surrounding hegemonic masculinity. M-opponents are defined by employment in [A1-3] and [A1-4]. Therefore, these representations of M-opponents bear traces of a gendered discourse that will be named 'Men as breadwinners' discourse'.

6.1.1.1.2 Familial relations

This theme focused on how relationships that position social actors in terms of their families were used for representations. The theme consists of two sub-themes that, in their representations, draw on a particular type of van Leeuwen identification – that of relational identification. This, van Leeuwen indicated, represents social actors in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations to each other.

6.1.1.1.2.1 Stereotyped paternal relationship

Within the first sub-theme several representations draw on stereotypical paternal relationships to exclusively depict Fem-supporters and Fem-opponents (see Appendix A Table-A2). Females were depicted, in terms of being daughters of men, and what was foregrounded was in part fathers' identities and in part females' relationship to men. Using relational identification regarding their father, in [A2-5] Fem-supporters were portrayed as 'honourable

and daughters of honourable men-شريفات وبنات أشراف', while in [A2-6] Fem-opponents were represented using the words 'her father is a middleman[29]-ابوها شريطي'. The difference between them is that, for a Fem-supporter, [A2-5] is considered a positive representation, as females are represented in relation to honourable men, whilst [A2-6] is a negative depiction of Fem-opponents.

In [A2-5] the Fem-opponent's honour is derived from her father's honour which makes her call for WD an honourable act. In [A2-6] the Fem-opponent's financial and social status is derived from her father who is a 'middleman'. Therefore, in [A2-6], Fem-opponents are mocked[30] as they are identified with the lower financial and social status of their fathers who cannot provide them with drivers and cars. Fem-opponents diminished socioeconomic position is also mocked by relational identification as 'daughters' of sheikhs-بنات شيوخ' underscore fem-opponents claims of being daughters' of rich men is false.

Despite their apparent differences, all these representations within this sub-theme combine female identity with the identity of the father. This representation of femininity is an accumulation of social relations and social practices. The representations, in which Fem-opponents and Fem-supporters are depicted by their fathers' identities rather than themselves, draw on one of the predominant Saudi Arabian gender ideologies, which that females always derive their social and financial status, if unmarried, from their father, and if married from their husband, but it is never the other way aroun. This gendered discourse will be named 'The socioeconomic status of men discourse'. Also, these representations bear traces of the 'Men as breadwinners' discourse'.

[29] This could also be translated as 'Second hand car dealer'.
[30] The emoji 😂😂😂😂😂 employed in the tweet intensifies the mockery.

6.1.1.1.2.2 Relational identification

In this sub-theme M-opponents and Fem-opponents were represented as having kinships, in line with van Leeuwen's relational identification, or not having a certain kinship, which is a modification that this research has applied to van Leeuwen's framework (see Appendix A Table-A3). After examination, it became apparent that only Fem-opponents were referred to in relation to mahram, whilst M-opponents were only once depicted as having no kinship with a female. The significance of using kinship for representation in the Saudi context is as follows. For M-opponents to be represented, as in [A3-7], by establishing the non-existence of relational identification to females, specifically sisters, using the terms 'has no sister-ما عنده خوات', is suggestive of the complex relationship between female honour and men. Since in Saudi Arabia women carry the family's honour, as illustrated in Chapter 2, if an M-opponent is depicted as having no sisters, then there is no honour for him to protect. Neither need he fear that that honour will be tarnished by his sisters driving. Therefore, categorizing such men as having no sisters excludes them from having a position in the discussion about WD. Even though [A3-7] supports WD, the depiction of M-opponents reinforces the 'Patriarchy discourse' and the 'Mahram discourse', as they particularly emphasise the mahram role; as protectors of the honour that females carry, men have the right to control and limit women's activities if those activities might put that honour at risk.

On the other hand, Fem-opponents were represented by their relational identification to mahram as illustrated next. [A3-8] and [A3-9] depict Fem-opponents using relational identification to mahram, and both representations employ hyperbole. They depict Fem-opponents as having an exaggerated number of male relatives, using the terms 'whose boys are a dozen-عياله درزن' and 'twenty brothers and 7 husbands and sixty thousand boys-عشرين اخ ٧ ازواج وستين الف ولد'. Fem-opponents are depicted in terms of their male children and simultaneously their reproductive status and childbearing abilities. Also, the way in which Fem-opponents' mahram are listed and represented in this sub-theme is in accordance with

another of van Leeuwen's categories, that of association. Depicting Fem-opponents by their mahram reinforces the Saudi Arabian gender ideology that men are responsible for women and women are passive recipients, which underlines the asymmetrical power relations. The same gender ideology has been used to oppose WD, as in [A3-8] and [A3-9] it is argued that women who have mahram should not drive as their men can do it for them. Employing the reproductive status and the childbearing aspect of a women's identity to represent her is sexist. In these examples, Fem-opponents are depicted as only having boys, which reveals the existence of what will be named the 'Mother of boys as privileged discourse' in Saudi Arabia.

Moving on to [A3-10], Fem-opponents were depicted using the relational identification to male family members and drivers, in this case using the words 'has brothers, or a driver-عندها اخوان،او سائق'. The representation is like [A3-11] where Fem-opponents were depicted using relational identification to mahram, with the words 'her father or her husband hired multiple drivers for her-ابوها اووزوجها جايبلها كذا سواق'. In [A3-11], these mahram are allocated an active role using the verb 'hired-جايبلها' and pay the expenses of the Fem-opponent's driver. This reinforces the stereotyped gender roles ascribed to men in Saudi families and of providing for female members, emphasising the hierarchical relationship between men and women. Men are the ones who hold the power over women's movements by providing drivers while women are the passive recipients. Therefore, representations in [A3-10] and [A3-11] reinforced the gendered discourses that this thesis names the 'Mahram discourse'.

Fem-opponents are represented by 'you have guardians -معك أولياء امور' in [A3-12], using relational identification to a particular group of men that includes father, brothers, husband and sons, and is different from the others because the term used entails and foregrounds the legal and cultural control that male guardians have over female actions. This representation reinforces normative Saudi Arabian gender relations, male dominance, and patriarchal social order. It is underpinned by the 'Patriarchy discourse', and the 'Mahram discourse' because it

supports the family social system and the power hierarchy, which involve legal and cultural power, that mahram hold over females in Saudi.

It seems that Fem-opponent representations that invoke relational identification to mahram are like M-opponent representations, both within the context of Saudi Arabia, reinforcing the 'mahram discourse' which is underpinned by the ideologies that entail that the responsibility and control of females are solely in the hand of their mahram and therefore females with mahram are in no position to demands any rights. Such ideologies do not view females as individuals. It also deprive women of their right and agency.These representations in turn highlights negative attitudes towards females who still support WD despite not having the need to drive as they have mahram to fulfil the role of driver. Implicitly linking the ability of females to call for WD with the condition of having or not having a mahram is a gendered ideology.

The last representation is [A3-13] which used relational identification to identify Fem-opponents with a female figure, using the term 'your mother Eve-امكم حواء', and here they are linked not just to any female but to Eve. This representation is interesting because what is drawn on is the notion of the first female sin,[31] committed by Eve. The point made claims that Eve transmitted her sin to all female descendants, and that the M-opponents are opposing WD as part of their fight against all women because of that sin. When comparing this isolated representation to all the other different depictions of male kinships that females were depicted with them, it appears that the only female relationship that was used was not an ordinary family relationship, but that of a female who has a significant position in Islam, as Eve was a prophet's wife. This reveals that normal female kinship cannot be used for representation as women have no power.

[31] It is important to note that the belief that the first sin was committed by Eve is not Islamic, but a misconception that is widely portrayed in the media and widespread among people.

6.1.1.1.3 Marital status, employment and education status

This theme consists of tweets that employed van Leeuwen's classification to depict the social actors using a mix of classifications (see Appendix A Table-A4). First, M-opponents were negatively classified in [A4-14] and [A4-15] in terms of their education with the words 'did not finish university-ماكملوالجامعة' and 'no completed education-ولا دراسه كملها'. Each representation seems to be considered negative for a different reason, however both M-opponent representations draw on the 'Men as breadwinners' discourse', which, in Saudi Arabia, expects that boys will finish their education and ultimately marry, have children, and support a family. So in this way they are obliged to perform a breadwinning role; a failure to finish their education is deemed negative as it is linked to a failure to fulfil their role as breadwinner.

We now turn to how the men as breadwinners's discourse is manifested. In [A4-14], uneducated M-opponents are also negatively appraised, using van Leeuwen's appraisement, as 'shallow thinkers-تفكيرهم سطحي'. In [A4-15] uneducated M-opponents are depicted using van Leeuwen's classification in terms of their employment, using the words 'no job-لاوظيفه' to indicate their inability to fulfil their role as breadwinner, and negatively appraised as 'a loser-طايش'. All the representations in [A4-15] reduced men's financial contribution and referred to their diminished ability[32] as breadwinners, whilst also making a comparison to employed females who are able to support their families. The representations in [A4-15] reinforce the gendered role of men as breadwinners and the view that those who do not fulfil their conventionally defined male provider role are not in a position to oppose WD. The view is that power relations between men and women are governed by men's ability to provide and those who fail to do that do not embody hegemonic masculinity or merit the power to subordinate and control women.

[32] Insinuated by the negative representations 'jobless' and 'uneducated' which reduced their chances of attaining a job.

In contrast, Fem-opponents and Fem-supporters were never portrayed in terms of their education, rather they were represented several times using marital status and once using employment. Marital status is a significant classification in Saudi Arabia, and being married is deemed the highest position a female can attain which has resulted in the gendered discourse 'Marriage is important to women'. In [A4-16] Fem-opponents are mocked because they are represented using van Leeuwen's activation. They are allocated the active role of looking for ways to get married using the term 'how to get married-كيف تتزوج'. This representation mocks women and the traditional discourse that underlines that marriage is the most important thing in the life of any woman. At the same time, however, there is an underlying sexist tone to this representation as it indicates the undesirability of Fem-opponents' femininity, as traditionally marriage in Saudi Arabia is arranged marriage, in which men lead the process of looking for a wife. So for women to be allocated the active role of looking for a husband is a negative representation. It also contrasts with the traditional view of femininity, of being desirable and chosen by a man.

In a male-dominated society females are expected to be financially supported by mahram, and to manage aspects of domestic life, but in [A4-17] Fem-supporters were classified in terms of employment and marital status as 'employees, divorcees, widows-للموظفات المطلقات الأرامل'. Although marital status and employment are two different classifications, in [A4-17], combining them indirectly highlights another aspect, that of relational identification to men. These three different groups of women, the divorced, widowed and employed, have one thing in common which is that either they do not have a man, or their men are financially incapable of supporting them. Their mahram have failed to fulfil the stereotypical cultural gender roles that are ascribed to men in Saudi Arabia, those of breadwinner or driver. These groups of women therefore need to drive and provide for themselves. Using marital status to represent Fem-opponents in [A4-17] perpetuates the traditional definition of women. Among the three classifications, classifying Fem-opponents as 'employees' is a particularly complex representation because, of course, not all employed women have no men. However, because

[A4-17] combined divorced and widowed women with employed ones, it gives the impression that all three groups have no men.

Examining these types of female representation to identify why these groups of women need to drive and exist in the public domain highlights the gender ideology whereby only groups of women deemed socially undesirable by men for marriage need to drive, and only then their existence in the public-sphere with men is justified. In the Arab world, young girls who have never been married are considered desirable by men for marriage while divorced and widowed women are not. The employed woman is not of interest to men, especially as a housewife; her employment challenges the hegemonic assumption that women are responsible for domestic work. Also, financial independence, which is a feature associated with hegemonic masculinity, could be viewed as gender deviance by men.

Using the term 'women are their own worst enemies-المرأة عدوة المرأة' in [A4-17], Fem-opponents were depicted in relation to Fem-supporters using relational identification/classification, and as enemies of Fem-supporters, especially the 'Employees, divorcees, widows' group. This representation draws on the 'Women beware women discourse', as Fem-opponents are positioned as enemies of other women who want to drive.

The final representation is in [A4-18] where a young M-opponent is negatively classified, using van Leeuwen's framework, in terms of marital status as 'divorced-مطلق'. This is not only negative because of the negative perceptions of divorced individuals in Saudi Arabia, but because the divorced man in [A4-18] has failed not only in his marriage, but also to fulfil his financial responsibilities to his children and his ex-wife. This representation draws on the stereotypical role that is ascribed to men, that of breadwinner, and his failure to fulfil the role. This representation has traces of the gendered 'Mahram discourse' and the 'Men as breadwinners' discourse'.

6.1.1.1.4 Relationship between gender and power

This theme consists of two sub-themes that, in their depiction of the different opponents, revealed a relationship between gender and power structure in Saudi society. The first sub-theme focuses on the depiction of Fem-opponents while the second concentrates on M-opponents.

6.1.1.1.4.1 Female representations

Within this sub-theme Fem-opponents were negatively depicted using different categories from van Leeuwen's framework, and each category depicted Fem-opponents using stereotypical traits of femininity, such as powerlessness and submissiveness, obedience to men, and subjection to control and manipulation by men. In these representations, as illustrated in Appendix A Table-A5, Fem-opponents are explicitly stereotypically depicted using terms that reflect submissiveness and obedience to men and then these representations are reinforced by employing passivation to emphasise the submissiveness and obedience of Fem-opponents to men.

Fem-opponents in [A5-19] are negatively depicted using van Leeuwen's classification in terms of power, using the words 'the powerless-هالضعيفات'. They are also depicted using van Leeuwen's passivation as they are represented as being on the receiving end of men's manipulation, which constructs men as having the power to control women. This representation negatively depicts Fem-opponents as easily manipulated individuals who cannot think for themselves, and their opposition to WD, rather than stemming from their own viewpoint, is considered to be the result of male manipulation and convincing Fem-opponents that they are pampered as princesses while the reality is the opposite.

The other representation is in [A5-20], where Fem-opponents are classified using van Leeuwen's gender categorisation as 'women-حريم'. This word, which in English translates as 'women', does not capture the meaning of the Arabic term, which is /ḥareem/ and is linked to

the Arabic word haram, which means forbidden and sacred (Bloome et al., 2004). The term /ḥareem/ in Saudi Arabia is used when calling a woman or referring to women in conversation in the presence of male strangers.[33] The purpose is to conceal the woman's name and her identity. This is due to cultural issues associated with shame and honour and concealment of all aspects of a woman's identity from strange men. The practice of concealing the names of women reflects their subordinate position in society. Whilst the term itself does not convey powerlessness, in [A5-20] the author of the tweet used van Leeuwen's passivation to allocate /ḥareem/ with the passive role of being used to submission.

All representations within this sub-theme perpetuate the stereotyping of Saudi women as submissive and oppressed by men. The representations, in their attempt to resist the discourse about the subordination of women in Saudi Arabia and to destabilise women's subjugation in society, unfortunately draw on the damaging gendered discourse, hereafter known as the 'Females are gullible', according to which females are easily manipulated because they are naïve. Also they draw on the 'Foolish women discourse as females are portrayed as lacking the mental abilities to think for themesleves and recognise men fabrications about women driving.

6.1.1.1.4.2 Male representations

In this sub-theme M-opponents were depicted using different categories from van Leeuwen's framework as powerful. M-opponents are represented using van Leeuwen's classification by gender categorisation, in [A6-21], [A6-22], and [A6-23] as 'the men-الرجال' and in [A6-24] 'the man-الرجل' (see Appendix A Table-A6). These representations by themselves are not indicative of power, but were allocated the active role of an actor with respect to given actions and the goal of these actions was always women.

[33] Any male who does not fall within the male mahram category.

The M-opponent representations challenge the hegemonic masculinity discourses in Saudi Arabia, which promote the idea that men's opposition of WD is for the benefit of women; in other words, men know what is best for women. As these representations depict, M-opponents are abusing their power and hegemony over women. These representations draw on what will be named the 'Men-power abuse discourse' which challenges the abuse of male hegemony and draws a distinction between men who abused their power and men who men does not.

6.1.1.1.5 Power and male gender identity

Within this theme, M-opponents were negatively represented by various representations which reveal that there is a relationship between the construction and representations of male gender identity and the exercise of power over women.

6.1.1.1.5.1 Male biological sex

Within this sub-theme, M-opponents were depicted by van Leeuwen's classification in terms of their biological sex (see Appendix A Table-A7). In different Twitter debates about various women's issues in Saudi Arabia certain terms have been constantly used to derogate men and women. Those terms have different negative connotations that are peculiar to the Saudi context. One such term that has evolved from its original use is '(The) male(s)', which is intended to derogate men. It is used for essentialization, and to reduce men to their biological sex and remove all positive attributes that are associated with manhood, depicting them as sexual beings and emphasizing their basic sexual instinct. Consequently, this reduces them to sexual beings, driven by their primitive nature and sexual urges or behaviours.'(The) male(s)' is also negative because it embodies toxic masculinity and represents those who adhere to masculinised gender norms. Use of this depiction aims to show the harmful form of masculinity that M-opponents embody and to overturn the masculinised gender norms that

they uphold. Use of '(The) male(s)' as a negative representation is culturally negative in the context of Saudi Arabia.[34]

This representation occurred as, 'the males-الذكور' in [A7-25], and, twice as 'the male-الذكر', in [A7-26] without any other form of representation. In other occurrences, the representation of M-opponents by their biological sex occurred with other representations, as will be illustrated under the appropriate theme heading.

6.1.1.1.5.2 Manhood

Within this sub-theme M-opponents were negatively classified, using van Leeuwen's classification, by their biological sex, as 'Semi-man-أشباه الرجل' and 'not a man-مو رجال' (see Appendix A Table-A8). In these representations, M-opponents' manhood, masculinities and sexual identity are removed and as a result the masculine quality of being powerful over women is also removed.

This is illustrated in [A8-27], where M-opponents are negatively depicted as 'Semi-man' because they are powerless, the power to make decisions about WD being in the hands of the government. In [A8-28], M-opponents are negatively portrayed as not being men because they are insecure in their manhood and masculinity and in their ability to trust females to the extent that they are appraised as being diseased with suspicion. This representation, among others in the Pro-WD tweets, reveals the existence of a gendered discourse that this thesis names 'Men fear women's freedom'.

6.1.1.1.5.3 Men's masculinities and women's honour

Within this sub-theme M-opponents were classified, using van Leeuwen's classification, in terms of their masculinity as 'Cuckold-ديوث' and 'the cuckold-الديوث' (see Appendix A Table-

[34] It should be noted, however, that in official documents, such as government and medical records, the term 'the male(s)' is neutral.

A9). These are negative representations because ‘cuckold’ refers to a man with no jealousy over their female. This term draws on the cultural definition of masculinities in Saudi Arabia in which men conform to and adopt specific stereotypical cultural gender roles and behaviours, namely jealousy over women and protecting the honour of their female and the family. If they fail to fulfil these roles, men are emasculated, labelled ‘Cuckolds’ and considered undeserving of the family honour. The usage of ‘cuckolds’ for negative representation could be because homosexuality has been a key subordinate masculinity in Saudi Arabia.

In each example M-opponents were emasculated as ‘cuckolds’ for a different reason: in [A9-29] for trusting a strange driver to drive their females instead of trusting their females; in [A9-30] for allowing their women to be driven alone by a strange non-mahram, which is ‘*khulwah*’[35] and forbidden in Islam; and in [A9-31] because M-opponents entrust a strange non-mahram to drive their helpless females, jeopardising their honour. In short, they are labelled cuckolds for not being jealous of non-mahram and protective of the women carrying their honour. These representations draw and reinforce the genderd discourse ‘Female subordination and male masculinity discourse’ by drawing a clear connection between M-opponents mascuilinity and not controlling or lack of control of females.

These representations draw on the ‘Mahram discourse’ , which involves men playing their traditional masculine role by using their power and jealousy over women to protect both them and their honour. If they fail, they lose their masculinity, and as a result they are ascribed one of the subordinate and rejected masculinities in the context of Saudi Arabia, that of homosexuality. Overall, using homosexuality for negative representation reflects the rejection of homosexuality in the Kingdom. Interestingly, however, although [A9-30] and [A9-31] degrade M-opponents as ‘The cuckold’, they are still allocated the active and powerful roles

[35] Being alone with a non-mahram from the opposite sex.

of ‘allowing’ and ‘entrusting’. In other words, even when men are negatively represented, they are still placed in a position of power and hegemony over women. This reflects a gender ideology in Saudi Arabia, that even a rejected form of masculinity, that of homosexuality, has more power than women. Also, representations in [A9-30] and [A9-31] reveal a ‘Patriarchy discourse’ as they support a discourse of dominance that clearly privileges men and bestows upon them control over women.

6.1.1.1.6 Female polarised roles

The representations within this theme fall into two subsets that draw upon the polarised roles for Saudi women of ‘slave’ and ‘queen’.

In the first subset of tweets Fem-opponents were negatively depicted in terms of slavery while Fem-supporters were represented in terms of freedom. First, using van Leeuwen’s functionalization category, Fem-opponents were allocated the role of slave, as in ‘the slaves-العبيد’ in [A10-32], ‘slaves of the males-عبدات الذكور’ in [A10-33], and ‘odalisque girl-جارية’ [A10-34], (see Appendix A Table-A10).

There is a particular focus on ‘slaves of the males’ as it is a prevalent representation, used by supporters of women’s issues,[36] to demean the Saudi women who oppose them. ‘Slaves of the males’ was popularised to diminish another cultural trope, that of ‘queen’, which will be discussed in the second subset of representation. Both terms have dominated social debates concerning issues that relate to Saudi women. The slave metaphor denotes female submission to men’s authority, and men’s exclusive mastery, both mental and physical, over women.

All the slavery representations in the first subset of tweets (see Appendix A Table-A10). have a sexual undertone as sexual exploitation was and is a critical component of enslavement,

[36] Those who hold a progressive view.

particularly the relationship between a slave[37] and their master.[38] Within this relationship men are associated with action, power and ownership. Interestingly, women are not regarded as passive, but rather viewed as actively subjecting themselves to slavery. The refusal of Fem-opponents to grasp gender equity and freedom, referring to WD, is illustrated in [A10-32], using a metaphor in which women are likened to slaves who would reject their freedom if it was handed to them, metaphorically falling on their heads like rain. In [A10-33] and [A10-34] this is explicitly identified as the refusal to drive. These representations reveal a gendered discourse hereafter known as the 'Women enslave themselves to men discourse', which incorporates traces of the 'Patriarchy discourse'. It differs, however, because it emphasises how females themselves play a role in their own subordination to males and their rejection of independence from masculine control.

The opposite of slavery is freedom, and Fem-supporters are depicted in relation to freedom. In [A10-35] Fem-supporters and M-opponents are described using contrasting appraisements. Fem-supporters are depicted positively using the term 'free woman-امرأة حره', while M-opponents are depicted as the 'scared male-ذكر خايف'. In this representation, supporters of WD draw on the notion that Saudi Arabia is characterised by a male-dominated social structure that fears and fights women's independence. These representations reveal gendered discourse 'Men fear women's freedom'.

In the second subset of tweets, the queen metaphor is invoked in critiques and mockery of the Fem-opponents [A11-37-38-39-40], and only once to represent M-opponents in [A11-36]. (see Appendix A Table-A11). A popular representation in Saudi Arabia is to portray Saudi women as queen(s). A queen is a cultural trope that has dominated social debate concerning issues that relate to the country's women. The queen metaphor applies to domestic queens, or pampered women who are chauffeured around, and, according to Doaiji (2017), is a result of

[37] A representation exclusively allocated to Fem-opponents.
[38] Men.

the Religious Awakening. This movement, which dominated Saudi Arabia, introduced an ideology whereby many restrictions[39] were applied to women (see Section 2.6. for details of the movement).

'Queen' is usually used for representations by opponents of WD, to indicate that women are protected and served. The same term is used by supporters of WD to signify being locked up. These representations mock the 'Saudi women as queen' discourse in which 'queen', which is a gender representation, removes women's agency, because they are stereotypically depicted as precious, fragile, and worthy of and in need of protection by men/mahram. The 'Saudi women as queen' discourse intersects with the 'Patriarchal discourse' because, while both are used to control women, the former conceals the controlling of females under the alluring metonymical metaphor 'queen' while the later explicitly recognizes it.

We now turn to the second dominant theme, gender related non-human representations dominant theme.

6.1.1.2 Gender related non-human representations dominant theme

There are three identified themes, namely animal, objectivation, and body parts, in which social actors were dehumanised.

6.1.1.2.1 Animal

Within this theme, Fem-opponents and M-opponents were depicted negatively using van Leeuwen's impersonalization, in which social actors can be represented by other means that do not include the semantic feature of being 'human'. More specifically, animal metaphors[40] and two similes were used, each of which represented a human by invoking an animal or animal traits and compared opponents to those animals (see Appendix A Table-A12). The

[39] Their clothing, employment, and their appearance in public, and segregation between the sexes became significant.
[40] Metaphors tend to have culturally specific connotations.

examination of the representations will start with the Fem-opponents, before moving on to the other representations.

The first depiction of Fem-opponents is as 'the sheep-الاغنام' in [A12-41], which invokes a quality of following the herd, of fearing the wolves. Females and males are assigned polarising roles, using animal metaphors, to highlight the gender relations in the Saudi context. This representation clearly draws on the 'Men as wolves discourse' which positions women as helpless, sexually enticing figures who are culpable if the wolf makes sexual advances. But [A12-41] ironically highlights that women's fear of men is misplaced and needs to be redirected to 'the shepherd-الراعي' who is the protector of the sheep; this seems to refer to the women's mahram and M-opponents as they are the ones who occupy this role. While the representation attempted to mock and show the absurdity of the 'Men as wolves discourse', it still attributed to Fem-opponents a lack of agency, particularly regarding women's responsibility for maintaining their own safety and the identification of threats. Therefore, this representation reinforces the gender stereotype that females are gullible and easily fooled and therefore require the protection of a man, thus it seems to invoke a gendered discourse, 'Females are gullible'.

Regarding the metaphorical representation of M-opponents as 'the shepherd' in [A12-41], which refers to the role of the mahram as the protector of women, this representation of M-opponents is intended to create a contrary discourse to the 'Mahram discourse'. It counters the role of mahram as the protector of females with the role of the attacker instead.

Several representations within this theme refer to the same animal, 'the donkey', to depict Fem-opponents and M-opponents, using a metaphor in [A12-42] and [A12-43] and a simile in [A12-48]. The characteristics of the donkey that are elicited in all representations are those of stupidity and ignorance. However, this is a gender-neutral representation used to degrade both

genders, as ‘the donkey(s)’ is an abusive term that is very commonly used in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, these representations do not show gender related aspects.

The second group of representations exclusively negatively dehumanised M-opponents using various terms and an emoji. Starting with the first representation, in [A12-44], M-opponents were negatively depicted as ‘the wolves-الذئاب’, and were assigned the characteristic of being dangerous, of being ready to devour their prey – in this case, women who wished to drive. The contrasting metaphors communicate women’s position relative to men and the power hierarchy. This representation drew on the ‘Men as wolves discourse’ to deconstruct the hypocrisy of the M-opponents who employ this discourse to incite fear of these wolves among women who want to drive. By showing that M-opponents are ‘the wolves’ themselves, and they are the danger, this tweet attempts to denaturalize the dominant discourse that ‘Men as wolves’ which has been used to oppose any issue in which women will gain more freedom away from their mahram.

All of the M-opponent representations that are discussed next, except for [A12-49], have the common purpose of emasculation, as they attribute stereotypical feminine attributes to males. The first representation is [A12-45] which highlights the hypocrisy of M-opponents, who are negatively classified, using van Leeuwen’s framework, as belonging to a group called /Darbāwiyya/[41]; people who threaten rape and indicate that females who wish to drive will be on the receiving end of their male aggression. To mock this M-opponent group and trivialise their rape threats and their masculine aggression, [A12-45] employed a simile through which M-opponents are dehumanised and compared to the ‘ostrich-كالنعامة’, focusing on its action of burying its head in the sand. This is like M-opponents ignoring the reality of WD when they travel abroad and pretend it is normal, then proceed to view WD as abnormal in Saudi Arabia

[41]A colloquial term used to classify a group of mostly young men who have a tendency to practice car drifting, spinning and driving dangerously, among other illegal acts. People who belong to this group tend to dress in a similar manner and to break the law by taking part in various activities. There is no English equivalent for this term.

and threaten Saudi women who wish to drive. By depicting M-opponents as cowards and hypocrites this representation challenges the dominant discourse that 'Men as wolves' which has been used to cause fear among women supporters of any women's issue.

In a male dominated society such as Saudi Arabia, the hierarchical relationship between men and women places the man as the supreme power. However, the power of the government surpasses that of men. In [A12-46] and [A12-47] this is highlighted by disempowering M-opponents and dehumanizing them using different animals: in [A12-46], by using a figure of speech and comparing them to the 'goat-العنز', and in [A12-47] by depicting them as 'greyhounds-يالسلق'. Both representations invoke the animal quality of being powerless, and in the context of WD they are powerless regarding the ban as the government is the decision-maker. Being powerless and not having power over your women in Saudi Arabia is emasculating.

The final representation, in [A12-49], employed a frog emoji, 🐸, to represent M-opponents. Van Leeuwen's framework does not include analysis of multimodality. However, the emoji in [A12-49] is a clear adoption of the frog metaphor which has been used as a term of abuse for men in the Saudi context. To employ the frog is to employ the traditional fairy-tale element[42] in which a princess must kiss a lot of frogs before she finds her prince/husband. Depicting M-opponents as frogs implies that they are not suitable for marriage and fulfilling the gender role of a husband, which is a significant role for a man in Saudi Arabia.

6.1.1.2.2 Objectivation

Within this theme, M-opponents and Fem-opponents are represented using van Leeuwen's objectivation, a subcategory of impersonalization (see Appendix A Table-A13).

[42] Taken intertextually from fairy-tales.

In the first representation, M-opponents were objectified by a noun that did not include the semantic features of being 'human', as realized in [A13-50] by the metonymical reference 'beards-اللحى'. 'Beards' are closely associated with religious men because they usually have beards. This type of objectivation is an example of somatization. The 'beard' representation can also indicate the function and the role those M-opponents play which is based on their ideological stance as religious men. This representation objectifies M-opponents as mere beards, and by doing so in [A13-50], it draws a distinction between the religious teaching and the role religious men play in placing restrictions on Saudi women's lives in Saudi Arabia. To dismantle the role of a specific group of religious figures that uphold a traditional discourse, which entails restrictions on Saudi women's lives are for their protection. The author of [A13-50] highlights that those who use religion to support this position are those who practice religion superficially and religion merely impact changes on their appearance rather than fundamentally change on their corrupted actions.

The second representation, in [A13-51], is one in which Fem-opponents were objectified as 'The meat-اللحمة' , this type of objectivation is an example of somatization. M-opponents were objectified as 'the rice-الرزات[43]', neither of which carries the semantic meaning of being 'human'. Fem-opponents are assigned the quality of being no more than a body, a representation that is usually intended to sexualize and objectify women and to degrade them, but in [A13-51] these qualities are used to mock Fem-opponents. The purpose of this representation is to mock the 'Women as sexual objects for men' discourse which has been used to conceal women in the private-sphere or justify the need to control women.

M-opponents are mocked as 'the rice' but it does not sexualize them and performs no other function than mockery. The objectivation of M-opponents as 'the rice' could be due to the

[43] Rice is an uncountable noun in Arabic. However, in colloquial Arabic in some Arab countries it is used in plural form.

popularity of rice dishes in Saudi Arabia as they are one of the many national dishes of the Kingdom.

There are several tweets in which Fem-opponents were objectified using the terms 'the jewel-الجوهره', [A14-52], 'safeguarded pearl-درہ المصونه', [A14-53], and 'the safeguarded pearl- یالدرہ المصونه', [A14-54] (see Appendix A Table-A14). These are usually used to highlight women's value and vulnerability and to indicate that they should therefore be kept safe from danger or harm; they are also part of the gendered discourse 'Women as jewel or pearl', used to oppose any issue through which women's issues might be improved. Use of these representations in Pro-WD tweets, however, is intended to mock Fem-opponents who draw on the gendered discourse 'Women as jewel or pearl' to justify their opposition.

The issue with the 'Women as jewel or pearl' discourse is that describing women as jewels or pearls not only commodifies them, but also presupposes that there is a property and owner relationship which imposes an asymmetrical gender relationship. The underlined ideology of female subordination and passivity is evident.

To illustrate the fallacy in the discourse of 'Women as jewel or pearl', [A14-52] shows that men's opposition to WD is not intended to protect women, as the gendered discourse has been claiming, but due to men's jealousy that women will surpass them once they are allowed to drive. Meanwhile, [A14-53] drew on the Women as jewel or pear discourse as a general mockery, and [A14-54] indicates that, rather than protecting women, current practice locks them inside the domestic sphere.

6.1.1.2.2.1 Objectivation of body parts

In this theme M-opponents and Fem-supporters were depicted using a particular form of van Leeuwen's objectivation, that of somatization, in which social actors are depicted by means of reference to a particular body part.

First, M-opponents were represented using the word 'nose-انف' in [A15-55], and as 'the opponents' noses-انوف المعارضين' [A15-56] (see Appendix A Table-A15).

In Saudi Arabia, 'my nose', 'this nose', or other variations have a particular usage which is culture specific: which is that they are only used by men[44] to make promises. The meaning invoked in all tweets in Appendix A Table-A15 is, doing something despite someone's nose is close to, but not precisely the same as, the meaning of the English idiom to 'put someone's nose out of joint'.

The symbolism of the nose[45] for men in the Arab world and Saudi Arabia is significant. The nose represents a man's honour and pride, which are linked to a woman's honour. Therefore, the nose metaphor reflects the power of men over women. To resist the male dominance and exercise of power and hegemony over women, both [A15-55] and [A15-56] say that women will drive despite their M-opponents' noses, which is also an insult to M-opponents. These representations resist a masculinised culture that coerces women to fulfil a certain role just to avoid the humiliation of men. These representations challenge the subordination of women, and as a result, they are challenging the 'Patriarchy discourse'.

In Appendix A Table-A16, two different negative representations depict M-opponents, but draw on the same gendered discourse concerning the 'male sex-drive'. First, in [A16-57], the 'heart is a disease' is a Qur'anic expression, and in this representation M-opponents are objectified as a diseased heart which in the context refers to a group of M-opponents who have bad, sexually driven, intentions towards women.

The other representation of M-opponents is 'brain consists of genitals-مخهم عباره عن أعضاء

[44] Also in the Gulf region rubbing noses is a form of greeting among men, therefore the link between 'the nose' and men is a complicated relationship.

[45] It is important to note that the body part that is closely associated with men is one that is a conspicuous feature and the most prominent part of the face.

تناسليه', found in [A16-58], which uses negative hyperbolic objectivation. In this representation, M-opponents, who are classified using van leeuwen classification by their their biological sex as 'males', are depicted as sexual beings driven by their primitive nature and whose minds and thinking are excessively preoccupied with sexual fantasies, urges or behaviours. These representations draw on the 'Male sex-drive' discourse which emphasises men's primitive nature and sex drive, and is the same discourse used by opponents of WD to warn against the danger of WD.

The final representation in is [A16-59], where Fem-supporters are objectified as 'beautiful faces-وجيه تفتح النفس', thereby reducing women to their beauty alone. This representation draws on the discourse surrounding the objectification and sexualisation of women's bodies. Fem-supporters are sexualised, and their value is based upon where they sit on the beauty scale, and [A16-59] makes it clear that support for WD is promoted by the pleasure of other male drivers who wish to enjoy the beauty of females. This representation supports the stereotypical depiction of women as seductive and draws upon and reinforces the gendered 'Women as sexual objects for men' discourse. Fundamentally, it involves the sexual objectification of women as mere objects whose sole function is to please men. [A16-59] indicates that Fem-supporters only serve the function of being 'easy on the eye', for the pleasure of male drivers. This reflects the stereotypical Saudi cultural perceptions of gender. The sexualization of Fem-supporters reflects the hegemonic power relations that govern Saudi society. Alongside the representation of Fem-supporters in [A16-59], is a representation of M-opponents, and these representations were juxtaposed to emphasise the difference in attractiveness. However, M-opponents were not objectified in the same way as fem-supporters; their unattractiveness was illustrated using a simile in which their faces were compared to their knees 'face is like your knee-وجهك مثل ركبتك', which meant they were ugly. It is important to note that, while the representation of M-opponents appears negative and that of Fem-supporters appears positive, after analysis it became apparent that both were negative,

but not equally so. Where the M-opponents were evaluated as ugly in terms of their appearance, Fem-supporters were objectified and reduced to mere bodies rather than people.

6.1.1.3 Ideological stance representations dominant theme

Within this theme there are two subsets of tweets. In the first one, M-opponents are negatively represented (see Appendix A Table-A17) as groups that hold an extreme position that is either religious and/or political, while in the second subset both Fem-opponents and M-opponents are represented with a radical ideological stance (see Appendix A Table-A18). After examination it became apparent that Fem-opponents were not represented by religious or political ideology.

For Saudi females to be depicted in political roles or as religious leaders at the trending time of the hashtag, during the ban, would have been inconsistent with the socio-cultural roles available to Saudi women and would have challenged the prevalent patriarchal ideology and gender hierarchy of Saudi society. The exclusion of women could also be because being in control is a gender role that is exclusively allocated to men, and as a result, the representations reflect the patriarchal domination of Saudi society, whereby men control the fates of women through their political and religious positions and affiliations.

Masculine hegemony is prevalent within extremist ideology, therefore depictions of M-opponents by extremist ideology uncover the practice of radicalised gender norms with regard to masculinity. They also reveal the sexism and gender-based prejudice and discrimination practiced by extremists with regard to Saudi women. Depictions of M-opponents by extremist ideology also shows the asymmetrical power relations, as men have power over women due to their control over religious and political institutions.

M-opponents' extremist representations begin with [A17-60] which uses van Leeuwen's functionalization, as M-opponents are identified by their role as strict religious clerics/men

who have the power and authority to issue fatwa that forbid WD, as 'matawa[46]-مطاوعة'. To dismantle the religious ground the contradictory standpoint that religious male clerics who oppose WD are the one who approve of women riding alone with a non-mahram, which is forbidden in Islam. Indicating that the prohibition of WD is a matter of control over women rather than of religious teaching. Also it reveals the asymmetrical power relation between men and women as M-opponents are allocated the active role of 'forbid' in relation to WD, while women are excluded from making decisions on matters that relate to them. The power to forbid and to issue religious fatwa is exclusive to the male gender.

Moving on to [A17-61], this tweet also depicted M-opponents in terms of their role as 'Matawa', but also employed van Leeuwen's classification to negatively classify them by their political affiliation, as 'Erdogan's Matawa[47]-مطاوعة أردوغان'. This explicitly depicts M-opponents as members of the terrorist and extremist group, the Muslim Brotherhood, the hub of which at that time was Turkey and its president Erdogan. This representation indicates that M-opponents adopt the Muslim Brotherhood's ideology. This is a negative depiction for several reasons: first, it represents M-opponents as a group with an affiliation to another country and not to Saudi Arabia; second, it links them with a group that Saudi Arabia has classified as extremist and terror related; and third it undermines the religious grounds for prohibiting WD. It does this by showing the hypocrisy of Saudi M-opponents who affiliated themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood and their extremist ideology which supported traditional strict gender roles and at the same time supported President Erdogan of Turkey who upholds liberal ideology, whilst not upholding any of the Muslim Brotherhood restrictions on Turkish women. The discrimination against Saudi women by 'Erdogan's Matawa' reveals a gendered ideology adopted by Saudi men affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood – that 'Saudi women are different', that Saudi women are held to a different

[46] Religious men.
[47] Religious men of Erdogan.

more restrictive standard than other Muslim women, and subjecting Saudi women to extreme restrictions in the name of religion while themselves enjoying more freedom.

We now turn to [A17-62], in which M-opponents are depicted using van Leeuwen's classification in terms of their ideological stance using the Arabic term '/almutanaṭi'wn/[48]-المتنطعون'. The closest translation is 'the extremists' which refers to those who go to extremes in matters of religion. This representation is a recontextualization of a religious[49] text, and is negative because, as a group, /almutanaṭi'wn/ are condemned by the Prophet (peace be upon him), due to their extremist actions. Therefore, this representation explicitly associates M-opponents with a condemned group which discredits the religious grounds for their opposition of WD. In [A17-62], M-opponents' prohibition of WD is trivialised and compared to their previous extreme actions of fleetingly prohibiting[50] many new innovations that have been introduced in Saudi Arabia.

Another extremist representation can be found in [A17-63], where M-opponents are classified in terms of their ideological stance as 'extremist-متشددين', which means that they hold extremist views, especially towards WD. Their extremist mentality is negatively appraised, using van Leeuwen's framework, as 'closed-minded-تفكيرهم متحجر'. Representations in [A17-63] clearly deny that there are any religious grounds for M-opponents to ban WD, highlighting that women in the Gulf are allowed to drive, and that they are like Saudi women in terms of their religion as all are Muslim. The extremist depiction dismantles the religious grounds for opposition.

[48] Which does not have an English equivalent.
[49] The term comes from a Hadith that "Ibn Mas'ud (May Allah be pleased with him) reported: The Prophet (peace be upon him), said, "Ruined are those who insist on hardship in matters of the Faith." He repeated this three times An-Nawawi, Y. (n.d.). *Riyad as-Salihin*. .
[50] It should be noted that this group prohibit everything to begin with, but later, as the author of the tweet claims, change their minds, abandoning their prohibition and becoming users themselves.

Next is [A17-64], in which M-opponents are negatively classified in terms of their ideological stance and affiliation, using van Leeuwen's classification, by the term 'the awakening-الصحويين'. This Arabic term refers to members of the Religious Awakening movement which prevailed in Saudi Arabia and was discussed in Section 2.6, and to those who adopt the movement's strict views and interpretation of Islamic teaching that restricted many aspects of women's lives.[51] In terms of gender, exclusively depicting M-opponents as belonging to this group suggests that prohibiting WD is an ideological rather than a religious matter. Before moving on to the final representation, all the previous representations have revealed that M-opponents' abuse of religious and political power to discriminate against women is facilitated by men being the decision-makers, particularly within household settings. This is a gender role in Saudi Arabia from which women were excluded.

The final representation is [A17-65], in which, using van Leeuwen's classification, the M-opponent is negatively classified by their affiliation to a political party as a 'follower-تابع'. The tweet does not, however, specify a specific political party; what the representation foregrounds is the opinion that M-opponents aimlessly oppose, because the leaders of the group or political party to which they belong oppose WD. In terms of gender this is an attack on M-opponents because it reduces them to mere followers, which undermines their leadership and masculinity. Men are always leaders of women in the Kingdom, but in this representation they are placed in the position of obeying. In other words, the power of decision-making is removed from M-opponents.

In the second subset, tweets draw on a radical ideological stance, and the terrorism discourse has been invoked to negatively represent WD opponents. This was achieved using van Leeuwen's classification by affiliation to militant groups, using different lexical terms.

[51] As highlighted in Section 2.7, post 9/11 the grasp of the Religious Awakening movement on many aspects of life in Saudi Arabia weakened and deteriorated, especially those aspects related to women, after which the government implemented many reforms, in particular those that empowered women.

In [A18-66], both Fem-opponents and M-opponents are negatively depicted as '[male] Daesh and [female] Daesh-[52] وداعشيه [53]داعشي'. Daesh is the Arabic acronymic term from the Arabic name of the militant group al-Dawla al-Islamiya al-Iraq al-Sham.[54] This is a negative representation because it depicts opponents as Daesh members; in other words members of a militant, terrorist group that disseminates violence and adopts radical ideologies, especially towards women. Within the radical ideology of Daesh, masculine hegemony and gender relations that are characterised by sexism and misogynistic behaviours are prevalent.

This ideology not only imposes severe restrictions on all aspects of women's lives and an extreme division of labour, but involves extreme violence against women. Furthermore, in terms of gender, classifying opponents as members of this radical group highlights that both genders practice radicalised gender norms of masculinity.

An interesting note is that while females were excluded from representation that positioned them in the political/religious public realm in the first subset, here they are explicitly represented in relation to terrorist and militant groups, even though extremism is stereotypically deemed a male domain. This could be because female terrorists are viewed as having disturbed the ideals of femininity, especially the peaceful and submissive elements, and it can be used to negatively depict Fem-opponents' femininity. Meanwhile, representing Fem-opponents in relation to the male exclusive political/religious realm is a positive representation and a prestigious one.

The last representation is [A18-67], in which WD opponents are represented, using van Leeuwen's assimilation, as a homogeneous group, particularly a terrorist one, with a unified

[52] There are no English equivalents for the Arabic term '/dāʿishīyah/', which refers to a female member of Daesh.
[53] There are no English equivalents for the Arabic term '/dāʿishī/', which refers to a male member of Daesh.
[54] Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, that is referred to in the Western media as ISIS.

extremist ideology; as 'the future of Daesh-مستقبل الدواعش'. This representation discredits the religious grounds of WD opposition as it reveals that opponents' radicalised gender norms are not Islamic, but like those of a terrorist group, therefore their opposition to WD is radical. Turning to the fourth dominant theme, negative appraisements representations dominant theme.

6.1.1.4 Negative appraisements representations dominant theme

This concerns representations in which social actors were evaluated negatively using van Leeuwen's appraisement category. There are two themes: the first focuses on negative representations of M-opponents, while the other is concerned with Fem-opponents.

Two things were apparent in the Pro-WD tweets regarding this dominant theme: first, that negative appraisement was used more frequently to depict M-opponents than Fem-opponents; and second, that gender contrast in terms of appraisement is clear, as the nature and type of negative appraisements used to describe and evaluate Fem-opponents and M-opponents are different, and it seems that there is a relationship between gender and the type of negative appraisement. M-opponents were negatively evaluated with terms that draw on their intellectual abilities, and on other stereotypical aspects of masculinity, while Fem-opponents were never depicted by their intellectual ability, but they were depicted in terms of feelings, which is a stereotypical ideal of femininity. These representations will be examined in detail below, starting with depictions of M-opponents.

6.1.1.4.1 Male

In this theme, van Leeuwen's appraisement category was used to challenge the gender stereotypical gender-normative discourses in Saudi Arabia, which normalise males' superior intellectual capabilities, and bravery. The representations of M-opponents within this theme employed various terms that counter those discourses.

6.1.1.4.1.1 Intellectual abilities

Within this theme there, there were four subsets of tweets where M-opponents' intellectual abilities were negatively depicted using van Leeuwen's appraisement. Gender stereotypes were found to link high level intellectual abilities with men, and lower-level abilities with women. This form of gender stereotyping is not exclusive to Saudi women but applies to women universally as illustrated in the field of Psychology (Bian et al., 2017; Jaxon et al., 2019).

Initially it appeared that the stereotyped gendered notions linking high-level intellectual ability with men in Saudi Arabia were not employed, but after examination it appeared that the first subset representations did not negate the male brilliance gender stereotype completely, because M-opponents were simultaneously negatively classified using van Leeuwen's classification by biological sex, as 'the males-الذكور'. As discussed in Section 6.1.1.1.5.1, in the context of Saudi Arabia this is derogatory.[55] Therefore, the group that was negatively evaluated with low intellectual ability was not men but those excluded from manhood and masculinity. The gendered stereotype of men's brilliance does not apply to 'The males' but still applies to 'Men'.

Turning now to examine first subset representations individually, we start with [A19-68] and [A19-69] where M-opponents were negatively represented by one of the stereotypical appraisements and gender stereotypes that are exclusive to women in the Saudi Arabian context, namely 'lacking in mind-ناقصي العقل'. The term has been commonly used in Saudi Arabia to stereotypically depict women as deficient in intelligence and tends to be used to justify treating women differently about many issues, one of which is driving. A point worth highlighting is that only when M-opponents' manhood was removed by depicting them as 'males' did they seem to become equal to females, and as a result, female exclusive

[55] This is because it reduces men to their biological sex, removes all manhood-related positive attributes, and highlights men's primitive nature and their sexual drive, which are aspects of 'toxic masculinity'.

appraisements were used to represent and derogate them. The dichotomy between man and male is explicit in the Pro-WD tweets.

In [A19-70], M-opponents' intellectual abilities were evaluated in the following two ways: 'their minds are raped-عقولهم مغتصبه'; and 'pornographic thinking and linked with buttocks-تفكيرهم اباحي ومرتبط بالمؤخرات'. These are negative because they depict M-opponents' intellectual abilities as consumed by pornographic and sexual ideas. Also, M-opponents were negatively classified in terms of gender as 'the male'.[56] All of these representations intensify and strongly reduce M-opponents to sexual beings whose minds are driven and consumed by their primitive nature and sexual urges and behaviours. Representations in [A19-70] have traces of the gendered discourse 'Male sex-drive' which emphasises men's primitive nature, suggesting that men are sexually obsessed, controlled by their instincts and sexual desires. This gendered discourse was detected throughout the study.

The last representation, in [A19-71], depicts both M-opponents and Fem-opponents, and in both cases, using van Leeuwen's classification, they are classified in terms of biological sex, 'the males' and 'the females'. Their intellectual abilities are negatively evaluated using the words 'their minds are locked[57]-عقولهم مكبله', indicating that they are not able to process new ideas, as in the case of WD, and are merely backward thinkers.

Within the second cluster of tweets M-opponents were negatively depicted as 'Retarded'(see Appendix A Table-A20). The use of 'retarded' to depict men has also been reported in a corpus study conducted by Pearce (2008). Retarded is used as abusive language to negatively evaluate a healthy person's intellectual ability. It has the meaning of backward-thinking and adherence to outdated norms, and in these representations mainly to refer to outdated gender norms of masculinity and control over women.

[56] See Section 6.1.1.1.5.1.
[57] The meaning is stronger and more extreme than narrow-minded.

In [A20-72] and [A20-73], 'retarded' was used exclusively to negatively link the idea that M-opponents were retarded (in the sense of 'backward thinking') with different aspects of masculinity in each example. In [A20-72] it implicitly entails M-opponents' loss of control over women's movements, which is viewed as negatively impacting their manhood, and specifically the stereotypical depiction of masculinity in the Saudi Arabian context which equates masculinity with control over women. The outdated cultural norm of masculinity is one in which men must control women, and in [A20-73], M-opponents are depicted as insecure in their manhood and masculinity and in their ability to trust females, such that they are negatively appraised as retarded. Both representations implicitly reveal that men fear losing control of women once they drive which will negatively impact their manhood. Therefore, these representations, among others in the Pro-WD tweets, reveal the existence of a gendered discourse that was identified in this research and named the 'Men fear women's freedom' discourse. Representations within this, the second, cluster of tweets draw on the notion that Saudi Arabia society is characterised by a male-dominated social structure that fears women's independence.

In the third subset, M-opponents' intellectual abilities were negatively appraised using the terms 'ignorant [people]-الجهلاء' and 'ignorant [person]-جاهل' (see Appendix A Table-A21). M-opponents are labelled ignorantfor different reasons: in [A21-74] for maintaining the belief that women are helpless and will be easy prey; in [A21-75] because their prohibition of WD is seen as irreligious. With regard to the latter, M-opponents accept the notion that women will ride with strange drivers, whilst within Islam it is not permissible for a woman to be alone with a non-mahram, but simultaneously they reject the idea of WD, which lets women drive themselves and enables them to avoid *khulwah.*[58]

These representations counter the stereotypical gender ideology in Saudi Arabia of men know best which intersects with the gender ideology that women have low intellectual ability and

[58] Being alone with a non-mahram

are gullible and therefore men are the 'best' decision makers even in relation to matters that concern women.

In the final subset of tweets, M-opponents' intellectual abilities are negatively appraised as stupid and foolish: 'stupid-غبي'in [A22-76] , [A22-77] ''crazy-/ mahābīl/مهابيل' , [A22-78] 'the fools-الحمقى' , and [A22-79] 'mentally retarded-مختل عقلياً'(see Appendix A Table-A22).

6.1.1.4.1.2 Sick minded

Within this sub-theme, M-opponents were negatively evaluated using van Leeuwen's appraisements and their morals were evaluated as corrupt using the term 'sick-مريض' (see Appendix A Table-A23). It is important to note that the Arabic term does not mean physically sick but sick in the mind, referring to sick minded people who have vulgar, obscene, or lewd thoughts; people who twist normal things, such as WD, into contorted sexual ideas. This negative representation implicitly depicts M-opponents as sexual beings, driven by their primitive nature, and explicitly represents their minds and thinking as excessively preoccupied with sexual fantasies, urges or behaviours that convolute normal issues, one of them being WD, into something that will lead to their corruption. Representations within this sub-theme reveal the gendered discourse 'Male sexual-drive' as they indicate that men are driven and controlled by their primitive nature and their sexual drive.

In some of the examples, the sexually twisted aspect is explicit. For example, [A23-80] clearly states that sick minded people are claiming that women who plan to drive will lose their chastity and honour. The sexual aspect is intensified by the negative appraisement 'filthy-قذر', which evaluates M-opponents' minds and thinking in terms of their excessive preoccupation with sexual fantasies, urges or behaviours. In [A23-81] the twisted sexual idea that M-opponents have is that, once their females[59] start driving and are outside male control,

[59] Who are referred to using the euphemism 'family'.

they will become prostitutes, misbehaving and doing things that will bring shame to the men of the family.

[A23-82] clearly states that the twisted minds of M-opponents perceive WD as if women had announced that they would strip naked, while women in the Gulf are driving whilst wearing a hijab.[60] By highlighting the experience of women in the gulf, who already wear the veil and hijab while driving , the author of [A23-82] is exposing the fallacy that hijab is barrier for women driving. In [A23-83] insinuates that the sexual twisted ideas in the heads of sick minded people by referring to lewd thoughts as fantasies in the brains of sick minded people.

6.1.1.4.1.3 Fearful

Within this sub-theme M-opponents were negatively appraised in [A24-85] as 'cowards-جبناء', 'scared [people]-خايفين', in [A24-86] as 'scared [person]-خايف', (see Appendix A Table-A24). These representations are negative because hegemonic masculinity in Saudi Arabia embodies the cultural Saudi ideals of masculinity which require men to be courageous and fearless. Such ideals are used to enforced and sustain men's power, and especially to keep the women of their family in check. The M-opponents' representations within this sub-theme overtly highlight the connection between M-opponents' fear of WD and their fear of losing male power and control over women. These representations indicate that Saudi Arabia is characterised by a male-dominated social structure that fears women's independence, therefore they reveal a gendered discourse, namely 'Men fear women's freedom'.

6.1.1.4.2 Female –selfishness

Using van Leeuwen's appraisement, Fem-opponents were only negatively appraised using one appraisement, drawing on a particular attribute to represent women in terms of feelings,

[60] An interesting note about this representation is that, the hijab and the veil of Muslim women, has been a point of contention. While the West has represented the veil as an obstacle to liberation Kolhatkar, S. (2002). "Saving" Afghan women. (How Media Creates Enemies). (1), 34. https://go.exlibris.link/ssLPNJfy . Opponents of WD has a similar view to the West. ssupporters of WD do not hold the same view, and throughout the study the same opinions were often repeated.

namely selfishness (see Appendix A Table-A25). Selflessness is one of the qualities that has been associated with the normative aspect of femininity and motherhood because, as Hays (1996) shows, it is deeply ingrained within essentialist notions of women and intensive mothering ideology. Interestingly, depicting women as selfish seems to reinforce the traditional gender discourse which depicts the normative aspect of femininity, and the ideal woman, as selfless. Drawing on traditional gender stereotypes is a means of negatively depicting Fem-opponents and challenging their opposition.

Every time Fem-opponents were appraised as 'selfish' they were depicted explicitly as being in active opposition, using terms such as 'the opponent-المعارضة' in [A25-87], 'rejecters-رافضات' in [A25-88], and 'the opponents-المعارضات' in [A25-89]. Which indicate that Fem-opponents are portrayed as actively opposing WD because of their active actions and efforts they are appraised as selfish. Fem-opponents are not accepted as active and powerful in their opposition to WD because it is not directed towards the men or children in her family. Thus, these representations reveal the gendered discourse of the 'Selfless women discourse' underpinned by the gender ideology which says that a woman's agency is viewed as selfish if directed towards anyone other than her family.

Now moving on to examine the final dominant theme within Pro-WD.

6.1.1.5 Affiliation and geographical locations dominant theme

All of the identified themes consist of representations in which opponents were depicted in relation to their affiliation or geographical location. There are three themes which are, nation, soceity, and nationality and ethnicity.

6.1.1.5.1 Nation

Within this theme, opponents were generally represented as a homogeneous and consensual group, using van Leeuwen's collectivization category. Groups of people were denoted using words such as 'the nation-الشعب' and 'nation-شعب' (as shown in Appendix A Table-A26). What these representations achieve is that the identity of opponents is not represented

individually. Also, opponents are classified in terms of a particular identity, namely their nationality, as in [A26-90] and [A26-91] where they are recognised as 'the Saudi-السعودي'.

Now, moving on to the stereotypes that were perpetuated in these representations. Starting with [A26-90], the Saudi nation is mocked and depicted as one that shares a gendered ideology that perpetuates the view that WD will lead to corruption and adultery. This combines several gender ideologies and discourses discussing 'women and corruption' and the view that 'females are gullible'.

In [A26-91], where opponents are represented as 'the Saudi nation-الشعب السعودي', they are negatively appraised as 'retarded-مُتخلف', which, as illustrated in Section 6.1.1.4.1.2, is abusive language used to mock the intellectual ability of opponents. This negative appraisement perpetuates the stereotype that the Saudi nation are retarded and fear anything new, such as WD. In [A26-92], the term 'retarded🙃-🙃مُتخلف ' is ascribed to opponents viewing WD as a disgrace or religiously forbidden. Also the upside-down face emoji '🙃'is used, to illustrate how the opponents turned WD upside down and had a distorted view of the subject.

When examining [A26-93], it can be seen that the collectivized opponents' 'nation' is negatively evaluated as 'paradoxical-متناقض'. Despite the resistance to WD, [A26-93] highlights that everyone will allow the women of their family to drive once it is allowed.

The last representation is [A26-94], in which the 'nation' representing the opponents is negatively appraised as 'ignorant-جاهل'. This is a general insult, intensified by the use of the sweat droplets emoji '💦💦', which in this context signifies spitting.

6.1.1.5.2 Society

Within this theme, WD opponents are also represented as a group, using van Leeuwen's collectivization, as they are depicted as a homogeneous group using the noun 'society-مجتمع' that denotes a group of people (see Appendix A Table-A27). Since this hashtag was trending during the ban on WD, voices calling for WD were viewed as the minority while those in opposition were viewed as the majority. Therefore such usage of collectivization draws the focus of the reader to the latter group and reflects the status quo of agreement with regard to opposing WD, but it does not reveal anything about the gender ideologies in these tweets. It was only when examining the other representations in the tweets that the negative representations of opponents became apparent.

Starting with [A27-95] and [A27-96], in which van Leeuwen's classification classified opponents as a Saudi society as one that governs by as a masculine and a patriarchal social system; as a 'patriarchal society[61]- مجتمع ذكوري'. This is a negative representation as it depicts Saudi society as a male dominated one, in which women regress and remain in roles that have been selected for them by that male-dominated, masculine society, and one of the roles that has been removed from them is that of being a driver.

The representations in both [A27-95] and [A27-96] resist the patriarchy in Saudi society, but [A27-96] indicate that men are privileged, and women are discriminated against because of an essentialist understanding of gender. By mocking the gender polarisation in society, the tweet reveals the gendered ideology in Saudi society that has been detrimental to women, which disseminate the idea the actions of men are not seen to have any negative effect on their reputation and their family, while females do because they carry the family honour, as illustrated in Section 2.2, and therefore any actions that are precived negative in Saudi Arabia could dishonor and disgrace their families.

[61] Which could also be translated as a 'patriarchal society'.

In [A27-97], van Leeuwen's classification categorises the society as 'bohemian', which does not apply to Saudi Arabia, depicting Saudi society as a 'bohemian retarded society😂-😂 مجتمع بو هيمي متخلف'. It is a sarcastic representation, used to highlight a patriarchal and a masculine society in which driving is a gendered role. The sarcastic aspect is also indicated by the laughing emoji with tears '😂'that is included in the tweets.

Next are [A27-98] and [A27-99], where opponents who are collectivized as a 'society' are negatively appraised, as 'retarded', which refers to backward-thinking people who adhere to outdated norms. In [A27-98], they are appraised and negatively evaluated by their intellectual ability as 'a retarded closed-minded society-مجتمع متخلف منغلق فكرياً'. In [A27-99] opponents are negatively appraised as 'retarded-متخلف'. In both examples Saudi society is stereotypically depicted as a backward-thinking society in [A27-98] that does not accept new ideas, and in [A27-99] that deprives women of their basics, which include driving.

Representations that evaluated Saudi society in terms of illness are [A27-100], which refers to a 'sick society😐💔-😐💔مجتمع مريض ', and [A27-101], which mentions 'a society with a split personality💔-مجتمع عنده انفصام في الشخصية💔'. As explained in 6.1.1.4.1.2, 'sick' refers to sickness in the minds of those who oppose WD. The representation in [A27-100] reveals the underlying gendered ideology, namely that the disease and sickness from which society suffers is one that says that woman cannot be trusted to drive themselves around freely. This is either because women are viewed as corruptible and therefore might commit acts that endanger their and their family's honour, or because they are gullible and easily manipulated, which would allow men to take advantage, thus endangering the family honour of which the woman is the carrier.

In [A27-101] the society is ridden with the disease of gendered ideologies, the nature of the illness specified as a 'split personality', referring to the hypocrisy of opponents in supporting females from other nationalities in overcming gender barrier and simultaneously opposing Saudi femalaes. It refers particularly to the public support of Saudi society on Twitter for the first female fighter pilot from the UAE, whilst at the same time opposing Saudi WD.

Another example in which the hypocrisy of WD opponents is negatively depicted is [A27-102]. However, it negatively evaluates this hypocrisy with the words 'A strange society👎[62] - مُجتمع غريب👎'. Society is evaluated as strange for the same contradictory reasons mentioned above, together with a hypocritical belief that women are forbidden to drive themselves whilst it is permissible for those women to be driven, alone, by a non-mahram, which is religiously prohibited in Islam. This representation and hypocrisy reveal gender ideologies in Saudi society that highlight underlying gender ideologies – the disease and sickness from which society suffers; that women cannot be trusted by themselves, to the extent that people are more accepting of women being driven by strange men, which is religiously prohibited.

In other representations, [A27-103] evaluates the collectivized opponents, using the negative appraisement 'the ignorant-الجاهل', because it is only when society is not doing well that they speak up and voice the truth, that allowing WD would be honourable in comparison to the status quo of women being driven by strange drivers. This representation reveals the ignorance about improving women's status in Saudi society.

Representations in [A27-104] and [A27-105] appear to be different but perform a similar function, because they show that discrimination against women is not grounded in Islam, and as a result they negatively depict the actions of Saudi society as non-Islamic. As will be illustrated next, starting with [A27-104].

[62] The thumbs down emoji '👎' emphasises the word strange.

In [A27-104], opponents are classified, using van Leeuwen's classification, as a 'pre-Islamic society-مجتمع جاهلي'. This is a negative representation as it removes the Islamic grounds upon which WD opponents base their opposition, and equates the practice of forbidding WD to practices in society before the advent of Islam, where ignorant non-Islamic practices with regard to women were predominant. In [A27-105], opponents[63] are negatively labelled as 'An ideologized-مؤدلج' society. Society is classified in terms of its ideology as being programmed to believe certain non-Islamic principles, which in the example include traditions, customs, fables, superstitions and savage legacies, all of which prevent anything beautiful happening, which in this case refers to WD. The reason this is a negative representation is because the principles of an Islamic society should be derived from Islamic teachings.

6.1.1.5.3 Nationality and ethnicity

Within the final theme M-opponents were represented multiple times by their nationality, while Fem-opponents were only represented in this way once. The only reason that could be identified for the discrepancy is that females were not perceived as opposition that can have an impact, while men are viewed as obstacles, but no relationship could be identified between gender and nationality, or gender and shared national identity. All the representations within this theme depicted opponents by their nationality using different categories from van Leeuwen's framework (see Appendix A Table-A28).

Starting with [A28-106], [A28-107], [A28-108], and [A28-109], which exclusively depict M-opponents. In [A28-106], M-opponents are represented as 'men in Saudi-الرجال بالسعوديه' which classifies them in terms of gender as 'men', and then in terms of their place of residence which is Saudi Arabia. Within this tweet the author applies a general social stereotype to all Saudi men, that they oppose WD because they view women as a disgrace and not because they fear that harm will come to them. In [A28-107], M-opponents are represented using van Leeuwen's classification as they are classified in term of their

[63] Who are collectivized as a 'society-مجتمع'.

nationality as 'the Saudi-السعودي'. In [A28-108], M-opponents are depicted using van Leeuwen's genericization as 'the Saudi young man-الشاب السعودي'. In [A28-109], M-opponents are represented using van Leeuwen's genericization as 'the Arab man-الرجل العربي'. As this representation does not refer to a specific person but rather to all Arab men, it was used metonymically to stand for the whole social group of Arab men, which includes Saudi male opponents. Lastly, the only depiction of Fem-opponents is in [A28-110], where they are depicted using van Leeuwen's genericization as 'the Saudi girl-البنت السعوديه'.

Having covered the analysis of the pro-women driving tweets, we now move on to discuss the analysis of the anti-driving tweets associated with the hashtag '#Women's car driving is a necessity'.

6.1.2 Anti-driving tweet analysis

In the anti-driving tweets, five dominant themes were identified: 1) gender-related human representations; 2) gender related non-human representations; 3) representations with affiliation and geographical locations ;4) representations with an ideological stance; and 5) negative appraisements. See Appendix B for all tweets discussed and identified in the Anti-WD analysis.

6.1.2.1 <u>Gender related human representation dominant theme</u>

Within the first dominant theme, social actors were portrayed in terms of human gender. There are eight themes detected within the first dominant theme

6.1.2.1.1 Stereotypical gender roles

Within this theme, representations of Fem-supporters and M-supporters used stereotypical gender roles (see Appendix B Table-B1). Beside the differences in the gender roles assigned to each gender, there was a difference in how these representations were portrayed: while Fem-supporters were put down and commanded to perform gender roles, M-supporters were

depicted as failing to fulfil gendered roles. M-supporters' representations will be examined first, followed by those of Fem-supporters.

First, in [B1-1], M-supporters were negatively represented using van Leeuwen's role allocation, as they were allocated the role of actor/agent in relation to sloughing off their 'head of household-رب الاسره' gender role, and of surrendering their responsibilities and gender role to women. This is a negative representation because the term 'sloughing off-ينسلخ', indicates that the gendered role of being 'head of household' is embedded in gender and maleness; that for men, sloughing off their role as head of household is metaphorically like shedding their skin. Also, in [B1-2] M-supporters were negatively depicted as failing to fulfil another male gender exclusive role in the Saudi Arabian context, that of being 'guardians-راع' and 'responsible-مسؤول', because in [B1-2] M-supporters, specifically 'fathers', would allow their daughters to drive.

The connection between representations revealed the gender ideology that those men not conforming to the stereotypical role of being a guardian – which entails controlling women's presence in the male dominated public-sphere – and who willingly allow their women to exist by themselves, are losing their position of responsibility over women, and also the power that comes with it, that are entailed in their role. Therefore, these representations reveal a relationship between masculinity and female control, and the gendered discourse 'Mahram discourse'.

The last M-supporters' representation is in [B1-3], in which they are indirectly represented. Here, instead of depicting M-supporters, M-opponents are described as those who fulfil the gender role of protecting the family honour, using the term 'protect his family-يحافظ على أهله', and this gender role is then linked to being part of a tribe. Therefore, opposition to WD is depicted as a gender role that is linked to the tribe and it intrinsic attribute and value of protecting honour, thereby excluding any M-supporters.

The M-supporters' representations reinforced 'Patriarchy discourse', and especially the unequal power relations in Saudi Arabia. What is intriguing about these representations is that the gender oppositions portrayed are not between female and male but within the male category itself, which was previously highlighted as possible by Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2013). Thus, power and control differentiate also between men themselves. Men who do not oppose WD, and by extension do not control women's movement, are viewed as less masculine than those who do control women's movement and are opposed to WD.

We now move on to examine representations of Fem-supporters (see Appendix B Table-B2) using backgrounding, which is a less radical type of van Leeuwen's exclusion that was employed to depict Fem-supporters. They were unmentioned subject of multiple commands in the imperative forms of different verbs. The commanding aspects of the representations revealed the power relationship between the sexes and the subordinate position of females.

What is important to note is that Fem-supporters were mocked for their desire to drive, by using various terms to exclusively depict them as 'drivers' of entities related to women's stereotypical gender role as homemakers and mothers and performing tasks related to the private-sphere. These representations reinforced women's subjugation in Saudi society by drawing on the gendered discourse 'Female domesticity', which Sunderland (2004) also identified and named 'Women as domestic'.

[B2-4] depicts Fem-supporters as involved in childcare and house-related responsibilities with the words 'drive her house and her kids-تقود بيتها وبزارينها'. In this representation the gender division of labour and its connection to the female reproductive role is apparent as women are allocated the role of taking care of children and indeed their entire families. This representation is also underscored by the essentialist view of women as more nurturing.

In [B2-5], Fem-supporters are depicted using the words 'drive the Panda supermarket trolley-سوقي عربيه بنده'. Here, they were mocked and commanded to drive a supermarket trolley, which

was clearly linked to the female role of grocery shopping and related to women's other roles of cooking and feeding the family.

Next, in three examples, Fem-supporters were depicted using the specific female role of cleaning which was realized using various terms: in [B2-6], 'drive the vacuum-قودي المكنسه'; in [B2-7], 'stick to the vacuums-خلوكم على المكانس'; and in [B2-8], 'turn on the vacuum cleaner-المكنسة الكهربائية شغليها'. These representations used domestic appliances that position Fem-supporters within a particular gendered space, that of the home and kitchen, and within the gendered activity of cleaning. Situating Fem-supporters within the private-sphere is the complete antithesis of WD.

The gender division of labour in patriarchal societies such as that in Saudi Arabia is deep-rooted and could be the reason for the appearance of van Leeuwen's exclusion in the above examples because females are assumed to be the only gender that performs these roles. Female roles are an extension of their domestic roles.

The only instance where Fem-supporters were not excluded was when they were mocked in relation to the public-sphere, in [B2-9]. Here, Fem-supporters were first included by ridiculing them, using the appraisement 'advanced/developed-المتطوره', which mocked them for considering WD to be an advancement for women. It continued to mock them by adopting van Leeuwen's role allocation and allocating Fem-supporters an actor role in relation to 'work on a car-carrying trailer-على سطحة'. This is a negative representation because this role in Saudi Arabia is generally occupied by physically strong men which is the opposite of the stereotypical female attribute of delicacy.

Lastly, in [B2-10], Fem-supporters are depicted using van Leeuwen's genericization as they are represented by a generic reference realized by the pronoun 'she-هي'. This does not reveal any stereotypical gender roles, but because the tweet explicitly states that Fem-supporters do

not understand their true purpose in life which is specified in [B2-10] as the stereotypical gender role of being 'dutiful to her parents'. Using van Leeuwen's role allocation in which girls[64] are allocated the actor role of serving their parents while married women[65] are allocated the actor role of taking care of their children and husbands using the words 'the girl is dutiful to her parents and the mother take care of her children and her husband-فالبنت تبر أبويها والأم برعاية أبناءها وزوجها '.

Fem-supporters' representations within this theme seem to reflect that the gender identity constructed for women in Saudi Arabia corresponds with what Connell (1991) identified as emphasized femininity, as the various representations reveal and accentuate specific roles for women that place females in a subordinate position to men. This was also apparent as Fem-supporters' desire to drive was mocked by commanding them to perform activities that are stereotypically female. These activities reveal that the gendered discourse of 'Female domesticity' is an inferior discourse.

All the representations within this theme reflect the gender order in Saudi Arabia, where the male-female dichotomy is publicly assumed and regularly justified. Saudi Arabia's gender division of labour is profoundly dependent upon the allocation of women's functions to the domestic and private realms and men's to the public realm. According to Eckert and McConnell-Ginet (2013), the gender division of labour is often linked to reproductive roles, and this is especially apparent in Fem-supporters' representations that depict them as mothers of children and taking care of their children, home and family. Females' domestic role is the opposite of men's public roles which in this theme were any responsibilities for the family and house that are located outside the home and a responsibility to protect their women in public. This gender division of labour is not only in terms of public/private space but also in terms of activities as it indirectly reinforces and restricts women's mobility and limits their

[64] Referred to as 'the girl-البنت'.
[65] Married women are identified as 'mother-الأم' in the orignal arabic tweet (see Appendix B Table-B2)

activities within their homes, while men are urged to perform activities that are in the public space which gives them greater mobility. Therefore, the female and male representations in this theme suggest that family life within a patriarchal society, such as that of Saudi Arabia, is systematised.

6.1.2.1.2 Familial relations

This theme concentrates on the way relationships position social actors in terms of their families. The theme consists of two sub-themes that, in their depiction of social actors, draw on a particular type of van Leeuwen identification – that of relational identification.[66] In both sub-themes the focus was on kinship relations.

6.1.2.1.2.1 Stereotypical paternal relationship

Here, representations drew on stereotypical paternal relationships, as illustrated in Appendix B Table-B3.

Starting with [B3-11] and [B3-12], whilst they explicitly depict Fem-opponents, they simultaneously and implicitly actually depict Fem-supporters. It appears that these tweets were cautious when expressing their opinions, so rather than clearly representing Fem-supporters, they eliminated them from being included in the positive representations of Fem-opponents. This became apparent following closer examination and comparing these tweets to others in the study.[67] The caution could be because, in Islam slander[68] is a major sin; it is prohibited and punishable.

Fem-opponents were represented as the daughters of men, and in these depictions the element that was foregrounded was not any part of their identity, but their fathers' identities. Therefore representation reveals 'The socioeconomic status of men discourse' and is indication of the

[66] Which van Leeuwen indicated represents social actors in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relations to each other.
[67] This approach to representation was also found to be repeated in Section 6.1.2.1.6.2.
[68] Especially accusing someone of adultery or fornication or using any such term to describe a person.

‘Men as breadwinners’ discourse’. The depiction of a female opponents’ relationship to a male was achieved in [B3-11] using the term ‘daughter of an honourable man-بنت شريف’, and in [B3-12] by ‘girls of honour and tribe-بنات الدين والاصل’. Both representations, whilst considered positive, still draw on one of the prevalent Saudi Arabian gender ideologies, which is that females social and financial status are inherited from their mahram.[69]
In [B3-11], Fem-opponents are depicted in relation to their father’s social status which is assumed to be honourable; the father is assumed to oppose WD and consequently his daughter should too, which makes female opposition to WD an honourable act. In [B3-12], it is more complex, as Fem-opponents are depicted in relation not only to their fathers but to all their male ancestors who are honourable and descended from the tribes. This indicates that WD contradicts religious teaching and tribal moral principles and values, and therefore female opposition to WD is both a religious and an ethical act.

We now focus on how the discussed positive representations of Fem-opponents in [B3-11] and [B3-12] simultaneously depict Fem-supporters. Examining the wording of [B3-11], ‘there is no daughter of an honourable man-مافيه بنت شريف’, this means that Fem-supporters are daughters of dishonourable men, which suggests that not only are Fem-supporters negatively depicted, but also their fathers. Also, [B3-12] states, ‘you will not be able to influence girls of honour and tribe’, which means that the females being influenced are Fem-supporters and are not girls of honour and tribe which suggests that not only Fem-supporters but their fathers and male ancestors too are negatively depicted.

In contrast, while Fem-supporters were not depicted in relation to honour, they were represented in terms of their fathers’ wealth; see [B3-13] where the financial and social status of the Fem-supporters are derived from their fathers, using the words ‘daughters of rich men-بنات الهوامير’. Only Fem-supporters were explicitly depicted in relation to their fathers’ identities. Therefore, in [B3-13], WD calls from Fem-supporters are trivialised as they are

[69] This complex ideology has also been identified and discussed in Section 6.1.1.1.1.

identified using their fathers' higher financial and social status, for which they have not worked, indicating that their desire to drive is not out of necessity as their rich fathers have implicitly provided them with drivers, but is a luxury sought by spoiled and superficial females. This representation revealed a gendered ideology underpinned by the stereotypical female attribute of being superficial and consumed by shallow things.

Moreover, in [B3-13], Fem-supporters are depicted in terms of their fathers' identities instead of as themselves, underscoring the existing ideology in Saudi Arabia that females social and financial status is clearly linked to their mahram's income and social position, specifically their father or husband, rather than their individual merits. This illustrates the existing social relations between fathers and daughters. The representation reveals 'The socioeconomic status of men discourse' and is evidence of the 'Men as breadwinners' discourse'.

It should be noted that, when trivialised by their explicit linkage to wealth, representations of Fem-supporters effectively exclude them from their religion, tribe and honour. This is due to the importance of these three things in the Saudi culture, as shown in Chapter 2. Therefore, excluding Fem-supporters from these things has a strong negative impact and excludes them from all the positive attributes attached to being a follower of Islam and member of a tribe.

Finally, in [B3-14] Fem-supporters and M-supporters of WD are depicted in terms of their relationship to the aristocracy as 'offspring of the upper-class-أبناء الطبقة المخملية', and what is foregrounded here is their wealth, with no mention made of the relationship to their paternal[70] source of wealth. Interestingly, when Fem-supporters are exclusively depicted, as in [B3-13], their father's identity as a wealthy person is clearly stated, however when both male and female are depicted, the father's wealth and social status are not mentioned, which reinforces the gender ideology that females derive their wealth from a male, whether their father or husband, depending on their marital status.

[70] Or even maternal source of wealth.

6.1.2.1.2.2 Relational identification

In this sub-theme, Fem-supporters were depicted as having kinships, in accordance with van Leeuwen's relational identification, or not having a specific kinship which, as illustrated in Section 6.1.1.1.2.2, is a modification applied by this study to relational identification.

Also, the way in which Fem-supporters' mahram are listed and represented in this sub-theme is in accordance with another of van Leeuwen's categories, that of association.[71] In this sub-theme, females are depicted in relation to a group of mahram, but these males are never labelled as mahram, they are just listed as a group of different male family members, the female relations of whom should not drive.

After examination, it became apparent that Fem-supporters were only referred to in relation to male family members, specifically mahram. In contrast, M-supporters were just once depicted as having kinship to females and in this sole representation females were referred to using the euphemism 'the family'[72] (see Appendix B Table-B4).

In comparison to the same sub-theme that was identified in the Pro-WD tweets (see Section 6.1.1.1.2.2), it seems that the authors of Anti-WD tweets worded their tweets and subsequently their depictions of social actors indirectly, as will be shown next.
In [B4-15], Fem-supporters were not explicitly depicted as not having mahram, because the tweet refers to females not having the right to call for WD, but uses the words 'her father is alive or she has a brother or is married-ابوها عايش او عندها اخوان او متزوجه'. The female relationship to a husband is realized using van Leeuwen's classification as the subjects are classified as 'married-متزوجه'. In [B4-16] the term, 'her brother is available, her father is

[71] Where a group consisting of social actors and/or groups of social actors is not labelled in the text.
[72] There are those who argue that the family euphemism is due to the significant role a woman plays in raising children and taking care of her family, and as a result, rather than representing her as an individual, she is represented using collective categorisation as the family. Then there are those who argue that the family euphemism is used to conceal the female identity out of shame. The usage of the family euphemism in this study seems to be the latter and is identical to -/ḥurmah/ in concealing identity. See Section 1.2.2.14.

available, her husband is available-اخوها موجود ابوها موجود زوجها موجود’ is used. Both examples clearly show that females who have these established relationships to this group of mahram have no right to request to drive, or to be allowed to drive, therefore implicitly only those females who are not related to any mahram can support WD.

The last female representation is to be found in [B4-17], where women are viewed as being allowed to support WD. This study included them as Fem-supporters who were identified by establishing the non-existence of relational identification to any mahram using the words ‘woman has no support from a father, a brother, a husband or a son-لم يكن للمراه سند من اب ،واخ ، وزوج ، وابن’. However, [B4-17] is different as the representation of Fem-supporters included the term ‘supporter[73]-سند’. This term in the Saudi context is only used to refer to mahram and reflects the significant role of men in women’s lives; it highlights that, by fulfilling the gendered roles that are anticipated of them towards women in Saudi society, and taking care of women, they empower those women, and that without their mahram women are powerless. Therefore, in [B4-17], the depiction of Fem-supporters without their mahram ‘support’ is a negative representation as it depicts Fem-supporters as powerless, in need of drivers, and being in the public-sphere because they do not have mahram to fulfil the stereotypical cultural normative gender roles that are ascribed to men in Saudi society. It implicitly emphasises the particular role Fem-supporters are assuming since they do not have mahram to protect their honour. This representation is underpinned by the gender ideology that a woman without a mahram is a powerless and vulnerable woman. It only becomes a woman’s responsibility to protect herself, as in [B4-17], when the absence of mahram is evident, at which point it would be permissible for a woman to drive herself as honour is culturally and religiously important.

All the female representations within this sub-theme are underlined by the ‘Patriarchy discourse’, and the ‘Mahram discourse’. As can be seen, mahram in all the representations are listed one after the other, in terms usually of who holds the power in women’s lives. When

[73] The English translation for which fails to convey the full cultural meaning.

women are unmarried, this is a father or a brother, and then the power moves to a husband and ends with her sons, and in all the representations this is reflected clearly and is never the other way around. Drawing on the‘Mahram discourse’, it is emphasised that females whose mahrams have fulfilled their gender roles have no rights to make any demands, as women are not responsible for themselves, but rather it is the responsibility of their mahram.

Finally, mahram are the ones who hold the power over female movements; females are deprived of the ability to drive themselves because only mahram are allowed to be their drivers while women are the passive recipients of that service. This gender ideology is a manifestation of male domination in Saudi society that privileges men with control over several significant aspects of women’s lives.

The only M-supporters’ representation is in [B4-18], which is complex because it functions as an example of relational identification and appraisement simultaneously. M-supporters are negatively depicted using the words ‘the one whose best is not to his family-اللي مافيه خير لأهل’, where the relationship with females of the family, who are depicted using the euphemism ‘family’, is established, although as an M-supporter the man is evaluated negatively as not fulfilling his stereotypical gender role. This is apparent in [B4-18], where M-opponents’ self-representation was juxtaposed in the same example using van Leeuwen’s functionalization, which is realized as ‘I am the driver of my family-أنا سواق لأهلي’ to emphasise the difference between fulfilling the stereotypical gender role of driver to females and subsequently the role of mahram. Therefore, this representation reinforces the gendered ‘Mahram discourse’.

A final note about all the representations in this sub-theme is that Fem-supporters’ relationship to mahram is explicitly listed while M-supporters’ relationship to females is depicted using a euphemism, which reflects the unequal power relations between men and women. Listing the mahram in the earlier examples reflects the hierarchy of power among mahram while all females are subordinated by mahram.

6.1.2.1.3 Biological sex

Within this theme Fem-supporters and M-supporters were depicted, using van Leeuwen's classification, in terms of their biological sex (see Appendix B Table-B5). The examination of the representations will start with the Fem-supporters.

First, Fem-supporters were classified as belonging to the 'Gender of Eve[74]-جنس حواء' in [B5-19]. The Arabic term has the same meaning as 'females' but is different as it clearly entails the relationship between Eve and all females.[75] In this representation, the term seems to be used to emphasise the stereotypical ideal of femininity, of being foolish and irrational. Fem-supporters are commanded to stay sane, as van Leeuwen's role allocation is used and Fem-supporters who are classified as 'Gender of Eve' are allocated the goal role in relation to the instruction 'stay sane-اعقلن'. The purpose of drawing on the relationship between all females and Eve in 'Gender of Eve' is not clear. Possibly the author of [B5-19] was making a link between Fem-supporters' actions in calling for WD and Eve's actions as the first female to sin. Perhaps the gravity of calling for WD is sufficient for it to be considered a sin. The (in)sanity of Fem-supporters is also mentioned in [B5-19], where it clearly highlights the irrationality of women's WD demands by drawing a direct and exclusive connection between females and the private-sphere and reminding them that 'the woman has only her house and kitchen-المرأه مالها الا بيتها والمطبخ'.

Another example is [B5-20], in which Fem-supporters were classified in terms of their biological sex as 'The female-الانثى', then were negatively appraised using van Leeuwen's appraisement, as 'not sane-مو صاحيات'; this is the stereotypical representation of females as crazy. In [B5-20] it implicitly indicates that men are the mentally superior and rational gender and explicitly states that men should avoid pointless discussion with an irrational and mentally inferior gender.

[74] An Arabic term that has no English equivalent but is translated as 'Gender of Eve'.
[75] There is no equivalent for men, so 'gender of Adam' is not a term in Arabic.

The representations in both [B5-19] and [B5-20] link the female biological sex to inferior mental capacity which reinforces the gender hierarchy and men's control over women. Therefore these representations inficate the gendered discourse 'Foolish women'.

In [B5-21] and [B5-22], Fem-supporters were represented using the words 'was a female-كانت_انثي', which, while it does not classify them in relation to a specific biological sex, does classify them as not female. Their femininity is removed because they are not fulfilling and embodying the feminine ideals emphasised in Saudi Arabia. Expressing their desire to drive was an expression of a desire to fulfil an exclusive gender role that was available to men alone at the time in which this hashtag was trending.[76] Driving is viewed as an extension of masculinity and consequently removes femininity. However, Fem-supporters are not ascribed masculine attributes as that would be considered positive and invalidate the purpose of the original negative representation. Therefore, these representations revealed that femininity in Saudi Arabia is bounded, and transgression of normative feminine practices is serious.

Before moving on to examine the M-supporters' representations it must be noted that depicting women in terms of their biological sex is not negative. As illustrated by the previous examples, every time women were classified by their biological sex a stereotypical ideal of femininity was highlighted, and because this is not a negative representation, both [B5-21] and [B5-22] had to remove Fem-supporters' femininity entirely in order to negatively depict them. In comparison to the representation of men by biological sex, which is dealt with in Section 6.1.2.1.5, where other forms of masculinity were used to negatively depict them, in the Saudi context, other forms of femininity are not used to depict Fem-supporters because the transgression of supporting WD and wanting to fulfil a gender role is beyond the boundaries of any form of femininity that exists in Saudi society. Masculinity cannot be used for depiction because it would be a positive representation for females.

[76] During the ban on WD.

We now examine the negative representations of M-supporters, which depict them using their biological sex. First, in each of [B5-23], [B5-24], and [B5-26], M-supporters were classified as 'The males-الذكور', which, as highlighted in Section 6.1.1.1.6.1, is a derogatory[77] term in Saudi Arabia. A note about using 'The male(s)' for representation is that not all usages foreground the same negative meaning.

In [B5-24], the term is employed to suggest that M-supporters are driven and controlled by their sexual urges and it insinuates that the intentions behind their support for females are not pure, but conceal sexual intentions to take advantage of women who wish to drive. In [B5-25], M-supporters are also classified in terms of biological sex, but using the unusual term 'A male person-شخص ذكري', which functions like the representation in [B5-24]. It reduces M-supporters to sexual beings and indicates that they are sex-oriented, but the sexual intentions are explicitly highlighted in [B5-25] using van Leeuwen's role allocation, as M-supporters are allocated the active role in relation to the verb 'can' (meaning 'is able to'), so can play, have fun, and have sex-يستطيع اللعب واللهوى والممارسه'.

The representations in [B5-24] and [B5-25] reveal the gender discourse 'Male sex-drive', emphasizing that men do not support WD simply for the benefit of women, but because there are ulterior sexual motives behind their support, which implies that women can only be viewed by men as sex objects. Also, it illustrates the gender ideology that in a male oriented society men and women's interests do not overlap.

Lastly, whilst [B5-26] does reduce M-supporters to their biological sex it does not highlight them as sexual beings, but emphasises that men who do not exercise their power and hegemony over women are merely biologically men and their manhood is removed, which entails the removal of power and also other stereotypical attributes of masculinity. [B5-26] includes other representation of M-supporters, as 'Egyptian vultures-رخمه' and 'sheep-شاه',

[77] It reduces men to their biological sex, and eradicates all positive attributes that are associated with manhood. It represents them as sexual beings, driven by basic sexual instinct.

which also emphasises their loss of power and masculinity and will be discussed in Section 6.1.2.2.1.

The representation in [B5-26] draws a direct relationship between hegemonic masculinity and women's subordination as it reinforces and disseminates the gender ideology that male domination and control of females is what makes men masculine, and that when men support WD it is due to an imbalance and disturbance in the power structure of Saudi society. In [B5-26] this is specifically focused on the mahram-subordinate relationship, which has resulted in men being powerless and unable to exercise their power and hegemony over women.

6.1.2.1.4 Women

Within this theme, Fem-supporters were classified in terms of gender, using van Leeuwen's framework, as 'The women-/al-ḥarym/الحريم'[B6-27], 'Woman-/ḥurmah/[78]حورمه'[B6-28], and 'woman-/ḥurmah/ حُرمه' in [B6-29] (see Appendix B Table-B6). As explained in Section 6.1.1.1.4.1, The term /ḥurmah/ is used instead of women's real names when they are referred to in the presence of male strangers in Saudi Arabia, the purpose being to conceal their names. The term /hurmah/, when employed to categorize women, is seen to reflect their need for protection, and because it is a relational category, the man to whom the female belongs must be identified (Bruck, 1997). Bruck (1997) also highlights that being a /ḥurmah/ is an attribute of women's vulnerability, a concept that justifies and rationalizes her dependency on men.

The female characteristic of vulnerability became apparent in [B6-27] where, besides Fem-supporters' gender classification as 'the women', they were also evaluated using van Leeuwen's appraisement as 'angry-معصبين' and 'retarded-المتخلف'. These negative evaluations stereotypically portray Fem-supporters as individuals consumed by their emotions, which, together with their limited mental capacity, according to [B6-27], prevents them from understanding the benefit of the WD ban. So, in [B6-27] the female vulnerability invoked is

[78] The author of the tweets wrote the optional diacritical called damma as part of the Arabic word which is a spelling mistake.

their mental and emotional incapacity to comprehend that the ban enforced by men is in their interests. Therefore this representation draws on two gendered discourses, ‘Females are gullible’, and ‘Foolish women’. The protection of men invoked for women in [B6-27] is not a physical but a mental protection, and one in which men are assigned the decision-making role of banning WD, because vulnerable women cannot perceive what is to their advantage.

Finally, in [B6-28] it is not clear which aspect of female identity was emphasised by using the gender classification /ḥurmah/. What we do know is that the classification reflects the subordination of women. In [B6-29], the term is used in the traditional manner, as explained at the beginning of this section, to conceal women’s identity. The concealment aspect of the term is emphasised in [B6-29], as women are reminded to conceal themselves in the private-sphere. As highlited at the beginning of this section, that the classification reflects the subordination of women as woman is commanded as a subordinate to stay home with the wirds ‘stay in your house-اجلسي فَ بيتك’ in [B6-29]. Therefore, this representation reflects unequal power relations as it is only due to women’s subordinate position in Saudi society that they can be ordered not to drive. This representation highlights the gendered discourse ‘female domesticity’.

6.1.2.1.5 Power and male gender identity

Within this theme, M-supporters were negatively represented using terms which show that there is a link between the representations of male gender identity and the exercise of power over women in Saudi. All three sub-themes reveal the gendered discourse ‘Female subordination and male masculinity discourse’.

6.1.2.1.5.1 Manhood

Within this sub-theme M-supporters were negatively represented using different van Leeuwen categories in relation to their manhood. The perception of manhood in these representations focuses on the relational dimension between M-supporters and women of their family (see Appendix B Table-B7).

The manhood representations reveal the gender ideology of patriarchal manhood in Saudi culture, and they emphasise specific values and roles for men that are designed to maintain male dominance over women, and the linkage between manhood and the nature of that dominant/subordinate relationship. These became apparent from an examination of multiple representations, and begin with two examples in which M-supporters are classified as a group who do not personify the hegemonic ideals of masculinity in Saudi society; in [B7-30] as 'semi-men-أشباه الرجال', and in [B7-31] as 'the womanish of men-المستأنثين من الرجال'. Both are negative as they essentialize M-supporters by their biological sex, thereby removing their manhood and masculinities, and making them more like women, which is considered negative in a masculine society such as Saudi Arabia.

[B7-30] addresses M-supporters who do not embody Saudi Arabian ideals of hegemonic masculinity, and represents them using van Leeuwen's role allocation as having abandoned their gender role; in this case, the role of taking responsibility for women and their needs, including as their drivers. M-supporters were also depicted, using role allocation, as having given their gender role to women – that is, as 'semi-men' – resulting in the removal of their manhood and masculinities. By abandoning their gender role to women, the only link to other men that was left was their biological sex. M-supporters' connection to other men is depicted more noticeably in [B7-31] using van Leeuwen's dissociation, as they are separated from other men and linked to women which also makes them an object of ridicule, as highlighted by the face with tears of joy emoji '😂'.

This representation reproduces and reinforces patriarchal gender hierarchies, and also illustrates the normative prescribed role of men as responsible for women, thereby demonstrating the patriarchal discourse in Saudi Arabia. It also reveals the gendered ideology that manhood and masculinity are the result of subordinating and controlling women, which is harmful not only for women but also for men, as it deters men from aligning with and

supporting women's issues and from abandoning any controlling practices over women that could result in them being emasculated.

Turning now to other examples in which representations describe and foreground M-supporters' manhood. In Saudi Arabia, manhood is also defined in terms of men's mahram responsibilities to their women. M-supporters' manhood is under attack, resulting in their emasculation, and a man who does not meet the requirements of patriarchal manhood is a subordinated man.

First, in [B7-32], M-supporters' manhood is undermined using van Leeuwen's classification with a categorisation that is specific to Arab culture and the Islamic positive ideal of manhood, namely protective jealousy. They are said to 'have no protective jealousy-معندك غيره' (see Section 6.1.2.1.5.2).

M-supporters are negatively classified without their manhood, as in 'has no shred of manhood-مافيه ذره رجولة', and subsequently, of lacking manhood and not exercising their protective jealousy over their women.[79] Both M-supporters and their females are represented in terms of the stereotypical mahram relationship. M-supporters' failure to fulfil their mahram role resulted in them being classified as 'The trashman-الزبال' as they were allocated the active role of throwing their females into the street and the public-sphere by allowing them to drive.

The representations in [B7-32] reveal the gendered 'Patriarchy discourse' and the 'Mahram discourse' as they illustrate the emasculation of those men who abandon their role as protectors of female family members and allow them to enter the public sphere instead of keeping them safe inside.

Moving on to [B7-33], here the M-supporters are backgrounded which is a lesser form of van Leeuwen's (2008) exclusion, but their manhood was included and was negatively classified

[79] Represented in example [B35-144] using the euphemism 'family-اهلك'.

using van Leeuwen's framework as 'lacking in manhood-ناقص في رجولته'. This was due to the failure to accomplish their mahram role, which was specifically depicted by the words 'the responsible-المسؤول'. Therefore, this representation reinforces the 'Mahram discourse' and highlights the gender role discrepancy between men and women.

The last representation is in [B7-34] where, using van Leeuwen's passivation as, M-supporters are represnted as at the reciving end of their manhood metaphorically being removed with the statement 'his manhood has been torn-نزعة رجولته'. This representation is a negative one as it emasculates M-supporters.

Finally, the representations in this sub-theme demonstrate that there is a correlation between manhood and hegemonic masculinity and the exercise of power over women by men in Saudi society. Therefore, whilst men wield power and dominate women, as well as protecting their honour,[80] this is to maintain their position amongst other men and to ensure that they embody the Saudi Arabian ideals of hegemonic masculinity.

6.1.2.1.5.2 Protective jealousy

The complexity in the negative representations in this sub-theme is that the negative perception of men without protective jealousy is as 'cuckolds' which will be discussed in Section 6.1.2.1.5.3. Classifying someone as a 'cuckold', if it is not true, is slander, and is prohibited within Islam. Therefore, those adhering to religious teaching will avoid it and turn to an alternative way of negatively depicting those who have no protective jealousy. A popular way is to use rhetorical questions, as in: [B8-35], 'Where is the protective jealousy?-اين الغيييرة'; [B8-36], 'where is their protective jealousy-وين غيرتكم'; [B8-37], 'have you no protective jealousy!?-ماعندك غاريه!؟'; [B8-38], 'have no protective jealousy-ماعنده غيره'; [B8-39], 'you have no protective jealousy-انت ما عندك غيره'; [B8-40], 'you have no protective

[80] Which has been shown through this study.

jealousy-ماعندك غيرة'; and [B8-41], 'have no protective jealousy and do not worry about his family-ماعنده غيرة ولا خوف ع أهله' (see Appendix B Table-B8).

6.1.2.1.5.3 Men's masculinities and women's honour and chastity

Within this sub-theme men's masculinities and women's honour and chastity are linked in the way M-supporters and Fem-supporters were negatively portrayed, because the representations of Fem-supporters are a result of the negative representations of M-supporters (see Appendix B Table-B9). Therefore, M-supporters' representations must be examined before Fem-supporters' representations.

M-supporters were depicted negatively in terms of their masculinity, using van Leeuwen's classification, with the word 'cuckold-ديوث' in [B9-42-44-45], and as 'the cuckold-الديوث'[B9-43-46]. Cuckolds are men who do not have protective jealously over their females. This term is underpinned by the cultural definition of masculinities in Saudi Arabia whereby men adhere to and must uphold particular stereotypical cultural gender roles and behaviours, especially jealousy with regard to women and protection of the female's honour. Within this sub-theme, by supporting WD, M-supporters failed to fulfil these roles; therefore, they were emasculated, characterised as 'cuckolds' and considered undeserving of the family honour.

As highlighted in Section 2.2, in Saudi Arabia females carry the family honour and men are the protectors of that honour, and consequently of females. As M-supporters had deserted the protector role, Fem-supporters were negatively classified by their honour and chastity rather than their femininity, as honour is more precious not only to women but also to their mahram. Therefore, references to a woman in [B9-44] and [B9-45] as a 'prostitute-عاهره', and in [B9-46] as 'the prostitute-العاهره' are not only negative representations of Fem-supporters but also of their mahram for not adhering to their own gender stereotypical role.

This relationship became clear in [B9-44] and [B9-45], which state that two masculine related ideals, those of manhood,[81] and protective jealousy,[82] are the elements that establish men's stereotypical gender role of 'mahram'. If not adopted and upheld by a man he becomes a cuckold. His power over the women of his family is now lost, and they forfeit the feminine attributes of bashfulness and shyness and are classed as prostitutes because, without a mahram, they mix with men in the public-sphere, as in the case of WD. Therefore, this clearly depicted relationship reveals the gendered ideology and gender discourse 'Female subordination and male masculinity discourse' which suggests that if not controlled a woman will morally deteriorate.

The last example, [B9-46], is one in which M-supporters' masculinity is negatively classified using the term 'the cuckold-الديوث', and also by referring to other aspects of masculinity. They are depicted as submissive and dominated by their wives, employing van Leeuwen's role allocation to allocate the active role of control to the wife, whilst M-supporters are allocated the role of the patient using the term 'the wife controls him-المره تحكمه'. This is considered a degrading representation for men due to the conflicting power relationship between men and women and the deviation from the traditional gender role of hegemonic masculinity. This representation not only draw on the genderd discourse 'Female subordination and male masculinity discourse' but also 'Powerless men and powerful women discourse'.

6.1.2.1.6 Female gender identity theme

This theme reflects the relationship between WD and female gender identity. In the first sub-theme, females are depicted using their femininity and in the second sub-theme by an integral part and stereotypical ideal of femininity in Saudi Arabia, that of chastity.

[81] Which was discussed in Section 6.1.2.1.5.1. Manhood
[82] Which was discussed in Section 6.1.2.1.5.2. Protective jealousy

6.1.2.1.6.1 Femininity

Within this sub-theme Fem-supporters were negatively portrayed in terms of their femininity, using van Leeuwen's classification, as 'The masculine lesbians/tomboys-البويات' in [B10-47] and 'The masculine lesbian/tomboy-البويه[83]' in [B10-48]. Fem-supporters are described as not conforming to the Saudi socio-cultural norms of femininity. Other examples in which Fem-supporters are negatively appraised in relation to their femininity are, 'lost our femininity-مضيعين أنوثتنا' in [B10-49], and 'her femininity decreased-تقل انوثتها' in [B10-50] (see Appendix B Table-B10).

In this sub-theme it became apparent that driving is viewed as an extension of masculinity, therefore Fem-supporters are completely excluded from womanhood and femininity, negatively classifying them as lesbians/tomboys. The classification removes their femininity because they are viewed as not embodying the emphasized femininity ideals of Saudi Arabian society, and it is rejected in Islam and Saudi Arabia. This indicates that, by mimicking the masculine behaviour of driving, Fem-supporters are also viewed as transgressing religious teaching. Therefore, these representations revealed the 'Traditional femininity discourse' and illustrate that femininity in Saudi context is bounded, and transgression of normative feminine practices is a serious action.

6.1.2.1.6.2 Female chastity

Within this sub-theme Fem-supporters are classified using a religious and cultural categorisation, that of chastity. Fem-support for WD is viewed as a violation of acceptable feminine behaviour by chaste women. Accusing a female of not being chaste is a significant religious sin and constitutes slander in Islam, therefore not all the examples clearly state that they refer to a lack of chastity. Examples are, [B11-51] which uses the emoji

[83] The Arabic words can have the meaning lesbian or tomboy, and it is difficult to precisely identify which the authors intended.

‘⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆⬆’ to indicate the opposite of chaste, and [B11-52] in which only Fem-opponents are classified as chaste, using the term ‘chaste Saudi girls- البنات العفيفات’.

Turning now to examples in which Fem-supporters are explicitly negatively portrayed. In [B11-53] Fem-supporters depicted using van Leeuwen’s exclusion category are backgrounded in relation to the negative activity of selling their honour. In [B11-54] they were included and negatively classified as ‘vile-ساقطه’, while Fem-opponents were juxtaposed and positively depicted as ‘the chaste-العفيفات’.

All representations within this sub-theme reflect a gendered discourse identified by this study, ‘Female subordination and male masculinity discourse’. This is becuase female desire to drive was deemed negative by society, tribe and family at the time, and was seen to have a detrimental and negative effect on female reputation and family, and on honour and sexual purity. Uncontrolled women are portrayed as loose women whose behaviour is not restricted by men, the masculine aspect is backgrounded and the impact one women’s honour being forgrounded.

6.1.2.1.7 Female marital status and employment

This theme[84] involves representations that portrayed Fem-supporters, using different van Leeuwen categories, in terms of their marital status and marriageability and once using employment (see Appendix B Table-B12). As shown in Section 6.1.1.1.3, marital status in Saudi Arabia is an important classification, and one that is reflected in this study, particularly regarding females who are classified in terms of marital status. The gendered ideology considers that marriage and childbirth, especially of boys (see Section 6.1.1.1.2.1), are the pivotal milestones that define the stereotypical ideals of women in a tribal and a patriarchal society such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, drawing on marital status and marriage to negatively

[84] The same theme and pattern also appeared in the Pro-WD tweets representing Fem-opponents. See Section 6.1.1.1.3.

represent Fem-supporters reflects the gendered discourse ‘Marriage is important to women’, as will be shown next.

We start with [B12-55], which used van Leeuwen’s classification to negatively categorise Fem-supporters in terms of marital status, as ‘divorce-مطلقه’, and using the pejorative term ‘spinster[85]-عانس’. Both not only indicate that women are single but also hint at their diminished chances of marriage. Marriage in Saudi Arabia is predominantly arranged, and men hold the power to choose and propose to women, which reflects the hierarchical structure between men and women. Therefore, ‘spinster-عانس’ indicates that Fem-supporters’ wish to drive repels and deters men from choosing them to fulfil the role of wife, which is the highest social status to which a female in Saudi Arabia can aspire.

Before moving on to examine [B12-56], it should be noted that the different Fem-supporters’ representations in [B12-56] are not of different groups of Fem-supporters, but are all characteristics refer to all Fem-supporters. In [B12-56], in addition to classifying Fem-supporters in terms of their marital status, using the pejorative term ‘the spinsters-العوانس’, they are classified by their employment and gender using the words ‘an employed girl- بنت موظفه’.

All of the above Fem-supporter representations using marital status and employment place Fem-supporters lower on the scale of social status as they highlight another aspect, that of relational identification to mahram, which they either do not have, or their mahram have failed to perform their gendered roles of driving and providing for their women. In [B12-56], mahram have failed to perform another gendered role, that of protecting their honour, which is reflected by using van Leeuwen’s association[86] category. Fem-supporters are associated

[85] It is important to note that, in Arabic, the term spinster or potential spinster is always used to represent women in a patronising, demeaning and stigmatising way and usually refers to women with high educational and income levels, and those who stray from what is considered the societal norm for women, examples of which are those who wish to drive.
[86] Where groups are formed by social actors.

with a non-mahram using the words 'have a lover-عندها حبيب', and this is a negative representation as relationships with the opposite sex are forbidden.[87] This reinforces the gendered role, men as protectors of honour, as it is believed that women without men will be taken advantage of by men in general, which shows the need for mahram to protect women's honour. Therefore this representation illustrate the genderd discourses 'Mahram discourse ' and 'Female subordination and male masculinity discourse'.

In [B12-57], Fem-supporters are also represented by marital status and eligibility for marriage using van Leeuwen's classification, however the non-standard Arabic term selected ' دعوها تعنس' has no English equivalent, as spinster is used as a verb 'تعنس' which has the meaning 'let her decay' but using a verb derived from spinster. Therefore, Fem-supporters are depicted using van Leeuwen's role allocation, particularly passivation,[88] as being on the receiving end of being left to decay which seems to support the biological clock concept.

All of the female representations within this theme have revealed the gender ideology linking female existence in the public-sphere to being socially undesirable to men for marriage, revealing the gender discourse 'Marriage is important to women'. Their mere existence in the male-dominated public-sphere is viewed as gender deviation and a transgression on a gender role.

6.1.2.1.8 Immaturity

The last theme recognises the trivialization of WD and its Fem-supporters. It categorises them as immature girls using van Leeuwen's classification, by age and immaturity as 'Teenagers-

[87] It is forbidden religiously and also culturally.

[88] Which is defined by van Leeuwen van Leeuwen, T. (2008). *Discourse and Practice: New Tools for Critical Analysis*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195323306.001.0001 as when a social actor is depicted as undergoing an action or represented as being on the receiving end of an activity.

مراهقات' in [B13-58], and using the negative term 'middle school girls-بنات المتوسط' in [B13-59-60-61] (see Appendix B Table-B13).

The term middle school is one that has been used to demean Fem-supporters of any women's issue in online discussion and implies that they are immature, like middle school girls.[89] Despite the chronological age of Fem-supporters, they are depicted and socially constructed as teens to reflect their immature mental capacity.

Two other terms are also used to classify Fem-supporters as immature: 'under the age of discernment-دون سن التمييز', in [B13-62], and 'children-البزارين' in [B13-63]. The 'age of discernment' is a specific term in Islam and is the age[90] at which children,[91] can understand right from wrong. Therefore, in these representations Fem-supporters are classified as children who cannot identify right from wrong.

Fem-supporters are also classified as girls who belong to the younger generation,[92] as 'girls of this generation-بنات هالجيل' in [B13-64], and 'this generation-الجيل' in [B13-65]. The representations function like other representations within this theme, they demean Fem-supporters' mental ability and show how immature they are in aspiring to drive.
All Fem-supporter representations within this theme drew on the gendered discourse 'Foolish women'.

In comparison to the different Fem-supporters' representations, M-supporters were only once classified by age, as 'the category of young men and [male] teenagers-فئة الشباب المراهقين' in [B13-66]. M-supporters are not classified as children, but as young teenagers. However, this is not because they are immature. [B13-66] explicitly states that 'their goals became clear'.

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[89] One could hypothesise about why the term is not high school or elementary school girls. Middle school in Saudi Arabia applies to teenagers, and girls start middle school when they are thirteen.
[90] Usually the age of seven.
[91] Both boys and girls.
[92] It is not clear whether they are referring to Generation Z or Millennials.

What is apparent is that M-supporters have plans[93] behind their support for WD which draw on the stereotypical depiction of men as being highly intellectual while Fem-supporters in the same example are depicted as mere followers.

We now turn to the second dominant theme, gender related non-human representations dominant theme.

6.1.2.2 Gender related non-human representations dominant theme

6.1.2.2.1 Animal

Within this theme, supporters were portrayed negatively using van Leeuwen's impersonalization.[94] More specifically, animal metaphors and similes were used, each of which represented a human by invoking an animal/animal traits and compared supporters to those animals (see Appendix B Table-B14). The examination will start with the M-supporters' representations.

The first group of tweets exclusively draws on a regional and specific metaphor used in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia, which depicts men as 'the Egyptian vulture', and was here used to negatively represent M-supporters. This is used derogatorily to emasculate men because the animal trait that is invoked is that of being cowardly and weak because the Egyptian vulture does not hunt or consume carrion. Within these tweets, the term 'the Egyptian vulture' is used to insult men's masculinity, indicating that they lack, or indeed exude the opposite of, hegemonic masculinity.

As shown in [B14-67], by using 'Egyptian vulture-رخم', in [B14-68], [B14-69] and [B14-70] as 'Egyptian vulture-رخمه', M-supporters were deemed to be submissive, powerless, and dominated by women. The masculinity of M-supporters is challenged because it is suggested that they are unable to assert their leadership in their own homes and with females. In [B14-

[93] The nature of the plans the author has in mind is not made clear.
[94] Through which social actors can be depicted in ways that do not involve the semantic features of being 'human'.

67], M-supporters' submissiveness and domination by women is emphasised by representing M-supporters as 'raised by a woman-تربية مره', which could be considered a realization of multiple van Leeuwen categories – a classification which labels Saudi boys who were raised solely by women. This is a negative cultural classification because men/boys raised by women are deemed less masculine than other men as they have not learned how to be a 'real' man from a male figure, and real men are the stereotypical ideal of masculinity. Also, it could be viewed as a realization of van Leeuwen's relational identification because it explicitly indicates and foregrounds a particular kinship between M-supporters and their mothers, and simultaneously shows the non-existence of a relationship between the M-supporters and their fathers.

To stress the submissiveness of M-supporters and their control by women, [B14-68] employs van Leeuwen's impersonalization. Here, M-supporters are dehumanised and compared to 'sheep-شاه' using a simile that focuses on powerlessness and being easily controlled and ordered around by women, who are allocated the active role of control. Both [B14-67] and [B14-68] M-supporters were positioned as the recipient of the women's ruling and control and are positioned as subordinate to the woman.

The above representations emasculate M-supporters by depicting them as not conforming to the stereotypical gender relations in the Saudi Arabian context. Therefore, they reveal the gender discourse 'Powerless men and powerful women'.

Representations in [B14-69], and [B14-70] also draw on the 'Egyptian vulture' to depict M-supporters, but they do not foreground their being controlled by women. In [B14-69], M-supporters are depicted using the metaphorical representation 'Egyptian vulture-رخمه' for their support of WD, not only because the request is deemed trivial, but because M-supporters support women being alone in public, which means that they support men's loss of control over women. In [B14-70], M-supporters are also emasculated because they fail to fulfil the

gendered role of serving and driving their family, which is a stereotypical role for men in Saudi Arabia.

All of the M-supporter representations that employed the 'Egyptian vulture' metaphor draw on the gendered discourse 'Female subordination and male masculinity discourse', which consider that manhood and masculinity in Saudi Arabia are the result of subordinating and controlling women, discourage men from supporting women's issues and even discourage them from abandoning controlling practices with regard to women.

In other tweets, M-supporters are dehumanised and metaphorically represented, as 'the sheep-الخاروف' in [B14-71], and 'the retweet sheep🐂 -خرفان الرتويت🐂'[95] in [B14-72]. The characteristics of the sheep that are suggested in all representations are those of powerlessness, being easily controlled, and susceptible to being ordered around by women. These negative representations remove the masculine ideal of power over women and instead allocate to M-supporters the feminine ideals of submissiveness and obedience to females. In [B14-72], the M-supporters' representation as submissive is attributed to M-supporters' concealed sexual intentions towards women, therefore this representation does not reveal women's power, but the gendered discourse 'Male sex-drive', which debates the primitive nature and sex drive that control M-supporters. In both representations the reversal of the gender order is intended to derogate M-supporters. Men being controlled by women contradicts the notions of hegemonic masculinity, and the patriarchal dominant gender ideology in Saudi Arabia. These representations could also be viewed as drawing on the 'Powerless men and powerful women' discourse as men are dominated by their primitive nature in relation to women.

[95] It also includes an ox emoji. The ox may have been included either because the sheep emoji was not available to the user, due to a lack of knowledge about how to access the sheep emoji, or due to a wrong choice by the user. Whatever the reason, the emoji represents the bovine family of animals to which the sheep belongs, therefore the emoji is used to emphasise the meaning of the lexical term.

In the last M-supporters' depiction, they were metaphorically and negatively portrayed in [B14-73] as 'Muslim pigs -خنازيرالمسلمين', which must be broken down to explain how it emasculates M-supporters. First, pigs are not part of Saudi culture, but are linked to Western culture. Second, all aspects of the pig are strictly religiously forbidden.[96] There is an association between pigs and sinners in Islam, therefore 'Muslim 'pigs' can be seen to employ van Leeuwen's classification and to categorise M-supporters as filthy sinners for supporting WD. Also, pigs are religiously associated with a lack of jealousy and with men being cuckolds. Therefore, this representation can be seen as classifying M-supporters in terms of their masculinity.

According to [B14-73], WD is equivalent to the prostitution of female family members, and to M-supporters not having protective jealousy for their females, both of which contradict Saudi Arabian hegemonic masculinity. Finally, representing M-supporters as 'Muslim pigs' emphasises the contradiction between being a Muslim and a supporter of WD; in other words, it implies that supporting WD is non-Islamic.

Next, we examine representations that dehumanise Fem-supporters, such as the 'cow-بقره' in [B14-74] and 'the cows-البقر' together with '🐄🐄🐄' in [B14-75]. In [B14-74] the quality of the cow being invoked is stupidity as Fem-supporters are depicted as stupid for not understanding the danger that WD entails. The representation also implies that women are incapable of handling incidents on their own, and are helpless without their mahram. These representations use the stereotypical notion of females as stupid and unable to understand the complexity of issues, and in these examples, of not understanding how the ban is to their benefit. In [B14-75], Fem-supporters are depicted as cows, assigning to them the quality of

[96] In Islam, pigs are deemed filthy and impure. Indeed the Qur'an declares that Allah punished and transformed sinners into pigs.

stupidity for supporting an issue that is deemed impossible.[97] Therefore, these representations reveal and disseminate the gendered discourse 'Foolish women'.

The stereotypical depiction of Fem-supporters continues to be invoked, but by metaphorically depicting them as 'the goat-العنزه' in [B14-76], the qualities invoked are powerlessness and vulnerability. Here the powerlessness is clearly intensified by removing the decision-making power from females, as they are also depicted, using van Leeuwen's passivation, as passive receivers – that is, as being allowed to drive rather than taking the decision. Females are depicted as powerless with regard to protecting themselves from men, who in contrast are metaphorically depicted as 'The wolves-الذيابه', and assigned the characteristic of being dangerous and ready to devour their prey, the goat.[98] The contrasting metaphors of the wolf as predator and the woman as goat and prey convey women's position in relation to men and the power hierarchy. They also reflect the asymmetrical gender power relationship and overt manifestations of male power.

Representations in [B14-76], drew on multiple gendered discourses. First, the 'Women as prey discourse', as Fem-supporters are depicted as submissive, vulnerable creatures that can be captured and dominated, perpetuating the view that women are targeted by men. The other gendered discourse is the 'Men as wolves' discourse which emphasises that men are driven by their primitive nature and sexual urges. This, as [B14-76] shows, is used to incite fear among Fem-supporters, as they are the ones portrayed as men's prey. The final gendered discourse is the 'Females are gullible' argument, that attributes to Fem-supporters a lack of agency, especially concerning women's responsibility for maintaining their protection. Therefore, this representation reinforces the gender stereotype that females are gullible and easily fooled and so require the protection of a man. These gendered discourses and

[97] In [B47-191], the tweet used an Arabic hyperbolic expression, 'لحجت البقره ع قرونها', equivalent to the English saying 'pigs might fly', to state that women will never be allowed to drive.
[98] Which is the powerless female.

representations perpetuate the notion that public space is not safe for helpless, vulnerable women and that women are unable to protect themselves and their honour, so constantly rely on the protection of their mahram.

[B14-77] also depicts the female as 'the goat-العنز', but here the characteristics of the animal invoked are its gullibility, naivety and small-mindedness. Females were assigned these qualities as they were depicted as unable to see the big picture behind the ban. The greatest ambition of the goat in [B14-77] is to collect her food, and she does this without considering the dangers. This reinforces the stereotypical notion that females are gullible, naive, and do not understand the advantage of something that is for their own benefit; in [B14-77], this refers to how the ban is of benefit to their safety and how it protects them from dangers they might otherwise encounter. Therefore, this representation reflects the 'Females are gullible' discourse.

Finally, both Fem-supporters and M-supporters were negatively represented by the same animal, 'the dog', using different terms. This is a gender-neutral representation, used to degrade both genders.

Starting with Fem-supporters, who are dehumanised in multiple tweets. In [B14-78], Fem-supporters are compared to 'dogs-الكلاب' using a simile that focuses on the action of barking, which has no impact, and is compared to the attempts of Fem-supporters to bring attention to WD by using the hashtag. This representation reflects the powerless position of women in relation to men and the power hierarchy.

In [B14-79], Fem-supporters are negatively represented using the word 'bitch[99]-كلبه', which is not a specific trait of the dog, but usually an abusive term, because dogs are considered to be impure on religious grounds.[100] Therefore, 'dog' is an insult in the Arab and Islamic world.

Fem-supporter representation in [B14-80] used a simile to dehumanise them and compare them to 'the greyhound-السلوقي'. Usually in Saudi Arabia the greyhound is only used as an abusive term to derogate men, but when it is used to represent females, it strips them of their femininity and labels them as physically ugly and prone to immoral behaviour that deviates from Islamic and Saudi doctrine. This, for females, is a significant offence, as morals are more significant for females because their reputation can be easily damaged.

The final example, [B14-81], in which M-supporters are negatively represented combines two of van Leeuwen's categories, those of impersonalization and relational identification, in the term 'sons of the dog[101]-عيال الكلب', which also insults and dehumanises M-supporters' fathers.

6.1.2.2.1.1 Animals and politics

Within this sub-theme supporters were negatively depicted using van Leeuwen's impersonalization[102] with reference to various animals. They were also categorised, using van Leeuwen's classification, in terms of ideological stance and political party. Due to the co-occurrence of these two van Leeuwen categories in this subset of tweets (see Appendix B Table-B15), they were assigned a sub-theme. This pattern intensified the supporters' negative depiction as will be illustrated next.

[99] A female dog.
[100] Islamic schools have different views about the impurity of dog salvia. Dogs are so impure that they negate Muslim ritual purity, and for that reason, Muslims are not allowed to own a dog except as a guard or a hunting dog.
[101] This is a common abusive term in Saudi Arabia.
[102] In impersonalization, social actors are negatively represented by other means that do not incorporate the semantic features of being 'human'.

To understand how the Liberal party and its ideology are used as a negative representation one must understand how liberalism is viewed in Saudi Arabia. According to Dekmejian (2003), in the Saudi context liberalism should be understood as a relative term used to convey a reformist ideology derived from the practice of Western liberalism, although minus reference to its foundational philosophical principles. In the Saudi Arabian context, all derivatives[103] of the term liberal have a negative connation, because liberalism and liberals are viewed as anti-Islamic (AlMaghlouth, 2017). Therefore, being liberal and Muslim at the same time is a contradiction, and each was clearly posited as a contradiction of the other in a fatwa by Alfawzan (2013). Liberalism also implies a non-adherence to Saudi norms and values (AlMaghlouth, 2017). In addition, there is a connection between liberalism in Saudi Arabia and WD, as explained in Section 2.8. Since first demonstration calling for WD on the 6th November 1990, WD supporters, have been negatively labelled as liberal, and other similar defamatory terms.

Ideological or political parties are considered to be negative representations because they have negative connotations in Saudi Arabia and are demonised and viewed as anti-Islamic and anti-Saudi, their supposed aim being the destruction of Saudi Arabia, Islam, and the Saudi people. Therefore, within the Saudi context, liberal and all associated terms are heavily loaded.

Starting with examples where M-supporters are ideologically classified as liberal and are negatively dehumanised as donkeys using various terms, in [B15-82], M-supporters were represented as 'The donkeys of the liberals-حمير بني الليبراليين' and Fem-supporters as 'their greyhounds of women-سلقهم من نساءهم'. In both representations, supporters are depicted as animals owned and controlled by the Liberal party but none of them is actually depicted as liberal. The representations reveal that WD is a Western, anti-Islamic notion and both

[103] Dekmejian Dekmejian, R. (2003). The Liberal Impulse in Saudi Arabia. *The Middle East journal*, *57*(3), 400-413. highlights that liberals are pejoratively labelled as "'ilmaniyyun-secularists" by their Islamic opponents. But his usage of the term 'secularists' is more commonly used in Saudi Arabia by all opponents of liberlism,and it is not exclusivly used by Islamic opponents.

supporters, male and female, are affiliated to and controlled by a foreign Western country and an ideology. There is a difference between the animals used to dehumanise each gender. While M-supporters are depicted as donkeys and the qualities being invoked are stupidity and a propensity to be controlled by the West, which both contradict stereotypical masculine ideals, Fem-supporters are depicted as 'greyhounds' to highlight their deviation from the Islamic and Saudi moral doctrine towards liberal and Western morals. Morals are more important and significant to females as their reputation can be easily tarnished,

In [B15-83] there are two types of supporters. The first are males who are negatively classified using their ideological and political affiliation as 'the liberal people-قوم لبرال', and they are allocated the active role of misleading the second group. The second group's gender is unclear, but they are depicted using van Leeuwen's impersonalization, as they are dehumanised using the derogatory term 'the donkeys-الحمير'. They are evaluated as stupid and portrayed as tricked by the liberals to support a meaninglessness cause – that of WD.

The final representation within this cluster is [B15-84], in which M-supporters are negatively classified as 'the liberals-الليبراليين', and are evaluated as stupid because they are also dehumanised as 'donkeys-حمير'. Their stupidity is attributed to not understanding the Saudi people's rejection of WD.

We turn now to a group of tweets, beginning with [B15-85], in which M-supporters are dehumanised as 'the dogs-الكلاب'. Besides being an insult, this is suggestive of the impure intentions of M-supporters who are also negatively classified as 'the liberals-الابراليين'. The combination of these two representations further taints the impure intentions of M-supporters with Western and anti-Islamic ideologies. Despite being dehumanised using van Leeuwen's role allocation, M-supporters are allocated power over women as they are given the active role in relation to the verb, 'remove', whilst women are the recipients. Revealing the genderd ideology 'females are guillible'.

In [B15-86], M-supporters are again negatively represented,[104] as the 'dog of the liberal-كلب ليبرال', which does not classify M-supporters as liberal themselves, but as owned, and controlled by the Liberal party. They are also allocated the active role of calling for WD, using van Leeuwen's role allocation in relation to the verb 'barking-تنبح'. This representation portrays WD as an impure and anti-Islamic cause which, interestingly, is led by M-supporters whilst no agency is attributed to females. In the other representation, supporters,[105] seem to be dehumanised using the words 'your herd-وقطيعك', indicating that there is another tier of supporters, who are females, who aimlessly follow the M-supporters leading the campaign. While both are negative representations, depicting females as passive and controlled by men, this is reflective of asymmetrical power relations, suggesting that even in a cause that relates to women, men are in control. This is also seen in [15-87], where supporters are divided into two groups, the first of which is M-supporters, who are classified as 'the liberals-الليبراليه' and are depicted as leaders. The second group are the followers, who are dehumanised and compared to animals using the simile 'like the herd-مثل القطيع وراهم', and this seems to refer to Fem-supporters, as the qualities of being foolish and gullible are invoked, which are stereotypical ideals of femininity. Therefore, both [B15-86] and [B15-87] draw on the gendered 'females are gullible' discourse and 'unequal male and female opportunities discourse'.

In [15-88] M-supporters depicted using a number of van Leeuwen using genericization as they are represented anonymously with a generic reference which is realized by the pronoun 'you-انتم'. Using van Leeuwen role allocation M-supporters were also allocated the subject role in relation to the verbs 'barking and braying-تنبحون وتناهقون' which are all verbs relate animals that in Islam are considered impure indicating that the call for WD is an impure and anti-Islamic. M-supporters were also classified in relation to ideological and political party as 'the liberals-البرالية', and they were allocated the active role in relation to the verb 'liberate-

[104] Using two van Leeuwen categories, classification and impersonalization.
[105] Who are most probably female although this is not explicitly stated.

تحرر' while women are allocated the recipient role in a matter that relate to them which is their own liberation. Revealing the gendered discourse 'Passive Saudi women'.

In the last example, [B15-89], M-supporters were classified in terms of their ideological and political affiliation as 'The liberals-الليبراليه', but as previously highlighted, liberalism is aligned with the West, which it emphasises by metaphorically representing M-supporters as 'Dogs of the West-كلاب الغرب'. The animal characteristic invoked is that of loyalty to the West. The other portrayal is 'donkeys-حمير' which is another dehumanising representation and a general insult.

Other examples used different ideological and political affiliations to negatively depict M-supporters as enemies of Saudi Arabia and Islam using representations that illustrated affiliation to either a foreign country[106]or ideologies. Using van Leeuwen's impersonalization and classification, they are represented in [B15-90] as 'Mule of the West-بغال الغرب', and 'Persian animal-مطايا فارس', and in [B15-91] in terms of religion and sects, and using impersonalization in 'the donkeys of the Jews the refusers-حمير اليهود الرافضه'.

The last representation in this sub-theme is in [B15-92], where M-supporters are classified in terms of political and ideological membership using the words 'The liberal-اللبرالي'. The simile 'The insect-الحشره' also likens them to bugs that transfer filth from the West, and in this context the dirt and the filth in question is the concept of WD. The qualities invoked by comparison to insects are powerlessness and insignificance, negatively highlighting the triviality of M-supporters. The implicit depiction of WD as dirt from the West highlights the view that WD is anti-Islamic.

This sub-theme clearly shows that only M-supporters were explicitly depicted in relation to negative ideological and political parties, whilst Fem-supporters were not directly represented

[106] Particularly Western ones and Iran.

as members of any political party. This supports the views set out in Section 6.1.1.3 and Section6.1.2.4.1, that in Saudi Arabia, being a member of a political or ideological party requires the agency to become a member of that party, even if it is viewed negatively. Therefore these representations reveal the genderd discourse 'Unequal male and female opportunities'.

6.1.2.2.2 Objectivation of body parts

In this theme, supporters were represented by a specific form of van Leeuwen's objectivation, that of somatization, in which social actors are described by reference to certain body parts. It was evident that, when depicting Fem-supporters there was a concentration on the objectivation of body parts that had aesthetic and sexual value to men. In contrast to this, M-supporters' representations focused on male body parts that had practical value and had an impact on men's ability to perceive and evaluate (see Appendix B Table-B16).

The analysis begins with an examination of Fem-supporters' representations then moves on to M-supporters. Fem-supporters were negatively objectified in [B16-93] as 'The one with the black knee-ام الركبه السوداء', and in [B16-94] as 'The black-knee-الركبة سوداء'. Both representations derogate women with a racial synecdoche that is frequently used to degrade women in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia. These representations draw on the discourse surrounding the objectification and sexualisation of women's bodies, which is 'Women as sexual objects for men'. In Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, being fair skinned is considered a sign of beauty, so reducing Fem-supporters to ugly body parts reveals that, beside the sexualization of Fem-supporters, they are deemed unwanted by men.

Other Fem-supporter representations that negatively objectified them include 'saggy breasts-مرهله الديودي' in [B16-95], and 'the one with breasts-يام ديودي' in [B16-96]. Both representations sexualize and objectify Fem-supporters by reducing them to nothing but their breasts. These representations reveal the widely held ideology that normalises the sexualization of women's bodies, namely that women's value stems from their beauty, so to insult Fem-supporters, the

authors of the tweets have objectified those body parts and negatively evaluated them. All of the representations reveal the gendered discourse 'Women as sexual objects for men', which underlines the gendered ideology that females only exist for male sexual gratification.

We now examine the use of body parts representing M-supporters. Using the term 'the one-eyed-الاعور' in [B16-97] objectifies M-supporters in relation to their eyes, not in terms of beauty but of being able to perceive the status-quo regarding traffic and street conditions in Saudi Arabia. M-supporters' objectification has nothing to do with standards of beauty. In another representation, M-supporters were objectified using the unusual term 'A shoe in the brain-جزمه في المخ' in [B16-98], which clearly links M-supporters' brains with a negative depiction of their intellectual abilities. Both M-supporters' representations negatively objectify body parts that are linked to masculinity, and specifically reference the stereotypical masculine ideal that men have a high level of intellectual ability, so the elimination of M-supporters from this stereotypical masculine ideal is negative.

We now turn to the third dominant theme, representations with affiliation and geographical locations dominant theme.

6.1.2.3 Representations with affiliation and geographical locations dominant theme

6.1.2.3.1 Naturalization

Fem-supporters were negatively depicted using van Leeuwen's classification as naturalized, which is a cultural classification that is specific to Saudi Arabia. As highlighted in Section 2.32.3, Saudi people are divided into Bedouins or nomadic and Hadri, or sedentary, therefore naturalized Saudis[107] are viewed as outsiders by some, as non-Saudi, and as not adhering to Saudi Arabian traditions and customs, although the naturalization process may have happened decades ago.

[107] Racial discrimination is not public practice and not practiced by all people, but as in any other country in the world, there are groups that adopt such discriminatory practices.

Within this theme, Fem-supporters were repeatedly depicted as naturalized Saudis while M-supporters were only once depicted as naturalized (see Appendix B Table-B17). This may be because females in Saudi Arabia are viewed as holders of religion, as illustrated in Chapter 2 [108] Therefore, classifying females as naturalized affiliates them with a foreign country and emphasises that their mahram are not originally Saudi and not descendants of Saudi tribes; as a result, the gender relations that govern the relationship between Fem-supporters and their mahram are not stereotypical of Saudi Arabia. Also, Fem-supporters and their mahram are identified as outsiders, which distances them from being Saudi, and from the religious and cultural identity usually ascribed to Saudi women.

Fem-supporters were negatively represented as naturalized using a variety of negative terms, but primarily in all the tweets using different forms of the negative racial slur '/ṭarūsh al-bḥar/', which does not have an English equivalent as it is exclusive[109] to Saudi Arabia. The term literally means 'throw up by the sea', because those who immigrated to Saudi Arabia and then were naturalized came via the Red Sea.

In [B17-99], Fem-supporters were depicted as '/al-ṭarūsh/ [110]-الطروش', which only means 'thrown up'.[111] [B17-99] highlights the division between Fem-supporters and Fem-opponents, by portraying Fem-opponents using van Leeuwen's classification, by nationality as 'the Saudi women-السعوديات'.

In [B17-100], [B17-101], [B17-102], and [B17-103], the naturalization representation was reiterated and emphasised by using other representations that also classify Fem-supporters negatively in terms of their naturalization. [B17-100] uses the term 'naturalized girls- بنات مجنسات' to show that Fem-supporters are not Saudi by descent. In [B17-101], Fem-supporters were classified in terms of naturalization using the words 'the naturalized of /torsh albahar/-

[108] Females are always the gender that reflect the religious and political status of the country.
[109] It is not even used in other Gulf countries.
[110] Plural form of
[111] The sea is implied and not stated.

طرش البحر من المتجنسات', and in [B17-102] 'the naturalized /ṭarsh bḥar/-طرش بحر المتجنسات'. Naturalization is clearly mentioned in both cases, which could be to help a non-Saudi audience to understand the local classification. Also, in [B17-102], Fem-supporters were negatively classified in terms of their morals and functionalized by what they do as 'ladies of the night-فتيات الليل'. Several negative representations in [B17-103] suggest that Fem-supporters were not originally Saudi and do not hold the same Islamic, Saudi and Arab values; namely, '/ṭarsh al-bḥar/-طرش البحر', 'the naturalized-المتجنسة', 'tails of the Western embassies-ذنب السفارات الغربية', and 'raised by the West- تربية الغرب'.

Only in [B17-104] and [B17-105] were M-supporters negatively classified in terms of naturalization. In [B17-104] using the terms 'naturalized-متسعود' and 'not a Saudi-ماهو سعودي'. In [B17-105] as '/ṭrwsh albḥar/-طروش البحر'.

Instead of depicting them as naturalized, M-supporters were generally classified in relation to their ideological stance and political party; in [B17-100], as 'Liberal dynasty-بني ليبرال' and 'secular-علمان', in [B17-101] as 'liberal and secular-الليبرالي والعلماني', and in [B17-102] as 'the liberal thug-السربوت الليبرالي' and 'the secular-العلماني'. These are all political slurs, used to derogate M-supporters and associate them with foreign countries and anti-Islamic ideologies. As shown throughout the study, liberalism and secularism, and all related terms, are heavily loaded and are viewed as anti-Islamic and anti-Saudi. In one example, [B17-100], M-supporters were also negatively classified in relation to Muslim sects, using the word 'refuser-روافض', which is a religious slur, generally used by Sunni Muslims to negatively refer to Shia Muslims who are a minority in Saudi Arabia. [112] Thus, its function is to show that M-supporters are outsiders.

Following examination of the above representations, it appears that Fem-supporters are split into two groups, the first of which consists of naturalized Fem-supporters, who are explicitly

[112] There is a Sunni majority.

and negatively depicted and are allocated more power in terms of calling for WD. The second group consists of native Saudi Fem-supporters who are implicitly addressed in the tweets as less powerful and as being played and fooled by more powerful actors. This is evident in [B17-101] and [B17-102], as all the negatively depicted supporters are allocated the active role in relation to the verbs 'corrupt' in [B17-101] and 'implicates' in [B17-102], where original Saudi Fem-supporters are allocated the recipient role.

These depictions of the passive female, whose concerns are called for by others who conceal their own intentions to morally destroy women, revealed the discourse 'Females are gullible'. The implication is that mahram are needed to protect women from the evil outsiders who plot to morally corrupt them, which reveals the gendered discourse the 'Mahram discourse'.

The depictions also revealed the gendered discourse 'Passive Saudi women'. This gendered discourse draws on the notion that Saudi women are passive or lack agency in advocating for their issues. Therfore Saudi women do not call for WD, or indeed anything else, and that these calls are from naturalized women who are viewed as foreigners because of their origins. The interpretation is that Saudi women are helpless and powerless and that the only women who actively call for women driving are those who are not Saudi natives.

6.1.2.3.2 Followers

Fem-supporters were negatively depicted, using van Leeuwen's classification, as followers but never as leaders, as 'followers of girls from other countries-تابعه لفتيات دول اخر' in [B18-106], and as 'the flunkies-الامعات' in [B18-107]. These classifications, while they appear different, both classified Fem-supporters as brainless and easily fooled which is a gender ideology in Saudi context and underpins the gendered discourse 'Females are gullible' (see Appendix B Table-B18).

In [B18-108] and [B18-109] Fem-supporters were negatively depicted using van leeuwen passivation as they are position in realtion to the verb 'following-يتبعونهم' in [B18-108] and

‘follow-ينساقون’. Fem-supporters are not positioned as activly following what men initiated but actually more carried away without much thought or agency.

6.1.2.3.3 Enemies and outsiders

Supporters, as a collective, were negatively represented using van Leeuwen’s classification as enemies (see Appendix B Table-B19). Enemies are divided into three types, the first of which are enemies of the country and its citizens, as in: ‘enemies of the country-اعداء الدولة’ in [B19-110], ‘the enemies-الاعداء’ in [B19-111], ‘intruders-الدخلاء’ in [B19-112], and ‘people who do not belong to the country-أشخاص لاينتمون للبلد’ in [B19-113]. The second type are enemies of religion, as in ‘enemy of modest dressing and veiling-أعداء الحشمة والستر’ in [B19-114], and ‘enemies of Islam-اعداء الاسلام’ in [B19-115]. The final type of enemy is of both the country and its people, and of religion, as follows: ‘The devil political party-حزب الشيطان’ in [B19-116], ‘Enemies of the religion and the country and tails of Persia-اعداء الدين والوطن وايران واذنابها’ in [B19-117], and ‘our enemies# the liberal and #the refuser-أعدائنا #الليبراليين و #الرافضة’ in [B19-118].

In [B19-112] ‘The Saudi woman of original tribal descent’ are excluded from demanding WD, while ‘intruders’ who are outsiders and not of original tribal descent whether naturalized or not, are positioned as actively calling for WD revealing the gendered discourse ‘Passive Saudi women’. The the other representations do not reveal any gender related aspect, but what they achieve is to portray WD as anti-Islamic and anti-Saudi.

Turning to the fourth dominant theme, representations using ideological stance and political party dominant theme.

6.1.2.4 Representations using ideological stance and political party dominant theme

6.1.2.4.1 Liberals and secularists

This theme is one of the largest in the Anti-WD tweets. The use of ideological stance and political party as negative representations is not novel in Saudi Arabia, particularly in the WD discourse and since the first WD demonstration in 1990, as those who were part of the demonstration were labelled liberals and secularists, amongst other things. Representation as a liberal is considered negative in Saudi Arabia because it denotes affiliation to a foreign, likely Western, country or ideological stance that is anti-Islamic.

The tweets within this theme can be found in Appendix B Table-B20. Based upon van Leeuwen's approach, supporters were classified in terms of their ideological stance and political party using various terms, as follows: 'the liberals-/al-libarāliyyah/الليبرالية' in [B20-119-120-121],[113] 'the liberal community-/al-jāliyyah al-libarāliyyah/ الجالية الليبرالية' in [B20-122-123-124],[114] 'Liberal dynasty-/Banw liybral/بنو ليبرال ' in [B20-125-126-127-128-129-130], ''Liberal dynasty-/Banū Libarāl/بنوا ليبرال ' in [B20-131],'Liberal dynasty-/ Banī Libarāl/بني لبرال' in [B20-132], 'The liberals-/ al-libarāliyīn/الليبراليين 'in [B20-133-134-135-136-137-138-139-140],[115] and 'the secularists-العلمانيين' in [B20-140-141].

M-supporters were also depicted using various terms: in [B20-142-143-144-145-146-147-148-149][116] as 'The liberal-/al-libarālī/الليبرالي', in [B20-150] as 'the liberal dynasty-بني ليبرال', in [B20-151] as 'a secularist person-لواحدن علماني', and in [B20-152] as 'The young men of the Refusers and the liberals-شباب الرافضه والليبرال'. In several tweets, besides being negatively classified as 'liberal', M-supporters were negatively represented in other ways. For example, in [B20-147], in terms of their masculinity as 'The castrated-المخصي', and in [B20-148].

[113] All these tweets used the same term with various spelling mistakes, but essentially the same term was repeated.
[114] All these tweets used the same term with various spelling mistakes, but essentially the same term was repeated.
[115] All these tweets used the same term with various spelling mistakes but essentially the same term was repeated.
[116] All these tweets used the same term with various spelling mistakes but essentially the same term was repeated.

M-supporters were classified in [B20-153] as 'The Westernised-التغريبيون' and 'The liberal scum-اليبراليين الحثاله', and in [B20-154] as 'The liberal and Secularist thugs- سرابيت الليبرال والعلمان'. M-supporters and not Saudi women in [B20-153] were allocated an active role in relation to the verb 'demands' women driving illustrating the gendered discourse 'Saudi women as passive'. In [B20-154] M-supporters are allocated that active role of 'manipulate' which women are the passive helpless recipient of being manipulation. Revealing the gendered discourses 'females are gullible and' 'women as prey'.

The anti-Islamic association of all political parties became evident when religious people, referred to in [B20-155] as 'the religious people-المتدينين' and in [B20-156] as 'people of knowledge-اهل العلم', were juxtaposed with supporters who were negatively classified as secular and liberal.

Whilst being affiliated to an ideological stance and political party has nothing directly to do with gender, indirectly it does. This became clear from the number of times M-supporters were explicitly represented and classified according to ideological stances and political parties, using various of the terms highlighted above, in contrast to the one time that Fem-supporters were represented in relation to a political party. Here, in [B20-157], they were functionalized, as they were allocated the role of slave to a political party using the words 'Slaves of Secularism-عبدات العلمانيه'. Employment of the word 'slave' for female representation also occurred in Section 6.1.1.1.6, a representation which shows that females cannot be considered as members of political parties as this requires agency. Therefore, the selection of 'slave' explicitly removes agency and is indicative of female submission to the men of the Secular party. This represents exclusive male mastery over women's mental faculties.

As highlighted in Chapter 2, the social participation of Saudi women in public discourse was limited, for social, cultural, and political reasons, even though there are no political parties in Saudi Arabia, as illustrated throughout the thesis Political party membership or ideological

affiliation requires a person to have some sort of personal power/agency and the freedom that will allow them to practice the philosophy of their ideology, but the majority of women lack the power to decide how to live many aspects of their lives,[117] and at the time, freedom of movement was restricted by inability to drive due to the ban on WD. Therefore, representation as a liberal, which is a negative representation, is exclusively reserved for the depiction of M-supporters, because in a masculine society such as Saudi Arabia, men have the power and the social freedom to associate themselves with ideological stances, unlike women.

Therefore, the representations in this theme, in comparison to the naturalization theme in which Fem-supporters were being naturalized, are an indication of the gendered discourse 'unequal opportunities for women and men' with regard to ideological affiliation and ideological freedom.

6.1.2.4.2 Female activists

Fem-supporters were negatively classified as activists (see Appendix B Table-B21). Activism in Saudi Arabia is negatively viewed and linked to foreign governments, foreign conspiracy, and agendas to corrupt society. Fem-supporters are mocked by the classification that uses the term '/al-ḥukūkiyyāt/-الحكوكيات' in [B21-158], which is a novel, derogatory term that is created by replacing letters in the original Arabic term for female activists,'/al-ḥuqūqiyyāt/-الحقوقيات'. The new derogatory term can be understood in various ways, for example, as people itching to talk about trivial issues, but the meaning that this thesis considers to be the closest is 'scorched'. This trivialises the activist and their efforst by referring to them as the scorched part of food (that is, the bottom), because they are thought to concern themselves with trivial issues. Mocking females for being activists revleaing the gendered discourse 'Unequal male and female opportunities discourse'. As females activism efforts are not deemed significant or even threatening.

[117] At the time of writing this thesis significant strides have been made in law to empower women so that they have similar powers to men over their lives.

In [B21-159], the Fem-supporter is labelled a 'activist-حقوقيه', and negatively dehumanised as they are allocated the active role in relation to the verb 'barking-بتنابحين ', indicating that their action is trivial and impure, like the bark of a dog.

Now moving on to examine the final dominant theme within Anti-WD.

6.1.2.5 Negative appraisements representations dominant theme

In the following themes, Fem-supporters were mostly negatively depicted and there were a few negative representations of M-supporters.

6.1.2.5.1 Intellectual and mental abilities

Supporters were negatively represented in terms of their intellectual and mental abilities using van Leeuwen's appraisement. The representations are divided into three subsets, namely intelligence, sanity, and ignorance (see Appendix B Table-B22).

In the intelligence cluster, while M-supporters were only once, in [B22-160], negatively appraised as 'retarded-متخلف', Fem-supporters were negatively and repeatedly appraised using various Arabic terms in relation to intelligence and mental capacity, using van Leeuwen's appraisement. They were appraised: as 'Stupid-/ġaʃīmah/غشيمه' in [B22-161]; 'Stupid-/ghaʃm/غُشْم' in [B22-162], which combines the meaning of stupidity and ignorance; as 'stupid-/makhfāt/مخفات' in [B22-163], which combines the meaning of stupid and easily fooled; as '/al-nuwayqisāt/النويقصات' in [B22-164], which has no English equivalent, although this particular negative representation is gender specific and draws on a religious text which was taken out of context by opponents of women gaining additional rights to support the belif that females are simple minded and advanced their own agenda; and as'the stupid-/al-ġabiyyah/ الغبية' in [B22-165] and 'stupid-/ġabiyyah/غبيه' in [B22-166]. In the last two examples, the reason for depicting Fem-supporters as stupid was explicit. In [B22-165] it was because 'smart men-الرجل ذكي', will take advantage of 'stupid' women and their new ability to

drive to run household errands, which reveals the gendered discourse ‘Females are gullible’. In [B22-166], the ‘stupid’ evaluation is made because Fem-supporters are viewed as focusing on the trivial issue of WD which will benefit the enemy.

Using van Leeuwen’s impersonalization, social actors were represented by other means that did not include the semantic features of being ‘human’; for example, [B22-167] uses the words ‘the small minds-العقول صغيره’ to show the triviality of WD supporters and the issue itself. In [B22-168], Fem-supporters were depicted as being of ‘trivial mind and sensual- عقل وشهوانية سخيف’. This is in the context of Saudi Arabia, where purity and chastity are positive female attributes and being depicted as sensual is negative. In [B22-169], Fem-supporters were represented by the term ‘the weak-minded- ضعاف العقول ’, their weakness rendering them gullible to control by liberal thugs.

We turn now to the sanity subset of representations in which all supporters’ sanity was negatively evaluated using various Arabic terms. In [B22-170], they were called ‘crazy-/mahābīl/مهابيل’, and in [B22-171] ‘the crazy-/al-mahabbal/المهبل’. Fem-supporters in [B22-172] were referred to as ‘the crazy-/almuhastiraat/-المهسترات’, and in [B22-173] as‘not sane- مو صاحيات’.

Finally, in the last subset, Fem-supporters were repeatedly negatively appraised in terms of wisdom and knowledge using an Arabic simile that labels them as ‘the ignorant-الجاهل’ in [B22-174], [B22-175], and [B22-176]. In particular, with regard to how they might manage the freedom that WD would bring, they are compared to ‘the weapon in the hands of the crazy’. This particular representation reflects the gendered ideology in Saudi society that the limited intellectual ability of women is similar to that of children or crazy people, which renders them vulnerable.

All the negative representations of Fem-supporters within this theme drew on the gendered discourses ‘Foolish women’ which is underlined by the gendered ideology illustrated in Section 6.1.1.4.1.1, that men are linked with higher level intellectual abilities than women.

6.1.2.5.2 Deformity

Both Fem-supporters and M-supporters were negatively appraised as ‘deformed’. However, with regard to Fem-supporters, this related to their belief that they could not drive, which is a stereotypical depiction of females, while for M-supporters the ‘deformed’ evaluation revolved around their thinking and support for WD (see Appendix B Table-B23).

Fem-supporters were once negatively appraised as ‘deformed-عاهات’ in [B23-177]. M-supporters were negatively appraised as ‘deformed-عاهه’in [B23-178] and as ‘mentally deformed-المعوقين’ in [B23-179].

6.1.2.5.3 Fem-supporters’ morals

Fem-supporters were negatively appraised in terms of their morals and behaviour as ‘The deviants-/ad-dushshīr/[118]الديشر’ in [B24-180], ‘deviant-/ad-dāja/الداجه’ in [B24-181], ‘deviant-/dashrah/دشره’ in [B24-182], and ‘The deviants-/ad-dushshīr/الدشير’ in [B24-183]. M-supporters were once labelled ‘The deviant-/ad-dāshir/الداشر’ in [B24-184]. Here, deviant refers to loose, uncontrolled women whose actions are deemed inappropriate and disturb the ideals of femininity, especially those of being peaceful and submissive to men. It also implicitly negatively evaluates their mahram for not fulfilling their gender role and controlling their women. (see Appendix B Table-24). All the representations in this theme reveal the genderd discourse ‘Female subordination and male masculinity discourse’. However, what is forgrounded is only the negative impact of women not being controlled by men.

[118] An obvious spelling mistake. It should read الدشير.

Fem-supporters do not embody the stereotypical traits of femininity that include powerlessness and submissiveness, obedience to men, and subjection. This is due to their rebellious calls for WD, which are viewed as a transgression on stereotypical feminine behaviours, their morals and behaviour are deemed to have negatively impacted female reputations, which are fragile, as highlighted throughout this thesis.

6.1.2.5.4 M-supporters' morals

Within this theme, 'M-supporters were negatively appraised in terms of their minds, morals and intentions using van Leeuwen's appraisement category (see Appendix B Table-B25 and Table-B26). The first subset of tweets focused on morals and minds and evaluated M-supporters as having obscene or lewd thoughts that lay behind their support for WD. Terms encountered were 'mentally and psychologically sick-مريض نفسيا وعقليا' in [B25-185], 'sick-مريض' in [B25-186], 'defiled the filthiest human being-اقذر وانجس البشر' in [B25-187], 'the filthiest and most absurd-اقذر واتفه' and 'the most despicable-اردلهم ',in [B25-188], and 'the most despicable-ارذل' in [B25-189].

These negative representations implicitly depict M-supporters as sexually motivated by their primitive nature and excessively preoccupied with sexual urges or behaviours. Representations within the first subset of tweets in this theme reveal the gendered discourse 'male sexual-drive' as they highlight that men are driven and controlled by their primitive nature and their sexual drive and reveal the gender ideology that, in a masculine society, men and women's interests cannot overlap. Therefore, men only support women's issues due to ulterior sexual motives, suggesting that women can only be viewed as sex objects by men.

The second subset of tweets focused on M-supporters' appraisement in terms of morals and intentions using the descriptions 'corrupted [person]-مفسد' in [B26-190], 'corrupted [people]-المفسدين' in [B26-191-192], and 'corrupt-افسد' in [B26-193]. The interesting part is that these representations also allocate the power to corrupt to M-supporters, whilst females were

negatively on the receiving end, revealing the gendered discourses ‘Females are gullible’, as women are fragile and easily corrupted by men, and the ‘Mahram discourse’, as women’s fragility and naivety reveal the need for their mahram to protect them from corruption.

The following chapter will discuss how the Anti-WD and Pro-WD in their representations of the social actors drew on the various gendered discourses that were identified in the findings.

Chapter 7 – Discussion

This chapter will begin by examining whether one of the key findings of this research, namely the mobilization of the same discourses by both supporters and opponents of WD in the tweets debating women driving, has been noted in other research, particularly in the context of media discourse. This comparative analysis will provide valuable insights into the broader implications of the findings and contribute to a deeper understanding of the mobilization of gendered discourses in other discourses. The chapter will then move on to discuss all of the gendered discourses identified in this thesis, how supporters and opponents of WD strategically mobilized these gendered discourses in the debate, and the different gendered ideologies that were revealed. Finally, it links the research findings to the wider field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) by conducting a comparative analysis of the gendered discourses identified in the tweets with those recognised in other languages and cultural contexts, to gain a deeper insight into their commonalities or distinctiveness.

As discussed in the previous chapters, women's driving in Saudi Arabia is a complex social, political and religious issue. This complexity is reflected in the gendered discourses and gendered ideologies that were detected in the representations of social actors. Even those who appeared to be Pro-WD reiterated and confirmed the existence of gender stereotypes and gender norms and roles.

In Chapter 6, the discursive strategies that were used to identify the social actors were also employed to identify gendered discourses. In this chapter, the discussion looks at those discourses and the relationships between them. In this chapter, the discourses are grouped together in order to foreground how both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets reinforce similar traditional gendered discourses. The study found that most of the discourses, identified, in both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets, drew upon and reinforced the same 'traditional' gendered

discourses. Except one discourse which is found in the Pro-WD which is ‘Women enslave themselves to men discourse’.

Here, the word ‘traditional’, as indicated by Atanga (2009, p. 93), relates to the mode of thought or behaviour that is passed from one generation to another, resulting in a ‘custom’, which in this study refers to something that is acceptable in Saudi society and Saudi tradition. No modern or progressive gendered discourses that opposed traditional discourses were identified in this study. Traditional gendered discourses are usually viewed as generally ‘conservative’. The study found that both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets drew upon and reinforced the same traditional gendered discourses that sustain traditional social practices. Not only that, but some of the conservative gendered discourses were only detected in Pro-WD portrayals of the different social actors, while others were only identified in Anti-WD tweets. Furthermore, the results show that whilst Anti-WD comments explicitly reinforced gendered stereotypes and gendered ideology in the gendered discourses, Pro-WD thoughts were more implicit in accomplishing the same task.

The study found that, regardless of where the authors of the tweets explicitly positioned themselves in relation to WD, whether in favour or in opposition, they both reinforced and drew on the same gendered discourses, revealing that the same gendered ideologies are shared by opposing groups. For example, the representations of Fem-opponents using the words ‘her father is a middleman-ابوها شريطي’ in the Pro-WD tweets in Section 6.1.1.1.2.1, and the representations of Fem-supporters as ‘Daughters of rich men-بنات الهوامير’ in the Anti-WD tweets in Section 6.1.2.1.2.1, both depicted female social actors in relation to aspects of their fathers’ identities, and specifically their fathers’ wealth. Despite opposing views regarding women driving doth drew on ‘The socioeconomic status of men discourse’ and reinforce the gendered ideology that underpinned the discourse see section 7.2.6.

Another example is the depiction of Fem-supporters as 'the goat-العنز' in the Anti-WD tweets in Section 6.1.2.2.1 and the representations of Fem-opponents as 'the sheep-الاغنام' in the Pro-WD tweets in Section 6.1.1.2.1. Despite their diverging positions regarding women driving, both drew on the same gendered discourse, namely 'Females are gullible'.

The results also revealed that the gendered ideologies surrounding Saudi women had both adapted and, more often, stayed consistent, despite Twitter users opposing or supporting WD. There are a number of gendered discourses that Pro-WD tweets drew upon to dismantle these ideologies, by mocking them both sarcastically and ironically. For example, Pro-WD representations in Section 6.1.1.2.1 attempted to mock the 'Men as wolves' discourse by portraying M-opponents as 'the shepherd-الراعي', and rather than assigning them the role of protector they were assigned the role of predator.

The next section will examine the media discourse to establish whether similar findings regarding the utilisation of similar discourses by conflicting parties have been previously noted.

7.1 Mobilization of the same discourse in other studies

As shown above, one of the key original findings of this research is that the same gendered discourses are mobilised by opposing parties, namely supporters and opponents, in the debate about women driving in Saudi Arabia. To the best of the researcher's knowledge, there are no other studies that have identified and named gendered discourses in colloquial Arabic data and shown how both groups draw on the same gendered discourses and gendered ideologies in Twitter discourse about women driving. Therefore, it would be worth examining other discourses to find out whether similar results emerge. There is a dearth of studies that have compared how opposing groups draw on multiple gendered discourses and gendered ideologies, but what other studies have done, that will be discussed in this section, is to examine how groups with ideological differences represent the same social actor and

reinforce similar gendered discourses or gendered ideologies, the data for which is mainly found in media discourses.

Starting with media discourse, specifically in the Western media, Amer (2017) conducted a CDS study to analyse the representation of political social actors in media coverage of the 2008–2009 Gaza war in news stories from four international newspapers. Although their ideological stances were different, with half of the chosen publications characterised as liberal and the other half as conservative, the results showed significant similarities in representation patterns between the different newspapers. Israeli agency was particularly foregrounded with regard to attaining a ceasefire, where Israeli actors were largely allocated activated roles. In contrast, the analysed newspapers foregrounded Palestinian agency in rejecting the Israeli ceasefire attempts by allocating them activated roles.

McKay (2020) produced a CDS study that focused on media discourse with a gender aspect by analysing data drawn from the Scottish press. Source material that revolved around coverage of a televised debate between the two main political figures, Johann Lamont and Nicola Sturgeon, was taken primarily from the opinion and editorial sections. The findings showed that there was a yearning for feminized public sphere employment. However, there was also proof of the separate sphere ideology, which views women as outsiders in relation to the public sphere and results in their marginalization. This ideology also imposes on women an expectation that they will follow the traditional gender norms of feminine behaviour. McKay's (2020) findings show that, despite the ideological differences between the newspapers, they all draw on problematic gendered discourses in relation to gender and political identity.

In another CDS study, Pereira and Biachi (2016) analysed the representations of two female Brazilian presidential election candidates in two weekly news magazines. It was the first time in Brazilian history that the number of female candidates had surpassed the number of men. The study demonstrated that both magazines disseminated and emphasised particular cultural and historical stereotypes concerning women and their roles in the examined society the effect of which variously granted them legitimacy and also denied them recognition as main figures in the Brazilian public sphere. The examined media frequently referred to characteristics historically branded as female attributes, for example fragility, and assigned in household responsibilities. In addition, shallow features involving physical appearance played an important role in shaping the representations of both female candidates to reinforce doubts about their ability and qualification for the presidency.

The next section summarises the discourses that were identified in the data analysis in Chapter 6, briefly considering which are the gender ideologies they express and what are the ideologies conveyed by the discourses identified.

7.2 Identified gendered discourses and gendered ideologies

7.2.1 Gender differences discourse

This gendered discourse was identified amongst the Pro-WD tweets, and is one of the dominant gendered discourses that underline many of the other discourses in this study. This is because it is an important 'lens' for the way individuals view reality, difference being, for the majority of people, what gender is all about (Sunderland, 2004).

Although this overarching gendered discourse was specifically drawn upon in Pro-WD tweets it was not invoked to contest to, or even to call for, gender equality, but rather to conform to and maintain essentialist thinking. The way in which gender difference is invoked in the Pro-WD tweets is implicitly sexist. Attempts to support WD have created opposition binaries, whereby it is normal and common-sense for men to be in the public-sphere and women to be

in the private-sphere; but women want to drive because males are not fulfilling their gendered role of driving, whilst at the same time men want women to fulfil their role in the kitchen. This implies that, if men fulfil their role as drivers, then women should fulfil theirs in the kitchen.

It is important to note that not all representations of women that relate to the kitchen and cooking indicate that women occupy a subservient position, as Matwick (2017) found in an examination of celebrity chef cookbooks. In this study, however, all representations of women that relate to the private-sphere position female social actors in a subservient position. The finding that the 'gender differences discourse' was invoked by Pro-WD tweets reveals that even supporters of women's issues still maintain an essentialist way of thinking and a very distinctive masculine and feminine binary, which perpetuates unequal and asymmetric power relations, characterised by a 'hierarchical female/male duality' (Peterson, 2002; Sunderland, 2004).

7.2.2 Patriarchy discourse

The 'patriarchy discourse' is one of the main gendered discourses that was drawn upon and reinforced in this study by both Pro-WD and Anti-WD participants, and usually when it was invoked, another gendered discourse was also detected, namely the 'Mahram discourse' (as illustrated in themes in the Pro-WD (see Section 6.1.1.1.2.2) and themes in the Anti-WD (see Section 6.1.2.1.2.2). In both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets it was detected in the representations of both M-opponents and Fem-opponents. The Pro-WD tweets drew on the 'patriarchy discourse' several times, and their usage was interesting as only once did they attempt to dismantle it. The other times they reinforced the discourse, adhering to traditional norms of masculinity that are legitimised by patriarchy, which exerts control and power over females in the name of protecting their honour; Pro-WD tweets, for example, portrayed M-opponents using the term 'has no sister-ما عنده خوات' in Section 6.1.1.1.2.1, and as 'The cuckold-الديوث' in Section 6.1.1.1.5.3. Both drew on the 'patriarchy discourse' to implicitly

support a discourse of dominance that privileges men and allocates to them control over women. In the former example, the Pro-WD tweets do not challenge patriarchy, they simply exclude M-opponents from the mahram group and from having a position of control over women. In the latter example, the opposite is achieved, as they employ the 'patriarchy discourse' to emphasise the role of men as protectors and uphold a discourse of dominance. Evidently, in not controlling women's movements and in allowing them to be driven by strangers, men are not using their power and jealousy over women to protect both them and their honour, whereas allowing women to drive themselves will protect their honour.

7.2.3 Mahram discourse

This gendered discourse was identified repeatedly in both the Pro-WD and the Anti-WD tweets. Both Pro-WD and Anti-WD drew upon it in a similar way, to reinforce the family social system and the power hierarchy which includes the legal and cultural power that mahram have over females in families in the Kingdom. In addition to that, when drawing on this gendered discourse the gendered ideology underlining it is emphasised, which is that mahram are responsible for, and have control over, the women in their family. Therefore, females who have mahram who have fulfilled their mahram roles should not make demands, and should not be involved in the debate about WD. The gendered ideology of absence of all mahram as a condition in which female ability to exist in the public sphere is clearly connected to not perceiving females as separate individuals from their mahram but as an extension of their mahram.

What is highlighted here is that, whether a woman wants to drive or not is not important, what is important is whether her mahram has fulfilled his role. This gendered discourse supports the gender hierarchy between a mahram and his females and upholds the view that hegemonic masculinity and male dominance are natural in the mahram-subordinate relationship.

Finally, both Anti-WD and Pro-WD emasculated men who did not adhere to their mahram role and drew on a rejected masculinities in the context of Saudi Arabia, which is homosexuality.

7.2.4 Men as breadwinners' discourse

While it is argued that the traditional image of men as 'breadwinners' (Connell, 1995b) has lost its cultural currency in other parts of the world, and a new dominant representation of masculine identities has emerged, in Saudi Arabia the dominant position of masculine identities still applies, which could be due to the religious and cultural discourses supporting men's role. The model of hegemonic masculinity in Saudi Arabia includes that of men as breadwinners as a key concept, and it plays a significant role in male hegemony and the subordination of women.

Despite the facts that masculinity is not fixed and that the feminization of the workplace in Saudi Arabia has undergone change, as noted in Chapter 1, only Pro-WD tweets repeatedly depicted M-opponents as playing the breadwinner role, which is a key element of hegemonic masculinity (Talbot, 2010). The role of breadwinner is one of the traditional masculine roles ascribed to men in Saudi Arabia, and is therefore one of the dominant representations of masculine identity in the Kingdom.

Both Pro-WD and Anti-WD draw and reinforce this discourse to reinforce gender role and gender inequality. However, only Pro-WD implies a connection between men's ability to provide and their ability to control women. This indicates that men's role as provider for their family grant them a position of power and control of women, reinforcing of power relations.

The breadwinner subordinate discourse falls within one of the main gendered discourses, namely the 'patriarchy discourse'. The 'Men as breadwinners' discourse' identified in this study implicitly reflects the traditional conservative discourse about family gender roles and

the responsibilities of men and women. Most importantly, it implicitly highlights the power that men are allocated as the main breadwinners and financial providers for their families. 'Men as breadwinners' discourse is mutually supportive 'female domesticity' discourse, which will be discussed next.

7.2.5 Female domesticity discourse

As one of the discourses that was drawn upon only by the Anti-WD tweets, this discourse is underlined by patriarchal gendered roles which confine women to the private-sphere in Saudi Arabia. The 'men as breadwinner' and 'female domesticity' discourses are connected, as both gendered discourses reinforce normative gender relations, reproducing gendered hierarchical binary structures and power relations. Even though the Pro-WD tweets did not draw on 'female domesticity', they have frequently and exclusively drawn on the 'men as breadwinner' discourse taking it for granted that men exclusively can be breadwinners. This gendered discourse reflects the gender order in Saudi Arabia, where the male-female dichotomy is publicly assumed and regularly justified. Saudi Arabian gender division of labour is profoundly dependent upon the allocation of women's functions to the domestic and private realms and men's to the public realm.

7.2.6 The socioeconomic status of men discourse

This gendered discourse is used by both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets to reinforce the representations of female social actors as an embodiment of traditional, subordinate femininity and the gender order in Saudi Arabia. In these representations, aspects of female's father's identity (whether financial or social status related) are employed in order to praise or mock, and what is emphasised is the dependence of females on their fathers as something to be expected. Despite the growing earning power of Saudi women due to increasing employment opportunities (see Chapter 1), what is used to negatively or positively represent them is not any aspect of their socioeconomic status that has been or can be achieved by females themselves, but some attribute of their father.

As has been highlighted in Chapter 6, this gendered discourse and representation are underpinned by one of the predominant gender ideologies in Saudi Arabia, which is that females derive their social and financial status, never from themselves, but from their mahram; if unmarried, from their father, and if married from their husband, but never the other way around. In the examined representations the focus was on the father only, and within this complex ideology religion and culture are intertwined.

This is a complex ideology as it has religious and cultural aspects. The religious aspects stem from the fact that daughters, and indeed all children, take their father's surname in Islam. The blood tie between a father and his daughters, and being named after their father, are attached to inheritance and spending responsibilities,[119] and determine who are the mahram of girls. The cultural aspects stem from the stereotyped gender roles ascribed to men of being head of household and breadwinners for their families and being responsible for providing for the females. A father is therefore obliged to provide for his daughters until they marry. Thus a father's status, class, wealth, honour and occupation, among other things, have an impact on the way his daughters and wife are viewed in society.

This gendered discourse and the underpinning ideology reflect and sustain existing social relations between fathers and daughters. They reflect and reinforce the gender asymmetry between parents, whereby fathers are the main parent because parts of their identity are used to characterise their offspring while those of the mother are not. Even if aspects of the mother's socioeconomic status are better or more prestigious than those of the father, they will not be used for female representation.

[119] Also responsibilities in various other matters.

This is a subordinate discourse under the overarching gendered discourse, which is the 'patriarchy discourse'. While this gendered discourse reflects and reproduces the power imbalance between male and female, despite the socioeconomic status that a female has achieved, she will always be identified by her mahram. It also reveals the freedom women have from the role of providers for their family and how males are allocated this position without their consent.

7.2.7 Traditional femininity discourse

Some representations found in the Anti-WD tweets drew a direct link between driving and femininity when depicting women who wished to drive, and viewed it as a transgression of traditional femininity. However, it was not clear whether the transgression was because it would bring women into the public-sphere or because driving was, at that time, an exclusively male role.

This study considers this to be an overarching discourse that includes the following subordinate discourses that were identified by this investigation.

7.2.7.1 Mother of boys as privileged

This is one of the discourses that was surprisingly only detected amongst Pro-WD tweets in their representation of Fem-opponents. It is underpinned by a gendered ideology in Saudi Arabia which entails mothers of boys being viewed as privileged, while mothers of girls are viewed as disadvantaged. There are multiple reasons for this. First, being a mother of boys means that the female has played what is considered a significant gender role, having provided her husband with a son and heir who will carry his father's name. Males carry and pass their father's name to their offspring and the family name can thus be maintained, while females only carry but cannot pass their family name to their children due to religious teaching. Second, as a mother of boys, a woman has ensured that another man can be expected to fill the role of breadwinner and to financially provide for her, in addition to

adopting other roles that will take him into the public-sphere, such as driving. This is a discriminatory discourse because it has been employed to exclude Saudi women not only from driving, as it has here in Pro-WD tweets, but also from joining the labour market and other domains that belong in the public-sphere. This gendered discourse expects that both genders – the mother and her boys – will conform to the traditional gender expectation that the female will rely on her boys (in the case of the representation of Fem-opponents in the Pro-WD tweets, to being driven, among other things that relate to the public-sphere, while confining herself to the private-sphere).

Despite the age difference between a mother and her son(s), this gendered discourse reinforces the norm of men's superiority and women's subordination due to gender. Mothers of boys are excluded from calling for WD simply because they have boys. These representations indicate that mothers of boys will be chauffeured by their sons, that having boys has fulfilled their gender role, that those women will, as expected, be allocated a dependent role, and on these grounds they are excluded from supporting or opposing WD. This gendered discourse maintains that the gender order should be applied and upheld, and when examined more closely it becomes apparent that it is underpinned by the same gendered ideology, that women must justify their existence in the public domain, which is similar to other gendered discourses (such as the 'gender differences discourse') in which female existence in the public-sphere is linked with conditions. Here, the right of a female to exist in the public realm is revoked by the mere fact that she has boys. This ties in closely with the 'Mahram discourse' as, regardless of a woman's age, power lies with her sons, even with male children, who are her mahram.

7.2.7.2 Selfless women discourse

Another gendered discourse that was detected amongst the Pro-WD tweets in their negative depiction of Fem-opponents is based upon the assumption that women will be selfless. Fem-opponents who have been perceived by Pro-WD tweets as active and powerful in their

opposition to WD are considered to have transgressed this traditional selflessness by actively opposing the campaign. Their action seemed to be deemed unacceptable and 'selfish'. Even though men strongly and actively opposed WD, they were not evaluated by Pro-WD tweets as selfish; they were evaluated in terms of other attributes, but never as selfish, while Fem-opponents were exclusively and repeatedly only evaluated as selfish.

This discourse is underpinned by the gendered ideology that if women's agency is not directed towards the men or children of their family it is then viewed as selfish as it is directed outside the family. Indeed, as Sunderland (2006) highlights, a woman is accepted as active and powerful only if her agency is directed in a selfless manner towards a man or child whom she loves. This is in contrast to men, who have a more complex range of possibilities –their power can be directed at anyone, even themselves, and they will not be labelled as selfish.

7.2.7.3 Saudi women as queens discourse and Women as jewels or pearls discourse

The 'Saudi women as queens' discourse and 'Women as jewels or pearls' discourse were also identified in other studies by Altoaimy (2017), Al Maghlouth (2017) and Bahammam (2018), which examined a similar genre to the present study, namely that of online data in the Saudi context.

However, in this study the discourses were not detected as in Bahammam's study in the oppositions and conservative, but were found in Pro-WD tweets, or in other words, those of supporters, although they did not reinforce the discourses, but rather mocked them and subverted them. These discourses were not detected in the Anti-WD tweets, even though these two discourses were amongst the 'go to' discourses for opposition to any issue related to Saudi women. It seems that these discourses have lost their value and cultural currency and their life span has now ended, due to constant mockery that they have no real value. Indeed the mere employment of them seems to backfire rather than making an impact. This transformation and change in the nature of detected gendered discourses should be noted.

7.2.7.4 Marriage is important to women discourse

While on the surface both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweeters hold opposing views with regard to whether Saudi women should be allowed to drive, they both agree on the classification of which women should drive which manifested in this gendered discourse that both Anti-WD and Pro-WD draws on in their representations of Fem-supporters and Fem-opponents.

Amongst Pro-WD tweets, traditional femininity, in which marriage is important to women, is reflected in the representations of Fem-supporters. Females who were portrayed by Pro-WD tweets as supporters of WD, and as a result could exist in the public-sphere with men, are those who are undesirable to men in terms of marriage. This varies in relation to their capability to work (career attainment is viewed as overtaking the male breadwinner role associated with hegemonic masculinity), and their previous marital status (divorced or widowed women do not embody the prized virginity/purity attributes of femininity in Saudi Arabia). Therefore, the view that they should be allowed to drive stems from their perception as women deprived of the service of a male mahram. This is similar to Sunderland's (2004) 'Incomplete woman' discourse, as both discourses portray women as incomplete individuals whose worth and value are determined by their relationship status, thus reinforcing gender based inequality. Sunderland's (2004) 'Incomplete woman' discourse', however, indicates that women will be complete once they are married, whereas the 'Marriage is important to women discourse' holds that the inability of women to be complete and married is because they no longer embody the prized attributes of purity.

The Pro-WD tweets also draw on the gendered discourse by appearing to mock Fem-opponents by depicting them as choosers within the hierarchical structure for marriage choice, which is a masculine practice and a gender role exclusive to men in Saudi Arabia; females are the ones who are chosen, an attribute that is embedded in traditional femininity and female passivity. However, Fem-opponents were not portrayed here in terms of the hierarchically

superiority that men have when looking for a wife; rather, what was invoked here is the idea that their traditional femininity failed to attract a suitor. However, the Pro-WD tweets actually reinforced the gendered discourse that marriage is important to women, and those who are not married are undesirable to men. Therefore, in their attempt to mock Fem-opponents they actually reinforce the gendered discourses 'marriage is important to women' and 'traditional femininity', as only those who are not married are deemed unwanted and undesirable to men.

The Anti-WD tweets were clearer in drawing on the gendered discourse 'marriage is important to women' in their depiction of Fem-supporters, referring to their marital status as divorced or spinster and clearly linking it to WD, which makes females responsible for their own transportation and freedom of movement, and as a result reduces male power over female freedom of movement as they join the male dominated public-sphere. All of this is problematised as rendering females undesirable to men for marriage and reducing their chances in the 'marriage market'.

What is interesting is that the way Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets drew on this discourse emphasises aspects of the same gendered ideology. While the Anti-WD comments emphasise that driving for women and being part of the public-sphere does negatively impact their marriageability, Pro-WD tweets only included those women whose chances already ranged from diminished to non-existent in the 'marriage market' due to other reasons. Therefore, if those females were to drive, it would not impact their already diminished chances of marriage.

The gendered ideology underpinning this gendered discourse is one that considers women with no marital link to male mahram as incomplete and of a lower social order. For them, being part of the public-sphere is a reflection of their undesirability by men for marriage, as

opposed to those who are married or still embody emphasised femininity who are concealed in the private-sphere.

7.2.7.5 Women beware women discourse

This gendered discourse, also identified by Sunderland (2004) in her examination of classroom discourse, was only detected in this study in the representation of Fem-opponents in the Pro-WD tweets. However, it was not detected in many tweets. Despite that, it is important and worthy of discussion because it was only identified in Pro-WD tweets and in the same tweets as the earlier identified 'marriage is important to women' gendered discourse.

The implication is that married women who are considered to be of a higher social order, or those who are excluded from the classification of women as undesirable for marriage, are the enemy. This animosity or lack of trust between the different groups is not explicit but it seems to be due to the difference in marital status, because married women, and those with male mahram who take seriously the gendered role of breadwinner, are concerned that these unmarried women, once they enter the public-sphere, might steal their men, or influence their established relationships with men.

7.2.8 Women as sexual objects for men discourse

This gendered discourse was drawn upon and emphasised by both the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets and only once mocked by an Anti-WD tweet. The sexualization and objectification of women's bodies is a pervasive sexist discourse underpinned by multiple gender ideologies: first, that normalise the sexualization of women's bodies, as the value of women stems from their beauty; and second, that suggest females only exist for male sexual gratification. The latter reflects the view of heterosexual relations based on gendered norms – whereby females are passive objects and males are active agents with natural urges that must be acted upon and cannot be controlled – that underpins the 'male sex-drive' discourse.

7.2.9 Male sex-drive discourse

Male sex-drive is one of the three heterosexual discourses that Hollway (1998, as cited in Sunderland, 2004) identified. In this study, this gendered discourse was identified in both the Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets with regard to negative representation of M-opponents and M-supporters and emphasising men's primitive nature and its control by their instincts and sexual desires.

Male sexuality was depicted as both predatory and promiscuous and foregrounded men's primitive nature. Both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets employed and reinforced this gendered discourse as the reason why male social actors either opposed or supported WD. Their sexual thinking is believed to make them oppose or support WD, implying that men reduce women to mere bodies, invoking the gendered discourse 'women as sexual objects for men'.

This issue has also been highlighted by Hollway (1998, as cited in Sunderland, 2004), who suggests that while 'male sex-drive' is explicitly to do with men, it is indirectly about women. Both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets drew on this discourse in such a way that the irresponsibility and danger of male sexuality are highlighted without any suggestion that men should be responsible for controlling their own sex-drive. Both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets simply agree that this is the reason why WD should be/is banned, reflecting a marked tolerance of male transgression, indeed both portray 'male sex-drive' as 'common sense'.

7.2.10 Females are gullible discourse

This discourse falls within the 'gender differences discourse', an essentialist representation of women as stupid and men as smart, in which this binary view is reinforced. This discourse, which was evident in the tweets of Anti-WD and Pro-WD participants, reinforced representations of Fem-supporters and Fem-opponents and is underpinned by the stereotypical notion that women's mental capacity is limited and lacking. Within this discourse, however, naivety is foregrounded rather than stupidity which is foregrounded in

the gendered discourse ‘foolish women’. Both discourses achieve the same function, emphasizing the need for male mahram to protect females, and both invoke the ‘patriarchy discourse’, which suggests that women not only require mahram for physical protection from danger but also for mental protection.

Different aspects of this gendered discourse are evoked and emphasise by Anti-WD and Pro-WD. The aspect of the gendered discourse that both Pro-WD and Anti-WD tweets seem to reinforce and emphasise is that female gullibility deters women from identifying threats and hidden agendas, rendering them unable to maintain their own safety and to protect their honour. Therefore, they are easily fooled, even by their own mahram, according to the Pro-WD tweets, which imply that they need the protection of men who, in contrast, are mentally acute and able to identify threats. The only difference between the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets in drawing on this gendered discourse is that the former are explicit in their subordination of women under the authority of a male mahram while the latter are not (an example of indirect sexism).

The Anti-WD tweets emphasise other aspects of the gendered discourses on female naivety; for example, their naivety and over-emotional nature that make them focus on trivial issues such as WD and not understand the objective of banning woman from driving for their own benefit. In short, they are not able to see the big picture and to establish the pros and cons (see Section 6.1.2.1.4). Both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets emphasise that the mental naivety of females makes them easily manipulated by men because females are mentally powerless in comparison to men.

7.2.11 Foolish women discourse

This gendered discourse, underpinned by the stereotypical view that women are lacking in mental ability and men are intellectual. The gendered stereotyping in the Saudi Arabian context is different as it is a recontextualization of a religious discourse that has been taken

out of context and has been used for years to dominate women and gender discrimination. Even though religious clerics have provided the correct religious interpretation, those who oppose women gaining more freedom persist in understanding the religious discourse in a way that serves their interests, imposes more restrictions on women, and enable men to dominate and control women.

The discourse was identified in the Anti-WD and Pro-WD representation of females. The Anti-WD representations of Fem-supporters in 6.1.2.1.3, draw on the discourse and links the female biological sex clearly to inferior mental capacity which reinforces the gender hierarchy and men's control over women in various aspects of life. In other themes both Anti-WD representations of Fem-supporters and the Pro-WD in representations of Fem-opponents drew on the 'foolish women' discourse without making a direct connection to the female biological sex only stereotypically portray females as individuals with limited mental capacity and therefore they are being manipulated by men. In this study 'foolish women' gendered discourse overlaps with the 'females are gullible'.

7.2.12 Passive Saudi women

This gendered discourse, which was identified only in the Anti-WD tweets, is underpinned by one of the negative stereotypical gendered ideologies about Saudi women (namely, that they are passive and helpless/powerless) that seem to be generalised in many aspects of life. The helplessness of Saudi women stems from the hegemonic gender relationship that places their mahram in control, and therefore those who call for WD are considered non-Saudi and not to embody the emphasized femininity that is valued in Saudi Arabia. Consequently, they are not governed by hegemonic gender relationships in the Kingdom, and are deemed foreigners. Their relationship with their mahram (who embody a non-Saudi hegemonic masculinity) is assumed to be governed by their country of origin. Interestingly, this discourse is similar to the gendered discourse about Saudi women which is identified in Western media and indicates that Saudi women require liberation because they are powerless.

The following pair of discourses, ‘Men as wolves’ and ‘Women as prey’ are very difficult to invoke separately as they are linked and mutually supportive of each other. Both draw on contrasting animalizing metaphors that convey the sex-based power hierarchy in Saudi Arabia.

7.2.13 Men as wolves discourse

Both Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets drew on one of the common gendered discourses that employ the metaphor ‘Men as wolves’ to emphasise that men are driven by their primitive nature and sexual urges. This gendered discourse is underpinned by multiple gendered ideologies: first, women are always blamed for the sexual actions of men; and second, the sexualization of women and the negative gender stereotype/gendered ideology of men, as primitive creatures who cannot control their urges, reduces men to mere sexual beings. Above all, that women are not only responsible and blamed for their actions, but also for the actions of others, including men. If men transgress it is as a result of a woman failing to cover herself, for example.

‘Men as wolves’ was identified in the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets, however they employ these discourses for different functions, as follows. Pro-WD tweets drew on ‘Men as wolves’ discourse, not to reinforce it, but in an attempt to denaturalize it and show its triviality as it is a popular discourse that has been employed in the past to oppose any issue through which women might gain more freedom from their mahram. It is important to note that in one of their attempts they drew on another gendered discourse; namely, ‘Females are gullible’, which reinforce the need for women protection by men. Anti-WD tweets, on the other hand, drew on gendered discourses to reinforce the gendered ideology that men are driven by their primitive nature and sexual urges, to incite fear amongst women, who are submissive and vulnerable creatures who cannot protect themselves, and to encourage them to allow their mahram to shield them from danger, concealing themselves in the home.

7.2.14 Women as prey discourse

According to the 'Women as prey' discourse, women are submissive creatures who can be captured and dominated (Tipler & Ruscher, 2019). Only Anti-WD tweets drew on one of this common gendered Saudi Arabian discourses to represent females. The Anti-WD reinforce the gendered ideology that females are submissive, vulnerable creatures who can be captured, manipulated and dominated, perpetuating the view that women are targeted by men and can be easily controlled.

7.2.15 Women enslave themselves to men discourse

In the Pro-WD tweets, this study found a similar but different gendered discourse to the 'women-as-slaves discourse' that Bahammam (2018) identified. In this study, the gendered discourse was named the 'women enslave themselves to men' discourse, where the nature of the relationship between women who are positioned as slaves and men as masters is different from the typical slave/master relationship, as women are not considered to be passive, but instead are actors who actively maintain their enslaved status to men who are associated with action, power and ownership. It emphasises that females themselves play a role in their own subordination to males and their rejection of independence from masculine control. This discourse counters what has been identified in other discourses, that Saudi women are victimised by men, and shows that women's agency is not removed by men, but rather is relinquished by females themselves. This discourse is considered a competing discourse to 'women-as-slaves discourse'.

7.2.16 Men fear women's freedom discourse

This gendered discourse was identified amongst the Pro-WD representations of M-opponents. 'Men fear women's freedom' is underpinned by patriarchal 'fear' of women but it is not fear of women 'winning' as in the gendered discourse entitled 'A battle-of-the-sexes', but fear of women's independence. This reveals the gendered ideology that a main feature of male dominance is the control of females, therefore female independence undermines men's

masculinity, particularly hegemonic masculinity, which is enacted in the subordination of females. What men fear here is linked to what Connell (1995a) named ‘the patriarchal dividend’, which is the advantage men generally gain from the general subordination of women.

7.2.17 Men-power abuse discourse and Powerless men and powerful women discourse

These two discourses are competing discourses as men are positined powerfull in one and powerless in the other. These two gendered discourses, which mainly discuss male hegemony from opposing perspective were identified:

The first gendered discourse, which was noted in the Pro-WD tweets, is ‘Men-power abuse’. In this discourse females were subjected to male dominance, reflecting the relationship between dominance and submission that constitutes hegemonic masculinity and femininity in Saudi Arabia. The gendered discourse simply reproduces the unequal power relation between women and men; it does not attempt to either consent to or dismantle it. However, ‘Men-power abuse’ discourse does not revoke M-supporters’ masculinity by portraying men as powerful, it merely attempts to challenge the abuse of male hegemony and draws a distinction between a ‘bad man’, as someone who has power and abuses it, and by inference a ‘good man’ who has power and does not abuse it. It should be noted that power over women is not challenged in this discourse, and neither is gender equality endorsed. What is promoted is the view that a man should wisely use his power over women in their family, which could be viewed as a very limited attempt to subvert male power by highlighting the abuse.

The second gendered discourse, which was identified in the Anti-WD tweets, is ‘Powerless men and powerful women’. In this discourse the representation is of powerless man versus powerful woman, in which the usual gender order is reversed, reflecting the gendered ideology that the only way for a man to support a woman is when he is dominated by a woman.

While the above gendered discourses appear to contradict each other, they do reflect the expectation that men will embody male dominance and control women in Saudi Arabia. It can be seen that it is impossible for both genders to be construed as powerful and equal. In the first case, the issue is not with holding power, it is simply with men abusing the power they have been granted, while in the second case, it is the possession of power that is the issue. These gendered discourses demonstrate that the expectation imposed by masculinity on men in Saudi Arabia to perform and embody dominance is very strong.

7.2.18 Female subordination and male masculinity discourse

This gendered discourse, which was only identified in the Anti-WD tweet representations of Fem-supporters and M-supporters of WD and the Pro-WD representations of M-opponents creates a link between female honour and male masculinity. In this gender discourse, hegemonic masculinity in Saudi Arabia is emphasised and gender relations are established as a hierarchy of male domination and female subordination and aim to maintain male domination. This gendered discourse underpinned by a gendered ideology that defines manhood and masculinity by female dominance and control which result in reinforcing toxic masculinity. Male domination in this discourse is portrayed as not only beneficial for men to reinforces their masculinity, but also for women to protect their reputation.

Both Anti-WD tweet and Pro-WD draw on this discourse negatively depicted men in relation to control. In this discourse men who do not embody hegemonic masculinity in Saudi Arabia by controlling their female kin they are emasculated because they are viewed as not fulfilling their role as ‘as protectors of honour’. The result in the emasculation of those men who abandon their role as protectors of female family members and allow them to enter the public sphere instead of keeping them safe inside. When the gender role of men as protectors of honour is not fulfilled, not only does it negatively impact male masculinity but also female reputations and honour.

At this point where the usage of the discourse between the Anti-WD and Pro-WD diverge. The Pro-WD imply the impact of not controlling females while the Anti-WD are explicit and negatively depict females in relation to their honour and reputation. Only women are portrayed in relation to reputation. This is due to the gendered ideology in Saudi Arabia, illustrated which ensures that the actions of men are not seen to have a negative effect on their reputation and/or family. Men are viewed as absolved, so nothing can tarnish their reputation. Meanwhile, female behaviour is under scrutiny because females are seen as carriers of the family honour, as illustrated in Section 2.2, and therefore any actions that are deemed negative by society, tribe, or family are capable of tarnishing their reputation and bringing shame on their families.

This becomes apparent when females who did not call for WD, but whose male kin want them to drive, are depicted as ‘trash’, reflecting their tarnished reputation. As can be seen, this gendered discourse does not implicitly nor explicitly portray men who do not control women in their family, and do not fulfil their mahram role as protectors of honour, in terms of their reputation.

Regarding female honour, while women are positioned as guardians of sexual morality and safety and play a central role in enforcing protection against the male sex-drive for the benefit of men, female honour and the responsibility for protecting female honour are portrayed in terms of gender order in Saudi Arabia. What this means is that it is the male responsibility first, and only when there is no male to fulfil this role does it become a female responsibility.

Its important to note that this gendered discourse is mutually supportive and intersect with other gendered namely ‘Foolish women’ and ‘Females are gullible’, both of which portray it as common-sense that women with inferior mental capacity cannot differentiate right from

wrong and are easily fooled by men have to be controlled by men who are stereotypically deemed have superior mental capacity.

7.2.19 Unequal male and female opportunities discourse

Gender is embedded in experience in all settings, and two of the experiences that this study has identified in both the Anti-WD and Pro-WD tweets stem from the political and religious realms because they reproduce the gender order in Saudi Arabia by positioning only men as members and elements of political and religious organisations. Females were only once positioned in relation to the political realm in the Anti-WD tweets, as 'Slaves of Secularism', which removes the agency of women to join the Secular party and reflects their position within it, not as members equal to men, but as members without power. They are completely submissive to the men of the Secular party who have exclusive mastery in the form of mental control over women.

Having provided an in-depth analysis of the gendered discourses evident in the tweets pertaining to women driving, the next section will link these findings to the broader field of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) by comparing and contrasting them with gendered discourses found in different languages and cultural contexts.

7.3 Gendered discourses in other contexts and languages

The discussion regarding the gendered discourses identified in Arabic tweets during the ban on women driving has been confined to Saudi Arabia, which is the context of the research. The next section expands and develops the discussion and links it to the wider field of CDS by comparing the gendered discourses named and categorized in this research with those identified in other studies that have analysed different languages in other cultural settings.

Through a comparative analysis, this section will examine the similarities and differences between the discourses identified in this study and those detected in other studies conducted

in various languages, which are rooted in other cultural, social, and political contexts, or that are different in other ways to the one examined in this study. By analysing both similarities and differences the study will contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of gendered discourses on a larger scale.

This section will begin by examining gendered discourses in the context of Hong Kong, which is a significantly different cultural and linguistic context to Saudi Arabia. Yu (2017), in her critical discourse studies, analysed gendered discourses in Cantonese data found within Hong Kong culture in an examination of a popular reality television series named Bride Wannabes. The series followed five unmarried Hong Kong women, aged 28 to 39, who underwent makeovers with a number of experts to increase their chances of finding a match at various matchmaking events. Yu's (2017) study identified and named five gendered discourses: 1) A traditional discourse on femininity; 2) A traditional discourse on women's singleness; 3) A postfeminist discourse on femininity; 4) A postfeminist discourse on women's singleness; and 5) An ageist discourse on unmarried women.

Before discussing the different gendered discourses, the first apparent difference between Yu's (2017) work and the current research is that the fact that women are actively looking for husbands is not problematised in Hong Kong as the entire study revolves around examination of a show in which women undergo makeovers to increase their chances of finding "the one". In contrast, in this research which analyses tweets about women driving, Fem-opponents were mocked as searching for a male suitor, devaluing their femininity because they were failing to follow the norms of arranged marriage in Saudi Arabia, which dictate that males are expected to take the initiative in searching for a wife. Therefore, in the Saudi context, these representations were used as traces to identify the gendered discourses which highlight that, for women, marriage is vital, and those who are not married are undesirable to men, revealing the gendered discourse 'Marriage is important to women' which falls within the 'Traditional

femininity' discourse. This difference in perception concerning women's pursuit of marriage could be attributed to the nature of marriage in each country. In Saudi Arabia marriage is largely arranged and men are the ones in a position of power. They choose their wives, due to religious and cultural factors, but are also allocated greater responsibilities, including that of providing financially for their women, and for protecting them, among other things. In Hong Kong, as Yu (2017) discusses, historically arranged marriage was once the norm, but following significant social change and transformation in gender dynamics, marriage seems to be more individualistic, so that men and women date and get to know each other, and personal compatibilities, shared values and love have a role to play, so arranged marriage is not as prevalent as in Saudi Arabia.

The way in which a number of Yu's (2017) gendered discourses were identified was also different. The Hong Kong study's first traditional discourse on femininity was also identified by the present study, but not by itself, rather as an overarching discourse, and under it a number of discourses were identified, so in this study it encompasses a range of discourses. However, what Yu (2017) did was to identify different aspects of the discourse, despite the apparent differences.

Despite the different cultures in which these studies are situated, the various aspects of traditional femininity identified by Yu (2017) in her Hong Kong study are similar to some of the gendered discourses identified in this Saudi Arabian study. For example, there is an emphasis on the physical appearance of female participants and on certain traits of femininity, such as being petite and of delicate appearance; in the Bride Wannabes study these traits are linked to the participants' desirability in terms of marriage. Being petite is specific to each country because what is considered petite can vary based on a population's average height. Generally though, for women, being petite or shorter than men is viewed as feminine. Similarly, in this research which examined women driving in the Saudi context, women's

beauty standards were also evaluated. However, they were only explicitly mentioned once in terms of the femininity trait being evaluated, which was fairness of skin. The remaining instances of female physical appearance in this study were more sexualized and objectified, with a focus on how men can benefit from women's beauty. Therefore, these instances of representation were employed to spot and name gendered discourses such as 'Women as sexual objects for men'.

Despite the differences, since in Yu's (2017) study the desirability of participants for marriage is evaluated based on their physical appearance, there is a backgrounded form of sexualisation and objectification, even if the study does not recognize it. What becomes clear is that, within the traditional discourse on femininity, feminine traits differ, and cultural specificity plays a significant role in what each culture deems feminine.

Yu (2017) highlighted another aspect within the traditional discourse on femininity; that the intellectual capabilities and career success of female participants were devalued, and not only that, but they also reflected negatively on how those women were perceived in relation to their chances of finding a husband. Female intellectual capabilities were also mentioned in this study, however they were not tied to women's chances of marriage, their value was not ridiculed, and they did not reflect negatively on women. In the Saudi data, female intellectual capabilities were stereotypically depicted as non-existent, as women were represented as stupid, thus instances of these representations were identified with the 'Foolish women discourse' whilst representations that emphasised naivety were linked with the 'Females are gullible discourse'. The difference in how female intellectual capability is employed is that, in the Saudi context, the diminished ability of females is used to invoke the need for men to protect females, both physically and mentally. This also highlights how, due to women's diminished mental abilities, they are unknowingly on the receiving end of male manipulation.

Also in the study that examined Bride Wannabes, women's career achievements were problematised as making women undesirable for marriage. This is another instance where this research found similar, but slightly different, representations, as female social actors, whether they had a successful career or were in an entry level job, were depicted simply as workers. The representation did, however, accomplish a similar function to those in Yu (2017) study, as Saudi women who worked were also rendered undesirable for marriage. In this study, career achievements were considered to be among the traces that helped to detect the 'Marriage is important to women' discourse.

Moving on to the second discourse that was identified by Yu (2017), which is the 'Traditional discourse on women's singleness', a similar discourse was found in this study and named 'Marriage is important to women'. Both discourses have the same functions in each data set which is to derogate those women who do not follow a heterosexual life path and to indicate that marriage is important to women, which is made more explicit in the naming of the gendered discourses of this study. However, some of the representations that this research considered as traces of the 'Marriage is important to women' discourse were identified by Yu (2017) as perspectives of the 'Traditional discourse on femininity', but then Yu (2017) goes on to discuss similar factors to this study, namely women's singleness and high educational and career attainment. The only difference is age, which did not occur in this research in relation to marriage. The Bride Wannabes identified derogatory terms that are very specific to the context of the study, these were "leftover women" and "the house for spinsters".

Another gendered discourse that Yu (2017) recognized was the 'Ageist discourse on unmarried women', but no similar discourses refer to a relationship between marriage and age in the women driving tweets. Age appeared repeatedly in the representation of Fem-opponents and Fem-supporters, and very few times in the representations of male-supporters,

but always in relation to their mental capacity, and when it was used it supported the 'foolish women' discourse.

The remaining discourses identified by Yu (2017), which are the 'Postfeminist discourse on femininity' and the 'Postfeminist discourse on women's singleness', were not spotted in the study about women driving. It is difficult to suggest a reason for the lack of postfeminist discourses in this study but it could be due to cultural and social differences between the two countries, and the historical and political context that shaped the discourses around gender that are described in Chapter 2. Clearly, the presence of religious movements such as Religious Awakening, and other factors such as oil and modernization, that have shaped discourses around gender in Saudi Arabia are unique to each country.

Another study that explored gendered discourses in a different cultural settings, and analysed a different language, was conducted by Wambura (2018) who carried out a critical discourse analysis that drew on Sunderland's (2004) gendered discourses approach. Wambura examined the women's issue of Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) by closely analysing female circumcision songs in Kuria Kenya in the period November 2014 to January 2015. The study focused on how metaphors were used to construct gendered discourses in these songs, which were sung in Kuria, a Bantu language mostly spoken among a cluster of people in Kenya and Tanzania. Kuria is also the name of the Kenyan community in which Kuria is spoken, a community that, like all of Kenyan society, is patriarchal in nature, where men are allocated power and authority to make decisions and women are subordinate. The analysis revealed a number of gendered discourses, which were the 'Woman as mother' discourse, the 'Woman as domestic' discourse, 'Women as objects of gaze' discourse, the '(circumcised) Woman as sweet and attractive' discourse, the 'Man as protector' discourse, and the 'Man as provider' discourse.

The ‘Woman as mother’ discourse, which emphasizes the importance of mothers in Kuria society and a woman’s capacity to produce as many children as she can, is linked to perception of her husband’s social status, as the number of children in a family is linked to wealth and the continuation of her husband’s lineage. The ‘Woman as mother’ discourse shares some characteristics with a gendered discourse that was identified in the Saudi Arabian tweets, which is the ‘Mother of boys as privileged’ discourse. Both discourses emphasise and link women’s abilities to have children to the gender role of nurturer and caregiver, reinforcing the notion that women’s main duty is their family which exists in the private sphere. Both discourses imply that the role of women is to maintain their husband’s lineage, the only difference, which could be due to religious and cultural differences, is that in Saudi Arabia the discourses particularly state that she should produce boys because only male children can pass on the family name.

Wambura (2018) does not specify that a mother is encouraged and/or expected to have boys so it is not clear whether both boys and girls can maintain their father’s lineage. Another discourse that was identified from the Kuria songs is the ‘Woman as domestic’ representation which resembles another discourse that was identified in the research data about women driving in Saudi Arabia, namely the ‘Female domesticity discourse’. Both discourses, found in data collected from two distinct cultures and using different languages, reinforce normative gender relations, reproducing gendered hierarchical binary structures and power relations. As both assign women to the private sphere while men are positioned in the public sphere as breadwinners, this perpetuates the view that the primary role of women is within the boundaries of the house.

The next discourse that Wambura (2018) recognised was ‘Women as objects of gaze’ which is similar to one also identified in this research, the ‘Women as sexual objects for men discourse’. Both objectify women and emphasise that women’s value and worth are mainly

based on their physical appearance, and both reinforce gender norms and gender order because they emphasise the notion that women exist solely for the pleasure of men which gives prominence to men's desires. The only difference is that in the Saudi context specific physical attributes such as skin fairness are mentioned, while in the Kuria context no explicit mention is made of any particular physical attribute. It was not, therefore, possible to determine whether the preferences of the two communities varied or whether each had its unique beauty standard, however the commonalty noted was the objectification of women, which indicates a common tendency to reduce females to mere objects of male gaze and desire. One of the discourses that is unique to the Kenyan community examined by Wambura (2018) is '(circumcised) Woman as sweet and attractive', a discourse that, as expected, was not identified in this research where tweets discuss women driving in Saudi Arabia.

Turning now to the 'Man as protector' discourse that highlights the role of men as defenders, not only of women but of their entire household and of the larger Kenyan community, men are expected to embody and demonstrate the masculine qualities of strength, bravery, and readiness to face threats and the enemy. So in short, the discourse assigns men the role of protector, and dominance over women in Kenyan society. As men have this esteemed role, the discourse stresses that women should give birth to as many male children as they can because a man fulfilling the role of family protector without male children is vulnerable and prone to attack. This discourse reinforces traditional gender norms and power dynamics. No single equivalent discourse was found in the Saudi context, but two were named in the tweets about women driving that reinforce aspects similar to those discussed in the 'Man as protector' discourse in the Kuria context; these are the 'Mahram discourse' and the 'Mother of boys as privileged' discourse. From the name of the first of these, the 'Mahram discourse', it is clear that it is exclusively linked to an Islamic context in which men are considered mahram. In this gendered discourse the mahram is protector both of his females, and the honour of his family that his females carry, which perpetuates and emphasises the view that

men must embody masculine characteristics that only relate to hegemonic masculinity in Saudi Arabia, reflecting protective jealousy. The second discourse is the 'Mother of boys as privileged' discourse which, while it is different from the 'Man as protector' discourse in Kuria society, does emphasise a similar notion, which is the importance of male children over females and the significance of male offspring in continuing and fulfilling the gender role that is exclusive to men in society over women.

The last discourse spotted by Wambura (2018) in the FGM circumcision songs was the 'Man as provider' discourse which is equivalent to the 'Men as breadwinners' discourse' in the Saudi context. These discourses emphasise that in both societies men's ability to financially provide for their family is a central concept that is vital to male hegemony, while women are positioned as dependents and beneficiaries. The allocation of power and control is important because it reinforces patriarchal structure and the division of labour. As men are positioned as the primary providers, it grants them power and control over women who are allocated the subordinate position.

The last example of research that has analysed gendered discourses is a critical discourse study in an American context conducted by Matwick (2017), who examined cookbooks written by renowned, modern female celebrity chefs. These were not typical chefs according to Matwick (2017), but amongst the top female celebrity chefs on the American Food Network channel that specialised in cooking shows, and were supposedly the first to create the concept of celebrity chefs. Each examined show was hosted by a female chef who presented a traditional cooking program, and most importantly, their depictions of the ideal American woman were, in each case, extensively disseminated. Matwick (2017) stresses that the personal lives of these women were very different as they included, a working, married New Englander without children, a divorced Italian-American mother, and a Western-ranch housewife with children. Certainly these women did not reflect the practices or beliefs of all

women. Matwick's (2017) study identified four gendered discourses from the shows: 'Traditional femininity', 'Discourse of achievability', 'Discourse of culinary power', and the 'Women, cooking, and sexual pleasure' discourse. Of these four, the only one that could also be found amongst the women driving tweets was 'Traditional femininity', but closer examination revealed that the characteristics of the discourse in each context were different. 'Traditional femininity' was apparent, according to Matwick (2017), in the celebrity chef cookbooks. The discourse reveals a complex interplay between caring for one's family and other people and adhering to tradition, and asserting one's independence and taking leisure in the kitchen. While it supports conventional gender norms, it also permits the possibility of challenging and transforming these norms within the realm of popular culture. The way the discourse appears in the cookbooks supports the constructions of conventional femininity and masculinity that are simultaneously restrictive and liberating for the cookbooks' readers. When compared to the 'Traditional femininity discourse', which was identified in tweets about women driving during the ban in Saudi Arabia, there is a striking difference between them, because in the Saudi research femininity is constructed as bounded and reinforces the view that any transgression of normative feminine practices is deemed a serious action; it was a restrictive discourse rather than a liberating one. Even other gendered discourses that were categorized as subordinate to the 'Traditional femininity discourse' were more restrictive to Saudi women.

The above discussion covers both Eastern and Western contexts as it draws on studies conducted in Hong Kong, Kenya and America which facilitates a broader understanding of how gendered discourses exhibit cultural specificities and shared aspects. The section reveals that several of the identified gendered discourses in each CDS study are unique to the context in which they were detected, while others, despite the contextual disparities between the studies, seem to transcend cultural and language boundaries.

The next chapter presents the conclusion to the thesis.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion

The previous chapter presented a discussion and summary of the findings of this thesis which documents a close examination of the complexities of the debate surrounding women driving in Saudi Arabia that were visible online, specifically on Twitter. This has enabled the study to gain insights into the language, discursive strategies, gendered discourses, and gendered ideologies employed by primary adversaries in their representation of the various social actors, female and male supporters, and opponents, in tweets about women driving in Saudi Arabia during the ban. Like any other rigorous research, the present study acknowledges its own limitations, the most important of which is the issue of representativeness which is an inherit shortcoming of any study that strives to provide an in-depth analysis within its allotted time frame and to find the middle ground and a balanced and optimal size for its data set. This leads us to another limitation that should be considered, namely the narrowing of scope to include only Twitter, and then a further narrowing of scope to only trending hashtags within Twitter. Another shortcoming relates to the translation of Arabic data, and in particular to conveying to an English-speaking audience the negative connotations inherent in some terms that were used to represent social actors. The last constraint concerns the inability of the study to present the original data, which has an ethical perspective. This chapter will not only discuss the shortcomings of this study, it will also make suggestions for future research that would overcome some of the limitations of the present investigation.

While the results of the study, the detailed analysis presented in Chapter 6, and the clear methodological application in themselves provide a multitude of compelling opportunities for future scholarly investigation, this chapter will present the contributions to knowledge made by this thesis. These relate to the study's contribution to CDS and broader research, and to its

methodological contribution. The chapter will then introduce the implications of the study. Chapter 8 will end with some final remarks and thoughts, which will provide a space for researchers to reflect on how the online discourses about women might change, or resist change, as socio-cultural changes in Saudi Arabia, like the lifting of the ban, continue to unfold, It is hoped that it will highlight potential impacts or resistance and prompt the reader to consider the evolving nature of online conversation and the need for diachronic study.

While this research has produced knowledge of the way Fem-opponents, M-opponents, Fem-supporters and M-supporters of WD are portrayed, the gendered ideologies underpinning these representations, and the gendered discourses involved, and has also not only enriched CDS research but added to the limited number of studies that have examined Arabic colloquial data and social media, there are a number of limitations that need to be highlighted, as mentioned below.

8.1 Limitations and suggestions for further research

As with any other research, this study has its limitations, one of which is that, as has been explicitly indicated, it is a qualitative study, and one of the limitations of any qualitative research is the issue of representativeness. In conducting a qualitative analysis, the results arising from the analysis of the trending hashtag, '#Women's car driving is a necessity', were never intended to be generalised to all Saudi people but are a representation of those who willingly tweeted and participated in discussion regarding the topic of women driving using the analysed trending hashtag.

Page et al. (2014) highlighted that the misinterpretation of representativeness has resulted in qualitative studies that incorporate two of the major research shortcomings; superficiality and over-generalisation. This is because researchers, in their attempts to achieve representativeness, include too much in their data sets, and the overtly broad range of the data sets resulted in an analysis that is lacking in depth.

The other issue is that researchers overextend their study observations beyond the scope of the data. Page et al. (2014) stress that representativeness is a firmly established notion in social scientific tradition that adopts quantitative methods, and that for a researcher to conduct a qualitative analysis within a reasonable time frame they must strike a balance regarding the size of their data set. To resolve the issue or representativeness, Page et al. (2014) indicate that the researcher should clearly highlight the limitations of their work, which can then be viewed as a vital feature of the study design, and may indeed strengthen the study's claims by making them more specific. The amount of data required to make the sample representative and the time needed to gather that data were both beyond the scope of this study. Some would argue that a corpus method would have resolved this issue, but the researcher holds the view that a corpus method would not have allowed the same findings to emerge, for various reasons: the data was in colloquial Arabic and conformed to neither traditional spelling nor grammar rules; the number of creative and unique spellings drawn from the different Saudi dialects (particularly the Qassimi dialect and Hail dialects) have an impact on the spelling, but also affect the gender assignment of words; and there were a considerable number of spelling mistakes within the data. All of these factors would have meant that many representations of social actors would not have been detected using a corpus method. Also tweets written by people with only a basic education, or with learning disabilities/difficulties such as dyslexia, which would have included significant spelling mistakes, would have been excluded, and as a result, a segment of the population would have been omitted.

This study only examined one platform, which was Twitter, and despite its popularity in Saudi Arabia (see 3.2.3, Twitter in Saudi Arabia), the analysis still has the limitation that it only examined Twitter users. Then there are those who abstain from joining Twitter, or people who were not aware of the discussion on Twitter as they were not social media users.

Also, there will be Saudi nationals who discussed WD using other languages, other social media platforms that are not as popular in Saudi Arabia as Twitter, and finally, others who discussed WD offline.

In addition, the study purposely analysed only trending hashtags in order to access only public data, in line with ethical standards (see Section 5.10, Consideration of ethical issues). This means that there are discussions about WD that were conducted in private accounts, or even public accounts, that used other hashtags that never reached trending status, and that this study did not consider for ethical reasons. In order to access only public data, a limitation arises which is that in collecting trending hashtags it also retrieved spams and irrelevant tweets and exacerbated the complexity of the cleaning process, as shown in Section 5.5.3.1. At the same time, however, this was an advantage for the study because, since the researcher collected the data in real time, it was possible to confirm that the hashtag was trending on the Twitter trend list and visible to everyone. One other point about collecting trending hashtags is that it is important to collect the data at an early stage, before Twitter users alter or even decide to completely delete their tweets. A data set collected at a later point in time might yield a different set of tweets, as highlighted by Bahammam (2018).

Another limitation of the study is that, while considerable care was taken with the process of data translation and the analysis was conducted using the original Arabic tweets, both of these are likely to affect the way in which non-Arabic readers receive the findings. They might particularly affect the reader's understanding of the negativity conveyed by terms such as 'the males' and 'the liberals'. Furthermore, the exclusion of original Arabic data due to ethical concerns (see Section 5.10, Consideration of ethical issues) may be perceived as a limitation.

One final thing that could be considered a limitation of the study is that it was not possible to include the translated data in the analysis in Chapter 6; only the social actor representations

were included and all the translated data were placed in separate appendices. This was not the preferred approach, but the researcher took this decision due to the constraints imposed by word count. While it is not a limitation per se, it does place a certain responsibility on the reader to locate the discussed tweets in each example in one document while reading the analysis in another. This back and forth could be viewed as a drawback.

Regarding suggestions for further research, it must be highlighted that, among many changes that have been implemented for the empowerment and benefit of Saudi women, one of them was the lifting of the ban on WD, and it would be interesting to examine a different time frame after that date to see how opponents and supporters were depicted following the change. It would also be interesting to see whether the representations of the social actors remain the same, whether any differences or new representations have emerged, or different gendered discourses have appeared with reference to the findings of this study, since the period examined by this analysis was the closest it could be before the lifting of the ban. Recommendations for further research also include the investigation of more social media data about other issues in Saudi Arabia involving women, as the number of CDS studies related to Saudi Arabia is limited. Research could utilise the results of this study to examine whether there are discrepancies and similarities in the ways Saudi Arabian people draw on gendered discourses with regard to different women's issues, and whether those in opposition to other women's issues opt for indirect sexism, as this study has found.

Another area for future research would be the use of Semiotic/multimodal analysis, such as van Leeuwen's (2008) Visual Social Actor Network, to identify the different ways in which social actors in historical WD data (or data related to other Saudi Arabian women's issues) were portrayed. Future research should aim to address the lack of studies that have examined such subjects in the context of Saudi Arabia, using Arabic data produced by Arabic users.

8.2 Originality and Contributions of this research

The study's originality and contribution to broader research on CDS, and on Twitter and its potential impact, will be discussed in this section. It presents some insights about the contributions to knowledge made by this thesis. It did not set out to establish a new academic field, but it did intend to contribute to the existing field in many ways. One of the contributions of this thesis is that it provides a non-Western perspective on the issue of WD in Saudi Arabia by analysing a Twitter hashtag written in Arabic that relates to the subject. By focusing on the Saudi perspective on a Saudi issue, this research offers a distinct viewpoint that differs from the prevalent Western interpretations typically found in CDS studies that have analysed Western newspapers and media discussions about Muslim, sometimes Saudi women, as highlighted in Chapter 1. Examining the Saudi perspective allows for a deeper understanding of how Saudi individuals themselves perceive and discuss issues that are relevant to their own society. This introduces a more authentic and culturally grounded understanding of the subject matter. By shifting the analytical lens to the Saudi perspective this research helps bridge the gap between Western-centric analyses and the lived experiences of individuals within Saudi society, providing valuable insights and potentially challenging or expanding existing narratives. The data that was analysed constitutes another contribution to the field, because by examining the tweets of Saudi people, rather than focusing solely on political, social and symbolic Saudi elites, this thesis has introduced a new and distinct data set that provides insights into the perspectives and opinions of a broader range of individuals within Saudi society. This expansion of the scope of the data allows for a more inclusive and diverse understanding of the topic. It offers a unique glimpse into the perspectives of Saudi individuals, which may differ from those of the elite. Analysis of these tweets has resulted in a new data set that will help to fill a gap in the existing literature and offer fresh insights into the topic under investigation. The originality of the approach that this research took to examine the issue of women driving and to identify the social actors involved is another

contribution to knowledge. The way in which the study recognized and examined both female and males as supporters and opponents transcends the simplistic men versus women perspective. By considering the varied stances of both men and women regarding women driving, and incorporating gender in the design of the study and the analysis, the study offers a more detailed and in-depth understanding of the dynamics within the discourse surrounding the topic. This approach allows for a comprehensive examination of the various perspectives and contributions from different genders, providing a more general view of the issue. By avoiding the simplistic binary framework and embracing inclusivity, this research contributes to a more in-depth understanding of the complexities within the discourse surrounding the topic of women driving in Saudi Arabia. This originality of perspective constitutes another original contribution of the study, as no other study has examined representations of male supporters and female opponents; other studies, as explained in the introduction, have narrowed the issue to women as supporters of women driving and men as opponents of women driving. With regard to the field of CDS, the first contribution relates to the context of the study, as it aims to add to the very limited number of studies that have examined the Saudi Arabian context. Also, in terms of the choice of data, by analysing Arabic data, and particularly colloquial Arabic, and examining a trending hashtag, it addresses the scarcity of studies and stimulates further research. Concerning CDS and gender studies, the research fills knowledge gaps in relation to the Arabic language, as well as gender and social media in the Saudi context. This study provides clear and solid Arabic linguistic evidence of how female and male supporters and opponents were represented on the Twitter social media platform, and contributes a case study to the literature about how social media and hashtags aimed at women's issues reproduce sexist norms and gender stereotypes. This thesis also demonstrates how sexism and gender stereotypes in social media discourse can be effectively deconstructed through multi-level in-depth linguistic analyses. The originality of the findings and major contributions of this study reveal a noteworthy aspect regarding the gendered discourses that were identified in the representations of the different social actors responding to the hashtag

about women driving. Despite the seemingly divergent positions and the utilization of distinct discursive strategies by different groups, this research uncovers a significant commonality. Both supporters and opponents of women driving contribute to the reinforcement of similar gendered ideologies and discourses. This discovery underscores the underlying presence of shared cultural beliefs and societal expectations that shape the portrayal of social actors involved in the discourse about women driving and demonstrates that both supporters and opponents reinforce gender stereotypes and gender norms and roles.

Another major contribution of this study to the field of CDS and Sunderland's (2004) work is the originality of the findings, and in particular the identification and naming of gendered discourses written in Arabic that had not been identified and named before, especially in colloquial Arabic in the Saudi context. The study calls these discourses: 'Women enslave themselves to men', 'The socioeconomic status of men', 'Men fear women's freedom', 'Female subordination and male masculinity discourse', 'Mother of boys as privileged', 'Passive Saudi women', and 'Selfless women'. These have not been detected to date, to the best of the researcher's knowledge, in other studies that have examined Twitter in the Saudi Arabian context. As previously highlighted, the only other study that has identified gendered discourses in this context is by Bahammam (2018), which makes no mention of these discourses.

The identification of these gendered discourses in colloquial Arabic should help other researchers to recognize them easily in the future and to detect whether changes occur in the way they appear, setting the ground for future research. Also, researchers examining other languages will be able to investigate whether similar gendered discourses exist which could enable comparison with gendered discourses in other languages. More explicitly, this thesis describes how the study identified the gendered discourses it found, and how it employed gender representations as linguistics traces in order to detect those gendered discourses, an

approach which had not previously been used. No existing studies that have analysed Arabic data clearly show the steps that were taken to identify their gendered discourses. This study contributes to the field of CDS, and especially to Sunderland's approach (2004), by applying an English-based linguistic framework to colloquial Arabic data. It clearly demonstrates how to apply Sunderland's approach in this unique context and enriches the field of CDS by naming and recognizing gendered discourses that had not been identified before.

Another contribution of this research is the application of English-based linguistic frameworks, including van Leeuwen's social actor framework (2008). The study contributes to van Leeuwen's framework by providing empirical evidence that supports and extends the framework, specifically in relation to gender representations. The research contributes to van Leeuwen's approach by showing which of his categories are helpful when examining gender, as some of those categories expose more, while others reveal nothing, about gender aspects when Arabic data is examined; this is something that has not been discussed before. For example, in this study collectivisation occurred but provides no perspective on the gender aspects of the examined social actor. This could be taken into consideration when other studies employ van Leeuwen for the analysis of gender. This study also contributes as it highlights the pair of categories that were frequently used to represent social actors in relation to gender when analysing colloquial Arabic. This will help future studies that employ van Leeuwen (2008) to examine gender.

Methodologically, a further contribution to this study is made by establishing if van Leeuwen's categories which are part of an English-based linguistic frameworks require modification when analysing non-standard Arabic data. When analysing the data with English-based linguistic frameworks the research took into consideration that the realization of van Leeuwen's categories in Arabic might be different to the way van Leeuwen had intended in his original framework. Therefore, the researcher used the framework in a

different way, because the data showed that, although van Leeuwen's categories did exist, they existed in a different way. For example, one of van Leeuwen's categories is relational identification which he defines as a representation of social actors in terms of their personal, kinship, or work relationships to each other. It is an important category, especially in a patriarchal society such as Saudi Arabia, where kinship not only defines relations but also bestows upon certain people – male mahram – power over the females in their family. The data did find that the social actors were represented using various forms of relational identification, for example, paternal but never maternal, however the data also showed that social actors were represented without relational identification, specifically using negation, which is equally as important as establishing kinship, because while the latter bestows power, the former revokes it. The methodological approach taken, and the research methodology assembled, involved modifications to van Leeuwen's relational identification, to not only consider the existence of, but also the negation of, a relationship. This modification, while applicable in Saudi Arabia and other Arab contexts, might not carry the same significance in a Western context. These modifications to van Leeuwen's framework is a unique contribution of this research that show when applying van Leeuwen's social actor framework (2008), which is in an English-based linguistic frameworks, to colloquial Arabic the nature of modifications that others could also employ in analysing Arabic. Also, this thesis contributes from a methodological perspective, as it provides a detailed account of the methodological development of the research project from its early stages. It presents a detailed qualitative analysis that shows the reader how the researcher identified the social actor representations and how these led to the detection of gendered discourses and gendered ideologies in Arabic data, illustrating clearly how the findings were achieved. To the best of research knowledge, this research is the first to employ van Leeuwen's social actor framework (2008) and thematic analysis and Sunderland's (2004) to analyse colloquial Arabic data.

Moving on to examine the study's contribution to broader research on Twitter, this thesis contributes to our understanding of how the platform is uniquely utilized in Saudi Arabia. It shows that the actions of individuals on the platform not only do not conform with traditional activism, as has been emphasised by other research, but fall within a distinct category, characterised by intense debate and discussion, that adhere to and are simultaneously regulated by the laws of the country. These activities, while different from conventional activism, play a socially significant role in shaping discourse and influencing public opinion around various issues, one of which is women driving. This research has also demonstrated the new significance of Twitter in the Saudi context, as an (inter)discursive tool for social debates and discussions.

By emphasising this distinct category of engagement, this research shows the ways in which Saudi Twitter users participate in discussions, providing insights into the unique dynamics of social interaction within the Saudi Arabian context. It challenges the notion that activism is the sole lens with which to view online actions and emphasizes the significance of recognizing and understanding this alternative category of intense debate and discussion.

By highlighting this form of engagement, this thesis contributes to a deeper understanding of the diverse ways in which people express their opinions online. The research emphasises the importance of considering the specific sociocultural context in which these online actions are unfolding and expands the discourse on online participation beyond the narrow view of traditional notions of activism.

Through its findings and methodological approach, this research advances knowledge of how Twitter discourse distinguishes from other social media platforms, namely the inclusivity of trending hashtags for Twitter users with lower numbers of followers or even non-existence follower. In other words, trending hashtags functions as a leveller in comparison to other

features of Twitter such as mentions (see Obia, 2023) regardless of the person social capital on Twitter, which can be deduced using metrics for example number of followers, voicing opinions using trending hashtags provide a level-playing field for all Twitter users. By leveraging trending hashtags, Twitter users can join and be seen as part of the broader conversation, amplifying their voices and ensuring visibility.

The findings of this study significantly contribute to our understanding of Twitter as an (inter)discursive tool for social debate, as it highlights the significance of Twitter's trending hashtags in facilitating inclusive participation and amplifying diverse voices. It distinguishes this research from previous studies that may have primarily focused on high-profile Twitter users.

This study shows that Twitter is a unique communicative medium, and that its distinctive features and norms, such as anonymity, had a significant influence on the ways in which the women driving debate unfolded and how Twitter participants engaged with it. It showcased the existence of varied viewpoints within Saudi society about women driving, including a range of opinions and arguments that presented a stark contrast to the narratives presented in the public mass media discourses, and challenged the monolithic portrayal of societal views on women driving.

Another contribution of the study is that it explores and adds to the suggested best practice and guidelines for social media research, particularly for Twitter. It highlights the importance of considering participants' privacy and anonymity in research conducted on the Twitter platform, and emphasises the need for researchers to acknowledge that their research has the potential to impact people who are not aware that their tweets are being analysed, examined, and most importantly published. It is also important to acknowledge that there are individuals who have taken extreme measures on Twitter to conceal their identity, by adopting a

pseudonym, not following the accounts of friends and family, or even masking their IP address, all in order to conceal their online identity from those around them. The study therefore emphasises the need to maintain the anonymity of participants, even if the researcher has ethically accessed the data and Twitter users' meta information, as this study has done. Even if the researcher considers the tweets to be harmless or non-controversial, it is imperative to protect the identity of the author of the tweet and ensure that they cannot be identified by others. Respecting participants' privacy is paramount, as their online tweets may have personal, cultural, or societal implications that may not be apparent to the researcher. Twitter itself, as a company and corporation, has treated user data as a commodity and has capitalized on that commodity. It has engaged in practices that exploit user information for profit, as evidenced by the company's track record, and by a $150 million dollar fine in 2020 (BBC, 2022) for illegal usage of user data for benefit from selling targeted advertising. It is vital, however, that researchers maintain higher ethical standards than corporations, exercise greater responsibility regarding Twitter users' data, and refrain from taking advantage of the indifference, lack of awareness and naivety of Twitter users. By highlighting the need for strict anonymity, this study adds to the growing body of research ethics within the field of social media research. It calls for researchers to exercise caution and ethical responsibility when analysing and discussing user-generated content. This study promotes ethical awareness and best practices within the growing field of research on Twitter and other social media platforms.

8.3 Implications of the Study

This section will discuss the potential impact and significance of the study. This thesis provides valuable insights that could be used to inform policy decisions and strategic planning to combat the gendered discourses and ideologies that were identified in tweets about women driving in Saudi Arabia. The research findings could help policy makers to develop interventions and initiatives that promote gender inclusivity and challenge harmful stereotypes and biases. With regard to education, the findings of this study could contribute to

the design of gender-inclusive curricula that address and counteract the gendered discourses and ideologies prevalent in society that were identified and named in this thesis. By incorporating diverse perspectives, challenging traditional gender roles, and promoting equality and inclusivity, educational institutions could play a vital role in shaping attitudes and beliefs. Finally, this research could be useful in the development of educational campaigns that address gendered discourses and ideologies, campaigns that raise awareness, challenge societal norms, and promote positive change by fostering critical thinking, promoting gender equality, and encouraging respectful dialogue. By targeting both online and offline spaces, such educational campaigns could reach a wide audience and contribute to societal transformation. Finally, teaching people to think critically and reflect on their own beliefs is an important skill. In the following section, the researcher shares her final thoughts and concluding remarks about the research.

8.4 Concluding remarks

By examining the representations of female and male supporters and opponents by the Anti-WD and Pro-WD Twitter users, the study's findings have shown the asymmetrical gendered power relations and that patriarchal gender ideologies are deeply ingrained in Saudi society. Also, that gender ideologies, do perform a powerful function in shaping all aspects of women lives even their ability perform a simple action as driving. As a researcher and a member of Saudi society, I found the findings of this study to be unexpected, particularly the one that relate to Pro-WD. As the study illustrates that Pro-WD did not drew on alternative discourses that challenge dominant discourses. Also, the number of instances in which they mock or attempt to dismantle gender stereotypes and gendered ideologies are limited. To the contrary, only Pro-WD actively drew on a number of discourses such as 'Mother of boys as privileged' to remove women agency or even dismiss women's view about WD as in the 'Selfless women discourse'. Some of the gendered discourses and gendered ideologies that prevailed in this study, such as matrimony, female domesticity, fragility of female's reputation and honour,

these are the same issues that has also been used against women, when they wanted to pursue education and even employments.

But since the data has been collected, and the lifting of the ban on women driving many major changes and reforms in Saudi Arabia has been implemented by Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman which have empowered women. These progressive measures have empowered saudi women. While the precise influence on gendered discourse and the impact on ingrained gender ideologies and stereotypes deeply embedded in Saudi society are yet to be fully examined. Online discourse about women related issues should be examined after all the changes in Saudi Arabia became part of the society, and study whether traditional gender roles and gendered discourses continue to surface or new one would emerge. Will the online discussion of women's issues on Twitter, conflict with the situation offline.

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List of Appendices

10.1 Appendix A Pro-Women Driving translations of oringal tweets

Table-A1	
1)	He does not want to be a driver for his family, [he just] wants them to be servants in the kitchen, [to the man] when you are in charge be just #Women's car driving is a necessity
2)	#Women's car driving is a necessity my brother the bottom line is the one who do not trust his family's morals should stay forever their driver😂
3)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I found that most men who oppose the campaign work as private drivers😐 Do not fear on your profession by injustice and [earning] dirty money and you know that livelihood is written [by Allah] 😐
4)	Most of those in opposition [of women driving] are owners of taxies and ride service companies that's why they oppose [women's driving] because it will end their livelihood
Table-A2	
5)	#Women's car driving is a necessity despite those who call for women driving are honourable and daughters of honourable men. I say that those who belittle those calls to drive should look at themselves first.
6)	#Women's car driving is a necessity some [of] the girls say that we oppose as we are daughters' of sheikhs we do not drive and at the end her father is middleman-second hand cars dealers 😂😂😂😂😂
Table-A3	
7)	#Women's car driving is a necessity most males opponents have no sisters, or simply he just denies his sister access to education or employment

8)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the one [female] whose boys are a dozen is not in need for women driving. Step aside and keep quiet … This hashtag is for needy males and needy females
9)	Those [females] who say Praise be to Allah, have twenty brothers and 7 husbands and sixty thousand boys to drive them wherever they want to go, should remember that others do not have that; you mama… you princesses #Women's car driving is a necessity
10)	#Women's car driving is a necessity mostly the opponent has brothers or a driver. Okay, you selfish [person], should those who have no brothers and no driver leave their lives on hold for you?! 😬😒
11)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Those women whose fathers and husbands hired multiple drivers for her, and she doesn't even know how much their salaries are just to go to the mall and to pay visits, should not interfere or bother us
12)	You have guardians to drive you wherever you want, and you slander us and lecture us on religion, temptation and sedition. [you] should say nice things, or better, remain silent #Women's car driving is a necessity
13)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Do you remember your mother Eve, they blamed her for leading Adam out of heaven that's why they fight us forever
Table-A4	
14)	#Women's car driving is a necessity all opponents and extremist of [opposing] the issue [of women driving] I think they did not finish university and their thinking is shallow and thankyou
15)	#Women's car driving is a necessity a loser with no job to suit him, no completed education driving, aimlessly drive through the streets, tell female employee who is supporting her family that she is not in a position to drive 🙂

16)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I find that the main interest of half of [females] opponents is how to get married. They have no goals in life besides that, and of course, do not care about demanding that they drive 🤔
17)	#Women's car driving is a necessity It's a real necessity for employees, divorcees and widows. Those who do not want to drive could remain silent. It's true what they say, women are their own worst enemies
18)	You will find that those young men who say bad things to women who demand to drive, telling them to stay in their place, are divorced [males] who, when you tell them to fulfil the rights of their ex-wives and children, ask what rights #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table A5	
19)	The one who does not want [to drive] should not drive manipulating with the brains of the powerless [females] are being manipulated by telling them that you are a princess that why you should not drive while she is waiting under the sun for a driver to stop for her #Women's car driving is a necessity
20)	#Women's car driving is a necessity there are women /ḥareem/ [who are] used to being submissive and will repeat what the man says with vigour and enthusiasm😂😂 . This is considered a psychological disorder you should look at yourselves
Table-A6	
21)	Half of the men population talk on behalf of women, lounging around the house and locking their [womenfolk up] for months at a time😂#Women's car driving is a necessity
22)	The men [tweeting] in the hashtag have cars and go to work with no problem. Then exerts power over a woman who wants to drive so that she won't be harassed or bullied #Women's car driving is a necessity

23)	#Women's car driving is a necessity if women were permitted to drive >the opponents from among men< can prevent their women from doing so, because driving won't be forced on them☺
24)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Driving is the last thing that the man holds over women so they have become irritated and are fighting back. We lead the way with our degrees and commitment to our jobs and now they are jealously guarding their manhood
Table-A7	
25)	To avoid bigotry, I try to understand the opponents [to women's driving], but I'm incapable of doing so, especially when they are males! What does it matter to them when the issue is one for women! #Women's car driving is a necessity
26)	The needs and work of many girls are at the mercy of the male whim. She has to put things on hold until the male is willing to drive them #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A8	
27)	Semi-man who is barking! you male, do you not realise that this issue is in the hands of the government, and that when women's driving is allowed you will as usual shut up and praise and congratulate them #Women's car driving is a necessity
28)	The disease of suspicion of a wife, sister, daughter, and that at a wink or gesture from a man she will be mesmerized. This proves that you know you are not a man and cannot provide support #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A9	
29)	#Women's car driving is a necessity It's a woman's right to serve herself and her family, as she is in a place of trust. Those who distrust her and place their trust in a private driver, with all due respect, is cuckold.
30)	The cuckold is the one who allows his wife ride alone with the driver. He is opposing #Women's car driving is a necessity

31)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Who is the cuckold, the one who trusts his sister and his wife with a driver who could possibly rape her, rather than allow her to drive herself? Raise your hand
Table-A10	
32)	#Women's car driving is a necessity if the sky rains with freedom .. you would see the slaves carrying umbrellas
33)	#Women's car driving is a necessity and still slaves' of the males say that they do not want to drive 😂may Allah damn your brains you and her
34)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the response that the girls who say we [all girls] do not need [to drive] and that she is a queen nothing last tomorrow you become an odalisque girl like us and you will need to depend on yourself
35)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Any free woman will support this hashtag, and any scared male will oppose it as they won't be able to control women if they are allowed to drive?
Table-A11	
36)	#Women's car driving is a necessity To the one who says 'you are a queen and a queen in your own house', the queen's era has ended. Now we reverse the roles and you [men] will become queens in your houses'? 🏃‍♂️💘
37)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you are obsessed with, let her she is a queen and everything you have include chastity and religion damn your masochism 💦
38)	#Women's car driving is a necessity so you are a repressed queen and you do not want to drive. Shut up and let others live 😕
39)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the most important thing is that you still believe you are a queen .. then who is the one who washes dishes and cleans the house 💔 queen they say 😩

40)	#Women's car driving is a necessity do not you understand ❓ you are a queen 👑and queens do not drive here 😝
Table-A12	
41)	The sheep spend their lives fearing the wolf and most likely the shepherd kills them #Women's car driving is a necessity
42)	#Women's car driving is a necessity to the donkey that says she does not want to drive stay in your house. No one is dragging you by the leg to drive, but I want to drive and to run my errands without asking anyone for a favour
43)	Drivers are never there when you need them, taxis are expensive, the sun beats down on us, we often have to tramp the streets, and then a donkey says that this is the start of attaining women #Women's car driving is a necessity
44)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I won't be driving, but would like to ask of those who say that women will become prey for the wolves, who are those wolves? Are they you and people like you?😔
45)	#Women's car driving is a necessity regarding the /Darbāwiyya/ they threaten to kidnap or assault [women who will drive] we did not see you do anything [while travelling] abroad you bury your head in the sand like an ostrich 😅
46)	The thing that makes me laugh are the tweets by [a man] that claim that there will be no driving for women, as if the decision is in his hands! He is like a goat, and tomorrow when the ban is lifted, he will be full of praise #Women's car driving is a necessity
47)	#Women's car driving is a necessity we will drive, by Allah's will and grace. You, the greyhounds, will not prevent us from doing something it is in the hands of King Salman, may Allah protect him. May he allow driving 😔
48)	#Women's car driving is a necessity does not feel it's necessity the one braying like donkeys here and call for women driving not to be allowed

49)	🐸 whoever objects to women driving, bring me a Qur'anic evidence. Go on, you school graduate'?#Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A13	
50)	The fault is in the thinking of the 'beards' who think about the corruption in themselves rather than about easing the lives of women #Women's car driving is a necessity
51)	The meat who does not want to drive should eat hay, stay in her house, and beg the rice(es), and be driven like a goat, but should not generalize her objections to those who are in need #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A14	
52)	#Women's car driving is a necessity some [of] the males are raised that they are better than females and they will have a heart attack if women surpass them, the issue is jealousy from you not on you the jewel
53)	Well, you safeguarded pearl, no one will drag you by your hair and make you drive #Women's car driving is a necessity
54)	#Women's car driving is a necessity a girl and opposing women driving. I will reiterate that her family will not let her drive if she did the impossible. That's why she pretends opposing women driving the safeguarded the pearl shut up
Table-A15	
55)	#Women's car driving is a necessity by Allah's grace we will drive despite putting the nose of everyone who forbids women their basics and see them socially disgraced out of joint
56)	Anything new they will disapprove. Previously it was women's education and now women's driving. The former happened and the latter will happen despite putting our opponents' noses out of joint?#Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A16	

57)	#Women's car driving is a necessity will be opposed by whose heart is a disease until the ban is lifted, and after that you will see him competing with you at the traffic department offices to complete his wife's car registration
58)	#Women's car driving is a necessity to women [of] the kingdom, direct your request to the government directly and disregard twitter males' clique whose brain consist of genitals
59)	#Women's car driving is a necessity brothers, we have to see beautiful faces on the Ring Road, and not only you, whose face is like your knee. Yet you oppose [women driving]
Table-A17	
60)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Matawa[120] [religious clerics/men] do not forget, [that you] forbid women from driving, and [instead permit women] riding with a stranger isn't this forbidden[?]. Enough of your lies and deception.
61)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Erdogan's Matawa[121]?? It's permissible for /alḥarym/ women to drive in turkey
62)	Women driving is a matter of time like satellite and mobile with cameras , and other things that were prohibited by the extremists at the beginning and then they accept them #Women's car driving is a necessity
63)	In Gulf countries women drive with her full freedom and no one harass her, but the one here opposing are extremist and closed-minded. #Women's car driving is a necessity
64)	#Women's car driving is a necessity to the awakening any independent women must be a prostitute because they reject women dignity, so they slander her
65)	The reason that some people oppose [women's driving] is because they belong or follow a particular party or a group, and leaders of this group oppose. And he is a follower no more no less #Women's car driving is a necessity

[120] Strict Religious men or strict religious clerics

Table-A18	
66)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity by Allah's grace [women’s] driving is coming despite every [male] Daesh /da‘shy/ and [female]Daesh /da‘shyah/, retard and coward
67)	Most of those who oppose driving are the future of Daesh #Women’s car driving is a necessity
Table-A19	
68)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity When a woman joins this hashtag to call for her needs and sees tweets by the males [who are] lacking in mind it is a great test of her patience
69)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity the category of males and females who are lacking in mind if you are against women driving people's circumstances are not the same, your fingers on your hands are not equal, selfishness is rotten
70)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity because of the males pornographic thinking and linked with buttocks I suspected that their minds are raped
71)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity the males who oppose women driving and the females who are pretending that they are opposing driving, I view them as /Laḥijyen/ their minds are locked/cuffed more than anything
Table-A20	
72)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity you are allowing women to drive has nothing to do with manhood you are retarded [person] ! you misunderstand manhood be a man and the field is open not only for women
73)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity I have lost hope in this issue because there are still retarded opponents who say no and the reason is that they lack of trust in themselves and their families 😔
Table-A21	

74)	First, ignorant [people] say that women are easy prey, but this is nonsense talk. Do you see them as rats that can be easily caught #Women's car driving is a necessity
75)	#Women's car driving is a necessity [how does a woman] riding with a driver is okay, but driving herself is not allowed "annnnnn[122]" you ignorant she rides with a mahram do you know what's a mahram
Table-A22	
76)	#Women's car driving is a necessity every stupid claim that the one [female] who drive will face harm we respond to him by saying that she faces more than that by walking and traveling with stranger
77)	Driving a car is to do my errands and to go for my job. What's on your mind, you crazy [people] that I will go out and go drifting with young men #Women's car driving is a necessity
78)	#Women's car driving is a necessity May Allah's curse the fools who prohibit it in the name of religion and the religion is innocent from them.
79)	If you reject that women drive cars and allow her to ride with a strange driver that you do not know then you are mentally retarded and you need to visit the hospital #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A23	
80)	The one who are saying that she [123] will lose her chastity and honour. We guard our honour and chastity more than you and the sick minded who are saying that. It's not our problem if you are filthy #Women's car driving is a necessity
81)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the one who thinks that his family will turn into prostitutes if they hold the steering wheel, then the problem is with you and your family, and it is not a problem for the entire society that you're sick minded.

[122] Is the equivalent of 'Argh' to indicate frustration and disappointment
[123] Refer to women who are going to drive

82)	Why do we assume that a woman who drivers is promiscuous and her family members cuckolds !! I know girls from the gulf who drive while wearing a veil! Where is the problem? We did not say that we will strip naked you sick minded people #Women's car driving is a necessity
83)	#Women's car driving is a necessity allowing women to drive is a matter of time and there is no compelling reason to prevent it, it's just fantasies in the brain of sick minded in case [women's] driving was allowed
84)	#Women's car driving is a necessity anything that is a for women, the ignorant [people] and sick minded will stand against women we are one hand✋
Table-A24	
85)	Ignore comments that make you feel bad no one should respond to them, because they are cowards and scared of having their masculinity challenged #Women's car driving is a necessity
86)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Any free woman will support this hashtag, and any scared male will oppose it as they won't be able to control women if they are allowed to drive?
Table-A25	
The following tweet was double coded	
87)	#Women's car driving is a necessity mostly the [female] opponent has brothers or a driver. Okay, you selfish [person], should those who have no brothers and no driver leave their lives on hold for you?! 😬😒
88)	#Women's car driving is a necessity a demand by a lot [of females] and [females] rejecters [women driving] they are not forced to drive stop being selfish and think about others if you are content others are not

89)	It's shameful that most of the opponents [of women's driving] are women. Why are you being [the] selfish? You may not need to drive but I do. Why do you try to hinder me even more #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A26	
90)	#Women's car driving is a necessity What I have understood from the Saudi the nation is that there is a relationship between adultery and the car. Just tell me how? Does it mean that you men commit adultery every day?
91)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Just take a quick look at this hashtag to see the extent to which the Saudi [the] nation is retarded and fears anything new. Allah is the one whose help is sought
92)	I know that we will not drive with a retarded nation but what frustrate me is the retarded tweets and replicated tweets that view [women's] driving as if it is a disgraces or forbidden🙃 #Women's car driving is a necessity
93)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I am certain that if they allow women driving, it is just a while then all the opponents will allow their families to drive, we are a paradoxical nation
94)	#قياده_المراه_للسياره_ضروره الناس وصلت المريخ ويجهزون للسكن فيه وانتوا مانعين حريمكم تسوق طول عمركم شعب جاهل ورح تظلون متخلفين طول العمر💦💦 #Women's car driving is a necessity the people have reached mars and prepared to settle there, and you are still preventing your women from driving. All your lives you have been an ignorant nation and will always remain rerated for eternity 💦💦
Table-A27	
95)	A pure patriarchal society 😂#Women's car driving is a necessity
96)	The Saudi society is a patriarchal society built on the enslavement of women, and the man is not at fault for assuming his rights, he just wants girls to be his maid🙇 #Women's car driving is a necessity

97)	A bohemian retarded society that considers driving to be only a manly work 😂 #Women's car driving is a necessity
98)	A retarded close-minded society fear new things and progress. You will end up doing like what you did in the past with the radio and television #Women's car driving is a necessity
99)	The one who does not want [male] his family to drive and the one [female] who does not want to drive, that their business. But we want to drive oh retarded society you deny us from the simplest things #Women's car driving is a necessity
100)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Oh, driving is a problem and a disaster, but women riding with a strange driver is normal! I swear this is a sick society 😐💔
101)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the ones who oppose women driving are the ones who praise the female Emirati pilot😂 a society with split personality 💔
102)	It's forbidden for a woman to drive a car but permitted for her to ride with a driver in a car! A strange society👎#Women's car driving is a necessity
103)	#Women's car driving is a necessity an ignorant society! If it's fine, then they say everyone is fine and if it's not fine then they speak up. The truth is that women driving is more honourable than [being driven by strange] drivers and thank you
104)	#Women's car driving is a necessity If a woman speaks about her needs, they accuse her of being against Al-Saud and her country and accuse her of being a prostitute. [This is] the thinking of a pre-Islamic society
105)	An ideologized society controlled by traditions, customs, fables, superstitions and by savage legacies that fight every beautiful thing #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-A28	
106)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Men in Saudi prevent us from driving not because they are concerned on us. No it's just because you are a creature that has no opinion that follow his opinions because you are basically a disgrace

107)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the human is an enemy for anything he does not know and I say the Saudi is an enemy for anything he does not know👎they are still stuck on women driving and flexing their muscles on this issue for 30 years #enough
108)	#Women's car driving is a necessity The Saudi young man alleges that the woman will not be able to compete with his driving skills because he knows that the woman will adhere to the driving law more than him
109)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the Arab man feel less than that the Western man and even the Asian man his only way to protect his female is by restricting her
110)	#Women's car driving is a necessity this is the Saudi girl) either with a driver who is not a mahram or beg someone to driver her around and when she join this hashtag, she starts to pretend that she does not want to drive

10.2 Appendix B Anti-Women Driving translations of original tweets

Table-B1	
1)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the problem is when the man sloughs from his duties as head of household and places all the household responsibilities and his responsibilities on the women 😔🤔
2)	#Women's car driving is a necessity if a father accept that his daughter will drive then he lost the meaning of .. All of you are guardians and are responsible for your wards
3)	#Women's car driving is a necessity honour comes above everything, and the one who is aware about honour and protect his family from thugs. Then I challenge any one from people of the tribes to accept [women driving]. In my opinion it should not be introduced
Table-B2	
4)	#Women's car driving is a necessity let her drive her house and her kids and then we will see.. the issue is simple
5)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you should [first] learn to drive the Panda supermarket trolley, and then drive**.....**

6)	#Women's car driving is a necessity as if we can tolerate more traffic congestion. Stay in your house and drive the vacuum. It's better for you 💔😂
7)	#Women's car driving is a necessity how nice of our girls, stick to the vacuums and we are your drivers😊
8)	#Women's car driving is a necessity they recommend to turn on the vacuum cleaner and [drive it] from one room to another and you can also drift [with the vacuum]and enjoy that😄😄😄
9)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the luxuriousness is that you have a private driver and a car .. why don't [you] advanced/developed [female] work on car-carrying trailer[124]
10)	Who call for# Women's car driving is a necessity she did not realise her true purpose in life.. the girl is dutiful to her parents, and the mother take care of her children and her husband ?
Table-B3	
11)	There is no daughter of an honourable man that wants to drive #Women's car driving is a necessity
12)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I swear that you will not be able to influence girls of honour and tribe their values are strong
13)	They have not resolved the issues of widows and divorced women and unemployment and poverty so that they can pay attention to daughters of rich men #Women's car driving is a necessity
14)	Its luxuries and non-essential that the offspring of the upper-class want even if they get it and I hope they do not they will not relinquish their private drivers, as it completes their prestige #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B4	

[124] This is a truck that is also known as a car hauler. This type of truck, trailer or semi-trailer is designed to transport multiple vehicles.

15)	#Women's car driving is a necessity now the one her father is alive or she has brother or married, on what ground is she calling for women driving? by the permission of Allah you will not drive❤️
16)	No of course, it is not a necessity if she does not want [to ride with] a driver, then her brother is available, her father is available, her husband is available #Women's car driving is a necessity
17)	#Women's car driving is a necessity If a woman has no support from a father, brother, husband or son, then she has the right to drive. It's less damaging than having a foreign driver who may violate her honour
18)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the one whose best is not to his family is of no benefit to anyone and I am the driver of my family and I do not mind taking them wherever the need to go. My rest comes when I see them joyful
Table-B5	
19)	#Women's car driving is a necessity there is no [driving] there is no [driving] there is no [driving] Gender of Eve stay sane the woman has only her house and kitchen may Allah rectify and guid you ✋✋✋
20)	#Women's car driving is a necessity do not argue with the female☺️ if she defeats you , she will despise you, and if you defeat her, she will hate you. It is better for you if you stay silent😜 I swear they are not sane😂😂😂😂😂
21)	#She was a female until she said I want to drive it is not out of necessity it's just stubbornness 😢#Women's car driving is a necessity# you should understand that you won't drive
22)	#She was a female until she said #Women's car driving is a necessity

23)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the males who are calling for [women] driving I wish that on your way encounter a girl driving a Ford [125] who does not know how to drive and she hits your new car😂
24)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the Devil's hope for paradise[126] as along as tribesmen are alive you won't even ride a bicycle. As for the males they have intentions they realized. the end!! ?
25)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the one who wants women driving is a male person and not a female so that he can play ,have fun ,and have sex with her any time he wants, and she wants that's it
26)	The males' supporters either he is an Egyptian vulture [127] that the woman herds and controls like a sheep or one of the slackers who spend most of their time at /istirahat/[128] and cafés # Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B6	
27)	The issue is that all the women are angry and do not understand that the ban on women driving is for their interest, but the retarded do not think #Women's car driving is a necessity
28)	#Women's car driving is a necessity woman you will not drive
29)	#Women's car driving is a necessity oh woman, may Allah guide you stay in your house. We cannot handle any more traffic 😶🔥!
Table-B7	
30)	#Women's car driving is a necessity why are women advocating for women's driving? Because semi-men abandon their responsibility for women and gave women the role of men..!

[125] An American make of car that is, in Saudi Arabia, associated with bad drivers.
[126] An idiom that means a snowball's chance in hell.
[127] Egyptian vulture refers to the animal species and is in no way connected with the Egyptian people.
[128] This term refers to places outside people's homes, often locations such as 'holiday villas' where men tend to gather.

31)	The problem is that most of [those] who are calling [for women's driving] are the womanish of men 😂 We are aware that you are tweeting from abroad and your goal is corruption #Women's car driving is a necessity
32)	#Women's car driving is a necessity because you have no protective jealousy on your family[129] you will just throw them in the street and be relived from them -you trashman😅. Sadly [he] has no shred of manhood
33)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the majority of those who demand women to drive are lacking in manhood! You are the responsible for her service and seek her comfort and her needs
34)	For the one who has become weak, and lost his determination, has diminished power, and his manhood has been stripped, rise above and distance yourself from immorality. Women in our society are conservative ….#Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B8	
35)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I am astonished when I see men supporting women driving. Where is the protective jealousy?
36)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I lost respect for half of the people [because they support women driving] how can they allow a girl to drive where are her brothers where is their protective jealousy
37)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the problem is not with the girls who call for women driving, it is with the man who wants his sister to drive. I have a question for this group, have you no protective jealousy!?
38)	#Women's car driving is a necessity most of them [men supporter of women driving] have no protective jealousy, do not want to be responsible, and does not care if his sister went out by herself and if she gets kidnapped

[129] Using the euphemism 'family-اهلك' refer to women of the men family.

39)	The person who created this hashtag, if you have no protective jealousy let your family drive, but do not involve yourself in other people's families … our women are revered and honoured without driving #Women's car driving is a necessity
40)	#Women's car driving is a necessity to the people who say, if you do not trust your family, other people do trust them, if your honour is not important to you, other people care about their honour, if you have no protective jealousy other people do
41)	#Women's car driving is a necessity to the one who support [women driving]. Sadly, in my opinion: 1- have no protective jealousy and do not worry about his family 2- lazy and dependent 3-Sells cars
Table-B9	
42)	I seek refuge in Allah. I think that the person who created this hashtag is probably a cuckold. If he was honest, he would have talked about divorced, and widowed women who have been appealing their rights in courts for years #Women's car driving is a necessity
43)	Who is the cuckold who will allow his sister and his wife to drive the person who created this hashtag is a cuckold. Allah will not look at him the day of resurrection #Women's car driving is a necessity
44)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Whoever calls for women driving in the name of freedom of rights is either a cuckold or a prostitute 💔🤓
45)	When manhood and protective jealousy in men are dead, then women's bashfulness and shyness will die ; behind every cuckold is a prostitute[130] #Women's car driving is a necessity
46)	#Women's car driving is a necessity That's true it is a necessity for the prostitute who wants to drive so that she can go to her lover apartment, and its necessity for the cuckold whose honour is stomped on at house and the wife controls him :)
Table-B10	
47)	#Women's car driving is a necessity a necessity for "the masculine lesbians/tomboys" girls

[130] It is a play on the saying, behind every great man is a woman.

48)	Imagine the masculine lesbian/tomboy driving and next to her is her girlfriend and her citrus soft drink is on the dashboard ..“Continue your walk you are with beautiful eyelash”[131] #Women’s car driving is a necessity
49)	I am against this hashtag I am cherished in my family’s house, and we have who drive us. Why have we lost our femininity so that we want to drive?! 🤔 #Women’s car driving is a necessity
50)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity of course not in Saudi. We are daughters’ of sheikhs and princesses 😌. I feel as that [the woman] who drive her femininity decreased. I do not know why 😐, I cannot imagine it in Saudi? 👎🏻😱
Table-B11	
51)	Chaste Saudi women reject women’s driving and the other group call for it ⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️⬆️#Women’s car driving is a necessity
52)	(The chaste girls reject women’s driving) #Women’s car driving is a necessity
53)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity who want to sell her honour then drive!!!!
54)	Of course, it’s a necessity for every vile [woman] but the chaste [woman], I swear they are disgusted just by mention of it #Women’s car driving is a necessity
Table-B12	
55)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity of course no because there is no woman that drive unless she is either divorce or a spinster [according to] statistics of the Gulf countries [132]. and this what they are looking for, which is to marginalize women in the name of freedom!
56)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity the number of the spinsters will increase an employed girl with a car, and have a lover what does she want with marriage and commitment and raising children. This is one of the aims of this hashtags.

[131] A flirtatious sentence that used to be popular in the 80s. Men used to say this to women.
[132] It’s arbitrary statistics by the author of the tweet.

57)	#Women's car driving is a necessity any guy who wants to get married … do you think he will accept you as his wife[?] he will not marry you because you are driving let her [remain a] spinster and her life will be wasted while you are looking at…. your car flap😂
Table-B13	
58)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the problem is that unfortunately most girls who want to drive are teenagers …My dear stay at your home and keep watching your TV shows
59)	Middle school girls have been annoying. No baba there is no driving my sweetheart [133] :(. #Women's car driving is a necessity
60)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Mohammed bin Salman said the decision is the society's decision and since I am an important part of society I say no for [women] driving ..pack your things and go way Middle school girls☺️
61)	All those in the hashtag [who] want to drive and brag are middle school girls😂😂😂😂😂😂😂 #Women's car driving is a necessity
62)	The girls in the hashtag supporting women driving I think are under the age of discernment because there is no sane person will support women driving and he know the negative aspect 🔪🌞#Women's car driving is a necessity
63)	#Women's car driving is a necessity are you seeing the traffic congestion and accidents. how can you call for [women] driving. The problem with children is that they demand without thinking through
64)	#Women's car driving is a necessity no that's a bad idea. May God protect us from girls of this generation. The good ones has gone 😘👍 they were good even the trunk of the car was enough for them😘💞👇
65)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the ambition of the Saudi [female] become to drive a car | Damn this generation 👎🏽

[133] The Arabic term used is /ya galboush/ which is a term of endearment usually used for children Arabic the closest translation is my sweetheart or my dear. In this tweet It used her to mock females' supporters as it emphasize their childish demands

66)	#Women's car driving is a necessity who calls for women driving are the category of young men and [male] teenagers their goals become exposed and clear and a category of girls follow them.
Table-B14	
67)	The person who started this hashtag is an Egyptian vulture and raised by a woman and the woman ruling commanded him to start this hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity
The following tweet was double coded	
68)	The males supporters either he is an Egyptian vulture [134] that the woman herd and control like a sheep or one of the slackers who spend most of their time at /istirahat/ [135] and cafés #Women's car driving is a necessity
69)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the liberals are prevalent in this hashtag and this hashtag will end and no one will drive [.] and unfortunately you are an Egyptian vulture and you are incompetent and there are more important issue than [women] driving and.
70)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I am surprised by the man who call for women driving, and their excuse is the [problem] of too many [foreign] drivers so why do not you serve your family you are the Egyptian vulture
71)	Mohammed bin Salman said that we cannot impose something on the nation that they do not want. That means that those [refer to female] who want to drive and the sheep who support them eat hay there is no driving #Women's car driving is a necessity
72)	Most [male] supporters for #Women's car driving is a necessity are beggars for girls' retweets😊 (the retweet sheep🐂)
73)	#Women's car driving is a necessity women driving for the car is prostitution and */dayatha/*[136] we will not allow it Muslim pigs we seek refuge in Allah from all of you amen 😁

[134] Egyptian vulture refers to the species of the animal it has no connection of being an Egyptian person
[135] This term refers to places located outside people home and often has more of a "holiday villa" men tend to gather in these places
[136] The state of not having protective jealousy on female members of his family and his honour is violated and who overlooks the indecency and immoral behaviour of his family

74)	#Women's car driving is a necessity if you got into an accident while you are alone in a place far from your home, how would you act and communicate to him and it is impossible [for you] to endure all this shit, of course you cow
75)	#Women's car driving is a necessity when 'the cow goes on pilgrimage on its horns[137]'#Oh the cows ☺️ 🐄🐄🐄
76)	Just think before you let the goat into the wolfs (refer to men) cage, are they going to respect her or have her for lunch🤔 most probably they will have here for dinner #Women's car driving is a necessity
77)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the utmost ambition of the goat is to gather her forage
78)	I swear that you will not drive bark like the dogs 🐕 #Women's car driving is a necessity
79)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you will never drive you bitch /kalbah/
80)	Do not drive and say I am a daughter of Saudi man do not drive and be like the greyhound #Women's car driving is a necessity
81)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you know what's the problem is? that there are a bunch of sons of the dog who support women driving, but when you ask him is it okay for your sister to drive, he say no they just want to be able to take advantage of women
Table-B15	
82)	#Women's car driving is a necessity when will the liberal donkeys and their greyhounds of women will stop from their scribbles there is no driving the broom is more than enough
83)	I am from the opponent party, the liberal people tricked you and you are like the donkeys followed them, there are things more important than this meaninglessness issue #Women's car driving is a necessity
84)	#Women's car driving is a necessity are we back discussing the same topic!! the liberals are only concern is women driving! We do not want to drive don't you understand you donkeys

[137] pigs might fly

85)	If praying at home for a woman is better than praying at a mosque, why are the dogs want to remove her from her house perish your hands you the liberals #Women's car driving is a necessity
86)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you, dog of the liberal , the barking still continues, do you think that all women issues and the society issues have been resolved? you and your herd are still barking. You won't drive 😂
87)	#Women's car driving is a necessity anything the liberals say, you follow them like the herd, after them like a blind follower. Think with your brain about the consequences.
88)	#Women's car driving is a necessity how long will you keep barking and braying about women driving, the only thing that concern the liberals are to liberate [women], liberate your daughters (and the rest on us)
89)	The liberals has arrived .. Dogs of the West are barking for no reason .. no one cares about you donkeys 😂😂😂😂#Women's car driving is a necessity
90)	Few humans participate in this hashtag , and a lot a lot of mules of the West and Persian animals who repeat the same phrases, and twisted logic #Women's car driving is a necessity
91)	Every time I see this hashtag, I smell the stench of the donkeys of the Jews the refusers[138] and their aids of hypocrites spiteful [people] who hate# Saudi #Women's car driving is a necessity
92)	The liberal is like the insect that lands on filth and then transfers it, and he lands on the filth of the West and transfer it to us #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B16	
93)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you will not drive you hag, the one with black knee
94)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you should thank God you are respected and served by a driver and servants, and no one is in your position has all of that, and even with the black knee

[138] Could be translated as the rejectors

95)	#Women's car driving is a necessity you won't drive , you won't drive you saggy breasts
96)	#Women's car driving is a necessity they drive a tractor on your head you and her You won't drive the one with breasts😤
97)	Who is the one-eyed shameless [man] who call for women driving. Does not see the broken street that has damage our cars or the traffic congestion on the streets #Women's car driving is a necessity
98)	The one who support #Women's car driving is a necessity [he has] a shoe in the brain. There is a need for a surgery to remove the shoes from his brain. Where is [the issues] of older [female] graduates? Where is the issue of the housewife's salary ? where is all of this?
Table-B17	
99)	It's very clear and obvious that the only people who call for women driving are /altorsh/ because the Saudi women do not want to drive #Women's car driving is a necessity
100)	#Women's car driving is a necessity manipulation by the liberal dynasty and secular [people] and refusers and naturalized girls and /torsh albahar/, and you believe them the society will not be kind to you..
101)	#Women's car driving is a necessity did the liberal and secular [person] and the naturalized /torsh albahar/ call for you to gain other important things, such as employment among others? of course not they want to [morally] corrupt you
102)	#Women's car driving is a necessity do not let the liberal thug and secular [person] and ladies of the night. and naturalized /ṭarsh bḥar/ implicates you. It's not in your interest to drive the society will reject you
103)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the world is returning. .. to the hijab, Islam, and morals and the naturalized …/ṭarsh al-bḥar/ tails of the Western embassies, and raised by the West wants to drive 😂

104)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the person who created this hashtag is an immoral person and am sure that he is naturalized and not a Saudi and those who are smart will understand😎
105)	My brother you are really bothering us, the woman will not drive and stop bringing this topic, /ṭrwsh albḥar/ if you are not pleased you should leave Saudi Arabia #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B18	
106)	Do not let nonessential things in life distract you be unique and do not be followers of girls from other countries without thinking #Women's car driving is a necessity
107)	They have every luxury in life and the only thing that left is driving. Just notice who is demanding it, the aristocracy and their /ima'aht / the flunkies #Women's car driving is a necessity
The following tweet was double coded	
108)	#Women's car driving is a necessity it's an idea from the liberal thugs they want the two gender to mix and the weak-minded of the girls are following them.. but they won't be able to deceive the woman of original tribal descent
The following tweet was double coded	
109)	#Women's car driving is a necessity who calls for women driving are the category of young men and [male] teenagers their goals become exposed and clear and a category of girls follow them aimlessly.
Table-B19	
110)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the government has concluded the discussion on women driving, but enemies of the country are trying to create chaos in the country by sugar-coating the poison
111)	The Saudi society are aware and understands what the enemies wants, and our government is aware of this. The people and the government are one unit, and one heart #Women's car driving is a necessity

112)	The Saudi woman of original tribal descent is not one of those demanding women's driving, but there are some intruders in the society who are demanding #Women's car driving is a necessity
113)	#Women's car driving is a necessity The strange thing is that if you search the hashtag you will find new accounts with female username or people who do not belong to the country!. how is this happening? ask who
114)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I swear that enemies of modest dressing and veiling will not set still until they see women in public, in the street of Mecca and Madina wearing shorts and bikinis
115)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Let enemies of Islam bark and die of envy 🖕😉. " " " " " " " " "
116)	Allah knows best, this hashtag is from the devil political party. Listen listen women will not drive in Saudi, this is for sure, she will not drive; she will not drive
117)	Enemies of the religion and the country and tails of Persia [secret agent] Are working hard using hashtags to disrupt the security of the country #Women's car driving is a necessity no it's not a necessity you are only going to drive in the "land of temporary marriage[139]"
118)	#Women's car driving is a necessity who demands [women's driving] are our enemies #the liberal and #the refuser. Does it make sense that my enemy demands something and claim that it is my right! If I see him, I will spit on his face
Table-B20	
119)	What do they want those liberals #Women's car driving is a necessity
120)	#Women's car driving is a necessity they started this hashtag to distract us from the issue of the Iranian bombing! The liberals always align with Iran, because of the freedom of immorality and moral decay

[139] Refer to Iran.

121)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the liberals did not give up, they want to get out the Saudi women in anyway, the Saudi woman is living her life and did not complain to you
122)	#Women's car driving is a necessity aren't we done with the liberal community drivel 😤
123)	#Women's car driving is a necessity because this issue is just a symbol of victory to# the liberal community despite if there is a real need for driving, I will continue fighting against [women's driving] as long as I live
124	Widows divorced, graduates, unemployed, disabled are not of concern to the #Liberal dynasty, what's matter is just getting her out of her house to drive a car #Women's car driving is a necessity
125)	Hahahah, Allah (alone) whose help can be sough, I spit on Liberal dynasty
126)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I swear that you have disgusted us with this topic you Liberal dynasty may Allah damn you
127)	If the woman was important, why don't you talk about her employment and her other rights that are worth discussing. Oh Liberal dynasty your goals are dreams #Women's car driving is a necessity
128)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the bigger issue is that most [of those] in the hashtag call themselves civilised, and they are [the] Liberal dynasty agitating the issue
129)	#Women's car driving is a necessity liberal dynasty people they have only one concern which is women's driving, could you please leave us alone, there is nothing left but for me to drive in the afternoon.
130)	#Women's car driving is a necessity .. the liberal dynasty only knows modernization when it comes to women's driving .. really degeneration of thoughts
131)	Liberal dynasty do not care about women's interests as much as they care about unveiling her, otherwise they would have demanded more important issues than driving #Women's car driving is a necessity
132)	Liberal dynasty /Bany liybral/ calls for [women's] driving in spreading corruption and immorality won't be successful, because the chaste [females] will remain chaste, even if

	she drives, and the indecent [female] is your way for unveiling 👮#Women's car driving is a necessity
133)	#Women's car driving is a necessity imagine with me the current state of the liberals right now, each one of them has created hundreds of [Twitter] accounts with fake names of girls and boys and they are pretending 💔😂#driving is not a necessity 😌
134)	The liberal always demanding for a law, and then when the government passes laws , do we abolish Sharia[140] or liberalize the country you liberal😂#Women's car driving is a necessity
135)	Instead of thinking about trivial issues, think about something that benefit widows, divorced women, poor (the liberals are a problem)
136)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I swear that those who created the hashtag are the liberals, we do not want to drive, I am good like this thank God. This decision will not be implemented as long as our leader is in power💚💚
137)	#Women's car driving is a necessity oh the liberals, the girls of my country are still like a cover chocolate covered with her beauty and modesty, the car's door is open for her to ride, and become the princess of this world
138)	The liberals' exploitation of the causes of the poor to achieve their desire is a terrifying matter, that makes you realise how fascists they are. What if they were in power? #Women's car driving is a necessity
139)	#Women's car driving is a necessity despite our continuous refusal and the demands of the traitors liberals ,the government decision is the decisive factor
140)	#Women's car driving is a necessity for the hypocrites, for the liberal it is a necessity, for the secularists /al'lmanyyn/ it is a necessity
141)	We are all opposing women's driving may Allah curse the secularists #Women's car driving is a necessity

[140] Islamic Law

142)	The liberal writes about the cinema and women's driving, but he does not write about poor women, widows, and those who are searching for housing! #Women's car driving is a necessity
143)	The liberal mixes with women anywhere and considers it permissible, but with the driver, he considers it forbidden #Women's car driving is a necessity
144)	#Women's car driving is a necessity and the liberal still strive with all he has to spread sedition in Saudi society. This will not happen, and our leadership is present.
145)	#Women's car driving is a necessity all the demands have been met housing, unemployment, and others. The only thing that left is women's driving. You are very concern about her. May Allah damn every liberal
146)	Where is the necessity? They pretend to that there is a necessity. This is the era of the liberal, he establishes the necessities that he desires, and who opposes him is condemned #Women's car driving is a necessity
147)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Now, you the castrated Liberal, [you have] abandon all the problems from housing, salaries, streets and unemployment and focused and insisted on women driving. Shame on you, she won't drive
148)	Any topic that is supported by the lying down /Mnbṭḥ/ liberal you find that it match with the Hadith 'and wrongdoing is that which wavers in your soul, and which you dislike people finding out about glory to Allah #Women's car driving is a necessity
149)	#Women's car driving is a necessity this is a liberal hashtag and the liberal without dignity, lives an animalistic life, and in the end, he claims civilization, my dear those who doesn't remember his past has no future
150)	#Women's car driving is a necessity regarding the liberal dynasty who are barking here, if you see his real life, you will find him sanctifying customs and traditions in his home like the Quran

151)	#Women's car driving is a necessity Allah is the greatest, towns of Makkah and people of the Sunnah your *'ird* [141] became a discussion for a secularist person
152)	#Women's car driving is a necessity 90 percent of twitter accounts tweeting about women driving are fake accounts in girls' names which belongs to the young men of the refusers and the liberals. who are you fooling?
153)	#Women's car driving is a necessity this is how the West demand, this is how the Westernised demands, this is what the liberal scum wish, the purpose is not her rights but to reach her
154)	#Women's car driving is a necessity The society… won't accept it, do not get yourself involved it. The liberal and Secularist thugs manipulate you, and harm yourself … the society will not have mercy on you
155)	When you read the tweets of the liberals in this hashtag, you discover how shallow they are, their ideas are void and their inverted culture. They argue with the religious people #Women's car driving is a necessity
156)	#Women's car driving is a necessity You cannot find any Secular or liberal person who support the people; they love chaos and corruption. If it was up to them, they would destroy mosques. If you look you will only find that people of knowledge[142] who stand with the people
157)	And slaves of Secularism want to drive and to open the door of corruption on our country. May Allah protect our country and [may people] like you are eradicated #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B21	
158)	The utmost selfishness that /al-ḥukūkiyyāt/ has reached in our time is by demanding what they lack while ignoring the demands of a lot of women in need #Women's car driving is a necessity

[141] Refer to women and the honour they carry
[142] Religious knowledge. This term means religious scholars

159)	For every [female] activist on Twitter, I hope that you go out in the morning during rush hour and see the congestion, then we will see if you keep barking or not #Women's car driving is a necessity
Table-B22	
160)	#Women's car driving is a necessity we do not want to drive, we do not want to drive we have more important issues other than driving a car you and him are retard /mutakhalif/ 😕😕😕😕
161)	#Women's car driving is a necessity no it's not a necessity you and her are stupid
162)	For God's sake we do not need more stupid [drivers] in the streets; enough that some men have sicken us with their driving😩#Women's car driving is a necessity
163)	#Women's car driving is a necessity no, who said that it's [refer to women driving] a necessary demand? There are more important things than women driving. and then we don't need any more stupid [driver] in the streets ✋
164)	The /alnwayqṣat/ won't drive #Women's car driving is a necessity
165)	#Women's car driving is a necessity she does not need to drive and if the stupid [female] drive smart men, will pile everything on her, from household chores and children + errands that have nothing to do with the house.
166)	Sorry, but I feel that anyone [female] who talks about driving and neglect the important issues is stupid and without even realising is serving our enemy #Women's car driving is a necessity
167)	#Women's car driving is a necessity and the small-minds continue in their shallow requests and people call for different things based on their values and ideas For that I say It is initiated [refer to Islam] as something strange, and it would revert to its [old position] of being strange😔
168)	#Women's car driving is a necessity trivial mind and sensual [she] sell…her hijab and her honour and her protection for driving a car what if they rape you what will you do 😂

169)	#Women's car driving is a necessity it's an idea from the liberal thugs they want the two gender to mix and the weak-minded of the girls are following them.. but they won't be able to deceive the woman of original tribal descent
170)	#Women's car driving is a necessity I swear you are crazy! as if our streets are empty. Now us men are cramped on the streets, and you want women to add women to us!
171)	#Women's car driving is a necessity may Allah make you sick, you and your sickening topic. They say the crazy talks a lot they said from its repetition 👊
172)	Sane girls do not want to drive while the crazy ones are calling for #Women's car driving is a necessity
The following tweet was double coded	
173)	#Women's car driving is a necessity do not argue with the female 😌 if she defeats you, she will despise you, and if you defeat her, she will hate you. It is better for you if you stay silent😜 I swear they are not sane😂😂😂😂😂
174)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the freedom in the hands of the ignorant .. is like the weapon in the hands of the crazy.. you won't drive you won't drive
175)	#Women's car driving is a necessity freedom in the hands of the ignorant is like the weapon in the hands of the crazy. The interest of the Saudi women is far removed from----- her religion and creed except for some
176)	#Women's car driving is a necessity freedom in the hands of the ignorant is like the weapon in the hands of the crazy. The interest of the Saudi women is far removed from her religion and creed except for some
Table-B23	
177)	#Women's car driving is a necessity we are not in need of deformed people driving in the street
178)	#Women's car driving is a necessity no it's not a necessity and no one complained to you. If you want to let your woman and sister drive or go to outside Saudi, you deformed person

179)	The government is preoccupied with external problems, and the Iranian expansion , Houthis and ISIS and you mu‘aq mentally deformed are only care about your interest #Women’s car driving is a necessity
Table-B24	
180)	The deviants are out relax there is no women driving. And the one who has driving in her mind do not speak. [if she] drive I swear she will not be able tell a rooster from a donkey 👍 #Women’s car driving is a necessity
181)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity anyone [female] who demands for driving first eat shit you /aldajah/ [female] deviant😎😹
182)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity if the women in need is the one that will drive, then everything would be fine. But the problem is the one who drive is deviant and one in need cannot drive!
183)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity the streets are already suffering from the male deviants. Are we in need for females [the] deviants !?🤔
184)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity the deviant repeat that her Khalwah[143] with a driver is not appropriate, only to let her drive ? Okay but what about her seclusion for long hours in closed rooms while at work? is that healthy 😂
Table-B25	
185)	Who started this hashtag is mentally and psychologically sick #Women’s car driving is a necessity
186)	#Women’s car driving is a necessity a sterile topic, and an attempt to stir up any controversy, you sick, generally may Allah keep you for us as our drivers and workers for free😝
187)	The problem with the issue of woman driving is that advocates for it are the defiled and the filthiest human being on the face of earth #Women’s car driving is a necessity

[143] Seclusion with a non-mahram male is forbidden in Islam.

188)	The advocates are the filthiest and most absurd people and the most despicable #Women's car driving is a necessity
189)	#Women's car driving is a necessity do you want to know the purpose of her driving see who is calling for women driving (the most despicable people) the girl is not safe in public spaces, how can she be safe in her car
Table-B26	
190)	#Women's car driving is a necessity the advocates are two [types] 1-corrupted [person] seek to unveil women 2- flunky who follow the crowd's opinion
191)	No driving or authority for women expect in her husband's home. Anything else is a path to corruption and to the benefit of the corrupt [people] supporters in the hashtag #Women's car driving is a necessity
192)	The corrupted [people] tried before to corrupt the youth, and now they want to corrupt women #Women's car driving is a necessity
193)	Most people calling for women driving are the most corrupt people #Women's car driving is a necessity

10.3 Appendix C Saudi public figures Twitter accounts

Name	**Twitter username**	**Verification status**	**Information about the user**
Hamsa Alssonosi	@hamssonosi	Her account is verified	She is a writer at Alwatn newspaper
Manal Alsahrif	@manal_alsharif	Her account is verified	Co-founder and leader of the women2drive campaign
Aisha Almana	@aalmana	Even though her account is not verified, she appeared in a number of interviews and her identity is confirmed	A member of the women2drive campaign. One of the women who were part of the first women driving campaign on the 6th November 1990
Hessah Alshayk	@hessahR2030	Even though her account is not verified, her identity is confirmed	A former newspaper columnist
Haya Almaneea	@haya_almaneea	Her account is not verified	A columnist at Alriyadh newspaper, former Shura Council member and academic at Princess Noura University in Riyadh.