Veit, W.
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7701-8995
(2026)
Is consciousness required for AI welfare?
Asian Journal of Philosophy, 5 (1).
18.
ISSN 2731-4642
doi: 10.1007/s44204-026-00382-3
Abstract/Summary
Goldstein and Kirk–Giannini have recently argued that artificial language agents can possess well-being in the absence of phenomenal consciousness. Here, I challenge their position, contending that their arguments fail to establish that consciousness is dispensable for well-being. Moreover, their arguments generate counterintuitive implications that are more problematic than those they attribute to views requiring consciousness for welfare subjecthood. Thus, consciousness (or rather sentience) should still be treated as a requirement for AI welfare.
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| Item Type | Article |
| URI | https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/id/eprint/127912 |
| Identification Number/DOI | 10.1007/s44204-026-00382-3 |
| Refereed | Yes |
| Divisions | Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy |
| Publisher | Springer |
| Download/View statistics | View download statistics for this item |
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