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A Modular Access Control Architecture for the Earth System Grid Federation

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We present key aspects of the federated access control solution required for the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF), including a standard mechanism for securing OPeNDAP-based services and corresponding extensions to the NetCDF software libraries to support this paradigm.

ESGF is an international collaboration to enable access to Earth science data – beginning with a deployment in support of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, phase 5, a framework of climate model experiments whose results will be available in a distributed, globally accessible archive. By maintaining a separation of concerns between the various aspects of the system, it has been possible to devise a highly flexible access control architecture adaptable to the spectrum of needs presented. Such a modular approach is only possible through the definition of interfaces: at the inter-organisational level with web services and at the application level with the use of server side middleware and REST-based principles.

Keywords: Security, OPeNDAP, NetCDF, ESGF, CMIP5

1 Introduction

The production, evaluation and interpretation of climate model simulations are integral activities within Earth system science. Since the very first General Circulation Models run more than forty years ago, to the very latest Earth System Model simulations running now as part of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project, phase 5 (CMIP5), these activities have always been on the leading edge of computing. As the models have improved, adding more internal processes, and running at higher resolution, so has the volume of data produced increased.

CMIP5, organised under the auspices of the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), will deliver science that will feed into the next Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) assessment report. As such, the analysis and interpretation will be a global activity, requiring global access to petascale data archives held on multiple continents. Traditional centralised archive solutions will clearly not suffice.

In order to address this challenge, a global federation – the Earth System Grid Federation (ESGF) has been built on the nucleus of the U.S. Earth System Grid Center for Enabling Technologies (ESG-CET)^[1]. The ESGF was established to cope with data production at O(25) sites globally conforming to O(50) distinct numerical experiments and resulting in O(100,000) years of simulated climate corresponding to O(6500) years of the real-world climate.

A key tenet of the design philosophy of CMIP5 was to identify the “core” output from the simulations – that is the data which was likely to see the most analysis by scientists. The consequential key requirement for ESGF has been to maximise the exposure of that core data (expected to be approximately 2.5 petabytes), even as it exposes all the data produced for CMIP5. Thus, ESGF is essentially a federation of the originating modelling archives (or their proxies), and a number of replicant archives, three of which have committed to persist that core data indefinitely. These persistent archives will be located at the Program for Climate Model Diagnosis and Intercomparison (PCMDI) at the U.S. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the British Atmospheric Data Centre (BADC) in the UK National Centre for Atmospheric Science, and the German Climate Computing Centre (DKRZ). ESGF itself is described in detail elsewhere^[2].

The purpose of this paper is to describe particular techniques used to design the access control to the data in this globally distributed data system. This presents significant challenges highlighted by the heterogeneous nature of the environment in which a solution must be applied. This diversity is expressed on a number of levels: the range of tools and services used within the climate model community, the associated protocols and technology stacks employed, and the varied organisational structures representative across the federation members. We focus then on various aspects of the security architecture used to address these challenges: (1) a service oriented architecture; (2) HTTP based services and key applications; (3) the NetCDF^[3] client implementation of the OPeNDAP^[4] protocol and finally, (4) a walkthrough of a use case for data download, illustrating how the various components function together in the working system.

2 Requirements

ESGF has six key requirements that motivated the security solutions provided:

- 1) Seamless access to data hosted by all organisations in the federation, that is, single sign-on such that the same credentials can be used across the federation
- 2) A mechanism to set policy on restricting access to chosen datasets, per dataset on a case by case basis
- 3) The ability to notify users of changes to data and services. This requires the collection of user attributes including e-mail addresses whilst at the same time respecting user privacy.
- 4) The ability to collect metrics about data download, specifically the number of unique downloads.
- 5) Seamless integration with multiple interfaces to a service or resource, specifically, browser-based access and thick client access.
- 6) Clean integration with services and tools that scientists commonly use.

These requirements are considered in turn in the following sections, but we begin by outlining the overarching deployment environment and architectural requirements. The ESGF architecture defines Data Nodes and Gateway Nodes. Data Nodes are sites that host the model data and associated access services. Replication services enable the CMIP5 core data to be mirrored across the key archiving sites and publishing services make that data discoverable through Gateways - portals to the system.

For requirement (1), we look at the application of a service-oriented architecture, and requirements (2), (3) and (4) are addressed in attribute management and authorisation solutions. For requirement (5), ESGF includes both GridFTP^[5] and HTTP based data access services. However, for the purposes of this paper we concentrate on the application of access control functionality to the HTTP server side architecture. Finally, requirement (6) focuses on work carried out for ESGF to add a standardised access control layer to OPeNDAP, which is a core data access service for the federation.

PCMDI has a lead role for CMIP5, holding the delegated authority of the various modelling groups to allow access according to their varying access criteria (co-ordinated by the WCRP). As such it needs to control the assignment of CMIP5 access authorisation, on a dataset-by-dataset basis, to individuals in the user community. Each ESGF institution may host CMIP5 datasets other than their own, but in doing so they need to honour the PCMDI role, even as they retain control over their own datasets, and those under other authorisation domains. Much of the data will be available with liberal licensing conditions. ESGF currently enforces a simple registration policy for CMIP5 access, coupled with the requirement for an e-mail address

that can be validated. Thus, the level of assurance required is low in comparison to that of many systems. Even so, for resource providers, the security architecture should provide some level of protection for their finite computing assets, for example from malicious or unintended requests which might overload network or server resources.

We emphasise that in order to function as a federation, ESGF must have the ability to collect, curate, and publish trusted federation service metadata.

3 Service-Oriented Architecture

ESGF is deployed in various locations, alongside existing activities. Fundamental then to the development of a federated access control infrastructure is the interfaces between organisations. A standards-based approach was employed wherever practicable to facilitate interoperability and ensure the use of peer-reviewed protocols. In this section we describe the services and their interfaces, looking in turn at authentication and single sign-on, attribute management and authorisation.

3.1 Authentication and Single Sign-on

The distributed nature of the ESG architecture meant that single sign-on was favoured from the outset as a means to simplify access for users and join the user management infrastructures of the different participating institutions together. The OpenID^[6] standard was chosen early by the ESG team to provide single sign-on capability^[7]. An evaluation exercise showed that particular vulnerabilities in the specification could be addressed by stipulating SSL for OpenID Provider endpoints. As a consequence, ESGF OpenID Relying Parties are able to utilise SSL-based peer authentication to whitelist OpenID Provider identities to a given set of registered Identity Providers (IdPs) within the federation. The restricted set of IdPs allowed ESGF to leverage an agreed set of site attributes, and to enforce trust and service level agreements on the IdP. Each ESGF Gateway Node hosts an OpenID Identity Provider, where a user can register to get a login account.

OpenID is augmented with the use of SAML^[8] (the Security Assertion Mark-up Language) v2.0 with the SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol) binding to provide standard interfaces for the various other security services required to broker access. As a baseline, all interactions with services are secured with Transport Layer Security (TLS), with mutual authentication. Whitelisting of client certificate subject names enables services to restrict queries to a trusted set of retrievers.

3.1.1 Dual Authentication Mechanisms

While OpenID is suited for interaction with browser clients, it does not lend itself well to use with thick clients. To support the latter, each Gateway Node site runs a MyProxy^[9] Online CA service. This can issue short-lived X.509 credentials which can be used with PKI-aware applications. The Online CA is backed by the same user authentication system as the OpenID service, thus issuing a

certificate to any user who has a valid OpenID login. Certificates issued from the MyProxy server are configured to include the respective OpenID URI in the certificate subject name. These credentials are used for authentication with GridFTP servers and also HTTP based applications including OPeNDAP-based services as will be described later in this paper.

3.2 Attribute Management

User attributes are exchanged between trusted parties within the federation. They fall into two categories which derive directly from requirements (2), (3) and (4) listed in Section 2:

- Site attributes include a limited amount of personal user information used for registration and notification purposes and are specific to the user's IdP.
- Virtual Organisation (VO) attributes include access control attributes used to restrict access to data. They are scoped for the community and may be assigned at some other ESGF authority than their IdP via a registration process.

VO-level attribute agreements were necessitated for two key use cases: access to the distributed CMIP5 data archive and bulk replication of data between archiving sites. For CMIP5 data access, PCMDI has authority to issue users with access rights. For the replication use case, the originating site of the data to be replicated has authority. In all cases, attributes names are namespace constrained to ensure enforcement of the issuing authority.

3.2.1 Push and Pull Models for Attribute Retrieval

As we explored these use cases, it became apparent that the system would benefit from both push and pull models for the transmission of attributes to consumers. Attributes may be pushed at the authentication stage with OpenID via the AX (Attribute Exchange) mechanism or with PKI based authentication by including a SAML assertion as an extension in a user certificate^[11]. The latter was applied for the replication use case where the authorisation layer of the GridFTP service, can extract the attribute assertion to determine access for a given resource.

In some scenarios, a pull model is more suited such as where attribute information is required out of band of the authentication process or where the source of authority for attribute information is not itself an IdP. Any authority such as PCMDI, which has responsibilities for a specific data set or a group of data sets, may enroll users with the corresponding access attributes. They provide a registration interface for this purpose and also a SAML-based attribute service. This interface enables consumers to query user attribute entitlement. These services are associated with the resources they protect, and authorities may have users registered with them from a number of different IdPs from within the federation^[12]. Attribute Services use whitelist techniques, based on the federation

trusted service metadata (see Section 3.4), to restrict access to user attributes and preserve user privacy.

3.3 Authorisation Service

Each organisation within ESGF that hosts secure services (e.g. OPeNDAP or GridFTP), also hosts an authorisation service which exposes a SAML interface allowing authorised remote entities in the ESGF to query for decisions on access to given resources. This service supports a pull model to obtain user attributes. A registry maps user attribute names onto their respective issuing attribute service, so that for example, a resource secured with a CMIP5 attribute will trigger a query to the PCMDI Attribute Service to verify the user's entitlement to this attribute.

3.4 Federation Metadata

An essential aspect of any federation is the establishment and curation of federation credentials, which provides the core trust roots of the federation. In the case of ESGF, for authentication purposes the following metadata is required:

- 1) Trusted CA certificates, Signing Policy, and CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists).
- 2) The whitelist of OpenID Identity Providers.

1) is used to validate any certificate chain presented in on a TLS channel (both for client to service, and service-to-service communication). 2) is used by OpenID Relying Parties to restrict which IdPs can assert user identities in the federation. In addition, the metadata also contains information about the various trusted services, including attribute and authorisation services, and data download services, which may query them. We have defined a schema to describe the data, and are in the process of building an infrastructure that will allow each organisation to own and register their metadata, and obtain the complete federation data for their use.

3.4.1 Service Discovery

OpenID 2.0, supports the Yadis^[13] protocol whereby a HTTP GET request for a user's OpenID yields an eXtensible Resource Descriptor Service (XRDS) document containing the service endpoint for the respective OpenID Provider. XRDS can be further exploited to advertise multiple identity services. This has been leveraged for ESGF so that a given user's OpenID may be introspected to discover MyProxy server and attribute service endpoints associated with their IdP.

4 Modular Architecture for HTTP Based Services

In this section, we describe the architecture adopted for integrating security with the HTTP-based access services. Prior to the work with ESGF, lessons drawn from previous software development projects at the BADC^[14]

had highlighted the need for non-intrusive approaches to access control for HTTP services - the layering of access control functionality over services in such a way as to minimise the impact on their existing interfaces. Two strong themes emerged: the use of REST^[15]-based principles to govern access control policy and the use of Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP)^[16] techniques.

Security is often cited as an exemplar for AOP. HTTP server-side interface specifications like the Python WSGI^[17] (Web Server Gateway Interface) and Java Servlets provide a means to layer access control middleware components without the need to modify the underlying application. This separation of concerns between access control functionality and application has further implications. The use of a given middleware interface specification constrains the range of properties upon which access may be determined to within the scope of the parameters of that interface, for HTTP: the URI, request method and so on. Adopting REST-based principles, URIs may be associated with resources to be protected and so a URI based access control policy can be realised. This has the advantage of performance – request content need not be parsed, only the request URI – and clarity: resources to be protected have a clear mapping to the URIs by which they are exposed. Not all services are easily amenable to this practice, however. For example, some operations for OGC^[18] (Open Geospatial Consortium) web services require the use of the POST method. In such cases the access control middleware may need to consume the request message body so as to apply a given access policy.

A consequence of a URI based access policy is that the granularity of the URI scheme must match the granularity of access control policy required. In practice this has meant some careful consideration of the ESGF URI schemes for protected applications and data. This whole philosophy differs in approach to security application frameworks that embed access control functionality in the application code itself. Whilst they provide flexibility and fine-grained control over access, they break the separation between application code and access control functionality. In general, they cannot be deployed in environments where service stacks are maintained and developed independently of the security framework.

A filter-based architecture also enables the assembly of independent middleware components into a pipeline or chain since they all adhere to a common interface. This characteristic can be exploited to divide up access control functionality. For example, HTTP response codes can be used to separate the more generic function of flagging an unauthenticated request – by setting a HTTP 401 Unauthorized code – to the more application specific function of enforcing some associated response (e.g. displaying a sign in user interface).

4.1 Filter Chain for ESGF Services

Filters are defined to perform specific authentication and authorization related functions and follow a specific order. This is illustrated in figure 1:




Figure 1: HTTP Server Side Filter Chain

Two filter chains are shown. The first fronts the application to be protected; the second one shown alongside it, deals specifically with the authentication process. The request from a client goes to the data serving application to be accessed, in this case an OPeNDAP service. An authentication enforcement filter is first to intercept the request. This checks the access restrictions for requested resource by consulting the policy. If no restriction is in place, control is passed on to the underlying application to serve the request. If a secured resource has been requested, the filter checks for the presence of a valid session cookie. In the absence of this, the client is returned a HTTP 30x response requesting redirection to an authentication service endpoint (shown on the right in figure 1), which listens over HTTPS. This dual HTTP/HTTPS arrangement allows authentication to be executed over a secure channel whilst at the same time avoiding the performance penalty associated with large data transfers over an encrypted connection.

The authentication service itself uses a twofold chain to enable a client to authenticate with either PKI-based

credentials or via OpenID. Notably, with this arrangement, the server side is agnostic to the client request method employed. The first filter checks for a user X.509 certificate obtained from the SSL handshake. If present, authentication proceeds based on verification of this identity: otherwise control passes to the next filter, which initiates an OpenID Relying Party interface. The default behaviour then is to assume OpenID-based sign in from a browser but note that the response code will be HTTP 401 Unauthorized to signal to non-browser-based clients that authentication credentials are required.

Whatever authentication method is used, a positive result will trigger a HTTP 30x redirect response to return the client back to the HTTP-based authentication filter. A signed authentication cookie is returned with this in the HTTP header. The recipient must be within the same cookie domain so that the returned cookie is visible to the authentication filter fronting the data serving application. On receipt of the cookie, this filter verifies it, sets the users authenticated status and passes control on to the next filter. The sequence in figure 2 illustrates the steps.




Figure 2: SSL Client Based Authentication with security filters (authorisation filters omitted for this illustration)

After the authentication filter, the request is intercepted by one or more authorisation filters. Typically, a chain will contain at least one SAML-based authorisation filter that is responsible for issuing requests to the external authorisation service. This may also enforce the authorisation decisions it receives or else delegate this to a separate, dedicated enforcement filter.

4.1.1 Python and Java Implementations

A Python implementation, developed at the BADC for the NERC (Natural Environment Research Council) DataGrid^[14], was used to pilot many of the features of the filter-based architecture used for ESGF. A parallel Java implementation has also been written, which can be used to secure a generic web application that runs within a Java servlet container. This implementation is deployed widely at the ESGF Data Node sites.

5 Securing OPeNDAP Based Services

OPeNDAP is a data access framework widely used in the fields of oceanography and atmospheric science research, and was a key service to be supported by the ESGF security architecture. Data is served over a network

interface, which abstracts the underlying data format from the client, and provides sub-setting functionality. The default Data Node configuration currently uses the THREDDS Data Server^[19] (TDS) implementation of the OPeNDAP protocol. With the server side filter-based architecture as described in the previous section, it has been possible to configure both TDS and PyDAP^[20] based OPeNDAP server implementations to support dual OpenID and SSL client based authentication mechanisms.

5.1 Extensions to NetCDF for ESGF Security-Aware Clients

Whilst the ability to apply this flexible approach to the server-side security layer is important, the development of compatible client software is vital to the adoption of these services across a wide user base. The redirect-based pattern with PKI-based credentials makes this solution suitable for simple HTTP clients. Wget, a utility available on most UNIX-based systems, can also easily be configured in this way. Clearly though, for this solution to have significant adoption, the relevant changes would need to be integrated into OPeNDAP client libraries. The software libraries for NetCDF were an obvious starting point. NetCDF is the standard format chosen for CMIP5 data and these are

widely used as the basis for client tools in the climate science community. By inserting changes at the NetCDF level in the software stack, all these dependencies would collectively benefit.

Working with Unidata, the maker of the NetCDF software, the C NetCDF library was adapted to enable custom SSL client settings. These were applied at the level of the user's `.dodsrc` file so that no changes to the C API were necessary. Thus existing software that builds on the NetCDF libraries requires no change to source code to support ESGF-based security, besides relinking with the latest version of the libraries. The security extensions are included in the NetCDF 4.1.2 release. This has been built with a number of different applications including Ferret^[21], and NetCDF Python bindings^[22]. Work is also underway to add support to the Java NetCDF client libraries and extensions to the PyDAP client libraries have enabled PyDAP-based packages like CDX^[23] to access ESGF hosted data. By instrumenting both NetCDF C/Java and PyDAP libraries, we are instantly enabling a large portion of the current earth science analysis toolkits with an access control layer.

6 Secured Data Access Walkthrough

In this section we present a walkthrough of a typical use case to illustrate how the individual components in the security architecture interact.




Figure 3: Secured Wget based Data Download

A user browses for CMIP5 data via the search facility of a Gateway Node and discovers data hosted at the BADC's Data Node. Individual datasets may be downloaded directly

via the browser using OpenID. Alternatively for multiple downloads, an option is provided to generate a data download script for the user to download and execute. This uses the Wget program to perform the HTTP based retrievals. To download secured datasets, the Gateway provides a Java MyProxyLogon^[9] WebStart program to enable users to obtain PKI credentials from MyProxy. The credentials are saved to a standard location on the user's file system visible to the Wget script.

When the script is called, the various datasets are retrieved from the Data Nodes specified in the script download URLs. For any given request, the security filters fronting the data serving application authenticate the request based on the PKI credentials provided and check for authorisation by calling the respective authorisation services. For CMIP5 data, a given authorisation service will check user entitlement with the corresponding authority for CMIP5 attribute registration: the PCMDI attribute service. If the user is registered, access is granted.

7 Future Work and Related Developments

Although the initial deployment of the Earth System Grid Federation has been in the context of supporting CMIP5, many other applications are expected to be deployed with the same infrastructure. Within both Europe and the U.S. there are major collaborative projects being built around ESGF. Significantly, enabling PKI-based authentication, opens up OPeNDAP based services to the Grid based security paradigm and in particular user delegation using proxy certificates^[24]. A short NERC-funded proof-of-concept project MashMyData is exploring how OPeNDAP services and an OGC Web Processing Service can be coupled together in a workflow leveraging the ESGF security infrastructure with support for proxy certificates.

8 Conclusions

Modular design principles applied on a number of levels through the security architecture have resulted in a highly flexible solution applicable to the target domain whilst at the same time minimising the impact on the underlying APIs of existing services and tools.

The extensive use of existing standards in the service-oriented architecture has facilitated interoperability, with Python and Java implementations of services freely interchangeable. The filter-based HTTP server side architecture has enabled the same access control solution to be applied over a range of applications. It has also made possible a flexible approach to access control configuration where any given application may be fronted with multiple authentication and authorisation schemes. This is demonstrated by dual OpenID- and PKI-based authentication support. The latter, by exploiting characteristics inherent in HTTP/HTTPS, has minimised the entry point for client side tools to support it. This has meant that the user community can turn to simple freely available tools such as Wget to access secured data within

ESGF. Moreover, by applying security extensions to NetCDF, a software library used widely across the Earth science community, all the dependent software packages and tools built on it are enabled with the security support.

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