Beyond the American century: Walter Lippmann and American grand strategy, 1943-1950


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Beyond the American Century

Walter Lippmann and American Grand Strategy, 1943-1950

That ambivalent Jeremiah of the press, Walter Lippmann...¹

Dean Acheson

As the United States became a world power, journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann feared that it would become its own worst enemy. During and after World War Two, he tried to steer the country towards coherent statecraft, to define the national interest and the limits of power, and give geopolitical expression to the role of the United States as the core of an Atlantic strategic system. But in response to world war, the Truman Doctrine and the Korean War, he became pessimistic about the country’s ability to conduct strategy effectively. In the prophetic tradition, he believed that a fatal symbiosis between America’s growing strength and domestic politics led it towards crisis. Though at times ahistorical, Lippmann’s concept of strategy deserves attention for its dialogue between power and identity, for its questioning of ‘ends’ as well as means, and for its focus on the danger of self-defeating behaviour.

The prospect of America’s decline as a world power has raised fresh interest in grand strategy.² Our understanding of America’s present dilemmas can be strengthened by a closer reading of the journalist and intellectual Walter Lippmann (1889-1974). Lippmann is a central figure in diplomatic history. Foreign Affairs named US Foreign Policy: Shield
of the Republic as one of the most important diplomatic works in seventy-five years. Historian Walter Russell Mead regards Lippmann as Jeffersonian in his understanding of American statecraft. During the Gulf War of 1991, critics of American diplomacy turned to Lippmann’s arguments for limiting military commitments, his emphasis on the stopping points of power, and his preference for blue-water maritime strategies above fatal adventures on land. During internally divisive wars from Vietnam to Iraq, they turned to Lippmann’s concern for the domestic ‘political foundations of US statecraft.’ Despite this prominence, Lippmann was also a disappointed figure. Between World War Two and the Korean War, he became pessimistic. He struggled to influence policy and to formulate coherent answers to the dilemmas facing the new superpower, namely how to define America’s interests by finding a middle point between the extremes of isolation and globalism.

As this article argues, Lippmann argued within a prophetic tradition that emphasized the internal political causes of strategic failure. The concept of prophecy is a promising point of entry into understanding the ‘wave’ of political realists of the early Cold War. If ‘strategy’ is the orchestration of ends, ways and means in the context of actual or possible armed conflict, and if a ‘defence intellectual’ is a figure who interprets the role of US military power to a general audience, a ‘prophet’ is a public intellectual who identifies a failure, traces the causes of the injury historically, and calls for the restoration of a more enlightened past. In this tradition, Lippmann’s writings formed an ‘American Jeremiad’, a form of political rhetoric that is both ethical and eschatological. Lippmann worried that America was vulnerable not primarily because of externalities such as dangerous
enemies or new weapons, but because of its own pathologies. Left unchecked, such pathologies could cause America to behave in self-defeating ways, provoking counter-balancing coalitions or leading to disastrous peripheral wars. Americans, he argued, had lost sight of their forefathers’ adroit statecraft and fell prey to utopian ideals, just as Great Power conflict returned.

This article examines how Lippmann’s evolving ideas interlocked with World War Two and the early Cold War to produce his vision, which has not been fully explored in the existing literature.\textsuperscript{11} Ronald Steel’s biography is stimulating but not an overarching interpretation of Lippmann’s strategic thought.\textsuperscript{12} Joel Rosenthal and Kenneth Thompson show how intellectuals such as Lippmann tried to temper Wilsonian idealism by instilling a sense of responsibility in American diplomacy.\textsuperscript{13} This article explains the growth of that realism historically. Vibeke Tjalve shows how prophets such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr recast traditions of the puritan ‘Jeremiad’ to articulate an alternative, self-critical patriotism.\textsuperscript{14} This article shows how Lippmann through his Jeremiads developed a theory about America’s strategic fallibility.

The argument has three parts. First I place Lippmann in the intellectual context of the renaissance in strategic thinking during World War Two. Lippmann conceived of strategy as the preservation of cohesion at home through a restrained activism abroad, a vision of an Atlantic geopolitical identity tempered by a hard-headed calculation of strength. Where other minds focused primarily on European precedents, Lippmann turned to America’s early history. If he saw popular attitudes to foreign policy as ‘inconstant,
irrational and ill-considered\textsuperscript{15}, during and after World War Two he argued for the revival of classical strategic principles, principally the need to balance power with commitments.\textsuperscript{16} Both strands of ideas came together in 1943-1950 to generate the notion of the ‘Lippmann gap’, the view that efficient strategy and the internal order of the state were symbiotic. Inherently volatile republican democracies and bad strategies could reinforce each other, leading to a spiral of drift abroad and division at home.

Second, more theoretically than his contemporaries, Lippmann doubted America’s capacity to strategize. America’s success, its rise to unprecedented relative power at a relatively low cost, loosened its restraint. Its tendency towards extremes prevented it from making war conclusively, so that it could not translate military victories into lasting political outcomes. These doubts were called forth and accentuated by the experience of World War Two, the Truman Doctrine of 1947 and the Korean War (1950-1953). Finally, I appraise the limits of his prophecy and why it still matters. He was a Jeremiah bound to be disappointed. Lippmann had a complex, adversarial relationship with the state. His pessimism can be traced partly to nostalgia for America’s foundational era. He blamed modern democracy, scapegoating it for problems that are inherent in strategy itself. Nevertheless, Lippmann is worth reading because he offers a conception of strategy not as a narrow, reductionist exercise in pursuing fixed ‘ends’, but as a dialogue between a country’s identity and its power.

Lippmann’s conception of strategy grew within a debate in 1939-1941 about the nature of American vulnerability. As Nazi Germany conquered continental Europe, two paradigms
competed: ‘Fortress America’ and ‘national security.’ ‘Fortress America’, was a more restricted concept. It was bounded by geographical limits, was more reactive than anticipatory, and trusted in America’s inherent capacity to defend its region. Conversely, ‘national security’, was an expansive and potentially unbounded view of America’s security interests and was later embodied in Henry Luce’s concept of ‘The American Century.’ These interests lay beyond America’s region, and America needed an extended military presence to advance them. In spirit, ‘Fortress America’ conceived America’s region as large and defensible, presuming against intervention abroad, and favoured maritime strategies. The latter saw America as vulnerable in a shrinking world, and was more disposed to land power and to global commitments.

World War Two accelerated the shift from ‘Fortress America’ to the ‘American Century.’ Even before Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, America expanded its security domain by coercing Japan with economic sanctions, by providing material assistance to Great Britain, by acquiring new bases from Newfoundland to British Guiana, by fighting an undeclared naval war with Germany in the Atlantic, and by redrawing the map of its own hemisphere. After Pearl Harbor, policymakers and the public majority concluded that new military capabilities made ‘Fortress America’ redundant. New conditions meant that America could not rely on its geopolitical luck of being distant from enemies and flanked by oceans and unthreatening neighbours. The threat from trans-oceanic predators was produced by the confluence of new military technology (especially long-range airpower) and geopolitics (the danger of a conquering state creating a dangerous imbalance of power). A dominant Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan could threaten the homeland with encirclement, economic suffocation or even invasion. Military planners followed Washington’s vision that American security depended not only on a vigilant homeland defence, but on a favourable balance of power abroad and the prevention of any state generating overwhelming offensive combat power.\textsuperscript{20} War created a willingness to maintain a peacetime military establishment on an unprecedented scale.\textsuperscript{21} Once continental and hemispheric, America’s conception of its outer defences became extra-regional and global.

These ideas took root through the collaboration of the state with intellectuals. The marriage of expertise and mass mobilization was foreshadowed in Roosevelt’s ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ address on 29 December 1940. ‘As planes and ships and guns and shells are produced, your Government, with its defense experts, can then determine how best to us them to defend this hemisphere.’\textsuperscript{22} ‘National security’ became common public coinage and a mainstream academic discipline\textsuperscript{23} with the publication of Edward Mead Earle’s collection \textit{Makers of Modern Strategy} and Nicholas Spykman’s \textit{America’s Strategy in World Politics}.\textsuperscript{24} A concept took root, of strategy in a higher political realm expanded in space and time.\textsuperscript{25} The Joint Chiefs of Staff adopted a Brookings Institution study which argued for the prevention of any hostile powers or coalitions dominating the Eurasian landmass.\textsuperscript{26}

Several converging forces drove this renaissance. Global war with its intercontinental alliances and scale encouraged the state to make strategy higher and broader. It prompted a shift from narrow military plans in isolation to the synchronized campaigns of coalition
war. The rediscovery of strategy was stimulated also by Anglo-American collaboration and the encounter with the more politically effective British staff-system. Technology enabled global combat in what Roosevelt called ‘a single world conflict.’ This connectedness drew attention to mapping and the relationship between space and power. Cartographers altered the image of America from a secure continent shielded by distance, to a vulnerable island in a world closing in under the Axis triangular stranglehold. Scholars such as Edward Mead Earle and Harold Sprout helped produce an educational wartime map, the *Citizen’s War Atlas*.

The shift from self-defence to national security raised the questions: what and where were the limits of American power? How could an enlarged domain be given geopolitical expression? Was there a frontier beyond which America’s vital interests were not implicated? Lippmann’s *US Foreign Policy* was his most developed attempt to answer. Like E.H. Carr, Lippmann chastised the interwar generation for its neglect of power. He diagnosed an American ‘habit of mind’, the illusion that it could enjoy ‘free security’ without engaging in power-politics. Such illusions were bred by peace, liberal idealism, and geographic distance. Between the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 and the war with Spain in 1898, British sea power underwrote the security of America’s hemisphere. This arrangement unraveled over time with the demise of British power and the rise of German naval power as America failed to come to terms with the challenge to British maritime supremacy. The long period of ‘unearned security’ of the nineteenth century bred both complacency and idealism, making America averse to the hard-headed
alignment of resources with goals. A family of ideas - Pacifism, Disarmament, Anti-Alliances and Collective Security - eroded coherent strategy.

Lippmann charged that Americans wrongly regarded war as the suspension rather than the continuation of politics. The delusion that war was an aberration in human affairs paradoxically led the nation to embrace over-ambitious conceptions of its wars as efforts to end war itself. Just as it rapidly disarmed in the wake of war, it became a crusader when it was roused to belligerency. Looking back to America’s disappointing experience of World War One, Lippmann argued that America’s material abundance reinforced the illusion that war was a quantitative matter of applying force and mass overwhelmingly with political outcomes naturally following. After mobilizing manpower, finance, ships and munitions in 1917-18, America failed to harmonise war with political aims. The net result was an insolvent diplomacy that left the nation vulnerable.

*US Foreign Policy* blamed Wilsonianism. A lapsed Wilsonian himself, Lippmann took aim at its faith in law and international institutions, its rejection of alliances, its hostility to the plurality of the world and dangerous drive to extirpate other ideologies. In truth, Wilsonianism is a conflicted, protean concept. For Lippmann, it represented not the muscular crusading version of 1917, but the pacific ‘one world’ idealism that followed the war. Seductively peaceful conditions deluded America into believing it could safely disarm, reject alliances and base its behaviour on abstract principles. Unless statesmen could ‘with cold calculation organize and regulate the politics of power’, they risked ‘a cycle of disastrous wars followed by peace settlements which breed more wars.'
secure itself, America must step into the vacuum created by the weakening British
Empire to create a settled balance of power, applying spheres of influence, military
muscle and alliances. Paths to peace that lost sight of tough-minded considerations of
power could not work, whether insulation from the world or excessive faith in
international institutions. Lippmann looked ahead to the possibility of post-war Great
Power confrontation and the wartime alliance, which must be preserved as the nucleus of
peace.

To Lippmann, not isolationism but insolvency was the underlying problem, the failure to
align power and interests with a surplus of power in reserve. Isolationism is a theory that
states can secure themselves through detachment from foreign commitments. By
contrast, insolvency sprang from a failure to retain coherence between the nation’s power
and its political interests. Hence Lippmann’s warning against overstretch: ‘it is just as
important to define the limit beyond which we will not intervene as it is to convince our
people that we cannot find security in an isolationist policy.’ America courted
insolvency by acquiring far flung interests, almost forty per cent of the earth’s land
surface, outweighing its power to protect them. In the Western Pacific after the Spanish-
American wars, it acquired commitments that it neither liquidated nor secured. It
conceded Japanese naval superiority in Asian waters and refused to place adequate
defensive forces in the Philippines.

Lippmann rejected the myth that Imperial Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was the result
of isolationism and that the lesson was the need for worldwide hegemony. Far from being
innocently passive, America before 1941 had pursued a forward policy of securing an East Asian ‘open door’ of trading interests and paternalism towards China. It imposed an asset freeze and embargo on oil shipments to coerce Japan. Lippmann warned against over-ambitious war aims conceived in the reaction against isolationism. Messianic ideas, whether Luce’s missionary notion of ‘the American Century’ to spread democratic principles throughout the world, or Wendell Willkie’s internationalist plea for a collective security, could be just as fatal as isolation. These aims carried the ‘insidious temptations of imperialism.’ America’s war aims should not be a universalist effort to transform world politics, but to work with other great powers to achieve a long period of security from ‘world conquerors.’

In attempting to circumscribe America’s war aims, Lippmann focused on maritime peripheries, following not the followers of Halford Mackinder and their emphasis on control of the Eurasian heartland, but the navalist Alfred Thayer Mahan in his view of the oceans as a commercial conveyer belt and as a highway that could propel aggressors to America’s vulnerable ocean flanks. Lippmann was drawn to seapower and the coastal centers of industrial-military strength. American security interests extended to the coastlines of the Atlantic basin and the Pacific islands, which were also the limits of America’s domain. He drew on geopolitics to foresee the tragedy of a post-war American-Soviet collision. No longer would American-Russian relations be steered by ‘the historic fact that each is for the other a potential friend in the rear of its potential enemies.’ America’s widening frontier, enfolding the German, Japanese, and British ‘buffer zones’, would collide with the widening Soviet perimeter.
Lippmann took seriously the idea that America was directly threatened and that new military technology such as long-range bombers and naval aviation gave the offensive edge to aggressors and erased the traditional delaying and shielding effects of distance. The Axis threatened to make America an encircled state, its power dispersed over an ‘immense ocean lake’, inferior to the aggregate power of the ‘Old World’ that would have the advantage of initiative. His arguments were more developed than the demagogically promoted fear of Axis conquest and imminent Nazi revolutions in Latin America. He pointed to other dangers of a war that extended to the homeland. Even if America would defeat any invader on its own soil, Lippmann argued that the ‘condition of France in 1918 and 1944’ showed the need to prevent such devastation by conducting a forward defence abroad. Lippmann also drew on another long-established theme, that the country’s liberal way of life would be endangered if it were forced to become an embattled militarised garrison state in a continual state of emergency.

Lippmann was less technically minded than the aviator and anti-interventionist Charles Lindbergh and the geostrategist Nicholas Spykman, who better grasped the limits of modern military capabilities. Lindbergh believed the limits were so stringent that ‘self-defence’ would suffice. Spykman observed that new military machines in some ways made long-range aggression more difficult, not less. Would-be trans-oceanic invaders would have to reckon with the refueling and supply needs of modern forces, while a strong defending air force would minimize the danger of trans-Atlantic invasion. Spykman argued that America should intervene not because it was directly threatened but
on other grounds, to pre-empt slow economic strangulation that could occur if hostile
powers dominated other continents.

As others have already demonstrated, there are good reasons to doubt the ‘clear and
present danger’ and ‘offence-threat’ arguments,\textsuperscript{49} even if Nazi Germany may have had
long-term designs on attacking the United States.\textsuperscript{50} America was a large landmass, not a
small island. Invading and conquering from across two oceans was still difficult. America
had a strong protective curtain in its navy, and while Britain remained on the board, in
British seapower. Hitler’s inability to subdue let alone conquer the closer island state of
Britain assisted Lindbergh’s arguments about the far greater logistical feat of successfully
attacking across the Atlantic Ocean, or transporting an invasion force unmolested.
Moreover, America from its bases had combat interception reach to disrupt or deny any
aggressor. Provided it maintained a sufficient coastal defence, it enjoyed ‘home’
advantage through shorter supply lines and the ability to apply a superior weight of force
over a smaller distance.

Consider also another fear Lippmann entertained, whereby an aggressor uses nearby
territories for bombing raids or as a bridgehead.\textsuperscript{51} An attack via West Africa to Brazil and
then New Orleans to Miami was the common scenario. But as skeptics reasonably
suggested, ‘even if a German Expeditionary Force were somehow able to occupy West
Africa and pass over the Atlantic to Brazil, it would still be as far from the United States
as it had been in Europe. And how was a modern, mechanised army to traverse the
jungles and mountains of South and Central America to invade the United States?’\textsuperscript{52} The
fear of a long-range threat presumed the emergence of an unchallenged Eurasian enemy, with other counterbalancing states eliminated. The actual events of the war throw doubt on that eventuality. Nazi Germany had already met stalemate on two fronts and its limitations were becoming visible. As well as its repulsion by Britain in 1940, Hitler’s armies had already passed their culminating point, had been struck by the Russian winter and failed to take Moscow, and the balance on the Eastern Front was gradually tilting to the defenders. With America as nonbelligerent offshore balancer providing material support to Britain and Russia, this was already proving sufficient to maintain ‘centers of resistance’ to deny Hitler the kind of Eurasian dominance that Lippmann feared.\(^{53}\)

Lippmann’s diplomatic expertise ran ahead of his military-technical expertise. He did not engage fully with the complexities about the geopolitical implications of modern military power. But Pearl Harbor leant a visceral popular appeal to his argument that America was directly threatened in a shrinking world. Lippmann successfully spearheaded it intellectually. He wrote not as a military technocrat, but as a prophet. Stressing the offensive long-range combat power of modern weapons was an effective way rhetorically to challenge notions that America could be secure without projecting power beyond its water’s edge.

In stressing America’s self-destructive tendencies, he revived a long-standing idea in American prophecy. Aside from external aggressors, the roots of vulnerability lay not in military defeat, but through ‘free people’ forgetting how to govern themselves responsibly.\(^{54}\) America’s volatile politics caused it to be ‘too pacifist in times of peace
and too bellicose in times of war.’ If during peacetime it regarded war as an abomination, in war it embraced an eschatological view of the conflict as enacting a grand design to reorder the world.\textsuperscript{55} Both phases lead to disappointment and a relapse into each other. It was important to avoid both extremes and get strategy right not only to subdue external enemies or secure the country against predators abroad, but because incoherence could cause internal chaos, just as domestic strife could derange policy. Even victory could contain the seeds of future crisis:

Our failure now to form a national policy will, though we defeat our enemies, leave us dangerously exposed to deadly conflict at home and to unmanageable perils abroad. For the return from a state of total war to a state of peace which no one trusts will raise catastrophic issues in our midst. Rent by domestic controversy, for want of a settled foreign policy we shall act not upon reflection and choice but under the impulse of accidents and the impact of force.\textsuperscript{56}

In a chain of causation, strategic failure and domestic divisions would reinforce each other. Lippmann echoed the likes of Alexander Hamilton, who argued that opposition to factionalism and sectional interest was the foundation for national security from external threats, and George Washington’s Farewell Speech of 1796, co-written by Hamilton, which admonished Americans in the wake of the bitter internal struggle over the Anglo-American Jay Treaty to curtail party disputes in order to protect foreign policy.\textsuperscript{57} Centrifugal forces within American politics trapped it in a ‘deadly cycle’, lurching from naïve isolation to crusading overreach. This was the tragedy of American diplomacy.
To show where Lippmann ‘sits’ intellectually, his work can be compared to two other strategic minds of the era, Edward Mead Earle and Nicholas Spykman. All three tried to combat the notion that America was special and therefore beyond power politics. They wanted to ‘de-exceptionalise’ America to destroy the stigma attached to traditional statecraft. But they differed on whether strategy was historically alien to American traditions and how to restore it. Earle sought to educate Americans through classical European models. *Makers of Modern Strategy* studied only two American officers Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan and General William Mitchell. Only three pages were devoted to George Washington and five to Thomas Jefferson. American national character was ‘mechanically minded and possessed of almost religious faith in the machine’, hence the lack of a Clausewitz or a Vauban.\(^58\) As well as the subject matter, the weighting towards Europe was reflected in the role of intellectual émigrés in the writing of *Makers*. Nine of twenty contributors were immigrants or first generation descendants of immigrants. Although Earle credited Alexander Hamilton with being one of the great orchestrating American minds\(^59\), *Makers* mostly treated American contributions as marginal. Earle was logocentric: he looked for codified ‘strategic doctrine’ as the expression of strategy. He found little theory in America’s heritage. By contrast, Spykman did not invoke the Fathers, European models or any authority to legitimise its argument. To Spykman, supporting isolation or intervention by summoning sacred history was a distraction. America’s choices must be measured by their merits and utility, not by tradition. ‘Historical precedent and the voice of the Fathers can be used as a means to gain support for a doctrine but not as proof of its soundness. Not conformity with the past but workability in the present is the criterion of a sound policy.’\(^60\)
Lippmann also rejected American exceptionalism. But instead of dismissing the Founders, he recast them as models of hard-headed strategy. As a journalist speaking to a wide readership, Lippmann was sensitive to the need to domesticate *Realpolitik* by presenting strategy as an authentic American tradition. The American audience was not a neutral machine that would rationally process argument, but could be swayed by appeals to collective memory. He focused on American historical models, especially the Monroe Doctrine of regional separation. Lippmann approached strategy as a set of practices and instincts, a logic to interactions that did not have to be theoretically articulated.  

American foreign relations were born in a cradle of power-political sensibilities. Washington and Jefferson inherited a European diplomatic tradition, accepted the danger of conflict as a fact of life, supported appropriate temporary alliances, and advocated naval preparedness and restraint to buy time. They exploited America’s geographical advantages and European rivalries, enabling America to grow while avoiding over-entanglement in European conflicts. Lippmann’s diagnosis was a Jeremiad. It showed America beginning with prudent diplomacy, lapsing into utopian naivety, and needing to be restored. By rejecting power politics, the prewar generation had squandered the capital of its forbears.  

What was the solution? Neither strategic shock nor mechanistic reforms could do the job. It would take great men who could rise above democratic squabbles to constrain the people’s volatility. Lippmann urged restraint in domestic political competition, imploring elites to guide the democracy. In line with other anti-majoritarians who believed that
unfettered mass influence threatened sound policy, Lippmann argued that because the
democratic mass was incompetent to judge foreign affairs, it was best to leave it to
seasoned elites.\textsuperscript{64} The political class must close ranks and protect foreign policy and
public opinion from one another. This explains his own wartime interventions, promoting
during the 1940 election the bipartisan agreement to keep foreign policy debate off the
 table. It explains his support for overall consensus-seeking across the Executive and the
Congress, such as the John Foster Dulles-Cordell Hull ‘truce’ of 1944, and his warning
that internal political conflict could alienate the armed forces.\textsuperscript{65}

Lippmann’s ideal-type was George Washington. Lippmann made Washington embody
his patrician longing for a virtuous leader who tames the wayward people. Lippmann’s
Washington supported popular sovereignty but doubted the sanctity of popular will, and
led his countryman ‘until they could decide the issue between defeat and victory, between
their own disunion, which would have destroyed them, and the union that has proved to
be their salvation.’\textsuperscript{66} Two contemporary ‘‘Washingtons’ emerged, President Roosevelt
and the Republican nominee of 1940, Wendell Willkie. After Willkie’s death in October
1944, Lippmann praised him for rising above factionalism to protect American
diplomacy.\textsuperscript{67} He regarded Willkie’s nomination in 1940 as second in importance only to
the Battle of Britain, because it neutralized foreign policy out of the election debate.
Otherwise, the Republican Party would have gone isolationist and made it almost
impossible to assist allies and buy time to prepare for war, leaving America ‘isolated,
divided and desperately hard pressed.’\textsuperscript{68}
After Roosevelt’s death on 12 April 1945, Lippmann praised him as ‘a remarkable strategist’ who denied Nazi Germany and Japan the chance to form a junction to fight a combined war, while the Allies ‘gathered and advanced their own forces.’ Roosevelt’s approach at Tehran and Yalta, placing power politics at the core of the new international architecture coincided with Lippmann’s blueprint of a post-war consortium of Great Powers, paying heed to Stalin’s security objectives and realistically accommodating the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence that the advancing Red Army had turned into fact.

Lippmann was an anti-triumphalist. He disliked notions of America’s world-historical role as redeemer nation and was uneasy with wartime internationalism and the ideal that America could reorder the world away from power politics towards permanent peace. Victory was merely a fleeting political opportunity. The timing of his writings is significant. His warnings about the post-war collapse of the alliance and future insolvency were conceived at the moment of success. As he warned of post-war tragedy in world politics in *US War Aims* of July 1944, the Allies had won major victories at Midway, El Alamein, Guadalcanal, Tripoli and Tunisia, the German Sixth Army had been destroyed at Stalingrad, and the Allies had prevailed in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Lippmann’s fears were realized after the war, as he lost faith in his effort to instill responsible restraint into US diplomacy. Already in March 1945 he found that the idealistic masses made it difficult to wean elites from ‘the Wilsonian ideology into something that fits the realities.’ Two historical points mark Lippmann’s shift into pessimism about America’s capacity to break the deadly cycle and his loss of faith in
elites themselves: the Truman Doctrine in March 1947, and the Korean War from 1950. The transition from Roosevelt to Truman was critical to Lippmann’s pessimism. Before the Truman Administration’s Cold War stance solidified, he worried that there was no overarching strategy in a fragmented government. With the growing antagonism against Stalin, the administration abandoned its accommodating stance and turned ‘its obligations to Greece and Turkey into what appeared to be a world-wide commitment to resist Soviet expansionism wherever it appeared.’ Lippmann had articulated during the war territorialized goals, which urged a negotiated distance from the Soviet Union. Yet Truman eventually announced universal, expansive goals. Eleven months after the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, Lippmann argued:

We have won both wars. But on the crucial issues our diplomacy has thus far always miscarried. It has been unable to prevent war. It has been unable to avoid war. It has not prepared us for war. It has not been able to settle the wars when they have been fought and won…Now after two victorious world wars, we find ourselves discussing the possibility of a third world war.

Truman’s ambitious program to check Soviet expansion, with an arms buildup and a web of alliances around the Soviet perimeter, seemed to embody the insolvency Lippmann had foreseen. The swollen costs exceeded America’s power and instead of a calibrated rivalry, it became a crusade.

The intertwining of foreign policy and domestic political strife in the early Cold War persuaded Lippmann that the United States could not be guided towards enlightened
diplomacy. Having committed America to a worldwide resistance to Communist expansion on national security grounds, non-intervention in China, the successful Chinese communist revolution, and the first detonation of the Soviet atomic bomb created domestic pressure and accusations of weakness abroad and betrayal within, coarsening domestic politics. Truman was a victim of his own heightened rhetoric, as ‘The administration found itself entrapped in the strategic images that it had earlier propagated amongst the public to gain support for its policies.’ Here was the ‘Lippmann gap’ and pernicious effects of domestic political turmoil practically demonstrated.

Lippmann was disappointed with Washington’s failure in defining its sphere of commitment to stick to a geographical outer limit. Secretary of State Dean Acheson at the National Press Club in January 1950 defined an American defence line short of Formosa or Korea, a speech Lippmann admired. Yet Truman then committed troops to the Korean peninsula. Acheson admitted that one motive was to outflank domestic critics such as the China Lobby and hard-line Cold Warriors and neutralize the charge of being ‘soft’ on communism, to prove a beleaguered President’s anti-communist credentials. Defining and sustaining clear and limited war aims was difficult given the competing demands of alliance bargaining, the pulse of the battlefield, the drive to escalate from General Douglas MacArthur and the President’s rhetoric that made compromise harder to accept. This resulted in the expansion of the war beyond the 38th parallel and conflict with China, ‘one of the greatest mistakes in our history’, and a crisis in civil-military relations. Incoherence abroad made possible the ascent of Senator McCarthy’s demagoguery. This reflected both a systemic failure - the National Security Council’s
inability to harmonise diplomacy with military force - and a lack of ‘good men’, or strong elite guardians.\textsuperscript{80}

By 1948 he judged that Truman lacked the statesmanship to oversee German reconstruction\textsuperscript{81}; by 1950 he decided that America’s dealings with China failed because amateur Congressmen, journalists and officers had overruled professionals.\textsuperscript{82} This view of wise Cassandras being defeated by crude populism he would later theorise as ‘The Malady of Democratic States’: the climate of modern democracy meant that men worth listening to were discouraged from speaking out.\textsuperscript{83} Lippmann elevated his criticisms of mass politics into a theory about the direct link between the franchise and inconclusive wars.\textsuperscript{84}

Lippmann’s disillusionment also grew from the fact that his own arguments were received only selectively. In terms of impact, his writing helped to popularize the idea that American security rested on the balance of forces abroad. But his warnings against an imprudent counter-reaction into overstretch had less impact. Since Pearl Harbor, the reaction in the balance of opinion against the failures of isolationism and towards intervention was so overwhelming that it was difficult to popularize the case for a more restrained balancing act. Overcoming ‘isolationism,’ rather than balancing ends and means, dominated congressional and public debate.\textsuperscript{85} Policymakers looked past Lippmann’s sense of tragedy, ignored his warnings about the limits of power and the propensity for American victory to become a mere armistice.
This cherry picking of Lippmann’s ideas was evident when the *Ladies Home Journal* presented his ideas in comic-book form.\(^{86}\) It depicted Lippmann’s concept of the transoceanic breadth of America’s security interests, the need to preserve the wartime alliance and reform the aggressor nations, and it conveyed the failures of prewar disarmament and rejection of alliances. But it overlooked his arguments about the mutual spiral of foreign policy drift and domestic disorder. The direct threat of a world order dominated by the Axis aggressors overshadowed the other dimension of Lippmann’s prophecy about the more insidious threat America posed to its own security.

Once *US Foreign Policy* was published, men of state took it as a manifesto for a forward-leaning military presence, particularly in the post-war era. James Forrestal endorsed it, the Under Secretary of the Navy and later Secretary of Defence, but interpreted the book not as an argument for balance, but as an argument for a ‘positive’ as opposed to a ‘passive’ policy.\(^ {87}\) In December 1945, Lippmann wrote that America’s task was not to secure worldwide democracy, but to make communism and democracy co-exist. Competitive coexistence was possible, and he analogised the Soviet Union with the medieval Islamic empire as a rival force with an ideology of conquest that could be lived with.\(^ {88}\) Forrestal disagreed and launched his own study.\(^ {89}\) The gulf between them was accentuated when Forrestal suggested to Lippmann privately after the 1948 Prague crisis that America might have to make preventative war against the Soviet Union.\(^ {90}\) John McCloy, then the assistant secretary of war and soon-to-be high commissioner of occupied Germany, found his views ‘enlightening.’\(^ {91}\) But McCloy like Forrestal went on
to advocate not Lippmann’s concert-balance strategy and bilateral withdrawal from occupied Germany, but global hegemony.

America’s antagonism with the Soviet Union drove Lippmann apart from Washington’s doctrines and policies. Lippmann’s debate with diplomat and strategist George Kennan about a containment doctrine was based on misunderstandings that flowed from ambiguities in Kennan’s writings. In actuality, both believed in a form of containment that was selective and asymmetrical, rather than indiscriminate and universal, in a long-haul competitive coexistence with the Soviet Union. Like Kennan, Lippmann feared that a commitment to a long-term military presence in a divided Europe would be an obstacle to a settlement with Moscow, and the drive for an independent West Germany had triggered Moscow’s aggressive response in the Berlin blockade (June 1948-may 1949). He also opposed the expansion of America’s formal alliances and the creation in April 1949 of a greater NATO beyond the Atlantic area. Lippmann unsuccessfully proposed an alternative, a diplomatic settlement with a bilateral withdrawal from a unified, demilitarised and neutralised Germany. This followed the logic of his wartime prophecies that negotiated buffer space in Central Europe and the limitation of military presence was a surer way to security than proximity and mutual spirals of distrust. But he was rebuffed in the creation of West Germany, the formation of NATO and the Korean War.

How can we explain Lippmann’s failure to influence post-war strategy? Part of the answer can be found in America’s increased power and in the raw opportunity for post-war expansion. The change in power relativities as a result of World War Two left
America’s might artificially high in 1945. It experienced unprecedented industrial expansion. It reached the highest per capita productivity, the highest standard of living, domination of the world’s gold reserves, and became the largest creditor and exporter. Its capacity to project power globally with long range bombers and carrier task forces was unparalleled. It had a nuclear monopoly. There was great worldwide demand for its loans and weapons. If massive relative power creates a temptation for ‘visionary world making,’ it was a utopian moment fertile for such ideas. American leaders ‘eagerly reached for their mandate of heaven.’ This made Washington inhospitable to Lippmann’s arguments for restraint, diplomatic compromise and the creation of spheres of influence.

Lippmann’s post-war marginality in world of policy also reflected the government’s instrumental approach to intellectual advice. When he argued for restraint against the grain of its preconceptions, he did not get his way. The state was not an open recipient of ideas willing to be dissuaded by civil society, but an autonomous actor harnessing ideas to serve preconceived ends. Cold War intellectuals functioned more often as legitimizers and rationalisers after the fact. Intellectual concepts mattered, but only had a modest creative role. By and large, governments selected ideas that suited and legitimized their agenda. Expertise could take effect, but mostly in terms of legitimizing and popularizing rather than changing policy.

Lippmann’s prophecy also had its limits and weaknesses. It was a form of political rhetoric about national decline. His elitist philosophy his own faith in expertise was at
times misplaced. His disappointment was rooted not in the caliber of leaders but in an idealized vision of the early republic. Lippmann like Niebuhr argued in the classical tradition of Plato and Aristotle that justice was more effectively pursued by smaller polities. World powers, like the United States, would have difficulty in replicating the virtues of intimate communities. With ‘distance and ignorance’, complex choices were subjected to simplism and ideology. Lippmann’s ideal was the smaller, eighteenth century republic of tutored citizens. Industrialization and an ill-informed mass public heralded the decline of democratic values. But after World War Two, the very things he disliked about mass society – its inconstancy and strategic illiteracy -he found replicated in the political class who were supposed to rise above it. During the Korean war, Lippmann effectively upended his own faith in expertise by turning on one of the most established veterans of government, Dean Acheson.

Ultimately, few if any leaders could live up to his ideals. Lippmann held contemporary rulers to a high standard based on a hagiographic view of the Founding Fathers. While he rightly identified the prudent strategic principles laid out in Washington’s Farewell Address, the Fathers as they were might also have failed Lippmann’s exacting test, given that they could be heavily factional and also launched reckless wars, such as President James Madison’s invasion of Canada. As an elitist who continuously lost faith in elites, Lippmann eventually turned against Presidents Hoover, Truman, Eisenhower, Johnson, and even Roosevelt in 1944. It is not much of an exaggeration that leaders had to die before Lippmann idealized them.
With its story of heroes and decline, prophecy lends itself to historical oversimplification. Lippmann was right that British seapower underwrote America’s hemispheric security in the nineteenth century. Yet Britain in American eyes was a threat as well as a partner in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. ‘Free security’ was a label interwar Americans gave to a period that was actually an age of anxiety. Britain’s Royal Navy was constantly feared. Well before German naval power rose to challenge Britain, a tradition of military thinkers (‘guardians’) was dedicated to fortifying coastal harbors and preparing defences to protect cities on the Atlantic seaboard from British assault. American naval expansionists in the 1880’s appealed to the image not of a country sheltered by the British navy, but ‘ringed by hostile states bent on laying waste its coastal cities.’

Lippmann underplayed this dark side of Anglo-American relations because he promoted an image of a culturally connected, historically natural and strategically linked Atlantic community. Paradoxically, he had a calculating approach to power but a strongly ideological concept of America’s role as guardian of Atlantic civilization. By leaving out the history of Anglo-American antagonism and placing maritime collaboration in the foreground, Lippmann fashioned an ‘imagined community’ of Atlantic nations that was both strategically and ideologically coherent.

The major theme in Lippmann’s writing was the pernicious effects of democracy on strategy. His blaming of democracy rested on dubious foundations. It sprang partly from a romantic concept of the orderly pre-industrial, pre-democratic world and its limitation of war, a notion that is historically overstated. Authoritarian regimes also have undertaken ruinous military adventures, from the crowned rulers in the Thirty Years
War to Imperial Japan’s brutal expansionism in Lippmann’s own time, which cannot be attributed to an excess of popular sovereignty. Lippmann ascribed to democracy problems that are inherent in strategy. Once America went beyond national self-defence into the open-ended pursuit of national security, its defence perimeter became unclear and potentially boundless, an endlessly shifting frontier. War itself continued to disrupt boundaries that Lippmann believed ought to be settled, and changed the power-political realities. For his argument in favour of natural spheres of influence, Lippmann himself could not stick to continuous boundaries. In *US Foreign Policy* he initially proposed a neutral buffer zone in Eastern Europe, then the following year, he accepted it as a Soviet sphere. The Red Army’s advances changed the equation. He initially favoured the unification of Korea in vague terms, then opposed a land war to enforce it. Japan he had once regarded as an advance base of US power, writing in March 1948 in the wake of the Soviet Prague coup that it should be built up as part of a holding strategy, as the Japanese islands were the ‘main base for action in eastern Asia’ and that America should build up the power to ‘dominate Soviet Siberia.’ By December 1950 he rejected the notion that America could occupy Japan, because its forces would be vulnerable to a Soviet atomic strike, because a Pacific battle would be too vast, and because Korea demonstrated the costs of land commitments. Now America should switch to a maritime and carrier-centric strategy of sea denial from a more contracted Pacific perimeter from Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, to the Philippines. The changing military context often refused to be subordinated to policy, altering political aims.
None of these changing opinions were necessarily unreasonable, but they demonstrate that even a seasoned intellectual who resisted demagogic politics struggled to define American interests. New technology, power configurations, and economic constraints unsettled well-ordered strategic blueprints. This difficulty did not flow from the democratic character of America, but from the inherent difficulties in strategy itself. Inconstancy was one of the weaknesses of democracy that Lippmann most disliked, yet he continually changed his mind if not on the abstract principles, the concrete details of American diplomacy. Even the strategic vision of experts could only be provisional, because it constantly had to adjust to the unexpected and the unknown.

Why, then, does Lippmann still matter? His views of American diplomacy were hardly infallible. He argued from an elitist, anti-democratic position that could be ahistorical. He struggled to answer the questions he posed about American statecraft. In terms of direct influence on policy, he became a marginal figure. But he still offers a good point of departure for considering America’s strategic dilemmas today. ‘Strategy’ can be an empty word and a narrow, unreflective process, a reductionist debate between the poles of ‘isolationism’ and ‘leadership’, the mere maximization of means in pursuit of fixed, unquestioned ‘ends’, with a fixation on solutions rather than defining problems, on external threats rather than self-defeating behaviour. Lippmann offers a richer conception of strategy that goes beyond binary slogans, that is sensitive to the relation between costs and commitments and the limits of power. Above all, he turns attention to the dangers that powerful states can pose to themselves. In this regard Lippmann stands in an American prophetic tradition, echoing Abraham Lincoln’s warning that the destruction of
America would not come from the hands of a ‘transatlantic military giant’ but from within, and anticipating Reinhold Niebuhr’s fear that if America ever perished, ‘the strength of a giant nation was directed by eyes too blind to see all the hazards of the struggle.’

3 David C. Hendrickson, ‘Significant Books of the Last 75 Years’ *Foreign Affairs* vol.76 (1997), 221-222.
7 See also Cameron Craig ‘A Realist Jeremiad: American Realists and US Foreign Policy’ *Security Studies* vol. 1, number 4 (1992), 703-709.
9 David Milne ‘America’s ‘intellectual’ diplomacy’ *International Affairs* vol. 86, number 1 (2010), 49-68, 50.
11 Lippmann’s ideas are most discussed within the Cold War context: see Ronald Steel’s introduction, *The Cold War: With an Essay by George Kennan ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’* (New York, 1947); for Lippmann’s place within ‘blocs’ of ideas, see D. Stephen Blum, *Walter Lippmann: Cosmopolitanism in the Century of Total War* (Ithaca, 1983).
This dichotomy is borrowed from John A. Thompson ‘Another Look at the Downfall of ‘Fortress America’ Journal of American Studies vol. 26, number 3 (1992), 393-408, 396-397.


25 Earle defined strategy as ‘not merely a concept of wartime, but it is an inherent element of statecraft at all times’ against enemies, ‘actual, potential or merely presumed.’ Lecture on Grand Strategy, Army and Navy Staff College, Washington DC, 15 September 1944, EMEP [Edward Mead Earle Papers, Princeton University Library, MC 020, Box 37: ‘Writing

26 ‘A Security Policy for Postwar America’ 8 March 1945, 3, Albert C. (Albert Coady) Wedemeyer Papers HIWPR [Hoover Institution of War, Peace and Revolution, Stanford University, California], Box 90 Folder


29 ‘Project for a Global War Atlas’ 24 November 1942; Harold Sprout, ‘Revised Prospectus for a War Atlas’ (nd); Letter, Harold Sprout to Chester Kerr, 19 November 1942; Letter, Earle to Kerr, 4 October 1943, EMEP Box 29.

30 Walter Lippmann, US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic (Boston, 1943). His others were The Stakes of Diplomacy (New York, 1915), arguing for an active US liberal foreign policy; US War Aims (Boston, 1944), arguing for a balance of power instead of a one-world collective security system; and The Cold War: A Study in US Foreign Policy since 1945 (New York, 1947), a critique of anti-Soviet containment strategy.


32 Lippmann, U.S. War Aims, ix.

33 Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York, 1922), 73.


35 US Foreign Policy, p. 101.


37 ‘The correct name for the policy of keeping the commitments without enlarging our power and our alliances is not isolationism, but insolvency.’ US Foreign Policy, 69-70.

38 Letter, Lippmann to Hugh R. Wilson, 8 April 1943, WLP: Box 110 Folder 2251, Reel 99.


[42] Letter, Lippmann to Jacques Maritain, 1 July 1943, WLP: Box 88 Folder 1450, Reel 78.

[43] Alfred Thayer Mahan, ‘The Problem of Asia’ in *The Problem of Asia* (New York, 1900), 133. America’s defences extend across both oceans and to all transoceanic lands from which an attack by sea or by air can be launched.” *US Foreign Policy*, 94-95.


[46] Letter, Lippmann to Richard Lewis Jr. 7 January 1945, WLP General Public Correspondence, Box 132 Folder 2597, Reel 120.

[47] Lippmann on 7 April 1941 wrote to a mother: ‘…it would be equally serious if he [her son] had to spend several years of his life as a soldier guarding the coast of Brazil or Venezuela or Canada.’ WLP Box 95 Folder 1691, Reel 85. On the ‘garrison state’ argument, see Michael Lind, *The American Way of Strategy: US Foreign Policy and the American Way of Life* (Oxford, 2006), 95-110; Ross A. Kennedy, ‘Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and an American Conception of National Security’ *Diplomatic History* vol. 25, number 1 (2001), 1-32.


[51] Lippmann argued that a supreme naval power could easily ‘ferry’ troops: Letter, Lippmann to Edmond E. Lincoln, 6 August 1940, WLP Box 85 Folder 1340, Reel 75.


[54] Speech, Freedom House, 24 October 1943, WLP Speeches Group No.326, Series VI, Box 229.


[56] Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy*, 4-5.


[61] On strategy as a ‘logic’, see Walter A. McDougall ‘Can the United States do Grand Strategy?’ *Orbis* 54: 2 (Spring, 2010), 165-184.


[63] As he made clear in his speech at the 30th Harvard reunion dinner on 18 June 1940, WLP Speeches, Group No.326, Series VI, Box 230.


[67] Speech to Willkie Anniversary Dinner, Freedom House 18 Feb 1946, WLP Speeches, Group No.326, Series VI, Box 229.

Lippmann, ‘The President as Strategist’ T & T 7 April 1945.


Letter, Lippmann to Ross J.S. Hoffman, 15 March 1945, WLP Box 78 Folder 1061, Reel 68.

Letter, Lippmann to John McClay, WLP Box 86 Folder 1393, Reel 77.

Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p.22.


Steel, Walter Lippmann and the American Century, 467.


Letter, Lippmann to Millad Tydings, 22 January 1952, WLP Box 106 Folder 2093, Reel 95.

Letter, Lippmann to Alan G. Kirk, 26 April 1950, WLP Box 82, Folder 1234, Reel 72.

By July 1950, Lippmann had become ‘gloomy about the quality of the men in charge of our destiny.’ Letter to Joseph W. Alsop, 19 July 1950, WLP Box 50 Folder 38, Reel 40.

Letter, Lippmann to Bernard Berenson, 8 June 1948, WLP Box 56 Folder 208, Reel 46.

Letter, Lippmann to Earle, 3 January 1950, EMEP Series 3 Box 19.

Lippmann, Public Philosophy, 30-31.

Letter, Lippmann to Learned Hand, 12 March 1955, WLP Box 76 Folder 978, Reel 65.


Comic Strip, Ladies Home Journal August 1943 in EMEP Box 38.

Letter, James V. Forrestal to Lippmann, 16 May 1943, WLP Box 71 Folder 794, Reel 61.

Letter, Lippmann to Quincy Wright, 23 January 1948, WLP Box 111 Folder 2280, Reel 100.


Letter, John McCloy to Lippmann, 30 June 1944, WLP Box 86 Folder 1393, Reel 77.


Bruce Kuklick, Blind Oracles: Intellectuals and War from Kennan to Kissinger (Princeton, 2007), 225.


*T & T* 20 July 1950.

Letter, Lippmann to Admiral Forrest P. Sherman, 5 April 1948, WLP Box 102 Folder 1936, Reel 91.

Letter, Lippmann to Douglas Southall Freeman, 19 December 1950, WLP Box 72 Folder 826, Reel 62.