

# *The AVOID programme's new simulations of the global benefits of stringent climate change mitigation*

Article

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1 **Title: The AVOID programme’s new simulations of the global benefits of stringent**  
2 **climate change mitigation**

3  
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5 Gosling, S.N., Nicholls, R.J., O’Hanley, J., Osborn, T.J., Osborne, T., Price, J., Raper,  
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7  
8 **Abstract** Quantitative simulations of the global-scale benefits of climate change mitigation  
9 are presented, using a harmonised, self-consistent approach based on a single set of climate  
10 change scenarios. The approach draws on a synthesis of output from both physically-based  
11 and economics-based models, and incorporates uncertainty analyses. Previous studies have  
12 projected global and regional climate change and its impacts over the 21<sup>st</sup> century but have  
13 generally focused on analysis of business-as-usual scenarios, with no explicit mitigation  
14 policy included. This study finds that both the economics-based and physically-based models  
15 indicate that early, stringent mitigation would avoid a large proportion of the impacts of  
16 climate change projected for the 2080s. However, it also shows that not all the impacts can  
17 now be avoided, so that adaptation would also therefore be needed to avoid some of the  
18 potential damage. Delay in mitigation substantially reduces the percentage of impacts that  
19 can be avoided, providing strong new quantitative evidence for the need for stringent and  
20 prompt global mitigation action on greenhouse gas emissions, combined with effective  
21 adaptation, if large, widespread climate change impacts are to be avoided. Energy  
22 technology models suggest that such stringent and prompt mitigation action is  
23 technologically feasible, although the estimated costs vary depending on the specific  
24 modelling approach and assumptions.

25  
26 **Main Text:**

27 Many previous studies have used physically-based models to project global and regional  
28 climate change and its impacts over the 21<sup>st</sup> century (Solomon et al. 2007) but have generally  
29 focused on analysis of business-as-usual scenarios, with no explicit mitigation policy  
30 included. The few exceptions (Ciscar et al. 2011) have tended to provide limited coverage of  
31 sectors or regions.

33 A new UK stakeholder-led program - Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change (AVOID) - has  
34 now produced quantified, integrated, physically- and economics-based modelling information  
35 about the global-scale benefits of global climate change mitigation. A key focus is the  
36 climate changes and impacts that can be *avoided* by stringent action to reduce anthropogenic  
37 emissions of greenhouse gases. An important aspect of the approach is the use of two  
38 complementary probabilistic modelling approaches. The first is the creation of a link  
39 between probabilistic climate change projection and complex physically based climate  
40 change impacts models. The second is the use a probabilistic integrated model to simulate  
41 aggregate economic impacts of climate change.

42

43 The AVOID program addresses three questions posed by stakeholders from UK government  
44 departments: (i) What large-scale climate changes (which are often undesirable and  
45 sometimes considered dangerous) are likely to be triggered by different amounts of future  
46 warming? (ii) What emissions and development pathways can minimize the undesirable  
47 impacts of climate change? (iii) Are these emissions pathways economically and  
48 technologically feasible? The results summarised in this paper present the program's initial  
49 steps towards answering these questions.

50

51 Alternative global emission pathways for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, including two 'business as usual'  
52 scenarios A1B and A1FI, and several mitigation scenarios, are used to drive a simple climate  
53 model that estimates resultant global-mean warming. The mitigation pathways initially  
54 follow a business as usual scenario, SRES A1B (Nakicenovich et al. 2000) and then transition  
55 over seven years to zero emissions growth. The rate of reduction in emissions growth is then  
56 applied beyond the peak until the emissions reach a long term rate of reduction. This long  
57 term reduction rate is applied until emissions reach a "floor" value, which can be considered  
58 as a point beyond which it is difficult to mitigate, such as may be associated with a need to  
59 maintain food supply through application of fertilisers leading to emissions of N<sub>2</sub>O.

60 Variations in the year in which emissions peak globally (2016 or 2030), the long-term rate of  
61 emission reduction (1 to 5%/yr), and a range of different emission floors (from 0 to 17  
62 GtCO<sub>2</sub>e/yr ) provide 150 alternative multi-gas mitigation pathways. Emissions of CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>  
63 and N<sub>2</sub>O are specified along with more minor constituents and aerosol emissions. Six  
64 scenarios are selected for analysis of avoided regional climate change and impacts (Table 1).  
65 Although our mitigation scenarios start from the SRES A1B scenario it is acceptable to  
66 compare the impacts avoided with both SRES A1B and SRES A1FI because for the first few

67 decades of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, when mitigation action is initiated in our experiments, there is  
 68 little difference in the climate response of the two business as usual scenarios.

69

70 **Table 1.** The AVOID baseline and mitigation scenarios.

71

Name	Type	Year global emissions peak	Rate of subsequent emission reduction %/yr	Emissions floor
A1FI	Baseline	N/A	None	N/A
A1B	Baseline	2050	None	N/A
2016r2H	Mitigation	2016	2	High
2016r4L	Mitigation	2016	4	Low
2016r5L	Mitigation	2016	5	Low
2030r2H	Mitigation	2030	2	High
2030r5L	Mitigation	2030	5	Low

72

73

74

75 For our estimation of physically based impacts this study uses the simple climate model  
 76 MAGICC (Wigley & Raper, 2001) which was extensively used by the Intergovernmental  
 77 Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Houghton et al. 2001), and is capable of emulating global-  
 78 mean warming from more complex models. This is necessary because the sample of more  
 79 complex GCMs that were available and which directly used mitigation scenarios was still  
 80 very limited when the impact calculations were carried out (e.g. Johns et al., 2011 for an early  
 81 example). Whilst the CMIP5 model intercomparison is providing more GCM simulations for  
 82 a mitigation pathway, even now these are available only for a very limited number of  
 83 mitigation cases, typically only E1 (Lowe et al., 2009a) and RCP2.6 (Moss et al. 2010). For  
 84 our study we require a wider range of emission pathways so that we can compare the relative  
 85 effects of emission peak year and long-term emission reduction rate on climate impacts.  
 86 Thus, we have used the simple climate model approach, combined where appropriate with  
 87 spatial pattern scaling, as the only viable approach to covering the scenarios of interest.  
 88 Uncertainty in climate response was included for three key MAGICC parameters, the climate  
 89 sensitivity (defined as the equilibrium global mean temperature increase for a doubling of  
 90 atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>), the ocean mixing rate (that determines how quickly the warming at the  
 91 surface is diffused throughout the ocean), and a climate-carbon cycle feedback amplification

92 factor (that amplifies the temperature dependent climate-carbon cycle feedback in MAGICC).  
93 The precise details are described in Lowe et al. (2009b). These uncertainties are propagated  
94 through to the impacts analysis, and a suite of physically-based impacts models which  
95 characterise impacts in a range of metrics. Uncertainties within the physical impacts models  
96 themselves are, in general, not considered within the study.

97

98 The study's projections of global temperature rise are consistent with the IPCC's projected  
99 global annual warming in baseline scenarios SRES A1B of 1.7-4.4°C above 1990 levels by  
100 the end of the century (Solomon et al. 2007) (i.e., 2.2-4.9°C above pre-industrial levels). The  
101 median warming in the A1B business as usual scenarios is 4°C above pre-industrial levels  
102 (10-90 percentile range is 3.1-5.5°C above pre-industrial levels). In contrast, stringent  
103 mitigation that causes global annual emissions to peak in 2016 and decline at 5% annually  
104 thereafter produces a 55% chance of **limiting warming to 2°C above pre-industrial levels**.  
105 This mitigation also reduces the chance of global warming reaching 3°C above pre-industrial  
106 levels from 19 in 20 in the business as usual scenario to 1 in 20 with stringent mitigation.  
107 Scenarios in which global annual emissions peak in 2030 are unable to deliver a 50% chance  
108 of limiting annual global mean temperature change to 2°C above pre-industrial levels,  
109 although they do provide a greater than evens chance (66% to 75%) that warming will remain  
110 below 3°C and reduce the chance of a 4°C rise to about 3%. Figure 1a summarises these  
111 outcomes. A detailed analysis of the relationship between peaking date for global emissions,  
112 subsequent emission reduction rates, and levels of emissions in 2050 may be found in  
113 Huntingford et al. (2012).

114

115 Projections for specific impact sectors were made using spatially-explicit process-based  
116 global physical impacts models, covering water resources, river and coastal flood risk,  
117 wetland loss, terrestrial biodiversity, crop suitability and productivity, and heating and  
118 cooling demands (Arnell et al 2013, Warren et al in press). A direct comparison is made  
119 between the levels of impacts in the presence and absence of action to reduce emissions of  
120 greenhouse gas emissions. The models include the influence of socioeconomic factors such  
121 as population upon impacts. These factors are held constant across all scenarios so that the  
122 effect of climate change is isolated.

123

124 All impacts projections were run with spatially-explicit climate scenarios produced by  
125 pattern-scaling climate model output to match the changes in global mean temperature as  
126 simulated by MAGICC under the different emissions pathways, and with socio-economic  
127 impact metrics assuming that population and economic growth follow either the SRES A1B  
128 or SRES A1FI socio-economic scenarios (see Arnell et al., 2013, for more details of the  
129 hydrological, crop, coastal and temperature-based indicators). Pattern-scaling (Warren et al.,  
130 2012) has a number of advantages, including that climate change projections can be  
131 constructed for (e.g. mitigation) scenarios that have not been simulated by the GCMs, but  
132 also some limitations, principally that it assumes a linear change in the amplitude of the  
133 regional pattern of climate as the global-mean temperature increases. In some instances,  
134 GCMs exhibit more complex behaviour, which is not captured by the pattern-scaling  
135 approach used here. This method has been shown to provide an “acceptable” emulation of  
136 the GCM responses for the types of scenario studied here, given the other large uncertainties  
137 in estimation of regional climate changes. The water resources and river flooding indicators  
138 were based on river flows simulated using Mac-PDM.09 (Gosling & Arnell, 2011). Changes  
139 in exposure to water resources stress is characterised by the total numbers of people living in  
140 watersheds with less than 1000m<sup>3</sup>/capita/year in the 1961-1990 baseline experiencing a  
141 significant decrease or increase in average annual runoff, where a significant change in runoff  
142 is greater than the standard deviation in average annual runoff due to multi-decadal  
143 variability. Change in exposure to river flooding is characterised by the numbers of people  
144 living in flood-prone areas where the return period of the baseline 20-year flood either  
145 doubles or halves due to climate change. In different parts of the world, exposure to both  
146 water stress and river flooding may increase or decrease in response to climate change.  
147 Change in coastal flood risk and coastal wetland extent were calculated using DIVA 2.0.4  
148 (Hinkel & Klein, 2009), which combines the effect of natural land movement and sea level  
149 rise. Coastal flood risk is characterised by the average annual number of people flooded in  
150 coastal floods, and it is assumed that the level of coastal flood protection increases as  
151 population density and wealth in flood-prone areas increases, and also as sea level rises; some  
152 adaptation is therefore assumed. The effect of climate change on the suitability of land for  
153 cropping is characterised by the area of cropland over which Ramankutty et al.’s (2009) crop  
154 suitability index changes by more than 5%; the index combines climate suitability (defined  
155 by rainfall, temperature and evaporation) and crop suitability (based on soil carbon content  
156 and pH). Both improvements and decreases in crop suitability are simulated. The productivity  
157 of spring wheat and soybean was estimated using the GLAM model (Challinor et al., 2004),

158 which simulates crop productivity based on climate, CO<sub>2</sub> concentration and soil  
159 characteristics; some adaptation is incorporated here, as it is assumed that the variety with the  
160 greatest yield under the simulated climate is planted. Changes in heating and cooling  
161 requirements are represented by changes in regional population-weighted heating and cooling  
162 degree days (using 18°C as the temperature threshold for both heating and cooling). A global  
163 analysis of impacts on biodiversity (Warren et al. in press) provides the potential climatic  
164 range changes for 48,786 animal and plant species across the globe under the AVOID  
165 scenarios, using MaxEnt (Elith et al .2010) 80% of these species have climatic ranges in  
166 excess of 30,000 km<sup>2</sup>, hence these climatic range losses would affect ecosystem services  
167 across large areas. A realistic level of species dispersal (natural adaptation by biodiversity) is  
168 assumed to take place. Uncertainties within the physical impacts models themselves are  
169 mostly not considered within the study. Models simulate responses to climate change that are  
170 beneficial as well as those which are not. Where climate change has a detrimental impact, the  
171 avoided impacts are defined as positive in sign; where climate change has a beneficial  
172 impact, the avoided impacts are defined as negative in sign.

173

174 The second approach to estimating impacts used the simple integrated model PAGE2002  
175 (Policy Analysis for the Greenhouse Effect: Hope, 2008), which simulates the radiative  
176 forcing and greenhouse warming resulting from the selected six emission scenarios, and  
177 further estimates the economic damage caused by warming to market and non-market sectors  
178 using parameters estimated from the literature. The climate model within PAGE2002 is  
179 simpler than the MAGICC plus pattern-scaling approach used for the physical impact  
180 modelling exercise but it is nevertheless still able to credibly sample the uncertainty in the  
181 transient climate response and the long-term response of surface temperatures for the  
182 scenarios of interest. The differences in damages between the SRES A1B baseline and policy  
183 scenarios are compared to produce estimates of the benefits of reduced carbon emissions.  
184 Equity weighting of the damages can be introduced into the calculations to reflect the wide  
185 disparity in incomes between the developed and developing worlds. Parameters linking  
186 emissions to climate change and linking climate change to damages are incorporated as  
187 probability distributions, thus enabling a probabilistic analysis to take place. The model also  
188 includes damages that might result from abrupt changes in the Earth's response to greenhouse  
189 warming (Hope, 2008).

190



191 The impacts under the different emissions scenarios are simulated using an integrated  
 192 assessment model, PAGE2002, which estimates impacts in economic terms, and a suite of  
 193 physically-based impacts models which characterise impacts in a range of metrics. The  
 194 combination of the two contrasting modelling approaches (physical and integrated) allows  
 195 investigation of the robustness of outputs to the use of very different modelling approaches.

196  
 197

198 Table 2 summarises the indicators used and explains whether they are used show benefits or  
 199 losses in response to climate change.

200

201 Table 2. Indicators used in the study.

Indicator	Metric	Sign adopted in Figure 2a, b
Total economic damages		PAGE simulates disbenefits of climate change, the avoided damage is a positive number
No. of species losing more than half their current climatic range	Count of species	The number of species protected due to mitigation is shown as a positive number
Improvement in crop suitability	Area of cropland	Since increased suitability is a benefit which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are negative
Decrease in crop suitability	Area of cropland	Since decreased suitability is a loss which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are positive
Exposure to increased water stress	Number of people living in water-stressed watersheds	Since increased exposure is a loss which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are positive
Exposure to decreased water stress	Number of people living in water-stressed watersheds	Since decreased exposure is a benefit which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are negative
Exposure to increased river flood frequency	Number of people living in river floodplains	Since increased exposure is a loss which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are positive

Exposure to decreased river flood frequency	Number of people living in river floodplains	Since decreased exposure is a benefit which mitigation reduces, the avoided impacts are negative
Change in people exposed to coastal flood	Average annual number of people flooded in coastal storms	Sea level only rises in response to climate change, so these changes are all losses which mitigation reduces, so the avoided impacts are positive
Change in coastal wetland	Area of coastal wetland	Sea level only rises in response to climate change, so these changes are all losses which mitigation reduces, so the avoided impacts are positive
Change in heating degree days	Population-weighted heating degree day total	Climate change generally increases regional temperatures so that there are fewer days below a heating threshold. This is a benefit which mitigation reduces, so the avoided impacts are negative
Change in cooling degree days	Population-weighted cooling degree day total	Climate change generally increases regional temperatures so that there are more days above a heating threshold. This is a loss which mitigation reduces, so the avoided impacts are positive

202

203

204 Fig 2a combines output from the PAGE integrated assessment model with those from the  
 205 physically based models. In particular, the figure shows the impacts avoided in the mitigation  
 206 scenarios relative to the A1B baseline scenario impacts, expressed as a percentage. Solid  
 207 bars represent the case average outcome from driving the with the median global climate  
 208 change outcome from the MAGICC4.1 model combined with the seven alternative patterns  
 209 of regional downscaling. Note that where climate change causes losses, the avoided impacts

210 are shown as positive (red). Where climate change has a beneficial effect, the avoided  
211 impacts are shown as negative (blue). Table 2 details which indicators refer to benefits and  
212 losses. Overall, the positive benefits of mitigation (red bars in Fig 2a) greatly outweigh the  
213 negatives (blue bars in Fig 2a). Further, for past-peak emission reduction rates of 2-5%,  
214 avoided impacts in physical and economic terms in the 21<sup>st</sup> century are larger for earlier  
215 peaking dates (in the range 2016-2030) irrespective of the subsequent emission reduction  
216 rate. Both red bars (referring to an emission peaking date of 2016 and subsequent emission  
217 reduction at 5% annually) and pink bars (referring to an emission peaking date of 2016 and  
218 subsequent emission reduction at only 2% annually) produce a larger proportion of avoided  
219 impacts than do the orange bars (referring to an emission peaking date of 2030 and  
220 subsequent emission reduction at 5% annually thereafter). Hence, fewer impacts can be  
221 avoided (in either physical or economic terms) when global emissions do not peak until 2030,  
222 even if emissions are reduced at 5% thereafter, than if emissions peak in 2016 and are  
223 reduced at 2% annually thereafter. The finding of a tradeoff between emission reduction rate  
224 and the date at which global emission peak reflects the relatively fixed relationship between  
225 total cumulative CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and peak temperature change.

226

227 In some individual sectors or regions, avoided physical impacts can be reduced by as much as  
228 70% by 2100, whilst in other regions or sectors, only 15% of the impacts may still be  
229 avoided. Many populated areas are projected to experience increased exposure to fluvial  
230 flood risk in the business as usual scenario by 2100, and these risks are reduced by some 60%  
231 with mitigation. A small percentage of world population is actually projected to experience  
232 slightly less exposure to fluvial flood risk in the business as usual scenario than in the  
233 mitigation scenario. Avoided impacts in sectors impacted by sea level rise tend to be smaller,  
234 owing to the slow response of sea level rise to changes in radiative forcing. For sea level rise  
235 projections, only a single global circulation model (HadCM3) was used, which provided  
236 projections of a rise 47.3 cm for A1B by the end of the century, which reduced to 30.9 cm  
237 under the most stringent mitigation scenario. However, for many of the impact categories  
238 studied, 30-50% of the impacts are avoided by 2100 relative to the A1B baseline case.  
239 Relative to an A1FI baseline case, avoided impacts are larger, ranging from 30-80%,  
240 compared to 20-70% with the A1B baseline (Figs. 2a,b).

241

242

243 Fig 2a also shows error bars representing uncertainty in the estimates of avoided impacts. In  
244 the case of the physical impacts models, uncertainty analysis is largely based on uncertainties  
245 in climate projection, focusing on uncertainties in the differing regional patterns of change  
246 produced when downscaling using different GCM patterns. This is justified because our  
247 probabilistic analysis suggests that the contribution to total uncertainty in many impacts from  
248 local pattern tends to dominate over the uncertainty from the global response and which is  
249 associated with, for instance, the uncertainty in the transient climate response. Seven climate  
250 models from the CMIP3 model set were used. The models (HadCM3, HadGEM1, ECHAM5,  
251 IPSL\_CM4, CCSM3.1 (T47), CGCM3.1 (T63) and CSIRO\_MK3.0) span the broad range of  
252 changes simulated under the full CMIP3 model set (Meehl et al. 2007), and provide an  
253 indication of the range in possible future climates. At the time of writing, studies such as the  
254 ‘AgMIP’ ([www.agmip.org](http://www.agmip.org)) are now producing estimates of the uncertainties inherent in  
255 impacts modelling, Further work is required to understand how to correctly combine the  
256 uncertainty in transient climate response with local pattern uncertainty, and also to  
257 incorporate the outcomes of these ongoing studies of uncertainty within impact model  
258 simulations.

259

260 Figure 2a also shows that if global emissions peak in 2016, around one half of the aggregate  
261 economic impacts can be avoided by the 2080s, but if mitigation is delayed so that emissions  
262 peak in 2030, only around a third of the impacts can be avoided. This is the case regardless of  
263 whether or not equity weightings are used in the PAGE2002 model. It should be noted that  
264 similar trends in terms of the dependence of reduced avoided impacts on the timing of  
265 mitigation are produced by the physical impacts models and the PAGE2002 modelling  
266 approach (Fig 2a). Uncertainty analysis in the integrated modelling approach is necessarily  
267 different from that of the physical modelling approach, as in the case of PAGE the  
268 probabilistic analysis synthesises uncertainties in climate projection and damage estimation  
269 into a single analysis, allowing the production of 10%, 50%, and 90% outcomes  
270 incorporating several aspects of uncertainty, and it is these 10% and 90% outcomes which  
271 comprise the error bars.

272

273 **Hence these projections demonstrate that early, stringent mitigation can avoid a large**  
274 **proportion of the impacts of climate change that are projected to occur during the**  
275 **second half of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, irrespective of whether impacts are measured in physical**  
276 **or economic terms.**

277

278 The question then arises as to how large are these physical and economic impacts. Figures  
279 3a, b show probability distributions of aggregate economic impacts in the A1B baseline  
280 scenario estimated by the PAGE model, detailing the inclusion or otherwise of equity  
281 weighting, which show mean estimates of US\$12.6 trillion (8.2 trillion) of weighted  
282 (unweighted) annual aggregate damage in the 2080s, with a 10 – 90% range of US\$4-24  
283 trillion (3 -15 trillion). Warren et al. (in press) estimate under the A1B scenario,  $57\pm 6\%$  % of  
284 plants and  $34\pm 7\%$  % of animals will lose more than half their climatic range by the 2080s.  
285 Detailed physical impacts modelling results presented elsewhere (Arnell et al 2013), also  
286 show that the estimated impacts in 2100 under the A1B and A1FI baselines are large.  
287 Examples of estimated global scale impacts in 2100 under the A1FI (A1B) scenario using the  
288 HadCM3 regional downscaling pattern are: 60% (38%) decline in spring wheat productivity;  
289 68% (46%) decline in soybean productivity; 35%(32%) decline in coastal wetland extent;  
290 64% (56%) cropland with decreased crop suitability and 12% (14%) with increasing  
291 suitability; 16%(13%) of global population with increased exposure to water stress; 65%  
292 (58%) of the flood-prone population is exposed to greater flood risk; 125% (92%) increase in  
293 cooling energy demand and 55%(42%) decrease in heating energy demand. However, like  
294 many other studies, this one finds large uncertainties in the projections of *precise* values of  
295 avoided impacts, larger, in fact, than the differences between the various mitigation scenarios  
296 considered. This is not surprising since the various GCMs produce differing representations  
297 of regional climate change. However, what is significant for policy is that the avoided  
298 impacts are likely to be large (see Figures 2, 3) regardless of these uncertainties. The study  
299 thus addresses the need to make mitigation decisions against a backdrop of uncertainty in  
300 climate projections, by identifying a more robust indicator of mitigation benefits in terms of  
301 the percentage of impacts avoided by mitigating. **Hence, the projections indicate that the**  
302 **avoided impacts are large and spatially extensive.** Nonetheless, adaptation planners still  
303 need to prepare for a wide range of possible outcomes in terms of the residual impacts after  
304 mitigation has been accounted for.

305

306 The results from the global biodiversity analysis here were consistent with a separate analysis  
307 based on the same scenarios, of the effects of climate change on European species focusing  
308 on 194 European mammals and 500 European plants using a Neural Ensembles modelling  
309 approach and two GCM patterns (O’Hanley 2009). This study projected that 13-25 European  
310 plant species (16-25 mammals) would incur a climatic range loss of more than 50% by the

311 2080s under the A1B baseline scenario, compared to only 4-5 plants and 4-6 mammals in a  
312 stringent mitigation scenario in which global emissions peak in 2016 and are reduced at 5%  
313 thereafter.

314

315 We now consider the issue of whether the scenarios we used are feasible. A survey of  
316 integrated assessment models by den Elzen et al. (2010) concluded that global long-term  
317 emissions reductions rates of up to 3.5% per year are possible but are less commonly seen in  
318 the model studies, which typically try to minimize costs, than lower emission reduction rates.  
319 Several other studies have also concluded that higher reduction rates are possible (Climate  
320 Change Committee, 2008, O'Neill 2010, UNEP, 2010). Analysis in the AVOID programme  
321 using a range of integrated assessment models demonstrated that transitioning from business-  
322 as-usual emissions scenarios (which for each model were broadly consistent with SRES A1B)  
323 to scenarios that included emissions peaking in 2016 and achieved a 2 degrees C limit to  
324 global warming were technologically possible, but with a broad range of annual 2050  
325 mitigation cost estimates ranging from -2% of 2050 GDP (i.e. an economic benefit) to +9%  
326 of 2050 GDP (Bowen, 2010). Additional analysis in the AVOID programme focused  
327 specifically on China and India demonstrated that these two regions could in theory deploy a  
328 range of low-carbon technologies which would allow them to achieve per-capita CO<sub>2</sub>  
329 emissions of around 2tCO<sub>2</sub> or less by 2050, in mitigation scenarios which limited global  
330 warming to 2 degrees C, and which included global emissions peaking by 2020 (Gambhir et  
331 al, 2011, Gambhir et al, 2012). For China, the annual mitigation cost by 2050 was estimated  
332 at about 2% of China's 2050 GDP, and for India, 1.2-2.4% of India's 2050 GDP (with the  
333 higher level resulting from a scenario in which carbon capture and storage was excluded from  
334 available technology options, and biomass availability was limited). **Hence we conclude**  
335 **there is evidence that it will be technologically possible to limit warming to 2°C above**  
336 **pre-industrial levels but in economic terms could be challenging to do so.**

337

338 It is possible to make a comparison of the estimated aggregate avoided economic damages  
339 from our study with mitigation costs, both from the PAGE2002 model. Upon moving from  
340 the A1B baseline to the stringent mitigation scenario in which global emissions peak in 2016  
341 and are reduced at 5% thereafter, the mean net present value of avoided damages amounts to  
342 US\$57, with a 10 – 90% range of US\$ 5 – 136 trillion while the mean net present value of  
343 abatement costs amounts to \$US 9, with a 10 – 90% range of US\$ 2 – 18 trillion (Fig 4a, b).  
344 The mean net present value of net benefits amounts to US\$ 48trillion , with a 10 - 90% range

345 of US\$ 0 -121 trillion (Fig 4c), Hence, in PAGE2002 the benefits exceeds the costs even for  
346 the most stringent mitigation scenario, with 90% confidence.

347

348 In other studies a variety of economic optimization approaches have been used to produce  
349 cost-benefit analyses for investment in mitigation of global greenhouse gas emissions, using  
350 models such as DICE/RICE, ENVISAGE, MERGE, and FUND (Tol 1999; Nordhaus &  
351 Boyer, 2000; Manne & Richels, 2005; Nordhaus 2008; Roson & Mensbrugge 2012). Such  
352 cost benefit analysis (CBA) has tended to recommend relatively modest levels of mitigation,  
353 but the outcome of cost-benefit analysis is very strongly dependent on subjective  
354 assumptions, such as the choice of discount rates, and suitable equity weighting (Schneider,  
355 1997; Ackerman et al., 2009). CBA uses simple equations to represent climate change and  
356 its impacts which are inconsistent with the latest understanding of the relationships between  
357 emissions and climate change, and between climate change and its impacts (Schneider, 1997;  
358 Ackerman et al., 2009, Warren et al 2010, Van Vurren et al 2011,) and the simple equations  
359 used produce damage curves with simple shapes that have frequently not been correctly  
360 calibrated to match recent scientific understanding, lack the ability to represent complex  
361 behaviour, and frequently omit or mis-calibrate regional variation. Whilst these same  
362 problems may affect our own PAGE2002 results this is minimized by the probabilistic  
363 approach, and we do not conduct an optimization process. The outcome of optimization  
364 alters each time new parameter values are available from the literature concerning climate  
365 change or its impacts, making the process of optimization unreliable. For this reason, an  
366 extremely wide range of results can be produced by adjusting the input parameters.

367 Uncertainties in estimates of the social cost of carbon (SCC), one of the strongest  
368 determinants of the outcomes of formal cost-benefit analysis, clearly illustrate the  
369 dependence of SCC on climate sensitivity, the shape of the climate change damage function,  
370 and the value of the discount rate (Ackermann & Stanton, 2012, Tol 2009). In contrast, the  
371 approach described here is based on a risk assessment of alternative scenarios of the future,  
372 including a presentation of uncertainties in outcomes of these scenarios. The methods avoid  
373 the inherent problems of optimization, and instead estimate the climate change impacts  
374 associated with different global greenhouse gas emissions futures, taking into account the  
375 uncertainties in our ability to project climate change and its, where possible, impacts. Thus, in  
376 our studies we do not select a global temperature limit from an optimized CBA, but instead  
377 recognize that the models are better used to provide one of many strands of evidence that will  
378 contribute to decisions on a suitable temperature target level.

379

380 It should be noted that optimization based approaches using a high (3%) discount rate  
381 commonly result in ‘optimal’ global temperature rise of between 2.9 and 3.5°C above pre-  
382 industrial levels (Bosello et al. 2010, Hope 2008, Nordhaus 2008, Nordhaus 2010). These  
383 moderate levels of mitigation would allow many of the substantial climate change impacts  
384 projected here to persist. However, use of lower discount rates in these same models can  
385 lower the optimal global temperature rise to around 2.5°C (Bosello et al. 2010). Hence the  
386 stringent mitigation scenarios examined here are inconsistent with the outcome of  
387 optimization approaches *if high discount rates are used in the models* and yet might be *more*  
388 *consistent* with them *if low discount rates are used*. However, it has been shown that the  
389 regional damages associated with a 2°C temperature increase simulated with physically-  
390 based impacts models differ very significantly from those produced by aggregate economic  
391 estimates produced by the RICE integrated model, which is commonly used in optimization  
392 based approaches (ClimateCost 2012) and in particular, very large underestimations of  
393 damages in Africa and S. and E. Asia have were found..

394

395 The findings of our work are consistent with those of Gosling et al. (2011) which also  
396 provides evidence of the need for stringent global action on climate change if significant  
397 undesirable impacts are to be avoided. Both the economic and physically based modelling  
398 approaches used in this study show that if the goal of a mitigation policy is to maximize the  
399 avoidance of climate change impacts in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It is also likely that the lower  
400 temperatures in the mitigation scenarios reduce other impacts associated with abrupt or  
401 irreversible changes in the climate system, such as die-back of Amazon forests or irreversible  
402 loss of the major ice sheets. For feasible rates of emission reduction of 2-5%, the date at  
403 which global emissions peak (over the range 2016-2030) is more influential, in terms of  
404 impacts avoided, than the rate of subsequent emission reductions. The study also makes it  
405 clear that even in the presence of very stringent mitigation, climate change impacts will be  
406 substantial in many areas and hence significant investment in adaptation will be necessary. In  
407 spite of this, climate change impacts under stringent mitigation increase much more slowly  
408 with time, allowing a slower and more feasible rate of adaptation to the remaining impacts.

409

410 In summary, in spite of the uncertainties in projecting precise values of projected climate  
411 change impacts, the AVOID study provides strong quantitative evidence for the need for



412 stringent and prompt global mitigation action on greenhouse gas emissions combined with  
413 effective adaptation if severe climate change impacts are to be avoided. The findings also  
414 highlight the inadequacy of the often-deployed cost-benefit analysis to the questions  
415 considered here.

416  
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
567 **Acknowledgments:**

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
570 **Figure 1a Cumulative probability of constraining global temperature outcomes in the**  
 571 **AVOID scenarios, showing the probability of constraining global temperature rise**  
 572 **below various thresholds**

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575 **Figure 1b The 10, 50 and 90 percentile outcomes of global temperature rise in the**  
 576 **AVOID scenarios.**



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
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581 **Figure 2a**

582 Percentage of climate change impacts avoided in the 2100 in various sectors upon moving  
 583 from an unmitigated A1B baseline to three of our mitigation scenarios in which emissions are  
 584 reduced at 5% annually after peaking globally in 2016 (red bars, scenario 2016R5L), reduced  
 585 at 2% annually after peaking globally in 2016 (pink bars) or reduced at 5% annually after  
 586 peaking in 2030 (orange bars, scenario 2030R5L). Avoided benefits are shown in shades of  
 587 blue for the same three scenarios. The total economic damages are produced by the PAGE  
 588 model and refer to the sum of market and non-market impacts (and actually refer to impacts  
 589 in the 2080s). Error bars represent 10% and 90% estimates for all sources of uncertainty in  
 590 climate projection and impact estimation (for PAGE model) or the effect of use of a range of  
 591 downscaling patterns corresponding to the emulation of seven alternative global circulation  
 592 models (for physically based impacts models).

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
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
605 **Figure 2b**  
606 As Figure 2b, but for A1FI (for a smaller selection of metrics than Figure 2a).



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611 **Figure 3a, b** Probability distribution of estimated aggregate economic climate change  
 612 impacts in the 2080s in an unmitigated A1B baseline as produced by PAGE model.  
 613 Estimates refer to the sum of market and non-market impacts and encompass uncertainties in  
 614 both climate change modelling and in estimation of damages. Fig 3a refers to equity-  
 615 weighted estimates and Fig 3b to un-weighted estimates.


616 a. Impacts in 2080, A1B scenario, weighted.



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


620 b. Impacts in 2080, A1B scenario, unweighted.



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626 **Figure 4a** Net present value of abatement costs from 2000 to 2200 in the PAGE2002 model  
 627 upon moving from a baseline A1B scenario to a mitigation scenario in which global  
 628 emissions peak in 2016 and decline at 5% annually thereafter  
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


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**Figure 4b**


Net present value of avoided impacts from 2000 to 2200 in the PAGE2002 model upon moving from a baseline A1B scenario to a mitigation scenario in which global emissions peak in 2016 and decline at 5% annually thereafter



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**Figure 4c** Net present value of net benefits (i.e. – avoided impacts minus abatement costs) from 2000 to 2200 in the PAGE2002 model upon moving from a baseline A1B scenario to a mitigation scenario in which global emissions peak in 2016 and decline at 5% annually thereafter



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