Realpolitik

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Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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Realpolitik is an approach to foreign policy in which preservation of the state and promotion of the national interest are the ultimate goals and power is the primary tool for achieving those ends. Associated historically with leaders such as Richelieu, Bismarck, Stresemann and Kissinger, it may be understood as the practical counterpart to the realist school of International Relations theory.

The term Realpolitik emerged in mid-nineteenth century Germany (see Haslam 2002: 183-4) and was introduced into academic political science by Friedrich Meinecke. However, it harks back to a longer tradition of thought about reasons of state that is associated pre-eminently with Niccolò Machiavelli. His work, The Prince (Machiavelli 1995), in which he advises the Medicis on how to restore the fortunes of Florence, is often regarded as the bible of Realpolitik.

Proponents of Realpolitik regard the sovereign state as a unitary actor whose interests can be reasonably straightforwardly identified. These interests are defined in terms of power and revolve around maintaining and enhancing the state's international position. For example, Bismarck developed a system of interlocking alliances designed to keep France isolated and hence forestall the creation of a Franco-Russian alliance which could force the new German Empire to fight on two fronts. A century later, Kissinger's triangular diplomacy involved pursuing a rapprochement with China in order to incentivize the Soviet Union to cooperate with his policy of détente, thereby relieving pressure on a US state that was exhausted by entanglement in Indochina. These examples reveal the essential feature of a foreign policy of Realpolitik, viz. a willingness to be flexible in one's choice of alliance partners, setting ideological considerations to one side in order to manipulate the balance of power for national advantage.

Realpolitik, like realist theory, involves a categorical distinction between international and domestic politics. Machiavelli, however, recognized that domestic goodwill is a precondition of foreign policy
success. This was also understood by leaders such as Bismarck and Stresemann, for whom foreign policy success and domestic stability (in Imperial Germany and the Weimar Republic respectively) went hand in hand. In contrast, neglect of domestic politics was a signal feature of Kissinger's brand of Realpolitik. Whilst he appeared to believe that the wise statesman should simply be left alone to carry out the business of foreign policy in an enlightened fashion, the collapse of détente between the US and USSR in the late-1970s was due in no small part to the activism of Kissinger's domestic critics, most notably in their efforts to impose greater conditionality on US trade relations with the USSR than Kissinger deemed desirable.

Realpolitik demands that the national interest be prioritized over all other ends and values. This is sometimes held to be amoral, or even immoral. Yet Realpolitik is not strictly divorced from ethical considerations. Machiavelli insists that the kinds of moral constraints that apply to relations between individuals within well-constituted states do not apply to those states in their relations with one another. Foreign policy is, nevertheless, always conducted in a context provided by the established conventions of the age. These rules and understandings shape how others will respond and hence how the national interest may most productively be advanced. Indeed, shaping such conventions is an important tool by which the powerful may seek to advance their interests. What proponents of Realpolitik deny is the existence of rules which transcend time and space: they insist that leaders must adjust to their circumstances.

Whereas exponents of Realpolitik regard themselves as realists, adopting a pragmatic attitude unencumbered by sentiment, they may be regarded by others as scheming and even untrustworthy. These two faces of Realpolitik may be traced back to Machiavelli (1995: 48), who advises leaders to 'never take things easy in times of peace, but rather use the latter assiduously, in order to be able to reap the profit in times of adversity'. Few would find fault with the notion that those responsible for the national defense should remain alert to future threats and be willing to make difficult decisions. The notion that opportunities for national advantage should always be exploited and that the ends always justify the means is, however, more controversial. The pejorative connotations which often attach to Realpolitik stem from the fact that it may be difficult to disentangle what is required for national defense from what may be desired by unscrupulous leaders, not least because of the secrecy with which figures such as Bismarck and Kissinger have carried out their foreign policies.

In contemporary international politics, Realpolitik's pejorative connotations have become more prominent, such that the term is often used to disparage a foreign policy as cynically self-interested.
The more neutral notion of power politics, however, continues to be central to the realist and neorealist schools of International Relations theory: scholars such as Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer view power politics as the essential characteristic of an anarchic international system, though they largely avoid the term *Realpolitik*.

Perhaps the most significant criticism of *Realpolitik* is that it conflates description and prescription. Machiavelli’s analysis of the challenges facing Florentine leaders was not only rooted in particular historical circumstances, but was also designed to promote a particular outcome, viz. to save renaissance Italy from disunity and foreign domination. It is therefore important to establish where analysis ends and advice begins. Like their realist counterparts in International Relations, proponents of *Realpolitik* argue that their approach reflects the necessities of competition between sovereign states in an anarchic setting. Yet if international politics is shaped by how leaders think and act, then our descriptions matter: to the extent that authors such as Machiavelli advise leaders to act in a power-political fashion, they may help to bring into existence precisely the kind of world which they represent as a fact of international life.

[Cross References]
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[References and Suggested Readings]