

Poetry, parables and codes: translating the letters of Indian soldiers

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Poetry, parables and codes: translating the letters of Indian soldiers.

The Indian army on the Western Front between 26 September 1914 and Boxing Day 1915 (some 138,600 men) was a multiethnic, multi religious, and above all multilingual organisation, with at least seven languages spoken among its troops.

Censoring the letters written to and from these soldiers thus represented a task which was enormous both linguistically, and in the sheer volume of letters sent every week - from the families in India to troops on the Western front (at least 10,000 per week), from Indian troops in France to India (about 20,000 per week), and from wounded Indian soldiers in Britain to India (1,500- 4,000 per week)¹. As far as censorship was concerned, by the time the letters reached the Chief Censor's Office at the India Base Post Office in Boulogne, it was expected that a preliminary security-type censorship, of varying degrees of efficiency, would have operated at regimental or local level.

The job of the Office was thus less the suppression of material, and rather the monitoring of states of mind and morale - that of the Indian troops at the Front (it was the first time that Indian regiments had been deployed in Europe), and that of public opinion back home in India, in particular looking for signs of increased subversion as a result of anti-war sentiment. The Office prepared a weekly report on these matters with illustrative translated extracts of the letters to send back to the authorities in Britain - the Military Headquarters, the India Office, the Cabinet, and the King. Given the number of letters involved, and the fact that actually deciphering and translating an individual letter could take a censor two hours,² the team at the Base Post Office consisting of four, then eight, then five employees - all former interpreters with Indian cavalry regiments, oriental scholars and old 'India hands' - was acutely aware

of the problematics of regarding these translated texts as valid evidence of the state of mind of the Indian troops:

' it becomes a distinctly difficult and delicate matter to precisely tell the temperature of what may be called the pulse of the native troops in the Indian Expeditionary Force from their letters alone'.³

Much of the historiographical debate on the Indian Corps has centred on its military effectiveness on the Western Front. Some scholars have argued for example that the performance of the Indian troops was relatively poor overall, that they were a colonial army whose original purpose and training made it unsuited to the type of winter war being waged in Europe (Greenhut, 1983). More recently, a new generation of historians has challenged this interpretation (Morton-Jack 2006, 2014), emphasizing instead what they see as the professionalism of the Indians' record in the European war. The letters written to and from the troops themselves (now happily digitalized by the British Library) have given us an additional window onto the more broadly cultural experiences of Indian troops on the Western Front, the ways in which their direct encounter with Western societies and warfare was represented and understood by them (VanKoski 1995; Omissi 1999). Of course any interpretation of the actual contents of the letters has to accept the essentially palimpsestic nature of these texts with their multiple mediators - the often illiterate sender or receiver, the literate middleman writer, and the anglophone translator (Das 2011a,b). Rather than addressing the letters themselves as cultural signifiers, or contributing to the debate on military effectiveness, this chapter focuses instead on the pivotal role of translation in the India Base Post Office in Boulogne. The lived reality of what we now recognise as the cultural hybridity of the First World War was radically dependent on language

transmission. In this particular case, translation in the censor's office, translating was not an innocent neutral rendering of foreign words into English, but rather a highly political intervention. Translators acting as censors were political actors both in their approach to the texts themselves, and in their re-presentation of the texts to their British governmental and military audiences. As far as the text was concerned, translation became a form of detective work, an unravelling of the physical and linguistic subterfuges which might be being used by Indian soldiers to circumvent censorship. As far as the audience was concerned, translation was the presentation of 'cultural meaning' to people in Britain who were largely devoid of the relevant cultural frameworks and who, within Government at least, were actually engaged in an ongoing internal dispute about the precise role that Indian troops should be playing in the war.

The translator as detective

Indian letter writers both in India and at the Front were clearly aware that they were subject to local/battalion censorship: ' We are not allowed to tell you the real facts about the war'; 'I cannot write the truth to you...There is much to tell, but I cannot write, because it is strictly forbidden'; ' We are not allowed to write about the war....What is put in the papers is all lies, we have only captured 400 yards of trenches. the war is very hard'; ' I could not give you any newsbecause the letters written here have to be produced before an officer and we are forbidden to say anything about the war or where we are. if any such information is given, the letter is torn up'.⁴

Censorship was certainly resented by many of the Indian soldiers fighting on the Front: 'The result of the war whether it be victory or defeat will not be influenced by the tearing up of letters - especially by the tearing up of letters of men who entrusted their lives and fortunes and comfort and their home to that nation whose blood is being shed upon the battlefield'.⁵ This consciousness that their personal messages to and from family and friends have all passed over the censor's desk is a constant theme, with some letters even directly addressing the hidden official reader, either to upbraid or flatter him- ' To the person who examines this letter. Please cut out what is unnecessary and do not destroy the letter' ;⁶ 'These words that I have written above, I have written only for the purpose that if any great folk open the letter they may be pleased'.⁷

In order to evade the censorship of which they were only too aware, some correspondents attempted to bypass official posting networks. As Indian troops became more established in France, it was evident that alternative routes for sending and receiving letters were being opened up. Letters coming from India could be sent direct to the Expeditionary Force via the French Post Office, and would only be censored if the French authorities spotted them and specifically sent them on.⁸ By April 1915, a number of letters from India were being addressed directly to postal towns in France - 'This shows that a certain number of Indian clerks and others who were in a position to give fixed addresses in this country have done so, and have thus been enabled hitherto to evade the censorship'.⁹ Again, if the French Post Office were not vigilant, Indian soldiers could avoid censorship by dropping their letters into French pillar boxes¹⁰. The longer Indian troops were in France, the more likely it was that they would strike up relationships with local citizens, and this could potentially

be another alternative channel for correspondence - ' A letter has been intercepted during the week addressed by a Frenchwoman to an Indian hospital storekeeper in which the writer suggests that an accommodation address should be arranged by her correspondent for the delivery of her letters....it is understood that it is especially desired to prevent this practice from becoming common'.¹¹

Physical evasion of censorship like this however was necessarily a less common activity than what might be termed linguistic evasion practised within the very text of the letter itself. In this case correspondents might deliberately use language in such a way as to disguise the truths that they wanted to convey, through what the Boulogne Post Office described as , ' veiled metaphors or secret writing'.¹² At the very basic level, a letter writer could enclose a loose scrap of paper with his missive, signalling that part of the letter which contained the real message.¹³ Some writers set up a mutually agreed secret code with their correspondents by means of which they could try and communicate details of casualty and death figures. Thus a soldier recovering in hospital in Brighton, wanting to know how the rest of his regiment at the Front was faring, suggested: ' If a man is wounded but not dead, write his name, and if he is wounded put "1" after his name. If he is dead put "2" after his name and below write that so and so sends his greeting. If you write this way no one can catch you. Otherwise the letter is torn up'.¹⁴ Similarly, a writer from India begged his correspondent to, 'write your name and if the wound is very severe draw two lines above it, but if it is an ordinary wound put one line so that I may know'.¹⁵ Others proposed that a soldier at the Front might , ' write everything fully but backwards, the last letter first and the first last'.¹⁶

As the war progressed, the use of these codes clearly increased - 'Secret writing by signs or euphemisms is coming more into vogue'¹⁷. For the translator, a seemingly straightforward letter might actually contain a series of coded references, embedded messages: 'interspersed between the lines of the writing are words and letters which can be interpreted to mean " The Germans have seen our signs" or our friendship'.¹⁸ By September 1915, the Base Post Office was also finding explicit references to invisible ink : 'we are not allowed to write in plain letters.... We read the letter from Bhag Singh to Bhagat Singh by smoking it (warming it)'.¹⁹

More common, and far more challenging for the translator-detective however, was the evasion of censorship through what was regarded in the Office as the typically Indian custom of story telling with a hidden moral purpose, parables:²⁰ '(it is) almost impossible for any censorship of oriental correspondence to be effective as a barrier. Orientals excel in the art of conveying information without saying anything definitive'.²¹ An essentially oral tradition, manifesting itself in the letters in both prose and poetry, was potentially flexible enough to conceal descriptions and opinions which might otherwise have been censored. Writers could retell well-known stories which were then open to be interpreted by their families as specific commentaries on the war. Thus, a Pathan at the Front, writing to his brother in Urdu, recounted an apparently traditional story of a fight between various named Indians. The translator, re-reading the tale in the context of activity on the Western Front, espied instead, 'a very fair account of the war up to date',²² in which each of the named characters could be seen to personify one of the combatant nations: Jullal Khan- Germany; Ahmad Din- Austria; Rahim Bakhan- Turkey; and the 'brothers': Amir Khan- Britain; Faqir Muhammed- France; Baraket Ali- Belgium; Sarwar Khan- Serbia.

Whilst such one-to-one equivalent character stories could generally be disentangled, it was much more difficult to unpick many other traditional expressions and stories,²³ often so closely related to local topography that it was impossible to divine what they actually meant. A soldier recovering in hospital in England for example wrote to his brother, an employee on the North West Railway in India, that he was not allowed to describe the real facts of the war, but that, 'When you go to Piplan on foot you will understand what I mean.... it is a sort of parable'. As the translator commented, 'What the parable may mean it is impossible to say. Piplan is a station on the North West Railway between Pindi and Jhelum just on the edge of the Salt Range, but only a person who knew the neighbourhood very well could grasp the allusion'.²⁴

When these parables were in poetic form, they became even more resistant to the translators, particularly as the Boulogne Post Office staff were markedly unsympathetic to poetic expression: 'Many of the men show a tendency to break into poetry which I am inclined to regard as a rather ominous sign of mental disquietude'.²⁵ The meaning of poetry, in Persian, Pashti or Punjabi, was extremely difficult for a non-native speaker, even one with good linguistic skills, to interpret: 'there is nothing that can be done in the way of censorship. For there is no one living who can make head or tail of these things except the people who have been brought up on the ballads...'.²⁶ Although the translated poetry seemed to have little meaning,²⁷ the translators continued to believe that it could potentially be quite dangerous.²⁸

In comparison with parables, attempts to evade the censor using keywords to stand for something else, a form of metonymy, were rather easier to detect. 'Red and black

pepper' for example were commonly used in the letters to refer to white troops and Indian troops: 'All the black pepper has been finished; there is only a little left'; ' the black pepper which has come from India has all been used up and to carry on with I will (i.e. they will) now send for more, otherwise there would be very little red pepper remaining, because the black is hard and there is plenty of it'.²⁹ 'Fruit' was another word which the censors suspected of hidden meaning: 'There is plenty of fruit here. But we are not allowed to eat it'.³⁰ In October 1915, the Boulogne Post Office withheld one such letter, convinced that 'fruit' here referred to European women: ' Apples, grapes, pears, and peaches are to be had in abundance. The pears and peaches - praise be to God - are of a flavour far surpassing their flavour in India'.³¹

If the translator acted as a detective however, he very seldom actually censored letters. With the exception of occasional notes which mentioned sex with white women, gave positive accounts about Prisoners of War in Germany, or described particularly distressing war wounds (Omissi 1999), the vast majority of the letters were passed on. The overall policy was liberal, one of minimal interference: ' it must be remembered that it is only a proportion, and not a very large proportion of the letters written by the Indian soldiers that are censored here, and any action taken here in the way of erasure and so forth is almost negligible.....it would be quite unfair to withhold the whole of a long letter containing as often as not what the writer believed to be his last will and testament, simply because here and there through the letter advice was givennot to join the army'.³²

The translator as cultural mediator

Rather than censors, translators at the Boulogne Post Office operated as cultural mediators, transmitting an understanding of the wartime mood of Indians to the authorities in Britain, both military and governmental. This cultural mediation aspect of translation operated through three main translational processes: arrangement of material, through the way the translators organised their reports; glossing, through the annotations they offered to elucidate particular cultural references which their audience might find difficult to understand; and through advisory comments offered to the authorities in Britain about the overall context, what the translators perceived to be the situation in India and on the Western Front.

To begin with, the weekly reports presented their British readers with examples of letters organised by race and caste: 17 Sikhs, 4 Garhawalis, 2 Dogras, 1 Mahomedan, 2 Jats, 4 Punjabi Mahomedans, 1 Pathan, 1 Gurkha.³³ When the letters of a new racial grouping were included for the first time, the report would signal this, and specifically suggest what the mood of this particular ethnicity on the Front might be.³⁴ Soon however, the reports moved from this strictly ethnic organisation of correspondence, towards a presentation which would enable readers to distinguish themes which were relevant across the whole spectrum of racial categories. Whilst each letter was still tagged with the writer's ethnicity and language, the translators sought to illustrate key issues relating to morale in India and on the Western Front via general cross-cutting themes, directing their readers' attention to sections on: good moral tone; mendacity; bad moral tone; suggestive or secret correspondence; references to war (high prices, unrest in India, returning to India, good treatment); belief in eventual destruction; loyal expressions.³⁵

Having arranged the material, the translators then glossed particular cultural references which might not be readily comprehensible to their British audience.³⁶ Thus readers were made aware that Sikhs were complaining about the disrespect shown to their religion at the Front when the translator glossed relevant keywords in the particular letter: 'Kachhehra' meaning 'drawers which all Sikhs must wear', and 'kirpán' meaning 'sacrificial knife, in practice, a slip of steel worn in the hair'.³⁷ A reference to Hindu religious observance and its sacred tree- 'shake the pipal tree'- was in reality, translators carefully pointed out, an appeal for the receivers of the letter to ensure they did not themselves volunteer for war - 'the leaves of the pipal tree are long and thin and resemble the blade of a sword, so the secondary and real meaning is to go to the war and count (or see) the bayonets'.³⁸ A letter from a ward orderly needed to be glossed for a British audience in order to emphasize the fact that the apparently innocent suggestion that a correspondent should fumigate himself with the Bhilawan nut was in practice a means of giving advice on how to be excused from fighting because of medical invalidity: 'This use of the marking nut causes the body to swell and pimples to appear'.³⁹

As well as glosses appended to specific letters, the translators signalled more general cultural information which they thought was important to understand in cases where the issues concerned could prove to be politically dangerous to the stability of the Army, or to public opinion in India. Thus for example they mentioned their own problems with the work of those, 'well meaning but ignorant persons' from the YMCA who were providing free envelopes for troops with the YMCA Christian crest - 'We spend hours every day cutting these headings off...It is the possible effect in India of what is printed on the paper that is important. An agitator could make great

capital out of it'.⁴⁰ Complaints in the letters about the ways in which dead bodies were being treated in the campaign were singled out as having the potential to cause considerable harm in an Indian context: 'There can be no question about the danger, in India, of remarks of this kind, although from the point of view of a military censorship there is no harm in them'.⁴¹

The sheer volume of letters which the Boulogne Post Office was reading every week, combined with their specialist linguistic and cultural knowledge, meant that the translators were in a particularly good position to offer advice to the authorities about how morale both in India and on the Western Front might be improved. There had been disquiet in official circles about the possible influence of the war on anti-colonial feeling in India, and the translators kept a close watch to see whether there was any noticeable increase in explicitly anti-British propaganda.⁴² The verdict was that, 'in the last resort the sympathies of the ordinary decent man are on the side of law and order. This attitude is undoubtedly the main prop on which the British Raj in India rests'.⁴³ This apparent continued support for the Empire appeared in practice to amount to a feeling that, 'the devil they knew was better than the devil they did not know'.⁴⁴ What the Boulogne Post Office felt that the authorities must urgently understand however was, 'the great importance of a really good news service'. Ensuring India had full information about the war was a political necessity for the continuation of British credibility: 'there is a general impression that the real facts are being concealed...the two extracts add strongly to the arguments which have so often been used in these reports in favour of keeping India fully supplied with information'.⁴⁵

As far as troops on the Front were concerned, the advice consistently offered by the Office was that the authorities should now recognise the suffering of the Indian soldiers, and ensure that they were relieved as soon as possible. With these interventions the translators were entering into an ongoing dispute between British Indian and British metropolitan strategists about the most effective means of using Indian forces. On the one hand, the Indian commander Willcocks was arguing that the Indian troops were a special case, and that unless their interests were properly respected they might well cease to cooperate. On the other hand, the metropolitan Haig was contending that Indian soldiers should be treated exactly the same as their European counterparts. A particularly sensitive subject which the translators openly discussed was that of wounded Indian troops, and the advisability of sending such men directly back to the Front on their recovery. Many Indian soldiers regarded this move as a flagrant violation of the pre-war traditions of their army which held that the sick should always be sent directly home. Translators counselled caution: 'it is abundantly clear from letters written in all parts of the globe that Indian opinion is quite solid against the sending back to the trenches of men who have once been wounded'; 'if they could be allowed to return to India for even a short period, say two or three months, it would be an act of grace which would be greatly appreciated by the Indian troops, and render them more ready to answer the call of duty when required after that period'.⁴⁶ The translators maintained that there were clear political reasons for showing some flexibility in these matters, given the, 'feeling that the native sepoys in France are being sacrificed to spare the British troops. This feeling...is likely to produce a somewhat pernicious effect on the morale of the native troops in Europe which will probably react with cumulative force on the feelings and passions of the populace in India'.⁴⁷ The German propaganda campaign in the winter

of 1914-15, airdropping leaflets in Hindi which advocated mutiny and desertion in the Indian Army, had, despite the worries of the authorities, produced relatively little reaction. Here too, the translators were at pains to explain and excuse those very limited cases in which desertion had actually taken place: ' the motive which induced the men to desert was compounded of homesickness and a despair of survival upon any other terms. Desertion appeared to offer the only chance of life and of a return home, and it was not treachery or any collusion with the enemy...(no 12) refers to desertion in so many words as " going home" '.⁴⁸

Looking to the future and the postwar stability of the Indian Empire, the translators were in a unique position to advise the British authorities on how the consequences of War might begin to change the Raj in India. The Indian army itself, its recruitment already declining, would surely have to modernise, they claimed. One approach would be to examine successful foreign models: ' considerable information could be gleaned from a study of the constitution, political rights and behaviour of the Muhammedan regiments employed by the French army, and also of the by no means small percentage of Muhammadans serving in some of the Russian regiments'.⁴⁹

More generally, they pointed out that the Indians' direct exposure to European culture during the war period would produce effects which could potentially be unhelpful to the continued status of the British in India - Indians might for example get the, 'wrong idea about the "izzat" (honour) of English women, a sentiment which if not properly held in check would be most detrimental to the prestige and spirit of European rule in India'⁵⁰ . At the same time, the experience which Indians had gained in the War could equally be seen as a unique educative opportunity: ' Under stress of necessity many Indian soldiers during their stay in Europe have learned to read and

write their own languages, and primers and spelling books come in large quantities from India to the army'.⁵¹ Overall, it was evident that the deployment of the Indian Army on the Western Front had brought Indians for the first time into direct contact with Europeans in their own European space, and the results of these meetings were likely to be, the translators argued, highly unpredictable both for India and for its British colonizers: 'this war will do more towards giving the natives of India a practical insight into European manners and customs than several generations of education....The net result of the war on the feelings and prejudices of the native population in India is probably one of the most eminently interesting outcomes of this campaign'.⁵²

Between September 1914 and Boxing Day 1915, the dialogue between Indian letter writers had been, like the Indian Corps itself, transplanted to Europe. The India Base Post Office in Boulogne became in effect a 'contact zone', what Mary-Louise Pratt defines as 'the space and time where subjects previously separated by geography and history are co-present, the point at which their trajectories now intersect' (2008, 4). In the space of the censors' office, the trajectories of multiple Indian identities met those of British military and governmental officials, physically unseen, but verbally co-present in the written texts - letters from Indians, and reports back to Britain - spilling over the desks. In this 'Translation Zone' (Apter 2006), the translators' relationship with their source and target texts was highly specific. As regards the letters themselves, their task as translators was to scan the potentially suspect text in order to cleanse it of possibly damaging nuggets of privileged information, and then re-present it in its disinfected state to the originally designated receivers. As regards the British audience, the translators sought to re-present the texts yet again, but this time as a

contribution to an 'official' ongoing narrative of the Indian Army at war in the West. In this respect, the Boulogne Post Office provides an unusual insight into the role of military translation, offering us a picture of translators as professionals endowed with considerable agency, declining to censure much of the material crossing their desks, and using translational skills - arrangement of material, glossing and advisory notes - in order to present a particular image of the Indian Corps and to argue forcibly and consistently on its behalf:

' Never since the days of Hannibal....has any body of mercenaries suffered so much and complained so little as some of the regiments of Indian infantry now in France....if the strain is not to reach breaking point the "door of hope" must be opened somewhere before too long...the burden of proof should now be shifted to fresh shoulders'.⁵³

¹ 1. Figures from British Library India Office Records collection, hereafter IOR: IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, 20 March 1915.

² Ibid

³ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, 15 May 1915.

⁴ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 6 March, 1915, Extract 9; IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 11 October 1915, Extract 9; IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 5 June 1915, Extract 38; IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 9 August 1915, Extract 17.

⁵ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 17 June 1915, Extract 4a.

⁶ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 14 August 1915, Extract 32.

⁷ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 20 March, 1915, Extract 11.

⁸ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/2, Report 27 March, 1915.

⁹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 24 April, 1915.

¹⁰ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/5, Report 28 August 1915.

¹¹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 31 July 1915.

¹² IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 5 June 1915.

¹³ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/2, Report 17 April 1915, Extract 8.

¹⁴ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/2, Report 17 April, 1915, extract 22.

¹⁵ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/2, Report 8 May 1915, Extract 9.

¹⁶ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 5 June 1915, Extract 19.

¹⁷ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 15 May, 1915.

¹⁸ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 22 May, 1915, Extract 25.

¹⁹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/5, Report 4 September 1915, Extract 48.

²⁰ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 5 June, 1915.

²¹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, 15 February 1915.

²² IOR/L/MIL/5/825/2, Report 3 April, 1915, Extract 1.

²³ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 6 March, 1915, Extract 8.

²⁴ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 6 March, 1915, Extract 9.

²⁵ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 23 January, 1915.

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- ²⁶ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 6 March, 1915.
- ²⁷ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/5, Report 11 September, 1915, extracts 44, 45.
- ²⁸ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 3 July 1915, Extract 92.
- ²⁹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 20 March, 1915, Extract 41; Report 3 April, 1915, Extract 13; IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 29 May 1915, Extract 4; IOR/L/ML/5/825/5, Report 28 August 1915, Extract 38.
- ³⁰ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/6, Report 25 September 1915, extract 52.
- ³¹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/6, Report 27 November 1915, Extract 31.
- ³² IOR/L/MIL/5/825/5, Report 28 August 1915.
- ³³ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 12 February 1915.
- ³⁴ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 30 January 1915.
- ³⁵ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 17 April, 1915.
- ³⁶ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 23 January, 1915.
- ³⁷ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 9 August, 1915, Extract 21.
- ³⁸ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 5 June, 1915, Extract 6.
- ³⁹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 31 July, 1915, Extract 30.
- ⁴⁰ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 15 January 1915, 3 February, 1915.
- ⁴¹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 6 March, 1915.
- ⁴² IOR/L/MIL/5/825/1, Report 3 April, 1915.
- ⁴³ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 1 May 1915.
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- ⁴⁶ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 31 July, 1915. See also, 3 July, 1915; IOR/L/MIL/5/825/6, Report 13 November 1915.
- ⁴⁷ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/3, Report 15 May, 1915.
- ⁴⁸ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 6 November, 1915.
- ⁴⁹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 26 June, 1915.
- ⁵⁰ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 12 June, 1915.
- ⁵¹ IOR/L/MIL/5/825/8, Report 11 December, 1915.
- ⁵² IOR/L/MIL/5/825/4, Report 12 June 1915, 19 June 1915.
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