University of Reading

Metaphysical and historical claims in the birth of tragedy

Book or Report Section

Published Version

Harloe, K. C. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0207-5212 (2008) Metaphysical and historical claims in the birth of tragedy. In: Dries, M. (ed.) Nietzsche on time and history. A collection of essays. Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 271-285. ISBN 9783110190090 Available at https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/6933/

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing.

Publisher: Walter de Gruyter

All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement.

www.reading.ac.uk/centaur

CentAUR

University of Reading

Central Archive at the University of Reading

Reading's research outputs online

Nietzsche on Time and History

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Nietzsche on Time and History

Edited by
Manuel Dries

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Walter de Gruyter · Berlin · New York

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

♾ Printed on acid-free paper which falls within the guidelines
of the ANSI to ensure permanence and durability.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 978-3-11-019009-0

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek

The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available in the Internet at http://dnb.d-nb.de.

© Copyright 2008 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 10785 Berlin, Germany.
All rights reserved, including those of translation into foreign languages. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Printed in Germany
Cover design: Martin Zech, Bremen.
Printing and binding: Hubert & Co GmbH & Co KG, Göttingen.

If there is no goal in the whole of history of man's lot, then we must put one in: assuming, on the one hand, that we have need of a goal, and on the other that we've come to see through the illusion of an immanent goal and purpose. And the reason we have need of goals is that we have need of a will—which is the spine of us. 'Will' as the compensation of lost 'belief', i.e., for the idea that there is a divine will, one which has plans for us.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß Summer 1886–Spring 1887, KSA 12, 6[9]

We are still growing continually, our sense of time and place, etc., is still developing.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß April–June 1885, KSA 11, 34[124]

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

'Timeless' to be rejected. At a particular moment of a force, an absolute conditionality of the redistribution of all forces is given: it cannot stand still. 'Change' is part of the essence, and therefore so is temporality—which, however, just amounts to one more conceptual positing of the necessity of change.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Nachlaß May–July 1885, KSA 11, 35[55]

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Acknowledgements

The essays in this volume were first presented at the 15th International Conference of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society of Great Britain and Ireland, held at Peterhouse, Cambridge, in September 2005. I wish to take this opportunity to thank delegates and all those who participated in this event for the debates and critical discussions that shaped the research presented here.

I would further like to thank the Faculty of Philosophy and the Department of German at Cambridge for providing generous financial support. I am much indebted to Raymond Geuss, Simon Blackburn, Margaret Clare Ryan, and the Executive Committee of the Friedrich Nietzsche Society for their advice during the various stages of the editing of this volume.

Two of the contributions in this book are either drawn from or have appeared in full elsewhere, and this material appears with permission and my thanks. Raymond Geuss' article was previously published in his collection of essays *Outside Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It is reprinted here with permission of Princeton University Press. Lawrence J. Hatab's article is drawn in parts from the text of his book *Nietzsche's Life Sentence: Coming to Terms with Eternal Recurrence* (New York: Routledge University Press, 2005). I thank Routledge for permission to publish the essay.

The four excerpts of printed music of Wagner, Bizet, and Stravinsky in Jonathan R. Cohen's essay appear here with permission of Dover Publishing, Chester Music Limited (Music Sales) and Schott Music GmbH & Co. KG. Every effort has been made to trace and contact copyright holders. If there are any inadvertent omissions I apologize to those concerned and undertake to include suitable acknowledgements in future editions.

Finally, I would like to thank Walter de Gruyter Publishers for taking on this volume, Gertrud Grünkorn, Christoph Schirmer, and Jana Pokorny for their patient support, and Angela Blackburn for copyediting the final manuscript.

author's copy with permission by WdG 2008

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Contents

Notes on Contributors XI
Abbreviations and Translations XIII

Nietzsche's Critique of Staticism
Introduction to Nietzsche on Time and History 1
Manuel Dries

Part I: Time, History, Method

Nietzsche's Cultural Criticism and his Historical Methodology 23
Andrea Orsucci
Thucydides, Nietzsche, and Williams 35
Raymond Geuss
The Late Nietzsche's Fundamental Critique
of Historical Scholarship 51
Thomas H. Brobjer
authors copy with permission by WdG 2008
Part II: Genealogy, Time, Becoming

Nietzsche's Timely Genealogy: An Exercise in Anti-Reductionist
Naturalism 63
Tinneke Beeckman
From Kantian Temporality to Nietzschean Naturalism 75
R. Kevin Hill
Nietzsche's Problem of the Past 87
John Richardson
Towards Adualism: Becoming and Nihilism in Nietzsche's
Philosophy 113
Manuel Dries

Part III: Eternal Recurrence, Meaning, Agency

Shocking Time: Reading Eternal Recurrence Literally 149
Lawrence J. Hatab
Suicide, Meaning, and Redemption 163
Paul S. Loeb
Nietzsche and the Temporality of (Self-)Legislation 191
Herman W. Siemens

Part IV: Nietzsche's Contemporaries

Geschichte or *Historie*? Nietzsche's Second *Untimely Meditation* in the Context of Nineteenth-Century Philological Studies 213
Anthony K. Jensen
'An Uncanny Re-Awakening': Nietzsche's Renascence of the Renaissance out of the Spirit of Jacob Burckhardt 231
Martin A. Ruehl

Part V: Tragic and Musical Time

Metaphysical and Historical Claims in *The Birth of Tragedy* 275
Katherine Harloe
Nietzsche's Musical Conception of Time 291
Jonathan R. Cohen

Index rerum et nominum 309

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Notes on Contributors

TINNEKE BEECKMAN is postdoctoral researcher for the Fund of Scientific Research, Flanders. She works for the Department of Philosophy, University of Brussels, Belgium.

THOMAS H. BROBJER is Associate Professor in the Department of the History of Science and Ideas at Uppsala University, Sweden.

JONATHAN R. COHEN is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Maine in Farmington, USA.

MANUEL DRIES is Research Fellow at Wolfson College and the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, UK.

RAYMOND GEUSS is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, UK.

KATHERINE C. HARLOE is a Career Development Fellow in Classics at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, UK.

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri

LAWRENCE J. HATAB is Louis I. Jaffe Professor of Philosophy at Old Dominion University, Virginia, USA.

R. KEVIN HILL is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Portland State University, USA.

ANTHONY K. JENSEN is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Xavier University in Cincinnati, Ohio, USA.

PAUL S. LOEB is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Puget Sound, USA.

ANDREA ORSUCCI is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Cagliari, Italy.

JOHN RICHARDSON is Professor of Philosophy at New York University, USA.

MARTIN A. RUEHL is University Lecturer of German at Sidney Sussex College, University of Cambridge, UK.

HERMAN SIEMENS is University Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Leiden, The Netherlands.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Abbreviations and Translations

Friedrich Nietzsche's published and unpublished writings (Nachlaß) are quoted according to the following abbreviations:

A *The Anti-Christ*, cited by section number.
AOM 'Assorted Opinions and Maxims' (vol. 2, pt 1, of *Human, All Too Human*), cited by section number.
BAW *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Werke*, ed. Hans Joachim Mette, 5 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1933–1940), cited by volume and page number.
BAB *Historisch-kritische Gesamtausgabe. Briefe*, ed. Hans Joachim Mette, 4 vols. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1933–1940), cited by volume and page number.
BGE *Beyond Good and Evil*, cited by section number.
Nietzsche Copyright Permission by DeG 2008
BT *The Birth of Tragedy*, cited by section number and KSA page number.
CV 'Five Prologues to Five Unwritten Books', cited by number and KSA page number.
CW *The Case of Wagner*, cited by section number.
D *Daybreak*, cited by section number.
EH *Ecce Homo*, cited by section heading and (when applicable) number.
EI 'On the Future of Our Educational Institutions', cited by section number.
GM *On the Genealogy of Morality*, cited by essay and section number.
GS *The Gay Science*, cited by section number.
HA *Human, All Too Human*, cited by volume and section number.
CV 'Five Prefaces to Five Unwritten Books', cited by preface number and KSA page number.
KGB *Briefwechsel. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1975–), cited by volume and page number.
KGW *Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, established by Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari, ed. Wolfgang Müller-Lauter and Karl Pestalozzi (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–), cited by volume, part, and page number.

KSA *Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1967–), cited by volume and page number. The Nachlaß is cited by date, KSA volume, notebook section, and fragment number.

KSB *Sämtliche Briefe. Kritische Studienausgabe Briefe*, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986–), cited by volume and page number.

NCW *Nietzsche contra Wagner*, cited by section heading.

OTL 'On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense', cited by KSA page number.

PTAG 'Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks', cited by section number.

TI *Twilight of the Idols*, cited by section heading and number.

UM *Untimely Meditations*, cited by part and section number, and (when applicable) KSA page number.

Z *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, cited by part, section heading, and (when applicable) number.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Note on Translations of Nietzsche's Works

The contributors to this volume have used different translations of Nietzsche's texts, often modified by the individual contributor. At the end of each essay the reader will find a list of the translations used. Where no such list has been provided the contributor has relied exclusively on his or her own translations. All translations from Nietzsche's Nachlaß are usually by the individual contributors, although other translations have been consulted whenever possible, notably *The Will to Power*, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), and *Writings from the Late Notebooks*, ed. Rüdiger Bittner, trans. Kate Sturge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Metaphysical and Historical Claims in *The Birth of Tragedy*

Katherine Harloe

What is *The Birth of Tragedy* about? From a contemporary critical perspective, the very attempt to pose this question may appear hopelessly naive. Even if the furthest reaches of the complex and varied history of the reception of Nietzsche's first book are ignored, debates among scholars over its coherence, content, and significance within Nietzsche's thought have shown no signs of abating, and Montinari's comment twenty-five years ago that 'the entire problem of interpretation of Nietzsche's philosophical firstling is still wide open' appears equally apposite today (Montinari 1980, p. 5). In this essay I wish to question an assumption which I believe has come increasingly to guide interpretation of *The Birth of Tragedy*, and which is common to many who hold very different substantive views of its content. This is the idea that it should be read primarily as a contribution to what was, admittedly, one of the major debates of German philosophy after Kant: that of the possibility of metaphysics. If this assumption is granted, the most important question to ask about Nietzsche's first book becomes whether or not he there asserts or denies the possibility of 'transcendent' knowledge of the ultimate nature of the world. Regardless of the substantive differences between the answers scholars have given to this question over the past few decades, agreement that *The Birth of Tragedy* is essentially an exercise in metaphysics has informed many influential readings.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Sometimes the assumption is very much a background presence in a discussion which focuses on different themes. Consider, for example, Alexander Nehamas' views as put forward in his book *Nietzsche: Life as Literature* (Nehamas 1985). His interpretation of Nietzsche places the doctrine of perspectivism centre-stage and is primarily concerned with the writings of the 1880s rather than the 1870s. *The Birth of Tragedy* is, however, mentioned in order to support the following observation:

> Nietzsche seems to have believed that there are some ultimate facts, some non-interpretive truths, concerning the real nature of the world ... he denied that these facts could ever be correctly stated through reason, language, and science. Yet he also believed (and here the influence of Schopenhauer became dominant) that tragedy, primarily through the musically inspired, 'Dionysian' chorus, can intimate the final truth that the ultimate nature of the world is to

> have no orderly structure: in itself the world is chaos, with no laws, no reason, and no purpose. (Nehamas 1985, pp. 42–43)

The Birth of Tragedy is here invoked as a document of Nietzsche's early faith in the possibility of metaphysics, and is thereby distinguished from the later writings, in which 'Nietzsche comes to deny the very contrast between things-in-themselves and appearance which was presupposed by his discussion of tragedy' (Nehamas 1985, p. 43). The assumption does rather more work in motivating the influential, deconstructive readings of *The Birth of Tragedy* offered by Paul de Man and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (de Man 1979, pp. 79–102; Lacoue-Labarthe 1971). As Henry Staten has convincingly shown, it is because de Man interprets *The Birth of Tragedy* as an attempt to depict an 'ontological hierarchy', according to which the Dionysian is genetically prior to the Apollonian, that his verdict on it as a text that is logocentric—and his consequent deconstruction—can operate (de Man 1979, pp. 83, 85; Staten 1990, pp. 187–216). More recently, James I. Porter has argued against the view that any metaphysical thesis is asserted in *The Birth of Tragedy* and in favour of reading it as an attempt 'to mimic and challenge—through a mixture of parody, irony, implausibility, and logical circularity—the metaphysical banalities that the work superficially conveys' (Porter 2000a, p. 87). While his reconstruction of the content of Nietzsche's argument could not be more opposed to that of Nehamas or de Man, his reinterpretation of Nietzsche as an anti-metaphysician nevertheless leaves the question of metaphysics in the foreground.

author's copy with permission by WdG 2008

This first interpretative question is usually thought to be bound up closely with a second contested issue: the Schopenhauerianism of Nietzsche's first book. The connection seems straightforward enough: *The Birth of Tragedy*'s elaboration of the Apollonian-Dionysian polarity conspicuously deploys Schopenhauerian language, and Schopenhauer's magnum opus, *The World as Will and Representation* (Schopenhauer 1969 [English]; 1949a and b [German])[1], offers a systematic metaphysics in the traditional sense of a set of interconnected claims about the ultimate nature of the world. We might, therefore, take *The Birth of Tragedy*'s Schopenhauerianism as an indicator of its metaphysical commitment: insofar as Nietzsche's position there may justly be characterized as Schopenhauerian, he is defending a metaphysical thesis. It is my contention that this apparently plausible inference is in fact mistaken, and rests upon an oversimplification of what 'Schopenhauer' could have represented for Nietzsche at the time of

1 Translations from Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's Nachlaß and letters are my own.

writing *The Birth of Tragedy*. Appreciating this leads us to recognize that *The Birth of Tragedy* may be 'Schopenhauerian' yet not 'metaphysical' in any straightforward sense.

My argument to this effect will proceed by means of a critique of one of the most recent attempts to give an overarching interpretation of *The Birth of Tragedy*: the aforementioned reading of Porter. Porter's discussion is important as it exposes of some of the puzzles and difficulties that arise when the interpretative question with which I began is answered in the affirmative. He is correct to insist that certain aspects of *The Birth of Tragedy*'s 'narrative structure'—its language, imagery, and train of argument—call into question the notion that its author is 'uncritically enthralled to a metaphysics that ... [he] later abandoned' (Porter 2000a, p. 20). In reinterpreting *The Birth of Tragedy* as an 'attack on metaphysics' (ibid., p. 28), however, and equating this with an attack on Schopenhauer, Porter repeats what I suggest are a mistaken interpretative assumption and attendant oversimplification. By responding to his arguments, then, I hope to be able to indicate why both ways of answering the question of metaphysics in relation to *The Birth of Tragedy* miss what is really at issue.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

It would, of course, be impossible to provide an adequate response to Porter in the course of this essay. This is not just because his reading of *The Birth of Tragedy* is based on an detailed and broad-ranging consideration of Nietzsche's notebooks and early philological writings,[2] but also because he attributes to Nietzsche a deliberate strategy of what Quentin Skinner has termed 'oblique reference' (Skinner 1969, pp. 32–35). Put crudely, this is the writing of something one does not believe in order to disguise as well as to set out what one means to say. As Skinner points out, oblique strategies pose particular problems of interpretation, assessment of which requires close attention to the possible linguistic (textual) contexts of a particular work in order to decide whether its author is subverting or sustaining the ideas, generic conventions, topoi and so on, of his predecessors and contemporaries. Porter interprets *The Birth of Tragedy* as a subversive text; the immediate target of its critique is Wagnerian and Schopenhauerian metaphysics. My comments here are intended to draw attention to some aspects of the Schopenhauerian and Wagnerian linguistic

2 In addition to Porter 2000a, the focus of my discussion here, this reading is extended in Porter 2000b.

context, overlooked by Porter, which I believe support a different interpretation.

One of the cornerstones of Porter's reading is his interpretation of the Dionysian as a 'pleat in the texture of appearance' (2000a, p. 49; see pp. 33–50, passim) and hence of metaphysics as something 'generated from within' appearance itself. Repeatedly in *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche seems to claim that the Dionysian is ontologically prior to the Apollonian—'the eternal and original artistic power that first calls the whole world of phenomena into existence' (BT 25, quoted in Porter 2000a, p. 36). This message is, however, undermined by passages such as the allusion to Lucretius in *The Birth of Tragedy* 1, which implies that all divinities, Dionysus included, are the product of dreams. Just as much as Apollo, then, who is explicitly associated with dreams and deception, the opening section of *The Birth of Tragedy* provides a hefty hint that Dionysus is illusory: an aspect of human psychology rather than a constituent of the deeper reality behind appearances. Nevertheless—and this is the flip-side of Porter's reading—Nietzsche tells us that such illusions cannot simply be done away with. They are the product of the deep-seated human need to project some higher meaning onto existence.

Authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

These are noteworthy observations, but do they, as Porter thinks, amount to a decisive move away from a Schopenhauerian or Wagnerian position? Let us consider the crucial passage where Nietzsche states that 'As Lucretius envisages it, it was in dream that the magnificent figures of the gods first appeared before the souls of men' (BT 1, KSA 1, p. 26). The sentence continues by quoting Wagner:

> In dream the great image-maker saw the delightfully proportioned bodies of superhuman beings; and the Hellenic poet, if asked about the secrets of poetic procreation, would likewise have reminded us of dream and would have given an account much like that given by Hans Sachs in the *Meistersinger*:
>
> > My friend, it is the poet's task
> > To mark his dreams, their meaning ask.
> > Trust me, the truest phantom man doth know
> > Hath meaning only dreams may show:
> > The arts of verse and poetry
> > Tell nought but dreaming's prophecy. (ibid.)

In the following paragraph, which continues the theme of dreaming, we are referred to Schopenhauer:

> Philosophical natures even have a presentiment that hidden beneath the reality in which we live and have our being there also lies a second, quite different reality; in other words, this reality too is a semblance, and Schopenhauer actually states that the mark of a person's capacity for philosophy is the gift of

> feeling occasionally as if people and all things were mere phantoms or dream-images. (ibid.)

Porter is, I think, correct to interpret these passages as implicating the Dionysian and the supposedly higher reality it symbolizes in 'appearances', but how are we to read the specific allusions to Wagner and Schopenhauer in this context?

The immediate Schopenhauerian allusion is to a passage from his Nachlaß,[3] but the theme is treated at greater length in volume 2 of *The World as Will and Representation*, in a chapter tellingly titled 'On Man's Need for Metaphysics' (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 160–187/1949b, pp. 175–209). There Schopenhauer talks of man as an *animal metaphysicum*, permanently afflicted by the desire for metaphysical knowledge. In the face of the evident suffering and misery of life, humans are compelled to wonder why the world exists. The desperate need for an answer to this question is, Schopenhauer says, the origin of all 'metaphysical' thought, both religious and philosophical:

> Temples and churches, pagodas and mosques, in all countries and ages, in their splendour and spaciousness, testify to man's need for metaphysics, a need strong and ineradicable, which follows close on the physical. (1969, vol. 2, p. 162/1949b, p. 177)

Author's copy with permission by Walter de Gruyter

The difference between religion and philosophy does not consist in the claim, common to both, to embody a truth beyond appearances, but rather in their mode of presentation. Religions provide a 'popular metaphysics' resting upon revelation, and can be true solely *sensu allegorico*. Philosophy, by contrast, appeals to thought and conviction and claims to be true *sensu proprio* (1969, vol. 2, pp. 166–168/1949b, pp. 183, 185). Nevertheless, both arise from humans' need, faced with the misery of life, to make 'metaphysical assumptions' about the existence of another world whose real character is separated by 'a deep gulf, a radical difference' from anything of which they can conceive (1969, vol. 2, p. 178/1949b, pp. 197, 198). Belief in metaphysical doctrines is, then, a human cognitive response to misery and helplessness in the face of existence, and both religion and philosophy, as forms of metaphysics, gain their content by a projection of the antithesis of the world of 'appearances' into an assumed beyond. In this

3 'He who does not feel occasionally as if people and all things were mere phantoms or dream-images has no gift for philosophy. For it arises out of the contrast of individual things with the Idea of which they are the appearance' (Schopenhauer 1864, p. 295). An annotated copy of this work survives among Nietzsche's personal effects, although the date at which he purchased it is unknown (see Oehler 1942, p. 21).

chapter of *The World as Will and Representation*, Schopenhauer presents a view of the origins of metaphysical thought which is surprisingly similar to Porter's interpretation of the hidden message of *The Birth of Tragedy* 1.

The heavily annotated copy of *The World as Will and Representation* which survives among Nietzsche's personal possessions is part of the *Collected Works* edited by Julius Frauenstädt and published in 1873–1874, after the appearance of *The Birth of Tragedy* (Oehler 1942, p. 21). While there can be no doubt that Nietzsche read *The World as Will and Representation* extensively in the years 1865–1872, it is impossible to prove which chapters he studied most attentively. It is, however, extremely likely that he was familiar with the chapter discussed above, as it contains Schopenhauer's problematic and much-commented-upon claim that, unlike the systems of his predecessors, his metaphysics is *not* transcendent:

> And although no one can recognize the thing-in-itself through the veil of the forms of perception, on the other hand everyone carries this within himself, in fact he himself is it; hence in self-consciousness it must be in some way accessible to him, although still only conditionally. Thus the bridge on which metaphysics passes beyond experience is nothing but just that analysis of experience into phenomenon and thing-in-itself in which I have placed Kant's greatest merit. For it contains the proof of a kernel of the phenomenon different from the phenomenon itself. It is true that this kernel can never be entirely separated from the phenomenon, and be regarded by itself as an *ens extramundanum*; but it is known always only in its relations and references to the phenomenon itself. The interpretation and explanation of the phenomenon, however, in relation to its inner kernel can give us information about it which does not otherwise come into consciousness. Therefore in this sense metaphysics goes beyond the phenomenon, i.e., nature, to what is concealed in or behind it (*τὸ μετὰ τὸ φυσικόν*), yet always regarding it only as that which appears in the phenomenon, not independently of all phenomenon. Metaphysics thus remains immanent, and does not become transcendent; for it never tears itself entirely from experience, but remains the mere interpretation and explanation thereof, as it never speaks of the thing-in-itself otherwise than in its relation to the phenomenon. This, at any rate, is the sense in which I have attempted to solve the problem of metaphysics, taking into general consideration the limits of human knowledge which have been demonstrated by Kant. (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 182–183/1949b, pp. 203–204)

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

This claim was interrogated by Rudolf Haym in his 1864 essay on Schopenhauer, which Nietzsche read in 1866.[4]

4 Nietzsche to Hermann Mushacke, 27 April 1866, KGB I 2, pp. 126–129; Nietzsche to Carl von Gersdorff, end-August 1866, KGB I 2, pp. 156–161 (see Barbera 1994).

The likely linguistic contexts of the appeal of *The Birth of Tragedy* 1 to Wagner complement this picture of congruence between Nietzsche's arguments and Schopenhauerian themes. The passage Nietzsche quotes centres around the paradoxical notion of the 'truest phantom' or 'illusion' (*wahrster Wahn*), and is taken from Act III of *Die Meistersinger*, in which *Wahn* is a prominent theme.[5] It is therefore relevant to consider Wagner's letter to Ludwig II of Bavaria (Wagner 1911 [German]/1995 [English]), published in 1873 under the title *Über Staat und Religion*, which Nietzsche read in manuscript in 1869.[6] In this letter, Wagner combines a Schopenhauerian metaphysical standpoint with a lengthy analysis of political and religious ideas as forms of *Wahn*, necessary illusions:

> Blindness is the world's true essence, and not Knowledge prompts its movements, but merely a headlong impulse, a blind impetus of unique weight and violence, which procures itself just so much light and knowledge as will suffice to still the pressing need experienced at the moment. So we recognize that nothing really happens but what has issued from this not far-seeing Will that answers merely to the momentarily-expressed need. (1995, p. 10/1911, p. 8)

Humans are the unwitting instruments of this blind striving for existence, and both patriotism (which induces them to place the ends of state above their own egoistic goals) and religion (which counsels resignation in the face of the wretchedness of existence) are ruses by which they are induced to serve the ends of Will. This outlook leads Wagner to give the following analysis of religious feeling:

author's copy with permission by WdG 2008

> Its inmost kernel is denial of the world—i.e., recognition of the world *as a fleeting and dreamlike state reposing merely on illusion*—and struggle for Redemption from it, prepared-for by renunciation, attained by Faith. In true Religion a complete reversal thus occurs of all the aspirations to which the State had owed its founding and its organising: what is seen to be unattainable here, the human mind desists from striving-for upon this path, to ensure its reaching by a path entirely opposite. To the religious eye the truth grows plain that there must be another world than this, because the inextinguishable bent-to-happiness cannot be stilled within this world, and hence requires another world for its redemption. What, now, is that other world? So far as the conceptual faculties of human Understanding reach, and in their practical application as intellectual Reason, it is quite impossible to gain a notion that shall not

5 I am thinking in particular of Hans Sachs' famous *Wahn-monologue* at the end of act III, scene 1. The passage Nietzsche cites is from the beginning of act III, scene 2.

6 See Barbera 1994, p. 219 (no. 4). As late as 1873, Nietzsche thought fit to praise this work of Wagner's as 'in the highest sense "edifying"' (Nietzsche to Gersdorff, 2 March 1873, KSB II 3, p. 131).

> clearly show itself as founded on this selfsame world of need and change: wherefore, since this world is the source of our unhappiness, that other world, of redemption from it, must be precisely as different from the mode of cognisance whereby we are to perceive that other world must be different from the mode which shews us nothing but this present world of suffering and illusion. (1995, pp. 23–24/1911, pp. 20–21, emphasis mine)

Religious feeling is awesome in nature—Wagner calls it 'wonder-working' (*wunderwirkend*) and 'sublime' (*erhaben*) (1995, p. 25/1911, p. 21), but is nonetheless illusion for all that. In explicitly associating religious thought with illusion and dream, Wagner goes further than Schopenhauer does in the passages I have quoted, but both the language and the content of this recognizably Schopenhauerian train of thought foreshadow those aspects of *The Birth of Tragedy* 1 that Porter emphasizes.[7]

If Porter's argument that the Dionysian or the metaphysical originates as the compensatory fantasy of needy and suffering human beings is granted, it seems nevertheless that the elaboration of these thoughts in the opening sections of *The Birth of Tragedy* draws considerably on Schopenhauer's treatment of the same theme. It is, moreover, not merely Nietzsche's account of the *origins* of metaphysics that is Schopenhauerian in tenor. His discussion of the *resurgence* of the need for metaphysics in his contemporary era is also redolent of Schopenhauer. According to Nietzsche, this need is provoked anew by the eventual bankruptcy of the optimistic, 'Socratic' belief that science can provide a fully satisfactory explanation of the world (see especially BT 15, 18). The second half of Schopenhauer's chapter 'On Man's Need for Metaphysics' is likewise devoted to an extensive and scathing discussion of the ambitions of science to explain the world:

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

> Naturalism, or the purely physical way of considering things, will never be sufficient, it is like a sum in arithmetic that never comes out. Beginningless and endless causal series, inscrutable fundamental forces, endless space, beginningless time, infinite divisibility of matter, and all this further conditioned by a knowing brain, in which alone it exists just like a dream and without which it vanishes—all these things constitute the labyrinth in which naturalism leads us incessantly round and round ... In fact, even if a man wandered through all the planets of all the fixed stars, he would still not have made one step in *metaphysics*. On the contrary, the greatest advance in *physics* will only

7 The connection between metaphysical 'knowledge' and dreams is treated at length in Schopenhauer's essay on spirit-seeing (Schopenhauer 1960 [German]/1974 [English]). This discussion inspired Wagner's 1870 centenary essay on Beethoven, which Nietzsche praises in the Preface to BT and in section 16 (KSA 1, pp. 23, 104).

> make the need for a system of *metaphysics* felt more and more, since the corrected, extended, and more thorough knowledge of nature is the very knowledge that always undermines and finally overthrows the metaphysical assumptions that till then have prevailed. (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 177–178/1949b, pp. 196–197)

Like Nietzsche, Schopenhauer is disdainful of the ambitions of science, and believes that it will eventually refute itself, provoking a return to metaphysical speculation. Not only are there general thematic parallels, but the very terms in which Nietzsche expresses the cultural importance of Socratism echo the cosmic imagery of Schopenhauer's contemptuous dismissal.[8]

An element of continuity with Schopenhauerian ideas is also, I would argue, implied by the imagery of veiling that Nietzsche uses to depict the insight offered by the Dionysian state:

> Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be not only united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but one with him, as if the veil of maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious primordial unity. (BT 1, KSA 1, pp. 29–30; see too BT 15, KSA 1, pp. 98–99; BT 24, KSA 1, p. 150)

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Porter points out that the veracity of this vision is far from assured, suggesting that the subjunctive character of the 'as if'-clause and the continued fluttering of the tattered veil imply that the Dionysian vision does not provide immediate insight into the beyond (2000a, pp. 51–52). He concludes that this represents a critique of Schopenhauer; but again, there are Schopenhauerian precedents. We have already seen Schopenhauer speak of 'the veil of the forms of perception' in *The World as Will and Representa-*

8 'For the first time, thanks to this universality, a common network of thought was stretched over the whole globe, with prospects of encompassing even the laws of the entire solar system' (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 100). They also contain echoes of Wagner. Nietzsche characterizes the Socratic instinct for scientific knowledge as a 'sublime metaphysical illusion' (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 99) and comments that without its influence, human energy would have been 'applied instead to the practical, i.e., egotistical goals of individuals and nations'. The 'wars of extinction' that would have ensued would have led to a generalized and suicidal pessimism of the kind which, Nietzsche claims, 'has existed throughout the entire world, wherever art has not appeared in one form or other, especially as religion or science, to heal and to ward off the breath of that pestilence' (BT 15, KSA 1, pp. 100; see also p. 102). Wagner had likewise argued that patriotic or political *Wahn* is still too close to individual egoism to be stable, and will collapse into war unless supplemented by the illusions of faith (1995, pp. 15–19/1911, pp. 12–14). Nietzsche's account of the way science functions as a form of illusion is thereby aligned with Wagner's discussion of religion.

tion II, chapter 17, when wrestling with the thorny issue of human beings' 'inner' experience of the thing-in-itself (1969, vol. 2, pp. 182–183, quoted above). He resorts to this metaphor again in the following chapter, this time to confess the impossibility of an unshrouded view:

> Meanwhile it is to be carefully noted, and I have always kept it in mind, that even the inward observation we have of our own will still does not by any means furnish an exhaustive and adequate knowledge of the thing-in-itself ... in this inner knowledge, the thing-in-itself has indeed to a great extent cast off its veils, but still does not appear quite naked ... Accordingly we have to refer the whole world of phenomena to that one in which the thing-in-itself is manifested under the lightest of all veils, and still remains phenomenon only insofar as my intellect, the only thing capable of knowledge, still always remains distinguished from me as the one who wills, and does not cast off the knowledge-form of *time* even with inner perception. (Schopenhauer 1969, vol. 2, pp. 197, 198/1949b, pp. 220–221)[9]

These passages are taken from the second volume of *The World as Will and Representation*, which was added in the second edition of 1844 and forms a supplement to volume 1. There is no question that such statements are hard to reconcile with the confidence with which the thesis that the world is Will is presented in the first edition of Schopenhauer's work. It is nevertheless evident that the terms of what Porter sees a radical critique of Schopenhauer are available from Schopenhauer himself.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

I have, I hope, succeeded in showing that allusions to these particular chapters of *The World as Will and Representation* are prominent at several points in *The Birth of Tragedy*. Nietzsche's selective allusions may fairly be said to emphasize this self-critical moment in Schopenhauer, but do they thereby amount to a wholesale rejection of whatever he may have understood the elder philosopher to stand for? An alternative interpretation is suggested by yet another apologia for the use of metaphysical language—this time from Nietzsche's own notebooks. The passage is from an early draft of Fragment 10[1], which survives labelled by Nietzsche as

9 The imagery of the veil has a long pedigree in German philosophical aesthetics, evoked by Kant Goethe, Schiller, Novalis, Hegel, and others. See Gombrich 1985 for some examples. The implication is always double-edged: a veil conceals as much as it reveals. It is this tradition that Nietzsche taps into with his remarks about the veiling and unveiling in BT 15 and in *The Gay Science* (GS Preface to the second edition 4, KSA 3, pp. 351–352; GS 57, KSA 3, pp. 421–422).

'Fragment of an extended form of "The Birth of Tragedy" written in the first weeks of the year 1871' (KSA 7, pp. 333ff.):

> If I ventured in passing to speak of genius and of appearance as if a knowledge that exceeded every bound stood at my disposal and as if I were able to see out of the pure, great eye of the world, in what follows it will be explained that in using this figurative language [*Bildersprache*] I do not believe that I have stepped beyond anthropomorphic bounds. But who could endure existence without such mystical possibilities? (KSA 14, p. 541)

Porter states that Nietzsche's position in *The Birth of Tragedy* is 'not only that metaphysics is a fictional enterprise worthy of being shattered once and for all *but also that its resurrection is an inescapable and constitutional need deeply implanted in human nature*' (Porter 2000a, p. 9; emphasis mine). Although he recognizes that Nietzsche portrays metaphysical speculation as a matter of human need, his overall discussion of *The Birth of Tragedy* suggests that its argument is weighted heavily towards critique. In the passage above, however, we see Nietzsche underlining in poignant terms a conclusion that we have also seen Schopenhauer and Wagner emphasize: the need for a myth such as the metaphysical provides in order to endure existence. Nietzsche's acknowledgement of this need, together with its Schopenhauerian precedent, raises the possibility that *The Birth of Tragedy* deploys Schopenhauer not in parodic fashion, as a weapon with which to shatter all such illusions, but rather as a means of developing them in a new and superior form.[10]

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

This interpretation also coheres with Nietzsche's comments about the work of Friedrich August Lange. Porter argues that it was reading Lange that caused Nietzsche to apostatize from Schopenhauer (Porter 2000a, pp. 5, 9–16). Yet, in the same August 1866 letter to Gersdorff in which he praises Lange's *History of Materialism* as 'splendid and highly instructive' (KGB I 2, p. 159), Nietzsche draws a different conclusion: 'You see that even in the face of this most exacting critique our Schopenhauer remains for us, indeed, he almost becomes us even more.' What Lange's arguments show is, according to Nietzsche, that philosophy can only be a form of art, of which none other than Schopenhauer furnishes the highest example:

> If philosophy is art, then even Haym may hide from Schopenhauer; if philosophy should be edifying, then I at least know no philosopher who edifies more than our Schopenhauer. (KGB I 2, p. 160)

My suggestion is therefore that Nietzsche draws upon Schopenhauer in *The Birth of Tragedy* as part of his attempt to foster a new form of Wagnerian

10 Note the echo in Nietzsche's 1873 praise of Wagner's 'On State and Religion' as 'highly "edifying"', quoted in n. 6 above.

Wahn: an acknowledgement and indulgence of the need to find a higher meaning in existence, however illusory that meaning may be. This project may seem opposed to Schopenhauer's goal of presenting a system of metaphysics in the grand style, yet there are sufficient counter-currents in *The World as Will and Representation* to enable Nietzsche to enlist his predecessor in the service of this enterprise. Schopenhauer claims that his philosophy embodies a set of 'truths' (1969, vol. 2, p. 185/1949b, p. 206), yet not in the sense that it presents a system of conclusions derived deductively from true premises, nor because it relies on some form of privileged intuition. Rather, it is true in virtue of providing, in contrast to science, an 'understanding' (*Verständniß*), 'interpretation' (*Auslegung*), or 'deciphering' (*Entzifferung*) of the world of phenomena which is, so he claims, rich, satisfying and complete (1969, vol. 2 pp. 184–186/1949b, pp. 204–205). It is such a humanly satisfying interpretation of existence that, according to the arguments of *The Birth of Tragedy*, only art can provide. Nietzsche picks up on those elements of *The World as Will and Representation* which can be redeployed creatively in order to support this insight. The presentation of Schopenhauer which results from his refashioning is, admittedly, partial and one-sided. It may nevertheless be concluded that *The Birth of Tragedy* extends Schopenhauerian themes and concerns in order to hammer its message home.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

The Birth of Tragedy's co-option of Schopenhauer extends further than this, however. Nietzsche does not stop at drawing upon his predecessor's arguments in order to announce the crisis of science; he also dramatizes this crisis and casts Schopenhauer in a leading role. He does so by constructing a narrative which has its beginnings in sixth-century Greece, and which locates Schopenhauer—along with Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Socrates, Kant, and Wagner—at points along a cultural development that will culminate in a new form of tragic art.[11] This chronology is putatively historical, but insofar as it may be characterized as a form of illusion that aims, via a representation of the past, to generate a constellation of

11 This comment assumes that the 'rebirth' of tragedy Nietzsche envisages in *The Birth of Tragedy* is, indeed, a Wagnerian Renaissance. Although this has sometimes been questioned, it still seems to me the best way to make sense not only of *The Birth of Tragedy* but of the references to Wagner in Nietzsche's notes and letters of the early 1870s. The scope of the rebirth Nietzsche has in mind is, however, far too broad and indeed open-ended to encompass Wagner alone. Although Wagner is identified with the fulfilment of this ideal in *The Birth of Tragedy*, this is compatible with the view that he later retracted this association and, as occurred in *Ecce Homo*, disavowed *The Birth of Tragedy*'s Wagnerianism without disowning the 'hope' that speaks out from the work (EH III BT 1 and 4).

beliefs and attitudes that legitimate a particular form of cultural activity, it might more aptly be termed ideological. Its function is to alert its readers to the climacteric shift taking place in European culture and to raise their hopes for tragedy's rebirth.

Nietzsche's most general verdict on Schopenhauer's significance within this narrative comes in *The Birth of Tragedy* sections 18 and 19, when he is describing the disintegration of the Socratic-optimistic outlook:

> The catastrophe slumbering in the womb of theoretical culture is gradually beginning to frighten modern man ... Meanwhile great natures with a bent for general problems have applied the tools of science itself, with incredible deliberation, to prove that all understanding, by its very nature, is limited and conditional, thereby rejecting decisively the claim of science to universal validity and universal goals. Thanks to this demonstration it has been recognized for the first time that it is a delusion [*Wahnvorstellung*] to believe that we can penetrate to the innermost essence of things by following the chain of causality. The hardest-fought victory was won by the enormous courage and wisdom of Kant and Schopenhauer, a victory over the optimism which lies hidden in the nature of logic and which in turn is the hidden foundation of our culture ... This insight marks the beginning of a culture which I now dare to describe as a tragic culture. Its most important feature lies in putting wisdom in place of science as its highest goal. (BT 18, KSA 1, pp. 117–118)

Author's copy. Not for distribution. © Harloe 2009

> Let us recall then, how Kant and Schopenhauer made it possible for the spirit of German philosophy ... to destroy scientific Socratism's contented pleasure in existence by demonstrating its limits, and how this demonstration ushered in an incomparably deeper and more serious consideration of ethical questions and art, one which can be defined as the conceptual formulation of Dionysiac wisdom. In what direction does this mysterious unity of German music and German philosophy point, if not towards a new form of existence, the content of which can only be guessed at from Hellenic analogies? (BT 19, KSA 1, p. 128)

In these remarks, Schopenhauer is lauded (alongside Kant) for having demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Socratic attempt to view the world as amenable to human understanding. The philosophers are not praised for their residual hope for a form of knowledge that transcends the bounds of experience, but rather because of the demonstration their arguments furnish of those very bounds. Although it is Socrates whom Nietzsche dubs 'the vortex and turning point of so-called world history' (BT 15, KSA 1, p. 100), in *The Birth of Tragedy* 18 and 19, Kant and Schopenhauer appear almost as important as actors on the world-historical stage. In finally discrediting Socratism, they clear the way for the replacement of corrosive scientism with a 'new form of existence': a renewed kind of artistic orientation to the world. Schopenhauer is significant in this story not as the last metaphysician, but rather as the philosopher who demonstrates the need for

a new myth and who anticipates its form.[12] In doing so, he merits praise as an augur of the rebirth of tragedy. His successor, both in this prophesying and in this anticipating, is Nietzsche himself.

This paper has tried to rehabilitate some claims about *The Birth of Tragedy* which may seem rather traditional: namely, the positive character of its appropriation of Schopenhauer and Wagner, and the importance of the (quasi-)historical structure of its argument. Being traditional does not, of course, amount to being mistaken, and I hope I have shown that such claims can be supported by crediting Nietzsche with a less naive reception of Schopenhauer than has sometimes been suggested. Nietzsche famously warns philosophers to be vigilant about the unnoticed and subtle commitments inherent in the grammar of our language (BGE 2, KSA 5, p. 54; TI '"Reason" in Philosophy' 5, KSA 6, p. 78), but the manner in which the areas and positions of long-running debates come to be defined may occasionally be just as insidious.[13]

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

References

Barbera, Sandro, 1994, 'Ein Sinn und unzählige Hieroglyphen. Einige Motive von Nietzsches Auseinandersetzung mit Schopenhauer in der Basler Zeit', in: Tilman Borsche / Federico Gerratana / Aldo Venturelli (eds.), Centauren-Geburten. Wis-

12 As Nietzsche emphasizes in BT 16, it is Schopenhauer's analysis of the representational and expressive capacity of music which also provides an intimation of the kind of art by means of which the crisis can be overcome. Schopenhauer's writings suggest that a work of art which combines music with images or action can represent 'the innermost kernel preceding all form, or the heart of things' (Schopenhauer 1949a, p. 311, quoted by Nietzsche, BT 16, KSA 1, p. 106). This is, of course, the kind of representation Nietzsche characterizes as *myth*: 'the symbolic image ... with the highest degree of significance' (BT 16, KSA 1, p. 107). Regrettably, space considerations preclude any further discussion of this aspect of Nietzsche's appropriation of Schopenhauer here.

13 The research for this paper was begun when I was a Junior Postdoctoral Fellow in the Institute of Greece, Rome and the Classical Tradition at the University of Bristol, UK. I am grateful to the Institute Board for funding my research and to the Bristol Classical Seminar for their responses to an early presentation. I also owe thanks to Martin Ruehl, Raymond Geuss, Mike Levene, and Thomas Brobjer for their comments and questions on my initial conference paper, and to Nicholas Jardine and Dawn Phillips for subsequent constructive criticism.

senschaft, Kunst und Philosophie beim jungen Nietzsche, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 217–233.
de Man, Paul, 1979, Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke, and Proust, New Haven: Yale University Press.
Gombrich, E. H., 1985, 'The Symbol of the Veil: Psychological Reflections on Schiller's Poetry', in: Peregrine Horden (ed.), Freud and the Humanities, London: Duckworth, pp. 75–109.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, 1971, 'Le detour', in: Poétique, 5, pp. 53–76.
Montinari, Mazzino, 1980, Nietzsche lesen, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Nehamas, Alexander, 1985, Nietzsche: Life as Literature, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Oehler, Max, 1942, Nietzsches Bibliothek, Weimar: Gesellschaft der Freunde des Nietzsche-Archivs.
Porter, James I., 2000a, The Invention of Dionysus: An Essay on The Birth of Tragedy, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Porter, James I., 2000b, Nietzsche and the Philology of the Future, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1864, Aus Arthur Schopenhauer's handschriftlichem Nachlaß. Abhandlungen, Anmerkungen, Aphorismen und Fragmente, ed. Julius Frauenstädt, Leipzig: F. U. Brockhaus.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1949a, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Erster Band, in: Arthur Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke. Nach der ersten, von Julius Frauenstädt besorgten Gesamtausgabe neu bearbeitet, ed. Arthur Hübscher, vol. 3, Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus Verlag.
authors copy with permission by WdG 2008
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1949b, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, Zweiter Band, in: Arthur Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Arthur Hübscher, vol. 4, Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus Verlag.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1960, 'Versuch über das Geistersehn und was damit zusammenhängt', in: Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga und Paralipomena. Kleine philosophische Schriften, Erster Band, in: Arthur Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke, ed. Arthur Hübscher, vol. 5, Wiesbaden: Eberhard Brockhaus Verlag, pp. 239–329.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1969, The World as Will and Representation, trans. E. F. J. Payne, 2 vols., New York: Dover.
Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1974, 'Essay on Spirit-Seeing and Everything Connected Therewith', in: Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena: Short Philosophical Essays, trans. E. F. J. Payne, vol. 1, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 225–309.
Skinner, Quentin, 1969, 'Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas', in: History and Theory, 8, pp. 3–53.
Staten, Henry, 1990, Nietzsche's Voice, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Wagner, Richard, 1911, 'Über Staat und Religion', in: Richard Wagner, Sämtliche Schriften und Dichtungen. Volksausgabe, Sechste Auflage, vol. 8, Leipzig: Breitkopf und Härtel, pp. 3–29.
Wagner, Richard, 1995, 'On State and Religion', in: Richard Wagner, Art and Politics, trans. William Ashton Ellis, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, pp. 5–34.

Translations

The Birth of Tragedy, ed. Raymond Geuss, trans. Ronald Speirs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

Index rerum et nominum

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

A

Abel, G., 10, 18, 122, 132–134, 142–143
Absichtlichkeit, 130
absolute, V, 3–4, 10, 77, 114, 123–124, 128–129, 137–138, 155, 233, 306
Abstammungslehre, 28, 32
abstraction, 49
absurd, 69, 122, 155, 164–167, 187
acquaintance, 23, 214, 231
activity, 53, 65, 72, 130, 179, 198, 223–225, 235, 286
acts of intending, 95
actuality, 3, 79, 158
adaptation, 13, 28, 68, 70–72
adaptive-pragmatic, 9
Adorno, Th. W., 238, 264
adualism, 113–146.
adualistic-dialetheic, 2, 9, 10–11
Aeschylus, 215, 219, 286
aesthetic, 160, 186, 199, 218, 232, 234, 239, 256, 306
aestheticism, 243
affect, 71–72, 84, 97, 129, 304
affirmation, 14–15, 113, 139, 149, 151–155, 161, 166–167, 180, 183–184, 195, 199–202
afterlife, 25, 165
Afterphilosophie, 247
agency, 10, 16, 85, 96, 102, 108, 125, 248
aggressive, 99, 258
agon, 203–209
agonal law, 209
agonistic, 15, 17, 151, 153–154, 161, 260
ahistorical, 241, 247
Ajax, 39
alchemy, 140
Alcibiades, 37
alienation, 196
alternatives, 9, 12, 136–137, 142
Altertumswissenschaft, 16, 213, 214
Alteuropa, 236
altruism, 68, 136
ambiguity, 1, 196–199
amor fati, 150
amoral, 257, 261
amoralism, 239
anaesthesia, 124
anarchists, 174
Anaxagoras, 137
Anderson, R. L., 176, 189
Andler, C., 232, 246, 264
anglo-analytic, 11
anomalous, 102, 120
anomaly, 14, 113
anthropocentric, 135
anthropological, 1, 8
anthropomorphic, 285
anti-humanist, 16, 233, 255, 264
Antike, 266
anti-liberal, 16, 233, 255
antiquarian, 16, 51, 213–226
antiquity, 16, 43, 44, 215–226, 233, 240, 243, 246–249, 252, 259
Antisemitismus, 269
antistoricismo, 227
Apollonian, 159, 234, 276–278
appearance, 3–4, 24, 45, 79, 85, 120, 125, 151, 155, 164, 193, 201, 220, 231, 276–280, 284
approximation, 41, 121
Ardinghello, 233–234, 239, 267
argument from anxiety, 8
aristocratic, 16, 139, 251–256
Aristophanes, 38
Aristotle, 40, 47, 222
art, 45, 103, 122, 140, 159, 160, 177, 201–202, 220, 234, 237–238, 243, 248, 253, 256, 257, 258, 261, 263, 283, 285, 286, 287, 292, 295
artist, 55, 77, 121, 159, 201, 234, 238, 257
artistic, 15, 38, 55, 104, 159, 160, 201, 222, 234–235, 256–258, 278, 287, 291
artworks, 122
ascetic, 15, 54–56, 97, 100–101, 107, 138, 152, 164–166, 169–175, 181–182, 260
asceticism, 15, 26–27, 154, 166
Aschheim, S. E., 262, 264
Asian, 30
asymmetrical, 132
atemporal, 2, 80

authors copy with permission by wdG 2008

atheist, 257
Athenians, 42, 44
atom, 127, 129
atomistic, 196, 202, 209
Aufklärung, 269
Auflösungsprozess, 116
Augustine, 26–27, 155
Aunger, R., 72–73
autopoesis, 3
auto-sensitization, 4
awareness, 8, 79, 83, 106, 127, 133, 189

B

Bächtold, H., 254, 264
backwards-willing, 185–188
Baldwin, G., 233, 264
Barbera, S., 198, 210, 280–281, 288
Barkow, J., 64, 73
Barth, H., 232, 265
Bauer, S., 248, 254, 265, 270
Baumgarten, F. F., 263, 265
Baumkultus, 25, 32
beauty, 24, 199, 233, 262–263
becoming, 3–8, 14, 75, 85, 91, 113–142, 151–155, 161, 164, 170, 191, 198, 200, 217, 224–226, 231, 250
Beeckman, T., IX, XI, 13, 18, **63–74**
Beethoven, 243, 244, 282
being, 3–7, 14, 25, 42, 52, 54, 57, 64, 67–68, 71, 75–76, 78, 81, 83, 85, 89, 91, 102–103, 106, 108–110, 113–142, 151, 154, 159, 161, 167, 169, 172, 173, 176–178, 182, 184, 186, 187, 191–194, 197–200, 203, 215, 217, 227, 243, 246, 261, 278, 285, 288, 302, 305
benevolence, 109
Benz, E., 251, 265
Berg, Ch., 254, 265
Bergk, Th., 215
Bergmann, P., 241, 244, 265
Berkeley, 35, 49, 50, 82, 84, 264, 272
Berkowitz, P., 181, 189
Berlin, I., 40
Bernhardy, G., 216, 229
Bertram, E., 249, 265
besinnen, 4–5
Bewegungen, 269
Bewusstsein, 198
Biedermeier, 238
Bildungsbürger, 240
Bildungstrieb, 123
Bildungsvereine, 254
binary thinking, 3, 151
biology, 23, 67, 71–72
Bismarck, 239, 241, 270–271
Bizet, 37, 292–294
Blackmore, S., 70–73
blame, 239
blasphemous, 239, 257
Bluhm, H., 249, 265
body, 25, 32, 101, 125–126, 131, 160, 167, 194, 209, 304
Boeckh, A., 213–217, 221, 223, 226
Boeschenstein, H., 255, 265
Bohley, R., 251, 265
Borcherdt, H., 234, 265
Borchmeyer, D., 242, 244, 249, 265
Borgia, C., 233, 236, 238–239, 250, 257–263
author's copy with permission by WdG 2008
Boscovich, R., 82
both-and, 11
bourgeois, 234–240, 254, 260
Bowie, A., 121, 143
Boyd, R. 72, 74
Brahmanistic, 28
brain, 11, 13, 75–80, 282
Brecht, 234, 265
Brobjer, IX, XI, 13, 18, **51–60**, 219, 227, 232, 241–242, 265, 288
Brose, K., 232, 265
Brown, G., 67, 73
brutality, 237, 239
Buddhism, 28, 127, 182
Bullen, B., 235, 266
Burckhardt, J., X, 16, 19, 30–32, 52, 58, 200, 231–272
Bürgerhumanismus, 240
burials, 25
Bursian, C., 216, 227
Byzantium, 91

C

cadence, 295, 296
Calder III, W. M., 227–228
Callebaut, W., 71, 73
Campioni, G., 213, 227, 242–245, 266

Camus, A., 15, 163–168, 171, 183, 186–189
Cancik, H., 241, 244, 254, 266
Carmen, 292–295, 301
Cartesian, 8, 10, 48, 123
Catholic, 231, 250–251
causal, 8, 42, 46, 93, 97, 129, 132, 152, 155, 185, 282
causality, 75–76, 84, 97, 125, 130, 287
Cavell, S., 195, 210
centripetal, 202
Cesana, A., 244, 266
Cesare Borgia aestheticism, 262
C-fibres, 11
chaos, 2–3, 140, 178, 276, 297, 302, 304
chemical, 9, 125
Choephoren, 219
choral, 160, 244, 292
chorus, 222, 275
Christentum, 269–270, 272
christianisme, 25, 33
Christianity, 12, 24–31, 47, 94, 239, 243, 250, 259–260
chronophile, 7
chronophobia, 4
Cicero, 44
circularity, 155, 185, 276
civilization, 12, 24, 25–30, 170, 233–264
Clark, M., 33, 111, 124, 143, 144, 188, 189
classic, 47, 71, 258, 292, 301
classical philology, 89, 213, 241, 244, 252
coercive, 207–208
coexistence, 12, 31–32
cognition, 10, 48, 78, 80, 81, 82, 93, 95, 96, 99, 134, 154, 156, 279
Cohen, J. R., X–XI, 17–18, 33, **291–307**
Cohen, M. D., 215, 228
cohesion, 94, 139
comedy, 260
commands, 99, 165, 185, 189
communism, 254
Communist Manifesto, 235
community, 16–17, 25–27, 97, 135–136, 139, 201, 209
compassion, 139
competing powers, 207
competition, 101, 205
complementarity, 307
completeness, 204
complexity, 14, 26, 29, 67, 114, 131, 135, 217
composition, 3, 243, 296
Conant, J., 195, 210
conceptual, V, 28, 114, 150, 160, 281, 287
condottieri, 233, 237, 256
confederation, 127
conflict, 12, 35, 42, 48, 88, 111, 115, 153, 196, 199, 202, 208, 209, 217, 307
conformity, 194, 201
conscience, 92, 99, 136, 193
conscious, 4, 54, 69, 79, 92, 95, 99, 106, 129, 130–134, 142, 159, 165–167, 185, 187–188
consciousness, 4, 10, 11, 46, 72, 76, 93, 123, 124, 128, 134, 165–166, 181, 185, 187, 280
conspirieren, 126
contentious contentment, 140
contest, 151, 203–207, 227
continental, 11, 135
continuum, 30, 125, 131–132
continuum-relations, 134
contradiction, 5, 9, 15, 52, 65, 73, 91, 105–106, 166, 191, 207
Conway, D., 195, 204, 210
Corcyra, 44–45
Cosmides, L., 73
cosmological, 14–15, 149, 154, 160, 185
cosmos, 59, 82, 186
counter-force, 14, 113, 117–118, 135, 141, 151, 209
counter-ideal, 15, 57, 169, 171–172, 180, 182
Craig, G., 234, 266
creative, 17, 127, 156–159, 175–176, 180, 192, 196, 201, 205, 208, 223–224, 247, 295
creativity, 73, 156, 206
creator, 85, 258
creator-god, 48

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

crime, 198, 256, 261
critical history, 51
crystallization, 16, 233, 292, 297
cultivation, 46
cult, 25–26
culture, 16, 26, 31–32, 39, 45, 47, 51, 53, 58, 63–65, 70–72, 90, 104, 119, 150, 158, 196, 199, 201, 203, 222, 226, 233, 235, 240–249, 252–256, 262–264, 286, 287
custom, 94, 97, 99, 170, 191
cycle, 188–189
cyclic repetition, 154–157

D

da Romano, E., 236
dancing, 65, 159, 295, 304
Danto, A. C., 123, 128, 143
Darwin, Ch., 13, 28, 64–73, 89, 93
Darwinism, 53, 66–72, 87, 92–93, 111
Darwinizing, 73
de Man, P., 17, 276, 288
death, 38, 40, 45, 104, 138, 150–152, 155, 164–170, 175, 181–188, 250, 260
death of God, 104, 151–152, 175
death of Socrates, 38
decadence, 41, 85, 119, 172, 174, 241
decadent, 15, 58, 124, 138, 168–169, 172
decay, 85, 209, 260, 292
deconstruction, 16, 173, 248, 276
deferral, 209
degenerating, 15, 119, 167, 169–171
deity, 85
Deleuze, G., 69, 73, 125, 143
democratic, 208, 253
democratization, 254
Demokratie, 269
Dennett, D., 68, 71–73
Derrida, J., 139, 143
desire, 3, 5, 40, 54, 69, 73, 88, 94, 97, 117, 124, 164, 170, 175, 179, 199, 201–202, 209, 222, 236, 250, 254, 279, 292, 296
despotic rulers, 236
destruction, 41, 44, 80, 85, 141, 156, 205, 222, 256
destructive, 18, 40, 119, 170, 182, 196, 198, 222, 304
Detwiler, B., 256, 266
Deussen, P., 28, 32
diachronic, 127, 192, 247
dialectical, 3
dialetheic, 10
Dialetheism, 9
difference-preserving, 11
differential, 70, 138
dilemma, 103, 135–136
Dionysian, 76, 124, 141, 159–160, 219, 234, 262, 275–283
Dionysus, 38, 278, 289
directednesses, 95
diremption, 196
disembodied, 185, 264
disgregation, 129, 135, 196, 209
disjunction, 3, 15, 120–121
dissatisfaction, 156, 164
diversity, 15, 202–206
Dodds, E. R., 47–49
dogmatic, 12, 48, 123
Dombowsky, D., 258, 266
Donnellan, B., 247, 266
doubleness, 138
doubt, 5, 56, 79, 122, 126, 170, 187, 241, 256, 260, 263, 280
Draper, J. W., 24, 32
dream, 177, 278, 281, 282
Dries, IX, XI, **1–19**, 14, 18, 19, **113–145**, 114, 135, 143, 144, 189
drives, 32, 54, 66, 92–110, 131, 152, 194, 222
dualism, 14, 114, 120–123, 130
dualistic, 113, 137, 138
duality, 49, 137, 139
Dühring, 56
duration, 65, 114, 123, 133–134
dwarf, 105, 182, 187
dynamic, 120, 126, 129, 151, 191, 195–196, 203, 205–206, 207

E

early modern, 231–236, 240, 244, 246, 253, 255, 257–259, 261, 263
earth, 56, 89, 153, 170, 174–175, 186, 201, 295
ecstatic nihilism, 116, 119, 183

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

educators, 197
efficacy, 94, 116, 123–124, 132, 222
egalitarian, 52, 203, 260
ego, 91
egocentric, 203
egoism, 234, 283
Egypt, 91
Egypticism, 85
Einheit, 128, 132, 202
einverleibt, 6, 133
either-or, 10, 135–140
elitism, 253, 255
emancipation, 194, 200, 202, 240, 244–245, 249
embodied, 25, 160, 167, 183, 239, 252
Emden, Ch. J., 115, 143
Emerson, W., 15, 195, 197, 210
emotional force, 159
emotions, 42
empirical, 10, 47, 75, 78, 81–82, 150
empirically real, 81
empiricism, 252
encounters, 117, 125
endless melody, 17, 291–292, 295–297, 300–304, 307
Enlightenment, 196, 234, 246, 264
epiphenomenal, 9, 252
epistemological, 53–54, 152, 157, 223
equality, 208, 254–255
Erasmus, 244, 271
Ernst, J., 239, 266
error, 4–10, 36, 95, 102, 121, 157, 300
error theory, 4–5
essence, V, 3–4, 27, 54, 65, 114, 122, 125–126, 182, 186, 213, 249, 252, 262, 281, 287
essentialism, 132
eternal novelty, 156
eternal recurrence, 14–15, 56–57, 127, 141, 149–161, 174, 180–189
eternal return, 87–90, 105, 110–111, 183
eternity, 105, 151, 186, 189, 204, 207
ethical, 6–7, 16, 37, 39, 42, 47–48, 66, 204, 206, 209, 234, 239, 246, 287
ethics, 47–48, 191, 260
etiological, 93
Euclideans, 77
Euripides, 38, 160, 286
Europe, 7, 43, 56, 235–238, 244, 251, 253–255, 257, 260, 262, 267
evolution, 28, 53, 63–67, 69–72, 92, 97, 253
evolutionary history, 133
evolutionary psychology, 64, 68, 73
exaptation, 68
excellence, 4, 35, 193, 238, 246, 295
excess, 232, 261
excitation, 11, 56
exhaustion, 167, 170
existence, 2–3, 6, 48, 53, 67, 69, 70, 77–82, 88, 92, 98, 114, 126, 137, 150–151, 153, 155, 165, 167, 169, 174–176, 178, 180–181, 184–186, 189, 194–195, 198–199, 237, 244, 278–279, 281, 285, 287, 303, 306
existentialist, 165, 167, 183–184, 305
exogenous, 115
experiential, 10–11, 124
experiment, 117, 149
externalism, 95

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

F

factual, 42, 149, 157
factuality, 58, 158
faculties, 281
fallacy, 8, 68
falsehood, 198, 218
falsification, 15, 77, 82, 121, 131, 178
Farulli, L., 246, 253, 266
fatalism, 137
fate, 43, 46, 115, 175, 187, 188, 201, 241
fatigue, 117, 119, 169, 171
Faustian, 239
feeling, 1, 27, 29, 41, 90, 95, 98–99, 118, 136, 181, 195, 203, 225, 243, 261, 279, 281–282, 292, 295
Ferguson, W. K., 233–235, 240, 266
fiction, 8, 10, 127, 157, 160, 234, 239
fictionalist, 9
Figal, G., 125, 143
fighter, 201, 204
fighting, 238
Figl, J., 128, 143
figurative, 158, 284
finitude, 152, 155, 193
first-person perspective, 9–10, 142

fitness, 70, 94
fixation, 87, 89
fixed, 1, 102, 118, 126, 151–152, 179, 197, 282
fixity, 158
flourishing, 17, 171, 295
flow, 83, 91, 123, 186, 225, 292
flux, 119–120, 123, 128, 133, 138, 141, 152, 158, 209
force, V, 15, 29, 64, 68–71, 77, 82, 93, 107–109, 116–118, 121, 125, 127, 129–154, 156, 159, 161, 166, 178, 183, 191, 197, 201–204, 207, 223, 232, 234, 237, 242, 246, 249, 256, 259, 282, 292
Ford, A., 41, 49
forgetfulness, 88
forgetting, 103, 179
formless, 244
Förster-Nietzsche, E., 245, 266
Foucault, M., 31, 32, 63, 69, 73
foundation, 51, 56, 124, 151, 233, 241, 255, 287
Fowler, R., L., 220, 227
fragility, 135
framework, 7, 9, 10, 11, 135, 177, 179, 191, 206, 241, 259
Frank, M., 121, 127, 143
free spirit, 199, 209, 245, 257
freedom, 87, 95, 105, 108–110, 156, 165, 175, 184, 194, 199, 201–202, 208, 232, 251, 295
Freeman, A., 10, 18, 19, 131, 143
Frege, G., 124
Freigeist, 266
Freiheit, 144
Freud, S., 37, 183, 288
Froben, J., 244
Frühromantik, 143
Fubini, R., 240, 263, 267
fundamental-duality, 11

G

Ganze, 115, 135
Gay, P., 232, 238, 267
Gegenkraft, 113, 116, 117, 141
Gegensatz, 10
Gelzer, H., 239, 267
genealogy, 4–7, 14, 63–71, 88, 92, 95–96, 98, 102–110, 119, 124, 193, 234
genius, 26, 37, 135, 199–202, 204, 239, 242, 246, 248, 264, 284
genotype, 72
Gerechtigkeit, 202
Gerhardt, V., 121, 143, 192, 195, 200, 202, 204, 210, 213, 228, 243, 260, 267
German culture, 204, 241, 250
German Darwinism, 67
Germanen, 25, 32
Germanic, 241, 243, 264
Germany, 28, 91, 218, 231–234, 252, 254, 262–264, 270
Geschichte, X, 16, 18, 24, 32, 213, 216, 226–228, 265–272
Geuss, R., VII, IX, XI, 12, 18, **35–50**, 63, 73, 142, 288, 289
Gilbert, F., 235, 267
Gilbert, M., 232, 267
Gleichheit, 136, 208, 255
Gleichmachung, 208
goal, V, 1, 13, 28, 52, 92, 119, 125, 126, 129, 137, 174–178, 181, 185, 188–189, 209, 215, 222, 225, 285, 287
godless, 155, 172, 239
Goethe, J. W. von, 16, 136, 143, 214–215, 226, 228, 234, 239, 243, 259, 268, 284
Gombrich, E. H., 284, 288
Gomme, A. W., 43, 50
Gossman, L., 232, 236, 241, 254, 258, 267
Gottfried, P., 267
Gould, S., 68, 73
Greece, 41, 91, 158, 220, 243, 246, 248, 252, 286, 288
Greek, XIV, 9, 12, 16, 24–25, 28, 43–47, 59, 79, 155, 157–160, 174, 192, 203, 220–222, 226, 233, 243, 245, 247, 256, 270–271
Gregor-Dellin, M., 249, 267, 271
Grey, J., 18
Gründer, K., 220, 226, 228
guilt, 47, 99, 102, 165

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

H

Habermas, J., 196, 210
habituated, 8, 10
Hale, J. R., 237, 267
Hales, S., 127, 143
Hampe, K., 257, 267
Hankins, J., 240, 267
happiness, 5–6, 12, 39, 48, 88, 150, 173, 194, 261
Hardtwig, W., 235, 267
Harloe, X, XI, 17, 18, **275–289**
harmonic, 292, 296, 302
Harnack, A. von, 27, 31–32
Hatab, L. J., IX, XI, 10, 14, 18, 65, 73, **149–162**, 168, 185, 190
Haupt, M., 215–217, 220, 272
health, 39, 54, 57, 88, 104–105, 172, 174, 181, 183, 199, 223, 249, 259, 304
Hector, 39
hedonist, 55
Hegel, G. W. F., 2–4, 18, 37, 64, 115, 120, 124, 139, 143, 196, 247, 284
Heidegger, M., 31, 32, 210
Heinse, (J. J.) W., 233–234, 239–240, 265, 267, 272
Hellene, 13, 48, 160
Hellenic, 25, 38, 58, 203, 246, 278, 287
Heller, E., 232, 267
Heraclitean, 7, 10, 121, 137, 202
Heraclitus, 134, 137–138, 203
hereditary, 28
heredity, 70
hermeneutics, 122
heterogeneous, 23–25, 29
heteronomy, 195, 204
hierarchical, 255
hierarchy, 102, 276
Higgins, 306, 307
Hill, R. K., IX, XI, 13, 18, **75–85**, 269
Hinz, M., 244, 268
Hippocrates, 42, 45
Hirsch, E., 249, 251, 268
historian, 25, 51, 54–58, 216, 221–227, 231–234, 251, 263
historical, 12–13, 16–17, 23–24, 28–32, 38, 43, 47–48, 51–59, 67–69, 85, 87, 96, 99, 101, 103, 157–158, 213, 216, 221–222, 226, 232–233, 246, 248, 256–257, 259, 261, 264, 286, 288
historicist, 85
historicity, 5, 221, 224
historiography, 55, 213, 220, 224–226
history, V, 1–3, 7, 10–11, 13, 16, 23, 28– 31, 36, 40, 42–47, 49, 51–59, 63, 65–68, 72, 87, 89, 91, 94, 96–101, 121, 157–158, 161, 170, 174, 184, 186, 191, 201, 213–215, 219, 223–224, 227, 231–234, 244, 247–248, 251–252, 262–263, 275, 287, *See* ahistorical, critical history, evolutionary history, historian, historicism, historicity, historiography, overhistorical, prehistoric, prehistory, superhistorical, suprahistorical, time, unhistorical.
Hofmann, H., 241, 268
Hölderlin, F., 215
holistic, 161, 216, 225
Homer, 42, 203
homogeneity, 29, 94
homogenization, 136
homogenous, 30, 255
hope (ἐλπίς), 40
Houlgate, S., 120, 143
human animal, 15, 164, 170–171, 174, 176, 178–183, 186–188
human existence, 151, 175–176, 179, 186
humanism, 232, 240, 243, 251, 255
humanitas, 240, 259
humanity, 64–66, 92, 94, 96, 116, 119, 201, 255, 260, 262
humankind, 94, 170–175, 182, 184
Humboldt, A. von 214
hypostases, 125

I

idealism, 76, 79–80, 82, 104
idealization, 234, 237
identity, 27, 102, 106, 114, 120, 126, 127, 135, 233, 237, 257
illness, 138, 169, 174
illogical, 136

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

illusion, V, 1, 5, 43, 51, 102–103, 119, 199–200, 223, 281–283, 286
illusory, 3, 7, 121, 124, 199, 278, 285
imagination, 47, 233, 260
immanence, V, 1, 155, 175, 198, 201, 280
immoral, 85, 238, 261
immoralism, 172, 232–236
impermanence, 3, 113
impulse, 49, 65, 195, 201, 213, 223, 226, 244, 281
incoherent, 36, 81, 82
inconsistency, 8, 118, 119–122, 141
incorporated, 6, 10, 109–110, 131, 133, 140
indeterminacy, 3, 123
indetermination, 120, 128
indifferent, 29, 39, 136
individualism, 17, 193, 233, 238–240, 253, 255, 261, 263
inheritance, 67, 70–71, 77, 233, 237
innocence of becoming, 115, 119
inorganic, 131–134
instinct, 93–94, 97, 104, 140, 164, 167, 171, 175, 222, 224, 257, 283
instinctive, 58
intellectual, 53, 172, 231–232, 239–240, 244–245, 263, 281
intelligence, 36
intentionality, 92–93, 105, 122, 130–131
interconnected, 35, 276
interdetermination, 128
interpretationism, 132
intersubjectivity, 306
interweavings, 23, 30
intoxication, 124
intuition, 76–77, 134, 224, 286
involuntary, 47, 161
irony, 276
irrational, 247
irreducibility, 160–161
isomorphic, 129

J

Jacobs, A., 234, 268
Jahn, O., 213–228
Janssen, E. M., 232, 234, 239, 251–252, 255, 257, 261, 268
Janz, C. P., 244, 268
Jeismann, K.-E., 254, 268
Jelavich, P., 263, 268
Jensen, A. K., X, XI, 16, 18, **213–229**
Jewish, 27, 31, 174, 245
Joël, K., 248, 268
Judeo-Christian, 7, 85
judgement, 37, 44, 46, 96, 132, 195, 198–199, 220, 223, 225, 236, 239, 257–258, 261
Jung, M., 248, 268
justice, 15, 29, 83, 115, 173, 202, 223, 236, 254, 296

K

Kaegi, W., 231–239, 244–248, 251, 256, 258, 261, 268, 272
Kahan, A., 236, 268
Kant, I., 13, 47–48, 75–85, 89, 110, 135, 143, 160, 275, 280, 284–287, 305–306
Kantianism, 77, 79
Katsafanas, P., 127, 143
Kitcher, P., 64, 73
Knobe, J., 10, 18, 132, 143
knowability, 8
knowable, 81
knowledge, 11, 35, 39–40, 48–49, 52, 75, 79, 83, 92, 100–101, 106, 150, 209, 215, 242, 275, 279–284, 287
Körner, E., 233, 269

L

La Rochefoucauld, F. de, 247, 266
Lachmann, K., 213, 216–218, 221–222
Lacoue-Labarthe, P., 276, 289
Ladwig, P., 240, 269
Laland, K., 67, 73
Lamarck, J.-P. de, 13, 64–71
Lange, F. A., 285
Langer, S., 304, 307
language, 11, 14, 26, 44, 65, 93, 114, 120–123, 125, 128–130, 133, 142, 157–159, 201, 209, 214, 226, 262–263, 275–277, 282, 284, 288, 292, 295, 306
Large, D., 145, 241, 269

authors copy with permission by WDG 2008

laughter, 185
law, 10–11, 15, 25, 67, 98, 127, 191–209, 256
law-givers, 198, 204–206
Lecky, W. E. H., 25, 27, 32, 66, 74
legislator, 192, 199, 203–204
legislators, 192, 204, 209
legislator-types, 192
Leiter, B., 10, 18–19, 33, 132, 143, 144, 166, 169, 183–184, 190
Leo, H., 234, 236, 269
leveller, 206
levelling synthesis, 138
liberalism, 260
liberty, 172, 234, 236, 238, 239, 240
Lichtenberger, H., 266
life as lived, 15, 156
life-affirmation, 15, 26, 150–156, 161, 168–169, 171–172, 180–181, 184, 188, 199, 200, 203
life-as-becoming, 15, 191
life-denying, 152–154, 166, 169, 171, 260
listen, 295, 297, 304
listener, 17, 160, 244, 292, 296–297, 301–303, 307
literal, 5, 149, 154, 156–162
literality, 14, 149, 158
Loeb, P. S., IX, XI, 15, 18, **163–190**
logic, 7, 9–10, 117, 127, 134, 137–142, 165, 167–168, 188, 287
logic of alternatives, 137
logocentric, 276
Lothar, R., 262–263, 269
love, 27, 116, 135, 139, 142, 154, 164, 172–173, 177, 197, 201, 207–209, 260, 296
Löwith, K., 256, 269
Luther, M., 16, 241, 243–244, 248–251, 265, 268

M

Machiavelli, N., 237, 239, 242–243, 256–258, 271
Macht, 142–144, 200, 210, 241
macro-teleological, 3–4
Magee, B., 296, 307
maladaptive, 68
Mann, Th., 244, 262, 266, 269–270
Mannhardt, W., 25, 32
Marti, U., 254, 269
Martin, A. von, 232, 237, 239, 245, 248, 258–259, 263
martyrdom, 27
Marx, K., 235
mask, 54, 135
mass, 171, 255, 262
massification, 254
master, 125, 130–131, 170, 224, 226, 259
materialism, 236
mathematical symmetry, 292
Mattioli, A., 245, 269
Maurer, R., 232, 269
McGinn, C., 10, 18
meaning, 3, 13–14, 28, 41–44, 48, 57, 59, 63, 65, 68, 83, 91, 94–95, 117–118, 120–121, 130, 149–157, 160–161, 164–166, 169, 171–188, 192, 194, 197–198, 200, 207, 221, 233, 250, 278, 285–307
measures, 17, 151, 292–301
mechanism, 66, 78, 91, 94
medievalism, 244
Melodie, 292
melody, 17, 292, 295–296, 301
meme, 70, 72
memetics, 64, 72–73
memory, 87–90, 97–102, 105, 179–180, 188, 197
meta-belief, 7
metabolism, 304
metaphor, 27, 157, 283, 302–305
metaphysician, 123, 219, 287
metaphysics, 7, 17, 55, 77, 84–85, 120, 123–124, 127–129, 139, 142, 197, 200, 247, 275–285, 303
Methodenstreit, 228
methodological, 13, 16, 68, 216, 225, 252
Meyer, E., 30, 32, 272
Michelangelo, B., 257–258
Michelet, J., 238, 269
micrologists, 222
micro-teleological, 3
Middle Ages, 235, 242, 251–252, 255, 259, 264
Mill, J. S., 53

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

mimetic, 158–161
mind, 10–13, 43, 66, 75, 78, 80, 82–84, 92, 98, 100, 115, 127, 131–132, 137, 154, 163, 165, 184, 199, 226, 250, 262, 281, 284, 286
mind-brain-world state, 11
Mithras, 26
mixing, 12, 29, 31, 32
mixture, 108, 256, 276
mnemonic, 179, 182, 185
mnemotechniques, 89, 179
modern, 29, 32, 40, 45, 47, 52–55, 58, 70, 87, 160, 171, 174, 192, 196, 199, 213, 233, 235–238, 240, 243, 246, 250, 254–255, 257–261, 287, 291
modernity, 31, 52, 196, 201–202, 209, 236–237
modesty, 96, 260
Molner, D., 247, 269
moment, V, 3, 69, 71, 91, 102, 109, 126, 132, 136, 176, 179–180, 185, 187–189, 244, 262, 281, 284
momentum, 107
Mommsen, W. J., 51, 256, 269
Mongolian, 24
monism, 11, 113, 134, 137
monstrosity, 258
Montaigne, M. E. de, 247, 269, 271
monument, 104, 257
monumental, 16, 51, 213, 221, 224–226, 252, 257
Moore, G., 115, 123, 143
morality, 7, 15, 36, 53, 59, 65–68, 72–73, 95, 98–99, 102–103, 108, 114, 165, 191, 194–196, 204–206, 209, 231–232, 241, 259, 260, 262, 295
moralization, 39
mosquito, 136
motion, 1, 130, 247
Müller, C. W., 213, 217, 228, 268
Müller-Lauter, W., XIII, 125, 144
multiplicity, 32, 73, 120, 135, 139, 194, 202–203
mummification, 7, 121, 224
music, 17, 27, 37, 159, 178, 201, 218, 226, 241–244, 249, 253, 287, 291–292, 295–296, 297, 301–304, 306
mutually exclusive, 5–6, 9, 12, 136–137, 140, 142
mysterious, 201, 256, 283, 287, 306
mystery, 26
mystical, 285
myth, 39, 140, 160, 186–188, 285–288
mythopoetic, 157

N

Naake, E., 254, 269
Nägeli, K. W., 28, 32
Nancy, J.-L., 10, 18
narrative, 17, 41, 43–44, 64, 131, 176, 185, 260, 277, 286, 292
nationalism, 233
nations, 11, 91, 283
natural science, 4, 52–53, 55, 65, 72, 76, 78, 81, 115, 117–118
naturalisation, 194
naturalism, 13, 63–65, 73, 75, 78–79, 151, 282
Nehamas, A., 15, 17, 176–180, 190, 233, 262, 269, 275–276, 289
neither space nor time, 77
neither-nor, 11, 138
neo-Romantic, 232
neurobiological, 11
neuroscience, 11
Newtonian physics, 76
Niebuhr, B. G., 51
Nietzscheanism, 262
nihilism, 7, 9, 11, 14, 52, 57–58, 104, 107, 113–119, 127–129, 135, 137, 140–142, 170, 172, 181, 196, 204, 307
nobility, 29, 225
noble, 196, 223, 225, 234, 248, 250, 255, 258–260, 264
nomadic, 91
non-Christian, 3
non-circularity, 39
non-contradiction, 10
nondualist, 11
non-literary, 12, 42
non-mythic, 12, 42
non-permanent, 7
non-reductive, 13–14, 114, 132
non-sensory, 5–6
non-static, 7

author's copy with permission by WdG 2018

non-theological, 12, 42
non-traditional, 12
Norbrook, D., 251, 261, 269
Nordic, 244
norm, 170
normative, 152
nothingness, 155–156, 164, 172, 176, 181–182, 187
noumenal, 81, 85, 124
novelistic model, 156

O

objectivity, 4, 52–54, 58, 104, 117, 239, 305
observable facts, 42
observation, 38, 157, 256, 261, 275, 284
observer, 138, 263
Odysseus, 24
Oehler, M., 279–280, 289
Oldenberg, H., 28, 32
Olympus, 160
omnipotence, 203
omnipresent, 179
oneness, 115, 135–139
ontological, 3, 5–7, 121, 123–124, 127, 276
ontology, 7, 14, 75, 113–114, 117, 122, 128, 134, 142, 191, 194
oppositional, 136, 151
optimism, 12, 17, 39, 41, 47, 49, 225, 287
optimistic, 3, 39–40, 246–247, 282
orality, 158
orderliness, 24
orders, 251, 254
organic, 3, 29, 91, 93, 95, 117, 131–134
organism, 10, 68, 71, 94–95, 132, 134, 142
organs, 92–93, 134
originality, 36, 89
origins, 23–25, 31, 48, 65, 68, 90, 233, 237, 280, 282
Orsucci, A., IX, XI, 12, 19, **23–33**, 249, 251, 270
oscillation, 3
Osiris, 26
otherness, 139, 153
Ottmann, H., 31–32
Overbeck, F., 27, 31–33, 184
overcoming, 6, 29, 109–110, 114–115, 141, 151, 155, 173–174, 182, 192–193, 196, 207, 222, 241, 261, 287
overhistorical, 51

P

pagan, 25, 27, 30, 257, 259
pain, 6, 11, 89, 99, 117, 207, 256
painful, 6, 118, 197, 221
painter, 57
painting, 238
Panizza, O., 262–263, 270
panlogicist, 3
panpsychism, 83, 131
papacy, 250–251, 257
paradigm of becoming, 116, 128, 130, 133, 138–140
paradigm of being, 4, 114, 116, 129, 134, 137
paradigm shift, 117–119
paradoxical, 76, 129, 166, 281
Parmenides, 4, 79, 85, 137
parody, 276
particle, 215, 221
particularism, 15, 194–195, 206, 209
partisanship, 45
passion, 101, 202, 222, 246
passive, 72, 205, 207
Pastor, L., 231–232, 251, 263, 270
paternalism, 236
pathological, 45, 236
pathos, 118, 126, 244, 259
Patroclus, 39
peace, 202, 231
peacefulness, 261
Peloponnesians, 42, 44
penalty, 40
perception, 71, 84, 131, 203, 209, 247, 280, 283–284, 302, 306
perfection, 64, 66, 155, 185, 195–197, 215
perfectionism, 15, 195
performative sense, 158–159
permanent, 3–7, 113, 118, 261, 279
Pernet, M., 251, 270
perspectival, 10, 130–132, 142, 154, 306

authors copy with permission by Nova 2018

perspective, 10–11, 17, 32, 71, 104, 127, 130–133, 137, 142, 158, 167, 168, 194, 199, 206, 221, 224, 244, 246, 261, 275, 302
perspectivism, 75, 83, 131, 150, 275
pessimism, 3, 12, 39, 47, 124, 155, 183, 225, 241, 256, 283
pessimist, 12, 48, 57, 168
Petersen, E., 217, 228
petrifaction, 292, 297
phantasmal, 1, 126
phantasms, 137
phantom, 278, 281
phenomena, 12, 23–24, 28–31, 63, 65, 72, 75, 123, 138, 278, 284, 286
phenomenal, 76–81, 85, 125, 128
phenomenalism, 82
phenomenological, 11, 123–124, 126–127, 135, 139, 141
phenomenology, 123–125, 135, 139
phenotypic, 71
philhellenist, 233, 263
Philistius, 44
philologist, 23, 57, 59, 219, 222, 224, 252
philology, 16, 29, 214–227
physical, 81, 126, 128, 132, 138, 174, 260, 279, 282
physicalism, 131
physiological, 18, 70, 123–124, 166, 170, 304
physis, 198, 200
plants, 25, 91
Plato, 12, 35–49, 58, 89, 96, 137, 159, 164, 198, 247
Platonic-Aristotelean-Kantian tradition, 48
Platonism, 26
pleasure, 287
Pletsch, C., 232, 270
pluralism, 15, 191, 194–195, 203–207
Poellner, P., 123–124, 126, 144
poetry, 12, 41, 128, 159, 257, 278
polemic reversal, 8, 10
political, 43, 45–46, 49, 52, 151, 202, 204, 217, 232, 234, 236–240, 246, 254–258, 263, 281, 283, 291
Politycki, M., 215, 228
Porter, J. I., 17, 125, 144, 220, 228, 276–285, 289
Pöschl, V., 224, 228
positivism, 14, 42, 46, 55–58, 104, 154, 215, 222, 303
power, 13–14, 25, 27, 29, 40–41, 66–71, 84, 92–94, 98–110, 117, 123, 125–131, 151, 153, 160, 170, 179, 184, 186, 189, 191–192, 196, 200–208, 225, 234–243, 256, 261, 264, 278
powerless, 187
pragmatic, 237
prayer, 27
predictability, 6, 49
prediction, 222
prehistory, 25, 89
prehuman, 179
presence in us, 104
pre-Socratic, 41, 46, 191
pride, 88, 103, 107, 109
priest, 58, 90, 97, 171, 174, 250, 253
Priest, G., 10, 19, 90, 97, 140, 144, 171, 250, 253
primeval times, 94
primeval training to remember, 100
primitive, 12, 24–28, 35, 47, 88, 97
primordial, 13, 76–77, 99–100, 120, 249, 283
primordial unity, 76, 283
principium individuationis, 16, 75, 248
prison, 40
prisoner, 175
processes, 11, 28, 75, 80–82, 92–96, 103, 108, 126, 128–131, 142, 205
productivity, 16, 136, 238, 255
profanity, 239
progress, 52–53, 57, 64, 66, 70, 155, 171, 247, 260
progressus, 28
proletarian revolution, 236
promise, 53, 88, 97–98, 106, 108, 259, 262
properties, 2, 9, 81, 84
propositional, 40, 67, 128, 150, 177
protension, 7
proto-human, 102
proto-intentional, 14
protoplasm, 131

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

protozoan, 126
providence, 155, 177–178, 180
psyche, 37
psychoanalysis, 73
psychological, 16, 37, 78, 89, 94, 129, 149, 159, 173, 221, 223, 225–226, 231, 234, 247, 252–253, 291
psychologist, 66
psychology, 10, 39, 47, 66, 80, 95, 149, 159, 167, 278
punishment, 25, 53, 89, 92, 95, 171, 186–187
purposeless, 76
purposive, 47
purposiveness, 93, 104

Q

quale, 11
qualitative, 11
quality, 222, 224–226, 256
quanta, 126–130
quantum, 117, 130
quarks, 81
quasi-staticism, 9
quattrocento, 16, 235, 243–244, 248, 254, 257–258
Quine, W. V., 10, 135, 138, 144

R

radical becoming, 120, 128, 151
radicalism, 256
radicalization, 116–117
Ranke, L. von, 51, 261, 267, 270
ratiocination, 41
rational, 3–4, 6, 39, 41, 113, 151, 153, 159, 305
rationalism, 38, 40, 49, 247
Rausch, 124
reactive, 13, 52, 72–73, 95
realism, 36, 45, 78, 122, 127, 132, 258
reality, 2, 4–5, 10–11, 36, 46, 54, 58, 81–82, 84–85, 113, 118, 120, 123, 127, 132, 138, 140, 159, 160, 179, 189, 223, 278–279, 305–306
recitative, 292
recurring, 119, 181
redemption, 14, 26, 28, 152, 175, 177–281
reductionism, 65, 73, 222
reductive, 10, 63–64, 132, 137, 151
Reformation, 91, 244, 249, 250–251, 259–260, 265, 268
Reformator des Lebens, 199
Reginster, B., 10, 19, 181, 190
regulative fiction, 8, 10
regulative rule, 10
Rehm, W., 233–234, 239, 262, 270
Reibnitz, B. von, 245, 270
Reinhardt, V., 263, 270
relational, 126, 209
relations, 8, 13–14, 30, 81, 84, 113–114, 122–130, 138, 142, 154, 157, 191–192, 202, 209, 280
relativism, 135–136
religion, 92, 98–99, 102–103, 151, 238, 240, 251, 261, 279, 281, 283
religious, 25–27, 30, 40, 46, 52, 104, 150, 155–156, 196, 234–236, 260, 279, 281–282
religious ceremonies, 27
remedy, 6, 117–119
remember, 87–88, 96–102, 106, 182, 197
Renaissance, X, 16, 19, 30–32, 53, 91, 117, 174, 231–271, 286
Renan, E., 25–27, 33, 56
repetition, 149, 154–156, 180, 187, 189
replicative, 93–94
replicator, 70
republican, 17, 234, 236, 238, 240, 255
republics, 240
resentful, 90, 92
resentment, 57
resistance, 47, 64, 151, 207–209, 261
responsibility, 48, 95, 103, 108–109, 194, 234
Ressing, G., 241, 270
restlessness, 221
retension, 7
retrospective stance, 14, 98–110
revaluation, 52, 56–57, 59, 140, 150–151, 225
revenge, 27, 88, 98, 153, 181
revolution, 52
revolutionary, 68, 184, 236, 256, 258

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

rhetorical, 36, 44, 139, 158
rhetorician, 45
rhyme, 295
rhythm, 17, 292, 295–297, 301–307
Ribbeck, O., 217, 228
Richardson, IX, XI, 13, 19, 78, 85, **87–111**, 125, 130–133, 143–144, 176, 190
Richerson, P., 72, 74
rigidity, 137, 205, 207
Ritschl, F., 58, 213, 216–218, 220, 226, 228
Ritter-Santini, L., 262, 270
rituals, 25
Rockwell,W. T., 10, 11, 19
Roeck, B., 263, 266, 270
Rohde, E., 33, 214, 220, 228, 232
Roman, 221, 234, 244, 265
Romantic, 121, 128, 219, 234, 239, 244
Romanticism, 104
Ross, W., 241, 244–245, 247, 249, 264, 270
Rossi, R., 232, 270
Ruehl, X, XI, 16, 19, **231–272**, 288
Ruhstaller, P., 232, 270
ruling caste, 257
Rumohr, C. F. von, 234–236, 238, 270
Rumsfeld, D., 41
Russian, 297

S

Sach-Philologie, 16, 215, 227
sacred, 158
sacrifice, 137, 165
sacrilegious, 300
Sadie, S., 292, 296, 307
Salaquarda, J., 213–214, 228, 242, 244, 249, 265
Salin, E., 232, 245, 271
salvational, 14, 154–155
sameness, 136, 208
Sandys, J. E., 215–218, 228
Sautet, M., 256, 271
sceptic, 40, 78, 122
scepticism, 48, 77, 246, 264
Scheidekunst, 140
Schein, 3, 39, 137
Schieder, Th., 241, 271
Schiller, F. von, 135, 143, 196, 215, 234, 240, 259, 266, 284, 288
Schlechta, K., 232, 271
Schlegel, F. von, 121, 214
Schlegel, A. W. von, 214
Schmerzbringerin, 117–118
Schmidt, M., 254, 268, 271
scholastic factions, 16, 220
Schopenhauer, A., 2–3, 13–19, 40, 75, 77, 79, 82, 89, 115, 121, 124, 155, 160, 167–168, 171, 190, 192–204, 209–210, 225, 233, 241, 247, 248, 267–268, 271, 275–289
science, 4, 7, 10, 13, 17, 36, 42–43, 46–48, 52, 54, 59, 65, 72, 76, 78, 81, 91, 96, 99, 103, 106, 110, 117–118, 220, 238, 246, 264, 275, 282–283, 286, 287
scientism, 236, 260, 287
scriptural, 155
secularization, 240, 250–251, 264
secularized world-views, 114
secularizers, 235
security, 236, 240, 261
sedimented layers of the past, 91
Sein, 4, 6, 28, 32, 122, 137, 197, 267
Sekurität, 236, 260
Selbstbewusstsein, 133
Selbstmord, 37
selected-designed, 95, 97
selection, 64, 67, 69–71, 93–94, 96–99, 108, 131, 133, 141, 183, 213
selective, 16, 72, 77, 93, 97, 107, 109, 139, 153, 162, 184, 225, 284
self, 8, 17, 54, 99, 102, 106, 127, 131, 133, 137–138, 176, 180, 185, 189, 191, 197, 202, 235, 255, 260, 264
self-knowledge, 91, 197
self-legislation, 15, 192–197, 200, 204, 207–209
self-reflection, 4, 100
semantic, 5, 129
semblance, 137, 278
sensation, 92, 95, 201, 295
senses, 4–6, 26, 79, 85, 98, 117, 119, 121, 124, 137, 157–158, 164
sensorium, 115
sexual, 133
shame, 47, 201

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

shamelessness, 219
sick, 89, 95, 108, 167, 170–171, 174, 259
sickness, 170, 177
Siemens, H. W., IX, XI, 15, 19, **191–210**, 215, 228
Simmel, G., 181, 190, 195, 210
Simonde de Sismondi, J.-Ch. L., 235, 271
simplicity, 24, 195
simplification, 131
simulation, 159
simultaneity, 10, 12, 114, 130, 133, 140, 142
simultaneity-thinking, 113, 134, 140, 142
Sisyphus, 15, 163, 186–189
Sittengeschichte, 32
Sittengesetz, 195, 256
Sittlichkeit der Sitte, 97
Skinner, Q., 35, 45, 50, 277, 289
slave, 95, 108, 232, 251, 260–261
slavish, 92, 206
Smith, J. H., 125, 144
sociability, 39
social, 14, 26, 43, 49, 64, 67, 73, 88, 93–109, 174, 208, 232, 235–237, 255
socialism, 260
socialists, 174
socialization, 89, 97
sociobiology, 68
sociology, 49
sociopolitical, 232, 236, 241, 253–254
Socrates, 13, 36, 38–42, 49, 79–80, 89, 135, 150, 163, 167, 286–287
Socrates who makes music, 49
Socratic, 17, 38, 42, 45, 49, 243, 248, 282–283, 287
Soll, I., 181, 188, 190
Sommer, A. U., 250, 261–262, 271
Sophocles, 41–42, 45, 219, 286
sorrow, 88, 90, 187
soul, 8, 27, 35, 104, 165, 171, 173, 197, 223, 225, 246, 264, 291, 302
soulless, 236
sovereign, 97, 202, 237
sovereignty, 103, 109, 253
spatiotemporal, 80
spectrum, 36, 134
Spencer, H., 13, 67–68, 72
Spengler, O., 30, 33
Spir, A., 79–80
spirit, 14, 29, 37, 44, 59, 149, 151, 215–216, 222, 226, 236, 240, 244, 250, 252, 263, 287
spiritual, 25, 30, 101, 104, 151–152, 173, 178, 244, 256
spirituality, 295
Sprache, 229
Staat, 268, 281, 289
stability, 1, 29, 115, 126, 133–134
stable, 3, 7, 15, 135, 151, 283, 302
Stack, G. J., 115, 144
Stadelmann, R., 239, 271
Stahl, H.-P., 40, 43, 50
Stambaugh, J., 123, 144, 213, 228
Staten, H., 126, 144, 276, 289
static, 1, 6, 8, 15, 127, 137
staticism, 1–11
staticist worldview, 2–6, 11
Stierle, K., 233, 271
Stilkunst, 265
stimulant, 207–208
stimulus, 207, 237
stoic, 117, 247
stomach, 304
Storr, A., 297, 307
Stravinsky, I. F., 297, 300
Strawson, G., 10–11, 18–19, 131–132, 143
strength, 7, 18, 65, 94, 141, 160, 164, 208, 224, 260, 295, 304
structuration, 38
structureless, 128
struggle, 42, 69–70, 73, 98, 154, 170, 191, 199–200, 204, 208, 214, 220, 225, 235, 238, 264, 281
Sturm und Drang, 233
style, 1, 44–45, 259, 261, 285
subconscious, 54, 185
subjection, 205–207
subjective, 77, 84, 127
subjectivism, 137
subjectivity, 84, 127, 233, 240, 262
sublime, 172, 256, 282–283
substance, 3, 8, 35, 84, 123, 127, 129
substantiality, 125

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

substratum, 77, 84, 135
subterranean, 26
subtext, 261
suffering, 5–6, 70, 87–88, 95, 108, 118, 137, 150, 159, 164–175, 180–183, 247, 256, 279, 282
suicidal instincts, 15, 169, 182
suicidal nihilism, 15, 153, 166, 169
suicide, 15, 25, 27, 153, 163–172, 181, 184, 187
superhistorical, 31
superhuman, 15, 181, 183–186, 189, 257–258, 278
superman, 233, 262–263
superstitious, 25–26
suprahistorical, 103
suspicion, 27, 99, 208, 232
swimming and floating, 291–292
symbol, 26, 151, 173, 182, 187, 262
symbolic, 150, 160, 288
symmetrical, 208
symphonic, 202
symptom, 85, 164
system, 4, 7, 67, 71, 121, 133, 237, 254, 282–283, 285
systematic, 3, 12, 48, 113, 121, 192, 276

T

taming, 7, 89, 170
tautology, 152
teleological, 14, 115, 130, 152, 154, 155
teleology, 55, 64, 92, 115, 121, 130
telos, 197
temperate zone, 53
temporal, 8, 12, 14, 80, 95, 114, 131–132, 142, 152–156, 191–193, 200, 304, 306
temporal movement, 152–155
temporality, V, 3, 17, 114, 130–133, 140, 142, 201
tension, 9–13, 29, 91, 126, 138, 166, 199, 209, 244
testimony, 157
theatre, 38, 131
theatrical, 159
Theognideian, 215
theologian, 27, 31
theological, 48, 65, 156
theology, 84
theoretical, 10, 36–37, 81–82, 99–101, 103, 109, 177–179, 188, 192, 199, 213–214, 226, 237, 243, 246, 287
theory, 9, 14, 26, 28, 39, 43, 63, 66, 70–79, 82, 90, 100–102, 109, 111, 123, 127, 131–134, 142, 158, 182, 220, 235, 306
therapy, 117
thing, 1, 3, 8, 28, 40, 44, 49, 53, 56, 67, 77, 83–87, 115, 126, 127, 168, 172, 197, 254, 284
thing-in-itself, 3–4, 17, 54, 75, 77, 78, 81–84, 280, 283–284, 303–304
Thompson, E., 10, 19
Thucydidean, 12, 37, 41, 44–47
Thucydides, IX, 12, 18, 35–50, 58–59
tightrope, 173
time. *See* absolute time, adaptation over time, aporia of time, atemporal, becoming, circular time, conscious time, cyclic repetition, cyclical, diegetic time, eternal recurrence, eternal return, flux of time, historical time, ill-will towards time, infinite time, linear, non-circularity, novelistic model, permanent, pessimistic model, positivistic, power over time, reality of time, revenge against time and becoming, salvational, teleological, time for us, time itself, time signatures, time-atom theory.
time-atom theory, 7
time-in-itself, 18, 303–306
timeless, 7, 23, 142, 248
Todte, M., 240, 271
togetherness, 139
tonic, 18, 292, 304, 307
Tooby, J., 73
torture, 171, 187
totality, 125, 133, 177
towardness, 93
Tracy, J. D., 244, 271
Traeger, J., 238, 271
tragedians, 243
tragedy, 12, 37, 45–47, 160, 219, 222, 226, 244, 247, 275–276, 286, 288

authors copy with permission by WdG 2018

tragic, 150, 152, 155–156, 159–160, 187, 219, 243, 250, 286, 287
tragic finitude, 152, 155
transcendence, 150–152, 155, 196, 197
transcendent, 85, 115, 125, 175, 198, 275, 280
transcendental, 78–81, 110
transcendentally ideal, 77, 80–81, 85
transconsistent, 140
transformation, 6, 70, 155, 159, 199, 219, 262
transgressive, 239, 256, 258, 263–264
transient, 137
transvaluation, 191, 209, 241–242, 250, 257, 259
transvaluative, 250, 259, 260, 262
trauma, 153, 155
Tristan, 292–301, 307
Troeltsch, E., 29–30, 33
trope, 157
tropical, 259
truth, 4–6, 9, 11, 36, 46, 48, 59, 77, 100–102, 104, 106–107, 110–111, 114, 116, 119, 122, 124, 131, 142, 151, 155, 159, 165–167, 174, 178, 185, 194, 199, 221, 223, 247, 251, 275, 279, 281
truthfulness, 39, 41, 48, 199, 249
Tugend, 242, 261
two-world metaphysics, 7, 121, 135
tyrannical, 203, 208, 237, 239–240, 255–256, 264
tyranny, 16, 78, 203, 207, 233, 255–256, 295

Ü

überflüssig, 138
Übermensch, 135, 190
Uekermann, G., 262–263, 271
Ulfers, F., 215, 228
ultimates, 9
uncertainty, 6–7, 222, 256
unconscious, 11, 93, 129, 130–131, 133
undecidability, 158
undefinable, 28
unfreedom, 178, 208, 237
unhappiness, 281
unhealthy, 221, 305
unhistorical, 56, 103
unidirectional, 186
unification, 15
unified, 136, 186
unifying, 196, 202, 209
union, 139
uniqueness, 194
unitary, 26, 49
unity, 28, 76, 114–115, 121, 135, 136, 139, 142, 193, 202, 207, 287
universal, 48, 76, 92, 127, 191, 195, 204, 207–208, 254–255, 283, 287
universe, 48, 114, 131, 238
univocal, 157
unobservable, 81–82
unperceived posits, 82
Unschuld, 115
Unsinn, 6
unsinnlich, 6
unveiling, 174, 284
Usener, H., 23, 30, 33
utilitarian, 239, 260
utility, 64, 66–68, 108

V

Vacano, D. A. von, 258, 271
vague, 9, 305
value, 3–10, 13, 29, 32, 36, 42, 45, 53, 55, 63–68, 78, 96, 108, 110–115, 119, 121, 132, 139, 150, 154, 163–165, 168, 198, 199, 208, 214, 222–227
value of life, 163–164, 198
Vattimo, G., 122, 144
vector, 129
veil, 84, 117, 238, 280, 283–284
veiled, 197, 254
vengeful, 250
Versteinerung, 300
vice, 97, 129, 195, 223, 257, 301
violence, 16, 208, 223, 233, 241, 261, 263, 281
violent, 139, 141, 175, 231, 238, 240, 246, 255
virtue, 3, 41–42, 78, 93, 96, 168, 173, 242, 261, 286, 295
visual, 305
vital, 116, 139, 259–260

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008

vitality, 235
Vivarelli, V., 247, 271
Vogt, E., 217, 228
Voigt, G., 240, 271
volition, 47, 129
Volpi, F., 242, 271
voluntary, 2, 15, 25, 27, 47
vornehm, 250
Vrba, E., 68, 73

W

Wagner, R., XIII, XIV, 15–17, 37, 144, 192–193, 199, 200–204, 218, 220, 226, 228, 233, 241–254, 263–271, 278–307
Wahn, 281–287
Waldenfels, B., 10, 19, 138, 144
war, 16, 41–46, 196, 202, 233, 245, 259, 261, 283
warmth, 27
water, 9, 100
weak, 36, 41, 80, 108, 119, 169, 171, 260
weakness, 36, 94, 135, 154, 260
Weber, M., 30, 33, 235, 237, 267, 272
Wechselbestimmung, 128
Weibel, O., 234, 272
Welshon, R., 118, 127, 129, 143–144
Wenzel, J., 236, 272
Werden, 6, 113, 121, 133, 144, 270. *See also* becoming.
West, M. L., 30, 40, 50, 151
Wheeler III, S. C., 10, 19
whole, V, 1, 3, 8, 40, 43, 54, 56, 65, 79, 82, 89–90, 97, 101, 104, 115, 122, 125, 130–142, 165, 169, 177, 187, 193, 200, 216, 220–221, 225, 252, 278, 283–284, 296, 304
wholeness, 185
Widerfahrnis, 138
Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, U. von, 214, 216, 218, 220, 227–229
will to power, 14, 27, 64, 69–70, 72, 83, 92, 111–115, 123–134, 141–142, 150–153, 167, 171, 184, 195, 257
Wille, 144, 289
Williams, B. IX, 12, 18, 33–50, 64, 66, 74, 145
willing, 14–15, 79–80, 88, 90, 95, 100, 101–111, 118, 137, 154, 164, 176–187
wills, 14, 91–94, 132, 167, 186, 284, 305
Winckelmann, J. J., 246
Wirklichkeit, 18
Wolf, F. A., 51, 213–216, 223, 226, 229
Wölfflin, H., 258, 272
world-disclosive, 14, 149, 160
world-negating, 3
worldview, 2, 118
worthlessness, 199, 225
Wort-Philologie, 16, 215
Wotan, 226

Y

Young, J., 123, 144, 168, 177–180, 187, 190, 269

Z

Zeeden, E. W., 239, 241, 272
Zeit, 199–200, 260, 264, 269, 272, 288
Zeitalter, 255
Zeitdauer, 300
Zuckert, C., 213, 229
Zugleich-Denken, 113, 134
Zukunft, 192
Zukunftsmusik, 296
Zukunftsphilologie, 214, 218

author's copy with permission by WdG 2008

authors copy with permission by WdG 2008