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CROSSING BROADCASTERS: THE TRANSATLANTIC EXCHANGE
BETWEEN SYLVESTER ‘PAT’ WEAVER AND SIR IAN JACOB, 1955-56

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Abstract
This article is interested in the long-standing exchange visits by broadcasters across the Atlantic, as these give insight into the developing relationships between British and US broadcasting. Informed by original archive research at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., and the BBC Written Archives’ Centre, Caversham, the article focuses on the charged rhetorical exchange of then-President of NBC Television, Sylvester ‘Pat’ Weaver (1908-2002), and then-Director General of the BBC, Sir Ian Jacob (1899-1993), in London and New York in 1955-1956. The article identifies this altercation as a foundational moment when the identities of British and US broadcasting became highlighted, performed and negotiated. Jacob and Weaver’s transatlantic exchange illuminates the move from war-time cooperation to post-war global competition between the two broadcasting systems and helps to uncover the thus far marginalised history of the US pressure and influence on the arrival of commercial broadcasting in Britain. The historiographical analysis further demonstrates that Ian Jacob deserves more scholarly attention and recognition than he has received so far.

Keywords
TRANSATLANTIC EXCHANGE; TELEVISION HISTORY; HISTORIOGRAPHY; SIR IAN JACOB; SYLVESTER ‘PAT’ WEAVER; BBC; ITV; J. WALTER THOMPSON.
This article looks at how cultures of British and US television have influenced each other by considering the rhetorical exchanges by broadcasters across the Atlantic during the 1950s, when television emerged as the dominant mass medium, when significant changes in broadcasting systems (especially within the UK) materialised, and when, not coincidentally, many exchange visits by broadcasting executives took place. Drawing on original archive research at the Library of Congress, Washington D.C., and the BBC Written Archives’ Centre, Caversham, the article focuses on 1955-1956 as a historical moment when particular developments and notions concerning the identity of, and competitive difference between, British and US broadcasting crystallised and came under pressure. It pays detailed attention to the words, work and experiences of two individuals, Sylvester Weaver and Ian Jacob. This has the benefit of bringing specificity to what can sometimes appear as impersonal matters of transatlantic exchange, highlighting such exchange instead in all its ‘productive force’, and can help to uncover a marginalised history. Moreover, such a focus can illuminate wider discourses and structures of knowledge and power, as Pamela Wilson has noted:

Discourses, such as those enunciated by television executives, may come from the mouths and hands of individuals, but are ultimately socially produced (and often institutionalized) ways of making sense of and communicating social class-based values and ideological positions.

A discursive altercation
The history of television in the UK and USA is marked by frequent discursive comparison and contrast between the two broadcasting systems. In her work on broadcasting and national identity formation, Michele Hilmes has mapped the historical development of the relationship between British and US broadcasting roughly as follows: following initial separation and resistance marked by the disparagement of each other’s systems in a series of high-profile policy debates, British and US broadcasting went through a period of increasing interchange and cross-influence in the 1930s. Then followed an intense and urgent (albeit conflicted) cooperation during World War II, which was eventually marginalised by a post-war competitive struggle for world dominance. Hilmes has argued that the pattern of mutual projection and comparison marking this relationship time and time again was not simply strategic but determinant: if either system had not existed, the other would have had to invent it. From the earliest moments – 1920 onwards – the United States and the United Kingdom regarded each other across the Atlantic with an intense and selective scrutiny that provided ammunition for supporters of both systems. [...] The ways Great Britain and the United States defined, defended, and discursively constructed their competing systems had repercussions across the globe. It is worth taking a look at some of the foundational moments of this opposition in order to pick apart some of the basic assumptions, shortcomings, idiosyncrasies, and methods of deployment that underlie both [...].
What informs and runs parallel to such comparative discourses is a long history of exchange in the form of transatlantic visits by broadcasting personnel, to study, network with, and/or critique each other.5

Such cross-visits usually took place at moments when institutional, industrial and/or technological developments were occurring, and/or at celebratory occasions marking milestones that offered opportunities for reflection and prediction. They often included high-profile speeches where close attention was paid by audiences that included fellow broadcasters, the press and sometimes other constituents. Here, issues of performance and performativity emerged, marking the discourses about self and Other in these moments where both those in and those out of their native surroundings were trying to make sense of the historical moment in process, frequently engaging in self-legitimation through displacing and ‘projecting undesirable “foreign” attributes’ onto the system from the other side of the Atlantic.6 Thus, there is something particularly charged and at stake in such exchanges, which offer some of the evanescent texture of history.

These cross-visits have received some attention in existing scholarship, though not as much as might reasonably be expected, given their long-standing presence in the history of broadcasting. For example, Briggs’ seminal historical account is scattered with brief references to events of this kind, such as the case of ‘two British visitors of particular interest and importance [who] crossed the Atlantic to find out what was happening there’ in 1920 and 1921.7 The visits by Godfrey Isaacs (then-Managing Director of British telecommunications company Marconi) and F.J. Brown (then-Assistant Secretary to the Post Office) yielded useful information for the development of radio in the UK at a formative time when the USA seemed ahead in terms of pace of development. Hilmes has considered a number of cross-visits, including visits to North America by that paragon of British public service broadcasting, John Reith, who, in addition to a long-running series of epistolary exchanges with then-Head of NBC, Merlin Aylesworth, undertook more than one visit to the USA and Canada.8 I will now extend this valuable work by exploring a foundational moment during the 1950s that concerns an altercation between two significant figures in the history of US and British television.

These two figures are Sylvester ‘Pat’ Weaver (1908-2002), President of NBC Television from 1952 until 1955, and Sir Ian Jacob (1899-1993), BBC Director General from 1952 until 1959, who engaged in a charged rhetorical exchange across 1955-1956. To some extent, Weaver and Jacob play out US-UK stereotypes: Weaver was something of a showman with a flair for (self-) promotion and penchant for ‘lofty and often hyperbolic rhetoric’, which informed his legendarily verbose memoranda.9 This contrasts quite sharply with the Brit’s noted reserve and preference for ‘brisk minutes’.10 Most certainly, Jacob would not have posed for publicity photographs with J. Fred Muggs, the television chimpanzee that was hired under Weaver’s reign and featured in horrified tales of the US re-broadcasting of the Coronation.11 However, what makes them fascinating is that they also articulated and embodied not only the differences, but also the potential for concurrence between the two broadcasting systems. Weaver’s long-standing belief in the importance of broadcasting beyond commercial purposes and Jacob’s fight for broadcasting independence – both of which I will consider in more detail later –
problematise some of the dominant preconceptions about each system. Both were from privileged backgrounds, with wartime experience to draw upon, and at the helm of powerful institutions at a time of significant change. They shared some views on what broadcasting should be and do, especially regarding cultural uplift – and therefore are subject to the same potential criticism of class-based cultural imperialism – and independence (be it from the sponsor or government). Such similarities in experience and philosophy notwithstanding, they were each deeply embedded in their respective system; and this tension informs their charged rhetorical exchange in 1955-1956.

This altercation might at first glance appear as another in a series of broadcasters’ spats, surviving in existing historical accounts in the form of fewer than a handful of brief and/or indirect references. But actually, this was a moment that vividly dramatises the move from war-time cooperation to post-war global competition between the two broadcasting systems; that is intertwined with an aspect of the beginnings of commercial broadcasting in Britain marginalised in dominant historical accounts; that offers access to a denser historical picture of this important time period in which a number of discourses converged; and that marks a significant development of broadcasting relationships even beyond the UK and USA.

The altercation was sparked by Pat Weaver during a speech delivered to the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising (IPA) at an event marking the beginning of commercial television in Britain, to an audience consisting of representatives from, amongst others, the BBC, the ITA, the press, and the advertising industry. It took place at Grosvenor House in London on 27 September 1955, five days after ITV’s opening night. Early in his speech, Weaver, noting that he kept a close eye on press discourses in Britain, dismissed the long-established British charge that advertising and public service broadcasting are antithetical. The crux of the altercation came when he went on to argue:

I have always thought that taking pride in having a broadcasting instrument that did not carry advertising was like taking pride in a railway system that did not carry freight. There is no question but that broadcasting has a wide usefulness to people, but there is also no question that an equal usefulness is through broadcasting’s integration into a modern economic society through advertising.

His words, especially the train simile, exhibited a belittling view of the BBC’s public service broadcasting system, which was presented as limited, not robust enough to carry the weight of bulky cargo, and not quite competing on grown-up terms. In this, Weaver’s remarks stood in a long trajectory of US press and broadcasting comments taking a derogatory stance concerning (monopolistic) public service broadcasting in Britain for its supposed anachronistic, feeble and ‘prissy’ qualities.

It is telling that the simile used is one featuring railway technology, for trains are ‘the central symbol of nineteenth-century modernity’. They are closely connected to the idea of the nation, with strong connotations of empire building, strategic expansionism and industrial capitalism; and in a US context the expansionistic freedom of ‘going west’. These notions infuse the rest of Weaver’s speech, which is informed by understanding broadcasting and the nation as closely linked, and steeped in the rhetoric of modernity, as the following representative extract demonstrates:
Broadcasting can upgrade the economy, while upgrading, when properly run, popular taste. […] It should be interesting for you to hear what we believe television is doing in the United States, and within our own frame of reference, how it is serving a revolution of incalculable scope.

With frequent references to revolution, renewal, energy, speed and change, whereby modernist ideologies of improvement and democratic freedom are conflated with commercialism, Weaver’s speech put forward a strong picture of US social and economic advancement. There is an ironic undercurrent for the contemporary reader, as Weaver’s self-righteous boasting is historically located shortly before the end of the first ‘Golden Age’ of US television drama and the beginning of the ‘Vast Wasteland’, as well as shortly before the emergence of the quiz show scandal and the ‘Golden Age’ of television drama in Britain. Indeed, within a few years Weaver would publicly complain about the state of US television for its increasing ratings focus and lack of programming breadth, and be ‘propounding the need for noncommercial television as an alternative voice.’

Free from the burden of such hindsight, Weaver continued by not hesitating to invoke that long-standing US criticism of British broadcasting and society, namely the perceived paternalistic, closed-down elitism:

I believe wholeheartedly that we in America are trying to achieve our revolution. I also fear that you in Great Britain are trying to stop your revolution. […] We believe that this is a real revolution and that it is creating a new elite […] [which] will bring about […] an explosion of an infinite number of personalities, each moving finally as his talents and interests direct him, not as his good and bad luck in birth and health and race, etc., have determined for him. [sic]

Leaving aside the contentiousness of his idealising and (at best) myopic claims about US broadcasting and society, given the long-standing problems with both concerning inequality and marginalisation, Weaver’s words propositioned the USA as an energetic, upward-moving nation. Chiming with the American Dream discourse of meritocracy and opportunity, this offered a criticism of the post-war consensus in Britain that had seen Britain shift towards the nationalisation of key industries and services (including the railway in 1948). It also contested (especially with the repeated references to a ‘new elite’) long-standing discourses of British/European cultural superiority.

Not content with this, Weaver proceeded to explicitly criticise the BBC, finding it lacking on its own, public service, terms:

[…] the BBC by its very nature will not do what commercial television must do. […] It seems to me that commercial television, because of the need to attract a total audience, will have more influence in elevating British tastes than the BBC, which is filling and responsive to needs that already exist and that, thanks to commercial television, will be ever enlarged. British commercial television thus can follow what we at NBC consider the grand design of television, the creation of an all-people elite.

Re-appropriating – and to the BBC delegates at the time, given the alignment of public service and commercial interests, very probably perverting – the BBC’s own rhetoric of providing cultural uplift, and fairly comprehensively critiquing non-
commercial broadcasting in Britain, Weaver’s speech must have seemed rather galling to much of the Grosvenor House audience. However, as self-aggrandising as his words undoubtedly were, they contained a prescient truth, in that the instant success of ITV reflected the fact that its programming suited the tastes of the British public in a way that the BBC’s had not. Moreover, it is significant that it was Weaver who was delivering such discursive posturing: shaped by his World War II experience of serving in the Office of War Information, as well as his experience of working in the advertising industry, Weaver himself had pushed for network control over programming and for spot advertising.\(^{19}\) He had shown a continued commitment to including educational/cultural material in programming, especially with his commercially mostly non-profitable ‘Operation Frontal Lobes’ programming policy and ‘enlightenment through exposure’ philosophy.\(^{20}\)

Thus, Weaver was a US broadcasting executive who certainly could have been expected to be aligned with and sympathetic to the public service values of the BBC.\(^{21}\) Indeed, 1956 was the year that Weaver, finding himself increasingly at odds with NBC founder General David Sarnoff, was given little choice but to leave NBC after a short period as NBC chairman, ‘when it became clear that the network could no longer follow his philosophy of program variety and innovation’.\(^{22}\) It is important to bear in mind that strategic motives and discursive contingencies shape the claims that broadcasters make, and Weaver was, as already noted, something of a showman who was not averse to rhetorical exaggeration. However, the fact that it was the public-service-minded Weaver who initiated the altercation undoubtedly intensified this criticism of the BBC in front of a British home audience at a delicate time, when its possible loss of the mass audience could (and ultimately, would) lend itself to debates over the justification of the licence fee.

Weaver’s speech stung, prompting discussion at a BBC Board of Management meeting in October 1955.\(^{23}\) It received an equally high-profile response, when, within fewer than six months, Ian Jacob was in the Roosevelt Hotel in New York, delivering a speech at a luncheon of the Radio and Television Executive Society, on 21 March 1956. His speech was dedicated to, explicitly and implicitly, rebutting US claims and criticisms, with the following playful remarks framing the main points of discussion:

Having read reports of some of the statements made here about the B.B.C. and what it does, or does not do, I felt I was reading the kind of report that might have been current in the days of the great explorers. Remote foreign lands had been visited by these men, who brought back somewhat fantastic tales of the habits of the natives.\(^{24}\) While not a showman like Weaver, Jacob was noted for a ‘dexterity with words [that] made him an excellent rapporteur’, and this was evident during this occasion.\(^{25}\) Reversing the rhetoric of colonialism, Jacob’s speech proceeded to explicitly address a number of those ‘fantastic tales’, mostly drawn from Weaver’s speech.

The first major point of Jacob’s speech actually, albeit indirectly, responded to other US criticism of non-commercial broadcasting, namely remarks made in September 1955 by then-FCC Chairman George C. McConnaughey to the Radio and Television
Executive Society. Without explicitly referencing McConnaughey, Jacob pointed out that the BBC was not governed by Parliament, and instead run by governors appointed ‘not as political nominees, but as representative men and women to act as trustees for the nation.’ This alluded to the fact that the commissioners of the FCC were appointed by the President of the United States (subject to confirmation by Senate), and took issue with the supposed autonomy and editorial independence of US broadcasting, which in US discourses had long been favourably compared to the oft presumed partiality and government-dependency of the BBC. This was an issue of long-standing interest to Jacob, who was at the time closely involved in the push to end the Fourteen-Day Rule, which, cited in his speech as ‘highly controversial’, had prevented the BBC from broadcasting discussions of subjects due for debate in Parliament within the next fortnight, and for whose abolition the arrival of ITV actually proved beneficial. Moreover, as BBC Director General, he would only a few months later be at the forefront of fraught relations between the BBC and the British government, especially then-Prime Minister Anthony Eden, over the BBC’s reporting of the Suez crisis and the dissensus within Britain on this political issue. Like Weaver before him, Jacob in this speech made sure to address some long-standing criticisms and preconceptions by re-appropriating and reversing the other’s established rhetoric, here concerning broadcasting independence.

Jacob’s speech then focused on Weaver’s 1955 Grosvenor House remarks, first by taking issue with Weaver’s comment concerning the BBC’s apparent limited ability to fulfil its public service remit. By the time of Jacob’s appearance at the Roosevelt Hotel, Weaver’s above-noted prescience had proven right in that commercial television in Britain was reaching ‘the big audience’, something which Jacob referred to in passing, downplaying this success with the brief remark that commercial television ‘is doing quite well among those people who have taken the trouble to convert their sets to receive its service’. Conceding as much as, and no more than this – and most certainly making no mention of the fact that, as Crisell notes, ‘[u]nder Director General Sir Ian Jacob the policy was partly to compete with ITV, to match like with like,’ which suggests more responsiveness than Jacob would have been willing to admit to here – Jacob explicitly addressed Weaver’s verbal gauntlet. He denied the American’s contentious criticism as follows:

There seems to be a curious idea current in some people’s minds that the B.B.C. serves only minorities. I would like to say something about this, and […] I am sure that Mr. Weaver will forgive me if I refer to a speech made by him in September last year in London. […] The objectives put by Mr. Weaver are just those which have been followed, with fair success too, by the B.B.C. over the years. The main criticism levelled against us, […] in Britain, is that we have tried too hard to follow the policy which Mr. Weaver advanced as that which commercial television should follow. The BBC [sic] has attracted and does attract the big audiences […].

The BBC was thus rhetorically presented as if anything, guilty of fulfilling its public service remit too well.
As a newspaper report confirms, Jacob adopted a humorous tone, undoubtedly carefully planned, keen to suggest an air of unconcernedness.\textsuperscript{28} He matched Weaver’s boasts with the words:

\begin{quote}
I challenge anyone to show that there is anywhere in the world, a Television Service that exceeds […] that of the B.B.C. […] We do not fear competition. We believe that we can produce programmes in each category of the output of a consistently higher quality than our competition.
\end{quote}

With the use of the word ‘competition’ here loaded by leaving space to encompass both commercial television in Britain and US broadcasting, this was indeed a bold claim to make – although one that would receive backing in the forthcoming ‘Golden Age’ of British television drama of the 1960s and 1970s. In some ways, Jacob’s claim is reminiscent of the strength of conviction (if not arrogance) of a John Reith, who, as Hilmes has observed, during a 1931 visit to the USA delivered a speech before the National Advisory Council on Education by Radio (NACRE), predicting that ‘it would only be a matter of time before the US would come around to adopting British structure [sic]’.\textsuperscript{29}

McConnaughey’s comments received an oblique reply, but Weaver’s train simile evidently could not go without repeated, explicit rebuttals; the goading on British home turf, at an event celebrating the beginning of commercial competition for the BBC no less, too much to let it go. Jacob challenged the ideological position represented by Weaver as follows:

\begin{quote}
This new development [commercial television in Britain] was hailed in the United States as progress. The British were at last seeing sense. There was also, I noted, a feeling that it was an extension of the American way of life, and therefore valuable quite apart from the additional openings it would create for American programme and advertising material. […] Mr. Weaver, at the time of the opening of the new service last September […] said:-

‘I have always thought that taking pride in having a broadcasting instrument that did not carry advertising was like taking pride in a railway system that did not carry freight’.

Well, that is a point of view; though I have not yet heard of a demand that on a railway the freight and the passengers should travel in the same compartment. It is quite a new idea to us.
\end{quote}

Jacob’s argument questioned the self-evidence of the conceptualisation of the beneficial qualities of the commercial system that underpinned Weaver’s boastful claims about the state of the nation in the USA and supposed stagnation within Britain.

Jacob parried the simile in a way that not only picked at the very foundation of Weaver’s argument, but also strategically brought in notions of a classed hierarchy and order, invoking notions of an uncultured US chaos with a long-standing presence in British discourses on US broadcasting.\textsuperscript{30} Jacob was clearly concerned to achieve some public image brand management, even damage management, keen to redress a discursive manoeuvre whereby a technology pioneered by and developed further at the height of the British Empire was being invoked against it. Similarly to Weaver, Jacob had a wartime information service background, and this extensive experience in communications
undoubtedly aided his ability to manage rhetorical self-representation and discursive power struggles at a high profile event. To do so was performatively pertinent here, as the US broadcasters in his audience at the Roosevelt Hotel, would have undoubtedly been keeping a close eye on developments in British television in the preceding months and been aware of the BBC taking second place to ITV’s instantaneous success.

**Rhetoric in Context**
The Weaver-Jacob altercation of 1955-56 is a particularly vivid moment of rhetorical exchange between US and British broadcasters. Following ‘a three-decade history of fraught exchange’ across the Atlantic, there is much here that is familiar from previous commentary and critique.31 For example, the US rhetoric and argument here conflated democratic freedom with the freedom of the market and critiqued British broadcasting’s dependency on state legitimation. It adopted a derogatory position towards British broadcasting for – to shift the movement-based imagery from the railway to the bicycle – its penchant for riding with training wheels. This was already evident, in, for example, 1933-34, during what Hilmes has called a ‘flap’ caused by a pamphlet titled ‘Broadcasting in the US’ by the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB). This was concerned with avoiding broadcasting reforms in the USA, whose criticism of broadcasting in India included such patronising comments as: ‘The British Broadcasting Corporation does not have to stay awake. […] It can afford to rest. It knows that no rival will broadcast while it’s sleeping.’32 Vice versa, Jacob’s rebuttal was clearly a continuation of long-standing British ‘best in the world’ self-discourses; and his judiciously chosen reference to BBC television beginning ‘four years before the first television service started in the United States’ stood in a trajectory with previous pronouncements stressing proficiency and history by individuals such as Reith.

However, the 1955-56 altercation was enfolded within a particular historical moment, which made Weaver and Jacob’s train-invoking parry more charged, Weaver’s words more stinging, and Jacob’s rebuttal somewhat more brittle, than the surviving transcripts can convey. This concerns both the wider socio-political context and ‘behind the scenes’ aspects of the broadcasting context. In terms of the relationship between broadcasting and the nation, it was the USA that had emerged during the post-war years as a nation both socio-politically and economically in a strong upward trajectory, stepping in front of the UK as a superpower. Weaver’s speech repeatedly alluded to this; and the rhetoric of both Weaver and Jacob was not myopically restricted to the USA and UK. Jacob was keen to stress the significance of national context for the BBC, due to his concern to present the BBC as the leading national broadcaster, but mentioned his personal experience of the BBC’s global reputation. To some extent, this matched Weaver’s talk of a ‘new world’, with a sense that both their words were located on, and addressed to, a world stage.

In this ‘new world’, the USA had emerged as a global leader thanks to its economic post-war boom, replacing a crumbling British Empire. Near bankruptcy by the end of World War II, the UK lost a significant portion of its political-economic autonomy to the USA and its standing as a superpower during the late 1940s and 1950s. This was evidenced by the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, the loss of colonies such as
India, and Britain’s humiliating withdrawal during the Suez Crisis mere months after Jacob’s speech. Weaver explicitly referred to the US post-war boom and implicated broadcasting, especially television, within it, conflating social mobility and consumption along the way, just as he left aside the complicating matter of the post-war economic upturn within 1950s Britain, which actually facilitated the campaign for commercial television:

It was the power of television showing the people the rewards before them, making them willing work ever to harder [sic] to reach their individual goals that sent us to our soaring new plateau, and this is going to happen again, and again, and again, in the United States.

Weaver’s speech in London made use of this high-profile moment to drive home this change of world order, which he saw as having been aided by commercial broadcasting, to his diverse audience constituents. He drew on the links between the railway and the nation, implying that the USA was now the one able to make better use of an expansionistic technology pioneered by the old order, and the links between the nation and broadcasting. The latter was of particular significance in the 1950s as, following the disruptions of the war and the immediate post-war years, television was establishing itself as a mass medium. Of course, the historical moment was furthermore deeply wrapped up within the context of the Cold War, which was heating up during the 1950s, a decade that included the Korean War, McCarthyism and the Warsaw Pact, following an unsettled period after the death of Stalin. Indeed, with the new world order Weaver was referring to centred around the folds of the Iron Curtain, the train parry carried extra significance because it was a high-profile moment of the USA emphasising its supremacy and propulsive success in a way that looked somewhat beyond the fading empire of Britain and towards the former wartime ally and fellow nuclear superpower, the USSR.

In her discussion of the discourses surrounding NBC’s ‘Operation Frontal Lobes’ project, Pamela Wilson has pointed out that:

In many discourses (particularly those external communications used to market the programming to sponsors and the public), the enlightenment ideology was explicitly connected to a nationalistic, Democratic imperative in this early Cold War/Korean War era. The function of television as ‘a democratic arm of national enlightenment’ was seen as a way to develop the intellectual levels of America’s citizenry, to build up the nation’s intellectual forces as a defense against the Communist threat.33

This is detectible in Weaver’s words, which contained veiled references to communism and a claim to there being no socialists in the USA, which is only more striking when considering that at the time of his speech, US television practitioners blacklisted during Hollywood’s ‘Red Scare’ were working ‘under cover’ for British television.34 With the USA and USSR competing, rhetorically and otherwise, for world domination during the Cold War, the opportunity to attack the long-established, globally respected BBC and the anti-commercial ethos it embodied, and propound the success of the US broadcasting system, can be understood as ideological point-scoring for the USA. After all, if Britain (which had the globally respected BBC) let in commercial – and thus, to some extent, both US and US-style – broadcasting, and this furthermore proved successful, then this
vividly demonstrated the strength of the US broadcasting system and the capitalist ideology that underlies it.

As far as the broadcasting context is more specifically concerned, the altercation marked a moment of the former colony arguably taking the broadcasting empire baton from the UK, and without much strenuous effort at that. Ultimately, it was Weaver’s words that were infused with a sense of upward trajectory and momentum. Falling back on some long-established tropes, Jacob mobilised a rhetoric that attempted to put the upstart ex-colony in its place more via the BBC’s history and traditions, and less via a sense of forward-moving momentum. (It is telling that a brief reference to a future second BBC television channel was immediately followed by a paragraph on the limitations to expansion due to various restrictions.) Despite some degree of looking ahead, Jacob’s speech was more informed by a backward-oriented sensibility, encapsulated by his stress on the BBC’s television service predating that of the USA.

Of course, Jacob’s somewhat traditional performative confidence in the supremacy of British non-commercial broadcasting was in many ways precisely what was needed. Remembered for his leadership skills, Jacob would have been concerned to boost the morale of his staff, which, following the widespread admiration for the BBC’s wartime news broadcasting and coverage of the Coronation, had been flagging in the face of ITV’s arrival and success, with a number of production and engineering personnel having left for the new ITV companies. The very familiarity of his ‘best in the world’ rhetoric, emphasising and insisting that it was ‘business as usual’ for the BBC – and so reminiscent of, for example, Reith’s confident prediction that the USA would emulate the UK only a quarter of a century earlier – must have been reassuring for his staff. In his attempt to keep his troops’ morale up to stop desertion, especially when faced with a powerful combatant – the military metaphor is invoked here to allude to Jacob’s pre-BBC experiences – his strategicness and awareness of the importance of staff as a limited, valuable resource were very much part of Jacob’s modus operandi. This was one that he had already demonstrated when he took charge of the BBC’s European Service (later the BBC World Service) after the war, whose post-war inevitable drop in ratings was causing a declining morale-induced ‘seepage of talented staff’.35

However, while Jacob’s confidence seemed so much like that of the first Director General, it was also located within a markedly different historical moment. Given the developments of the preceding 25 years, Jacob’s words were unlikely to ruffle any feathers amongst and likely to appear as somewhat hollow to his US audience. The (painful) truth, unspoken by Weaver and Jacob, was that the USA was assuming a leading position not only in a new socio-economic and political order, but also in terms of broadcasting systems. As has Hilmes noted, the formative years of broadcasting had seen a ‘battle of the paradigms’:

One nation after another observed the privately owned, competitive commercial system of the United States and the state-chartered, public service monopoly of Great Britain and used their examples to craft local solutions. As this dualistic modelling extended across the globe in the 1920s and 1930s, more often than not it was the United States that came out the loser both rhetorically and practically.36
While in the early years of radio broadcasting, it had been the non-commercial public service system epitomised for many by the BBC, that had been favoured across a range of national contexts, during the Cold War rise of television, the commercial system embodied and advocated by the USA was gaining ground.

In the battle for broadcasting world domination, the US broadcasting system and philosophy was emerging as a winner for a cluster of inter-connected reasons. One is that the general global spread of television meant an increase in potential new export markets for US television, facilitated by the latter’s shift towards filmed drama series. Then, by the end of the 1950s, an increasing number of countries had adopted commercial (and thus US-style and likely US-friendly) television, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Portugal, South Korea, Thailand and the UK. That this list included the UK was crucial, as Barnouw has argued:

British commercial television, shaking up economics and customs at home, also had reverberating effects elsewhere, as other nations followed the British example. All instantly became purchasers of American telefilms. They also became outlets for advertising of many American companies and their subsidiaries. Moreover, the spread of commercial television was often linked to US intervention, and Britain was no exception in this.

When Weaver delivered his London speech in 1955, he was doing so to BBC staff who were smarting from the arrival of the unwanted competition of commercial television, which in many ways was not supposed to have been. The Beveridge Report had found against the introduction of commercial television in the UK, citing US television as a negative example. This recommendation was made partly void by the next change of government, and there was some criticism of the BBC’s televisions service. But with the BBC’s successful coverage of the Coronation, and a general ‘anti-American feeling’ in British society, bolstered by tales of the US re-broadcasting of the Coronation featuring commercials and the aforementioned J. Fred Muggs, there were reasons for the BBC to feel that it was a far from foregone conclusion whether commercial television would arrive, and furthermore, if it did, what form it would take.

Jacob’s early years as Director General had seen him closely involved in the campaign against commercial competition, drawing up several proposals for alternative arrangements that included plans to have the BBC run a second television service partly financed by advertising. However, for all of Jacob’s ‘ability to manipulate the levers of Whitehall’, such plans were rejected, and commercial broadcasting was introduced in Britain, and with remarkable speed. While historical accounts duly stress how British commercial television differs in important aspects from the US system (favouring spot advertising over the sponsorship system, coupled with an import quota), what deserves more consideration is the US influence and pressure behind this pushing through of commercial television in Britain, from which the BBC audience members of Weaver’s speech were smarting.
Much of the campaigning both for and against commercial television in Britain was conducted by British bodies, chiefly embodied by the Popular Television Association and the National Television Council, led by Christopher Mayhew and Violet Bonham Carter. With the former, what is generally acknowledged is the importance of a small group of Tory backbenchers with relevant industry connections. As Catherine Johnson and Rob Turnock have summed up, drawing on Bernard Sendall’s work:

What ultimately drove through legislation for commercial television was a small handful of Conservative MPs. [...] A small, but cohesive group of Tory backbench MPs came from the world of business and believed in free enterprise and competition. These MPs, known as the ‘One Nation Group’, were [...] vociferous in their campaign for commercial television (Sendall 1982).45

Some attention has been paid by scholars to the business connections (which included advertising agencies) and motives of these MPs. Sendall has argued against the view put forward by H. H. Wilson and Clive Jenkins that it was commercial self-interest that was driving their campaign for commercial television.46 However, what has not been considered enough is the transatlantic dimension of these contentious issues. Crucially, one of the key advertising agencies in Britain, J. Walter Thompson – one of its directors, MP John Rodger, was a founder of the One Nation Group – was a multinational company with its base in the USA. There, J. Walter Thompson had played a part in the development of broadcasting for some time, as one of the advertising agencies that produced programmes in the days of radio.47 As Gary Edgerton has observed, it had facilitated the development of the prestigious Kraft Television Theatre anthology series because it was looking for something to help sell the product Cheeze Whiz.48

The name of J. Walter Thompson is referenced in many of the key historical accounts of British (commercial) television: Andrew Crisell has mentioned that the commercial TV campaign ‘enjoyed strong backing from business – among others, Pye Radio, the West End theatre managers and the advertising agency J. Walter Thompson – as well as the support of the Daily Mirror and the Financial Times.’49 Asa Briggs has noted that ‘J. Walter Thompson, the international advertising company […] had helped to prepare evidence against the BBC monopoly during the Beveridge inquiry.’50 Sendall has pointed out that:

Crucial to the eventual success of the campaign [for commercial television] was the fact that individuals from two or three of the larger agencies (such as J. Walter Thompson and S. H. Benson) organised themselves to give a better understanding of the different ways in which television advertising might be introduced.51

These references to J. Walter Thompson tend to be quite brief, and when the transatlantic dimension is noted, it is done so without offering critical reflection on the significance of this.52

The US influence on the introduction of commercial television in Britain has been discussed more elsewhere, including, interestingly enough, historical accounts of US television. Erik Barnouw has written that:

The start of commercial television in Britain late in 1955 opened a crucial market for American advertisers and their agents. That they were ready to leap in was not surprising, for they had worked hard to bring this transition about. [...] The
shrinking of radio audiences threatened these advertisers with shrinking British sales – unless alternative television facilities became available. […] The strategy for achieving commercialization of British television is said to have been master-minded by the London branch of the J. Walter Thompson advertising agency, working with a group in Parliament. Their well-financed campaign did not emphasize commercial advantages but shrewdly attacked the British Broadcasting Corporation at its most objectionable point – its monopoly status.53

In his historical discussion of US television in the 1950s, William Boddy has argued a related point:

The growth of the international market in telefilms both followed and fueled a larger postwar shift by U.S.-based multinational corporations and their advertising agencies into new foreign markets. For example, the campaign in 1955 to establish commercial television in Great Britain, although led by members of the British Conservative party, received substantial assistance from the American advertising agency J. Walter Thompson. As the historian Herbert Schiller points out, the expansion of the American communications industry abroad in the 1950s and 1960s was also encouraged by policies of the U.S. government. Foreign sales of American programs were accompanied by major direct investments in foreign companies and markets by U.S. television networks, equipment manufacturers, and program distributors.54

Elsewhere, Stefan Schwarzkopf has been explicitly interested in US influence on the British advertising industry. He has considered in some detail how US advertising agencies operating in London, especially the globally dominant J. Walter Thompson, having ‘pushed the way towards commercial television’, were able to take advantage of their experience in television advertising and financial muscle for the required cumulative investment to establish their hold over British television advertising.55

What is worth reflecting upon here is that the role of US influence on the introduction of commercial television in Britain has been considered neither often nor explicitly enough. With arguments pertaining to this influence having emerged on both sides of the Atlantic – Jenkins was a British trade unionist and H. H. Wilson a US politics scholar – in the 1960s and been available for consideration and scrutiny since then, they have been engaged with mostly outside of British television studies (Barnouw and Boddy are US television scholars, Schwarzkopf is a German-born marketing scholar). They have yet to make more significant inroads into the dominant British scholarly discourses on television, which have perhaps not been entirely comfortable with considering this transatlantic dimension of one of the key developments within British television thus far. However, such a transatlantic dimension certainly further problematises ITV as a British object of study.56

Deserving more attention, this transatlantic dimension undoubtedly gave added charge to the Jacob-Weaver altercation in 1955-1956. After all, Weaver was delivering his speech to the IPA, which, having pushed for commercial television, represented an industry dominated by US companies; and this US presence at Weaver’s speech must have been very notable for his audience members – just as a US presence had been there
for viewers (Jacob included) on ITV’s first night of broadcasting, in the form of smiley faces on cheese slices in a commercial produced for US company Kraft by J. Walter Thompson.\textsuperscript{57} While both Weaver’s and Jacob’s speeches survive in the form of transcripts only, no recording could have captured what went so crucially unspoken at both occasions, which encompasses significant socio-political and broadcasting developments that engendered and infused these events and the speeches that sought to process and manage the discourses at stake.

Conclusion
This article has explored transatlantic exchange via a focus on individuals as a site for the expression, negotiation and performance of the tensions that have marked the relationship between US and British broadcasting. These include those between difference and assimilation, competition and cooperation, and public service and commercialism. During transatlantic exchange, particular articulations of national identity are not only embodied by those individuals, but also become performative, constructed and highlighted through their words and actions. Historiographically, by ordering, condensing, and personalising, the individual as a focal point for my discussion has offered concrete glimpses of the texture of different broadcasting cultures, and of what is less tangible or permanent, but not less real and relevant. Perhaps most importantly, this approach has allowed me to undertake critical engagement with Ian Jacob.

While Weaver has received a good amount of scholarly attention, Jacob deserves much more than he has so far. Director General during almost all of the 1950s, he saw and dealt with challenges and opportunities that include a significant rise in television viewership, the Coronation, the arrival of commercial television and thus a significant challenge to the conceptualisation of broadcasting in Britain, the end of the Fourteen-Day rule and the Suez crisis. He made a significant contribution to the development of television in Britain through his performative and other efforts to uphold the BBC both internally and externally as the national broadcaster and a global force in the face of increasing competition; and these actions played their part in the Pilkington Report’s recommendation that the third television channel in Britain was to be allocated to the BBC. Touching on the relationship between agency and historical contingency that informs this article’s focus on individuals, a tribute to Jacob on his retirement from the BBC in 1959, having listed some of his achievements, reflected that:

\begin{quote}
None of these things, Sir Ian would at once observe, happen because of one man, but it is also true that one man, in his position, could easily have produced a situation in which they could not have happened so well.\textsuperscript{58}
\end{quote}

The words and work of individuals such as Jacob and Weaver dramatise, supplement and/or raise questions about established historiographical narratives, including and especially those of the relationship between British and US television. As noted earlier, there has been a great number of transatlantic exchange visits: there were plenty before Jacob and Weaver’s altercation, especially during the earlier parts of the 1950s, when the arrival of commercial television in Britain gave rise to much study, comparison and critique. Indeed, Briggs has noted that in 1954, ‘[t]here were so many visitors across the Atlantic that Grace Wyndham Goldie […] suggested the compilation
of a combined BBC report on America on which action might be taken." There would be further cross-visits over the decades to come, reiterating some of the same debates, criticisms and rebuttals. For example, in 1961, within the context of the Pilkington Report, Jacob’s successor Hugh Carlton Greene spoke at a luncheon in the Waldorf Astoria hotel in New York arranged by NBC, in which he pointed out that the BBC was not under government control.

However, the 1955-1956 Jacob-Weaver exchange has deserved detailed consideration, because it was such a charged encounter that sought to manage a dense historical moment in which a set of discourses closely informed one another, and in which the former wartime allies were in a process of working through a new world order of (and beyond) broadcasting. Whilst the British Golden Age of the 1960s and 1970s and the American ‘Vast Wasteland’ were still to come, this foundational moment marked a turning point where the US philosophy of broadcasting was becoming globally dominant and American influence was making inroads into British broadcasting, which was no longer synonymous with the BBC only. Jacob’s and Weaver’s speeches dramatise the tensions arising from the continual need to work through and perform the sense of self and Other within a relationship of two systems that are different but mutually implicating and defining. That their exchange invokes the railway as an analogy is apt in this respect, for it is inherently mobile as well as conceptually unstable, closely associated with both the progress and horror of modernity. Here, it encapsulates the tensions between these systems at a time when the relationship between the two was at – pun indeed intended – an important junction, still marking broadcasting in both countries to the present day.

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(9,347 words)

1 Michele Hilmes, The ‘North Atlantic Triangle’: Britain, the USA and Canada in 1950s television, Media History, 16, no. 1 (2010), 32.
2 Pamela Wilson, NBC Television’s ‘Operation Frontal Lobes’: cultural hegemony and fifties’ program planning, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 15, no. 1 (1995), 84.
5 While much of the rhetoric of these visits has asserted difference, if not supremacy, the very fact of these long-standing cross-exchanges complicates any understanding of the two broadcasting systems as binary opposites.
6 Hilmes, Who We Are, 63.
12 See also Wilson, ‘Operation Frontal Lobes’, 86.
15 One representative example here stems from the same year as Weaver’s speech; a *New York Times* article commented: ‘And the B.B.C.’s television is often lamentable – gauche, amateurish and half-baked. […] It is so tired by 11 P.M. that it gives the news in sound only; the screen goes blank. It has brazenly invented something called Interludes, for use when a program runs short of the time when the next program begins.’ Robert Waithman, *Love That Soap -- And B.B.C.*, *The New York Times*, August 14, 1955, 58-59.
17 In Britain, of course, broadcasting/the BBC and the railway had commercial beginnings before becoming nationalised. Mark Casson has noted that ‘[f]ree market ideology was most important in the early and most intensive phase of railway building, up to 1866. Commitment to free markets was based on the notion that they were well suited, in some sense, to the British character.’ Mark Casson, *The World’s First Railway System: Enterprise, Competition, and Regulation on the Railway Network in Victorian Britain* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009), 30.
19 As Hilmes has pointed out, the early US sponsor system received much criticism in British discourses, which in turn was mobilised by US networks pushing for the change to spot advertising. Hilmes, *Network Nations*, 226.
20 In his critique of the common tendency in historical accounts to position Weaver as a broadcasting pioneer of the Golden Age, Vance Kepley has located Weaver’s work within its commercial context, pointing out that it was enabled by the deep pockets of NBC’s parent company RCA, and furthermore part of NBC’s campaign to secure affiliate contracts with local stations. Vance Kepley, Jr., From ‘Frontal Lobes’ to the ‘Bob-and-Bob’ Show: NBC Management and Programming Strategies, 1949-65, in: Tino Balio (ed.), *Hollywood in the Age of Television* (Boston, Unwin Hyman, 1990).
23 Board of Management, Minutes of Meeting held on Monday, 3rd October 1955, from BBC Written Archives’ Centre file: R2/8/2 – Board of Management – Minutes 1955.
The confrontational quality of Jacob’s negotiations with the government contained an added charge given his own Whitehall background, and particularly his close professional and personal ties to Churchill.


Hilmes, *Network Nations*. The arrival of the railway in Britain had brought with it concerns of un-orderliness in terms of mobility and social change.


Wilson, ‘Operation Frontal Lobes’, 86.


Charles Richardson, *Biography*, 222.

Hilmes, *Who We Are*, 54.


As Hilmes has noted, ‘During the Cold War era, U.S. government agencies recruited the broadcasting industry into its expansionist plans, linking commercial television with democratic ideology and actively promoting its spread and growth (and not coincidentally opening up new American markets in the process).’ Hilmes, *Who We Are*, 55.

The Beveridge Report itself was informed by transatlantic exchange, as the Beveridge Committee had sent members to the USA and Canada to analyse the differences between British and North American broadcasting.

Crisell, *An Introductory History*, 82-83.

Crisell, *An Introductory History*, 85.

See Briggs, *Volume IV*.

Richardson, *Biography*, 234.


Weaver had participated in this form of programming control when working for Young & Rubicam, and subsequently turned against it. See also Mike Mashon, NBC, J. Walter Thompson, and the Struggle for Control of Television Programming, 1946-58, in: Michele Hilmes (ed.), *NBC: America’s Network* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 2007).


Crisell, *An Introductory History*, 84.

Briggs, *Volume IV*, 396.
51 Sendall, Volume 1, 18.

52 H. H. Wilson has paid (albeit limited) attention to the domination of the British advertising industry by US companies, while Jenkins has been interested in a range of US influences on commercial television in Britain. See Wilson, Pressure Group; and Jenkins, Power Behind the Screen.

53 Barnouw, Tube of Plenty, 223.

54 William Boddy, Fifties Television: The Industry and Its Critics (Urbana; Chicago, University of Illinois Press, 1990), 142.

55 Stefan Schwarzkopf, ‘A moment of triumph in the history of the free mind’?: British and American advertising agencies’ responses to the introduction of commercial television in the United Kingdom, in: Michael Bailey (ed.), Narrating Media History (London, Routledge, 2009), 90. H. H. Wilson and Schwarzkopf have highlighted a divergence of opinion within the British advertising industry itself regarding the introduction of commercial television: smaller British agencies had concerns they would be pushed out by their American (or American-owned) competitors. See Wilson, Pressure Group, 139.


58 Then-BBC Chairman Sir Arthur fforde cited in Richardson, Biography, 261-262.

59 Briggs, Volume IV, 986.


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