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Book or Report Section

Accepted Version

Schroeter, M. (2019) The language ideology of silence and silencing in public discourse Claims to silencing as metadiscursive moves in German anti-political correctness discourse. In: Murray, A. J. and Durrheim, K. (eds.) Qualitative studies of silence: the unsaid as social action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, pp. 165-185. ISBN 9781108345552 doi:
<https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108345552.010> Available at
<http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/76955/>

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To link to this article DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/9781108345552.010>

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

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The language ideology of silence and silencing in public discourse

Claims to silencing as metadiscursive moves in German anti-political correctness discourse

1 Introduction

The present chapter looks at silence through the lens of metadiscourse. The contribution of this chapter to the volume is that it points out how silence can be grasped analytically by studying metadiscourse about it. In doing so, it is also concerned with language ideology. I will argue that metadiscourse is indicative of attitudes towards or beliefs about the discursive phenomenon that is the object of metadiscourse, in this case silence and silencing. By way of a sample empirical analysis that illustrates the approach and the involved language ideological stances, I will deal with the anti-political correctness discourse – a transnational discursive phenomenon since the 1990s that continues to cluster around language taboos, hate speech, (un-)sayability, access to and limitations of public discourse, freedom of opinion, denial of voice and representation, silencing and censorship. Hence, aspects of silence, or more particularly silencing, loom large in anti-pc discourse, and the shape and idea of public discourse itself is invoked and negotiated here with a view on voice as a condition for democracy (cf. Couldry 2010). It will be impossible within the scope of this chapter, and for an individual researcher, to cover the various appropriations of (anti-) pc in different societies and languages. Therefore, as a Germanist, I will focus on the German context. To my mind, the German anti-pc discourse is as good an example or case study as any other. Having said this, and based on a comparative view on the US and UK anti-pc discourse, I believe that anti-pc debates in other countries rest on similar wider premises and exhibit similar discursive strategies and patterns of argumentation as laid out in the following, so that this chapter should provide useful aspects for researchers concerned with other societies and languages, to consider and adapt for the specific contexts that they might be interested in.

I will maintain in this chapter that the unsaid becomes utilized in anti-pc discourse as a discursive strategy. The unsaid features in anti-pc discourse as something that could (ontologically) be said, and that (socio-politically) wants, warrants or even needs saying, but is prevented from being said through language taboos, silencing or even censorship. Within this context, or pretext, however, what is claimed to be unsaid more often than not does get said, or if not at least a case is made for the legitimacy of it being said. Anti-pc refers to established links between public discourse and democratic representation, so that claims about the legitimacy of the unsaid entail the grievance, as well as the illegitimacy, of being silenced. It therefore seems that we are dealing with a strategic ‘strawman unsaid’.

It also seems that we are dealing with the more particular notions of silencing, taboo and censorship rather than silence more broadly. Silence can be a result of silencing as well as of deliberate choice – or both, in cases of, for example self-censorship for not wanting to take risks or ‘rock the boat’ by breaking a taboo or whistle-blowing. Taboos can have the effect of silencing (cf. Zerubavel 2006), as well as social marginalization “determined by the order of discourse that neither affords salience to certain points of view, nor resonance for voices from groups that are not perceived to be proper, or entitled, or participating speakers” (Schröter/Taylor 2018, 9; cf. Achino-Loeb 2006). Censorship (cf. Anthonissen 2003, 2008, Galasiński 2003)

would involve powerful actors who have resources at their disposal to limit and suppress speech by others. All of these (taboos, silencing through marginalization, censorship) are claimed by anti-pc discourse to be applied through political correctness. The salience of anti-pc discourses in Germany and probably elsewhere lies in the way in which silence and silencing is at odds with public discourse in post-war democracy, which I will discuss in the following.

2 Silence at odds with public discourse

Since the spread of mass media in the 20th century and online communication in the 21st century, silence has become increasingly at odds with public and political discourse. It has been shown for the German context that, historically, overt silence was a tool of wielding power in the 17th century (Benthien 2006) and a means to avoid political conflict in the 19th century (Owzar 2006). Proverbs about silence contain a sediment of language attitudes which suggest a positive view on silence as protection of valuable information (Spitznagel, Reiners 1998). However, increasingly since the 20th century, politicians and public figures are expected to provide a constant flow of and availability for communication. In this context, their silence will be viewed as problematic (Schröter 2013). While mass media sustain and fuel this development, democratic governance with its requirements of public deliberation, transparency and accountability is at the heart of the valuation of communication and the problematizing of silence.

Germany makes a good case for observing this development, since after the Nazi dictatorship, the occupation governments considered it of particular importance that the Germans re-learn and engage with democratic debate (Verheyen 2010). The parliamentary committee that worked out the new constitution of the post war West German Federal Republic constantly emphasized the role and value of democratic debate (Kilian 1997). It is perhaps not surprising that one of the most influential thinkers on the ethics of public deliberation, Jürgen Habermas, emerged from a West German post-war context. Around the same time, the generational revolt of 1968, which was sustained in various ways by social actors of the radical and political left, problematized the silence about the Nazi past, in particular about the Holocaust, and furthered the valuation of discussion, debate and public democratic deliberation (Verheyen 2010, Kämper 2012, Scharloth 2011) which also fed into subsequent left liberal social movements, such as the peace movement and the environmental protection movements. An increasingly critical, sceptical (von Hodenberg 2006) or at times even cynical journalism frequently puts politicians on the spot, ready to scandalise any obvious attempts at keeping silent or evading (Bull 2003, 2012, Clayman 2002, 2007). The popularisation of psychology and psychotherapy might have sustained the sceptical view on silence as a result of the valuation of talk in seeing good communication as a means to solve personal and interpersonal problems (Peters 1999, Kämper 2002) and, increasingly, as a valuable professional skill (Cameron 2000).

What is more, this political, cultural and intellectual context has led to increasing public language awareness (cf. Chouliaraki/Fairclough's 1999 notion of increasing reflexivity), so much so that "metalinguistic sensitivity is, in a certain sense, a hallmark of contemporary social life" (Jaworski, Coupland, Galasiński 2004: 6). Critical Language Awareness has, therefore, "arisen in response to the growing importance of linguistic gatekeeping, i.e. an increasing number of individuals and institutions spelling out desirable or required versions of communication in

various contexts.” (Coupland, Jaworski 2004: 39) The way people express themselves, especially in public and in the face of possibly multiplied audiences, has come under scrutiny because the way we talk is regarded as indicative of our attitudes and ideological positions. Again, Germany’s Nazi past influenced the reflection on the relationship between language and ideology there (cf. Sandkühler 2008) and provides drastic examples of silencing and censorship. Poststructuralist approaches to language and discourse and in particular Foucault’s thinking about the relationship between power, knowledge and discourse proved influential in seeing ‘the order of discourse’ as a modern manifestation of power beyond physical coercion. This theorising of discourse sheds a light on the marginalisation of groups or viewpoints going along with lack of voice and silencing.

These – very briefly sketched – factors suggest a language ideology in public discourse which entails a negative view on silence and silencing. Silence is seen as not conducive to democratic governance and mass media serve as a tool to accelerate and intensify communication in the public sphere, increasing the need for and expectations of communication. Silence is seen as an obstacle to solving problems and overcoming trauma. The link made between language use and ideology leads to an increasing language awareness which means that people can be held to account for what they say, how they say it and, occasionally, what they are silent about. Discourse is seen as constituting and enshrining power relations in societies, and silence is seen as indicative of a lack of power (as yet more so than as a means of resistance) and/or as a result of silencing.

It is important to outline these factors, if only briefly, in order to understand the anti-political correctness discourse; the most salient language ideological debate of recent decades in Germany, but also elsewhere – if in varying historical, political and cultural contexts. The present-day German anti-pc discourse evolves mainly around claims by the New Right to have been silenced and their views to have been tabooed through left-liberal discourse hegemony. I will describe anti-pc discourse as a language ideological debate and claims to have been silenced as strategic metadiscursive moves which seek to shift public discourse in order to gain legitimacy for the New Right’s ideological positions and most of all, to delegitimise the left which is framed as censoring any other views.

These strategies rely on the negative evaluation of silence and on the link between power and silencing. In their aim to undermine the political left, the New Right profit from the fact that the negative evaluation of silence, the valuation discussion in a comprehensively accessible public sphere, the link between language and ideology as well as between power and silencing have been introduced by the political and intellectual left and sustained by a broader left-liberal milieu (cf. Black 1988). This way, the New Right can undermine the left by suggesting a reversal – left-liberals proclaim openness and discourse accessibility for all, but are in fact silencing ‘the majority’ of ‘ordinary people’ who do not share ‘their ideological views’.

Before I proceed to discussing the German anti-pc discourse as a language ideological debate and to providing examples for the metadiscursive moves around silence and silencing on which this debate rests, I will briefly outline what investigating metadiscourse can bring to the study of silence.

3 Metadiscourse and language ideology

Verschueren (1985) in his study of *What People Say They Do With Words* looks at 'linguistic action verbials', i.e. expressions in the lexical and idiomatic inventory used to describe the performance of a number of linguistic actions. Interestingly, he devotes a chapter to silence and a range of expressions used to refer to it. Through surveying such expressions, he is able to show how speakers conceptualise silence and different kinds of silence, e.g. 'to button one's lip', 'to keep under wraps', 'to fall silent', 'to say nothing'. Accordingly, Verschueren distinguishes *verba silendi* which refer to not speaking, *verba reticendi* which refer to absence of talk about a particular topic, and *verba cessandi* which refer to intervals of silence following speech. Looking at metalinguistic reference to silence, Verschueren also carves out other characteristics of silence, such as code (spoken or written; 83ff.), duration and intensity (89ff.), whether silences are more or less deliberate (96ff.), and reasons for deliberate silences (101ff.). It is interesting to note that already the inventory of metalinguistic reference to silence provides some clues as to how speakers conceive of it. However, much like the gist of Jaworski, Coupland and Galasiński's volume (2004), it is not the point here to describe or establish an inventory of metalinguistic reference, but to investigate metadiscourse, i.e. recurring references to instances of silence or silencing in their discursive contexts because "[i]f language is used in ways that actively give shape to social contexts, then we are forced to consider the "meta-zone" where contextualisation happens" (Jaworski, Coupland 2004: 5).

In Schröter (2013) I look at metadiscourse about politicians' silences in three instances from German public discourse, two involving political scandals and as a third case the metadiscourse about Angela Merkel's handling of silence. These analyses show that metadiscourse about silence provides rich data for studying the language ideology of silence in political discourse. I argue that silence manifests phenomenologically through disappointed expectations of speech. Thus, whenever politicians' silences are referred to in metadiscourse, this can be seen as indicative of a disappointed expectation of speech. Moreover, often the reasons for why speech was expected and hence, the grounds on which silence gets noted, were explicated in the metadiscourse about these silences. In the case of Angela Merkel, gendered perceptions of her 'doing leadership' also come into play in that the interpretations of her perceived silences oscillate between a negative angle that associates silence with lack of leadership and clandestine removal of opponents while shunning open confrontation, as well as a positive angle from which silence is seen as a means to establish harmony and to maintain scope for action.

Since "the social meaning of communicative forms can never be taken as natural and transparent but must always be examined as cultural construction" (Woolard 1998: 36), metalinguistic comments and metadiscourses provide particular insight into the process of construction and meaning making. "The "meta" dimension of language in use points us precisely to an interaction between socially structured meanings and values for talk and their activation in local contexts under local contingencies" (Coupland/Jaworski, 26). It therefore seems worthwhile to look at discourses *about* silence in order to understand how speakers make sense of silence, what it means to discourse participants, how they refer to or purport silences and at how silence and/or its appropriateness or legitimacy is assessed. All of this gives us clues about the language ideology of silence (cf. Schröter 2013, 50ff.).

Woolard (1998) sees language ideologies as explicit or implicit representations “that construe the intersection of language and human beings in a social world” (20), specifying that ideologies of language are not about language alone. “Rather, they envision and enact ties of language to identity, to aesthetics, to morality, and to epistemology.” (ibid.). To name a few examples, Cameron’s study of *Verbal Hygiene* (1995), the contributions in Blommaert’s volume (1999), Lippi-Green’s *English with an Accent*, Johnson’s study (2005) of the discourse about the German spelling reform and Pfalzgraf’s (2006) as well as Spitzmüller’s (2005) analyses of the German discourse about Anglicisms all show that debates about language are ultimately linked to ideology and issues of cultural hegemony and, ultimately, power. Most of these look at ongoing language ideological debates “in which language is central as a topic, a motif, a target, and in which language ideologies are being articulated, formed, amended, enforced” (Blommaert 1999: 1) and which “develop against a wider socio-political and historical horizon of relationships of power, forms of discrimination, social engineering, nation-building and so forth.” (ibid.: 2). Blommaert argues in favour of a better understanding “of the precise role played by language ideologies in more general socio-political developments, conflicts and struggles” (ibid.), in this case, the language ideology of silence.

Esewhere (Blommaert 2005), he also argues that research of language-in-society should “start from the observation that language matters to people” and that “we need to find out *how* language [and silence, MS] matters to people.” (14; italics in the original) In order to investigate language ideological debates, a Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of such debates and metadiscourses seems useful for its attention to socio-political context as well as power and ideology in discourse. The present chapter aligns with the Discourse Historical Approach to CDA that emphasizes macro-topic relatedness, pluri-perspectivity and argumentativity (cf. Reisigl, Wodak 2009). I will discuss below how the German anti-pc debate is related to politically relevant issues such as national identity, multiculturalism, feminism and to different political stances taken on these matters, by way of regarding the wider context that provides salience to the claims of silencing made in anti-pc discourse. I will also refer to a number of texts surrounding the more in-depth case study as part of Germany’s anti-pc discourse which I provide in sections 4 and 5, in order to point out interdiscursivity and also different perspectives involved in the discourse. I will look at recurrent arguments put forward by Germany’s New Right in anti-pc discourse, and I will assess the implications of such argumentations for the ongoing language ideological debate.

I maintain that anti-pc discourse is a language ideological debate and that a critical stance towards silence in public and political discourse is at the heart of it, and in fact exploited in this discourse. Blommaert asserts that debates “are excellent linguistic-ethnographic targets. They are textual/discursive, they produce discourses and metadiscourses, and they result in a battery of texts that can be borrowed, quoted, echoed, vulgarised etc.” (ibid.; 10). They constitute “moments of textual formation and transformation, in which minority views can be transformed into majority views and vice versa [...] and in which socio-political alliances are shaped or altered in discourse” (ibid.); they thereby give us analytical access to studying processes of discursive change. (ibid., 11)

Metadiscourse can be indicative of discursive change, but to some extent it can also be instigated in order to achieve discursive change. In my view, this is what is happening with anti-pc discourse. Anti-pc discourse consists essentially of claims by the New Right to have been silenced by the left/left-liberals. I see these claims to silencing as strategic metadiscursive moves that are aimed at discursive change – essentially to make certain propositions more acceptable by delegitimising criticism and by instantly moving criticism of propositions into a metadiscursive realm in which the issue is not what has been said. Rather, a straw man claim of not being allowed to say it is set up, followed by a display of outrage at such censorship.

Wodak's (2015) description of the 'right wing perpetuum mobile' neatly captures the process. It starts with a provocation (e.g. a racist or sexist proposition), followed by denial (of racism/sexism) and claimed victimhood to be accused (of racism/sexism) and for the denial of freedom of speech which "shift the frame and trigger another debate – unrelated to the original scandal – about political correctness and thus serve as a distraction and allow evasion of the primary scandalous issue." (ibid., 20). Erdl (2004) similarly maintains that the discourse about political correctness needs to be seen as a manoeuvre of discursive diversion rather than a serious discussion about what is (not) permissible to say in public discourse. Anti pc-discourse has established a topos of silencing which relies on the negative associations with silence in public discourse previously established by left-liberal thinkers and left-liberal political milieus. This makes it an even better stick to beat the left with. Anti-pc discourse is a language ideological debate, at the heart of which is not language (or the absence of it) per se, but issues of society, national identity and power (cf. Woolard 1998).

4 The New Right, anti-pc and the Nazi past

In the following, I would like to draw together what was outlined so far by looking at examples from German anti-pc discourse as a language ideological debate which is, as outlined above, part of a broader social conflict which in the German case is very much about national identity and national integrity. The relevance of how to deal with the Nazi past for German national identity can hardly be overestimated and it is particularly debates about 'the politics of the past' in which anti-pc discourse featured and reoccurred by now for decades. The aspect that I called national integrity refers to the problematization of a loss of national sovereignty and the favoring of an ethnically homogenous society

All of these issues are central to the New Right in Germany. The German New Right is a diverse political movement which became tangible during the 1980s that puts emphasis on distancing itself from National Socialism while perpetuating a nationalist and ethnopluralist discourse and agenda that puts emphasis on the notion of cultural hegemony as a way of acquiring power. A more moderate part of this spectrum might link into conservative politics, a more radical part with the militant extreme right. There is also an intellectual underpinning of this movement, mirrored in several publications such as *Junge Welt* (from 1986), *eigentümlich frei* (since 1998) and *Sezession* (since 2003). The appropriation of Gramsci's notion of cultural hegemony by Alain de Benoist was influential in Germany and forms the basis for an increasing challenge or appropriation by the New Right of anything that is associated with left liberal politics which they perpetuate has been hegemonic in Germany since 1968, such as feminism, ecological politics,

multiculturalism and ethnic diversity as well as a politics of the past that acknowledges German guilt and responsibility in particular for the Holocaust. The New Right also became tangible in a number of debates, especially relating to dealing with the Nazi past (Historian's Row 1986, Jenninger speech 1988, Botho Strauß' publication *Anschwellender Bocksgesang* 1992, Soldaten sind Mörder quote 1994/95, Goldhagen' s publication *Hitler's Willing Executioners* 1996, Crimes of the Wehrmacht exhibition 1996/97, Walser-Bubis debate 1998, Holocaust Monument in Berlin 1999 and more), but also to immigration, feminism and ethnic diversity (Steffen Heitmann as Federal President candidate 1993, Sarrazin's book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* 2010).

According to Staas(2017), the term political correctness featured in German newspapers for the first time in 1991, subsequently referred to interchangeably in English, or with the English acronym pc, or in German (politische Korrektheit; adjective: politisch korrekt). Initially, the references were limited to reporting about debates on US university campuses. However, in 1993 Dieter E. Zimmer published an essay in *Die Zeit*, again referring to US universities, but claiming that a similar cultural-political climate existed in Germany, even if it was not referred to in terms of political correctness – Zimmer argues that the concept was familiar, even if it lacked a label. However, from there it did not take long for the term to gain ground.

The way in which the notion of pc was taken up in the framework of an emerging anti-pc discourse is illustrated through a flurry of book publications in the years 1995 and 1996 relating to German political correctness, mostly with a negative view of pc either as ridiculous and futile language policing (Röhl 1995) or as dangerous anti-democratic censorship (Behrens/von Rimscha 1995, Groths 1996). Political correctness was predominantly regarded in a negative light, but initially, as Erdl (2004) meticulously demonstrates, the term was used in a broad variety of contexts and relating to various topics, if most frequently to political issues around minority and identity politics. However, increasingly, anti-pc discourse became a domain of and central to the discourse of the New Right and the main vehicle to challenge the purportedly hegemonic left. Opposed politics of multiculturalism, EU integration, feminism, environmentalism and not least regarding the Nazi past are dismissed as politically correct, and anti-pc discourse became the main vehicle in which these issues could be linked with one another as well as to the left.

What is interesting to note for the German context is that Behrens and von Rimscha in their anti-pc publication (1995) already refer to 'Vergangenheitspolitik' (the politics of the past) and thereby slot pc into the German debate about the Nazi past that had flared up with the first notable New Right's attempt at revisionism in the Historians' Debate only eight years earlier.¹

In fact, this discursive constellation was arguably already outlined before the notion of 'political correctness' even arrived in Germany and can be traced back to the Historians' Debate of 1986 (cf. Kapitzky 2000, Kailitz 2008, Mittmann 2008). Since the arrival of the notion of political correctness in the early 1990s, anti-pc discourse reliably resurfaces in every debate that ensues

¹ One publication from these early years that does not condemn pc (Diederichsen 1996) sees the emerging anti-pc discourse as an attempt by the New Right to shift public discourse, with regard to identity politics, but also to the Nazi past.

about controversial statements about the Nazi past and in particular about the historical singularity and memorialisation of the Holocaust. Put very briefly, at the heart of these controversies are attempts by the New Right to hegemonise a historical narrative that puts the Holocaust in a context of, or to even frame it as a reaction to, other historical atrocities and to thereby relativise it, so as to relieve Germany from a specific legacy of guilt. German culture and politics of memorising the Holocaust are seen as a constant painful reminder, a constant demand of shame, an obstacle to a 'healthy' collective self-confidence and self-understanding as a 'normal' country among others. It is also seen as a tabooing of German victimhood, to the extent that the existence of a radical(ised) right is blamed on the purported negation of a positive German national identity and the silencing of German suffering.

German linguists observed the emerging discourse about political correctness; Frank (1996) notes the negativity of the discourse about pc, but sees pc mainly referring to issues of identity politics, much like Hoffmann (1996) who remains ambivalent in situating pc as either an attempt to protect minorities from discrimination or as policing/censorship. Only later, Kapitzky (2000) and Johnson/Suhr (2003) point out the way in which the anti-pc discourse links with the discourse about the Nazi past.

In the meantime, the first big public debate about dealing with the Nazi past into which the anti-pc discourse was fully inscribed occurred in 1998, triggered by a speech by renowned author Martin Walser who argued against what he viewed as ritualization and lip-servicing of public commemoration and claimed that what he sees as the constant reminder of the Holocaust was exploited for present purposes and that Auschwitz was used as a means to intimidate and as a moral bludgeon (see Niven 2002 regarding the implications of Walser's speech for German 'politics of the past'). He also called the Holocaust Monument in Berlin a "monumentalization of our disgrace" (Walser 1998). It is worthwhile looking at this debate because it marks the explicit integration of political correctness into debates about the past. Mittmann (2008) also sees it as the point at which it becomes obvious that the New Right pursued a strategy of taboo breaking in order to shift the boundaries of sayability and to ensure acceptance via a campaign to safeguard the endangered freedom of opinion (82, 86). The debate was considered so salient that just like previous ones and later ones², it was documented in book form shortly after it occurred (Schirmmacher 1999). The following quotes (all translated from the original German by me, MS) are taken from Schirmmacher's documentation, which contains letters by members of the public³ to both Martin Walser and Ignatz Bubis (the then chairman of the Council of German Jews, who publicly condemned Walser's speech) as well as newspaper articles.

First of all, it is worthwhile noticing that Walser himself indicates a gesture of taboo-breaking in his speech by stating "[...] now I tremble with my own audacity when I say: Auschwitz is not suited to become a routine threat, a means of intimidation or moral bludgeon" (Walser 1998).

² Notably the Historians' Row (Augstein 1987); the debate following a speech by the then speaker of the German parliament, Philipp Jenninger, commemorating the 1938 pogroms against Jews in 1988 (Laschet/Malangré 1989); the debate about the exhibition "Crimes of the Wehrmacht" (Thiele 1997); the debate about Thilo Sarrazin's book *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Deutschlandstiftung Integration 2010).

³ I will in the following refer to the pages in the documentation in which these were published, rather than quoting the (partly untitled) material in this collection as individual texts.

Consequently, reactions to the speech praise Walser's courage and emphasise the risks that he took; his "straightforwardness, openness and courage is incredibly moving" as he "pursues his point with honesty and even under risk." (29f.); he "dared the utmost" by speaking the truth" (76) and he was admired for resisting "this control" (195), for protesting "against the enforcement of political correctness" (33) and for taking "a walk along the thin line which separates what you can and cannot say in this country when it comes to ritualization and instrumentalisation of the Holocaust [...] Knowing too well which dangers he would face." (55f.)

These quotes illustrate that by 1998, anti-pc topoi were established which purport that public discourse is a space controlled by left liberals who will lash out at anyone 'speaking truths', which will "trigger the rituals of indignation of leftist do-gooders (...), the mechanisms of ostracisation in the dictatorship of opinions through 'political correctness'." (86)

Furthermore, some contributions accuse 'the left' of having dropped out of dialogue mode, "there is no listening anymore, but there is only ready-to-shoot-attention to see if the obligatory code words are placed" (59) ; the left purportedly demand "the correct Nazi crimes memorisation formulae" (81) and "specific circles" "deliberately use the term Auschwitz as a knockout argument" (190).

Last but not least, critical as well as endorsing reactions reflect that Walser's speech is seen as a discursive intervention, aimed at, or with the possible consequence of change. Critical reactions to the speech accuse Walser himself of "moving it [Auschwitz, MS] into the realm of the utterly unspeakable" (82), thereby attempting to silence the past; "the prize winning author demanded no less than the end of the public debate about the Holocaust" (49), and of operating within the same parameters that he criticises since "at the same time he caters for the media mechanisms of provocation, taboo breaking and outrage. [...]" (82) More neutral reactions endorse the debate as worthwhile, as any debate will be a healthy sign of democracy (182, 199) while other contributions explicitly endorse a discursive shift that they see going along with it:

"Therefore it is absolutely necessary that persons of integrity turn against paying the demanded 'lip service'. [...] This is the only way to avoid an exploitation of this climate [...] by those from the far right corner who will never learn" (161)

"A lot of people in Germany have probably been waiting, and we have to thank him for pulling this topic away from the extreme right. In a way, he has made it socially acceptable and therefore accessible for democratic spheres who have been waiting for it." (183)

The quotes above celebrate the prospect of far right issues becoming 'less far right' by being pulled into the centre by persons of good social standing (such as Walser and not e.g. militant Neo-Nazis). This notion of 'not leaving certain issues' to the far right, the claimed need to disassociate them from the far right and moving them to a centre which the speaker claims to inhabit also reoccur in later debates. It is as though the centre is imagined as a boat on the sea from which a rope is thrown to pull something heavy towards it, but only the object is conceived to be moving, not the boat – when it is more likely that the boat would move, too. However,

pulling the boat, i.e. moving the centre to the right by tying it to far right propositions might just be the aim of the New Right.

Mittmann (2008) outlines how this debate relates to earlier and later debates about controversial statements by politicians and public figures and also notes how at this point the anti-pc discourse starts to operate with reversal; i.e. associating the 'politically correct left' (which would traditionally be most critical of the Nazi dictatorship) and its purported censorship with the Nazi dictatorship and positioning those who perpetuate anti-pc discourse as victims of this censorship who therefore also cannot themselves be associated with Nazism.

It is useful to provide the brief insight above into the first debate relating to the Nazi past into which an anti-pc discourse, which was by then established and appropriated by the New Right, was fully inscribed. Several of the threads outlined above reoccur in later debates, as I will show below. The case below shows recurring topoi, such as the courage needed to speak out and risk of telling truths in the face of attempts of silencing, pc as dictatorship and pc victims as victims of dictatorship and discursive shifts aimed for, as outlined in section 3. However, the case that I am going to discuss below also illustrates an intensification or radicalisation of the anti-pc discourse which has taken place since the Walser-Bubis debate in that anti-pc discourse becomes salient enough for the New Right for entire book publications based on retaliating anti-pc discourse by self-declared pc-victims. The case of Eva Herman was chosen because, as I will show, it is pertinent for and illustrative of the German anti-pc discourse and associated claims to have been silenced, but has received little attention so far as a part of it and as an early instance of the intensification just mentioned.

5 New Right anti-pc discourse – the case of Eva Herman

In 2007, the prominent German TV news journalist and talk show host Eva Herman, who had by that point published a couple of anti-feminist books that demanded a 'return' of German women to relishing motherhood and family values, was publicly noted to have stated that through the condemnation of the Nazi past by the 1968 generational revolt, also things that were positive, such as family values, were discredited and abolished. She made this remark in a rather complex sentence structure produced in oral speech in reply to a question at a press conference in September 2007 and it was widely understood that she endorsed the family politics of the Nazis, which she did in fact briefly deal with and condemn in one of her books (Herman 2006). At the press conference and in her book that was introduced at that conference (Herman 2007), she also explicitly distanced herself from any radical ideologies, left or right. However, her remark was scandalised and widely covered in the media as an endorsement of Nazi family politics and as a consequence, she lost her job as a talk show presenter for the North German Public Broadcasting Service. In her account of the affair (Herman 2010), she maintains that in her remark, she lamented the loss of family values that existed before, during and after National Socialism which if anything were perverted during the Third Reich. This perversion of values and traditions in her view led to the dismissal of family values through the social changes around and following 1968. The latter is her main focus of criticism; in particular the second wave of German feminism in the 1970s and its purported focus on women's self-realisation at the expense of the needs of children. In October 2007, Eva Herman was invited to a popular talk show with a view on

discussing her remarks about the Nazi past. The show provided air space for her to either admit that she made a mistake or did not express herself clearly, or, failing that, for her to be associated with endorsing Nazi family politics. The former was stubbornly denied by her and she did not successfully manage to untie herself from the latter during the show, but rather added a couple of problematic statements such as that it was dangerous in Germany to say anything about the past at all. This led to the dismissal of her as a guest by the host before the scheduled end of the show, which again triggered media reporting about this TV-scandal. In this context, Jörg Thomann writes in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that “[n]ow at the latest, Eva Herman has become a martyr of all those who are convinced that there is no right to free speech in this country.”

The attempts to associate Eva Herman with an endorsement of the Third Reich were vehemently rejected by herself, and to some extent missed the point.⁴ Rather than trying to associate her with ‘Old Nazism’, it might have been more interesting to explore the ways in which she writes herself into the discourse of the New Right: With her creation of a catastrophic demographic scenario in which the Germans are dying out because women have been brainwashed to focus on their careers; with her condemnation of the 1968 generational revolt and in particular the feminist movement of the 1970s; and not least with pursuing an anti-pc discourse in order to legitimise her own stance and to delegitimise criticism of her antifeminist and anti-1968 discourse. A prominent female public figure with a highly successful media career, educated and middle class, she provided a wealth of authoritative reference for the antifeminist discourse of the New Right. Following the scandalisation of her remarks and positioning herself as pc-victim, she subsequently wrote two retaliating media-critical books that were published with the *Kopp* publishing house which hosts many other publications by the New Right.⁵ This move, to publish a retaliating anti-pc book in reply to scandalisation and criticism, was repeated after her by Thilo Sarrazin.⁶ The occurrence of retaliating anti-pc publications indicates in my view not only the degree to which anti-pc topoi have become a widespread and widely accessible argumentative resource in public discourse, but also a radicalisation and intensification of the fight against the purported left liberal cultural hegemony.

⁴ So does in my view Pfungsttag’s (2010) rhetorical analysis that addresses the question whether or not Eva Herman was rightly associated with National Socialism. He dismisses the Nazi accusations as unfair and unjustified, but focusses mainly on her writings on motherhood and shows that she follows a biologist conceptualisation which, as he argues, cannot be automatically or exclusively associated with Nazi ideology.

⁵ Herman 2010 and 2012.

⁶ Thilo Sarrazin, like Eva Herman educated and middle class and having held a number of significant public offices, published a book in 2010, *Deutschland schafft sich ab* (Germany abolishes itself) in which he claims the failure of Muslim immigrants to integrate into German society. He also paints a catastrophic demographic scenario in which the unwillingness of educated German women to reproduce is contrasted with a high birth rate among uneducated (and, as implicitly claimed, uneducatable) Muslim immigrants, leading to a ‘conquest by fertility’. The book was a bestseller, but apparently being offended by the widespread criticism with which it also met, he published a book about ‘the new terror of virtue’ in 2014 in which he frames himself as pc-victim and criticism of his book as attempts to silence him. This book was published by the same mainstream publisher which published his first book, i.e. the anti-pc discourse of being silenced was seen as widely acceptable enough so that he did not (have to) revert to a more niche New Right publishing house. However, economic interests are also likely to be at play since *Deutschland schafft sich ab* was a bestseller.

Unlike Sarrazin's anti-pc book published four years later, in Eva Herman's first retaliating book *Die Wahrheit und ihr Preis. Meinung, Macht und Medien* (The price of truth. Opinion, power and the media), anti-pc discourse is not foregrounded. The book reads as a partly personal, partly factual account of the origin and scandalisation of her remarks, up to a detailed, nearly line-by-line account of the talk show from which she was dismissed. She describes the effect that the affair had on her and provides quotes from correspondence, newspaper articles and from statements by her lawyers. However, anti-pc discourse threads through the entire book, which I am going to show in the following. Before I proceed, it is worthwhile mentioning that her own publication was preceded by an anti-pc book dealing with the newspaper reporting about her which is dubbed a 'media witch hunt' in the title of the book, published by Arne Hoffmann (2007) in the New Right *Lichtschlag* publishing house, from which Eva Herman herself also gratefully quotes (42, 161). The following quotes from her own book (2010) were translated from the original German by me, MS.

In her retaliating book, Eva Herman maintains that media and politics in Germany work hand in hand to silence certain issues and voices who are trying to bring these issues to light. With regard to politics, she purports the political will for women to be in gainful employment and to create nursery provision for children at a large scale; "that without criticism and without discussion, the federal republic has entered a path of mass provision of nurseries that could hardly be questioned anymore" (56). She also detects the political will to implement Gender Mainstreaming, which she calls "the largest and most dangerous re-education programme of mankind" (46). She sees these politics as a result of the power and influence of the 1970s' feminists. "Germany's chief feminist⁷ reconstructed the country for decades as the principal team leader and has turned it into the globalized gender mainstream with some cunning finger tricks [...]" (104). She expresses admiration for a professor who she quotes, without distance markers, referring to feminists as "stalinist lesbocrats" (87). Thus, she refers to the "public manipulation through politics and media in the past forty years" (242) (i.e. since the 1970s) and a "devious politics" which steers people's lives "more and more into realms which are highly dangerous for freedom" (114).

"And many times I asked myself in despair which invisible, dark and paralysing force must lie over our country so that no one dared anymore to discuss entirely natural matters such as being a mother and having children." (51)

She sees the media as working along these political premises which were brought about by feminism. The media partake in silencing any voices that stray away from this line, and she positions herself as such a critical voice.

"But once you understand that my arguments not only go against the views of certain feminists, but that also the political mainstream cannot relate to a differentiated view on motherhood [...], then you can also assume a political interest in not supporting any voices who state the opposite." (72)

The media only focus on women's emancipation and self-realisation (102, 207), they silence the question of children's needs (207) and thus "there are a lot of issues that we urgently need to talk

⁷ Eva Herman refers to Alice Schwarzer.

about since the mainstream media hardly provide any information about them” (227). The media therefore neglect their democratic function of providing multi-faceted, non-partisan information. The media have a “huge responsibility”, but journalists do not live up to it by “selling their own sad lifestyles as the only truth, as mainstream opinion, as politically correct formula.” (107)

Eva Herman also positions herself as a victim of silencing. Firstly, she was meant to remain politically neutral while she was still newsreader in a prestigious public broadcasting news show and she saw this as a limitation to pursuing her topic, so she gave up the job. “Do I really have to sing the common politically correct song [...]? Shall I remain silent [...] so as to keep my job?” (21) Later in the book, she refers to these limitations as “Auftrittsverbot” (157), a term also, though not exclusively, associated with the prohibition of performances by Jewish artists in the Third Reich. Secondly, she portrays herself as ostracised by a misinformed and misquoting press following her original scandalous remark: “And if you say the word mother these days, you must be a Nazi! [...] The most important aim of this kind of reporting seems to be that the story appears interesting from the outside and that outlet and author will shine in a politically correct light. Marketable conclusion: Eva Herman is a Nazi! We are not!” (105). Thirdly, as a consequence, she lost her job as a talk show host: “And this state has decided to pursue mass provision of nurseries [...] against which I clearly and publicly position myself. Have I become a kind of regime critic? Is this the reason why the North German Broadcasting Service wanted to take me off the programme? That would be claiming too much honour, would it not?” (155) Last but not least, the talk show that she was invited to as a guest was set up as a public tribunal to finish her off. “I cannot get rid of the feeling that a well prepared cooperation is happening here, or how is this ‘court situation’ to be explained? Am I accused of a crime? It seems so!” (191). She uses metaphors of inquisition (witch hunt, 39), incrimination and in particular hunting. She sees herself subjected to a hunt by a pack (73, 82, 86, 91, 94, 99, and more). She also positions herself as a martyr who has become the bearer of a divine ordeal (82, 86, 114, 154) and she sees others as profiteers of or exploiting her downfall (121, 159f.).

However, she also positions herself as speaking on behalf of a substantial number of ordinary people by constructing an opposition between public and published opinion: The latter tugs along political preferences and premises, seemingly disassociated from the former. The former expresses itself in letters and emails that Eva Herman receives. However, ordinary people have no voice in the public sphere and are too intimidated to speak their minds. Eva Herman, as a public figure, provides them with such a voice and takes the blame for it, acting on their behalf: “[...] the many letters and emails which I receive daily, in which women, mothers as well as grandmothers, but also men thank me for my courage to talk aloud about all this [...]” (28); “I encountered thousands of people, personally or in writing, who were glad that someone with a prominent name publicly addressed this problem, when they hardly dared to open their mouths anymore.” (53) She also suggests that people in the media sphere are detached from ordinary people and look down on them with arrogance: “The people sitting out there in front of the screen are not as you seem to want them to be, which is numb, stupid and insensitive.” (218) Moreover, the media people are in the minority and the ordinary people are in the majority. Therefore, the German public sphere is undemocratically constituted in that a self-catering, navel-gazing minority dismisses the pressing concerns of the majority:

“However, I know loads of these women. They write to me, they come to my public talks. And it is not a rare occurrence that they would cry with relief that someone understands, or even takes up the fight for them. Oh, why would I want to continue discussion with these vain media people here who only sit on their sparkly cloud and not even try to understand others, who are, by the way and in contrast to them, in the overwhelming majority!” (205)

Towards the end of the book, Eva Herman puts her hope in the delimitation of the public sphere through online communication (259f.). She pursues this point further in a subsequent book publication with the same publisher, *Das Medienkartell. Wie wir täglich getäuscht werden* (The Media Cartel. How we are deceived every day). The purported opposition between public and published opinion, elite self-interest and silenced majority and the prospect of ‘democratisation of the public sphere’ through online communication are threads in the discourse of the New Right. For example, the New Right publisher André Lichtschlag makes the same points in an interview with the New Right weekly magazine *Junge Freiheit* (Schwarz 2009) and Frauke Petry, then chairwomen of the New Right political party *Alternative für Deutschland*, writes a celebratory comment for the same newspaper (2016) in which she frames the election of Donald Trump as a victory for the silent majority.

During the talk show from which she was dismissed towards the end, Eva Herman also demands to safeguard the issue of motherhood and family values from occupation by the radical right. She quotes herself in her book saying: “It bears one great danger: If it is not possible anymore in our democracy to talk about these things [...] Then we really play into the hands of the right, because nobody cares about these things anymore [...] Then they will claim this territory for themselves, because nobody else cares.” (210f.) Thus, silencing her and the points that she makes means leaving an empty space that can be occupied by the right. It is not straightforward to see why it would be dangerous to leave this issue to the right – it can only mean that Eva Herman is convinced that she is in the centre and not allowing her to occupy the territory and thereby incorporating it to the centre would leave it to the right, make the right more popular and lead to the rise of the right. It either does not occur to her or she is trying to blur that she already pursues a discourse of the right – the New Right, not Old Nazi – and actively helps to construct and to popularise it. This becomes even clearer with the following last point in my analysis of Eva Herman’s anti-pc discourse.

Finally, Eva Herman engages in an attempt to reverse the association with the Third Reich by claiming that she herself criticised Nazi family politics for advocating a separation of the children from their mothers, and that current feminists advocated the same (45, 109). She quotes another professor who criticises the way in which she was dealt with as a “Säuberungsaktion” – ‘cleansing operation’; a Nazi euphemism pertaining to the forced removal of Jews and other people in German occupied territories – and who furthers the reversal by claiming that especially the Jewish associations in Germany would be the last to want to tolerate such a development (133). Eva Herman puts herself in a line with previous other ‘pc-victims’ “all of whom, like me, were because of some quotes, speeches or reports that were purportedly not ‘politically correct’ at times in a murderous way like poor animals hunted up and down the country [...]” (259). This, then, leads her onto a remarkable reversal of historical legacy and responsibility:

“The way in which dissidents were being dealt with should be a warning to us and sharpen our perception. Because we Germans just are a society with an extremely loaded, difficult past, in which life and death were decided upon with murderous actions, cynicism and deeply hurtful arrogance. [...] We do not only carry this heavy guilt, we are also responsible for looking very closely at facts in the future, before we collectively judge and eliminate so-called dissidents” (259).

This is a particularly problematic statement not only because some of the ‘pc-victims’ named by Eva Herman quite clearly pursued a revisionist agenda, and not only because she claims that political correctness is currently undermining the lessons to be learned from the past, but also because she claims that ‘pc’ and its purported advocates are repeating the crimes of the past, and thus she appears on a par with victims of the Nazi regime. This Third Reich perpetrator-victim reversal is again a typical feature of revisionist and New Right discourse (cf. Wodak 2015: 16).

Conclusion

In this chapter, it was my aim to describe anti-pc discourse as a language ideological debate through which the New Right seeks to gain acceptance for controversial propositions, and to show that silence and silencing is at the heart of this debate. The strategic metadiscursive moves of claiming to be silenced is a central means by the New Right to attempt such discursive shifts and to battle the purported left-liberal discourse hegemony. Claims to be silenced are particularly useful in this context for a number of reasons. Firstly, left-liberal thinking about public discourse and with it the problematisation of silence is turned against the left: They are purportedly the ones that do not pertain to the ethics of public deliberation, they close off and control the public sphere, they actively silence others. They are the (political and media) elite who impede ordinary people’s right to freedom of speech and they have the power via discursive hegemony to do so, while the New Right are the underdogs who speak uncomfortable, but necessary truths. The left is therefore framed to be acting against their own premises. Thus, secondly, claims to be silenced therefore delegitimise the left as undemocratic censors and legitimise the New Right as courageous taboo breakers who at times do so at considerable cost, but out of strong conviction. They thereby turn into the regime critics which the left has taught us to admire – although purportedly, they have ‘the silent majority’ behind them. Thirdly, anti-pc discourse is a metadiscourse that diverts any debate away from content into the meta-zone of who is (not) allowed to say what. Any criticism of problematic propositions is slotted into this metadiscourse and delegitimised as undemocratic censorship, making it more difficult to debate the proposition as such.

What this aims to show, in the framework of the present volume, is on the one hand that a contextualized analysis of metadiscourse, as suggested by Blommaert (1999) is useful for studying language ideological debates as described by Woolard (1998), and that such an approach can, and perhaps should be extended to include not only debates about phenomenologically manifest uses or misuses of language, but also discourses about silence and silencing. On the other hand, for those already interested in silence, this goes to show that studying metadiscourse can be a fruitful way into empirical analysis. Firstly, it circumnavigates the methodological difficulty, especially when dealing with public or political discourse, to

identify silence because it allows studying references to perceived silences which can more easily form the basis of empirical textual analyses (see, however, Schröter/Taylor 2018 for further and different methodological suggestions). However, metadiscourse is not just a stopgap, but it allows secondly to study the norms and expectations or, here, the ideological conflict, surrounding silence (or silencing) (Schröter 2013) and therefore allows a more in-depth understanding of meanings assigned to silence, or the basis on which (in-)accessibility of discourses are claimed. Thirdly, studying metadiscourse might provide access to effects that, for example, ostentatious silences have, which tend to draw attention to them (cf., e.g. Thurlow/Moshin 2018, Garbutt 2018), or as in the cases above, the salience of claims to being silenced, which are based on democratic ideals about participation in public discourse and aim to trigger ethical concern or moral outrage.

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