

The University Of Reading



**University of
Reading**

**The Development of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over
Japan: A Study of Invisible Deterrence between 1945 and 1970**

Hiroshi Nakatani

PhD, Politics

Department of Politics and International Relations

February 2019

Declaration of Original Authorship

Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all materials from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged

Hiroshi Nakatani

This thesis is dedicated to the late Colonel Matuo Keiichi for his service to Japan.

Acknowledgments

Throughout my PhD life, many people and institutions have thoughtfully supported and encouraged my work. It is probably most appropriate to begin by acknowledging the School of Politics, International Relations and Economics, University of Reading for its financial assistance for three years. I am also extremely indebted to the Lyndon Johnson Library, the British Association for Japanese Studies and Reading Travel Research Grants for providing me with research grants, which enabled me to travel and research abroad. Without their generous financial support, this research project would not have been possible.

I would also like to express my appreciation to my supervisors. I have been fortunate to have three supervisors. It was my greatest honour to work under Professor Beatrice Heuser, for whom I came to Reading. She has taught me many invaluable things which otherwise I could have never learned. She has taught me how to conduct great research and treat your students in particular. As a matter of fact, finding a greater supervisor than her can be more difficult to finish a PhD. I would also like to thank Professor Alan Cromartie for his supervision and patience. His critical comments have shaped my work, making it readable. Professor Tom Long has been a very dedicated supervisor. His advice is always encouraging, concise and precise.

I am immensely indebted to Professor Stefan Wolff and Dr Masashi Okuyama for advising me to come back to the UK for my doctoral work. I will prove that their foresight is right. I am also grateful to Professor Fintan Hoey, who encouraged me to apply for the Nuclear Boot Camp in Seoul through which I gained a lot of practical feedback for this thesis. Meeting another like-minded fellow in Washing D.C. was my precious memory. My great British friend, Jack Harding, also deserves a mention. I truly appreciate his comradeship. I probably owe him an apology for making him endure my really weird jokes. I look forward to telling him “But you are not a great doctor!” My gratitude naturally goes to Mr. and Mrs.

Richardson for providing me with a comfortable room. They are always compassionate and caring. I would also like to thank people who gave me not only a great time but also some new perspectives over wine and beer at pubs and bars.

This is last but not least, I owe a huge debt of gratitude to my parents. I just could not thank them enough. I will follow what they have always told me. We are the guardians of Japan. Now it is my turn to serve our country.

Table of Contents

Abbreviation	6
List of Chart, Map and Table	7
Abstract	8
Chapter One: Introduction	9
Chapter Two: Background Factors: From a Former Evil Enemy to a Virtual Ally	54
Chapter Three: The Nuclearisation of US allies and Japan's Perceptions of a Nuclear Base	110
Chapter Four: The First Chinese Nuclear Test and the US Nuclear Umbrella over Japan	161
Chapter Five: The Reversion of the Bonins and Ryukyus: The Completion of Invisible Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Its Theoretical Mechanism	201
Chapter Six: The Japanese Secret Nuclear Studies in the 1960s: Elite Perceptions	263
Chapter Seven: Conclusion: Long Peace or War Avoidance	309
Bibliography	342

Abbreviation

CIA	Central Intelligent Service
CINCPAC	Commander in Chief Pacific
END	Extended Nuclear Deterrence
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
GSDF	Ground Self-Defence Force
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile
IISS	International Institute of Strategic Studies
IR	International Relations (as a discipline)
IRBM	Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile
JCS	Joint Chief of Staff
JDA	Japan Defence Agency
JSDF	Japan Self Defence Force
MLF	Multilateral Force
MOD	Ministry of Defence
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MRBM	Medium Range Ballistic Missile
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation
SLBM	Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America (as a country)
US	United States (as an adjective of USA)
UK	United Kingdom

List of Figure, Maps and Tables

I.A. Map: Countries under the US Nuclear Umbrella State

I.B. Map: Current Membership of the NPT

I.C. Map: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 2018)

II. List of Key Events

III.A. Table: Proliferation Drivers and Barriers

III. B. Table: Japanese views of Effectiveness of Various Means for Japan's Security

III. C. Japanese views of an Independent Japanese Nuclear Deterrent, 1966-1973

III. D. Table: US/ Soviet Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1949-1952.

III. E. Table: The Numbers of Troops of US Forces in Japan and SDF

III. F. Table: Key Components of Invisible END

III.G Table: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 2018)

IV.Figure: Military Expenditure as Share of GDP

Abstract

This thesis seeks to offer a novel theoretical and empirical insight into the unique form of the United States (US) extended nuclear deterrence (END) — also known as a nuclear umbrella — provided to Japan. In contrast to the main trend of nuclear weapons deployment in America’s close allies during the Cold War, Japan was only the key allied state that never hosted US nuclear weapons on its soil throughout the Cold War. Japan, instead, relied on US END backed by strategic forces mainly at sea. US END over Japan was thus “invisible” in that US nuclear weapons were not forward-deployed.

This situation has not changed since it was developed in the 1960s. The thesis is an essentially historical project but its main aim is to understand US END over Japan today. Its approach is to use history as a tool to understand the present. The thesis unravels the complex developments of such deterrence between 1945 and 1970. More specifically it seeks to understand under what circumstances Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella and what factors have shaped “Invisible” END.

The primary argument of this thesis is that public anti-military and nuclear sentiment in Japan shaped by its historical experience in the devastating World War Two significantly influenced the strategic calculations of Japanese leaders as well as American leaders. Key events in the foregoing period set social and political conditions on strategy making of Japan even today. The thesis will specifically examine the formation process of Japan’s non-nuclear path chosen. In order to understand the non-nuclear path taken, the thesis will also examine the meaning of the Japan’s alternative nuclear path. In fact there were some Japanese leaders such as Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who clearly saw strategic value in nuclear deterrence. “Invisible” END was arguably a product of political compromise for Japan.

Chapter One

Introduction

You have to believe in two impossible things before breakfast: someone will use nuclear weapons; someone will use nuclear weapons on your behalf.

—Edward Luttwak¹

This thesis will explore the peculiarity of United States (US) extended nuclear deterrence (END) over Japan with a particular focus on a period between 1945 and 1970. It seeks to provide a novel theoretical and practical insight into what the author terms “Invisible” US END over Japan constituted by strategic forces mainly at sea (submarine launched ballistic missile: SLBM) and to a lesser extent strategic bombers stationed in the US territory.² It is invisible in the sense that US nuclear weapons were never deployed in the mainland of Japan at any period despite the fact that the US military certainly had plans to place nuclear weapons in Japan. Interestingly such plans were never implemented.

While the approach of the thesis is essentially history-oriented, it employs history as a tool to understand the present. Where we stand today has grown out of the past and thus, “knowledge of the past is prerequisite to an understanding of the present.”³ Historically grounded analysis is essential for contextual understanding. Ignoring history essentially fails to appreciate the current social and political contexts within which present-day discourses and practices operate as they are formed and institutionalized over time.

Drawing on historical insights, this analysis is the first attempt of its kind to theorise “Invisible” END; hence it will examine not only how this concept came to

¹ Author’s exchange with Edward Luttwak before his interview by Bungei Shinjuat the Bungei Shunju Building in Tokyo, 12 October 2018.


² See for example Morton H. Halperin: *Contemporary Military Strategy* (Boston: Little Brown and company., 1967), pp. 122-123.

³ Michael Howard: *The Lessons of History* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1991, ppb. 1993), p.9.

emerge in the first place and developed but also how it functions in theory. The effect of the invisibility of extended nuclear deterrence has been overlooked, and it has not been adequately theorised. This thesis specifically looks at the formation process of Japan's non-nuclear path and the peculiar form of US END. Drawing on multinational archival research in Japan, the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) done by the author, it sets out to empirically account for how Japan came under the US nuclear protection and what factors have shaped "Invisible" END. More specifically this thesis addresses the two research questions: *Under what circumstances did Japan come under the US nuclear umbrella?; What factors have shaped invisible extended nuclear deterrence?*

The thesis will scrutinise not only these primary sources but also public opinions elaborated and represented in works by critics, political debates and domestic events. It sheds light on the divergent views on nuclear deterrence between political elites and the Japanese public. It will identify Japan's strategic preferences and strategic views on nuclear weapons and END through close analysis of the significance and impact of Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment shaped by its unique historical encounter with nuclear weapons on the actual strategy making and political calculation of decision makers. In parallel with this, it will also distinguish the patterns of Japan's strategic behaviours with respect to nuclear threats from regional nuclear powers (Russia and China). The most simple but probably most difficult way to tackle the regional nuclear threats was to acquire Japan's own nuclear weapons but Japan instead took the non-nuclear path. To understand why a certain choice was taken and preferred (Invisible END) but some other options (Visible END or Japan's nuclear option) were not taken helps us understand the strategic preferences and choices of Japan, or more specifically how Japan will likely address current nuclear threats in East Asia especially given that Japan still maintains "Invisible" END. In order to comprehend "Invisible END", it is appropriate to start with a close examination of the central concept of the thesis: Extended Nuclear Deterrence.

I.A. Map: Countries under the US Nuclear Umbrella



Source: Nuclear Umbrella States, *ILPI*, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?page_id=1882, accessed 30 January 2019.

The Subject: Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Extended deterrence is literally an extension of deterrence. What exactly is deterrence? Deterrence is essentially about preserving the status quo.⁴ The fundamental goal of deterrence is to induce an adversary not to take specific undesirable actions (e.g. an armed aggression or a use of nuclear weapons) against a

⁴ Andre Beaufre: *Deterrence and Strategy*, trans. R. H. Barry (London: Faber and Faber., 1965), p. 24; Barry Buzan: *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations* (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan., 1987), p. 136, 139.

deterrent through the use of threats.⁵ More specifically, the prominent deterrence specialist, Patrick Morgan, observed that “Deterrence is a matter between states involving the threat of force to prevent military action.”⁶ In short, deterrence aims to dissuade an adversary from crossing a line (attacking the deterrent) through the threat of force. It is essentially an art of manipulation of the adversary’s psychological perception of the threat. An aggressor may be deterred for various reasons: overwhelming costs with little gains, unbearable pains, fear of escalation (a full-scale nuclear exchange), risk-aversion, ambiguity, confusion, the low likelihood of the achievement of aimed political goals, strong resistance, and the list goes on.⁷ The bottom line is, nevertheless, a deterrent must psychologically influence the thought processes of the enemy, forcing him to reach a conclusion that an armed attack will not be a right choice. Morgan lucidly clarified the psychological dimension of deterrence:

Deterrence is undoubtedly a psychological phenomenon, for it involves convincing an opponent not to attack by threatening it with harm in retaliation. To ‘convince’ is to penetrate and manipulate the thought processes of the opposing leaders so that they draw the “proper” conclusion about the utility of attacking. This gives the effectiveness of deterrence a psychological dimension that is only partially related to the deterrent’s retaliatory capabilities, for it is the persuasiveness of the message about those capabilities rather than the capabilities themselves that determines success or failure.⁸

A direct bilateral deterrent relationship (normally between two nuclear

⁵ John Baylis: *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy: 1945-1964* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1995), p.4; Lawrence Freedman: *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2004), p. 6.

⁶ Italics in original. Patrick M. Morgan: *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Sage Publications: London., 1977), p. 20.

⁷ On typology of deterrence, see Glenn H. Snyder: *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1961). See also Peter Roberts and Andrew Hardie: “The Validity of Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century”, Occasional Paper, *Royal United Service Institute* (August 2015), p. 9.

⁸ Patrick M. Morgan: “Saving Face For the Sake of Deterrence”, in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.): *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP., 1985, ppb. 1989), p. 125.

powers: US-Soviet competition) is known as central deterrence. This bilateral competition is essentially to deter the other from attacking one's homeland.⁹ Beyond this one-to one confrontation, extended deterrence is therefore concerned with deterring an armed attack against a third party. It aims to "protect other countries and territories from attack, as distinct from preventing a direct attack on one's own national territory."¹⁰ More specifically, it refers to "the prevention of aggression or coercion against U.S. allies or security partners through threats of U.S. nuclear retaliation."¹¹ While the concept also is described as a "nuclear umbrella" in colloquial language, extended nuclear deterrence and a nuclear umbrella are interchangeably used in academic literature.¹²

The concept of a "nuclear umbrella" is very much a derivative of the American containment strategy in the Cold War. The USA assumed a responsibility for global leadership to prevent spread of communism replacing the same role previously played by Great Britain. It had strategic stakes in protecting the global interests, in defence of the so-called the Free world as opposed to the communist world.¹³ The intense Cold-War confrontation between the two nuclear super powers required the USA to firmly preserve its own bloc even at the risk of nuclear war. Drawing a lesson from European events in the 1930s, the USA recognised that "peace and security come only through vigilance and preparedness." This critical thinking was reflected in "a strategy of containment of Soviet expansionism."¹⁴ Accordingly, "containment" rather than "appeasement" was adopted by the US

⁹ Philip Bobbitt: *Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1988),pp. 9-10; Freedman *Deterrence* , p. 35; David S. Yost: *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace., 1998), p.33.

¹⁰ Paul K. Huth: "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War", *American Political Science Review* Vol. 82 No. 2 (1988), p. 424.

¹¹ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 33.

¹² Andrew O'Neil: *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the twenty-first century* (London: Routledge., 2013), p.2.

¹³ John Foster Dulles: "Policy for Security and Peace", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32 No. 3 (Apr 1953), p. 353.

¹⁴ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington D.C.: the White House., March 1990), pp. 1-2, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080>, accessed on 14 February 2018. See also Melvyn P. Leffler: "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48", *The American Historical Review* Vol. 89 No. 2 (Apr 1984), p. 356.

policymakers, hoping to induce the Kremlin's restraint specifically in Europe backed by the US nuclear monopoly of the immediate post-world war two years.¹⁵ This strategic condition resulted in the extension of US nuclear deterrence to America's key allies.¹⁶ In terms of their geographical settings, as the father of "containment strategy" George Kennan observed, Western Europe and Japan were particularly significant for the USA to contain the USSR. Kennan's view was well received in the US government.¹⁷ Therefore, it is no surprise that the US nuclear umbrella covered particularly Western Europe and Japan during the Cold War.¹⁸

Indeed Jeffrey Larsen, a former Strategic Command officer, explained that "The United States extended deterrence by making it clear that it would, if necessary, use nuclear weapons in response to a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on allies, *especially in Europe and Japan*" during the Cold War.¹⁹ In addition to NATO, Japan is one of few Asian countries (South Korea and Australia), which has had credible nuclear assurance from the USA (See the nuclear umbrella map above).²⁰ Other Asian countries like Thailand and the Philippines might be given US nuclear assurance but rather ambiguously. As former Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, rightly observed, in the case of these countries "the

¹⁵ Harry S. Truman: "The President's Farewell Address to the American People", 15 January 1953, Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, *Truman Library*, <https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2059>, accessed on 9 November 2017. See also Azar Gat: *War in Human Civilization* (New York: Oxford U.P., 2006, ppb. 2008), pp.613-617; R.J. Overy: "Airpower and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 15 No. 1 (1992), p. 81, 87, 96.

¹⁶ Richard K. Betts: *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1987), p.31; Gregg Herken: *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1980); Janne E. Nolan: *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Basic Books., 1989), p. 37.

¹⁷ George F. Kennan: *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Little, Brown and Company: Boston., 1967), pp. 374-375, 381, 391; X: "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 25 No. 4 (Jul 1947), pp. 566-582. See also John Lewis Gaddis: *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1982), p. 57; John Lewis Gaddis: *The Long Peace: Inquires Into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1987), p. 41, 142; John Lewis Gaddis: "Grand strategies in the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), pp. 1-21.

¹⁸ Bobbitt, *Democracy and Deterrence*, pp. 9-10.

¹⁹ Emphasis added. Jeffrey A. Larsen: "Extended Deterrence", in Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen (eds.): *Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History. Volume II* (California: ABC-CLIO., 2005), p. 123.

²⁰ O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 2-3, 122-123.

protection of the US nuclear umbrella is at best implicit rather than explicit.”²¹ There is a question of the level of a regular defence dialogue with respect to US nuclear commitments between the US and these countries.²² In the context of the Cold War these two Southeast Asian countries were the members of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) with the collective defense treaty, Article 4 of which stipulated that “it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.”²³

Yet the SEATO officially dissolved in 1977. SEATO was first established in 1954 in order to contain the spread of communism in Southeast Asia fueled and backed by Red China.²⁴ Even since its foundation, SEATO had some serious flaws. Although SEATO was founded to prevent communists from gaining ground in Southeast Asia, its members included only two Southeast Asian countries, Thailand and the Philippines. This was a serious problem as a regional organisation. While there were other Asia-Pacific countries in SEATO, Pakistan (Australia and New Zealand in the organization), the organisation’s membership also included non-regional powers, Great Britain, France and the USA. It is important to note that even from the start of SEATO, its members viewed the danger that China would spread communism in the region quite differently. Pakistan, for example, saw India as more of a threat than China and what Pakistan truly wanted from SEATO was security protection against its rival.²⁵ Britain and France started trade with Communist China already in 1950s. Britain also was not willing to commit itself to

²¹ Gareth Evans: “Nuclear Deterrence in Asia and the Pacific”, *Asia & The Pacific Policy Studies* Vol.1 No.1 (January 2014), p. 98 .

²² Lawrence Freedman: “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, *The Changing Strategic Landscape, Part II*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies:hereafter IISS, 1989), pp.18-31; Stefanie Von Hlatky: “Introduction: American Alliances and Extended Deterrence”, in Stefanie Von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (eds.): *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown U.P.,2015), p. 5; O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 2-3, 122-123.

²³ “Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact)” 8 September 1954, *Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library*, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp, accessed on 22 December 2018.

²⁴ Leszek Buszynski: “SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished”, *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 12 No. 2 (Sep 1981), p. 287.

²⁵ Robert J. McMahon: “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), p. 299.

defending South East Asia when Europe faced more serious communist threats. As its name, SEATO, suggests, it was an Asian model of NATO although American policy-makers did not like the acronym of “SEATO” since it naturally implied a NATO-like organisation, which it really was not.²⁶ The multi-regional powers did not militarily cooperate when it was required the most (during the Vietnam War): SEATO was indeed portrayed as a “zoo of paper tigers”²⁷ or “a mere paper alliance, its capacity for dealing with either over aggression or international subversion well nigh invisible.”²⁸ There was no collective identity within SEATO, but different interests and challenges created by linguistic, political and cultural differences among its members resulted in paralysis.²⁹

During the Vietnam War, indeed SEATO was of little use; unlike NATO, it did not treat an armed attack against one of the member states as an attack against all but its ambiguous treaty provisions considered it as a mere “common danger” and SEATO was to “consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.”³⁰ Instead of acting collectively, SEATO virtually let the USA carry out military operations unilaterally in Vietnam. As one analyst rightly described, “SEATO had no power other than that provided by the United States.”³¹ Richard Nixon even wrote in his *Foreign Affairs*’ article (two years before he became President) that SEATO had “weakened to the point at which it is little more than an institutional embodiment of an American commitment, and a somewhat anachronistic relic of the days when France and Britain were active members.”³² Even though the USA justified its military intervention based in part on honouring the SEATO treaty obligation, in reality it was rather American fear of

²⁶ *Foreign Relations of United States* (Hereafter *FRUS*), 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1984), Document 304, pp. 140-141.

²⁷ J.P.D. Dubabin: *The Cold War*, 2nd ed (Harlow: Pearson, Longman., 2008), p.214.

²⁸ McMahon: “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 300.

²⁹ Buszynski, “SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977”, p. 288; Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein: “Why Is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism”, *International Organization* Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-579, 593-598.

³⁰ “Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact).”

³¹ Paul E. Eckel: “SEATO: An Ailing Alliance”, *World Affairs* Vol. 134 No. 2 (Fall 1971), p. 99.

³² Richard M. Nixon: “Asia after Viet Nam”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 46 No. 1 (Oct 1967), pp. 115-116.

losing its credibility and reliability as the leader of the West. It was feared that if the country did not act in Southeast Asia, the Communists would challenge and ruin American interests elsewhere or somewhere more important, resulting in major humiliation.³³

Indeed, after the US withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 SEATO was dissolved in 1977 owing to the difficulties and differences articulated above.³⁴ This proved that the USA was no longer willing to act militarily in defence of Southeast Asia. If these countries had been the principal defensive areas of US END, SEATO would not have been dissolved. It obviously lacked the official mechanism of assurance. In this connection it is important to note that Thailand and the Philippines in fact wanted SEATO to continue to exist due to their need for US security assurances, but in the end these two Southeast Asian countries had to accept that the credibility of US security commitments was in decline. They eventually moved toward an accommodation with Red China (the USA visited China in 1972 partially in an attempt to end the Vietnam War on its reasonable terms) and adapted themselves to the new situation.³⁵ Today these Southeast Asian countries are the signatories to the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty, which entered into force in 1997.³⁶

In contrast, Japan was constantly given formal US security assurance mainly through verbal declaration especially from 1965. In July 1966 Dean Rusk, the State Secretary for the Kennedy and Johnson administration, held that in the case of a nuclear attack against Japan “the U.S. would defend Japan with whatever was required.”³⁷ As we will see below, the strategic importance of Japan (economic strength, industry capacity and US military infrastructure: large military presence) during the Cold War was nothing comparable to the other Asian countries. While

³³ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 240-242.

³⁴ Anthony Best, et al: *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge., 2008), p. 266, 298.

³⁵ Buszynski, “SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977”, pp. 287-296.

³⁶ Andrew Futter: *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Sage Publications., 2015), p. 182.

³⁷ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan (Washington, D.C.: GPO., 2006), Document 74, p. 150.

US perceived interests in Japan (not only the US perceptions but also the perceptions of other countries' US interests in Japan) were obviously high, how could the USA effectively protect its global interests at stake by nuclear weapons?

For effective END, the USA must have credible nuclear capabilities to inflict massive damage upon a potential aggressor who considers attacking US allies. Some defence analysts observed that END in essence developed as a maximum effect of US nuclear deterrence built on its nuclear superiority at the early stage of the Cold War when Russian nuclear retaliation capability against the US homeland was quite limited. In other words, the US threats of nuclear attacks in retaliation for Russia's military aggression on America's European allies were credible.³⁸ Apart from nuclear capabilities (threats), there are three more vital requirements for END to function. First effective END requires US security commitments explicitly provided through a security treaty. Second, it also calls for US political resolve (including public declaration) to fulfil the security commitments to protect its allies potentially even risking the destruction of New York to deter aggression on West Berlin or Tokyo). Finally, the USA must clearly communicate its determination to the enemy: a potential attacker will be devastated by an American nuclear attack should it attack America's allies. Its political signalling must be loud, clear and credible; otherwise the aggressor would simply disregard the signal. ³⁹ A

³⁸ Christoph Bluth: "Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations", in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.): *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1992), p. 141; Johnston C. Conover: *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence* P-5967 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation., 1977), p. 7; Gregory F. Treverton: "How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?", in Bobbitt, Freedman, Treverton (eds.) *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader*, pp. 112-113; Phil Williams: "Deterrence", In John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), p. 80.

³⁹ Edward Luttwak: "The Problems of Extending Deterrence" in Christoph Bertram (ed.): *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: IISS., 1980), p. 33; Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence", p.19, 25; Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser: "Signalling Alliance Commitments: Hand Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence", *American Journal of Political Science* Vol. 58 No. 4 (October 2014), pp. 921-922; Paul K. Huth: *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press., 1988), p. 4; O'Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 124; Brad Roberts: *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*. (Stanford, CA: Stanford U.P., 2016), p. 177; Roberts and Hardie, "The Validity of Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century", pp. 8-9; Ian Smart: "European Nuclear Options", in Kenneth A. Myers (ed.): *NATO The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting* (London: Croom Helom.,1980), p. 118; Scott D. Sagan: "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks", *International Security* Vol. 24 No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp.97-98.

simplified equation of extended deterrence can be outlined as follows.

Capabilities+Security Commitments+ Resolve+Communication (Signalling)=END.

While END is not complicated in theory, it is extremely complex in practice. The bottom line is that the national security of US allies depends heavily on the USA on the grounds that they do not have nuclear weapons at their disposal. The central issue of END always centres around the credibility of US nuclear threats or US security commitments (it is also known as reassurance to allies), including the use of nuclear weapons for its allies when they are being threatened by a nuclear aggressor.⁴⁰ One of the key reasons why the USA has always retained a “First-Use” policy is to reassure US allies including Japan that it may use nuclear weapons even before they are attacked.⁴¹ The 2018 *Nuclear Posture Review*, for instance, posits that “To help preserve deterrence and the assurance of allies and partners, the United States has never adopted a ‘no first use’ policy and, given the contemporary threat environment, such a policy is not justified today.”⁴² It is inescapably a daunting political decision to defend an ally by recourse to nuclear weapons when retaliation in kind may follow. In reality, taking any necessary means—including use of nuclear weapons to defend allies and incurring massive

⁴⁰ Bernard Brodie: “The Anatomy of Deterrence”, *World Politics* Vol. 11 no.2 (January 1959), p.188; Freedman, “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, p.18; Beatrice Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG: Nuclear Strategies and Forces for Europe, 1949-2000* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1998), pp. 15-25; Michael Howard: “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980’s”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 61 No.2 (Winter 1982), pp. 310-313 (309-324); Hans J. Morgenthau: “The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy”, *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 58 No.1 (Mar 1964), pp. 33-34; Thomas C. Schelling: *Arms and Influence* (New Heave: Yale U.P., 1966), p. 35.

⁴¹ Michael S. Gerson: “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy”, *International Security* Vol. 35 No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 13-14, 43-47; O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 25; Dena Priest and Walter Pincus: “U.S. Rejects ‘No First Use’ Atomic Policy”, *The Washington Post*, 24 November 1998, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1998/11/24/us-rejects-no-first-use-atomic-policy/1aa7d8f0-c34c-4f34-beed-2178d142a2e7/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.f9bbd0adc725, accessed on 3 February 2019.

⁴² *Nuclear Posture Review 2018* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2018), p. 22. Available at <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>, accessed on 20 February 2018.

damage on the homeland of the nuclear defender for the sake of honouring its defence commitments to them—does not appear a feasible promise to fulfill. The credibility of such a nuclear threat is inherently questionable.

The following famous claim by French General Pierre Marie Gallois remains valid and relevant even today: “no nation can be expected to commit suicide for the sake of another.”⁴³ In a similar vein, the distinguished American nuclear strategist, Bernard Brodie, emphasised the difficulty of achieving a credible US nuclear commitment: “We may be quite sure we will hit back if hit directly ourselves, but will we do so if any of our chief allies is attacked or threatened to attack?”⁴⁴ American Economist Thomas Schelling elaborated on this aspect and emphasised the inherent distinction between home and abroad by insisting as follows:

A good national starting point is the national boundary. As a tentative approximation — a very tentative one — the difference between the national homeland and everything ‘abroad’ is the difference between threats that are inherently credible, even if unspoken and the threats that have to be made credible. To project the shadow of one’s military force over other countries and territories is an act of diplomacy. To *fight* abroad is a military act, but to *persuade* enemies or allies that one fight aboard, under circumstances of great cost and risk, requires more than a military capability.⁴⁵

Thomas Nicholas of US Naval War College critically observed this conundrum: “extended deterrence was an immense gamble: it rested not on the intuitive understanding of self-defense, but increasingly on the imponderable question of whether a U.S. president would really risk trading Chicago for Bonn.”⁴⁶ The US,

⁴³ Pierre Marie Gallois quoted in John Garnett: “Defense Policy Making” in John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear Powers*, 2nd ed Revised and Enlarged (New York: Holmes & Meier., 1987), p.7. See also Henry Kissinger: *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1994), p. 608.

⁴⁴ Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence”, p.188.

⁴⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 36.

⁴⁶ Thomas M. Nichols: *No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security* (Philadelphia: University

therefore, must convince not only an adversary but *also its allies* that its security commitment is sufficiently credible to deter an adversary. Brad Roberts, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for nuclear and missile-defense policy, pointed out that “Today, the nuclear umbrella has the same purposes – to deter and assure.”⁴⁷ It is doubtlessly a daunting task to protect and reassure a distant ally not least when the defender’s homeland is intact. ⁴⁸ In this respect, “the Healey Theorem” formulated by former British Defense Minister, Denis Healey, still stands out: “it takes only five per cent credibility of American retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five per cent credibility of American retaliation to reassure the Europeans.”⁴⁹ Thus, END also involves the psychological reassurance of allies (confidence-building measures). ⁵⁰

That is, it is not sufficient for one party (defender) to declare and stress that the other (protégé) is protected by nuclear deterrence. This calls for constant US reassurance measures to its allies which must feel secured by the US protection. END is therefore concerned with not only deterrence but also psychological reassurance. A metaphor to describe such a facet of END is a coin: one side is the threat of nuclear retaliation against an aggressor (deterrence) and the other side is psychological reassurance to US allies.⁵¹ Thus, END cannot be studied in isolation from reassurance. For some US allies, reassurance can be more important than deterrence itself. As we will see, this was certainly the case with Japan. As several US security analysts lucidly explained, “the requirements of assurance may differ from the requirements of extended deterrence.”⁵² Both parties (a defender and a

of Pennsylvania Press., 2014), p.23.

⁴⁷ Brad Roberts; “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia”, National Institute for Defense Studies, Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No. 1, (9 August 2013), available at <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf> , accessed on 6 August 2017. p. 2.

⁴⁸ Brodie, “The Anatomy of Deterrence”, p.188; Ivo H. Daalder: *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1991), p.3; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 36.

⁴⁹ Denis Healey: *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph., 1989), p.243

⁵⁰ David S. Yost: “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO”, *International Affairs* Vol. 85 No.4 (July 2009),pp. 755-756, 763-764, 768, 772.

⁵¹ O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 26. See also Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence”, pp. 309-324.

⁵² Justin V. Anderson and Jeffrey A. Larsen with Polly M. Holdorf, “Extended Deterrence and Allied

protégé) need to mutually and explicitly acknowledge that one's nuclear deterrence is extended to the other—the mutual recognition of END: one side confirms that it provides a nuclear umbrella and the other side also confirms that it is under the protection of the nuclear umbrella.⁵³ This must be further confirmed between the supreme political leaders (e.g. US President and Japanese Prime Minister) of the two countries given that the US President is the only person who can authorise the launch of American nuclear weapons.⁵⁴ Once both leaders recognise the US nuclear assurance provided to Japan, the Japanese government formally acknowledges the existence of the US nuclear umbrella potentially through domestic political debates and formally and publicly declares that it relies on the nuclear umbrella. This is a formula for the recognition of an US ally formally being under US nuclear protection.

Accordingly, this thesis defines END as *a mutually-recognized mechanism of security protection provided by a nuclear defender (the USA) that ensures the security of its ally (Japan) by means of nuclear threats so as to deter an adversary's nuclear attack on Japan*. In this connection, it is also important to clarify that US END over Japan mainly aims to deter *nuclear* attacks against Japan but END naturally deters conventional attacks against Japan too. This is because nuclear weapons are more likely to be used when a conventional fight escalates. They could serve as general (peace time), immediate (crisis) and intrawar (in the midst of war) deterrence.⁵⁵

Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Visible and Invisible

During the Cold War, European NATO states relied heavily on US nuclear

Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS Occasional Paper 69 (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, 2013), p. 6.

⁵³ Carlo Masala, “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East”, *Strategic Assessment* Vol. 14 No. 4 (January 2012), p.118.

⁵⁴ Richard K. Betts and Matthew C. Waxman: “The President and the Bomb”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.97 No.2 (Mar/ Apr 2018), pp. 119-128.

⁵⁵ On different types of deterrence, see Freedman, *Deterrence*; Morgan, *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis*.

forces deployed on European soil to offset their overwhelming conventional military weakness vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and its satellites.⁵⁶ Since nuclear deterrence was seen integral to NATO's defence.⁵⁷ The first reference to US nuclear commitments to NATO was made as early as December 1949.⁵⁸ The final communiqué of the North Atlantic Council, 14-16 December 1953 stated that "special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defence system."⁵⁹ Indeed some two months before this statement, the US Army deployed the first nuclear weapons (the 280-millimeter atomic artillery) in West Germany.⁶⁰

In view of NATO's concerns for the credibility of US END, David Yost, an American NATO specialist, even held that "The history of NATO during the Cold War can be told as essentially a series of debates among the allies about the requirements of extended deterrence."⁶¹ Because of perennial fears of nuclear abandonment (the failure to come to defence and response by nuclear means when needed) by the USA,⁶² NATO and especially the frontline state West Germany (whose territory was divided by the winners of World War Two) actively sought the deployment of American nuclear weapons on European soil.⁶³ It is

⁵⁶ Stephen J. Cimbala: *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy* (London: FRANK CASS., 1991), p. 5; Fred Kaplan: "Rethinking Nuclear Policy", *Foreign Affairs* Vol.95 No.5 (Sep/ Oct 2016), p. 21; Keith B. Payne: *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky., 2001), pp.94-95; Smart, "European Nuclear Options", p. 117.

⁵⁷ Paul Buteux: *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge, U.P., 1983, ppb. 2010), p. 1; David S. Yost: *NATO's Balancing Act* (Washington, DC.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2014), p. 88.

⁵⁸ Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.): "DC 6/1, The Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Area", 1 December 1949, NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, *NATO Archives*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a491201a.pdf>, accessed on 19 January 2019.

⁵⁹ "Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council", Chairman: Mr G. Bidault, Foreign Minister of France, 14-16-December 1953, Paris, *NATO Online Library*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c531216a.htm>, accessed on 19 January 2019.

⁶⁰ Honore M. Catudal, Jr: *Nuclear Deterrence: Does it deter?* (London: Mansell Publishing., 1985), p. 218.

⁶¹ Yost, "Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO", p.755. See also Freedman, "The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence," 18-19.

⁶² On abandonment, see Michael Mandelbaum: *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge U.P., 1981, ppb. 1982), pp. 151-156 and Glenn H. Snyder: *Alliance Politics* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 1999, ppb. 2007).

⁶³ Futter, *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons*, p. 80; Francis J. Gavin: *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in American's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 2012), p. 40; Marc Trachtenberg: *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement. 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1996), pp. 146, 196-197.

NATO's belief that nuclear forces stationed in Western Europe bring forth stability and peace in Europe, which conventional forces alone could not produce.⁶⁴

In general forward deployment since the late 1950's has been symbolized by – “nuclear sharing arrangements” – “that is, risk and responsibility sharing, with some European Allies hosting U.S. nuclear weapons and delivery systems and/ or providing delivery systems of their own.”⁶⁵ It also entails “multinational decision making and policy implementation.”⁶⁶ These weapons are operated under dual-key arrangements that specify “nuclear weapons could not be fired without positive assent by both the United States and the country on whose soil the weapons were deployed.”⁶⁷ In effect, the US has a stronger veto as nuclear weapons themselves are under the sole custody of the USA.⁶⁸ The US government can refuse the transfer of its nuclear weapons to European NATO states in the event of emergency. The strategic rationale behind nuclear sharing arrangements was nevertheless in part to “convince the allies that the US nuclear guarantee was genuine by giving them a hand implementing it. This would in turn...promote alliance cohesion and reinforce deterrence.”⁶⁹ While it is true that nuclear warheads stored in Europe are under sole US control, in theory the host nations could become “de facto” nuclear powers should the US government authorise the transfer of its nuclear warheads and they are loaded on combat planes of the host countries such as Germany and Italy.

Nuclear sharing arrangements were institutionalized when the “Nuclear Planning Group” was formed for the purpose of nuclear consultations within NATO and the sense of European involvement in the development of NATO nuclear policy

⁶⁴ NATO: *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press., 2001), p. 160.

⁶⁵ Yost, *NATO's Balancing Act*, p. 92.

⁶⁶ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 34.

⁶⁷ Lyndon Baines Johnson: *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston., 1971), p. 477.

⁶⁸ Steven Pifer, et al., “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence: Considerations and Challenges”, *The Brookings Institute*, Arms Control Series, Paper 3 (May 2010), Washington D.C., p. 6. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf, accessed on 15 May 2018; David N. Schwartz: *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1983), p. 80.

⁶⁹ David S. Yost: “The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence”, *International Affairs* Vol.87 No.6 (Nov 2011), p. 1404.

in 1966.⁷⁰ This was done in consideration of West Germany in particular not least after France left the military command of NATO in 1966; West Germany needed to “have a voice in the formulation of Alliance nuclear policy....”⁷¹

It is worth noting that West Germany faced an acute nuclear dilemma because of its Cold-War frontline status.⁷² On the one hand, it sought firm US nuclear assurances not least because it pledged its non-nuclear status (not to manufacture nuclear weapons) to Western European countries based on the Paris accords of 1954. It was a precondition for West German membership of Western European Union in 1954 and NATO in 1955.⁷³ On the other hand, it did not want to use US nuclear weapons (forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons) stationed in its territory on the grounds even the use of tactical nuclear weapons on German’s soil was devastating enough to Western Germany.⁷⁴ This reaction was natural as no country wants its homeland to be a major nuclear battlefield. In fact, the distinction between “strategic” and “tactical” or also known as “non-strategic” nuclear weapons is quite a blur as the dire *Carte Blanche* exercise in West Germany in June 1955 demonstrated.⁷⁵

While this military exercise did not escalate to all-out nuclear war, the simulated use of tactical nuclear weapons was nevertheless equivalent to the use of strategic nuclear weapons for Germany, resulting in millions of German casualties. The public reveal of results of the exercise immensely shocked West German

⁷⁰ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p. 161, 420.

⁷¹ Message from the U.S. Mission to NATO to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense, “Future of NPG”, 30 November 1974, quoted in Yost, “The US debate on NATO nuclear deterrence”, p. 1404. See also Francis J. Gavin: “Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Anne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Detente*(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), pp. 401-402.

⁷² Bluth, “Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations”, pp. 142-144.

⁷³ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*, p. 124; J. Michael Legge: *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*. RAND Report R-2964-FF (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1983), p. 10; Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 31.

⁷⁴ Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 747; Healey, *The Time of My Life*, p. 238.

⁷⁵ See for example Richard Weitz: “The Historical Context”, in Tom Nicholas, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey D. McCausland(eds.): *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO* (Pennsylvania: US Army War College., 2012), pp. 4-5.

citizens and left a negative impact on public perceptions of nuclear weapons.⁷⁶ Roberts, moreover, claimed that “the employment of any nuclear weapons would be a strategic act, whatever its target and whatever its means of delivery.”⁷⁷ That said, for the sake of clarification, this thesis interprets “tactical nuclear weapons” as forward-deployable weapons such as short range missiles and artilleries and “strategic nuclear weapons” as weapons of intercontinental range (strategic bombers, ballistic missiles); hence they did not need to be stationed in US allied states and instead they were stationed in the mainland of the USA or in the middle of the ocean (e.g. SLBMs).⁷⁸

Although nuclear weapons were the sources of a serious problem as the West German case above shows, it must be reiterated that the physical presence (visibility) of US nuclear weapons stationed in Western Europe (forward deployment) is regarded as a tangible symbol of firm US nuclear commitments to NATO states.⁷⁹ It is even argued that while a large number of US nuclear weapons were stationed in Europe during the Cold War, they were nothing but a political tool to reassure Europeans and West Germans in particular.⁸⁰ The uniqueness of NATO as the only nuclear alliance can be summarised as “the broadest possible participation of Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles in *peacetime basing of nuclear forces*...”⁸¹ NATO understands that “The presence of US nuclear forces based in Europe and committed to NATO provides an essential political and military link between the European and North American members of the

⁷⁶ Robert T. Davis II: “Cold War Infamy: NATO Exercise Carte Blanche” in Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier and Guillaume Lasconjarias (eds.): *Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact* (Rome: NATO Defense College., 2018), pp. 47-49; Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*, p. 127.

⁷⁷ Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, p. 181.

⁷⁸ On this point, see for example Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 748; Richard Smoke: *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience in the Cold War*, 3rd ed (Massachusetts: McGraw-Hill., 1993), p. 68.

⁷⁹ David S. Yost, *The US and Nuclear Deterrence in Europe*, Adelphi Paper 326 (London: IISS., 1999), 8-11; Yost, “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO”, p. 7.

⁸⁰ Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, p. 41.

⁸¹ Italics added. North Atlantic Council: “Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization” (19 Nov 2010), p.16, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed on 28 February 2018.

Alliance.”⁸² This is known as strategic “coupling.”⁸³

For NATO, a mere American oral pledge to come to defend Europe in cases of contingency even risking nuclear war was not at all convincing and satisfactory. Without doubt, for Western Europeans the visibility of US nuclear commitments was required to reassure them during the Cold War. In theory because of the physical presence of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe even during peacetime, these weapons enhanced the credibility of US nuclear commitments and played a key role to “deter any Soviet attack by acting as ‘tripwires’ or detonators, escalating to the use of more destructive nuclear exchanges and ultimately to strikes against the American and Soviet homelands.”⁸⁴ Therefore, NATO strove to create the impression that more violence or further rapid nuclear escalation involving US strategic nuclear weapons would follow should it be attacked by the Soviet Union.⁸⁵ NATO’s answer to this security challenge was an early and first use of its tactical nuclear weapons (MC 14/3: NATO’s Flexible Response) to send a political signal to the Soviet leadership.⁸⁶ It was essentially to show NATO’s resolve by deliberately crossing the nuclear threshold⁸⁷ and ultimately “to dissuade an adversary from attacking, or if he attacked, to force him to agree an armistice.”⁸⁸ It can also be argued that “A substantial consensus of officials and experts on both sides of the Atlantic holds that U.S. nuclear commitments would be less credible if they

⁸² NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p. 161.

⁸³ Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Stephen J. Cimbala: *The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State U.P., 1997), p. 47. See also Jerome H. Kahan: *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution.,1975), p. 17; Robert S. McNamara: *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (London: Hodder and Stoughton.,1968), p.39; Smart, “European Nuclear Options”, p. 118.

⁸⁵ Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*, p. 7; Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, p. 10;Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution*, p. 158.

⁸⁶ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*, pp. 47-57; Beatrice Heuser: *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), p. 376; Robert S. McNamara: *Blundering Into Disaster* (London: Bloomsbury., 1986), pp. 24-25.

⁸⁷ Lawrence Freedman “I Exist; Therefore I Deter”, *International Security* Vol. 13 No.1 (Summer 1988), p. 179; Idem, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 749; Gerson, “No First Use”, p 14; Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, p. 361, 376. See also Kahn, *On Escalation*, p. 138, 290 and Richard Smoke: *War: Controlling Escalation* (Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1977), pp. 11-14.

⁸⁸ Beatrice Heuser: “Clausewitz’s Ideas of Strategy and Victory” in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.): *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2007), p. 157.

depended solely on forces at sea and in North America.”⁸⁹ The deployment of US nuclear weapons outside its territory could also be seen as a clear sign of firm American resolve.

By contrast, this was not the case with Japan. Instead of demanding visible US nuclear commitments (forward-deployed nuclear weapons and potentially even nuclear sharing arrangements), Japan actively sought an invisible nuclear commitment in the sense that US nuclear weapons would never be deployed to the mainland of Japan: “Invisible” END. The country specifically sought sea-based deterrence composed of submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMS) or carrier aircraft deployed in the sea during the Cold War.⁹⁰ Japan has also been protected by strategic bombers stationed in Guam.⁹¹ Accordingly the most crucial difference between the two models is the assurance form. One is visible (achieved through the presence of US tactical nuclear weapons on the ground) and the other is invisible (achieved through an offshore deterrent or deterrence at sea).

“Invisible” END is rather a “faith-based” approach while the NATO model is more of a “physical-evidence-based” approach backed by the visible presence of US nuclear weapons in Europe. To be sure, the ultimate decision to use nuclear weapons resides with the USA, an American President in particular, who is the only person to authorise the launch of nuclear weapons.⁹² The USA holds a stronger veto to transfer its nuclear warheads deployed to European NATO states. That said, the importance of the physical presence is also concerned with US reassurance (the other side of the END coin) to NATO. In the absence of any visible form of

⁸⁹ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 33.

⁹⁰ Makoto Kawanago: “Kaku no Kasa to Nihon: INF Zenpai to Sore Igo” [The Nuclear Umbrella and Japan After INF Treaty], *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 90 (1989), p. 107; Larsen, “US Extended Deterrence and Europe”, 53-64; Terumasa Nakanishi: “U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan”, *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 10 No.1 (1987), p. 83, 87; Shinichi Ogawa: *Kaku Gunbi Kanri Gunshuku no Yukue* [The Future of Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament], (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo, 1996), pp.215-220.

⁹¹ Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, pp. 122-123; Jeffrey A. Larsen, “US Extended Deterrence and Europe”, in Hlatky and Wenger (eds.), *The Future of Extended Deterrence*, pp. 62-64; Michito Tsuruoka: “The NATO vs. East Asian Models of Extended Nuclear Deterrence? Seeking a Synergy beyond Dichotomy”, *Asan Forum*, Vol. 4 No. 3 (May/ June 2016), <http://www.theasanforum.org/the-nato-vs-east-asian-models-of-extended-nuclear-deterrence-seeking-a-synergy-beyond-dichotomy/>, accessed on 14 February, 2018.

⁹² Betts and Waxman, “The President and the Bomb”, pp. 119-120.

reassurance, American oral reassurance to Japan has a significant impact on Japan's sense of security. As we will explore, the US reassurance mechanism for Japan was principally a bilateral talk (summit meeting) in which the American political leaders reassured Japanese counterparts that Japan would be protected by the US nuclear umbrella. The first clear reference to the US nuclear umbrella over Japan traces back to 1965. In this respect, what a US President has to say about US nuclear protection of Japan is a decisive factor to reassure Japan. Depending on a comment, his voice can undermine the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan. This is why now the credibility of US END is being questioned. Trump's constant critical comments about America's key allies including Japan undermine it. All things considered, *"Invisible" END is a faith-based deterrent backed by the off-shore component of nuclear weapons*. It must be stressed that as this thesis reveals, this form of END was not exactly something Japanese leaders wanted but rather this was a product of political compromise.

While as widely known the Japanese public held anti-nuclear sentiment shaped by its historical experience in the two atomic bombings, this did not necessarily mean the top decision makers such as Japanese Prime Ministers held the same view. Driven by their strategic calculations, some of them actually thought that Japan would need an independent nuclear deterrent for Japan's defence. This point became evident not least when China detonated its very first nuclear device in 1964. According to Brodie, this event was one of the key political developments of the 1960s.⁹³ In response, then Prime Minister Eisaku Sato in particular reasoned that Japan would need nuclear weapons too now that China acquired its nuclear weapons.⁹⁴ What this suggests is that there were some Japanese political leaders whose strategic views were in support of Japan's nuclear option notwithstanding prevalent anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.

What we need to address is how far this Japanese anti-nuclear belief really

⁹³ Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie: *From Crossbow to H-Bomb: The Evolution of the Weapons and Tactics of Warfare*. Revised and Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana U.P.,1973), p. 279.

⁹⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Japan, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 37, pp. 55-56.

affected or limited the Japanese nuclear path. Therefore, this thesis will closely examine Japan's decision-making process to shed light upon Japanese perspectives on US nuclear weapons and deterrence for Japan's security. In light of this, the thesis will explore a formative period of US END over Japan between 1945 and 1970. There were several key events during this period such as demilitarisation, rearmament, the emergence of the defence-minded Sato government, the Chinese nuclear test, Japanese secret nuclear studies, reversion of Okinawa and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In view of Prime Minister Sato's pro-nuclear stance coincident with the rise of a nuclear China, this thesis contends that Japan under Prime Minister Eisaku Sato's strong leadership elicited American nuclear assurances in direct response to the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964. "Invisible" END was in fact a product of Sato's political compromise. The rest of the chapters will explore exactly how this peculiar form of US END came to emerge and develop in Japan drawing on primary sources.

Rationale of the Research

Why does the historical developments of US END over Japan matter for Strategic Studies and International Relations (IR)? There are two specific reasons why this study deserves academic attention. First the Japanese case is unique and even counterintuitive. Japan arguably had every conceivable reason to pursue its own nuclear weapons.

Most importantly, there was political geography: Japan faced the geographical reality of having two nuclear neighbours. Political geography is a socially constructed concept.⁹⁵ It is subject to the interpretation of political relations to one's neighbours by political leaders in a given country. It also depends on where those leaders are located from which they view regional and world

⁹⁵ Colin Gray: *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2013, ppb. 2016), p. 125.

politics.⁹⁶ Colin Gray, the Anglo-American strategist, boldly contended that “geography per se is of no interest. What matters is the political and strategic meaning ascribed to geography” and “Geography is context for human thought and behaviour.”⁹⁷ His colleague Geoffrey Sloan cogently argues that “Geographical location is self-evidently unchanging, but the interpretation of it evolves according to policy preferences.”⁹⁸

Nevertheless, in the case of Japan, the geographic configurations of the Far East and the nuclear ownership in the region could be played down but not ignored. Focusing on political geography, foreign policy analysts John Spanier and Robert Wendzel plausibly observed that “The location of a state in relation to other states is a fact of immense importance. Who is or is not one’s neighbour has significant strategic implications.”⁹⁹ Therefore, while political geography can be quite subjective and relative to one’s political relations to neighbours, it is configured around hard realities. It is what one makes of it that varies: from a US strategic point of view, it was also quite logical to deploy its nuclear weapons in Japan exactly because of Japan’s proximity to Russia and China. Despite those factors, Japan has maintained its non-nuclear status and relied on the peculiar form of “Invisible” END.

Second, the Japanese case illuminates the importance of local context: the often forgotten and overlooked dimension of strategy.¹⁰⁰ This study will empirically prove how socio-cultural factors influence the formulation of strategy. As American strategists learned in the late 1970s through the study of Soviet strategic culture, each country holds distinct strategic views and preferences.¹⁰¹ This study therefore

⁹⁶ John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel: *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed (Washington D. C.: CQ Press., 1996), p. 132.

⁹⁷ Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy*, p. 121, 123.

⁹⁸ Geoffrey Sloan: *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History* (London: Routledge., 2017), p. xiv.

⁹⁹ Spanier and Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, p. 132.

¹⁰⁰ Colin S. Gray: *The Future of Strategy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p. 87; Michael Howard: “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.57 No.5 (Summer 1979), pp. 975-986; Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley: “Introduction: On Strategy”, in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.): *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1994), p. 7.

¹⁰¹ On this point see Jack L. Snyder: *The Soviet Strategic Culture for Limited Nuclear Operations*,

adds empirical knowledge of strategy making to Strategic Studies.

In terms of political geography, China and Russia were not only communist countries but regional rivals against whom Japan had fought twice over the last fifty years. Just before the end of World War Two, the Soviet Union invaded Japan breaching the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact and illegally occupied the so-called Northern Territories (four islands: *Habamai*, *Etro*, *Shikotan*, *Kunashiri*). More significantly the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 was a watershed in Japanese politics and especially the emergence of explicit US ENDF over Japan. China threatened Japan politically but not militarily more than Russia did because Japanese leaders saw China as a technologically backward country at the time.¹⁰² In other words, they did not believe that China would become a nuclear power in the 1960s. During the Cold War, Japan boasted highly advanced nuclear facilities and plenty of plutonium though not weapon-grade. Japan is often regarded a latent nuclear power.¹⁰³ The father of Neo-Realism Kenneth Waltz boldly asserted that “those who have harnessed the atom for peaceful purposes can quickly move into the nuclear military business.”¹⁰⁴ During this period, the Japanese economy was recovering and even booming, and became the world’s second economic power after the USA by the late 1960s, getting ahead of other European economic powers (the Japanese Economic Miracle). Considering this material reality, Japan might have built its own nuclear forces.

Exactly due to Japan’s political geography and its economic, technological and industrial potential, Japan in fact “has historically received more statements of reassurance...than other US allies in Asia.”¹⁰⁵ Japan was a key US ally and played

R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation., 1977). See also Colin S. Gray: *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (London: Hamilton Press., 1986).

¹⁰² Yuri Kase: “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/ 70 Internal Report”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 8 No.2 (Summer 2001), p. 60.

¹⁰³ Mark Fitzpatrick: *Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan* (London: IISS., 2015), pp.11-12.

¹⁰⁴ Kenneth N Waltz: “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, *International Security*, Vol.18 No.2 (Autumn 1993), p. 67.

¹⁰⁵ O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 124.

a key role to keep Russia and China at bay during the Cold War.¹⁰⁶ This was evident during the Korean War when US troops were directly sent to the Korean Peninsula from Japan. Furthermore, Japan would have been used as a central base for US nuclear operations in the Far East.¹⁰⁷ Losing Japan as a strategic base would have been an American nightmare.¹⁰⁸ Considering this, it was militarily logical to store US nuclear weapons in Japan.

In fact, the US government had secret plans to introduce nuclear weapons into the mainland of Japan in the 1950s and 1960s. This also includes a plan to introduce nuclear sharing arrangements similar to those of NATO. In this plan US nuclear weapons stored in the mainland of Japan were to be operated by Japan Self Defence Force (JSDF). In the end, however, the USA never managed to secure acceptance of any of these plans and failed to deploy US nuclear weapons in Japan.¹⁰⁹ This fact alone deserves great attention. More interestingly, US nuclear forces were deployed to other island nations, Britain, Taiwan and the Philippines. Japan was the only US Asian ally, which did not host any US nuclear weapons on its territory.¹¹⁰ In principle, it should be a puzzle that Japan was the only exception

¹⁰⁶ Airgram From American Consul to Department of State, "The Self-Defense Forces in Hokkaido", 2 July 1965, Subject Numeric File 1964-1966, DEF 6 Japan, Box 1664, Record Group(RG) 59, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA); *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 18 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1994), Document 11, pp. 26-27; National Intelligence Estimate 11-14/40-81D, "Soviet Military Forces in the Far East", February 1982, *Central Intelligence Agency* (Hereafter *CIA*), pp. 6-7 available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000261311.pdf, accessed on 29 July 2017. See also Susan Lesley Clark: "Soviet Policy toward Japan", *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 36 No.4 (1987), p. 132; Hiroshi Kimura: "Soviet policy toward Japan", *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 7 No. 3 (1984), pp. 30-31; Sugio Takahashi: "Beikoku ni Yoru Kakudai Yokushino Jittai [On US Extended Deterrence]" in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujyo (ed.): *Nichbei Doumei towa Nanika* [What is US-Japan Security Alliance] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha., 2011), p. 70.

¹⁰⁷ Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden Bello: *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books., 1987), p. 76; Kimura, "Soviet Policy Toward Japan", *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 7 No.3 (1987), pp. 30-31; Yuri Kase: "Japan", in John Glenn, Darry Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.): *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate., 2004), p. 139; Shigeki Nishimura: "Nihon no Gunji Senryaku Kankyo: Nordic Analogy [The Strategic Environment of Japan: Nordic Analogy]", *Kaigai Jijyo* Vol. 33 No.3 (1985), p. 77; Sheila A. Smith: "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance" in Michael Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books., 1999), p. 74.

¹⁰⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1991), Document 159, pp. 325-330.

¹⁰⁹ Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr: "Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 56 No. 1 (Jan/ Feb 2000), p. 79.

¹¹⁰ US nuclear weapons were deployed to the other US Asian allies (Philippines: 1957-1977, South

to this rule. Even if Japan had not been able to possess its own nuclear weapons for whatever reason, Japan could have had US nuclear weapons on its soil. For this reason, external (external threats, political geography) and material (technology and economy) variables alone cannot explain the Japan's peculiar course.

To answer this puzzle, we also need to look specifically at the domestic process of strategy making. It is not sufficient to examine the US government rationale behind its failed plan to place nuclear weapons in Japan since one half of the solid account is still missing especially considering that END is a mutually acknowledged concept. Gray cogently contended that "all knowledge is local knowledge, all policy is made domestically, and every maker of policy and strategy has been encultured by a particular tradition and society."¹¹¹ That said, traditionally strategic studies, highly inspired by Western thinking, were centered on International Relations (IR) theory of "(Neo) Realism." It postulates that every single nation is a rationally uniform actor (or a mere unit of international politics) striving to survive in the world of anarchy (the ordering principle of international relations), positing its external environment is decisive in determining security policies.¹¹² In its logic, each country prioritizes national survival as a political entity

Korea: 1958-1991 and Taiwan: 1958-1974). On this point, see "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945 Through September 1977" (Office of the Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Washington, DC, 1978) and Memorandum from Philip E. Barringer, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs to Colonel Haskin et al, October 8, 1968, enclosing memorandum to Barringer from W. J. Lehman, Department of State Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs October 8, 1968, with draft "Compendium of Nuclear Weapons Arrangements", Excised Copy. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/nd-7.pdf>, accessed on February 9, 2018. See also Fuhrmann and Sechser, "Signalling Alliance Commitments", p.926; Hans M. Kristensen, "Nukes in the Taiwan Crisis," *Federation of American Scientists*, 13 May 2008, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/nukes-in-the-taiwan-crisis/>, accessed on 29 January 2018; Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr: "Where They Were", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 55 No. 6 (Nov/ Dec 1999), pp. 26-35; Norris, Arkin and Burr: "Where They Were: How Much Did Japan Know?" p. 79; Joseph F. Pilat, "A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 39 No. 4 (June 2016), pp. 581-582.

¹¹¹ Colin S. Gray: *The Second Nuclear Age* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1999), p.61.

¹¹² Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence*, p.7; John Garnett: "Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions", in John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 9-12; Robert Jervis: "Identity and the Cold War" in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Anne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), p. 27; William T. Tow: "The nuclear Waltz: Rational actors, deterrence and nuclear non-proliferation", *Australian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 49 No. 3 (2014), p. 541; Kenneth N. Waltz: *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill Education., 1979).

and competes for power and security by increasing military strength.¹¹³ As Peter Katzenstein of Cornell University rightly pointed out, “Most students of national security accord pride of place to material forces that define the balance of power between states. They have no patience for intangibles like culture.”¹¹⁴ Arguably the major limitation of IR theory of “Realism” is to focus dominantly on power balance and ignore non-material variables such as values, norms and interpretation of power itself by each country. The author of *the Clash of the Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington boldly asserted that “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural.”¹¹⁵ Whether this claim is correct or not is a matter of severe debate. Today more and more military pundits are nevertheless cognizant of cultural influence in strategy making.¹¹⁶ The Japanese case evidently suggests that we should examine internal (domestic) as well as external influence to comprehend the case.

As for internal influence it is easy to conclude that Japan has a nuclear allergy because of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The real question is, however, how this historical experience was shared within Japanese society as a norm and whether this socio-cultural factor acted as a decisive factor in determining responses to external threats. By analyzing the role of this factor in the process of strategy making, this thesis will add empirical insight into the role of the socio-cultural factors overlooked in the formulation of strategy to Strategic Studies.

Having identified why this study matters, we also need to discuss why it is important to study the specific twenty five- year period between 1945 and 1970 to

¹¹³ Simon Dalby: “American Security Discourse: the Persistence of Geopolitics”, *Political Geography Quarterly* Vol. 9 No. 2 (April 1990), p. 175, 177; John J. Mearshimer: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton&Company., 2001); Jack Snyder: “One World, Rival Theories”, *Foreign Policy* Vol. 145 (Nov/Dec 2004), pp. 52-62; Craig A. Snyder (ed.): “Contemporary Security and Strategy” in Craig A. Snyder: *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1999), pp. 1-4; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*.

¹¹⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein: *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar in Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 1996), p. 17.

¹¹⁵ Samuel P. Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster., 1997, ppb. 2002), p. 21.

¹¹⁶ Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds.): *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1999); Joseph S. Nye Jr and Sean M. Lynn-Jones: “International Security Studies”, *International Security* Vol. 12 No. 4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27; Patrick Porter: *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia U.P., 2009), pp.6-8, 13.

understand “Invisible” END. In view of Japan’s unique historical experience with atomic bombing, it is vital to start the study with the year of 1945. It was also when Japan came under US occupation, which lasted until 1952. The occupation period is also a key to understanding how the Japanese society transformed through the US introduced reforms such as the peace constitution, demilitarisation and later a major turn of the occupation policy: rearmament. A series of US reforms brought about institutionalized anti-militarism. As Christopher Hughes of University of Warwick, pointed out, Japan’s passive military posture originally came from “its experiences of catastrophic defeat in the Pacific war; the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki; the US-dominated Allied Occupation; Japanese demilitarization; the adoption of Article 9 of the so-called ‘peace constitution’ of 1947...”¹¹⁷ As for the year of 1970, it was when Japan signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Thus, Japan internationally declared that it renounced its nuclear path. In the meantime both the Japanese and the US government decided to extend the Japan-US security of 1960, which was due for renewal in 1970 (after that year unless a notice to terminate the treaty was made by either party, it would be automatically renewed).

There were some key developments in the early 1970s such as the so-called “Nixon Shocks” of 1971, the unilateral cancellation of the convertibility of US dollar into gold and President Nixon’s visit to China and the “Schlesinger Doctrine” in 1974.¹¹⁸ This thesis does not deny the significance of these events on Japan’s defence but to reiterate the key argument of this thesis, the fundamental form of US END was formed before these events. With this in mind, this study will focus on this twenty five-year of the formative period of “Invisible” END over Japan.

¹¹⁷ Christopher W. Hughes: *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (London: IISS., 2004), p.21.

¹¹⁸ Makoto Iokibe: “Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy”, JIIA, Japan’s Diplomacy Series, p.20, Japan Digital Library, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy/160330_Makoto_Iokibe.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017, p20; Michael Schaller: “Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cold War Volume III Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), pp. 171-175; O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 79.

Literature Review

It was during the Cold War that extended nuclear deterrence theory was elaborated. The key driver behind this phenomenon was the advent of the nuclear age as described above. As security analyst Theo Farrell explained, “It would be no exaggeration to say that strategic studies really took off...with the onset of the nuclear age: the prospect of nuclear annihilation concentrated the minds of academic and ordinary folk on the causes and impact of war.”¹¹⁹ Since the frontline of the Cold War was Western Europe, West Germany in particular, much attention to US END was devoted to the region. Indeed the case of US END over Western Europe or European NATO is well studied.¹²⁰ Among them, a renowned European security specialist, Beatrice Heuser’s work empirically shows the key developments of nuclear relations among the North Atlantic alliance drawing on recently declassified documents.¹²¹

In comparison to the case of NATO, extended nuclear deterrence (END) outside Europe seems to have gained less attention notwithstanding the salience of the topic.¹²² Indeed, it is quite recent that English literature has started to focus more on END in the Asia Pacific as a whole driven by the resurgence of Russia and the rise of a nuclear-armed North Korea.¹²³ These works are, however, written by Anglo-Saxon scholars. Since they do not use Japanese sources, their analysis of Japanese perspectives on US END is one-sided and limited given that translated

¹¹⁹ Theo Farrell: “General Introduction” in Theo Farrell (ed.): *Security Studies: Critical Concepts in International Relations* (London: Routledge., 2010), p. 10.

¹²⁰ Christoph Bluth: *Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1995); Daalder, *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response*; Robert Thomas Davis II: “The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968”, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation., Ohio State University, 2008) ; Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980*; Schwartz, *NATO’s Nuclear Dilemmas*; Marc Trachtenberg: *History & Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1991), Chapter 4; Idem, *A Constructed Peace*; NATO, *NATO Handbook*, Chapter 7; Yost, *NATO Transformed*, chapter 2.

¹²¹ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*.

¹²² O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p.2

¹²³ Fitzpatrick, *Asia’s latent Nuclear Powers*; Robert A. Manning: “The Future of US Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025”, (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council., 2014), available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Future_US_Ext_Det_in_Asia.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2018; O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*; Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, chapter 5, 7; Terence Roehrig: *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia U.P., 2017).

sources (from Japanese into English) are still not adequate.

The Cold-War trend of intensive academic attention paid to the European case was natural due to the geopolitical importance of Western Europe (the location was considered essential to prevent world domination by a single power) to the US grand strategy (containment strategy) during the Cold War.¹²⁴ Its principal objective was to “prevent any hostile power or group of powers from dominating the Eurasian land mass.”¹²⁵ Walt Rostow, National Security Advisor to President Lyndon Johnson, articulated on this point as follows:

Since the combined resources of Eurasia could pose a serious threat of military defeat to the United States, it is the American interest that no single power or group of power hostile or potentially hostile to the United States dominate that area or a sufficient portion of it to threaten the United States and any coalition the United States can build and sustain.¹²⁶

In contrast, East Asia was considered to be secondary and peripheral area.¹²⁷ This is certainly true, but as the Cold War intensified, the US interests were globalized in the form of “Strategies of Containment” and of NSC 68 (National Security Council Policy Paper).¹²⁸ It is pointed out that “During the Cold War, the United States had no choice but to go onshore in Europe and Northeast Asia, as its allies in those regions could not contain the Soviet Union by themselves. So

¹²⁴ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*; Colin S. Gray: “The Nuclear Age and the Cold War”, in John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (eds.): *The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present* (New York: Oxford U.P., 2011), p. 241, 255; idem, *Perspectives on Strategy*, p. 134.

¹²⁵ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 1. *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1977), Document 85, p. 238.

¹²⁶ W. W. Rostow: *The United States in the World Arena: A Study in Recent History* (New York: Harper and Row., 1960), p. 544.

¹²⁷ See for example, Jeremy Black: *Geopolitics: And the Quest for Dominance* (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 2016), p. 192; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 112; Hemmer and Katzenstein, “Why is There No NATO in Asia?”, pp. 575-607; Smart, “European Nuclear Options”, pp. 118-119; Maxwell D. Taylor: *The Uncertain Trumpet* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited., 1960) p. 145.

¹²⁸ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp.108-117; Robert J. Art: “To What Ends Military Power?”, *International Security* Vol. 4 No. 4 (Spring 1980), p 3; Phil Williams: “United States Defence Policy”, in John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 199-206. See also *FRUS*, 1948, The Far East and Australia, Vol. 6, (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1974), Document 519, pp. 698-699.

Washington forged the Korean War to contain Soviet political clout in Northeast Asia.”¹²⁹ It is also true that the chief objective of US Cold-War nuclear strategy was to convince its adversary not to take any direct military action against the USA and its allies by the use of US nuclear threats.¹³⁰

It is worth noting that an American nuclear strategist, Keith Payne, stressed that today’s nuclear landscape is different from the Cold War and warned that “The convenience of focusing largely on a single adversary in this regard is over.”¹³¹ In fact, this statement was already true in East Asia after China denoted the first nuclear device in 1964. END was thus, crucial in East Asia too. Despite this, US END over East Asia received much less academic attention than that over Western Europe during the Cold War.¹³²

As for specifically the case of Japan, there is one major reason why END over Japan has received less attention within Japan. Studying military affairs in general was not really welcome in postwar Japan. It was regarded as a controversial subject.¹³³ During the Cold War, studying military affairs was considered to be pure evil business mainly because this conduct was uncritically believed to lead to a revival of prewar Japan’s militarism. The main issue of postwar Japan’s defence policies was rather ideological battles: rearmament vs. unarmed neutrality.¹³⁴ In postwar Japanese society military affairs became a Japanese Pandora’s box.¹³⁵

Moreover there are fewer Japanese academic works than journalistic works

¹²⁹ John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen S. Walt, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 95 No. 4 (Jul/Aug 2016), p. 75.

¹³⁰ Conover, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence*, p. 7; Freedman, “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, pp.18-31; Williams, “Deterrence”, p. 80.

¹³¹ Keith B. Payne: *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky., 1996), p.xi.

¹³² Much attention was paid to nuclear guarantee to NATO but less to East Asia. See O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p.2. See also Smart, “European Nuclear Options”, p. 119.

¹³³ Naoko Sajima: *Anzen Hoshō te nandarou* [What is Security Studies?] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo., 2011), pp. ii-iii; Ikutaro Shimizu: *Nihon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* [Independent Japan and the Nuclear Option] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.,1980), p. 99.

¹³⁴ Hideo Ohtake: *Saigunbi to Nashonarismus: Hoshu, Riberaru, Shakai Minshu Shugisha no Boueikan* [Rearmament and Nationalism: Conservative, Liberal, Social Democrats and Their Perspectives on Defence] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1988).

¹³⁵ Taeru Kurono: *Senso Gaku Gairon* [Introduction to War Studies] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2005), p. 6.

on US END over Japan.¹³⁶ This is mainly because access to official documents was significantly limited until quite recently. Most of these works focus on Japan's secret nuclear studies on the feasibility and desirability of Japan's nuclearisation carried out by Japanese government officials in the 1960s, and US-Japan secret nuclear deals. The main motivation behind their works is to attract public attention that the Japanese government officials secretly studied the feasibility and desirability nuclear weapons while Japanese political leaders did not order that such studies be conducted. These works were internal reports in nature. With respect to the secret nuclear deals, Japanese journalists seek to shock the Japanese public that the Japanese government secretly concluded a deal that the US military could reintroduce nuclear weapons into Okinawa in the event of a crisis without informing the Japanese. Those works essentially criticise the behind-the-scenes and dishonest dealings.

To be sure, this does not mean there were no great Japanese academic works on US END over Japan produced during the Cold War. Due to the limited availability of primary source, these works were, however, purely descriptive, theoretical but not empirical.¹³⁷ In English literature on the subject Terumasa Nakanishi's and James R. Van de Velde's work, both published in the late 1980s, stood out for their theoretical excellence while their theoretical contention was not backed by primary source either.¹³⁸

¹³⁶ See for example Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu hen (ed.): *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu: Kakusareta kaku no Sengoshi* [US-Japan Alliance and Nuclear Reactors: The Hidden Nuclear History of Post-War] (Tokyo: Tokyo Shimbun., 2013); Miki Kase: *Daitouryou ate Nihonkoku Shushou no Gokuhi File* [Secret Files of Japanese Prime Minister for American Presidents] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha., 1999); NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan: *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon: Hibakukoku no Shirarezaru Shinjitsu* [Japan that sought nuclear: The truth behind Post-war Japan's Politics] (Tokyo: Kobunsha., 2012); Shoji Niihara: *Kakuheiki Shiyo keikaku wo Yomitoku: America Shinkakusenryaku to Nihon* [Understanding US Nuclear War Plans: New US Nuclear Strategy and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinnihon Shupansha., 2002); Masakatsu Ota: *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Doumei* [Dark Sides of Alliance: Nuclear Umbrella and US-Japan Alliance] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha., 2004) ; Hiroki Sugita: *Hikaku no Sentaku* [Decision for Non-Nuclear] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2005). See also Yoko Iwama : "The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty" in John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (eds.): *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance* (London: Routledge., 2018), p. 153 (151-170).

¹³⁷ Kawanago, "Kaku no Kasa to Nihon", 103-119; Shinichi Ogawa: "Kaku no Kasa to Rironteki Kento: Tenkanki no Kaku Yokushi to Gunbi Kanri"[Theoretical Examinations of Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control] *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 90 (1989), pp. 91-102.

¹³⁸ James R. Van de Velde: "Japan's Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence For Japan",

Until the late 2000s when then Foreign Minister, Katsuya Okada, undertook his initiative in thoroughly reviewing the US nuclear policy toward Japan (*Mitsuyaku: Secret Nuclear Deals*) in 2009, the Japanese government had highly restricted the declassification of the documents related to US-Japan nuclear relations and the Japanese policy makers' views on nuclear deterrence. At his request an official report was subsequently released in 2010.¹³⁹ The existence of secret nuclear deals was long known. One of the deals includes the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Okinawa in emergency situations publicly revealed by Kei Wakaizumi already in 1994.¹⁴⁰ Yet until 2009, the Japanese government had publicly ignored the issue. Okada castigated the Japanese declassification system of diplomatic documents as undemocratic.¹⁴¹ It is also important to note that *Foreign Relations of the United States, Japan, 1964-1968* and *1969-1972* were released in 2006 and 2018 respectively. Thanks to the completion of these edited volumes, key documents related to US END over Japan became more widely accessible.

Because of the limited available information, empirical studies of US END over Japan using both American and Japanese archival documents have been scarce. Fintan Hoey's work is one exception to this rule. His work fully incorporates recently declassified archival documents from both Japan and the USA. Admittedly as the title of his book (*Sato, America and the Cold War*), the main focus of his work is on Prime Minister Sato's foreign policy but not on the US nuclear umbrella over

Journal of Northeast Asia Study Vol. 7 No. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 16-39; Nakanishi, "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan", pp. 81-97.

¹³⁹ "Iwayuru Mitsuyaku Mondaini Kansuru Yusikisha Inkai Houkkokusho"[Advisory Panel's Final Report on the so-called Secret Deals], 9 March 2010, *Gaimusho* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereafter *MOFA*), available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf, accessed on 4 August 2018.

¹⁴⁰ Kei Wakaizumi: *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu: Kakumitsuyaku no Shinjitsu Shinsoban* [I want to believe there was no choice available: The Truth Behind the Secret Nuclear Deals] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.,1994).

¹⁴¹ Katsuya Okada: *Gaiko wo Hiraku: Kakugunshuku Mitsuyaku no Genbade* [Open Diplomacy: The Frontline of Nuclear Disarmament and the Secret Agreements] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2014), pp. 105-109. See also Takichi Nishimiyama: *Okinawa Mitsuyaku: Jyohou Hanzai to Nichibei Doumei* [Okinawa Secret Agreement: Information Crime and US-Japan Alliance] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2012), p.58; Tsuyoshi Sunohara: *Kaku ga nakunaranainanatsu no riyu* [Seven Reasons Why Nuclear Weapons Cannot be Abolished] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha., 2010), pp. 105-106; "Nichibei Mitsuyaku no Hanseiki" [Secret Agreements between Japan and the USA over half a century], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 10 March 2010.

Japan.¹⁴² Other than that, this brilliant work provides the most updated knowledge about Sato's foreign policy and his time.

There also are several excellent Japanese works on the subject by Akira Kurosaki and Masakatsu Ota.¹⁴³ While they draw on Japanese and American archival materials, their principal interests are different. Kurosaki's work focuses mainly on the Japanese government's non-nuclear path while Ota with his journalist background traces the historical developments of *Mitsuyaku* (Secret Nuclear Deals between the Japanese and the US government). Ota incorrectly calls Japan-US security alliance a "nuclear alliance" despite the fact that US nuclear weapons have never been deployed in the mainland of Japan during peacetime and therefore, the alliance lacks the mechanism nuclear burden sharing.¹⁴⁴ Moreover, the US government clearly recognizes NATO as a nuclear alliance. In April 2010, State Secretary Hillary Clinton stated that "As a nuclear alliance, sharing nuclear risks and responsibilities widely is fundamental."¹⁴⁵ NATO's latest Deterrence and Defence Posture Review of 2012 also posited that "As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance."¹⁴⁶ By contrast, neither the US government nor the Japanese government ever made any similar statement about a nuclear alliance. Ota's statement is somewhat value-laden particularly in view of his anti-nuclear position. His works indeed put a strong emphasis on the existence of US secret plans to introduce its nuclear weapons into Japan.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴² Fintan Hoey: *Sato, America and the Cold War: US-Japanese Relations 1964-72* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2015).

¹⁴³ Akira Kurosaki: *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei: America no Kakufukakusan Gaiko to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976* [Nuclear Weapons and US-Japan Relations: US policy of non-nuclear proliferation and Japan's choice 1960-1976] (Tokyo: Yushisha., 2006); Ota, *Meiyaku no Yami*; Masakatsu Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo* [The Whole Picture of US-Japan Secret Deal] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2011).

¹⁴⁴ Masakatsu Ota: *Nichibei Kaku Domei: Genbaku, Kaku no Kasa, Fukushima [Japan-US Nuclear Alliance: Atomic Bombing, Nuclear Umbrella, Fukushima]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2014). See also Idem, *Meiyaku no Yami*.

¹⁴⁵ Arshad Mohammend and David Brunnstrom: "U.S. signal its nuclear arms stay in Europe for now", 22 April 2010, *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-nuclear/u-s-signals-its-nuclear-arms-stay-in-europe-for-now-idUSTRE63L54Q20100422> accessed on 22 January 2019.

¹⁴⁶ "Deterrence and Defence Posture Review", 20 May 2012, *North Atlantic Treaty Organisation*, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm, accessed on 22 January 2019.

¹⁴⁷ Ota, *Nichibei Kaku Domei*; Idem, *Meiyaku no Yami*; Masakatsu Ota: *Hiroku: Kaku Sukuupu no Uragawa* [Secret memoir: the inside story of nuclear scoops] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2013), especially

Surprisingly, these two outstanding works do not discuss the peculiar form of “Invisible” END. Given the fact the nuclearisation of East Asia accelerated in the 1950s and 1960s but Japan was exception to this rule, more attention should be paid to this peculiar case. In fact, they do not devote any attention to the invisibility of END, much less theorise it.¹⁴⁸ This may be because they do not come from the field of Strategic Studies. Kurosaki is a diplomatic historian while Ota is a journalist.

This thesis is, however, written within the tradition of Strategic Studies. Moreover, these two works and all other works on US END over Japan pay little attention to the 1940s. This is probably logical because the period was not an exactly formative period of US END. Yet overlooking this period fails to draw a comprehensive picture of US END over Japan. Key issues surrounding it developed during the 1940s and the early 1950s. There are two particularly vital issues: the introduction of Article 9 and demilitarisation. Nobody can discuss Japan’s security without any reference to these two points. With this in mind, this thesis draws a more comprehensive picture of US END over Japan by theorizing “Invisible” END, focusing on the overlooked period and drawing upon primary sources including recently declassified materials and those already declassified but previously ignored by other authors.

Research Methodology and Sources

In order to unravel the complexity and peculiarity of the US END over Japan, this project adopts a qualitative research method. Qualitative research is of particular use in interpreting meanings, ideas, images, beliefs and values in great depth as the method enables researchers to analyse specific contexts.¹⁴⁹ This aspect

chapter 1, 2, 3.

¹⁴⁸ Kurosaki, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*.

¹⁴⁹ Alan Bryman: *Social Research Methods* (New York: Oxford U.P., 2012); Martyn Denscombe: *The Good Research Guide, 3rd ed.* (New York: Open U.P., 2008); Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet: *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press., 2005),

is crucial for this research because this study entails hardly quantifiable factors such as ideology, personal idiosyncrasy and beliefs.¹⁵⁰ These factors are crucial to understanding US END over Japan today. They have considerably influenced the formation of Japan's defence strategy and thus, the form of US END over Japan. More specifically, this thesis employs a historically informed approach: "Path Dependence." According to economist Douglass North, "Path dependence means that history matters. We cannot understand today's choices...without tracing" their evolution over time.¹⁵¹ More specifically it suggests that "earlier processes are relevant to a full understanding of contemporary social events."¹⁵² This sounds too obvious and vague to tell us anything about exactly how history matters. That said its logic is in fact more complex than a simplistic contention: "the past matters."¹⁵³

In order to see the dynamics of historical force, "Path Dependence" suggests that we need to probe not only a single event but a sequence of events because they shape particular courses of action.¹⁵⁴ In other words, it actually warns that we should not just look at a single decisive event such as Japan's complete defeat in August 1945. Japan's anti-nuclear sentiment is doubtlessly rooted in the devastating war marked by atomic bombing upon Japan but as we will see it did not become evident until the *Daigo Fukuryūmaru* incident of 1954. Ever since, the lofty idea of realising a nuclear-weapons-free-world as the Japanese paramount political goal started to gain wide public support in Japanese society.¹⁵⁵ The incident suggests that it actually took some time and events to bring about the anti-nuclear sentiment. While it is true that some changes are more decisive than others, each

pp.19-21.

¹⁵⁰ Murray and Grimsley, "Introduction: On Strategy", p. 1.

¹⁵¹ Douglass C. North: *Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1990), p. 100.

¹⁵² Paul Pierson: "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 94 No. 2 (Jun 2000), p. 263.

¹⁵³ James Mahoney: "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology", *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29 No. 4 (Aug 2000), pp. 507-548.

¹⁵⁴ Pierson: "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", p. 252.; Geog Schreyogg, Jorg Sydow and Philip Holtmann: "How History Matters in Organisations: The Case of Path Dependence", *Management & Organizational History* Vol. 6 No.1, p. 83.

¹⁵⁵ Kazuya Sakamoto: "Dokuritsukoku no Jouken [Requirements for independent states]" in Makoto Iokibe (ed.): *Sengonihon Gaikoshi*. Shinban[The Diplomatic History of Japanese Postwar, 2nd ed] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2007), pp. 77-78.

key event is still incremental in nature and all the events combined are to bring about a particular belief system and path.¹⁵⁶

The existence of the distinct belief system is, however, not sufficient enough to condition Japanese policy makers. While it does not have to become the consensus of the Japanese, it has to be widely shared as a norm throughout Japan. Once this non-nuclear path is formed, a self-reinforcing mechanism operates. The internal dynamics growingly become dominant and the path gains more support and legitimacy and attempts to preserve practices.¹⁵⁷ Self-reinforcing dynamics create social patterns which reproduce themselves over time.¹⁵⁸ The Japanese public, for instance, demonstrated its fervent opposition to visits by US nuclear-powered naval vessels to Japan in the 1960s even though they were not armed with nuclear weapons. This resulted in wide public acceptance of Japan's declaration of three non-nuclear principles in 1968 and to a lesser extent Japan's signature to the NPT in 1970. Japan's decision to sign the NPT stemmed in part from a norm of its non-nuclear status. Japan's non-nuclear path was further institutionalized by itself. After this formalising process, it becomes extremely difficult to deviate. Change can still occur but its extent is rather bounded not least after a particular norm is institutionalized.¹⁵⁹ Contrasting paths such as the nuclear path and the path of "Visible" END are nearly automatically excluded.

The path gets deeply fixed over time as a specific norm such as an anti-nuclear norm has already been deeply embedded throughout society and also in practice. It has become a Japanese tradition to officially oppose nuclear weapons, and this tradition is reflected in formal and informal Japanese institutions. Policy makers do not necessarily get locked in fixed values or traditions but their actions

¹⁵⁶ James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul: "Historical Context and Path Dependence", in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2006), p. 457; Charles Tilly: "Why and How History Matters", in Goodin and Tilly (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, p. 421 (417-437).

¹⁵⁷ Paul Pierson: *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2004), p.10, 18. Mahoney and Schensul, "Historical Context and Path Dependence", pp. 466-467.

¹⁵⁸ Mahoney, "Path Dependence in Historical Sociology", pp. 511-515.

¹⁵⁹ Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics", p. 256, 265. See also Andrew Bennet and Colin Elman: "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence", *Political Analysis* Vol. 14 No.3, p. 252.

and preferences are severely conditioned within them. They stick to their dominant modes of political understanding (in this case, the non-nuclear option) in the face of challenges.¹⁶⁰ Indeed today's Japanese policy makers are still considerably conditioned by the path taken nearly 70 years ago. As historian and sociologist William Sewell succinctly explained, "what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a sequence of events occurring at a later point time."¹⁶¹ This is what the author means by "history matters." Looking at "Path Dependence" from a different angle, it helps us understand the choices not taken, or why actors do not change policies to seemingly more beneficial ones. Concomitant with the non-nuclear path, the non-military path was adopted. The American-imposed new peace constitution came into force in 1947 and Japan's rearmament has been a controversial issue ever since. Japan has also decided to take a broadly non-military path. In this respect, an in-depth analysis is required to comprehend the detailed contexts of the subject.

For the sake of in-depth examination of the dynamics of historical forces this study will principally focus on Japan's decision-making process— exactly how decision makers were influenced by both external and internal elements to shape "Invisible" END. It is important to note that while anti-nuclear sentiment (or nuclear mentality) was widely shared in Japan, some political leaders especially those who were in charge of making a strategy had a significantly different view of nuclear weapons from the Japanese public. In this regard, it is essential to examine how the political leaders vacillated between two possible courses of action (whether to build an independent nuclear deterrent, and whether to accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan). In short, through the in-depth examination of the decision-making process, this thesis will aim to analyse how external and internal elements interact with each other. This thesis draws on multiple sources ranging

¹⁶⁰ Pierson, *Politics in Time*, p. 11. Schreyogg, Sydow and Holtmann, "How History Matters in Organisations", p. 85.

¹⁶¹ William H. Sewell Jr.: "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology", in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.): *The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press., 1996), pp. 262-263.

from official primary sources to comic books to study the process.

Since extended nuclear deterrence is mutual acknowledgement of such deterrence by both a protector and a protégé, it is essential to examine top-level discussion between the Japanese and the American government. Given the importance of the issues, the summit-level talks between a Japanese Prime Minister and a US President need to be scrutinized. For this purpose, archival research was conducted in the National Archives II, College Park, the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Texas, the National Archives, London, the National Archives of Japan, Tokyo and the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. This research project, therefore, draws on these archival documents.

Apart from these official government documents, edited government document volumes are also used. These include the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series edited by the Office of the Historian, *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho* (Key Diplomatic Documents) edited by the Kajima Institute of International Peace and *Nichibei Kankei Shiryo Shu, 1945-97* (A Documentary History of US-Japanese Relations) edited by Chihiro Hosoya. Online databases such as the Digital National Security Archive and the Japanese Foreign Affairs's website also provide key materials. These primary documents are examined in order to investigate the political recognition of US END by the top leaders and their perception of Japanese public opinion against nuclear weapons with a particular focus on the Japanese decision-making level. In other words, the primary sources are used to identify two distinct aspects in the decision-making level: the actual views of the political leaders on US nuclear deterrence and their assessment of domestic anti-nuclear sentiment when making key decisions. In addition, memoirs, diaries, biographies of former leaders and officials, and their comments and government statements are examined for the analysis of their understanding of END and public opinion.

For the analysis of Japanese nuclear mentalities, it is vital to study books and journals by critics of the day, and newspapers. Since Japan is known for its popular culture, Japanese *manga* (comic book), and movies have been included.

Interestingly Japanese anti-nuclear feeling is at times clearly depicted in popular culture. The elucidation of these materials helps us to understand the distinct background of Japanese nuclear mentalities.¹⁶² It is worth mentioning that public opinion polls are a useful indicator to measure Japanese public opinion against nuclear weapons, but as Freedman aptly warned us, “Just because numbers were involved did not make a statement more correct than one expressed in a more literary form...”¹⁶³ In other words, it is more crucial to look at the context where this number originates.

It is also crucial to analyse political debates on nuclear weapons as how nuclear issues were treated in public might reflect a general attitude toward the subject. As for political debates, Diet debates are key in that nuclear issues often received more attention due to its controversial nature of the subject in Japan. For this reason, the political leaders in the ruling party were more attentive to the debates. In general public debates within mass politics may largely affect political calculation of decision makers.¹⁶⁴ As Heuser asserted, “in a democracy or political nation-state, the electorate cannot be dissociated from the politics of the government they have elected into office.”¹⁶⁵ While it is true that today national leaders still dominate decision-making and they can do away with public opinion, the popular voice has become a critical, if not deterministic, factor for influencing a political direction. Political leaders cannot simply ignore public opinion about sensitive military issues such as missile deployment. The mass public voice can challenge the political stability and legitimacy of the government.¹⁶⁶ By analyzing

¹⁶² On this approach, see Beatrice Heuser: *Nuclear Mentalities?: Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.,1998); Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*.

¹⁶³ Lawrence Freedman: *The Future of War: A History* (London: Allen Lane., 2017),p. 114.

¹⁶⁴ On this point see for example Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, pp. 1-2; Beatrice Heuser and Jeannie Johnson: “Introduction: National Styles and Strategic Culture”, in Beatrice Heuser and Eithan Shamir (eds.): *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2016), p.11. See also Macgregor Knox: “Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy”, in Murray, Knox and Bernstein (eds.), *The Making of Strategy*, pp. 621-626.

¹⁶⁵ Beatrice Heuser: “Strategy Before the Word: Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World”, *RUSI Journal* Vol. 155 No. 1 (Feb/ Mar 2010), p. 38.

¹⁶⁶ Garnett, “Defense Policy-Making”, pp. 12-13; Knox, “Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy”, pp. 621-626. See also William Greider: “The People Versus the Experts” in

the research materials above, this thesis aims to unravel how “Invisible” END came to emerge and develop.

Structure and Content

This thesis is essentially first attempt of its kind to theorise “Invisible” END through the detailed examination of the formative period of the deterrent between 1945 and 1970. Following this introduction, the rest of the thesis is divided into six chapters. From Chapter Two to Chapter five, the developments of US END over Japan are examined chronologically followed by the strategic analysis of key events and developments especially with respect to their impact in Japan’s defence strategy. Chapter Six also deals with Japan’s elite perceptions of US END but its main focus is on several secret nuclear studies on Japan’s independent nuclear option driven by fears of the Chinese nuclear test and time pressure to sign the NPT in the late 1960s. After examining the historical developments of “Invisible” END and the studies of feasibility and desirability of Japan’s nuclear option in the next six chapters, this thesis identifies the circumstances under which Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella, factors that shaped the peculiar form of the umbrella, and the nature of it.

Chapter Two explores background factors of “Invisible” END, looking closely at a period between 1945 and 1955. It first analyse the way Japan’s nuclear decision making was made and factors that surrounds the decision making. There were some key developments and events such as the US occupation from 1945 and 1952, the Korean War of 1950 and the *Lucky Dragon* Incident of 1954 (a Japanese finishing boat was irradiated by nuclear fallout from an American thermonuclear test at Bikini atoll: the Third Bombing), which drastically changed the course of Japan’s Cold War. Had it not been for these events, Japan’s post-war path would

Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), pp. 89-100. On the critical view of the public influence on policy-making, see Yascha Mounk: “America is not a democracy”, *The Atlantic* (March 2018), pp. 82-87.

have been completely different. It therefore focuses on them and their impact on rearmament of Japan following disarmament during the early occupation years. Over all it explains how the key events in the period of the chapter brought Japan on Japan's distinct path of non-military-cum-nuclear path.

Chapter Three analyses a period between 1954 and 1964. It focuses on the Eisenhower's plan to introduce nuclear weapons on Japan's soil including nuclear sharing arrangements. Fervent Japanese reactions to the deployment of *Honest John* missile even without nuclear components in 1955 virtually thwarted the US introduction plan. This chapter also examines measures the Eisenhower administration attempted to assuage Japanese hysteric attitudes toward nuclear weapons so that it could eventually deploy nuclear weapons in Japan. It intensively discusses how carefully the US and Japanese government handled key nuclear matters especially between 1955 and 1963 regardless of whether they were civilian or military use.

Chapter Four looks at a period between 1964 and 1968. This four-year period was a key moment for Japan to come under the US nuclear umbrella. It examines the strategic impact of the Chinese nuclear test of 1964 on the new defence-minded Prime Minister Sato. The test marked a watershed in the emergence of the US nuclear umbrella over Japan. Since nuclear assurance from US President is a key component of US END over Japan, the chapter analyses the assurance mechanism provided by President Lyndon Baines Johnson through the summit meetings in 1965 and 1967 and some other various meetings. This four-year period helps us understand how Japan explicitly came under the nuclear umbrella.

Chapter Five focuses broadly on a five-year period between 1964 and 1969 and it specially looks at diplomatic negotiations over the reversion of the Bonin (Ogasawara) and the Ryukyu (Okinawa) Islands between 1967 and 1969. These islands were under US control even after Japan regained its independence in 1952. Because of the administrative status of the islands, the USA deployed nuclear weapons in the islands. While in the end, the Japanese government managed to

remove nuclear arsenals from the islands, it had to conclude a secret nuclear deal with the US government, which permitted the US military to reintroduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in the case of emergency. This chapter examines why this deal was made. It also discusses how “Invisible” END works in theory because the reversion of these islands means the completion of the invisible form of US END at least during peacetime.

Chapter Six deals with considerations that surrounded Japan’s decision to sign the NPT in 1970 and Japan’s secret nuclear studies on the feasibility and desirability of an independent nuclear deterrent. For clarification, they were not ordered or directed by Prime Minister Sato. Rather they were done by Japanese government officials and their close colleagues. The NPT was closely connected to Japan’s nuclear option. As far as Japanese policy makers were concerned, signing the NPT would internationally foreclose Japan’s nuclear option. The most important driver behind these studies was the Chinese nuclear test. This chapter also critically analyses Japanese technological capabilities to produce nuclear weapons in the late 1960s. It address a key question: Did Japan have a reliable “strategic hedging” option?

Chapter Seven concludes the thesis by considering special meaning of nuclear weapons attached to Japan. It discusses why the non-military-cum-nuclear path was chosen but not the nuclear path, answers the research questions of the thesis and describes the nature of “Invisible” END over Japan. It deals with what Japanese nuclear history between 1945 and 1970 teaches about today’s nuclear challenges in the Asia Pacific

II. List of Key Events

2 September 1945:

Japan formally surrenders by signing the Instrument of Surrender.

3 November 1946:

The new Japanese constitution is promulgated. (It comes into effect on 3 May 1947)

25 June 1950:

The Korean War breaks out (The truce agreement is signed on 27 July 1953)

10 August 1950:

The National Police Reserve is promulgated and enforced.

8 September 1951:

Japan signs the San Francisco Peace Treaty and First US-Japan Security Treaty.

1 March 1954:

The *Lucky Dragon* was irradiated by nuclear fallout from a thermonuclear test at Bikini atoll.

2 July 1954:

Japan Defence Agency and Self-Defence Forces are established.

15 November 1955:

The Liberal Democratic Party is formed.

6 January 1960:

Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Record of Discussion was exchanged by Aiihiro Fujiyama and Douglas MacArthur II.

19 January 1960:

New US-Japan security treaty (Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan) is signed. It comes into effect in June.

4 April 1963:

Ohira and Reischauer had a secret meeting about transit rights of naval vessels

16 October 1964:

Communist China conducted its first nuclear test

13 January 1965:

Joint Communiqué between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato following talks in Washington refers to US security commitments to Japan potentially including nuclear protection.

30 January 1968:

Prime Minister Sato announces the four nuclear pillars including Japan's reliance on the US nuclear umbrella at Diet.

26 July 1968:

The Bonin Islands are restored to Japan

21 November 1969:

President Nixon and Prime Minister agree to return the Ryukyu Islands without US nuclear weapons in 1972. In the meantime, they also sign "Agreed Minute."

3 February 1970

Japan signs the NPT two years after it opened for signature.

Chapter Two

Background Factors: From a Former Evil Enemy to a Virtual Ally

I am well aware of my political stance, but it is my belief that the cadets at the National Defence Academy of Japan are a weakness and obloquy in our young generation. I should like to put all my efforts to discourage our young people from going to the academy. I wish that there will be only few candidates in the future.

—Kenzaburo Oe¹⁶⁷

This chapter will examine the period between 1945 and 1955 to explore the origins of “Invisible” US END over Japan. There were several key developments in the period: US occupation accompanied by postwar reforms represented by two Ds—“Democratisation” and “Demilitarisation” including disarmament and the introduction of the new American-imposed constitution. Although the USA succeeded in demilitarising Japan, the Korean War significantly changed the mood and Japan’s rearmament had to initiate. More importantly, the emergence of Japanese fervent anti-nuclear sentiment in the foregoing period was significant as far as the formation of “Invisible” END was concerned.

Therefore, this chapter aims to identify a postwar anti-nuclear norm (Nuclear Mentality) in Japan. Its main facet is not only anti-nuclear weapons sentiment but also a military aversion. This can be simply summarised as “Anti-Nuclear Pacifism.”¹⁶⁸ While at first glance this expression appears to describe a prevalent postwar Japanese norm, the reality was more complex. Japan’s feeling of anti-nuclear and anti-military was genuine, but not all Japanese were pacifists. The Japanese socialist party that advocated a pacifist norm such as “unarmed neutrality” never won its position as the ruling party. In reality, the conservative

¹⁶⁷ Kenzaburo Oe: “Jyoyu to Boueidai Sei [Actress and Cadet]”, *Mainichi Shimbun*, 25 June 1958.

¹⁶⁸ Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu: “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960”, in Leffler and Westad (eds.), *The Cold War Volume I Origins*, p. 244.

party (Liberal Democratic Party) governed postwar Japan. Some Prime Ministers of the party even advocated Japan's nuclear option. While the Japanese were truly sensitive about military issues, they did not necessarily deny Japan's right to self-defence. Rather the post-war national consensus of Japan was that people did not want another bloody and devastating war. The vivid symbol of the war was doubtlessly the atomic bombing. There was a strong feeling of "never again" widely shared among postwar Japanese society.¹⁶⁹ Japan was traumatised by the war and many people indeed did not want to even think about it.¹⁷⁰ Many people did not want to touch military affairs and their deliberate lack of interest in them was somewhat natural. Therefore, to be more accurate, postwar Japan held a norm of a military aversion under which Japan had anti-nuclear and military sentiments; hence its non-military-cum-nuclear path. The top priority of postwar Japan was not to rebuild its military strength but to revitalize its economy. The emergence of this socio-cultural norm was probably inevitable given that Second World War completely devastated Japan. Japanese society was literally born out of the ashes of the war. Without close scrutiny of the Japanese postwar beliefs, it will be less clear exactly why Japan relied on the peculiar form of US END.

To be sure, particular strategic preferences adopted to deal with security challenges are a reflection of strategic beliefs (ideational) but also material limitations of countries. Strategies are doubtlessly made under the interaction and influence of multiple factors. Strategy-making can never be reduced to just a single causal relationship as all the factors function differently from context to context.¹⁷¹ Strategic preferences are substantially influenced by key material factors such as

¹⁶⁹ Yuichi Hosoya: *Sengoshino Kaiho II Jishu Dokuritu towa Nanika Zenpen: Haisen kara Nihonkoku Kenpo Seitei made* [Critical Analysis of Postwar History: What is National Independence?: The Defeat of Japan and the Enactment of the New Constitution] (Tokyo:Shinchosha., 2018)..

¹⁷⁰ Keiji Nakazawa: *Hadashino Gen wa Hiroshima wo Wasurenai* [Barefoot Gen is Always with Hiroshima] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2008), pp. 10-28, 36-37; Toshiyuki Shikata: *Kyokuto Yuji: Kakutenihonwa Sensoni Hikikomareru* [Contingency in the Far East: Japan will be dragged into war] (Tokyo: Kuresutosha., 1996), p. 194.

¹⁷¹ See for example Carl von Clausewitz: *On War*, tans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1984, ppb. 1989), p. 183.

technology and geography.¹⁷² Technology is not all about what technology one has but it is also about how human beings interpret it and employ it.¹⁷³ Japan might have been technologically capable of building its indigenous nuclear weapons. Yet Japan did not even have a nuclear weapons programme. The possession of nuclear weapon technology did not automatically mean that the Japanese political leadership wanted to utilise it to acquire nuclear bombs. In this respect, it is more of a question of why specific technology was accepted while other technology was not. This can be for a variety of reasons well beyond the narrow military technological dimension. Japan's political perception of nuclear technology was crucial because it was essentially a Japanese choice to renounce its nuclear path. Despite its advanced nuclear technology, ultimately Japan decided to rely on US nuclear protection, instead. Accordingly, technology involves political and cultural understanding of specific military technology and its strategic utility.

As the term political geography emphasizes, geography is subject to the understanding and interpretation by policy makers in a given state because it is relative to the nature of foreign relations (e.g. friendly or hostile) to neighboring states.¹⁷⁴ The locations of countries with respect to their neighbouring countries are one of most important strategic considerations for national leaders as nations must be vigilant and watchful if they are surrounded by hostile nations.¹⁷⁵ Indeed, most wars are fought between neighbours for various causes but one of the major reasons is specific territorial disputes.¹⁷⁶ Thus, a threat perception is closely related to

¹⁷² There are other key variables that include time, "Bureaucracy, economy, ideology, mass politics, national prestige, the nature of the regime and political capital." On this point, see Colin S. Gray: *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2010, ppb. 2016), pp. 38-39, Steven Jeremy: *Strategy For Action* (London: Knightstone Publishing., 2011), pp. 204-206; Knox, "Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy", pp.614- 645; Murray and Grimsley, "Introduction: On Strategy", pp.12-13.

¹⁷³ Colin S. Gray, *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1999), p. 97. See also Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, pp. 72-74 and Michael I. Handel: *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* 3rd Revised and Expanded ed (London: Routledge., 2010), p.82.

¹⁷⁴ Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, p. 84; Spanier and Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, p. 132.

¹⁷⁵ Kathleen E. Braden and Fred M. Shelley: *Engaging Geopolitics* (Essex: Pearson Education., 2000), p. 6; Colin S. Gray: "A Debate on Geopolitics: The Continued Primacy of Geography", *Orbis* Vol. 40 No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 247.

¹⁷⁶ John A. Vasquez: "Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32 No. 3 (Aug 1995), pp. 277-293.

geographical proximity.¹⁷⁷ Generally speaking proximate power can more easily and physically pose an acute and immediate threat than those in the distance. ¹⁷⁸ It is true that Brazil does not pose any significant threat to Japan simply because it is located in the distance (and of course Brazil has no desire to do so at all).

If a country is surrounded by hostile nations, the policy makers of the country are more wary of their national security, but this does not mean the public shares the same view as the policy makers; in fact they did not, and this is where the political dimension comes in, with its particular views of the world conditioned by country-specific interpretations of the world, nuclear mentalities as we will see below. It is worth noting that due to Japan's geographical proximity to China and Russia, the Pentagon had a clear plan to store US nuclear weapons in Japan in the 1950s, but in the end, it abandoned the plan as Japan as a whole was not convinced of the necessity of such deployment. Worse still, it was fervently opposed to such deployment.

It is important to note that several issues that arose in the approximately ten-year period covered in this chapter were directly linked to the nuclear debates over "Invisible" END particularly during the diplomatic negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa as we will shall. This period thus sets the foundation for the peculiar form of US END over Japan. This chapter revolves around how postwar Japan found its beginnings in the new world with a particular focus on rearmament and nuclear weapons. First we will examine two key dimensions of the formation of "Invisible" END: Japan's Nuclear Decision Making (how a key decision was made) and Japan's cultural disposition or mentality with regard to nuclear weapons (how the Japanese perceived nuclear weapons).

¹⁷⁷ Craig A. Snyder (ed.): "Contemporary Security and Strategy" in Craig A. Snyder: *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1999), pp. 1-4; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*. pp. 91-93.

¹⁷⁸ Stephen M. Walt: *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1987, ppb. 1990), p. 23.

Japan's Nuclear Decision Making with respect to US END.

Before we delve into the historical development of “Invisible” US END, it is crucial to understand how Japan made decisions with respect to the policy of relying on US END over Japan. Japan's security policy making in general was conditioned broadly by five factors, factional politics, the opposition party, the peace constitution, bureaucrats and public opinion.¹⁷⁹ While it is true that the key decisions with respect to US END ultimately resided with the leadership of Japanese Prime Ministers as we will see below, these five conditions nevertheless set strict limitation on the expansion of Japan's military capabilities. In other words, they constrained Japan's military posture. Japanese Prime Ministers' strategic calculation was circumscribed by these conditions, especially public opinion.

From 1955 to the end of Cold War, Japan loosely had a two-party system with the conservative or centre-right Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the left-idealist Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). This system is also known as *Gojuginen Taisei* (The 1955 Political System) because the political rivalry between the conservative camp and the socialist camp was created in 1955.¹⁸⁰ Their struggle for political power continued throughout the Cold War. In reality, the LDP had been the ruling party since its establishment in 1955 and dominant in policymaking during the period. One of the principal reasons why the LDP successfully managed its political power, keeping the opposition parties from gaining political power, was its economic-centred policy. It prioritized economic growth and Japan's rapid economic success during the Cold War attracted wide domestic political support for the party.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁹ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, pp. 31-40; Joseph P. Keddell, Jr: *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe., 1993), pp. 12-26; Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 79.

¹⁸⁰ Masumi Ishikawa: *Sengo Seijishi, Shinban* [The History of Post War Japan, New Edition] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2004), pp. 70-75; Shinichi Kitaoka: *Jiminto: Seikento no 38Nen* [The Liberal Democratic Party: 38 Years as the Ruling Party] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha., 1995), p. 63; Shinichi Kitaoka: *Nihon Seijisi: Gaiko to Kenryoku* [A Political History of Modern Japan: Foreign Relations and Domestic Politics] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2011), pp. 224-226.

¹⁸¹ Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*; pp. 12-13

The LDP itself was established as a merger between the Liberal Party led by Shigeru Yoshida and the Japan Domestic Party led by Ichiro Hatoyama in 1955 to contend with the rising socialist power.¹⁸² Its key goals included the revision of the constitution to make Japan more sovereign.¹⁸³ Because of this formation history, the LDP had some influential factions such as Yoshida's and Hatoyama's group. In other words, the LDP leaders could not afford to ignore the existence of factional politics within the party.¹⁸⁴ Yoshida's preference for an unambitious military posture for the sake of economic recovery was, for example, consciously or unconsciously followed especially by his disciples (Yoshida school), Ikeda Hayato and Eisaku Sato.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, a LDP leader needed to run consensus-based management to have cohesion within the party. Such cohesion was needed to run the party smoothly.¹⁸⁶ Yet when it came to the emergence and treatment of US END over Japan, factional politics did not usually have any strong influence. It was left to the strong leadership of the Prime Minister to ensure the US nuclear umbrella. This was clear in the negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa as we will see below. Prime Minister Sato secretly concluded a secret nuclear deal with the US government without letting the fractional political leaders know about the surreptitious operation. Their interaction with Prime Ministers, however, helps us to understand how the Japanese supreme leaders viewed nuclear deterrence and Japan's nuclear option.

As for a political role of the main opposition party (SDPJ) that long denied the constitutionality of JSDF, it had little political input into decision making not

¹⁸² Thomas U. Berger: "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism" in Green and Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p. 194.

¹⁸³ "To no Shimei" [The Mission of LDPJ], 15 November 1955, *Jiminto*, <https://www.jimin.jp/aboutus/declaration/>, accessed on 16 January 2019.

¹⁸⁴ Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 14; Kitaoka, *Nihon Seijisi*.

¹⁸⁵ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence*, p. 24; Masataka Kosaka: *Saisho Yoshida Shigeru* [Prime Minister Yoshida] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1968), pp. 46-47; Ayako Kusunoki: "The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-nuclear Policy", *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Vol. 15 (2008), p. 30; Nicholas Evan Sarantakes: *The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A & M U.P., 2000), p. 131; Michael Schaller: *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since The Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1997), pp. 186-188.

¹⁸⁶ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, pp. 38-39; Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 14.

least when it came to US END. That being said, it raised nuclear issues as the political agendas at the National Diet at times.¹⁸⁷ This indeed helped clarify the government stance on the US nuclear umbrella as we will see below. The opposition party also put the brakes on the rise in Japan's defence spending while the LDP dominance managed to incrementally expand Japan's military force.¹⁸⁸

The Japanese constitution is commonly known as a peace constitution. Article 9 legally bans the possession of Japan's national military force and war potential:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.¹⁸⁹

Due to the existence of the Article, as one Japanese analyst explained, "any security policy formulated by the Japanese government must therefore be scrutinized to ensure compliance with its basic tenets."¹⁹⁰ Owing to Article 9 some military choices were nearly automatically excluded. During the Cold War, sending SDF overseas for whatever purposes including Peace Keeping Operation was, for example, infeasible. SDF's role was completely limited to defence of the territory of Japan. As long as this pacifist constitution was in effect, Japan's remilitarisation

¹⁸⁷ Yoshiki Hayakawa, Mari Uchiumi, Dai Tamaru and Reiko Ohyama: *Seisaku Kateiron: Seisaku Kagaku heno Shotai* [On Policy-Making: Invitation to Policy Science] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo.,2004), pp. 168, 175-176. See also Takako Hikotani: "The Japanese Diet and defence policy-making", *International Affairs* Vol.94 No.4 (2018), p. 796 and Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, p. 39.

¹⁸⁸ Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 15; Mike M. Mochizuki: "Japan's Search for Strategy", *International Security* Vol. 8 No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), p. 153; Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance", p.75, 77.

¹⁸⁹ "The Constitution of Japan", *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed on 18 October 2018.

¹⁹⁰ Kase, "Japan", p. 133.

was inevitably restricted. When it was drafted in 1946, the US government or the General Headquarters (GHQ) led by General Douglas MacArthur, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers in particular was convinced that this constitution was necessary to prevent Japan from rising again as a military power. As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s, the constitution became a stumbling block for the renewed US policy for Japan. This is why the US government urged Japan to revise the constitution in the 1950s after it changed its occupation policy (the reverse course) as we will see below.

In general, bureaucrats, many of whom were in favour of an economic-centric policy and a lightly armed force, were also leading actors to draft and implement policies with political leaders in Japan.¹⁹¹ As Japan's defence was dependent heavily on the US-Japan security treaty, bureaucrats especially those from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) not the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) closely worked with the US government. They were in charge of developing the general direction of Japan's defence. It is important to note that Japan finally elevated the JDA to full-fledged ministry status (the Ministry of Defence) in 2007. The JDA was part of Prime Minister's Office rather than an independent ministry. Because of war-time experiences, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took an initiative and played a leading role in dealing with security matters with the US government.¹⁹² Indeed one of the main roles of the JDA was limited to monitoring and controlling Japanese Self-Defence Force under civilians.¹⁹³ Since the ruling party remained unchanged during the Cold War, Japanese political leaders from the

¹⁹¹ Berger, "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism", pp.193-194.

¹⁹² Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, pp. 36-37.

¹⁹³ Hikotani, "The Japanese Diet and defence policy-making", p. 798; Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, p. 36; Shingo Nakajima: *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku: Yoshida Rosen wo meguru Seiji Gaiko Gunji* [Postwar Japan's Defence Policy: The Yoshida Line Concerned with Politics, Diplomacy and Military](Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai., 2006), p.77;Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff: "Japan's Nuclear Hedge: Beyond 'Allergy' and Breakout", in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner: *Strategic Asia 2013-14 Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research., 2013), pp. 253; Takao Sebata: *Bouei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichibei Gaidorain* [National Defence Programme Outline: The Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha., 1998), pp. 37-39, 47-48.

LDP managed to create harmonious relations with the Japanese bureaucrats.¹⁹⁴ Yet it is important to note that while government officials conducted some internal studies on nuclear matters including an independent nuclear deterrent, those studies did not influence Japan's nuclear policy. This was mainly because nuclear issues, not least the US nuclear umbrella over Japan, were so sensitive and emotionally-charged in Japanese politics that only Prime Ministers made key decisions with regard to the official treatment of the US nuclear umbrella as we will see below.¹⁹⁵ In other words, key decisions were left in the hands of Prime Minister.¹⁹⁶ In the meantime, the political climate shaped by the constraints noted above surrounded Japanese political leaders.¹⁹⁷

It is important to note that the political climate was also greatly shaped by domestic anti-military culture stemming from Japan's historical experience in devastating defeat in World War Two clearly marked by the two atomic bombings. To some extent, an anti-military norm is arguably institutionalized by the pacifist constitution represented by Article 9. The constitution was much welcomed by the Japanese public.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, Japanese political leaders were concerned about the consequences of overlooking public opinion especially given that anti-military culture was pervasive throughout Japanese society. If they did, they would more likely lose their political seats in the next general election. While there were political, social and institutional conditions for the formulation of Japan's security policy, there was no systematic way of making Japan's nuclear decision regarding US END over Japan. It is rather a case-by-case approach and a product of the social climate and diplomatic negotiations. Therefore, it is crucial to scrutinize how some key political figures (actual decision makers) viewed, discussed and treated the US

¹⁹⁴ Hayakawa, Uchiumi, Tamaru and Ohyama, *Seisaku Kateiron*, p. 133; Kusano, *Seisaku Katei Bunsekinyumon*, p. 10; Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 14; Sebata, *Bouei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichibei Gaidorain*, pp. 23-25..

¹⁹⁵ See Hikotani, "The Japanese Diet and defence policy-making", p. 798; Samuels and Schoff, "Japan's Nuclear Hedge", p. 253. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 95

¹⁹⁶ Prime Minister Sato secretly made a key decision on the secret reintroduction deal over the reversion of Okinawa. See for example Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 95.

¹⁹⁷ Maria Rose Rublee: *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press.,2009), p. 54.

¹⁹⁸ Kase, "Japan", pp. 137-138.

nuclear umbrella over Japan with their American counterparts.

III.A. Table: Proliferation Drivers and Barriers

	<i>Drivers</i>	<i>Barriers</i>
Security	States acquire nuclear weapons to protect their own sovereignty.	States forgo nuclear weapons when it is in their security interest to do so and/ or when they can gain protection from a nuclear ally.
Prestige	States acquire nuclear weapons to fulfil perception of national destiny or to be viewed as a “great power” in international affairs.	States forgo nuclear weapons because of the international norm against the weapons. They seek acceptance or leadership in the international community.
Domestic	States acquire nuclear weapons when a set of well-placed bureaucratic actors convince political leaders of the need for them.	States forgo nuclear weapons when there is significant public opposition to nuclear programs, when there is a change in regime or in government priorities, and/or when well-placed bureaucratic actors convince political leaders that nuclear weapons are unnecessary.
Technology	States acquire nuclear weapons because they have the technological ability to do so.	States forgo nuclear weapons when they cannot develop or acquire the technology or technical know-how necessary to make fissile material and build a bomb.
Economic	Economics generally do not drive a state to pursue nuclear	States may forgo nuclear weapons because they are too costly, because

	<p>weapons, though advocates of nuclear weapons do argue that a nuclear defence is cheaper than a conventional defense.</p>	<p>of the economic sanctions that result from a nuclear weapons program, or because of the economic benefits that follow the abandonment of such a program.</p>
--	---	---

Source: Joseph Cirincione: *Bomb Scare: The History and Future of Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Columbia U.P., 2007), p. 49.

Nuclear Mentalities of Japan

This section aims to discuss key questions of the thesis: are the Japanese keen on nuclear weapons, are they nuclear-minded, do the Japanese have “nuclear mentalities.” According to Heuser, who elaborated upon the concept, “nuclear mentalities”, they refer to collective world views, beliefs and discourse common to the public at large within a given state. They are to disclose distinct assumptions (unique to a given state) about nuclear deterrence and defence in general.¹⁹⁹ National attitudes and beliefs—widely shared by the public— about war and defence issues including nuclear deterrence are particularly shaped by historical experiences, which serves as “a framework of reference known to anybody” in the country.²⁰⁰ It is generally believed that historical experiences provide people with some guidance: “Sociocultural values are assumed to be axiomatic beliefs that members of a society hold in common, even if the opinions they derive from these beliefs vary greatly.”²⁰¹ In this respect, it truly depends on people’s interpretations

¹⁹⁹ Heuser and Johnson, “Introduction: National Styles and Strategic Culture”, p.13; Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?* See also Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*.

²⁰⁰ Heuser and Johnson, “Introduction: National Styles and Strategic Culture”, p. 13; See also Theo Farrell: *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 2005), p.14; Murray and Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy”, p. 10; The Royal College of Defense Studies: “Thinking Strategically October 2010 Edition”, *Defense Academy of the United Kingdom*, (Oct 2010), p.34. See also Murray and Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy”, p. 10.

²⁰¹ Marijke Breuning: “Culture, History, Role: Belgian and Dutch Axioms and Foreign Assistance Policy”, in Valerie M. Hudson (ed.): *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1997), p. 103. See also Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*, p. 338 and Yuen Foong Khong: *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton U.P.,

of historical experiences, which in turn shapes strategic debates. Therefore, the concept entails some subjective understanding of social reality. Indeed, Japan's unique historical experience in the atomic bombing could have justified and legitimized Japan's possession of nuclear weapons to protect itself from another nuclear attack in the future. On the contrary the atomic bombing against Japan led to Japan's support for the nuclear-weapons-free world.²⁰² The socially constructed world view of Japan is that as the only country ever suffered from the two nuclear attacks, Japan has to promote this imagined world and nuclear weapons are absolute evil that has to be slain. The British philosopher of war, Christopher Coker, convincingly explained that "Societies have different cognitive styles, different cultural beliefs and different ways of perceiving the world and their own place within it."²⁰³

In this regard, we need to look at the term of "social imaginary" elaborated by Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor to clarify the cultural approach the thesis employed. Taylor defines "social imaginary" as "the ways people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows."²⁰⁴ Its role is "what enables through making sense of, the practices of a society."²⁰⁵ The social imaginary may not be shared by every single member of the society but shared by a majority of people. More importantly, it is "common understanding that makes possible common practices and a widely shared sense of legitimacy."²⁰⁶ The common understanding of social surroundings or collective world views suggest that once a certain norm is developed and accepted in the society, it becomes highly influential and affects the minds of people, leading to the common and collective practice. In the case of Japan, this refers to non-nuclear option rather than an independent deterrent. As Taylor cogently held, "we have a

1992), pp. 1-16.

²⁰² On this point, see Glenn D. Hook: "Evolution of the Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan", *Current Research on Peace and Violence* Vol. 10 No. 1 (1987), p. 40.

²⁰³ Christopher Coker: *The Improbable War: China, the United States and the Logic of Great Power Conflict* (London: Hurst., 2015, ppb. 2017), p. 12.

²⁰⁴ Charles Taylor: *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke U.P., 2004), p. 23.

²⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

²⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

sense of how things usually go, but this is interwoven with an idea of how they ought to go, of what missteps would invalidate the practice.”²⁰⁷ Indeed as Coker lucidly argued, “We are comprised entirely of beliefs about ourselves and about the world we inhabit.”²⁰⁸ In other words, the collective understanding of and discourse on nuclear issues common to the society is socially constructed. Mentalities in relation to nuclear weapons – or as a short hand. “nuclear mentalities”—are therefore a reflection of our subjective understanding of nuclear deterrence and defence issues in general. Nuclear Mentalities are of use when explaining unusual political phenomena or what looks like anomalies in the eyes of Western researchers. They have, for example, long considered Japan will become a nuclear power because it faces immediate nuclear threats from its nuclear neighbours (Russia and China), boasts highly advanced civil nuclear technology, and Japan’s rich economy can afford to pay for nuclear weapons. Japan has seemingly every conceivable reason to acquire nuclear weapons. In the words of Schelling, “Japan indeed is an anomaly. Japan is a departure from the general rule.”²⁰⁹

Looking at external and material factors does not spell out why Japan refrains from acquiring nuclear bombs. As the focus on mentalities suggest, we also need to scrutinise internal and ideational force together with external and material factors. With that in mind, we have to recognize that strategies go through a domestic process and they are inevitably influenced by domestic beliefs and collective world views. Accordingly, strategy makers cannot escape from their local context that inevitably reflects national beliefs of their country.²¹⁰

The main focus of this section is on the identification of general Japanese public perceptions of defence and nuclear issues in the period between 1945 and 1970. While postwar Japan is well known for its pacifism, it is not much known that

²⁰⁷ Ibid.,p. 24.

²⁰⁸ Christopher Coker: *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Cambridge: Politiy Press., 2014), p. 86.

²⁰⁹ First Agenda Topic, “Peace and Security in Asia and The Roles of Japan and the United” by Thomas C. Schelling, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference January 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Political and Defense, POL 19 RYU IS, Box 2459, RG 59, NARA.

²¹⁰ Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age*, p.61; Harry R.Yarger: *Strategic Theories For The 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute., 2006), p.10.

exactly what the domestic climate was like and how defence issues were assessed and treated within it. It explains this key domestic political and cultural context (a general aversion of military affairs) where these issues were domestically perceived and assessed. It must be stressed that Japanese policy makers could not simply afford to be indifferent to public opinion emerged from this context when making Japan's defence strategy. The examination of the domestic context in the foregoing period will not be done completely chronologically. Instead it will focus on some key ideas emerged from the domestic context that influenced general public views on defence issues. Public opinion in turn influenced the political calculation of Japanese leaders and eventually affect Japan's defence strategy. The perceptions of Japanese political leaders on these issues will be discussed in the next three chapters.

Without the clear identification of Japanese mentalities in relation to nuclear weapons and the domestic condition, the level of the impact of Japanese public opinion on the making of Japan's defence strategy will be less clear. Without it we do not understand exactly why Japan took a non-nuclear path as opposed to the contention by some Western analysts such as Herman Kahn that Japan would go nuclear.²¹¹ The rest of the thesis will demonstrate that Japan's non-nuclear path was self-reinforced and hard to deviate.

One of the crucial differences between prewar and postwar Japan was that in general the Japanese public showed a general aversion from defence issues and use of force in particular.²¹² A strong feeling of an aversion to the next war was the national consensus. Anything related to military became eclipsed in postwar Japan.

When one talks about the Japanese nuclear mentalities, there are two key components: an anti-military norm distinctly marked by the acceptance of the

²¹¹ Herman Kahn: *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Prentice Hall., 1970), pp. 191-195. See also John Welfield: *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the postwar American alliance system A study in the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy*, Reprint ed. (London: Bloombury., 2012), p. 252.

²¹² Peter J. Katzensein: *Cultural Norms and National Security: Politics and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 1996).

Pacifist constitution and anti-nuclear sentiment rooted in historical experience in the atomic bombing during Second World War.²¹³ Both were highly emotional matters. As noted above, the Japanese shared sentiments of “never again.” In view of Japanese experience of the highly devastating war, and the complete defeat symbolized by the two atomic bombs dropped upon Japan, anti-military sentiment was probably a natural reaction for the Japanese. The last war was doubtlessly traumatic enough. Because of the war, the country was completely ruined. Nobody wanted another war ever again and wanted to think about war. It was probably natural for postwar Japan to take a non-military-cum-nuclear path. Once this path was chosen and especially institutionalized by the Japanese constitution and subsequent political non-nuclear pledge, it got extremely difficult to reverse the course. In short, it nearly automatically excluded some key options available such as the revision of the American-made constitution and the introduction of US nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan. At the same time Japanese political leaders sought to ensure Japan’s security with limited but available means.

In the words of General MacArthur, “the military defeat had produced a spiritual and political vacuum. All the old beliefs had been fundamentally shattered by the outcome of the war.”²¹⁴ The late administrative vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Ryohei Murata, similarly observed that postwar Japan was aberrant and there was a distinct line between before and after 1945. Japan had become a peculiar country.²¹⁵ The Japanese non-military path might have not been necessarily inevitable but the Japanese intentionally put aside defence issues immediately after the war because rehabilitation was urgently needed. Japan’s economy was completely destroyed and its sovereignty was virtually suspended during the US occupation period between 1945 and 1952.

²¹³ Naomi Shono and Hideaki Nagai: “Kaku Ishiki Kenkyu no Koso” [The Study of Nuclear Awareness] in Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (eds.): *Kaku to Heiwa: Nihonjin no Ishiki* [Nuclear and Peace: The Awareness of the Japanese] (Kyoto: Houritsu Bunkasha., 1978), p. 1.

²¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1948, The Far East and Australia, Vol. 6, p. 697.

²¹⁵ Ryohei Murata: *Naze Gaimusho ha Dameninattanoka: Yomigaere Nihon Gaiko* [Why Japanese diplomacy fails: The Restoration of Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Fushosha.,2002), pp.15-18.

An idealist norm such as “unarmed neutrality” emerged in the 1950s was widely prevalent and influential in postwar Japan. To be sure, it does not mean that the idea of “unarmed neutrality” was widely accepted by the majority of the Japanese. One opinion poll conducted in December 1966 by the Japanese government showed only 17% of respondents supported such a concept.²¹⁶ The idea was promoted by the Japanese socialist party and the so-called *Shimpoteki Bunkajin* [progressive intellectuals], some of whom even praised the Cultural Revolution in China.²¹⁷ According to the logic of “unarmed neutrality”, if Japan was unarmed and neutral to any side of the Cold War competition, Japan would not be a military target in cases of war. In light of this logic, they argued that the Japan-US security treaty should be terminated and US bases in Japan should be closed down. Japan should not possess any form of military capability.²¹⁸ To put it simply, “unarmed neutrality” was “anti-military, anti-government and anti-American.”²¹⁹ A nationalist figure like Yukio Mishima, one of the most influential novelists in postwar Japan, chastised the concept for its idealism. For him it was nothing but illusory.²²⁰ This was completely unilateral peace. Actual peace cannot be realised without any cooperation with Japan’s neighbours. Political scientist Takashi Inoguchi called this mood “inward-looking pacifism.”²²¹ Or it can also be described as *Ikkoku Heiwa Shugi* (one country pacifism).²²² That said, it is true that the

²¹⁶ The exact question was “what would be an effective way to defend Japan?” The most popular answer was “do not know.” See Sorifu Kohoshitsu: “Anzen Hoshō Boei Mondaini Kansuru Yoron Chōsa Kekka” [Results of Opinion Poll with respect to Defence issues, conducted in December 1966], *MOFA*, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku10.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2019.

²¹⁷ Yoshihisa Hara: *Sengosinonakano Nihon Shakaito: Sono Riso Shugi towa Nani deattanoka* [The Japanese Socialist Party in Postwar Japan: What was Its Idealism?] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shansha., 2000), pp. 200-206; Atsushi Koyano: *Nihonjin notameno Sekaishinyumon* [Introduction to World History for the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 2013), p. 258, 260; Akihiro Sado: *Jieitaishi: Bouei Seisaku no Nanajyu Nen* [The History of Japanese Self-Defence Forces: Defence Policy over the last 70 years] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2015), p. 84.

²¹⁸ Michiaki Asaba: *Uyoku to Sayoku* [Right Wing and Left Wing] (Tokyo: Gentosha., 2006), pp. 172, 206-107; Kase, “Japan”, p. 136; Kedell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 21.

²¹⁹ Kenichiro Sasae: *Rethinking Japan-US Relations: An analysis of the relationship between Japan and the US and implications for the future of their security alliance*, Adelphi Papers 292 (London: IISS., 1994), p. 15.

²²⁰ Yukio Mishima: *Wakaki Samurainotameni* [For Young Samurai] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1996), pp. 153-154.

²²¹ Inoguchi, “Japan: Reassessing the Relationship Between Power and Wealth”, p. 254.

²²² Kase, “Japan”, p. 137.

Japanese public to some extent favoured some sort of neutrality.

More importantly, the Japanese embraced the American-made constitution that prohibits Japan from possessing national military force.²²³ This meant that Japan virtually renounced the use of force to achieve political ends apart from self-defence. Because of this peace constitution, the use of a Japanese word *Gun* meaning military became a taboo in JSDF despite the fact that the nature of the organization is a military establishment.²²⁴ As stated previously, until 2007 Japan did not have the Ministry of Defence (MOD). To be sure, this did not mean Japanese political leaders believed it unnecessary to establish the MOD. Prime Minister Eisaku Sato insisted that Japan should “make the Japan Defense Agency a ministry.”²²⁵ The political debate upon the status upgrade of the JDA always ended negatively during the Cold War. Japanese policy makers viewed it with great suspicion and even believed that the possession of the MOD would lead to the rise of another militarist Japan.²²⁶

The Nobel Prize in literature laureate, Kenzaburo Oe’s statement above made in 1958 evinced that Japan’s anti-military culture was evident in post-war Japanese society. Moreover, at the dawn of JSDF, its personnel had been condemned as “tax thieves” by Japanese public and it took some time to gain public approval for the new establishment.²²⁷ As Japan cannot legally have its armed forces, bizarrely infantry (*Hohei* in Japanese) is instead called *Futsuka* (i.e. “normal division”), a term which still makes no sense to ordinary Japanese people. Similarly, tank (*sensha*) was initially called special vehicle (*Tokusha*) in order to avoid using a

²²³ Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 86.

²²⁴ Yukio Mishima: *Koudougaku Nyumon* [Introduction to Behavioural Study] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1974), pp. 14-15.

²²⁵ Memorandum of Conversation: Views of Eisaku SATO, (1 February 1963), Digital National Security Archive (hereafter DNSA), JU00201, Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security and Economic Relations, 1960-1976 (hereafter JUSDSER, 1960-1976).

²²⁶ Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku (GRIPS) C.O.E. Oraru Seiskau Kenkyu Purojekuto: *Kaihara Osamu Oral History*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo:Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku., 1998), pp. 93-94.

²²⁷ “Jieitai Takeda Goro Moto Toubaku Gicho=63: Sengo anokoro to Ima to 10” [Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Japanese Self Defence Force, Goro Takeda (63): Post-War and Now Series 10], Asahi Shimbun, 22 August, 1985. See also Christopher W. Hughes: *Japan’s Remilitarisation* (London: IISS., 2009), p.100.

military term.²²⁸ At the political level, political debates on Japanese security were prone to ending up with interpretation of Article 9.²²⁹ Notably a public opinion poll carried out in 2002 demonstrated that more than half the Japanese people (63.6 percent) believed that postwar security was sustained by the peace constitution.²³⁰ In this connection, only approximately 10 percent of the Japanese (between 1969 and 2003) firmly believed that Japan should protect itself by its own people without any dependence on the USA.²³¹

As such the peace or military-averse identity was institutionalized and embedded in the formulation of Japan's security policy after the end of World War Two.²³² As Hughes rightly observed, "Japan's predilection for limiting its military security role was in large part derived from wartime defeat and the anti-militaristic principles derived from the 1947 'peace constitution', which ever since have framed the constraints and opportunities of security policymaking in Japan."²³³

²²⁸ See for example Akira Ikegami: *Shiranai dewa sumasarenai Jieitaino Honto no Jitsuryoku* [Things You Must Know About Japan Self Defence Force: The Truth About Japan's Defence Capabilities] (Tokyo: SB Creative., 2018).

²²⁹ Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance", p. 75.

²³⁰ The poll was cited in Naoko Sajima: *Kokusai Anzen Hoshoron I: Tenkan suru paradaimu* [Theory of International Security Vol. 1: Paradigm Shift] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppansha., 2007), pp. 16-17.

²³¹ The poll result (1969 to 2003) was cited in Sajima, *Kokusai Anzen Hoshoron I*, p. 23.

²³² Andrew L. Oros: *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford U.P., 2008), p. 193.

²³³ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, p. 31

III. B. Table: Japanese views of Effectiveness of Various Means for Japan's Security

	<i>Effective</i>	<i>Not Effective</i>
Military Power	40%	46%
Economic Cooperation	75%	11%
Diplomatic Means	75%	10%

Source: *Mainichi Shimbun* 3 May 1972 as cited by Paul Midford: *Rethinking Japanese Public Opinion and Security* (Stanford: CA: Stanford U.P., 2011), p. 61.

To be sure, there are some Japanese critics who lamented this public climate. Tsutomu Matsumura, retired General of Ground Self-Defence Force (GSDF), used a metaphor of a person afraid of seeing a doctor in order to criticise the postwar Japanese environment for uncritically viewing military affairs: You are scared to have a medical checkup because you might have a fatal disease. If you do not go to see a doctor, at least you do not need to face the reality of your health. Needless to say, this kills you sooner or later. The same thing can be said of postwar Japan. In the name of the peace constitution the Japanese public avoided facing anything related to military.²³⁴ More specifically the dominant attitude of postwar Japan toward military issues can be described as “see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil.”

Notably when the existence of *Mitsuya Kenkyu* (Three Arrows Study), which studied the security impact of the renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula on Japanese security, and the SDF's contingency plans for such a scenario carried out by the Japanese Joint Chief of Staff, were publicly revealed in 1965 at the National Diet, this study was severely criticised for violation of civilian control.²³⁵ Needless to say, it was natural and vital for those in charge of national

²³⁴ Tsutomu Matsumura: *Sensogaku* [War Study] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1998), p. 5. See also Shimizu, *Nihon yo Kokka tare*.

²³⁵ On the minutes of Diet debate, see Yosan Inakai Bouei Zujiyo Kenkyu Mondaito ni Kansuru Yosan Inikai Giroku Dai Sango [The Special Committee of the Issue of the Operational Plan Study, House of Representative], 12 March 1965, *Kokkai Kaigijiroku Kensaku Sisutemu*(hereafter KKKS) [Online

defence to study and prepare contingency plans but the Japanese government failed to explain why SDF was responsible for such a study.²³⁶ The dominant climate of postwar politics as a reflection of the popular anti-military mood viewed this act as if SDF had been secretly planning a next war. The Japanese public at that time suspected that the SDF would attempt to start a war like the Imperial Japanese Army. In the end, SDF's staff had a sense of guilt for having drawn up this plan, which in other countries would have seen as an essential part of an army's work.²³⁷ In the wake of this incident, another study of contingency plans became virtually unfeasible.²³⁸

III. C. Japanese views of an Independent Japanese Nuclear Deterrent, 1966-1973

	<i>Support</i>	<i>Oppose</i>
Does Japan need nuclear weapons?	20.30%	64.60%
How desirable is Japan's nuclear option? (1969-1972)	11.60%	76.60%

Source: Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 264.

Additionally, “memories of horrific nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki have sustained anti-nuclear sentiment and helped justify national policies championing non-proliferation and forgoing an indigenous nuclear arsenal.”²³⁹ As Murata maintained, throughout the Cold War, nuclear weapons became an

Database of proceedings of the Diet], <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/048/0530/04803120530003.pdf>, accessed on 27 October 2018.

²³⁶ Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 78.

²³⁷ Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen (ed.): *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutori: Moto Togo Bakuryo Kaigi Gicho* [Oral History of Ryuheinakamura: Former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff edited by National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense] (Tokyo: Bouei Kenkyujo., 2008), p. 202; Akihiko Tanaka: *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 nen no Mosaku* [National Security: The Trajectory of Japan's Security After the War] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha., 1997), pp. 215-216.

²³⁸ Berger, “Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism”, p. 196.

²³⁹ Samuels and Schoff, “Japan's Nuclear Hedge”, p. 232. See also Nobumasa Akiyama: “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture” in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center.,2003) , p. 65.

emotional issue. It has been impossible to have political debates objectively on nuclear strategy without provoking an emotional response from the Japanese public. He lamented this unhealthy political environment for making Japan's defence policy.²⁴⁰ In other words, discussing nuclear issues especially with respect to nuclear weapons (and deterrence) in public became a taboo. This was particularly so after the *Lucky Dragon* incident in 1954 as we will see below. We even find this approach in popular fiction and films. The first *Godzilla* movie of 1954 was a direct reflection of the incident and the societal shock of the time.²⁴¹ The fictional monster lived quietly in a cave of the seabed at Bikini atoll but a series of nuclear tests conducted near his nest forced poor *Godzilla* to evacuate. Awoken by the nuclear tests, *Godzilla* attacks human civilization²⁴² In other words, *Godzilla* is also a victim of the nuclear tests. The leading actor in the first *Godzilla*, Akira Takarada, once said that the film "has a serious historical background."²⁴³ Indeed this monster is sometimes understood as a metaphor for nuclear dangers in Japan.²⁴⁴ As a result of the nuclear incident the anti-nuclear sentiment was widely prevalent and deeply embedded in the minds of the Japanese in postwar Japan.

Having experienced the devastation of atomic bombing, Japan emphasized peace education and taught intensively the inhumanity of the atomic bombings at school. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are one of the most popular school trip (also as part of peace education) destinations.²⁴⁵ Many Japanese students visit these places and

²⁴⁰ Ryohei Murata: *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Gekan: Sokoku no Saisei wo Jisedaini Takushite* [Murata Ryohei Memoir Volume 2: Messages for Young Generations for the Restoration of Japan], (Kyoto: Mineruva., 2008), p. 316.

²⁴¹ Peter H. Brothers: *Atomic Dreams and the Nuclear Nightmare: The Making of Godzilla* (1954) (Seattle: Create Space Books., 2015), p.xv.

²⁴² "Gojira (1954)" [Godzilla], Japanese Cinema Database, <https://www.japanese-cinema-db.jp/Details?id=5492> accessed on 23 January 2019. See also "Nichiyo ni Omou: Gojira to Hoshu, Hakai to Sozo" [Contemplating on Sunday: Godzilla and the Conservative, Destruction and Creation], *Asahi Shimbun*, 28 August 2016.

²⁴³ Akira Takarada quoted in Brothers, *Atomic Dreams and the Nuclear Nightmare*, p.xv.

²⁴⁴ Minato Kawamura: *Genpatsu to Genbaku: Kaku no Sengo Seishinsi* [Nuclear Reactors and Atomic Bombing: Atom and History of Post-War Mentality] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha., 2011), p. 13. See also . David Deamer: *Deluze, Japanese Cinema and the Atom Bomb* (New York: Bloomsbury., 2014), p.68..

²⁴⁵ Toshifumi Murakami: "Heiwakeisei houho no kyouiku ni tsuitenno kosatsu: Chugakusei no Heiwa Ishiki Chosa wo Tegakarini [A study on Education about the Method to Be a Peace Builder: By the Investigation of Peace Consciousness of Junior High School Students]", *Hiroshima Peace Science*, Vol. 28 (2006), p. 32.

learn the horrific effects of atomic bombing. Before and after their school trip, they also study about the atomic bombing and understand why nuclear weapons must be abolished in the world. One of the most popular materials for the school trip (and also for peace education) to Hiroshima is Keiji Nakazawa's *manga* (comic book) *Hadashi no Gen* (Barefoot Gen) in 1972. It would be no exaggeration to say that most pupils in Japan have read it because a copy was widely available at primary schools throughout Japan. It was, moreover, made into TV series and movies. It has been translated into many languages as well. The author himself was a *Hibakusha* (atomic survivor) in Hiroshima. He initially did not want to write a comic book about the atomic bombing on Hiroshima as he vividly remembered every single detail of what happened in Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. For a long time he had not wanted to recall this traumatic event. Yet his mother's death caused by radiation sickness as an after effect of the atomic bombing was a turning point in his career. From that moment on, he was determined to share the memories of Hiroshima with wider audiences.²⁴⁶ Because of his encounter with the atomic bombing in Hiroshima, what happened on 6 August 1945 was very realistically depicted in *Barefoot Gen*. At first, Japanese anti-nuclear attitudes were not clear as Japanese society was literally devastated and its top priority was to recover economically. Moreover, as Nakazawa suggested, many Japanese people tried not to think about war ever again. After Japan's independence was restored and Japanese had some space to look at external issues, they also recovered repressed memories. Japan's unique experience in encountering the atomic bombing have produced some popular cultural works through which many generations of Japanese children have been exposed to how dreadful and inhumane the atomic bombings against Hiroshima and Nagasaki were.

As a retired General Toshiyuki Shikata aptly put it, "Japan's non-nuclear option is a rare exception of a national consensus." Shikata even said that 99 % of the Japanese would support this view: Japan would never develop its own nuclear

²⁴⁶ Nakazawa, *Hadashino Gen wa Hiroshima wo Wasurenai*, pp. 10-28, 36-37.

weapons.²⁴⁷ Shikata's contention is probably over exaggerated. National consensus does not necessarily mean that 100 % of the people or every single member of a given nation agrees with a certain opinion. Any political decision or opinion never gains a 100 % approval rate of the people. There is always a minority view that endorses Japan's nuclear option. In reality as the Cambridge English dictionary defines, consensus is "a generally accepted opinion or decision among a group of people."²⁴⁸ France, for example, is well known for its national consensus on the need of its independent nuclear weapons in order to make the country sovereign and independent, but France still has a minority group opposed to French nuclear bombs.²⁴⁹ As Heuser rightly observed, "Few states contain just one culture, and just one homogeneous population with shared values, traditions, and attitudes to life, death, and the use of force."²⁵⁰ In France a national consensus on the need of French nuclear bombs means that in addition to conservative parties, from the 1970s onward the French social and the communist parties embraced *force de frappe*. Therefore, France nuclear weapons receive wide public and political support.²⁵¹

In the case of Japan, despite the anti-nuclear norm widely accepted in Japanese society, there were always individuals and groups that sought an independent deterrent. A Japanese renewed sociologist, Ikutaro Shimizu, for instance, publicly declared that Japan should acquire its indigenous nuclear weapons in 1980.²⁵² As we shall see below several Japanese Prime Ministers too thought Japan should develop its own nuclear weapons. As the Table III. C (Japanese views of an Independent Japanese Nuclear Deterrent, 1966-1973) shows,

²⁴⁷ Shikata, *Kyokuto Yuji*, p. 194.

²⁴⁸ "Consensus", Cambridge Dictionary (Online),

<https://dictionary.cambridge.org/ja/dictionary/english/consensus>, accessed 21 May 2019.

²⁴⁹ Beatrice Heuser: "Beliefs, Culture, Proliferation and use of nuclear weapons", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 23 No.1 (March 200), p. 88, 94.

²⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 94. See also Anthony D. Smith: *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press., 1991), p. 175.

²⁵¹ Heuser, *Nuclear Mentalities?*, pp. 77, 143-144 263-264; Jolyon Howorth: "consensus of Silence: The French Socialist Party and Defence Policy under Francois Mitterrand", *International Affairs* Vol. 60 No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 579-600.

²⁵² Ikutaro Shimizu: *Nihon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* [Japan Be Independent as a State: Japan's Nuclear Option] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1980).

still approximately 11% of respondents answered that it would be desirable for Japan to acquire its own nuclear weapons while 76 % of respondents answered that it would be undesirable for Japan to obtain its own nuclear weapons.²⁵³ The data nevertheless suggests that a large majority of the Japanese explicitly exhibited strong opposition to nuclear weapons. Behind this background, “the pro-nuclear discourse has been delegitimized...by establishing the central role of victim in the anti-nuclear discourse.” Indeed the feeling of nuclear victimhood has been deeply embedded in Japan. ²⁵⁴

As a nuclear proliferation specialist, Maria Rost Rublee, noted, “a significant segment of the Japanese population, including many politicians and large portions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has been persuaded specifically that nuclear weapons are morally wrong and thus can never be considered a legitimate political or military tool.”²⁵⁵ In effect the pro-nuclear Japanese Prime Ministers could not afford to ignore major public opposition to nuclear weapons as we will explore in the rest of the chapters. They indeed did not choose Japan’s nuclear option as it was not a politically practicable option. As a result, we can say that Japan’s non-nuclear option is a national consensus: a generally accepted decision among the Japanese to forgo nuclear weapons although this does not deny the fact that Japan still has a minority group that advocates an independent nuclear deterrent.

Whether nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction or weapons for long peace did not matter to them because nuclear weapons automatically denoted absolute evil. For them as the only country ever attacked by atomic bombs (*Yuiitsu no Hibakukoku*), Japan was on a mission to draw attention to the inhumanity of nuclear weapons.²⁵⁶ What was unthinkable for them was the idea of

²⁵³ On the results of the surveys, see Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (ed.), *Kaku to Heiwa*, pp. 17-18.

²⁵⁴ Hook, “Evolution of the Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan”, p. 36.

²⁵⁵ Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, p. 92. See also Mike M. Mochizuki: “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 14 No. 2 (Jul 2007), p. 307.

²⁵⁶ Shuichiro Iwata: *Kaku Senryaku to Kaku Gunbi Kanri : Nihon no Hikaku Seiaaku no Kadai* [Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control: Challenges for Japan’s Non-Nuclear Policy] (Tokyo: Nihon

placing nuclear weapons in Japan—nuclear weapons were thus visible to the Japanese public. When we study perspectives of the Japanese government on nuclear deterrence, we must keep this aspect in mind. Japanese policy makers have to take into consideration the mentalities of the Japanese with regard to nuclear weapons.²⁵⁷ Key political decisions were still made within this distinct mode of Japan's political thinking. To be sure, there was a small group of defence planners and political leaders who considered that Japan's own nuclear weapons were vital for its defence and prestige in international politics.²⁵⁸ While several key Japanese Prime Ministers (Kishi, Ikeda and Sato) also supported this view as we will see below, their policy still paid heed to postwar popular antinuclear attitudes.

Japan's encounter with the three atomic bombings including the *Lucky Dragon* incident has doubtlessly transformed its way of perceiving nuclear weapons. Had it not been devastated and irradiated by atomic bombs and the thermonuclear test, Japan would have had a more modest and objective attitude toward nuclear weapons and deterrence. The strategic use of nuclear weapons was not considered with the strategic reality of international security in mind. For Japanese audiences, nuclear issues were rather political, societal and emotional subjects.²⁵⁹ As we will see below, the US government and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato actually attempted to correct this Japanese public view about nuclear weapons although it was doomed to failure. Japan has a unique approach to nuclear issues, and understanding this peculiarity is a key to comprehend how the Japanese government viewed nuclear deterrence as a representative of the Japanese citizens. As Nick Ritchie of

Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo., 1996), pp. 134-135; Kenzaburo Oe: "Hiroshima no Kokoro to Souzouryoku"[Hiroshima's Minds and Imagination] in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen II: kaku wo Koeru Sekaiye* [Nuclear and Human: The World Without Nuclear Weapons Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Iwanami Kawamura: *Genpatsu to Genbaku* Shoten., 1999), pp.306,

²⁵⁷ Akiyama, "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture", p. 89; Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Kazuo Otsuki: "Soukatsu to Teigen" [Conclusion and Proposal] in Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (ed.), *Kaku to Heiwa*, p. 221.

²⁵⁸ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Northeast Asia, Vol. 22 (Washington, D.C.: GPO., 1996), Document 354, pp. 730-731; National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, "Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries-Likelihood and Consequences", 18 June 1957, CIA. Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf>, accessed on 19 June 2017.

²⁵⁹ Akiyama, "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture", p. 89.

University of York maintained, “Explaining the politics of nuclear weapons requires an understanding of the meanings assigned to them in their social and historical contexts, how these meanings are embedded in shared understandings of national identity, and how these meanings change and develop.”²⁶⁰

Japan Under US Occupation

Japan was under US (ruled from the General Headquarters: GHQ stationed in Tokyo, to be more precise) occupation for nearly seven years between 1945 and 1952. There is no question that the seven-year occupation had a lasting effect on Japan’s post-occupation security policy and the perception of Japanese national security especially given the fact that Japan was occupied by a foreign power for the first time in its history.²⁶¹ More importantly political reforms implemented in Japan during this period subsequently influenced the shape of US END over Japan. By embracing the pacifist constitution introduced in this period, Japan limited its military capability by itself.

Japan formerly surrendered and ended the Second World War on 2 September 1945. The initial US occupation policy for Japan was straightforward in that it aimed at realising a demilitarised including disarmament and democratised Japan as a key US initial post-surrender policy, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) 150/4 A evinced. Its ultimate objectives were that “To insure that Japan will not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security of the world” and “To bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” To realise these objectives, it posited that “Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarised. The authority of the

²⁶⁰ Nick Ritchie: “Nuclear Identities and Scottish Independence”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 23 No. 6 (2016), p. 653.

²⁶¹ Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 18.

militarists and the influence of militarism will be totally eliminated from her political, economic and social life.”²⁶² In other words, by bringing social-political changes America wanted both a physically (disarming) and psychologically (replacing old ideas by imposing new values) transformed and neutralised Japan.²⁶³

The most important and long-lasting postwar reform implemented by the GHQ was without doubt the introduction of the American-imposed new constitution. General MacArthur requested the Government Section (in charge of making and implementing US occupation policies) of the GHQ to create a new constitution the basis of his notes: “MacArthur notes.”²⁶⁴ This document is the origin of Article 9 that has been regarded as a sacred object by the Japanese.²⁶⁵ The crucial difference between the notes and the final version of Article 9 is that the former actually even denied the right to self-defence as Japan must become an unarmed country.²⁶⁶ General MacArthur’s adjutant, Justin Williams, also conceded that at first MacArthur even denied the possession of any military capability by Japan including such a capability for self-defence.²⁶⁷ Colonel Charles Kades of the Government Section, a main author of the Japanese constitution, did not share MacArthur’s view and did eliminate the following line: “even preserving its own security” from the notes. ²⁶⁸ When interviewed by a Japanese scholar, Kades asserted that “every single nation has the right to preserve its own security, and that the constitution

²⁶² U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (SWNCC 150/4 A), GHQ/ SCAP Records: “Top Secret, File No. 1-Covering the Period from 1 September 1945 thru 19 January 1946” <Sheet No. TS00320-00323>, *National Diet Library*, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryu/01/022_2/022_2_0021.html, accessed on 9 May 2017. See also Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 26.

²⁶³ Makoto Iokibe: *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon* [US-Japanese War and Post-War Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2005), p. 181; Kitaoka, *Nihon Seijisi*, p. 219; Terumasa Nakanishi: *Nihonjin toshite Koredakewa Shitte okitaikoto* [Things you as Japanese must know] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2006), p. 22-29.

²⁶⁴ Three basic points stated by Supreme Commander to be “musts” in constitutional revision. 4 February 1946. Alfred Hussey Papers; Constitution File No. 1, Document No. 5, http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/shiryu/03/072/072_0021.html, accessed on 9 May 2017.

²⁶⁵ Hikaru Ohta and Shinich Nakazawa: *Kenpo Kyuzuyo wo Sekai Isan ni* [Article 9 as the World Heritage] (Tokyo:Shueisha., 2006).

²⁶⁶ Ishikawa, *Sengo Seijishi*, pp. 21-22.

²⁶⁷ Justin Williams interviewed by Yoshiki Hidaka. See Yoshiki Hidaka: *Nihon ni Showa Kenpo wo Ataeta Shinso* [The Truth Behind the Japan’s Showa Constitution] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2015), p. 177.

²⁶⁸ Three basic points stated by Supreme Commander to be “musts” in constitutional revision. 4 February 1946. .

abandoning such a right is unrealistic.”²⁶⁹ When the Japanese government considered whether or not it accepted the American-made constitution, Kades observed that Article 9 was actually not the biggest issue, but it was the future of the Japanese emperor and his imperial family that mattered most to Japan.²⁷⁰ Prime Minister Yoshida (1946-1947/ 1948-1953) recalled that for the sake of the future status of the Japanese emperor it would be better to follow the GHQ order.²⁷¹ It is without doubt a peaceful constitution but it was produced in an undemocratic way. The new constitution came effective in May 1947.

Although initially the introduction of the new constitution and Article 9 in particular was a marked symbol of “democratisation” and “demilitarisation” of Japan, ironically this new change significantly made it difficult for the US government to implement its subsequent foreign policy (rearmament of Japan). The core spirit of the constitution was set out in the preamble to the constitution as follows: “We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world.”²⁷²

There was also a key GHQ policy that influenced Japanese nuclear mentalities. During the occupation period, the GHQ implemented censorship.²⁷³ It did not allow the Japanese media to criticise the GHQ for American soldiers’ crimes and such policies as the creation of the new Japanese constitution.²⁷⁴ Any mention of the US atomic bombing on Japan was actually subjected to strict censorship until

²⁶⁹ Osamu Nishi: *Nihonkoku Kenpo ha Koshite Umareta* [On the birth of the Japanese Constitution] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinsha., 2000), p. 183.

²⁷⁰ Charles Kades interviewed by Osamu Nishi. See Osamu Nishi: *Nihonkoku Kenpo no Tansyo wo Kenshosuru* [The Examination of the birth of the Japanese Constitution] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo., 1986), p.48.

²⁷¹ Shigeru Yoshida: *Kaiso Junen Dai Yonkan* [The Story of My Life Vol. 4] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 1958), p.174.

²⁷² “The Constitution of Japan.”

²⁷³ SCAPIN-16: Freedom of Press and Speech 10 September 1945, National Diet Library, <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/9885078>, accessed 10 May 2017.

²⁷⁴ Jun Eto: *Tozasareta Gengo Kukan: Senryogun no Kenetsu to SengoNihon* [The Closed Society for Freedom of Speech: The Occupation Force’s Censorship and Postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Bungei Shnshu., 1994), pp. 237-241.

the end of the US occupation of April 1952.²⁷⁵ Thus anti-nuclear and anti-American sentiment was formally suppressed during this occupation period. Moreover, for the Japanese the biggest priority during the occupation period was to restore its completely devastated economy and war-weary society. The Japanese desperately needed butter more than guns.²⁷⁶

As shown initially the GHQ's main task was to disarm and democratize Imperial Japan to prevent from it fighting against the United States ever again. The GHQ maintained this initial policy in the first three years of the occupation. Gradually the superpowers confrontation was looming large not least after the Berlin blockade of 1948. This crisis was significant in terms of the emergence of US END because Truman did send B 29 heavy bombers, though not modified to carry atomic bombs, to Britain and Western Germany during the blockade.²⁷⁷ Gregg Herken, an American historian held that "Significantly, only the shadow of deterrence had crossed the Atlantic."²⁷⁸ Furthermore, an authority on American security Richard Betts put it, "the nuclear threat of 1948 marks the crystallization of the policy of extended nuclear deterrence."²⁷⁹

In the meantime, the importance of Japan increased as the Chinese communist party won the Chinese civil war in 1949, which drove the US policy makers to reassess America's global strategy involving Japan.²⁸⁰ One American top secret report of 1949 indeed noted that "The Japanese Islands are of high strategic

²⁷⁵ Akiyama, "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture", pp. 72-74; Shono and Nagai, "Kaku Ishiki Kenkyu no Koso", p. 1; "Senryoka Koukousei ga tsudutta Hibaku Nikki 69 Nen hette netto de Koukai" [Japanese High School Student Diary during the US occupation is released online for the first time in 69 years], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 5 August 2018, <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20180804/mog/00m/040/001000c>, accessed on 5 August 2018.

²⁷⁶ Takashi Inoguchi: "Japan: Reassessing the Relationship Between Power and Wealth", in Ngaire Woods (ed.): *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1996, ppb. 2004), pp. 241-242.

²⁷⁷ Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 110; Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, pp. 258-260; Scott D. Sagan: *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1989), p. 15.

²⁷⁸ Herken, *The Winning Weapon*, p.262. See also Gregg Herken: "The Nuclear Gnostics" in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), p. 14; Nolan, *Guardians of the Arsenal*, p. 37.

²⁷⁹ Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, p.31.

²⁸⁰ Marc Gallicchio: "Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy, 1945-69" in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler: *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001* (Tokyo: Kodansha International., 2001), p. 116; Inoguchi, "Japan: Reassessing the Relationship Between Power and Wealth", p. 250. See also Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 90-91.

importance to United States security interests in the Far East, primarily because of their geographic location with respect to the trade routes of the North Pacific, the exits and entrances of the Sea of Japan, the East China and Yellow Seas.”²⁸¹ Since then, the US occupation policy for Japan had to be altered and softened, or even reversed. The US government started to regard Japan as a bulwark against the Communists in the Far East.²⁸² This is, according to historian John Dower, “the shift of occupation priorities from democratization of a former enemy to reconstruction of a future cold war ally.”²⁸³ In other words, Japan had to be part of Western containment force so as to prevent the spread of communism in the Far East.

According to the late American government official, Townsend Hoopes, during the midst of great turmoil in East Asia in the late 1940s and the existence of divided political opinion in its policy toward China and Korea, “Japan seemed the area in the Far East where they [American political leaders] were willing to offer genuine bipartisan support.”²⁸⁴ In September 1947 one CIA assessment report on the global security situation indeed deemed Japan “the only area [within the Far East] capable of relatively early development as a power center.”²⁸⁵ In June 1950, US Army General Omar Bradley held that “From a strictly military point of view, I do believe the defense of Western Europe would be strengthened by the inclusion of Germany...because we do know that they have great production facilities that we could use and we know that they are very capable soldiers and airmen and

²⁸¹ *FRUS, 1949* The Far East and Australia Vol. 8 Part2 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1976), Document 97, p. 774.

²⁸² *FRUS, 1952-1954*, National Security Affairs, Vol. 2, Part1 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1984), Document 80, p. 409.

²⁸³ John W. Dower: “Reform and Reconsolidation” in Harry Wray and Kilarly Conroy (eds.): *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 1983), p. 347. See also Townsend Hoopes: *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (London: Andre Deutsch., 1973), pp. 92-93.

²⁸⁴ Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, p.90.

²⁸⁵ “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States”, 26 September 1947, *CIA*, p.vii, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP67-00059A000500060004-6.pdf>, accessed on 29 July 2018.

sailors.”²⁸⁶ Without doubt, exactly the same thing could be said of the Japanese situation. The same CIA report of 1947, however, alerted the American leadership to the risks of the early termination of US occupation on the grounds that the Japanese unsettled economic situation “would open the way to vigorous Soviet penetration.”²⁸⁷

Similarly the prominent American diplomat George Kennan was acutely concerned about Japanese economic recovery, political stability and security since its military forces were totally disbanded with “no effective means of combating the Communist penetration and political pressure.”²⁸⁸ At the same time, as NSC 20/1 of 1948 posited, the US foreign objective was “to reduce the power and influence of Moscow to limits where they will no longer constitute a threat to the peace and stability of international society.”²⁸⁹ Therefore, Japanese independence was extended by the new policy (NSC 13/3 of 1949) inspired by Kennan now with a particular focus on Japan’s economic recovery rather than democratization and demilitarisation.²⁹⁰ The outbreak of the Korean War, however, drastically changed the mood in Washington, urging the early settlement of a peace treaty and the rearmament of Japan. John Foster Dulles, special advisor to the State Department for the peace treaty negotiation, was in Tokyo when North Korea invaded South Korea. He reported to his supervisor Dean Acheson: “War at the doorstep had awakened Japan and stirred apprehension among its people...Delaying the treaty

²⁸⁶ General Bradley quoted in Dean Acheson: *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton., 1969), p. 433

²⁸⁷ “Review of the World Situation as it Relates to the Security of the United States.”

²⁸⁸ Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, p. 376. See also “Baishoukaiketsu to Heiwajoyaku wo Isoge [Fasten the Process of the Japanese Independence]”, *Mainichi Shimbun*, 18 March, 1947; Kumao Nishimura: *Nihon Gaikoshi 27: San Francisco Heiwa Jyoyaku* [The History of Japanese Diplomacy Vol 27: San Francisco Peace Treaty] (Tokyo: Kashimakenkyujyo Shuppankai., 1971), p. 25; *FRUS*, 1947, Vol. 6, The Far East (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1972), Document 429, pp. 537-542; Gutherie-Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960”, pp. 249-250; Yoshihide Soeya: “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Doctrine” [The Yoshida Line and the Yoshida Doctrine] *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 151(2008), p. 5.

²⁸⁹ *FRUS*, 1948, General; the United Nations, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1976), Document 37, p. 609.

²⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1949 The Far East and Australia Vol. 8 Part2, Document 70, pp. 730-736. See also Gaddis, “Grand strategies in the Cold War”, p. 381.

might lose us more than successful resistance of the attack might gain.”²⁹¹

The Korean War: A Turning Point for Rearmament

The Korean War itself was a local war fought within the Korean Peninsula. It nevertheless had a global impact on Europe in particular, let alone Japan.²⁹² It triggered the fear that it would be only one of a series of Communist moves to extend Communist control of the World, eventually leading to a war in Europe.²⁹³ In the wake of the war, Truman accepted a top secret government decision document NSC 68 accompanied by a significant increase in defence spending.²⁹⁴ The US military budget tripled (from 13.1 billion dollars to 50.4 billion dollars) and a major rearmament programme began as a result of this decision.²⁹⁵ The war prompted the US government to reappraise its strategy, making it more globalized since “If any weakness or hesitation on the part of the United States is encountered anywhere it will be instantaneously exploited by the communists to undermine confidence in and support of the United States everywhere”.²⁹⁶ As Heuser lucidly noted, “What was not foreseen was the psychological effect of the Korean War on America’s allies. The USA subsequently had to make a commitment to the defence of South Korea in order not to weaken the allies’ faith in a US commitment to other parts of the world.”²⁹⁷ The US decision to enter the war was thus strongly motivated to show its resolve to protect global interests at stake, and demonstrate

²⁹¹ John Foster Dulles quoted in Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 433. See also Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, p. 104.

²⁹² Robert Jervis: “The Impact of the Korean on the Cold War”, *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 24 No. 4 (Dec 1980), pp. 563-592.

²⁹³ Beatrice Heuser: “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making”, *Review of International Studies* Vol. 17 No. 1 (Jan 1991), pp. 17-40.

²⁹⁴ Ernest R. May: *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York: St Martin’s Press., 1993), pp. 10-14. See also Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, p. 44 and David Holloway: “Nuclear Weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962” in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of The Cold War Volume I Origins*, p.385.

²⁹⁵ Lawrence Freedman: “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, in Peter Paret (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (New Jersey: Princeton U. P., 1986), p. 738; Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, pp. 44-45; Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 109-117; idem, “Grand strategies in the Cold War”, p. 8; Walker, *The Cold War*, pp. 72-77.

²⁹⁶ *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 121, p. 383.

²⁹⁷ Heuser, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat”, p. 29.

the credibility of American security commitments to its allies.

When US troops were sent to Korea in 1950, US Army General Maxwell Taylor was in Berlin. He recalled that a leading Socialist figure in Berlin told him that “We Germans have always known you Americans are generous and kindhearted. Look at what the Marshall aid has done for Berlin. But we never were sure how you really stood until you offered Korea the lives of your sons and not...pancakes.”²⁹⁸ As Schelling aptly put it, “A government never knows just how committed it is to action until the occasion when its commitment is challenged.”²⁹⁹ It is also important to note that the Eisenhower administration allegedly deployed atomic weapons (either aircraft or warheads) to Okinawa during the war although nuclear weapons were probably not deployed there until 1954. This strategic signal was nevertheless meant to break the stalled negotiations on the termination of the war.³⁰⁰

In direct response to the Korean War, NATO was turned into a peacetime military organisation (the full initiation of the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe: SHAPE). America sent more its troops (four divisions) to West Germany for “forward defense” commanded by the very first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General Dwight D. Eisenhower.³⁰¹ A long-term American commitment to Europe demonstrated by the large American military presence in the region was therefore made. Indeed the Korean War “put the ‘O’ in NATO.”³⁰² The war also proved that the US forward bases (overseas) were increasingly more vital to US global strategy and its constant military readiness.³⁰³

The war also significantly influenced the future course of Japan’s

²⁹⁸ Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 154.

²⁹⁹ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 93.

³⁰⁰ McGeorge Bundy: *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House., 1988), p. 239; Roger Dingman: “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War”, *International Security* Vol. 13 No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), p. 79; Callum A. MacDonald: *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press., 1986), p. 178. See also Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962”, p 381; Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were”, p. 29.

³⁰¹ Jervis, “The Impact of the Korean on the Cold War”, pp. 581.

³⁰² Yost, *NATO Transformed*, p. 29.

³⁰³ John Lewis Gaddis: *The Cold War* (London: Penguin Books., 2005).

security.³⁰⁴ When the Korean War broke out, the US occupation army (four divisions) was sent to the Korean Peninsula directly from Japan due to its geographical proximity to Korea. Thereafter Japan crucially became a strategic outpost for fighting in Korea.³⁰⁵ Now there was no question that Japan had to protect itself from a communist threat or even subversion. Dean Acheson, then Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, made an assessment about the Japanese reaction to the war. According to Acheson, “an attack on Korea would be regarded by the Japanese as aimed at them” and he “stressed that importance of a conciliatory peace treaty in maintaining a Japan independent of Soviet influence.” He feared that the Soviet Union would increase pressure on Japan to be neutralized rather than aligning with the USA.³⁰⁶ Against this backdrop on 8 July 1950 General MacArthur sent a letter to Prime Minister Yoshida. This letter requested Japan to create a new police establishment (a 75000-man national police reserve).³⁰⁷ Colonel Frank Kowalski, who was in charge of training the new organization, explained that the emergence of the “National Police Reserve” was “a kind of twilight zone of rearmament.”³⁰⁸

The Korean War proved two crucial points: the geographical significance of US military bases in Japan and the importance of holding Japan on the US side for the US bases in Japan played an important role to provide logistical support during

³⁰⁴ “3.7 Gaimusho: Chosen no Doran to warera no Tachiba” [Ministry of Foreign Affairs: The Korean Crisis and Our Position] (19 August 1950) in Hideo Ohtake Hen (ed.): *Sengo Nihon Bouei Mondai Shiriyoshu: Dai Ikan Higunji kara Saigunbihe* [Collection of Materials Related to Post-War Japanese Defence Issues: Vol. 1 From Disarmament to Rearmament] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo., 1991), pp. 345-351; “Kokka Hijyo Jitai Fukoku Ka Hiroshima, Fukuoka Ryokeisatukankun [The Possibility of Declaring a State of Emergency]”, *Yomiuri Shimbum*, 27 June, 1950. On a critical view of the impact of the war on Japanese security see Roger Dingman, “The Dagger and the Gift”, *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Vol. 2 No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 29-55.

³⁰⁵ Satoshi Morimoto: *Nihon Bouei Saikoron* [Reconsideration of Japan’s Defence Policy] (Tokyo: Kairyusha., 2008), p. 101; Martin E. Weinstein: *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1971), p. 51

³⁰⁶ Acheson, *Present at the Creation*, p. 434.

³⁰⁷ Emphasis added. GHQ/ SCA Records, Government Section, Box No. 2194 “Correspondence between General MACARTHUR and Prime Minister-General WHITNEY and Prime Minister” <Sheet No. GS (B)01751> National Diet Library, http://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/img_r/M010/M010-001r.html, accessed on 3 May, 2017. See also Rinjiro Sodei, edit and trans: *Correspondence between General MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida & Other High Japanese Officials [1945-1951]* (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppanyoku., 2000), p. 204.

³⁰⁸ Frank Kowalski quoted in John W. Dower: *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press., 1999), p. 547.

the Korean War.³⁰⁹ As we will see below, the geographical proximity of Japan to the Korean Peninsula was also why it would have been logical to deploy US nuclear weapons in Japan.

Since Japanese bases were the centre of logistics, Japan received a various bulk order such as trucks, tires, radios and repair service from the US forces, which was paid in US dollars increasing foreign exchange reserve. Japanese economy benefited greatly from the high demands in the war known as *Chosen Tokuju* (Korean War Special Procurement). This war virtually revitalised Japan's economy.³¹⁰ For the American leaders, domestically this war "helped transform Japan ruthless enemy into de facto ally."³¹¹

In the wake of the Korean War, Dulles urged the Truman government to hasten the negotiation of the peace treaty with Japan to grant Japan's independence. The Pentagon, however, demanded the extension of the occupation due to the importance of US bases there especially with respect to unrestricted use of such bases.³¹² Prime Minister Yoshida was all too well aware that US forces in Japan needed to remain stationed where they had already been settled if the coming peace treaty was to be concluded.³¹³ Japan was willing to permit the provision of bases and facilities on the territory of Japan for the US military in return for the restoration of Japan's sovereignty. In short, the treaty was based mainly on "the terms of continuing the American military presence on Japanese

³⁰⁹ Morimoto, *Nihon Bouei Saikoron*, p. 101; Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 51

³¹⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler: "Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991", *OAH Magazine of History* Vol. 19 No. 2 (Mar 2005), p. 68; Akira Iriye: *Shin Nihon no Gaiko: Chikyuka Jidai no Nihon no Sentaku* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1991), p. 72.

³¹¹ Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift", p. 39.

³¹² *FRUS*, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: GPO., 1976), Document 731, 744 pp. 1243, 1265-1266 See also Narahiko Toyoshita: *Anpojoyaku no Seiritsu* [The Formation of Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), p.136; Nishimura, *Nihon Gaikoshi 27: San Francisco Heiwa Jyoyaku*, p. 62. See also Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, p. 91.

³¹³ Kiichi Miyazawa: *Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan* [The Secret Discussion between Tokyo and Washington] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron., 1999), pp. 55-56. See also Ikuhiko Hata: *Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi* [The History of Japanese Rearmament] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1976), pp. 75-76; Makiko Ueda: "Senryo Shokini okeru Ashida Hitoshino Kokusai Jyoseininsiki: Ahisa Shusei kara Ashida Shokan he [Ashida's Views on the International Affairs in the Early Occupation Period: From 'Sahida Amendament' to 'Ashida Memorandum']" *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 151(2008), pp. 62-63, 65.

territory.”³¹⁴

The US- Japan security alliance is often described as an alliance composed of “Japanese shield” and “American Sword.”³¹⁵ This sword includes American nuclear force as it later became clear. Japan has only defence capabilities (shield) and therefore, the US forces in Japan complements them with offence capabilities. Without doubt, this unique character of the alliance is closely linked to the fact that Japan was completely disarmed in the 1940s and its defence capability was limited to self-defence legally circumscribed by Article 9. Initially even self-defence was severely limited. The Japanese was supposed to grapple with their internal security (communist movements) by themselves and the USA would take responsibility for external security.³¹⁶

Yet Dulles expected Japan to have a more vigorous role in containing communist expansion in the Far East including by a massive rearmament programme.³¹⁷ The prominent American authority on Japan’s security, Mike Mochizuki, rightly pointed out the American intention by asserting that “In adopting a comprehensive containment policy, the United States wanted Japan to be an active military and economic ally to combat Asian communism...In short, what Americans wanted from Japan was both a strong Japanese economy that was resistant to communism and an active diplomatic and military ally for their regional containment strategy.”³¹⁸

Dulles conducted a round of tortuous negotiations on Japan’s rearmament with Prime Minister Yoshida in 1951. Dulles got a strong impression that the Japanese leaders were surprisingly equivocal about future Japanese security after

³¹⁴ Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p.69.

³¹⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 24; Noboru Yamaguchi: “Waga Kunino Boueiryoku no Yakuwari to Nichibei Doumei [Japanese Defence Capability and role, and US-Japan Security Alliance]” in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujyo (ed.): *Nichbei Doumei towa Nanika* [What is US-Japan Security Alliance] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha., 2011), pp. 25-29.

³¹⁶ Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, pp. 40-45, 105-107.

³¹⁷ John Foster Dulles: “Security in the Pacific”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 30 No. 2 (Jan 1952), pp. 176, 178-179; Toyoshita, *Anpojoyaku no Seiritsu*, p.50.

³¹⁸ Mike M. Mochizuki: “U.S.–Japan Relations in the Asia–Pacific Region” in Iriye and Wampler, *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001*, pp. 13-14.

its independence.³¹⁹ The Japanese government attitude toward rearmament was that rearmament was not possible at this moment. The top priority was the rehabilitation and stabilisation of the country.³²⁰ For Yoshida, however, it was not acceptable to rearm before Japanese economy was fully recovered. Japan would also be obliged to amend Article 9 of its constitution for drastic rearmament.³²¹ In fact, Yoshida dodged the US demands for rearmament by using the existence of Article 9 as a pretext for a slow and moderate increase of Japan's defence capabilities.³²²

The San Francisco Peace Treaty was nevertheless signed between the allied nations and Japan on 8 September 1951. Yet this did not mean that Japan became fully independent. Japan did not regain its whole territory because Article 3 of the treaty stipulates that

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Can (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.³²³

³¹⁹ Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles*, p. 96; W. J. Sebald: *Nihon Senryo Gaiko no Kaiso* [Memory of the American Occupation of Japan], trans. Kenzo Nozue (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha., 1966), p. 223.

³²⁰ Beigawa he Shukou Shita: "Waga Ho Kenkai", [The Document Passed to the US side: Our Stance], 30 January 1951, Microfilm, B'-0009, B'. 4.0.0.1-3, Gaiko Shiroyokan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: DAMOFAJ].

³²¹ Hata, *Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi*, pp.186-187; Futoshi Shibayama and Ayako Kusunoki: "Nichibei Senso to Nihon Senryo [The War and the Occupation]" in Makoto Iokibe: *Nichibei Kankeishi*[The History of US- Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2008), pp. 172-173; Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", p. 157; Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, p. 54; "Saigunbi no Houkoue[Toward the Rearmament]", *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 11 February, 1951.

³²² Nakajima, *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku*, pp. 92-95.

³²³ Reprinted in Nishimura, *Nihon Gaikoshi*, p. 398 and United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty of Peace with Japan (with two declarations). Signed at San Francisco, on 8 September 1951, available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf>, accessed

It is important to note that there were conflicting views between the State Department and the Pentagon whether these islands should continue to be retained by the USA.³²⁴ This territorial conundrum eventually led Japan to face a major nuclear problem during negotiations over the reversion of the Bonins and the Ryukyus in the 1960s as we will see in Chapter Five. The State Department did not necessarily think that the maintenance of these islands was imperative. The JCS, nevertheless, urged the Truman government to retain the islands as they were deemed necessary for its military operations.³²⁵ The US military was in favour of its military needs taking priority over local sentiment.³²⁶ In the end, the US military won the Truman government's support.

On the same day, the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan was also signed.³²⁷ The preamble of the treaty read that

On the coming into force of that Treaty [San Francisco Peace Treaty], Japan will not have the effective means to exercise its inherent right of self defense because it has been disarmed. There is danger to Japan in this situation because irresponsible militarism has not yet been driven from the world. Therefore Japan desires a Security Treaty with the United States of America to come into force simultaneously with the Treaty of Peace between the United States of American and Japan.³²⁸

The wording of US security commitments in the security treaty between the USA and Japan was, however, extremely ambiguous. It only recognised that Japan did

on 5 May 2017.

³²⁴ On the origins of the problem, see Robert D. Eldridge: *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2001) and Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*.

³²⁵ Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, pp. xviii-xix, xxii, 24-78.

³²⁶ Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, pp. 5, 365-372..

³²⁷ Welfield: *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 50.

³²⁸ Emphasis added. Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: "Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America", 8 September 1951, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp, accessed on 5th May, 2017.

not possess sufficient defence capabilities for self-defence and therefore, it was crucial for the American military forces to remain stationed in Japan. Article 1 of the treaty read as follows:

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces *may be utilized* to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through or intervention by an outside power or powers.³²⁹

This security treaty thus bore a character of continuation of the US occupation. It was severely criticised as an unequal treaty by Japanese political leaders, for there was no reference to a US defence commitment to Japan but it nevertheless permitted US force to continue to stay in Japan. Worse still, the US military forces could be employed for Japan's internal security in cases of large-scale riots as Article 1 shows. While the essence of the treaty might have been transitional, it did not set any time limit of expiration of the treaty. Article 4 posited that "This Treaty will expires whenever in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan will have come into force there will have come into force such United Nations arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactory provide for the maintenance by the United Nations or otherwise of international peace and security in the Japan Area."³³⁰

The unequal nature of the security treaty was a main driver for the Kishi

³²⁹ Emphasis added. Ibid.

³³⁰ Ibid.

administration to sign the new security treaty with the USA in 1960 to correct these shortcomings.³³¹ While the formal declaration of establishing a security relation with the USA by signing the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 could be taken as a deterrent message in the case of NATO,³³² even extended deterrence over Japan, not to mention END, was at best ambiguous with the 1951 security treaty. Nevertheless, as the prominent British strategy analyst Lawrence Freedman explained, “In principle, to be an ally of the United States might be thought sufficient to be considered a vital interest of the United States and so gain the benefits of deterrence.”³³³

At any rate, Japan was externally powerless, and it needed continued US military presence in Japan.³³⁴ Former Prime Minister Nobuske Kishi indeed recalled that “Then we had no troops...the United States bore the entire responsibility for defense...”³³⁵ In general, forward-deployed US forces are considered “to provide for the mutual security of allied nations, primarily to counter and contain communist powers such as the Soviet Union and China.”³³⁶ It is important to note that “At the end of the American occupation of Japan, 260,000 U.S. military personnel remained in Japan with their bases and facilities covering 1,352 square kilometers.”³³⁷ In other words, “The Preponderant U.S. military presence in and around Japan during the early decades of the Cold War seemed evidence enough that the U.S. military would be there to assist in any situation that might threaten Japan’s security.”³³⁸ This was mere existential extended deterrence backed by the presence of large US troops. The main assumption of mere existential extended deterrence rests on the fact that large US troops in Japan would make it difficult and costly for a would-be attacker to strike Japan. To some extent, it did

³³¹ Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 42.

³³² Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, p. 4.

³³³ Freedman, *Deterrence*, p. 36.

³³⁴ FRUS, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, pp. 54-57; Shigeru Yoshida: “Japan and the Crisis in Asia”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (Jan 1951), pp. 173-174.

³³⁵ FRUS, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 183, p. 371.

³³⁶ Tim Kane: “Development and US Troop Deployments”, *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol. 3 No. 3 (2012), p. 257.

³³⁷ Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p.71.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

not matter if US forces in Japan would take a military response in retaliation for an armed aggression on Japan. As long as there was a possibility backed by the mere visible presence of large US troops in Japan, an aggressor could not completely eliminate the probability that they would come to defend Japan. Therefore, it would be deterred.

From the perspective of US grand strategy, one top secret National Security Council report of 1952 stressed, “The security of Japan is of such importance to the United States position in the Pacific area that the United States would fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of the territory of Japan.”³³⁹ Furthermore one NSC report of 1955 even asserted that “The strategic location and military and industrial potential of Japan are such that the security of the United States would require us to fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of Japan by attack.”³⁴⁰

Japan thus virtually managed its security by relying on US military forces stationed in Japan for the purposes of defence and deterrence. Or it was what Martin Weinstein, former political advisor to US Ambassador to Japan, called a “de facto guarantee” since it was hardly conceivable that the Soviet Union would attack Japan as long as the large US forces were stationed in Japan.³⁴¹ The US government also was aware that the presence of its army, navy and air force served to deter communist aggression.³⁴² In this regard, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski made an interesting remark about the importance of hosting US troops for a deterrent effect at the Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. in November 2008. He held that “Everyone agrees that countries that have US soldiers on their territory do not get invaded.”³⁴³ Historian Marc Gallicchio argued that “Yoshida and other

³³⁹ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1985), Document 588, p. 1302.

³⁴⁰ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 54.

³⁴¹ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy*, pp. 45-46, 115. See also Dulles, “Security in the Pacific”, p. 179.

³⁴² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 60.

³⁴³ Radoslaw Sikorski quoted in Liviu Horovitz: “Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons”, *European Security* Vol. 23 No. 1 (2014), pp. 82-83.

Japanese leaders understood that a strike against Japan would provoke an American military response. At any rate, most Japanese officials doubted that any such attack would occur.”³⁴⁴ Their presence was thus interpreted by Japanese leaders as having a deterrent effect. ³⁴⁵

Owing to the strategic importance of Japan to US grand strategy and the fact that the US fought in Korea to prevent the communist control of the Peninsula, the credibility of US threats to punish an armed aggression against Japan was probably high.

For some this can also be interpreted as de facto reliance on US nuclear weapons because Japan was included into US extended deterrence although this argument is considerably debatable.³⁴⁶ There was no articulation of US security commitments with respect to nuclear protection of Japan at that time. Be that as it may, as the treaty was signed, the US nuclear superiority vis-à-vis the Soviet Union was unquestionable (a 17 to 1 ratio)³⁴⁷ and its nuclear threat was credible given that the US continent was relatively invulnerable to Soviet nuclear attacks by its nascent nuclear force which lacked intercontinental delivery platforms.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁴ Gallicchio, “Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance”, p. 123.

³⁴⁵ Osamu Ishii: *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku* [The Introduction to Secret Nuclear Deals] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo., 2010), p. 12 ; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 71-72; Takahashi, “Beikoku ni Yoru Kakudai Yokushino Jittai”, pp. 48-49.

³⁴⁶ See Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture”, p. 69.

³⁴⁷ As of 1951, the USA possessed 438 weapons while the Soviet Union held only 25 bombs. See Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen: “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 56 No. 1 (Jan/ Feb 2010), p. 81.

³⁴⁸ Bluth, “Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations”, p. 141.

III. D. Table: US/ Soviet Nuclear Weapons Inventories, 1949-1952.

	USA	Soviet Union
1949	170	1
1950	299	5
1951	438	25
1952	841	50

Source: Norris and Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010”, p. 81..

The Stalled Negotiations and Moderation in American Policy

Further rearmament negotiations between the US and the Japanese government ensued even after the peace and security treaty. Indeed as one analyst observed, “In the early 1950s, rearmament was a source of protracted debate between Japan and the United States and within Japan itself.”³⁴⁹ Exasperated by Japan’s tenacious reluctance to its rearmament programme, when he visited Japan in November 1953, Vice President Richard Nixon even lamented that the disarmament of Japan including the introduction of the new peace constitution was a great American mistake.³⁵⁰ While the last section explained the general US strategic rationale behind its demand for Japan’s rearmament, in this section we will more closely probe why the US wanted a stronger Japan by rearming itself and how Japan reacted to this demand by grudgingly increasing its military strength.

It is important to note that the US government even urged Japan to build 10-15 divisions composed of 300.000-325.000 for a new army and appropriate air

³⁴⁹ Jennifer M. Miller: “The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in US-Japanese Relations”, *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol.46 No.1 (Jan 2011), p. 83.

³⁵⁰ Nixon’s Speech at the Japan –American Society (11/19/1953) in Chihiro Hosoya, et al (Tadasshi Aruga, Osamu Ishii, Takuya Sasaki) (eds): *Nichibei Kankei Shiryō Shū 1945-97* [A Documentary History of U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1945-1997] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai., 1999), pp. 253-254; Aichi Daijin Nixon Daitoryo Kaidan (Gunjimen) [Record of Conversation Between Foreign Minister Aichi and President Nixon: Issues Related to Military Affairs], 2 June 1969, CD1 01-514, DAMOFAJ. See also 1953: Sato Sorinikuson Daitouryo Kaidan, Dai Ikkai [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon] (19 November 1969), CD H22-012, No. H221826, DAMOFAJ; VP Nixon in Japan, *Nixon Foundation*, <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2015/06/1953-vp-nixon-in-japan/>, accessed on 21 October 2018.

and naval strength as articulated in NSC 125 series in 1953.³⁵¹ In reality the strength of 180,000 personnel was the virtual ceiling of the Ground Self Defence Force (GSDF) throughout the Cold War.³⁵² Although the number (a ground force of 180,000) had been first proposed by Japan in October 1953, this target number was actually not achieved until the late 1960s.³⁵³ The Eisenhower administration expected that Japan would play a vigorous security role in the Asia Pacific: “Japan’s independent position is directed in the interest of the free world”³⁵⁴ and “Japan has the potential to assume a leading and stabilizing role in Asia.”³⁵⁵

To some extent, the USA even wanted a stronger Japan so that America could reduce its military role and responsibility and its great costs of operation in the region. As far as alliance politics is concerned this is known as “burden sharing.”³⁵⁶ In addition, due to Japan’s great economic and military potential for a contribution toward the stabilization of the Far East, Japan was assumed to be the America’s regional partner to contain communism. The Eisenhower administration foresaw that “United States interests would best be served by a strong Japan, firmly allied with the United States, and better able to serve as a counterweight to Communist China and contribute to free world strength in the Far East.”³⁵⁷ In fact this American stance continued throughout the 1960’s not least during the Vietnam War. The State Department recognised that “the basic long-term goal of U.S. policy toward Japan was...the development of Japan as a major power center in Asia

³⁵¹ See for example *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 588, pp. 1300-1308. See also “Beigaiko Himitsu Bunsho: Kenposyuusei mo Soutei [The US secret diplomatic document: A Hypothetical plan of the Amendment of the Japan’s constitution]”, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 30 April, 1978; Miyazawa, *Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan*, p. 190; *Kaihara Osamu Oral History*, Vol. 1, pp. 255-256.

³⁵² Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*: p. 17.

³⁵³ “Ikeda-Robertson Talks (10/5-10/30/ 1953) in Rusk’s Visit to Japan (6 December 1966)” in Hosoya, et al (eds.), *Nichibei Kankei Shiryō Shū 1945-97*, pp. 233-252. See also *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 43, p. 89; Hiroshi Masuda: *Jieitaino Tanjo* [The Creation of Japan Self-Defence Forces] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2004), p.74; Miyazawa, *Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan*, pp. 200-275; Kazuya Sakamoto: *Nichibei Doumeino Kizuna: Anpojoyoyaku to Sougoseino Mosaku* [The Bonds of the US-Japan Alliance: The Trajectory of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Mutual Cooperation] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2000), pp. 86-87; Kosuke Yoshitsugu: *Nichibei Domeiha Ikani Tsukuraretaka: Anpo Taiseino Tenkanten 1951-1964* (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2011), pp. 36-37.

³⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 588, p. 1305.

³⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 54.

³⁵⁶ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 588, p. 1302, 1303.

³⁵⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 55

acting in concert with U.S. and Free World objectives...A corollary to our base policy is our desire to see a stronger Japanese defense establishment which would assume a greater responsibility of the Far East.”³⁵⁸ As we will see below, in line with this thinking, the US military even wanted to equip Japan with operational nuclear weapons.

Although Yoshida believed that it was sufficient to provide America with Japanese military bases to meet Dulles’ demand, in the end he had to compromise with the US government on the rearmament matters.³⁵⁹ The Japanese government presented a new idea of creating new forces (the National Security Forces) apart from the existing a national police reserve to the American side.³⁶⁰ When the National Security Forces composed of 110,000 ground troops and a 7,590 maritime force were established in August 1952, Yoshida made a speech at National Safety Agency in which he declared that “the establishment of the National Safety Forces was the foundation of the future independent Japanese military forces.”³⁶¹ Some internal documents of the National Security Forces also clearly showed that those engaged in the organization recognised its establishment would eventually become the national independent military forces.³⁶² Indeed, this new organization later turned into the Japan Self-Defence Forces in 1954. This proposal was nevertheless meant to meet the US demand for rearmament and it domestically could explain that the new establishment was to enhance Japan’s internal security.³⁶³ This was a tipping point for postwar Japan as “Yoshida made the crucial decision to create the armed forces within the Constitutional restrictions rather than to revise Article

³⁵⁸ Airgram From American Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, “Politico-Economic Assessment: Japan”, 4 December 1964, Box 2375, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, RG 59, NARA.

³⁵⁹ Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 69-70.

³⁶⁰ “Memorandum by the Japanese Government, ‘Initial Steps for Rearmament Program’ (3 February 1951) in Hosoya, et al (eds), *Nichibeï Kankei Shiryô Shu 1945-97*, p. 89.

³⁶¹ “Shusho Saigunbi wo Shisa”[Prime Minister Suggests Further Rearmament], *Asahi Shimbun*, 5 August 1952.

³⁶² Honpo Saigunbi Mondai Ikken Dai 2 Kan Isshi [Issues of Rearmament of Japan: Vol. 2], Undated, C’20002, DAMOFAJ.

³⁶³ Kato, *Shiroku Jieitaishi*, p. 52; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, p. 70; Shibayama and Kusunoki, “Nichibeï Senso to Nihon Senryô”, p. 175; Hideki Uemura: *Saigunbi to Gojûgonen Taisei* [Rearmament and the 1955 System] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha., 1995), pp. 50-52; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 82.

9.”³⁶⁴

The constitutionality of SDF has been a controversial issue ever since while the Japanese government has always interpreted that the status of SDF is legitimate. It is because Article 9 (peace clause) of the constitution does not deny Japan’s right for self-defence. As a result the constitution permits Japan to possess self-defence capabilities which are kept to a minimum.³⁶⁵ SDF’s main role is solely self-defence and lacks offensive capability—“land, sea and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.”³⁶⁶ Moreover, SDF cannot be employed for offensive purposes.³⁶⁷ It is not difficult to imagine that this legal interpretation is quite controversial. The government claim of the constitutionality of SDF is rather a political interpretation. If one reads it literally, the legal existence of SDF is truly questionable. Even those in SDF questioned themselves the legal status of their establishment. One retired general of Air Self-Defence Force said in a Japanese online TV programme that he reckoned that Article 9 did not allow Japan to possess SDF when he was a cadet at the National Defence Academy.³⁶⁸ In short, Japan’s defence policy in the early 1950s was not necessarily a reflection of its military logic or Japan’s threat perception. It was a direct diplomatic compromise.³⁶⁹

America eventually accepted the proposal of establishing SDF and expected future rearmament of Japan on its own initiative and responsibility for its national security.³⁷⁰ Yet this was not completely satisfactory to Dulles. He asserted that without a clear responsible attitude toward mutual defence, “the United States was not disposed to assume obligations which Japan could not now reciprocate.”³⁷¹ He

³⁶⁴ Kase, “Japan”, p. 141.

³⁶⁵ Boei Sho: *Heisei 29 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 2017], available at <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2017/html/n2121000.html>, accessed on 4 January 2019.

³⁶⁶ “The Constitution of Japan.”

³⁶⁷ Keddell, *The Politics of Defense in Japan*, p. 21; Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*: p. 15; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, p. 31.

³⁶⁸ DHC Terebi: “Hougen Bar Riikusu # 56 Riikusu Five” [Bar Talks and Leaks: Episode 56, Leaks Five], 4 October 2018. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auIVjN0Qe8U>, accessed on 28 January 2019.

³⁶⁹ Sebata, *Bouei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichibei Gaidorain*, p. 28.

³⁷⁰ “Chuhei to Saigunbi he” [Stationing of US Troops and Rearmament], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 8 February 1951

³⁷¹ Dulles “Security in the Pacific”, p. 179.

also stressed that “Potential aggressors have little respect for peoples who have no will to fight for their own protection or to make the sacrifices needed to make that fighting significant. Also, they know that such peoples do not attract allies to fight for their cause. For all of these reasons, local defense is important.”³⁷² To be sure, Japan wanted explicit US security protection given its own small military capability.³⁷³ For Dulles, Japan had to take more responsibility for at least its own defence and collective security for the Asia Pacific. The matter of mutual defence later became a point of contention when the US and the Japanese government negotiated over the revision of the 1951 security treaty. Christopher Hughes speculated that the Japanese government did not want the mutuality in the treaty due to its fear of entrapment (Japan might unwillingly be dragged into war started by America).³⁷⁴ Yet he could not furnish any evidence.³⁷⁵

Be that as it may, Yoshida was quite successful in that Japan maintained only a small-scale self-defence force.³⁷⁶ This is what Yoshida had aimed for: the maintenance of the lightly armed self-defence force (its military capacity was kept to a minimum level constrained by Article 9), primary pursuit of economic growth by closely aligning with the US and dependence on the US-Japan security alliance for Japan’s security.³⁷⁷ This is known as “Yoshida Doctrine.”³⁷⁸ In fact Yoshida did not completely opposed rearmament while it is true that the Yoshida line enabled Japan to recover quickly and to achieve Japan’s economic miracle in the Cold War.³⁷⁹ Yoshida believed that Japan should have full-fledged armed forces when it recovered from the war. He was, however, certain that the time was not ripe yet.³⁸⁰

³⁷² Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace”, p. 359.

³⁷³ See for example, Iokibe, “Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy”, p. 7.

³⁷⁴ On entrapment see for example Glenn H. Snyder “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *World Politics* Vol.36 No.4 (Jul 1984), pp.461-495 and Idem, *Alliance Politics*, pp. 181-183

³⁷⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 23.

³⁷⁶ Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, “Security Treaty.”

³⁷⁷ See for example Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, pp. 21-24, 31; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, p. 162.

³⁷⁸ On the Yoshida Doctrine see Nakajima, *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku*.

³⁷⁹ Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*: p. 32.

³⁸⁰ “Shusho Kowa heno Shoshin Hyōmei [Prime Minister Yoshida States His Policy for the Peace Negotiations constitution]”, *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 April, 1951; Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 22; Soeya, “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Doctrine”, p. 5; Uemura, *Saigunbi to*

Dulles even wanted the revision of the Japanese constitution for further rearmament, but this was not politically acceptable to the Yoshida administration. The Japanese government was simply not ready to establish a full-fledged army.³⁸¹

Yoshida's principles become a cornerstone of the post-war Japan's grand strategy.³⁸² Japan successfully revitalized its economy and became the second largest economic power by the late 1960s.³⁸³ As Mochizuki succinctly described the postwar Japanese security context, "Japan has adhered to a strategy which relied upon the American security guarantee, permitting the country to have a minimal defense capability and to concentrate on economic development."³⁸⁴ The doctrine was widely received on the grounds that the Japanese were extremely exhausted and devastated by war. For them the top priority was placed on Japan's rehabilitation, economic recovery in particular after the total defeat. The "Yoshida doctrine" should be understood in a very distinct post-war context where Japanese forces were disbanded, the peace constitution was introduced, and the peace-seeking society was developed out of a war-weary Japan. This emotional reaction, indeed, became a principal drive for postwar Japan.³⁸⁵ For postwar Japan, the issue of rearmament was not a mere problem of economic recovery but a political and emotional predicament as well.

Gojūgonen Taisei, pp. 40-41

³⁸¹ Ikeda Robertson Kaidan ni Kansuru Bunsho [Documents Related to Ikeda, Robertson Talks], 19, 21 October 1953 in Kashima Heiwa Kenkyūjo Hen (ed.): *Nihon Gaiko Shūyo Bunsho, Nenpyō Dai 1 Kan, 1941-1960* [The Key Documents and Chronological Table of Japanese Diplomacy, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo., 1983), p. 581. See also Yomiuri Shimbun Sengoshi-han Hen (ed.): *Showa Sengoshi: Saigunbi no Kiseki* [The History of the Rearmament of Japan] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-Sha., 1981), p. 359; "Ike Seiken Chousen Senso no Makkinihon Saigunbi he Kaiken Teigen" [The Eisenhower Administration proposes the amendment of the Japanese Constitution for the rearmament at the end of the Korean War] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 7 December 1984.


³⁸² Kitaoka, *Nihon Seijishi*, p. 217; Sado, *Jeitaiishi*, p. 29; Soeya, "Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Doctrine", pp. 1-2; Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", p. 157.

³⁸³ Kurt M. Campbell and Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara: "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable" in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.): *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 2004), p. 220.

³⁸⁴ Mochizuki, "Japan's Search for Strategy", p. 152.

³⁸⁵ Iokibe, "Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy", p. 7.

IV. Figure: Military Expenditure as Share of GDP



Source: Military Spending, *Our World in Data*, <https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending>, accessed 2 February 2019.

Gradually the US government understood the Japan's financial struggle and the fragility of the society. Even Dulles, for instance, recognised Japan's position.³⁸⁶ The Eisenhower administration moderated further its view on Japan's rearmament and virtually recognised Yoshida's policy of gradual rearmament in an incremental fashion. Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and US President Eisenhower issued on 10 November 1954, indeed stated that

It was agreed that the economic well-being of the Japanese people is a matter of importance to the entire free world. The achievement of improved economic conditions in Japan depends partly upon the ability of the Japanese people themselves to pursue sound and constructive internal monetary and other economic policies and partly upon Japan's ability to expand its trade with other countries...The United States is aware of the efforts which Japan is making to

³⁸⁶ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 835, p. 1798.

solve its difficult economic problems and will continue to examine sympathetically means whereby it can assist the Japanese people to advance their well-being.³⁸⁷

NSC 5516/1 of 1955 (US Policy Toward Japan) further suggested that the US government “should avoid pressing the Japanese to increase their military forces to the prejudice of political and economic stability.”³⁸⁸ The US government was aware that “Both economic austerity and the defense program are essentially unpopular with many segments of the Japanese public, and require major political efforts if they are to be achieved.”³⁸⁹ In the meantime, the US government still wanted to “assist Japan to develop military forces which will eventually be capable of assuming primary responsibility for the defense of Japan.”³⁹⁰ Obviously the rearmament issue illuminated Japan’s postwar military aversion. Interestingly, when it comes to demanding rearmament, as the US government conceded, it “has limited capacity to influence Japanese action.”³⁹¹ Even though the USA attempted to urge Japan to rearm itself through the diplomatic negotiations, both the Japanese government and the Japanese public were adamant and did not allow any radical change in rearmament. While the Eisenhower administration did not give up its policy of Japan’s rearmament, it softened the tone of the issue. Two years later, Eisenhower told Prime Minister Kishi that “Japan can be a true partner only if it is strong spiritually, in the sense of combating the dangers of communism, strong economically, and possesses defense forces capable of making it a real ally in case of attack in that part of the world.” The Eisenhower continued and stressed that “the great burden in the Pacific lies upon the United States, and...for that reason our forces stationed in Japan have been larger than would otherwise have

³⁸⁷ The World and Japan Database (Project Leader: Tanaka Akihiro): “Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida and U.S. President Eisenhower”, 10 November 1954, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19541110.D1E.html>, accessed on 11 October 2017. See also Gallicchio, “Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance”, p. 121; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, p. 79.

³⁸⁸ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 57.

³⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

³⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

been the case.”³⁹² Eisenhower still implied that Japan should assume responsibility for self defence and regional defence.

For Japan, the tightened bilateral relations between the two countries further enabled Japan to revitalize the Japanese economy not least because of Japanese access to the US market and “the United States is Japan’s largest foreign customer and source of supply (20 % of its export trade and 40 % of its imports).”³⁹³ In 1956 Japan’s Economic White Paper stated that “Finally our economy has proved that we are now at the end of war” denoting that the Japanese economy had recovered from the post-war depression.³⁹⁴ While the Japanese economy started to revive from the early 1950s, Japan experienced nuclear dangers again in March 1954. This incident eventually thwarted US nuclear policy toward Japan.

The Third Bombing: The *Daigo Fukuryūmaru* Incident

The postwar US-Japan negotiations on Japan’s rearmament proved that the issue could not be dealt with in isolation from Japan’s postwar military-averse culture and its low military posture. Although the Japanese nuclear allergy has been taken for granted since 1945, it was not so evident until 1954. In 1954 Japanese nuclear mentalities were clearly identified. Thereafter, it became evident that nuclear weapon was unacceptable to postwar Japanese society.

On 1 March, 1954 a Japanese fishing boat, *Daigo Fukuryūmaru* (Lucky Dragon) was irradiated and contaminated by nuclear fallout from a US thermonuclear test (code-named *Castle Bravo*) on Bikini Atoll.³⁹⁵ One of the crew members, Aikichi Kuboyama, died one year later because of acute nuclear radiation

³⁹² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 183, p. 374.

³⁹³ *Ibid.*, Document 28, p. 53. See also Leffler, “Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991”, p. 68; Mike M. Mochizuki: “Economics and Security: A Conceptual Framework” in Green and Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p.231.

³⁹⁴ Nenji Hokoku [Annual Report], *Economic Planning Agency*, 1956, available at <http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-0000i1.html>, accessed on 15 May 2017.

³⁹⁵ Robert A. Divine: *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-1960* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1978), pp. 3-4.

disease. His death made headline news in Japan.³⁹⁶

US official's statement that the *Lucky Dragon* was a Soviet spy ship, doing espionage provoked Japanese resentment despite the fact that the ship was out of the off-limit area.³⁹⁷ This incident not only triggered Japanese memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki but also cast a dark shadow on US-Japan relations, sparking anti-American sentiment.³⁹⁸

This nuclear test aroused public fears and anti-US sentiments and caused further direct life problems for many Japanese people. It turned out that tens of fishing boats were also contaminated and thus, Japanese fishermen had to throw away tons of fish. Some fishing markets including the largest market of Japan, Tsukiji Fish Market, and fish stores were temporarily forced to close. Due to concerns about food safety, fish stores posted a note that "we do not sell Bikini tunas here." This was a critical situation or "tuna panic" given that fish is the Japanese primary source of food.³⁹⁹ As one critic rightly pointed out,

Over the next 10 months, 414, 584 kg (457 tons) of fish were confiscated and destroyed instigating a major diplomatic and international incident between America and Japan. No longer were the atomic bombings considered as tragic incidents of the past but of a paralyzing present, bringing those events back into sharp public focus and encouraging many to support those who had survived the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings⁴⁰⁰

The *Lucky Dragon* incident, coming two years after the taboo of discussing all things nuclear was lifted by the US, sparked the so-called Japanese "nuclear

³⁹⁶ Deamer, *Deluze, Japanese Cinema and the Atom Bomb*, p. 95.

³⁹⁷ Tetsuo Arima: *Genpatsu to Genbaku: Nichi Bei Ei Kakubuso no Kurayami* [Nuclear Reactor and Atomic Bomb: Japan, America, Britain and Darkness of Nuclearization] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 2012), pp. 20, 24-25; Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 72; Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, p.51; Uemura, *Saigunbi to Gojugonenen Taisei* ., pp. 207-208.

³⁹⁸ Akiyama, "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture", p. 75; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, p.7, 30; Matthew Jones: *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2010), p. 323; Sakamoto, *Nichibeï Doumeino Kizuna* Uemura, p. 109; Gutherie-Shimizu, "Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960", p. 244.

³⁹⁹ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibeï Doumei to Genpatsu*, pp. 78-79; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, p.7.

⁴⁰⁰ Brothers, *Atomic Dreams and the Nuclear Nightmare*, p.14.

allergy.” Thereafter, the Japanese started to advocate the ideal of the “nuclear free world.”⁴⁰¹ As for the concept, “nuclear allergy” is interpreted as a negative reaction to any matter related to nuclear weapons apart from peaceful use of nuclear energy. The term itself first appeared in the 1960s when a nuclear-propelled submarine made a port call at Japan.⁴⁰² There were large demonstrations against the nuclear submarine visit in the local area (e.g. Sasebo) as we shall see. Japanese were extremely sensitive about such a visit as the submarine had an adjective “nuclear.” Even though not all nuclear-powered submarines were armed with nuclear weapons, they were directly associated with nuclear weapons as far as the Japanese were concerned. The term, nuclear allergy, since then has broadened the meaning. Now it generally denotes strong anti-nuclear sentiment.⁴⁰³ “Nuclear phobia” and “nuclear hysteria” are similarly used to describe Japan’s fervent anti-nuclear sentiment.⁴⁰⁴

As far as US-Japan nuclear relations (especially with respect to the future deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons to Japan) were concerned, the *Lucky Dragon* incident was a turning point. It is often described as “the third atomic bombing”, or “the second benchmark in Japan’s nuclear history”⁴⁰⁵ discharging oppressed resentment from the US occupation period.⁴⁰⁶ Anti-nuclear sentiment stemming from Hiroshima and Nagasaki was not initially felt but the incident in 1954 made it clearly visible. As one Japanese analyst succinctly held, “Although the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are now recognized by almost all Japanese as the origin of anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan, in the early 1950s, the seriousness of these events was not widely understood in Japan due to the [previous] media censorship imposed by the GHQ.”⁴⁰⁷ Furthermore, Japanese did not want to think

⁴⁰¹ On this point see for example Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 77-78.

⁴⁰² Gleen D. Hook: “The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergy as Political Metaphor”, *Journal of Peace Research* Vo. 21 No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 259-275.

⁴⁰³ On this point, see Kawamura, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, p. 12; Akihiro Yamamoto: *Kaku to Nihonjin* [Nuclear Power and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2015), pp. 100-101.

⁴⁰⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 34, p. 45.

⁴⁰⁵ Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture”, p. 65. See also Shono and Nagai, “Kaku Ishiki Kenkyu no Koso”, p. 1.

⁴⁰⁶ See for example Ishii, *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku*, p. 15; Kawamura, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 14-15.

⁴⁰⁷ Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture”, p. 72.

back on their disastrous experience in war marked by the atomic bombing. The word *Yuiitsu no Habkukoku* (the only country ever suffered from atomic bombing) started to be widely used in Japan from the mid-1950's onward as a direct result of the *lucky Dragon* incident.⁴⁰⁸ One NSC report of 1955 also analysed the situation and rightly commented that "Because of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, Japan has an unusually intense psychological vulnerability to the threat of nuclear weapons. This was evident in the reactions in Japan to the *Fukuryu Maru* incident of March 1954."⁴⁰⁹

This incident attracted nationwide petitions of 30 million Japanese people, one third of the whole Japanese population at the time, demanding the suspension of nuclear tests. Following the incident, Japanese opposition to American nuclear testing ensued.⁴¹⁰ This incident also produced several vocal anti-nuclear organizations such as *Gensuiikyo* and *Hidankyo*.⁴¹¹ The Eisenhower administration was concerned about the possibility of the public outcry accelerating Japan's neutralism or even anti-American sentiment.⁴¹² The US ambassador to Japan, John Moore Allison (1954-1957), sent a telegram that the vessel was not doing espionage.⁴¹³ It also stressed that Japanese psychological vulnerability to nuclear weapons and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of such a problem (psychological warfare).⁴¹⁴ One American intelligence report released in August 1954 that predicted some probable developments through 1957 pointed out that neutralist

⁴⁰⁸ Tetsuto Kato: *Nihon no Shakai Shugi: Genbaku Hantai Genbaku Suishin no Ronri* [Japanese Socialism: Anti-Atomic Bombs and The logic of Promotion of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2013), p. 267.

⁴⁰⁹ Appendix Certain Aspect of the Situation, NSC 5516/1 9 April 1955, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218, NARA.

⁴¹⁰ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 80-81; Kato, *Nihon no Shakai Shugi*, pp. 182-183, 208; John Mitchell: "Okinawa, nuclear weapons and 'Japan's' special psychological problem", *The Japan Times*, 8th July 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2012/07/08/general/okinawa-nuclear-weapons-and-japans-special-psychological-problem/#.WT7j1Os1_IU, accessed on 10 June 2017. See also FRUS, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 56.

⁴¹¹ Akiyama, "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture", p. 65, 72, 74; Gutherie-Shimizu, "Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960", p. 259.

⁴¹² FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 762, p. 1647. See also; Kurosaki, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*, p.8; Divine, *Blowing on the Wind*, pp. 30-31.

⁴¹³ FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 762, p. 1643.

⁴¹⁴ Ibid., p. 1646.

sentiment in Japan would probably increase and it would continue to be critical of US policy.⁴¹⁵ Worse still, Allison, even noted that “Japan does not consider itself an ally or partner of the United States but rather a nation which for the time being is forced by circumstances to cooperate with the United States.”⁴¹⁶

Conclusion

The USA (and the GHQ led by General MacArthur) had clear occupation policies when it came to Japan. These were “demilitarisation” and “democratisation” including disarmament clearly represented by the peace constitution, Article 9 in particular. Japan’s embrace of the US occupation policy has successfully prevented Japan from becoming a military power as the USA initially sought. Ironically this restrained the legitimacy of the altered US policy for rearmament of Japan. The loss of the Republic of China as a dominant power to control the Chinese continent and the outbreak of the Korean War drastically transformed America’s occupation policies toward Japan. Now these were focused on “economic recovery” and “rearmament.” The course of the occupation was reversed. With the advantage of hindsight this drastic change was an ultimate strategic failure of US grand strategy. The US government could not achieve its ultimate aims: “rearmament” and a “leading player” in containing communist in the Far East.⁴¹⁷ These two goals were closely connected as Dulles even wanted a stronger Japan closely aligned with the USA so that Japan would take a more burden of regional defence.

In this regard, the biggest US strategic failure was the introduction of the new constitution. It became one of the strong barriers for the USA to demand Japan’s rearmament. Had it not been introduced and therefore not been institutionalized, Japan’s rearmament would have been much easier. The brake was institutionalized by Americans themselves. Once it became institutionalized and

⁴¹⁵ Ibid., Document 785, p. 1697.

⁴¹⁶ Ibid., Document 785, p. 1714.

⁴¹⁷ Dulles, “Security in the Pacific”, pp. 176, 178-179

accepted, it also became difficult to change the constitution. In addition to the new constitution, postwar Japan avoided facing military affairs. Following the devastating war, the Japanese top priority was the rehabilitation of its economy but not its military which ultimately destroyed the country. The early postwar period of anti-military feeling was probably natural. The Japanese needed somebody to be blamed for tremendous losses the country suffered. On the one hand, the USA was still somewhat successful in inducing Japan to establish a small scale military establishment: from the National Police Reserve to the SDF. On the other hand, Japan or Yoshida to be more accurate established the SDF without revising the constitution despite the fact that its nature is completely military. This has become a controversial political issue since its establishment in 1954. Due to the existence of Article 9 (peace clause), a massive rearmament programme was nearly automatically excluded. As a US government special report well summarised, “Both popular attitudes and constitutional proscription have handicapped the development of Japan’s defense...Pacifism was enshrined in...Japan’s post-war constitution.”⁴¹⁸

Japan’s defence spending throughout the Cold War was relatively small in view of its economic capacity (virtually 1 % ceiling of GNP). After the Japanese economy started to recover followed by the Korean War (*chosen Tokuju*), Japan suffered from the “Third Bombing” (the *Lucky Dragon* incident). This incident triggered Japanese memories of the war and the atomic bombing. The Japanese sense of victimhood arouse as well. It was a natural reaction for the Japan to dread nuclear weapons and feel that they did not even want to see nuclear arsenals near them. This is why the US deployment plan of *Honest John* missile provoked an angry response.

⁴¹⁸ Special Report, “Japan Rethinking Security Policy”, 29 April 1966, National Security File (NSF), Country File, Japan Box 251, Lyndon Baines Johnson (hereafter LBJ) Library.

Chapter Three

The Nuclearisation of US allies and Japan's Perceptions of a Nuclear Base

As the use of nuclear power for other purposes develops, the emotional distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons will decrease. The real question...is when the time will come when Japan will permit the introduction of nuclear weapons.

—Masayoshi Ohira⁴¹⁹

Japan's complete defeat of World War Two doubtlessly had an enormous impact on the course of postwar Japan's defence. This chapter shows that the rise of fervent Japan's anti-nuclear sentiment did not stop the Eisenhower administration from seeking a stronger Japan even armed with tactical nuclear weapons as part of Eisenhower's grand strategy, "New Look." Having faced fervent Japan's nuclear allergy, the Eisenhower administration attempted to utilise the "Atoms for Peace Programme" in order to educate the Japanese about the salience of nuclear technology as a first step toward the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan. Arguably it was during the 1950s that Japan had the highest possibility to be nuclearised given the fact that the Eisenhower administration sought to make such nuclear arrangements. The chapter examines how the US and the Japanese government treated sensitive nuclear issues that emerged in the 1950s and how the USA ultimately compromised on these issues. In the 1950s US-Japanese relations were precarious and the presence of US troops stationed in Japan was seen as the continuation of US occupation. Neutralism appeared widespread in the eyes of US diplomats and the USA did not want a neutral Japan in any form. The chapter also looks at how the non-military and nuclear path was further reinforced in the period between 1955 and 1964.

⁴¹⁹ Masayoshi Ohira, Former Foreign Minister Ohira, in private conversation with US Congressmen, 9 September 1964, quoted in Report on "Japan's Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field: Proposed U.S. Courses of Action", (15 June 1965), p. C4. DNSA, JU00485, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

US Failed Attempts: the First Appearance of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Ambassador Allison sent a telegram that highlighted Japanese psychological vulnerability to nuclear weapons and the possibility of Soviet exploitation of such an issue (psychological warfare).⁴²⁰ Despite the clear emergence of the Japanese nuclear allergy, the US military still sought to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

While US air forces wanted to store nuclear weapons at US bases throughout Japan as with Western Europe, the State Department denied such action.⁴²¹ The Eisenhower administration expanded the size and variety of nuclear bombs and deployed US nuclear forces globally on the basis of the “New Look” strategy.⁴²² The first and foremost business for the Eisenhower administration was to bring the prolonged Korean War to a rapid end.⁴²³ A pledge to pay his personal visit to Korea and to end the war was part of the Eisenhower’s election campaign.⁴²⁴ This public announcement was indeed considered to be one of the decisive reasons that elected him as President.⁴²⁵

Drawing lessons from the Korean War, the Eisenhower administration had a strong desire for the avoidance of another Korean War.⁴²⁶ Indeed the Eisenhower administration chose to move toward more reliance on nuclear threats over a large conventional standing army so as to lessen defence spending inflated by the war.⁴²⁷

⁴²⁰ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document 762, p. 1646.

⁴²¹ See for example Jones, *After Hiroshima*, pp. 326-327.

⁴²² Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980*, p. 1; Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, p. 47; Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 11-14; McMahon, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 293.

⁴²³ Robert A. Divine: *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1981), pp. 17-18; Samuel F. Wells, Jr: “The Origins of Massive Retaliation”, *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 96 No. 1 (Spring 1981), p. 31.

⁴²⁴ Robert A. Divine: *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952 1960* (New York: New Viewpoints., 1974), p. 75. See also Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell: “What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority”, *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 97 No. 4 (Winter 1982-1983), p. 591.

⁴²⁵ Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952 1960*, pp. 82-83.

⁴²⁶ Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, pp. 49-52.

⁴²⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-57, Vol. 19, *National Security Policy* (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1990), Document 2, 11,77, pp. 3-4, 57-58, 301-303. See also Lawrence Freedman: *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2003), p. 74; McMahon, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 293; Taylor, *The Uncertain Trumpet*, p. 23.

Even though the “New Look” policy is often simply summarised as “More Bang for the buck”, its logic was more complex and overarching than its critics castigated.⁴²⁸ It was Eisenhower’s strong belief that “A vital factor in the long-term survival of the free world is the maintenance by the United States of a sound, strong economy.”⁴²⁹

In parallel with this long-haul approach, it was in this context that the so-called “Massive Retaliation” was introduced and remained “the basic orientation of American defense policy” throughout the Eisenhower administration notwithstanding severe criticism.⁴³⁰ “Massive Retaliation” publicly evinced how America would use nuclear weapons and thus, it served as the very first declaratory strategy of its kind.⁴³¹ Dulles’s speech on 12 January 1954 was believed to introduce the term, “Massive Retaliation” although he never stated such words.⁴³² What Dulles did actually say was that “Local defense must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power” as local defence with conventional force alone was not strong enough to deter the Soviet Union.⁴³³ What Dulles really aimed to achieve was to gain political advantage through a threat of “massive retaliation.”⁴³⁴ The true nature of “Massive Retaliation” was “calculated ambiguity”⁴³⁵ because the Eisenhower administration actually did not explicitly explain the circumstances under which the USA would implement the massive

⁴²⁸ Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 740.

⁴²⁹ *FRUS*, 1952-54, Vol. 2, Part1: *National Security affairs*, Document 59, p. 307.

⁴³⁰ Bernard Brodie: *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Prentice U.P., 1959, ppb. 1971), p. 249. See also Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, p.83 and Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*, p. 73.

⁴³¹ Michael Mandelbaum: *The Nuclear Question 1946-1976*(Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1979), p. 50.

⁴³² Five days earlier (7 January 1954), Eisenhower laid out his idea of deterrence maintained by “a massive capability to strike back” in his State of Union address. On this point, see Wells, “The Origins of Massive Retaliation”, p. 33.

⁴³³ John Foster Dulles: “Speech on Massive Retaliation”, January 12, 1945 in Jeffrey Porro, et al (eds.): *The Nuclear Age Reader* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1989), p. 86. See also Treverton, “How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?”, p. 113.

⁴³⁴ Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 741.

⁴³⁵ The Trump administration retains the doctrine of “calculated ambiguity” as well. See *Nuclear Posture Review 2018*, p. 22. On recent debates about “calculated ambiguity”, See John Deutch: “A Nuclear Posture for Today”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 No. 1 (Jan/Feb 2005), pp. 49-60; Gerson, “No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy”; David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening: “Nuclear first use revisited”, *Survival* Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 27-44; Alexander Lanoszaka and Thomas Leo Scherer: “Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol 24 No. 3-4, pp. 343-355; Sagan, “The Commitment Trap”, pp. 85-115.

strike, making the Soviet Union unsure about a US response.⁴³⁶ According to Nixon, “Eisenhower always stressed that it is important not to tell an enemy what we would do, because he could prepare to meet it, but even more important not to tell an enemy what we would not do because it would encourage him to push us around.”⁴³⁷

According to the distinguished political scientist Samuel Huntington, “The decision to place greater reliance upon nuclear weapons was a key aspect of the New Look” and it implied that “reduction in conventional armed forces would be paralleled by increasing capabilities in tactical nuclear weapons.”⁴³⁸ It is worth mentioning that the USA “moved, by the mid-1950s, from an era of nuclear scarcity to the threshold of an era of nuclear plenty...From approximately 50 bombs in 1948, the US stockpile grew to perhaps 300 in 1950, to at least 1, 000 in 1953, to 18,000 by the end of the Eisenhower administration, and into the 30, 000 range in the mid-1960s.”⁴³⁹

Personally President Eisenhower was sympathetic toward the nuclearisation of close US allies. In February 1960 Eisenhower stated that he had “always strongly favored the sharing of our weapons.”⁴⁴⁰ The military rationale behind the overseas deployment of US nuclear weapons was that the capability of US ground force deployed in the US allied states would be further strengthened “by provision of short-range nuclear weapons.”⁴⁴¹ Indeed, NATO started to rely on US tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe for local defence from 1953 to substitute the new weapons for manpower and compensate NATO’s conventional

⁴³⁶ Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, p.39; Saki Dockrill: *Eisenhower’s New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1996), p. 202; Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p.82; George H. Quester: “Was Eisenhower Genius?”, *International Security* Vol.4 No.1 (Fall 1979), p.162; Wells, Jr, “The Origins of Massive Retaliation”, p. 36, 38.

⁴³⁷ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2 Japan, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 2018), Document 112, p. 398.

⁴³⁸ Samuel P. Huntington: *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1961), p. 79, 84. See also Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, p. 37.

⁴³⁹ David Alan Rosenberg: “Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1986) Vol.9 No.1, p. 39. On US nuclear stockpiles see also Norris and Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010”, pp. 81-82.

⁴⁴⁰ Eisenhower quoted in Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace*, p. 197.

⁴⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, DC.: GPO, 1996), Document 129, p. 497.

weakness with these arsenals against the Soviet Union. NATO accepted the “New Look” approach of defence.⁴⁴² In December 1957 NATO agreed “to establish stocks of nuclear warheads, which will be readily available for the defense of the Alliance in case of need.”⁴⁴³ In June 1958 the Eisenhower administration amended the Atomic Energy Act (concerning development and control of nuclear energy) in order to share sensitive nuclear information on technical specifications of the weapons and actual atomic weapons with close US allies. Late in 1958 US intermediate-range ballistic (IRBM) missiles *Thor* were deployed in Britain under “dual-key” arrangements.⁴⁴⁴ In order to reassure Europeans, the Eisenhower administration in the late 50s also made decisions to send its IRBMs (*Jupiter*) to Italy and Turkey. They were deployed in Italy in 1960 and in Turkey in 1961 respectively.⁴⁴⁵ Interestingly the US military had a similar policy toward Japan as we will see below.

Another key tenet of the “New Look” strategy was the creation of a more extensive alliance network to contain communism and deter communist aggression.⁴⁴⁶ Dulles also placed a high priority on collective security with America’s alliances. In his *Foreign Affairs* article, Dulles asserted that “the cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defense. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility.”⁴⁴⁷ Based on the strategic

⁴⁴² Raymond Aron: *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy*, trans. Ernst Pawel (Westport: Greenwood Press., 1965), p.229; Freedman, “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, p. 746; Treverton, “How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?”, p. 113.

⁴⁴³ “Final Communiqué”, Chairman: Mr. P.H. Speak, Secretary of General of NATO, 16-19 December 1957, Paris, *NATO Online Library*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c571219a.htm>, accessed on 19 January 1953.

⁴⁴⁴ Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980*, p. 2; Ian Clark and David Angell: “Britain, the United States and the control of nuclear weapons: The diplomacy of the Thor deployment 1956-58”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft* Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 153-177; Jan Melissen: “The Thor saga: Anglo-American nuclear relations, US IRBM development and deployment in Britain 1955-1959”, *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 172-173.

⁴⁴⁵ Seyom Brown: *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Reagan* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1983), p.120; Robert S. Norris, Steven M. Kosiak and Stephen I. Schwartz: “Deploying the Bomb” in Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.): *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 1998), p. 145.

⁴⁴⁶ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Vol. 2, Part1, Document 151, pp. 578-597.

⁴⁴⁷ Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace”, p. 355.

logic of the importance of the global alliance network, the Eisenhower administration started to deploy tactical nuclear weapons to the Far East as well. It was designed to lessen its vulnerability by increasing more targets for Soviet military strikes.⁴⁴⁸ It is also important to note that before the emergence of intercontinental ballistic missiles, foreign bases were crucial for the USA to carry out its air (nuclear) strikes.⁴⁴⁹ More specifically foreign bases were vital for nuclear operations before B 52 strategic bombers with intercontinental flying range came into operation in 1955 in that B-29s and B-47s with their limited flying range were capable of attacking the Soviet Union only from its peripheral areas such as England, Turkey and Japan.⁴⁵⁰ As one analyst observes, “The basic strategic concept underlying all American war plans called for an air offensive against a prospective enemy from overseas bases.”⁴⁵¹ Indeed, Dulles stressed this aspect:

Without the cooperation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities. Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent power. With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill called the ‘supreme deterrent.’⁴⁵²

In terms of Japan’s strategic location, Japan was one of the key strategic areas in close proximity to the Korean peninsula, China and the Soviet Union. As already noted, it is important to bear in mind that the US government also wanted Japan to assume a more active defence role due to its very strategic location. From Japanese perspectives, Japanese military leaders certainly feared Soviet’s invasion

⁴⁴⁸ On the history of US nuclear deployment, see Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were”, pp. 26-35.

⁴⁴⁹ Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace”, p. 356.

⁴⁵⁰ Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoening: *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company., 1984), pp. 148-151; Norris, Kosiak and Schwartz, “Deploying the Bomb”, p. 191; Steven T. Ross: *American War Plans 1945-1950* (London: Frank Cass., 2004), pp. 60-61

⁴⁵¹ Leffler, “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48”, p. 351.

⁴⁵² Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace”, p. 356.

from the Northern part of Japan in a manner of the Korean War in Japan and the key strategic areas of Japan for protection were indeed Hokkaido and Tsugaru Strait—both are Northern Japan.⁴⁵³ The location of these places was a strategically key exit to the Pacific.⁴⁵⁴ Throughout the Cold War, Soviet invasion of air space and its large naval presence around Japanese waters naturally posed a threat to Japan.⁴⁵⁵ As a general rule, geographical proximity “breeds issues for dispute, provides territory contiguous to both parties, which facilitates combat, and triggers incentives to sign up allies which are able to distract the neighbor elsewhere.”⁴⁵⁶ Furthermore, proximate powers can more easily and physically pose an acute threat to one than those that are in the distance.⁴⁵⁷ One analyst even asserted that “If the Soviet wanted to invade Japan, it would certainly have the military capabilities to do so.”⁴⁵⁸ The CIA also estimated that the Soviet Union possessed the military “capability of conducting a major amphibious airborne offensive against Japan; simultaneously assaulting Hokkaido and northern Honshu; or of invading Hokkaido first, to be followed by an invasion of Honshu” although it concluded that the possibility of such an attack was remote.⁴⁵⁹

Of course, unlike West Germany that has continuous neighbours, a direct

⁴⁵³ Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen, *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutori*, p. 176; Shigeki Nishimura: “Nihon no Gunji Senryaku Kankyo: Nordic Analogy [The Strategic Environment of Japan: Nordic Analogy]”, *Kaigai Jijyo* Vol. 33 No.3 (1985), pp. 70-74; Shigeki Nishimura (ed.): *Senryaku no kyokasho* [An Introduction to Strategy] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo., 2009), chapter 12; Kazuhisa Ogawa: *Zainichi Beigun* [US Forces in Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha.,1985), pp. 12-13

⁴⁵⁴ Yukio Satoh: *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper 178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1982), p.4.

⁴⁵⁵ Clark, “Soviet Policy toward Japan”, p. 149; Nishimura, “Nihon no Gunji Senryaku Kankyo: Nordic Analogy”, pp. 63-65, 71.

⁴⁵⁶ Colin S. Gray: *Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge., 2006), chap 9, p. 137.

⁴⁵⁷ Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons*, (New York: Columbia U.P., 2007), pp. 52-53; Gray, *Strategy and History*, p. 132; Walt, *The Origins of Alliances*, p. 23.

⁴⁵⁸ John E. Endicott: *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors* (New York: Praeger Publishers., 1975), pp. 24-25. Edward Luttwak dissented and doubted the Soviet Union's operational capability of conducting an amphibious invasion of Japan. See Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence”, p. 34. See also Shinichi Ogawa: “U.S. Nuclear Forces and Japanese / Western Pacific Security” in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven Maaranen(eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and North America* (New York: Plenum Press., 1992), pp. 149-150.

⁴⁵⁹ “Likelihood of a Soviet Attack on Japan in the Near Future”, 11 May1951, *CIA* available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79R01012A001100030013-1.pdf>, accessed on 13 August 2018.

outright invasion of Japan by the Soviet military was much more challenging because of its insular status and US air and naval superiority (the Seventh Fleet equipped with both conventional and nuclear arsenals) combined with the SDF's defence capabilities.⁴⁶⁰ Yet due to Japan's geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, Japan, needless to say, could not have been intact, had a war between the superpowers broken out.⁴⁶¹ Strikingly, Dulles maintained that "It is in Asia that Russian imperialism finds its most powerful expression."⁴⁶²

Japan was considered to be the strategic base of US nuclear strikes as part of nuclear operations against China and the Soviet Union.⁴⁶³ Moreover, the Eisenhower government started to halve the numbers of 200,000 troops in Japan by the end of 1956 based on the "New Look" strategy.⁴⁶⁴ Behind this shift, there also was growing resentment over the continued massive presence of US ground troops after Japan regained its independence in 1952. The Eisenhower administration was clearly aware of the domestic sentiment. Eisenhower indeed stated:

We are aware of the problems created for Japan, and also for the United States, by the presence of our troops in Japan. We do not like to be anywhere where we are not wanted. We are therefore ready to consider beginning to withdraw our troops. We realize that in a crowded country the presence of foreign troops causes unusually acute problems and we are ready to talk about that as one of the ways in which we can help.⁴⁶⁵

As a result, Japanese had to increase military strength by themselves to fill a

⁴⁶⁰ Luttwak, "The Problems of Extending Deterrence", p. 35; Ogawa, *Kaku Gunbikanri Gunshuku no yukue*, p.216; Ogawa, "U.S. Nuclear Forces and Japanese / Western Pacific Security", pp. 149-151; Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", p. 156. See also Freedman, *The Future of War*, p. 268; Weitz, "The Historical Context", p. 11.

⁴⁶¹ Nishimura, "Nihon no Gunji Senryaku Kankyo", p. 7.

⁴⁶² Dulles: "Security in the Pacific", p. 187.

⁴⁶³ Hayes, Zarsky and Bello, *American Lake*, p. 76. Hans Kriestensen: "Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella", Global Problem Solving nuke policy Supporting Documents. *Nautilus Institute*. (21 July 1999), Available at <http://nautilus.org/supporting-documents/japan-under-the-us-nuclear-umbrella/>, accessed on 7 March 2016, pp. 1-61; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, p. 95.

⁴⁶⁴ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 129.

⁴⁶⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 183, p. 374.

security gap to be created after US troop withdrawal from Japan.⁴⁶⁶ Since the USA depended more on US nuclear deterrence, a large expensive standing army was not essential. Throughout the Eisenhower administration, the solution probably lay in new technology. In the words of Dulles,

The essential thing is that a potential aggressor should know in advance that he can and will be made to suffer for his aggression more than he can possibly gain by it. This calls for a system in which local defensive strength is reinforced by more mobile deterrent power. The method of doing so will vary according to the character of the various areas.⁴⁶⁷

This general statement did not directly indicate that the USA needed to deploy its nuclear weapons to Japan. The Eisenhower administration was nevertheless clearly saw the value of the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons to Japan. In December 1954 the Eisenhower administration first authorised the deployment of non-nuclear weapon components to US bases in Japan. In fact around the same time, a number of media reports emerged on the plans on US nuclear weapon (*Honest John* missile) introduction into Japan.⁴⁶⁸

⁴⁶⁶ Ibid., Document 43, p. 89 ; *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea (Washington D.C. : GPO., 1994), Document 190, p. 378.

⁴⁶⁷ Dulles, "Policy for Security and Peace", p. 358.

⁴⁶⁸ See Memorandum For the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "US of Atomic Weapons", 8 February 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA and Letter to Reuben B. Robertson, Jr from Herbert Hoover, Jr, 18 November, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

III. E. Table: The Numbers of US Forces in Japan and SDF

	US Forces, Japan	Self Defence Force (SDF)
1952	260,000	117, 590(National Security Forces)
1953	250,000	120,323 (National Security Forces)
1954	210,000	152, 115 (SDF onwards)
1955	150,000	149, 769
1956	117, 000	197, 182
1957	87,000	204, 105
1958	65,000	222,102
1959	58,000	230,935
1960	48,000	230,934

Source: Nakajima, *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku*, p. 156.

The then US ambassador to Japan, Douglas MacArthur II (General MacArthur's nephew: 1957-1961), later also confirmed that he had a talk about the deployment plan of US nuclear weapons in Japan with the Japanese government.⁴⁶⁹ Prime Minister Ichiro Hatoyama (1954-1956) stated in March 1955 that "Japan had no reason to decline the US deployment of nuclear weapons to Japan if [military] power sustains peace" although he retracted his words following the severe public outcry against his statement.⁴⁷⁰ In response to the Hatoyama's statement, the State Department noted that "this might give us some color of a claim of Japanese acquiescence in the event of a leak as to such deployment."⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁹ "Watahino Zainin Chu wa Mochikominai: Makkasa Moto Taishi Kataru" [There was no nuclear deployment into Japan while I was in office], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 May 1981. See also Memorandum for the Secretary, "Deployment of Atomic Weapons to Japan", 1 June 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁷⁰ "Kakkaini Hamon Yoban Genbaku Chozou" [Hatoyama's Controversial Statement on the Storage of Atomic Bombs in Japan] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 14 March 1955; "Genbaku Chozou ni wa Hantai: Saha Hatoyama Genmei Torikeshi Youkyu" [The Socialist Party was opposed to the Storage of Atomic Bombs in Japan and requested Hatoyama to retract his Statement] *Asahi Shimbun*, 15 March 1955; "Genbaku Chozou wa Kateiron" [The Storage of Atomic Bombs was just a Hypothetical Question] *Asahi Shimbun*, 16 March 1955.

⁴⁷¹ Letter to John M. Allison from Gerald C. Smith, 22 March, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG

That said, this was an optimistic observation. One memorandum sent to the Secretary of State in August 1955 observed the Japanese reaction to the missile (*Honest John*) introduction and explained that “There is a very considerable furor over introduction of Honest John rocket launchers into Japan.”⁴⁷² Hatoyama faced the much more severe backlash than he had expected. Later the same year Hatoyama made an assertion that if the US government requested the Japanese government for the introduction of US nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan, the government would certainly reject such a request. He reiterated that the USA could not deploy nuclear weapons in Japan without our consent. He implied that he would resign if this rule was violated and nuclear weapons were introduced by the USA.⁴⁷³ Around the same time similarly Foreign Minister Mamoru Shigemitsu assured at the Diet that the US military did not have any nuclear weapons in Japan. Moreover, he said that he had a special agreement with Ambassador Allison that the US military forces did not have any intention of bringing its nuclear weapons into Japan or create a nuclear base in Japan in the future without our consent.⁴⁷⁴ This was, however, a complete falsehood arousing Allison’s ire.⁴⁷⁵ Allison, nevertheless, understood that the severe political climate of Japan against the introduction of nuclear weapons to Japan.⁴⁷⁶

While it is uncertain why Shigemitsu made this remark, it was not difficult to conclude that Shigemitsu’s action was aimed to placate public apprehension. In other words, this statement was reassurance to the Japanese public that was

59,NARA.

⁴⁷² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 43, p. 89.

⁴⁷³ Ichiro Hatoyama, Sangiin Honkaigi [Plenary Assembly of House of Councilors] 30 July 1955, *KKKS*, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/022/0512/02207300512043.pdf>, accessed on 8 August 2017. See also Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, pp. 80-83 and Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, pp.80-81.

⁴⁷⁴ Mamoru Shigemitsu, Shugiin Gaimuinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 6 July 1955, *KKKS*, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/022/0082/02207060082027.pdf>, accessed on 8 Aug 2017.

⁴⁷⁵ U.S. State Department, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, “The Relationship of Japan to Nuclear Weapons and Warfare”, Washington, D.C., 1957, p.8. Secret. Retrieved by the Nautilus Institute, Digital Library, 11 December 1999, available at <http://oldsite.nautilus.org/archives/library/security/foia/StateOIR57.html>, 18 November 2017.

⁴⁷⁶ Jones, *After Hiroshima*, p. 265.

strenuously opposed to the nuclear presence on Japan's soil.⁴⁷⁷ Notably, in August 1955, the first *Gensuibaku Kinshi Sekaitaikai* (World Conference Against A & H Bombs) held in Hiroshima proclaimed its slogan that "non-introduction of nuclear artillery, non-nuclear storage and non-expansion of military bases for war preparation."⁴⁷⁸

Honest John missiles were after all deployed to a US base (Camp Drake) close to Tokyo in summer. The missiles were reported to be unequipped with nuclear warheads.⁴⁷⁹ Indeed the official study of the Defence Department revealed in 1975 that "Only nonnuclear components, however, were authorized for Japan."⁴⁸⁰ As far as the Japanese government was concerned, a missile without a nuclear warhead was interpreted as a non-nuclear weapon.⁴⁸¹ The decision to deploy non-nuclear missiles was made on account of "the bad political situation then existing in Japan, it was decided that nuclear components would not be deployed to Japan."⁴⁸² Yet the deployment of complete nuclear weapons was still militarily desirable with a view to enhancing the combat capability and readiness of US forces in Japan.⁴⁸³

This introduction was an American test to closely monitor the Japanese public reaction and Weinstein analysed that "If there had been no public outcry, or if it had passed more quickly, the United States Government would probably have

⁴⁷⁷ Peter Hayes: *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books., 1991), pp. 36-37; Shinichi Kitaoka: "The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts: Background and Disclosure", *Asia-Pacific Review* Vol. 17 No. 2 (2010), p. 13.

⁴⁷⁸ Niihara, *Kakuheiki Shiyo keikaku wo Yomitoku*, p. 180.

⁴⁷⁹ Norris, Arkin and Burr, "Where They Were", p. 30; Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy*, pp. 80-81.

⁴⁸⁰ L. Wainstein et al: "The Evolution of U.S. Strategic Command and Control and Warning, 1945-1972", Institute for Defense Analyses Study S-467, June 1975. Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/nd-9.pdf>, accessed on 30 January 2019

⁴⁸¹ Jieitai to Kenpo (Shiryoshu), [Japanese Self-Defence Force and the Constitution: Reference Book], Boei Kenshujo Senshibu [Office of War History at the National Defence College], December 1976, 4A-34-957, p. 27, Kokuritsu Kobunshokan [National Archive of Japan], Tokyo.

⁴⁸² Memorandum for the Secretary, "Reply to Secretary of Defense's Letter of January 28, 1955, Concerning the Deployment of Nuclear Weapons to Japan", 11 March 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁸³ Letter to Charles E. Wilson from John Foster Dulles, 11 March, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

continued to press for the atomic warheads in Japan.”⁴⁸⁴ In reality, as American embassy in Tokyo noted, Japan “has trembled at the introduction of the ‘Honest John’ rocket, has indicated lack of concurrence in the storage in Japan of atomic war heads...”⁴⁸⁵ It must be stressed that in the US military point of view, nuclear weapons were needed to protect American troops in Japan as well. Two months before his death (November 2016), President Nixon’s Defence Secretary Melvin Laird spoke to NHK (Japan’s national public broadcasting corporation) and expressed America’s security concerns about Japan’s non-nuclear status. He said that “we [the US forces in Japan] were standing there naked.”⁴⁸⁶ This acute reality eventually led to the conclusion of the secret nuclear agreement (reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Okinawa in cases of emergency) partially in return for the reversion of Okinawa as we will explore in the Chapter Five.

Having faced the vehement repugnance after the thermonuclear test and the *Honest John* incident, President Eisenhower backed away from the deployment plan in the end. Ambassador Allison also opined that “it would be most unwise to attempt to bring nuclear components into Japan now unless there is urgent military necessity to do so...”⁴⁸⁷ The US military too was acutely aware of this political difficulty when a joint Map Exercise *FUJI* took place in Japan between 24 and 28 September 1957 where nuclear weapons played a role. They faced an acute challenge: “The most difficult problems concerning atomic weapons involved introduction of atomic weapons into Japan, which the Japanese would not agree to prior to joint U.S.-Japanese declaration of emergency, and their use in hostilities, which was approved only if Japan were attacked by atomic weapons or if the two governments considered the situation to be grave.”⁴⁸⁸ Yet it was to somewhat

⁴⁸⁴ Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 82.

⁴⁸⁵ Embassy Telegram, 7 September 1956, recited in *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 113, p. 254.

⁴⁸⁶ NHK Supesharu Sukuupu Dokyumento: Kaku wo Motometa Nihon [NHK Special, Series Scoop Document: Japan that Sought Nuclears], Broadcasted on 10 September 2017.

⁴⁸⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary, “Deployment of Atomic Weapons to Japan.”

⁴⁸⁸ A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “On Atomic Weapons Deployment.” See also Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, Pacific, “Base Requirements in Japan”, 26 September 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

sanguine about the prospect of future introduction of atomic weapons into Japan because “the door has been left open for a change in policy as soon as public opinion will permit.”⁴⁸⁹ As a provisional and immediate military measure, the JCS was authorized to have an access to nuclear components stored adjacent to Japan (most probably Okinawa) and use the completed weapons in times of contingency.⁴⁹⁰ In other words, nuclear components became available to the military commander in Japan and they were united with non-nuclear components such as *Honest John* missiles as nuclear weapons in face of imminent armed attack. As we will see below, this contingency plan even continued in the 1960s. This was the very first appearance of US END over Japan. The US government nevertheless failed to introduce nuclear weapons into Japan.

Interestingly Dulles was reported to describe the Japanese “nuclear allergy” as “a wave of hysteria.”⁴⁹¹ One US State Department’s intelligence report of 1957 analysed that “The intensity of Japanese public reactions to association with nuclear weapons in practical ways has limited the effectiveness of Japan’s security arrangements with the US. In the present climate of domestic opinion, for examples, the Japanese Government could not publicly agree to storage by US forces of nuclear weapons in Japan and still retain office.” It went on to observe that “Japanese opinion is a controlling factor in the formulation for Japan’s national policy toward nuclear weapons.”⁴⁹²

In the end, Dulles, who had long advocated rearming Japan, advised the US military to renounce its nuclear deployment plan to Japan.⁴⁹³ Indeed, these

⁴⁸⁹ A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “On Atomic Weapons Deployment.”

⁴⁹⁰ Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff from Secretary of Defense, “Use of Atomic Weapons”, 3 March 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

⁴⁹¹ Quoted in Hayes, *Pacific Powderkeg*, p. 36.

⁴⁹² U.S. State Department, Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, “The Relationship of Japan to Nuclear Weapons and Warfare”, Washington, D.C., 1957.

⁴⁹³ Memorandum For the File, “Meeting in Mr. MacArthur’s Office, Japan”, See also Letter From John Foster Dulles to Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, 3 June 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59. See also Letter to Charles E. Wilson from John Foster Dulles, 11 March, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

non-nuclear components were removed from Japan as a Japanese nuclear allergy had not waned away while one of the potential courses of action for US nuclear plans in Japan was “Secretly to replace non-nuclear components with sealed pit weapons when the former become obsolete” as this was the most desirable military option. It was, however, politically the most unrealistic one as well.⁴⁹⁴

While Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960) articulated in the Diet in May 1957 that it was not entirely correct to say all nuclear weapons were unconstitutional in light of the technical development, he also claimed that Japan would not allow any US nuclear battalion to be stationed in Japan.⁴⁹⁵ He was attentive to the nuclear-sensitive Japanese public. Kishi’s statement apparently had some political effect on the Soviet Union. The Soviet embassy in Tokyo sent a warning note to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, stating that “Japanese statesmen...have recently been making statements which can only be interpreted as attempts to secure the legality of nuclear armament.” It then expressed the Soviet desire for “the permanent neutrality of Japan.”⁴⁹⁶ In respect to this possibility, one American government official stressed that a neutral Japan was simply an immediate political objective of the Sino-Soviet bloc.⁴⁹⁷

Although Kishi believed that nuclear weapons for the exclusive purpose of self-defence were constitutionally permissible, he conceded that the Atomic Energy Basic Law of 1955 (Article 2 in particular) limited development and use of nuclear energy to solely peaceful programmes. Successive Japanese governments have inherited this understanding of the legality of an independent nuclear deterrent.⁴⁹⁸

Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, p.52.

⁴⁹⁴ Naval Message FROM CINCIPAC to JCS, 20 August 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA ; Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were”, p. 31. See also Letter to John M. Allison from Gerald C. Smith, 22 March, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

⁴⁹⁵ Nobusuke Kishi, Sangiin Yosan Iinkai [Budget Committee of the House of Councilors] 7 May 1957, *KKKS*, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/026/0514/02605070514024.pdf>, accessed on 18 May 2017.

⁴⁹⁶ Telegram British Embassy Moscow, No. 711 6 May, 1959, Foreign Office, Nuclear weapons in Japan, Code FJ File 1194, 1959. FO371/ 141479. The National Archives of the UK.

⁴⁹⁷ Memo United Kingdom Delegation to NATO 22 May, 1959, Confidential, Foreign Office, Nuclear weapons in Japan, Code FJ File 1194, 1959. FO371/ 141479. The National Archives of the UK.

⁴⁹⁸ Nobusuke Kishi, Naikaku Iinkai [Cabinet Committee] 7 May 1957, *KKKS*,

As to his stance on nuclear weapons, he later clarified that at that time he did not think that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons but nuclear weapons were constitutional if nuclear weapons could be used defensively for national defence.⁴⁹⁹ In fact Japanese Foreign Ministry officials are reported to have discussed a Japanese option of acquiring nuclear weapons during the Kishi administration. Vice Foreign Minister Hisanari Yamada informed US ambassador to Japan, MacArthur that the nuclear option was under scrutiny. Yet he also maintained the difficulty of realising such an option considering the foreseeable general public reaction to the decision.⁵⁰⁰

One CIA report rightly assessed that the Japan's nuclear option was widely unwelcome in Japan and Japanese conservative leaders including Kishi "take the position that Japan's future greatness must rely primarily on economic rather than military strength."⁵⁰¹ Since Hatoyama's statement on the possibility of hosting US nuclear weapons, however, no politicians had explicitly and positively favoured welcoming US nuclear forces onto the Japanese soil. It had become a great political risk for the Japanese leaders. This norm has not changed yet. In 1983 Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-1987), for example, stressed that there were no nuclear weapons throughout Japan due to the Japanese non-nuclear stance.⁵⁰² This fact contradicts one analyst's claim that "Japan has since the 1950s regarded the extension of a US nuclear umbrella to be integral to its national security

<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/026/0514/02605070514024.pdf>, accessed on 18 May 2017. See also Jieitai to Kenpo, p. 25, 42.

⁴⁹⁹ Yoshihisa Hara (ed.): *Kishinobuske Shogenroku* [Oral Record of Nobusuke Kishi] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2014), pp. 180-181.

⁵⁰⁰ "Kakuheiki: Kishi Seiken Kaku Hoyu wo Giron Beikoubunsho de Hanmei Boeiyou Heikini" [The Kishi Administration discussed an option of developing Japan's Independent Nuclear Weapons as Defensive Weapons: The US National Archives Reveals] *Mainichi Shimbun*, 13 March 2013; "Japan discussed acquisition of 'defensive' nuclear weapons in 1958", *The Japan Times*, 17th March 2013, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/03/17/national/history/japan-discussed-acquisition-of-defensiv-e-nuclear-weapons-in-1958/>, accessed on 10 June 2017.

⁵⁰¹ National Intelligence Estimate 100-2-58, "Development of Nuclear Capabilities by Fourth Countries: Likelihood and Consequences", 1 July 1958, CIA. Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-3a.pdf>, accessed on 2 September 2017, p. 15.

⁵⁰² "Shushou Soren Gaishou Hatugen ni Hanron: Nihon ni Kaku wa nai"[In Response to Soviet Foreign Minister's Statement, Prime Minister says There are no nuclear weapons in Japan], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 4 April 1983.

strategy.”⁵⁰³ While it is true Japan could have obtained visible US nuclear assurance, it instead rejected such an offer.

Japan’s Encounter with Nuclear Energy

The US nuclear storage plan on Japan was renounced while in fact the Eisenhower administration did not eliminate the plan completely as NSC 6008/1 revealed.⁵⁰⁴ It was nevertheless concerned that Japan’s adamant anti-nuclear sentiment would be wedded to socialist movements. The US officials suggested that Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” programme (the promotion of civilian uses of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes)⁵⁰⁵ should be utilized to counter the movements and get the Japanese familiar with and exposed to atomic energy and conventional defence, fostering a healthier environment for an appreciation of the nuclear weapons programme.⁵⁰⁶ Japan was indeed the first country to house an American atomic energy library and Japanese young researchers were invited to US cancer research facilities. This series of activities was considered to be of use “in reducing existing psychological barriers as well as fostering a greater appreciation of the realities of the military atomic program.”⁵⁰⁷

After this first step forward, “indoctrinating Japanese leaders as to the necessity for nuclear weapons to the defense of the free world” was a natural measure for clearing away political obstacles to the storage of atomic weapons in

⁵⁰³ O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 83.

⁵⁰⁴ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Vol. 18, Document 175, p. 346. See also A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “On Atomic Weapons Deployment.”

⁵⁰⁵ The programme led to the formation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957. See Gavin, “Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War”, p. 398.

⁵⁰⁶ Letter From Gerald C. Smith to Gordon Gray, 3 December 1956, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA; Letter from Gerald C. Smith to John M. Alison, 9 December 1956, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

⁵⁰⁷ Letter to Reuben B. Robertson, Jr from Herbert Hoover, Jr, 18 November, 1955, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

Japan.⁵⁰⁸ The ultimate goal was to get the Japanese government to accept US nuclear weapons even during peacetime as desired earlier.⁵⁰⁹ This situation is often described by a Japanese proverb: *Doku wo Motte Doku wo Seisuru* (Send a thief to catch a thief).⁵¹⁰ Japan and the USA reached an agreement for cooperation on nuclear energy in November 1955. The US government was to provide Japan with uranium and research nuclear plants. The Japanese government enacted the Atomic Energy Basic Law the following month. The basic policy of Japanese nuclear research, according to the main writer of the bill, Yasuhiro Nakasone, was after all directed to solely peaceful purposes.⁵¹¹ Yet it did not exclude the possibility and capability of building Japanese nuclear weapons.⁵¹² In theory, “As the number of power and research nuclear reactors in a country increases, the potential for producing plutonium will increase, which could reduce the time between decision and the availability of nuclear weapons.”⁵¹³

Based on the bilateral cooperation, some American political leader even proposed a plan to build a nuclear power plant in Hiroshima so that the people in Hiroshima could benefit from the new technology for medicine and industry. The implication of this idea was to tranquilize the anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.⁵¹⁴ As is not difficult to imagine, the proposal faced a strong backlash by the people in Hiroshima. Eisenhower learned the severity of Hiroshima’s anti-nuclear

⁵⁰⁸ Memorandum For the File, “Meeting in Mr. MacArthur’s Office, Japan”, 14 January 1957, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA. Initially this was advised by a Japanese journalist, Hidetoshi Shibata. See Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, p. 26; Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 82-85.

⁵⁰⁹ Memorandum For the File, “Meeting in Mr. MacArthur’s Office, Japan”, 14 January 1957, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA

⁵⁰⁹ Memorandum for the File, “Meeting in Mr. MacArthur’s Office, Japan.”

⁵¹⁰ See for example Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, p. 26 and Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, p. 55.

⁵¹¹ Yasuhiro Nakasone: *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaiko* [Nakasone Yasuhiro’s accounts on Post-War Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 2012), pp. 128-129.

⁵¹² Yoshitaka Sasaki: “Kakusenryaku no Naka no Nihon” [US Nuclear Strategy and Japan] in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen I: kakuto Taiketsu suru 20 Seiki* [Nuclear and Human: Confronting Nuclearism The 20th Century World in Crisis Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 1999), p. 215.

⁵¹³ National Intelligence Estimate, 4-3-61, “Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK”, 21 September 1961, CIA. Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf>, accessed on 31 January 2019.

⁵¹⁴ Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, p. 54.

sentiment.⁵¹⁵ That said, the “Atoms for Peace” programme was widely welcome in Japan in part due to the Japanese mass media’s positive media coverage. *Yomiuri Shimbun*, in particular, featured on atomic energy and atomic exhibitions throughout Japan and the Japanese leaders trusted that the civilian use of atomic power was harmonious with Japanese society.⁵¹⁶ It was also reflected in popular Japanese sci-fi animation. *Tetsuwan Atomu* later made into a Hollywood film under the name Astro Boy is powered by nuclear power as his name suggests, *Atom(u)*. He represented an image for “Atoms for Peace” in Japan. At that time atomic energy was representation of state-of-art scientific technology.⁵¹⁷

One of the main reasons why atomic energy was highly promoted in Japan was the lesson of history that Japan should not prioritize morale superiority over scientific and material prowess. One of the well-known examples that highlights Japan’s superiority in terms of morale was that the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy completely underestimated the importance of logistics in a war. One command manual of the Imperial Japanese Army produced in 1928 clearly stated that the destiny of a battle would be ultimately determined by morale strength. Material power was important but it was not a decisive factor to influence the course of a war.⁵¹⁸ This morale-oriented spirit was often reiterated by Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. He famously said war was a clash of wills and war could be only lost that one thought lost and if one’s resistance is exhausted; “we can win the war as long as we believe in victory and our moral resistance persists until the end of the war.”⁵¹⁹ Furthermore, Tojo and other Japanese military commanders tended to claim that the most important thing of all in war was one’s “morale superiority” but not the superiority of technology and weapons. As a consequence Tojo’s argument about

⁵¹⁵ Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 32, 45-49..

⁵¹⁶ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, pp. 96-99; Ota, *Hiroku*, pp. 227-228.

⁵¹⁷ Kawamura, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 56-59, 102.

⁵¹⁸ Yoshio Sugino: *Daitoa Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu* [The Nature of Japan’s defeat of the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2015), p. 42.

⁵¹⁹ Hideki Tojo quoted in Shoji Kokami: *Fujimi no TokkoHei: Gunshin wa naze Jokan ni Hanko sitaka* [Invincible Kamikaze Pilot: Why the God of Air Battle refused orders from His Commnader] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2017), p.257.

morale rendered Japan blind to overall US material superiority to Japan.⁵²⁰ The Japanese penchant for prioritizing morale was rooted in its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. This victory was led to a complete illusion and “victory disease” (The Japanese military falsely believed that Japanese victory was due to its non-material strength especially its superiority in morale and command skills) convincing the Japanese military that the Japan was never to be defeated.⁵²¹

As political scientist Taketsugu Tsurutani rightly observed, “The martial spirit...ultimately led to the disaster of 1945.”⁵²² Japan indeed undervalued the critical role logistics played in the Pacific theatre, even causing Japanese soldiers to die from starvation in islands like Guadalcanal. The island was called *Gato* (an island of starvation) in Japanese. Many Japanese soldiers died from starvation even before engaged in fighting because there was not enough food and ammunition to sustain their combat operations (the logistic line was completely cut off).⁵²³ Incidentally many Japanese soldiers did not know the existence of the US Marine Corps until they physically encountered the Marines in Guadalcanal, implying that the Imperial Japanese Army did not devote enough time to study its enemy, the American armed forces, even though the USA had been a potential rival for years before the war.⁵²⁴ Worse still, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not protect the Japanese convoy routes and let US submarines destroy Japanese merchant ships (they were there without any naval protection most of the time).⁵²⁵ Japan’s merchant fleet carried the crucial resources Japan needed to sustain wartime

⁵²⁰ Masayasu Hosaka: *Showa no Kaibutsu Nanatsu no Nazo* [Giants in the Showa Period: Seven Mysteries] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2018), pp.13, 20, 37-40, 47; Ibid., p. 264.

⁵²¹ Makoto Miyoshi: *500 Nin no Taiken ni Manabu Taiheiyō Senso no Sinin to Haiin* [Learn from 500 People The True Cause of the Pacific War and The Cause of a Defeat] (Tokyo: Tosho Kankokai., 1999), pp. 161-163; Sugino, *Daitō Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu.*, p. 12, 132; James B. Wood: *Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers., 2007), pp. 27, 38-41.

⁵²² Taketsugu Tsurutani: “Old Habits, New Times: Challenges to Japanese-American Security Relations”, *International Security* Vol. 7 No. 2 (Fall 1982), p. 178.

⁵²³ NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan Hen (ed.): *Taiheiyō Senso Nihon no Haiin 2: Gadarukanaru Manabazaru Guntai* [The Cause of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War 2: Guadalcanal, the Armed Forces which Never Learned] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten., 1995), pp. 3-5, 243-248.

⁵²⁴ Ibid., pp. 58-60, 211-213; Sugino, *Daitō Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu.*, pp. 42, 190-191, 193.

⁵²⁵ NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan Hen (ed.): *Taiheiyō Senso Nihon no Haiin 1: Nichibeī Kaisen Shosan nashi* [The Cause of Japan’s defeat in the Pacific War 1: The outbreak of the War between Japan and the USA, Japan Had No Chance to Win] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten., 1995), pp. 66-67, 192-198.

economy and supply its military. After the war, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo himself admitted one of the reasons why Japan lost the war was it did not protect its merchant fleet and sea lane.⁵²⁶ Needless to say it was completely absurd and disastrous that Japanese war plans ignored the importance of logistics and intelligence (material power of its enemies).⁵²⁷

Because of this costly lesson learnt from World War Two, the National Defence Academy of Japan intentionally offered no humanities course until 1974.⁵²⁸ The principal education policy of the school put a great emphasis on scientific logic (*Kagakuteki Shikoryoku*) and its curriculum followed Tokyo Institute of Technology, the most renowned science and engineering university in Japan. The new school was not designed to produce “great warriors” but rational men. The first head of the academy, Tomoo Maki, and Prime Minister Yoshida worked out the basic curriculum and orientation of the new academy. For Yoshida the new academy had to accommodate all the cadets for three different services in one place. They had to study together at the same school rather than study separately in three different locations so that future officers would not mistrust and oppose each other in a war where close collaboration among the different services is required. It was believed that one of the main reasons why Japan lost the war against the USA was that there was no close operational and intelligence collaboration between the army and navy, let alone a clear joint operational plan.⁵²⁹

According to one graduate (Class 1966), who later became the Chief of staff of the Ground Self-Defence Force (equivalent to the Chief of Army), it was

⁵²⁶ Miyoshi, *500 Nin no Taiken ni Manabu Taiheiyō Senso no Sinin to Haiin*, pp. 108, 111-112; Wood, *Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War*, pp.27-30, 38.

⁵²⁷ Sugino, *Daitō Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu*, pp. 11-14.

⁵²⁸ National Defense Academy of Japan, <http://www.mod.go.jp/nda/about/history.html>, accessed on 17th June 2017. In the 1960s, it was criticised that future officers would also need to know humanities in order to manage a big organization like Self-Defence Force. It was urged that more intellectually balanced candidates be needed. See Boei Kenkyukai Hen (ed.): *Boei Cho Jieitai* [Japan Defence Agency: Japan Defence Force] (Tokyo: Kaya Shobo., 1988), p. 380.

⁵²⁹ Boei Kenkyukai Hen, *Boei Cho Jieitai*, p. 394; Hisashi Fujii: *RikuKaigun Senshi ni Manabu Makeru Soshiki to Nihonjin* [Lessons Learnt from Land and Naval War History: A Feeble Organisation and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shueisha., 2008), pp. 232-234; Atsushi Sugii and Akitoshi Hoshino: *Bouei Daigakko de Senso to Anzen Hoshō wo dou Manandaka* [How We Learned War and National Security at National Defence Academy] (Tokyo: Shodensha., 2014), pp. 5, 15-19, 210; Sugino, *Daitō Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu*, p. 103.

self-evident that the academy was designed to educate future officers in science and engineering because there was no humanities course (when he entered the academy) but science and engineering. All the cadets could study was those science subjects. Those officers equipped with scientific knowledge were expected to think scientifically but not intuitively and irrationally (acting without any concrete data and information about material strength and military capabilities of an enemy). As a result, scientific logic (*Kagakuteki Shikoryoku*) means that officers deal with military issues and make appropriate judgments predicated on scientific data and evidence.⁵³⁰ In short, the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme in Japanese military education.

Additionally, the new technology (atom) was seen as a chance to revitalize postwar Japan since it was the state of art technology. Japan had a slogan of “catching up and surpassing the powerful Western nations” such as Great Britain.⁵³¹ For those who advocated nuclear energy, they could not waste another minute since Japan was banned from doing research on atoms during the US occupation period.⁵³² Advancing the new energy was wedded to *Japanese National Pride*.⁵³³ As we shall see, advancing Japan’s civilian nuclear technology was one of the biggest reasons why Japan was reluctant to sign and ratify the NPT. It took six years for Japan to ratify it after Japan signed it due to Japan’s concerns that the NPT system, safeguards in particular, would hinder its civilian atomic energy programme.

That being said, it was truly uncertain whether the civilian atomic programme of Japan contributed to assuaging the Japanese nuclear allergy. One CIA intelligence report of 1957 posited that “While Japanese opponents of nuclear weapons are extremely vocal at present, considerable work is being done in the area

⁵³⁰ Author’s exchange with former Chief of staff of Ground Self-Defence Force, who graduated from the National Defence Academy of Japan in 1966 at the Author’s home in Tokyo, 16 May 2019. See also Sugii and Hoshino, *Bouei Daigakko de Senso to Anzen Hoshou wo dou Manandaka*, p. 210

⁵³¹ Yasuhiro Nakasone: *Jiseiroku* [On My Life] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha., 2004) , pp. 42-43.

⁵³² Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 197; Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon”, p. 210.

⁵³³ Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 110-111.

of peaceful uses, which will probably serve in them to develop a less emotional public approach toward military uses as well as contributing to the potential for a military program.”⁵³⁴ Such an analysis was nothing but naïve. While the “Atoms for Peace” programme was widely received in Japan because of its appeal as the state-of-art technology and the historical lesson learnt from the war, the Japanese civil nuclear energy programme was advanced in isolation from the military use of nuclear energy (nuclear weapons). Throughout the rest of the Cold War, US nuclear weapons were never stored on the mainland of Japan. The Japanese government was extremely sensitive about the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan.

Prime Minister Kishi, US Nuclear Introduction Plans and the New Security Treaty of 1960

As already noted, the first US-Japan security treaty of 1951 was generally considered as an extension of the US occupation. Shigemitsu believed that it should be revised to be a more equal one and “Japan was in a ‘subjugated’ position under the Treaty.”⁵³⁵ The treaty indeed bore the deep impress of US occupation when Japan was in a precarious situation. The treaty did not even set forth US responsibility for the protection of Japan. Worse still, the US forces in Japan had the right to suppress large-scale domestic unrest.⁵³⁶ This was considered as a clear violation of Japanese sovereignty. As discussed above, although the US could not manage to bring its own nuclear weapons into Japan, technically the US could introduce its nuclear weapons into Japan as there was no stipulation on the change or deployment of specific military weaponry in the 1951 security treaty.⁵³⁷ For

⁵³⁴ National Intelligence Estimate 100-6-57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries-Likelihood and Consequences”, 18 June 1957, CIA. Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-2.pdf>, accessed on 19 June 2017.

⁵³⁵ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. 23, Part 1 Japan, Document 183, p. 371.

⁵³⁶ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 129.

⁵³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 129.

Japan, the new security treaty meant recovery of its sovereignty as an independent state. It sought to regulate the operational use of the US military bases in Japan as well as the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.⁵³⁸

In 1955 Prime Minister Hatoyama and his Foreign Minister, Shigemitsu made the first effort to replace the old treaty to add the provisions that stipulated mutual defence. Their effort was seen as premature by Dulles as he believed that Japanese defense capability was still weak and its defence effort was not satisfactory to the USA.⁵³⁹ Dulles implied that “a sufficient legal framework and amended constitution” meaning the amendment of Article 9 were required to replace the old security treaty at that time.⁵⁴⁰ The Hatoyama government was precarious and it was unlikely to amend Article 9 in such a political climate.⁵⁴¹ The major task of revision of the security treaty was left to the next Prime Minister.

Following Hatoyama, Nobusuke Kishi, a former Class-A war crime suspect but a pro-American political leader, became Prime Minister (1957-1960).⁵⁴² To be exact, Tanzan Ishibashi succeeded Hatoyama, but he had the only two-month premiership due to his health issue, which led him to resign. Following the resignation Kishi replaced Ishibashi. Kishi strove to complete Hatoyama’s unfinished business as he felt that the treaty was one of the remaining problems from the end of the war between the USA and Japan, and the rise of public revulsion against the treaty due to its unequal character had to be contained. As well as the revision of the Japanese constitution, this was his primary political goal.⁵⁴³ Kishi put much more efforts to eliminate unequal provisions in the treaty.⁵⁴⁴

⁵³⁸ Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, p. 186; Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 64.

⁵³⁹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 45, pp. 97-104. See also Ichiro Kouno: *Ima dakara Hanaso* [Finally It is time to Disclose the Truth] (Tokyo: Shunyodo Shoten., 1958), pp. 100-101 and Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 148.

⁵⁴⁰ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 45, p. 102.

⁵⁴¹ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p.114; Takahashi, “Nichibei Anzen Hosho Jyoyaku”, p. 268; Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, pp. 77-78

⁵⁴² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 122, pp. 270-271.

⁵⁴³ Yoshihisa Hara: *Kishinobusuke: Kenseino Seijika* [Kishinobusuke: The Leading Politician in Showa] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 1995), pp. 156-157; Ishikawa, *Sengo Seijishi*, p. 85.

⁵⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 187, pp. 387-392. See also Hideki Uemura: *Jietai ha Darenomonoka* [Whose Self-Defence Forces?] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2002), pp. 76-77; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 97- 98.

It is important to look at the backdrop of his political move.

In 1956 Japan joined the United Nations (UN) after rapprochement with the Soviet Union and became a non-permanent member of the Security Council two years later. Japan's Economic white paper of 1956 also declared that war was finally over. It was no exaggeration to say that "Japan's growth during the 1950's was phenomenal" not least because "Between 1952 and 1960, Japan's exports tripled, and her imports more than doubled" and she became a leading global exporter.⁵⁴⁵ Unlike in 1951 when Japan signed the first security treaty with the USA, Japan was regaining its power and political clout, coincident with the rise of the sense of further independence among the Japanese public.⁵⁴⁶ Indeed when Kishi replaced Tanzan Ishibashi as Prime Minister, "resentment against Japan's subordinate position under the security treaty" was becoming more evident.⁵⁴⁷

To hasten the process of revising the security treaty Kishi expanded JSDF further and devised the first national defence policy. The Kishi government adopted the Basic Policy on National Defence and the First National Defence Build-up Plan in 1957. Kishi actually formulated the new defence policies prior to his visit to Washington in June 1957 with a view to demonstrating the Japan's own defense efforts to the American government as this was considered essential in order to revise the security treaty.⁵⁴⁸ The joint communiqué following the meeting between Kishi and Eisenhower issued on 21 June 1957 indeed stated that "The United States welcomed Japan's plans for the buildup of her defense forces and accordingly, in consonance with the letter and spirit of the Security Treaty, will substantially reduce the numbers of United States forces in Japan within the next year, including a prompt withdrawal of all United States ground combat forces."⁵⁴⁹ The Japanese

⁵⁴⁵ George R. Packard III: *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 1966), p. 34.

⁵⁴⁶ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 126, pp. 277-279; *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan ; Korea, Vol. 18, Document 15, p. 34. See also Jones, *After Hiroshima*, p. 318; Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 33-34, 41; Gutherie-Shimizu, "Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960", pp. 264.

⁵⁴⁷ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 126, Footnote 4, p. 277.

⁵⁴⁸ Kitaoka, *Jiminto*, p. 83.

⁵⁴⁹ The World and Japan Database (Project Leader: Tanaka Akihiro): "Joint communiqué of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi and U.S. President Eisenhower", 21 June 1957,

government also successfully included the lines in the communiqué that “The President and the Prime Minister affirmed their understanding that the Security Treaty of 1951 was designed to be transitional in character and not in that form to remain perpetuity.”⁵⁵⁰ Based on this mutual understanding, the two governments proceeded the negotiations over the revision of the treaty.

The newly adopted Basic Policy proclaimed that “Japan tackles external aggression on the basis of the security arrangement with the United States until such time that the United Nations will be capable of functioning in preventing such aggression in the future.”⁵⁵¹ In this connection, Kishi was reported to acknowledge to Ambassador MacArthur “Japan’s dependence on the U.S. nuclear deterrent to prevent general war” in May 1957.⁵⁵² The existing record does not specify exactly why he made this comment and how he viewed US END. Considering the context where Kishi’s comment was made (they were discussing the importance of the revision of the 1951 security treaty), he might have said it to show his stance that unlike the Japanese public he was not fervently opposed to US nuclear weapons. In this regard it is important to note that the US government had to treat nuclear issues with Japan very sensitively after the *Lucky Dragon* incident of 1954 and the severe public opposition to the deployment of the *Honest John* to Japan in the following year. In short, his comment might have been tactical to demonstrate that he was the man whom the US government could reliably work with. Indeed MacArthur reported that “we can do business with him...”⁵⁵³ To be sure Kishi might have genuinely believed that US END was important for Japan’s defence. While we do not know the truth, the existing record does not show that MacArthur gave Kishi any assurance that Japan was or would be protected by the US nuclear umbrella.⁵⁵⁴ Even if MacArthur had assured Kishi that the USA would defend Japan by nuclear

<http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19570621.D1E.html> , accessed on 2 February 2019.

⁵⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵⁵¹ Basic Policy on National Defence, *Ministry of Defence* available at <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2013/pc/2013/html/ns006000.html>, accessed on 22 June 2017.

⁵⁵² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 159, p. 328

⁵⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁵⁴ Ibid.

means, his assurance would have not made much of a difference. He was just an ambassador and he was not even a cabinet member of the Eisenhower government. Given that END consists of deterrence and assurance and the latter is more important than the former to Japan, assurance would have had to be offered by President Eisenhower or at least Dulles. This was not to happen until January 1965 when President Lyndon Johnson directly assured Prime Minister Eisaku Sato that US security commitments to Japan included nuclear protection.⁵⁵⁵

It is important to note that the basic defence policy also posited that Japan set out to build up its defence capabilities on a step-by-step basis to the extent that self-defence permits and within national capacity and circumstance.⁵⁵⁶ Based on this, Japan also adopted the concept of *Senshu Boei* (the exclusively defence-oriented policy). According to Japanese Ministry of Defence, “The exclusively defense-oriented policy means that defensive force is used only in the event of an attack...the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense...The policy...refers to the posture of a passive defense strategy in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution.”⁵⁵⁷ By implication this suggested that Japan ruled out an option of the use of threats of force for a political purpose and its homeland had to be attacked first to take military action (retaliation) in the name of self-defence.⁵⁵⁸ It also illuminates that the Japanese constitution limits military actions as an independent country.⁵⁵⁹ According to the Basic Policy on National Defence and the concept of *Senshu Boei* explicitly articulated that Japan’s security would depend on

⁵⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 41, p. 70..

⁵⁵⁶ Basic Policy on National Defence.

⁵⁵⁷ “Fundamental Concepts of National Defense”, *Ministry of Defence*, https://web.archive.org/web/20161105124319/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html.accessed on 11 September 2018.

⁵⁵⁸ Kato, *Waga Kunino Bouei Seisaku*, p. 152.

⁵⁵⁹ Japan still maintains this strategic defense policy as a cornerstone of its defence thinking even today. The term itself was first mentioned in July 1955 by the then Chief Defence Agency, Arata Sugihara. See Arata Sugihara, Shugiin Naikaku Iinkai [Cabinet Committee] 5 July 1955, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/022/0388/02207050388034.pdf>, accessed on 11 September 2018.

the US military cooperation as Yoshida laid out.⁵⁶⁰ Since this declaration, it has become a tradition for the leader of the DPJ to follow the Japan-US cooperation line.⁵⁶¹

Around the same time, Ambassador MacArthur feared that the USA “would see Japan drift progressively into neutralism” as he sensed that neutralism was rising among Japanese society.⁵⁶² He stressed:

our basic objective with respect to Japan is...at least firmly align and, if possible, to knit Japan so thoroughly into the fabric of the free world nations that it will not in the next few years be easily tempted to take an independent course leading either to non-alignment or neutralism (at best of the Swiss-Swedish type or at worst of the Nehru brand) or worst of all some form of accommodation with the Communist bloc.⁵⁶³

It might be difficult to imagine but postwar Japan was greatly colored by a socialist ideology. There was, for example, a dominant postwar narrative: the Korean War broke out because South Korea and the USA (the capitalists) invaded North Korea which some Japanese socialist intellectuals called *Chijou no Rakuen* (The Last Paradise on the earth).⁵⁶⁴ Of course, the truth is the other way around. Yet intellectuals and the mass media altogether repeatedly released the fabrication, which in turn misled the Japanese public, giving the narrative credibility.⁵⁶⁵ The US government too was clearly aware that it had to offset Marxist attitudes among

⁵⁶⁰ Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State. 26 August 1958, 6 p.m., Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218, NARA. See also Memorandum for Record, Conference between Mr Masuhara and General Biddle, “Discussed Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to the United States”, 15 March 1957, Replies and Correspondence Related to Field Visits Security and the Government of Japan, Communication, Training, Operations 1957, JCS, Box 1, RG 334, NARA. See also Kitaoka, *Jiminto*, pp. 81-83; Akihiro Sado: *Sengoseiji to Jeitai* [The Post-War Japan and Japanese Self-Defence Forces] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Hirofumikan., 2006), p. 52; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, p. 97; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshou*, pp. 155-162, 172.

⁵⁶¹ Kitaoka, *Jiminto*, p. 96.

⁵⁶² *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 279, 358, p. 279, 358.

⁵⁶³ *Ibid.*, Document 159, pp. 325-326.

⁵⁶⁴ Kent Sidney Gilbert: *Mada GHQ no Senno ni Sibarareteru Nihonjin* [Japanese who are still under the GHQ’s indoctrination] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujyo., 2017), p. 230.

⁵⁶⁵ Nakanishi, *Nihonjin toshite Koredakewa Shitte okitaikoto*, p. 62.

Japanese intellectuals.⁵⁶⁶

Ambassador MacArthur also urged the US government to revise the security treaty now that Japan finally had a reliable and seasoned political figure, appreciating Kishi's defense efforts.⁵⁶⁷ The rise of the Kishi government had, MacArthur argued, "reached the turning point in our relations with Japan."⁵⁶⁸ He expressed his voice to President Eisenhower that "if we do not work with Japan, within five years they will be headed in the wrong direction...They might even turn to work with the Communists."⁵⁶⁹ MacArthur also described Kishi favourably because he "was content to seek security, prosperity, and a measure of diplomatic independence for Japan in partnership with the United States, as a loyal member of the Free World."⁵⁷⁰ Dulles, too, who was initially against the revision of the security treaty, softened his attitude toward the issue as Kishi's visit to the USA neared.⁵⁷¹ The President's special consultant, Frank Nash, even told Dulles that "Mr Kishi was not only the 'best bet', but the 'only bet' we had in Japan for the foreseeable future..."⁵⁷²

Stressing the strategic importance of Japan, MacArthur spelled out:

if there is not adequate deterrent military strength deployed in this area, the Communists might be tempted to use force (just as they did in Korea). Therefore, the continued presence in the Far East of the minimum necessary deterrent military strength is vital to the preservation of peace, and Japan is of major importance to the proper deployment and logistical support of our deterrent forces.⁵⁷³

He also stressed "the significance of Japan going into a long-term defense treaty

⁵⁶⁶ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 28, p. 59.

⁵⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, Document 159, pp. 325-330.

⁵⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, Document 126, p. 277.

⁵⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, Document 357, p. 358.

⁵⁷⁰ Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 83.

⁵⁷¹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 357, pp. 357-360

⁵⁷² *Ibid.*, Document 339, p. 339.

⁵⁷³ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 24, Document 11, pp. 26-27.

with us [the USA] incalculable psychologically and politically.”⁵⁷⁴ Subsequently Eisenhower came to acceptance of MacArthur’s suggestion and proceeded to the conclusion of the new security treaty without demanding the revision of the constitution.⁵⁷⁵ It is important to note that some US officials believed that the new security treaty would eventually lead the Japanese government to allow the US introduction of nuclear components (core) and itself to have its own nuclear weapons.⁵⁷⁶

Behind this rationale, in the late 1950’s the US military had wanted to alter the Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment in order for the USA to store its nuclear weapons on Japan eventually, only to fail.⁵⁷⁷ As the revision of the US-Japan security treaty appeared evident, the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) sent a telegram to JCS in which the CINCPAC demonstrated military desirability of introducing nuclear components to Japan while acknowledging such an option was politically daunting. The CINCPAC was also aware that there would be no satisfactory solution for both the US and Japanese government in this regard and suggested that the US maintain the neither confirm nor deny policy.⁵⁷⁸ This policy initiated in 1958 and it made the existence of nuclear weapons on board deliberately equivocal.⁵⁷⁹

For the JCS, it was logical to strengthen Japanese military capabilities; “a strong Japan allied to the United States would be a deterrent to a general war, and a deterrent to military conflict short of general war.”⁵⁸⁰ The JCS also pointed out:

⁵⁷⁴ Ibid., Document 23, p. 60.

⁵⁷⁵ Guthrie-Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960”, p. 264.

⁵⁷⁶ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 24, Document 11, p.27.

⁵⁷⁷ Letter From Gerald C. Smith to Gordon Gray, 3 December 1956, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA; Memorandum For the File, “Meeting in Mr. Mac Arthur’s Office, Japan”, 14 January 1957, Special Assistant for Atomic Energy, Country and Subject Files Relation to Atomic Energy Matters 1950-1962, Box 2, RG 59,NARA.

⁵⁷⁸ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan, Korea, Vol. 24, Document 22, pp. 56-57.

⁵⁷⁹ “OPNAV INSTRUCTION 5721. 1F”, *Department of the Navy*, 3 February 2006, Retrieved by The Nuclear Information Project, available at <http://www.nukestrat.com/us/navy/OPNAVINST5721.pdf>, accessed on 20 November 2017.

⁵⁸⁰ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 174, p. 350.

The United States would prefer that Japan integrate appropriate atomic weapons into the Japanese self-defense forces...it will be expected that she will make a greater contribution to the collective non-Communist strength in the Far East. In order to make this contribution Japanese self-defense forces must eventually be equipped with the most modern conventional and atomic weapons.⁵⁸¹

A more immediate course of action was to “Seek governmental agreement for introduction of atomic weapons into Japan for use by U.S. Forces.”⁵⁸²

From some Japanese defence practitioners’ perspectives, Japan’s proximity to the Soviet territory as well as historical encounters with the Soviet Union might have brought about Japanese anxiety. This war experience with the Soviet Union rendered Japanese views about the intentions of the Kremlin highly suspicious. Past behaviours may affect strategic perceptions about an old enemy, creating a hostile reputation whether or not it would be accurate and reasonable. To be sure, the past behaviours and present behaviours of the Soviet Union would have been different but Soviet’s past behaviour were certainly an indicator of its crisis behaviour.⁵⁸³ As a result, Japan might have had legitimate fears and animosity against Russia’s conduct. Psychologically, if not strategically, some Japanese might have wanted to have US tactical nuclear weapons on its soil given its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union. Yet the strategic environment of Japan was relatively moderate compared to Europe not least after the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of 1956, which opened diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and enabled Japan to join the United Nations (UN) finally in the same year. Japan became a non-permanent member of the Security Council two years later. It was

⁵⁸¹ A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, “On Atomic Weapons Deployment”, 17 February 1958, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218, NARA.

⁵⁸² Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, Pacific, “Base Requirements in Japan”, 26 September 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

⁵⁸³ On the debates about the influence of past behaviours on strategic perception, see Patrcik M. Morgan: *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2003), p. 192; Paul K. Huth: “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates”, *Annual Review of Political Science* Vol. 2 No. 25 (Dec 1980), pp. 32-34; Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp.55-59.

also militarily formidable for the Soviet forces to send massive forces into Japan.⁵⁸⁴

That said, it is worth noting that several senior officers from Japan Ground Defence Force (JGDF) were sent to United States Army Command and General Staff College (CGSC) in Kansas. They studied how to employ nuclear artilleries operationally in battle fields. General Kenjiro Mitsuoka, who was invited by US army to Kansas when he was colonel, later thought back to his course at the college where he learned how to use tactical nuclear weapons (nuclear artilleries) in battle fields to offset operational weakness against a hypothetical adversary in detail. He wrote a report on a contingency plan involving the use of America's theatre nuclear weapons in case of Soviet attacks.⁵⁸⁵ He translated the text books used at CGSC into Japanese for educating more Japanese officers about the actual use of nuclear weapons. This was carried out with the Pentomic division in mind. He even proposed that JGDF create a special nuclear battalion.⁵⁸⁶

In response to the nuclear age, the US army fielded the short-lived Pentomic division (1956-1961) in 1956. It was specially trained and designed to operate and survive in a nuclear battlefield, and was equipped with tactical nuclear weapons.⁵⁸⁷ Tactical nuclear weapons with low-yield warheads (10 kilotons) were considered to be suitable for operational use in the battle field.⁵⁸⁸ It was deemed necessary for nuclear contingencies in the Far East in the post-Korean War era while this shift was probably more politically motivated so as to emphasise its role in nuclear operations.⁵⁸⁹ In fact when *Honest John* missiles were introduced into

⁵⁸⁴ Ogawa, *Zainichi Beigun*, p.17 9.

⁵⁸⁵ Sugita, *Hikaku no Sentaku*, pp. 43-48. See also political debate at the Japanese Diet, Kouichiro Ueda, Shugiin Yosan Inkaï [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 12 March 1985, *KKKS*, <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/102/1380/10203121380005.pdf>, accessed on 11 Aug 2017.

⁵⁸⁶ Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, pp. 42-44. See also Jones, *After Hiroshima*, p. 327; Boei Sho Boei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen, *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutori*, p. 178; Kouichiro Ueda, Shugiin Yosan Inkaï [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 12 March 1985.

⁵⁸⁷ Paul Bracken: *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale U.P.,1983), p. 137; Catudal, *Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 218; Gregg Herken: *Counsels of War* (New York: Oxford U.P., 1985, ppb 1987), p. 103.

⁵⁸⁸ Robert Endicott Osgood: *NATO: The Entangling Alliance* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press., 1962), p. 105.

⁵⁸⁹ Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 16-17; Norris, Kosiak and Schwartz, "Deploying the Bomb", pp. 153-156.

South Korea in 1958, the US Army clearly envisioned that the Pentomic division there would be equipped with those missiles.⁵⁹⁰ The creation of the nuclear battalion also was not an absurd idea on the grounds that “Strictly from a military point of view, possession of atomic weapon might be desirable for effective defense” although it might increase the risk of war.⁵⁹¹ It is also important to note that the idea of “limited nuclear war” was prevalent in the 1950s. Henry Kissinger’s *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* which advocated limited nuclear war was written against this backdrop and published in 1958.⁵⁹² In the 1950s it was generally recognised in the West that warfare would be inevitably nuclear.⁵⁹³

Remarkably, General Kumao Imoto was reported to claim that Japan would need nuclear arsenals for its defence against a nuclear adversary and there was a possibility that Japan would create Pentomic forces in the near future during his visit to the USA in November 1958.⁵⁹⁴ One year earlier Administrative vice minister of Defence, Keikichi Masuhara, told Chief Military Assistance Advisory Group, Japan, General William S. Biddle that Japan was not completely ready to accept US nuclear weapons in Japan while a possibility of nuclear armed forces and their deployment would be studied and “Such forces would be activated prior to 1960 if feasible.”⁵⁹⁵ That being said, given that *Honest John* is a surface-to-surface missile, nuclear weapons would have been used on Japan’s soil, most probably in Hokkaido (in proximity to Russia) against Russian invading forces. If that had been the case, Japan would have destroyed itself with another nuclear weapon.

⁵⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Korea, Vol. 23, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1993), Document 228, 230, 261, pp. 464-465, 467-468, 532-533.

⁵⁹¹ Memorandum for Record, “Conference between Mr Masuhara and General Biddle”, 11 April 1957, Replies and Correspondence Related to Field Visits, Security and the Government of Japan , Communication, Training, Operations 1957, JCS, Box 1, RG 334, NARA.

⁵⁹² See Henry A. Kissinger: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*. (New York: Harper & Brothers., 1957).

⁵⁹³ Osgood, *NATO: The Entangling Alliance*, pp. 105-110.

⁵⁹⁴ Kei Hoashi, Shugiin Gaimu Iinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 22 December 1958, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/031/0082/03112220082002.pdf>, accessed on 11 Aug 2017. See also Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, Pacific, “Base Requirements in Japan”, 26 September 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

⁵⁹⁵ Memorandum for Record, “Conference between Mr Masuhara and General Biddle”, 10 March 1957, Replies and Correspondence Related to Field Visits, Security and the Government of Japan , Communication, Training, Operations 1957, JCS, Box 1, RG 334, NARA.

Additionally, the US military had an idea to introduce the NATO style nuclear-sharing arrangements to JSDF in order to deal with a Soviet nuclear threat while this was not an official proposal to the Japanese government. This was based on JCS's strategic consideration that "Atomic weapons are needed as an integral part of the free world arsenal not only to serve as a deterrent...For best results and optimum defense, atomic capable delivery systems should be located in Japan."⁵⁹⁶ It is also true that according to its internal documents, the JDA was keen on the role of NATO's tactical nuclear weapons.⁵⁹⁷ The JCS's stance on nuclear weapons for key US allies was unequivocal: "For the long range period the most likely approach would be to seek Japanese acceptance of nuclear weapons under arrangements similar to those contemplated with the NATO countries."⁵⁹⁸ Around the same time, one top-secret NSC document posited that "the United States should enhance the nuclear weapons capability of *selected allies* by the exchange with term or provision to them of appropriate information, materials, or nuclear weapons, under arrangements for control of weapons to be determined."⁵⁹⁹

Japan was doubtlessly included in the selected US allies although the JCS was well aware that "Under the present political climate in Japan, it would be optimistic to plan on the introduction of atomic weapons into Japan during the foreseeable future."⁶⁰⁰ Indeed the US government did not have an immediate plan to equip Japan with nuclear weapons or introduce them into Japan.⁶⁰¹ At any rate, the signing new treaty meant that Japan would take more responsibility for not only its own defence but regional security in general.

⁵⁹⁶ A Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee, "On Atomic Weapons Deployment."

⁵⁹⁷ Boei Shiryo Dai Ichigo [Defence Related Materials Vol. 1], November 1956, C'20002, DAMOFAJ.

⁵⁹⁸ Memorandum for the Commander in Chief Pacific, "Base requirement in Japan", 26 September 1958, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 9, RG 218, NARA.

⁵⁹⁹ Italics added. Memorandum for the NSC Planning Board, "Basic National Security Policy", 6 July 1959, National Security Council, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary. Office of the Regional Planning Advisor, Top Secret Files, 1957-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

⁶⁰⁰ Memorandum for the Commander in Chief, Pacific, "Base Requirements in Japan", 26 September 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA. See also Naval Message From CINBCPAC to CNC, CNCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CCMUSJAPAN, 28 February 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

⁶⁰¹ Incoming Telegram From MacArthur to Secretary of State, 31 July 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

Finally, in January 1960, the US and the Japanese government reached an agreement on the new security treaty (the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan) and it was signed in Washington. The new security treaty was generally considered much more equal and firmer in terms of US security commitments to Japan than the old one.⁶⁰² Article 5 of the new treaty finally stipulated US security commitments to Japan, (should Japan be attacked), which Japanese leaders had long yearned for.⁶⁰³ It read that

Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof will be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures will be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.⁶⁰⁴

There are also some claims that Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella upon signing the treaty.⁶⁰⁵ Indeed, Larsen argued that “the United States has long-standing security commitments to Japan through the US-Japan Security Pact. Both sides had always assumed that this meant the possible use of US nuclear weapons to protect Japanese territorial sovereignty against potential aggression...”⁶⁰⁶ Some analysts also observed that the concept of extended

⁶⁰² Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 75; Guthrie-Shimizu, “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War, 1945-1960”, p. 264; Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 87.

⁶⁰³ Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 68.

⁶⁰⁴ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, reprinted in Green and Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p. 331.

⁶⁰⁵ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibeï Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 125; Kawanago, “Kaku no Kasa to Nihon: INF Zenpai to Sore Igo”, p. 105, 107; Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 22

⁶⁰⁶ Larsen, “US Extended Deterrence and Europe”, p. 45.

deterrence including the use of threats of nuclear weapons “was enshrined in the language of the U.S.-Japan Defense Treaty.”⁶⁰⁷ This sort of reasoning is not entirely incorrect. Without doubt, US END is provided on the basis of the US-Japan security treaty. Yet as of 1960, this was not mutually understood. As discussed in the first chapter, NATO is the only nuclear alliance while its collective defence treaty does not state any US nuclear assurance. In the words of Beatrice Heuser, “The text specifically leaves leeway for each Party to the Treaty to decide for itself what action it may deem necessary...”⁶⁰⁸ Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty stipulates:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America will be considered an attack against them all, and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually, and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.⁶⁰⁹

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof will immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures will be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

To be sure, extended nuclear deterrence was provided as part of the North Atlantic treaty but as Heuser noted, what action to be taken is up to the NATO members. More crucially Article 5 does not guarantee American nuclear retaliation.⁶¹⁰ In terms of security commitments, the Brussels Treaty of 1948 was

⁶⁰⁷ Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 221.

⁶⁰⁸ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*, p. 2.

⁶⁰⁹ NATO, *NATO Handbook*, p. 528.

⁶¹⁰ Heuser, *NATO, Britain, France and The FRG*; Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy*. pp. 362.

firmer. Article 4 of the treaty read as follows

If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the party so attacked *all the military* and other aid and assistance in their power.⁶¹¹

More specifically US nuclear security commitments were provided through close discussion and consultation on the mechanism of US security assurances among the NATO member states; otherwise any country that had a security treaty with the USA would automatically be given the US nuclear umbrella. That is quite doubtful.

Moreover the analysts' analysis above can be emphatically denied given the existence of the nuclear umbrella debate of the 1960s where Japanese political leaders discussed whether Japan was under the US nuclear umbrella or not as we will see in the next chapter. As of 1960, there had been no bilateral talks on the subject at all. In fact, the mutual acknowledgement of the US security commitments including nuclear deterrence and serious discussions on a role of US nuclear deterrence for Japan's defence emerged in the mid-1960s. To be more accurate, this new security represented by Article 5 made extended deterrence (but not END) more explicit. At the time, the concept of US END was not officially and mutually treated as a key agenda. While the one side of the coin of END is assurance, there was no official assurance mechanism with respect to US nuclear protection of Japan in 1960.

Despite this shift in a more mutual defensive mode, the new treaty did not change the fundamental character of the US-Japan alliance: Japan provides bases and facilities to the USA and the US forces in Japan in turn utilise them for its

⁶¹¹ Emphasis added. "The Brussels Treaty", *North Atlantic Treaty Organization* http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17072.htm, accessed on 22 May, 2016.

strategic purposes including contribution to the security of Japan as Article 6 stipulated.⁶¹² Article 6 read that “For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.”⁶¹³ NSC 6008/1 of 1960 proclaimed that “Militarily, Japan is the key to the defense of the Western Pacific against Communist aggression. Her logistic facilities and bases are indispensable to an economical and effective defense of the Far East.”⁶¹⁴ The new treaty also established the ten-year time period to terminate the treaty: “after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty will terminate one year after such notice has been given.”⁶¹⁵ It meant that after 1970 the treaty could be technically abrogated at the request of either party as long as it was notified one year in advance, which unexpectedly shaped the course of the reversion of Okinawa in the late 1960s as we will see below.⁶¹⁶

Tacit Understanding of Transit Rights

Another Japanese major concern with respect to the new security treaty was doubtlessly the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan although the US could not freely bring its nuclear weapons into Japan at its will as the *Honest John* incident demonstrated.⁶¹⁷ Article 6 of the new treaty set forth the restricted use of US bases in Japan and the separate exchange notes stipulated the status of these bases: “Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces,

⁶¹² *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Vol. 18, Document 175, p. 341. See also Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 73; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 100-101.

⁶¹³ Reprinted in Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, reprinted in Green and Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p. 331

⁶¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Vol. 18, Document 175, p. 337.

⁶¹⁵ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States, reprinted in Green and Cronin (eds.), *The U.S.-Japan Alliance*, p. 332.

⁶¹⁶ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 35, p. 48.

⁶¹⁷ Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State. 26 August 1958, 6 p.m.

major changes in the equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article 5 of the said Treaty, will be the subjects of prior consultation with the agreement of Japan.”⁶¹⁸ With this, Japan now had the power of a final veto over the specific US military equipment including the introduction of US nuclear weapons and operational use of US military bases in Japan in hostilities outside Japan.⁶¹⁹ The joint communiqué following the summit meeting also declared that “The President assured him that the United States Government has no intention of acting in a manner contrary to the wishes of the Japanese Government with respect to the matters involving prior consultation under the treaty.”⁶²⁰

Behind this public agreement, however, the two governments made a secret deal regarding entry rights of nuclear weapons too as this issue could not be dealt with publicly.⁶²¹ Recognising the political infeasibility of obtaining a written assurance for such an agreement from the Japanese government, the US Navy explained that “it probably would be necessary to make it a classified and therefore unpublished appendix to a future Mutual Defense Treaty.”⁶²²

According to one recently declassified exchange of notes (commonly referred to as a “Record of Discussion”) dated on 6 January 1960, “Major Changes in their equipment is understood to mean the introduction into Japan of nuclear weapons, including the intermediate and long range missiles as well as the construction of

⁶¹⁸ The World and Japan Database (Project Leader: Tanaka Akihiro): “Exchanged Notes, Regarding the Implementation of Article VI of Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, 19 January 1960”, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/docs/19600119.T2E.html>, accessed on 11 October 2017.

⁶¹⁹ Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, p. 25.

⁶²⁰ Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Kishi of Japan. 19 January 1960. The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27971>, accessed on 14 November 2017.

⁶²¹ Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Box 8, Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319.

⁶²² Naval Message From CINBCPAC to CNC, CNCUSARPAC, CINCPACFLT, CINCPACAF, CCMUSJAPAN, 28 February 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

bases for such weapons.”⁶²³ The American government understood that “Consultation was, however, not required for transit of ports or airbase in Japan by the United States vessels and aircraft, regardless of their armament.” Prior consultation was not called for introduction of non-nuclear components into Japan either.⁶²⁴ This military position was clear. In September 1958, the Chairman of the JCS, Nathan Farragut Twining, noted that “The entry of U.S. warships into Japanese ports would not be a matter for joint consultation”⁶²⁵ while he recognised that “there is virtually no prospect of a solution which will satisfy both sides. The ‘atom bomb’ in any context still remains in Japan a matter of the utmost emotional intensity.”⁶²⁶

At the time of negotiations over the new security treaty, however, the Japanese government reportedly did not share America’s interpretation that US navy ships armed with nuclear weapons would be allowed to transit through Japan without subject to consultation with the Japanese government.⁶²⁷ That being so, one government document prepared for a series of Diet debates in the same year clearly articulated that “major changes” signified the placement of nuclear warheads, medium and long-range missiles on Japan (no matter how short it was) and the construction of nuclear bases in Japan.⁶²⁸

To be sure, the US warships equipped with nuclear weapons made port

⁶²³ Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Record of Discussion, 6 January 1960 Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka 1960 nen 1 gatsu no Anpo Jyoyaku Kaiteijino KakuMochikomini Kansuru [Mitsuyaku] Mondai Kanren [Documents pertaining to The Secret Deal at the time of the revision of Japan-US Security Treaty of January 1960], http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/t_1960kakupdf, accessed on 11 October 2017. See also Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands.

⁶²⁴ Description of Consultation Arrangements under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, June 1960, (From The United State and Japan, 1960-1972) Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/doc01.pdf>, accessed on 11 October 2017. See also Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands.

⁶²⁵ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Security Treaty-Japan”,23 September 1958, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218,NARA.

⁶²⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Security Treaty-Japan” 10 September 1958, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218,NARA.

⁶²⁷ Kitaoka, “The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts”, p. 17.

⁶²⁸ Jizen Kyougini kansuru Koukan Kouibun Kankei (Soutei Mondou)[Prepared Notes on Issues concerning Prior Consultation], 6 February 1960, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals] ,*MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1960kaku3.pdf, accessed on 17 November 2017.

calls at Japan throughout the Cold War.⁶²⁹ It is worth noting that one rationale behind a US submarine's visit to a port of a US ally was "to reassure a U.S. ally." For instance, "In 1963, following the withdrawal of U.S. intermediate-range ballistic missiles from Turkey, the *Sam Houston* visited Izmir."⁶³⁰ Remarkably, this reassurance mechanism was more of a political challenge for Japan. Interestingly Japan did not share this US reassurance view at that stage.

In April 1963 the US Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer met with Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira and told him that "*introduce...implying placing or installing on Japanese soil.*"⁶³¹ Indeed the JCS understood that joint consultation would be called for only when US nuclear forces are *deployed* into Japan in time of emergency.⁶³² Reischauer was rather confident about reaching complete mutual understanding with Ohira.⁶³³

When interviewed by a Japanese journalist in 1981, Reischauer publicly clarified the US position once again. It was the US government and military understanding that US naval vessels armed with either nuclear or conventional weapons were permitted to transit through Japan but were not permitted to store them on the Japanese ground on a long-term basis. He, however, admitted that the two parties did not codify this oral agreement. Nonetheless, introduction just meant the "deployment" and the "storage" of nuclear weapons on Japan, but not "transit" and "port call."⁶³⁴ Former Prime Minister Kishi actually backed Reischauer up on the matter and recalled that nuclear storage on Japan would be subjected to prior

⁶²⁹ See for example Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands.

⁶³⁰ Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan: *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1978), p. 48.

⁶³¹ Department of State Cable, Tokyo 2335, April 4 1963 (Section one of two), reporting on meeting between Ambassador Reischauer and Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira to discuss presence of nuclear weapons on U.S. (From the United States and Japan, 1960-1972) Retrieved by the National Security Archive, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/doc03.pdf>, accessed on 16 November 2017.

⁶³² Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, 23 September 1958. See also Note by the Secretaries to the Holders of J.C.S 2180/123, "Security Treaty-Japan" 2 October 1958, Geographic File 1958, Japan Part 2, Box 8, RG 218,NARA.

⁶³³ Department of State Cable, Tokyo 2335, April 4 1963 (Section one of two).

⁶³⁴ "Raishawar Moto Taishi Kaiken Shouhou" [Interview of Former Ambassador Reischauer], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 18 May 1981. See also "Bei Kaku Mochikomi Kikou"; Letter to Glenn E. Smiley From Robert A. Fearey, 24 November 1964, Subject Numeric File 1964-1966, DEF 7 JAPAN-US, Box 1664, RG 59, NARA.

consultation but the consultation would not be necessary for transit as this was not considered as “major changes.”⁶³⁵

At any rate this interpretation appears at least later shared by the Japanese leaders and officials especially those in Foreign Affairs. As one former administrative vice minister of Foreign Affairs admitted, a condition that required prior consultation was for the US government to store nuclear weapons in Japan. This rule did not apply to US naval ships carrying either nuclear or conventional arsenals that passed through Japanese waters.⁶³⁶ In view of this, one may argue that Japan actually did not have “Invisible” END. Yet, it is important to clarify again that what makes “Visible” END distinct from “Invisible” END is the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons *on land* of the US host nations for the purpose of visibility of reassurance. According to the US government interpretation above, “introduction” was required for “Visible” END. “Invisible” END is distinct from “Visible” END in that “introduction” was never implemented and thus, “Invisible” END lacked nuclear sharing arrangements, a core component of “Visible” END. Of course this does not alter the fact that US nuclear weapons were around Japanese waters. More importantly, as discussed above, Japan refused the introduction of US nuclear weapons. In other words, it refused the key component of “Visible” END.

Knowing Japan’s anti-nuclear sentiment,⁶³⁷ it was nearly impossible for any Japanese leaders to concede that US naval vessels armed with nuclear weapons were allowed to transit through Japan. What successive Japanese governments did until 2010 was delivering an equivocal statement and employed an absurd logic that there was no request of prior consultation from the US government. Therefore, the US warships did not carry any nuclear weapons.⁶³⁸ This is what Japanese

⁶³⁵ “Seifu Kaku Kikou Hitei de Toosu”[The Japanese Government Continues to Emphatically Deny Any Visit of US Naval Vessels Armed with Nuclear Weapons] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 May 1981.

⁶³⁶ “Nichibei Mitsuyaku Nokoru Nazo Murata Moto Jikan no Ichimon Itto Gaimusho wa uso wo Kasaneta” [Unresolved Issues of the Secret Deals: Q & A with Former Administrative Vice Minister Murata], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 30 June 2009.

⁶³⁷ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 334, pp. 690-691.

⁶³⁸ In 1981 Prime Minister Suzuki remarked transits and port calls of US nuclear vessels were subject

people refer to, *kusai mono ni futa wo shiro*, meaning sweeping trouble under the rug and implying turning away from the real problem. This absurd logic was applied to evade political repercussions throughout the Cold War.

The Kennedy Administration and Prime Minister Ikeda (1960-64)

Although Kishi succeeded in concluding the new defence treaty, there had been mass demonstrations led by Japanese leftists surrounding the National Diet building to protest against revising the new pact, chanting their unfounded message of “*Makikomare*” (entrapment) and their slogan, *Ampo Hantai* (No to the new security treaty) even causing one fatality.⁶³⁹ Because of the fierce public repugnance, Kishi was forced to step down after the new security treaty came into effect in June 1960. Kishi was a member of the Tojo cabinet and a “Class A” war crime suspect, which invited further public furor.⁶⁴⁰ As Ambassador MacArthur analysed, once Kishi made himself firmly committed to the new security treaty, the treaty issue could not be separated from Kishi.⁶⁴¹ The vigorous impetus of the anti-security treaty campaigns naturally ceased after Kishi as an objectionable target resigned.⁶⁴²

Due to the massive media coverage, it was widely believed that a majority of the Japanese public opposed the treaty. This was not the case, however. The leading figures of the anti-new security treaty campaign were, in fact, Japanese

to prior consultation. The Japanese Government would not authorise such a port call. See “Kaku Kikou Genjitsutekini Taisho” [Port Calls of US Naval Vessels Carrying Nuclear Weapons are to be Practically Dealt With] *Yomiuri Shimbun* 21 May 1981. See also “Beikan Kaku Tsunda mama Nihon Kikou” [US Naval Ships Equipped with Nuclear Arsenals Visit Japanese Ports Without Unloading Nuclear Weapons] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 7 October 1974; “Nichibei Mitsuyaku Nokoru Nazo Kawamura Kanbo Choukan Mitsuyaku Sonzaishinai” [Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura Denies the Existence of the Secret Deal: Remained Unresolved Issue], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 30 June 2009.

⁶³⁹ Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 137, 182; Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. 91; Schaller, “Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991”, pp. 159-160.

⁶⁴⁰ Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 75; Masayuki Tadokoro: “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei” [The Model of Modern Japanese Economic Diplomacy] in Makoto Iokibe (ed.): *Sengonihon Gaikoshi [The Diplomatic History of Japanese post-war]* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2007), pp. 119-120.

⁶⁴¹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea, Document 190, p. 380.

⁶⁴² Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 74; Sakamoto, “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken”, pp. 101-102; Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 161; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshu*, pp. 192-193.

socialists.⁶⁴³ MacArthur was clearly aware of a massive Communist campaign to neutralize Japan: “Sino-Soviet Bloc has long had as its principal target in Asia the isolation, neutralization, and eventual control of Japan. It has skillfully directed a massive campaign of threats, inducements, and agitation against chronic weakness of Japan’s democratic system.”⁶⁴⁴ Soviet propaganda campaign urged Japan’s neutrality and even implied the possibility of a nuclear provocation. At that time Prime Minister Kishi viewed that the communists were “trying to alienate Japan from the United States. If even a small crack is opened between Japan and the United States, the communists will drive a wedge into it.”⁶⁴⁵ It is worth mentioning that the Soviet Union made its sabre rattling and fired its missiles over Japan in January 1960 falling down to the Pacific Ocean.⁶⁴⁶ It is worth noting that the somewhat influential concept of “unarmed neutrality” advocated by socialists was also supported by Soviet and Chinese communists. As long as this concept was the dominant thinking in Japan, they did not have to worry about the resurgence of Japan as a military power again. They could manage to keep Japan weak physically and psychologically.⁶⁴⁷ It is no surprise that the KGB provided some financial aid to Minoru Oda, the peace movement leader of Japan during the Vietnam War for his activities as revealed after the end of the Cold War.⁶⁴⁸ That said, it is true that this concept was somewhat popular in Japanese society regardless of Sino-Soviet Communist intervention. The Japanese public to some extent accepted the idealist norm.

In reality, even those including the members of the socialist party who were vehemently opposed to the security treaty had never taken a look at the treaty.⁶⁴⁹

⁶⁴³ Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 82-137; Sado, *Jieitaishi*, pp. 76-77.

⁶⁴⁴ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea, Document 190, p. 380.

⁶⁴⁵ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 183, p. 371.

⁶⁴⁶ Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, pp. 183-184.

⁶⁴⁷ Eiichi Tanizawa: *Konna Nihonni Darega sita: Sengo Minshu Shugi no Daihyosha Oe Kenzaburo heno Kokuhatujo* [Who Corrupted Japan?: Challenge to Kenzaburo Oe, the Leading Figure of Post-War Democracy] (Tokyo: Kuresutosha., 1995), p. 27, 130.

⁶⁴⁸ “Beheiren KGB to Sesshokusi Shiken Enjo Motomeru: Kyu Soren Gokuhi Bunsho de Hokoku” [Soviet Top Secret Document Unveils: KGB Offers Financial Support to Japanese Peace Activists] *Sankei Shimbun*, 18 January 1993.

⁶⁴⁹ Miyoko Kudo: *Kenran Taru Shubun: Kishi Nobusuke Den* (Tokyo: Gentosha., 2014), p. 507.

Most ordinary Japanese enjoyed their normal lives and they were rather indifferent to the security issues.⁶⁵⁰ What Kishi truly desired to achieve was to regain further independence and initiative, but his political goals were never realised.

Owing to a severe backlash President Eisenhower's visit to Japan was cancelled.⁶⁵¹ It is notable that no sitting American President paid a visit to Japan until November 1974 when President Gerald Ford finally visited Japan. The memories of the mass anti-security treaty demonstrations were still vivid in 1974 and in the end the Japanese government employed ten thousand policemen to ensure the safety of the President.⁶⁵² As the first sitting American President ever visited Japan, he made an interesting remark at the Japan Press Club on 20 November 1974. There he said that "I hope that my visit will be the first of many by American Presidents."⁶⁵³

Late in June 1960 Ambassador MacArthur sent a telegram to State Department. It analysed the current Japanese situation as follows:

Although most Japanese appraise their economic interests in terms of alignment with free world and recognize the importance of American market, in the security field there is an instinctive yearning on part of most Japanese for [a] world where they would not have to side with either American or Soviet giant but could sit it out on sidelines. This widespread form of latent neutralism is fed on [the] anti-militarist sentiments, pacifism, fuzzy-mindedness, nuclear neuroses and

⁶⁵⁰ One survey shows that the only 11 percent of the Japanese are willing to fight for Japan. See "How Japan's youth see the Kamikaze pilots of WW2", *BBC*, 3 November 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39351262>, accessed on 3 November 2017. Strikingly the accommodation percent of nuclear shelters in Japan today is only 0.02 percent connotating 99.8 percents of the Japanese can get killed by nuclear attacks in theory. The data is found on the website of *Japan Nuclear Shelter Association*, <http://www.j-shelter.com/>, accessed on 25 October 2017.

⁶⁵¹ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan, Korea, Vol. 18, Document 162, pp. 304-305.

⁶⁵² Tara John : "Here's What Happened During the First U.S. Presidential Trip to Japan", *Time*, 24 May 2016, <http://time.com/4346481/gerard-ford-president-japan-visit/>, accessed 29 January 2019.

⁶⁵³ Gerald R. Ford: "Japan Press Club of the President's Speech and Statements", 20/11/ 74, *Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum*, available at <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0122/1252149.pdf>, accessed on 29 January 2019.

Marxist bent of Japanese intellectuals and educators.⁶⁵⁴

The US government sent a new ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer (1961-1966) in March 1961, a Harvard professor who spent his childhood in Japan, with a view to improving damaged diplomatic relations with Japan.⁶⁵⁵ While it is widely believed Kishi's successor Hayato Ikeda's (1960-1964) general policy was economically oriented and conciliatory, Ikeda was actually a conservative politician who was clearly interested in nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence.⁶⁵⁶ Yet it was just imperative of him to maintain a low profile attitude toward national defence by turning to the domestic attention to economic growth after the public backlash against Kishi.⁶⁵⁷

Due to his low profile attitude toward national defense and his economic-oriented policy, public debates on defense issues became muted.⁶⁵⁸ Throughout the Ikeda administration, Japanese economy boomed and this was when public opinion on the revision of the Japanese constitution and national defense became inattentive: their choice was the maintenance of limited JSDF military capability under the peace constitution.⁶⁵⁹ At the same time, Ikeda understood well the salience of military power in international politics and even advocated Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons.⁶⁶⁰

As we have already seen, the Eisenhower administration had to renounce its plan to store nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan as it had faced a vehement backlash. Interestingly this did not prevent the Kennedy administration from taking the same action. Due to the salience of the Japan's strategic location and military necessities, the Kennedy administration, too, sought a possibility of storing US nuclear weapons on Japanese soil. While admitting that the Japanese

⁶⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Vol. 18, Japan; Korea, Document 190, p. 380.

⁶⁵⁵ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 167; Idem, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", pp. 163-164.

⁶⁵⁶ Berger, "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism", p. 195; Fitzpatrick, *Asia's latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 66; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, p.198.

⁶⁵⁷ Iriye, *Shin Nihon no Gaiko*, p. 128.

⁶⁵⁸ Sado, *Jieitaishi*, p. 108.

⁶⁵⁹ Tadokoro, "Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei", pp. 108-109, 120.

⁶⁶⁰ Kitaoka, *Jiminto*, p. 111; Nakasone, *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaiko*, p. 177.

were paranoid about eschewing another nuclear war, a policy paper of the State Department stressed that nuclear storage “remains an important U.S. military objective to be pursued when politically feasible.”⁶⁶¹

Reischauer concluded that the US military plan to store US nuclear weapons on Japan’s soil during peacetime was politically infeasible to the Japanese.⁶⁶² While this was his assessment of the nuclear reality of the Japanese public at that time, he later implicitly suggested US nuclear weapon should be visibly deployed on Japan now that Japan’s nuclear allergy was much mitigated than was in the 1950s and 60s.⁶⁶³ Notably, one policy guidance paper noted that “Maintain a pattern of consultation with Japan consonant with its status as the major partner of the U.S. in Asia, paralleling such consultations with top Western European leader.”⁶⁶⁴

Since the Eisenhower administration failed to deploy US nuclear weapons in Japan the JCS devised a special contingency plan, “High Gear”, against this background. Since it had no operational nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan, the US military planned that C-130s (a military transport aircraft) on a constant alert status in Okinawa would carry the nuclear components of atomic weapons to three American base in Japan—Itazuke in Fukuoka (Southern Japan), Yokota in Tokyo (Eastern Japan) and Misawa in Aomori (Northern Japan) in case of contingency. Edward Rice, deputy assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs, was opposed to the plan on the grounds that it would not have Japanese public approval, potentially causing unnecessary friction with the Japanese government.⁶⁶⁵ In view of the location of each base, the US air force in Japan was

⁶⁶¹ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 354, p. 731.

⁶⁶² Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, pp. 57-59.

⁶⁶³ “Raishawar Moto Taishi Kaiken Shouhou.” See also Bei Kaku Mochikomi Kikou.”

⁶⁶⁴ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 354, p. 733.

⁶⁶⁵ Nuclear Weapons Storage in Japan, Edward E. Rice, Secret 22 March 1962, reprinted in Ishii, *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku*, p.79; “U.S. planned atomic attacks from Japan”, *The Japan Times* (9 May 2000), <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2000/05/09/national/u-s-planned-atomic-attacks-from-japan>, accessed on 11 August 2017; Ota, *Meiyaku no Yami*, pp. 9-12. See also Jones, *After Hiroshima*, p. 265; Naval Message FROM CINCIPAC to JCS, 20 August 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA; Schaller, *Altered States*, pp. 196-197.

probably to attack the Soviet Union and Communist China. At any rate the USA finally removed non-nuclear components from Japan in 1965 as “by 1965 Pentagon official apparently decided that allergy was too difficult to cure.”⁶⁶⁶ Even after this, the facilities related to the “Single Integrated Operational Plan” (US strategic war-fighting plan) such as the Liaison office were established at Fuchu air base, Tokyo in 1967 and it was in operation until 1972.⁶⁶⁷

In view of this, it can be argued that Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella in the early 1960s. Yet the same situation had already existed when the Eisenhower administration attempted to store *Honest John* missiles in 1955. Morton Halperin, who served for the Johnson, Nixon and Clinton administration, well summarized the US stance that “the focus during the 1950s and 1960s was on ‘educating the Japanese about nuclear weapons’ so that Japan would permit the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory...”⁶⁶⁸ This was more of America’s unilateral action. The concept of US END was not mutually recognised on both occasions. In contrast, to some extent, Japan was trying to close the umbrella by refusing the introduction of US nuclear weapons. As one CIA intelligence report of 1961 clearly stated, “Antimilitary, particularly antinuclear attitudes remain extremely strong among the populace and susceptible to exploitation by socialists and Communists.”⁶⁶⁹ While it is true that some Japanese conservative leaders believed that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, this sort of voice was a minority view.

On the Japanese side Prime Minister Ikeda was actually the one who

⁶⁶⁶ Norris Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were”, p. 31.

⁶⁶⁷ Kriestensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella”, pp. 4, 51-53. See also Security Subcommittee of Security Consultative Committee, 11-12 September 1968, NSF, Country File, Box 252, Japan, LBJ Library.

⁶⁶⁸ Morton H. Halperin: “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper and Commentaries”, nuke policy, 09 July, 1999, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/nuke-policy/morton-h-halperin-the-nuclear-dimension-of-the-u-s-japan-alliance-paper-and-commentaries/>, accessed on 13 September 2017, p. 25.

⁶⁶⁹ National Intelligence Estimate, 4-3-61, “Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK”, 21 September 1961, CIA. Retrieved by the *National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf>, accessed on 31 January 2019.

approved to deploy *Nike Ajax* and *MIM-23 HAWK* in Japan.⁶⁷⁰ In fact a decision to introduce these surface to air missiles was made during the Kishi government.⁶⁷¹ It is important to note that he was also keen on US nuclear introduction to Japan for an economic reason. By placing nuclear weapons in Japan, he thought Japan could save defense spending as the USA and NATO did in the 1950s. While it was uncertain of how committed he was to the idea, he expressed his view that “he had not been thinking so much of Japan’s going into the production of nuclear weapons, but of the argument that the presence of US nuclear weapons in Japan might be necessary for its defense...he would be interested in learning more about the broader aspects of the nuclear armaments questions” when he met with Secretary of State Dean Rusk in November 1961.⁶⁷²

While *Nike Ajax* and *MIN-23 HAWK* missile were not designed to equip nuclear warheads and one politician held at the National Diet that the creation of *HAWK* Battalions planned in the Second Defence Build-up Plan must be seen as a prelude of arming SDF with nuclear weapons.⁶⁷³ In the late 1950s a senior British officer suspected that Japan did not rule out a nuclear delivery platform (*Nike* missile) for its defence.⁶⁷⁴ While this analysis was not entirely correct, Ikeda personally seemed to be keen on nuclear arsenals. More importantly Ikeda also made a decision to approve the US nuclear submarine’s first visit (USS *Sea Dragon*) to Japanese ports in August 1964.⁶⁷⁵

While Ikeda was more concerned about Soviet nuclear forces, Japanese policy makers started to worry about a potential Chinese nuclear test. In reaction to this increasing concern, the Japanese government deliberately acted in a calm and

⁶⁷⁰ Yoshitsugu, *Nichibei Domeiha Ikani Tsukuraretaka*, pp. 112, 116-117,189-191.

⁶⁷¹ Cocharan, Arkin, and Hoening, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, p. 19, 45, 95

⁶⁷² *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Northeast Asia, Vol. 22, Document 346, p. 711.

⁶⁷³ Kendo Ito, Sangiin Honkaigi [House of Councilors plenary session] 2 June 1961, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/038/0512/03806020512033.pdf>, accessed on 18th May 2017. See also Cocharan, Arkin, and Hoening, *Nuclear Weapons Databook*, p. 19, 45, 95

⁶⁷⁴ Memo Brigadier R.H.R. Cumming 25 September 1959, (FJ 1194/9) Foreign Office, “Nuclear weapons in Japan”, Code FJ File 1194, 1959. FO371/ 141479. The National Archives of the UK.

⁶⁷⁵ Yoshitsugu, *Nichibei Domeiha Ikani Tsukuraretaka*, p190.

unemotional way.⁶⁷⁶ On 16 October 1964 China successfully exploded its first nuclear device. The following day the Japanese government voiced an objection to the nuclear test and made a short statement about the event that said that there was no immediate significant effect on Japan's defense as long as the Japan-US security treaty remained in effect.⁶⁷⁷ At the same time, the Tokyo Olympic Games were taking place in Japan. Because of the excitement of the Olympiad, the nuclear test did not have a substantial impact on Japanese society. It produced neither public fear nor political debate at the National Diet.⁶⁷⁸ One report of Foreign Ministry also laid out that "Only the existence of the U.S.-Japan security system keeps us from feeling any threat of foreign aggression and guarantees our security." Yet it also stated that "Though there is no present danger of direct military aggression against Japan, we still cannot feel completely at ease concerning Communist China."⁶⁷⁹

Conclusion

One of the key defence agendas between the USA and Japan in the 1950s was the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan during peacetime as NATO did. In contrast to NATO, Japanese unique experiences of Hiroshima, Nagasaki and *Daigo Fukuryūmaru* made it impossible for the Japanese government to accept the introduction of US nuclear weapons. As Hatoyama learned the public backlash against the deployment of *Honest John* was massive enough for him to retract his previous statements that implied welcoming US nuclear weapons. As a consequence

⁶⁷⁶ Kei Wakaizumi, "Japanese Attitudes Toward the Chinese Nuclear Programs", Paper Presented at Airlie House, Warrenton, Virginia, 30 August to 4 September, 1965, DEF 18, Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese Political Affair 1960-1975, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

Tadokoro, "Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei", p. 117.

⁶⁷⁸ "Zen Jinruino Higan Mushi sita Boukyo: Kanbochoukan Danwa" [China Turns against Earnest Desire of all humankind: Chief Cabinet Secretary's Comment] *Asahi Shimbun*, 17 October 1964. See also Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee, 13 December, 1964, 17 December 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 4, LBJ Library.

⁶⁷⁹ The translation of the paper: "Materials for Diet Interpellations on the China Problem" is found in Shigeharu Matsumoto: "Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influences on Japan's Policy" in A. M. Halperin: *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company., 1965), p.162.

of the strong public backlash, both Hatoyama and Kishi made a public statement that the Japanese government would not accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons on its soil. Without Japan's unique historical encounter with the atomic bombing, Japan would have had a more objective view on nuclear deterrence. Without peacetime forward deployment of nuclear weapons on Japan's soil, Japan cannot be considered as a nuclear alliance as opposed to one Japanese critic's false contention.⁶⁸⁰ Japan rejected the "Visible" form of US END on its own free will. The US military did not manage to *introduce* any nuclear weapons into Japan due to concerns about a fervent public backlash.

For Japan the Yoshida line created a posture of reliance on the USA for its security. Japan did not revise its American-made constitution throughout the Cold War and kept defence spending low even after the Japanese economy started to recover from the mid-1950s. This chapter clearly demonstrates that the non-military-cum-nuclear path was reinforced. Once the self-reinforcing mechanism operated, it was difficult for both the US and the Japanese government to reverse the course. To some extent, it is not entirely incorrect to say the Japanese stopped thinking about defence issues as its own issue to tackle, and military affairs became disconnected from postwar Japanese society. Notwithstanding the public indifference, Japanese policy makers could not simply ignore the acute strategic reality of nuclear politics of the Far East as we shall see in the next chapter.

⁶⁸⁰ Ota, *Nichibei Kaku Domei*.

Chapter Four

The First Chinese Nuclear Test (1964) and the US Nuclear Umbrella over Japan

Japan is aware that security matters involve the survival of mankind...but that public opinion could not be ignored altogether under a democratic political system. The first level of awareness is most important but it must be balanced against the needs of public opinion.

— Takeo Miki⁶⁸¹

It is highly unlikely that Japan would develop nuclear weapons, even if other countries less powerful than Japan did so.

—Osamu Kaihara⁶⁸²

It is true that the Chinese nuclear test did not have a substantial impact on Japanese society. Interestingly one opinion poll conducted in December 1966 demonstrated that nearly one third of respondents (28%) did not know that China actually developed nuclear weapons. 19 % out of 72 % (those who was aware of the Chinese nuclear programme) answered that Japan should abrogate the Japan-US security treaty and adopt a neutral policy. Only 10 % out of 72 % believed that Japan should also acquire nuclear weapons.⁶⁸³

On the contrary the test did have a great effect on Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (1964-1972), who replaced the ailing Ikeda in November 1964. It is also important to note that several Japanese secret studies on the feasibility and desirability of Japan's nuclear option in the late 1960s were directly driven by the

⁶⁸¹ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Ryukyu Islands", 16 September 1967". Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/docs/doc17.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2018.

⁶⁸² Osamu Kaihara, Defense Agency Bureau Directory Kaihara, to Embassy officer, December, 1964, quoted in Report on "Japan's Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field", p. C4.

⁶⁸³ Sorifu Kohoshitsu, "Anzen Hoshō Boei Mondaini Kansuru Yoron Chōsa Kekka."

Chinese nuclear test too as we will see in Chapter Six.⁶⁸⁴

For Sato a nuclear China was a serious strategic problem.⁶⁸⁵ It definitely shaped the course of Sato's approach to the US government with respect to Japan's security.⁶⁸⁶ Sato, for instance, regarded a nuclear China as a "Madman carrying a knife [*Kichigai ni Hamono*]" when China was making great progress in the development of nuclear missiles.⁶⁸⁷ This Japanese idiom described a nuclear China as an *extremely dangerous* entity. The use of such an expression actually implied that Sato probably thought a nuclear China was not rational but insane. To give a further example about Sato's perception of Communist China, Sato's executive secretary, Minoru Kusuda recalled that "communist China would have probably been his [Sato's] biggest threat."⁶⁸⁸

Remarkably, Sato perceived that Communist China posed a more fundamental threat to Japanese security than the Soviet Union did. When China carried out its first nuclear test in 1964, the country was reported to possess only one nuclear bomb. On the contrary the total number of Soviet nuclear weapons was 5220. The number included 193 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and 37 submarines that were capable of launching submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Some of these submarines were operated in the Pacific and the Sea of

⁶⁸⁴ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p.125-126.

⁶⁸⁵ Sori Houbei Toukingu Pepa [Talking Paper for PM Sato Visit to the United States of America] (undated), CD A-444, No. 210055, DAMOFAJ; "Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee", December 13 1964, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Records Relating to Disarmament and Arms Control, 1961-1966, Box 11, RG 59, NARA. See also Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 211; Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", pp. 55-68 ; Kei Wakaizumi: "Chugoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho [A Nuclear China and Japan's Security]", February 1966 *Chuo Koron*, p. 46; Wakaizumi, "Japanese Attitudes Toward the Chinese Nuclear Programs", pp. 7-8.

⁶⁸⁶ Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 7.

⁶⁸⁷ Incoming Telegram from American Embassy to the Department of State, "Secretary's Meeting With PM SATO: Communist China", 6 December 1966, NSF, Country File, Japan Box 251, LBJ Library. "Rusk's Visit to Japan (6 December 1966)" in Hosoya, et al (eds), *Nichibei Kankei Shiryou Shu 1945-97*, p. 727. See also Motohiro Mori, Sangiin, Nikkan Kihon Jyoyaku to Tokubetsu Inkaei [The Special Committee of the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, House of Councillors], 25 November 1965, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/050/0400/05011250400004.pdf>, accessed on 12 September 2018.

⁶⁸⁸ Minoru Kusuda Oral Interview, NSA US-Japan Project Oral History Program, (16 November 1995), *the National Security Archive*, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/japan/kusudaohinterview.htm>, accessed on 25 January 2018.

Japan. The Soviet Union possessed approximately 750 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and IRBMs, which could attack Japan. Some of these missiles were based on the Pacific coast.⁶⁸⁹ With its few nuclear bombs, China did not target Japan but the Soviet Union. China moreover declared a “non-first-use” policy. In other words, China would not use its nuclear weapons other than in retaliation.⁶⁹⁰ Realistically the Soviet Union could pose a greater and more immediate threat to Japan but a threat perception is not all about military strength. As Huntington lucidly argued, “States define threats in terms of the intentions of other states, and those intentions and how they are perceived are powerfully shaped by cultural considerations.”⁶⁹¹ In other words, threat perception is subjective and it may have nothing to do with actual military capabilities of a potential rival.⁶⁹² Indeed China’s military modernization was moderate and its military technology was still greatly behind Western powers throughout the Cold War.⁶⁹³

That said, China became the first non-white and Asian country to acquire nuclear weapons, which was a symbol of a major power and the most advanced technology at that time.⁶⁹⁴ The significance of the emergence of a nuclear China went beyond Japan’s national security. It was concerned with Japan’s national pride and coincided with the inauguration of Sato’s conservative administration.⁶⁹⁵ It is also worth noting that Japan did not normalise its diplomatic relations with Communist China until 1972 while Japan had done so with the Soviet Union in

⁶⁸⁹ Norris and Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010”, p. 81; International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 1964-65* (London: The Institute for Strategic Studies., 1964), p. 3; Pavel Podvig (ed.): *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press., 2001), pp. 123-128, 135,237, 246, 273.

⁶⁹⁰ Gregory Treverton: “China’s Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence”, in Christoph Bertram (ed.): *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: IISS., 1980), pp 38-48..

⁶⁹¹ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, p. 34.

⁶⁹² See for example John Glenn and Darryl Howlett: “Neorealism” in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.): *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate., 2004), p. 39.

⁶⁹³ Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*, p. 11; Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence”, pp. 31-37.

⁶⁹⁴ On the prestige aspect of nuclear weapons, see Scott D. Sagan: “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons? : Three Models in Search of a Bomb”, *International Security* Vol.21 No.3 (Winter 1996/97), pp.73-80; Anne Harrington de Santana: “Nuclear Weapons As the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force”, *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 325-345.

⁶⁹⁵ Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy”, p. 32; Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, 90.

1956.⁶⁹⁶

Later, the Cultural Revolution might have had strong effect on Sato's perception of China's intention rather than capability. In Sato's eyes, a nuclear China was perceived as an irrational actor, which alerted Sato to Chinese nuclear developments.⁶⁹⁷ For a similar reason, the US government saw Communist China "as the ultimate revolutionary 'rogue state', and in recent memory it had fought US troops in Korea, attacked India, threatened Taiwan, and armed the Viet Cong."⁶⁹⁸ Already in November 1962 Kennedy's National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy stressed that "A Red China nuclear presence is the greatest single threat to the status quo over the next few years."⁶⁹⁹ In this regard, China in the 1960s was much more threatening than North Korea's nuclear weapons today. The USA even contemplated a military strike against the nascent Chinese nuclear production facilities while such military action was after all undesirable owing to the unbearable political and military costs, rife with considerable uncertainty.⁷⁰⁰ It is also no exaggeration to say the rise of a nuclear China was a watershed in the establishment of the NPT regime. From this point onwards, the USA and the Soviet Union were required to seriously work together to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. A nuclear China was considered to be a destabilising factor for the global balance of power.⁷⁰¹ In comparison to the Eisenhower and Kennedy

⁶⁹⁶ Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*, pp. 8-9.

⁶⁹⁷ Eisaku Sato, Sangiin, Nikkan Kihon Jyoyaku to Tokubetsu Inikai [The Special Committee of the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, House of Councillors], 25 November 1965, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/050/0400/05011250400004.pdf>, accessed on 12 September 2018.

⁶⁹⁸ Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, p. 26. See also Idem, "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War", p. 402.

⁶⁹⁹ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 7, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1995), Document 243, p. 598.

⁷⁰⁰ Department of State, Policy Planning Council, Report on "The Bases for Direct Action Against Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities", 14 April 1964 and Memorandum for the President, "The implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability", 30 April 1964, NSF, Country File, Cambodia, China, Box 237, LBJ Library; Report on "Destruction of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Capabilities", filed 24 June 2002, China, NSF, Committee File Box 5, LBJ Library. See also Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Ryukyu Islands" and Francis Gavin: "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960's", *International Security* Vol. 29 No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 103-107; Idem, *Nuclear Statecraft*, p. 102.

⁷⁰¹ Gavin, "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War", pp. 400-414; McNamara,

administration, the Johnson administration was more serious and committed to preventing further nuclear proliferation. It is important to stress that the Johnson administration considered that extended nuclear deterrence was one solution to inhibit US allies' ambition for acquiring their indigenous nuclear weapons. This point loomed large in the wake of a nuclear China. This chapter will explore how the emergence of a nuclear China coincided with the inauguration of the Sato's conservative administration affected the explicit emergence of "Invisible" END.

Sato's Stance on Nuclear Weapons and the Rise of a Nuclear-Armed China

Sato criticised Ikeda's low profile stance and the nuclear debates came back to the stage in the mid 1960's.⁷⁰² He did not shy away from addressing Japan's security including nuclear security, striving to transgress the embedded anti-militarism of the post-war era. Sato could not simply sit still following the nuclear test and let "China alone in Asia emerge as a world nuclear power."⁷⁰³ For the Japanese government a nuclear-armed China had a more political and psychological impact on Japan given deep-seated historical enmities toward China. This would inevitably create more opportunities to debate on defence more vigorously.⁷⁰⁴ It is true that a nuclear-armed China was not an immediate threat but a long-term threat.⁷⁰⁵

The US government viewed Sato as a conservative, pro-American and anti-Communist politician who was more enthusiastic and proactive about defense and even a proponent of acquiring nuclear weapons.⁷⁰⁶ As a defence-minded leader

The Essence of Security, p. 164.

⁷⁰² Kitaoka, *Nihon Seijisi*, p. 230.

⁷⁰³ "Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee", December 13 1964, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Politico-Military Affairs, Records Relating to Disarmament and Arms Control, 1961-1966, Box 11, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁰⁴ "Chukyo tsuini Kakujikken" [Communist China Finally Conducted a Nuclear Test], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 17 October 1964.

⁷⁰⁵ Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen, *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutorii*, p. 239.

⁷⁰⁶ Paper on "Effects of the Chinese Bomb on Nuclear Spread", 2 November 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 5, LBJ Library; Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee, 13 December, 1964, 17 December 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 4, LBJ Library; Incoming Telegram from American

Sato sought an early meeting with President Johnson with a view to discussing the Chinese nuclear test and the Vietnam issue.⁷⁰⁷ Sato gave a clear sign that the main agenda of the first summit meeting of 1965 was going to be Japan's security when he met with US ambassador to Japan Reischauer in December 1964. Reischauer suggested to Sato that the joint communiqué include a passage reaffirming the US-Japan defense treaty.⁷⁰⁸ It was also his belief that the most important US diplomatic objective with respect to Japan was to win over Japan to the US side as a more active partner.⁷⁰⁹

The Japanese talking points for the coming summit meeting given to the American side started with the issue of Japan's security, highlighting the importance of US-Japan security alliance and of US security commitments against a Chinese nuclear threat. It went on to say that China had to be convinced that any attack on Japan from China would invite US nuclear retaliation.⁷¹⁰ In December 1964 Sato articulated his view on an independent nuclear deterrent to Reischauer: "if [the] other fellow had nuclears it was only common sense to have them oneself. The Japanese public he realized was not ready for this but would have to be educated to this point, and he felt [the] younger generation showed hopeful signs of going this way." Sato then clarified that this was just his personal view and did not represent Japanese public opinion.⁷¹¹ In Sato's eyes, the younger generation that did not directly experience the war was more objective about defence issues.⁷¹²

Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 23 December 1964, Box 2376, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits, Meetings, Japan, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato", 9 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), Japan, LBJ Library.

⁷⁰⁷ Sori Raishawa Beitaishi Kaidan Youshi [The Summary of the Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and US ambassador to Japan Reishcauer], 29 December 1964, CD A'-444, No. 210054, DAMOFAJ; Sori Houbei Toukingu Pepa. See also Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato", 9 January 1965.

⁷⁰⁸ Sori Reischauer Bei Taishi Kaidan Youshi. See also Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 23 December 1964, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁰⁹ Incoming Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 23 December 1964.

⁷¹⁰ Sori Houbei Toukingu Pepa.

⁷¹¹ Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷¹² *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2 Japan, Document 112, p. 398.

Some two years earlier the American Embassy in Tokyo also reported that “a growing number of Japanese have begun to focus more realistically on the consequences of Communist China’s nuclear program.”⁷¹³ Moreover, two years earlier one Japanese foreign official similarly felt that “Japanese opinion was already becoming more realistic about nuclear weapons, and he speculated that this trend might accelerate once China made progress in the nuclear field.”⁷¹⁴

Sato was also confident about Japan’s technological prowess and said that nuclear weapons “were much less costly than was generally assumed and Japanese scientific and industrial level was fully up to producing them.” Sato continued and insisted that “[the] constitution must be revised, though time not yet ripe for this.”⁷¹⁵ Of course, this sort of reasoning was not uncommon at that time. The logic was straightforward in that “If their opponent had, or was getting it, they too had to have it if they were not to fail in their patriotic duty” as a British Cold War diplomat, Rodric Braithwaite noted.⁷¹⁶ In fact, two years earlier Sato had already expressed his nationalistic view. He told Reischauer that “Japanese attitudes are changing, but slowly” and “emphasized the importance of restoring a feeling of pride in Japan and an acceptance of the defence forces.”⁷¹⁷

Moreover, one CIA intelligence estimate report released after the Chinese nuclear test analysed that “Japan has an advanced nuclear research and power program about as large as that of Italy and theoretically could produce nuclear weapons by the end of this decade if it desired. Like Italy, however, Japan does not have sufficient uranium for a weapons program.” Yet it also posited that “The memory of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains vivid in Japan, and public resistance

⁷¹³ Private Views of Three Japanese Foreign Office Officials Regarding Japan’s Policy Toward Nuclear Weapons, (21 June 1962), DNSA, JU00164, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

⁷¹⁴ Memorandum of Conversation: Japanese Policy Toward Nuclear Weapons (16 June 1962), DNSA, JU00164, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

⁷¹⁵ Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷¹⁶ Rodric Braithwaite: *Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation* (London: Profile Books., 2017), p. 397.

⁷¹⁷ Memorandum of Conversation: Views of Eisaku SATO, (1 February 1963), DNSA, JU00201, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

to nuclear weapons is stronger than in any other country.”⁷¹⁸ Sato’s comments on an independent nuclear deterrent was nevertheless significant in that “Never before, had a Japanese leader expressed so openly the desire to develop nuclear weapons, even if those sentiments were only private ruminations” as analysts observed.⁷¹⁹

Following Sato’s eye-opening remark on Japan’s nuclear option, Reischauer’s analysis recommended that Sato needed “more guidance and education by us than did Ikeda to keep him out of dangerous courses...and his views which are bound to leak out to some extent could set off some serious repercussions in Japan.”⁷²⁰ At the beginning of the same month (December 1965), in fact Reischauer already suggested that “We must...be very watchful of any tendencies in Japan to doubt the firmness of U.S. defense commitments or the value of our nuclear deterrent in defence of Free World positions in Asia and in Particular in Japan.”⁷²¹ An American background paper prepared for the visit of Sato, moreover, recommended that the US government convince Japan to rely on US nuclear deterrence for its security against nuclear threats rather than an independent nuclear deterrent. The US government should also cooperate with Japan on the development of its peaceful nuclear and space projects as a means to demonstrate its scientific superiority in Asia. This paper did not specify exactly how the US would defend Japan by its nuclear deterrence. It just asserted that “the U.S. is both able and determined to come to their defense in a nuclear showdown.”⁷²² What this indicated was nevertheless that among many agendas one of the principal issues of the forthcoming meeting in Washington D.C was US nuclear assurance to Japan.

⁷¹⁸ “National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, ‘Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade.’” 21 October, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, *Wilson Center* available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994>, accessed on 9 October 2018.

⁷¹⁹ Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 221.

⁷²⁰ Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964. There is no Japanese record of the conversation between Sato and Reishauer although there is a mention of this private meeting. See Sori Raishawa Beitaishi Kaidan Youshi.

⁷²¹ Airgram From American Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, “Politico-Economic Assessment: Japan”, 4 December 1964, Box 2375, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, RG 59, NARA.

⁷²² Background Paper, “Japanese Security Situation”, 7 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan , Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

The First Summit (12/13 January 1965) and the Explicit US Nuclear Umbrella

On 12 January 1965, Sato met with President Johnson in Washington D.C and launched the first summit meeting by expressing his grave concerns about Communist China. While there is a slight difference in the exact wording of the records of conversation of America's and Japan's, both records showed that President Johnson guaranteed US nuclear commitments to Japanese security.⁷²³ Specifically, Sato stressed the salience of US-Japan security treaty for Japan's security considering Japan had no nuclear weapons and asked Johnson for American nuclear commitments to Japan. According to the Japanese record, Johnson reassured Sato by stating "You have my assurance."⁷²⁴ In response Sato answered that "this is what he would like to ask but said that he is unable to say so publicly" according to the American record.⁷²⁵ This was a decisive moment for US END over Japan as this was the very first time that a Japanese Prime Minister officially and explicitly raised and discussed the issue with a US President, which had never taken place ever before.

More importantly, an American President gave a formal verbal nuclear assurance to his counterpart for the first time in history. Yet as we will see below, at that stage, this American pledge stayed only at the level of the political leadership of Sato. The Sato government had to undergo another three-year long political debate to officially and publicly acknowledge that Japan was under the US nuclear umbrella. In other words, the nuclear umbrella became explicitly open,⁷²⁶ but the Sato government as a whole did not acknowledge that the umbrella covered Japan

⁷²³ Memorandum of Conversation, "Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems", 11:30 a.m, 12 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library; Dai 1 Kai Johnson Daitouryo Sato Sori Kaidan Youshi [The First Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato, Summary of the Conversation], 12 January 1965, CD1 01-535, DAMOFAJ.

⁷²⁴ Dai 1 Kai Johnson Daitouryo Sato Sori Kaidan Youshi [The First Meeting Between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato, Summary of the Conversation], 12 January 1965, CD1 01-535, DAMOFAJ. According to America's records, the US side stated that "the United States would stand by its commitments and provide that defense." See Memorandum of Conversation, "Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems", 11:30 a.m, 12 January 1965.

⁷²⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, "Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems", 11:30 a.m, 12 January 1965.

⁷²⁶ Sunohara, *Kaku ga nakunaranainanatsu no riyu*, 86.

at this stage.

Following this meeting, they had another meeting joined by Foreign Minister Etsuzaburo Shiina, the Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic Party, Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk. In this meeting, they confirmed the US nuclear assurance again and Rusk asked Sato how the Chinese nuclear test affected the perception of the Japanese of the Japan-US security treaty and the presence of US forces in Japan. Sato answered that that “the majority of Japanese people are in favour of the treaty, but in general they were opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the use of such weapons” notwithstanding the Chinese nuclear test.⁷²⁷ That said, he briefly stated that “although he could see why it might be argued that if China has nuclear weapons, Japan should also [acquire them], this was not Japan’s policy.”⁷²⁸ Here he reiterated his personal views on the necessity of Japan’s own nuclear armament while he was well aware that an independent nuclear deterrent was politically unfeasible for Japan.

The former Chairman of the Japanese Joint Chief of Japan, Ryuhei Nakamura, noted too that at the time there was almost a consensus that Japan could not deal with nuclear security on its own.⁷²⁹ Similarly one year before the summit meeting the American embassy in Tokyo analysed public opinion about Japan’ nuclear option and concluded that “As the only people ever to suffer atomic attack, the Japanese people remain unalterably opposed to the military use of atomic energy.”⁷³⁰ The foregoing American background paper prepared for Sato’s visit was even more precise: “Deep-seated pacifist, anti-nuclear inhibitions stemming from Japan’s pre-war and wartime experiences are likely to continue to dominate Japan’s defence policies for the immediate future.”⁷³¹ As far as the

⁷²⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, “Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems”, 12:15 p.m, 12 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan , Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library; Zentai Kaigi [The General Meeting], 12 January 1965, CD1 01-535. MOFA, DAOJ.

⁷²⁸ Ibid.

⁷²⁹ Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen, *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutorii*, p. 243.

⁷³⁰ A Background Study Prepared by American Embassy, “The Japanese Defense Effort and Military Offsets”, 29 January 1963, Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese Political Affair 1960-1975, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

⁷³¹ Background Paper, “Japanese Security Situation”, 7 January 1965.

meeting record is concerned, this embedded anti-military norm inhibited Sato's nuclear ambition.

In the afternoon of the same day, Sato had another meeting with Rusk, who asked Sato about the US nuclear assurance again; whether Sato was fully reassured by President's security commitments to Japan. Sato's answer was positive. Rusk replied to Sato further that "the Chinese nuclear test had not diminished US security commitments to Japan and the US-Japan security treaty stood firmly as ever. We must teach Communist China that its nuclear attacks on Japan would trigger severe American nuclear retaliation."⁷³² It must be noted that Rusk reiterated a similar point that the USA extended its deterrence to Japan in September 1967. He actually held that "It must be made absolutely clear to Peking that the United State will respond and has the capability to respond."⁷³³

From this, it is safe to say that Sato obtained the first explicit formal assurances with respect to the US nuclear protection. At the same time the US government was highly concerned about the Japanese attitude toward a nuclear China. In the wake of the Chinese test, Washington had set out to intensify efforts to prevent further nuclear proliferation. Johnson was particularly concerned for the future with more nuclear states.⁷³⁴ The most direct consequence of the test was the formation of the so-called Gilpatric Committee (named after the chairman Roswell Gilpatric) in November 1964 at Johnson's request.⁷³⁵ This committee studied the impact of the spread of further nuclear weapons to new hands.⁷³⁶ While the final report was not released until the end of January, it recommended that the US

⁷³² Sato Sori Rusk Chokan Kaidanroku [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and Secretary of State Rusk] 12 January 1965, CD A' 444, No. 210047, DAMOFAJ. See also Memorandum of Conversation, "U.S.-Japan Security Ties", 3:30 p.m, 12 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan , Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷³³ Memorandum of Conversation between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Ryukyu Islands."

⁷³⁴ Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, pp. 469-470, 476.

⁷³⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 11, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington D.C.: GPO., 1997), Document 64, pp. 173-182.

⁷³⁶ On the background of the Gilpatric Committee, see for example. Hal Brands: "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee and U.S. National Security Policy", *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 8 No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 83-113 and Gavin, "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War", pp. 405-406.

government substantially intensify its efforts to check nuclear proliferation. It even posited that “The world is fast approaching a point of no return in the prospects of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.”⁷³⁷ One CIA intelligence estimate report released after the Chinese nuclear test foresaw such a possibility throughout Asia.⁷³⁸ In fact one of the ways proposed for such a predicament was US END. It is important to note that following the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964 President Johnson declared that “The US reaffirms its defense commitments in Asia. Even if Communist China should eventually develop an effective nuclear capability, that capability would have no effect upon the readiness of the US to respond to requests from Asian nations for help in dealing with Communist Chinese aggression.”⁷³⁹

He was probably well aware of the importance of providing explicit security commitments including US nuclear deterrence to Japan because he received several reports that recommended such a measure prior the meeting.⁷⁴⁰ Johnson regarded West Germany and Japan as the so-called “nuclear threshold states” that were technically capable of producing their own nuclear weapons at “any time they decided to do so.”⁷⁴¹ Political scientist Francis Gavin analysed a key US motivation to fight in Vietnam. It was essentially to demonstrate American firm resolve to protect its strategic interest even by means of force; otherwise Japan would not trust US security commitments to it and develop nuclear weapons for the sake of its national security. Moreover, it was considered that if either Japan or West Germany developed nuclear weapons, the other would follow suit.⁷⁴²

In a similar vein, one policy briefing memo considered Japan to be one of

⁷³⁷ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 11, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 64, p. 174.

⁷³⁸ “National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64, ‘Prospects for a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Over the Next Decade’,” 21 October, 1964, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, *Wilson Center* available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115994>, accessed on 9 October 2018.

⁷³⁹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 10, National Security Policy, (Washington D.C.: GPO.,2001), Document 163, pp. 517-518.

⁷⁴⁰ Airgram From American Embassy Tokyo to Department of State, “Politico-Economic Assessment: Japan”, 4 December 1964, Box 2375, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, RG 59, NARA; Background Paper: China Problem, (5 January 1965), DNSA, JU00412, JUSDSER, 1960-1976; Briefing For Gilpatrick Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 1 December 1964 and Report on “Probable Consequences”, filed 26 June 2002, NSF, Committee File, Box 4, LBJ Library.

⁷⁴¹ Johnson, *The Vantage Point.*, p. 478.

⁷⁴² Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, p. 93.

few countries that “are not only capable of producing nuclear weapons but are seriously considering whether to do so.”⁷⁴³ A concept of a nuclear weapons bank (US nuclear stockpiles) “in the Far East from which countries threatened by Chinese nuclear power might draw nuclear weapons when and if required”⁷⁴⁴ was proposed. Nuclear sharing arrangements with Japan also were an alternative idea. It was suggested that US nuclear weapons be deployed in Japan and Japanese Self-Defence Force have training for the employment of IRBM in the Pacific. We might recall a similar idea was already suggested in the 1950s. Additionally an option of allowing the acquirement of Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons was also considered.⁷⁴⁵ At any rate, it was obvious that “a process of intensified dialogues with the Japanese on nuclear matters should be undertaken.”⁷⁴⁶

What this suggests is that the US government started to be aware of the importance of strengthening its security commitments including nuclear deterrence to Japan. Behind these considerations, since the Chinese nuclear test, in the eyes of American policy makers, it had become obvious that the loss of Japanese confidence in US security commitments to Japan might cause Japan to develop its independent nuclear deterrent.⁷⁴⁷ In connection to US concerns about nuclear proliferation, a detailed account of Japan’s decision to sign the NPT will be discussed in Chapter Six. We should bear in mind that the Johnson administration was more committed to nonproliferation and it worked closely with the Soviet Union to establish the NPT regime. With that in mind, it would have been unlikely that the Johnson administration would have permitted Japan to acquire its indigenous nuclear

⁷⁴³ Briefing For Gilpatrick Committee on Nuclear Proliferation, 1 December 1964.

⁷⁴⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, “Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 15 December 1964, Presidential Task Force Committee on nuclear Proliferation (1 of 2) , NSF, Subject Files, Box 35, LBJ Library.

⁷⁴⁵ Paper on “Effects of the Chinese Bomb on Nuclear Spread”; Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee, 13 December, 1964; Four Alternatives to Nuclear Proliferation, filed 14 February 2002 and Selective Relaxation of Efforts to Contain Proliferation, filed 12 September 1994, NSF, Committee File, Box 4, LBJ Library; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 11, Part 2 Japan, Document 59, pp. 122-125. See also Yanosuke Narazaki, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai [The Budget Committee of House of Representatives] 19 February 1966, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0514/05102190514018.pdf>, accessed on 22 August 2017.

⁷⁴⁶ Summary of Statement made before Gilpatric Committee, 13 December 1964. See also Memorandum for the President, “The implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability”.

⁷⁴⁷ Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. 10.

weapons.

The next day (13th), Sato had a meeting with Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara. They discussed the importance of US extended nuclear deterrence over Japan, US security assurance in particular. McNamara suspected the initiation of Japan's nuclear weapons programme vis-à-vis a nuclear China. Sato noted that the Japanese were opposed to the acquisition and the use of nuclear weapons although it was technically possible for Japan to build such arsenals. Japan was not like de Gaulle France.⁷⁴⁸ The Japanese did not want the US introduction of its nuclear weapons into Japan since it was an evident breach of the US-Japan security agreements. That said, "Tokyo expected the US government to retaliate from US nuclear weapons at sea immediately in the event of war." McNamara replied to Sato that nuclear weapons at sea could be launched readily.⁷⁴⁹ They did not specify what this sea-based deterrent constituted, but Japan gradually saw strategic values in SLBMs as we will see below.

From this conversation, we can see Sato's ambivalent feeling that, on the one hand, the presence of US nuclear weapons on Japan's soil was not politically acceptable considering Japan's nuclear taboo. Sato, on the other hand, sought another American nuclear assurance from US Secretary of Defense, knowing the importance of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan's security. What is more interesting is Sato was somehow confident in Japan's technical capability of producing nuclear weapons in Japan. Whether or not this statement was mere bluff and a diplomatic tactic is unknowable now. Sato's confidence might have been genuine given that he was acutely concerned that any information leaks from the Tokaimura reactors could facilitate the Chinese nuclear weapons programme while it is quite uncertain that to what extent he was informed about precise nuclear weapons technology.⁷⁵⁰ Japanese political leaders, nevertheless, appeared to share

⁷⁴⁸ He reiterated the same position in July 1966. He stressed that "there was no De Gaulle in Japan." See *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 74, p. 150.

⁷⁴⁹ Sato Makunamara kaidan [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and Secretary of Defence McNamara], 13 January 1965, CD A-444, No. 210049, DAMOFAJ.

⁷⁵⁰ Chicom Briefing for Prime Minister Sato, (1 March 1967), DNSA, JU00652, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

the understanding at the time that Japan had a technical capability of producing its indigenous nuclear weapons but it would not do so for the sake of the peace of human civilization.⁷⁵¹

Sato stressed that Japan relied heavily on the US nuclear umbrella despite its advanced nuclear weapon technology. From a strategic point of view, at any rate, this sea-based deterrent form fit well in the maritime nature of Japan.⁷⁵² This form is less vulnerable than the land based deterrent form.⁷⁵³ In the afternoon of the same day, Miki spoke to the Vice President-elect, Hubert Humphrey. Humphrey expressed his deep concern about further nuclear proliferation by Japan and India. In order to prevent the spread of further nuclear weapons, he even proposed a Multilateral Force (MLF) with Japan to Miki. Humphrey went on to argue that “It would have a good effect in Communist China if you had a hand on the umbrella to be sure the rain doesn’t come down on you.”⁷⁵⁴

The main idea of MLF proposed in the early 1960s was that NATO’s integrated crews would jointly operate naval vessels armed with *Polaris* missiles under the NATO supreme commander’s authority. This was an American answer to NATO’s concerns about American security guarantees.⁷⁵⁵ In the end, NATO failed to reach a consensus on the proposal because most NATO states were not willing for this joint effort; mixed manning sounded infeasible.⁷⁵⁶ This was not least when they discovered that the US government would still retain a veto over the launch of

⁷⁵¹ “Ampo Taisei wa Kenji: Chugoku no Kakukyōi Bei KakuYokushiryōku ni Tayoru”; Memorandum of Conversation, “Japanese Views on Defense and Nuclear Proliferation”, 1 September 1965, DEF 18, Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese Political Affairs 1960-1975, Box 2, RG 59; “Shusho Shimoda Kenkai Shiji Kakukakusan Boushi” [Foreign Minister Upholds Shimoda’s View: Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 February 1966.

⁷⁵² Sea based systems are considered to be SLBMs, sea-launched cruise missiles, and carrier aircraft. On this point, see David S. Yost: “Western Nuclear Force Structures” in Beatrice Heuser (ed.): *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security*, Occasional Paper 5 (Maryland: Center For International Security Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland., 1991), p. 35 (26-46).

⁷⁵³ Nakanishi, “U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan”, pp. 83-86-87.

⁷⁵⁴ Miki Kanjicho Hamphri Ziki Daitoryo Kaidanroku [Memorandum of Conversation Between the Secretary General of the Liberal-Democratic Party Miki and the Vice President Nominee Humphrey], 13 January 1965, CD A-444, No. 210053, DAMOFAJ; Memorandum of Conversation, “United States-Japan Relations and Policy Problems in Asia”, 13 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 250 (2 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁵⁵ Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 477.

⁷⁵⁶ Legge, *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*, pp. 12-13.

nuclear missiles and the financial burden would be shared among the participants.⁷⁵⁷ The MLF proposal was also hoped to “deter the allies, specifically the Federal Republic of Germany, from trying to build up their own nuclear arsenals.”⁷⁵⁸ This suggests that the rationale of Humphrey’s proposal could have been meant to prevent Japan from going nuclear by offering and ensuring a more credible deterrent.

As predicted, the Sato’s first meetings with President Johnson and his key administration members addressed Japan’s security. In view of political discussions between the two governments, this summit meeting was in part dedicated to US security assurances to Japan in the wake of the Chinese nuclear test. The first meeting was overall a success for Sato. The Johnson administration made it clear that Japan was explicitly protected by the US nuclear umbrella, which the previous Japanese Prime Ministers had never asked and broached openly. Indeed one intelligence report observed that Sato broke “taboos against mentioning the need for nuclear protection.”⁷⁵⁹ As a result of the first summit meeting, the concept of US END was explicitly and mutually understood by the two governments. Even before then, it can be argued that Japan had been under US nuclear protection. This was, however, completely one-sided, provided through Eisenhower’s grand strategy “New Look.”⁷⁶⁰ Considering that the key component of extended deterrence is psychological assurance, the concept must be mutually shared by both the protector and the protégé.

The joint statement following the meetings indeed reiterated that the USA was determined to fulfill its security commitments stipulated in the US-Japan security treaty and protect Japan from all forms of external aggression. It proclaimed:

⁷⁵⁷ Catudal, *Nuclear Deterrence*, pp. 221-222 and Schwartz, *NATO’s Nuclear Dilemma*, pp. 82-85, 94-95.

⁷⁵⁸ Melvyn P. Leffler: *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), p. 163. See also Catudal, *Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 222 and Gavin, “Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War”, p. 402.

⁷⁵⁹ Special Report Weekly Review, “Prime Minister Sato’s Position in a Renascent Japan”, 9 November 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJ Library.

⁷⁶⁰ See for example Kurosaki, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*, pp. 188-189.

The President and the Prime Minister recognizing that the question of China is a problem having a vital bearing on the peace and stability of Asia, exchanged frank views on the positions of their respective countries and agreed to maintain close consultation with each other on this matter. The President emphasized the United States policy of firm support for the Republic of China and his grave concern that Communist China's militant policies and expansionist pressures against its neighbors endanger the peace of Asia...The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed their belief that it is essential for the stability and peace of Asia that there be no uncertainty about Japan's security. From this viewpoint, the Prime Minister stated that Japan's basic policy is to maintain firmly the United States-Japan Mutual Cooperation and Security Treaty arrangements, and the President reaffirmed the United States determination to abide by its commitment under the Treaty to defend Japan against *any armed attack* from the outside. The President and the Prime Minister affirmed the importance of constantly seeking even closer relationships between the two countries.⁷⁶¹

While the text did not elaborate what *any armed attack* actually meant, in February 1966 Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina suggested it included a nuclear attack from China and the Soviet Union.⁷⁶² The two governments intentionally did not use the term "Nuclear Umbrella" or "Nuclear" for fear of a public backlash in view of the nuclear-sensitive Japanese public.⁷⁶³ This statement was nevertheless

⁷⁶¹ Emphasis added. Text of Joint Communiqué Between President Lyndon B. Johnson and His Excellency Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan Following Talks in Washington, January 12 and 13, 1965, 13 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁶² Etsusaburo Shiina, Shugiin Yosai Inkaikai [The Budget Committee of House of Representatives] 18 February 1966, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0514/05102180514017.pdf>, accessed on 22 Aug 2017.

⁷⁶³ Akira Kurosaki: "Sato Seiken No Kakuseisaku to America no Kaku no Kasa: Amerikano Kaku Yokushiryoku heno Ison Seisaku no Koushikika Teichaku to sono Haikei [Nuclear Policy of the Sato Government and the US Nuclear Umbrella: The Outset and Background of Japan's Reliance on US Nuclear Deterrence]", *Prime*, (Oct 2002), Meiji Gakuin University Institutional Repository, P. 76; Sunohara, *Kaku ga nakunaranainanatsu no riyu*, p.88-89.

the first explicit US nuclear commitment to Japan.⁷⁶⁴ To be more precise, the two governments had not seriously discussed the problem of US nuclear assurance to Japan until the US-Japan summit meeting of 1965.

Before the first summit meeting, Sato evinced his pro-nuclear weapon stance. No sooner did the meeting commence than he appeared to alter his nuclear policy or soften his tone. After the first day of the summit meeting (12th), he delivered a speech at the National Press Club in Washington D.C. where he reiterated the government stance on self-restraint in the development of nuclear weapons.⁷⁶⁵ Analysts vigorously discuss the motivations behind Sato's seeming change in his thought. Some observed that Sato's statement was possibly a diplomatic tactic to obtain US nuclear assurance and assure the Japanese of the American security guarantee as Japan lacked the technological capability of producing nuclear weapons.⁷⁶⁶ Yet it is uncertain whether Sato's statement was a diplomatic gambit; rather he wanted to see the American government reaction.⁷⁶⁷

Based on his interview with a Japanese politician, a noted Japanese journalist, Tsuyoshi Sunohara, explained that Sato's shift was diplomatic bargaining with the USA. Japan abandoned its nuclear programme on the condition that the American government would not hinder the Japanese space programme. As evidence to support his argument, Sunohara pointed out one statement by Sato that the Japan's rockets could be used for a military purpose in his talks with McNamara.⁷⁶⁸ Moreover, it is true that the US government was even willing to technically assist the Japanese space programme. The rationale behind this was that advanced space projects could be utilised to demonstrate Japan's scientific

⁷⁶⁴ Kase, "Japan", p. 143.

⁷⁶⁵ Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting Today with Prime Minister Sato", 13 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁶⁶ Kusunoki, "The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-nuclear Policy", pp. 31-32; Kase, *Daitouryou ate Nihonkoku Shushou no Gokuh File*, p. 146; Etel Solingen: "The Perils of Prediction: Japan's Once and Future Nuclear Status", in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova: *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective Vol. 2* (Stanford, CA: Stanford U.P., 2010), p. 141

⁷⁶⁷ Kurosaki, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*, pp. 59-60.

⁷⁶⁸ Sunohara, *Kaku ga nakunaranainanatsu no riyu*, p. 86-87. On the talks, see Sato Makunamara kaidan.

prowess challenged by a nuclear China. With the possession of this scientific superiority, the US government could also reduce the Japanese incentive for an indigenous atomic bomb as a symbol of its global power and prestige.⁷⁶⁹ In contrast to those arguments, Fintan Hoey, a specialist on Sato's foreign policy, suggested that Sato did not necessarily abandon his nuclear option but what he attempted to do is still to keep the nuclear option open while preserving the US nuclear commitments.⁷⁷⁰

It is conceivable that all these considerations shaped Sato's nuclear policy. In general, the ultimate decision on whether to carry out a nuclear weapons programme would depend on multiple considerations. They could be external (prestige and the nature of perceived threats), and internal (politics, economy and emotional).⁷⁷¹ In view of Sato's talks with the American leaders, Sato was greatly sensitive to Japanese public opinion and Sato probably knew that his nuclear option was unrealistic against this backdrop even though he personally believed that Japan would need its own nuclear weapons for its security. On the one hand, when Rusk sounded out Sato's views on potential Japan's defence options including an independent deterrent in the absence of a defence treaty with the USA in July 1966, he pointed out that "the majority of the Japanese people had not forgotten Hiroshima and were opposed to nuclear weapons."⁷⁷² On the other hand, Sato privately told Nakasone that Japan as an independent country must have nuclear

⁷⁶⁹ Background Paper: China Problem, (5 January 1965), DNSA, JU00412, JUSDSER, 1960-1976; Vice President's Visit to Japan December 1965, "Background Paper Cooperative Effort in Outer Space Exploration", 1965, SP, Box2, Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese Political Affair 1960-1975, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting Today with Prime Minister Sato", 13 January 1965, Box 2376, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits, Meetings, Japan, RG 59, NARA. See also Memorandum, "Nuclear Weapons Programs Around the World", 3 December 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 6, LBJ Library and Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato", 9 January 1965 and Report on "Problems of Nuclear Proliferation Outside Europe", 7 December 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 1, LBJ Library; Memorandum for the President, "Space Cooperation with Japan", 26 December 1968, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 252, LBJ Library.

⁷⁷⁰ Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 9.

⁷⁷¹ National Intelligence Estimate, 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK", 21 September 1961, CIA. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf>, accessed on 31 January 2018.

⁷⁷² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 74, p. 150.

weapons to deal with China and the USA.⁷⁷³ In September 1968 Sato also privately held that “I should declare that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons and then, resign once and for all.”⁷⁷⁴ In short, he was clearly aware of conceivable political repercussions to such efforts in the face of the so-called Japan’s “nuclear allergy.” Sato came to understand what his realistic option (reliance on US END rather than acquisition of Japan’s own nuclear weapons) was and followed the direction accordingly.⁷⁷⁵

Moreover, the Johnson government was becoming more serious about non-nuclear proliferation. In 1966 Johnson stated at the dinner table that “nations which do not seek national nuclear weapons can be sure that they will have our strong support, if they need it, against any threat of nuclear blackmail.”⁷⁷⁶ Furthermore, the NPT was already on the surface. Considering these factors above, reliance on US END was the most realistic option for Sato. END was a product of compromise in view of Sato’s desire for an independent deterrent.

The Nuclear Umbrella Debates in 1967 and the Political Recognition of the Nuclear Umbrella

While Sato successfully elicited the US nuclear assurance from Johnson and thus created the modern foundation for US END over Japan, debates on the salience of the US nuclear umbrella ensued in Japan.⁷⁷⁷ In February 1966 Takeso

⁷⁷³ Nakasone, *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru.*, p. 178.

⁷⁷⁴ Entry of 16 September 1968, Minoru Kusuda: *Kusuda Minoru Nikki: Sato Eisaku Sori Shuseki Hishokan no 2000 Nichi*[Diary of Kusuda Minoru: 2000 Days of Eisaku Sato’s Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister](Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2001), p. 260.

⁷⁷⁵ Kurosaki, *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*, pp. 58-59.

⁷⁷⁶ Lyndon B. Johnson Remarks at the State Dinner in Parliament House, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 30 October 1966. The American Presidency Project, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=27971>, accessed on 22 August 2017. See also Report on “Security Guarantees and Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.”

⁷⁷⁷ As is not difficult to imagine, socialists in Japan were fervently opposed to the US nuclear umbrella. See for example Masao Iwama, Sangiin, Nikkan Kihon Jyoyaku to Tokubetsu Inkaikai [The Special Committee of the Treaty of Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea, House of Councillors] 3 December 1965, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/050/0400/05012030400009.pdf>, accessed on 10 September 2018.

Shimoda, administrative vice minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, publicly alleged that Japan was not yet under the protection of the US nuclear umbrella despite the fact that Japan had a security treaty with the USA.⁷⁷⁸ This statement precipitated a political debate at the National Diet, demanding the clarification of the government stance on the US nuclear umbrella. Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina clarified that Shimoda's comment did not reflect a formal view of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).⁷⁷⁹ According to Shimoda's strategic perspective, the best solution for Japan's security was global nuclear disarmament. It was not an ideal option to depend perpetually on the US nuclear umbrella and there was no guarantee that the Soviet Union and China would renounce their nuclear arsenals.⁷⁸⁰ Some 10 months later Shimoda also expressed his strategic view on Japan's security against a nuclear-armed China. Noting that China's future was uncertain and unpredictable, Shimoda argued that a nuclear option should not be ruled out and a future generation should make a final decision over whether or not to acquire Japan's own nuclear weapons.⁷⁸¹

Following Shimoda's controversial remark, Shiina soon announced the formally unified view of MOFA and stated that "In view of the current international situation, the US nuclear weapons played a significant role in deterring general war in a global scale. Given this general role of US nuclear deterrence, it was hard to deny the fact that Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella."⁷⁸² Two months

⁷⁷⁸ "Ampo Izi kara Henka Shimoda no Sekkyokuteki Hatugen Seifu Yotou de Giron Yobisou"[The Shift of the Current Status of the US-Japan Security Treaty: Administrative Vice Minister Shimoda's Contentious Remark Will likely to provoke Political Debate], *Asahi Shimbun*, 18 February 1966.

⁷⁷⁹ Etsusaburo Shiina, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai [The Budget Committee of House of Representatives] 19 February 1966, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0514/05102190514018.pdf>, accessed on 22 Aug 2017.

⁷⁸⁰ "Mazu Kakuhooyukoku ga Haikino Shisei Simese: Kakukakusanboushi de Shimoda Zikan Hyoumei" [Administrative Vice Minister Shimoda's Statement with Respect to Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear States Must Show their Firm Commitments to the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons First] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 18 February 1966; "Kaku no kasa heno Izon Koukyuka subekidenai: Amp Genjitsu dewa Hitsuyo" [Japan Should not Permanently Rely on the US Nuclear Umbrella: Realistically the Japan-US Security is Crucial for Japanese Security], *Nihon keizai Shimbun*, 19 April 2017. On his realist views: see Takeso Shimoda: *Nihon wa koushite Saisei shita: Sengo Nihon Gaiko no Shougen, Ge* [The Process of Post-War Japan's Recovery: Testimony to Post-War Japan's Diplomacy, Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Gyousei Mondai Kenkyujo., 1985), pp. 228-233.

⁷⁸¹ "Nihon no Kakuheiki Hoyu: Shouraino Sedai ga Sentaku"[Japan's Nuclear Option is to be Decided by Future Generation], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 2 December 1967.

⁷⁸² Shiina, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai. See also "Nihon Kaku no Kasa ni Takaku Kakusenryoku wa Sanka

later, MOFA released a document on its official position regarding the US nuclear umbrella which read that Japan under the Japan-US security suggested US nuclear force performed as a deterrent to prevent an adversary from carrying out a nuclear strike against Japan.⁷⁸³ In other words, the Japanese government formally, if not explicitly, acknowledged that its security now depended on US END. Strikingly, Shiina also held that “Japan under the US nuclear umbrella did not automatically mean that Japan would host nuclear bases. Right now Japan had no plan to join the NATO type MLF and will not do so in the future.”⁷⁸⁴ It is important to note that in April 1966 Reischauer shared his opinion on a nuclear sharing arrangement with Japan with the State Department and stated that that “is a possibility but not for a considerable number of years.”⁷⁸⁵

At any rate a series of public remarks was significant since the Japanese leaders finally started to discuss the importance of US nuclear weapons for Japan’s security, which had not really taken place previously. Indeed one CIA special report in April 1966 that reviewed Japanese security policy noted that “For the first time since their devastating defeat in World War II, the Japanese have undertaken a serious and responsible debate on national security.”⁷⁸⁶ As a result of Shimoda’s statement, the Japanese government had more explicitly come to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.⁷⁸⁷ After the first meeting between Sato and Johnson in January 1965, the Japanese government started to express its dependence on the US nuclear umbrella. In April 1967 Minister of Foreign Affairs Takeo Miki publicly remarked

senu Seifu Touitsu Kenkai” [Japan Comes Under the US Nuclear Umbrella but It Will not Join Multilateral Force: The Formal View of the Japanese Government] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 February 1966.

⁷⁸³ “Waga Kunino Anzen Hosho Mondainichibei Ampo Hosho Jyoyaku ni tsuite” [Issues on Japan’s National Security: Perspectives on Japan-US Security Treaty] (16 April 1966) in *Waga Gaiko no Kinkyō, Dai 11 Gou* [Diplomatic White Paper, Volume 11], 1966, MOFA, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1967/s42shiryō.htm#r>, accessed on 4 September 2018.

⁷⁸⁴ Shiina, Shugiin Yosai Inkaishi. See also “Nihon Kaku no Kasa ni Takaku Kakusenryoku wa Sanka senu Seifu Touitsu Kenkai” *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 19 February 1966.

⁷⁸⁵ Incoming Telegram From American Embassy Tokyo (Reischauer) to Secretary of State, 28 April 1966, Subject Numeric File 1964-1966, DEF 6 Japan, Box 1664, RG 59, NARA.

⁷⁸⁶ Special Report, “Japan Rethinking Security Policy”, 29 April 1966.

⁷⁸⁷ Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, p, 228.

that Japan's security was dependent on US nuclear deterrence, for instance.⁷⁸⁸ Miki reiterated this stance when he met with State Secretary Rusk later the same year.⁷⁸⁹ This was reconfirmed in the next summit meeting of 1967 between the two governments. That said, Sato had to go through another big political challenge before publicly acknowledging that the Japanese government as a whole relied on "Invisible" US END.

The Second Summit (14/15 November 1967) and Sato's Failed Attempt at Raising Public Awareness

In November 1967 (between 14th and 15th) Sato had the second meeting with President Johnson and his cabinet members. There Sato again reemphasised the importance of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan's security and of raising the Japanese awareness of national security although the central theme of this meeting was the reversion of Ryukyu and Bonin Islands (those islands were still fully under US jurisdiction decreed by the San Francisco Peace Treaty).⁷⁹⁰ We will discuss on the link between reversion of these islands and the completion of "Invisible" END in the next chapter.

It is important to note that China conducted its first thermonuclear test in June 1967. Even just before this test, the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State got an impression through the US-Japan planning talks that the Japanese officials were wary of the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities. They expressed their "desire for a more visible US deterrent."⁷⁹¹ As one US secret

⁷⁸⁸ "Ampo Taisei wa Kenji: Chugoku no Kakukyoyei Bei KakuYokushiryoku ni Tayoru" [To Firmly Maintain the Japan-US Security System: Japan has no Choice but to Rely on US Nuclear Deterrence vis-à-vis Chinese Nuclear Threats], *Asahi Shimbun*, 14 April 1967.

⁷⁸⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Ryukyu Islands", 16 September 1967."

⁷⁹⁰ Sato Sori Johnson Daitouryo Kaidanroku Dai Ikai Kaidan [Memorandum of the Conversation Between PM Sato and President Johnson], 14 November 1967, CD H22-021, No. H223506, DAMOFAJ. See also Memorandum for the President, "The Ryukyu-Bonin Islands and the Sato Visit", 27 October 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁹¹ Memorandum for the Secretary, "US-Japan Planning Talks-General Information Memorandum", 5 June 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJ Library. See also Memorandum for the Secretary,

report analysed, “Appearance of a deliverable nuclear weapons capability in Chinese Communist hands will unquestionably, however, provoke a stronger reaction [from Japan].”⁷⁹² What made Japanese leaders uneasy about its security was a logical conclusion that as Chinese nuclear forces expanded, the USA would be more cautious about its military action against China although China’s conventional forces could not match American forces at all, China could not have a credible second strike capability against the US homeland and China’s nuclear programme were slow and moderate.⁷⁹³ It was also doubtful that China had credible and sufficient numbers of operational nuclear weapons as of 1967.⁷⁹⁴ When he talked to McNamara on 14 November 1967, Sato asserted that “Japan’s whole security was based on its security arrangement with the U.S. The Japanese were well protected by the U.S. nuclear umbrella and Japan had no intention of making nuclear weapons. Three years ago the President assured him that the U.S. was prepared to aid Japan against any attack.” McNamara responded to this positively.⁷⁹⁵ It is also important to note that earlier in 1967 when McNamara was interviewed by Wakaizumi for *Chuo Koron* (Japanese magazine), he stressed that Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella and reassured that “those with whom we have treaties are protected by the full arsenal of our weapon system, both conventional and nuclear.”⁷⁹⁶

The next day (15th), Sato asked Johnson for reassurance of US security commitments to Japan. In response, Johnson stated that “the United States is committed and as long as he is president we would carry out this commitment.”⁷⁹⁷

“US-Japan Planning Talks-Information Memorandum”, 12 December 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJ Library.

⁷⁹² Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. 6.

⁷⁹³ Treverton, “China’s Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence”, pp. 38-44..

⁷⁹⁴ See for example, Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, p. 132, 134 and Norris and Kristensen, “Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010”, p, 81.

⁷⁹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, “Balance of Payments”, 14 November 1967; Sato Sori Makunamara Kokubo Choukan Kaidanroku [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and Defence Secretary McNamara], 14 November 1967, CD H22-021, No. H223508, DAMOFAJ.

⁷⁹⁶ Memorandum for Distribution List, “Secretary McNamara’s Interview with Professor Wakaizumi for Chuo Koron”, 3 August 1966, Interview 15 July 1966, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 251, LBJ Library.

⁷⁹⁷ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 106, p. 238; Sato Sori Johnson Daitouryo

In light of Sato's remark, Sato's determination to rely on the US nuclear umbrella was evident. The joint communiqué again touched the Chinese nuclear programme and declared:

They [the President and the Prime Minister] noted the fact that Communist China is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the importance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China. The President and the Prime Minister also agreed that, while it is difficult to predict at present what external posture Communist China may eventually assume, it is essential for the free world countries to continue to cooperate among themselves to promote political stability and economic prosperity in the area...They declared it to be the fundamental policy of both countries to maintain firmly the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan in order to ensure the security of Japan and the peace and security of the Far East.⁷⁹⁸

As a Japanese scholar, Yuri Kase, pointed out, "repeated U.S. verbal assurances regarding Japan's security played a crucial role for Japan in addressing the China threat of the late 1960's."⁷⁹⁹

It is important to note that the Johnson administration set out to tighten its defence ties more with Japan in the wake of the China's nuclear test.⁸⁰⁰ The US government even gave a high level confidential briefing on China's nuclear weapons programme to Sato in March 1967.⁸⁰¹ The main purpose of the briefings was

Kaidanroku Dainikai Kaidan [Memorandum of the Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson], 15 November 1967, CD H22-021, No. H223507, DAMOFAJ.

⁷⁹⁸ Joint Communiqué between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan following talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967, CD A'-437, No. 200091, DAMOFAJ. See also Text of Joint Communiqué Between President Lyndon B. Johnson and His Excellency Prime Minister Sato of Japan Following Talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁷⁹⁹ Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 63.

⁸⁰⁰ Memorandum for the President, "Your Meeting with Prime Minister Sato", 9 January 1965.

⁸⁰¹ Chicom Briefing for Prime Minister Sato, (1 march 1967), DNSA, JU00652, JUSDSER, 1960-1976. See also *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 82, p. 163.

presumably to ease Sato's grave security concern and they were also to show strong US security commitments to Japan. Ambassador Johnson was quite confident that the briefing deeply impressed Sato.⁸⁰² Moreover, the US government potentially aimed to secure Japan's NPT signature.⁸⁰³

As for the central agenda of the meeting (Okinawa and Bonin), before his second meeting, Sato made a tour of South East Asian countries including Saigon to show his keen support for Johnson's Vietnam War. Japan also financially contributed to the Asian Development Bank and provided financial support to South East Asian countries such as Indonesia.⁸⁰⁴ This was well received by the American government. Indeed the Defence Secretary McNamara stated that "he was pleased to see Japan expand its role in Asia and growing interest in the Asian Development Bank and other projects. He hoped that as the years went by Japan would play a larger role."⁸⁰⁵ This act was considered necessary in order to facilitate the negotiations over the Ryukyus with a view to "forming a consensus on a decision to repatriate Okinawa within the next two to three years."⁸⁰⁶

Indeed, historian Michael Schaller noted that "The president's advisers agreed that the reversion of Okinawa and the Bonins must be linked to Japan carrying a heavier economic and political burden in Southeast Asia, cooperating in efforts to contain China, improving the balance-of-payments problems, buying more U.S. military products, and granting continued base rights on Okinawa."⁸⁰⁷ In preparation for the coming summit meeting one secret briefing paper drafted by the State Department also stated that "On our part we will seek from the Japanese a

⁸⁰² Chicom Briefing for Prime Minister Sato, (1 march 1967).

⁸⁰³ Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 222.

⁸⁰⁴ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary, "Congressional Consultation on the Ryukyus and the Bonins—Briefing Memorandum", 6 November 1967. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/docs/doc09.pdf>, accessed on 9 October 2018.

⁸⁰⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, "Balance of Payments", 14 November 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library. Sato Sori Makunamara Kokubo Choukan Kaidanroku [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and Defence Secretary McNamara], 14 November 1967, CD H22-021, No. H223508, DAMOFAJ. See also Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hosu*, p. 70-74; Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. 156

⁸⁰⁶ Iokibe, "Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy", p. 19. See also Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hosu*, pp. 70-72.

⁸⁰⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 204.

greater commitment to the regional security and strength of the East Asian region and more specifically greater support on Vietnam and commitments to assume a larger share of the financial burden for regional assistance and easing our balance of payment problem.”⁸⁰⁸

On top of this, through the efforts of Kei Wakaizumi, Sato’s “confidential personal representative”, Sato successfully achieved his key diplomatic goal (agreement on the return of Okinawa within three years) through this second summit meeting.⁸⁰⁹ Sato sent Wakaizumi to Washington before the summit meeting in order to have his message delivered. Wakaizumi stressed that Sato would need to make progress in the reversion issue of Okinawa with his formula of agreement “within a few years” on a date for the reversion of the islands due to the great rise of impatience of Japanese people with the unchanged status of the Islands.⁸¹⁰ Interestingly, this behind-scene dealing without any involvement of MOFA is said to have been driven by Sato’s distrust in Foreign Minister Miki. He was a very ambitious minister who wanted to replace Sato and did not work for Sato faithfully.⁸¹¹ The two leaders addressed the reversion issues of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands and hammered out an agreement that the Bonin Islands would be returned to Japan in a year notwithstanding the JCS and Navy in particular opposition.⁸¹² They also agreed that a reversion date for the Ryukyu Islands would be arranged within a few years.⁸¹³ The joint communiqué announced on 15

⁸⁰⁸ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary.

⁸⁰⁹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 102, Japan, p. 222. See also Letter from Eisaku Sato to Walt Rostow, 9 November 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 252, LBJ Library and Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 90-94.

⁸¹⁰ Message from Professor Wakaizumi, (13 November 1967), DNSA, JU00838, JUSDSER, 1960-1976. See also U. Alexis Johnson: *The Right Hand of Power: The memoirs of an American diplomat* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall., 1984), pp. 478-479; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 70-72., 86-99.

⁸¹¹ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 461,478-479; Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*, p. 159; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.231.

⁸¹² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 99, pp. 213-217; Tape No. 15, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries, Diaries (Transcripts of Tapes 11-20) Box 1, LBJ Library; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 472-473, 478.

⁸¹³ Joint Communiqué between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan following talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967. See also Ryukyus Reversion Timetable, (21 December 1967), DNSA, JU00862, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

November 1967 indeed proclaimed that “an agreement should be reached between the two governments within a few years on a date satisfactory to them for the reversion of these islands. The President stated that he fully understands the desire of the Japanese people for the reversion of these islands.” It also stated that the two leaders “recognized that the United States military bases on these islands continue to play a vital role in assuring the security of Japan and other free nations in the Far East.”⁸¹⁴

Sato was well aware that post-reversion security of Okinawa particularly in respect to nuclear weapons must be directly dealt with for the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands.⁸¹⁵ Additionally when Sato’s special envoy Wakaizumi had a meeting with William Rostow, National Security Advisor, to sound out US stance on reversion of Okinawa before the second summit meeting in November 1967, Rostow told Wakaizumi that the Sato government had to educate the Japanese about the salience of US nuclear deterrence in international relations. This was because Rostow expected that reversion of Okinawa meant that Japan would have to live with US nuclear weapons stored on Okinawa.⁸¹⁶ The presence of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa had been an open secret for a long time.⁸¹⁷ These nuclear missiles targeted the Soviet Union and Communist China although it is uncertain that exactly what targets they were designed to attack.⁸¹⁸ Since the US government had a “neither confirm nor deny” policy, the presence of such weapons were not officially made clear. This, however, became the biggest issue in the reversion negotiations as we will explore in the next chapter.

⁸¹⁴ Joint Communiqué between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan following talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967.

⁸¹⁵ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall., 1984), pp. 473-474; Kurosaki, “Sato Seiken No Kakuseisaku to America”, p. 84; Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy”, p. 38.

⁸¹⁶ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 91. See also Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, pp. 71-72, 222-226. .

⁸¹⁷ See for example, William Burr, Barbara Elias and Robert Wampler (eds.): “Nuclear Weapons on Okinawa Declassified December 2015, Photos Available Since 1990”, *National Security Archive*, Briefing Book #541, 19 February 2016, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/japan-nuclear-vault/2016-02-19/nuclear-weapons-okinawa-declassified-december-2015> accessed on 5 December 2018.

⁸¹⁸ Masakatsu Ota: “U.S. veterans reveal 1962 nuclear close call dodged in Okinawa”, *Kyodo news service*, 27 March 2015.

Japan had to make more efforts toward self-defence and assume more responsibilities for Asian security although reversion of the Bonins would be worked out within a year without any significant difficulty.⁸¹⁹ The issue of the Bonin Islands in terms of security importance was much easier than that of Okinawa where key US strategic interests were at stake.⁸²⁰ To this end, Sato would strive to educate the Japanese about defense issues in general, the role of US military bases and nuclear weapons in Okinawa to soothe the Japanese nuclear allergy.⁸²¹ We may recall that Sato had already told Reischauer that young people could be educated and he might have been confident of realising this aim. At the time of the meeting, it was well conceivable that Sato's idea of reversion was a nuclear-attached Okinawa.⁸²² In November 1967 Sato boldly alleged at a press conference that "should the Japanese have a firm determination to defend the country by themselves, Okinawa would be returned to Japan in even less than three years." He even went on to claim that "The reversion of a nuclear-attached Okinawa was worth consideration." In line with this thinking Sato also observed that the Japanese pacifist constitution had no strategic use in constraining behaviour of the Soviet Union and Communist China.⁸²³ This could also mean that the return of Okinawa to Japan was a more urgent issue than the removal of nuclear weapons from Okinawa as Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi implied later.⁸²⁴ This Japanese position was totally understandable in that the recovery of the islands even in an

⁸¹⁹ Sato Sori Rasuku Kokumu Choukan Kaidanroku [Memorandum of the Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and State Secretary Rusk], 15 November 1967, CD H22-021, No. H223509, DAMOFAJ. See also Memorandum of Conversation, W. W. Rostow and Kei Wakaizumi, 27 October 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 252, LBJ Library; Memorandum for the President, "Visit of Prime Minister Sato", 27 October 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library; Talking Points, "Topic Sato Wishes to Discuss, filed on 16 July 1992, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁸²⁰ Telegram, "Ryukyus and Bonins: US Position of Reversion of Ryukyus", 29 September 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 251, LBJ Library.

⁸²¹ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, pp. 227-232; Sato Sori Johnson Daitouryo Kaidanroku. See also Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries (Transcripts of Tapes 11-20) Box 1, LBJ Library.

⁸²² Memorandum for the Secretary, "Sato's Okinawa Problem", 8 September 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 104, Japan, p. 230.

⁸²³ "Kuni wo Mamoru Ketsui wo: Shusho Kisyu Kaiken" [Show Your Resolve to Defend Our Country Stated at a Press Conference], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 21 November 1967.

⁸²⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 140, p. 314.

undesirable way was better than continued foreign occupation of Japan's sovereign territory in which the local population had longed for the recovery of their control and the status of the islands as Japan. As the US Ambassador to Japan Alexis Johnson (1966-1969) well summarized, "Prime Minister Sato, on the basis of his understanding that he would not be able to obtain the return of the administration of Okinawa unless he were able to agree to the storage of nuclear weapons there, has been trying hard to overcome what is known here in Japan as a nuclear allergy and obtain a consensus which would permit him to agree to the storage of nuclear weapons."⁸²⁵

Nearly a month later the summit Sato apparently set out to remedy Japan's nuclear allergy. Sato stressed that the Japanese should learn more about nuclear power beyond nuclear weapons. If they acquired accurate knowledge upon nuclear power, there would be no such thing as a nuclear allergy, continued Sato. At the same time, he also emphasised that Japan's defence capabilities would be expanded only within the limits of the Japanese constitution because Japan was expected to assume a more active defence role in regional as well as domestic defence following the reversion of Okinawa.⁸²⁶ He had never intended to replace the US forces in Japan by JSDF.⁸²⁷ Furthermore, Sato made a speech on "How to survive in the Nuclear Age" at the National Diet in January 1968, promoting the peaceful use of nuclear power. He again held that Japan was protected by the US nuclear umbrella as part of the US-Japan security treaty.⁸²⁸ He also allowed US nuclear-propelled

⁸²⁵ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries.

⁸²⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Talking Points for the NSC Discussion on the Ryukyus and Bonins: Action Memorandum, 29 August 1967, Box 2, Executive Secretariat, NSC Meeting Files, 1966-1968, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense, "Okinawa Reversion: Transfer of Defense Responsibilities", 14 June 1971, Box 191, Records of the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, Reference Paper Files Relating to Reversion, 1971-72, RG260, NARA.

⁸²⁷ Eisaku Sato, Okinawa Mondai to ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai [The Special Committee of Okinawan Issues, House of Representatives] 22 December 1967, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0064/05712220064004.pdf>, accessed on 25 Aug 2017.

⁸²⁸ Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Honkaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Councillors] 27 January 1968, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0064/05712220064004.pdf>, accessed on 25 Aug 2017; Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Honkaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Councillors] 30 January 1968, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/05801300001003.pdf>, accessed on 25 Aug 2017

aircraft carriers to visit and dock at Japanese ports.⁸²⁹ His attempt to break the post-war nuclear norm deeply embedded was doomed to fail.⁸³⁰

First, there were massive demonstrations against an US nuclear aircraft carrier *Enterprise's* port call to Sasebo in January 1968.⁸³¹ To some extent, Sato was confident of its successful visit to Japan as Japanese reactions to visits by other US nuclear-propelled vessels (e.g. nuclear-powered submarines) dwindled each time.⁸³²

It is important to note that the US government first requested the Japanese government to allow a *Nautilus-type* nuclear-propelled (but conventionally armed) submarine port call at Japan for repose and logistics in June 1961.⁸³³ At that time Japanese Foreign Minister Zentaro Kosaka rejected the American request. He stated that “The public still tends to relate anything atomic to nuclear weapons and thereby to the possibility of involvement in a nuclear war.” He went on to say “At present, there is certain to be great deal of opposition to almost any step relating to atomic energy, including a visit by nuclear-powered submarines.”⁸³⁴ One month later the two sides agreed that “it was premature to raise the question of entry into Japanese port.”⁸³⁵ They needed to readdress the question in the near future. The US government renewed a request again in 1963. This time again new Japanese Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira did not give consent to the American request for visits to Japan by nuclear-powered submarines immediately.⁸³⁶ At the National Diet, the Japanese socialist party was clearly opposed to US nuclear-powered submarines’ port calls at Japan. Prime Minister Ikeda and Foreign Minister Ohira had to explain a key difference between a

⁸²⁹ Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 223.

⁸³⁰ Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, p. 59.

⁸³¹ It must be noted that in general this sort of protests were organized by socialist groups affiliated with the Japanese socialist party. See the analysis of the American embassy in Tokyo, Incoming Telegram From Tokyo to Department of State, 4 June 1964, Subject Numeric File 1964-1966, DEF 7 JAPAN-US, Box 1664, RG 59, NARA.

⁸³² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, p. 230; Sato Sori Johnson Daitouryo Kaidanroku.

⁸³³ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 334, pp. 690-691.

⁸³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 691.

⁸³⁵ Memorandum of Conversation: Entry into Japanese Ports of Nuclear Submarines (24 July 1961), DNSA, JU00125, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

⁸³⁶ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 180.

nuclear-powered submarine (*Nautilus*-type) and a nuclear-armed submarine (*Polaris*-type) and the main purpose and the safety of their visits.⁸³⁷ Given that *Nautilus*-type submarines were still conventionally armed, the US government did not call for Japanese permission for the submarines to visit Japan. The US government nevertheless clearly recognised the sensitivity of such a visit and it did not go against the Japanese will.⁸³⁸ Due to Japan's domestic concerns of an allergic reaction to the visit or what Reischauer called "Nuclear Phobia"⁸³⁹, the Japanese government did not give a green light to America until November 1964.⁸⁴⁰ The first port call at Sasebo by USS *Sea Dragon* (*Nautilus*-type) did not generate any strong public reaction except some socialist protest groups and nor did subsequent nuclear-powered submarine visits as both the Japanese and the US government worked closely to schedule each visit to avoid any sensitive timing such as prior to the Japanese House of Councilors election in July 1965.⁸⁴¹

Before the first visit, some Japanese bureaucrats, such as Osamu Kaihara of the JDA, strove to assuage local fears of a nuclear-powered submarine visit. He met the mayor of the port city Sasebo and stressed the safety (free from radioactive contamination) of nuclear-powered vessels. Kaihara gave him assurance by telling a story to the effect that such a submarine visited New York and a local boy fished near the submarine. Convinced of the safety of a nuclear-propelled submarine visit by Kaihara, the mayor gave consent to the first visit by the vessel.⁸⁴² In other words, long patience and preparation were required for the successful visit.

⁸³⁷ Hayato Ikeda and Masayoshi Ohira, Shugiin Hon Kaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Representatives] 26 April 1963, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/043/0512/04304260512020.pdf>, accessed on 4 January 2019.

⁸³⁸ The World and Japan Database (Project Leader: Tanaka Akihiro): "Bei Gensen no Anzenseini Kansuru Ohira Masayoshi Gaisho Danwa: Beikoku Genshiryoku Sensuikan no Nihon Kiko Mondainitsuite" [Foreign Minister Masayoshi Ohira's Comments on the Safety of US Nuclear-Powered Submarine: On US Nuclear-Powered Submarines' Port Calls at Japan], 5 June 1963", <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19630605.01J.html>, accessed on 4 January 2019. See also *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 334, pp. 690-691 and *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 31, p. 39.

⁸³⁹ *Ibid.*, Document, 34, p. 45.

⁸⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Document 31, 34, pp. 38-39, 44-46.

⁸⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Document, 34, pp. 44-46.

⁸⁴² Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku (GRIPS) C.O.E. Oraru Seisaku Kenkyu Purojektko: *Kaihara Osamu Oral History*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku., 2000), pp. 94-96.

The US government viewed the entry as part of Sato's tactics to overcome "Japan's Nuclear Weapons Allergy."⁸⁴³ The American Embassy in Tokyo also made an observation of anti-nuclear submarine visit campaigns and suggested that "Despite the fact that the opposition campaign will continue, they will lose the momentum."⁸⁴⁴ To Sato's surprise, it turned out otherwise. The visit of *Enterprise* (a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier) in January 1968, coupled with anti-Vietnam war campaigns by Japanese left-wing groups, aroused severe opposition and massive demonstrations even including many ordinary people mainly in and around Sasebo but also to lesser extent, across Japan, coupled with strenuous opposition to the American Vietnam War,⁸⁴⁵ which might have triggered a public demand of Japan's neutralism.⁸⁴⁶ In short, *Enterprise* became a symbol of war and nuclear weapons.⁸⁴⁷ The issue loomed large in Sato and it also showed that Japanese military-averse culture was as strong as ever.⁸⁴⁸ Toshio Kimura, the Chief Cabinet Secretary, enunciated that

Both the Japanese and American governments must take cognizance of the fact that *Enterprise* visit precipitated a popular reaction different to that caused by the earlier visits of nuclear submarines. Although there may have been many who went along merely out of curiosity, the government must attach importance to the fact that citizens of Sasebo showed a certain degree of hostility to the police. Friendly relations between the two peoples are the basis of the Japanese-American security treaty system. It is the belief of both governments that incidents damaging to the future friendly relations should be, if possible, avoided.⁸⁴⁹

⁸⁴³ Telegram from American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, February 1968, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJ Library; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, pp. 262-263. See also Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 490.

⁸⁴⁴ Incoming Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 2 December 1965, Box 1665 Subject Numeric File 1964-1966, DEF 7 Japan-US, RG 59, NARA.

⁸⁴⁵ Many people who were against the war were in fact Japanese socialists. See Koyano, *Nihonjin notameno Sekaishinyumon*, p. 260.

⁸⁴⁶ Japan and Nuclear Defense, (24 January 1968), DNSA, JU00878, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

⁸⁴⁷ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 492-493.

⁸⁴⁸ Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp.38-42.

⁸⁴⁹ Toshio Kimura quoted in Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 235.

Additionally, USS *Swordfish* (nuclear-powered submarine) at Sasebo was reported to leak some radioactive material in May 1968 although it was later proved that alleged leaks of radiation did not come from the submarine. High radiation results at the port were produced because of a mechanical failure of reading equipment.⁸⁵⁰ The news, however, attracted wide media coverage, causing nearly regionally limited but public hysteria.⁸⁵¹ In fact after this incident, it took another one and a half year for another nuclear-propelled submarine to call at a Japanese port.⁸⁵² This time the Japanese government responded very quickly to the public outcry.⁸⁵³ Seemingly, Sato strove to raise the Japanese awareness of national security including nuclear power by accepting nuclear-powered naval ships' port calls, but it ultimately failed.

In view of what he had said, his vision was to live in the world with US nuclear weapons which the Japanese would accept and depend on for their national defence. What Sato could realistically do was nothing but to create more dependence on the US-Japan security treaty. Even though he was known as the most pro-nuclear Prime Minister, it is uncertain how dedicated he was to build up a Japan's independent deterrent.⁸⁵⁴ If he had pursued careful military calculations, he would have attempted to acquire SLBMs or cruise missiles as effective and robust delivery vehicles. Yet there was no clear sign that such options were even considered.⁸⁵⁵ The fact is that Sato neither wished to nor attempted to substantially increase the defense budget. Indeed Sato's security policy was still in line with the Yoshida line.⁸⁵⁶ Clearly aware of Japan's anti-nuclear feeling, Sato's most realistic choice was to tighten Japan's security ties with the USA. In the meantime, Japan

⁸⁵⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 121 130, ,p . 276, 298.

⁸⁵¹ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 496-497; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, pp. 240-242.

⁸⁵² Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 498.

⁸⁵³ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 237.

⁸⁵⁴ See for example Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 44.

⁸⁵⁵ See for example Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, p. 110; Katsuhisa Furukawa: "Japan's Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Perspective", *Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, & Strategic Studies* Vol. 37 (2010), p. 20; Fitzpatrick, *Asia's latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 97.

⁸⁵⁶ Iriye, *Shin Nihon no Gaiko*, p. 135; Kusunoki, "The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-nuclear Policy", p. 36; Sado, *Jieitaishi*, pp. 108-110.

would try to have a more open environment to make a more positive defence policy. As a first step toward this, as the Eisenhower administration attempted, Sato might have started his effort with nuclear energy to make the Japanese more familiar with the new scientific technology. To know the salience of nuclear technology eventually might have created a breakthrough in remedy of Japanese nuclear allergy. Yet as nuclear energy directly linked with military technology (naval ships), his attempt to raise security awareness through port-call visits by US naval vessels ultimately failed.

The Three Non-Nuclear Principles and the US Nuclear Umbrella

Sato also enunciated the “Three Non-Nuclear principles (not to possess, produce and introduce nuclear weapons)” at the National Diet in December 1967.⁸⁵⁷ These principles were anything but original or new as the previous Japanese government had announced them separately since the 1950s. As we recall, Prime Minister Hatoyama, for example, clearly stated that the Japanese government would not approve the US introduction of nuclear weapons onto Japan. Prime Minister Kishi noted that Japan had no intention of building its own nuclear weapons while possessing nuclear weapons for a defensive purpose was constitutionally permissible. Sato’s announcement was merely to grapple with domestic opposition to US nuclear weapons in his tactical manner.⁸⁵⁸ The true objective of these principles was in fact to break a nuclear taboo by directly raising this nuclear agenda publicly. In contrast to Sato’s expectation, these non-nuclear principles were widely received and welcome in Japan. As a Japanese scholar, Yuri

⁸⁵⁷ Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 11 December 1967, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0514/05712110514002.pdf>, accessed on 25 Aug 2017; Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 13 December 1967, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/057/0514/05712130514004.pdf>, accessed on 25 Aug 2017. See also Statement by Prime Minister Eisaku Sato at the Budget Committee in the House of Representatives, 11 December 1967, MOFA, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/disarmament/nnp/>, 25 August 2017.

⁸⁵⁸ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 92; Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, pp. 221-222;

Kase, aptly put it, “His attempt ironically rekindled a strong feeling amid the Japanese people that Japan should be the leading advocate of a nuclear-weapons-free world.”⁸⁵⁹ In fact Sato initially focused on the only first two principles of not possessing and not producing.⁸⁶⁰

Through the two summit meetings with President Johnson (1965/ 1967), Sato showed his keen interests in US extended nuclear deterrence. Nakasone of the LDP, however, insisted that the non-nuclear principles be three including the principle of non-introduction because the non-nuclear principles were only complete with a combination of three. It was Nakasone’s firm belief that Japan should evince its lofty non-nuclear policies to the world while he admitted that they were just politically idealistic — not necessarily reflecting the reality.⁸⁶¹ In line with Nakasone’s suggestion, Sato reaffirmed the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” in the aforementioned speech (How to survive in the Nuclear Age) in January 1968.⁸⁶² Sato was not pleased to include the non-introduction principle in his speech on the ground that it would probably impede his negotiations on the reversion of Okinawa with the USA.⁸⁶³ Sato indeed later claimed that these principles were “nonsense.”⁸⁶⁴ Indeed, this principle became a political restraint in the negotiations over Okinawa with the Nixon government.⁸⁶⁵ Convinced that they would constrain the forthcoming negotiations over the Ryukyus and damage the credibility of the US

⁸⁵⁹ Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, p. 59.

⁸⁶⁰ Ota, *Meiyaku no Yami*, p. 264; Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy”, p. 38; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, pp. 221-222.

⁸⁶¹ Nakasone, *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru*, pp. 179-181. See also Entry of 26 January 1968, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, p. 159.

⁸⁶² Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, p.222. There have been vigorous debates on Sato’s motivations behind the introduction of the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.” See Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp.43-45; Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, pp. 59-60; Kurosaki, “Sato Seiken No Kakuseisaku to America”, pp. 81-85; Kriestensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella”, p. 3.

Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy”, pp. 37-46; NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 112-113;

⁸⁶³ Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 44; Ota, *Meiyaku no Yami*, pp. 262-264.

⁸⁶⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, p.314. See also Sorini Taisuru Hokoku (Okinawa Kankei) [Report for Prime Minister: Issues related to Okinawa] 7 October 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Deceits pertaining to The Secret Deals] ,*MOFA*; Draft Record of Conversation 15 October 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku2.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2017.

⁸⁶⁵ Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon”, p. 247.

nuclear umbrella, in January 1968 Sato publicly introduced the new “four non-nuclear pillars”:

- (1) maintain the original Three Non-Nuclear Principles
- (2) pursue global nuclear disarmament
- (3) limit the use of nuclear energy to peaceful purposes as regulated by the 1955 Atomic Energy Basic Law
- (4) rely on the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent based on the 1960 U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.⁸⁶⁶

Sato therefore fully recognised the importance of the US nuclear umbrella for Japan’s security. Obviously, the original “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” alone were insufficient and they would fully function in conjunction with the other three policies.⁸⁶⁷ Finally, Sato officially and publicly acknowledged that Japan’s non-nuclear path was backed by US nuclear deterrence. One Japanese scholar argued that from this moment on (January 1968) Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella.⁸⁶⁸ Considering that the Sato government had to undergo domestic political challenges and END is a mutually-acknowledged concept, it is not accurate to say this moment alone was decisive for Japan to come under the US nuclear umbrella. Through a series of political events between January 1965 and January 1968, Japan officially and publicly acknowledged that Japan was under the US nuclear protection.

The new four pillars were inspired by one of Sato’s key advisor Wakaizumi, who is believed to have had a great influence in shaping the Sato’s nuclear policy.

⁸⁶⁶ Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa: “Japan: New Nuclear Realism” in Muthiah Alagappa: *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford U.P., 2008), p. 350; Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Hon Kaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Representatives] 30 January 1968, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0001/05801300001003.pdf>, accessed on 26 August 2017.

⁸⁶⁷ Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, pp. 59-60; Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture”, p. 85.

⁸⁶⁸ Kurosaki: *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei*, p. 187, 215.

He indeed had several private meetings with Sato.⁸⁶⁹ His reflections on the course of the Japan's future nuclear policy are found in his works in the 1960's, underscoring the importance of keeping the nuclear option open by maintaining the capability of building nuclear weapons. One unpublished policy paper of 1964 written shortly after the Chinese first nuclear device test similarly proposed that Japan should demonstrate to the world that Japan was capable of producing nuclear weapons, but it would not do so, founded upon its own belief and principle.

That said, he also urged that Japan build its advanced capability of producing nuclear arsenals on demand and therefore, Japan would promote and advance its civilian nuclear and space programmes, which would, in turn, be easily turned into a military nuclear programme.⁸⁷⁰ Wakaizumi argued that from a military perspective, the US-Japan defence treaty had a deterrent effect and keeping the capability would give the Japanese themselves

psychological and political reassurance.⁸⁷¹ At the same time, Wakaizumi was well aware that Japan would need to rely on the US nuclear umbrella since the Japanese were not ready to assume defence responsibility in East Asia.⁸⁷² In a similar vein, Wakaizumi's two essays published in 1966 and 1967 respectively argued that Japan should maintain the technological capability (foundation) of producing nuclear weapons; at the same time Japan deliberately would maintain its non-nuclear policy.⁸⁷³ If this was Sato's nuclear stance, he did not totally rule out Japan's nuclear option. There is, however, no clear evidence that this became Sato's nuclear stance while the possibility cannot be completely denied since Wakaizumi

⁸⁶⁹ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 21, 140-141; Entry of 3 February 1968, *Kusuda Minoru Nikki*, p. 163.

⁸⁷⁰ "Genpatsu wo Kakubuso Senzairyoku ni" [Nuclear Reactor Can be Converted for the Production of Nuclear Armaments] *Chunichi Shimbun*, 26 February 2013. See also Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, pp. 127-129 and Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 20-21.

⁸⁷¹ "Genpatsu wo Kakubuso Senzairyoku ni"; Memorandum of Conversation, "Japanese Views on Defense and Nuclear Proliferation."; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 20-21. See also NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 81-83;

⁸⁷² Wakaizumi, "Japan Beyond 1970", pp. 509-520.

⁸⁷³ Wakaizumi, "Chugoku no Kakubuso to Nihon no Anzen Hosho", pp. 47-79; Kei Wakaizumi: "Kakugunshuku Heiwa Gaiko no Teisho [A Proposal for Peaceful Diplomacy of Nuclear Disarmament]", March 1967 *Chuo Koron*, pp. 68-101.

was a key and trustworthy political advisor of Sato. The influence of this proposal is unknowable and unprovable. At any rate, Japan pursued its civilian nuclear and space programme. In order to pursue this option, Japan still needed to rely on the US nuclear umbrella.

Sato was also driven to promote the new four non-nuclear pillars for fear that the left-wing political parties would attempt to pass the non-nuclear principles as a Diet resolution. It was, in fact, in 1971 that the original three non-nuclear principles were passed as a Diet resolution.⁸⁷⁴ As Nobumasa Akiyama, a Japanese nuclear specialist, observed, “The Diet resolution of the Three Non-nuclear Principles was a product of a political deal between Sato and the opposition for the approval of the agreement for the return of Okinawa which was signed between the United States and Japan in June 1971.”⁸⁷⁵ In short, the “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” have become an evident moral symbol of a Japan’s non-nuclear pledge (*Kokuze*) of Japan although they lacked any legal binding force.⁸⁷⁶ Accordingly, the reversion of Okinawa was entwined with the status of US nuclear weapons after reversion.

Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the political process through which Japan sought US END. It did not arise out of nowhere. A series of events from the emergence of a nuclear China and the conservative and anti-communist Sato government onwards were key for US END over Japan to explicitly come out. As shown above, Sato was extremely cautious of a nuclear China. It was his strong leadership that elicited American nuclear assurance directly from President

⁸⁷⁴ Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 223; Ota, *Meiyaku no Yami*, pp. 263-264; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, pp. 223-224.

⁸⁷⁵ Akiyama, “The Socio-Political Roots of Japan’s Non-Nuclear Posture”, p. 84.

⁸⁷⁶ Clark, “Soviet Policy toward Japan”, p. 141; Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, pp.34-35; Mataka Kamiya: “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?”, *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2002/03), p. 65.

Johnson and his cabinet members. It is worth noting that until the summit meeting in January 1965, both countries' supreme leaders had never faced the issue of US END as directly as Sato and Johnson did. To be sure, even before this event, the nuclear umbrella might have been unilaterally provided to Japan through Eisenhower's "New Look" strategy, for instance. Yet, given the importance of assurance to US allies, it was one sided but not mutually recognised. In other words, it was implicit in essence. We have to keep in mind that this thesis interprets END as a mutually acknowledged concept. In this respect, January 1965 was without doubt a turning point. Yet it took another three-year domestic political debate for the Japanese government as a whole to acknowledge that Japan formally came under the US nuclear umbrella. As already noted by a Japanese scholar, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact date when Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella. A series of key political events and development occurred between 1965 and 1968 can nevertheless be considered as one period during which Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella.

For Sato (a defence-minded and nuclear proponent leader), an independent nuclear deterrent was probably not absurd but strategic option. Despite his strategic view, this option was, as he admitted, politically infeasible. He was also sensitive about Japanese public opinion which was severely opposed to nuclear weapons. Aware of the domestic anti-nuclear feeling, he was the one who said directly to McNamara that Japan did not want the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan while at one point, he was determined to raise public awareness of defence issues so that Japan could facilitate the negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa. It was not really successful and his idea of a "nuclear-attached" Okinawa was to be revised.

Chapter Five

The Reversion of Bonins and Ryukyus: The Completion of Invisible Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Its Theoretical Mechanism

As a keen student who has studied National Security and Crisis Management since I was young, I must say [Japan] is a “Fool’s Paradise” where the people idiotically and tragically believe that water and security are free.

—Kei Wakaizumi⁸⁷⁷

In this chapter, we will examine the strategic impact of the reversion of the Bonin and especially Ryukyu Islands — “the only [remaining] major problem between Japan and the United States”⁸⁷⁸— on “Invisible” END rather than the detailed study of the reversion process of these islands. There exists well-studied literature on that subject.⁸⁷⁹ The key questions to be addressed here are why these islands were strategically vital to US military strategy and how the two governments treated the nuclear storage issue. As already noted, the presence of US nuclear weapons in Okinawa was an open secret. This was no surprise since Okinawa was part of US territory. It took twenty years for Japan to regain the Ryukyu Islands following its independence of 1952. It is important to delve into a strategic rationale behind the removal of the forward-deployed nuclear weapons from these islands as the return of these islands to Japan without forward-deployed nuclear weapons meant the completion of “Invisible” END. This form of US END over Japan has not changed a bit ever since.

⁸⁷⁷ Kei Wakaizumi: Letter to Kenji Donoshita (20th January 1995) in NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan: *Okinawa Henkan no Daisho: Kaku to Kichi Misshi Wakaizumu Kei no Kunou* [The Price of Okinawa Reversion: Nuclear and Basa, Special Delegate Kei Wakaizumi’s distress] (Tokyo: Kobunsha., 2012), p. 205 .

⁸⁷⁸ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967), DNSA, JU00699, JUSDSER, 1960-1976; Richard Finn, 4 February 1969, Box 18 Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319.

⁸⁷⁹ For English literature see Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp. 72-118 ; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power* ; Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations*; Schaller, *Altered States*, pp. 210-244; Kei Wakaizumi: John Swenson-Wright (ed.): *The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 2002).

As we have seen, the US government failed to introduce its nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan due to public revulsion against such a move: “Nuclear war planners never obtained the right to store complete nuclear weapons on the main islands.”⁸⁸⁰ The Ryukyu and Bonin islands were, however, in practice under US administrative control.⁸⁸¹ In fact the status of the Ryukyus was more that of a foreign country, but not Japan. During the US occupation period, Japanese people needed not only a passport but also a visa to visit the islands. There were occasions that the US government refused to grant a visa to Japanese people who criticised US military control over the islands.⁸⁸² While cars drove on the left-hand side in Japan, cars in the Ryukyu Islands drove on the right. The local currency was not the Japanese Yen but the US dollar.

One of the focal points of negotiations about the reversion of these islands was indeed the issue of nuclear weapons. At its peak Okinawa hosted nearly 1200 nuclear weapons with 19 different types such as *Mace B*, *Honest John* and *Nike Hercules*.⁸⁸³ Some even described Okinawa as “chock-a-block full of nuclear weapons of all types.”⁸⁸⁴ Okinawa was in fact the largest nuclear depot in the Far East.⁸⁸⁵ The US military possessed unrestricted military use including the storage of US nuclear weapons in the islands. The provisions of the security treaty of prior consultation did not apply to these islands because they were beyond Japanese administrative control.⁸⁸⁶ An American military historian, Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, bluntly held that “Americans had ruled the Ryukyu Islands as a colony

⁸⁸⁰ Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 12.

⁸⁸¹ Background Paper, “Ryukyu Islands”, 7 January 1965, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

⁸⁸² Hiroto Kishimoto: “Pasupoto no Hanashi”, Okinawa Prefectural Museum and Art Museum, 27 February 2014, <https://okimu.jp/museum/column/088/> accessed on 5 December 2018.

⁸⁸³ Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, pp. 29-30; Jon Mitchell: “Okinawa bacteria toxic legacy crosses continents, spans generations: U.S. veterans who served in Okinawa believe Agent Orange caused their children’s ailments”, *Japan Times*, 4 June 2013, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2013/06/04/issues/okinawa-bacteria-toxic-legacy-crosses-continents-spans-generations/#.WcvCQ7LyiIV>, accessed on 27 September 2017.

⁸⁸⁴ Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 79.

⁸⁸⁵ Ota, *Hiroku*, pp. 151-152.

⁸⁸⁶ Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, Box 8, Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319; *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 24, p. 97..

in everything but name since the end of War War II.”⁸⁸⁷ In a similar vein, Weinstein asserted that “the United States would be free to equip its forces on the island with whatever weapons it thought necessary and to deploy these forces anywhere in the Far East without having to consult with the Japanese Government.”⁸⁸⁸

In the 1950’s the JCS learned that it would be politically challenging to introduce nuclear weapons into the mainland of Japan and that the Japanese public would be most unlikely to support US nuclear operations. As a consequence, Okinawa as a strategic base for theatre nuclear missiles became more vital.⁸⁸⁹ Additionally one American secret document even explained that “Okinawa houses the most important US military base system in the Western Pacific, capable of performing a wide variety of functions.”⁸⁹⁰ The loss of these islands would constrain not only US nuclear but a variety of military operations. Referring specifically to Okinawa, one US secret document boldly claimed that “Its value is enhanced by the absence of any legal restriction on American free access to or use of the bases; which permits storage of nuclear weapons and the launching of military combat operations directly from these bases.”⁸⁹¹ To lesser extent this was also the case with the Bonins. Indeed already in the early 1950’s the US government foresaw that over the long term US military actions would be severely restricted in the mainland of Japan by future Japanese governments. This prospect enhanced the salience of retention of American bases in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.⁸⁹²

⁸⁸⁷ Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. xv.

⁸⁸⁸ Weinstein, *Japan’s Postwar Defence Policy*, p. 93.

⁸⁸⁹ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Importance of Okinawa”, 1 May 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA. See also Naval Message FROM CINCIPAC to JCS, 20 August 1958.

⁸⁹⁰ Memorandum, Davis to the Vice President, et al., Subject: NSSM 5–Japan Policy, 28 April 1969 (From the United States and Japan, 1960-1972) Retrieved by *National Security Archive*, available at <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/doc04.pdf>, accessed on 9 October 2017..

⁸⁹¹ Memorandum, Davis to the Vice President, et al., Subject: NSSM 5–Japan Policy, 28 April 1969 (From the United States and Japan, 1960-1972). See also Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary.

⁸⁹² *FRUS*, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2, Document, p. 588, 1302.

The Reversion of the Bonin Islands

The Bonin Islands also known as the Ogasawara Islands, island chain composed of several key strategic islands such as Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima, both of which had held US nuclear weapons, were fully returned to Japan in June 1968 based on the agreement in the summit meeting between America and Japan in November 1967.⁸⁹³ The joint communiqué following the meeting proclaimed that the President and the Prime Minister concurred that

two governments will enter immediately into consultations regarding the specific arrangements for accomplishing the early restoration of these islands to Japan without detriment to the security of the area. These consultations will take into account the intention of the Government of Japan, expressed by the Prime Minister, gradually to assume much of the responsibility for defense of the area.⁸⁹⁴

Therefore, the reversion of the Bonin Islands was closely concerned with Japan's assumption of more defence responsibility.

US Navy in particular regarded these two islands as strategic "hideouts" for submarines and bombers to be resupplied after the mainland of Japan and Okinawa were destroyed at the initiation of nuclear war.⁸⁹⁵ The US Navy and JCS insisted that the USA have a right to store or place nuclear weapons there again in the future should such a necessity arise.⁸⁹⁶ According to the US Ambassador to Japan, Alexis Johnson, "The Navy's basic position was that we should not give up anything anywhere that might someday possibly be useful. If we were to lose Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan, and the Philippines, the Navy argued, the Bonins would be an

⁸⁹³ Memorandum The White House, 4 June 1968, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, Japan, LBJL.

⁸⁹⁴ Joint Communiqué between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan following talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967.

⁸⁹⁵ Norris, Arkin and Burr, "Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?", p. 12.

⁸⁹⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, "Reversion of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands Issue", filed 26 October 1992, NSF, Country File, Japan Box 252, LBJ Library; Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries.

important reserve. I thought this was *nonsense*.”⁸⁹⁷ Furthermore, Senate Mike Mansfield held that “There are no major U.S. military installations there and strategic considerations do not appear to be involved in any significant way. In sum, there would appear to be no major block—at least I know of none—to the restoration of the Bonins.”⁸⁹⁸

The JCS, however, did not wish to lose administrative rights over the islands in light of the military utility of these islands in the event of nuclear war or “for meeting a wide range of military contingencies”⁸⁹⁹ while the State Department saw the reversion problem otherwise. The State Department did not find it vital to retain the Bonins Islands.⁹⁰⁰ The key aspect of negotiations over the reversion of the Bonins especially for the JCS was the treatment of the US nuclear weapons on the islands in the event of a contingency once the US government decided to cede control of the islands. It is, however, quite doubtful of the strategic importance of the islands. As Alexis Johnson pointed out, when they were used as a strategic back-up base in the scenario of US Navy, they would no longer serve as a backup base because it would be more likely to launch ICBMs stationed in the mainland of the USA in this situation. Why would US Navy remain to stay closer to Japan after the US allies in East Asia were completely devastated? It would be more sensible to go deeper and go toward South (Australia and New Zealand). That is what a strategic back-up plan means.

In 1956 the US navy started to store warheads of nuclear submarine-launched *Regulus* missiles on Chichijima. This island was assumed to serve as a recovery or back-up base and so was Iwo Jima on which nuclear cores were stored.⁹⁰¹ The cores were removed from Iwo Jima in 1959 and the last

⁸⁹⁷ Emphasis added. Tape No. 15, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 472.

⁸⁹⁸ Mike Mansfield quoted in Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. 161.

⁸⁹⁹ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Reversion of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands Issue.” See also Memorandum for the President, “Visit of Prime Minister Sato”, 27 October 1967.

⁹⁰⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 99, pp. 216-217.

⁹⁰¹ Chairman’s Staff Group to Amoral Radford, “Dispersal to Atomic Weapons in the Bonin and Volcano Islands”, 4 June 1957. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/docs/doc04.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2018;

warheads of *Regulus* missiles replaced by SLBMs (*Polaris* missiles) were withdrawn from Chichijima in 1964.⁹⁰² Accordingly, by the time the two governments started the formal negotiations over the Bonin Islands in 1967, nuclear weapons had already been removed. This casts serious doubt on the strategic importance of the islands. If these islands were truly crucial for US operational plans, nuclear weapons stored on the islands would not have been removed especially given that they were under US administrative control. Indeed, Alexis Johnson argued that “The Navy was making very little use of the islands anyway, so its argument seemed a little pale.”⁹⁰³ It also suggests forward deployment of nuclear weapons was not necessarily vital in the case of the Bonins as they were replaced by nuclear-armed submarines.

As for a nuclear operation involving the Bonin Islands, the key challenge was the contingency use of the islands: the storage of nuclear weapons in such a situation.⁹⁰⁴ While US Navy and the JCS put pressure on Ambassador Johnson to reach a firm agreement with the Japanese government that they would be allowed to store nuclear weapons in the event of contingency, he did not believe that such an occasion were relatively conceivable. He was well aware that it would be politically unacceptable for the Japanese government to sanction the US military formal permission to store nuclear weapons in the Bonin Islands.⁹⁰⁵ This was a key rationale behind “Invisible” END. In the case of the Bonins, reintroduction of US nuclear weapons would not be an urgent matter in cases of a contingency. The operational deployment of *Polaris* that replaced *Regulus* missiles reduced the necessity of the contingency use of the islands.

Statement Department Cable to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 5 November 1967. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEPP/NSAEPP22/docs/doc08.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2018; State Department Cable to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, “Bonins Fact Sheet”, 12 December 1967. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEPP/NSAEPP22/docs/doc11.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2018.

⁹⁰² Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 13,78.

⁹⁰³ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 473.

⁹⁰⁴ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries. See also Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 78.

⁹⁰⁵ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries. See also Statement Department Cable to U.S. Embassy Tokyo, 5 November 1967.

Foreign Minister Miki nevertheless acknowledged that the case that nuclear weapons were to be reintroduced into the Bonin Islands would not be considered separately from security of whole Japan. Yet he refused to make a formal agreement to permit the US emergency reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into the Bonin Islands, let alone formulate a written agreement between the two governments and each copy would be kept secretly by the two governments.⁹⁰⁶ Their conclusion was that Japan would commit to enter into prior consultation should the USA need to store US nuclear weapons in the islands. Ideally America “would anticipate a favourable reaction from the Government of Japan” for such a request.⁹⁰⁷ Realistically speaking, the possibility of such a situation was quite remote.

At any rate, the case that nuclear weapons were reintroduced to the islands would imply that Japan’s vital security was in imminent danger and Japan would find itself in a difficult situation to refuse the request in such a situation. In a similar vein, Wakaizumi held that as to the issue of prior consultation, “the point may be made that one should not necessarily assume that Japan will veto any American actions necessary for dealing promptly and effectively with threats directly endangering the peace and security of the Far East”⁹⁰⁸ Some Japanese analysts insisted that this was another secret nuclear agreement between the US and the Japanese government as Japan was expected to approve the US request.⁹⁰⁹

That being said, depending on the severity of the situation, Japan still held power to decline the American request if it found such an act would not be essential.

⁹⁰⁶ Telegram from American Embassy Tokyo to State Department, 29 December 1967, Japan, Cables Vol. VII 10/ 67-12/ 68 (2 of 3), NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJL. See also Tokyo Embassy Cable to State Department, “Nuclear Weapons and Bonin Negotiations”, 29 December 1967. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/docs/doc12.pdf>, accessed on 2 August 2018.

⁹⁰⁷ Telegram from American Embassy Tokyo to State Department, 21 March 1968, Japan, Cables Vol. VII 10/ 67-12/ 68 (2 of 3), NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, LBJL. *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 118, p. 269.

⁹⁰⁸ Third Agenda Topic, Japanese-American Relations After the Reversion of Okinawa, by Kei Wakaizumi, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference January 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Political and Defense, POL 19 RYU IS, Box 2459, RG 59, NARA.

⁹⁰⁹ Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 79; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, pp. 260-262.

In short, the US did not have automatic approval from the Japanese government to permit its nuclear storage plan in emergency. While the Japanese government did not make any special secret agreement on the contingency reintroduction of nuclear weapons on the islands, the same issue recurred in the case of Okinawa.⁹¹⁰ It is pointed out that the reversion style of the Bonins set a precedent for that of Okinawa,⁹¹¹ although the two parties formally agreed that “the Bonins settlement is not a precedent for the Ryukyus.”⁹¹² This is because, as Rusk observed, “should action be taken to return the Bonins, would this not make the Ryukyu situation more difficult, since it would impel the Ryukyuan to ask ‘why not us, too?’”⁹¹³

At that time this sort of reasoning was probably natural given that Okinawa was truly the last major remaining problem between the USA and Japan. It would not have been too naïve for the local populace in the Ryukyu Islands to suppose it would be finally their turn to be returned to Japan. The Bonin Islands were where they continued to be administered together with the Ryukyu Islands even after Japan gained its national independence in 1952. Return of administration over the Bonin Islands by the US government to Japan would signify that the US government was finally willing to cede the remaining territories administered by the US to Japan. Despite Rusk’s concern, as time went by it was becoming evident that the US government was required to work out the reversion problem of Okinawa and at least take interim measures in face of mounting pressures on reversion of the Ryukyu Islands from not only the Rykyu people but also ordinary Japanese: “mishandling of this issue could lead to dire consequences. The Socialists will exploit such mishandling to their advantage. The Communists will also.”⁹¹⁴ Furthermore, Japanese Foreign Minister Miki stressed that “As background for the Prime Minister’s visit in November, great expectations for some

⁹¹⁰ Cable from American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, 29 December 1967.

⁹¹¹ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 483.

⁹¹² *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 118, p. 269. See also Tape No. 17, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries, Diaries (Transcripts of Tapes 11-20) Box 1, LBJ Library.

⁹¹³ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Ryukyu Islands” 16 September 1967.”

⁹¹⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 105, p. 233. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967).

progress on the matter of the return of Okinawa have been aroused among the people of Japan and the greatest difficulty would ensue if no step forward is taken; in fact, it would endanger the political life of the [Sato] government.”⁹¹⁵ The US government was well aware that the Japanese saw the status of Okinawa under “alien rule and a disparate administrative system” as “unnatural.”⁹¹⁶ Indeed a prior return of the Bonin Islands was considered to be “utilized to stem pressures for immediate return of the Ryukyus.”⁹¹⁷ This indeed served as an interim measure.

In fact it is quite uncertain whether Okinawa could have been returned to Japan without the reversion of the Bonins. In effect the State Department recognised that “US finds Bonins Islands problem easier to treat than Ryukyus in view lesser degree of importance from security point of view.”⁹¹⁸ As a result, reversion of the Bonin Islands would naturally precede that of the Ryukyu Islands. To be sure, this was exactly what happened in the late 1960s. After all, as one top secret American document illuminated, “The Bonins and other Western Pacific Islands are of little or no importance militarily but have been retained principally for contingency purposes.”⁹¹⁹ Tokyo also understood the Bonin Islands presently had little military utility. The immediate reversion of the Bonins was therefore relatively promising.⁹²⁰ This was, however, not the case with the Ryukyus. The strategic importance of the Ryukyus was nothing comparable to the Bonins. When

⁹¹⁵ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Ryukyu Islands”, 16 September 1967.

⁹¹⁶ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary, “Congressional Consultation on the Ryukyus and the Bonins”, 6 November 1967.” Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/docs/doc09.pdf>, accessed on 17 May 2019.

⁹¹⁷ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary, “Congressional Consultation on the Ryukyus and the Bonins”, 6 November 1967.”

⁹¹⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 97, p. 209.

⁹¹⁹ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967).

⁹²⁰ Gaimu Daijin Johnson Taishi Kaidan [Memorandum of Conversation Between Foreign Minister Miki and the US Ambassador to Japan Johnson] 19 July 1967, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku1.pdf, accessed on 24 September 2017; Bundy Jikanho tonu Kaidan (Okinawa Ogasawa Mondai) [Memorandum of Conversation Between Bundy and Shimoda] 28 September 1967, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku1.pdf, accessed on 24 September 2017.

the Japanese and the US government worked on the negotiations on the reversion of the Ryukyus, the USA was in the midst of fighting the Vietnam War. Okinawa, the main island of the Ryukyu Islands, was fully used for war efforts. On several occasions B-52 bombers even directly flew from and in Okinawa to North Vietnam for strategic bombing operations.⁹²¹

Okinawa and Nuclear Weapons

For the US military, the Ryukyu Islands including the largest and main island Okinawa (*Honto*) were strategically crucial due to “its critical importance for operations in Korea and security in the western pacific.”⁹²² As Sarantakes correctly observed, American military planners “used the island’s proximity to the Asian mainland to develop plans that allowed them to project American power onto the continent against Communist foe.”⁹²³ Reischauer looked back on his first visit to Okinawa in the summer of 1961 and observed that “The American military looked on the retention of Okinawa as essential to America’s future military position in the Western Pacific...It saw the Japanese government as its chief challenger for control of Okinawa.”⁹²⁴ This aspect implies that the US military regarded Okinawa as its legitimate territory. The JCS even asserted that “The entire United States strategic position in the Pacific would be seriously jeopardized if the Ryukyus were to come under the control of Japan.”⁹²⁵

These islands were under US military (Army) control. The Japanese inevitably saw this condition as “unnatural” and as an extension of the US

⁹²¹ Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Yosan Iinkai [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 26 February 1968, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/058/0380/05802260380006.pdf>, accessed on 26 September 2017; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967). See also Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 483-483, 502 and Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 196.

⁹²² Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 171. See also Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967).

⁹²³ Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. xix.

⁹²⁴ Edwin O. Reischauer: *My Life Between Japan and America* 1st Far East Reprint Edition (Tokyo: John Weatherhill Inc., 1986), p. 204.

⁹²⁵ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, “Strategic Importance of Okinawa.”

occupation.⁹²⁶ The longer Okinawa was administered by the US military, the more frustrated the Okinawan people were about the status of the islands. Sato's highest diplomatic goal during his tenure was the return of the Ryukyu Islands and he made a famous speech when he visited Okinawa in 1965 as the first Prime Minister to pay a visit to the island.⁹²⁷ In the speech, he enunciated that "The postwar will not end until we have Okinawa back to Japan."⁹²⁸ Yet we now know that one sentence—"Okinawa has played a significant role in the stability and peace of the Far East"—was added to the same speech by American pressure.⁹²⁹

As observed above, the summit meeting of 1967 between President Johnson and Prime Minister Sato made progress in anticipating the reversion of the Ryukyu "within three years." Unlike the Bonins, which had little military utility during peacetime, Okinawa was actively used as "an operational support base for combat operations" during the Vietnam War.⁹³⁰ The salience of Okinawa naturally increased as the Vietnam War escalated.⁹³¹ During that war, Okinawa served as a key logistic base for US military actions.

In light of this, the US military sought to retain its right of unrestricted military use there. Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp even asserted that "without Okinawa we couldn't continue fighting the Vietnam War."⁹³² Ambassador Johnson, however, thought:

in the long run, I thought this freedom might be counterproductive. Japan would have to take more responsibility in regional politics if its security depended on its

⁹²⁶ Memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, William P. Bundy to the Secretary. See also Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, p. 372.

⁹²⁷ Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. 130; Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 191.

⁹²⁸ "Sato's Statement in Okinawa" (19 August 1965) in Hosoya, et al: *Nichibei Kankei Shiryō Shū 1945-97*, p. 632.

⁹²⁹ "Bei Atsuryoku de Enzetsu Shusei 1965nen Sato Shusho no Okinawa Houmon [The speech was modified by American pressure: Sato's visit to Okinawa in 1965]", *Okinawa Times*, 16 January 2015, <http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/articles/-/48117>, accessed on 26 September 2017. See also Tadokoro, "Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei", p.137.

⁹³⁰ Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance", p.71.

⁹³¹ See for example *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 105, pp. 232-234; Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Ryukyu Islands."; Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", pp. 166-169.

⁹³² Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 196.

own decisions about how those Okinawa bases could be used...I also believed that the United States was very unlikely ever again to fight in Asia without Japan's full support. Thus, under almost any circumstances, we ourselves would wish to consult with the Japanese government before deploying forces from Okinawa.⁹³³

He went on to observe that "Any 'freedoms' we had on paper would be entirely theoretical in the face of a hostile population...it was an illusion to think we would have any freedom of action whatever, on Japan or Okinawa, if the local population was hostile to us no matter what 'fine print' was included in our agreements."⁹³⁴

That said, there was even an option to turn down the Japanese demand and delay negotiations over Okinawa at least until the end of the Vietnam War.⁹³⁵ Indeed Sato was well aware that the timing was not on Japan's side in view of the ongoing war and the developments of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme.⁹³⁶ At the same time, the mounting public antagonism against the US military was becoming more and more evident.⁹³⁷ One top secret action memorandum for the President in August 1967 even stressed that "The longer we delay negotiations the greater the danger than an explosive situation could develop."⁹³⁸ Both the Japanese mass media and public were highly against the free use of the US military bases and nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa.⁹³⁹

It is also important to note that Okinawa had been highly fortified by 1960. The island hosted key facilities of navy, air force, logistics and intelligence forming the most important US base network in the Asia-Pacific.⁹⁴⁰ In other words, the US military invested a huge amount of money in Okinawa. Nuclear weapons were also

⁹³³ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 508-509.

⁹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 540-541.

⁹³⁵ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967).

⁹³⁶ Sato Sori Rasku Kokumu Choukan Kaidanroku, 15 November 1967.

⁹³⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 184, 189, 193.

⁹³⁸ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967).

⁹³⁹ Memorandum for Walt Rostow, the White House, from Leonard H. Marks, 13 November 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan. Box 252, Japan, LBJ Library.

⁹⁴⁰ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 171.

extensively and massively deployed to the island.⁹⁴¹ Against this backdrop, the reversion of the Ryukyu Islands was a daunting task for both governments. In 1968 Sato implied at the Diet that to demand the US government to remove its nuclear weapons from Okinawa would make negotiations over Okinawa very difficult.⁹⁴² Notably when Japanese Foreign Minister Miki made a query about the necessity of a nuclear base on Okinawa to Secretary State Rusk in September 1967, Rusk answered to this inquiry by remarking that “a nuclear base is an absolute.” He also said that “this should be determined by security requirements and not by public opinion.”⁹⁴³

As Alexis Johnson pointed out, “The real issue was whether we would accept the same restrictions on them that governed our bases on Japan proper under the 1960 Security Treaty.”⁹⁴⁴ The Japanese government pondered which choice to make: *Genjo Dori* (status quo) or *Hondo Nami* (the same status as the mainland of Japan; hence no peacetime nuclear deployment) with respect to the treatment of locally- deployed nuclear weapons on a post-reversion Okinawa.⁹⁴⁵ As noted previously, Sato initially considered the reversion of Okinawa with US nuclear weapons deployed and therefore, a status quo option. In 1967 Alexis Johnson informed Foreign Minister Miki that it was possible to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa but such an act was undesirable on the grounds that this would weaken American deterrence vis-à-vis China.⁹⁴⁶ Defence Secretary McNamara was opposed to this view and believed nuclear weapons did not need to remain there “since we would never again fight a war in Asia without Japanese

⁹⁴¹ Norris, Arkin and Burr, “Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?”, p. 79.

⁹⁴² Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Yosai Inkaishi [Budget Committee of the House of Representatives] 26 February 1968.

⁹⁴³ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Ryukyu Islands.”

⁹⁴⁴ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 474-475.

⁹⁴⁵ Okinawa Ogasawa Mondai (Sorito Uchiawase) [The Okinawa and Ogasawa Issue: Memorandum for Prime Minister] 9 August 1967, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku1.pdf, accessed on 27 September 2017.

⁹⁴⁶ Gaimu Daijin Johnson Taishi Kaidan. See also Tape No. 17, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries.

support.”⁹⁴⁷ At any rate, the final progress could not be made until President Richard Nixon came into office in 1969 since Johnson had abandoned his re-election bid as he faced domestically fervent public opposition to his Vietnam War.⁹⁴⁸ Indeed it was in 1969 when the Japanese and US government reached an agreement on reversion of the Ryukyu Islands. There were several reasons why the USA finally came to the conclusion that it should cede control of Okinawa, but it is difficult to distinguish which factor was the most decisive; some key factors can be singled out.

First, Washington understood that it would be eventually required to return the islands if it wanted to maintain good relations with Japan – the longer the USA retained Okinawa, the more hatred it created among the Japanese.⁹⁴⁹ It was wiser to strengthen the US-Japan relations by returning the Ryukyu Islands.⁹⁵⁰ In 1961 Reischauer as an American official publicly called Okinawans Japanese and he believed that this public statement was the first official statement to recognise Okinawa as part of Japan. He also suggested that the US government hasten the formal process of return of Okinawa.⁹⁵¹ One year later President Kennedy acknowledged that Okinawa was part of the Japanese territory and he showed his willingness to return the island.⁹⁵² It was, however, uncertain how willing Kennedy was to return Okinawa to Japan.⁹⁵³ At any rate his administration was unfortunately short-lived. Yet by the time Nixon took office in January 1969, the reversion of Okinawa had “reached the point of no return...The pressures have built up in both Japan and Okinawa to the point where I can see virtually no hope of stalling off beyond the end of next year a decision on the timing of reversion” as the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs William Bundy

⁹⁴⁷ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 475; Tape No. 15, Papers of Alexis Johnson.

⁹⁴⁸ Tape No. 16, Papers of Alexis Johnson; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 486; Shimoda, *Nihon wa koushite Saisei shita*, pp. 179-180.

⁹⁴⁹ Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, p. 226.

⁹⁵⁰ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2 Japan, Document 13, pp. 52-54.

⁹⁵¹ Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, pp. 205-206, 236.

⁹⁵² Statement by the President Upon Signing Order Relating to the Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 19 March 1962, *The American Presidency Project*, <http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=9114>, 18 October 2017.

⁹⁵³ *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 22, Northeast Asia, Document 370, p. 773.

observed.⁹⁵⁴ The further delay would seriously affect the renewal of the US-Japan security treaty, which the US government wanted to continue,⁹⁵⁵ due in 1970 or even bring down the “pro-America” Sato government, unleashing vehement resentment against America. The likely scenario of this deteriorating situation would have been the rise of the opposition parties. If the main opposition party (the socialist party) had replaced the LDP government, it would have abrogated the US-Japan security treaty as it had long claimed and Japanese neutralism would have further deepened.⁹⁵⁶

For the US policy makers, the reversion of Okinawa was far preferable to losing all the bases throughout Japan by continuously and adamantly refusing to grant the administration return of Okinawa.⁹⁵⁷ This was expected to accelerate further with the emergence of Chobyō Yara as chief executive of Okinawa (equivalent to prefectural governor) in 1968, who was adamantly opposed to the continued occupation of Okinawa by the US army.⁹⁵⁸ As Foreign Minister Miki correctly observed in 1967, “Public opinion at present, which is critical of the failure to achieve reversion, cannot be disregarded for it is a major factor in the situation.”⁹⁵⁹

The Okinawans, after all, truly believed themselves Japanese.⁹⁶⁰ The longer the US military control over the Ryukyu Islands continued, the more frustrated the Japanese as a whole became. In June 1957 when Prime Minister Kishi met with President Eisenhower, Kishi insisted that “The 800,000 people of Okinawa are Japanese, and they are not different from the rest of the Japanese

⁹⁵⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 138, p. 310.

⁹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, Document 74, pp.149- 150.

⁹⁵⁶ See for example Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten [Records of the 489 th Foreign Policy Planning Committee: Problems Related the NPT] 30 April 1966, *Gaimusho* [MOFA], https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku08.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

⁹⁵⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 213; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 246.

⁹⁵⁸ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 544. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 62; Tadokoro, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei”, pp. 140-141.

⁹⁵⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, between Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki and Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “Ryukyu Islands”, 16 September 1967.

⁹⁶⁰ Comparison of US Base Rights in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands: Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America*, p. 205.

people. The problems of Okinawa are not simply those of 800,000 Okinawans, but of 90,000,000 Japanese. It may be thought that the Japanese Government interferes too much in the affairs of Okinawa, but they are our people.”⁹⁶¹ There is even a claim that the USA was fortunate in that the nearly twenty years of US army retention of Okinawa did not significantly damage US-Japan alliance relations.⁹⁶² One analyst observed that “There was an almost universal agreement that return of Okinawa, in a manner acceptable to both the Japanese political elite and to public opinion, was necessary to prevent the alliance from foundering.”⁹⁶³ In the words of Sarantakes,, “In fact, maintaining the security alliance with Japan, which was the foundation of regional stability, was the main reason the United States had agreed to return the island.”⁹⁶⁴ Wakaizumi also understood the fragility of the bilateral relations due to the reversion and trade issues (textiles) and mishandling them “might compel renunciation of the Treaty by Washington or Tokyo.”⁹⁶⁵

Second it was also due to Prime Minister Sato whom the US government found reliable and trustworthy. Sato was indeed more vocal about Japanese security.⁹⁶⁶ The US government also expected Japan to assume a more active and expanded role in greater defence responsibilities in Asia on Japan’s own initiative following the reversion.⁹⁶⁷ In comparison to the 1950’s, the early 50s in particular, it was much moderate but the US government in the 1960s continued to encourage “moderate increases and qualitative improvement in Japan’s defense efforts, while avoiding any pressure on her to develop substantially larger forces or to play a larger regional security role.”⁹⁶⁸ Indeed Nixon decided to cede control of Okinawa to Japan in hope of Japan developing more military capability and assuming

⁹⁶¹ *FRUS, 1955-1957*, Vol. 23, Part 1 Japan, Document 183, p. 372.

⁹⁶² Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, p. 374.

⁹⁶³ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.246.

⁹⁶⁴ Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, p. 175.

⁹⁶⁵ Wakaizumi, “Japan Beyond 1970”, p. 512.

⁹⁶⁶ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Talking Points for the NSC Discussion on the Ryukyus and Bonins: Action Memorandum, 29 August 1967, Box 2, Executive Secretaria, NSC Meeting Files, 1966-1968, RG 59, NARA; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 480.

⁹⁶⁷ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense (7 August 1967); Talking Points, “Topic Sato Wishes to Discuss”; LBJ Library; Tape No. 15 Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries. See also Dai 2 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku.

⁹⁶⁸ *FRUS, 1969-1976*, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 13, p. 53.

greater defense responsibilities for regional security after the reversion of Okinawa coupled with Japan's more economic and technical assistance to the regional countries as part of the so-called Nixon Doctrine announced in July 1969 to facilitate an end of the Vietnam War.⁹⁶⁹ The new doctrine assumed that US Asian allies would have to be more responsible for their own defence and the USA would still provide its nuclear shield to them in case of contingency.⁹⁷⁰ In his TV address to the "Nation on War" in Vietnam in November 1969, Nixon clarified his doctrine:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we will provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we will furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments.

But we will look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence.⁹⁷¹

On top of this, Sato understood and appreciated the importance of US bases in Okinawa for the security of the Far East and wanted the US military to remain stationed there.⁹⁷²

Third, Sato privately promised Nixon that the Japanese government would restrict the exports of Japanese textile products of Japan to the US market

⁹⁶⁹ Henry Kissinger: *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company., 1979), p. 334; Sato Sorinikuson Daitouryo Kaidan, Dai Ikkai [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon] (19 November 1969), CD H22-012, No. H221826, DAMOFAJ. See also Eldridge, *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem*, p. 374; Endicott, *Japan's Nuclear Option*, p. 4; Sarantakes, *The American Occupation of Okinawa*, pp. 154-155.

⁹⁷⁰ Cirincione, *Bomb Scare*, p. 56; Earl C. Ravenal: "The Nixon Doctrine and Our Asian Commitments", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 49 No. 2 (Jan 1971), pp. 201-217.

⁹⁷¹ Richard M. Nixon: "Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam", 3 November 1969, *Richard Nixon Foundaiton, Library, Museum*, <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnam-november-3-1969/>, accessed on 1 February 2019.

⁹⁷² Incoming Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 30 December 1964, Box 2376, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits, Meetings, Japan, RG 59, NARA; Memorandum for the Secretary, "Sato's Okinawa Problem", 8 September 1967, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (2 of 2), LBJ Library. See also Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 473. See also *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 140, Japan, p. 315

although this later became an empty promise arousing the mistrust of the Nixon administration in the Japanese government.⁹⁷³ The textile issue first arose in the mid 1950s when the US government lowered tariffs on textile. Since then cheaper Japanese textiles had swept the US textile market.⁹⁷⁴ The US textile industry demanded strong restrictions on the imports of textile from Japan. Interestingly, Schaller suggested that Nixon and Kissinger considered that US forces in Japan was not only to deter the Communist but also to keep Japan from becoming a military power again (double containment).⁹⁷⁵ Schaller may be slightly deterministic. He did not really elaborate upon the possibility that Nixon and Kissinger might have been simply frustrated about Japan's political incompetence to breakthrough in the stalled textile problem. Since Nixon actually encouraged Japan's rearmament in the 1950s, it is questionable that Nixon and Kissinger had a serious policy of containment of Japan. Japan's case was completely different from Western Europe where the large presence of US troops reassured German neighbours that the resurgence of Germany would be prevented by Americans. As stated previously West Germany was permitted to join the Western European Union by its pledge of non-nuclear status.

In other words, the textile issue was crucial for the Nixon administration. Kissinger, for example, stated that "we had traded Okinawa for concessions on textiles."⁹⁷⁶ Wakaizumi, who somehow got involved in the negotiations over Japan's restriction of textile exports to the US market, also highlighted that the textile problem was much more important than the nuclear issue of Okinawa for President Nixon.⁹⁷⁷

⁹⁷³ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 28, 30, pp. 52-54, 87-88. On the textile conflict between Japan and America, see I. M. Destler, Haruhiko Fukui and Hideo Sato: *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell U.P., 1979); Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 336-340; Takashi Nobuo: *Wakaizumi Kei to Nichibei Mitsuyaku: Okinawa Henkan to Seni Kousho wo meguru Misshi Gaiko* [Wakaizumi Kei and US-Japan Secret Deals: Secret Diplomacy for Okinawa Reversion and Textile Negotiations] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha., 2012).

⁹⁷⁴ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 159, p. 373.

⁹⁷⁵ Schaller, "Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991", pp. 156-157.

⁹⁷⁶ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 336. See also *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 30, pp. 87-88; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 550; Kitaoka, *Jiminto*, pp. 133-134.

⁹⁷⁷ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 453. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*,

Fourth, the nuclear weapons deployed in Okinawa such as *Mace-B* had become outdated as the introduction of strategic nuclear weapons such as SLBMs and ICBMs.⁹⁷⁸ This situation might be similar to the Kennedy administration's decision during the Cuban missile to remove *Jupiter* missiles from Turkey and Italy as those missiles went outdated and could nevertheless be replaced by *Polaris* SLBMs.⁹⁷⁹ McNamara reassured the Italians and Turks that the *Polaris* submarines assigned to NATO would serve "as a replacement for the dismantled [*Jupiter*] missiles."⁹⁸⁰ Eisenhower also noted that ICBM would diminish strategic roles of IRBMs in the long run.⁹⁸¹ As technology advanced, strategic bombers on continual air alert were rendered unnecessary by the introduction of ICBMs and SLBMs in the very beginning of 1960s and they dramatically reduced the level of strategic vulnerability.⁹⁸² It is also worth noting that since the late 1990s when WE 177 nuclear bomb was retired, UK nuclear deterrence has relied solely on a nuclear-submarine platform.⁹⁸³

According to Wohlstetter's realistic analysis of the US nuclear force, "Most of the force is made up of missiles that can be launched from the continental United States or from ocean areas to distant targets."⁹⁸⁴ In fact he already made a similar comment in the 1950s.⁹⁸⁵ On top of this, as Halperin observed, "because the United States has very substantial nuclear forces that can be moved into the Pacific area on very short notice, it is necessary to take into account the American strategic and

p. 329.

⁹⁷⁸ See for example *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 97, p. 210.

⁹⁷⁹ Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.): *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Concise Edition* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company., 2001), p. xxxiv. See also Brown, *The Faces of Power*, p.120.

⁹⁸⁰ Schwartz, *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas*, p. 95.

⁹⁸¹ Eisenhower, *Mandate For Change*, p.457.

⁹⁸² Freedman, *The Future of War*, p. 88. On the introduction of strategic forces, see Divine, *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952-1960*, p. 185; David Alan Rosenberg: "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960", *International Security* Vol. 7 No. 4 (Spring 1983), p. 69; Treverton, "How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?", p. 119.

⁹⁸³ Jeremy Stocker: *The United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 386 (London: IISS., 2007), p. 25

⁹⁸⁴ Seconds Agenda Topic, Place of Okinawa Return of Administrative Rights and U.S. Bases, by Albert Wohlstetter, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference January 1969, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969, Political and Defense, POL 19 RYU IS, Box 2459, RG 59, NARA.

⁹⁸⁵ See Albert Wohlstetter: "The Delicate Balance of Terror", *Foreign Affairs* Vol.37 No.2 (Jan 1959), pp. 223-224.

nuclear forces based in the United States.”⁹⁸⁶ In a similar vein, Wakaizumi observed that now that strategic nuclear missiles were in operation, a nuclear role of Okinawa was much diminished.⁹⁸⁷ It is also important to note that after the MLF proposal was renounced NATO also started to rely on US *Polaris* submarines assigned to the NATO supreme commander in the mid-1960s.⁹⁸⁸

As we will see below, this also was a positive development to the Japanese government. Sato changed his initial policy of a nuclear-attached Okinawa and adopted the policy of a nuclear-free Okinawa. Of course, Sato understood the importance of more visibility of nuclear weapons as noted in the last chapter. He indeed called “Three Non-Nuclear Principles” nonsense. Because of his declared principles, it would be difficult to promote the idea of status quo. At any rate, Sato had already sought deterrence at sea in 1965. In view of the maritime nature of Japan, this was probably backed by SLBMs. In the meantime, he showed his reluctance to accept the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

To some extent, the JCS was confident that these new weapon systems could replace the forward-deployed missiles while it was in favour of maintaining nuclear storages rights on Okinawa.⁹⁸⁹ Japanese policy makers were also aware of this view and shared the view that *Polaris* could replace Mace B and forward-deployed nuclear weapons would not be necessary any longer.⁹⁹⁰ Operationally nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines such as USS George Washington would not need to make port calls at foreign countries. Indeed, according to Reischauer, they did not make any visit to Japan.⁹⁹¹ To give an example, the 1968-1969 version of *the Military Balance* indicated that seven

⁹⁸⁶ Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, p.122.

⁹⁸⁷ Third Agenda Topic, Japanese-American Relations After the Reversion of Okinawa, by Kei Wakaizumi.

⁹⁸⁸ Catudal, *Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 222.

⁹⁸⁹ Zai Okinawa Beigun no Senryakujo no Yakuwarini tuite [Concerning the strategic role of US military forces in Okinawa] 7 August 1967, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku1.pdf, accessed on 27 September 2017; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 140, p. 314. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp. 102-103 and Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p. 238, 243.

⁹⁹⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 97, 140, pp. 210, 314-315

⁹⁹¹ “Raishawar Moto Taishi Kaiken Shouhou.”

nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines, each of which carried sixteen *Polaris* missiles, were deployed in the Pacific Ocean.⁹⁹² Moreover, US nuclear weapons were also stationed in South Korea and Guam.⁹⁹³ There was a review of US forward nuclear weapons and the US military also removed them from other regional countries such as Taiwan and the Philippines in 1974 and 1976 respectively⁹⁹⁴

That said, the US military desired the continued deployment of nuclear weapons on Okinawa even after the reversion although the US government was well aware that the Japanese would likely to refuse any US nuclear right.⁹⁹⁵ This opposition voice from the JCS was by far stronger than the case of the Bonin Islands, and it was too loud for Nixon to ignore, arguing that the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons there would weaken regional deterrence,⁹⁹⁶ which eventually led Sato down a path of signing a classified nuclear agreement (the right for emergency storage of nuclear weapons) with Nixon in 1969 even though Sato did not want any secret agreement with the US government.⁹⁹⁷ As Alexis Johnson explained, “Although we might not now want to store nuclear weapons on the island or mount operations elsewhere without prior consultation, the right to do so in a crisis might be worth retaining.”⁹⁹⁸ This deal was arguably inevitable as the Sato government tried to accommodate the military requirement and also understood the importance of US military presence as a deterrent. In the mean time the government was well aware of popular demand of a nuclear free Okinawa. In other words, the Sato

⁹⁹² International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance, 1968-1969* (London: IISS., 1968), p. 28.

⁹⁹³ Halperin, *Contemporary Military Strategy*, p. 122; Kitaoka, “The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts”, p. 23.

⁹⁹⁴ Kriestensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella”, pp. 3, 23-24.

⁹⁹⁵ Memorandum, Davis to the Vice President, et al., Subject: NSSM 5–Japan Policy, 28 April 1969; Strategy Paper on Okinawa Negotiations, 3 July 1969, Box 1, Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319; o Tape No. 17, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries.

⁹⁹⁶ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 333; Memorandum For the Secretary of Defense, “Nuclear Weapons as an Obstacle to Reversion of Ryukyus”, 8 July 1968, Box 1, Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319.

⁹⁹⁷ Report by the J-5 to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Okinawa-Draft Communiqué, 5 November 1969, Box 1, Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, History of the Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1978, RG319; Strategy Paper on Okinawa Negotiations; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 280-281, 320, 397-398.

⁹⁹⁸ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 475.

government vacillated between the two incompatible demands. A viable solution was to conclude the secret deal.⁹⁹⁹ As Kissinger recalled, however, “the military and political risks of seeking to maintain the status quo outweighed the military cost of having somewhat less flexibility in operating the Okinawa bases under Japanese sovereignty. Indeed, our refusal to negotiate an accommodation could well lead as a practical matter to our losing the bases altogether.”¹⁰⁰⁰

Moreover, Sato shifted his earlier stance of “blank state” (any option available) of the nuclear issue to Okinawa free of nuclear weapons at the beginning of 1969.¹⁰⁰¹ In January 1969 Sato surprised Ambassador (to the USA) Shimoda by giving his own thought that now nuclear-attached reversion was unacceptable. Japan should go for a nuclear free Okinawa.¹⁰⁰² Half a year later, Sato declared the same position of the return of Okinawa free of nuclear weapons at the Diet.¹⁰⁰³ Sato was required to reverse his initial policy with respect to Okinawa reversion under the condition of a nuclear-attached Okinawa (status quo). He learned from his failed attempts to assuage a nuclear allergy that this reversion manner was not acceptable to the Japanese public although Okinawa could have been returned to Japanese control earlier if Japan accepted a nuclear-attached Okinawa. Moreover, it was becoming evident by the end of 1968 that the nuclear attached reversion of Okinawa was no longer a politically feasible option for the Japanese government due to mounting public outcry.¹⁰⁰⁴ Japanese politicians including even conservative political figures like Nakasone also stressed that Okinawa had to be returned on the

⁹⁹⁹ See for example Masaaki Gabe: “Toboshi Taibei Bunseki Kousho ” [Poor Basement of American Strategy Constrains Japanese Negotiations over Okinawa], *Asahi Shimbun*, 23 December 2010.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 327.

¹⁰⁰¹ Shinichi Kitaoka: “Nichibei Doumeiniokeru Mitsuyaku Mondai [The Issue of the Secret Deals between the US-Japan alliance]” in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujo (ed.), *Nichbei Doumei towa Nanika*, p.272; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 193-216. See also Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Yosan Iinkai [Budget Committee of House of Councilors] 10 March 1969, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/061/1380/06103101380009.pdf>, accessed on 10 October 2017; Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Gaimu Iinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 11 April 1969, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/061/0110/06104110110012.pdf>, accessed on 9 October 2017.

¹⁰⁰² Shimoda, *Nihon wa koushite Saisei shita*, pp. 177-178.

¹⁰⁰³ Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Honkaigi [Plenary Assembly of House of Councillors] 13 June 1969, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/061/0010/06106130010027.pdf>, accessed on 4 January 2019.

¹⁰⁰⁴ Kusunoki, “The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan’s Non-nuclear Policy”, p. 45; Niihara: *Kakuheiki Shiyokeikaku wo Yomitoku*, p. 207-208.

basis of homeland-level (non-peacetime deployment of nuclear weapons).¹⁰⁰⁵

That said, Sato personally understood the importance of US nuclear deterrence as Japan restricted itself with the “Three Non-Nuclear” principles for its security. With that in mind, Sato also stated in March 1969 that, “Japan had no choice but to rely on the US nuclear protection.”¹⁰⁰⁶ In the end, the Japanese government had to concede to the USA secretly “a right to reintroduce nuclear weapons to Okinawa in an emergency” and “under the security treaty it had a stake in the security of Taiwan and South Korea” in order to have Okinawa back.¹⁰⁰⁷ As for the Security of South Korea, Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi told Ambassador Johnson that Prime Minister Sato in January 1969 that Prime Minister Sato and he were fully supportive about US operations in Korea and without any prejudice to Japan, US bases throughout Japan would back such operations should hostilities on the Korean Peninsula resume.¹⁰⁰⁸

Five months later when Sato met with Secretary of State William Rogers, he made a similar comment about Japan’s formal support for US military operations in event of renewal of the Korean War. He remarked to Rogers that Japan would back US military operations on the Korean Peninsula. Should there be a request from the US government, all the US military bases throughout Japan including the ones in Okinawa would be available for such operations. In the meantime, Sato stressed that a nuclear-attached Okinawa would not be acceptable to the Japanese due to its historical experience of the atomic bombing.¹⁰⁰⁹

¹⁰⁰⁵ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 234, 237-238.

¹⁰⁰⁶ Eisaku Sato, Sangiin Yosai Inkaishi [Budget Committee of the House of Councilors] 10 March 1969, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/061/1380/06103101380009.pdf>, accessed on 4 October 2017.

¹⁰⁰⁷ Schaller, *Altered States*, p. 213.

¹⁰⁰⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 140, p. 314.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Sato Sori to Rozyasu Kokumu Chokan tonon Kaidan Youshi [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and the State Secretary Rogers] (31 July 1969), CD H22-012, No. H221821, DAMOFAJ.

The Secret Nuclear Deal and Invisible END

In 1994 Kei Wakaizumi, who served as Sato's envoy during the negotiations for Okinawa reversion, revealed to the public that Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon had the foregoing secret deal that US will reintroduce its nuclear weapons into Okinawa in cases of contingency.¹⁰¹⁰ Although the Nixon administration understood that it was desirable to keep nuclear weapons on Okinawa, this was not imperative. One key top secret document dated on 28 May 1969, National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 13, clearly stated the US stance on the coming negotiations over the reversion of Okinawa. They were mainly concerned with security issues as specified below.

Our willingness to agree to reversion in 1972 provided there is agreement in 1969 on the essential elements governing U.S. military use and provided detailed negotiations are completed at that time.

Our desire for maximum free conventional use of the military bases, particularly with respect to Korea, Taiwan and Vietnam.

Our desire to retain nuclear weapons on Okinawa, but indicating that the President is prepared to consider, at the final stages of negotiation, the withdrawal of the weapons while retaining emergency storage and transit rights, if other elements of the Okinawan agreement and satisfactory.¹⁰¹¹

In September 1969 Sato's special envoy delivered Kissinger's (and hence the US government stance) messages to Sato that President Nixon had agreed to remove nuclear weapons from Okinawa on condition that the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Okinawa in an emergency was permitted by Tokyo, demanding a secret agreed minute.¹⁰¹² Sato grudgingly accepted this secret

¹⁰¹⁰ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 450-451.

¹⁰¹¹ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 13, p. 53

¹⁰¹² Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 354-358.

minute.¹⁰¹³ Consequently the key issue for the US government was how to secure the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Okinawa in the case of contingency. The Nixon government tried to use the nuclear card to lead the negotiations over Okinawa on its own terms although the *New York Times* leaked the “fallback position for the negotiations with the Japanese on Okinawa” in June 1969.¹⁰¹⁴ Sato sent his emissary Wakaizumi to Washington so as to deal with this issue and his American counterpart was Henry Kissinger (the National Security Advisor to President Nixon). Due to the importance of the secrecy of the negotiations, they decided to call each other Mr. Yoshida and Dr Jones respectively.¹⁰¹⁵ This behind-the-scenes or back-channel diplomacy also appeared in Kissinger’s *White House Years* in 1979¹⁰¹⁶ They carefully worked out the secret agreement on the emergency storage of nuclear weapons on Okinawa.

This confidential operation did not deny any role to the official US-Japan diplomatic channel in the negotiations over Okinawa: Japanese Foreign Minister Aichi also evinced the Japanese attitude toward the “homeland-level” reversion of Okinawa which would restrict freedom of military action regardless of whether it was conventional or nuclear.¹⁰¹⁷ Both sides of diplomats toiled on drawing up the Joint Communiqué, understanding the salience of the emergency nuclear storage on Okinawa. MOFA was in fact prepared to acknowledge the reintroduction of nuclear weapons in a contingency.¹⁰¹⁸ Sato also told MOFA officials that Japan would agree to approve the US request of the reintroduction of nuclear weapons in an emergency.¹⁰¹⁹ That said rather the secret nuclear accord depended heavily on the back channel and the final decision was left to the two leaders at the coming

¹⁰¹³ Ibid., p. 397.

¹⁰¹⁴ Richard Nixon: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson., 1978), p. 389. See also Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 329.

¹⁰¹⁵ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 289.

¹⁰¹⁶ Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 333-340.

¹⁰¹⁷ Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 510-511. See also Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 269-270, 320.

¹⁰¹⁸ Draft Record of Conversation 15 October 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku2.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2017.

¹⁰¹⁹ Sorini Taisuru Hokoku (Okinawa Kankei) [Report for Prime Minister: Issues related to Okinawa] 7 October 1969.

summit meeting held between 19 and 21 November 1969.¹⁰²⁰ Therefore, the official diplomatic track played a limited role in the final nuclear negotiations. Indeed, MOFA never housed the “Agreed Minute” on the nuclear storage in time of emergency ¹⁰²¹ that was exclusively written by Kissinger and Wakaizumi.¹⁰²² Finally in November 1969 when Sato met with Nixon in Washington D.C, both governments formally declared that Okinawa would fully revert to Japan in 1972 without any forward-deployed nuclear weapons.¹⁰²³ The joint communiqué of 1969 proclaimed:

The Prime Minister described in detail the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons and the policy of the Japanese Government reflecting such sentiment. The President expressed his deep understanding and assured the Prime Minister that, without prejudice to the position of the United States Government with respect to the prior consultation system under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the reversion of Okinawa would be carried out in a manner consistent with the policy of the Japanese Government as described by the Prime Minister.

Kissinger clarified that the line “the particular sentiment of the Japanese people against nuclear weapons” implicitly indicated the Okinawa would be “nuclear free.” In short Article 4 of the security treaty would apply to Okinawa upon

¹⁰²⁰ Memorandum, Winthrop Brown to U. Alexis Johnson, 28 October 1969 (From the United States and Japan, 1960-1972) Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/doc06.pdf>, 9 October 2017. See also Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 396-399, 434.

¹⁰²¹ “Kaku Mitsuyaku Bunsho Sato Moto Shusho Teini” [The Nuclear Secret Deal Concerning After the Reversion of Okinawa is Found at Prime Minister Sato’s Previous Residence], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 22 December 2009; “Okinawa Henkango no Kaku Saimochikomi: Mitsuyaku Bunsho wa Mitukarazu” [The Document Related to Reintroduction of Nuclear Weapons into Okinawa after the reversion of the Islands was not Found], *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 28 November 2009.

¹⁰²² Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp. 396-399, 426.

¹⁰²³ On records of the meetings, see Sato Sorinikuson Daitouryo Kaidan, Dai Ikkai (19 November), Nikai (20 November), Sankai (21 November) [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon] (19-21 November 1969), CD H22-012, No. H221826, DAMOFAJ; *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2 Japan, Document 27, 31, 34, pp. 78-82, 89-102, 105-109.

its return.¹⁰²⁴ This was, however, a public statement. Before this statement was made public, Sato and Nixon signed a secret “Agreed Minute” on the first day of the summit (19 November 1969). For Sato, this summit was particularly special because he went to Washington “to settle the Okinawa issue.”¹⁰²⁵ The detailed procedure of signing the minute was devised by Wakaizumi and Kissinger.¹⁰²⁶ According to the planned scenario, President Nixon would invite Sato to the small room beside the Oval office during the summit meeting to show Sato Nixon’s collection of art without their interpreters. There the two sheets of an agreed minute written in English— both leaders “agreed that this Minute in duplicate, be kept each only in the offices of the President and the Prime Minister”— were prepared by Kissinger and all they had to do was to sign each sheet.¹⁰²⁷ This indeed took place on the first day (19 November 1969).¹⁰²⁸

Notably the existence of this secret agreement was known to only four people: President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Prime Minister Sato and Kei Wakaizumi at the time of signing it although there is a strong possibility that this top secret was later shared by few elites especially from the State Department and the Pentagon so as to meet military demands.¹⁰²⁹ Alexis Johnson also noted that “The Prime Minister was here last week, November 19th and 20th, and a decision was reached that we would remove our nuclear weapons from Okinawa but we retained the right to consult with the Japanese to put them back if we felt there was an emergency.”¹⁰³⁰ While the American copy was finally discovered at the National Archives and Records Administration by a Japanese journalist in June 2018, the

¹⁰²⁴ Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 335. See also Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 545-546.

¹⁰²⁵ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 140, p. 315.

¹⁰²⁶ Telecom, Henry Kissinger and “Y” [Kei Wakaizumi], 15 and 19 November 1969, Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <http://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/doc07.pdf>, accessed on 9 October 2017; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp.432-434.

¹⁰²⁷ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, frontispiece.

¹⁰²⁸ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 28, pp. 82-85 ; Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, pp.477-480.

¹⁰²⁹ Tape No. 18, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries, Diaries (Transcripts of Tapes 11-20) Box 1, LBJ Library. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp. 105-106; Ishii, *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku*, p.120; Kriestensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella”, p. 22; Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon”, pp. 243-244.

¹⁰³⁰ Tape No. 18, Papers of Alexis Johnson Diaries.

Japanese copy was found at Prime Minister Sato's home in December 2009.¹⁰³¹ When Sato's son found this document, he inquired whether MOFA's archives would preserve it. To his dismay, MOFA declined his offer.¹⁰³²

This behind-the-scenes diplomacy was implemented outside the official diplomatic track and it is conceivable that MOFA officials were so resentful about this secret operation that they did not accept the document.¹⁰³³ Five months later, the Japanese government acknowledged that this was the genuine document signed by President Nixon and Prime Minister Sato¹⁰³⁴ while this secret agreement was no longer valid since this document was not handed over to his successors.¹⁰³⁵ In June 2010 Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada officially announced that the US government also confirmed that this agreement was invalid now.¹⁰³⁶ This can be interpreted as meaning that "Invisible" END is complete. That being so, this does not necessarily deny the possibility that a strategic bomber such as B52 whether or not it carries nuclear weapons can fly into Japan in the event of crisis.

In 1994 this "Agreed Minute" was revealed to the public by Wakaizumi. It read that

As stated in the Joint Communiqué, it is the intention of the United States Government to remove all the nuclear weapons from Okinawa by the time of actual reversion of the administrative rights to Japan...However, in order to discharge effectively the international obligations assumed by the United States for the

¹⁰³¹ "Kaku Mitsuyaku Bunsho Sato Moto Shusho Teini"; "Kaku Mitsuyaku Gijiroku wo Kakunin: Bei Kobunshokan Kimitsu Bunsho toshite Hokan" [The American Copy is Confirmed: National Archives Stores it as a Top-Secret Document], *Chunichi Shimbun*, 23 June 2018.

¹⁰³² "Kaku Mitsuyaku Bunsho ga Sonzai Sato Moto Shusho Izoku ga Hokan: Gaimusho Uketori Kyohi" [The Signed Sheet of the Nuclear Deal Concerning Okinawa: Foreign Ministry Declines to Take the Document] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 23 December 2009.

¹⁰³³ Ishii, *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku*, p.21.

¹⁰³⁴ "Sato Nikuson Ryoushi ga Shomei: Okinawa Kaku Mitsuyaku Busho Seifu Jitsubutsu to Nintai" [The Government acknowledges the Document: Sato and Nixon Signs the Form], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 31 March 2011.

¹⁰³⁵ Yushikisha Inka niyuru Hokokusho [The Final Report of the Expert Committee] 9 March 2010, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka [The Investigation of the Secret Deals], *MOFA*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf, accessed on 19 November 2017. See also Kitaoka, "Nichibei Doumeiniokeru Mitsuyaku Mondai", pp. 273-274.

¹⁰³⁶ "Mitsuyaku Goui Gijiroku: Nichibei Yukou Dewanai", *Yomiuri Shimbun*, 16 July 2010.

defense of countries in the Far East including Japan, in time of great emergency the United States Government will require the reentry of nuclear weapons and transit rights in Okinawa with prior consultation with the Government of Japan. The United States Government would anticipate a favorable response. The United States Government also requires the standby retention and activation in time of great emergency of existing nuclear storage locations in Okinawa: Kaduna, Naha, Chinook and Nike Hercules units...The Government of Japan, appreciating the United States Government's requirements in time of great emergency stated above by the president, will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes place.¹⁰³⁷

Whether this minute was written reflecting the negotiations over the Bonin Islands was uncertain in which the US government representative expressed its desirability that the US government “would anticipate *a favorable reaction* from the Government of Japan” for such a request.¹⁰³⁸ The secret nuclear deal above also laid out that the American government “would anticipate a favorable response” for emergency reentry and transit rights from the Japanese government.¹⁰³⁹ In contrast to the case of the Bonin Islands, this time the Japanese government was required to assume much more evident responsibility for the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons as the secret minute proclaimed that the Japanese government “will meet these requirements without delay when such prior consultation takes place.”¹⁰⁴⁰ This top secret agreement clearly demonstrates that both sides compromised on the nuclear issue and they managed to meet their demands. For Japan, needless to say, nuclear weapons were to be removed from Okinawa despite the US NCND policy. For America, it still retained the right of emergency nuclear storage on Okinawa. As for the “free use” problem, the Japanese government did not

¹⁰³⁷ See Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, frontispiece.

¹⁰³⁸ Emphasis added. Cable from American Embassy Tokyo to Secretary of State, 21 March 1968.

¹⁰³⁹ Emphasis added. Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, frontispiece.

¹⁰⁴⁰ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, frontispiece.

overtly grant such a right to the US military. Instead, the joint communiqué first acknowledged that “in the light of the present situation, the presence of United States forces in the Far East constituted a mainstay for the stability of the area.” It then proclaimed that a “the security of the Republic of Korea was *essential* to Japan’s own security” and “the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also the most *important* factor for the security of Japan.”¹⁰⁴¹ It also stressed “the security of Japan could not be adequately maintained without international peace and security in the Far East and, therefore, the security of countries in the Far East was a matter of serious concern for Japan.”¹⁰⁴²

On the use of bases for the Vietnam War, Japan showed its tacit understanding of the importance of such military missions for the USA: “should peace in Viet-Nam have been realised by the time reversion of Okinawa is scheduled to take place, the two governments would-fully consult with each other in the light of the situation at that time so that reversion would be accomplished without affecting the United States efforts”¹⁰⁴³ In addition, Sato delivered a speech at the Press Club, asserting that both Taiwan and South Korean were crucial to Japan’s security. Therefore, the Japanese government would favourably respond to American requests to use and operate from bases in Japan should an armed attack against these two countries arise.¹⁰⁴⁴ These two pieces were actually closely intertwined; the latter complemented the former.¹⁰⁴⁵ Sato’s speech was to demonstrate the Japanese support for US military action in the Far East and to clarify the Japan’s stance that the reversion of Okinawa would be completed

¹⁰⁴¹ Emphasis added. Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Sato of Japan, 21 November 1969. See also Sato Sorinikuson Daitouryo Kaidan, Dai Sankai [Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon] (21 November 1969), CD H22-012, No. H221826, DAMOFAJ.

¹⁰⁴² Joint Statement Following Discussions with Prime Minister Sato of Japan, 21 November 1969.

¹⁰⁴³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴⁴ Nasionaru Puresu Kurabu ni okeru Sato Sori Daijin Enzetsu [Prime Minister Sato’s Speech at the National Press] (11 November 1969) in Hosoya, et al (eds.), *Nichibei Kankei Shiryou Shu 1945-97*, p. 793-799; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, 545. Tanaka, *Anzen Hosho*, pp. 227-228.

¹⁰⁴⁵ Gaimu Daijin Houbei Hokoku [The Report of Foreign Minister’s Visit to the USA] 15 September 1969, Iwayuru 「Mitsuyaku」 Mondaini Kansuru Chosa Kekka Sonota Kanrenbunsho [Other Documents pertaining to The Secret Deals], *MOFA* http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyakupdfs/k_1972kaku2.pdf, accessed on 9 October 2017; Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, p. 546. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 113.

without detriment to the US security interests.¹⁰⁴⁶

When Wakaizumi published his book, he expressed to the Japanese public there was no other choice but to conclude the secret agreement with the US government in order for Okinawa to revert to Japan. Wakaizumi believed it a “necessary evil” and he was rather confident that such a case that the reintroduction of nuclear weapons into Japan was quite remote in the foreseeable future.¹⁰⁴⁷ With the advantage of hindsight, it can be argued that this secret deal would not have been vital.¹⁰⁴⁸ One analyst even criticised harshly Sato for contradicting his “Three Non-Nuclear Principles.”¹⁰⁴⁹ While his decision was labeled as the behind-the-scenes dishonest dealing, his critics are ignorant about the diplomatic and strategic context.

The reversion could have been delayed further without this secret agreement while of course this argument is never provable. Sato must be given a credit as he managed to have US nuclear weapons removed from Okinawa despite the JCS’s fervent opposition to such a move. More importantly, his non-nuclear principles actually did apply to Okinawa during a peace time. This was obviously a major achievement. It is important to distinguish the status of nuclear presence between peace and crisis time especially when it comes to the US END. At the time the Vietnam War was still taking place despite the temporary suspension of air bombing on North Vietnam in the wake of the *Tet* Offense of 1968, China was advancing its nuclear weapons programme, and the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan were in the proximity of Okinawa and many nuclear weapons were deployed in Okinawa due to its strategic location (keystone) in the Asia Pacific. Furthermore, the status of Okinawa was a clear symbol of the winner of the Second World War and the reversion of Okinawa to full Japanese control was, as Sato asserted, the

¹⁰⁴⁶ Tadokoro, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei”, pp. 140-141.

¹⁰⁴⁷ Wakaizumi, *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu*, p. 320. Morton Helperin also believed that there was a little chance that nuclear weapons would be used in the region. See Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance.”

¹⁰⁴⁸ See for example Kitaoka, “Nichibei Doumeiniokeru Mitsuyaku Mondai, p.275.

¹⁰⁴⁹ Sasaki, “Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon”, p. 247.

true end of the Second World War.¹⁰⁵⁰ In 1952 US army General Joseph Lawton Collins boldly asserted that “we don’t envisage staying in Japan indefinitely, but if we build up Okinawa into a major base we do envisage staying there indefinitely.”¹⁰⁵¹ Echoing General Collins, another US army General Omar Bradley maintained that “Our position in Japan is temporary, but if we are going to stay in Okinawa we should stay there permanently.”¹⁰⁵² It is not difficult to imagine that the “Agreed Minute” was prepared predominantly for satisfying the long-held US military demands.¹⁰⁵³

In view of these points, as Wakaizumi remarked, the secret nuclear agreement was indeed a necessary evil. Most importantly, what the Sato government carved out was a “nuclear free” Japan where no nuclear weapons were deployed on Japan’s soil at least during peacetime. It must be noted that reversion of the Ryukyu Islands is what the Japanese had yearned for. In 1972 Okinawa was fully returned to Japan on the basis of the agreement of the summit meeting (a nuclear free Okinawa) notwithstanding some difficulties.¹⁰⁵⁴ US Secretary of State William Rogers, for example, wrote to Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Fukuda in 1972, giving Japan “the assurances of the Government of the United States of America concerning nuclear weapon on Okinawa have been fully carried out.”¹⁰⁵⁵ This was also when the invisible extended nuclear deterrence came into a full form. Since then, theoretically Japan has been protected by the US strategic triad system rather than forward deployment of US nuclear weapons as in the case of NATO.

For the Japanese national leaders, initially a nuclear-attached Okinawa was a very realistic reversion style. Yet they eventually learned that this was politically unacceptable to the Japanese. As the negotiations over the reversion of

¹⁰⁵⁰ Tadokoro, “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei”, pp. 136-137; Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, p. 218.

¹⁰⁵¹ *FRUS*, 1952-1954, China and Japan, Vol. 14, Part 2, Document 547, p. 1226.

¹⁰⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 1227.

¹⁰⁵³ Kitaoka, “The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts”, p. 23. See also Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, pp. 105-106.

¹⁰⁵⁴ These issues are beyond this thesis’s scope. On this point, see Johnson, *The Right Hand of Power*, pp. 548-551; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 336-340.

¹⁰⁵⁵ Letter, William P. Rogers, U.S Secretary of State, to Takeo Fukuda, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, 15 May, 1972 quoted in Kriestensen, “Japan under the US Nuclear Umbrella”, p.23. See also Cirincione, *Bomb Scare*, p. 70.

Okinawa progressed, the visibility of nuclear deterrence was no longer a militarily vital problem but a political and emotional issue. “Invisible” END came to completion in 1972 when Okinawa was returned to Japan. From 1970 onward, the Japanese government officially started to use the term the “nuclear deterrence [the US nuclear umbrella]” in its public documents without elaborating upon how exactly this umbrella protected Japan.

The Shape of US Extended Nuclear Deterrence over Japan

As the preceding chapters illustrated, Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella through a series of key events between 1965 and 1968 as a direct result of both Japanese concerns about the first Chinese nuclear test and the emergence of the defence-minded Sato Administration. US-Japan security relations were politically tightened between Prime Minister Sato and President Johnson. Since 1965 it has become a tradition for the US to provide verbal nuclear reassurance to Japan.¹⁰⁵⁶ This fundamental basis of US END over Japan has not changed since the 1960s.¹⁰⁵⁷ Since the US and Japanese government reached the agreement on the reversion of Okinawa without forward-deployed nuclear weapons in 1969, “Invisible” END also came to completion in the late 1960s at least during peacetime. In this section, we will explore how “Invisible” US END over Japan works in theory. As the practical value of such deterrence has never been put to the test (i.e. Japan has not ever been close to any armed aggression since 1945), this is completely a theoretical analysis and it still refers to empirical evidence with respect to “Invisible” END articulated above.

In contrast to NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, there were no US forward-deployed nuclear weapons on Japan as we have seen. “Invisible” END was instead backed by US strategic forces, B 52 Strategic bombers and SLBMs in

¹⁰⁵⁶ See for example Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, p. 63.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Takahashi, “Beikoku ni Yoru Kakudai Yokushino Jittai”, p. 54.

particular given the maritime nature of the region.¹⁰⁵⁸ Indeed both Japanese and American strategists viewed in the late 1960s that SLBMs could protect Japan. The credibility of US security commitments may appear weak without the visible component of nuclear weapons. Yet as we have seen, this was more a political rather than a security problem for Japan. As stated previously, the requirements of END were *Nuclear Capabilities (nuclear threats)*, *Security Commitments (stipulated in a security treaty)*, *Political Resolve and Communication (Signalling)*. Such a formula does not spell out how “Invisible” END would discourage a potential attacker from attacking Japan in theory

There are two key components of “Invisible” END: “escalation” and “calculated ambiguity.” They are closely intertwined. Under these two concepts, there are some key notions that make END credible: “tripwire”, “perceived interests”, and “reputations.” To some extent, “escalation” and “calculated ambiguity” are also key components of “Visible” END although it does not mean that “Visible” and “Invisible” END work exactly in the same way in theory. The main difference was the layer of escalation: NATO’s tactical nuclear weapons acting as a “trip-wire” connecting between “tactical level of deterrence” and “strategic nuclear deterrence” would more likely trigger strategic nuclear exchanges in theory.¹⁰⁵⁹ In addition to the presence of tactical nuclear weapons as a “trip-wire”, Britain and France also contributed to NATO’s nuclear defence while they reserve completely independent nuclear decisions and their deterrent contribution is quite limited.¹⁰⁶⁰ Since the inception of NATO, the USA with its strategic nuclear arsenals has been the only country that could provide “the supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.”¹⁰⁶¹ In this sense, both “Visible” END and “Invisible” END rely on US strategic nuclear forces. Therefore, what ultimately would deter

¹⁰⁵⁸ Kawanago, “Kaku no Kasa to Nihon”, p. 112. It was also possible that carrier aircraft armed with nuclear weapons in the middle of the ocean could have been deployed during the Cold War.

¹⁰⁵⁹ Smart, “European Nuclear Options”, p. 118. See also Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 276; Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence”, p. 35.

¹⁰⁶⁰ Yost, *NATO’s Balancing Act*, pp. 89-91.

¹⁰⁶¹ “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, 20 May 2012

communist aggression was the prospect of nuclear war since it was a nuclear Armageddon, rendering many major cities “nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin” in a Cold-War parlance.¹⁰⁶² As a result END works in theory through “the mechanism of escalation.”¹⁰⁶³

It is important to note that tactical nuclear weapons are not the only “trip-wire” but US local force stationed in host nations were also expected to serve as a “trip-wire.” For Japan, US local troops stationed in Japan would also play such an important role to trigger nuclear escalation. In order to unravel the trip-wire role of US force in Japan, first we will examine the mechanism of escalation and how it contributes to deterrence followed by discussion on credibility elements and “calculated ambiguity.”

Escalation. As General Carl Von Clausewitz has taught us, war has a natural tendency to escalate.¹⁰⁶⁴ Whether or not escalation was inevitable, nuclear powers in particular were well conscious of the probability of escalation in the nuclear age.¹⁰⁶⁵ There is always an ambiguous and unpredictable prospect of the expansion of a crisis because one side may increase the level of its violence. Once a conflict erupts, each side might find it difficult to resist pressures to increase the level of violence rather than a fight in a regulated manner because violence might create counter-reaction (violence). What is the likelihood that a country attacked by an enemy will not retaliate and instead sit still? A military response would create a reaction from the other side by following suit. Exchanges of violence would further intensify the scale of violence. Such a reaction-action cycle would increase the level and extent of violence. This is commonly known as escalation.¹⁰⁶⁶ By nature,

¹⁰⁶² Captain William B Moore: Memorandum Op-36 C/ jm 18 March 1954 reprint in David Alan Rosenberg and W. B. Moore: “Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours”, *International Security* Vol. 6 No. 3 (Winter 1981-1982), p. 11, 25

¹⁰⁶³ Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence”, p. 32.

¹⁰⁶⁴ Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*, p. 2, 11, 66, 68, 80; Christopher Coker: *Rebooting Clausewitz* (London: Hurst., 2017), p. 31; Michael Howard: *Clausewitz: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2002), p. 52, 55.

¹⁰⁶⁵ Richard K. Betts: “Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence”, *World Politics*, Vol. 37 No.2 (Jan 1985), pp.153-154; John Garnett: “Limited War”, in John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), p. 126.

¹⁰⁶⁶ On the term, escalation, see for example Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*; Morton H.

Schelling argued that “Violence, especially war, is a confused and uncertain activity, highly unpredictable, depending on decisions made by fallible human beings organized into imperfect governments, depending on fallible communications and warning systems and on the untested performance of people and equipment.”¹⁰⁶⁷ He even claimed that “The essence of the crisis is its unpredictability. The ‘crisis’ that is confidently believed to involve no danger of things getting out of hand is no crisis; no matter how energetic the activity, as long as things are believed safe there is no crisis.”¹⁰⁶⁸ In the nuclear age, nobody knew with a certainty whether a locally limited war might escalate to nuclear war. If escalation process did not stop at the early stage, it would be more likely that nuclear weapons, regardless of whether this was small-scale, were used in a war. This would probably provoke strategic nuclear exchanges, resulting in an all-out nuclear war. In other words, “uncertain process of escalation” existed in a Cold-War crisis.¹⁰⁶⁹

Although there is no convincing reason to believe that every war would escalate into nuclear war, political leaders were never certain that conventional war might escalate into nuclear war in the Cold War context and “They might stumble into war without fully intending to get into war.”¹⁰⁷⁰ Policy makers inadvertently get trapped into war without any intention to engage in war.¹⁰⁷¹ The prospect of nuclear war must be cautiously assessed by decision makers. The Soviet leaders in fact did not believe that escalation could be placed under complete human control. They indeed acted with more caution and prudence.¹⁰⁷² Decision makers must bear in mind that “non-nuclear war is not just appalling in itself. It is also the likeliest route to nuclear war. In practice, indeed, it is the only likely route” as British

Halperin: *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966); Herman Kahn: *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers., 2010); Smoke, *War*.

¹⁰⁶⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

¹⁰⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 104-105.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*, p. 71.

¹⁰⁷¹ *Ibid.*, p. 71. See also Halperin: *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷² Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart: “Soviet views on escalation”, *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 7 No. 4 (1984), pp. 73-77. See also Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 18.

strategist Michael Quinlan held.¹⁰⁷³ In a similar vein, McGeorge Bundy, Security Advisor to the Kennedy and Johnson Administration laid out his concept of “existential deterrence” that “rests on uncertainty about what could happen, not in what has been asserted.”¹⁰⁷⁴

In this respect, Schelling’s concept of “threat that leaves something to chance” stands out. Schelling argued that a crisis by itself may get out of control and the essence of this threat is that “the final decision is not altogether under the theatre’s control.”¹⁰⁷⁵ More plainly and succinctly, he also asserted that “The idea is simply that a limited war can get out of hand by degrees.”¹⁰⁷⁶ In other words, what is frightening about escalation is that nobody could completely control the escalation mechanism.¹⁰⁷⁷ The bottom line was that Schelling suggested that states were able to exploit the uncertainty nature of escalation inherent in a crisis for a deterrent purpose.¹⁰⁷⁸ The prospect of escalation in a conflict creates risks and fears for potential military action. Such a concern in turn produces restraint and a deterrent effect.¹⁰⁷⁹ As Freedman aptly put it, “It was the fear of nuclear war itself that deterred, not the specific threat of nuclear retaliation.”¹⁰⁸⁰

It must be noted that the Soviet Union and the USA came very close to the brink of nuclear war over Cuba (a foreign country) in October 1962. During the crisis, both sides were extremely concerned about a possibility of the loss of control of the crisis due in part to miscalculation and the dynamism of the crisis itself. It could have inadvertently turned into all-out war especially given the fact that

¹⁰⁷³ Michel Quinlan: *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Problems, Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2009), p. 22. See also Freedman, “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, pp. 30-31.

¹⁰⁷⁴ McGeorge Bundy: “Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences” in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), p.9. See also McGeorge Bundy: “To Cap the volcano”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 48 No. 1 (Oct 1969), pp.9-11.

¹⁰⁷⁵ Italics in original. Thomas C. Schelling: *The Strategy of Conflict* (Massachusetts: Harvard U.P., 1960), p.188.

¹⁰⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 193. See also Cimballa, *Clausewitz and Escalation*, p. 1, 5, 185 ; Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, p. 19; Phil Williams: *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (London: Martin Robertson., 1976), p. 98.

¹⁰⁷⁷ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 104-105.

¹⁰⁷⁸ Ibid., p. 94.

¹⁰⁷⁹ See for example Beaufre, *Deterrence and Strategy*, pp. 24-25.

¹⁰⁸⁰ Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 211.

(unknown to the USA at that time) the operational nuclear weapons were under control of the Soviet local commander in Cuba.¹⁰⁸¹ The Cuban missile crisis taught both the Soviet and American leaders several straightforward and unequivocal lessons that the nuclear dangers and uncertainties lay naturally in a US-Soviet confrontation and the importance of communication during a crisis and the control of atomic bombs.¹⁰⁸² Miscalculation, miscommunication and misinterpretation of American interests and resolve were unavoidable, but they would have come at a great price. They would have led to hasten an uncertain process of escalation. Boldly it can be even argued that miscalculation and misunderstanding themselves escalate a war.¹⁰⁸³ There is room for debate but after the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, both the Soviet Union and the USA clearly became unduly cautious and even status-quo powers and had no intention to intervene in the other side by violent means. The division of the West and the East was completely formalised.¹⁰⁸⁴

The concept of unpredictability inherent in escalation played a key role in the nuclear age as the last stage of war between nuclear states was likely to be all out nuclear war, which would have made decision makers to take an even first step extremely cautiously.¹⁰⁸⁵ They might fear the consequences of their outright attacks against their opponent and avert a potential risk.¹⁰⁸⁶ As Halperin observed, during the Cold War, pervasively “The desire to avoid central war exercises a major influence on decision makers during a local war.”¹⁰⁸⁷ Such desire was especially the case with a high-tension conflict because “the probability of a chain of event leading to a nuclear confrontation increases.” In tense crises such as the Berlin crisis of 1958

¹⁰⁸¹ Robert Jervis: “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What can we know, why did it start, and how did it end?”, in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.): *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal* (London: Routledge., 2015), p. 2, 4-15-16; Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, p. 81; Sergey Radchenko: “On Hedgehogs and Passions: History, Hearsay, and Hotchpotch in the Writing of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Scott and Hughes (eds.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 192-197.

¹⁰⁸² Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, p. 84.

¹⁰⁸³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 93, 95.

¹⁰⁸⁴ On this point, see Braithwaite, *Armageddon and Paranoia*, p. 161 and Colin S. Gray: “Strategy in the nuclear age”, in Murray, Knox and Bernstein (eds.), *The Making of Strategy*, pp. 611-612.

¹⁰⁸⁵ Beatrice Heuser: *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Pimlico., 2002), p. 155; Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*, p. 78; Kahn, *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s*, pp. 78-79; Smoke, *War*, p. 41..

¹⁰⁸⁶ Barry Nalebuff: “Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation”, *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Vol. 9 No. 2 (Spring 1986), p. 21.

¹⁰⁸⁷ Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 10.

and 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis neither the Soviet nor the USA took any outright military option even though it was recommended by the US military especially in the Cuban missile crisis.¹⁰⁸⁸

Yet one can argue against the contention about uncertainty in a crisis. It could actually work the other way around. It may impair the credibility of a nuclear threat exactly because of fear and risk of escalation. If the prospect of nuclear escalation ever exists, a nuclear defender is quite unlikely to take military action to protect its protégé. That is to say, there is also a possibility of self-deterrence.¹⁰⁸⁹ To be sure, the use of any type of nuclear weapons for the sake of allies was an extremely daunting political decision. Consequently, a potential invader might not be convinced that nuclear retaliation would follow its attack against an ally of a nuclear defender. It may abandon its ally if a nuclear exchange was imminently expected. While uncertainty of escalation was a key for deterrence, some certainty of firm American security commitments was also required. An American President should never declare that he would not threaten to use nuclear weapons in retaliation for an aggressor's use of nuclear weapons against America's allies even if this threat might not be credible or a mere bluff. Unfortunately we do not live in a world where all threats are completely credible.¹⁰⁹⁰ America still had to create an impression that nuclear escalation and thus, US nuclear retaliation on behalf of its ally would be carried out should a crisis escalate. To create a credible mechanism of escalation was doubtlessly a daunting task, and to make it credible requires the mechanism of some certainty of initiating an escalation process eventually leading to a nuclear attack against an aggressor.

Trip-Wire. How could the USA enhance the threats of nuclear retaliation and the credibility of its security commitments when and where required? It is essentially concerned with convincing a potential attacker that a defender will

¹⁰⁸⁸ On Kennedy's conflicts, see Lawrence Freedman: *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 2000, ppb. 2002).

¹⁰⁸⁹ Huth, *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War*, pp.3, 5-6.

¹⁰⁹⁰ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 92.

defend its ally and be willing to escalate for that purpose. One answer produced to this conundrum during the Cold War was a trip-wire doctrine.¹⁰⁹¹ When a nuclear defender says that it will come to defend a country far from its homeland, this does not sound credible unless it has some vital interests in the protégé. In this regard, locally deployed US force can be seen as signalling political commitments and even vested interests of the defender. US troops stationed abroad were indeed not only there to defend a host country but also to show its tangible interests in and commitments to local defence. If American soldiers were killed because of an enemy invasion against the host country, it would now mean that American core interests were directly attacked, making escalation more credible.¹⁰⁹² If that happened, Americans would have to protect their fellow Americans. It is believable convincing that the USA would take a military response at least to rescue the fellow Americans. As Freedman explained, the key role of American troops in Europe “was not as a shield but as a ‘trip-wire’, capable of triggering the entry into a war of America’s nuclear arsenal.”¹⁰⁹³ In the same vein, political scientist Michael Mandelbaum asserted that American troops in Europe “served as hostages to the Americans’ willingness to honor their commitments. If the Soviets attacked in Europe, the United States with all its wealth and power, would have to come to the rescue of its soldiers, and hence of the Europeans.”¹⁰⁹⁴ That being said, does conventional force acting as a trip-wire symbolise itself as “an unambiguous threshold beyond which the alliance would use its nuclear weapons”, as one analyst claimed?¹⁰⁹⁵ This could have been the case with NATO since it is the most important formal alliance of the USA.¹⁰⁹⁶ What about other areas? After the tripwire has been breached, will the USA be resolved to escalate in every single situation? How convincing is that to a potential attacker? Therefore, an important question is whether this “trip-wire”

¹⁰⁹¹ Shelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, p.187.

¹⁰⁹² Gerald Garvey: *Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear Policies and Alliance Politics* (Lexington: Lexington Books., 1984), p. 69

¹⁰⁹³ Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 85.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution*, pp. 154-155.

¹⁰⁹⁵ Buteux, *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980*, p. 3.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p. 153; Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse: *International Relations*, 9th ed., Update2010-2011 (United States: Person Education., 2011), pp. 65-66

doctrine is applicable to the Japanese case. The answer is affirmative for a number of reasons.

Perceived Interests. As the analysis of the US treatment of Japan as a security ally in the previous chapters has shown, Japan was one of few countries in relation to which the USA had great interest in extending deterrence during the Cold War. In other words, America's "perceived interests" in defending Japan appeared high.¹⁰⁹⁷ "Perceived interests" in defending allies even by nuclear means are formed under the influence of some key elements which also serve as credibility elements of END. According to one American military thinker, they entail "the strength of alliances between the defender and ally, the defender's political and economic support for the ally, trade relationships, and the status of military forces..."¹⁰⁹⁸ These elements suggests that where US global strategic interests during peacetime are high, the credibility of the defender's threats are also high. The US-Japan alliance covers all these elements (security treaty, local military balance, and foreign trade and political support) as shown in the previous chapters. It also suggests that deterrence is not all about military capability but also the defender's political interests in defending its allies and resolve. An aggressor would be more hesitate and cautious when it comes to the areas where the US perceived interests were at stake.

In this respect, during the Cold War US immediate perceived interests at stake were doubtlessly Berlin. As a Cold War warrior David Miller observed, "Throughout the Cold War there was no other place or group of people that epitomized the issues at stake as clearly as Berlin and the Berliner."¹⁰⁹⁹ The frontline of an intensive Cold War ideological competition was the divided city of Berlin. Marshall Plan aid and some other American generous financial aid enabled

¹⁰⁹⁷ See for example Edward Luttwak: "The Nuclear Alternatives", in Myers (ed.), *NATO The Next Thirty Years*, p. 96 ; Idem, "The Problems of Extending Deterrence", p. 33; Smart, "European Nuclear Options", p. 118.

¹⁰⁹⁸ William G. Eldridge: "The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey", Walker Paper No. 18 (Alabama: Air U.P.,2011), p. 23. See also Sagan, "The Commitment Trap", p. 98.

¹⁰⁹⁹ David Miller: *The Cold War: A Military History* (London: Pimlico., 2001), p. 328.

West Berlin to prosper and it “became a permanent advertisement for the virtues of capitalism and democracy in the middle of communist East Germany.”¹¹⁰⁰ There were at least three major crises (1948, 1958, and 1961) in Berlin during the Cold War. On each occasion, the USA and the Soviet Union came into conflict over their interests in Berlin because the frontline of an intensive Cold War ideological competition was arguably the divided city of Berlin. Both sides were required to show force and the strength of their determination and interest in defending Berlin; the failure to do so would damage US grand strategic interests of containment. It would also erode America’s global standing as the leader of the West. That is, “Perceived interests” and “Reputation” are closely connected.

Reputations. In the highly geopolitical context of bloc politics in the Cold War, the failure to act to protect American global interests would erode American commitments and could destroy its reputation as the global leader of the West. Geopolitics, according to Gray, is defined as “the spatial study *and practice* of international relations.”¹¹⁰¹ He further argued that “all politics is geopolitics” and “all political matters occur within a particular geographical context; in short, they have a geopolitical dimension.”¹¹⁰² Sloan spelled out this aspect: “geographical knowledge would always be integrated within the body of political knowledge”¹¹⁰³ and “geopolitical theory has moulded the actions and perceptions of policy makers.”¹¹⁰⁴ Similarly Gray noted that “Some appreciation of the meaning of the geographical setting for international politics pervades thought and action, but that appreciation can be so habitual and uninspiring as to blind us to geopolitical insight and understanding.”¹¹⁰⁵ Gaddis even asserted that “There soon developed a line of reasoning reminiscent of Sir Halford Mackinder’s geopolitics, with its assumption that none of the world’s ‘rimlands’ could be secure if the European ‘heartland’ was

¹¹⁰⁰ Gaddis, *The Cold War*, p. 112.

¹¹⁰¹ Emphasis in original. Colin S. Gray “Inescapable Geography”, in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds.): *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass.,1999), p.164.

¹¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 164.

¹¹⁰³ Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy*, p. 5.

¹¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

¹¹⁰⁵ Gray, “The Continued Primacy of Geography”, p. 259.

under the domination of a single hostile power.”¹¹⁰⁶ Indeed, the Cold War global competition also was perceived as recurring patterns of conflict between the continental power (tiger: the Soviet Union) and the maritime power (shark: the USA).¹¹⁰⁷

Shortly after the end of World War Two, the USA became nearly the only one capable of balancing against the newly emerging rival, the Soviet Union. Taking over war-torn Britain, the USA assumed a global leadership role and took interest in checking Soviet advances on the Eurasian continent.¹¹⁰⁸ Echoing Mackinder’s theory, Gray argued that “In Anglo-American perspective, the pre-eminent strategic narrative of 1800-1991 was the recurring necessity to prevent the domination of Europe, then of Eurasia, and then, prospectively, of the whole world, by a single state or coalition.”¹¹⁰⁹ There was certainly a continuity of Classical Geopolitics but Cold-War geopolitics highlighted the aspect of an ideological struggle between the Soviet Union and the USA.¹¹¹⁰ They viewed each other as “deadly foes.”¹¹¹¹ British historian Hew Strachan was correct in that “The very expression ‘the west’ makes the point: those states committed to liberal democracy and capitalism were also geographically contiguous, and united by the Atlantic.”¹¹¹² While immediate stakes were the protection of the Rimlands of Eurasia (Western Europe in particular, the Middle East, and Southeast and East Asia), the geopolitical scope was beyond the Western Europe and certainly global.¹¹¹³ The USA became “the leading, indeed essential, guardian of the non-Soviet world against whatever might have transpired

¹¹⁰⁶ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 56.

¹¹⁰⁷ Gray, “The Nuclear Age and the Cold War”, p. 241. See also Saul B. Cohen: *Geography and Politics in a World divided*, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford U.P., 1973), p. xvi; Kaluds Dodds: *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction* (Harrow: Pearson Education Limited., 2005), p.2;

¹¹⁰⁸ Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 22, 447.

¹¹⁰⁹ Colin S. Gray: *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson., 2005, ppb. 2006), p. 147.

¹¹¹⁰ Black, *Geopolitics*, p. 180, 210.

¹¹¹¹ Gray, “The Nuclear Age and the Cold War”, p. 239.

¹¹¹² Hew Strachan: *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2013), p. 272.

¹¹¹³ Gray, “The Nuclear Age and the Cold War”, p. 241, 245; Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History*, pp. 162-176.

in the absence of that guardianship.”¹¹¹⁴As US National Security Strategy of 1988 noted. “since 1945, we [Americans] fought two world wars to prevent the Soviet Union from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to dominate its neighbours in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the global balance power to our disadvantage.”¹¹¹⁵ What was considered to be crucial in this globalised political, military and ideological struggle was which side one was on, regardless of whether one truly put faith in either the Western (democracy and capitalism) or Eastern (Communism) system.¹¹¹⁶ Such a black – or – white approach “was to lead to failure to appreciate the difference between Communism and Third World populist nationalism, a failure that repeatedly led to problems for US foreign policy” as historian Jeremy Black rightly pointed out. ¹¹¹⁷ This approach underlay America’s “indiscriminate globalism.”¹¹¹⁸ In the words of Kissinger:

In effect, containment came to be equated with the construction of military alliances around the entire Soviet periphery over two continents. World order would consist of the confrontation of two incongruent superpowers – each of which organized an international order within its sphere.¹¹¹⁹

In other words, there was a strong sense of “us” versus “them” antagonism in the Cold-War superpowers competition.¹¹²⁰ For this reason, as the Cold War authority John Lewis Gaddis cogently noted, in the Cold War context “events in East Asia could not be separated from those taking place in other parts of the

¹¹¹⁴ Gray, “Strategy in the nuclear age”, p. 610.

¹¹¹⁵ *National Security Strategy of the United States*, (Washington D.C.: the White House., January 1988), p. 1, Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1988.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121129-393>, accessed on 14 May 2019.

¹¹¹⁶ Black, *Geopolitics*, p. 187, 205.

¹¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

¹¹¹⁸ Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History*, p. 176.

¹¹¹⁹ Henry Kissinger: *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press., 2014), p. 286. See also Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, p. 447.

¹¹²⁰ Black, *Geopolitics*, p. 180.

world.”¹¹²¹ According to Freedman, “In principle, every act of foreign policy has some significance for the creation of expectations of future performance. Compliance may be a form of humiliation and an acknowledgment of submission.”¹¹²² Reflecting the Korean War, Schelling also posited that “The main reason why we are committed in many of these places is that our threats are interdependent. Essentially we tell the Soviets that we have to react here because, if we did not, they would not believe us when we say that we will react there.”¹¹²³ Schelling also argued that “what one does today” in a crisis affects “what one can be expected to do tomorrow.”¹¹²⁴ As Scott Sagan of Stanford University observed, “with respect to military intervention in regional crises, U.S. leaders have often believed that they must respond to deterrent failures because they fear that other U.S. commitments would otherwise appear less credible.”¹¹²⁵ That is, America’s motive for military intervention in a crisis was in part for saving its “face.”

Returning to Berlin, we know that Khrushchev made an attempt to drive the Western powers out of Berlin.¹¹²⁶ He demanded that the Western occupying powers terminate the military occupation of the city, turning Berlin into a free city and leave Berlin within six months, or he would conclude a separate peace treaty with East Germany and let the East Germans directly deal with the access of the Western powers to Berlin.¹¹²⁷ Eisenhower obviously could not back down from Khrushchev’s threat on the grounds that this would clearly show that American security commitments to its allies were actually hollow in view of the strategic importance of Berlin.¹¹²⁸ Eisenhower stood firm over Berlin and even prepared to

¹¹²¹ Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 114.

¹¹²² Freedman, *Deterrence*, p. 52.

¹¹²³ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 55.

¹¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹¹²⁵ Sagan, “The Commitment Trap”, p. 101.

¹¹²⁶ Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkely, *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938*. 9th Revised ed (London: Penguin Books., 2011), p. 162; Brown, *The Faces of Power*, pp.139-142; John Lewis Gaddis: *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford U.P., 1997, ppb. 1998), p. 140; Vojtech Mastny: “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962” in Leffler and Westad, *The Cambridge History of The Cold War Volume I Origins*, p. 325.

¹¹²⁷ Ambrose and Brinkely, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 163; Gaddis, *The Cold War*, pp. 113-114.

¹¹²⁸ Betts, *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance*, pp.85, 88-91; Therese Delpech: *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy*

use nuclear weapons to defend Berlin.¹¹²⁹ He refused the ultimatum while he showed his willingness to talk.¹¹³⁰ Convinced that the crisis would escalate to general war, Eisenhower did not find it imperative to increase conventional military strength in West Germany. He indeed rejected the JCS recommendation to send a division to Europe.¹¹³¹ Khrushchev withdrew the deadline and instead he agreed to meet with Eisenhower for negotiation.

Khrushchev sought a new Berlin settlement because “The bone continued to catch in his throat.”¹¹³² He resumed the Berlin conflict when he met with the newly-elected President Kennedy at the Vienna summit in June 1961. At the summit Khrushchev handed an aide-memoire on Berlin directly to Kennedy. He again put a six-month deadline for negotiations over a peace treaty and threatened to conclude a peace treaty with East Germany and to hand over Western access to Berlin to the East German government if there was no change in the status of Berlin.¹¹³³ Like Eisenhower, Kennedy stood firm over Berlin. He could not let any change in the city status, even risking nuclear war.¹¹³⁴ The principal reason for Kennedy’s commitment to Berlin was the same as Eisenhower’s: America’s abandonment of Berlin would undermine its credibility and prestige.¹¹³⁵ It would basically demonstrate America’s weakness that could have been taken as a sign by its allies that the USA would not come to defend them.¹¹³⁶ In Berlin America would

(California: Rand Corporation., 2012), p. 65; Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 243.

¹¹²⁹ McMahon, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 309.

¹¹³⁰ Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962”, pp. 392-393.

¹¹³¹ Kori Shake: “A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises” in John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake (eds.): *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2002), pp. 26-27.

¹¹³² Ambrose and Brinkely, *Rise to Globalism*, p. 178. See also Richard Crockatt: *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991* (London: Routledge., 1995), p. 135; Jack M. Schick: *The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press., 1971), p. 141.

¹¹³³ Brown, *The Faces of Power*, pp.223-224;Holloway, “Nuclear Weapons and the Escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962”, p. 393; Schick, *The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962*, p. 137, 147; Shake, “A Broader Range of Choice?”

¹¹³⁴ Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 254; Newhouse, *The Nuclear Age*, p. 157; McMahon, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 309; Trachtenberg, *History & Strategy*, p. 218.

¹¹³⁵ Ausland, *Kennedy, Khrushchev and the Berlin-Cuba Crisis 1961-1964*, p. 99; Ambrose and Brinkely, *Rise to Globalism*, pp. 178-179; Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century*, pp. 66-67; McMahon, “US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy”, p. 309; Shake, “A Broader Range of Choice?”, p. 23.

¹¹³⁶ Westad, *The Cold War: A World History*, pp. 294-295.

have been required to use force “to maintain the Western orientation of Germany and the cohesion of the NATO alliance as well as to defend the freedom of the West Berliners.”¹¹³⁷

Accordingly, saving its reputation as the strong leader of the West was clearly part of American political objectives during the Cold War. Once the USA lost its reputation, it would be hard to rebuild its credibility and reputation. Worse still, the loss of its reputation would have invited further Communist aggression elsewhere because they would have been convinced that the USA would have backed down. This was certainly what the US government would have wanted to avoid. Yet this does not mean it is truly worth risking American lives to preserve a reputation as in the case of the Vietnam War. It is contended that the way the USA treated issues in the peripheral areas of the third world probably did not have much influence in shaping Soviet’s image of American treatment of key issues in vital areas like Europe and Japan.¹¹³⁸

That said, it is important to note that the credibility of US nuclear threats would be easily undermined in cases where US interests were truly at stake. In this case, it seemed to have a serious credibility problem as in general “the credibility of the extended U.S deterrent depends on the Soviet belief that a U.S. president would risk nuclear escalation on behalf of foreign commitment.”¹¹³⁹ The level of US interests can be measured by the numbers of US troops in specific countries. Since the beginning of the Cold War, (West) Germany and Japan have been major countries where large US forces and key military facilities have been stationed. Even today Japan hosts the largest US troops (38,818 as of 2016). After Japan, Germany has the second largest US troops (34, 602).¹¹⁴⁰ Still the biggest question is

¹¹³⁷ Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, p. 5.

¹¹³⁸ Freedman: *Deterrence*, pp. 54-56.

¹¹³⁹ Gray and Payne, “Victory is Possible”, p. 16.

¹¹⁴⁰ Kristen Blalik: “U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades”, *Pew Research Center*,

<http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/>, accessed on 15 March 2018; Time Kane: “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2000, CDA 06-02(Massachusetts: The Heritage Foundation.. May 2006), available at <file:///C:/Users/PCUser/Downloads/cda06-02.pdf>, accessed on 24 January 2019.

whether the USA would use nuclear weapons to protect its key allies if this act certainly triggered Soviet nuclear strikes against the US homeland. The answer is quite negative and nuclear abandonment is highly conceivable.

Calculated Ambiguity. That being said, an interesting aspect of deterrence lies in the unpredictability of a response of a defender. On the one hand, a potential attacker could easily believe that Americans would not retaliate by nuclear weapons on behalf its protégé. On the other hand, the aggressor still could not completely ignore the possibility that they would retaliate with conventional force and eventually nuclear weapons. While it might have been an empty threat or a mere bluff, the US government still made public statements (declaratory policies) about its security commitments to its allies including nuclear protection. The US government, for example, publicly declared in January 1965 that the USA would come to defend Japan from all forms of attacks.

Realistically the most likely US military response in a crisis would not have been nuclear retaliation; it would have issued threats, increased military readiness, send more troops to a crisis area or a conflict zone. The threshold of the use of conventional force was much lower and it was indeed employed in Cold War crises and wars such as the Cuban crisis of 1962 and the Korean War. An American military response did not have to be a nuclear attack in the first place because once violence was exchanged between America and the Soviet Union or China, both sides could not ignore the prospect of nuclear escalation. Once an exchange of violence was initiated, the unpredictable nature of escalation inherent in violence and war would also set off. As security analyst Stephen Cimbala aptly put it, “crossing the threshold from peace to war, from coercion into the actual use of force, is more significant than the first use of nuclear weapons for nuclear armed states.”¹¹⁴¹ In the transition process, unknown consequences might take place and things might get out of hand.¹¹⁴²

¹¹⁴¹ Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*, p. 200.

¹¹⁴² Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 96.

Furthermore, nuclear strategist Herman Kahn argued that “the fear that the other side may react, indeed overreact, is most likely to deter escalation.”¹¹⁴³ The bottom line is that a potential attacker was not completely sure if its aggression would not follow an American military response. It also was made deliberately uncertain under what circumstances the USA might use nuclear weapons against the adversary. One hundred percent certainty of nuclear retaliation is ideal but this is impossible to achieve. While it is true that “ambiguous commitments could open the way to misperception”, even a low chance of triggering nuclear exchanges was hardly ignorable.¹¹⁴⁴ Such fact alone would still influence the enemy’s cost calculus in a crisis. It is true that any political leaders “are reluctant to begin a decisive action that is replete with dangers, no matter what the advantages dangled before them might be.”¹¹⁴⁵ As long as the possibility of nuclear retaliation was not absolutely nil, a potential aggressor would still act with caution and restraint in the Cold War context.

As the Cuban missile crisis demonstrated, uncertainty of how the other would react was vital for both sides.¹¹⁴⁶ To put it simply, we did not know what the other would do next with absolute certainty. As Freedman observed, “The role of uncertainty in reinforcing deterrence had been widely recognised by the leading strategists of the nuclear age.”¹¹⁴⁷ In a similar vein, John Baylis, a leading British nuclear strategy analyst, noted that “Deterrence...is enhanced by deliberately creating uncertainty in the adversary’s mind.”¹¹⁴⁸ During the Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950’s, the Eisenhower government was committed to the defence of Taiwan but it never specified what to do about the problem. It was vital to “keep the

¹¹⁴³ Herman Kahn: *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers., 2010), p. 3.

¹¹⁴⁴ Keith Krause: “Rational and Deterrence in Theory and Practice”, in Snyder (ed.), *Contemporary Security and Strategy*, p. 124.

¹¹⁴⁵ Luttwak, “The Nuclear Alternatives”, p. 96.

¹¹⁴⁶ Robert Jervis: “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What can we know, why did it start, and how did it end?” in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis*; p. 2, 4-15-16 (1-39); Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age*, p. 81; Sergey Radchenko: “On Hedgehogs and Passions: History, Hearsay, and Hotchpotch in the Writing of the Cuban Missile Crisis”, in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.), *The Cuban Missile Crisis*, pp. 192-197 (183-203).

¹¹⁴⁷ Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 207.

¹¹⁴⁸ Baylis, *Ambiguity and Deterrence*, pp. 5-6.

Communist guessing.”¹¹⁴⁹ In the words of Dulles, “It should not be stated in advance precisely what would be the scope of military action if new aggression occurred. That is a matter which the aggressor had best remain ignorant. But he can know and does know, in the light of present policies, that the choice in this respect is ours and not his.”¹¹⁵⁰

The Soviet Union and China would not know in advance how the USA would react to their attacks against America’s allies.¹¹⁵¹ They were not certain if their aggression against US allies would set off an American military response. It was unknown to them that precise conditions under which American nuclear response would be evoked against the Communists. This reality could bring forth confusion, ambiguity, risk and frustration. Since ambiguity always surrounds a US response, it can be unlisted for a deterrent purpose. It is important to deliberately keep an enemy guessing about America’s next moves, creating an opportunity for them to rethink the consequences of action yet to be taken. This is the “calculated ambiguity” of END.

¹¹⁴⁹ Eisenhower, *The White Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961*, p. 295. See also Divine, *Eisenhower and the Cold War*, pp. 66-67

¹¹⁵⁰ Dulles, “Policy for Security and Peace”, p. 360.

¹¹⁵¹ Cimbala, *Clausewitz and Escalation*; Herman Kahn: *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, Publishers., 1965); Smoke, *War*.

III. F. Table: Key Components of Invisible END

Escalation	Uncertainty inherent in a crisis
Calculated Ambiguity	Ambiguity of a US response and of when to use nuclear weapons
Sub I: Tripwire	Large presence of US troops in Japan (the number of US troops has been reduced and key military facilities are still heavily used)
Sub II: Perceived Interests	Key strategic partner and location
Sub III: Reputation	The loss of a reputation as the guardian of the Free world

Invisible END. Having looked at the key elements of END, we now examine how they contribute to “Invisible” END. If the concepts of “escalation” and “calculated ambiguity” applied to “invisible” END, one could say that a potential adversary would still consider the prospect of US nuclear retaliation and escalation before it attacked Japan.¹¹⁵² It is worth considering that in a contingency “there is a certain irreducible risk that an armed conflict might escalate into a nuclear war.”¹¹⁵³ The Soviet Union or China could not completely eliminate the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons by the USA especially when a crisis deepened and escalated. It was unpredictable that what a US response their armed aggression against Japan would provoke and under what circumstances the USA would use nuclear weapons against them. As Kissinger asserted, “no war in the nuclear age can ever be completely free of the spectre of nuclear weapons.”¹¹⁵⁴

Such fact complicated already complex strategic calculation further,

¹¹⁵² Ogawa, “Kaku no Kasa to Rironteki Kento”, pp. 95-96; Idem, *Kaku Gunbikanri Gunshuku no yukue* [The Future of Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament] (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo., 1996), pp.216-217.

¹¹⁵³ Marc Trachtenberg: “The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis”, *International Security*, Vol. 10 No. 1 (Summer 1985), p. 139.

¹¹⁵⁴ Henry A. Kissinger: “Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal”, *Arms Control* (Fall 1960), p. 800.

created uncertainty and made the risk of aggression against Japan incalculable. It is the unpredictability of an American response to a crisis and later its choice to escalate the conflict for Japan that would contribute to extended deterrence.¹¹⁵⁵ To be sure, the extent to which the Soviet Union or China was interested in attacking Japan throughout the Cold War was unknown. As pointed out above, the Soviet Union might not have had a strong intention to attack the US bloc after 1962. When it nevertheless had occurred, the Communists would have had to face the probability that the US military fought with Japan even threatening the use of nuclear weapons when and where deemed necessary not least after it intensified.

All a potential attacker should have known in advance was that the USA had the potential to harm. This fact would still complicate risk calculations of a potential aggressor when it contemplated attacking Japan. It had to take into account the unpredictability of the crisis and crisis behavior of the USA. The Communist leaders had to ask themselves a fundamental question that what would happen after they attacked Japan? Could the crisis be (in) tractable? More specifically, what would be a US response? Would they be able to manage the consequences of the penalty for their misconduct? If it was completely predicted that US direct military intervention in a crisis between Japan and China or the Soviet Union would not happen, Communists would enjoy the freedom of their action and be more tempted to invade Japan. America's military intervention was, however, not fully predictable. Miscalculations of American reactions and intent could be catastrophic. They would naturally want to avoid unforeseen risks and attempt to lower them under the condition of ever-present ambiguity.

As we have seen, the joint communiqué following the first summit meeting of 1965 articulated a pledge by the US that *any armed attack* by an adversary against Japan would be met by an American military response. To be sure, whether America actually would use nuclear weapons to defend Japan was not certain. Yet

¹¹⁵⁵ See for example Conover, *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence*, p. 34; Kissinger, "Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear?", p. 815; Schoff, "Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan", p. 108.

this statement still made Chinese or Soviet strategic calculations complicated. It was not easy for the Communist to confidently hope that their deliberate attack on Japan would not provoke American retaliation in the form of whether nuclear or conventional attacks, making them unsure of what the USA response would be.

The fact that little accurate information was available about what was the next step likely to be taken in defence of Japan would generate caution, hesitation and even fear from an adversary.¹¹⁵⁶ Indeed, it is uncertainty of response that may deter a military aggression against Japan.¹¹⁵⁷ Adversaries were never certain of what their military actions would set off. Indeed, Halperin argued that “the mere fact that the United States had nuclear weapons and had a treaty commitment to Japan would create the possibility that the United States would use nuclear weapons in response to a nuclear attack on Japan, even if it was not committed to doing so.”¹¹⁵⁸ In short, the strategic logic behind US END over Japan is that either the Soviet Union or China could not completely ignore the possibility of triggering even US nuclear retaliation once Japan was massively devastated.¹¹⁵⁹ The US, needless to say, possessed massive and credible nuclear forces including possibly undetectable nuclear submarines. An American intelligence specialist, Gregory Treverton, aptly described this situation: “Soviet uncertainty about the American and allied response would sustain deterrence even as Soviet nuclear forces improved...any potential aggressor would be compelled to caution because it would be uncertain how close the United States was to the brink of nuclear retaliation.”¹¹⁶⁰ As Freedman aptly put it, “At issues is not the certainty that devastating weapons will be used but just the possibility that they might.”¹¹⁶¹

The prospect of employment of power to hurt (nuclear forces) could have

¹¹⁵⁶ Bruce R. Nardulli: “Clausewitz and the reorientation of nuclear strategy”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 5 No. 4 (1982), p. 498; Quester “Was Eisenhower a Genius?”, p. 178. See also Freedman, *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, p. 207.

¹¹⁵⁷ Ogawa, *Kaku Gunbikanri Gunshuku no yukue*, p. 216.

¹¹⁵⁸ Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 17.

¹¹⁵⁹ Ogawa, “Kaku no Kasa to Rironteki Kento”, pp. 95-96.

¹¹⁶⁰ Treverton, “How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?”, p. 115.

¹¹⁶¹ Lawrence Freedman: *Nuclear Deterrence* (London: Penguin Random House UK., 2018), p. 50.

deterrent effects.¹¹⁶² Any nuclear power could not technically destroy all US nuclear forces, SLBMs in particular by a first strike. As a renowned American nuclear strategy analyst, Fred Kaplan noted, “If deterrence was defined as the survivability of a second-strike force, SLBMS... were crucial.”¹¹⁶³ Given this frightful reality, so long as there is a possibility that rather invulnerable nuclear force might be launched in response to nuclear attacks by Russians or Chinese, they might be deterred. In view of this aspect, to some extent, details on specific weaponry required for deterrence did not matter as long as the USA had a secure second strike capability and a possibility of retaliation with this military capability. What matters was the potential to harm and retaliate effectively.

Ultimately, the key to “invisible” END rests on ambiguity of a US response and escalation caused by the response to an armed aggression against Japan, which can never be eradicated both in peacetime and crisis time. In this regard, “Invisible” END, to some extent, rests on Bundy’s existential deterrence: the prospect of nuclear escalation or that “the impossibility of knowing for sure that devastating retaliation would not occur” deters a potential aggression.¹¹⁶⁴ In this respect, we have to closely look at the trip-wire role of US force in Japan along with a role of US “perceived interests” and “reputation.”

In practice US nuclear threat designed to protect Japan is backed by forward-deployed conventional force, US forces stationed on Japan. As a plausible scenario, any large-scale armed attack against Japan would probably lead to a response of US forces in Japan as stipulated in the US-Japan security.¹¹⁶⁵ Of course, even before the assault, an opponent had to deal with the Seventh Fleet, arguably the best fleet among the US naval fleets, in view of the maritime environment of Japan. With the presence of the fleet, the successful chance of a Russian amphibious invasion of Japan was doubtful.¹¹⁶⁶ The Seventh Fleet relied heavily

¹¹⁶² Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, pp.5-9.

¹¹⁶³ Kaplan, “Rethinking Nuclear Policy”, p.22. See also *FRUS*, 1961-1963, Vol. 8, p. 151.

¹¹⁶⁴ Sagan, “The Commitment Trap”, p. 88.)

¹¹⁶⁵ Kubo, “Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata.”

¹¹⁶⁶ See for example Luttwak, “The Problems of Extending Deterrence” p. 34

on the facilities and ship repair services at Yokosuka base, which also guaranteed forward military presence.¹¹⁶⁷ Without this key base, the Seventh fleet operations would be much hindered. Already in 1957, American policy makers saw the importance of Japan and stressed that “without Yokosuka and Sasebo we would have to employ 2-1/2 times the number of ships to maintain and supply the 7th Fleet.”¹¹⁶⁸ It is no surprise that the Seventh Fleet has been headquartered at Yokosuka since 1972. The loss of Japan as a military stronghold would significantly reduce the US power projection capabilities as a whole in light of Japan’s geographical proximity to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan and the Soviet Union. This was also a key American consideration behind the reversion of Okinawa as stated previously.

In this respect, Schelling’s analogy of “trip wire” may be of relevance. To reemphasise this point by paraphrasing Schelling, “The acknowledged purpose of stationing American troops in *Japan* as a ‘trip wire’ was to convince the Russians that war in *Japan* would involve the United States whether the Russian thought the United States wanted to be involved or not—that escape from the commitment was physically impossible.”¹¹⁶⁹ That is, to some extent, the host nations hold the American troops hostage whose death would guarantee an American military involvement. As a result, the US defence commitments could be robust and even automatic unless the US government wanted to abandon fellow Americans.

All Japan should do was to defend itself against limited military attacks because large-scale communist attacks against Japan would provoke American military response in kind.¹¹⁷⁰ We must ask ourselves how likely it was that Russia or China would attack Japan without considering the prospect of US defence intervention in the instance of such an aggression to defend Japan where large US

¹¹⁶⁷ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document, 35, p. 48; Smith, “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 73.

¹¹⁶⁸ *FRUS*, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 18, Document 23, p. 60. See also Document 11 of the same volume, pp. 26-27.

¹¹⁶⁹ Emphasis added. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, p. 187.

¹¹⁷⁰ Mochizuki, “Japan’s Search for Strategy”, p. 156.

troops were stationed throughout Japan. In 1969 when the US and the Japanese government agreed to return Okinawa to Japan, the numbers of US troops in Japan was, for example, 41,800.¹¹⁷¹ They could not simply ignore the presence of US forces in Japan as its commitment to Japan and as a “trip-wire”. If American troops in Japan were attacked, the prospect of the entry of US nuclear weapons into a war would go much higher not least after the conflict expanded. In the words of the late British strategist, Michael Quinlan, “The risk of escalation to large-scale nuclear war is inescapably present in any significant armed conflict between nuclear-capable powers, whoever may have started the conflict.”¹¹⁷²

To reiterate, Article 5 of the US-Japan security treaty stipulates that “Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.”¹¹⁷³ If American troops in Japan incurred massive damage, this large-scale attack would turn loose a negative chain of events that could eventually lead to nuclear war. Without forward-deployed forces being attacked, this escalation scenario was quite unlikely and Japan would doubtlessly be more vulnerable. In other words, forward-deployed forces are a key component of “Invisible” END.¹¹⁷⁴ In this respect, Schelling posited that “What local military forces can do, even against very superior forces, is to initiate this uncertain process of escalation...Being able to lose a local war in a dangerous and provocative manner may make the risk—not the sure consequences, but the possibility of this act—

¹¹⁷¹ On the numbers of US forces in Japan, see Dai 3 14 Zu Zainichi Beigun Hieryoku no Suii [Appendix 3, 14 Chart of the numbers of US forces in Japan between 1957 and 1974] in Boei cho: *Showa 57 Nenban Boei Hakusho*[Defence White Paper, 1976], available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1985/w1985_03041.htm, accessed on 10 February 2019.

¹¹⁷² Quinlan, *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons*, p. 66. See also Freedman, *The Future of War*, p. 80.

¹¹⁷³ See Eccleston, Dawson and McNamara (eds.), *The Asia Pacific Profile*, p. 344.

¹¹⁷⁴ Ken Jimbo: “Rethinking Japanese Security: New Concepts in Deterrence and Defense”, in *Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center.,2003), p. 24 (24-45);Takuya Kubo: “Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata [A Framework to Consider the Development of Japan’s Defence Capabilities]”, available at the website of Tanaka Akihiko, World and Japan Database, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, University of Tokyo, 20 February 1971, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPSC/19710220.01J.html>, accessed on 10 September 2017.

outweigh the apparent gains to the other side.”¹¹⁷⁵ Was it too naive to think that the Communists wanted to avoid a military showdown with the USA?

On top of this, Japan and the US became trade partners during the Cold War. The US-Japan alliance is not only a security but also an economic and political alliance. Some American government officials even posited in 1965 that “Even leaving aside our Security Treaty commitments to Japan and our economic interest in retaining Japan as our second largest trading partner, there is good reason to believe that it will remain apparent in Tokyo, Moscow and Peiping that Communist subjugation of Japan would so drastically impair our world political and security position that there could be no possibility of our failing to come to Japan’s assistance if it were attacked.”¹¹⁷⁶ In other words, the US core interests were also found in peacetime US-Japan relations.

As Kennan maintained, Europe and Japan were particularly significant for the USA to contain the USSR.¹¹⁷⁷ With the advantage of hindsight Kennan’s contention was proved right. Japan became “the Germany of Orient” as one scholar called.¹¹⁷⁸ One letter written to Dulles in May 1957 indeed stressed the strategic importance of Japan for US global strategy:

In terms of our vital interests, Japan occupies in Asia a position similar to that of Germany in Western Europe. Just as the course that Germany follows in Western Europe will vitally affect where Western Europe goes, so the course that Japan chooses to follow will vitally influence the road that the free nations of the Far East and Asia follow. Japan has the only great industrial complex in Asia which in a sense is comparable to Ruhr-Western Europe complex. If it were ever harnessed to Communist power, we would be in a desperate situation. It is every bit as

¹¹⁷⁵ Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, pp. 104-105.

¹¹⁷⁶ Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field: Proposed U.S. Courses of Action”, p. 8.

¹¹⁷⁷ Kennan, *Memoirs 1925-1950*, pp. 374-375, 381, 391. See also Gaddis, *The Long Peace*, p. 41, 142.

¹¹⁷⁸ Walter LaFeber: *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-2000* 9th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education., 2002), pp.71-72.

important to us as Germany.¹¹⁷⁹

In other words, the loss of Japan would make it more difficult to defend the Asia-Pacific as a whole.¹¹⁸⁰ That Japan was under an imminent threat might have seen US global interests at stake too. In this respect, a potential attacker might be deterred by the probability that the US might react to protect its interests at stake. In a globalised context of the Cold War, from a grand strategic point of view, abandoning Japan meant the complete loss of its face, destroying its reputation as the global leader. If the USA had failed to respond to a military assault against Japan despite the large presence of American force in Japan, European NATO members would have lost their trust in American security commitments. In other words, the USA would have been required to retaliate in order to save its “face” and “reputation” as the leader of the Free World. As Roberts held, “issues of American credibility have sharpened in a world where actions anywhere have implications everywhere, reinforcing anxiety about U.S. consistency and magnifying the challenges of assurance.”¹¹⁸¹ Indeed as Schaller stressed the strategic importance of Japan, “Neither the war in Korea nor the one in Vietnam could have been fought but for the fact American leaders considered Japan the ultimate target of aggression in both cases.”¹¹⁸² In other words, the USA was convinced that the credibility of American security commitments to its allies would be shattered if the USA did not militarily act to combat against the spread of communism in these areas.¹¹⁸³

One NSC document in 1959 even posited that “The potential of Japan is now the key to Free World position in the Far East-Southeast Asia area because of her large industrious population highly indoctrinated and skilled in manufacturing

¹¹⁷⁹ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, Document 159, p. 325.

¹¹⁸⁰ *FRUS*, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, pp. 325-330.

¹¹⁸¹ Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, p. 179.

¹¹⁸² Schaller “Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991” p. 157.

¹¹⁸³ Melvyn P. Leffler: “Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991”, *OAH Magazine of History* Vol. 19 No. 2 (Mar 2005), p. 68.

techniques, and a large commercial and industrial base...With the industrial power of Japan, the communists could control the Far East.”¹¹⁸⁴

In light of this American analysis, there was a strong possibility that the US military must take military actions to protect the US “perceived” interests in Japan. Japan under communist control would have destabilized the whole region and thus, it would have been disadvantageous in many other respects for the USA itself. This would make US resolve more robust. Of course, the credibility of US nuclear commitments depends on US political determination after all.¹¹⁸⁵ At any rate, “invisible” END resides with the possibility of US willingness to escalate and the unpredictability of a US response. In short, “Invisible” END rests on a function of existential deterrence built on calculated ambiguity. Due to the existence of America’s constant political declarations about the possibility of America’s military intervention in a crisis to defend Japan should it be attacked by Chinese or Russians, the possibility of honouring political commitments was never nil. What would cause nuclear retaliation on behalf of Japan was never specified and a potential attacker never knew how the USA would respond to its aggression (calculated ambiguity). There were some strategic reasons for the USA to protect Japan: the presence of US troops in Japan (tripwire), the strategic importance of Japan for its grand strategy (perceived interests), the severe consequences of abandoning Japan (reputation). In view of these aspects, the probability of nuclear escalation following an attack on Japan could not be completely eliminated. This is how “Invisible END” works in theory.

Even though Japan did not rely on tactical nuclear weapons to signal to the Communists America’s resolve and the possibility of escalation, “Invisible” END still relied on US force stationed in Japan as an instrument for the mechanism of escalation (bring US strategic nuclear weapons). Japan accepted this “Invisible”

¹¹⁸⁴ Memorandum for the NSC Planning Board, “Basic National Security Policy”, 6 July 1959, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary. Office of the Regional Planning Advisor, Tope Secret Files, 1957-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

¹¹⁸⁵ Nakanishi, “U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan”, p. 93.

form of deterrence and put its faith in the uncertainty nature of the nuclear deterrent.

Conclusion

One of the primary reasons why Wakaizumi wrote the book on Okinawa reversion was to arouse national discussion on Japan's national security, but his plan was doomed.¹¹⁸⁶ Contrary to his expectation, his book did not get the attention he thought that deserved. The Japanese public showed apathy about his book and his confession. What this suggests is that the Japanese have not directly addressed one of the post-war fundamental issues: nuclear weapons. The invisible form of US END was a direct result of political compromise of Sato, who clearly understood the importance of nuclear deterrence. In the meantime, he was well aware that the Japanese public would never allow either the construction of indigenous nuclear weapons or the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan. In view of these concerns, Sato reached the secret agreement about the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Okinawa during a crisis especially in the event of the renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. As Sato admitted, Japan could not simply ignore the developments of the Korean Peninsula in this circumstance.

The existence of the secret nuclear deal can emphatically deny the legitimacy of "Invisible" END. Since this thesis contends that END constitutes not only deterrence but also psychological reassurance and the latter is more important than deterrence itself for Japan, it should stress again that "Visible" END calls for the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons on the soil of host nations and joint nuclear operation (burden sharing.) NATO was the most evident case of "Visible" END. Most importantly, Okinawa, the whole island of which the US military had long regarded as the legitimate military base, was diplomatically returned to Japan. It was definitely the last remaining problem between Japan and

¹¹⁸⁶ NHK Supersharu Shuzaihan, *Okinawa Henkan*, pp. 210-232.

the USA. When President Ford visited Japan in 1974, he declared that “Together, We removed the legacies of World War Two. The Reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last vestige of that war from our agenda.”¹¹⁸⁷

As General Shikata plausibly observed, relying on US nuclear deterrence for Japanese security has been the best course available.¹¹⁸⁸ Moreover, one Japanese analyst argued that “US extended deterrence is like oxygen for Japan: one will never notice it when it exists, but one will never be able to survive without it.”¹¹⁸⁹ We never notice US END over Japan probably because its nature is invisible inherent in ambiguity of a US response and the unpredictable course of a crisis if Japan is attacked. In theory Japan could elicit a deterrent effect from this uncertainty nature of deterrence (calculated ambiguity). Highly affected by the domestic political condition: infeasibility of the peacetime introduction of nuclear storage in Japan, this is after all the Japanese strategic preference.

Yet it must be noted that there is an unanswerable puzzle whether *deterrence worked and consequently, the USSR and China did not invade Japan during the Cold War.*¹¹⁹⁰ In truth, despite the theoretical developments of deterrence in the Cold War, we do not know how to make deterrence work with absolute certainty. Deterrence is after all a function of human psychology.¹¹⁹¹ As an international security expert Robert Art rightly asserted, “Explaining why something did not happen is more difficult than explaining why something did.”¹¹⁹² In a similar vein, a renowned deterrence specialist, Richard Smoke, also maintained that “In international relations as in everything else, one can never prove why something has *not* occurred.”¹¹⁹³ The effect of coercive use of force is a function of human psychology, which depends heavily on the perceptions of an

¹¹⁸⁷ Ford, “Japan Press Club of the President’s Speech and Statements.”

¹¹⁸⁸ Shikata, *Kyokuto Yuji*, p. 175.

¹¹⁸⁹ Katsuhisa Furukawa: “Nuclear option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework for Japan’s Nuclear Policy” in *Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center.,2003), p. 117.

¹¹⁹⁰ Indeed, it is often likened to a theological debate. See Carlo Masala: “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East”, *Strategic Assessment* Vol.14 No.4 (Jan 2012), p. 116.

¹¹⁹¹ Payne, *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence*, pp. xii-xiii, 30.

¹¹⁹² Art, “To What Ends Military Power?”, p. 8.

¹¹⁹³ Smoke, *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma*, p. 71.

adversary influenced by multiple variables.¹¹⁹⁴ There is, nevertheless, one thing for sure: the US military presence matters in deterrence for the case of Japan.

¹¹⁹⁴ Cordesman, *Deterrence in the 1980s*, p. 2; Terry L. Deibel: *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic form American Statecraft* (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 2007), pp. 142-143; Alexander L. George: “Coercive Diplomacy”, in Art and Waltz (eds), *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, p. 76; Stephen J. Cimbala: *Rethinking Nuclear Strategy* (Delaware: Scholarly Resources.,1988), pp. 183-184

Chapter Six

The Japanese Secret Nuclear Studies in the 1960s: Elite Perceptions

Some people consider it an anomaly that a country with Japan's economic strength, technological skill should be content to have comparatively small military forces and to depend on its nuclear security and on the behaviour of the other countries. Japan indeed is an anomaly. Japan is a departure from the general rule.

—Thomas C. Schelling¹¹⁹⁵

As noted in the previous three chapters, Japan's nuclear allergy was deep-seated. This anti-nuclear sentiment has been indeed widely shared among Japanese society. As stated previously, "Japan's non-nuclear option is a rare exception of a national consensus."¹¹⁹⁶ This does not mean, however, that Japanese policy makers have never considered Japan's independent nuclear deterrent option. We now know that Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, who won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974 for his three non-nuclear principles,¹¹⁹⁷ expressed his keen interests in Japan's nuclear option.¹¹⁹⁸ There were also several secret nuclear studies conducted by Japanese elites (bureaucrats and their associates) in the 1960s. These studies were driven by the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964 and the mounting pressure to sign the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Japanese elites critically analysed the world environment based in part on political realism. They could not simply turn a blind eye to the rise of a nuclear-armed China. This chapter will explore how the Japanese elites interpreted the feasibility and the pros and cons of an independent nuclear deterrent and their logical conclusion to dependence on US END. It will also critically examine if Japan had an immediate technological capability of producing nuclear weapons.

¹¹⁹⁵ First Agenda Topic, "Peace and Security in Asia and The Roles of Japan and the United" by Thomas C. Schelling.

¹¹⁹⁶ Shikata, *Kyokuto Yuji*, p. 194.

¹¹⁹⁷ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, p. 104.

¹¹⁹⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan (Washington D.C.: GPO., 2006) , pp.55-56.

For the sake of clarification, the secret nuclear studies were not a full-fledged government nuclear weapons programme like the Manhattan Project. Rather they were unofficial and pure theoretical studies on Japan's independent nuclear option. While the involvement of a political direction in these studies is pointed out by some analysts,¹¹⁹⁹ there is no evidence that Prime Minister Sato directed these projects at his request.¹²⁰⁰ It must be noted that the key members in one major nuclear study emphatically denied any governmental involvement or intervention.¹²⁰¹ They were carried out purely by senior Japanese government officials and their close colleagues outside the government.¹²⁰² In this chapter, three nuclear studies will be chronologically examined. Among these, particular attention will be devoted to one study (1968/70) commissioned by the Japanese Cabinet Research Office due to its scale and repercussions after the public disclosure of the study.

¹¹⁹⁹ Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 223; Katsuhisa Furukawa: "Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework for Japan's Nuclear Policy", in Self and Thompson (eds.): *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century*, p. 104; Selig S. Harrison (ed.): *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 1996), p.8; Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, pp. 92-93; Kase, *Daitouryou ate*, p. 26.

¹²⁰⁰ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.258.

¹²⁰¹ Michio Royama: "Seifu wa Kansho sinakatta" [There was no Intervention from the Government, *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 November 1994; Minro Shigaki:" Naicho Naibu no Teian ga Hottan"[The Studies were Driven by the own initiative of the Cabinet Research Office], *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 November 1994

¹²⁰² Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, 65-67; Masakatsu Ota: *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo* [The Whole Picture of US-Japan Secret Deal] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2011), p. 244.

I.B. Map: Current Membership of the NPT



Source: Number Umbrella State, *ILPI*, accessed 30 January 2019.

The Controversial Nature of the NPT

It is crucial to expound first how Japan viewed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty that foreclosed Japan's nuclear option in order to understand the key rationale behind the Japan's secret nuclear studies of the 1960s. Although it seems no surprise for Japan to sign the NPT without any problem and delay, Japan was actually one of the last countries to sign the treaty in 1970. Japan took another six years to ratify it. As an authority on deterrence, George Quester, posed an important question: "Given Japan's nuclear allergy in the aftermath of

Hiroshima and Nagasaki, why is NPT not made-to-order for Japan?”¹²⁰³ The answer to this question was more complex than his simple contention that Japan should be eager to sign the NPT. While it is true that it officially supported the NPT, Japan ran into some difficulties in signing and ratifying the NPT. Ambassador Johnson lucidly observed that “while in the end Japan will probably have no choice but to sign the NPT on whatever terms the U.S. and Soviets are able to agree upon, we should not necessarily take Japan for granted in this regard.”¹²⁰⁴ Japan indeed faced some security and political obstacles to joining the NPT regime.

First, to sign the NPT essentially meant closing down Japan’s nuclear path at least for the next twenty five years as stipulated in Article X. II: “Twenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods.” After the initial term of twenty five years, the treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995.¹²⁰⁵ When the NPT was raised as a global political agenda in the mid-1960s, there was an acute uncertainty whether China (a mad man with a knife) would sign the NPT. In fact China did not accede to it until 1992 (See the map of the current status of the NPT membership above). One Japanese diplomat implied that the NPT without China was meaningless because “it was the only country that would pose nuclear threats to Japan.”¹²⁰⁶

In this regard it was no surprise that Japanese foreign officials expressed their concerns about tying their hands to non-nuclear status. It would significantly

¹²⁰³ George H. Quester: “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, *Asian Survey* Vol. 10 No. 9 (Sep 1970), p. 766 (765-778).

¹²⁰⁴ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 84, p. 168.

¹²⁰⁵ “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, UNODA, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>, accessed on 31 December 2018. See also “Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 17 April-12 May 1995, UNODA, https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199503.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

¹²⁰⁶ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku. See also Dai 336 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Saikino Kakukakusan Boushi Mondaino Ugoki [Records of the 336 th Foreign Policy Planning Committee: Recent Developments of the NPT Problems] 28 July 1965, MOFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku06.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

undermine Japan's national interests.¹²⁰⁷ Ambassador Johnson understood the Japanese security position and explained in March 1967 that “the NPT requires Japan to renounce its options while doing nothing to meet its immediate concerns, which are the Soviet Union and Communist China, are in my opinion only a part of the reason for Japan's ambivalence on the NPT.”¹²⁰⁸ In fact in March 1967 Sato told Johnson that “Communist China was a clear threat and agreements such as the Partial Test Ban and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty were meaningless (sic) As long as Communist China stayed outside.”¹²⁰⁹

To be sure, as already demonstrated in the previous chapters, even without the NPT, it was considerably unlikely that Japan would go nuclear. There was still a big difference between an international treaty-based non-nuclear status and a mere domestic political decision to remain a non-nuclear power.¹²¹⁰ While it is true that Japan could technically withdraw from the NPT as Article X. I articulates (the legal right to withdraw), “NPT ratification unquestionably raised barriers to Japan's nuclearisation.”¹²¹¹ Article X. I stipulates as follows:

Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.¹²¹²

¹²⁰⁷ Dai 2 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku Taiko, Dai 2 Bu Tomen no waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku [Records of the 2nd Foreign Policy Planning Committee: Guidelines of Japan's Foreign Policy] 29 August 1969, MOFA https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku03.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018; Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten.

¹²⁰⁸ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 84, p. 168.

¹²⁰⁹ Chicom Briefing for Prime Minister Sato, (1 March 1967), DNSA, JU00652, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

¹²¹⁰ Dai 336 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku.

¹²¹¹ Etel Solingen: *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2007), p. 65.

¹²¹² “Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, UNODA.

Indeed North Korea withdrew from the NPT in January 2003, issuing an official statement that “Though we pull out of the NPT, we have no intention of producing nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production of electricity.” At the same time, North Korea severely blamed US aggression for its withdrawal.¹²¹³ Recently the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the so-called “Iran Nuclear Deal” has prompted Iran to threaten to withdraw from the NPT as well.¹²¹⁴ Accordingly, the NPT is not flawless and still gives the signatories an option to build nuclear weapons should their security be in imminent danger. That said, considering the record and history of the NPT, North Korea is the only exception and the treaty has been overall successful.

Importantly Japanese foreign officials even discussed the option of withdrawal from the NPT if a nuclear China posed serious threats to Japan. One official even held that “the NPT without China was nonsense. Japan had better make its position clear that Japan would withdraw from the NPT without Chinese participation in the treaty.”¹²¹⁵

The ramifications of the non-nuclear decision in the 1960s were decisive for Japan’s future especially given that Japan might have had an advanced technological and economic capacity for the production of nuclear weapons.¹²¹⁶ One secret American government report of 1965 that assessed Japan’s nuclear weapon production capability noted that “Japan is technologically and economically capable of becoming a formidable nuclear power...it could test its first nuclear device as early as 1971 without violating existing reactor safeguard provisions, thereafter

¹²¹³ “North Korea withdraws from nuclear treaty”, *The Guardian*, 10 January 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/10/northkorea1>, accessed 11 February 2019.

¹²¹⁴ Michale Pee, Alex Barker and Najameh Bozorgmehr: “Iran threatens to withdraw from nuclear proliferation treaty”, *The Guardian*, 25 May 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/6dda41ac-6020-11e8-9334-2218e7146b04>, accessed on 11 February 2019.

¹²¹⁵ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten.

¹²¹⁶ Etsusaburo Shiina Shugiin Gaimuiinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 18 February 1966, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0082/05102180082002.pdf>, accessed on 2 January 2019; Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten.

producing estimated 10-30 weapons annually.”¹²¹⁷ Regardless of whether this estimate was accurate, Japan was doubtlessly one of the NPT’s main targets—ensuring that Japan would remain a non-nuclear-weapon state was one of the NPT’s important goals.¹²¹⁸

It is worth noting that in November 1969 Kiichi Arita, Director General of Defence Agency (Defence Minister), admitted that twenty five years of a formal commitment to Japan’s non-nuclear status was definitely a grave concern for Japan. He argued that while we wanted to see the future of the US-Japan Security Treaty (which was due to be renewed in 1970) and the political direction of Communist China first, we should nevertheless proceed to sign the treaty. A nationalist figure of the LDP and a Pearl Harbour attack Planner, Minoru Genda, argued against Arita’s claim. He held that we were quite uncertain if the US nuclear umbrella would work against a Chinese nuclear attack upon us. Therefore, we should not sign the NPT.¹²¹⁹ To clarify his argument, the nationalist group did not necessarily deny the importance of the US-Japan security alliance, but it advocated more Japan’s independence. It also regarded “military independence and rearmament as a matter of national pride, and the military forces of such countries as the...Soviet Union and China as dangerous.”¹²²⁰ At any rate it is clear that following Chinese nuclearisation, the NPT was closely linked to Japan’s security

Second, the NPT affected a Japanese global standing. The sense of frustration of joining the NPT regime was particularly found in some segments of the Foreign Ministry, which was in charge of the NPT negotiations.¹²²¹ The late administrative vice-minister of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ryohei Murata, thought

¹²¹⁷ Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. 1.

¹²¹⁸ Hoey, *Sato, America and the Cold War*, p. 77.

¹²¹⁹ Kakubou Joyaku ni Kansuru Jiminto Goudo Kaigi: Daijinhatsu Zaibei Ei Doku So Kokurendai Junebu DaiTaishi ate Dempo[Minutes of General LDPJ Meeting on the NPT: Telegram from Foreign Minister to Ambassador to US, UK, Germany, Soviet, the United Nation and Geneva Mission] 10 November 1969, *MOFA*, , https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku04.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

¹²²⁰ Sasae, *Rethinking Japan-US Relations*: p. 15

¹²²¹ Iwama, “The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, p. 164.

that the NPT principally targeted Japan's and Germany's nuclear option.¹²²² It was essentially an unequal treaty in that it allowed the five nuclear states to keep their nuclear forces while the rest of the world was prohibited from possessing such weapons, dividing the world between “haves” and “have-nots.”¹²²³ As President Johnson admitted, under the NPT “nations without nuclear weapons promised not to make them or receive them from others” while “Nations with nuclear weapons pledged to work toward effective arms control and disarmament.”¹²²⁴ This in part motivated the Foreign Ministry to have a secret (but private) meeting with West German officials in 1969 although this meeting did not have any great impact on the course of both countries' foreign policy.¹²²⁵ The sense of inequality (haves and have-nots) was widely shared within the LDP too.¹²²⁶ The NPT regime ultimately created the exclusive nuclear club while Japan was excluded from it at least for twenty five years and instead the treaty gave Japan second-class status.¹²²⁷ Deputy Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Nobuhiko Ushiba, articulated in November 1966:

it would be absolutely unacceptable for Japan to be permanently categorised as a second-class state by joining the NPT regime. This was not just a Japanese status issue but it was a serious problem of the predetermined condition that would allow

¹²²² Murata, *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jyokan*, p. 211; NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 43-45.

¹²²³ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku Shomeino Saino Nihonkoku Seifu Seimei [The Government Statement with Respect to the Signature of the NPT], 3 February 1970, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku14.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2019. See also Dai 360 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kaku Kakusan Boshi Mondainitsuite [Records of the 360th Foreign Policy Planning Committee: Problems Related to the NPT] 16 February 1966, MOFA https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku07.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018; Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten.

¹²²⁴ Johnson, *The Vantage Point*, p. 462.

¹²²⁵ NHK Supersharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p. 24. See also Murata, *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jyokan*, p. 212.

¹²²⁶ Etsusaburo Shiina, Shugiin Gaimuinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 18 February 1966, *KKKS*; <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0082/05102180082002.pdf>, accessed on 3 January 2019. See also Quester, “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, p. 773, 776.

¹²²⁷ Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite [Present Japanese Stance on the Ratification of the NPT], 24 April 1973, MOFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku15.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2019; *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 84, p. 168.

the only five nuclear powers to make key decision about vital global issues. This condition would never be acceptable and for us, this was a critical problem.¹²²⁸

The following month, Ushiba made a similar statement when he met with Nicholas Katzenbach, Under Secretary of State. There he said:

Japan has very strong views against being permanently classified as a second-rate power through signing the treaty and foregoing nuclear weapons. While Japan is not contemplating a nuclear weapons program, it would be most unfortunate if due to the treaty there was a division between the nuclear powers as first-rate powers and the non-nuclear powers as second-rate powers.¹²²⁹

This is why the Japanese government was closely watching the reactions of other countries which had a similar position to Japan (technically advanced and potentially anxious for great power status) such as Italy, Sweden and West Germany in particular.¹²³⁰ There was even a contention that Japan would not suffer from anything even remaining outside the treaty if West Germany did not join the NPT regime either.¹²³¹ Moreover, in September 1967 Miki told Rusk that “Should India and Italy, for example, not agree to sign Japan would also find it most difficult to do so.”¹²³² It is important to note that Japan signed the NPT in February 1970 after West Germany signed it in November 1969. Japan closely watched West German’s reaction to the treaty.¹²³³

¹²²⁸ Dai 5 Kainichibei Seisaku Kikaku Kyougu (Kiroku) [The Fifth Japan-US Policy Planning Dialogue, Record] November 1966, *MOFA*, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku12.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

¹²²⁹ Memorandum of Conversation: U.S.-Japanese Relations (2 December 1966), DNSA, JU00617, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

¹²³⁰ Dai 336 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku. See also Iwama, “The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty”, p. 168; Memorandum of Conversation: Non-Proliferation Treaty (Part II of II), (16 September 1967). See also Quester, “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, p. 769.

¹²³¹ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku: Kakufukakusan Joyaku no Mondaiten.

¹²³² Memorandum of Conversation: Non-Proliferation Treaty (Part II of II), (16 September 1967).

¹²³³ Yoko Iwama: “The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the

In February 1969 the staff members of the Japanese Foreign Policy Planning Committee held a secret but still private meeting on the future foreign policy with West Germany officials and laid out future challenges Japan would likely face after joining the NPT such as the rise of a nuclear India and the arms control between the USA and China. The Japanese foreign officials implied that the Japanese civilian nuclear and space programme could be converted to the military nuclear weapon programme in case of an emergency. The Japanese side reportedly encouraged the West German officials to play a more independent and active diplomatic role in foreign affairs and work together for the goal. Needless to say, this idea was not well received in the German side.¹²³⁴ Yet Japanese diplomats needed to know how their German counterparts perceived implications of the NPT on German's security.¹²³⁵

Interestingly the opposition parties were also opposed to the NPT due in part to the discriminatory nature of the treaty. They also expressed their objection to the NPT on the grounds that its effort was not sufficient enough for the global nuclear disarmament. It still allowed the five nuclear weapons to retain their nuclear arsenals without any concrete deadline.¹²³⁶

Third, the Japanese government was concerned that the NPT would hinder the peaceful use of atomic energy.¹²³⁷ The Japanese electronics industry too was greatly wary that the NPT would impede its commercial activity. The treaty raised

Non-Proliferation Treaty' in John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (eds.): *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance* (Abingdon: Routledge., 2018), p. 164 (151-170); Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 225.

¹²³⁴ The German document was released along with other Top-Secret Documents in response to NHK's TV programme (Kaku wo Motometa Nihon) by MOFA in 2010. It is available at the website of MOFA, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku00.pdf, accessed on 6 September 2017. For the Japanese record, see Dai Ikkai NichiDoku Seisaku Kikaku Kyogi Yoroku [The Summary of The First Japan-German Policy Planning Meeting], 6 February 1969, MOFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku01.pdf, accessed on 30 December 2018.

¹²³⁵ Murata, *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jyoukan*, p. 212.

¹²³⁶ Shichiro Hozumi, Shugiin Gaimuinkai [Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives] 18 February 1966, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/051/0082/05102180082002.pdf>, accessed on 2 January 2019. See also Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, p. 66; Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, p. 64.

¹²³⁷ Memorandum of Conversation: Non-Proliferation Treaty (Part II of II), (16 September 1967), DNSA, JU00757, JUSDSER, 1960-1976.

the question of safeguards.¹²³⁸ The Japanese government was opposed to any unequal treatment of safeguards or any special concessions for the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), which retained its self-inspection system exempted from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection system.¹²³⁹ The main duty of the IAEA is to monitor international proliferation of nuclear weapons.¹²⁴⁰

Moreover, when the EURATOM member states (Belgium, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) signed the NPT in 1969, they clearly indicated their position on the treaty. They would not ratify it until they reached a satisfactory agreement on safeguards with the IAEA. Japan had to follow suit. Japan could not place its civil atomic programme in a disadvantageous position relative to EURATOM.¹²⁴¹ Although there were some negative aspects of signing the NPT in the long run, Japan did not face any urgent strategic challenges.¹²⁴² Now we will look at why Japan signed the NPT.

Diplomatically and domestically there was no way that Japan remained outside the NPT like India. In addition, it was arguably more beneficial for Japan to join the non-proliferation regime.¹²⁴³ It was after all nearly unthinkable for Japan to go nuclear. In this respect, the Japanese government was fully aware that its nuclear security had to depend heavily on US nuclear deterrence.¹²⁴⁴ Japanese diplomats were to some extent convinced that the US nuclear umbrella would

¹²³⁸ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Inukai Kiroku. See also Quester, “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, p. 766; Solingen, *Nuclear Logics*, p. 64.

¹²³⁹ Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite; Kakubou Joyaku ni Kansuru Jiminto Goudo Kaigi; Memorandum of Conversation: Non-Proliferation Treaty (Part II of II), (16 September 1967). See also Quester, “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, pp. 766-770, 777-778.

¹²⁴⁰ Gavin, “Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War”, p. 398.

¹²⁴¹ Kakuheikino Fukakusan ni Kansuru Joyaku heno wagakunino Kanyu niyoru Rigai Tokushitsu [Merits and Demerits of Japanese Participation in the NPT], August 1969, MOFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku11.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2019; Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

¹²⁴² Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

¹²⁴³ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Inukai Kiroku.

¹²⁴⁴ Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

continue to protect Japan as long as it acted as a responsible member of the free world.¹²⁴⁵

In fact, as early as 1966 the Sato government showed its support for the NPT at the Diet mainly because of Japanese non-nuclear policy shaped by anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan.¹²⁴⁶ In March 1967 Sato himself stated at the Diet that Japan as a country seeking world peace and disarmament was in support of the peace spirit of the NPT.¹²⁴⁷ Moreover Japan declared that it would promote “arms control and a reduction of arms race, including *the early conclusion of a Non-Proliferation Treaty*” in the joint statement following the US-Japan summit in November 1967.¹²⁴⁸ Following month, “Three Non-Nuclear principles” (not to possess, produce and introduce nuclear weapons) were declared as well. Japan essentially reconfirmed its non-nuclear principles as a distinct symbol of a “peace state” again by signing the treaty.¹²⁴⁹ In this connection, Japan chose its peace state status over the second-tier status. Japanese policy makers were acutely aware that Japan in any case would not be able to become a nuclear super power like the Soviet Union and the USA.¹²⁵⁰ To be sure, a nuclear Japan was highly unlikely at any rate given fervent public opposition to the nuclearisation of Japan. In the meantime, when Japan signed the NPT Japan pointed to the existence of Article X.I (the right to withdrawal) in the statement accompanying its signature in 1970. It still paid heed to its security.¹²⁵¹ The Chinese nuclear programme was deliberately left untouched.¹²⁵² One analyst argued that “States such as Japan and South Korea, as

¹²⁴⁵ Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku.

¹²⁴⁶ Shiina, Shugiin Gaimuinkai, 18 February 1966.

¹²⁴⁷ Eisaku Sato, Shugiin Hon Kaigi [A Plenary Session of House of Representatives] 14 March 1967, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/055/0512/05503140512003.pdf>, accessed on 3 January 2019.

¹²⁴⁸ Emphasis added. Joint Communiqué between President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato of Japan following talks in Washington November 14 and 15, 1967.

¹²⁴⁹ Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

¹²⁵⁰ Dai 336 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku.

¹²⁵¹ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku Shomeino Saino Nihonkoku Seifu Seimei ; Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite: Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru, 12 February 1970, MOFA, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku09.pdf, accessed on 2 January 2019.

¹²⁵² Dai 489 Kai Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai Kiroku.

well as many NATO allies, have foresworn indigenous nuclear arsenals in part because of credible U.S. extended deterrence commitments.”¹²⁵³ As we have seen, the reality was much more complex than this assessment. Because of its security concerns about a nuclear China and the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella, some Japanese policy makers found it vital to keep Japan’s nuclear option open in case of a future contingency.

It is also important to note how the US government perceived Japan’s ambiguous attitude toward signing the NPT. As the Japanese government admitted, there was no strong American pressure on the Japanese government to hasten to sign the treaty.¹²⁵⁴ When Prime Minister Sato met with President Nixon in November 1969, Sato remarked to Nixon that “there had been no change in Japan’s position based on the strong national sentiment against nuclear weapons...If the United States felt that it required early Japanese signature he hoped it would so inform the Foreign Minister.” Nixon replied to Sato that “he would not press for this. Each must do so in its own time, when it felt it best to do so...Japan was a sovereign state and should make this decision itself. He had told the Germans the same thing.”¹²⁵⁵ To be sure, Johnson’s and Nixon’s attitude toward the NPT was different. Johnson was the one who strove to establish the NPT while Nixon was arguably more relaxed about the treaty and even desired (selective) nuclear proliferation from his strategic point of view. We have to bear in mind that Nixon lamented that Japan’s disarmament was a mistake and he wanted a stronger Japan to contain communism in the Far East. In short, Nixon wanted Japan to be a regional balancer. In view of his strategic view, it was probably no surprise that he was not personally against Japan’s nuclear option although in public he would have had to completely oppose it. On 6 January 1972, Nixon told Sato that “Japan is faced with an unacceptable choice: either Japan develops its own deterrent power however unpalatable vis-à-vis its neighbours, who are armed with nuclear weapons, or it

¹²⁵³ Gerson, “No First Use”, p. 43.

¹²⁵⁴ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite:Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru.

¹²⁵⁵ *FRUS*, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2, Japan, Document 35, p. 114.

comes to an accommodation with them.” In response, Sato answered that “Japan has adopted by unanimous resolution of the Diet a policy based on the three non-nuclear principles [on 24 November 1971]. Therefore, Japan must rely on the United States nuclear umbrella under the Mutual Security Treaty.”¹²⁵⁶ The next day they had a talk about the NPT. Sato asked whether Japan should ratify the treaty immediately and Nixon replied:

each nation should handle this problem in the light of its own circumstances. It is not a matter for us to decide, and we respect the right of each nation to decide for itself in the light of its own desires. The United States, he said, is not exerting pressure on Japan to ratify...The President continued; Japan might take its time, and thus keep any potential enemy concerned. He then asked the Prime Minister to forget the preceding remark.¹²⁵⁷

He further went to claim that “For domestic purposes he understood that the GOJ had to say that Japan would not develop its military power, but in terms of serving Japan’s foreign policy he felt it better to cause its neighbors some concern...”¹²⁵⁸ In response Sato reiterated his political view expressed to US political leaders. He answered that “the anti-war, anti-security treaty feelings in Japan are deep-rooted. If the situation changed, Japan would wish to defend itself, but the shock of the war is still deep and more time is needed before a change could take place.”¹²⁵⁹ From this exchange, we can see Nixon’s strategic view, but his personal strategic view did not necessarily mean it would be shared by other nuclear powers and even with his own administration.

As for another key driver for Japan to sign the NPT, Japan also considered that its peaceful use of atomic energy would be hindered if Japan remained outside

¹²⁵⁶ Ibid., Document 111, p. 380.

¹²⁵⁷ Ibid., Document 112, p. 397..

¹²⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 397-398.

¹²⁵⁹ Ibid., p.398.

the NPT.¹²⁶⁰ Because Japan relied heavily on nuclear fissile materials imported from the NPT signatory states such as the USA and the UK, it was highly conceivable that these countries would have restricted imports to Japan in the foreseeable future if Japan had remained outside the NPT.¹²⁶¹ On the contrary, Japan would continue to have, and gain even better access to the nuclear materials if Japan signed the treaty.¹²⁶² As for the inspection issue, Japan followed the EURATOM's stance on ratification—it would ratify the treaty only after coming to the satisfactory agreement on safeguards. More technically, Japan had to sign it first in order to have a say in the equal treatment of safeguards.¹²⁶³ If Japan signed it after the treaty came into force (March 1970), Japan was obliged to sign and ratify it at the same time without any negotiations over safeguards. It was more of a tactical decision to sign it at that time.¹²⁶⁴ Japan could negotiate its position over IAEA safeguards against its civil atomic activities. The Japanese government was also aware that it took quite a long time to ratify it since the ratification process required Diet approval.¹²⁶⁵ When Japan signed the treaty, it even implied that the signature would not be followed by rapid ratification.¹²⁶⁶ Japan took as many as six years to see and ensure that its nuclear energy programme would not be constrained by the NPT regulations. Japan ratified the treaty again after West Germany ratified it in 1975.¹²⁶⁷ In the end, Japan probably had no choice but to join the NPT. That being said, it was in no way uncontested and it was directly

¹²⁶⁰ Kakubou Joyaku ni Kansuru Jiminto Goudo Kaigi.

¹²⁶¹ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite:Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru. See also Ryukichi Imai: "Japan's Nuclear Policy: Reflections on the Immediate Past, Prognosis for the 21st Century" in Raju G. C. Thomas: *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1998), p. 192 (183-206).

¹²⁶² Kakuheikino Fukakusan ni Kansuru Joyaku heno wagakunino Kanyu niyoru Rigai tokushitsu; Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite:Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru; Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

¹²⁶³ "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)." See also Gen Dankainiokeru Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku (NPT) Hijyun Mondaini Kansuru wagakunino Taido nitsuite.

¹²⁶⁴ Kakuheikino Fukakusan ni Kansuru Joyaku heno wagakunino Kanyu niyoru Rigai tokushitsu ; Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite:Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru.

¹²⁶⁵ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku no Shomeinitsuite:Gimon to Hihan ni Kotaeru.

¹²⁶⁶ Kakuheiki Fukakusan Joyaku Shomeino Saino Nihonkoku Seifu Seimei..

¹²⁶⁷ Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 223; Harrison, *Japan's Nuclear Future*, p. 7; Imai, "Japan's Nuclear Policy", pp. 192-194; Iwama, "The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty", p. 165.

concerned with Japan's defence, prestige and energy security. With these in mind, we will explore the rationale behind the secret nuclear studies of the 1960s.

The Quasi Defence Agent Report of 1968

Let us start with a quasi-Defence Agency report on a Japan's nuclear-arming option. This study was publicly produced in the late 1960's by a quasi-private group known as *Anzen Hosho Chousa Kai* (Research Commission on Security). This group actually consisted of the active officials of the Japan Defence Agency (JDA) such as Osamu Kaihara and journalists from Yomiuri News Paper. One of the members later reflected that this kind of study was imperative although it was a taboo to examine the possibility of the possession of independent nuclear weapons within the JDA. This study was disguised as a private report despite the fact that active government officials were involved in the study. It could not completely conceal its official character as a production of the JDA.¹²⁶⁸ When this work was produced, there was a clear reason why this type of work could not be conducted by the JDA. It was because of the public revelation of a secret US-Japan joint operational plan study (*Mitsuya Kenkyu*) of 1963 based on a scenario of the renewal of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula. It assumed the introduction of US nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan and use of such arsenals in case of direct attacks on Japan.¹²⁶⁹ Admittedly, the US military believed it necessary to use tactical nuclear weapons in times of an armed conflict in Korea, but it was predictable that the tactical use of nuclear weapons, nevertheless, would escalate to general war.¹²⁷⁰ This secret operational study was unveiled in 1965 and provoked a fervent backlash as already noted. Since then, the JDA became reluctant to study a

¹²⁶⁸ Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, pp. 67-70.

¹²⁶⁹ Haruo Fujii: *Top Secret: Nichibei Kyodo Sakusen no Teteikenkyu* [The Detailed Study of Secret US-Japan Joint Operational Plan] (Tokyo: Kojinsha., 1992), pp. 124-126.

¹²⁷⁰ Memorandum for the Secretary of State, "Study of Limited War Capabilities", 28 July 1960, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary. Office of the Regional Planning Advisor, Top Secret Files, 1957-1962, Box 2, RG 59, NARA.

contingency plan.¹²⁷¹

Its section of nuclear armament was written by Osamu Kaihara, who was the then Director General of the National Defence Council.¹²⁷² The report's conclusion was straightforward in that Japan's nuclear option was not desirable even though Japan was technically capable of producing plutonium-based nuclear bombs (approximately 20 bombs per year) utilizing its first full-scale commercial nuclear reactor at Tokaimura imported from Britain.¹²⁷³ The report raised two specific reasons why it argued against Japan's nuclear option: first it would incur the huge production costs that would make such an option not only financially but also militarily unattractive; second it would have considerable repercussions on Japan's global standing as a peace state, generating grave mistrust among Japanese neighbours. All these things considered, the report proposed that the most sensible option Japan should pursue to rely on US nuclear deterrence.¹²⁷⁴ It also articulated that while Japan's nuclear option was often discussed abroad, there was general agreement in Japan that it should not build its own nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. In view of the current constitution, political and social climate, the report concluded that it was inconceivable that the Japanese would allow themselves to choose the nuclear path.¹²⁷⁵

The 1968/ 70 Report

In the wake of the China's nuclear test, in February 1968 Minro Shigaki of the Cabinet Research Office commissioned a secret nuclear study to the top authorities on international politics, military strategy and nuclear energy, forming

¹²⁷¹ Tanaka, *Anzen Hoshō*, pp. 215-216.

¹²⁷² Yoshitaka Sasaki: "Kakusenryaku no Nakano Nihon"[US Nuclear Strategy and Japan] in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen I: kakuto Taiketsu suru 20 Seiki* [Nuclear and Human: Confronting Nuclearism The 20th Century World in Crisis Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.,1999), pp. 254-257.

¹²⁷³ Anzen Hoshō Chosa Kainihon no *Anzen Hoshō: 1970 Nen he no Tenbo 1968 Nen Ban* [Japan's Security: Prospects for 1970, 1968 Edition] (Tokyo: Anzen Hoshō Chosa Kai., 1968), pp. 312-313.

¹²⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 138-142.

¹²⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 293.

a study group: *Kanamaro Kai*.¹²⁷⁶ This study aimed to explore the feasibility and desirability of Japan's independent nuclear weapons. Shigaki explained that the study was driven by a sense of urgency and insecurity that the US nuclear umbrella alone did not have enough a deterrent effect on China.¹²⁷⁷ As a Japanese scholar, Yuri Kase, plausibly maintained, "Japan, in the mid-1960s, viewed China as a developing state with little technological capability. Hence, China's first nuclear detonation created major unease among Japanese policymakers and scholars."¹²⁷⁸ Indeed in March 1967 Sato said that he was shocked to find that the development pace of the Chinese nuclear weapons programme was much faster than he expected.¹²⁷⁹ This perception of unsophisticated Chinese technology is likened to the *Sputnik* Shock of 1957. After the successful launch of *Sputnik*, the Americans could no longer regard the Russians as technologically backward people.¹²⁸⁰ This might have been the second *Sputnik* Shock to Japan. As security scholar Barry Buzan maintained, nations "face the constant worry that their rivals will gain a military advantage by being the first to achieve a decisive technological breakthrough. Such conditions create relentless pressure on states to lead, or at least to keep up with, the pace of change by continuously modernizing their armed force."¹²⁸¹

The study group produced the two separate reports known as the 1968 and the 1970 reports, which were first leaked to the public in 1994 by a Japanese national newspaper, *Asahi Shimbun*. It treated the reports as its headlines.¹²⁸² This study was significant in that the special government funding was allocated to it and the study itself was also comprehensive. The group studied the subject, consulting widely with government officials and experts on military, economy,

¹²⁷⁶ NHK Supersharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p.77.

¹²⁷⁷ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibeï Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 126, 204; NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 72-74.

¹²⁷⁸ Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 60.

¹²⁷⁹ Chicom Briefing for Prime Minister Sato, (1 March 1967).

¹²⁸⁰ Dwight D. Eisenhower, *The White House Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (London: Heinemann, 1965), 205.

¹²⁸¹ Buzan, *An Introduction to Strategic Studies*, p. 109.

¹²⁸² "Kakubuso Kano daga Motenu" [Technologically Able to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, but Not to Do So], *Asahi Shimbun*, 13 November 1994.

weapon, finance and nuclear energy in developing recommendations.¹²⁸³ For that, the reports presumably reflected the most genuine information available on the subject at that time. Now we will examine the first part of the report (1968).

The 1968 report mainly assessed the Japanese technological, organizational and financial feasibility of Japan's nuclearisation (a nuclear armed Japan). In its introduction, the report set out its aim to analyse critically the popular contention that Japan could easily become a nuclear state. Notably while it concluded that purely theoretically Japan had no technical impediments to producing a small number of nuclear weapons and it would be rather easy, it suggested that Japan would face many practical barriers such as the huge financial costs of building an effective deterrent (i.e. a credible second strike capability).¹²⁸⁴

The 1968 report suggested, as the Research Commission on Security noted, that the first commercial nuclear reactor at Tokaimura might be able to produce plutonium-base bombs. This reactor (the Calder-Hall variety) certainly produced plutonium that is under the IAEA's eyes. Yet it would not produce weapon-grade plutonium. Japan would need nuclear fuel reprocessing (plutonium separation) facilities to acquire weapon-grade plutonium. For that purpose, Japan would need more plutonium to produce weapon-grade plutonium and it would be hard to import more uranium than necessary from the UK. In other words, Japan did not have fissile materials at its disposal. Moreover, the reprocessing costs would be high.¹²⁸⁵ Even a sanguine CIA analysis done in 1964 reported that Japan "theoretically could produce nuclear weapons by the end of this decade if it desired...however, Japan does not have sufficient uranium for a weapons program. A major problem would be

¹²⁸³ Ibid. See also Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 56 and Campbell and Sunohara: "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 223; Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo*, pp. 243-245.

¹²⁸⁴ Naikaku Chosa Shitsu: "Nihon no Kakuseisakuni Kansuru Kisoteki Kenkyu: Sono Ichi (hereafter simply The 1968 Report)", September 1968. The two reports are available on the website of Union of Concerned Scientist, <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-nuclear-weapons-policy/japan-america-nuclear-posture#.W a2RqrLyjIU>, accessed on 4 September 2017.

¹²⁸⁵ The 1968 Report, pp.2-9.

to locate sources of uranium free of safeguards.”¹²⁸⁶ More crucially even if Japan could produce nuclear bombs, they had to be tested at least three to five times to ensure that they would work. The reliability of untested weapons was not certain. Realistically speaking, Japan did not have any underground nuclear testing sites.¹²⁸⁷ Of course, alternatively a testing site could have been constructed in a mountainous area at an estimated cost of 30 million US dollars.¹²⁸⁸ Japan could have carried out a test under the sea within Japanese waters but this would have been a clear breach of the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 which Japan signed in August 1963. The test would have readily provoked public rage in Japan over the experiment.¹²⁸⁹

As a delivery platform, missiles were the most realistic choices for Japan. Yet Japan did not have strategic missiles and much less the military guidance system. That said, China tested its first ICBM in 1971 and so, the technical difficulty would have probably been surmountable. Yet it was conceivable that many science students would not be willing to study the missile guidance system if they found out that this system in turn would be used for a military purpose.¹²⁹⁰ There was no guarantee that Japanese scientists would obediently follow an order from the Japanese government order to produce nuclear bombs. This major project could not be achieved without massive public support either. Of course, in theory Japan would not have needed public support to build nuclear weapons. In the case of nuclear-sensitive Japan, this option was not politically sensible and even feasible. Any sign of a secret nuclear weapons program would have risked the political life of any cabinet no matter how popular it would have been. There was a big hurdle to reach a national consensus of a nuclear Japan even if the government was

¹²⁸⁶ “National Intelligence Estimate NIE 4-2-64”, p. 13. See also Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. A5, A10.

¹²⁸⁷ The 1968 Report, p. 46. See also Nakasone, *Jiseiroku*, p. 224.

¹²⁸⁸ One US dollar was 360 Yen until 1971. See Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, B4.

¹²⁸⁹ Yamada, *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka*, pp. 225-226.

¹²⁹⁰ The 1968 Report, pp.26-30.

determined to acquire its own nuclear weapons.¹²⁹¹ After all, the Japanese defence budget would soar so as to realise a nuclear-armed Japan. Shigaki also acknowledged that the cabinet would immediately collapse if the Japanese government attempted to convince the Japanese of the merits of an independent nuclear deterrent.¹²⁹² This was, indeed, one of the main reasons why the reports were never disclosed to the public.¹²⁹³ This emotional impediment might have been surmountable if the international situation would have shifted dramatically. In this regard, the final decision to acquire nuclear weapons resided with the political determination of Japanese Prime Minister. It was not sufficient to assess a pure financial and technical capability of producing nuclear weapons. The first report contended that the final conclusion could not be made without any close examination of strategic, political, diplomatic and domestic dimensions of Japan's nuclearisation.¹²⁹⁴

The second report (1970) addressed exactly these issues. It clearly stated in its introduction that the purpose of this report was to assess the remaining challenges and make the final conclusion.¹²⁹⁵ It first analysed Chinese nuclear strategy and the possibility and effects of Chinese blackmail on Japan. It placed great confidence in the US nuclear umbrella against this security challenge. As long as China could not completely eliminate the possibility of US nuclear strikes on China, it would behave sensibly.¹²⁹⁶ As we have already seen in the first report, building a robust independent nuclear deterrent would have involved significant costs. If Japan obtained only a small number of nuclear forces, it would merely induce China to launch a pre-emptive first strike. Therefore, Japan should be well

¹²⁹¹ Ibid., pp. 38-39.

¹²⁹² NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 78-79.

¹²⁹³ Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 56.

¹²⁹⁴ The 1968 Report, pp. 60-62.

¹²⁹⁵ Naikaku Chosa Shitsu: "Nihon no Kakuseisakuni Kansuru Kisoteki Kenkyu: Sono Ichi (hereafter simply The 1970 Report)", January 1970. The two reports are available on the website of Union of Concerned Scientists,

http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-nuclear-weapons-policy/japan-america-nuclear-posture#.W_a2RqrLyjiIU, accessed on 5 September 2017.

¹²⁹⁶ The 1970 Report, pp. 2-14.

aware that its own deterrence would be likely doomed to fail.¹²⁹⁷

Worse still, Japan was extremely vulnerable to nuclear strikes due to its unique geographical features. Japan lacked strategic depth with high popular density in one area. As of 1968, nearly half of Japan's population inhabited 20 percent of its relatively small territory. The industrial hub was also located in the same area. Given this high popular density, even one hydrogen bomb could have a dreadful strategic blow to Japan.¹²⁹⁸

Notably the report compared a nuclear-armed Japan with a nuclear armed France to study what strategic effects a nuclear Japan would entail. The report's analysis of French nuclear weapons was that these arsenals were a more political and diplomatic symbol of French independence than a mere military tool. The US nuclear umbrella covered the whole of Western Europe, and the French nuclear shield was only supplementary to America's. Unfortunately, the same rule could not be applicable to the Japanese case. It would alarm China and the Soviet Union and arouse diplomatic frictions with the USA, damaging the bilateral relations. It would also arouse the fervent public opposition and domestic political instability, dividing Japanese society.¹²⁹⁹ In fact, Sato remarked Rusk in July 1966 that "he personally did not think it would be a good thing for Japan to follow France."¹³⁰⁰ There is indeed an analysis that French unilateralism was nevertheless enabled by French understanding that the security of Western Europe (including France) as a whole was supported by the fact that US interests were at stake.¹³⁰¹ Thus, the French case could not apply to Japan and reliance on the US nuclear umbrella was the only, if not the best, option available to Japan.

To sum up, it was difficult to reach the conclusion that Japan's independent nuclear weapons would strengthen Japan's defence capability and improve overall

¹²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 17..

¹²⁹⁸ Ibid., pp. 17-18.

¹²⁹⁹ Ibid., pp. 20-26.

¹³⁰⁰ *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Japan, Document 74, p. 150.

¹³⁰¹ William O. Chittick: *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press., 2006), p. 138.

Japan's security. From a strategic deterrent point of view, Japan would be required to build up a second strike capability, which was realistically almost impossible to possess. Moreover, practically speaking, Japan did not have any underground nuclear testing sites. After all, Japan's nuclear weapons would create more problems than security benefits.¹³⁰² The report stressed that "the day that the possession of nuclear weapons was prerequisite for major power status was simply gone now."¹³⁰³

Accordingly, the top Japanese authorities concluded that Japan would not need its own nuclear shield and instead, they argued that Japan had better continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. As with Sato, their logical conclusion was dependence on US END while they did not discuss what the umbrella entailed in any detail. Although an independent nuclear deterrent option was a hugely costly project, purely theoretically the reports articulated that Japan had the technical ability to produce nuclear weapons. In view of economical, political and diplomatic constraints, indigenous nuclear weapons were neither practical nor feasible. That amounts to a political will and determination. Yet this decision would virtually end the political life of any cabinet no matter how popular the cabinet was. After all, the best option available for Japan's nuclear security was to depend upon US nuclear deterrence.

Be that as it may, these two reports did not have a great influence on the Sato government. It is important to note that these reports were completed without any review from political leaders and thus they did not represent the official Japanese nuclear policy.¹³⁰⁴ These reports (200 copies) were distributed to the key members of the Sato Cabinet, and the senior officials of the MOFA, JDA, and Ministry of Finance, from which they did not cause any reaction. The reports were also delivered to Sato but he did not make any response either.¹³⁰⁵ Shigaki later told

¹³⁰² The 1970 Report, pp. 27-28.

¹³⁰³ Ibid., p. 28.

¹³⁰⁴ Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 56.

¹³⁰⁵ Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 128-129;

a Japanese journalist that the reports went straight to rubbish bins.¹³⁰⁶ It was quite unlikely that Sato actually read the nearly 90-page long reports. Rather it was more likely that Sato had already made his non-nuclear policy based on his advisors by the time the reports were completed as shown in the last two chapters.¹³⁰⁷ That said, these reports were valuable sources of information considering that the study was conducted by the top Japanese experts who could have been consulted as regards Japan's nuclear option if Japan had embarked on its nuclear weapons programme. Interestingly, their final recommendation was in the face of practical constraints the nuclear option could not replace the strategic values of US END. This conclusion was to some extent in line with Sato's strategic decision to rely on US END.

Future Foreign Policy and Maintenance of Nuclear Potential

In 1969 the Japanese Foreign Policy Planning Committee at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also produced one top-secret report, *Waga Kuni no Gaiko Seisaku Taiko* (Guidelines of Japan's Foreign Policy), which also dealt with Japan's nuclear future although it did not support the possession of Japan's independent nuclear weapons as with the other reports. A Japanese national newspaper, *Mainichi Shimbun*, first revealed the existence of this top-secret report in 1994.¹³⁰⁸ Yet, it had not been declassified until the 2000s. This report was produced against the background of Japan facing mounting pressure to sign the NPT while Japanese public opinion was overwhelmingly in favour of UN-oriented diplomacy.¹³⁰⁹ Notably

¹³⁰⁶ Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, p. 72.

¹³⁰⁷ See also Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization", p. 56; Akira Kurosaki: "Nihon Kakubusou Kenkyu (1968Nen) to wa Nan Dattaka" [Reexamining the 1968 Report on Japan's Nuclear Weapons Capability: From a Comparative Perspective], *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 182 (2015), p. 133; Minoru Kusuda: "Okinawa Henkan wo Satoshi Zyushi"[Prime Minister Sato Prioritises the Return of Okinawa]*Asahi Shimbun*, 13 November 1994.

¹³⁰⁸ "Gaimusho Kakuheiki Seizo Nouryokuwo" [Ministry of Foreign Affairs Retains Technical Capability of Producing Nuclear Weapons], *Mainichi Shimbun*, 1 August 1994.

¹³⁰⁹ Etel Solingen: *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2007), p. 63; Kusunoki, "The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-nuclear Policy", p. 45.

there was an argument within the organization that Japan's technical potential (technological foundation) to produce nuclear weapons should not be impeded by NPT while it is true that it did not represent an official view of MOFA.¹³¹⁰ One of the members involved in the report recalled that losing the option would weaken Japan's diplomatic and political standing in global politics. Japan would not acquire nuclear weapons; concurrently, it would not abandon the technological potential to build nuclear weapons.¹³¹¹ Murata similarly asserted that "Japan would not rule out its nuclear option in case that Japan's national survival was under imminent danger."¹³¹² To be sure, this sort of strategic consideration was nothing unique to Japan. Similarly, Sweden was assumed to adopt "the policy of maintaining the freedom of action" in the 1950s on the basis of the calculation that the development of a civil nuclear programme was decisive for a nuclear weapon programme. At the same time, Sweden decided to accept the US nuclear umbrella.¹³¹³

Remarkably, this report was written from an IR Realist point of view. It articulated that the world order was maintained by a balance of power. To some extent, it directly denied postwar predominant culture of a war aversion in Japan.¹³¹⁴ Like the other reports, however, it concluded that Japan was a militarily vulnerable country and it would be impossible to create its own effective nuclear deterrent. Consequently, Japan must continue to work closely with the USA for its security. The importance of diplomatic relations with the USA could not be

¹³¹⁰ Murata, *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jyokan*, p. 212. See also Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 204-205 and "Waga Kunino Gaiko."

¹³¹¹ "Gaimusho Kakuheiki Seizo Nouryokuwo." See also Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu Hen (ed.): *Usagino Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon No Kakuto Jyohou Senryaku* [Rabbit's ears and Dove's Dream: Japan's nuclear and Information Strategy] (Tokyo:Liberuta Shuppan., 1995), pp.15, 19-21.

¹³¹² NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p. 26. See also Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 204-205.

¹³¹³ Paul M. Cole: "Atomic Bombast: Nuclear weapon decision-making in Sweden 1946-72", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol 20 No. 2 (1997), p. 240; Lars Wallin: "Sweden", in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): *Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security* (New York: Oxford U.P.,1991), pp. 371-374.

¹³¹⁴ Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai: "Waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku Taiko (hereafter Wagaku Kunino Gaiko)" [Guidelines of Japan's Foreign Policy], Top Secret, 25 September 1969, p. 69. This top-secret report is available at the MOFA homepage, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku02.pdf, accessed on 6 September 2017.

overestimated.¹³¹⁵As for nuclear deterrence, Japan had no choice but to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Japan would aim to strengthen its conventional military capabilities concurrently. It was also desirable for Japan to elevate the level of the consultation mechanism including contingency planning to that of NATO.¹³¹⁶ While it is true that there were some foreign officials who privately thought that Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, it appears that Japanese foreign officials generally agreed that Japan should rely on US END.¹³¹⁷

The report stressed the importance of raising Japanese awareness of the salience of the US-Japan defence alliance and regional threats to Japan's security. The Japanese's perception of national security was narrowly focused in accordance with the dictates of post-war pacifism and idealism. Since the views of Japanese ordinary people did not reflect real world politics, they had to be corrected. The Japanese public had to understand that the nature of world politics prompted responsible governments to strive to heighten their security. In doing so, the Japanese would understand the salience of military forces in global politics. Furthermore, they would not cause unnecessary public upheaval should the introduction of US tactical nuclear weapons into Japan in case of contingency arise.¹³¹⁸

Accordingly, the senior officials of MOFA interpreted that the Japanese nuclear allergy and their pacifist norm were detriment to national security; hence they had to be overcome through public education. That said, they did not reach the conclusion that Japan should obtain its indigenous nuclear weapons. Instead, they implicitly proposed that the Japan keep its nuclear option (or "potential" meaning atomic technology and energy which can be drawn on to generate nuclear bombs) available in case of future contingency. The report stressed that "regardless of whether or not Japan joined the NPT, Japan would maintain the policy of not

¹³¹⁵ Gaiko Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai, "Waga Kunino Gaiko Seisaku Taiko", pp.9-16.

¹³¹⁶ Ibid.,pp.62-65.

¹³¹⁷ Memorandum of Conversation: Japanese Policy Toward Nuclear Weapons (16 June 1962).

¹³¹⁸ "Waga Kunino Gaiko", pp.62-71.

possessing nuclear weapons for the time being. It was, however, crucial to keep the economic and technical potential necessary to produce nuclear weapons. Japan would see to it that such a latent capability was not to be impeded.”¹³¹⁹

That said, the authors were certainly aware that Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment was deeply rooted in Japan’s special historical experiences in the last world war and this could not be simply ignored. ¹³²⁰ In this respect, the populace were not passive and obedient bystanders. On the contrary, they were active and strident participants. Overall, the reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and the maintenance of the nuclear potential might have been the most realistic option the senior foreign officials could afford for Japan’s security.

Accordingly, all these studies reached the same conclusion that the nuclear option was not desirable for Japan. For its nuclear security in the face of China’s looming ICBM development, the best option available was to depend on the US extended nuclear deterrence on account of the huge financial, political and diplomatic costs of the alternative. Kase observed that “The only perceived benefit of a nuclear Japan would be less dependence on the United States; Japan would not have to be the ‘little brother’ any longer.”¹³²¹ This would be achieved at the expense of long-term huge financial costs to Japan as the Japanese economy was also tied to the American market. Nuclear proliferation analyst Etel Solingen correctly observed that “the US-Japan alliance is a substitute for Japan’s nuclear weapons, which would enable Japan to invest resources in the economic expansion that turned it into the second-largest economy worldwide.”¹³²²

It is noteworthy that the Japanese policy makers regarded domestic public opinion, the “nuclear allergy” to be exact, as a major stumbling block to the nuclear option. They had to treat it with care so that it would not burst. In 1958 Ambassador MacArthur observed that “government cannot disregard public opinion.

¹³¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 67-68.

¹³²⁰ Ibid., pp. 67-71.

¹³²¹ Kase, “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization”, p. 65.

¹³²² Etel Solingen: *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton U.P., 2007), pp. 50-60.

Should Japanese public entertain some genuine apprehension on the nuclear weapons question, government has to deal with it.”¹³²³ While it is true that “Japan’s choices will be determined ultimately by how well potential threats can be managed and by the strength of the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence”, it is not entirely correct to suggest that the US nuclear commitment was the ultimate factor.¹³²⁴ This is not to suggest a mono-causal argument but even the domestic-norm factor (the non-nuclear path) alone would have significantly constrained Japan from pursuing the nuclear option in the 1960s more strongly than other factors such as economic, technological and diplomatic constraint. It can be considered as a sufficient condition. In the meantime, we have to bear in mind that “although public sentiment against nuclear weapons remains strong, its ability to fully inhibit the decisions of Japanese leaders should not be exaggerated.”¹³²⁵ A more realistic assessment is that “Japan did not begin a program to acquire a nuclear weapons capability may have something to do with the confidence gained from extended nuclear deterrence commitments, but it could equally have had a lot to do with the formidable domestic institutional obstacles to nuclear acquisition...”¹³²⁶

To be sure, this was not a healthy environment to develop a security policy, but the policy makers had to face the reality and deal with the future security challenges. As defence analyst James Schoff aptly put it, “the details about how deterrence worked mattered little” to Japan. This unhealthy environment “allowed Japan to be fervently nonnuclear in its public statements and government policies.”¹³²⁷ To keep the economic and technical potential for the nuclear weapon production might have been the most balanced but realistic security option of Japan. Yet whether Japan did actually deliberately maintain this nuclear-potential option

¹³²³ Incoming Telegram From MacArthur to Secretary of State, 31 July 1958, Box 9, Geographic File, Japan, RG 218, NARA.

¹³²⁴ Samuels and Schoff, “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge”, pp. 236.

¹³²⁵ Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 242.

¹³²⁶ O’Neil, *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence*, p. 88.

¹³²⁷ James L Schoff: “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan” in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds.): *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon* (Baltimore: George Town U.P., 2012), p. 101. (99-113)

is somewhat doubtful.

Nuclear Hedging or Energy Autonomy

Some analysts contended that Japan has maintained the nuclear potential (also known as nuclear hedging)¹³²⁸ to produce nuclear weapons in a short time as its vital strategy even after the Cold War.¹³²⁹ Should the US nuclear umbrella over Japan close, Japan might go nuclear in a short time.¹³³⁰ This claim must be critically analysed, however.

First of all, it is uncertain if Japan even had this immediate nuclear programme. Second, even if Japan had had it, could Prime Minister have started it readily and immediately when faced with political constraints? Or Japan might play the nuclear-hedging card to send a diplomatic signal to the USA by adding more pressure on the US government to continue its security commitments to Japan.¹³³¹

In the words of Freedman, “It is hard to think of a single development that would transform security calculations around the world, including whether or not to build national nuclear arsenals, than a decision by the United States to disentangle itself from its alliance commitments.”¹³³² In a similar vein Mark Fitzpatrick at the

¹³²⁸ On the term, “Nuclear Hedging” See Ariel Levite: “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited”, *International Security* Vol. 27 No.3 (Winter 2002/03), p. 69. Similarly Japan is regarded as a “virtual nuclear weapons state.” On this point, see Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 243. See also Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper and Commentaries”, pp. 21,27-28.

¹³²⁹ Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 151-153; Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu, *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu*, p. 130-131; NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 95-97; Samuels and Schoff: “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge”, pp. 232-264.

¹³³⁰ Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, pp. 223-225; Campbell and Sunohara, “Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable”, p. 244; Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. 3,8,10; Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes: “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option” in Yoshihara and Holmes (eds.), *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age*, p. 120; Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, pp. 2-4, 8-9; Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 29; Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 110.

¹³³¹ Green and Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism”, p. 348, 365; Ariel Levite: “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited”, *International Security* Vol. 27 No.3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 71. 79-80.

¹³³² Freedman, *The Future of War*, p. 282. See also Katsumi Sugiyama: *Chugoku no Gunjiryoku Nihon no Boueiryoku* [China’s Military Capability and Japan’s Military Capability] (Tokyo: Shoden Sha., 2013), pp. 183-185.

International Institute for Strategic Studies argued that “the reliability of the US security commitment is the dominant variable. Maintaining the credibility of US extended deterrence is the strongest safeguard of nuclear non-proliferation in the region.”¹³³³ Indeed after the Chinese nuclear test it was feared that Japan might go nuclear if American security commitments appeared declined.¹³³⁴ While the extension of US nuclear deterrence to US allies prevented nuclear proliferation among them while it did not stop France from obtaining its indigenous nuclear weapons.¹³³⁵

In March 1963 President Kennedy famously said that “I am haunted by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful there may be ten nuclear powers instead of four, and by 1975, 15 or 20.”¹³³⁶ In contrast to his dire prediction, the nuclear club has expanded very slowly since 1963. Now there are in fact nearly 40 to 50 countries which have technological capabilities of producing nuclear weapons.¹³³⁷ In this respect it can also be argued that most non-nuclear states are content with their non-nuclear status whether they are under the US nuclear umbrella or not.

Realistically to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent would severely undermine an alliance relationship with the USA at risk of losing its security protection.¹³³⁸ The late administrative vice minister of the JDA, Takuya Kubo, discussed a close link between Japan’s civil nuclear programme and US security assurance in his famous report. It is his belief that Japan advanced its civilian nuclear energy programme, which in turn would enable Japan to develop nuclear weapons at any time. If Japan reached that technologically advanced stage, the US

¹³³³ Fitzpatrick, *Asia’s latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 13.

¹³³⁴ Treverton, “China’s Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence”, p. 43.

¹³³⁵ See for example, Rebecca K. C. Hersmand and Robert Peters: “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 539-553.

¹³³⁶ John F. Kennedy, “News Conference 52”, 21 March 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum,

<https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conferences/news-conference-52>, accessed on 22 January 2019.

¹³³⁷ On this point see, Jacques E. C. Hymans: “Theories of Nuclear Proliferation”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3 (November 2006), p. 457; Rublee, *Nonproliferation Norms*, p. 31.

¹³³⁸ Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper and Commentaries”, p. 29, <https://nautilus.org/nuke-policy/morton-h-halperin-the-nuclear-dimension-of-the-u-s-japan-alliance-paper-and-commentaries/>, accessed on 13 September 2017; Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 110.

government would feel pressured to sustain the US nuclear umbrella under the US-Japanese security regime. This was not least because the more advanced nuclear programme Japan had, the more likely the USA had to worry about regional nuclear proliferation and rapid instability in international relation. He reasoned that Japan had no choice but to rely on the US nuclear umbrella due to its inherent vulnerability to nuclear attacks.¹³³⁹

In contrast, one of the participants (General of JGDF) of a secret 1995 JDA paper on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction¹³⁴⁰ held that “Japan would not need its independent nuclear weapons due to its strategic vulnerability even if Japan lost the US nuclear umbrella. The Japanese industry hub is located in a small and dense area [Tokaido/ Taiheiyo Belt], which gives Japan acute strategic vulnerabilities.”¹³⁴¹ It is noted that nearly one third of the whole population of Japan dwelled in two major cities: Tokyo and Osaka. The rough rate of the population concentration was that one out of ten resided in Tokyo.¹³⁴² Beyond Japan’s nuclear allergy, even from a military point of view, an independent nuclear deterrent option was questionable for some Japanese strategists. This contradicts the Western analysts’ contention that Japan’s nuclear option was impeded by US END.¹³⁴³ In this regard, Japan might not be better off with own nuclear weapons. In theory Japan would lose more than it gained in case of nuclear exchanges. It is true that in the event of nuclear war against China or Russia both of which possess massive territories, they could overwhelm Japan unless Japan had a strategic triad. This would significantly increase the military budget and require Japan to amend Article 9; hence it was not even a realistic choice. That being said, their analysis,

¹³³⁹ Kubo, “Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata.”

¹³⁴⁰ Tairyo Hakai Heikino Kakusan Mondainitsuite [Concerning the Problem of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction] Japan Defence Agency (1995). This report is available on the website of Union of Concerned Scientists, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-documents/nuclear-weapons/Secret+Japanese+Report+on+Nuclear+Options.pdf>, accessed on 9 September 2017.

¹³⁴¹ Remarks at Nihon Kurauzebittsu Gakkai (The Clausewitz Society of Japan), 26 April 2017. See also Mataka Kamiya: “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 26 No. 1 (Winter 2002/03), p. 68.

¹³⁴² Packard, *Protest in Tokyo*, p. 183.

¹³⁴³ Fitzpatrick, *Asia’s Latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 13.

however, overlooks the case of Britain, which especially now relies solely on nuclear-armed submarines. The land size of Japan is actually larger than that of Britain. Minimum deterrence (possession of a second strike capability after absorbing an enemy first strike) can be achievable in theory.¹³⁴⁴

Having discussed the pros and cons of Japan's nuclear option. We will now focus on the reality of Japan's nuclear hedging option. It is important to note that Japan's nuclear hedging option is not supported by empirical evidence. With the official documents available, one Japanese scholar concluded that Japan lacked a political will and guidance to increase its capability to develop nuclear weapons, let alone an official cabinet decision to do so. Rather the development of civilian nuclear programme coincidentally helped establish its latent nuclear capabilities.¹³⁴⁵ Llewellyn Hughes, a Japanese politics specialist, too, observed that nuclear hedging has not been a consistent national policy as this requires highly integrated coordination across government organizations, the Japanese atomic energy agency, the JDA and the ministry of Finance in particular. Yet there was almost no interaction between the defence and scientific community in Japan. Japan's civilian atomic energy programme developed extensively for energy security to reduce its level of external energy dependence (energy autonomy) rather than future military security concerns in mind as Japan lacked natural resources.¹³⁴⁶ In September 1967 when he met with Rusk, Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, for instance, stressed that "Japan requires annually 100 million tons of crude oil, 99 % of which is

¹³⁴⁴ On this point, see for example, Kan Ito: *Chugoku no Kaku Senryoku ninihon wa Kussuru: Imakoso Nihonjin ni Hitsuyo na Kaku Yokushiryoku* [Chinese Nuclear Force Overwhelms Japan: Nuclear Deterrence Japanese Need Now] (Tokyo: Shogakukan., 2011), pp. 106-108.

¹³⁴⁵ Akira Kurosaki: "Nihon Kakubusou Kenkyu (1968Nen) to wa Nan Dattaka" [Reexamining the 1968 Report on Japan's Nuclear Weapons Capability], *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 182 (2015), pp. 133-135. See also Jacques E.C. Hymans: "Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb", *International Security*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (Fall 2011), p. 156, 187.

¹³⁴⁶ Llewellyn Hughes: "Why Japan Will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan", *International Security* Vol. 31 No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 80-83, 95-96. See also Katsuhisa Furukawa: "Japan's Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapons: A Historical Perspective", *Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, & Strategic Studies* Vol. 37 (2010), pp. 20-21; Fitzpatrick, *Asia's latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 84; Atsuyuki Suzuki: "Why Plutonium is A 'Must' For Japan", in Harrison, *Japan's Nuclear Future*, p. 63; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.254; Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self: "Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology: Japan's Prospects for Nuclear Breakout", in Self and Thompson (eds.), *Japan's Nuclear Option*, p. 149.

imported, to provide for 60 % of her energy requirement. The peaceful development of nuclear energy, therefore, is of great interest to Japan because other energy requirements are expected to continue to increase.”¹³⁴⁷

In other words, “what may appear at first glance to be nuclear hedging is actually merely the legacy of past choices”¹³⁴⁸ or nuclear hedging is simply a by-product of Japan’s civilian nuclear programme.¹³⁴⁹ These counter arguments are slightly off the point. To be sure, it is safe for them to conclude that Japan’s nuclear hedging option is not empirically provable. From a strategic point of view, however, it is a card which you do not show to your enemy and even your friends. As a rule of thumb you would not tell your adversary what you are planning. It could be unwritten and implicit in nature, which was widely shared within the policy-making circle. It left some ambiguity that Japan might be able to produce nuclear weapons in a rather short term should it become inevitable. Those in the circle neither deny nor confirm it.¹³⁵⁰ It was a sensible option for the Japanese government to keep a latent capability for the production of nuclear weapons.¹³⁵¹ As a nuclear non-proliferation specialist, Ariel Levite lucidly put it, “Would-be proliferants rarely make formal decisions to acquire the bomb or for that matter to give it up before they absolutely have to (e.g., before they are on the verge of attaining or eliminating a nuclear capability), if then.”¹³⁵²

When it comes to nuclear hedging, therefore, it is more crucial to analyse how practical the option was and what strategic impact it entailed. We will now examine these two essential points with a particular focus on Japan’s technical foundation of the late 1960’s. We must bear in mind that in late 1964 Prime Minister Sato boldly asserted that “Nuclears...were much less costly than was generally assumed and Japanese scientific and industrial level was fully up to

¹³⁴⁷ Memorandum of Conversation:Non-Proliferation Treaty(Part II of II), (16 September 1967).

¹³⁴⁸ Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy”, p. 156.

¹³⁴⁹ Thompson and Self: “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology”, p. 148, 167; Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.257.

¹³⁵⁰ See for example NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 95-97.

¹³⁵¹ Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo”, p.311.

¹³⁵² Levite, “Never Say Never Again”, p. 67.

producing them.”¹³⁵³ How credible was this argument at that time?

First of all, it was doubtful that Japan was able to produce nuclear bombs with its first commercial nuclear plant at Tokaimura since it was not designed to produce weapon-grade plutonium. This categorically contradicts a common claim that Japan could build nuclear weapons in a short time. Yet some contended that Japan was technically capable of producing nuclear weapons.¹³⁵⁴ Levite boldly asserted that Japan has been “within a few months of acquiring nuclear weapons.”¹³⁵⁵ Japanese politics analyst John Welfield, also noted that “Technically, Japan had been in a position to begin development of a small, independent nuclear strike force since the late 1960s” although he was also somewhat uncertain whether Japan was able to produce nuclear weapons rapidly.¹³⁵⁶ Joseph Cirincione, a renowned nuclear specialist, asserted that “Building a bomb still poses significant scientific and engineering challenges...Technological barriers do not affect the most advanced countries of the world. Japan, for example, has long since known how to reprocess plutonium.”¹³⁵⁷ He went on to claim that “Tokyo’s civilian stockpile...could be converted to military uses in a matter of weeks or months.”¹³⁵⁸ Already in 1961 one CIA intelligence report assessed that

Given the state of Japan’s scientific and technical advancement and its industrial resources, we believe that Japan could probably have its first nuclear device in five or six years, if it decided in the next year or so to embark on a nuclear weapons program, and that it could have its first weapon deliverable by aircraft a year or so later. It could also probably develop missiles with ranges up to 1,000 [k]m in about the same time and compatible fission warheads for such missiles by 1970.”

¹³⁵³ Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, Box 2376, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1964-1966, Political & Defense, POL 7 Visits, Meetings, Japan, RG 59, NARA. See also *FRUS*, 1964-1968, Vol. 29, Part 2, Document 37, pp. 55-56.

¹³⁵⁴ Halperin, “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, p. 21.

¹³⁵⁵ Levite, “Never Say Never Again”, p. 72.

¹³⁵⁶ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.253.

¹³⁵⁷ Cirincione, *Bomb Scare*, pp. 51-52.

¹³⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

The common logic behind these claims is the notion that any civilian atomic programme could be readily converted to a nuclear weapon programme.¹³⁶⁰

In reality, this is nothing but a myth. Japan was required to change fuels quite frequently to produce the enough amount of plutonium for the production of nuclear weapons. This could not have been done secretly. The IAEA, which Japan joined in 1957, would keep a critical eye on the activities, inviting snap inspections.¹³⁶¹ In addition to this, Japan would need to use a reprocessing plant in order to extract weapon-grade plutonium.¹³⁶² It must be noted that the possession of reactor-grade plutonium is one and the production of nuclear bombs is another.¹³⁶³ The 1968 report estimated that the first Japanese reprocessing facility was to be built by 1972. In fact it only came into operation in 1977.¹³⁶⁴ It implies that Japan would not have been able to produce any nuclear bombs until 1977.¹³⁶⁵ Worse still, the commercial reactor had technical failures and broke down several times after its completion. It had not been fully operational when the 1968 report was written. This technical failure could happen quite frequently and it would cause further lengthy delays. This would have further hindered the production of nuclear weapons.¹³⁶⁶ By 1977, Japan had ratified the NPT.¹³⁶⁷ If Japan had wanted to build

¹³⁵⁹ National Intelligence Estimate, 4-3-61, "Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities of Free World Countries Other than the US and UK", 21 September 1961, CIA. Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/prolif-6b.pdf>, accessed on 31 January 2018.

¹³⁶⁰ Gavin, "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation", p. 412.

¹³⁶¹ Thompson and Self, "Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology", p. 159. See also Campbell and Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable", p. 220.

¹³⁶² Anzen Hosho Chosa Kainihon no Anzen Hosho; pp. 314-315; Endicott: *Japan's Nuclear Option*, pp. 133-134.

¹³⁶³ It is important to note that US atomic specialists suggested that Japanese nuclear facilities could be utilised as nuclear weapons making facilities. See Memorandum for Steven Rivkia, "Major Nuclear Facilities", 5 November 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 6, LBJ Library.

¹³⁶⁴ The 1968 Report, pp. 1-6. See also Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaku*, p. 211 and Harrison, *Japan's Nuclear Future*, pp. 18-20.

¹³⁶⁵ It must be noted that even the reliability of this reprocessing facility for the production of nuclear weapons is substantially uncertain. See Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, pp. 208-210.

¹³⁶⁶ Arima, *Genpatsu to Genbaki*, pp. 123-151.; Hymans, "Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation", p. 168.

¹³⁶⁷ Japan signed the NPT in 1970 and subsequently ratified it in 1976.

its own nuclear weapons, it would be required to withdraw from NPT as North Korea did.

It must be noted that Japan's nuclear capability was not immediate but latent and thus, it was difficult to say Japan could have acquired nuclear weapons immediately once the Japanese government made a political decision. This technological reality has not changed significantly even today.¹³⁶⁸ Of course, this did not necessarily mean Japan lacked technical expertise and capability to build its own nuclear weapons once it was earnestly committed to produce nuclear weapons. Notably in the 1960s when horizontal nuclear proliferation (the emergence of more nuclear states) or the "Nth" country problem as it was called at the time was looming large, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory made an interesting experiment on this very issue.¹³⁶⁹ The laboratory selected two physicist postdocs who did not have any previous knowledge of nuclear weapons and paid them to design their own nuclear bombs together utilising only open information for two and a half years. They were not given any access to classified information. The principal purpose of this experiment was to see if a small hypothetical Third World country was capable of designing atomic bombs by itself.¹³⁷⁰ Importantly, they deliberately chose to design a plutonium implosion bomb as it was more technically demanding. This decision was made principally for their reputation as scientists.¹³⁷¹

It is true that America was so confident that it did not even carry out a test for a uranium gun-type bomb and it still used the bomb against Hiroshima, suggesting this sort of a bomb is not technologically demanding to build. This implies that the construction of a uranium bomb was quite possible for technically advanced states like Japan. While the final results are still classified, the two scientists appeared to have succeeded in designing an atomic bomb that could

¹³⁶⁸ See for example Mataka Kamiya: "Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?", *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2002/03), p. 69.

¹³⁶⁹ For the details of this experiment, see Dan Stober: "No Experience Necessary", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol.59 No.2 (Mar/ Apr 2003), pp.57-63.

¹³⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 57-58.

¹³⁷¹ Oliver Burkeman: "How Two Student Built an A-Bomb", *The Guardian*, 24 June 2003, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jun/24/usa.science>, accessed on 3 August 2018; *Ibid.*, p. 59.

produce the same explosive yield as Little Boy. It was more of technical and material difficulty of obtaining weapon-grade plutonium and enriched uranium¹³⁷²

As the 1968 report recognised, Japan relied heavily on foreign suppliers for fissile materials (uranium) to operate the plant. In other words, Japan did not have enough uranium for the production of nuclear weapons at disposal. The British government could exercise veto power. This seriously would limit Japan's nuclear activity.¹³⁷³ The British government would have stopped supplying uranium to Japan if it had seriously suspected Japan's nuclear programme. Naturally, countries without sufficient fissile materials will be prevented from going nuclear. They cannot be regarded as virtual nuclear states since their nuclear weapons programmes too vulnerable to external sources suppliers.¹³⁷⁴ In prior to operational deployment of nuclear bombs, Japan would also need to find a testing site to conduct a nuclear test to ascertain that the bomb functioned. Without this, the bomb could not constitute effective deterrence. As Hughes succinctly observed, "Japan has no experience of nuclear testing, and would have to develop suitable delivery systems"—the fact would make it difficult for Japan to build a credible second strike nuclear capability.¹³⁷⁵

With respect to a delivery system, Japanese civilian rockets could be used to carry warheads. Notably, one US intelligence report estimated that "Japan is further capable, in the light of its relatively sophisticated space program, of producing as many as 100 nuclear-equipped MRBMs by 1975" although it recognised a severe domestic barrier: "the Japanese public is overwhelmingly opposed to the presence of nuclear weapons, foreign or domestic, on Japanese

¹³⁷² "Summary Report of the NTH Country Experiment, March 1967", Retrieved by *the National Security Archive*, available at <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/news/20030701/nth-country.pdf>, accessed on 31 July 2018. See also Stober, "No Experience Necessary", pp. 60-61 and Burkeman, "How Two Student Built an A-Bomb."

¹³⁷³ The 1968 Report, pp. 4-5. See also Kurosaki, "Nihon Kakubusou Kenkyu", p. 130 and Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, p.255.

¹³⁷⁴ Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke: "Determinants of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 51 (2007), p. 169.

¹³⁷⁵ Hughes, *Japan's Remilitarisation*, p. 109.

soil.”¹³⁷⁶ Wakaizumi made even more sanguine estimates that “Japan could build nuclear warheads and medium range missile by 1970.”¹³⁷⁷ Yet, the design of secure re-entry vehicles was hard to master. In fact Japanese research on re-entry technology was not conducted until 1994 notwithstanding its first successful launch of a satellite into orbit in 1970.¹³⁷⁸ It must be noted that in May 1969 the Japanese National Diet ruled that Japan’s space programme was limited to peaceful and scientific purposes.¹³⁷⁹ The rocket programme of Japan developed was not meant and designed to serve a military use for both financial and constitutional reasons.¹³⁸⁰ In 1969, the then director of Science and Technology Agency, Shiro Kimura, held that the space program solely aimed for non-military research.¹³⁸¹ It was indeed after the end of the Cold War (2003) that Japan launched its first information gathering satellite.¹³⁸² What is more technically challenging is the development of SLBMs. The sea-launched missile would have been needed in view of the maritime nature of Japan but they are technically more difficult to produce as they must be specifically designed to fit into a submarine, perform under sea and keep on the right track after a launch.¹³⁸³

As James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, both American defence specialists, argued, “if Tokyo chose to rely on a missile delivery system, then it would need to produce a workable, miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted atop an accurate cruise or ballistic missile. Such a feat is not beyond Japanese engineering

¹³⁷⁶ Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the Nuclear Weapons Field”, pp. 1-2.

¹³⁷⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, “Japanese Views on Defense and Nuclear Proliferation.”

¹³⁷⁸ See for example Harrison, *Japan’s Nuclear Future*, pp. 21-24; Fitzpatrick, *Asia’s latent Nuclear Powers*, p. 96; Samuels and Schoff, “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge”, p. 241; Thompson and Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology”, p. 172.

¹³⁷⁹ JAXA Webpage, http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_1/1-1-1-4_j.html, accessed on 25th September 2017.

¹³⁸⁰ Takao Murayama: “Wagakunino Uchu kaihatu wo Kangaeru Shiten: Uchu Kihon Houan no Jyoon ni Yosete [The Perspective of Japan’s Space Programme: The Space Basic Law at the National Diet]”, Reference, (Sep 2007), pp. 18-19; Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, p. A10. Thompson and Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology”, p. 173.

¹³⁸¹ Shiro Kimura, Kagaku Gijyutsu Shinko Tokubetu Iikanai [Special Sub-Committee for the Promotion of Science and Technology] 8 May 1958, *KKKS*, <http://kokkaindl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/061/0560/06105080560011.pdf>, accessed on 26 September 2017.

¹³⁸² Murayama, “Wagakunino Uchu kaihatu”, p. 22.

¹³⁸³ Anzen Hosho Chosa *Kainihon no Anzen Hosho*, pp. 334-337; Thompson and Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology”, p. 174.

proWess, but it would involve significant lead time.”¹³⁸⁴ Yet Japan lacked this technical foundation. At the same time, Japan had to work on the effective command and control system for military operations. Who would actually direct the grand project? In Japan cooperation and coordination across organizations has been notoriously rare, even within the Self-Defence Forces of Japan. If the Japanese government would have wanted to establish the Japanese version of the Strategic Air Command, it would have been a daunting task.

Matake Kamiya, a professor of national security at National Defence Academy of Japan, made a more realistic assessment that “The time needed for Japan to make this extensive list of technological strides can more realistically be measured in decades than years.”¹³⁸⁵ Or a slightly more optimistic assessment by a Japanese nuclear scientist estimated at least 5 years for Japan to arm itself with nuclear weapons.¹³⁸⁶ It must be emphasized that possessing the technological base to build nuclear weapons and the capability to produce nuclear weapons at once if required have completely different strategic connotations. Realistically what Japan had was the former base. If Japan did not have the latter capability, the best alternative was still reliance on US END.

Second, when it comes to making nuclear bombs, there was uncertainty not only about the technological foundation but also about the characters of Japanese nuclear scientists. Japanese scientists completely lacked expertise on nuclear testing and missile and warhead design.¹³⁸⁷ While it is true that the scientific knowledge of construction of nuclear bombs was widely diffused, this did not automatically mean that countries would not encounter any technical problems.¹³⁸⁸ When it comes to building an atomic bomb in practice, as Freedman noted, “the

¹³⁸⁴ Yoshihara and Holmes, “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option”, pp. 122-123.

¹³⁸⁵ Kamiya, “Nuclear Japan”, p. 71.

¹³⁸⁶ Katsuya Yamada: *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka* [Nuclear Weapons and Japan] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo.,2009) p.228.

¹³⁸⁷ Furukawa, “Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence”, pp. 114-115; Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 94; Kazuhisa Ogawa: *14 Sai karano riaru Bouei Ron* [Practical Defence Debate for Junior High School Students] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2010), p. 225; Yamada, *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka*, pp.214-215.

¹³⁸⁸ Peter R. Lavoy: “Nuclear Proliferation Over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3 (Nov 2006), p. 449.

technical difficulties were hardly trivial, even if sufficient fissionable material and capable engineers could be acquired, and there were obvious risks that would be faced by anyone trying to put a crude weapons together.”¹³⁸⁹ In this respect, it would take at least a few years to make themselves familiar with the exact techniques (Research and Development). Moreover, once Japan had started its full-scale nuclear weapon programme, it would have certainly met engineering difficulty and unexpected friction, increasing the production costs and extending a manufacturing period further.¹³⁹⁰ One scientist who actually engaged in the first commercial nuclear reactor at Tokai used the analogy of flour to explain the technical obstacle to making nuclear bombs: That you produce flour did not automatically mean you could make bread. In other words, there is a distinct technological difference between the production of plutonium and that of nuclear bombs. Those are two different things in nature.¹³⁹¹ This scientist also acknowledged that there had been neither an internal study on the production of nuclear weapons nor a political direction to do so.¹³⁹²

It is also important to note that the commercial nuclear reactor at Tokai was privately owned.¹³⁹³ The enterprise had a veto on the government proposal to produce nuclear weapons. That is, even reactor-grade plutonium was not at the disposal of the government.¹³⁹⁴ As noted previously it was not enough for Japan to have only a few atomic bombs if the country wanted to deter its regional nuclear powers. In that case, Japan might need nuclear submarines equipped with SLBMs or at least nuclear cruise missiles.¹³⁹⁵ One Japanese military analyst noted that

¹³⁸⁹ Freedman, *The Future of War*, p. 181.

¹³⁹⁰ Yamada, *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo Tsukurenoka*, p. 228.

¹³⁹¹ NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p. 92.

¹³⁹² *Ibid.*, pp. 92-95. See also Jinzaburo Takagi: “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Critical Review” in Harrison (ed.), *Japan’s Nuclear Future*, p. 76.

¹³⁹³ The Japan Atomic Power company that operated the reactor could be considered as a quasi-government organisation while top share holders were private companies.

¹³⁹⁴ Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation”, pp. 170, 182, 185-186.

¹³⁹⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 110. See also Nisohachi Hyodo: “Nihon Kakubuso no Gutaiteki sukeduru” [The Detailed Schedule of Japan’s Nuclearisation] in Terumasa Nakanishi (ed.): *Nihon Kakubuso no Ronten: Kokka Sonritsu no Kiki wo Ikinuku Michi* [The Point on a Nuclear Armed Japan: The Way to Survive in the Age of Crisis for the Nation’s Existence] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2006), pp. 183-186.

these weapon systems were required to build Japan's effective nuclear deterrence against its regional nuclear powers. Yet these could not have been achieved without American technological support.¹³⁹⁶

There was also a question of the character of the Japanese scientists. Kumao Kaneko, a retired diplomat who worked closely with Japanese nuclear scientists for years, observed that having been exposed to post-war peace education and the atoms for peace policy, they were unlikely to follow government orders to produce nuclear bombs.¹³⁹⁷ Japanese nuclear scientists at universities shared a similar attitude toward the military use of atoms.¹³⁹⁸ This fact would lead to an ultimate question whether the Japanese Prime Minister could successfully convince them to build Japan's independent deterrent. Their motivation for dedication to the nuclear programme would be truly uncertain.¹³⁹⁹ Quester interestingly noted that "self-inspection' in the pluralistic Japan of the 1970's would be as reliable as self-inspection within EURATOM."¹⁴⁰⁰ This does not necessarily mean they would never be convinced but it would take a lengthy time for the supreme leader to do so. This would undermine the nuclear-hedging option of Japan.

Third, the Japan's atomic basic law limited the utilisation and research of atomic energy to solely peaceful purposes: "the use of radioisotopes in research, medicine, and industry."¹⁴⁰¹ Of course, this law could be amended. This would eventually lead to the question of the amendment of Article 9 despite the fact that the Japanese government alleged that defensive weapons were constitutional. A majority of the Japanese viewed the issue otherwise.¹⁴⁰² Politically it is generally

¹³⁹⁶ Furukawa, "Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence", p. 112; Sugita, *Kensho Hikakuno Sentaku*, pp. 212-215.

¹³⁹⁷ Kumao Kaneko: *Nihon no Kaku Asia no Kaku Nipponjin no Kakuonchi wo Tsuku* [Japan's Atom, Asia's Atom and Question Japanese Ignorance of Atom] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1997), p. 58. See also Furukawa, "Japan's Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapons", p. 21. See also NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p. 95.

¹³⁹⁸ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 261-262.

¹³⁹⁹ Yamada, *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka*, p. 216.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Quester, "Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty", pp. 777-778.

¹⁴⁰¹ Scientific Intelligence Report, "Japanese Nuclear Energy Program" 18 November 1964, NSF, Committee File, Box 6, LBJ Library.

¹⁴⁰² Anzen Hosho Chosa Kainihon no Anzen Hosho: 1970 Nen he no Tenbo 1968 Nen Ban, pp. 140-141, 293; Endicott, *Japan's Nuclear Option*, p. 41, 45; Kubo, "Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata"; Schoff,

interpreted that Japan was not allowed to possess any power projection capabilities or war potential as stipulated in Article 9 including ICBMs, strategic bombers and aircraft carriers. These weapons were generally considered as offensive weapons rather than defensive forces.¹⁴⁰³ Could the Japanese government gain enough public support to amend Article 9 while “Pacifism was enshrined in...Japan’s post-war constitution”?¹⁴⁰⁴ Would the Japanese support Japan’s independent nuclear option? The answer would have been negative on the grounds that the Japanese public was vehemently opposed to Japan’s independent nuclear forces in the 1960s and the 1970s.

Throughout this period, opinion polls demonstrated that only 20 percent of the Japanese consulted were in favour of an independent nuclear deterrent. This national consensus has indeed remained the same.¹⁴⁰⁵ Over this period there appeared two major security concepts among the Japanese public: reliance on the Japan-US Security Treaty and a posture of unarmed neutrality.¹⁴⁰⁶ As one Japanese nuclear scientist accurately depicted the Japanese nuclear mentality, “Most Japanese people believe that Japan will undoubtedly stick to its non-nuclear-weapons position and abide by its Three-Non-Nuclear Principles.”¹⁴⁰⁷ Hughes similarly held that “Japanese policymaking opinion concerning nuclear option reflects and certainly has to take note of deeply embedded anti-nuclear feeling among the Japanese public...”¹⁴⁰⁸ Indeed the Japanese government could not simply overlook the extremely nuclear – sensitive public and this key factor was credible enough to create doubt “whether Japan could really enter into the nuclear ‘balance of terror’ with enemy nations.”¹⁴⁰⁹ If these obstacles were not surmountable, the Japanese government would be self-deterred to convert its civilian nuclear and space programmes to the military nuclear weapons programme.

“Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan”, p. 102.

¹⁴⁰³ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 33; Kubo, “Boueiryoku Seibino Kangaekata.”

¹⁴⁰⁴ Special Report, “Japan Rethinking Security Policy”, 29 April 1966.

¹⁴⁰⁵ Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse*, pp. 263-264.

¹⁴⁰⁶ Wakaizumi, “Japanese Attitudes Toward the Chinese Nuclear Programs”, p. 47.

¹⁴⁰⁷ Takagi, “Japan’s Plutonium Program”, p. 76.

¹⁴⁰⁸ Hughes, *Japan’s Remilitarisation*, p. 108..

¹⁴⁰⁹ Thompson and Self, “Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology”, p. 175.

In this respect, Mochizuki is correct in that “three factors have been particularly salient in determining Japan’s policy toward nuclear weapons: national identity as a peace state, commitment to the global non-proliferation regime, and realistic security calculation including the alliance with the United States.”¹⁴¹⁰ Similarly, some US officials working on non-nuclear proliferation issues viewed that Japan’s technological capacity to produce its indigenous nuclear weapons was unquestionable while they also recognise that a combination of four factors would determine the course of the Japanese nuclear programme. These were (1) public support for rearmament including nuclear weapons (2) the level of the development of Chinese nuclear weapons programme (3) the emergence of further nuclear states in Asia (4) the reliability of the US nuclear umbrella.¹⁴¹¹

After all, Japan had to overcome both domestic and international obstacles. This is not necessarily to deny that Japan was capable of producing nuclear weapons. Especially now that North Korea is a nuclear power, no one could doubt that Japan could have been a nuclear power too. Jacques Hymans, a renowned nuclear proliferation analyst, rightly pointed out that “when the nuclear policymaking arena contains a large number of entrenched veto players, they all need to agree before a nuclear weapons project can be set in motion.” He went on to claim that “ever since the 1950s...the country’s traditional nuclear policy orientation has become extremely difficult to change- and next to impossible to change quickly or quietly.”¹⁴¹² Moreover, based on his actual experience in making political decisions Kissinger argued that his critics totally overlooked the complexity of “the pluralistic political system of a democratic ally, in which national leaders could not dominate the decision-making as in a dictatorship.”¹⁴¹³

With these barriers in mind, it is difficult to conclude that Japan actually had the *potential* or the reliable nuclear hedging option in the time period this

¹⁴¹⁰ Mochizuki, “Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo”, p.306.

¹⁴¹¹ Report on “Japan’s Prospects in the nuclear Weapons Field”, pp. 2-10.

¹⁴¹² Hymans, “Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation”, p. 155, 161.

¹⁴¹³ Kissinger, *White House Years*, , p. 339.

thesis covers. Given the complex issues discussed above, as a viable strategy Japan had to rely on the US nuclear umbrella for its security against the regional nuclear threats. Since Japan ratified the NPT in 1976, Japan in fact has opposed resolutions demanding world-wide nuclear disarmament at the UN not least when the USA is against them. Strikingly, the average approval rate for the UN resolutions related to nuclear disarmament over the last 50 years is 55 percent.¹⁴¹⁴ Considering Japan's disastrous experience with nuclear weapons, it would have been natural to assume that Japan would have spearheaded those resolutions. In reality, Japan recently even boycotted the negotiations on the Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty, which the USA, needless to say, did not take part in either.¹⁴¹⁵ Why has Japan followed and supported the USA at the UN? The principal rationale behind has been that Japan is under the US nuclear umbrella and Japan does not want to poke holes the umbrella. A retired diplomat and a former arms reduction representative of Japan, Mitsuro Donowaki, suggested that so long as Japan is under the US nuclear protection, Japan's choices must be in favour of American's.¹⁴¹⁶ He also called the nuclear umbrella a "necessary evil" not least because Japan's security relied heavily on the USA and also the reality of world politics was unpredictable.¹⁴¹⁷ In this connection, it is worth noting that Japan is a strong opponent of the policy of "Non-First-Use." Japanese policy makers hold "a belief that adopting no first use would weaken the perceived American commitment to Japan's defence."¹⁴¹⁸

¹⁴¹⁴ NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, pp. 149-151. See also Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu Hen (ed.): *Usagino Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon No Kakuto Jyohou Senryaku* [Rabbit's ears and Dove's Dream: Japan's nuclear and Information Strategy] (Tokyo:Liberuta Shuppan., 1995), pp. 42-45.

¹⁴¹⁵ "Japan abstains as nuclear arms ban treaty talks start at U.N.", *Japan Times*, 28 March 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/03/28/national/japan-abstains-talks-start-u-n-nuclear-arms-ban-treaty/#.Wg1NLLvPbIU>, accessed on 29 March 2017.

¹⁴¹⁶ NHK supesharu Shuzaihan, *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon*, p. 155.

¹⁴¹⁷ Ibid.,p. 162.

¹⁴¹⁸ Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal: "No First Use and Credible Deterrence", *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* Vol. 1 No. 1 (2018), p. 103. See also Gerson, "No First Use", p 47.

Conclusion

Notwithstanding Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment, it was imperative for those in charge of the formulation of Japan's national security strategy to explore the desirability and feasibility of Japan's acquisition of an independent nuclear deterrent in the wake of the first Chinese nuclear test. In other words, the impact of the test on their perceptions of the security environment in the Far East was enormous. This is clear because the secret studies in the 1960s were carried out by the initiatives of Japanese themselves. Sato emphasized that a nuclear China was *a mad man with a knife*. Interestingly enough though, they all reached the same conclusion: Japan's nuclear option was not worthwhile; instead, Japan should continue to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. Several considerations against the nuclear option were identified: deterioration of Japan's international standing, great diplomatic and economic costs, Japanese geographical particularities and public opinion. After all, the Japanese policy makers could not be indifferent to pervasive anti-nuclear sentiment in Japan. For defence-minded officials, it was completely logical to consider raising public awareness of self-defence to increase Japanese security. In reality this political condition has not changed much since the 1960s.

In contrast to what foreign analysts estimated, Japan would not obtain nuclear weapons in a short period of time. To be sure, Japan would eventually succeed in building its indigenous nuclear weapons purely theoretically. This would not come easily and cheaply, however. There were stumbling blocks even including a technological difficulty on the way of the successful nuclear weapons programme. The Japanese government as a whole did not have any strong intention to acquire nuclear weapons. To maintain a technological capability for the production of nuclear weapons was one thing, and to possess firm political determination to build nuclear weapons was another. Moreover, technological influence on strategy-making depends heavily on how strategy makers interpret the technology

for strategic use. Gray lucidly accounted for this aspect: “A weapon can be no more effective than the person who uses it. Technology is important, but in war and strategy people matter most.”¹⁴¹⁹ Whether Japan carefully chose a nuclear-hedging option is not empirically provable. In the meantime, it is not deniable that some political leaders shared the same idea and promoted the civilian nuclear and space programme in case of an emergency. Such calculation might have been made in isolation from Japanese scientists. Rather it could have been pure strategic consideration. All things considered, US END was still the best but only option available to Japan, and successive Japanese governments agreed.

¹⁴¹⁹ Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 97. See also Gray, *The Strategy Bridge*, pp. 72-74 and Handel, *Masters of War*, p.82.

Chapter Seven

Conclusion: Long Peace or War Avoidance

Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up.

—Barack Obama¹⁴²⁰

It is inconceivable that we could ever become, even if we wanted to, a military power capable of attacking our neighbors, to say nothing of carrying war far down beyond the equator. There is no menace from Japan.

—Shigeru Yoshida¹⁴²¹

Ultimately, this thesis has examined the formative period of “Invisible” END over Japan between 1945 and 1970. When it comes to nuclear issues in Japan, a nuclear allergy always dominated public debates that reached a dead end. When making a strategy, the Japanese leaders carefully took into account a series of historical and emotional factors. As strategy analyst John Garnett lucidly explained, “Not that international situation is irrelevant; but internal factors are at least as important because policymakers spend as much time looking behind them as they do in front of them, and any adequate explanation of defense policy must take this into account.”¹⁴²² This was clearly true to the Japanese case.

¹⁴²⁰ Barack Obama: “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague”, *The White House* 5 April 2009 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>, accessed on 6 Nov, 2015. See also *Nuclear Posture Review 2010* (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2010), p. iv. Available at [https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report.pdf](https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf), accessed on 3 February 2018.

¹⁴²¹ Yoshida, “Japan and the Crisis in Asia”, p. 174.

¹⁴²² Garnett, “Defense Policy-Making”, p. 25.

The thesis has elaborated upon exactly how a post-war antimilitary and antinuclear norm clearly marked by the embrace of Article 9 and shaped by Japan's unique historical encounter with the three atomic bombings including the *Lucky Dragon* incident had an influence in making Japan's defence strategy. These in turn paved the non-military-cum-nuclear path. Of course Japan's non-nuclear path is well known. Yet the thesis has highlighted clear divergent views between American and Japanese political leaders and even the Japanese leaders and the Japanese public. Until March 1954 (the *Lucky Dragon* incident), initially Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment were interestingly not so obvious. By then, it had already existed but it had been dormant like *Godzilla* was suddenly awoken by the American thermonuclear test in 1954. Japan faced nuclear dangers again. Despite Japanese anti-nuclear feelings, American leaders sought to deploy nuclear weapons on the mainland of Japan on the basis of their military logic. As we have seen, the Japanese leaders in the 1950s and 1960s understood the strategic importance of nuclear deterrence for Japan's security. In the face of the socio-cultural constraint, what the Japanese leaders could realistically do against regional nuclear threats was, however, to strengthen security ties with the USA.

On the one hand, in the 1950s the Eisenhower administration attempted to place newly available tactical nuclear weapons in Japan as part of its grand strategy "New Look" and the US military was crystal clear about its stance on the introduction of nuclear weapons into the mainland of Japan to enhance local defence capabilities. To rephrase Laird, US forces in Japan could not be there naked. On the other hand, the Japanese government was required to refuse such a controversial plan in the face of a severe backlash against the deployment of *Honest John* missiles in Japan. The missile deployment provoked a more severe backlash than the Hatoyama administration expected, forcing Foreign Minister Shigemitsu to lie about the existence of mutual understanding of non-deployment of nuclear weapons with the US government. Then Prime Minister Hatoyama probably underestimated Japanese anti-nuclear feelings. *Godzilla* was already awoken. The

US military too completely underestimated fervent Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment and got a backlash. Having understood the difficulty of the deployment of nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan, the US government used Okinawa as a nuclear base.

Remarkably it took nearly twenty years after the outset of the nuclear age for a Japanese leader to elicit a *verbal* nuclear assurance to Japan from the US leader. As a direct result of the China's first nuclear test of 1964 coincident with the emergence of the more defence-minded Sato administration, "Invisible" US END became explicit. Yet Japan had to undergo some acute domestic political debates between January 1965 and January 1968 to officially and publically acknowledge that Japan was now under the US nuclear umbrella. To remind ourselves the first research question of the thesis is:

Under what circumstances did Japan come under the US nuclear umbrella?

As the thesis reveals, it is impossible to specify or pinpoint the date. Japan came under the US nuclear umbrella during one consecutive period between January 1965 and January 1968 on the grounds that it was in this period that Japan finally explicitly recognised and then officially and publicly accepted the importance of US END for Japan's security. Prime Minister Sato was well aware of two things important for a balanced strategy: nuclear deterrence and making allowance for public opinion. Sato found nuclear weapons vital for national security vis-à-vis a nuclear China. Considering that Japan's nuclear option was not politically feasible, what Sato realistically could do was to seek a US nuclear assurance and thus US END. Interestingly as the Sato-McNamara meeting in January 1965 illustrates, this deterrent form was invisible—sea-based deterrent. This invisible form was a product of Sato's political compromise. Like his predecessors, he could not accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan. Sato still sought US END deemed

vital for Japan's security but it was inevitably an invisible form. In connection to Japan's understanding of US END, it is also important to discuss Japan's nuclear option (nuclear path).

While the Eisenhower government in the 1950s was relaxed about and even willing to share nuclear weapons with close US allies, the Johnson administration in the 1960s started to be more concerned about nuclear proliferation in the wake of a nuclear China. President Johnson was committed to the NPT and succeeded in concluding the treaty in July 1968. While it is true that Japan had already decided to rely on "Invisible" US END by July 1968, the NPT internationally foreclosed the Japan's nuclear path. Partially beset by the development of Chinese nuclear capabilities, Japanese officials were somewhat reluctant to sign the treaty although they did sign the treaty in 1970.

In view of this Japanese concern, it was no surprise that some officials insisted that Japan maintain the technological potential or foundation to produce nuclear weapons in a short period of time in case of emergency. Such a contingency measure sounds reasonable and feasible given that Japan is a technologically advanced country. In reality, however, it was quite uncertain that Japan had an immediate technological capability to produce its indigenous nuclear weapons promptly in the late 1960s. As the thesis reveals, there were some technical hurdles for the production of indigenous nuclear weapons in the 1960s. This did not mean that they could not be surmountable. Yet it would have taken longer than Western analysts estimated. More importantly, it was uncertain that to what extent Japanese nuclear scientists were willing to develop Japan's nuclear weapons. All things considered, the technological potential option was not a reliable option. If it was not reliable, it could not be taken as strategic option.

From the US strategic point of view, as this thesis elaborates, it was desirable for Japan to accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan for regional defence. The US government could have exerted more pressure on the Japanese government to accept the deployment of nuclear arsenals. Or in the 1950s

before the Japanese government had no veto over “major changes in the military equipment”, the US government could have technically introduced nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan. In each key event such as the *Honest John* Deployment, the revision of the new treaty, the treatment of nuclear weapons in the Bonin and the Ryukyu Islands, to some extent the US government compromised. It also prioritised its diplomatic ties with Japan and Japan’s domestic political stability over its ultimate demands of Japan’s rearmament. The Japanese public was not ready to assume more responsibility for regional defence. The issue of Japan’s responsibility for regional defence continues to be a matter of debate even today.

That being said, if we look at the secret nuclear agreement between Sato and Nixon in 1969, the reintroduction of US nuclear weapons into Japan in the event of contingency could have occurred. One may be doubtful whether Japan is truly protected by “Invisible” END. What makes “Visible” END distinct from “Invisible” END is the *peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons* in host nations, and these nuclear weapons are jointly operated under nuclear sharing arrangements. The 2018 Brussels summit declaration, for instance, posits that “NATO’s nuclear deterrence posture also relies on United State’s nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe.”¹⁴²³ Under the nuclear sharing arrangements there is a strong sense of burden sharing in “Visible” END. The same thing cannot be said of the case of “Invisible” END.

Be that as it may, as the Japanese public never allowed Japan to go nuclear, Japanese policy makers had to seek a way to protect the country from regional nuclear threats and major invasions.¹⁴²⁴ To reiterate the key point, “Invisible” US END is a product of compromise for Japan. Having reached the agreement with the US government on reversion of Okinawa in 1969, “invisible END” came to completion in 1972 when Okinawa was legally restored to Japan. Since then, actual wording of US nuclear deterrence for Japan’s defence has become more explicit and

¹⁴²³ North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: “Brussels Summit Declaration” (11 Jul 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm, accessed on 5 February 2019.

¹⁴²⁴ See for example Kurosaki, “Sato Seiken No Kakuseisaku to America”, p. 81.

evident. The first clear public reference to the importance of US nuclear deterrence for Japan's security was indeed found in an official Japanese government document in 1972. The Defence Buildup Plan for the next five years posited that "Japan will rely on US nuclear deterrence against nuclear threats to Japan."¹⁴²⁵ Furthermore, the joint announcement delivered to the press following the Japan-US summit meeting publicly employed the words: *nuclear deterrent* for the first time in 1975. It proclaimed that

The Prime Minister and the President expressed their conviction that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States has greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East and is an indispensable element of the basic international political structure in Asia, and that the continued maintenance of the Treaty serves the long-term interests of both countries. Further, they recognized the *US nuclear deterrent* is an important contributor to the security of Japan. In this connection, the President reassured the Prime Minister that the United States would continue to abide by its defense commitment to Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security in the event of armed attack against Japan, whether by nuclear or conventional forces.¹⁴²⁶

While it directly referred to the nuclear deterrent, the most basic message was not different from previous statements such as the joint statement of 1965. It claimed that the USA would stand by to "defend Japan against any armed attack from the outside."¹⁴²⁷ In other words, since 1965 it has become a recurrent ritual for the two

¹⁴²⁵ "Dai Yoji Gokanen Keikaku no Sakuteini Saishiteno Josei Handan oyobi Boeino Koso (Showa Yonjunana Nen Jugatu Kokonoka Kakugi Kettei)" [The Analysis of the Current World Situation and Defence Concepts for the Fourth Defence Build up Plan For the Next Five Years, approved by the Cabinet on 9 October 1972] in Boei cho: *Showa 51 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 1976], available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_9106.html, accessed on 4 November 2018.

¹⁴²⁶ Emphasis added. The World and Japan Database: "Japan-U.S. Joint Announcement to the Press (by Prime Minister Takeo Miki and President Gerald R. Ford)", 6 August 1975, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19750806.01E.html>, accessed on 4 November 2018.

¹⁴²⁷ Text of Joint Communiqué Between President Lyndon B. Johnson and His Excellency Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan Following Talks in Washington, January 12 and 13, 1965

governments to reconfirm US nuclear assurance to Japan.¹⁴²⁸ This invisible form of US END remains unchanged even today. Thus, this time period is doubtlessly a key to understanding the nature of US END over Japan.

Moreover, the thesis makes three key contributions to the field of IR and Strategic Studies broadly and the deterrence literature more specifically. First it theorises “Invisible” US END built on both empirical historical analysis and deterrence literature. It provides both a novel theoretical and empirical insight into the invisibility of US END. As already noted, a historical study on NATO’s case or “Visible” END is well studied. A systematic study on “Visible” and “Invisible” is, however, still missing. Such a study is still needed to identify the true nature of US END. The thesis nevertheless adds the other half solid account of US END to deterrence literature.

Second, the thesis empirically reveals how a socio-cultural factor (Japanese nuclear mentalities) shaped Japan’s defence strategy. There were some policy makers in both the US and Japanese government who saw strategic value in the deployment of US nuclear weapons in Japan but after all they could not simply ignore Japanese public opinion severely against such an operation. It therefore empirically explains why Japan was the rare exception of close US allies which became nuclearised: one of the most important US allies located in a strategic location but it never hosted US allies. In other words, Japan’s strategic preferences cannot be explained by focusing solely on external threats and pure military logic. This leads to the final point.

Third, the thesis empirically debunks the main assumption of IR Realists: a rational uniform actor who is cautious of external threats and seeks security and power in the world of anarchy and self help. It proves that domestic beliefs matter a

¹⁴²⁸ In February 2017 President Trump reconfirmed US security commitments to Japan. The Joint Statement released following the first official meeting declared that “The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional is unwavering.” See Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 10 February 2017, the White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-prime-minister-shinzo-abe/>, accessed on 4 November 2018.

great deal and Japan holds unique strategic preferences that are quite distinct from the assumption of IR Realism. After the end of the Cold War, IR realists such as Kenneth Waltz and Christopher Layne argued that Japan would acquire nuclear weapons for its security because Japan was completely surrounded by regional nuclear powers. Yet as this thesis shows Japan's non-nuclear path is firmly established. Behind their contention, apart from external nuclear threats they viewed that Japan had an economic and technological capacity to develop its own nuclear weapons.¹⁴²⁹ In this respect, some Western analysts too regarded Japan as a latent nuclear state although their argument is not fully supported by empirical evidence. Yet this might have been somewhat inevitable as primary sources have been classified until quite recently and English literature on the subject has been scarce. To be sure it is true that Japan could technically build its indigenous nuclear weapons. Yet this does not automatically mean that Japan could go nuclear rapidly. There are many practical hurdles that could delay the Japan's nuclear weapons programme. This was particularly so in the 1960s as we have seen. According to empirical evidence elaborated in this chapter, it is safe to say that Japan at least in the 1960s could not have produced nuclear weapons in a short period of time. Japan had neither political will nor the immediate technological capacity.

The Strategic Logic Behind “Invisible” END.

Having answered the first research question in the previous section, this thesis will address and answer the second research question:

What factors have shaped invisible extended nuclear deterrence?

¹⁴²⁹ Christopher Layne: “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise”, *International Security* Vol. 17 No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics”, pp. 5-41; Kenneth N. Waltz: “Structural Realism after the Cold War”, *International Security* Vol. 45 No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 5-41. See also Kahn, *The Emerging Japanese Superstate*.

In the end, no US government has so far placed nuclear weapons on the mainland of Japan. The USA also removed its nuclear weapons from Okinawa by 1972. This did not necessarily mean that key Japanese decision makers such as Kishi, Ikeda and Sato underestimated more visible nuclear deterrence or even an independent nuclear deterrent. This thesis has shown that Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment mattered greatly and established the non-nuclear path, but this was not the sole factor to shape “Invisible” US END over Japan. If the actual decision makers such as Sato had completely supported the path, he would not have even requested President Johnson for an American nuclear assurance to Japan. There were also other key factors (*Economy, Geography, Technology, and Nuclear Mentalities*) to shape “Invisible” END. It is important to stress that the interaction of these factors in turn shapes “Invisible” END. As Clausewitz warned us, there are certain factors in the formulation of strategy and they function interconnectively: “It would...be disastrous to try to develop our understanding of strategy by analyzing these factors in isolation.”¹⁴³⁰

Economy. While he was the leader most favourable to nuclear weapons, Sato was also a pupil of Yoshida. Although he was personally determined to raise public awareness of defence issues, he actually did not raise defence spending (see IV. Figure: Military Expenditure). Even today, the Japanese defence budget is only around 1 % of its GDP. If we look at the political reality, even Sato’s security policy was still in line with the Yoshida line. Although Yoshida was not necessarily opposed to rearmament when Japan’s economy was recovered, his successors did not change the course and the constitution. What this tells us is that Japan’s post-war path was clearly not military but economic. Since rearmament or a major military buildup programme was unpopular and was considered to hinder Japan’s economic recovery, the Japanese government prioritised economic developments. Behind this political priority, there also was an evident public mood of a war and military aversion. Since the end of devastating war, they did not want to think

¹⁴³⁰ Clausewitz, *On War*, p. 183.

about war any longer and it was understood that their future lay in economy. Although the economic factor did not directly shape “Invisible” END, it still shows the domestic context where Japan’s defence strategy was made. Given that defence issues were not popular and the Japanese public was clearly averse to the military, nuclear weapons were never welcome in Japan.

Geography/ Technology. While geography and technology are two distinct factors, they were closely interactive and interconnected when it came to shaping “Invisible” END. Therefore, it is important to discuss the two factors together but not in isolation. Technology coupled with geography certainly has an impact on strategy considering what technology has enabled: overcoming physical distance and terrain.¹⁴³¹

At the beginning of US occupation, the USA came to Japan with a view to demilitarising and democratizing Japan so that Japan could no longer pose any threat to the USA. Indeed the USA successfully achieved these two occupation goals by 1950. As a consequence of the defeat of the Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War in 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War, the US occupation policy had to be reversed. After complete disarmament Japan had to be rearmed so that Japan could closely work with the USA to contain the further spread of communism in the Far East. It is important to note that the US government especially in the 1950s wanted a stronger Japan even equipped with US tactical nuclear weapons. This was mainly because Japan is located in close proximity to the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan, China and the Soviet Union. In other words, Japan was regarded as a US strategic outpost in the Far East. US military bases were, for instance, heavily used during the Korean War. Moreover, initially the flying range of strategic bombers such as B-29s and B-47s until the introduction of B-52 in 1955 was so limited that operationally these earlier types of bombers could only carry out nuclear strikes against the Soviet Union from its peripheral areas and Japan was situated in such a key

¹⁴³¹ Gray, *Modern Strategy*, p. 40; Strachan, *The Direction of War*, pp.191-192; William Walker: *A perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (London: Routhledge., 2012), p. 61.

location.

In this regard, it was militarily logical for the US government to deploy nuclear weapons in case of the renewal hostilities on the Korean Peninsula or some contingency in the Far East. The US military clearly recognised the strategic importance of Japan and there was no question that it wanted to introduce nuclear weapons on the mainland of Japan due to its strategic location. Moreover, nuclear weapons were also needed to be deployed in Japan in order to defend US forces in Japan. Indeed the US government made an attempt to deploy nuclear weapons in Japan (e.g. Honest John missile deployment in 1955) but it completely foundered on Japanese resistance.

It is worth noting that the US military deployed its nuclear weapons in the other US allied countries in the region such as South Korea and Taiwan. In fact Japan was the only America's regional allied state that did not host US nuclear weapons.¹⁴³² Aware of the importance of the introduction of nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan, in the 1950s and 1960s both the US and the Japanese governments attempted to cure Japan's nuclear allergy through nuclear education (the Atoms for Peace Programme and port call visits of nuclear-powered naval vessels) in the hope that the Japanese public would eventually accept the deployment of US nuclear weapons. Yet this public attempt through nuclear education did not succeed either. Instead, the US government deployed nuclear weapons in the Bonin Islands and mainly the Ryukyu Islands, which were under US control. For Japanese policy makers, following a severe backlash against the *Honest John* missile development of 1955, it became nearly politically impossible to accept US nuclear weapons on Japan's soil. That said, they still needed and indeed sought American nuclear assurances to Japan especially China became the first Asian nuclear power in 1964. It is notable that American security protection of Japan had to be provided in the form of invisibility. As both the US and Japanese

¹⁴³² See for example, Norris, Arkin and Burr, "Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?", pp. 11-13, 78-79.

governments were clearly aware of Japan's nuclear allergy, US END over Japan became invisible. While it is true that the geographical location of Japan was key for US grand strategy, the nature of Japan's geography is maritime (in comparison to another key strategic location such as West Germany). This Japanese geographical feature was crucial when it came to the emergence of "Invisible" END. As the Sato-McNamara discussion in January 1965 revealed, Sato sought the US nuclear umbrella, but he stressed that Japan did not want the deployment of American nuclear weapons onto the mainland of Japan. Instead, Sato asked McNamara for deterrence at sea (Invisible END). At the time, it was not particularly clear exactly what constituted deterrence at sea. As US-Japan negotiations over reversion of Okinawa progressed, it became evident that Japan sought American protection by *Polaris* nuclear submarines operated in the middle of the (Pacific) ocean.

The extent to which technology changes strategies is a matter of vigorous debate.¹⁴³³ The technological dimension of strategies especially with respect to nuclear strategy was nevertheless more influential than ever before, ranging from bomber-delivered free fall bombs to submarine-launched missiles.¹⁴³⁴ Major technological developments of strategic missiles, particularly the introduction of SLBMs, changed strategic calculations of both American strategists and Japanese political leaders. Even though the US military still demanded the continued forward deployment of nuclear weapons in Okinawa, both countries' practitioners observed that forward-deployed nuclear weapons could be replaced by SLBMs. In fact already in the early 1960s *Regulus* missiles in the Bonin Islands were removed based in part on the logic that the newly introduced *Polaris* missiles would render the forward deployment of the older generation of the missiles unnecessary in the Bonins. More specifically, to echo Albert Wohlstetter, US nuclear forces in the late

¹⁴³³ See for example Stephen Biddle: "The Gulf War Debate Redux", *International Security* Vol.22 No.2 (Fall 1997), pp. 163-174, Christopher Coker: *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2014), pp. 34-52; Gray, *Perspectives on Strategy*, pp. 153-184; Freedman, *The Future of War*; p.xviii; Howard: "The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy", pp. 970-980 and Strachan, *The Direction of War*, pp.166-192.

¹⁴³⁴ Huntington, *The Common Defense*, p. 74; Rosenberg, "The Origins of Overkill", p.10; Snyder, *Deterrence and Defense*, p.8; Strachan, *The Direction of War*, p.187; Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*, p. xi; Walker, *A perpetual Menace*, p. 62.

1960s already constituted strategic missiles that could be launched from the US mainland and “*ocean areas to distant targets.*”¹⁴³⁵ Japanese policy makers including Wakaizumi agreed upon this point and they believed that *Polaris* could replace forward-deployed nuclear weapons (i.e. *Mace B*) in Okinawa.

To be sure, it was desirable for the US military to keep American nuclear weapons stationed in Okinawa even after the return of Okinawa to Japan. Although it was in favour of maintaining nuclear weapons in Okinawa, even the JCS was confident that SLBMs would render forward-deployed nuclear weapons in Okinawa unnecessary. This, however, did not mean that the new missile technology canceled differences among the geographical environments (land, sea and air). Indeed the nuclear “triad” (bomber, ICBM, SLBM) represents three distinct geographical dimensions: air, ground, and sea respectively.¹⁴³⁶ Both Japanese and American policy makers applied the new technology to one geographical dimension: sea. As Gray plausibly explained, geography is not wholly determinative but it “typically provides the necessary explanation for why particular defence choices are made.”¹⁴³⁷ Gray even insisted that “That technology has cancelled geography contains just enough merit to be called a plausible fallacy.”¹⁴³⁸ In view of the maritime nature of Japan and the very low likelihood of a bolt out of the blue attack by the Soviet Union or China against Japan, sea-based deterrence backed by ballistic missile submarines was probably a logical solution. This was also what Japanese strategists considered to be suitable for Japan.

Based in part on this broad strategic calculation along with other various reasons, Okinawa was returned to Japan without any forward-deployed nuclear weapons. Thus, Japan completely relied on the invisible form of US END. While it is true that the completion of “Invisible” END was enabled by the newly available technology (SLBMs) and Japan’s unique geographical features (maritime), the

¹⁴³⁵ Emphasis added. Second Agenda Topic, Place of Okinawa Return of Administrative Rights and U.S. Bases, by Albert Wohlstetter, Japan-U.S. Kyoto Conference January 1969.

¹⁴³⁶ Gray, “The Continued Primacy of Geography”, p. 257; idem, “Inescapable Geography”, p. 174.

¹⁴³⁷ Gray, *The Future of Strategy*, p. 84.

¹⁴³⁸ Colin S. Gray: “The Continued Primacy of Geography”, *Orbis* Vol. 40 No. 2 (Spring 1996), p. 251

strategic calculation behind “Invisible” END was significantly influenced by political consideration for Japan’s nuclear allergy, which did not allow any forward deployment of nuclear weapons on Japan’s soil. As Gray stressed, “All knowledge is local knowledge, all policy is made domestically, and every maker of policy and strategy has been encultured by a particular tradition and society.”¹⁴³⁹ In other words, a final product, strategy, is a reflection of local contexts where strategy is ultimately made.

Nuclear Mentalities. Each key nuclear—related event in Japan such as the deployment of *Honest John* and the *Enterprise’s* port call at Sasebo, the Japanese public was severely opposed to weapons that were closely related to nuclear bombs although they were technically not nuclear weapons by themselves. As the thesis has revealed, despite the public anti-nuclear sentiment, some key Japanese political leaders and Japanese elites did not necessarily share Japanese nuclear allergic reactions to nuclear weapons. Sato in particular saw strategic values in Japanese indigenous nuclear weapons. He was personally convinced that nuclear deterrence was vital for Japan’s security. He personally hoped that the younger generation who did not have direct experience in the war could be educated so that the future Japanese would eventually have more objective attitudes toward Japan’s defence. Yet this was his optimistic observation. Like his predecessors, he simply could not afford to ignore public opinion. As a defence-minded leader, he still successfully elicited the Johnson administration’s nuclear assurance to Japan. “Invisible” US END over Japan was a product of compromise for Sato. For the Johnson administration, nuclear proliferation became one of the most impending global issues in the wake of a nuclear China. The provision of the US nuclear umbrella to Japan was a practical solution to prevent Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons.

The complete defeat of Japan symbolized by the two atomic weapons dropped on Japan was a major turning point for Japan and even in Japanese history. Japanese nuclear mentalities can be simply described as mentalities of “never

¹⁴³⁹ Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age*, p.61.

again”, a postwar norm of a war aversion: fervent anti-military and anti-nuclear sentiments. The national consensus of postwar Japan was that “we never ever want another war.” The last war was devastating and traumatic enough for the Japanese. This emotional reaction was natural and probably inevitable.

As already noted, Japan could have built a full-fledged army and arguably introduced even nuclear sharing arrangements similar to NATO’s given the fact that US grand strategy sought to build up a stronger Japan closely aligned with the USA. Japan was expected to play a key role in combating communism in the Far East.

Ultimately, it was a Japanese choice to make slow progress in rearmament. Historical memories of World War Two were still vivid especially in the late 1940s and the 1950s. Indeed most Japanese people including the decision makers were not prepared to take a “reverse course” so that Japan could actively contain communism in the Far East with the USA. This reluctant posture incited the ire of the US government although the American leaders had to accept the reality as they were the one who imposed several stumbling blocks on Japan. The introduction of the peace constitution was an ultimate American strategic mistake as Nixon lamented. It virtually thwarted the US strategic plan to increase Japan’s defence capabilities to the level the US government wanted (e.g. 10 Army divisions and the deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons in the mainland of Japan.)

Between the 1950s and 1970s Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment was shaped and even embodied in actual policies including “Three Non-Nuclear Policies” and a “Nuclear-Free” Okinawa. That Japan sought US “Invisible END” in the 1960s could also be a consequence of Japan’s anti-nuclear sentiment. As Japan insulated itself from nuclear weapons because of its unique historical experiences of atomic bombing, Japan also created public apathy about its own security. War has become somebody else’s problem for postwar Japan. It has become a norm for the Japanese to rely on the USA for Japan’s defence even though there is no automatic guarantee that the American will do so.

Had it not been for Hiroshima, Nagasaki and *Daigo Fukuryūmaru*, the Japanese would not have been extremely sensitive and emotional about the treatment of nuclear weapons. That said, it is not correct to conclude that this non-material factor alone led to the creation of “Invisible” END. Material factors such as geography and technology were decisive as well. It can be argued that looking out for culture is important but it does not explain everything any more than does geography, or technology by itself. The cultural approach is of particular use and value when employed with other explanatory factors including material variables.¹⁴⁴⁰ Focusing on geography, Sloan cogently argued that “Geography does not directly condition strategy; instead, it is refracted through prisms of culture and technology.”¹⁴⁴¹ With this in mind, the answer to the second research question is that the combination and dynamic interaction of material and non-material factors in turn shaped “Invisible” END. Without the distinct geographical features of Japan and the technological development of sea-launched ballistic missiles, both the US and the Japanese government would have made a totally different strategic calculation with respect to nuclear deterrence.

Having answered the research questions, it is important to discuss the nature of “Invisible END.” The nature of “Invisible” END can simply be surmised as “existential deterrence” in the invisible form of US deterrence provided to Japan by the oral assurance of American leaders. Since the US nuclear assurance to Japan was invisible (deterrence at sea), the nature of such deterrent form relies on ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in American military response and a crisis itself. So long as Japanese security against the hostile Japanese nuclear neighbours was left in the hands of American President’s will to retaliate and even make a preemptive strike, this did not appear credible. This was especially so where US nuclear weapons were not physically deployed on the territory of its allies. The

¹⁴⁴⁰ On this point see Michael C. Desch: “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies”, *International Security* Vol.23 No.1 (Summer 1998), pp. 169-170; Gray, *Strategy and Politics*, p. 107.

¹⁴⁴¹ Sloan, *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History*, p. 25.

invisible form of assurance appears less credible as a deterrent. A Communist military aggression against Japan without provoking US nuclear retaliation might have been logical considerations.

That said, as elaborated previously, a would-be aggressor could not completely eliminate the possibility of an actual US military response including nuclear retaliation. The US government repeatedly declared that the US would protect Japan from all the forms of attack. It just did not specify exactly when, how and where it would use nuclear weapons to protect Japan (calculated ambiguity). This fact would complex the strategic calculation of the enemy. To some extent, it did not matter whether US would initially retaliate with nuclear weapons. Once a conflict erupted and escalated, the possibility of nuclear war always existed.

The political leaders of hostile nuclear powers had to be wary of what their military strike against Japan might set off. Once US forces in Japan were attacked and thus, the USA lost its strategic assets, this would be no longer a military confrontation between Japan and the enemy. Moreover, as discussed throughout the thesis, Japan is one of the key US strategic areas. If the USA did not act to protect its key strategic interest, it would completely lose its credibility and reputation as the leader of the West. Further escalation appeared inevitable in this regard. During the Cold War, there was no question that the final stage of escalation was all-out nuclear war. This prospect of nuclear war would prompt prudence and restraint of an opponent. In essence, the nature of “invisible” END was founded on “existential deterrence”: Purely theoretically, it can be argued that the prospect of nuclear escalation always exists as the USA would take a military response to protect Japan and its fellow American soldiers if they are attacked. Therefore, it can deter an enemy. Of course, the reality was much more complex.

In case of contingency, nevertheless, the US military could have technically reintroduced nuclear weapons into Okinawa although this secret agreement is no longer valid. In such a situation, they could have also been deployed to the mainland of Japan. To be sure, this is truly hypothetical but this


could apply even today. More realistically, a B-52 bomber (regardless of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons or not) could fly into Japan during a crisis. Japanese Air Self Defence could conduct an in-flight refueling mission for a B-52 and Japanese F-15s could guard the bomber if the former plan did not work out well. Indeed F-15s of Japan Air Self-Defence Force and a B-52 of the US Air Force conducted a joint military exercise in the sky above the Japanese sea in July 2018.¹⁴⁴²

Essentially “Invisible” US END over Japan has been a cornerstone of Japanese security policy since Japan accepted it in the 1960s. One can argue that memories of war and Hiroshima and Nagasaki are fading away. That is probably true, but public indifference to defence issues remains strong today. What is distinct from the Cold War context to the today’s context is that the security landscape of East Asia is increasingly complex and volatile with the rise of China, which also modernized its nuclear forces, and North Korea as a nuclear power. The key question is whether Japan will seek a more visible form of US END to deal with the new security challenges at its own initiative.

¹⁴⁴² “Kuuji Kaku Tosaigata Bakugekiki to Kyodo Kunren Kitachosen he no Keikai Taisei Kenji”, *Sankei Shimbun*, 28 July 2018, <https://www.sankei.com/photo/story/news/180728/sty1807280008-n1.html>, accessed on 24 January 2019.

I.C. Map: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 2018)

ESTIMATE OF GLOBAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN JANUARY 2018



Source: SIPRI Year Book 2018, *SIPRI*, <https://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/2018-june>, accessed 30 January 2019.

III.G Table: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January 2018 (SIPRI Year Book 2018)

World nuclear forces, January 2018

Country	Deployed Warheads*	Other warheads**	Total 2018	Total 2017
USA	1 750	4 700	6 450	6 800
Russia	1 600	5 250	6 850	7 000
UK	120	95	215	215
France	280	20	300	300
China		280	280	270
India		130-140	130-140	120-130
Pakistan		140-150	140-150	130-140
Israel		80	80	80
North Korea	(10-20)	(10-20)
Total	3 750	10 715	14 465	14 935

Source: *SIPRI Yearbook 2018*

* 'Deployed warheads' refers to warheads placed on missiles or located on bases with operational forces.

** 'Other warheads' refers to stored or reserve warheads and retired warheads awaiting dismantlement.

Total figures include the highest estimate when a range is given. Figures for North Korea are uncertain and are not included in total figures. All estimates are approximate.

Source: SIPRI Year Book 2018, *SIPRI*, <https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/modernization-nuclear-weapons-continues-number-pe-acekeepers-declines-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now>, accessed 30 January 2019.

What Does Japanese Nuclear History Tell US About Current Japan?

The main approach of this thesis is to employ history as a tool to understand the present. There are several key things the Japanese nuclear history covered in this thesis can help us understand about Japan's strategic preferences today. Surprisingly some key features of the foregoing period that shaped Japanese strategic preferences remain unchanged. Nearly fifty years ago Sato held that the Japanese public was not ready for an independent nuclear deterrent option "but would have to be educated to this point, and he felt younger generation showed hopeful signs of going this way." Sato also insisted that "[the] constitution must be revised, though time not yet ripe for this."¹⁴⁴³ Probably current Japanese political leaders can make exactly the same statement. In other words, the domestic condition of Japan for making a defence strategy is not fundamentally different from the time of Sato. To be sure, there are many more people who did not experience the war, and younger generations do not even know what 9/11 is. That being said, the non-military-cum-nuclear path is already established and self-reinforced. Once this path is well established, the younger generations will likely follow the path too as they grow up within the path.

What does this continuity tell us about current Japan and its likely security path? To be sure, the current security environment is quite different from the Cold War situation. Now North Korea, for example, joins the nuclear club. This means Japan is even more or completely surrounded by the nuclear neighbours. In fact, six out of the nine nuclear states are situated in the Asia-Pacific region.

That being said, it is important to note that nuclear threats from a rogue state (North Korea) are nothing new. China was not only the first regional but also global "rogue" state.¹⁴⁴⁴ In the words of political scientist Francis Gavin, "China was in many ways the original rogue state. Veering between the ironclad rule of

¹⁴⁴³ Telegram from American Embassy, Tokyo to the Department of State, 29 December 1964, NSF, Country File, Japan, Box 253 (1 of 2), LBJ Library.

¹⁴⁴⁴ Gavin, "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War", p. 402.

Mao Zedong and the anarchy of the Great Leap Forward in the 1950s and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, China's successful program to develop its own atomic weapons worried its neighbours and both Cold War superpowers."¹⁴⁴⁵ According to Japanese nuclear history, Japan lived with China under the US nuclear umbrella. In the 1960s, China was a purely nuclear threat to Japan. The exactly same thing can be said of a nuclear North Korea. Given its limited conventional capability it poses a purely nuclear threat to Japan. In the 1960s Japan's choice was to rely on the US nuclear umbrella. What about this time? Given that the non-nuclear path is firm in Japan, it is not a realistic idea for Japan to pursue an independent nuclear deterrent. Against this backdrop, IR Realists will probably suggest that the US nuclear umbrella is no longer credible and if Japan cannot have nuclear weapons, it should still build up its conventional capabilities by increasing defence spending. This is easier said than done. As we have seen, Japan has never had a major defence build-up but a slow and moderate programme of increasing defence capabilities. To some extent, Japan still continues to keep the Yoshida line at least in terms of the low military budget.

Alternatively, one might recommend that as President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Sato attempted, the present political leaders should raise Japanese public awareness of defence issues including nuclear deterrence. It did not succeed in the past and it is questionable that if it will work this time. Given the non-military-cum-nuclear path is strong and institutionalized, a drastic shift is unlikely. While Japanese policy makers are clearly aware of the nuclear threat of North Korea, ordinary Japanese do not share the same threat perception as in the 1960s. The latest Japanese Defence White Paper in August 2018 observed that the level of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme now poses "the gravest and most impending danger ever."¹⁴⁴⁶ If North Korea continued "Nuclear Brinkmanship" or missile tests against the Japanese sea, the Japanese public would feel constantly

¹⁴⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 402.

¹⁴⁴⁶ *Heisei 30 Nen Ban Nihon no Bouei: Bouei Hakusho [Defence of Japan: Annual Defence White Paper, 2018]* (Tokyo: Bouei Sho, August, 2018), p. 25.

threatened and might recognise the importance of self-defence capabilities. Yet after the historic June meeting between President Donald Trump and Supreme North Korean Leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea has found it difficult to resume its “brinkmanship” approach. In this situation, public attention naturally goes to domestic issues. This still does not deny that an eventual and gradual shift of the Japanese attitude toward defence issues even though such a sign does not appear clearly as we will see below. There are two acute constraints Japan faces when it shifts toward a more defence-oriented path. These are institutional and socio-cultural constraints.

Article 9 of the Japanese constitution introduced nearly 70 years ago has not been amended even once. So long as this article is in effect, Japanese defence capabilities are limited and Japan has no option but to rely on the USA. Due to the existence of the article, Japan has adopted the concept of *Senshu Boei* (the exclusively defence-oriented policy). It essentially means that “defensive force is used only in the event of an attack...the defense capabilities to be possessed and maintained by Japan are limited to the minimum necessary for self-defense.”¹⁴⁴⁷ In accordance with Article 9 the Japanese government considers that offensive weapons such as ICBMs and strategic bombers are a violation of the article.¹⁴⁴⁸

On the one hand, it is true that as stated previously Japanese government’s interpretation of Article 9 does not necessarily prohibit Japan from acquiring nuclear weapons. On the other hand, in practice the government decision to acquire nuclear weapons requires the Japanese government to revise the article. Of course, a fervent public backlash against the decision can easily be expected. That said, the nuclear option is not acceptable to Japanese public or even political leaders. It is highly questionable that they will endure the severe diplomatic repercussions caused by producing indigenous nuclear weapons. As the secret study commissioned

¹⁴⁴⁷ “Fundamental Concepts of National Defense”, *Ministry of Defence*, https://web.archive.org/web/20161105124319/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html, accessed on 11 September 2018.

¹⁴⁴⁸ Boei cho: *Showa 45 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 1970], available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1970/w1970_02.html, accessed on 10 February 2019.

by the Cabinet Research Office in the 1960s suggested, Japanese own nuclear weapons will not enhance its global standing. The same study also suggested that “the day that the possession of nuclear weapons was prerequisite for major power status was simply gone now.”¹⁴⁴⁹ Looking at the case of North Korea and Iran, a nuclear Japan is not a realistic choice. Unless it wants to sever diplomatic relations with the USA, the immediate benefits of nuclearisation would be small as the studies in the 1960s illustrated.

Moreover, Article 9 also is a clear symbol of Japan as a peace state.¹⁴⁵⁰ The main reason why the article has not been amended is that domestically it has been unthinkable to change it. It is to some extent treated as a sacred object. Even those who back the conservative Abe administration do not see the immediate necessity of the revision of the constitution today.¹⁴⁵¹ Even today most Japanese opposition parties are vehemently opposed to the revision of Article 9.¹⁴⁵² According to the results of opinion surveys conducted between 1997 and 2017, on average approximately 30 % of respondents favoured the revision of Article while approximately 60 % did not support the revision.¹⁴⁵³

The actual procedure to amend the constitution is ultimately left in the hands of the Japanese public because the final decision is made through a national referendum after the special bill passes through both the lower and upper house two thirds of which approves it. Following this procedure, more than half of the Japanese must vote in favour of the revision of the constitution.¹⁴⁵⁴ To be sure whether the Japanese approves it or not is unpredictable. What this suggests is that the institutional problem will not be solved immediately. The most likely security

¹⁴⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 28.

¹⁴⁵⁰ Ohta and Nakazawa, *Kenpo Kyuzyo wo Sekai Isan ni*.

¹⁴⁵¹ “Kaikenan Akino Kokkai Teishutsu Hihan” [Unrealistic Plan to Submit a Proposal for the Revision of the Constitution at the Coming Diet] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 18 August 2018.

¹⁴⁵² “Jimin Kaikenan, Sanin Teiji Miokuri” [LDPJ postpones sending its proposal to the Diet], *Jiji*, 4 December 2018, <https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2018120400834&g=po,l> accessed on 6 December 2018.

¹⁴⁵³ The survey results are cited in Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace: “Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability”, *International Affairs* Vol. 94 No. 4 (2018), p. 730.

¹⁴⁵⁴ “Motto Kuwashiku Kokumin Tohyo Seido”, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/kokumin_touhyou/kokkai.html accessed on 10 December 2018.

path for Japan will be a gradual but incremental increase of defence capabilities as Prime Minister Yoshida did under the security umbrella of the USA.¹⁴⁵⁵

The second constraint is Japanese nuclear mentalities. Japanese anti-nuclear sentiment is deeply-embedded in the minds of the Japanese. It is true that the memories of the atomic bombing upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki are certainly paling as time goes by. Yet this does not mean the end of a nuclear taboo. It is already deep-seated and long lasting. Furthermore, the impact of the *Fukushima Daiichi* Accident (nuclear plant explosion and nuclear leak) on 11 March 2011 could be equivalent to the “*fourth bombing*.” The accident caused by the largest earthquake ever recorded in Japan damaged the nuclear plants and released high radioactive materials that subsequently made the peripheral areas uninhabitable. Due to this accident, the Japanese people are more aware of the danger and risk of nuclear power. They are now more against *anything* nuclear. It must be noted that most nuclear plants in Japan have been forced to suspend their operation since the earthquake. It is safe to say that the nuclear path is further self-reinforced. In this regard, it will be truly unlikely that Japan will develop an independent nuclear deterrent or rely on visible END even if this were not in line with Japanese strategists’ visions. As the security environment in East Asia deteriorating, it may be realistic for some Japanese strategists to review nuclear sharing arrangements.

A NATO-style nuclear-sharing option is raised as a political agenda by some Japanese strategists today. They prioritise military logic over the domestic anti-nuclear norm as the US military did in the 1950s. Concerned about the future East Asian security environment, one prominent Japanese think tank (IIPS) proposed that Japan adopt the NATO’s nuclear sharing model in 2009.¹⁴⁵⁶ The impact of its recommendation has been slight. In the end, Japan’s realistic choice is to rely on “Invisible” END.

¹⁴⁵⁵ Hughes, *Japan’s Re-emergence as a ‘Normal’ Military Power*, p. 40; Kase, “Japan”, p. 129.

¹⁴⁵⁶ Research Group on the Japan-US Alliance: “A New Phrase in the Japan-US Alliance: 2009 Project Report”, *Institute for International Policy Studies* (September 2009), p. 10. See also Green and Furukawa, “Japan: New Nuclear Realism”, pp. 359-361.

In fact, since 2010 the Japanese government has regularly held a dialogue on extended deterrence with the US government.¹⁴⁵⁷ It is quite likely that Japan and US will strengthen their bilateral nuclear relations in light of the current nuclear politics of the Far East.¹⁴⁵⁸ Yet this does not mean the Japanese public accepts the nuclear sharing arrangements. Japanese political leaders might be able to secretly adopt them but not without negative implications.

First of all, this surreptitious deployment obviously lacks a deterrent effect unless it is made public. Second, China and Russia could technically detect unusual movements by the US military through their intelligence satellites. Needless to say, the Japanese public would be resentful when this clandestine operation was revealed. After the Fukushima incident, it is very hard to gain general public support for the plan. The nuclear-sharing option is also about breaking a norm of nuclear-free Japan the country has managed over 70 years. Moreover, if the US government were to decide deploy nuclear weapons in Japan, it would be more likely to do so for reassurance purposes. This measure would be designed to discourage the nuclearisation of Japan.¹⁴⁵⁹ In the current domestic climate of Japan, it is questionable that the Japanese public would be reassured by the presence of US nuclear weapons. On the contrary it would create nothing but repugnance and turmoil in Japan.

According to Elaine Bunn, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence for Nuclear and Missile Policy, unlike South Korea, Japanese officials too admitted that the Japanese are still not ready to accept the peacetime deployment of US nuclear weapons on Japan's soil.¹⁴⁶⁰ The most fundamental question to the Japanese is whether they are prepared to commit mass slaughter which they

¹⁴⁵⁷ Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan: "Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue" (11 July 2016) http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001202.html, accessed on 21 November 2016.

¹⁴⁵⁸ See for example Roberts, "Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia", pp. 4-9, 25-26; Roberts, *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century*, pp. 198-208; Michito Tsuruoka: *Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa*, Policy Brief (Washington D.C : German Marshall Fund of the United States., 2010).

¹⁴⁵⁹ On this point, see Gavin, *Nuclear Statecraft*, p. 41 and Weitz, "The Historical Context", p. 10.

¹⁴⁶⁰ Elaine Bunn: "Keynote Address" at Deterrence & Assurance Academic Alliance Conference, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, the USA (16 March 2018).

suffered from in 1945 for its security. If Japan is not ready to accept the visible form of US security assurance, “Visible” END may not serve as effective “assurance.” It may achieve the opposite. Worse still, the political sensitivity of Japan might be exploited by the regional nuclear states. They might take advantage of the political rift and aggravate it through political or financial aid to opposition groups against the forward deployment of US nuclear weapons. China might threaten to take economic sanctions (stop exporting vital natural resource as shown in the rare earth incident in 2010 over the Senkaku Islands).¹⁴⁶¹ In other words, it is a matter of Japanese political determination. In view of this Japanese political climate, a more realistic nuclear operational plan may be the introduction of nuclear weapons such as a B 52 strategic bomber into Japan in an emergency situation. This might not be so different from the secret agreement made in 1969 between Sato and Nixon. While it is true that the security and political condition of East Asia and Japan has changed, it is difficult to conclude that Japan would like a drastic change from the Cold War security mechanism Japan adopted in the 1960s. The die has long been cast and it is only Japan that can break the rules.

Given these institutional and socio-cultural constraints, the most realistic security path is not a drastic shift from “Invisible” END. It will most likely continue so long as they remain unchanged. Coupled with the total defeat of the war, Japan also lost the knowledge and emotional base to debate its national defense. Younger generations (the millennium and the post millennium generation) certainly do not have any direct encounter with war and they might have more objective views about war and military affairs as opposed to the older generations who directly experience the war. Yet as these issues have long been disconnected from postwar Japanese society, the Japanese public as a whole does not have keen interests in them. The non-military-cum-nuclear path has been firmly established. When the specific path has already been selected by older generations or their (grand) parents, the younger

¹⁴⁶¹ Keith Bradsher: “Amid Tension: China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan” (22 September 2010) <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html>, accessed on 21 December 2010.

generations may follow the path even without thinking of alternative path. Of course, external shocks might make the Japanese rethink about their existing path. The clear sign of such a shift has not appeared yet. Drawing on Japan's nuclear history, this thesis contends that a drastic shift from the nuclear path is absolutely unlikely while it is conceivable that the path itself may be reviewed and readjusted to the present security context of the Asia-Pacific. Given that the current path is highly institutionalized, institutional changes will probably come after a shift of Japanese public opinion about defence issues. When they occur, we can certainly see a major change in the direction of the established path. In the foreseeable future, Japan will continue to rely on US "Invisible" END for its security against regional nuclear threats.

With the advent of the Trump administration, however, the credibility and reliability of US END is severely questioned by US allies in Europe and the Asia Pacific. This is mainly due to President Trump's repeated negative comments about America's allies. At the same time, nuclear politics in the 21st century is more complex with more nuclear actors or what some defence specialists call the "Second Nuclear Age."¹⁴⁶²

In the face of this worsening security backdrop, America's allies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific have started to express their concerns about their security especially with respect to growing nuclear threats once again. Without doubt, US END is back to international security. Notwithstanding the growing importance of such deterrence for American allies, over the last two years Trump's words and deeds have raised doubts about the credibility of US END among US allies. We will review the impact of his statements on Japan's perceptions of the credibility of US

¹⁴⁶² On the Second Nuclear Age See Paul Bracken: *The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press., 2013), pp. 1-14; Victor D. Cha: "The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 24 No. 4 (2001), pp. 79-120; Gray, *The Second Nuclear Age* and Payne, *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age*. See also Kurt M. Campbell: "Nuclear Proliferation Beyond Rogue", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 26 No.1 (Winter 2002-03), pp. 7-15; Delpech, *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century*, p.30-33; Leopold Nuti and Christian Ostermann: "Introduction", Special Issue Extended Deterrence in Europe and East Asia During the Cold War-A Reappraisal *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 39 No. 4 (2001), pp. 477-483.

END. In terms of American nuclear assurances to Japan, one of the key assurance measures has been public declaration of assurance by US President since 1965.

Words Matter: Trump's Controversial Remarks and Japanese Reactions

During his presidential campaign and even after he came into office, Trump made several controversial remarks about America's allies, which has created their political concerns. During the campaign he, for instance, asserted that if Japan does not increase host nation support, the USA should withdraw US troops from Japan on the grounds that America cannot afford to keep deploying its military forces in Japan for Japanese security without Japanese serious financial support. Moreover, he even suggested that Japan would be better off by protecting itself by its own means even "including with nukes."¹⁴⁶³ Accordingly, he implied ending US defence commitments to Japan. These statements dismayed Japan as the US- Japan alliance has been central foundation of its security as elaborated throughout this thesis.

These comments indeed influenced Japanese political debates. In response to Trump's comment on Japan's acquisition of its own nuclear weapons, the then Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida clarified the Japanese government stance and explicitly stated that "arming ourselves with nuclear weapons is unthinkable."¹⁴⁶⁴ Even a pro-American Japanese newspaper, *Sankei Shimbun*, condemned Trump for

¹⁴⁶³ "Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees Transcripts", *CNN*, Aired 29 March 2016, 21:00, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/29/acd.02.html>, accessed on 16 June 2018; Melissa Chan: "Here's What Donald Trump Has Said About Nuclear Weapons", *Time*, 3 August 2016, <http://time.com/4437089/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-nukes/>, accessed on 16 June 2018; Tom LoBianco: "Trump flip-flops on Japan nukes", *CNN*, 2 June 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/02/politics/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-japan/index.html>, accessed on 16 June 2018; Kevin Raffery: "Will Trump's Foreign Policy Push Japan to Go Nuclear", *Japan Times*, 25 December 2016, <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/12/25/commentary/japan-commentary/will-trumps-foreign-policy-push-japan-go-nuclear/>, accessed on 15 June 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁴ "Kishida Gaimu Daijin Kaiken Kiroku"[Remarks by Foreign Minister Kishida], *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan*, 29 March 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/kaiken4_000326.html, accessed on 18 June 2018.

his irresponsible comments on Japan's security.¹⁴⁶⁵ Considering Trump's words and deeds during the presidential campaign, the emergence of the Trump administration was expected to be a major blow to the Japanese. One Japanese scholar noted that "For the Japanese, accordingly, there was more than enough reason to doubt the new U.S. president's competency and willingness to maintain the alliance—and thus more than enough reason to begin seeking alternative ways to ensure Japanese security."¹⁴⁶⁶ One Japanese Journalist also suggested that Japan cannot rely on Trump for its security as he has been under the investigation of FBI while the strong leadership of US president is essential for a stable world order.¹⁴⁶⁷ That said, some conservative Japanese including a former governor of Osaka Toru Hashimoto and a retired Lieutenant General Mamoru Sato welcomed this new opportunity, both claiming that the Trump administration finally make us aware that "we must defend our country by ourselves."¹⁴⁶⁸ Yet this sort of opinion is quite a minority view in Japan. In contrast to Germany where its doubts about Trump's security commitments to Europe generated a very small-scale but still "German Nuclear" debate (Germany should get its own nuclear weapons), a similar debate has not arisen yet in Japan.¹⁴⁶⁹ In the case of Japan, it is conceivable that

¹⁴⁶⁵ "Toranpu Kouho no tomaranu tondemo anporon Nikkan no dokujino kakuho yu itowazu Zainichibeigun tettaiwo"[President Candidate Trump's dreadful views on national security: openness to Japan's and South Korea's acquisition of nuclear weapons and withdrawal of US troops from Japan], *Sankei*, 6 March 2016, accessed on <http://www.sankei.com/world/news/160327/wor1603270032-n2.html>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁶ Takako Hikotani: "Trump's Gift to Japan: Times for Tokyo to Invest in the Liberal Order", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 96 No. 5 (Sep/ Oct 2017), p. 21.

¹⁴⁶⁷ Nobuhiko Ochiai: "Tsuini Toranpu Daitouryou no Seishin wa Houkaika" [Trump has lost his mind], *Zakzak*, *Yukan Fuji*, 22 July 2017, <http://www.zakzak.co.jp/soc/news/170721/soc1707210017-n1.html>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁸ Yoshihisa Furumori: "Hashimoto Torusi Toranpusi shousan" [Toru Hashimoto praise Mr Trump], *BLOGOS*, 30 March 2017, <http://blogos.com/article/216127/>, accessed on 18 June 2018; Mamoru Sato: "Toranpu hatsugen to Kakubusou" [Trump statements and Nuclearisation], *Sato Mamoru Blog*, 1 April 2016, <http://d.hatena.ne.jp/satoumamoru/20160401/1459480130>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

¹⁴⁶⁹ On the Germany nuclear debate, see "Germans are debating getting their own nuclear weapon", *The Economist*, 4 May 2017, <https://www.economist.com/europe/2017/03/04/germans-are-debating-getting-their-own-nuclear-weapon>, accessed on 23 January 2019. See also Hans Ruhle and Michale Ruhle: "German Nukes: The Phantom Menace" National Institute For Public Policy, Information Series, Issue No. 419, (22 March 2017), http://www.nipp.org/2017/03/21/ruhele-hans-and-michael-ruhele-german-nukes-the-phantom-menace/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%203.23.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief, accessed on 24 January 2019.

the Japanese elites simply do not want to face the Japanese nuclear taboo even if they believed it necessary to have the nuclear debate.

Trump's indiscreet words also targeted European alliance (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: NATO), calling NATO "obsolete." Trump demanded NATO member states to increase defence budget to meet NATO's stated goal of spending 2% of GDP on defence; the current share of the financial burden was "very unfair to the United States." The then Foreign Minister of Germany, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, expressed his concerns about Trump's statement, spreading dismay and uneasiness in the alliance.¹⁴⁷⁰ During the US presidential campaign, he also showed doubts about honouring Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, the mutual assistance clause. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg reacted to Trump and stressed the importance of the alliance; "This is no time to question the partnership between Europe and the United States...Going it alone is not an option."¹⁴⁷¹ Later he modified his views on the transatlantic alliance, referring to NATO as "no longer obsolete" when NATO chief Jens Stoltenberg visited the White House in April 2017.

Worse still, he did not explicitly mention and confirm US commitment to Article 5 at a special ceremony held at the new NATO headquarters in Brussels, which commemorated the time for invoking Article 5 for the first time in its history after the 9/11 attacks in spite of Defence Secretary James Mattis' and Vice President Mike Pence's preceding acknowledgement of Article 5. There again, he reiterated claims that NATO member states should increase their defence spending.¹⁴⁷² This generated major alarm and unease to NATO countries in view of this special occasion for an Article 5 memorial. Before the ceremony there was also naïve hope of Trump's final and long overdue endorsement of the collective defence

¹⁴⁷⁰ "Trump worries Nato with 'obsolete' comment", *BBC*, 16 January 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38635181>, accessed on 17 June, 2018

¹⁴⁷¹ "America is vital for Europe's defence, warns Nato chief", *The Times*, 14 November 2016.

¹⁴⁷² "Donald Trump tells Nato allies to pay up at Brussels talks", *BBC*, 25 May 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40037776>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

Jacob Pramuk: "Trump gave a speech to NATO leaders, but it's what he left out that got their attention", *CNBC*, 25 May 2017, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/25/trump-does-not-mention-support-for-article-5-in-nato-speech.html>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

clause given the importance of the event attached to NATO as a whole.¹⁴⁷³ In short, Trump failed to reassure the alliance that the US firmly stands by its European ally. Nearly two weeks after the summit Trump finally acknowledged that “absolutely, I would be committed to Article 5” while it is important to note that this remark was made only when a journalist asked him a question about whether America would invoke Article 5 should the Eastern European members be attacked by Russia.¹⁴⁷⁴ Worse still, recently the *New York Times* reported that in 2018 Trump privately said several times that he wanted the USA to leave NATO.¹⁴⁷⁵ If America shows its unwillingness to protect the most important alliance (NATO), the other US allies in other regions may naturally think that the same event will happen to them next. Trump might say that he wants the US troops to withdraw from Japan sooner or later.

As for Japan, since he took office, President Trump has seemingly moderated his political stance on the US-Japan security alliance, first by sending Defence Secretary Mattis to Japan and second through the first Japan-America summit meeting, both of which took place in March 2017.

On both occasions, the US government officially assured Japan that US nuclear commitments to Japan remain robust. Japan’s doubts about US nuclear commitments, however, cannot be completely cleared away when Trump’s unpredictable interventions continue and his treatment of the European allies is also causing uncertainty about the US security commitments to Europe. This raises a fundamental question whether Japan can still trust the US as its nuclear defender. The salience of US ENDS over Japan is, however, increasing when the

¹⁴⁷³ Patrick Wintour: “Nato member anxiously hope Trump’s visit will bring renewed commitment”, *The Guardian*, 24 May 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/24/nato-donald-trump-terrorism-brussels-visit>, accessed on 17 June 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁴ “Remarks by President Trump and President Iohannis of Romania in a Joint Press Conference”, *The White House*, 9 June, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-iohannis-romania-joint-press-conference/>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁵ Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper: “Trump Discussed Pulling U.S. From NATO, Aides Say Amid New Concerns Over Russia”, *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-president-trump.html>, accessed on 16 January 2019.

future of the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is still uncertain and China's newest Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), DF 41, which can carry ten warheads is very close to be operationalised.¹⁴⁷⁶ Even though he is behaving more moderately than he was during the presidential campaign, can the Japanese put their complete faith in the US nuclear umbrella? It is true that the latest US Nuclear Posture Review of 2018 evinces that "The U.S. commitment to our allies...in the Asia-Pacific region is unwavering."¹⁴⁷⁷ With uncertainty surrounding the Trump administration, this unwavering support can be perceived as an empty promise by the nuclear powers in the Asia-Pacific.

Furthermore, one poll revealed by the Pew Research Centre in June 2017 illuminates that Japan has quite low confidence in President Trump's global leadership (only 24%).¹⁴⁷⁸ It must be reemphasised that President Trump is the only person who can authorise the launch of American nuclear weapons to defend its allies.¹⁴⁷⁹

In the absence of any visible nuclear reassurance form, what the US supreme leader says has a considerable impact on the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence as this thesis has illuminated. If the President shows his unwillingness to protect US allies or give any sign of US reluctance to stand by them, the credibility of extended deterrence can be substantially diminished as it is ultimately the US President that decides whether or not to use nuclear weapons to protect American allies.

Whether the Trump administration will last another four years is or not, in view of Japan's non-military-cum-nuclear path, Japan must work closely with the USA (whoever runs the country) for its defence. At the same time, it is time for the Japanese to rethink its own problem. The worsening security environment in the

¹⁴⁷⁶ "Shingata ICBM Chikaku Haibika Toranpu Seikei Ikaku Chugoku" [New ICBM is soon to be deployed: China threatens the Trump administration], *JII.COM*, 17 June 2018, <https://www.jii.com/jc/article?k=2018061700231&g=use>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁷ *Nuclear Posture Review 2018*, p. 35, 36.

¹⁴⁷⁸ "Low confidence in Trump worldwide", *Pew Research Centre*, 23 June 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trump-s-leadership/pg_2017-06-26-us_image-02-0/, accessed on 18 June 2018.

¹⁴⁷⁹ Betts and Waxman, "The President and the Bomb", pp. 119-120.

Asia-Pacific and the fear of American isolationism creates an opportunity for the Japanese to face a long-time nuclear taboo regardless of whether they will take it. The first step should be to ask themselves two fundamental questions: Why does Japan rely on the US nuclear umbrella? What does this umbrella entail? This thesis helps guide them to answer these questions. To conclude, this thesis paraphrases a Japanese proverb: *Itsumademo aruto Omouna Oya to Kane, Sosite Amerika* [Never expect your sweet parents live forever, your money will not run out and American military support lasts for good].

Bibliography

Archives

Japan

Gaiko Shiriyokan [Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan], Tokyo.

Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Daichiji Daresu Raiho Kanaikei (Dai Ichiji Kosho) (Dai Ikkan), [On the Peace Treaty Negotiations: Dulles' Visit and the First Negotiation Round], January/ February 1951, Microfilm, B'- 0009, B'. 4.0.0.1-3.

Sanfuransisuko Kowa Kaigi [The San Francisco Peace Conference] September 1951, Microfilm, B'-0010, B'. 4.0.0.4.

Chosen Dorankankei Ikken Dai 2kan [The Korean War, Volume2] December 1951, A'. 7.1.0.5, A'-0129.

Sori Oyobi Gaimudaijin no Enzetsu Oyobi Seimeishu Daiikan [Statements and Speeches of Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Volume 1], October 1959, A10020.

Honpo Saigunbi ni Kansuru Roncho Dai 1kan [International Opinions on Our Rearmament, Volume 1], March 1965, C'. 2.0.0.2, C'-0001.

Sato Sori Houbei Kankei (1965.1) [Documents Related to Prime Minister Sato's Visit to the USA, January 1965], CD A'-444, A' 152-12-02

Sato Sori Houbei (1967.11) [Documents Related to Prime Minister Sato's Visit to the USA, November 1967], CD A'-434, A' 152-14.

Sato Sori Houbei Kyodo Seimei (1967.11) [Documents Related to Prime Minister Sato's Visit to the USA and Joint Communiqué, November 1967], CD A'-437, A' 152-14-4.

Nichibei Kankei (Okinawa Henkan) 47 [Japan-US Relations, the Reversion of

Okinawa], October/ November 1969, CD H22-021, 0600-2010-00038.

Reikishi Shiryo toshite Kachi ga Mitomeraru Kaiji Bunsho [Historical Materials Declassified by Their Values].

Kokuritsu Kobunshokan [National Archives of Japan], Tokyo

Kakuheiki Sekisai Kantei no Kobe Nyuko Kyohi ni Kansuru Ketsugi ni Kansuru Kento Bunsho [Documents Related to the Refusal of Port Calls at Kobe by US Naval Ships carrying Nuclear Weapons], Naiakufu Honfu Jyoho Kokai Shinsakai Jimukyoku [Secretariat of the Informaiton Disclosure Review Board, Cabinet Office], 2003, 06-094-00.

Jieitai to Kenpo (Shiryoshu), [Japanese Self-Defence Force and the Constitution: Reference Book], Boei Kenshujo Senshibu [Office of War History at the National Defence College], December 1976, 4A-34-957.

Saigunbi ni Hantaishita Yoshida Shigeru [Yoshida Shigeru, who opposed Japan's rearmament], Boei Kenshujo Senshibu [Office of War History at the National Defence College], 1 March 1973, 4A-35-2410.

Saigunbi no ikisatsu[The Accounts of Rearmament], Boei Kenshujo Senshibu [Office of War History at the National Defence College],1 September 1971, 4A-035-00.

Sorifurei Dai 24Go Showa 28nen Hoan Daigakko Kitei, [Regulations on National Safety Academy], Boei Kenshujo Senshibu [Office of War History at the National Defence College],22 March 1954 Hei 17 Boei, 4A-034-00

Boei Kenkyujo Toshokan [The Library of the National Institute of Defence Studies], Tokyo.

Bouei Sho Bouei Kenkyujo Senshibu Hen (ed.): *Nakamura Ryuhei Oraru Hisutori: Moto Togo Bakuryo Kaigi Gicho* [Oral History of Ryuheinakamura: Former Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff edited by National Institute for Defense Studies, Ministry of Defense] (Tokyo: Bouei Kenkyujo., 2008).

United States

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Subject Numeric Files, 1964-1966

Central Foreign Policy Files, 1967-1969

Geographic Files, 1961, 1962

Lot Files

Country and Subject Files Relating to Atomic Energy Matters, 1950-1962

NSC Meetings Files, 1966-1968

Office of the Country Director for Japan Records Relating to Japanese Political
Affair 1960-1975

Personal Name Files 1960

Records Relating to Disarmament and Arms Control, 1961-1966

Records Relating to Economic Aid, 1954-58

Top Secret File, 1957-1962

RG 218 Records of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff

Geographic File, 1958

RG 260, Records of United States Occupation Headquarters, World War II

Reference Paper Files Relating to Reversion 1971-1972

RG319, Army Staff

Center of Military History, Background Files to the Study, "History of the Civil
Administration of the Ryukyu Island", 1945-1978

RG 334, Interservice Agency

Replies and Correspondence Related to Field Visit, Security and the Government of
Japan, Communication, Training, Operations 1957-1967

Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas

National Security File

Country File: Canada, Denmark, Cambodia, China, Japan

Committee File: Committee on Nuclear Proliferation
Subject File.

Papers of U. Alexis Johnson Diaries, Transcripts of Tapes 1-30

The United Kingdom

The National Archives, Kew, London.

Nuclear Weapons in Japan, Code FJ File 1194, 1959. FO371/ 141479.

Nuclear Energy Programs: Japan, File 423, 1960. FO371/ 149567

Nuclear Co-operation with UK: Japan, File 2123, 1965. FO371/ 183320.

Published Primary Source Material

Foreign Relations of United States, 1947, Vol. 6, The Far East (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1972).

Foreign Relations of United States,, 1948, The Far East and Australia, Vol. 6, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1974).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1949, The Far East and Australia Vol. 8 Part2 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1976).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1948, General; the United Nations, Vol. 1, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1976)..

Foreign Relations of United States, 1950, Vol. 1, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1977).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1950, East Asia and the Pacific, Vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.,1976).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, Vol. 2, Part 1 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1984).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 12, Part 1, East Asia and the Pacific (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (GPO)., 1984).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1985)

Foreign Relations of United States, 1955-1957, Japan, Vol. 23, Part 1, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1991),

Foreign Relations of United States, 1955-1957, Vol. 19, *National Security Policy* (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1990).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1955-1957, Korea, Vol. 23, Part 2 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1993).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea Vol. 18 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1994).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1958-1960, Vol. 3, *National Security Policy; Arms Control and Disarmament* (Washington, DC.: Government Printing Office, 1996).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1961-1963, Vol. 7, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1995).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1961-1963, Northeast Asia, Vol. 22 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1996).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1964-1968, Vol. 11, Arms Control and Disarmament (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 1997).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1964-1968, Vol. 10, National Security Policy, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 2001).

Foreign Relations of United States, 1969-1976, Vol. 19, Part 2 Japan, (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office., 2018).

Chihiro Hosoya, Tadashi Aruga, Osamu Ishi, and Takuya Sasaki (eds.): *Nichibei Kankei Shiryou Shu 1945-97* [A Documentary History of U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1945-1997] (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppan Kai., 1999).

Heiwa Anzen Hosho Kenkyusho [Research Institute for Peace and Security], Doba Bunsho [Doba Papers], DVD (Maruzen, Tokyo, 2013).

Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo Hen (ed.): *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho, Nenpyo Dai 1 Kan, 1941-1960* [The Key Documents and Chronological Table of Japanese Diplomacy, Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo., 1983)

Kashima Heiwa Kenkyujo Hen (ed.): *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho, Nenpyo Dai 2 Kan, 1961-1970* [The Key Documents and Chronological Table of Japanese Diplomacy, Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Hara Shobo., 1984).

Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku (GRIPS) C.O.E. Oraru Seisaku Kenkyu Purojekuto: *Kaihara Osamu Oral History*, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku., 1998), *Osamu Oral History*, Vol. 2 (Tokyo: Seisaku Kenkyu Daigakuin Daigaku., 2000).

Online Databases

Central Intelligence Agency, Library, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications#cold-war>, accessed on 15 March 2017.

Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan [National Diet Library], *Kokkai Kaigijiroku Kensaku Sisutemu* [Proceedings of the Diet], <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/>, accessed on 27 February 2017.

Kokuritsu Kokkai Toshokan [National Diet Library], Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Directives to the Japanese Government (SCAPINs) *Kensei Shiryoshitsu* [Modern Japanese History Record], <https://rnavi.ndl.go.jp/kensei/entry/SCA-1.php>, accessed on 10 May 2017.

The Nautilus Institute, Digital Library, <http://oldsite.nautilus.org/archives/library/index.html>, accessed on 18 November

2017.

National Diet Library Archives, Birth of the Constitution of Japan, <http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/library/library.html>, accessed on 9 May 2017.

National Security Archive, The George Washington University, D.C., Digital National Security Archive.

Japan and the United States: Diplomatic, Security and Economic Relations, 1960-1976,

<https://www.proquest.com/products-services/databases/dnsa.html>, accessed on 15 January 2017.

NATO Online Library, <https://www.nato.int/docu/comm/comm4959.htm>, accessed on 19 January 2019.

University of California, Santa Barabara

The American Presidency Project, <https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/>, accessed 16 October 2017.

Wilson Centre Digital Archive, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/>, accessed on 17 November 2017.

The World and Japan Database (Project Leader: Tanaka Akihiko), Japanese Politics and International Relations, <http://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/index-ENG.html>, 3 February 2017.

Government Reports

Boei cho: *Showa 45 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 1970], available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1970/w1970_02.html, accessed on 10 February 2019.

Boei Cho: *Showa 51 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 1976], available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_data/1976/w1976_9106.html, accessed on 4 November 2018.

Boei Sho: *Heisei 29 Nenban Boei Hakusho* [Defence White Paper, 2017], available at <http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2017/html/n2121000.html>, accessed on 4 January 2019.

Boei Sho: *Heisei 30 Nen Ban Nihon no Bouei: Bouei Hakusho [Defence of Japan: Annual Defence White Paper, 2018]* (Tokyo: Bouei Sho, August, 2018)

History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons (U): July 1945 Through September 1977 (Office of the Assistant to Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), Washington, DC, 1978).

Iwayuru [Mitsuyaku] Mondai ni Kansuru Yushikisha Iinkai Hokokusho [Advisory Panel's Final Report on the so-called Secret Deals] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs., March 2010), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/pdfs/hokoku_yushiki.pdf, accessed on 17 March 2017.

Naikaku Chosa Shitsu: "Nihon no Kakuseisakuni Kansuru Kisoteki Kenkyu: Sono Ichi" [The 1968 Report], September 1968.

Naikaku Chosa Shitsu: "Nihon no Kakuseisakuni Kansuru Kisoteki Kenkyu: Sono Ichi" [The 1970 Report], January 1970.

National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington D.C.: the White House., January 1988), Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, available at <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1988.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121129-393>, accessed on 14 May 2019.

National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington D.C.: The White House., March 1990). Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, <https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss1990.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-121138-080>, accessed on 14 February 2018.

National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington D.C.: The White House., December 2017), The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-09-05-2.pdf>, accessed on 21 December, 2017,

Nenji Hokoku [Annual Report], *Economic Planning Agency*, 1956, available at <http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-0000i1.html>, accessed on 15th May 2017.

Nuclear Posture Review 2010 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, April 2010), available at, <http://archive.defense.gov/npr/docs/2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf>, accessed on 3 February 2018.

Nuclear Posture Review 2018 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, February 2018), available at <https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF>, accessed on 20 February 2018.

Sorifu Kohoshitsu: “Anzen Hoshō Boei Mondaini Kansuru Yoron Chōsa Kekka” [Results of Opinion Poll with respect to Defence issues, conducted in December 1966], *MOFA*, available at https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokokupdfs/kaku_hokoku10.pdf, accessed on 7 February 2019.

Tairyō Hakai Heikino Kakusan Mondainitsuite [Concerning the Problem of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction] Japan Defence Agency (1995). This report is available on the website of Union of Concerned Scientists, <https://s3.amazonaws.com/ucs-documents/nuclear-weapons/Secret+Japanese+Report+on+Nuclear+Options.pdf>, accessed on 9 September 2017.

Waga Gaiko no Kinkyō, Dai 11 Gō [Diplomatic White Paper, Volume 11], 1966, *Gaimushō* [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1967/s42shiryō.htm#r>, accessed on 4 September 2018.

Non-Government Reports

Justin V. Anderson and Jeffrey A. Larsen with Polly M. Holdorf, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current Challenges for U.S. Policy”, INSS Occasional Paper 69 (USAF Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, Colorado, 2013).

Johnston C. Conover: *U.S. Strategic Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence P-5967* (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation., 1977).

International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance 1964-65*

(London: The Institute for Strategic Studies., 1964)

International Institute for Strategic Studies: *The Military Balance, 1968-1969* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1968).

International Institute for Strategic Studies: “Strategic Survey 2016: The Annual Review of World Affairs”, (London: Routledge., 2016).

Morton H. Halperin: “The Nuclear Dimension of the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Paper and Commentaries”, nuke policy, 09 July, 1999, Nautilus Institute, <https://nautilus.org/nuke-policy/morton-h-halperin-the-nuclear-dimension-of-the-u-s-japan-alliance-paper-and-commentaries/>, accessed on 13 September 2017.

Hans Kristensen: “Japan Under the US nuclear Umbrella”, <http://nautilus.org/supporting-documents/japan-under-the-us-nuclear-umbrella/?view=pdf>, *Nautilus Institute* (21 July 1999), accessed on 7 March 2016.

David M. Kunsman and Douglas B. Lawson: *A Primer on U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy* (New Mexico: Sandia National Laboratories., 2001).

J. Michael Legge: *Theater Nuclear Weapons and the NATO Strategy of Flexible Response*. RAND Report R-2964-FF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1983).

Robert A. Manning: “The Future of US Extended Deterrence in Asia to 2025”, (Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council., 2014), available at http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/Future_US_Ext_Det_in_Asia.pdf, accessed on 1 June 2018.

Steven Pilfer, Richard C. Bush, Vanda Flab-Brown, Martin S. Indy, Michael O’hanlon and Kenneth M. Pollack: “U.S. Nuclear and Extended Deterrence : Considerations and Challenges”, Arms Control Series Paper 3 (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institute, May 2010) https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/06_nuclear_deterrence.pdf, accessed on 15 May 2018

Research Group on the Japan-US Alliance: “A New Phrase in the Japan-US

Alliance: 2009 Project Report”, *Institute for International Policy Studies* (September 2009).

Brad Roberts; “Extended Deterrence and Strategic Stability in Northeast Asia”, *National Institute for Defense Studies*, Visiting Scholar Paper Series, No. 1, (9 August 2013), available at <http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/visiting/pdf/01.pdf> , accessed on 6 August 2017, pp. 1-36.

Jack L. Snyder: *The Soviet Strategic Culture for Limited Nuclear Operations*, R-2154-AF (Santa Monica CA: Rand Corporation., 1977).

Perspective on Extended Deterrence, Recherches & Documents No. 03/ 2010 (Paris: Foundation pur la Recherche Strategique, 2010).

Diaries and Memoirs

Dean Acheson: *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (London: Hamish Hamilton., 1969).

Dwight D. Eisenhower: *The White Years: Mandate For Change 1953-1956* (London: Heinemann., 1963).

Dwight D. Eisenhower: *The White Years: Waging Peace 1956-1961* (London: Heinemann., 1965).

Denis Healey: *The Time of My Life* (London: Michael Joseph, 1989).

Minoru Kusuda: *Kusuda Minoru Nikki: Sato Eisaku Sori Shuseki Hishokan no 2000 Nichi* [Diary of Kusuda Minoru: 2000 Days of Eisaku Sato’s Executive Secretary to the Prime Minister](Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2001).

U. Alexis Johnson: *The Right Hand of Power: The memoirs of an American diplomat* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall., 1984).

Lyndon Baines Johnson: *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency*

1963-1969 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston., 1971)

Henry Kissinger: *White House Years* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company., 1979).

Ryohei Murata: *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Jokan: Tatakai ni Yabureshi Kuni ni Tsukaete* [Murata Ryohei Memoir Volume 1: Serving the Defeated Country], (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo., 2008).

Ryohei Murata: *Murata Ryohei Kaisoroku Gekan: Sokoku no Saisei wo Jisedaini Takushite* [Murata Ryohei Memoir Volume 2: Messages for Young Generations for the Restoration of Japan], (Kyoto: Mineruva Shobo., 2008).

Yasuhiro Nakasone: *Jiseiroku* [On My Life] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha., 2004).

Richard Nixon: *The Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (London: Sidgwick & Jackson., 1978).

Katsuya Okada: *Gaiko wo Hiraku: Kakugunshuku Mitsuyaku no Genbade* [Open Diplomacy: The Frontline of Nuclear Disarmament and the Secret Agreements] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2014)

Edwin O. Reischauer: *My Life Between Japan and America* 1st Far East Reprint Edition (Tokyo: John Weatherhill., 1986).

Eisaku Sato: *Sato Eisaku Nikki Dai Yon Kan* [Diary of Sato Eisaku, Vol. 4] edit by Takeshi Ito (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha., 1997).

Takeso Shimoda: *Nihon wa koushite Saisei shita: Sengo Nihon Gaiko no Shougen, Ge* [The Process of Post-War Japan's Recovery: Testimony to Post-War Japan's Diplomacy, Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Gyousei Mondai Kenkyujo., 1985).

Harry S. Truman: *Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: Volume Two Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Doubleday & Company., 1956).

Kei Wakaizumi: *Tasaku Nakarisi wo Sinzemuto Hossu: Kakumitsuyaku no Shinjitsu Shinsoban* [I want to believe there was no choice available: The Truth Behind the Secret Nuclear Deals] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.,1994).

Kei Wakaizumi: John Swenson-Wright (ed.): *The Best Course Available: A Personal Account of the Secret U.S.-Japan Okinawa Reversion Negotiations* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 2002).

Shigeru Yoshida: *Kaiso Junen Dai Yonkan* [My Memoir Vol. 4] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 1958).

Speeches

John Foster Dulles: “Speech on Massive Retaliation”, January 12, 1945 in Jeffrey Porro, Paul Doty, Carl Kaysen and Jack Ruina (eds.): *The Nuclear Age Reader* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1989), pp. 86-87.

Gerald R. Ford: “Japan Press Club of the President’s Speech and Statements”, 20/11/ 74, *Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum*, available at <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0122/1252149.pdf>, accessed on 29 January 2019.

Barack Obama: “Remarks by President Barack Obama, Hradcany Square, Prague”, *The Whitehouse* (5 April 2009) <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>, accessed on 6 Nov, 2015.

Richard M. Nixon: “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam”, 3 November 1969, *Richard Nixon Foundation, Library, Museum*, <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2017/09/address-nation-war-vietnam-november-3-1969/>, accessed on 1 February 2019.

Harry S. Truman: “The President’s Farewell Address to the American People”, 15 January 1953, Public Papers Harry S. Truman 1945-1953, *Truman Library*, <https://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2059>, accessed on 9 November 2017.

Newspapers and Periodicals

Asahi Shimbun
The Atlantic

The Economist
The Guardian
Chunichi Shimbun
Japan Times
Life
Chuo Koron
Kyodo News.
Mainichi Shimbun
The New York Times
Nihon Keizai Shimbun
Okinawa Times
Sankei Shimbun
Time
The Times
The Washington Post

Online Resources

Cambridge Dictionary (Online), <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/>, accessed 21 May 2019.

Kristen Blalik: “U.S. active-duty military presence overseas is at its smallest in decades”, *Pew Research Center*, <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/08/22/u-s-active-duty-military-presence-overseas-is-at-its-smallest-in-decades/>, accessed on 15 March 2018.

William Burr (ed.): “National Intelligence Estimates of the Nuclear Proliferation Problem: The First Ten Years, 1957-1967”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No, 155, 1 June 2005, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB155/index.htm>, accessed on 19 June 2017.

William Burr (ed.): “How Many and Where Were the Nukes?: What the U.S> Government No Longer Wants You to Know about Nuclear Weapons During the Cold War”, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No, 197, 18 August 2006, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB197/index.htm>, accessed on 25 March 2017.

William Burr, Barbara Elias and Robert Wampler (eds.): “Nuclear Weapons on Okinawa Declassified December 2015, Photos Available Since 1990”, *National Security Archive*, Briefing Book #541, 19 February 2016, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/japan-nuclear-vault/2016-02-19/nuclear-weapons-okinawa-declassified-december-2015> accessed on 5 December 2018.

“The Constitution of Japan”, *Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html, accessed on 18 October 2018.

“Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees Transcripts”, *CNN*, Aired 29 March 2016, 21:00, <http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/29/acd.02.html>, accessed on 16 June 2018.

Robbie Gramer: “Trump Discovers Article 5 After Disastrous NATO visit”, *Foreign Policy*, 9 June 2017, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/trump-discovers-article-5-after-disastrous-nato-visit-brussels-visit-transatlantic-relationship-europe/>, accessed on 17 June 2018.

JAXA Webpage, http://www.jaxa.jp/library/space_law/chapter_1/1-1-1-4_j.html, accessed on 25th September 2017.

Time Kane: “Global U.S. Troop Deployment, 1950-2000, CDA 06-02 (Massachusetts: The Heritage Foundation.. May 2006), available at <file:///C:/Users/PCUser/Downloads/cda06-02.pdf>, accessed on 24 January 2019.

John F. Kennedy, “News Conference 52”, 21 March 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, <https://www.jfklibrary.org/archives/other-resources/john-f-kennedy-press-conference/s/news-conference-52>, accessed on 22 January 2019.

Hiroto Kishimoto: “Pasupoto no Hanashi”, Okinawa Prefectural Museum and Art Museum, 27 February 2014, https://okimu.jp/museum/column/088/accessed_on_5_December_2018.

Hans M. Kristensen, “Nukes in the Taiwan Crisis,” *Federation of American Scientists*, May 13, 2008, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2008/05/nukes-in-the-taiwan-crisis/>, accessed on 29 January 2018.

Minoru Kusuda Oral Interview, NSA US-Japan Project Oral History Program, (16

November 1995) , *the National Security Archive*, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/japan/kusudaohinterview.htm>, accessed on 25 January 2018.

Tom LoBianco: “Trump flip-flops on Japan nukes”, *CNN*, 2 June 2016, <https://edition.cnn.com/2016/06/02/politics/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons-japan/index.html>, accessed on 16 June 2018.

Yoshihisa Furumori: “Hashimoto Torusi Toranpusi shousan” [Toru Hashimoto praise Mr Trump], *BLOGOS*, 30 March 2017, <http://blogos.com/article/216127/>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

Arshad Mohammend and David Brunnstrom: “U.S. signal its nuclear arms stay in Europe for now”, 22 April 2010, *Reuters*, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-nuclear/u-s-signals-its-nuclear-arms-stay-in-europe-for-now-idUSTRE63L54Q20100422>, accessed on 22 January 2019.

National Defense Academy of Japan, <http://www.mod.go.jp/nda/about/history.html>, accessed on 17th June 2017

North Atlantic Council: “Active Engagement, Modern Defence, Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” (19 Nov 2010), https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_publications/20120214_strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf, accessed on 28 February 2018.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, “Deterrence and Defence Posture Review”, 20 May 2012, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_87597.htm, accessed on 22 January 2019.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation: “Brussels Summit Declaration” (11 Jul 2018), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_156624.htm, accessed on 5 February 2019.

Novelprize.org “Barack H. Obama-Facts” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-facts.html, accessed on 5 November 2015.

Novelprize.org “Thomas C. Schelling-Facts” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2005/schelling-facts.html, accessed on 7 November 2015.

Nobuhiko Ochiai: “Tsuini Toranpu Daitouryou no seishin wa houkaika” [Trump has

lost his mind], *Zakzak, Yukan Fuji*, 22 July 2017, <http://www.zakzak.co.jp/soc/news/170721/soc1707210017-n1.html>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

Gregory W. Pedlow (ed.): NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969, *NATO Archives*, <https://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/sd49-69e.htm>, accessed on 19 January 2019.

Jacob Pramuk: “George W. Bush’s NATO ambassador slams Trump’s visit with alliance”, *CNBC*, 26 May 2017, <https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/26/trump-nato-visit-gets-bad-reviews-from-former-ambassadors.html>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

Hans Ruhle and Michale Ruhle: “German Nukes: The Phantom Menace” National Institute For Public Policy, Information Series, Issue No.. 419, (22 March 2017), http://www.nipp.org/2017/03/21/ruhe-hans-and-michael-ruhe-german-nukes-the-phantom-menace/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=EBB%203.23.17&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Early%20Bird%20Brief, accessed on 24 January 2019.

Mamoru Sato: “Toranpu Hatsugen to Kakubusou” [Trump statements and Nuclearisation], *Sato Mamoru Blog*, 1 April 2016, <http://d.hatena.ne.jp/satoumamoru/20160401/1459480130>, accessed on 18 June 2018.

Yukio Sato: “Japan’s Responsibility Sharing for the U.S. Extended Deterrence”, *Japan Policy Forum* (10 March 2014). <http://www.japanpolicyforum.jp/archives/diplomacy/pt20140310010210.html>, accessed on 15 November 2015.

Michito Tsuruoka: “The NATO vs. East Asian Models of Extended Nuclear Deterrence? Seeking a Synergy beyond Dichotomy”, *Asan Forum*, Vol. 4 No. 3 (May/June 2016), <http://www.theasanforum.org/the-nato-vs-east-asian-models-of-extended-nuclear-deterrence-seeking-a-synergy-beyond-dichotomy/>, accessed on 14 February, 2018.

Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy: “Security Treaty Between Japan and the United States of America”, 8 September 1951, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp, accessed on 5th May, 2017.

Robert A. Wampler (ed.): “Nuclear Noh Drama: Tokyo, Washington and the Case of the Missing Nuclear Agreements”, 13 October 2009. National Security Archive <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb291/>, accessed on 11 October 2017.

Basic Policy on National Defence, *Ministry of Defence* available at

<http://www.mod.go.jp/j/publication/wp/wp2013/pc/2013/html/ns006000.html>,
accessed on 22 June 2017.

“The Brussels Treaty”, *North Atlantic Treaty Organization*
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17072.htm, accessed on 22 May,
2016.

“Decision 3: Extension of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, 17
April-12 May 1995, UNODA,
[https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/
Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199503.pdf](https://unoda-web.s3-accelerate.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/assets/WMD/Nuclear/1995-NPT/pdf/NPT_CONF199503.pdf), accessed on 30 December 2018.

“Donald Trump tells NATO allies to pay up at Brussels talks”, *BBC*, 25 May 2017,
<https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-40037776>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

Jacob Pramuk: “Trump gave a speech to NATO leaders, but it’s what he left out that
got their attention”, *CNBC*, 25 May 2017,
[https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/25/trump-does-not-mention-support-for-article-5-in-n
ato-speech.html](https://www.cnbc.com/2017/05/25/trump-does-not-mention-support-for-article-5-in-nato-speech.html), accessed on 17 June, 2018.

“Fundamental Concepts of National Defense”, *Ministry of Defence*,
[https://web.archive.org/web/20161105124319/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/
dp02.html](https://web.archive.org/web/20161105124319/http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp02.html), accessed on 11 September 2018.

“Gojira (1954)” [Godzilla], *Japanese Cinema Database*,
<https://www.japanese-cinema-db.jp/Details?id=5492> accessed on 23 January 2019.

Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]: “*Kaku wo Motometa Nihon* Hodou nioite
Tori Agerareta Bushoto ni Kansuru Chosa nitusite no Kanren Bunsho [Documents
Related to NHK’s TV Programme: Japan that sought nuclears]
https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku_hokoku/kanrenbunsho.html, accessed on
3 September 2017.

Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs]: “Iwayuru Mitsuyaku Mondai ni Kansuru
Chosa Kekka”, [Results of the Examination on the so-called Secret Deals], 2010,
<https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/mitsuyaku/kekka.html>, accessed on 11 May
2017.

“Kishida Gaimu Daijin Kaiken Kiroku”[Remarks by Foreign Minister Kishida],

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 29 March 2016, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/kaiken/kaiken4_000326.html, accessed on 18 June 2018.

“Low confidence in Trump worldwide”, *Pew Research Centre*, 23 June 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2017/06/26/u-s-image-suffers-as-publics-around-world-question-trumps-leadership/pg_2017-06-26-us_image-02-0/, accessed on 18 June 2018.

Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Japan: “Japan-U.S. Extended Deterrence Dialogue” (11 July 2016) http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001202.html, accessed on 21 November 2016.

“Motto Kuwashiku Kokumin Tohyo Seido” [The system of National Referendum Explained], *Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications*, http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/kokumin_touhyou/kokkai.html accessed on 10 December 2018.

“Jimin Kaikenan, Sanin Teiji Miokuri” [LDPJ postpones sending its proposal to the Diet], *Jiji*, 4 December 2018, <https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2018120400834&g=po,l> accessed on 6 December 2018.

The Joint Statement released following the first official meeting declared that “The U.S. commitment to defend Japan through the full range of U.S. military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional is unwavering.” See Joint Statement from President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, 10 February 2017, *the White House*, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-statement-president-donald-j-trump-prime-minister-shinzo-abe/>, accessed on 4 November 2018.

“How Japan’s youth see the Kamikaze pilots of WW2”, *BBC*, 3 November 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-39351262>, accessed on 3 November 2017.

“Remarks by President Trump and President Iohannis of Romania in a Joint Press Conference”, *The White House*, 9 June, 2017, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-president-iohannis-romania-joint-press-conference/>, accessed on 17 June, 2018.

“Shingata ICBM Chikaku Haibika Toranpu Seikei Ikaku Chugoku” [New ICBM is soon to be deployed: China threatens the Trump administration], *Jiji.COM*, 17 June 2018, <https://www.jiji.com/jc/article?k=2018061700231&g=use>, accessed on 18

June 2018.

“Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (Manila Pact)” 8 September 1954, *Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library*, The Avalon Project Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/usmu003.asp, accessed on 22 December 2018.

“To no Shimei” [The Mission of LDPJ], 15 November 1955, *Jiminto*, <https://www.jimin.jp/aboutus/declaration/>, accessed on 16 January 2019.

“Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)”, UNODA, <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text>, accessed on 31 December 2018.

“Trump worries Nato with ‘obsolete’ comment”, *BBC*, 16 January 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-38635181>, accessed on 17 June 2018
“America is vital for Europe’s defence, warns Nato chief”, *The Times*, 14 November 2016.

“Trump says Nato ‘no longer obsolete’ ”, *BBC*, 12 April 2017, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-39585029>, accessed on 17 June 2018.

Union of Concerned Scientists, Japan and America’s Nuclear Posture (2013), <https://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/us-nuclear-weapons-policy/japan-america-nuclear-posture#.XG3F0IWeTIV>, 3 May 2017.

United Nations Treaty Collection, Treaty of Peace with Japan (with two declarations). Signed at San Francisco, on 8 September 1951, available at <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20136/volume-136-I-1832-English.pdf>, accessed on 5 May 2017.

“U.S. Nuclear Weapons on Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima”, 13 December 1999, National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 23, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB22/#docs>, accessed on 2 August 2018.

“Ukraine Conflict: Putin was ready for nuclear alert”, (15 March 2015), *BBC*, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-31899680>, accessed on 5 Nov.2015.

VP Nixon in Japan, Nixon Foundation, <https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2015/06/1953-vp-nixon-in-japan/>, accessed on 21 October 2018.

Unpublished Works

Elaine Bunn: “Keynote Address” at Deterrence & Assurance Academic Alliance Conference, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, the USA (16 March 2018).

Robert Thomas Davis II: “The Dilemma of NATO Strategy, 1949-1968”, (Unpublished PhD Dissertation. Ohio State University, 2008).

Edward Luttwak

Author’s exchange with Edward Luttwak before his interview by Bungei Shunju at the Bungei Shunju Building in Tokyo, 12 October 2018.

Remarks by a retired General of Japan Ground Self-Defence Force at Nihon Kurauzebittsu Gakkai (The Clausewitz Society of Japan), 26 April 2017.

Former Chief of Staff of Ground Self-Defence Force

Author’s exchange with former Chief of staff of Ground Self-Defence Force at the Author’s home in Tokyo, 16 May 2019.

Chart/ Maps

Chart: Military Expenditure as Share of GDP, Our World in Data, <https://ourworldindata.org/military-spending>, accessed 2 February 2019.

Map: Estimate of Global Nuclear Weapons in January (SIPRI Year Book 2018), *SIPRI*, <https://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/2018-june>, accessed 30 January 2019.

Map: Nuclear Umbrella States, *ILPI*, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?page_id=1882, accessed 30 January 2019.

Map: Current Membership of the NPT, *ILPI*, http://nwp.ilpi.org/?page_id=1882, accessed 30 January 2019.

Film/ Broadcasts

DHC Terebi: “Hougen Bar Riikusu # 56 Riikusu Five” [Bar Talks and Leaks: Episode 56, Leaks Five], 4 October 2018. Retrieved from

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=auIVjNOQe8U>, accessed on 28 January 2019.

Gojira [Godzilla], 1954, Directed by Ishiro Honda.

NHK Supesharu: Misshi Wakaizumi Kei: Okinawa Henkan no Daisho [NHK Special: Special Emissary Wakaizumi Kei: The Price of Okinawa Reversion], Broadcasted on 19 June 2010.

NHK Supesharu Sukuupu Dokyumento: Okinawa to Kaku [NHK Special, Series Scoop Document: Okinawa and Nuclear Weapons], Broadcasted on 3 October 2010.

NHK Supesharu Sukuupu Dokyumento: Kaku wo Motometa Nihon [NHK Special, Series Scoop Document: Japan that Sought Nuclears], Broadcasted on 10 September 2017.

Books and Monographs

Muthiah Alagappa (ed.): *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press., 2008).

Stephen E. Ambrose: *Eisenhower: Volume One Soldier General of the Army President-Elect 1890-1952* (London: George Allen & Unwin., 1983).

Stephen E. Ambrose: *Eisenhower The President: Volume Two 1952-1969* (London: George Allen & Unwin., 1984).

Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkely: *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938, 9th Revised ed* (London: Penguin Books., 2011).

Anzen Hosho Chosa Kai: *Nihon no Anzen Hosho: 1970 Nen he no Tenbo 1968 Nen Ban* [Japan's Security: Prospects for 1970, 1968 Edition] (Tokyo: Anzen Hosho Chosa Kai., 1968).

Graham Allison: *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Little, Brown and Company., 1971).

Graham Allison: *Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?* (London: Scribe., 2017).

Tetsuo Arima: *Genpatsu to Genbaku: Nichi Bei Ei Kakubuso no Kurayami* [Nuclear Reactor and Atomic Bomb: Japan, America, Britain and Darkness of Nuclearization] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 2012).

Raymond Aron: *The Great Debate: Theories of Nuclear Strategy*, trans. by Ernst Pawel (Westport: Greenwood Press., 1965).

Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (eds): *The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, 6th ed (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers., 2004).

Michiaki Asaba: *Uyoku to Sayoku* [Right Wing and Left Wing] (Tokyo: Gentosha., 2006).

John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975).

John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy II: Theories and Policies*. Second Edition Revised and Enlarged (New York: Holmes & Meier., 1987).

John Baylis and John Garnett (eds.): *Makers of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Pinter Publishers., 1991).

John Baylis: *Ambiguity and Deterrence: British Nuclear Strategy: 1945-1964* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1995).

John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (eds.): *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance* (London: Routledge., 2018).

Andre Beaufre: *An Introduction to Strategy*, trans. by R. H. Barry (New York: Fredrick A. Prager., 1965).

Andre Beaufre: *Deterrence and Strategy*, trans. R. H. Barry (London: Faber and

Faber., 1965).

Mark Beeson: *Regionalism and Globalization in East Asia* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2007).

Anthony Best, Jussi M. Hanhimaki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze: *International History of the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, 2nd ed (London: Routledge., 2008).

Richard K. Betts: *Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1987).

Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan: *Force without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1978),

Jeremy Black: *Geopolitics: And the Quest for Dominance* (Bloomington: Indiana U.P., 2016).

Christoph Bluth: *Britain, Germany and Western Nuclear Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1995).

Philip Bobbitt: *Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1988).

Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.): *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader* (New York: New York University Press., 1989).

Boei Kenkyukai Hen (ed.): *Boei Cho Jieitai* [Japan Defence Agency: Japan Defence Force] (Tokyo: Kaya Shobo., 1988).

Ken Booth: *Strategy and Ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm., 1979).

Ken Booth and Russell Trood (eds.): *Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1999).

Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler: *The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2007).

William L. Borden: *There will be no time: The Revolution in Strategy* (New York: The Macmillan Company., 1946).

Paul Bracken: *The Command and Control of Nuclear Forces* (New Haven: Yale University Press.,1983).

Paul Bracken: *The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger, and the New Power Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press., 2013)

Kathleen E. Braden and Fred M. Shelley: *Engaging Geopolitics* (Essex: Pearson Education., 2000).

Rodric Braithwaite: *Armageddon and Paranoia: The Nuclear Confrontation* (London: Profile Books., 2017).

Bernard Brodie (ed.): *The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company., 1946).

Bernard Brodie: *Strategy in the Missile Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1959, ppb. 1965).

Bernard Brodie and Fawn M. Brodie: *From Crossbow to H-Bomb*, Revised and Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press., 1973).

Bernard Brodie: *War and politics* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall., 1974).

Peter H. Brothers: *Atomic Dreams and the Nuclear Nightmare: The Making of Godzilla* (1954) (Seattle: Create Space Books.,2015).

Seyom Brown: *The Faces of Power: Constancy and Change in United States Foreign Policy From Truman to Reagan* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1983).

Alan Bryman: *Social Research Methods* (New York: Oxford University Press., 2012).

McGeorge Bundy: *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years* (New York: Random House., 1988).

Leszek Buszynski: "SEATO: Why It Survived until 1977 and Why It Was Abolished", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* Vol. 12 No. 2 (Sep 1981), pp. 287-296.

Paul Buteux: *The Politics of Nuclear Consultation in NATO 1965-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1983, ppb. 2010).

Barry Buzan: *An Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology & International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1987).

Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.): *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 2004)

Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr (eds.): *U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy* (Pennsylvania: US Army War College., 2001).

Campbell Craig and Sergey S. Radchenko: *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (New Haven: Yale University Press., 2008).

Honore M. Catudal, Jr: *Nuclear Deterrence: Does it deter?* (London: Mansell Publishing., 1985).

Gerald Chaliand (ed.): *The Art of War in World History* (California: University of California Press., 1994).

William O. Chittick: *American Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis* (Washington D.C.: CQ Press., 2006).

Stephen J. Cimbala: *Nuclear War and Nuclear Strategy* (Westport: Greenwood Press., 1987).

Stephen J. Cimbala: *Rethinking Nuclear Strategy* (Delaware: Scholarly Resources., 1988).

Stephen J. Cimbala: *Clausewitz and Escalation: Classical Perspective on Nuclear Strategy* (London: FRANK CASS., 1991).

Stephen J. Cimbala: *The Politics of Warfare: The Great Powers in the Twentieth Century* (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press., 1997).

Joseph Cirincione, *Bomb Scare: The History & Future of Nuclear Weapons*, (New York: Columbia University Press., 2007).

Joseph Cirincione: *Nuclear Nightmares: Securing the World Before It is Too Late* (New York: Columbia University Press., 2013).

Carl von Clausewitz: *On War*, tans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1984, ppb. 1989)

Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton M. Hoening: *Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities* (Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company., 1984).

Saul B. Cohen: *Geography and Politics in a World divided*, 2nd ed (New York: Oxford University Press., 1973).

Christopher Coker: *Reflections on American Foreign Policy Since 1945* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1990).

Christopher Coker: *Twilight of the West* (Oxford: Westview Press., 1998).

Christopher Coker: *Humane Warfare* (London: Routledge., 2001).

Christopher Coker: *The Future of War: The Re-Enhancement of War in the Twenty First Century* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing., 2004).

Christopher Coker: *War in an Age of Risk* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2009).

Christopher Coker: *Can War Be Eliminated?* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2014).

Christopher Coker: *Future War* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2015).

Christopher Coker: *The Improbable War: China, the United States and the Logic of Great Power Conflict* (London: Hurst., 2015, ppb. 2017).

Christopher Coker: *Rebooting Clausewitz* (London: Hurst., 2017).

Chunichi Shimbun Shakaibu hen (ed.): *Nichibei Doumei to Genpatsu: Kakusareta kaku no Sengoshi* [US-Japan Alliance and Nuclear Reactors: The Hidden Nuclear History of Post-War] (Tokyo: Tokyo Shimbun., 2013).

Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George: *Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic*

Problems of Our Time (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1983).

Anthony H. Cordesman: *Deterrence in the 1980s: Part I: American Strategic Forces and Extended Deterrence*, Adelphi Paper 175 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1982).

Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz and Jeffrey A. Larsen(eds.): *Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History. Volume II* (California: ABC-CLIO., 2005).

Richard Crockatt: *The Fifty Years War: The United States and the Soviet Union in World Politics, 1941-1991* (London: Routledge., 1995).

Ivo H. Daalder: *The Nature and Practice of Flexible Response: NATO Strategy and Theater Nuclear Forces Since 1967* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1991).

Robert Dalsjo: *Life-Line Lost: The Rise and Fall of 'Neutral' Sweden's Secret Reserve Option of Wartime Help from the West* (Stockholm: Santerus Academic Press., 2006).

Alexandre Debs and Nuno P. Monteiro: *Nuclear Politics: The Strategic Causes of Proliferation* (New York: Cambridge University Press., 2017).

Terry L. Deibel: *Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic form American Statecraft* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2007).

Therese Delpech: *Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century: Lessons from the Cold War for a New Era of Strategic Piracy* (Santa Monica, CL: Rand Corporation., 2012).

Martyn Denscombe: *The Good Research Guide for Small-Scale Social Research Projects*. 3rd ed (Maidenhead, Berkshire: Open University Press., 2008).

I. M. Destler, Haruhiko Fukui and Hideo Sato: *The Textile Wrangle: Conflict in Japanese-American Relations, 1969-1971* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1979).

Robert A. Divine: *Foreign Policy and U.S. Presidential Elections 1952 1960* (New York: New Viewpoints., 1974).

Robert A. Divine: *Blowing on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate 1954-1960* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1978).

Robert A. Divine: *Eisenhower and the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press.,

1981).

Michael Dockrill: *The Cold War 1945-1963* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1988).

Saki Dockrill: *Eisenhower's New-Look National Security Policy, 1953-61* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1996).

Everett Carl Dolman: *Pure Strategy: Power and Principle in the Space and Information Age* (London: Frank Cass., 2005).

Kaluds Dodds: *Global Geopolitics: A Critical Introduction* (Harrow: Pearson Education Limited., 2005).

Giulio Douhet: *The Command of the Air* (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press., 2009).

John W. Dower: *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press., 1999).

David Deamer: *Deluze, Japanese Cinema and the Atom Bomb* (New York: Bloomsbury., 2014).

Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2010).

John E. Endicott: *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors* (New York: Praeger Publishers., 1975).

Robert D. Eldridge: *The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952* (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 2001).

William G. Eldridge: "The Credibility of America's Extended Nuclear Deterrent: The Case of the Republic of Turkey", Wlaker Paper No. 18 (Alabama: Air University Press., 2011).

Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman (eds.): *Brides and Boundaries: Historians, Political Scientists, and the Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press., 2001).

Jun Eto: *Tozasareta Gengo Kukan: Senryogun no Kenetsu to SengoNihon* [The Closed Society for Freedom of Speech: The Occupation Force's Censorship and Postwar Japan] (Tokyo: Bungei Shnju., 1994).

Thomas H. Etzold and John Lewis Gaddis (eds.) *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1978).

Stephen Van Evera: *Guide to Methods For Students of Political Science* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1997).

Theo Farrell: *The Norms of War: Cultural Beliefs and Modern Conflict* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 2005).

Theo Farrell (ed.): *Security Studies: Critical Concepts in International Relations* (London: Routledge., 2010).

Mark Fitzpatrick: *Asia's Latent Nuclear Powers: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 2015).

Lawrence Freedman: *The Cold War: A Military History* (London: Cassell & Co., 2001).

Lawrence Freedman: *Kennedy's Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2000, ppb. 2002).

Lawrence Freedman: *The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy*, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2003).

Lawrence Freedman: *Deterrence* (Cambridge: Polity Press., 2004).

Lawrence Freedman: *Strategy: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2013).

Lawrence Freedman: *The Future of War: A History* (London: Allen Lane., 2017).

Lawrence Freedman: *Nuclear Deterrence* (London: Penguin Random House UK., 2018).

Haruo Fujii: *Toppu Sekuretto: Nichibei Kyodo Sakusen no Teteikenkyu* [Top Secret: The Detailed Study of Secret US-Japan Joint Operational Plan] (Tokyo: Kojinsha., 1992).

Hisashi Fujii: *RikuKaigun Senshi ni Manabu Makeru Soshiki to Nihonjin* [Lessons Learnt from Land and Naval War History: A Feeble Organisation and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shueisha., 2008).

Andrew Futter: *The Politics of Nuclear Weapons* (London: Sage Publications., 2015).

Andrew Futter: *Hacking the Bomb: Cyber Threats and Nuclear Weapons* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press., 2018).

Patrick J. Garrity and Steven Maaranen (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and North America* (New York: Plenum Press., 1992).

Francis J. Gavin: *Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in American's Atomic Age* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 2012).

John Lewis Gaddis: *Strategies of Containment* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1982).

John Lewis Gaddis: *The Long Peace: Inquires Into the History of the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1987).

John Lewis Gaddis: *The Cold War* (London: Penguin Books., 2005).

John Lewis Gaddis: *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1997, ppb. 1998).

Gerald Garvey: *Strategy and the Defense Dilemma: Nuclear Policies and Alliance*

Politics (Lexington: Lexington Books., 1984).

Azar Gat: *War in Human Civilization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2006, ppb. 2008).

John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake (eds.): *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2002)..

Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke: *Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. (New York: Columbia University Press., 1974).

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet: *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Science* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press., 2005).

Kent Sidney Gilbert: *Mada GHQ no Senno ni Sibarareteru Nihonjin* [Japanese who are still under the GHQ's indoctrination] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujyo., 2017).

James N. Gibson: *Nuclear Weapons of the United States: An Illustrated History* (Atglen, Penn: Schiffer Publishing., 1996).

John Glenn, Darry Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.): *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate.,2004).

Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds.): *Ideas & Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.,1993).

Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2006).

Colin S. Gray: *Strategic Studies: A Critical Assessment* (London: Aldwych Press., 1982).

Colin S. Gray: *Nuclear Strategy and National Style* (London: Hamilton Press., 1986).

Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan: *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass., 1999).

Colin S. Gray: *Modern Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1999).

Colin S. Gray: *The Second Nuclear Age* (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1999).

Colin S. Gray: *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson., 2005, ppb. 2006).

Colin S. Gray: *Strategy and History: Essays on Theory and Practice* (Oxon: Routledge., 2006).

Colin S. Gray: *The Future of Strategy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015).

Colin S. Gray: *The Strategy Bridge: Theory for Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2010, ppb. 2016).

Colin Gray: *Perspectives on Strategy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2013, ppb. 2016).

Michael Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books., 1999).

Shigeharu Matsumoto: "Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influences on Japan's Policy" in A. M. Halperin: *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company., 1965).

Morton H. Halperin: *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1966)

Morton H. Halperin: *Contemporary Military Strategy* (Boston: Little Brown and Company., 1967).

Morton H. Halperin: *Nuclear Fallacy: Dispelling the Myth of Nuclear Strategy* (Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company., 1987).

Michael I. Handel: *Masters of War: Classical Strategic Thought* 3rd Revised and

Expanded edition (London: Routledge., 2010).

Yoshihisa Hara: *Sengosinonakano Nihon Shakaito: Sono Riso Shugi towa Nani deattanoka* [The Japanese Socialist Party in Postwar Japan: What was Its Idealism?] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shansha., 2000).

Yoshihisa Hara (ed.): *Kishinobuske Shogenroku* [Oral Record of Nobusuke Kishi] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2014).

Selig S. Harrison (ed.): *Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 1996).

Max Hastings: *The Korean War* (London: Michael Joseph Ltd., 1987).

Ikuhiko Hata: *Shiroku Nihon Saigunbi* [The History of Japanese Rearmament] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1976).

Yoshiki Hayakawa, Mari Uchiumi, Dai Tamaru and Reiko Ohyama: *Seisaku Kateiron: Seisaku Kagaku heno Shotai* [On Policy-Making: Invitation to Policy Science] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo., 2004).

Peter Hayes, Lyuba Zarsky and Walden Bello: *American Lake: Nuclear Peril in the Pacific* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books., 1987).

Peter Hayes: *Pacific Powderkeg: American Nuclear Dilemmas in Korea* (Massachusetts: Lexington Books., 1991).

Gregg Herken: *The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War 1945-1950* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf., 1980).

Gregg Herken: *Counsels of War* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1985, ppb 1987).

Beatrice Heuser (ed.): *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security*, Occasional Paper 5 (Maryland: Center For International Security Studies, School of

Public Affairs, University of Maryland., 1991).

Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.): *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1992).

Beatrice Heuser: *Nuclear Mentalities? : Strategies and Beliefs in Britain, France and the FRG.* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1998).

Beatrice Heuser: *The Bomb: Nuclear Weapons in their Historical, Strategic and Ethical Context* (New York: Longman., 2000).

Beatrice Heuser: *Reading Clausewitz* (London: Pimlico., 2002).

Beatrice Heuser: *The Evolution of Strategy: Thinking War from Antiquity to the Present* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010).

Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (eds.): *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2016).

Beatrice Heuser: *Strategy Before Clausewitz: Linking Warfare and Statecraft, 1400-1830* (London: Routledge, 2018).

Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier and Guillaume Lasconjarias (eds.): *Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact* (Rome: NATO Defense College., 2018).

Yoshiki Hidaka: *Nihon ni Showakenpo wo Ataeta Shinso* [The Truth Behind the Japan's Showa Constitution] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujyo., 2015).

Stefanie Von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (eds): *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press., 2015).

Fintan Hoey: *Sato, America and the Cold War: US-Japanese Relations 1964-72* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2015).

David Holloway: *Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy* (New Haven: Yale University Press., 1994).

Townsend Hoopes: *The Devil and John Foster Dulles* (London: Andre Deutsch., 1973),

Yuichi Hosoya: *Sengoshino Kaiho II Jishu Dokuritu towa Nanika Zenpen: Haisen kara Nihonkoku Kenpo Seitei made* [Critical Analysis of Postwar History: What is National Independence?: The Defeat of Japan and the Enactment of the New Constitution] (Tokyo:Shinchosha., 2018).

Michael Howard: *The Lessons of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1991, ppb. 1993).

Valerie M. Hudson (ed.): *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1997).

Christopher W. Hughes: *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 2004).

Christopher W. Hughes: *Japan's Remilitarisation* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 2009).

Samuel P. Huntington: *The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1961).

Samuel P. Huntington: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (London: Simon & Schuster., 1997, ppb. 2002).

Paul K. Huth: *Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War* (New Haven: Yale University Press., 1988).

Akira Ikegami: *Shiranai dewa sumasarenai Jieitaino Honto no Jitsuryoku* [Things You Must Know About Japan Self Defence Force: The Truth About Japan's Defence Capabilities] (Tokyo: SB Creative., 2018).

Richard H. Immerman (ed.): *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1990).

Makoto Iokibe: *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon* [US-Japanese War and Post-War Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2005)

Makoto Iokibe (ed.): *Sengonihon Gaikoshi. Shinban*[The Diplomatic History of Japanese Postwar, 2nd ed] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2007).

Akira Iriye: *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (New York: Longman., 1987).

Akira Iriye: *Shin Nihon no Gaiko: Chikyuka Jidai no Nihon no Sentaku* (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1991).

Masumi Ishikawa: *Sengo Seijishi, Shinban* [The History of Post War Japan, New Edition] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2004).

Osamu Ishii: *Zero Kara Wakaru Kakumitsuyaku* [The Introduction to Secret Nuclear Deals] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo., 2010).

Kan Ito: *Chugoku no Kaku Senryoku ni Nihon wa Kussuru: Imakoso Nihonjin ni Hitsuyo na Kaku Yokushiryoku* [Chinese Nuclear Force Overwhelms Japan: Nuclear Deterrence Japanese Need Now] (Tokyo: Shogakukan., 2011).

Shuichiro Iwata: *Kaku Senryaku to Kaku Gunbi Kanri : Nihon no Hikaku Seiaku no Kadai* [Nuclear Strategy and Arms Control: Challenges for Japan's Non-Nuclear Policy] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo., 1996)

Carl G. Jacobsen (ed.): *Strategic Power USA/ USSR* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1990).

Steven Jeremy: *Strategy For Action* (London: Knightstone Publishing., 2011).

Robert Jervis: *The Illogic of America Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press., 1984).

Robert Jervis: *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press., 1985, ppb 1989).

Robert Jervis: *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press., 1989).

Alastair Iain Johnston: *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1995).

Matthew Jones: *After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010).

Jerome H. Kahan: *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1975).

Herman Kahn: *On Escalation: Metaphors and Scenarios* (New York: Frederick A Praeger, Publishers., 1965).

Herman Kahn: *The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Prentice Hall., 1970).

Herman Kahn: *On Thermonuclear War*. 2nd ed (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1978).

Herman Kahn: *Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1984).

Kumao Kaneko: *Nihon no Kaku Asia no Kaku Nipponjin no Kakuonchi wo Tsuku* [Japan's Atom, Asia's Atom and Question Japanese Ignorance of Atom] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun sha, 1997).

Fred Kaplan: *The Wizards of Armageddon* (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press., 1983).

Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): *Security with Nuclear Weapons: Different Perspectives on National Security* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1991).

Miki Kase: *Daitouryou ate Nihonkoku Shushou no Gokuhi File* [Secret Files of Japanese Prime Minister for American Presidents] (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha.,

1999).

Yozo Kato: *Shiroku Jieitaishi: Keisatsu Yobitai kara Konnichi made* [My Private Account of Japan Self-Defence Force: From Police Reserve to date] (Tokyo: Gekkan Seisaku Seiji Gepposha., 1979).

Tetsuto Kato: *Nihon no Shakai Shugi: Genbaku Hantai Genbaku Suishin no Ronri* [Japanese Socialism: Anti-Atomic Bombs and The logic of Promotion of Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2013).

Peter J. Katzenstein: *Cultural Norms and National Security: Politics and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1996).

Minato Kawamura: *Genpatsu to Genbaku: Kaku no Sengo Seishinsi* [Nuclear Reactors and Atomic Bombing: Atom and History of Post-War Mentality] (Tokyo: Kawade Shobo Shinsha., 2011).

William Kaufmann: *The McNamara Strategy* (New York: Harper & Row., 1964).

William Kaufmann (ed.): *Military Policy and National Security* (London: Kennikat Press., 1972).

Joseph P. Keddell, Jr: *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe., 1993).

George F. Kennan: *Memoirs 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company., 1967).

Yuen Foong Khong: *Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu and the Vietnam Decisions of 1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1992).

Henry Kissinger: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Brothers., 1957).

Henry Kissinger: *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon and Schuster., 1994).

Henry Kissinger: *World Order* (New York: Penguin Press., 2014).

Shinichi Kitaoka: *Jiminto: Seikento no 38Nen* [The Liberal Democratic Party: 38 Years as the Ruling Party] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha., 1995).

Shinichi Kitaoka: *Nihon Seijisi: Gaiko to Kenryoku* [A Political History of Modern Japan: Foreign Relations and Domestic Politics] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2011).

Shoji Kokami: *Fujimi no TokkoHei: Gunshin wa naze Jokan ni Hanko sitaka* [Invincible Kamikaze Pilot: Why the God of Air Battle refused orders from His Commnader] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2017).

Atsushi Koyano: *Nihonjin notameno Sekaishinyumon* [Introduction to World History for the Japanese] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 2013).

Masataka Kosaka: *Saisho Yoshida Shigeru* [Prime Minister Yoshida] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1968).

Keith Krause: “Rational and Deterrence in Theory and Practice”, in Craig A. Snyder: *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1999), pp. 120-149.

Miyoko Kudo: *Kenran Taru Shubun: Kishi Nobusuke Den* (Tokyo: Gentosha., 2014).

Taeru Kurono: *Senso Gaku Gairon* [Introduction to War Studies] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2005).

Akira Kurosaki: *Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei: America no Kakufukakusan Gaiko to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976* [Nuclear Weapons and US-Japan Relations: US policy of non-nuclear proliferation and Japan's choice 1960-1976] (Tokyo: Yushisha., 2006).

Walter LaFeber: *America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-2000* 9th ed (New York: McGraw-Hill Higher Education., 2002).

Melvyn P. Leffler: *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang., 2007).

Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010).

Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010).

Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume III Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010).

Ralph B. Levering, Vladimir O. Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe and C. Earl Edmondson: *Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives* (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield., 2001).

John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai: *China Builds the Bomb* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press., 1988).

Daniel Little: *Varieties of Social Explanation: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Social Science* (Oxford: Westview Press., 1991).

Edward N. Luttwak: *Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace*. Revised and Enlarged Edition (Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., 2001).

Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984).

Michael Mandelbaum: *The Nuclear Question 1946-1976* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1979).

Michael Mandelbaum: *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima* (New York: Cambridge University Press., 1981, ppb. 1982).

Callum A. MacDonald: *Korea: The War before Vietnam* (Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press., 1986).

Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984).

Mainichi Shimbun Shakaibu Hen (ed.): *Usagino Mimi to Hato no Yume: Nihon No Kakuto Jyohou Senryaku* [Rabbit's ears and Dove's Dream: Japan's nuclear and Information Strategy] (Tokyo: Liberuta Shuppan., 1995).

Tim Marshall: *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics* (London: Elliott and Thompson., 2015, ppb. 2016).

Hiroshi Masuda: *Jieitaino Tanjo* [The Creation of Japan Self-Defence Forces] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2004).

Tsutomu Matsumura: *Sensogaku* [War Study] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1998).

Ernest R. May: *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68* (New York: St Martin's Press., 1993).

Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow (eds.): *The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis, The Concise Edition* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company., 2001).

David S. McDonough: *Nuclear Superiority: The 'new triad' and the evolution of nuclear strategy*, Adelphi Papers. 383 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 2006).

Robert S. McNamara: *The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office* (London: Hodder and Stoughton., 1968).

Robert S. McNamara: *Blundering Into Disaster* (London: Bloomsbury., 1986).

John J. Mearsheimer: *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: Norton&Company., 2001).

Yukio Mishima: *Wakaki Samurainotameni* [For Young Samurai] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1996)..

David Miller: *The Cold War: A Military History* (London: Pimlico., 2001).

Yukio Mishima: *Koudougaku Nyumon* [Introduction to Behavioural Study] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1974).

Kiichi Miyazawa: *Tokyo Washington no Mitsudan* [The Secret Discussion between

Tokyo and Washington] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron., 1999).

Makoto Miyoshi: *500 Nin no Taiken ni Manabu Taiheiyo Senso no Sinin to Haiin* [Learn from 500 People The True Cause of the Pacific War and The Cause of a Defeat] (Tokyo: Tosho Kankokai., 1999).

Patrick M. Morgan: *Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis* (Sage Publications: London., 1977).

Patrick M. Morgan: *Deterrence Now* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Hans J. Morgenthau: *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 7th ed Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson and W. David Clinton* (Boston: McGraw-Hill Higher Education., 2006).

Satoshi Morimoto: *Nihon Bouei Saikoron* [Reconsideration of Japan's Defence Policy] (Tokyo: Kairyusha., 2008).

Ian Morris: *War: What is it good for?: The Role of Conflict in Civilisation, From Primates to Robots* (London: Profile Books., 2014).

Ryohei Murata: *Naze Gaimusho ha Dameninattanoka: Yomigaere Nihon Gaiko* [Why Japanese diplomacy fails: The Restoration of Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Fushosha., 2002).

Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.): *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1994).

Kenneth A. Myers (ed.): *NATO The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting* (London: Croom Helom., 1980),

Terumasa Nakanishi: *Nihonjin toshite Koredakewa Shitte okitaikoto* [Things you as Japanese must know] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2006).

NATO: *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press., 2001).

Shingo Nakajima: *Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku: Yoshida Rosen wo meguru Seiji Gaiko Gunji* [Postwar Japan's Defence Policy: The Yoshida Line Concerned with Politics, Diplomacy and Military] (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai., 2006).

Yasuhiro Nakasone: *Nakasone Yasuhiro ga Kataru Sengo Nihon Gaiko* [Nakasone Yasuhiro's accounts on Post-War Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Shinchosha., 2012)

Keiji Nakazawa: *Hadashino Gen wa Hiroshima wo Wasurenai* [Barefoot Gen is Always with Hiroshima] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2008).

John Newhouse: *The Nuclear Age: From Hiroshima to Star Wars* (London: Michale Joseph., 1989).

NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan Hen (ed.): *Taiheiyo Senso Nihon no Haiin 1: Nichibei Kaisen Shosan nashi* [The Cause of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War 1: The outbreak of the War between Japan and the USA, Japan Had No Chance to Win] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten., 1995).

NHK Supesharu Shuzaihan Hen (ed.): *Taiheiyo Senso Nihon no Haiin 2: Gadarukanaru Manabazaru Guntai* [The Cause of Japan's defeat in the Pacific War 2: Guadalcanal, the Armed Forces which Never Learned] (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten., 1995).

NHK Supersharu Shuzaihan: *Kaku wo Motometa Nihon: Hibakukoku no Shirarezaru Shinjitsu* [Japan that sought nuclears: The truth behind Post-war Japan's Politics] (Tokyo: Kobunsha., 2012).

NHK Supersharu Shuzaihan: *Okinawa Henkan no Daisho: Kaku to Kichi Misshi Wakaizumu Keino Kunou* [The Price of Okinawa Reversion: Nuclear and Basa, Special Delegate Kei Wakaizumi's distress] (Tokyo: Kobunsha., 2012)

Tom Nicholas, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey D. McCausland(eds.): *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO* (Pennsylvania: US Army War College., 2012).

Thomas M. Nichols: *No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. National Security* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press., 2014).

Shoji Niihara: *Kakuheiki Shiyo keikaku wo Yomitoku: America Shinkakusenryaku to Nihon* [Understanding US Nuclear War Plans: New US Nuclear Strategy and Japan] (Tokyo: Shinnihon Shupansha., 2002).

Takichi Nishimiyama: *Okinawa Mitsuyaku: Jyohou Hanzai to Nichibei Doumei* [Okinawa Secret Agreement: Information Crime and US-Japan Alliance] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2012).

Osamu Nishi: *Nihonkoku Kenpo no Tanzyo wo Kenshosuru* [The Examination of the birth of the Japanese Constitution] (Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo., 1986).

Osamu Nishi: *Nihonkoku Kenpo ha Koshite Umareta* [On the birth of the Japanese Constitution] (Tokyo: Chuokoron-Shinha., 2000).

Kumao Nishimura: *Nihon Gaikoshi 27: San Francisco Heiwa Jyoyaku* [The History of Japanese Diplomacy Vol 27: San Francisco Peace Treaty] (Tokyo: Kashima Kenkyujyo Shuppankai., 1971).

Shigeki Nishimura (ed.): *Senryaku no kyokasho* [An Introduction to Strategy] (Tokyo: Fuyo Shobo., 2009).

Takashi Nobuo: *Wakaizumi Kei to Nichibei Mitsuyaku: Okinawa Henkan to Seni Kousho wo meguru Misshi Gaiko* [Wakaizumi Kei and US-Japan Secret Deals: Secret Diplomacy for Okinawa Reversion and Textile Negotiations] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha., 2012).

Janne E. Nolan: *Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy* (New York: Basic Books., 1989).

Douglass C. North: *Institution, Institutional Change and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1990).

Joseph S. Nye, Jr: *Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 3rd ed. (New York: Longman., 2003).

Kazuhisa Ogawa: *Zainichi Beigun* [US Forces in Japan] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 1985).

Kazuhisa Ogawa: *14 Sai karano riaru Bouei Ron* [Practical Defence Debate for Junior High School Students] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2010).

Shinichi Ogawa: *Kaku GunbiKanri Gunshuku no Yukue* [The Future of Arms Control and Nuclear Disarmament], (Tokyo: Ashi Shobo, 1996).

Hideo Ohtake: *Saigunbi to Nashonarishumu: Hoshu, Riberaru, Shakai Minshu Shugisha no Boueikan* [Rearmament and Nationalism: Conservative, Liberal, Social Democrats and Their Perspectives on Defence] (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha., 1988).

Hideo Ohtake Hen (ed.): *Sengo Nihon Bouei Mondai Shiryoshu: Dai 1kan Higunji kara Saigunbihe* [Collection of Materials Related to Post-War Japanese Defence Issues: Vol. 1 From Disarmament to Rearmament] (Tokyo: Sanichi Shobo., 1991).

John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (eds.): *The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press., 2011).

Andrew O'Neil: *Asia, the US and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Atomic Umbrellas in the twenty-first century* (London: Routledge., 2013).

Andrew L. Oros: *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press., 2008).

Robert E. Osgood: *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press., 1968).

Hikaru Ohta and Shinich Nakazawa: *Kenpo Kyuzuyo wo Sekai Isan ni* [Article 9 as the World Heritage] (Tokyo:Shueisha., 2006).

Masakatsu Ota: *Meiyaku no Yami: Kaku no Kasa to Nichibei Doumei* [Dark Sides of Alliance: Nuclear Umbrella and US-Japan Alliance] (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha., 2004).

Masakatsu Ota, *Nichibei Kakumitsuyaku no Zenbo* [The Whole Picture of US-Japan Secret Deal] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2011).

Masakatsu Ota: *Hiroku: Kaku Sukuupu no Uragawa* [Secret memoir: the inside story of nuclear scoops] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2013), especially chapter 1, 2, 3.

Masakatsu Ota: *Nichibei Kaku Domei: Genbaku, Kaku no Kasa, Fukushima [Japan-US Nuclear Alliance: Atomic Bombing, Nuclear Umbrella, Fukushima]* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2014).

George R. Packard III: *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1966).

Robert A. Pape: *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1996).

T V. Paul, Richard J. Harknett and James J. Wirtz (eds.): *The Absolute Weapon Revisited: Nuclear Arms and the Emerging International Order* (Ann Arbor: University Michigan Press., 1998, ppb. 2000).

T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz (eds.): *Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press., 2009).

Keith B. Payne: *Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky., 1996).

Keith B. Payne: *The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky., 2001).

Guy B. Peters: *Comparative Politics: Theory and Method* (New York: New York University Press., 1998).

Guy B. Peters: *Strategies for Comparative Research in Political Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2013).

Paul Pierson: *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 2004).

Pavel Podvig (ed.): *Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces* (Massachusetts: The MIT Press., 2001).

Jeffrey Porro, Paul Doty, Carl Kaysen and Jack Ruina (eds.): *The Nuclear Age Reader* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf.,1989).

Patrick Porter: *Military Orientalism: Eastern War Through Western Eyes* (New York: Columbia University Press.,2009)..

William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova: *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective Vol. 2* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press., 2010).

George Quester: *Deterrence before Hiroshima* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers., 1986).

Michael Quinlan: *Thinking about Nuclear Weapons: Principles. Problems, Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2009).

Mitchell B. Reiss and Robert S. Litwak: *Nuclear Proliferation After the Cold War* (Washington, D.C: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press., 1994).

Anatol Rapport: *Strategy and Conscience* (New York: Haper & Row, Publishers., 1964).

Steven L. Rearden: *The Origins of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1953* (New York: St. Martin's Press., 1993).

Steven L. Rearden: *The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine* (Boulder CO: Westview Press., 1984).

Richard Rhodes: *Dark Sun: The Making of Hydrogen Bomb* (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks., 1995).

Brad Roberts: *The Case for U.S. Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century.* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press., 2016).

Terence Roehrig: *Japan, South Korea, and the United States Nuclear Umbrella: Deterrence After the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press., 2017).

Steven T. Ross: *American War Plans 1945-1950* (London: Frank Cass., 2004).

W. W. Rostow: *The United States in the World Arena: A Study in Recent History* (New York: Harper and Row., 1960).

The Royal College of Defense Studies: "Thinking Strategically October 2010 Edition", *Defense Academy of the United Kingdom*, (October 2010).

Maria Rose Rublee: *Nonproliferation Norms: Why States Choose Nuclear Restraint* (Georgia: University of Georgia Press.,2009).

Akihiro Sado: *Jieitaishi: Bouei Seisaku no Nanajyu Nen* [The History of Japanese Self-Defence Forces: Defence Policy over the last 70 years] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2015).

Scott D. Sagan: *Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1989).

Scott D, Sagan and Kenneth D. Waltz: *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate* (New York: Norton& Company., 2013).

Edward W. Said: *Orientalism* (London: Penguin Books., 1978, ppb. 2003).

Naoko Sajima: *Kokusai Anzen Hoshoron I: Tenkan suru paradaimu* [Theory of International Security Vol. 1: Paradigm Shift] (Tokyo: Naigai Shuppansha., 2007).

Naoko Sajima: *Anzen Hosho te nandarou* [What is Security Studies?] (Tokyo: Keiso Shobo., 2011).

Kazuya Sakamoto: *Nichibei Doumeino Kizuna: Anpojoyoyaku to Sougoseino Mosaku* [The Bonds of the US-Japan Alliance: The Trajectory of the US-Japan Security Treaty and Mutual Cooperation] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2000).

Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen I: kakuto Taiketsu suru 20 Seiki* [Nuclear and Human: Confronting Nuclearism The 20th Century World in Crisis Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.,1999).

Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen II: kaku wo Koeru Sekaiye* [Nuclear and Human: The World Without Nuclear Weapons Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Iwanami Kawamura: *Genpatsu to Genbaku* Shoten.,1999).

Nicholas Evan Sarantakes: *The American Occupation of Okinawa and U.S.-Japanese Relations* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press., 2000).

Kenichiro Sasae: *Rethinking Japan-US Relations: An analysis of the relationship between Japan and the US and implications for the future of their security alliance*, Adelphi Papers 292 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1994).

Yukio Satoh: *The Evolution of Japanese Security Policy*, Adelphi Paper 178 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1982).

Michael Schaller: *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since The Occupation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 1997).

Thomas C. Schelling: *The Strategy of Conflict* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press., 1960).

Thomas C. Schelling: *Arms and Influence* (New Heaven: Yale University Press., 1966).

Jack M. Schick: *The Berlin Crisis 1958-1962* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press., 1971).

Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.): *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 1998).

Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.): *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal* (London: Routledge., 2015).

W. J. Sebald: *Nihon Senryo Gaiko no Kaiso* [Memory of the American Occupation of Japan], trans. Kenzo Nozue (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha., 1966).

Takao Sebata: *Bouei Keikaku no Taiko to Nichibei Gaidorain* [National Defence Programme Outline: The Guideline for Japan-U.S. Defence Cooperation] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha., 1998).

Bejamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center., 2003).

Ikutaro Shimizu: *Nihon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* [Independent Japan and the Nuclear Option] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1980).

David N. Schwartz: *NATO's Nuclear Dilemmas* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution., 1983).

Toshiyuki Shikata: *Kyokuto Yuji: Kakutenihonwa Sensoni Hikikomareru* [Contingency in the Far East: Japan will be dragged into war] (Tokyo: Kuresutosha., 1996).

Ikutaro Shimizu: *Nihon yo Kokka tare: Kaku no Sentaku* [Japan Be Independent as a State: Japan's Nuclear Option] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju., 1980).

Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (eds.): *Kaku to Heiwa: Nihonjin no Ishiki* [Nuclear and Peace: The Awareness of the Japanese] (Kyoto: Houritsu Bunkasha., 1978).

Geoffrey R. Sloan: *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books., 1988).

Geoffrey Sloan: *Geopolitics, Geography and Strategic History* (London: Routledge., 2017).

Anthony D. Smith: *National Identity* (Reno: University of Nevada Press., 1991).

Rupert Smith: *The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World* (London: Penguin Books., 2006).

Richard Smoke: *War: Controlling Escalation* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press., 1977).

Richard Smoke: *National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma: An Introduction to the American Experience in the Cold War*, 3rd ed (Massachusetts: McGraw-Hill., 1993).

Craig A. Snyder: *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1999).

Tsuyoshi Sunohara: *Kaku ga nakunaranainanatsu no riyu* [Seven Reasons Why Nuclear Weapons Cannot be Abolished] (Tokyo: Shincho Sha., 2010).

Glenn H. Snyder: *Deterrence and Defense* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1961).

Glenn H. Snyder: *Alliance Politics* (New York: Cornell University Press., 1999, ppb. 2007).

Rinjiro Sodei, edit and trans: *Correspondence between General MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida & Other High Japanese Officials [1945-1951]* (Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku., 2000).

Etel Solingen: *Nuclear Logics: Contrasting Paths in East Asia and the Middle East* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 2007).

John Spanier and Steven W. Hook: *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 13th ed (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly., 1995).

John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel: *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed (Washington D. C.: CQ Press., 1996).

Nicholas J. Spykman: *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New Jersey: Transaction Publisher., 1942, ppb. 2008).

Jeremy Stocker: *The United Kingdom and Nuclear Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 386 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 2007).

Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.): *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2007).

Hew Strachan: *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2013).

William Stueck: *The Korean War*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1995).

Atsushi Sugii and Akitoshi Hoshino: *Bouei Daigakko de Senso to Anzen Hosho wo dou Manandaka* [How We Learned War and National Security at National Defence Academy] (Tokyo: Shodensha., 2014).

Yoshio Sugino: *Daitoa Senso Haiboku no Honshitsu* [The Nature of Japan's defeat of the Greater East Asian War] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo., 2015).

Hiroki Sugita: *Hikaku no Sentaku* [Decision for Non-Nuclear] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten., 2005).

Akihiko Tanaka: *Anzen Hosho: Sengo 50 nen no Mosaku* [National Security: The Trajectory of Japan's Security After the War] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun sha., 1997).

Eiichi Tanizawa: *Konna Nihonni Darega sita: Sengo Minshu Shugi no Daihyosha Oe Kenzaburo heno Kokuhatujo* [Who Corrupted Japan?: Challenge to Kenzaburo Oe, the Leading Figure of Post-War Democracy] (Tokyo: Kuresutosha., 1995)

Maxwell D. Taylor: *The Uncertain Trumpet* (London: Stevens & Sons Limited., 1960).

Charles Taylor: *Modern Social Imaginaries* (Durham: Duke University Press., 2004).

Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner: *Strategic Asia 2013-14 Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research., 2013).

Marc Trachtenberg: *History & Strategy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1991).

Marc Trachtenberg: *A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement. 1945-1963* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1996).

Jitsuo Tsuchiyama: *Anzen Hosho no kokusai seiji gaku Dai Nihan* [International Politics of Security: Anxiety and Hubris, 2nd ed] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2014).

Sun Tzu: *The Art of War*, Samuel B. Griffith trans. (Oxford: Oxford University

Press., 1963, ppb.1993).

Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (eds.): *Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research., 2013).

Terry Terriff, Stuart Croft, Lucy James and Patrick M. Morgan: *Security Studies Today* (Cambridge: Polity., 1999)

Geoffrey Till: *Maritime Strategy and the Nuclear Age* (The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1982).

Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.): *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1998).

Narahiko Toyoshita: *Anpojoyaku no Seiritsu* [The Formation of Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996).

Townshend Charles (eds.): *The Oxford History of Modern War* (New York: Oxford. University Press., 2005).

Hideki Uemura: *Saigunbi to Gojuginenen Taisei* [Rearmament and the 1955 System] (Tokyo: Bokutakusha., 1995).

Hideki Uemura: *Jietai ha Darenomonoka* [Whose Self-Defence Forces?] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2002).

Ward Wilson: *Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Mariner., 2014).

Gregory Treverton: "China's Nuclear Forces and the Stability of Soviet-American Deterrence", in Christoph Bertram (ed.): *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1980).
Martin Walker: *The Cold War* (London: Random House., 1994).

William Walker: *A perpetual Menace: Nuclear Weapons and International Order* (London: Routhledge., 2012).

Stephen M. Walt: *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press., 1987, ppb. 1990).

Kenneth N. Waltz: *Theory of International Politics* (London: McGraw-Hill Education., 1979).

Martin E. Weinstein: *Japan's Postwar Defence Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press., 1971).

John Welfield: *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the postwar American alliance system A study in the interaction of domestic politics and foreign policy*, Reprint ed. (London: Bloombury., 2012).

Odd Arne Westad: *The Cold War: A World History* (London: Allen Lane).

Phil Williams: *Crisis Management: Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age* (London: Martin Robertson., 1976).

Paul D. Williams (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge., 2008).

Ward Wilson: *Five Myths About Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Mariner., 2014).

Arnold Wolfers: *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press., 1962).

James B. Wood: *Japanese Military Strategy in the Pacific War: Was Defeat Inevitable?* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers., 2007).

Ngaire Woods (ed.): *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1996, ppb. 2004).

Harry Wray and Kiliary Conroy (eds.): *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 1983).

Katsuya Yamada: *Nihon wa Gensi Bakudan wo tsukurenoka* [Nuclear Weapons and Japan] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2009).

Akihiro Yamamoto: *Kaku to Nihonjin* [Nuclear Power and the Japanese] (Tokyo:

Chuo Koron Shinsha., 2015).

Harry R. Yarger: *Strategic Theories For The 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute. ,2006).

Harry R. Yarger: *Strategy and the National Security Professional: Strategic Thinking and Strategy Formulation in the 21st Century* (Westport: Prager Security International., 2008).

Yomiuri Shimbun Sengoshi-han Hen (ed.): *Showa Sengoshi: Saigunbi no Kiseki* [The History of the Rearmament of Japan] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbun-Sha., 1981),

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds.): *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon* (Baltimore: George Town University Press., 2012).

Kosuke Yoshitsugu: *Nichibei Domeiha Ikani Tsukuraretaka: Anpo Taiseino Tenkanten 1951-1964* (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2011).

David S. Yost: *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace., 1998).

Articles and Chapters

Nobumasa Akiyama: "The Socio-Political Roots of Japan's Non-Nuclear Posture" in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center., 2003), pp. 64-94.

Ian Clark and David Angell: "Britain, the United States and the control of nuclear weapons: The diplomacy of the Thor deployment 1956-58", *Diplomacy and Statecraft* Vol. 2 No. 3, pp. 153-177.

Tatyana Anichkina: "The U.S. Nuclear Umbrella in East Asia", *Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security* Vol.18 No.4 (2012), pp.73-80.

Lorna Arnold: "The History of Nuclear Weapons: The Frisch-Peierls Memorandum on the Possible Construction of Atomic Bombs of February 1940", *Cold War History* Vol. 3 No. 3 (April 2003), pp. 111-126.

Robert J. Art: "To What Ends Military Power?", *International Security* Vol. 4 No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 3-35.

Huge Beach: "The End of Nuclear Sharing?", *The RUSI Journal* Vol. 154 No.6 (2009), pp. 48-53.

Andrew Bennet and Colin Elman: "Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: The Example of Path Dependence", *Political Analysis* Vol. 14 No.3, pp. 250-267.

Thomas U. Berger: "Alliance Politics and Japan's Postwar Culture of Antimilitarism" in Michael Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books., 1999), pp. 189-207.

Barton J. Bernstein: "Roosevelt, Truman, and the Atomic Bomb, 1941-1945: A Reinterpretation", *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 90 (Spring 1975), pp23-69.

Richard K. Betts: "Conventional Deterrence: Predictive Uncertainty and Policy Confidence", *World Politics*, Vol. 37 No.2 (January 1985), pp.153-179.

Richard K. Betts and Matthew C. Waxman: "The President and the Bomb", *Foreign Affairs* Vol.97 No.2 (March/ April 2018), pp. 119-128.

Christoph Bluth: "Nuclear Weapons and British-German Relations", in Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds.): *Securing Peace in Europe, 1945-62: Thoughts for the post-Cold War Era* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1992), pp. 139-156.

Barry M. Blechman and Robert Powell: "What in the Name of God is Strategic Superiority", *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 97 No. 4 (Winter 1982-1983), pp. 589-602.

Ken Booth: "Alliances", in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 172-191.

Hal Brands: "Rethinking Nonproliferation: LBJ, the Gilpatric Committee and U.S. National Security Policy", *Journal of Cold War Studies* Vol. 8 No. 2 (Spring 2006), pp. 83-113.

Marijke Breuning: "Culture, History, Role: Belgian and Dutch Axioms and Foreign Assistance Policy", in Valerie M. Hudson (ed.): *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers., 1997), pp. 99-123.

Bernard Brodie: "The Anatomy of Deterrence", *World Politics* Vol. 11 no.2 (January 1959), pp. 173-191.

Bernard Brodie: "The Development of Nuclear Strategy", *International Security* Vol.2 No.4 (Spring 1978), pp. 65-83.

Andre Brown and Lorna Arnold, "The Quirks of Nuclear Deterrence", *International Relations* Vol. 24 No. 3, pp. 293-312.

Hedley Bull: "Strategic Studies and Its Critics", *World Politics* Vol. 20 No.4 (July 1968), pp. 593-605.

McGeorge Bundy: "To Cap the volcano", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 48 No. 1 (October 1969), pp.1-20

McGeorge Bundy: "Existential Deterrence and Its Consequences", in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), pp. 3-13.

Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara: "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable" in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn and Mitchell B. Reiss (eds.): *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 2004), pp. 218-253.

Kurt M. Campbell: "Nuclear Proliferation Beyond Rogue", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 26 No.1 (Winter 2002-03), pp. 7-15.

Victor D. Cha: "The second nuclear age: Proliferation pessimism versus sober optimism in South Asia and East Asia", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 24 No. 4 (2001), pp. 79-120.

Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder: "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity", *International Organization* Vol. 44 No.2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168.

Thomas J. Christensen "China, the US-Japan Alliance, the Security Dilemma in East Asia", *International Security*, Vol.23 No.4 (Spring 1999), pp. 49-80.

Susan Lesley Clark: "Soviet Policy toward Japan", *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science*, Vol. 36 No.4 (1987), pp. 132-150.

Paul M. Cole: "Atomic Bombast: Nuclear weapon decision-making in Sweden 1946-72", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol 20 No. 2 (1997), pp. 233-251.

Simon Dalby: "American Security Discourse: the Persistence of Geopolitics", *Political Geography Quarterly* Vol. 9 No. 2 (April 1990), pp. 171-188.

Steven R. David: "Explaining Third World Alignment", *World Politics* Vol. 43 No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233-256.

Robert T. Davis II: "Cold War Infamy: NATO Exercise Carte Blanche", in Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier and Guillaume Lasconjarias (eds.): *Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact* (Rome: NATO Defense College., 2018), pp. 47-64.

Michael C. Desch: "Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies", *International Security* Vol.23 No.1 (Summer 1998), pp. 141-170.

John Deutch: "A Nuclear Posture for Today", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 84 No. 1 (January/February 2005), pp. 49-60;

Roger Dingman: "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War", *International Security* Vol. 13 No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 50-91.

Roger Dingman, "The Dagger and the Gift", *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Vol. 2 No. 1 (Spring 1993), pp. 29-55.

John W. Dower: "Reform and Reconsolidation", in Harry Wray and Kilarity Conroy (eds.): *Japan Examined: Perspectives on Modern Japanese History* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press., 1983).

John Foster Dulles: "Security in the Pacific", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 30 No. 2 (January 1952), pp 175-187.

John Foster Dulles: "Policy for Security and Peace", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32 No. 3 (April 1953), pp. 353-364.

George W. Downs: "The Rational Debate", *World Politics* Vol. 41 No.2 (Jan 1989), pp. 225-237.

Paul E. Eckel: "SEATO: An Ailing Alliance", *World Affairs* Vol. 134 No. 2 (Fall 1971), pp. 97-114.

Fritz W. Ermarth: "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought", *International Security* Vol. 3 No.2 (Fall 1978), pp. 138-155.

Gareth Evans: "Nuclear Deterrence in Asia and the Pacific", *Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies* Vol.1 No.1 (January 2015), pp. 91-111.

Theo Farrell: "General Introduction", in Theo Farrell (ed.): *Security Studies: Critical Concepts in International Relations* (London: Routledge., 2010), pp. 1-14.

Edwin H. Fedder: "The Concept of Alliance", *International Studies Quarterly* Vol. 12 No. 1 (March 1986), pp. 65-86.

Steve Fetter and Jon Wolfsthal: “No First Use and Credible Deterrence”, *Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament* Vol. 1 No. 1 (2018), pp. 102-114.

Rosemary J. Foot: “Nuclear Coercion and the Ending of the Korean Conflict”, *International Security* Vol. 13 No. 3 (Winter 1988-1989), pp. 92-112.

John Foster Dulles: “Challenge and Response in United States Policy”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 36 No. 1 (October 1957), pp. 25-43.

J.P.D. Dunbabin: *The Cold War: The Great Powers and their Allies*, 2nd ed (Harlow: Pearson Longman., 2008).

Lawrence Freedman: “The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists”, In Peter Paret (ed.) *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press., 1986), pp. 735-778.

Lawrence Freedman “I Exist; Therefore I Deter”, *International Security* Vol. 13 No.1 (Summer 1988), pp. 177-195.

Lawrence Freedman: “The Evolution and Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, *The Changing Strategic Landscape, Part II*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., Spring 1989), pp.18-31.

Lawrence Freedman and Srinath Raghavan: “Coercion”, in Paul D. Williams (ed.) *Security Studies: An Introduction* (London: Routledge., 2008), pp.216-228.

Lawrence Freedman: “Framing Strategic Deterrence”, *The RUSI Journal* Vol. 154 No.4 (August 2009), pp. 46-50.

Aaron L. Friedberg: “A History of the U.S. Strategic ‘Doctrine’-1945 to 1980”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 3 No. 1 (1980), pp. 37-71.

Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Secher: “Signalling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence”, *American Journal of Political Science* Vol.58 No.4 (October 2014), pp.919-935.

Katsuhisa Furukawa: “Japan’s Policy and Views on Nuclear Weapons: A Historical

Perspective”, *Malaysian Journal of History, Politics, & Strategic Studies* Vol. 37 (2010), pp. 1-30.

Katsuhisa Furukawa: “Nuclear Option, Arms Control, and Extended Deterrence: In Search of a New Framework for Japan’s Nuclear Policy”, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center., 2003), pp. 95-147.

Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa: “Japan: New Nuclear Realism”, in Muthiah Alagappa(ed.): *The Long Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press., 2008), pp. 347-371.

Andrew Futter: “NATO, ballistic missile defense and the future of US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe”, *European Security* Vol. 20 No. 4 (2011), pp. 547-562.

Futoshi Shibayama and Ayako Kusunoki: “Nichibei Senso to Nihon Senryo [The War and the Occupation]” in Makoto Iokibe: *Nichibei Kankeishi* [The History of US-Japan Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2008),pp. 149-180.

John L. Gaddis “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System”, *International Security* Vol.10 No. (Spring 1986), pp. 99-142.

John Lewis Gaddis: “The Unexpected John Foster Dulles: Nuclear Weapons, Communism, and the Russians” in Richard H. Immerman (ed.): *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University, 1990), pp. 47-77.

John Lewis Gaddis: “Grand strategies in the Cold War” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.) *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 1-21.

Marc Gallicchio: “Occupation, Dominion, and Alliance: Japan in American Security Policy, 1945-69” in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler: *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001* (Tokyo: Kodansha International., 2001), pp. 115-134.

John Garnett: “Strategic Studies and Its Assumptions”, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 3-21.

John Garnett: "Limited War", in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 114-131.

John Garnett: "Defense Policy Making" in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy II: The Nuclear Powers*, 2nd ed Revised and Enlarged (New York: Holmes & Meier., 1987), pp. 1-27.

Francis Gavin: "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960's", *International Security* Vol. 29 No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), pp. 100-135.

Francis J. Gavin: "Nuclear proliferation and non-proliferation during the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Anne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume IICrises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 395-416.

Michael S. Gerson: "No First Use: The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy", *International Security* Vol. 35 No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7-47.

John Glenn and Darryl Howlett: "Neorealism", in John Glenn, Darryl Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.): *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate., 2004), pp. 21-44.

David Gompert, Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening: "Nuclear first use revisited", *Survival* Vol. 37 No. 3, pp. 27-44

Dennis M. Gormley and Douglas M. Hart: "Soviet views on escalation", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 7 No. 4 (1984), pp. 71-84.

Colin S. Gray: "What Rand Hath Wrought", *Foreign Policy* Vol. 4 (Autumn 1971), pp. 111-129.

Colin S. Gray: "Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory", *International Security* Vol. 4 No.1 (Summer 1979), pp. 54-87.

Colin S. Gray and Keith B. Payne: "Victory is Possible", *Foreign Policy* No. 39 (Summer 1980), pp. 14-27.

Colin S. Gray: "National Style in Strategy: The American Example", *International Security* Vol. 6 No.2 (Fall 1981), pp. 21-47.

Colin S. Gray: "Strategy in the nuclear age", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor

Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.): *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1994), pp. 579-613.

Colin S. Gray: "A Debate on Geopolitics: The Continued Primacy of Geography", *Orbis* Vol. 40 No. 2 (Spring 1996), pp. 247-259.

Colin S. Gray "Inescapable Geography", in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds.): *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass.,1999), pp. 161-177.

Colin S. Gray: "The Nuclear Age and the Cold War", in John Andreas Olsen and Colin S. Gray (eds.): *The Practice of Strategy: From Alexander the Great to the Present* (New York: Oxford University Press., 2011), pp. 237-259.

William Greider: "The People Versus the Experts" in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), pp. 89-100.

Christopher Hemmer and Peter J. Katzenstein: "Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identify, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism", *International Organization* Vol. 56 No. 3 (Summer 2002), pp. 575-607.

Gregg Herken: "A Most Deadly Illusion: The Atomic Secret and American Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1950", *Pacific Historical Review* Vol. 49 No. 1 (February 1980), pp. 51-70.

Gregg Herken: "The Nuclear Gnostics", in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), pp. 14-27.

Beatrice Heuser: "NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat: A New Perspective on Western Threat Perception and Policy Making", *Review of International Studies* Vol. 17 No. 1 (January 1991), pp. 17-40.

Beatrice Heuser: "The Development of NATO's Nuclear Strategy", *Contemporary European History* Vol. 4 No. 1 (March 1995), pp. 37-66.

Beatrice Heuser: "Historical Lessons and Discourse on Defence in France and

Germany, 1945-90”, *Rethinking History: The Journal of Theory and Practice* Vol. 2 No. 2 (1998), pp. 199-237.

Beatrice Heuser: “Beliefs, culture, proliferation and use of Nuclear Weapons”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 23 No. 1 (March 2000), pp. 74-100.

Beatrice Heuser: “Clausewitz’s Ideas of Strategy and Victory”, in Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe (eds.): *Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2007), pp. 138-162.

Beatrice Heuser: “Strategy Before the Word: Ancient Wisdom for the Modern World”, *RUSI Journal* Vol. 155 No. 1 (February/ March 2010), pp.36-43.

Beatrice Heuser and Jeannie Johnson: “Introduction: National Styles and Strategic Culture”, in Beatrice Heuser and Eitan Shamir (eds.): *Insurgencies and Counterinsurgencies: National Styles and Strategic Cultures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2016), pp. 1-22.

Beatrice Heuser: “Britain and the Origins and Future of the European Defence and Security Mechanism”, *RUSI Journal* Vol. 162 No. 2 (April/ May 2017), pp.16-23.

Beatrice Heuser and Kristan Stoddart: “Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/ Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War”, *Diplomacy and Statecraft* Vol. 28 No. 3 (2017), pp. 454-476.

Takako Hikotani: “Trump’s Gift to Japan: Times for Tokyo to Invest in the Liberal Order”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 96 No. 5 (September/ October 2017), pp. 21-27.

Takako Hikotani: “The Japanese Diet and defence policy-making”, *International Affairs* Vol.94 No.4 (2018), pp. 791-814.

Stefanie Von Hlatky , “Introduction: American Alliances and Extended Deterrence”, in Stefanie Von Hlatky and Andreas Wenger (eds): *The Future of Extended Deterrence: The United States, NATO, and Beyond* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press., 2015), pp. 1-16.

Fintan Hoey: “Japan and Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Security and

Non-Proliferation”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* No. 39 Vol. 4 (June 2016), pp. 484-501.

David Holloway: “Nuclear Weapons and the escalation of the Cold War, 1945-1962”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: *The Cambridge History of The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 376-397.

Masayasu Hosaka: *Showa no Kaibutsu Nanatsu no Nazo* [Giants in the Showa Period: Seven Mysteries] (Tokyo: Kodansha., 2018).

Rebecca K. C. Hersmand and Robert Peters: “Nuclear U-Turns: Learning from South Korean and Taiwanese Rollback”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3, pp. 539-553.

Gleen D. Hook: “The Nuclearization of Language: Nuclear Allergy as Political Metaphor”, *Journal of Peace Research* Vo. 21 No. 3 (September 1984), pp. 259-275.

Glenn D. Hook: “Evolution of the Anti-Nuclear Discourse in Japan”, *Current Research on Peace and Violence* Vol. 10 No. 1 (1987), pp. 32-43.

Michael Howard: “The Forgotten Dimensions of Strategy”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.57 No.5 (Summer 1979), pp. 975-986.

Michael Howard: “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980’s”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 61 No.2 (Winter 1982), pp.309-324.

Jolyon Howorth: “consensus of Silence: The French Socialist Party and Defence Policy under Francois Mitterrand”, *International Affairs* Vol. 60 No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 579-600.

Llewelyn Hughes: “Why Japan Will not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan”, *International Security* Vol. 31 No. 4 (Spring 2007), pp. 67-96.

Paul K. Huth: “Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates”, *Annual Review of Political Science* Vol. 2 No. 25 (December 1980), pp. 25-48.

Paul K. Huth: "Extended Deterrence and the Outbreak of War", *American Political Science Review* Vol. 82 No. 2 (1988), pp. 423-443.

Paul K. Huth: "The Extended Deterrent Value of Nuclear Weapons", *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 34 No. 2 (June 1990), pp. 270-290.

Jacques E. C. Hymans: "Theories of Nuclear Proliferation", *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 455-465.

Jacques E.C. Hymans: "Veto Players, Nuclear Energy, and Nonproliferation: Domestic Institutional Barriers to a Japanese Bomb", *International Security*, Vol. 36 No. 2 (Fall 2011), pp. 154-189.

Makoto Iokibe: "Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy", *JIIA*, Japan's Diplomacy Series, pp. 1-31, Japan Digital Library, https://www2.jiia.or.jp/en/pdf/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy/160330_Makoto_Iokibe.pdf, accessed on 2 December 2017,

Ryukichi Imai: "Japan's Nuclear Policy: Reflections on the Immediate Past, Prognosis for the 21st Century" in Raju G. C. Thomas (ed.): *The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Prospects for the 21st Century* (Basingstoke: McMillan Press., 1998), pp. 183-206.

Takashi Inoguchi: "Japan: Reassessing the Relationship Between Power and Wealth", in Ngaire Woods (ed.): *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1996, ppb. 2004), pp. 2241-258.

Yoko Iwama: "The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Decision to Join the Non-Proliferation Treaty", in John Baylis and Yoko Iwama (eds.): *Joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Deterrence, Non-Proliferation and the American Alliance* (London: Routledge., 2018), pp. 151-170.

Robert Jervis: "The Impact of the Korean on the Cold War", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 24 No. 4 (Dec 1980), pp. 563-592.

Robert Jervis: "Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence", *World Politics* Vol.41 No.2 (Jan 1989), pp. 183-207.

Robert Jervis: "Identity and the Cold War", in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Anne

Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume II Crises and Détente* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 22-43.

Robert Jervis: “The Cuban Missile Crisis: What can we know, why did it start, and how did it end?” in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.): *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal* (London: Routledge., 2015), pp. 1-39.

Ken Jimbo: “Rethinking Japanese Security: New Concepts in Deterrence and Defense”, in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan’s Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center., 2003), pp. 24-45.

Dong-Joon Jo and Erik Gartzke: “Determinants of Nuclear Proliferation”, *Journal of Conflict Resolution* Vol. 51 No. 2 (February 2007), pp. 167-194.

Matake Kamiya: “Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?”, *The Washington Quarterly* (Winter 2002/03), pp. 63-75.

Tim Kane: “Development and US Troop Deployments”, *Foreign Policy Analysis* Vol. 3 No. 3 (2012), pp. 255-273.

Fred Kaplan: “Rethinking Nuclear Policy”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.95 No.5 (September/October 2016), pp. 18-25.

Yuri Kase: “The Costs and Benefits of Japan’s Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/ 70 Internal Report”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 8 No.2 (Summer 2001), pp. 55-68.

Yuri Kase: “Japan”, in John Glenn, Darry Howlett and Stuart Poore (eds.): *Neorealism Versus Strategic Culture* (Aldershot: Ashgate., 2004), pp. 129-152..

Makoto Kawanago: “Kaku no Kasa to Nihon: INF Zenpai to Sore Igo” [The Nuclear Umbrella and Japan After INF Treaty], *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 90 (1989), pp. 103-119.

Hiroshi Kimura: “Soviet policy toward Japan”, *Washington Quarterly* Vol. 7 No. 3 (1984), pp. 21-37.

Henry A. Kissinger: “Limited War: Conventional or Nuclear? A Reappraisal”, *Arms*

Control (Fall 1960), p. 800, pp. 800-817.

Shinichi Kitaoka: "The Secret Japan-US Security Pacts: Background and Disclosure", *Asia-Pacific Review* Vol. 17 No. 2 (2010), pp. 10-25.

Shinichi Kitaoka: "Nichibei Doumeiniokeru Mitsuyaku Mondai [The Issue of the Secret Deals between the US-Japan alliance]" in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujyo (ed.): *Nichibei Doumei towa Nanika* [What is US-Japan Security Alliance] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha., 2011), pp. 256-276.

Macgregor Knox: "Conclusion: Continuity and revolution in the making of strategy", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.): *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1994), pp.614- 645.

Stephen Kotkin: "Russia's Perpetual Geopolitics", *Foreign Affairs* Vol.95 No.3 (May/June 2016), pp. 2-9.

Keith Krause: "Rational Deterrence Theory", in Craig A. Snyder (ed.): *Cotemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 1999), pp. 120-149.

Akira Kurosaki: "Sato Seiken No Kakuseisaku to America no Kaku no Kasa: Amerikano Kaku Yokushiryoku heno Izon Seisaku no Koushikika Teichaku to sono Haikei [Nuclear Policy of the Sato Government and the US Nuclear Umbrella: The Outset and Background of Japan's Reliance on US Nuclear Deterrence]", *Prime*, (Oct 2002), Meiji Gakuin University Institutional Repository, pp. 73-93.

Akira Kurosaki: "Nihon Kakubusou Kenkyu (1968Nen) to wa Nan Dattaka" [Reexamining the 1968 Report on Japan's Nuclear Weapons Capability: From a Comarative Perspective], *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 182 (2015), pp. 125-139.

Ayako Kusunoki: "The Sato Cabinet and the Making of Japan's Non-nuclear Policy", *Journal of American-East Asian Relations* Vol. 15 (2008), pp. 25-50.

Alexander Lanoszaka and Thomas Leo Scherer: "Nuclear ambiguity, no-first-use, and crisis stability in asymmetric crises", *Nonproliferation Review* Vol 24 No. 3-4, pp. 343-355;

Jeffrey S. Lantis: "Strategic Culture and Tailored Deterrence: Bridging the Gap between Theory and Practice," *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 30 No. 3 (Dec 2009), pp. 467-485.

Jeffrey A. Larsen: "Extended Deterrence", in Eric A. Croddy, James J. Wirtz and

Jeffrey A. Larsen(eds.): *Weapons of Mass Destruction: an Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology, and History. Volume II* (California: ABC-CLIO., 2005), pp. 123-126.

Peter R. Lavoy: “Nuclear Proliferation over the Next Decade: Causes, Warning Signs, and Policy Responses”, *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 13 No. 3 (November 2006), pp. 433-454.

Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein: “Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter”, *World Politics* Vol.41 No.2 (Jan 1989), pp. 208-224.

Melvyn P. Leffler: “The American Conception of National Security and the Beginnings of the Cold War, 1945-48”, *The American Historical Review* Vol. 89 No. 2 (April 1984), pp 346-381.

Melvyn P. Leffler: “Cold War and Global Hegemony, 1945-1991”, *OAH Magazine of History* Vol. 19 No. 2 (March 2005), pp. 65-72.

Ariel Levite: “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited”, *International Security* Vol. 27 No.3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.

Edward Luttwak: “The Problems of Extending Deterrence” in Christoph Bertram (ed): *The Future of Strategic Deterrence*, Adelphi Papers 236 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies., 1980), pp. 31-37.

Edward Luttwak: “The Nuclear Alternatives”, in Kenneth A. Myers (ed.): *NATO The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting* (London: Croom Helom.,1980), pp. 95-107.

James Mahoney: “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29 No. 4 (August 2000), pp. 507-548.

James Mahoney and Daniel Schensul: “Historical Context and Path Dependence”, in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2006), pp. 454-471..

Carlo Masala: “Extended Deterrence in the Middle East”, *Strategic Assessment* Vol.14 No.4 (January 2012), pp. 115-122.

Vojtech Mastny: “Soviet Foreign Policy, 1953-1962” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad: *The Cambridge History of The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 312-333.

Shigeharu Matsumoto: "Japan and China: Domestic and Foreign Influences on Japan's Policy", in A. M. Halperin: *Policies Toward China: Views from Six Continents* (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company., 1965), pp. 123-162.

Michael Mccgwire: "Nuclear Deterrence", *International Affairs* Vol.82 No.4 (July 2006), pp. 771-784.

Robert J. McMahon: "US National Security Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy" *The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp.288-311.

John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen S. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 95 No. 4 (July/August 2016), pp. 70-83.

Jan Melissen: "The Thor saga: Anglo-American nuclear relations, US IRBM development and deployment in Britain 1955-1959", *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 15 No. 2, pp. 172-173.

John J. Mearshimer: "Structural Realism", in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki and Steve Smith (eds.): *International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2010), pp.77-93.

John J. Mearshimer: "Why the Ukraine Crisis is the West's Fault", *Foreign Affairs* Vol.93 No.5 (September/ October 2014), pp.1-12.

Jennifer M. Miller: "The Struggle to Rearm Japan: Negotiating the Cold War State in US-Japanese Relations", *Journal of Contemporary History* Vol.46 No.1 (Jan 2011), pp. 82-108.

Mike M. Mochizuki: "Japan's Search for Strategy", *International Security* Vol. 8 No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 152-179.

Mike M. Mochizuki: "Economics and Security: A Conceptual Framework", in Michael Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): *The U.S. -Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books., 1999), pp. 231-246.

Mike M. Mochizuki: "U.S.—Japan Relations in the Asia—Pacific Region", in Akira Iriye and Robert A. Wampler: *Partnership: The United States and Japan 1951-2001* (Tokyo: Kodansha International., 2001), pp. 13-31.

Mike M. Mochizuki: "Japan Tests the Nuclear Taboo", *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 14 No. 2 (Jul 2007), pp. 303-328.

Patrick M. Morgan: "Saving Face For the Sake of Deterrence", in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein (eds.): *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press., 1985, ppb. 1989), pp. 125-152.

Hans J. Morgenthau: "The Four Paradoxes of Nuclear Strategy", *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 58 No.1 (March 1964), pp. 23-25.

John Mueller: "The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear Weapons: Stability in the Postwar World", *International Security* Vol.13 No.2 (Fall 1988), pp. 55-79.

Toshifumi Murakami: "Heiwakeisei houho no kyouiku ni tsuiteno kosatsu: Chugakusei no Heiwa Ishiki Chosa wo Tegakarini [A study on Education about the Method to Be a Peace Builder: By the Investigation of Peace Consciousness of Junior High School Students]", *Hiroshima Peace Science*, Vol. 28 (2006), pp. 27-44.

Takao Murayama: "Wagakunino Uchu kaihatu wo Kangaeru Shiten: Uchu Kihon Houan no Jyoan ni Yosete [The Perspective of Japan's Space Programme: The Space Basic Law at the National Diet]", *Reference*, (September 2007), pp 1-31.

Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley: "Introduction: On Strategy", in Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox and Alvin Bernstein (eds.): *The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1994), pp. 1-23.

Terumasa Nakanishi: "U.S. Nuclear Policy and Japan", *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 10 No.1 (1987), pp. 81-97.

Barry Nalebuff: "Brinkmanship and Nuclear Deterrence: The Neutrality of Escalation", *Conflict Management and Peace Science* Vol. 9 No. 2 (Spring 1986), pp. 19-30.

Bruce R. Nardulli: "Clausewitz and the reorientation of nuclear strategy", *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 5 No. 4 (1982), pp. 494-510.

Shigeki Nishimura: "Nihon no Gunji Senryaku Kankyo: Nordic Analogy [The Strategic Environment of Japan: Nordic Analogy]", *Kaigai Jijyo* Vol. 33 No.3 (1985), pp. 62-80.

Nisohachi Hyodo: "Nihon Kakubuso no Gutaiteki sukeduru" [The Detailed Schedule of Japan's Nuclearisation] in Terumasa Nakanishi (ed.): *Nihon Kakubuso no Ronten: Kokka Sonritsu no Kiki wo Ikinuku Michi* [The Point on a Nuclear Armed Japan: The Way to Survive in the Age of Crisis for the Nation's Existence] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo., 2006), pp. 156-188.

Paul Nitze: "The Development of NSC 68", *International Security* Vol. 4 No. 4 (Spring 1980), pp. 170-176.

Robert S. Norris, Steven M. Kosiak and Stephen I. Schwartz: "Deploying the Bomb" in Stephen I. Schwartz (ed.): *Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940* (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press., 1998), pp. 105-196.

Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr: "Where They Were", *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 55 No. 6 (November/ December 1999), pp. 26-35.

Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin and William Burr: "Where They Were: How much did Japan Know?", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 56 No. 1 (January/ February 2000), pp. 11-13, 78-79.

Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen: "Global nuclear weapons inventories, 1945-2010", *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol. 56 No. 1 (January/ February 2010), pp. 77-83.

Leopold Nuti and Christian Ostermann: "Introduction", Special Issue Extended Deterrence in Europe and East Asia During the Cold War-A Reappraisal *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 39 No. 4 (2001), pp. 477-483.

Richard M. Nixon: "Asia after Viet Nam", *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 46 No. 1 (October 1967), pp. 111-125.

Joseph S. Nye Jr: “Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes”, *International Organization* Vol.41 No.3 (Summer 1981), pp. 371-402.

Joseph S. Nye, Jr and Sean M. Lynn-Jones: “International Security Studies: A report of a Conference on the State of the Field”, *International Security*, Vol.12 No.4 (Spring 1988), pp. 5-27.

Kenzaburo Oe: “Hiroshima no Kokoro to Souzouryoku”[Hiroshima’s Minds and Imagination], in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen II: kaku wo Koeru Sekai he* [Nuclear and Human: The World Without Nuclear Weapons Vol. 2] (Tokyo: Iwanami Kawamura: *Genpatsu to Genbaku* Shoten.,1999), pp. 297-325.

Shinichi Ogawa: “Kaku no Kasa to Rironteki Kento: Tenkanki no Kaku Yokushi to Gunbi Kanri”[Theoretical Examinations of Extended Nuclear Deterrence: Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control] *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 90 (1989), pp. 91-102.

Shinichi Ogawa: “U.S. Nuclear Forces and Japanese / Western Pacific Security”, in Patrick J. Garrity and Steven Maaranen(eds.), *Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia and North America* (New York: Plenum Press., 1992), pp. 145-64.

R.J. Overy: “Airpower and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 15 No. 1 (1992), pp. 73-101.

Keith B. Payne: “Understanding Deterrence”, *Comparative Strategy* Vol.30 No.5 (2011), pp. 393-427.

Paul Pierson: “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics”, *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 94 No. 2 (June 2000), pp. 251-267.

Joseph F. Pilat, “A Reversal of Fortunes? Extended Deterrence and Assurance in Europe and East Asia”, *Journal of Strategic Studies* Vol. 39 No. 4 (June 2016), pp. 580-591.

George H. Quester: “Japan and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”, *Asian Survey* Vol. 10 No. 9 (September 1970), pp. 765-778.

George H. Quester: “Was Eisenhower Genius?”, *International Security* Vol.4 No.1 (Fall 1979), pp. 159-179.

George H. Quester: "Traditional and Soviet Military Doctrine: Tendencies and Dangers" in Douglas MacLean (ed.): *The Security Gamble: Deterrence Dilemmas in the Nuclear Age* (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Allanheld., 1984), pp. 28-49.

Sergey Radchenko: "On Hedgehogs and Passions: History, Hearsay, and Hotchpotch in the Writing of the Cuban Missile Crisis", in Len Scott and R. Gerald Hughes (eds.): *The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Critical Reappraisal* (London:Routledge., 2015), pp. 183-203.

Nick Ritchie: "Nuclear Identities and Scottish Independence", *Nonproliferation Review* Vol. 23 No. 6 (2016), pp. 653-675.

Peter Roberts and Andrew Hardie: "The Validity of Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century", Occasional Paper, *Royal United Service Institute* (August 2015), pp. 1-36.

David Alan Rosenberg: "American Atomic Strategy and the Hydrogen Bomb Decision", *The Journal of American History* Vol. 66 No. 1 (June 1979), pp. 62-87.

David Alan Rosenberg and W. B. Moore: "Smoking Radiating Ruin at the End of Two Hours", *International Security* Vol. 6 No. 3 (Winter 1981-1982), pp. 3-38.

David Alan Rosenberg: "The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960", *International Security* Vol. 7 No. 4 (Spring 1983), pp. 3-71.

David Alan Rosenberg: "Reality and Responsibility: Power and Process in the Making of United States Nuclear", *Journal of Strategic Studies* (1986) Vol.9 No.1, (1986), pp. 35-52.

Bruce Martin Russett: "Extended Deterrence with Nuclear Weapons: How Necessary, How Acceptable?", *Review of Politics* Vol.50 No.2 (Spring 1988), pp. 282-302.

Scott D. Sagan: "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb", *International Security* Vol.21 No.3 (Winter 1996/97), pp.54-86

Scott D. Sagan: "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks", *International Security* Vol. 24 No. 4 (Spring 2000), pp. 85-115.

Kazuya Sakamoto: “Dokuritsukoku no Jouken [Requirements for independent states]”, in Makoto Iokibe (ed.): *Sengonihon Gaikoshi*. Shinban[The Diplomatic History of Japanese Postwar, 2nd ed] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2007), pp. 65-104.

Richard J. Samuels and James L. Schoff: “Japan’s Nuclear Hedge: Beyond ‘Allergy’ and Breakout”, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner: *Strategic Asia 2013-14 Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Washington D.C: The National Bureau of Asian Research., 2013), pp. 232-264.

Anne Harrington de Santana: “Nuclear Weapons As the Currency of Power: Deconstructing the Fetishism of Force”, *Nonproliferation Review*, Vol. 16 No. 3, pp. 325-345.

Yoshitaka Sasaki: “Kakusenryaku no Naka no Nihon”[US Nuclear Strategy and Japan] in Yoshikazu Sakamoto (ed.): *Kakuto Ningen I: kakuto Taiketsu suru 20 Seiki* [Nuclear and Human: Confronting Nuclearism The 20th Century World in Crisis Vol. 1] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.,1999), pp. 188-280.

Michael Schaller: “Japan and the Cold War, 1960-1991”, in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume III Endings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp.156-180.

James L Schoff: “Changing Perceptions of Extended Deterrence in Japan”, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds.): *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon* (Washington D.C.: George Town University Press., 2012), pp. 99-113.

Geog Schreyogg, Jorg Sydow and Philip Holtmann: “How History Matters in Organisations: The Case of Path Dependence”, *Management & Organizational History* Vol 6 No.1, pp. 81-100.

William H. Sewell Jr.: “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology”, in Terrence J. McDonald (ed.): *The Historical Turn in the Human Sciences* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.,1996), pp. 245-280.

Radoslaw Sikorski quoted in Liviu Horovitz: “Why do they want American Nukes? Central and Eastern European positions regarding US nonstrategic nuclear weapons”, *European Security* Vol. 23 No. 1 (2014), pp. 73-89.

Sayuri Guthrie-Shimizu: “Japan, the United States, and the Cold War,

1945-1960” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds.): *The Cold War Volume I Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 2010), pp. 244-265.

Kori Schake: “A Broader Range of Choice? US Policy in the 1958 and 1961 Berlin Crises” in John P. S. Gearson and Kori Schake (eds.): *The Berlin Wall Crisis: Perspectives on Cold War Alliances* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan., 2002) pp. 22-42.

Naomi Shono and Hideakinagai: “Kaku Ishiki Kenkyu no Koso” [The Study of Nuclear Awareness] in Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (eds.): *Kaku to Heiwa: Nihonjin no Ishiki* [Nuclear and Peace: The Awareness of the Japanese] (Kyoto: Houritsu Bunkasha., 1978), pp. 1-8.

Naomi Shono, Hideakinagai and Kazuo Otsuki: “Soukatsu to Teigen” [Conclusion and Proposal], in Naomi Shono, Hideaki Nagai and Hirohisa Ueno Hen (eds.): *Kaku to Heiwa: Nihonjin no Ishiki* [Nuclear and Peace: The Awareness of the Japanese] (Kyoto: Houritsu Bunkasha., 1978), pp. 209-226..

Geoffrey Sloan and Colin S. Gray: “Why Geopolitics”, in Colin S. Gray and Geoffrey Sloan (eds.): *Geopolitics: Geography and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass., 1999), pp. 1-11.

Ian Smart: “European Nuclear Options”, in Kenneth A. Myers (ed.): *NATO The Next Thirty Years: The Changing Political, Economic and Military Setting* (London: Croom Helm., 1980), pp. 109-132.

Sheila A. Smith: “The Evolution of Military Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan Alliance”, in Michael Green and Patrick M. Cronin (eds.): *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Books., 1999), pp. 69-93.

Glenn H. Snyder: “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics”, *World Politics* Vol.36 No.4 (Jul 1984), pp.461-495.

Craig A. Snyder (ed.): “Contemporary Security and Strategy”, in Craig A. Snyder: *Contemporary Security and Strategy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press., 1999), pp. 1-12.

Jack Snyder: “One World, Rival Theories”, *Foreign Policy* Vol. 145 (Nov/Dec 2004), pp. 52-62.

Yoshihide Soeya: “Yoshida Rosen to Yoshida Doctrine” [The Yoshida Line and the

Yoshida Doctrine] *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 151(2008), pp. 1-17.

Etel Solingen: “The Perils of Prediction: Japan’s Once and Future Nuclear Status”, in William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova: *Forecasting Nuclear Proliferation in the 21st Century: A Comparative Perspective Vol. 2* (Stanford, CA.: Stanford University Press., 2010), pp. 131-157.

Dan Stober: “No Experience Necessary”, *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol.59 No.2 (Mar/ Apr 2003), pp.57-63.

Atsuyuki Suzuki: “Why Plutonium is A ‘Must’ For Japan”, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.): *Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 1996), pp. 47-68.

Shogo Suzuki and Corey Wallace: “Explaining Japan’s Response to Geopolitical Vulnerability”, *International Affairs* Vol. 94 No. 4 (2018), pp. 711-734.

Masayuki Tadokoro: “Keizai Taikoku no Gaikou no Genkei” [The Model of Modern Japanese Economic Diplomacy] in Makoto Iokibe (ed.): *Sengonihon Gaikoshi [The Diplomatic History of Japanese post-war]* (Tokyo: Yuhikaku., 2007), pp. 106-144.

Jinzaburo Takagi: “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Critical Review”, in Selig S. Harrison (ed.): *Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security* (Washington D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace., 1996), pp. 69-85.

Sugio Takahashi: “Beikoku ni Yoru Kakudai Yokushino Jittai” [On US Extended Deterrence] in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujyo (ed.): *Nichbei Doumei towa Nanika* [What is US-Japan Security Alliance] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha., 2011), pp. 43-65.

Ashley J. Tellis: “No Escape: Managing the Enduring Reality of Nuclear Weapons”, in Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner (eds.): *Asia in the Second Nuclear Age* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research., 2013), pp. 1-32.

Sue Thompson: “The Evolution of Southeast Asian Regionalism: Security, Economic Development, and Foreign Power Support for Regional Initiatives, 1947-77”, *Journal of ASEAN Studies* Vol. 5 No. 1 (2017), pp. 1-22.

Jeffrey W. Thompson and Benjamin L. Self: "Nuclear Energy, Space Launch Vehicles, and Advanced Technology: Japan's Prospects for Nuclear Breakout", in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson (eds.): *Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century* (Washington D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center.,2003), pp. 148-176.

Charles Tilly: "Why and How History Matters", in Robert E. Goodin and Charles Tilly (eds.): *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2006), pp. 417-437.

William T. Tow: "The nuclear Waltz: Rational actors, deterrence and nuclear non-proliferation", *Australian Journal of Political Science* Vol. 49 No. 3 (2014), pp. 541-546.

Marc Trachtenberg: "The Influence of Nuclear Weapons in the Cuban Missile Crisis", *International Security* Vol. 10 No. 1 (Summer 1985), pp. 137-163.

Marc Trachtenberg: "Strategic Thought in America, 1952-1966", *Political Science Quarterly* Vol.104 No.2 (Summer 1986), pp 301-334.

Gregory F. Treverton: "How Different Are Nuclear Weapons?", in Philip Bobbitt, Lawrence Freedman and Gregory F. Treverton (eds.): *US Nuclear Strategy: A Reader* (New York: New York University Press.,1989), pp. 112-121.

Michito Tsuruoka: *Why the NATO Nuclear Debate is Relevant to Japan and Vice Versa*, Policy Brief (Washington D.C: German Marshall Fund of the United States., 2010).

Christopher P. Twomey: "Lacunae in the Study of Culture in International Security", *Contemporary Security Policy* Vol. 29 No.2 (2008), pp. 338-357.

Makiko Ueda: "Senryo Shokini okeru Ashida Hitoshino Kokusai Jyoseininsiki: Ahisa Shusei kara Ashida Shokan he [Ashida's Views on the International Affairs in the Early Occupation Period: From 'Sahida Amendament' to 'Ashida Memorandum']" *Kokusai Seiji* Vol. 151(2008), pp. 54-72.

John A. Vasquez: "Why Do Neighbours Fight? Proximity, Interaction, or Territoriality", *Journal of Peace Research* Vol. 32 No. 3 (August 1995), pp. 277-293.

James R. Van de Velde: "Japan's Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence For Japan", *Journal of Northeast Asia Study* Vol. 7 No. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 16-39.

Lars Wallin: "Sweden", in Regina Cowen Karp (ed.): *Security with Nuclear Weapons? Different Perspectives on National Security* (New York: Oxford University Press., 1991), pp. 360-381.

Stephen M. Walt: "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", *International Security* Vol.9 No.4 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43.

Stephen M. Walt: "The Renaissance of Security Studies", *International Studies Quarterly* Vol.35 No.2 (July 1991), pp.211-239.

Stephen M. Walt: "Why alliances endure or collapse", *Survival*, Vol. 39 No. 1 (Spring 1997) pp. 156-179.

Stephen M. Walt "One World, Many Theories", *Foreign Policy*, No. 110 (Spring 1998), pp. 29-46.

Kenneth N Waltz: "The Emerging Structure of International Politics", *International Security*, Vol.18 No.2 (Autumn 1993), pp. 44-79.

Kenneth, N Waltz "Structural Realism After the Cold War", *International Security*, Vol.25 No.1 (Summer 2000), pp.5-41.

Richard Weitz: "The Historical Context", in Tom Nicholas, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey D. McCausland (eds.): *Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO* (Pennsylvania: US Army War College., 2012), pp. 3-12.

Samuel F. Wells, Jr: "Sounding the Tocsin: NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat", *International Security* Vol. 4 No. 2 (Fall 1979), pp. 116-158.

Samuel F. Wells, Jr: "The Origins of Massive Retaliation", *Political Science Quarterly* Vol. 96 No. 1 (Spring 1981), pp. 31-52.

Phill Williams: "United States Defence Policy", in John Baylis, et al (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 195-217.

Phil Williams: “Deterrence”, in John Baylis, Ken Booth, John Garnett and Phil Williams (eds.): *Contemporary Strategy: Theories and Policies* (London: Croom Helm., 1975), pp. 67-88.

Phil Williams: “Thomas Schelling”, in John Baylis and John Garnett (eds.): *Makers of Nuclear Strategy* (London: Pinter Publishers., 1991), pp. 120-135.

Albert Wohlstetter: “The Delicate Balance of Terror”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.37 No.2 (January 1959), pp. 211-234.

Albert Wohlstetter: “Illusions of Distance”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol.46 No.2 (January 1968), pp. 242-255.

X (George F. Kennan): “The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 25 No. 4 (Jul 1947), pp. 566-582.

Noboru Yamaguchi: “Waga Kunino Boueiryoku no Yakuwari to Nichibei Doumei [Japanese Defence Capability and role, and US-Japan Security Alliance]” in Sekai Heiwa Kenkyujyo (ed.): *Nichbei Doumei towa Nanika* [What is US-Japan Security Alliance] (Tokyo: Chuokoron Shinsha., 2011), pp. 25-42.

Shigeru Yoshida: “Japan and the Crisis in Asia”, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29 No. 2 (January 1951), pp. 171-181.

Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes: “Conclusion: Thinking about the Unthinkable: Tokyo’s Nuclear Option”, in Toshi Yoshihara and James R. Holmes (eds.): *Strategy in the Second Nuclear Age: Power, Ambition and the Ultimate Weapon* (Washington D.C.: George Town University Press., 2012), pp. 225-240.

David S. Yost: “Western Nuclear Force Structures” in Beatrice Heuser (ed.): *Nuclear Weapons and the Future of European Security*, Occasional Paper 5 (Maryland: Center For International Security Studies, School of Public Affairs, University of Maryland., 1991), pp. 26-46.

David S. Yost: “Assurance and US Extended Deterrence in NATO”, *International Affairs* Vol. 85 No.4 (July 2009), pp. 755-780.

David S. Yost: “US Extended Deterrence in NATO and North-East Asia,” in *Perspective on Extended Deterrence*, Recherches & Documents No. 03/ 2010 (Paris:

Foundation pour la Recherche Strategique, 2010), pp.13-34.

David S. Yost: "The US Debate on NATO Nuclear Deterrence", *International Affairs*
Vol.87 No.6 (November 2011), pp.1401-1438.