

# *Market impact under a new regulatory regime: Credit rating agencies in Europe*

Article

Accepted Version

Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., Klusak, P. and Tran, V. ORCID: <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9561-8118> (2015) Market impact under a new regulatory regime: Credit rating agencies in Europe. *Economic Notes*, 44 (2). pp. 275-308. ISSN 1468-0300 doi: 10.1111/ecno.12039 Available at <https://centaur.reading.ac.uk/88899/>

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from the work. See [Guidance on citing](#).

To link to this article DOI: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/ecno.12039>

Publisher: Wiley

All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the [End User Agreement](#).

[www.reading.ac.uk/centaur](http://www.reading.ac.uk/centaur)

**CentAUR**

Central Archive at the University of Reading

Reading's research outputs online

# Market Impact under a New Regulatory Regime: Credit Rating Agencies in Europe

Rasha Alsakka, Owain ap Gwilym\* , Patrycja Klusak and Vu Tran

*Bangor Business School, Bangor University, LL57 2DG, UK*

This version: 30<sup>th</sup> June 2014

---

## Abstract

We investigate whether there are any identifiable differences in market perceptions of rating news released by Moody's, S&P and Fitch following the establishment of a new regulatory regime in July 2011, when the European Securities and Markets Authority assumed responsibility for rating agencies' regulation in Europe. We focus the analysis on the impact of bank rating actions on stock returns and volatility during 2008-2013. Among the intended effects of the new regulatory regime are reduced market impact of rating actions and enhanced market stability, yet we find very mixed evidence. Differentials in market responses across CRAs are identified.

*JEL classification:* G15; G21; G24.

*Keywords:* Regulatory change; Bank rating downgrade; Share price volatility; European debt crisis.

---

\* Corresponding author, Professor of Finance, Bangor Business School, Bangor University, Bangor, LL57 2DG, UK. Tel.: +44 (0) 1248 382176. E-mail: owain.apgwilym@bangor.ac.uk.

## **1. Introduction**

The recent European debt crisis presented a uniquely challenging period for credit rating agencies (CRAs), triggering increased scrutiny of their relative performance. CRAs were partly blamed for the recent financial crisis and the subsequent effects on the global economy. This paper investigates the impact of the recently established regulatory regime for CRAs operating in Europe (see Section 2). We set out the key motivations and milestones in the regime overseen by the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which was assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU in July 2011. ESMA could play an important role in restoring the confidence of investors and market participants in the rating industry as well as enhancing financial stability. ESMA seeks to mitigate overreliance on credit ratings, hence reducing market reactions or overreactions to credit rating actions. However, some aspects of the proposed and implemented regulations might lead to unintended consequences. The desire to reduce mechanistic market reactions is somewhat contradicted by the inherent process of endorsement and approval of CRAs.

The empirical investigation in the paper aims to establish whether there is any identifiable difference in market perceptions of CRA actions in Europe across a sample period encompassing the establishment of the new regulatory regime. The analysis considers multiple CRAs (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) in a competitive setting and studies differences in their rating opinions. We specifically investigate the impacts of bank rating actions by the largest three CRAs on European banks' stock returns and volatility during January 2008 to December 2013. We also examine whether there is any change in market reactions to rating news after the establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011.

Prior literature demonstrates that corporates' stock returns respond strongly to rating downgrades from Moody's and S&P, while reactions to rating upgrades are much more muted (e.g. Hand et al. 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001, Li et al., 2006; Behr and Güttler,

2008; Halek and Eckles, 2010). Some recent studies investigate links between sovereign risk and domestic banks. De Bruyckere et al. (2013) find significant spillovers between bank and sovereign credit risk during the European debt crisis, providing evidence in favour of an asset holding channel and a collateral channel. Alsakka et al. (2014) show that sovereign rating actions have strong effects on bank rating downgrades in Europe during the recent crisis. Correa et al. (2014) find that sovereign rating downgrades (not upgrades) have a large significant impact on bank stock returns for those banks that are expected to receive stronger support from their governments.

The literature linked to bank ratings is relatively limited, and mainly focused on their determinants. Caporale et al. (2011) find that country-specific factors (in the form of heterogeneous intercepts) affect EU countries' bank ratings. Shen et al. (2012) find that larger bank assets and higher sovereign credit ratings boost bank credit ratings. Hau et al. (2013) find that bank characteristics significantly affect bank rating quality assigned to banks in Europe and the United States by the three largest CRAs. Hau et al. (2013) also show that CRAs tend to assign higher ratings to large banks and those banks that provide CRAs with a large quantity of securities rating business.

To the best of our knowledge, there is no prior research which examines the effect of the establishment of a new regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA) on the market perceptions of credit rating actions. We also fill a clear void in the literature on the effect of bank rating actions on European banks' stock returns and volatility during the recent crisis. Our main findings are summarised as follows. The impact of rating downgrades on the abnormal returns and share prices volatility varies across CRAs. There is mixed evidence in this sample on whether the establishment of ESMA oversight has had its intended effect of reducing market impact of CRAs or promoted market stability. S&P and Moody's downgrades trigger stronger negative abnormal returns, while these effects did not exist before July 2011. The regulatory change

has dampened the negative abnormal returns reported following bank rating downgrades by Fitch prior to July 2011. For share price volatility, we identify reductions following S&P downgrades. This effect did not exist before July 2011. Moody's rating downgrades trigger modest increases (decreases) in volatility after (before) July 2011, while Fitch rating downgrades have insignificant impact on banks' share price volatility.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the regulatory developments affecting the rating industry in Europe, Section 3 describes the data, Section 4 presents the methodology, Section 5 analyses the empirical results and Section 6 concludes the paper.

## **2. Regulatory developments affecting the rating industry in Europe**

### *2.1. 'Reactive' phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs*

Up until 2010, there was no direct EU legislation under which CRAs would fall. Self-regulation following the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) Code was an indirect form of supervision applied voluntarily by institutions (Johnson, 2004). The recent regulatory efforts concerning credit ratings originate from the US sub-prime crisis where CRAs were too permissive in rating structured finance products. The sub-prime crisis spread extensively to other financial sectors and shed light on the importance of ratings in the financial and economic stability (Alcubilla and Del Pozo, 2012). The G-7 Ministers and the Central Banks Governors requested the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) to study the origins of the turbulence and to advocate possible actions. This resulted in a report published in April 2008 (See Table 1).

During the G-20 summit in Washington 2008, member countries "aimed to ensure that no institution, product or market was left unregulated at EU and international levels" (European Commission (EC), 2013). Since there was no regulatory oversight of the CRAs in many jurisdictions, including Europe, this issue had to be tackled. The regime was shaped by

international agreement with participation of the G-20, Financial Stability Board (FSB) and IOSCO (see Table 1). The EC classified the main deficiencies of CRAs into three main areas: failures in integrity, failures in reliability and lack of transparency. In December 2009, EC outlined a new set of laws involving CRAs within the European jurisdiction. The first aspect focuses on registration procedures which require that financial firms in the EU obtain ratings only from certified CRAs. Secondly, explicit rules aimed at reducing conflicts of interest were introduced. Sanctions include governance requirements, inspections of CRAs, increased transparency and enhancement of methodologies and ratings quality.

Many academics and EC commentators identified problems related to limited competition among CRAs. The problems of mechanistic reliance on ratings were recognised by FSB/G-20 during the Toronto summit in June 2010. In October 2010, FSB released Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings which applies to standards, laws and regulations at the international level (FSB, 2010).

## *2.2. 'Implementation' phase of the EU Regulation of CRAs*

Following the G-20 summit, the European Parliament and the Council formed EU regulation on CRAs (CRA I Regulation), valid from December 2010 (EC, 2011a) (See Table 1). This regulation was amended in May 2011 (CRA II) to respond to the creation of the European credit ratings' supervisory authority, named the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) (EC, 2011b). ESMA was assigned with the responsibility for certifying and overlooking actions of CRAs from July 2011. In November 2011, EC released a proposal to amend the existing CRA regulation, known as CRA III regulation (EC, 2011c), as well as a proposal for a Directive on the use of external ratings by market participants (EC, 2011d). In January, the 2012 Executive Director of ESMA reported to the European Parliament on its progress of implementing revised regulation for CRAs (ESMA, 2012).

According to the European Central Bank (ECB, 2012), regulations on CRAs were applied from a micro-prudential perspective and intended to restore the confidence of investors and market participants as well as enhance financial stability. The main actions were intended to (i) reduce excessive reliance on credit ratings, (ii) alleviate risks associated with spillover effects, (iii) develop a stronger rating market to improve the overall quality of rating practices, (iv) safeguard compensation systems for investors, and (v) strengthen the independence of CRAs and the soundness of rating processes and methodologies with a view to enhanced ratings quality.

The European Council and European Parliament released technical standards for CRAs in March 2012, followed by processes for enforcing fines and penalties on CRAs in July (Official Journal of European Union (OJEU), 2012). The European Parliament and European Council agreed on a new Directive on CRAs in Europe in November 2012. At the time, sovereign ratings were a primary focus, with the directive requiring sovereign rating actions to be published after the close of markets and at least one hour before they reopen (EC, 2012). The legislation introduced a regime of civil liability which will enable an issuer to sue the CRA if proven to be a victim of misconduct or negligence of the agency (OJEU, 2012).

On 16 January 2013, European Parliament (2013) voted in favour of the new tougher CRA rules. CRAs are required to prepare yearly calendars with dates when unsolicited ratings will be released. Sovereign ratings are to be reviewed at least every six months. Dates of publishing outlooks, where relevant, are also required in advance. Moreover, issuers are to be informed about rating decisions 12 hours before they are made public. The EC is required to report to the Parliament by 1 July 2016 and reassess the state of affairs and propose modifications to regulatory proposals. One of the tasks recommended by ESMA involves re-evaluation of the consequences of the “issuer pays” model.

Amendments to the CRA III regulation entered into force in June 2013 (OJEU, 2013a). The accompanying Directive is required to be implemented by December 2014 (OJEU, 2013b). The regulation applies all principal requirements outlined in the initial Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009, to rating outlooks and watches. In December 2013, as part of its supervision and policy work plan, ESMA published a press release on its investigation of the three biggest CRAs (ESMA, 2013a). The researched areas include governance and organisation, expertise and resources used for rating purposes and procedures involved in releasing ratings. The authority compliments CRAs on adequacy of resources, training possibilities, practices during committee discussions and consistency and continuity of rating sovereigns amongst others. The report also reveals deficiencies which could lead to lower quality and reliability of sovereign ratings. In many instances ESMA proposes possible remedial actions.

In its Annual Report 2013, ESMA points to six action plans for CRAs conducted during 2012 and 2013 (ESMA, 2014a). ESMA comments on the record keeping practices and strengthening of the compliance function by CRAs. Deficiencies have been found in the areas of validating the rating methodologies and the security of IT systems used by CRAs. Further, the regulator fears that the revenue generating publishing activities of rating analysts might pose potential conflicts of interest whereas contracting external public relations agencies by some of the CRAs threatens the confidentiality of the data. ESMA's activity in 2013 included: (i) bank rating methodology, (ii) sovereign rating process investigation, (iii) monitoring of structured finance ratings by four CRAs, and (iv) deficiencies in publication controls. There are currently 23 registered and two certified CRAs in the EU (ESMA, 2014b). Amongst the registered CRAs, Fitch, Moody's and S&P represent 87 percent of the total market share (ESMA, 2013b).

### *2.3. 'Enhancement phase' of the EU Regulation of CRAs*

ESMA's future plans concentrate on producing numerous technical reports to the EC in relation to the structured finance industry and its efforts to minimise references in laws and regulations to external ratings (ESMA, 2014a). ESMA intends to enhance the existing collaboration with the IOSCO Committee and finalise amendments to the Code of Conduct for CRAs. There are proposals to form a European sovereign debt creditworthiness centre which requires ESMA's technical assistance.

Following the G-20 summit in 2013, the FSB urged regulators to speed up the process of reducing reliance on ratings in line with the agreements in October 2012 (see FSB, 2012). In order to accelerate this process, peer reviews aimed at helping national authorities in reaching objectives were conducted. This involves two phases: the initial stage recorded references to ratings made in laws and regulations across jurisdictions, published in a report in August 2013 (see FSB, 2013). The second, ongoing, phase concentrates on the strategies applied by authorities to execute the FSB Principles expected by end of 2015 (progress was published FSB, 2014). It is reported that approaches differ across jurisdictions and financial sectors and the developments are often uneven. For instance, private agreements, collateral contracts and risk-prudential frameworks for intermediaries rely on external ratings. Further, the report discourages national authorities and market participants from applying measures substituting CRAs ratings as they might lead to procyclicality and herding among investors. The attention was drawn especially to internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches for which reliability, comparability and transparency among others are questionable (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2013).

In the current phase of the increasing regulatory oversight of the CRA industry, little is yet known about its effectiveness as it is an ongoing process. Certain proposals need to be carefully evaluated. For instance, the methodology requirements might pose a threat to the

independence of the CRAs (ESMA, 2012, EC, 2012). Authorities themselves face difficulties such as technological improvements and choices between competition and stability in ratings needs to be made (ESMA, 2012). The increased responsibilities and the criteria set by the Parliament do not go in hand with timing of the reforms and imposed deadlines, thus causing a considerable strain on ESMA's capabilities.

### **3. Data sample**

We investigate the reactions of banks' stock returns and volatilities to bank rating actions by Moody's, S&P and Fitch during the period January 2008 to December 2013. Since July 2011, ESMA assumed responsibility for the ongoing regulatory reform and oversight of CRAs operating in Europe. The sample period is selected in order to overlap the establishment of the new regulatory regime, with the aim of capturing any significant change in market perceptions of rating actions. The sample is initially based the European banks included in the 2011 EU stress test. There were a total of 91 banks, from 21 European countries. However, some banks are excluded because they are not listed; hence have no share price information. This reduces the sample to 44 banks from 17 European countries (see Table 2). The daily share prices, national stock indices and other financial data of the sampled banks are retrieved from Data Stream.

Bank senior unsecured long-term debt ratings are collected from Bloomberg. Figure 1 presents the distribution of daily ratings of banks for each CRA. It is worth noting that none of the banks are rated at the triple-A rating category. This is consistent with the findings of Alsakka et al. (2014) that the European bank ratings are frequently constrained by the sovereign ceiling during the crisis period, and therefore the average bank ratings tend to be lower than the average sovereign ratings by 1 or 2 notches. Only 15% of banks ratings' observations were at speculative-grade rating (BB+/Ba1 or below) during the sample period. About 25% of the daily observations are AA+/Aa1, AA/Aa2 or AA-/Aa3 rating categories,

and about 45% at A+/A1, A/A2 or A-/A3 rating categories. These proportions reflect the developed nature of the sample countries. The percentage of banks' ratings observations at investment-grade (BBB-/Baa3 or above) by S&P, Moody's and Fitch dropped from 89%, 97% and 95% in the pre- July 2011 sub-sample to 71%, 68% and 78% in the post- July 2011 sub-sample.

We identify actual rating changes according to mapped 20-notch numerical ratings (AAA/Aaa = 20, AA+/Aa1 = 19, AA/Aa2 = 18 ... CCC-/Caa3 = 2, CC/Ca, SD-S/C = 1) by notches on the basis of daily intervals. Table 3 reports the numbers of rating events released by the CRAs on the sampled banks during January 2008 - December 2013. This reveals a strong bank rating downgrade trend in European countries as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis, with the total number of rating downgrades far exceeding the number of upgrades. For the sample, there are 126 (5) bank rating downgrades (upgrades) by S&P, 171 (4) by Moody's, and 120 (8) by Fitch. The limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks during the period makes empirical investigation of the effects of upgrades (in Sections 4 and 5) infeasible.

Moody's greater willingness to use downgrades of more than one-notch is notable. Approximately a quarter of bank rating downgrades by S&P and Fitch are of more than one-notch, compared to 43% by Moody's. Almost all of the rating downgrade events are "clean" i.e. are not followed by rating downgrade from other CRA(s) within at least 1 week. There are only 43 'unclean' rating events which involve more than one CRA taking rating downgrade action on the same bank within one week.

## 4. Methodology

### 4.1. Event study

We employ standard event study methodology to measure the reaction of bank share prices and volatility to bank rating downgrades. We examine changes in cumulative abnormal return (CAR), Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR)<sup>1</sup> and intraday high-low range (i.e. stock volatility) during time windows: [-1, 0], [0, 1], [0, 5], [0, 22], whereby day 0 is the day when a rating downgrade is released. Because all the sample banks are located in Europe, there is no time zone issue in identifying event dates. Therefore, we focus on one-day windows (i.e. [-1, 0] and [0, 1]) which capture the immediate impact of rating actions (if any). This is especially relevant to the intraday high-low range which measures daily market volatility or intraday heterogeneity in market participants' views of the banks' valuations.

Abnormal stock return (AR) is estimated using the market mode, as follows:

$$AR_t = R_t - E(R_t)$$

Where  $E(R_t) = \hat{\alpha} + \hat{\beta} \times R_t^M$

$R_t$  is the continuously compounded rate of return for stock  $i$  on day  $t$ .

$R_t^M$  is the continuously compounded rate of return for the national stock market index where the bank is listed, on day  $t$ .

$\hat{\alpha}$  and  $\hat{\beta}$  are the estimated parameters of the market model. The estimation window is a 200-day rolling window from day -250 to day -50 (i.e. pre-event window). The reason for selecting day -50 (not day -1) is to avoid any possible effects of rating anticipation.

Cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during time windows  $s$  are estimated as follows:

$$CAR_{s,t} = \sum_{i=0}^s AR_{t+i}$$

---

<sup>1</sup> BHAR is proposed by Barber and Lyon (1997), and is examined in order to disentangle the longer-term impacts of rating actions.

Where  $s = 1 \equiv$  time window is  $[0, 1]$ ;  $s = 5 \equiv$  time window is  $[0, 5]$ ; and  $s = 22 \equiv$  time window is  $[0, 22]$ .

Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHAR) during time windows  $s$  are computed as follows:

$$BHAR_{s,t} = \prod_{i=0}^s [1 + R_{t+i}] - \prod_{i=0}^s [1 + E(R_{t+i})]$$

Stock volatility is captured by intraday range (Parkinson, 1980) which is measured by the logarithm of intraday high over intraday low prices. The intraday range is estimated as:

$$Range_{it} = \frac{1}{2 \ln 2} \ln \left( \frac{High_{it}}{Low_{it}} \right)$$

Prior research shows that the daily range is significantly more efficient than the realized volatility. Alizadeh et al. (2002) and Brandt and Diebold (2006) demonstrate that the range-based volatility estimator appears robust to microstructure noise such as bid-ask bounce.

We conduct the tests in the event study on the pre- and post- July 2011 sub-samples. In order to avoid any possible bias due to the distribution of the sample means, we conduct both t-test and non-parametric tests. The non-parametric tests are sign- and Wilcoxon tests, testing whether the medians of CAR, BHAR and intraday high-low range during the time windows are significantly different to zero.

#### 4.2. Multivariate analysis

The multivariate analysis aims to control for multiple factors that may affect banks' share prices and volatility, such as the levels of banks' creditworthiness, bank size, book-to-market, bank characteristics or country characteristics (e.g. Shen et al., 2012; Hau et al., 2013). The following Equations are estimated:

$$CAR_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1a)$$

$$CAR_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \gamma_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} \times D_{Reg.change} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (1b)$$

$$BHAR_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2a)$$

$$BHAR_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \gamma_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} \times D_{Reg.change} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (2b)$$

$$\Delta Range_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3a)$$

$$\Delta Range_{i,s} = \alpha_1 + \beta_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} + \gamma_1 \times \Delta Rating_{i,t} \times D_{Reg.change} + \sum_{k=1}^n \phi_k \times X_{i,t}^k + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad (3b)$$

$CAR_{i,s}$  is the cumulative daily abnormal return of bank  $i$  during time windows  $s$  around credit rating actions from each CRA. Time windows are restricted to  $[-1, 0]$ ,  $[0, 1]$ ,  $[0, 5]$  and  $[0, 22]$ . Time windows  $[-1, 0]$  and  $[0, 1]$  convey the market movements when rating news is released, while time windows  $[0, 5]$  and  $[0, 22]$  capture market movements after rating news during 1 week and 1 month later.

$BHAR_{i,s}$  is the Buy-and-hold abnormal return of bank  $i$  over the time window  $s$ .

$\Delta Range_{i,s}$  is the cumulative daily change in the intraday high-low range of bank  $i$  stock prices over time window  $s$ .

$\Delta Rating_{i,t}$  is the daily change in the rating level of bank  $i$  at time  $t$ .

$D_{reg.change}$  is a dummy variable for the regulatory change, taking the value of one when the regulatory regime has been established (i.e. post July 2011) and zero otherwise. We also include the interaction between  $\Delta Rating$  and  $D_{reg.change}$  in order to disentangle any impact(s) of the new regulatory regime on the market participants' perceptions of CRAs' actions.

$\Sigma X^k$  is a set of control variables, including the current rating level of bank  $i$ , bank size (measured by the logarithm of total assets), book-to-market ratio, individual bank dummies

and year dummies. The current rating level of the bank is included to control for the financial and fundamental conditions of the bank. In other words, this is to control for the likelihood that less healthy banks (i.e. lower credit ratings) tend to experience more volatile changes in the dependent variables, i.e. returns and volatility. The bank size and Book-to-market ratio are included as they could explain the variation in returns to some extent (Fama and French, 1992). Bank dummies and year dummies are included to control for individual bank characteristics and the business cycle. The individual bank characteristics should mop up country specifics or country characteristics.<sup>2</sup>

The estimations of Equations (1), (2), and (3) are based on a sample of rating event days plus random bank-matched non-event days, drawn from the full sample excluding non-event observations within one month before and after rating announcements. This is done in order to mitigate rating clustering and market noise issues (e.g. Ferreira & Gama, 2007, Tran et al., 2014). It is noteworthy that the sample consists of observations on non-consecutive days that may be very distant from each other. Therefore, estimations of the equations are not time series investigations.<sup>3</sup> In line with prior literature, we expect rating downgrades to convey new information to the public, hence, trigger significant and negative impacts on stock return and volatility. We expect mixed or modest evidence on the impact of the new regulatory regime in terms of changing market perceptions of rating actions.

---

<sup>2</sup> We also carry out equivalent investigations using country dummies (instead of bank dummies) in order to control for country clustering or country characteristics. The results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar.

<sup>3</sup> We also conduct robustness tests by including lagged values of the dependent variables (i.e. CAR, BHAR, and intraday low-high range) to control for potential persistence in the dependent variables. The results are qualitatively similar (available upon request).

## 5. Empirical results

### 5.1. Event study

Tables 4-6 present the results of the event study. Overall, the findings present mixed evidence on the impact of the new regulatory regime on the market participants' perceptions of CRAs actions. The responses of CAR and BHAR to bank rating downgrades are very similar (see Tables 4 and 5).<sup>4</sup> Specifically, there is evidence of a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs. Prior to July 2011, reactions to Fitch downgrades are significant in each testing procedure. Within one week of Fitch downgrading a bank, the share prices decline by around 5-6 percentage points. This loss in share values is large compared to the reactions of returns to S&P downgrades which induce no significant reaction and Moody's where much smaller reactions are found (around 1.5 percentage points; significant in the t-test, not the non-parametric tests).

In contrast, in the post- July 2011 subsample, reactions to Fitch downgrades are no longer significant. This could be interpreted as indicating that the new regulation has been effective in its objective of dampening the market reactions to rating news. However, market responses to S&P and Moody's actions have also altered. S&P downgrades trigger a significant impact on CARs. The impact is only very short-term, i.e. during the day when rating news is released and no further significant reaction is found in the next days. The magnitude of the negative abnormal return is about 1.15 percentage points (see Table 4). On the other hand, Moody's downgrades induce longer lasting effects. The negative abnormal returns are reported up to one month after Moody's bank rating downgrades. On the day of rating announcements from Moody's, share values decrease by 0.6 percentage points and the reduction continues until one month later, and the magnitude of the reduction is also very

---

<sup>4</sup> The result for time window  $[-1, 0]$  is absent from Table 5 because it would not differ from the result reported in Table 4.

large, i.e. over 5 percentage points (see Tables 4 and 5). A possible explanation could arise from different adjustments in the three CRAs' policies in response to the regulation.

Table 6 presents results for the intraday high-low range. The greater the high-low range, the higher is the stock price volatility. Overall, the findings of Table 6 show evidence of a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs which is consistent with the results in Tables 4 and 5. In the sub-sample prior to July 2011, S&P downgrades trigger an increase in the intraday high-low range of less than 1 percentage point, and only during very short time windows, i.e. [-1, 0] and [0, 1]. This indicates that S&P downgrades trigger an immediate and very short-lived negative impact on share price volatility. In the post July 2011 sub-sample, the t-test on the intraday high-low range shows a significant increase of about 0.6 percentage points in response to S&P downgrades. However, the impact of S&P downgrades post July 2011 is not short-lived. Interestingly, the measure of stock price volatility reduces significantly within one month following S&P downgrades.

This pattern of market reactions is unexpected. Negative rating news (i.e. rating downgrades) often triggers negative market reactions (Hand et al., 1992; Dichev and Piotroski, 2001; Li et al., 2006; Halek and Eckles, 2010). However, it is noteworthy that these papers examine assets' returns. Table 6 presents results on asset volatility which behaves differently to asset returns (e.g. Beber and Brandt, 2009). Tran et al. (2014) illustrate that additional rating news (even negative rating news) could play a "confirmation" role and reduce market volatility. In other words, share price volatility reduces in response to S&P downgrades, which was not revealed prior to the regulatory regime changes. The direct implication is that the regulatory changes might contribute to enhance the transparency in the rating procedure, therefore, promote market stability in the sense that share prices are less volatile in response to S&P downgrades.

Similarly, the measure of share price volatility reduces in response to Fitch downgrades. The reduction appears in both prior to- and post- July 2011 periods. There is clearer evidence of the reduction in the later period. Prior to July 2011, the measure of share price volatility reduces about 1 percentage point within one month following Fitch downgrades. Post July 2011, the reduction is strongly significant under each testing procedure (i.e. at the 1% level of significance), and is immediate when Fitch rating downgrades are released. This supports the view that the regulatory changes might contribute to enhanced market stability.

However, the evidence from the reactions to Moody's downgrades contradicts this. The measure of share price volatility reduces prior to July 2011 but the reduction is not significant post July 2011. It is noteworthy that the pattern of reactions from abnormal returns and Buy-and-hold abnormal returns is also changed, but in the opposite fashion (compared to those of share volatility). The impact of Moody's downgrades becomes strongly significant and the magnitude of the reactions in abnormal returns is economically meaningful after July 2011. A possible explanation could be that around the time milestone, there might be a systematic change in the information content of rating downgrades which are released by each CRA. Further analysis on the sample lends support to this conjecture. There is a significant change in rating policies across the CRAs around the time milestone, at least relating to the sampled banks. Prior to July 2011, Moody's ratings are usually higher than S&P and Fitch ratings on the same banks. The proportion of Moody's ratings which are lower than both S&P and Fitch ratings on the same banks is only 2.5%, whereas in the sub-sample post-July 2011, the equivalent proportion is 28.2%. Prior to July 2011, 80.9% of S&P ratings are lower than those from Moody's on the same banks, 59.8% of Fitch ratings are lower than Moody's ratings on the same banks. In the post- July 2011 subsample, the equivalent figures are 25.4% and 16.8%.

In summary, there is clear-cut evidence that there is a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory regime establishment. However, it is not obvious that the shift is due to the new regulatory regime establishment or simply due to relative changes in rating policies and downgrade leadership across the CRAs themselves.<sup>5</sup>

## 5.2. Multivariate analysis

Tables 7 to 9 present the results from the multivariate investigations (i.e. estimations of Equations (1), (2) and (3)). The main independent variables of interest are  $\Delta Rating$  (i.e. daily changes in rating levels) and  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  (i.e. the interaction between changes in rating levels and the regulatory change dummy). In the baseline models (i.e. Equations (1a), (2a), (3a)), the estimated coefficients of  $\Delta Rating$  represent the impact of rating downgrades on the cumulative changes in abnormal returns, Buy-and-hold abnormal returns, intraday high-low range. The estimated coefficients of  $\Delta Rating$  in Equations (1b), (2b) and (3b) represent the impact of rating downgrades on stock returns and volatility prior to the regulatory regime establishment (i.e. prior to the time milestone when  $D_{reg.change} = 0$ ). The estimated coefficients of the interaction term  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  represent the impact of downgrades on the dependent variables in the post-July 2011 period (i.e.  $D_{reg.change} = 1$ ).

Table 7 reports results for Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b), i.e. impact of rating downgrades on CAR. Panel A of Table 7 shows that the coefficients of S&P  $\Delta Rating$  and  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  are insignificant in explaining the variability in CAR during most time windows. There is only one exception which is the interaction term during the  $[-1, 0]$  window, which indicates that reactions to S&P rating downgrades become more significant after the regulatory change in July 2011. S&P downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns of 0.9

---

<sup>5</sup> We have also conducted equivalent investigations after excluding 43 “unclean events”, described in Section 3. Results (available upon request) are qualitatively similar.

percentage points after July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived, i.e. on the same day when S&P downgrades are released.

Panel B of Table 7 reports the results for Moody's downgrades. In contrast to S&P, the baseline model (Eq. (1a)) shows that Moody's downgrades are influential, whereby Moody's bank downgrades induce significantly negative CAR, and the reduction is not short-lived. The magnitude of the negative abnormal return is 1.24 percentage points within one week following Moody's downgrades. The results of Eq. (1b) show that that prior to July 2011 Moody's bank downgrades are not significantly influential on CAR. On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  is negative and significant at 1% level, implying that the impact of Moody's downgrades becomes much stronger after July 2011. Abnormal returns of -1.37 (-5.91) percentage points are found within one day (month) following Moody's downgrades in the post-July 2011 period.

Panel C of Table 7 reports the results for Fitch rating downgrades. Similarly to Moody's, the baseline model (Eq. (1a)) shows that Fitch downgrades are influential, whereby the abnormal return is -2.36 percentage points within one week following Fitch downgrades. It is worth to mention that the magnitude of the market reaction is almost double that for Moody's downgrades. In Eq. (1b), the coefficients of Fitch  $\Delta rating$  are negative and significant implying that Fitch downgrades are influential in the period prior to July 2011. Interestingly, the coefficients of the interaction term  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  during [0, 5] and [0, 22] time windows are positive and significant. The effect of the regulatory change on the market impact of Fitch rating downgrades is positive. In other words, the regulatory change has dampened the reactions to Fitch downgrades.

Table 8 reports the results for Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) which investigate the market impact of downgrades on Buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 7. There is clear evidence of a shift in market

participants' perceptions of downgrades from the CRAs. S&P downgrades have insignificant impact on BHAR. However, the effect of the regulatory change on the impact of S&P downgrades is significant only during the  $[-1, 0]$  window.<sup>6</sup> In other words, after the regulatory change, S&P downgrades trigger short-lived negative BHAR. After the regulatory change, there is evidence of strengthened negative reactions to Moody's downgrades which is not short-lived. In contrast, the market impact of Fitch downgrades is weaker after the regulatory change, implying that the regulatory change has dampened negative reactions to Fitch downgrades.

Table 9 reports the results for Eq. (3a) and Eq. (3b), which investigate the market impact of rating downgrades on the intraday high-low range. Panel A of Table 9 shows that S&P downgrades trigger short-lived increases in share price volatility (i.e. during  $[-1, 0]$ ,  $[0, 1]$  time windows). The magnitude of the increases is about 0.5 percentage points, and only observed in the period before the regulatory change. However, the coefficients of  $\Delta Rating \times D_{reg.change}$  variable are negative and significant during  $[0, 5]$ ,  $[0, 22]$  time windows, implying that after the regulatory change, the share price volatility is reduced by 0.63% within one week/month following S&P downgrades. This pattern of volatility reactions did not exist before the regulatory change. This lends supports to the prior analysis that the regulatory change might promote transparency in rating procedures, and thus enhance financial market stability (see Section 5.1).

For the period before July 2011, Panel B of Table 9 shows that the banks' share price volatility is reduced by 0.8 percentage points within one month following Moody's downgrades. Yet, the regulatory change has altered the impact of Moody's rating downgrades, whereby they trigger modest increases in volatility after July 2011. Panel C of

---

<sup>6</sup> The estimations of Eq. (2a) and Eq. (2b) for time window  $[-1, 0]$  is absent from Table 8 because it would not differ from the results reported in Table 7 (Eq. (1a) and Eq. (1b) for the  $[-1, 0]$  time window).

Table 9 demonstrates that Fitch bank downgrades have insignificant impact on share price volatility before and after the regulatory change.

In summary, there is clear evidence that there is a shift in market participants' perceptions of rating actions across CRAs around the time milestone of the new regulatory regime establishment. The only exception is the volatility impact of Fitch downgrades, which are not influential before nor after the regulatory change. In general, larger banks are associated with more negative abnormal return and lower volatility. Banks with higher ratings experience more negative abnormal return and increased volatility following bank rating downgrades. We also carry out several robustness checks for outlier or extreme values which produce qualitatively similar results (available upon request).

## **6. Conclusion**

The primary focus of this paper is to investigate whether there is any identifiable difference in market perceptions of rating actions by Moody's, S&P and Fitch following the establishment of the new regulatory regime in July 2011 (i.e. ESMA taking over the ongoing regulatory oversight of CRAs operating in Europe). Using a sample of 44 publicly listed European banks which were part of the 2011 EU stress test, we examine the reactions of banks' stock returns and price volatility to bank rating actions by the three largest CRAs during January 2008 to December 2013. The sample period is characterised by a strong bank rating downgrade trend as a consequence of the sovereign debt crisis. We focus our empirical investigation (event study and regression analysis) on banks' rating downgrades, given the very limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs for this sample.

The empirical findings present mixed evidence of a shift in market perceptions of CRAs' rating downgrades after the establishment of the new regulatory regime. Differentials in market reactions to different CRAs are identified. Firstly, S&P and Moody's rating

downgrades trigger significant negative abnormal returns after July 2011, while these effects did not exist before July 2011. The negative abnormal return is only very short-lived following S&P actions. Secondly, the regulatory change has dampened the market response within one week/month following bank rating downgrades by Fitch. Third, S&P downgrades trigger short-lived increases in share price volatility prior to regulatory change, while after the regulatory change the share price volatility reduces following S&P actions. In the period prior to July 2011, Moody's downgrades reduce the banks' share price volatility, while they trigger modest increases in the volatility after July 2011. Finally, the regulatory change did not alter the insignificant impact of Fitch rating downgrades on banks' share price volatility. Overall, there is mixed evidence on whether the new regulatory regime has succeeded in dampening market reactions to rating news or promoted market stability. The shift in market perceptions of CRA downgrades could be due to either the new regulatory regime or changes in rating policies across CRAs.

To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to examine the effect of the new regulatory regime (i.e. ESMA's responsibility for CRAs) on the market reactions to credit rating actions, and therefore policy makers in the EU and ESMA should be particularly interested in these empirical findings. The paper is also relevant to fund managers and other investors, especially those who focus on international diversification and who follow passive investment strategies. This paper considers multiple CRAs in a competitive setting and studies differences in their rating opinions, and hence CRAs will also be interested from a reputational perspective. Further, the investigation of volatility reactions is particularly relevant to the widespread desire for market stability.

## References

- Alcubilla, R. G., Del Pozo, J. R. (2012), 'Credit Rating Agencies on the Watch List: Analysis of European Regulation', Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- Alizadeh, S., Brandt, M., Diebold, F. (2002), 'Range-Based Estimation of Stochastic Volatility Models', *Journal of Finance*, 57, pp. 1047-1091.
- Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O., Vu, T.N. (2014), 'The Sovereign-Bank Rating Channel and Rating Agencies' Downgrades during the European Debt Crisis', *Journal of International Money and Finance*, forthcoming.
- Barber, M. B., Lyon, J. D. (1997), 'Detecting Long-Run Abnormal Stock Returns: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistic', *Journal of Financial Economics*, 43, pp. 341-372.
- Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2013), 'Analysis of Risk-Weighted Assets for Credit Risk in the Banking Book', July 2013.
- Beber, A., Brandt, M. (2009), 'Resolving Macroeconomic Uncertainty in Stock and Bond Markets', *Review of Finance*, 13, pp. 1-45.
- Behr, P., Güttler, A. (2008), 'The Informational Content of Unsolicited Ratings', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 32, pp. 587-599.
- Brandt, M., Diebold, F. (2006), 'A No-Arbitrage Approach to Range-Based Estimation of Return Covariances and Correlations', *Journal of Business*, 79, pp. 61-74.
- Caporale, G., Matousek, R., Stewart, C. (2011), 'EU Banks Rating Assignments: Is There Heterogeneity between New and Old Member Countries?' *Review of International Economics*, 19, pp. 189-206.
- Correa, R., Lee, K-H., Sapriza, H., Suarez, G.A. (2014), 'Sovereign Credit Risk, Banks' Government Support and Bank Stock Returns around the World', *Journal of Money, Credit and Banking*, 46, pp. 93-121.
- De Bruyckere, V., Gerhardt, M., Schepens, G., Vander Vennet, R. (2013), 'Bank/Sovereign Risk Spillovers in the European Debt Crisis', *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 37, pp. 4793-4809.
- Dichev, I. D., Piotroski, J. D. (2001), 'The Long-Run Stock Returns following Bond Ratings Changes', *Journal of Finance*, 56, pp. 173-203.
- ECB (2012), 'Opinion of the European Central Bank of 2 April 2012', *Official Journal of the European Union*, C 167, pp. 2-14.

EC (2013), ‘New Rules on Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) – Frequently Asked Questions’, Memo, Brussels.

EC (2012), ‘Statement by Commissioner Michel Barnier following the Agreement of New European Rules to Regulate Credit Rating Agencies’, Memo, Brussels.

EC (2011a), ‘Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 on Credit Rating Agencies’, September 2009.

EC (2011b), ‘Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2011 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009’, May 2011.

EC (2011c), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies’, November 2011.

EC (2011d), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending Directive 2009/65/EC’, November 2011.

European (EU) Parliament News, (2013), ‘Tougher Credit Rating Rules Confirmed by Parliament's Vote’, Plenary Session, Economic and monetary Affairs. January 2013.

ESMA (2014a), ‘Credit Rating Agencies - Annual report’. ESMA/2014/151, February 2014.

ESMA (2014b), ‘ESMA Approves EuroRating as A Credit Rating Agency’, ESMA/2014/477.

ESMA (2013a), ‘ESMA 2013 CRA Supervision and Policy Work Plan’, ESMA/2013/87.

ESMA (2013b), ‘CRAs’ Market Share Calculation According to Article 8d of the CRA Regulation’, ESMA/2013/1933.

ESMA (2012), ‘Credit Rating Agencies: What Are the Next Steps?’ ESMA/2012/32.

ESME (2008), ‘Report to the European Commission on the Role of Credit Rating Agencies’, June 2008.

Fama, E., French, K. (1992), ‘The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns’, *Journal of Finance*, 47, pp. 427-465.

Ferreira, M. A., Gama, P. M. (2007), ‘Does Sovereign Debt Ratings News Spill over to International Stock Markets?’, *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 31, pp. 3162-3182.

FSB (2014), ‘Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, Peer Review Report, May 2014.

FSB (2013), ‘Interim Thematic Review on FSB Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, August 2013.

- FSB (2012), ‘Report to G-20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors on the Roadmap and Workshop for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, November 2012.
- FSB (2010), ‘Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings’, October 2010.
- FSF (2008), ‘Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience’, April 2008.
- Halek, M., Eckle, D. L. (2010), ‘Effects of Analysts’ Ratings on Insurer Stock Returns: Evidence of Asymmetric Responses’, *Journal of Risk and Insurance*, 77, pp. 801-827.
- Hand, J. R. M., Holthausen, R. W., Leftwich, R. W. (1992), ‘The Effect of Bond Rating Agency Announcements on Bond and Stock Prices’, *Journal of Finance*, 47, pp. 733-752.
- Hau, H., Langfield, S., Marques-Ibanez, D. (2013), ‘Bank Ratings: What Determines their Quality?’ *Economic Policy*, 28, pp. 289-333.
- Johnson, R., (2004), ‘Rating Agency Actions Around the Investment-Grade Boundary’, *The Journal of Fixed Income*, 13, pp. 25-37.
- Li, Y., Shin, Y, Moore, W. (2006), ‘Reactions of Japanese Markets to Changes in Credit Ratings by Global and Local Agencies’, *Journal of Banking and Finance*, 30, pp. 1007-1021.
- OJEU (2013a), ‘Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 Amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on Credit Rating Agencies’, Regulation Legislative Acts 146/1.
- OJEU (2013b), ‘Directive 2013/14/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 Amending Directive 2003/41/EC’, Regulation Legislative Acts 145/1.
- OJEU (2012), ‘Supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council’, Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), Numbers 446, 447, 448, 449 and 946.
- Parkinson, M. (1980), ‘The Extreme Value Method for Estimating the Variance of the Rate of Return’, *Journal of Business*, 53, pp. 61-65.
- Shen, C-H., Huang, Y-L., Hasan, I. (2012), ‘Asymmetric Benchmarking in Bank Credit Rating’, *Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money*, 22, pp. 171-193.
- Tran, V., Alsakka, R., ap Gwilym, O. (2014), ‘Sovereign Rating Actions and the Implied Volatility of Stock Index Options’, *International Review of Financial Analysis*, 34, 101-113.

**Table 1- Regulatory developments in Europe which affect CRAs**

	<b>Date</b>	<b>Authority</b>	<b>Event</b>
<b>‘Reactive phase’</b>	October 2007	G-7 and Central Banks Governors	Request to FSF for examining causes and weaknesses which triggered market turmoil in 2007.
	April 2008	FSF	Response to request from October 2007. Deficiencies of CRAs found in relation to structured products.
	June 2008	ESME <sup>7</sup>	EC outlines problems with lack of competition among the CRAs.
	November 2008	G-20 summit in Sao Paulo	CRAs included on the list of ‘systemically important institutions’.
	November 2008	G-20 summit in Washington	Compulsory registration when providing public ratings.
	April 2009	G-20 summit in London	Political agreement is reached about the CRA Regulation. Financial Stability Forum is re-established as Financial Stability Board (FSB).
	March 2009	IOSCO	Review of enactment of the IOSCO 2008 Code of Conduct on Fundamentals for CRAs.
	December 2009	EC	EC outlines a new set of laws aimed at CRAs. (i.e., registration procedures, governance requirements, internal controls, disclosure rules, improvement in rating methodologies).
	June 2010	G-20 summit in Toronto	Declaration stating need of reducing reliance on ratings in rules and regulations.
	October 27 2010	FSB/G-20	Response to June 2010 summit; release of principles minimising mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings (endorsed by G-20 states in Nov 2010).
<b>‘Implementation phase’</b>	October 2008 & April 2009	FSF	Follow up reports on the implementation of proposals by national authorities, international bodies and private sector.
	September 16 2009	EC	Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies; known as CRA regulation.
	July 4 2010	CESR	Implementation of the Central Repository (CEREP).
	January 1 2011	ESMA	ESMA replaces Committee of European Securities Regulators.
	January 1 2011	ESFS	Establishment of European System of Financial Supervisors: Newly formed ESMA, EBA, EIOPA and ESRB.
	February 2011	IOSCO	IOSCO’s Principles form a benchmark for all regulations of the CRAs in main jurisdictions.
	May 11 2011	EC	Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009; known as CRA II regulation.
	July 1 2011	ESMA	ESMA assigned with direct supervision of CRAs registered in

<sup>7</sup> European Securities Market Expert replaced by ESMA in January 2011.

			the EU.
‘Implementation phase’	November 15 2011	EC	Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies; known as CRA III regulation.
	November 15 2011	EC	Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings of collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) and Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Funds Managers in respect of the excessive reliance on credit ratings.
	February 7 2012	ESMA	Supplementing Regulation (EC) NO 1060/2009 on fees charged by ESMA to CRAs.
	March 31 2012	EC	Technical standards Supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on the: content and format of ratings data (no.446); assessment of compliance of methodologies (no.447); presentation of data (no.448); registration and certification (no.449).
	July 12 2012	EC	Supplementing Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 including rules on fines aimed at CRAs; rights to defence and temporal provisions.
	July 19 2012	ESMA	Memorandum of Understanding on the supervision of CRAs between ESMA and: authorities in Canada, CNV Argentina, SEC, MAS and ASIC.
	October 2012	FSB	FSB sets Roadmap and Workshop for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings.
	November 28 2012	European Council and European Parliament	Agreement of the trilogue of the EU rules to regulate CRAs (new directive). Statement by Commissioner Barnier.
	January 16 2013	European Parliament	Rules on rating sovereign debt and private firm’s creditworthiness approved by Parliament.
‘Enhancement phase’	May 21 2013	EC	Amendment of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies (CRA III regulation); entered into force on 20 June 2013.
	June 23 2013	ECAI	Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR).
	April 28 2014	EC	Supervisory jurisdictions of Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, Mexico and Singapore recognised as equivalent to the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on CRAs.
	May 5 2014	EC	Report on feasibility of a network between smaller CRAs in the EU.
	May 16 2014	EC	EU publishes response to the FSB request for action plans aimed at minimising reliance on CRA ratings.

**Table 2 - List of sampled banks**

	<b>Bank</b>	<b>Country</b>
1	Allied Irish Banks Plc	Ireland
2	Alpha Bank	Greece
3	Banco BPI, SA	Portugal
4	Banco Comercial Portugues, SA	Portugal
5	Banco Popular Espanol, SA	Spain
6	Banco de Sabadell, SA	Spain
7	Banco Santander, SA	Spain
8	Bank of Cyprus Public Co Ltd	Cyprus
9	Bank of Ireland	Ireland
10	Bank of Valletta	Malta
11	Bankia	Spain
12	Bankinter, SA	Spain
13	Barclays Plc	UK
14	BNP Paribas	France
15	Commerzbank AG	Germany
16	Credit Agricole	France
17	Espirito Santo Financial Group, SA	Portugal
18	Danske Bank	Denmark
19	Deutsche Bank AG	Germany
20	Dexia	Belgium
21	DNB ASA	Norway
22	Erste Bank Group	Austria

	<b>Bank</b>	<b>Country</b>
23	EFG Eurobank Ergasias SA	Greece
24	HSBC Holdings Plc	UK
25	Intesa Sanpaolo S.p.A	Italy
26	Jyske Bank	Denmark
27	KBC Bank	Belgium
28	Lloyds Banking Group Plc	UK
29	Marfin Popular Bank	Cyprus
30	National Bank of Greece	Greece
31	Nordea Bank AB	Sweden
32	Nova Kreditna Banka Maribor	Slovenia
33	Oesterreichische Volksbank AG	Austria
34	OTP Bank Nyrt	Hungary
35	Piraeus Bank Group	Greece
36	Raiffeisen Bank International	Austria
37	Royal Bank of Scotland Group	UK
38	Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken	Sweden
39	Societe Generale	France
40	Svenska Handelsbanken AB	Sweden
41	Swedbank AB	Sweden
42	Sydbank	Denmark
43	Unione di Banche Italiane S.c.p.A	Italy
44	Unicredit S.p.A	Italy

This table presents the banks and their country of origin which are included in our sample. The chosen banks are those public listed banks which are part of the 2011 EU stress test. The sample period is from January 2008 to December 2013.

**Table 3 - Rating events**

No. of events	S&P			Moody's			Fitch			Total		
	<7/2011	≥7/2011	Σ	<7/2011	≥7/2011	Σ	<7/2011	≥7/2011	Σ	<7/2011	≥7/2011	Σ
<b>Downgrades</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>88</b>	<b>83</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>120</b>	<b>218</b>	<b>199</b>	<b>417</b>
of which												
1-notch downgrades <i>(percentage)</i>	50 <i>73.5%</i>	47 <i>81.0%</i>	97 <i>77.0%</i>	50 <i>56.8%</i>	47 <i>56.6%</i>	97 <i>56.7%</i>	47 <i>75.8%</i>	36 <i>62.1%</i>	83 <i>69.2%</i>	147 <i>67.4%</i>	130 <i>65.3%</i>	277 <i>66.4%</i>
2-notch downgrades <i>(percentage)</i>	7 <i>10.3%</i>	11 <i>19.0%</i>	18 <i>14.3%</i>	23 <i>26.1%</i>	31 <i>37.3%</i>	54 <i>31.6%</i>	10 <i>16.1%</i>	19 <i>32.8%</i>	29 <i>24.2%</i>	40 <i>18.3%</i>	61 <i>30.7%</i>	101 <i>24.2%</i>
≥2-notch downgrades <i>(percentage)</i>	11 <i>16.2%</i>	0 <i>0.0%</i>	11 <i>8.7%</i>	15 <i>17.0%</i>	5 <i>6.0%</i>	20 <i>11.7%</i>	5 <i>8.1%</i>	3 <i>5.2%</i>	8 <i>6.7%</i>	31 <i>14.2%</i>	8 <i>4.0%</i>	39 <i>9.4%</i>

This table reports numbers of rating downgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (see Table 2) during January 2008 - December 2013. July 2011 is the regulatory-change date, whereby ESMA was assigned with direct supervision of CRAs in the EU. There are limited numbers of rating upgrades released by the CRAs on the sampled banks (i.e. 5 by S&P, 4 by Moody's and 8 by Fitch) making empirical investigation of rating upgrades infeasible.

**Table 4: Response of Cumulative daily abnormal returns**

Time window	Before July 2011				Post July 2011			
	[-1,0]	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]	[-1,0]	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]
<b>Panel A: S&amp;P downgrades</b>								
Mean	0.113	-0.466	-0.850 <sup>†</sup>	-2.770	<b>-1.152*</b>	-1.002	-1.131	-2.622 <sup>†</sup>
t-test	0.427	0.370	0.352	0.196	0.100	0.145	0.168	0.074
sign-test	0.500	0.404	0.043	0.313	0.012	0.448	0.074	0.179
Wilcoxon	0.428	0.340	0.049	0.468	0.015	0.223	0.179	0.114
Obs	68	68	68	68	58	58	58	58
<b>Panel B: Moody's downgrades</b>								
Mean	-0.749 <sup>†</sup>	-0.936 <sup>†</sup>	-1.501 <sup>†</sup>	0.849	<b>-0.622**</b>	<b>-1.043***</b>	<b>-1.273**</b>	<b>-5.440***</b>
t-test	0.034	0.092	0.067	0.290	0.012	0.008	0.031	0.003
sign-test	0.334	0.500	0.334	0.099	0.018	0.049	0.049	0.057
Wilcoxon	0.101	0.253	0.183	0.131	0.003	0.016	0.040	0.003
Obs	88	88	88	88	82	82	82	82
<b>Panel C: Fitch downgrades</b>								
Mean	-1.291 <sup>†</sup>	-2.336 <sup>†</sup>	<b>-5.954**</b>	<b>-5.751**</b>	0.455	0.022	1.996	2.985
t-test	0.036	0.033	0.015	0.034	0.291	0.485	0.106	0.126
sign-test	0.304	0.221	0.100	0.304	0.256	0.074	0.448	0.448
Wilcoxon	0.110	0.167	0.054	0.049	0.342	0.177	0.471	0.306
Obs	62	62	62	62	58	58	58	58

This table presents the results of the event study on cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Row 'Mean' reports average CARs during the time windows in percentage points. Rows 't-test', 'sign-test', 'Wilcoxon' report p-values from the respective tests. Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model using a rolling window of [-250,-50]. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. [-1,0] window captures abnormal returns in day 0. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample.

**Table 5: Response of Buy and Hold abnormal returns**

Time window	Before July 2011			Post July 2011		
	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]
<b>Panel A: S&amp;P downgrades</b>						
Mean	-0.138	0.385	0.032	-1.011	-1.138	-2.466 <sup>†</sup>
t-test	0.457	0.410	0.495	0.144	0.170	0.067
sign-test	0.404	0.111	0.195	0.448	0.074	0.119
Wilcoxon	0.347	0.059	0.324	0.218	0.160	0.073
Obs	68	68	68	58	58	58
<b>Panel B: Moody's downgrades</b>						
Mean	-0.883 <sup>†</sup>	-1.307 <sup>†</sup>	0.593	<b>-1.030***</b>	<b>-1.332**</b>	<b>-5.019***</b>
t-test	0.093	0.076	0.345	0.007	0.024	0.002
sign-test	0.500	0.196	0.142	0.049	0.049	0.012
Wilcoxon	0.224	0.143	0.227	0.012	0.023	0.001
Obs	88	88	88	82	82	82
<b>Panel C: Fitch downgrades</b>						
Mean	-2.247 <sup>†</sup>	<b>-5.003**</b>	<b>-5.032**</b>	-0.254	1.513	1.756
t-test	0.033	0.014	0.039	0.345	0.143	0.230
sign-test	0.221	0.100	0.221	0.043	0.448	0.256
Wilcoxon	0.163	0.047	0.027	0.114	0.465	0.492
Obs	62	62	62	58	58	58

This table presents the results of the event study on Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns (BHARs). Row 'Mean' reports average BHARs during the time windows in percentage points. Rows 't-test', 'sign-test', 'Wilcoxon' report p-values from the respective tests. Abnormal returns are estimated based on the market model using a rolling window of [-250, -50]. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. † denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample.

**Table 6: Response of Cumulative daily changes in intraday ranges**

	Before July 2011				Post July 2011			
Time window	[-1,0]	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]	[-1,0]	[0,1]	[0,5]	[0,22]
<b>Panel A: S&amp;P downgrades</b>								
Mean	<b>0.636**</b>	0.874 <sup>†</sup>	0.214	0.761	0.244	0.603 <sup>†</sup>	-0.215 <sup>†</sup>	<b>-0.716***</b>
t-test	0.023	0.050	0.329	0.112	0.327	0.088	0.281	0.001
sign-test	0.198	0.452	0.272	0.500	0.145	0.347	0.074	0.006
Wilcoxon	0.042	0.235	0.315	0.385	0.148	0.345	0.019	0.000
Obs	68	68	68	68	58	58	58	58
<b>Panel B: Moody's downgrades</b>								
Mean	-0.285	-0.989 <sup>†</sup>	<b>-1.219*</b>	-0.918	-0.270	0.191 <sup>†</sup>	-0.058	-0.209
t-test	0.332	0.091	0.069	0.138	0.136	0.242	0.434	0.271
sign-test	0.139	0.166	0.053	0.500	0.454	0.053	0.244	0.320
Wilcoxon	0.016	0.120	0.083	0.338	0.190	0.056	0.287	0.474
Obs	88	88	88	88	82	82	82	82
<b>Panel C: Fitch downgrades</b>								
Mean	-0.612	0.092	-0.766	<b>-1.041*</b>	-0.104	<b>-0.974***</b>	-0.546 <sup>†</sup>	<b>-0.811**</b>
t-test	0.156	0.452	0.116	0.064	0.394	0.002	0.091	0.019
sign-test	0.187	0.221	0.450	0.126	0.288	0.018	0.248	0.342
Wilcoxon	0.197	0.106	0.144	0.066	0.383	0.005	0.133	0.077
Obs	62	62	62	62	58	58	58	58

This table presents the results of the event study on cumulative changes in the intraday high-low range. The range utilizes intraday high and low prices using Parkinson (1980). Row 'Mean' reports average cumulative changes in the range during the time windows in percentage points. Rows 't-test', 'sign-test', 'Wilcoxon' report p-values from the respective tests. Bold figures denote significant in both t-test and non-parametric tests. <sup>†</sup> denotes significant in either t-test or non-parametric tests only. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample.

**Table 7: Response of CAR to downgrades**

Time window	[-1,0]		[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions								
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0006 (-0.22)	0.0022 (0.66)	-0.0057 (-1.15)	-0.0037 (-0.58)	-0.0112 (-1.40)	-0.0109 (-1.04)	-0.0175 (-1.41)	-0.0115 (-0.76)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		-0.0091* (-1.68)		-0.0066 (-0.80)		-0.0012 (-0.09)		-0.0193 (-0.86)
Rating level	-0.0004 (-0.42)	-0.0004 (-0.33)	-0.0024 (-1.39)	-0.0023 (-1.35)	-0.0029 (-1.16)	-0.0029 (-1.15)	-0.0015 (-0.31)	-0.0013 (-0.27)
Book to market	0.0018 (0.81)	0.0018 (0.81)	0.0044 (0.95)	0.0044 (0.95)	0.0051 (0.83)	0.0051 (0.83)	0.0099 (1.30)	0.0099 (1.29)
size	0.0071 (0.40)	0.0080 (0.45)	-0.0388 (-0.95)	-0.0382 (-0.92)	-0.1025* (-1.87)	-0.1024* (-1.85)	-0.2975*** (-3.36)	-0.2957*** (-3.30)
cons	-0.1317 (-0.47)	-0.1446 (-0.51)	0.5850 (0.91)	0.5757 (0.89)	2.3469* (1.89)	2.3440* (1.87)	6.5631*** (3.29)	6.5154*** (3.23)
<i>Obs.</i>	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518
$R^2$	0.11	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.09	0.18	0.18
Panel B: Reactions to Moody's actions								
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0045** (-2.40)	-0.0024 (-0.92)	-0.0075** (-2.58)	-0.0023 (-0.65)	-0.0124** (-2.28)	-0.0086 (-1.17)	-0.0150 (-1.64)	0.0074 (0.71)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		-0.0055* (-1.73)		-0.0137*** (-2.96)		-0.0099 (-1.16)		-0.0591*** (-3.25)
Rating level	-0.0007 (-0.99)	-0.0007 (-1.01)	-0.0011 (-0.91)	-0.0011 (-0.94)	-0.0018 (-0.91)	-0.0018 (-0.92)	0.0008 (0.21)	0.0007 (0.18)
Book to market	0.0018 (0.89)	0.0018 (0.89)	0.0037 (0.86)	0.0037 (0.87)	0.0040 (0.69)	0.0040 (0.69)	0.0100 (1.37)	0.0102 (1.39)
size	-0.0133 (-0.91)	-0.0131 (-0.89)	-0.0231 (-0.99)	-0.0226 (-0.97)	-0.0371 (-1.20)	-0.0367 (-1.20)	-0.1739*** (-3.12)	-0.1691*** (-3.03)
cons	0.3100 (0.95)	0.3052 (0.93)	0.5488 (1.05)	0.5367 (1.03)	0.6513 (1.34)	0.6475 (1.34)	2.7178*** (3.12)	3.7687*** (3.00)
<i>Obs.</i>	562	562	562	562	562	562	562	562
$R^2$	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.17

**Table 7 - Continued**

Time window	[-1,0]		[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions								
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0045	-0.0093*	-0.0119**	-0.0206**	-0.0236*	-0.0578***	-0.0125	-0.0473**
	(-1.61)	(-1.94)	(-2.19)	(-2.18)	(-1.82)	(-2.63)	(-0.85)	(-2.02)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		0.0089		0.0161		0.0628***		0.0640**
		(1.53)		(1.64)		(2.82)		(2.48)
Rating level	0.0002	0.0004	-0.0023	-0.0019	-0.0062**	-0.0047*	-0.0025	-0.0010
	(0.18)	(0.37)	(-1.50)	(-1.24)	(-2.10)	(-1.71)	(-0.53)	(-0.22)
Book to market	0.0028	0.0028	0.0049	0.0049	0.0045	0.0042	0.0104	0.0101
	(1.28)	(1.26)	(1.12)	(1.10)	(0.75)	(0.70)	(1.41)	(1.37)
size	-0.0186	-0.0169	-0.0218	-0.0188	-0.0919**	-0.0801*	-0.2665***	-0.2544***
	(-1.02)	(-0.95)	(-0.92)	(-0.81)	(-2.09)	(-1.94)	(-3.84)	(-3.78)
cons	0.4061	0.3693	0.4996	0.4076	1.4993**	1.2965**	4.1912***	3.9847***
	(1.00)	(0.92)	(0.94)	(0.79)	(2.17)	(2.01)	(3.84)	(3.76)
<i>Obs.</i>	512	512	512	512	512	512	512	512
$R^2$	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.17	0.19

This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (1a) and (1b). The dependent variable is cumulative abnormal returns during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation.

**Table 8: Response of Buy and Hold Abnormal returns to downgrades**

Time window	[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions						
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0050 (-1.07)	-0.0026 (-0.44)	-0.0073 (-1.10)	-0.0061 (-0.72)	-0.0093 (-0.86)	0.0009 (0.07)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		-0.0076 (-1.00)		-0.0039 (-0.34)		-0.0327* (-1.65)
Rating level	-0.0023 (-1.39)	-0.0022 (-1.33)	-0.0025 (-0.99)	-0.0024 (-0.97)	-0.0010 (-0.23)	-0.0007 (-0.16)
Book to market	0.0038 (0.97)	0.0038 (0.97)	0.0032 (0.73)	0.0032 (0.73)	0.0085 (1.43)	0.0085 (1.42)
size	-0.0318 (-0.89)	-0.0310 (-0.86)	-0.0766* (-1.78)	-0.0762* (-1.76)	-0.1880*** (-3.01)	-0.1842*** (-2.93)
cons	0.4753 (0.85)	0.4645 (0.82)	1.7616* (1.80)	1.7518* (1.78)	2.8217*** (2.85)	2.7604*** (2.76)
<i>Obs.</i>	518	518	518	518	518	518
$R^2$	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.10	0.16	0.18
Panel B: Reactions to Moody's actions						
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0075*** (-2.63)	-0.0023 (-0.67)	-0.0116** (-2.26)	-0.0076 (-1.10)	-0.0125 (-1.47)	0.0077 (0.80)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		-0.0134*** (-2.98)		-0.0105 (-1.27)		-0.0533*** (-3.32)
Rating level	-0.0011 (-0.93)	-0.0011 (-0.96)	-0.0014 (-0.74)	-0.0014 (-0.75)	0.0007 (0.21)	0.0006 (0.17)
Book to market	0.0032 (0.89)	0.0033 (0.90)	0.0026 (0.62)	0.0026 (0.63)	0.0089 (1.56)	0.0091 (1.57)
size	-0.0236 (-1.04)	-0.0232 (-1.02)	-0.0368 (-1.18)	-0.0364 (-1.17)	-0.1447*** (-2.89)	-0.1403*** (-2.80)
cons	0.5606 (1.10)	0.5487 (1.08)	0.6528 (1.32)	0.6488 (1.31)	2.2540*** (2.89)	3.1228*** (2.78)
<i>Obs.</i>	562	562	562	562	562	562
$R^2$	0.09	0.10	0.08	0.08	0.14	0.16

**Table 8** - Continued

Time window	[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions						
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0119**	-0.0198**	-0.0195*	-0.0483***	-0.0070	-0.0364*
	(-2.25)	(-2.15)	(-1.81)	(-2.74)	(-0.51)	(-1.84)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		0.0144		0.0529***		0.0542**
		(1.49)		(2.86)		(2.31)
Rating level	-0.0024*	-0.0021	-0.0058**	-0.0046*	-0.0018	-0.0005
	(-1.67)	(-1.42)	(-2.14)	(-1.78)	(-0.40)	(-0.12)
Book to market	0.0042	0.0042	0.0028	0.0026	0.0085	0.0082
	(1.15)	(1.13)	(0.65)	(0.59)	(1.51)	(1.47)
size	-0.0162	-0.0135	-0.0782*	-0.0682*	-0.2028***	-0.1926***
	(-0.69)	(-0.58)	(-1.93)	(-1.76)	(-3.28)	(-3.17)
cons	0.3743	0.2874	1.2805**	1.1097*	3.1732***	2.9984***
	(0.71)	(0.56)	(2.02)	(1.84)	(3.25)	(3.13)
<i>Obs.</i>	512	512	512	512	512	512
$R^2$	0.11	0.12	0.11	0.14	0.16	0.17

This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (2a) and (2b). The dependent variable is Buy-and-Hold abnormal returns during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation.


**Table 9: Cumulative changes in intraday range in response to downgrades**

Time window	[-1,0]		[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel A: Reactions to S&P actions								
$\Delta Rating$	0.0049*** (2.74)	0.0057*** (2.71)	0.0046** (2.30)	0.0052** (2.07)	0.0009 (0.41)	0.0028 (1.13)	0.0001 (0.06)	0.0021 (0.66)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		-0.0027 (-0.85)		-0.0021 (-0.54)		-0.0063* (-1.76)		-0.0063* (-1.67)
Rating level	0.0003 (0.49)	0.0004 (0.53)	0.0015** (2.35)	0.0015** (2.38)	0.0005 (0.76)	0.0006 (0.85)	0.0010 (1.26)	0.0011 (1.35)
Book to market size	-0.0012 (-0.93)	-0.0012 (-0.93)	-0.0012 (-0.90)	-0.0012 (-0.90)	-0.0014 (-1.29)	-0.0014 (-1.29)	-0.0003 (-0.50)	-0.0003 (-0.48)
cons	-0.0039 (-0.44)	-0.0036 (-0.40)	0.0174 (1.06)	0.0176 (1.06)	-0.0082 (-0.57)	-0.0076 (-0.52)	0.0287 (1.62)	0.0293* (1.65)
	0.0882 (0.42)	0.0813 (0.39)	-0.4187 (-1.14)	-0.4242 (-1.14)	0.1175 (0.52)	0.1071 (0.47)	-0.6334 (-1.56)	-0.6484 (-1.60)
<i>Obs.</i>	524	524	524	524	524	524	524	524
$R^2$	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Panel B: Reactions to Moody's actions								
$\Delta Rating$	-0.0001 (-0.06)	-0.0013 (-0.36)	-0.0028 (-1.04)	-0.0064 (-1.52)	-0.0050 (-1.46)	-0.0071 (-1.35)	-0.0043 (-1.37)	-0.0080* (-1.67)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		0.0031 (0.73)		0.0095** (1.99)		0.0055 (0.95)		0.0099* (1.75)
Rating level	0.0016** (2.44)	0.0016** (2.45)	0.0019*** (2.59)	0.0019*** (2.65)	0.0020** (2.57)	0.0020** (2.59)	0.0022** (2.47)	0.0022** (2.52)
Book to market size	-0.0017 (-1.28)	-0.0017 (-1.28)	-0.0014 (-1.01)	-0.0014 (-1.03)	-0.0016 (-1.39)	-0.0017 (-1.39)	-0.0004 (-0.65)	-0.0005 (-0.70)
cons	-0.0157* (-1.69)	-0.0158* (-1.68)	-0.0126 (-1.03)	-0.0129 (-1.04)	-0.0340*** (-2.77)	-0.0342*** (-2.74)	-0.0036 (-0.21)	-0.0044 (-0.26)
	0.3346 (1.62)	0.3371 (1.61)	0.2603 (0.96)	0.2681 (0.97)	0.5145*** (2.73)	0.5168*** (2.71)	0.0656 (0.17)	0.0847 (0.22)
<i>Obs.</i>	568	568	568	568	568	568	568	568
$R^2$	0.12	0.12	0.10	0.11	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13

**Table 9** - Continued

Time window	[-1,0]		[0,1]		[0,5]		[0,22]	
Panel C: Reactions to Fitch actions								
$\Delta Rating$	0.0006	-0.0019	0.0018	0.0055	-0.0011	0.0007	-0.0014	-0.0028
	(0.28)	(-0.58)	(0.65)	(1.08)	(-0.45)	(0.18)	(-0.53)	(-0.62)
$\Delta Rating \times D_{Reg.change}$		0.0046		-0.0069		-0.0034		0.0027
		(1.18)		(-1.33)		(-0.82)		(0.53)
Rating level	0.0010	0.0011	0.0017**	0.0015**	0.0011	0.0010	0.0020**	0.0021**
	(1.51)	(1.61)	(2.37)	(2.08)	(1.50)	(1.37)	(2.41)	(2.37)
Book to market	-0.0020	-0.0021	-0.0015	-0.0015	-0.0015	-0.0014	-0.0007	-0.0007
	(-1.48)	(-1.49)	(-1.10)	(-1.08)	(-1.34)	(-1.32)	(-1.11)	(-1.14)
size	-0.0207**	-0.0198**	-0.0073	-0.0086	-0.0230**	-0.0236**	-0.0038	-0.0033
	(-2.14)	(-2.13)	(-0.54)	(-0.65)	(-2.43)	(-2.54)	(-0.22)	(-0.20)
cons	0.3052**	0.2909**	0.0918	0.1134	0.3382**	0.3486**	0.0417	0.0331
	(2.02)	(1.99)	(0.44)	(0.56)	(2.27)	(2.40)	(0.16)	(0.13)
<i>Obs.</i>	518	518	518	518	518	518	518	518
$R^2$	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.09	0.10

This table reports the results of estimations of Equations (3a) and (3b). The dependent variable is cumulative changes in the intraday high-low range during the time windows. Absolute values of change in rating levels are used for ease of interpretation. Huber-White robust standard errors are used. \*, \*\*, \*\*\* denote significance at the 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Bank-matched random sampling from the full sample is used. See Tables 2 and 3 for details on the data sample. Bank dummies and year dummies are included but not reported for sake of presentation.



**Figure 1:** Distributions of daily bank rating observations. Moody's symbols (i.e. Aa1, Aa2 ... Caa3) are categorised in equivalent S&P and Fitch ratings categories (i.e. AA+, AA ... CCC-). The dataset covers 44 banks (see Table 2) during the period from January 2008 to December 2013.