Foye, C., Clapham, D. and Gabrieli, T. (2018) Home-ownership as a social norm and positional good: subjective well-being evidence from panel data. Urban Studies, 55 (6). pp. 1290-1312. ISSN 0042-0980 doi: https://doi.org/10.1177/0042098017695478

Fuerst, F., Gabrieli, T. and McAllister, P. (2017) A green winner's curse? Investor behavior in the market for eco-certified office buildings. Economic Modelling, 61. pp. 137-146. ISSN 0264-9993 doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.11.007

Gabrieli, T. and Ghosal, S. (2013) Non-existence of competitive equilibria with dynamically inconsistent preferences. Economic Theory, 52 (1). pp. 299-313. ISSN 1432-0479 doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-011-0623-9

Gabrieli, T. (2012) Inequality, intergenerational mobility and redistributive policies under endogenous information. Journal of Economic Asymmetries, 9 (1). pp. 23-49. ISSN 1703-4949

Gabrieli, T., Galvao, A. F. and Montes-Rojas, G. V. (2012) Who benefits from reducing the cost of formality? Quantile regression and discontinuity analysis. In: Lehmann, H. and Tatsiramos , K. (eds.) Informal Employment in Emerging and Transition Economies. Research in Labor Economics (34). Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 101-133. ISBN 9781780527864 doi: https://doi.org/10.1108/S0147-9121(2012)0000034006

Gabrieli, T. and Marcato, G. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6266-4676, (2010) Real options and game theoretical approaches to real estate development projects: multiple equilibria and the implications of different tie-breaking rules. Working Papers in Real Estate & Planning. 09/10. Working Paper. University of Reading, Reading. pp33.

Gabrieli, T., Galvao, Jr, A. F. and Montes-Rojas, G. V., (2010) Who benefits from reducing the cost of formality? Quantile regression discontinuity analysis. Working Papers in Real Estate & Planning. 11/10. Working Paper. University of Reading, Reading. pp40.

Gabrieli, T. and Marcato, G. ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6266-4676, (2009) Real options and game theoretical approaches to real estate development projects: multiple equilibria and the implications of different tie-breaking rules. Working Papers in Real Estate & Planning. 05/09. Working Paper. University of Reading, Reading. pp32.