Number of items: 20.
Article
Roberts, P., Andow, J. and Schmitdtke, K. A.
(2018)
Lay intuitions about epistemic normativity.
Synthese, 195 (7).
pp. 3267-3287.
ISSN 1573-0964
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-017-1371-6
Andow, J.
(2018)
Are intuitions about moral relevance susceptible to framing effects?
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 9 (1).
pp. 115-141.
ISSN 1878-5158
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-017-0352-5
Andow, J.
(2017)
Epistemic consequentialism, truth fairies and worse fairies.
Philosophia, 45 (3).
pp. 987-993.
ISSN 1574-9274
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-017-9833-0
Andow, J.
(2017)
Do non-philosophers think epistemic consequentialism is counterintuitive?
Synthese, 194 (7).
pp. 2631-2643.
ISSN 1573-0964
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-016-1071-7
Andow, J.
(2017)
Intuition-talk: virus or virtue?
Philosophia, 45 (2).
pp. 523-531.
ISSN 1574-9274
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9796-6
Andow, J.
(2017)
A partial defence of descriptive evidentialism about intuitions: a reply to Molyneux.
Metaphilosophy, 48 (1-2).
pp. 183-195.
ISSN 1467-9973
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12225
Andow, J.
(2016)
Reliable but not home free? What framing effects mean for moral intuitions.
Philosophical Psychology, 29 (6).
pp. 904-911.
ISSN 1465-394X
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1168794
Andow, J.
(2016)
Abduction by philosophers: reorienting philosophical
methodology.
Metaphilosophy, 47 (3).
pp. 353-370.
ISSN 1467-9973
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12191
Andow, J.
(2016)
Intuitions.
Analysis, 76 (2).
pp. 232-246.
ISSN 1467-8284
doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anv062
Andow, J.
(2016)
Thin, fine and with sensitivity: a metamethodology of intuitions.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 7 (1).
pp. 105-125.
ISSN 1878-5158
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-015-0247-2
Andow, J.
(2016)
Zebras, intransigence & semantic apocalypse: problems for dispositional metasemantics.
Philosophia, 44 (1).
pp. 53-62.
ISSN 1574-9274
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-015-9684-5
Andow, J.
(2016)
Qualitative tools & experimental philosophy.
Philosophical Psychology, 29 (8).
pp. 1128-1141.
ISSN 1465-394X
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2016.1224826
Andow, J. and Cova, F.
(2016)
Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: a reply to Feltz and Millan.
Philosophical Psychology, 29 (4).
pp. 550-566.
ISSN 1465-394X
doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1082542
Andow, J.
(2015)
How distinctive is philosophers’ intuition talk?
Metaphilosophy, 46 (4-5).
pp. 515-538.
ISSN 1467-9973
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12151
Andow, J.
(2015)
Expecting moral philosophers to be reliable.
Dialectica, 69 (2).
pp. 205-220.
ISSN 1746-8361
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1746-8361.12092
Andow, J.
(2015)
How “intuition” exploded.
Metaphilosophy, 46 (2).
pp. 189-212.
ISSN 1467-9973
doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/meta.12127
Andow, J.
(2015)
A semantic solution to the problem with aesthetic testimony.
Acta Analytica, 30 (2).
pp. 211-218.
ISSN 0353-5150
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-014-0238-4
Roberts, P., Andow, J. and Schmitdke, K.
(2014)
Colour relationalism and the real deliverances of introspection.
Erkenntnis, 79 (5).
pp. 1173-1189.
ISSN 1572-8420
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9600-6
Andow, J.
(2014)
Intuitions, disagreement and referential pluralism.
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 5 (2).
pp. 223-239.
ISSN 1878-5158
doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13164-013-0166-z
Thesis
Andow, J.
(2013)
Intuitions in the Face of Diversity.
PhD thesis, University of Nottingham.
This list was generated on Tue Dec 10 08:47:36 2024 UTC.