Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania
Robinson, E. J. Z. and Lokina, R. B. (2012) Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania. Environment and Development Economics, 17 (01). pp. 1-20. ISSN 1355-770X
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To link to this article DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X11000209
Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.
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