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Keep making sense

Segal, G. (2009) Keep making sense. Synthese, 170 (2). pp. 275-287. ISSN 1573-0964

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9583-z

Abstract/Summary

In a number works Jerry Fodor has defended a reductive, causal and referential theory of cognitive content. I argue against this, defending a quasi-Fregean notion of cognitive content, and arguing also that the cognitive content of non-singular concepts is narrow, rather than wide.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Humanities > Philosophy
ID Code:31255
Publisher:Springer

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