Accessibility navigation


Reassessing the interaction between investment and tenure uncertainty

Robinson, E. J. Z. (2005) Reassessing the interaction between investment and tenure uncertainty. Environment and Development Economics, 10 (2). pp. 143-157. ISSN 1355-770X

Full text not archived in this repository.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1017/S1355770X04001895

Abstract/Summary

A diverse body of empirical literature recognizes that investment can influence tenure security, yet this phenomenon has rarely been examined analytically. This paper develops a theoretical model that demonstrates explicitly conditions under which the probability of eviction is endogenous to investment undertaken on illegally encroached land. By accommodating explicitly the government's objective function and its ability to commit credibly to an eviction policy, the model reveals why both those farmers who under-invest, and those who raise their investment levels to improve tenure security, may be behaving rationally. Indeed, both types of behaviour are accommodated within a single model.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:31589
Publisher:Cambridge University Press

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation