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The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions

Bardsley, N. and Moffatt, P. G. (2007) The experimetrics of public goods: inferring motivations from contributions. Theory and Decision, 62 (2). pp. 161-193. ISSN 1573-7187

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s11238-006-9013-3

Abstract/Summary

In public goods experiments, stochastic choice, censoring and motivational heterogeneity give scope for disagreement over the extent of unselfishness, and whether it is reciprocal or altruistic. We show that these problems can be addressed econometrically, by estimating a finite mixture model to isolate types, incorporating double censoring and a tremble term. Most subjects act selfishly, but a substantial proportion are reciprocal with altruism playing only a marginal role. Isolating reciprocators enables a test of Sugden’s model of voluntary contributions. We estimate that reciprocators display a self-serving bias relative to the model.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:33307
Publisher:Springer

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