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An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals

Attanasi, G., García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Montesano, A. and , (2013) An experiment on Prisoner’s Dilemma with confirmed proposals. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 120 (2). pp. 216-227. ISSN 0749-5978

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.12.001

Abstract/Summary

We suggest an alternating proposals protocol with a confirmation stage as a way of solving a Prisoner's Dilemma game. We interpret players' proposals and (no) confirmation of outcomes of the game as a tacit communication device. The protocol leads to unprecedented high levels of cooperation in the laboratory. Assigning the power of confirmation to one of the two players alone, rather than alternating the role of a leader significantly increases the probability of cooperation in the first bargaining period. We interpret pre-agreement strategies as tacit messages on players' willingness to cooperate and as signals pursuing individualistic objectives like publicizing one's bargaining abilities or eliciting those of the opponent.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34661
Uncontrolled Keywords:Prisoner's Dilemma; Bargaining; Confirmed proposals; Cooperative agreement; Tacit communication; NonCooperative bargaining theory; cooperative games; social dilemmas; behaviour; communication; equilibrium; supergames
Publisher:Elsevier

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