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Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes

García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2012) Gender differences in ultimatum games: despite rather than due to risk attitudes. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 83 (1). pp. 42-49. ISSN 0167-2681

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.012

Abstract/Summary

We analyze experimental data obtained from an ultimatum game framed as a situation of employee-employer negotiation over salaries. Parallel to this, we elicit subjects' risk attitudes. In the existing literature, it has often been conjectured that gender differences in strategic environments are partly due to differences in risky decision making. Our evidence suggests that both gender and risk-related effects co-exist in ultimatum bargaining. However, differences in risk attitudes cannot explain gender effects in ultimatum bargaining.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34669
Uncontrolled Keywords:Gender differences; Ultimatum game; Risk attitudes Prisoners-dilemma game; Financial decision-making; Public-goods; behaviour; Sex; Women; Cooperation; Fairness; Men
Publisher:Elsevier

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