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How do markets manage water resources? An experiment

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García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Hernán-González, R. and Kujal, P. (2012) How do markets manage water resources? An experiment. Environmental and Resource Economics, 53 (1). pp. 1-23. ISSN 1573-1502

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1007/s10640-012-9545-7

Abstract/Summary

We experimentally test how a private monopoly, a duopoly and a public utility allocate water of differing qualities to households and farmers. Most of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions. Overexploitation of the resources is observed independently of the market structure. Stock depletion for the public utility is the fastest, followed by the private duopoly and private monopoly. On the positive aspects of centralized public management, we find that the average quality to price ratio offered by the public monopoly is substantially higher than that offered by the private monopoly or duopoly.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:No Reading authors. Back catalogue items
Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34670
Uncontrolled Keywords:Resource overexploitation; Public utility; Private monopoly; Duopoly; Water quality; Experiments; Experimental economics; Design
Publisher:Springer
Publisher Statement:The final publication is available at link.springer.com

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