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An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency

Andreou, A., Andreou, S. N., García-Gallego, A. and Georgantzis, N. (2013) An ultimatum bargaining experiment on trade union efficiency. Bulletin of Economic Research, 65 (4). pp. 354-361. ISSN 1467-8586

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2011.00406.x

Abstract/Summary

We present an ultimatum wage bargaining experiment showing that a trade union facilitating non-binding communication among workers, raises wages by simultaneously increasing employers’ posted offers and toughening the bargaining position of employees, without reducing overall market efficiency.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34770
Publisher:Blackwell Publishing

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