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Experimental duopolies under price guarantees

Fatas, E., Georgantzis, N., Mañez, J. A. and Sabater-Grande, G. (2013) Experimental duopolies under price guarantees. Applied Economics, 45 (1). pp. 15-35. ISSN 1466-4283

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.568398

Abstract/Summary

In a symmetric differentiated experimental duopoly we test the ability of Price Guarantees (PGs) to raise prices above the competitive levels. Different types of PGs (‘aggressive’ and ‘soft’ price-beating and price-matching) are implemented either as an exogenously imposed market rule or as a business strategy. Our results show that PGs may lead close to the collusive outcome, depending on whether the interaction between duopolists is repeated and provided that the guarantee is not of the ‘aggressive’ price-beating type.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34771
Publisher:Taylor & Francis

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