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Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort

García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N. and Jaramillo-Gutiérrez, A. (2008) Ultimatum salary bargaining with real effort. Economics Letters, 98 (1). pp. 78-83. ISSN 01651765

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.04.009

Abstract/Summary

We report experimental results on ultimatum salary bargaining with a real task performed by employee subjects. Compared to the baseline treatment with a hypothetical task, the introduction of a real task raises offers, accepted wages and rejection rates.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34780
Publisher:Elsevier

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