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Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies

García-Gallego, A., Georgantzis, N., Gil-Moltó, M. J. and Orts, V. (2006) Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies. International Review of Law and Economics, 26 (3). pp. 395-409. ISSN 0144-8188

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To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.irle.2006.11.008

Abstract/Summary

This paper studies the exclusion of potential competition as a motivating factor for international mergers. We propose a simple game-theoretic framework in order to discuss the conditions under which mergers that prevent reciprocal domestic competition will occur. Our analysis highlights the shortcomings of antitrust policies based on pre-merger/post-merger concentration comparisons. A review of several recent European cases suggests that actual merger policy often fails to consider potential competition.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Life Sciences > School of Agriculture, Policy and Development > Economic and Social Sciences Division > Food Economics and Marketing (FEM)
ID Code:34782
Publisher:Elsevier

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