Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental testSabater-Grande, G. and Georgantzis, N. (2002) Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: an experimental test. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 48 (1). pp. 37-50. ISSN 01672681 Full text not archived in this repository. It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing. To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(01)00223-2 Abstract/SummaryWe apply experimental methods to study the role of risk aversion on players’ behavior in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games. Faced with quantitatively equal discount factors, the most risk-averse players will choose Nash strategies more often in the presence of uncertainty than when future profits are discounted in a deterministic way. Overall, we find that risk aversion relates negatively with the frequency of collusive outcomes.
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