Accessibility navigation


Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out!

Gassebner, M., Jong-A-Pin, R. and Mierau, J. O. (2008) Terrorism and electoral accountability: one strike, you're out! Economics Letters, 100 (1). pp. 126-129. ISSN 0165-1765

Full text not archived in this repository.

It is advisable to refer to the publisher's version if you intend to cite from this work. See Guidance on citing.

To link to this item DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.12.011

Abstract/Summary

We examine the relationship between terrorism and electoral accountability. We find that terror has a robust positive effect on the probability that the incumbent government is replaced. The magnitude of the effect increases with the severity of the terrorist attack.

Item Type:Article
Refereed:Yes
Divisions:Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Science > School of Politics, Economics and International Relations > Economics
ID Code:35209
Publisher:Elsevier

University Staff: Request a correction | Centaur Editors: Update this record

Page navigation